Subtitle 1. General Provisions

Chapter 1 General Provisions

16-1-101. Recidivism definition and reporting.

  1. As used in this title, “recidivism” means a criminal act that results in the rearrest, reconviction, or return to incarceration of a person with or without a new sentence during a three-year period following the person's release from custody.
  2. An entity that makes a recidivism report under this title shall use the definition of recidivism in this section for purposes of the recidivism report.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1030, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1030, § 4, provided: “Temporary legislation.

“(a) The Department of Community Correction shall prepare a report on the number of persons under its supervision for the last five (5) years who would be considered recidivists under the definition provided in this act.

“(b) The report shall be completed by October 1, 2013, and copies shall be sent to the Governor and Legislative Council.”

Chapter 2 Oaths And Affirmations

Cross References. Affirmation in lieu of oath, § 16-55-120.

Definition of “oath,” § 5-53-101.

Effective Dates. Acts 1945, No. 19, § 3: approved Feb. 6, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found as a fact that members of the armed services of the United States of America may acknowledge conveyances before commissioned officers of any branch of said armed services, regardless of the amount of any money or value of the property involved, yet they cannot verify a pleading or make oath to an affidavit before such an officer; that this condition results in hardship to and discrimination against the members of the armed services of the United States of America, especially those in foreign fields; that this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; and that, therefore, this act shall take effect and be in force upon, from and after its passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Failure to swear or irregularity in swearing witnesses appearing before grand jury as ground for dismissal of indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 154.

Am. Jur. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Oath and Affirmation, § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 377.

Witnesses, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 229.

C.J.S. 67 C.J.S., Oaths and Affirmations, § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-2-101. Methods of administration.

  1. The usual mode of administering oaths practiced by the person who swears, laying his or her hand on and kissing the Gospels, shall be observed in all cases in which an oath is or may be required by law to be administered, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.
  2. Every person who shall desire it shall be permitted to swear with an uplifted hand in the following form: “You do solemnly swear, etc.”
  3. Every person who shall declare that he or she has conscientious scruples against taking an oath or swearing in any form shall be permitted to make his or her solemn declaration or affirmation in the following form: “You do solemnly and truly declare and affirm”.
  4. Whenever the court or magistrate by whom any person is about to be sworn, shall be satisfied that the person has any peculiar mode of swearing connected with or in addition to any of the forms mentioned in this section, which mode is more solemn and obligatory in the opinion of the person, the court or magistrate may adopt that mode of swearing.
  5. Every person believing in any religion other than the Christian religion shall be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of his or her religion, if there are any such ceremonies, instead of any of the other modes prescribed in this section.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 105, §§ 1-5; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4175-4179; Pope's Dig., §§ 5185-5189; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 40-101 — 40-105.

Case Notes

Affidavit.

This section does not prescribe the only method of administering oaths. Signing an affidavit for the purpose of swearing to it may be sufficient to justify a finding that the party was sworn. Cox v. State, 164 Ark. 126, 261 S.W. 303 (1924).

Where affidavit supporting search warrant stated on its face that it was subscribed and sworn to before municipal judge and the judge testified that he questioned the witness about the contents of the affidavit, asked if the statements therein were true, and had witness sign in his presence, it was unimportant that the judge did not require the witness to raise his right hand and state orally that the statements in the affidavit were “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God,” and the affidavit was properly sworn to under oath. Wilson v. State, 10 Ark. App. 176, 662 S.W.2d 204 (1983).

Cited: Thomas v. Hawkins, 217 Ark. 787, 233 S.W.2d 247 (1950).

16-2-102. Officials who may administer.

Every court and judge, including former judges of courts of record who served at least four (4) years, justices and clerks thereof, and all justices of the peace, shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations to witnesses and others concerning any thing or proceeding pending before them.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 105, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 4180; Pope's Dig., § 5190; Acts 1983, No. 850, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 40-106.

16-2-103. Perjury.

In all cases in which an oath is required or authorized by law, it may be taken in any of the forms prescribed in this chapter. Every person swearing, affirming, or declaring in any such form, or any form authorized by law, shall be deemed to have been lawfully sworn and to be guilty of perjury for corruptly and falsely swearing, affirming, or declaring, in the same manner as if he or she had sworn by laying his or her hand on the Gospels and kissing them.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 105, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 4181; Pope's Dig., § 5191; A.S.A. 1947, § 40-107.

16-2-104. Persons in armed services.

  1. Any person in any branch of the armed services of the United States of America may make oath to any affidavit before any commissioned officer of any branch of the services, and the certificate of the officer before whom the oath may be made shall be proof of the making of the oath.
  2. The officer shall show in his or her certificate his or her rank, the branch of service in which he or she is an officer, his or her outfit, and, if and when permissible, the place where the oath was made.

History. Acts 1945, No. 19, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 40-108.

Subchapter 2 — Uniform Unsworn Foreign Declarations Act

16-2-201. Short title.

This subchapter may be cited as the Uniform Unsworn Foreign Declarations Act.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-202. Definitions.

In this subchapter:

  1. “Boundaries of the United States” means the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
  2. “Law” includes the federal or a state constitution, a federal or state statute, a judicial decision or order, a rule of court, an executive order, and an administrative rule, regulation, or order.
  3. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  4. “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
    1. to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
    2. to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.
  5. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
  6. “Sworn declaration” means a declaration in a signed record given under oath. The term includes a sworn statement, verification, certificate, and affidavit.
  7. “Unsworn declaration” means a declaration in a signed record that is not given under oath, but is given under penalty of perjury.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-203. Applicability.

This subchapter applies to an unsworn declaration by a declarant who at the time of making the declaration is physically located outside the boundaries of the United States whether or not the location is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This subchapter does not apply to a declaration by a declarant who is physically located on property that is within the boundaries of the United States and subject to the jurisdiction of another country or a federally recognized Indian tribe.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-204. Validity of unsworn declaration.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), if a law of this state requires or permits use of a sworn declaration, an unsworn declaration meeting the requirements of this subchapter has the same effect as a sworn declaration.
  2. This subchapter does not apply to:
    1. a deposition;
    2. an oath of office;
    3. an oath required to be given before a specified official other than a notary public;
    4. a declaration to be recorded pursuant to:
      1. Title 16, Chapter 47;
      2. Title 18, Subtitle 2; or
      3. Title 26, Chapter 60; or
    5. an oath required by § 28-25-106.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-205. Required medium.

If a law of this state requires that a sworn declaration be presented in a particular medium, an unsworn declaration must be presented in that medium.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-206. Form of unsworn declaration.

An unsworn declaration under this subchapter must be in substantially the following form:

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of Arkansas that the foregoing is true and correct, and that I am physically located outside the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Executed on the day of , , at

(date) (month) (year)

(city or other location, and state) (country)

(printed name)

(signature)

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-207. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

16-2-208. Relation to Electronic Signatures In Global And National Commerce Act.

This subchapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001, et seq., as it existed on January 1, 2017, but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c), as it existed on January 1, 2017, or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b), as it existed on January 1, 2017.

History. Acts 2017, No. 889, § 3.

Chapter 3 Legal Notices And Advertisements

Cross References. Publication of laws, reports, etc., § 1-3-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1891, No. 157, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 181, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 189, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 92, § 3: Mar. 7, 1929.

Acts 1931, No. 32, § 3: approved Feb. 17, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “This act being for the immediate preservation of the public health, peace and safety, an emergency is declared and it is ordered that it be in force and take effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1933, No. 66, § 3: approved Mar. 2, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that the fees for the publication of legal notices and advertisements and advertisements of delinquent tax sales are unreasonably high, the payment of which works a hardship on large numbers of the citizens of this State, and an emergency is therefore hereby declared to exist and in order to immediately protect the public health, peace and safety, this act shall go into effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1937, No. 169, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1937, No. 263, § 4: Mar. 17, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “Because of the frequent questions arising in the minds of the public of the proper publication in which to place legal advertising, this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety and shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1943, No. 57, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1979, No. 18, § 4: Jan. 30, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the requirement that legal notices must be published in newspapers published in the applicable town or county has resulted in an undue burden being placed upon persons attempting to comply with such acts due to the lack of newspapers being published in such towns and counties, and that this Act is necessary to immediately remedy this inequity. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 3: Feb. 19, 1988. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that when a legal newspaper surrenders its second-class mailing privilege and is subsequently sold, it is unclear as to what requirements must be met by the resulting newspaper in order to become a legal newspaper; that this Act clarifies the law in this respect; that until this act becomes effective the legal newspaper status of some successor newspapers will be in doubt; and that this Act should become effective immediately in order to eliminate the confusion as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

General circulation newspaper, what constitutes within meaning of state statutes requiring publication of official notices and the like in such newspaper. 24 A.L.R.4th 822.

Am. Jur. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notice, § 1 et seq.

58 Am. Jur. 2d, Newsp., § 33 et seq.

C.J.S. 66 C.J.S., Notice, § 1 et seq.

66 C.J.S., Newsp., § 8 et seq.

16-3-101. Publication of required advertisements generally.

  1. All advertisements and orders of publication required by law or order of any court, or in conformity with any deed of trust, or real estate mortgage, or chattel mortgage where the amount therein received exceeds the sum of three hundred fifty dollars ($350), or power of attorney or administrators' notices, to be made, shall be published in at least one (1) newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the county in which the proceedings are had, to which the advertisement or order of publication shall pertain.
  2. If there is no newspaper published in the county, then publication shall be made by posting five (5) written or printed notices in five (5) of the most public places in the county.
  3. If there is more than one (1) legal newspaper in a county, publication may be made in each newspaper.
    1. As to amounts under three hundred fifty dollars ($350), written or printed notices may be posted in five (5) conspicuous places in the county.
    2. Notice shall be served in all cases upon the debtor as summons are served.
  4. This section shall not apply to warning orders governed by Rule 4(f) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Acts 1891, No. 157, § 4, p. 269; 1893, No. 181, § 1, p. 329; 1899, No. 189, § 1, p. 333; C. & M. Dig., § 6807; Pope's Dig., § 8776; Acts 1969, No. 116, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-101; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 37.

Case Notes

Authorized Newspaper.

The test whether a publication may be classed as a newspaper authorized to publish legal notices is whether the publication regularly carries a record of events of general interest to the public as a whole. Williamson v. Nixon, 187 Ark. 762, 62 S.W.2d 24 (1933).

A daily publication specializing in news relating to the courts and business transactions, having a yearly subscription rate, and carrying news of events of general public nature is a “newspaper” authorized to print legal advertisements. Williamson v. Nixon, 187 Ark. 762, 62 S.W.2d 24 (1933).

Compliance Presumed.

Where the record recited that notice was given in the manner prescribed by law, the presumption, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is that there has been compliance with this section. Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 119 Ark. 235, 177 S.W. 895 (1915).

Contracts.

This section does not prohibit parties from contracting in regard to the manner of advertising mortgaged property for sale in case of default in payment of the debt. Clark v. Wommack, 192 Ark. 895, 95 S.W.2d 891 (1936).

Discretion of Court.

The time and place and notice of sale under this section are within the discretion of the trial court. Brown v. Merchants & Planters Bank & Trust Co., 202 Ark. 684, 152 S.W.2d 548 (1941).

Irregularities Cured.

After confirmation of sale, any irregularities of notice will be cured. Carpenter v. Zarbuck, 74 Ark. 474, 86 S.W. 299 (1905); Simmons v. A.C. Carter & Co., 125 Ark. 547, 189 S.W. 176 (1916).

Sufficiency of Notice.

Where a county has two judicial districts, a tax sale will be held invalid when the land lies in one judicial district and is advertised for sale in a newspaper published in the other judicial district. Wolf & Bailey v. Phillips, 107 Ark. 374, 155 S.W. 924 (1913).

Where a deed of trust given upon land was less than $300, in a proceeding to foreclose, the requirements were met by the trustee where he gave notice by publication in a newspaper only. Wilkinson v. Hudspeth, 134 Ark. 132, 203 S.W. 263 (1918).

Foreclosure sale under deed of trust held void for the reason that no service was had upon the debtor as required by subsection (e) (now subdivision (d)(2)) of this section. Hunt v. Boyce, 176 Ark. 303, 3 S.W.2d 342 (1928).

Cited: Yell County v. Wills, 83 Ark. 229, 103 S.W. 618 (1907); Gleason v. Boone, 123 Ark. 523, 185 S.W. 1093 (1916).

16-3-102. Time advertisement to run.

  1. When any legal advertisement or notice is required by law to be published and no definite time is given for it to run, it shall be construed to mean for one (1) week.
  2. When a definite time is specified, it shall be construed to mean once a week during the time so specified, except that when a definite time is specified for publication of constitutional amendments proposed by the General Assembly, it shall be construed to mean publication in four (4) weekly issues of some newspaper in each county as is provided by law.

History. Acts 1891, No. 157, § 6, p. 269; 1893, No. 181, § 2, p. 329; C. & M. Dig., § 6809; Pope's Dig., § 8785; Acts 1969, No. 116, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-106; Acts 1991, No. 798, § 2.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section is general in its nature and operates upon the publication of notices under subsequent acts which come within its terms. Pope v. City of Nashville, 131 Ark. 429, 199 S.W. 101 (1917).

Initiative Measures.

Publication of initiative measures affecting local or county government is governed by the general law as to legal notices, and a local petition published in conformity therewith is sufficient. Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 78 S.W.2d 72 (1935).

Cited: Harrison Elec. Co. v. Citizens' Ice & Storage Co., 149 Ark. 502, 232 S.W. 932 (1921).

16-3-103. Payment and rates.

    1. When any notice or advertisement relating to any cause, matter, or thing in any court of record shall be required by law or the order of any court to be published, the notice or advertisement, when duly published, shall be paid for by the party at whose instance it was published. This payment, or so much thereof as is deemed reasonable, may be taxed as other costs otherwise allowed by the proper courts in the course of the proceedings to which the advertisement relates.
    2. Where there is more than one (1) newspaper published in any county, the advertisement shall be made in the newspaper designated by the attorney for the party causing the advertisement to be made.
  1. When any advertisement shall be made by a public officer thereunto authorized by law, the reasonable expense for advertising shall be allowed and paid out of the state or county treasury as other demands and charges of a like nature are allowed and paid.
  2. When a publication of a legal notice of any kind is allowed or required by law, except real property and personal property delinquent tax rates, a newspaper publishing the notice shall charge and receive not more than its regular classified advertising rate for publication.

History. Acts 1891, No. 157, §§ 1-3, p. 269; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6803-6805; Acts 1929, No. 92, § 1; 1933, No. 66, § 1; 1937, No. 169, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 8772-8774; Acts 1947, No. 123, § 1; 1955, No. 60, § 1; 1969, No. 116, § 1; 1977, No. 547, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 15-102 — 15-104.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Rates for Legal Advertisements, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 394.

Case Notes

Liability for Fees.

Delivery by the circuit clerk of legal notices to the newspaper to be published as required by law did not make the clerk personally liable for the publisher's fees. Eddins v. Williams, 161 Ark. 226, 255 S.W. 868 (1923).

Rates.

In absence of stipulation to the contrary, publisher is entitled to charge the maximum rates. Reed v. Doniphan Lumber Co., 91 Ark. 303, 121 S.W. 275 (1909).

16-3-104. Proof of publication.

  1. When any notice or advertisement shall be required by law or the order of any court to be published in any newspaper or made in conformity with any mortgage, deed of trust, power of attorney, or administrator's notice, the affidavit of the editor, proprietor, manager, or chief accountant, with a copy of the advertisement annexed, stating the number of times and the date of the papers in which the advertisement was published, shall be sufficient evidence of publication.
  2. If the notice is given by five (5) written or printed notices, according to the provisions of § 16-3-101, then the affidavit of the party giving the notice, properly verified before some officer authorized to administer oaths and showing the time and manner of giving the notice, shall be sufficient evidence of publication.
  3. No editor, proprietor, manager, or chief accountant shall be required to make the affidavit until his or her legal fee is paid.

History. Acts 1891, No. 157, § 5, p. 269; 1899, No. 189, § 2, p. 333; C. & M. Dig., § 6808; Pope's Dig., § 8784; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-105.

Case Notes

Affidavits.

An affidavit so worded that the affiant swore only to the date and insertion of the publication, and merely stated his connection with the newspaper and its circulation, was defective. Baker v. York, 65 Ark. 142, 45 S.W. 57 (1898).

Affidavit made by an accountant, but not by the chief accountant, was defective in that it did not comply with this section. Miller County v. Gazola, 65 Ark. 353, 46 S.W. 423 (1898).

Although an affidavit is sufficient evidence under this section, an affidavit is not the exclusive evidence. Whitford v. Whitford, 100 Ark. 63, 139 S.W. 653 (1911); Allen v. Allen, 126 Ark. 164, 189 S.W. 841 (1916); Straughan v. Bennett, 153 Ark. 254, 240 S.W. 30 (1922); Mahan v. Wilson, 169 Ark. 117, 273 S.W. 383 (1925).

Amendment of Proof.

An amendment correcting proof of publication of a warning order to obtain constructive service on nonresident defendants can be filed after judgment. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Maddux, 181 Ark. 726, 27 S.W.2d 514 (1930).

Certified Copies.

In suit to confirm tax title, it was proper for court to admit in evidence a certified copy of the publication of the delinquent lands. Stout v. Healey, 216 Ark. 821, 228 S.W.2d 45 (1950).

Compliance.

Proof of publication of notice of sale held to be in substantial compliance with this section, and, if not, would be cured by confirmation. Christopher v. Wasson, 198 Ark. 297, 128 S.W.2d 1012 (1939).

Cited: Covington v. Berry, 76 Ark. 460, 88 S.W. 1005 (1905); Hildreth v. Taylor, 117 Ark. 465, 175 S.W. 40 (1915); Clarke v. Federal Land Bank, 197 Ark. 1094, 126 S.W.2d 601 (1939).

16-3-105. Authorized publications — Legal newspapers.

  1. As used in this section, “legal newspaper” means a publication bearing a fixed title or name, published at a fixed place of business, regularly issued at fixed intervals as frequently as one (1) time each week and having a second-class mailing privilege, and being not less than four (4) pages of five (5) columns each.
  2. The primary function of such a publication shall be to inform, instruct, enlighten, and entertain, and to be an intangible service to which the general public as a whole resorts for intelligence of passing events of a political, religious, commercial, or social nature, for local and general current happenings, editorial comment, announcements, miscellaneous reading matter, advertisements, and other notices.
    1. For a newspaper to be eligible to publish legal notices and to be classified as a legal newspaper, it shall have been published at regular intervals continuously during a period of at least twelve (12) months, following the securing of a second-class mailing privilege, or as a direct legal successor of such a publication issued during the immediate prior period of at least twelve (12) months, or, in the case of a legal newspaper which surrenders its second-class mailing privilege and is subsequently sold, the resulting newspaper under new ownership is a legal newspaper if the purchased newspaper had been a legal newspaper within twelve (12) months prior to its sale. The newspaper shall be circulated and distributed from an established place of business to subscribers and readers generally of all classes in the county or counties in which it is circulated for a definite price or consideration for each copy or at a fixed price per annum, which price or consideration shall be fixed by the publisher at what he or she considers the value of the publication based upon the news value and service value it contains and not upon the physical or concrete worth of the raw materials so sold.
    2. It is ascertained by the General Assembly that the value of a newspaper or other publication coming within the requisites of this section is in the service that it renders to the community or communities it serves.
    1. The circulation of a legal newspaper shall be proven bona fide by at least fifty percent (50%) of the subscribers thereto having paid cash for their subscriptions to the newspaper, or its agents, or through recognized news dealers, over a period of six (6) months.
    2. A legal newspaper must publish an average of forty percent (40%) news matter which has sufficient merit to have created a following of paid readers.
    1. The definition of “legal newspaper” provided in this section shall not be construed to classify as legal newspapers publications such as racing forms, shopping guides, and similar publications devoted primarily to advertising.
    2. Special class publications having a bona fide circulation such as patriotic organs, religious publications, construction journals, and other similar class publications shall not be affected under the provisions of this section.

History. Acts 1937, No. 152, §§ 1-5; 1937, No. 263, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 8777-8781; Acts 1943, No. 57, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 15-108 — 15-112; Acts 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 1.

16-3-106. Authorized publications — Newspapers of general circulation.

All statutes requiring publication of legal notices by insertions in newspapers published either in the applicable town or county, and also requiring general circulation of the newspapers in the town or county, may be complied with, if no such newspaper is actually published in the town or county, by publication in a newspaper having general circulation in the town or county, irrespective of whether the newspaper is published and printed in the town or county or outside the boundaries of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1979, No. 18, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-116.

16-3-107. Authorized publications — Weekly newspapers of patriotic organizations.

  1. Any weekly newspaper published in the State of Arkansas by any statewide patriotic organization and having a circulation of five hundred (500) or more in the county in which the newspaper is published is declared to be a medium or forum in which there may be published all legal and judicial advertisements, notices, orders, reports, judgments, decrees, and sales in the county.
  2. All legal and judicial advertisements, notices, orders, reports, judgments, decrees, and sales published in such weekly newspapers are, and shall be deemed to have been, properly published within the meaning of the acts governing the publication of legal and judicial advertisements, notices, orders, reports, judgments, decrees, and sales.

History. Acts 1931, No. 32, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 8787, 8788; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 15-113, 15-114.

16-3-108. Authorized publications — Trade journals.

Whenever it appears to any state, county, or municipal agency or department that a special class of readers should be reached in order to obtain a wider range of bids, the department or agency may, in addition to the legal notices and advertising provided by law, place the advertising or notices in any recognized trade publication or construction journal published in the State of Arkansas reaching the special class. The rates regularly charged by the trade publication or construction journal may be paid by the state, county, or municipal department or agency.

History. Acts 1937, No. 222, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 8783; A.S.A. 1947, § 15-115.

Chapter 4 Uniform Interstate And International Procedure Act

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 3, which concerned determination of foreign law, was superseded by the enactment of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Rules for Inferior Courts pursuant to the supersession rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978. See Rule 44.1, ARCP. Some provisions of this chapter may have been similarly superseded.

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 7, § 6: Feb. 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that when the General Assembly enacted Arkansas' long-arm statute, the Uniform Interstate and International Procedures Act (Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 16-4-101 et seq.), it was not intended to exclusively define the basis for jurisdiction over non-resident corporate defendants, but rather was intended to expand the jurisdiction of Arkansas Courts, it being long held by the Arkansas bench and bar that service upon an agent appointed by a foreign corporation to receive process in Arkansas confers personal jurisdiction in a transitory action regardless of the long-arm statute, which long-held concept appears to have been struck down by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308 (1992). Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Uniform Interstate and International Procedural Act, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 118.

Jurisdiction — Nonresident Corporation Doing Business Within the State, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 198.

Legislative Notes — No. 119 — Personal Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 124.

Conflict of Laws — Arkansas 1959-64, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 135.

The Uniform Long-Arm Act in Arkansas. The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 627.

Conflict of Laws — Arkansas 1964-68, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Conflict of Laws — Personal Jurisdiction and the Long-Arm Statute, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 106.

Civil Procedure — In Personam Jurisdiction Based Upon a Single Transaction, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 322.

Grounds for Venue in Arkansas — A Survey, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 468.

Civil Procedure — Arkansas' Non-Resident Motorist Statute — What is Sufficient Compliance?, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 63.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas 1969-72, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas — The Choice-Influencing Considerations, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 199.

Recent Developments: Long Arm Jurisdiction: Defendant's Motion to Quash Service Under State Long Arm Statute Shifts Burden of Proof to Moving Party. Hawes Firearm Co. v. Roberts, 263 Ark. 510, 565 S.W.2d 620 (1978), 32 Ark. L. Rev. 606.

Simmons, Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc.: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 553.

Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1978-82, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 191.

Watkins, The Arkansas Long-Arm Statute: Just How Long Is It?, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 21.

Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1983-87, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 63.

Note, The Reach of the Long-Arm After Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley: Still a “Vague and Tangled” Area of the Law?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 209.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Owen, Survey of Arkansas Law: Civil Procedure, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 177.

Note, Quasi-in-rem Jurisdiction — Attachment of Insurer's Obligation to Nonresident Defendant (Seider Rule) Unconstitutional, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 125.

Notes, Civil Procedure — Minimum Contacts — Eighth Circuit Survey. Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982), 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 553.

Arkansas Law Survey, Greene, Civil Procedure, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 167.

Arkansas Law Survey, Nelson, Conflicts of Law, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 173.

Arkansas Law Survey, Bradley, Civil Procedure, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 107.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This chapter is procedural and not substantive and its retroactive application to a cause of action that accrued before its enactment is not unconstitutional. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Shwayder Bros., 238 Ark. 768, 384 S.W.2d 473 (1964).

This chapter does not unconstitutionally discriminate between resident and nonresident defendants as to venue. Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).

In General.

This chapter is, at least in part, identical to ARCP 4(e). A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc. v. Burnside, 282 Ark. 27, 665 S.W.2d 288 (1984).

Cited: National Sur. Corp. v. Inland Properties, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Ark. 1968); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974); Purser v. Corpus Christi State Nat'l Bank, 256 Ark. 452, 508 S.W.2d 549 (1974); Dutton-Lainson Co. v. McGee, 260 Ark. 494, 542 S.W.2d 739 (1976); Winters v. Lewis, 260 Ark. 563, 542 S.W.2d 746 (1976); Spears v. State, 264 Ark. 83, 568 S.W.2d 492 (1978).

16-4-101. Personal jurisdiction of Arkansas courts.

  1. Definition of “Person”. As used in this section, “person” includes an individual or his or her executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association, or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this state and whether or not organized under the laws of this state.
  2. Personal Jurisdiction. The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction of all persons, and all causes of action or claims for relief, to the maximum extent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
  3. Service. When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this section, service may be made either within or outside this state.
  4. Inconvenient Forum. When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 1; 1975, No. 252, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2502; Acts 1993, No. 7, § 1; 1995, No. 486, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 7, § 2, provided that the provisions of this act, being procedural in nature, shall apply retroactively and prospectively.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, A Brief Survey of Some Important 1991 and 1992 Insurance Law Decisions, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 85.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, The Reach of the Long-Arm After Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley: Still a “Vague and Tangled” Area of the Law?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 209.

Recent Developments, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1093.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

Note, Davis v. St. John's Health System, Inc.: General Jurisdiction, The Door is Ajar, But How Far Will It Open? 56 Ark. L. Rev. 647 (2003).

Rachel A. Orr, Recent Developments: Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporation Violates Due Process — Yanmar Co., Ltd. v. Slater , 65 Ark. L. Rev. 163 (2012).

Robin E. Wright, Case Note: Conspiring to Create Jurisdiction: Gibbs v. PrimeLending and the Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction in Arkansas, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 723 (2012).

Recent Developments: Contract Faxed to Arkansas by Non-Resident Defendants Is Sufficient To Establish Personal Jurisdiction, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 601 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Kathy McCarroll, Note: Reassessing Personal Jurisdiction in Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 229 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former subdivision C.1.(e) does not violate Ark. Const., Art. 2, §§ 2, 3, or 8. Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).

In General.

The long-arm statute displaced the common law principle of the transitory cause of action as a rationale for asserting jurisdiction over corporate defendants and required that the cause of action arise out of prescribed conduct such as the transaction of business in Arkansas. To the extent that Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578, (1957), stands for the principle that service upon an agent appointed by a foreign corporation to receive process in this state confers personal jurisdiction in a transitory action regardless of the long-arm statute, it is overruled. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

Five-factor test previously used by the Supreme Court of Arkansas to assess specific personal jurisdiction is no longer applicable. Instead, the following criteria are necessary for specific personal jurisdiction: (1) the defendant must purposefully avail himself or herself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum state; and (3) the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Construction.

This section should be liberally construed. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974).

Although this section is to be liberally construed, there must still be some evidence upon which a prima facie showing of jurisdiction may be found to exist. Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Burden of Proof.

A nonresident defendant filing a motion to dismiss or quash on grounds that there are not sufficient contacts within the state to be personally in the state, has the burden of going forward and offering proof to sustain the allegations of the motion, and if the motion is denied, this does not mean that the plaintiff is relieved from establishing jurisdiction; it merely means that at that point in the proceedings a prima facie case of jurisdiction sufficient to take the cause to trial has been made. Hawes Firearm Co. v. Roberts, 263 Ark. 510, 565 S.W.2d 620 (1978).

Under Arkansas law, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that a nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with Arkansas to be sued in personam; however, the nonresident defendant filing a motion to dismiss or quash has the burden of going forward and offering proof to sustain the allegations of no jurisdiction. Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Challenging a Finding of Jurisdiction.

A writ of prohibition will not lie in a case where the personal jurisdiction turns upon whether the activities of the defendant were sufficient to satisfy the “minimum contacts” test applied under this section in order to allow the court to exercise the maximum jurisdiction allowable by due process, since the “minimum contacts” test is a question of fact, and in cases where jurisdiction depends upon the establishment of facts, the issue of jurisdiction must be decided by the trial court, subject to correction on appeal rather than by a writ of prohibition. Wisconsin Brick & Block Corp. v. Cole, 274 Ark. 121, 622 S.W.2d 192 (1981).

When a trial court has made a determination that a person's contacts with Arkansas are sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945), and former subdivision C.1.(a) of this section, the proper manner of challenging the decision is by appeal and not by a petition for a writ of prohibition. Fausett v. Host, 315 Ark. 527, 868 S.W.2d 472 (1994).

Contacts Found.

Circuit court did not err in denying a nonresident defendant's motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction where the protective order only prohibited the nonresident from contacting the resident plaintiff and did not impose any sort of affirmative duty on the nonresident. Beason v. Parks, 2015 Ark. App. 246, 459 S.W.3d 841 (2015).

Contacts Not Found.

Motion to dismiss was granted because although plaintiff argued that general personal jurisdiction was satisfied because auto parts manufactured by defendants were ultimately included in cars sold extensively in the state, this “stream of commerce” argument was not an adequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction. P.A.M. Transp., Inc. v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc., No. 11-5130, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124189 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 26, 2011).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to appellee, a resident of Hawaii, in an action for defamation filed by appellant, an Arkansas resident, because the exchange of an email between appellee and a resident of Mississippi did not meet the minimum-contacts test; exercise of jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Morris v. Christopher, 2013 Ark. App. 312 (2013).

In an action for defamation, false light, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and interference with business expectancy, arising from two postings made on logistics industry websites concerning an allegedly nonconforming shipment of frozen chicken, the court did not have general jurisdiction over defendants given the limited scope of defendants' contacts with Arkansas. Sioux Transp., Inc. v. XPO Logistics, No. 5:15-CV-05265, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 22, 2015).

In an action for defamation, false light, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and interference with business expectancy, defendants did not have sufficient contacts with Arkansas to confer specific jurisdiction on the court where (1) mail and telephone contacts alone were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, and (2) most of the performance relating to the parties' agreement occurred outside of Arkansas, on the road from Alabama to Michigan. Sioux Transp., Inc. v. XPO Logistics, No. 5:15-CV-05265, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171801 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 22, 2015).

Circuit court did not err in determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over appellee; she prepared only one Arkansas tax return for appellant, he did not claim that the form was improperly prepared, and as neither party was an Arkansas resident, there was no interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents, and there was nothing about the sole act of preparing and signing one tax return that would have caused appellee to reasonably anticipate being brought into an Arkansas court. Reveley v. Roth, 2016 Ark. App. 248, 491 S.W.3d 490 (2016).

Contracts.

Contractual relationships held sufficient to establish jurisdiction over nonresident. Waukesha Bldg. Corp. v. Jameson, 246 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Ark. 1965); Dreyfus Co. v. Royster Co., 487 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); McMahen v. Paramount Holdings, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Rice v. SD Leasing, Inc., 14 Ark. App. 180, 686 S.W.2d 450 (1985); Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Negotiations within the state leading up to the execution of the contract constituted such minimal contacts as were sufficient to give a court in Arkansas jurisdiction over a suit on such contract. Thompson v. Ecological Science Corp., 421 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1970); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. v. Youngblood, 359 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Ark. 1973).

Contractual relationship held insufficient to establish jurisdiction over nonresident. Arkansas Poultry Coop. v. Red Barn Sys., 468 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1972); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992).

Evidence did not establish a contract to supply services or things in Arkansas which would bring nonresident under Arkansas jurisdiction. Roger N. Joyce & Assocs. v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

Agreement that lease would be governed by and construed under the laws of Arkansas did not give an Arkansas court personal jurisdiction in and of itself, but did provide another contact with this state which went to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982).

A single contract can provide the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if there is a substantial connection between the contract and the forum state. SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983).

In an Arkansas resident's breach of contract suit alleging an agreement that the Arkansas resident would pursue a wrongful death action in Arkansas on a Virginia resident's behalf in return for fifty percent of the Virginia resident's award, an Arkansas trial court had personal jurisdiction over the Virginia resident under subdivision B. of this section because the Virginia resident had purposefully availed herself of the process and protection of the Arkansas courts to procure a large sum of money, and should have reasonably anticipated being required to appear in an Arkansas court if a dispute arose regarding an agreement, performed in Arkansas, that was an integral part in her procurement of that money. Roberts v. Bendos, 102 Ark. App. 358, 285 S.W.3d 687 (2008), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 626 (Aug. 20, 2008).

Where a Bermuda corporation and its principal negotiated a contract in Arkansas with an Arkansas corporation to ship Arkansas poultry to Bermuda, the Arkansas court's exercise of personal jurisdiction under subdivisions A. and B. of this section over the Bermuda corporation and its principal in an action on the contract did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process. Twin Springs Group, Inc. v. Karibuni, Ltd., 2009 Ark. App. 649, 344 S.W.3d 100 (2009).

Questions of fact remained as to whether an Arizona shipping company and transportation brokerage and their presidents were subject to personal jurisdiction in Arkansas by virtue of their contracting with and allegedly defrauding an Arkansas trucking company for the transportation of food from Arizona to the East Coast. Hotfoot Logistics v. Shipping Point Mktg., 2013 Ark. 130, 426 S.W.3d 448 (2013), overruled in part, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Due Process.

The purpose of this section is to permit courts to exercise maximum in personam jurisdiction allowable by due process. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Gould v. P. T. Krakatau Steel, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S. Ct. 304, 121 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1992); Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of a defendant's activities in a state do not resolve the question of the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction, for whether due process is satisfied depends upon the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978); Gould v. Empire Steel Trading Co., 765 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Ark. 1991), aff'd, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992).

The use of arteries of interstate mail, telephone, railway, and banking facilities is insufficient, standing alone, to satisfy due process in asserting long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation. Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982).

Whether a trial court has in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants must be decided on the facts of each case. To make this determination, the court must decide whether the defendants' actions satisfy the “transacting business” requirement within the meaning of this section and whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction is consistent with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); Capps v. Roll Serv., Inc., 31 Ark. App. 48, 787 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

Factors to be considered in determining whether due process requirements have been satisfied when personal jurisdiction has been exercised over nonresident defendants are: (1) The nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of contacts with the forum state; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience to the parties. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Capps v. Roll Serv., Inc., 31 Ark. App. 48, 787 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

This section extends this state's jurisdiction over nonresidents to the limits permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.Dudley v. Dittmer, 795 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1986); Byer v. Gordos Ark., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

The inquiry as to the existence of in personam “long-arm” jurisdiction requires a two-part analysis. The court must first determine whether the facts presented satisfy the requirements of the state “long-arm” statute. After that is determined, and only if that is determined affirmatively, the court must then determine whether the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in order for state courts to maintain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident person under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party must satisfy two prongs: (1) the party must show that the nonresident has had sufficient minimum contacts with this state; and (2) the party must show that the court's exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Trial court erred in dismissing the Arkansas concrete company's action against the Kansas paint company because, even though the paint company had few ordinary business contacts with Arkansas, the paint company had filed a materialmen's lien against the concrete company's Arkansas real estate, which was sufficient contact to subject it to the jurisdiction of Arkansas courts; further, the lien filing also showed that the paint company had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Arkansas. Concrete Wallsystems of Ark., Inc. v. Master Paint Indus. Coating Corp., 95 Ark. App. 21, 233 S.W.3d 157 (2006).

Nonresident sellers' presence in Arkansas for several days during which they consummated a large sales transaction that became the subject of litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas was a sufficient contact to give the sellers a reasonable anticipation of being haled into court in Arkansas, and thus subjected them to personal jurisdiction under the Arkansas long-arm statute under this section. Bogle v. Jackson, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86776 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 13, 2007).

Japanese traction machine manufacturer's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) dismissal motion was denied because it had sufficient contacts with the Eastern District of Arkansas to warrant the court's exercising personal jurisdiction over it: (1) the Arkansas long-arm statute authorized the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the fullest extent allowed by the U.S. Const., Amend. XIVDue Process Clause; (2) due process required that the manufacturer have minimum contacts with Arkansas, such that the maintenance of the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; and (3) the manufacturer had sufficient contacts to render it subject to the court's jurisdiction in a products liability suit brought in the Eastern District of Arkansas because it did more than simply place its machine in the stream of commerce, it authorized a U.S. distributor to be the exclusive distributor of its products in the U.S., it provided a user manual in English with its machines, it placed no limitation on where the machines could be sold, it visited the distributor in the U.S. to discuss the sale of its products, and it was aware that its products were being sold throughout the U.S., including in Arkansas. Piggee v. Patterson Med. Prods., Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50785 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 29, 2008).

In a suit for fraud, unauthorized practice of law, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy, personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state corporate officers of related insurance marketing entities was established under subdivision B. of this section because the officers held Arkansas insurance licenses and the corporations they led solicited business in Arkansas. Birts v. Vermillion, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87205 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 23, 2009).

In a suit for fraud, unauthorized practice of law, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy, personal jurisdiction over out-of-state residents who were not employed by, or lacked ownership interests in, related insurance marketing entities was not established under subdivision B. of this section because minimum contacts were lacking. Birts v. Vermillion, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87205 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 23, 2009).

Based upon the allegations in the complaint and the employee's affidavit that his only contacts with Arkansas were by telephone and correspondence, the employee's contacts with Arkansas were insufficient to establish minimum contacts so as to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND v. Elender Escrow, Inc., No. 4:11CV00123 JMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134690 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2011).

Co-conspirators' contacts with Arkansas were insufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction over them or conspiracy jurisdiction over their co-conspirators. Conspiracy jurisdiction only applied when at least one of the conspirators had minimum contacts with Arkansas in furtherance of the conspiracy and such contacts had not been pled. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND v. Elender Escrow, Inc., No. 4:11CV00123 JMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134690 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2011).

Personal jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory did not violate due process. As such, the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate this section, Arkansas's long arm statute. Gibbs v. Primelending, 2011 Ark. 255, 381 S.W.3d 829 (2011).

Court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtors, because the complaint arose out of and was directly related to the 2003 judgments, which were entered in Arkansas and remain unsatisfied; the debtors entered into or guaranteed several loan contracts with an Arkansas bank and pledged Arkansas real estate as collateral, and the debtors defaulted on the loans and an Arkansas court entered judgments against them. Hauser v. Sims, 2012 Ark. App. 295, 423 S.W.3d 104 (2012).

Circuit court erred in finding that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over a Virginia attorney and his law firm sued for conversion, because they lacked sufficient “minimum contacts” with Arkansas, where the attorney acted as counsel for an out-of-state escrow agent, and the earnest money in question had been wired to the attorney by a Georgia company in connection with a purchase agreement between the Georgia company, as purchaser, and the Arkansas plaintiff, as seller. The Arkansas plaintiff was not a party to the escrow agreement between the Georgia company and the escrow agent, and the Court of Appeals could not say that the attorney “purposefully availed” himself of the benefits and protection of the laws of Arkansas. Goodwin v. Magness Oil Co., 2018 Ark. App. 303, 552 S.W.3d 26 (2018).

—Contacts Found.

Nonresident held to have had sufficient contacts with state to bring it within state's jurisdiction without denying due process. Davis v. Triumph Corp., 258 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Lauck v. E.C.K. Chivers & Assocs., 320 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Dixie Sound & Communications, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985).

Although Honda R & D makes no direct revenue from Arkansas, the Honda Corporate family does, and Honda R & D enjoys the revenues received by the Honda family. Therefore, plaintiff submitted sufficient information to conclude that defendant Honda R & D derives substantial revenue from the State of Arkansas, and that exercising jurisdiction over Honda R & D satisfies due process. Hawes v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Ark. 1990).

The fact that the corporation was neither present nor doing business in Arkansas and merely owned a subsidiary in Arkansas did not sufficiently connect the corporation to Arkansas to bring it within the state's personal jurisdiction under Arkansas's long-arm statute. Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 2003).

Court of appeals reversed the dismissal of a product liability suit for lack of jurisdiction over a French manufacturer where the manufacturer actively distributed and sold aircraft in the forum and operated a closely related business in the forum, which activities were sufficient to enforce long-arm jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Anderson v. Dassault Aviation, 361 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6948 (8th Cir. Apr. 9, 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1015, 125 S. Ct. 606, 160 L. Ed. 2d 484 (2004).

An insurance policy's territory-of-coverage clause, insuring a manufacturer against property damage from occurrences in the United States, established defendant insurer's sufficient contact to Arkansas to satisfy due process under subdivision B. of this section and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in plaintiff Arkansas farmer's indemnity suit against the insured. Ferrell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005).

Putative father's contacts with Arkansas were sufficient to meet due process requirements under § 9-17-201(8), this section, and U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, based on his agreement to submit to a paternity test in Arkansas and given the fact that he drove to Arkansas for the test that was administered in Arkansas. Moreover, the father could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Arkansas because a person submitting to a paternity test could foresee the possibility that a paternity suit and support action could have been brought there, and finally, the exercise of jurisdiction over the father did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice when the burden of litigating the action was in no way unreasonable and the state had an interest in protecting its minor children and ensuring the payment of child support. Payne v. France, 373 Ark. 175, 282 S.W.3d 760 (2008), overruled in part, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to a shipper and its officers because the contacts between a broker and the shipper were sufficient and the shipper and the officers should not have been surprised to be haled into court in Arkansas because the broker was an Arkansas corporation, the parties entered into a legally binding contract through the bill of lading, and the broker's breach-of-contract cause of action arose directly from the contacts between the shipper and the broker. Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., 2014 Ark. 460, 447 S.W.3d 592 (2014).

In an action alleging fraud and other claims related to an investment agreement, the federal district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's action for lack of personal jurisdiction because defendants, a California resident and his California-based business, had sufficient contacts with Arkansas to establish personal jurisdiction; the facts suggested that the individual defendant's contacts with Arkansas were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated, but rather were central to an alleged scheme to purposely avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Arkansas, and the individual defendant's actions in and affecting Arkansas were central to plaintiffs' allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and supported a finding of specific jurisdiction. Whaley v. Esebag, 946 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 2020).

In a suit to recover legal fees, there was personal jurisdiction consistent with due process because the guarantor's contacts were such that he should have anticipated being haled into court in Arkansas since he negotiated the legal services contract, made hundreds of calls and emails to the Arkansas law firm, and visited the state regarding the litigation. Henry Law Firm v. Cuker Interactive, LLC, 949 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2020).

—Contacts Not Found.

Contacts of nonresident with state held to be insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Frank v. Steel, 253 Ark. 338, 485 S.W.2d 737 (1972); Carter Oil Co. v. Apex Towing Co., 532 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (1981); Eagle Material Handling of Ark., Inc. v. Acme Dock Specialists, Inc., 273 Ark. 362, 616 S.W.2d 716 (1981); Marchant v. Peeples, 274 Ark. 233, 623 S.W.2d 523 (1981); Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981); Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 566 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Gould v. P. T. Krakatau Steel, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S. Ct. 304, 121 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1992).

Where a resident of another state has no contacts with Arkansas and engages in no activities that would establish a “presence” in Arkansas to render him amenable to suit, he is not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this state. Carter v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 58, 648 S.W.2d 472 (1983).

There were insufficient contacts between the nonresident guarantors and Arkansas to subject the guarantors to the jurisdiction of the Arkansas courts, for the mere fact that the individual defendants guaranteed an obligation to an Arkansas corporation did not subject the guarantors to jurisdiction in Arkansas. Nor did the guarantors' status as shareholders in the debtor corporation, or the more remote connection between some of the guarantors and California corporation, establish the minimum contacts between the guarantors and Arkansas necessary to satisfy due process. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n v. Alchemy Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1986).

Where company's single act was to guarantee a debt between an Arkansas company and a nonresident corporation, and the record was devoid of evidence of even mail or telephone transactions to bring the company within this state's jurisdiction, such contacts were insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction. Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992).

In an action to collect on student loan notes, where defendant was a Tennessee resident, never resided or engaged in business in Arkansas, signed student guarantee notes in Tennessee, and his children, for whose benefit the notes were executed, went to school in Tennessee, and where defendant's only contacts with Arkansas were that the guaranteed loan was made by an Arkansas bank and the guarantor was an Arkansas corporation, the connection was too tenuous to support a finding of personal jurisdiction. Glenn v. Student Loan Guarantee Found., 53 Ark. App. 132, 920 S.W.2d 500 (1996).

A nonresident manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of this state simply because its product is shipped there; there must be some showing that the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in this state or in some manner directed its activities at the forum state. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Personal jurisdiction not shown where the only contact that defendant had with Arkansas prior to the plaintiff's claim was the filing of an Oklahoma judgment against an Arkansas resident and the issuance of a writ of execution based on that judgment; such brief encounters with the state for the purpose of enforcing a judgment are not the type of continuous, systematic, and substantial contacts envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court to satisfy due process considerations. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

General personal jurisdiction not shown where corporation was not registered in Arkansas, had no employees here, had no agent for service in Arkansas, and had never initiated contact with people in Arkansas, and where the only contact that the corporation had had with this state had been sales to Arkansas residents, set in motion by Arkansas residents and merchandise delivered to Arkansas residents by mail or UPS. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

A federal court in Arkansas did not have personal jurisdiction over a Kentucky bank whose only contact with Arkansas was to issue a cashier's check payable to an Arkansas bank and then, it was alleged, wrongfully dishonor the check. First Nat'l Bank of Lewisville v. First Nat'l Bank of Clinton, 258 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2001).

In a personal injury action brought by a man and his wife where the man was injured when an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) turned over on him there were insufficient contacts with Arkansas for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction; although there were a series of transaction involving the ATV, the injured party and his wife were residents of Louisiana, where they had purchased the ATV, and they brought the ATV to Arkansas for recreational purposes. Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 366 Ark. 238, 234 S.W.3d 838 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds, Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Eastern District of Arkansas district court properly concluded that it could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation because doing so would not comport with due process: (1) an Arkansas widow filed a wrongful death suit against the corporation after her husband was killed in Tennessee, while unloading electrodes that the corporation had manufactured in Japan; (2) the Arkansas long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction on the district court to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause; (3) due process required minimum contacts with the forum state and a finding that maintenance of the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; (4) the corporation's only contacts with Arkansas were the annual visits made by its representatives to an Arkansas customer; (5) the widow's wrongful death claims did not arise from those contacts; (5) the corporation was not directly involved in the packing, shipping, or unloading of the electrodes, which activities were related to the worker's death; and (6) the inconvenience to the parties and the witnesses was also a factor weighing against the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation because essentially all of the witnesses and documents concerning the packaging, shipping, and unloading of the electrodes were located in Japan and/or outside of Arkansas. Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co., 528 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2008).

Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because defendant's only contact with Arkansas was the filing of a Utah judgment against plaintiff in the state, and it went too far to suggest that defendant's registration of the Utah judgment against plaintiff was sufficient alone to satisfy the Arkansas long-arm statute and Fourteenth Amendment due process considerations. Barnett v. Centennial Bank, Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11256 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 4, 2008).

District court did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants, an Iowa citizen and limited liability company, because the only contact with Arkansas was a single meeting by the parties in Arkansas; because defendants' trip to Arkansas (and their failure to obtain permission to use plaintiff's mark) did not cause or otherwise precipitate the alleged infringement, and nothing in the record showed any other connection to Arkansas, the contact with Arkansas was insufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause. Pangaea, Inc. v. Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2011).

—Question of Fact.

In order for a valid judgment to be rendered against a nonresident not served within the forum state, due process requires that certain minimum contacts exist between the nonresident and the state, such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; the contacts with the forum state must be such that the nonresident defendant should reasonably anticipate being “haled” into an Arkansas court. A single contract can provide the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if there is a substantial connection between the contract and the forum state; whether the “minimum contacts” requirement has been satisfied is a question of fact. Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988).

The existence of a state-created corporate form did not operate as a limitation on personal jurisdiction; it is necessary to utilize a case-by-case examination of the individual's contact with the forum. Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has established a five-factor test for determining the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts with the forum state so as to result in personal jurisdiction: (1) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Effect of Amendments.

The 1994 version of this section provided certain listed bases for personal jurisdictions; after its 1995 amendment, this section, in subdivision B., embraced all actions consitutionally permitted. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Enduring Relationship.

Subdivision B. of this section was not applicable where there was no showing that the defendant ever was domiciled in the state. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 257 Ark. 137, 514 S.W.2d 701 (1974).

Federal Law.

Federal court properly exercised jurisdiction over defendant, a bail bondsman, who submitted to state court an affidavit of intention to surrender accused requesting plaintiff's arrest, that lead to plaintiff's arrest and his suit for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1997).

Where none of the jurisdictional factors prescribed by 10 U.S.C. § 1408 were satisfied, and the federal statute preempted the application of the “minimum contacts” provisions of this section, the chancellor lacked personal jurisdiction to divide party's military pension. Pender v. Pender, 57 Ark. App. 305, 945 S.W.2d 395 (1997).

Foreign Company.

An Arkansas court has authority, under this section and the due process clause, U.S. Const. Amend. 14, to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company in a suit by the insured to recover under the insurance policy's uninsured motorist clause for damages arising out of an accident in Arkansas with an uninsured Arkansas motorist. Szalay v. Handcock, 307 Ark. 232, 819 S.W.2d 232 (1991).

Business owner met his burden of prima facie showing that the district court could exercise general personal jurisdiction over an international company under the Arkansas long-arm statute, subdivision B. of this section, because the owner presented evidence showing that the international company had purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business activities within Arkansas, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the state's laws: (1) the international company owned a security company that had promised to provide monitoring, alarm, and security services for the owner's Arkansas business; (2) statements on the international company's website and a prior lawsuit brought against the international company by the Securities and Exchange Commission provided proof that the international company manipulated and controlled the security company and that it received income from the security company's sale of security systems and services in the State of Arkansas; (3) the international company's contacts with Arkansas, through the security company, were the type of continuous and systematic contacts that established general jurisdiction even if the owner's claims did not specifically arise out of business activities directed at Arkansas; and (4) it would not violate the U.S. Const., Amend. XIVDue Process Clause to exercise jurisdiction over the international company because it could hardly be inconvenient for the international company to defend itself in a state where it was otherwise proud to conduct business. Duffer v. TYCO Int'l Ltd., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74476 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 26, 2008).

Arkansas did not have general jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer pursuant to subdivision (B) of this section in a wrongful-death suit arising from a tractor accident because the manufacturer was not itself doing business in Arkansas and did not dominate and control its American subsidiary, which sold tractors in Arkansas through authorized dealers, such that personal jurisdiction could be predicated on an alter ego relationship. Yanmar Co., Ltd. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439 (2012).

Forum Convenience.

Although this section may affect venue because of its provisions relating to jurisdiction and service of process, the provision that the court in which the action is filed has broad powers under the principle of forum non conveniens demonstrates that the statute is basically a jurisdiction-giving statute rather that a venue-fixing one. Ozark Supply Co. v. Glass, 261 Ark. 750, 552 S.W.2d 1 (1977).

Considerations usually associated with forum convenience were pertinent to federal court's decision that Arkansas' exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporation would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978).

Court may raise the doctrine of forum non conveniens on its own. Country Pride Foods Ltd. v. Medina & Medina, 279 Ark. 75, 648 S.W.2d 485 (1983).

The trial court's discretion in determining whether to dismiss an action due to an inconvenient forum must necessarily be based upon such factors as convenience to the parties in obtaining documents and witnesses, the expense involved in trying the case, questions of foreign law, trial docket, and other matters. Although the application of forum non conveniens lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion, the record must show the matters considered by the court in applying the doctrine. Country Pride Foods Ltd. v. Medina & Medina, 279 Ark. 75, 648 S.W.2d 485 (1983).

Where contract was executed in Arkansas and most of the parties were residents of the state, the convenience of the parties was best served by the hearing of the case in Arkansas. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985).

There is no requirement that plaintiff's claim be dismissed because of a prior pending action in federal court, nor is there any requirement that the court exercise the forum non conveniens discretion given it by subsection E. Helm v. Mid-America Indus., Inc., 301 Ark. 521, 785 S.W.2d 209, cert. denied, Helm v. Mid-America Industries, Inc., 498 U.S. 850, 111 S. Ct. 142, 112 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1990).

The application of forum non conveniens lies within the sound discretion of the trial court; only if this discretion is abused will be reviewing court reverse. Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Baker-Lowe-Fox Ins. Mktg., Inc., 316 Ark. 630, 873 S.W.2d 537 (1994).

Because an insurer was the first party to file suit, and it chose to do so in the county in which it had its principal office, pursuant to § 16-55-213(a), a circuit judge erred by applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens under subdivision D. of this section, effectively overruling the insurer's choice of venue. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Gadbury-Swift, 2010 Ark. 6, 362 S.W.3d 291 (2010).

It was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss a wrongful death complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the trial court weighed the parties' interests and the complaint's procedural posture and concluded it was best for a related federal court complaint to proceed; thus, the court did not exercise its discretion thoughtlessly or without due consideration. Silkman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 2015 Ark. 422, 474 S.W.3d 74 (2015).

Internet Contacts.

Manufacturer's advertisement on the World Wide Web was insufficient contact with this state to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Matters Outside Pleadings.

Circuit court did not err in considering matters outside the pleadings in reaching its conclusions regarding personal jurisdiction. Reveley v. Roth, 2016 Ark. App. 248, 491 S.W.3d 490 (2016).

Circuit court may consider evidence outside the pleadings on a motion under Ark. R. Civ. P. (12)(b)(2) alleging lack of personal jurisdiction. If the circuit court considers evidence outside the pleadings, the Rule (12)(b)(2) motion is not converted to a summary judgment motion, and previous cases that have taken a contrary position are overruled, see, e.g., Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 366 Ark. 238 (2006); Payne v. France, 373 Ark. 175 (2008); and Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc., 2013 Ark. 130. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Principal and Agent.

Nonresident principal acting through agent in state held to be transacting business so as to subject principal to jurisdiction. Wichman v. Hughes, 248 Ark. 121, 450 S.W.2d 294 (1970); Nix v. Dunavant, 249 Ark. 641, 460 S.W.2d 762 (1970); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

Former subdivision C.1. of this section would only enable the court to exercise jurisdiction over the principal on whose behalf the agent acted, based upon the conduct of the agent as it falls within this section. This section does not similarly authorize exercise of jurisdiction over an agent based upon the conduct of his principal, since the actions of an agent acting for a disclosed principal bind only the principal and not the agent, subjecting only the principal to jurisdiction on the basis of contact with the forum. Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Real Property.

A court of the county where real estate was located had jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident owner under former subdivision C.1.(e) of this section in an action by a real estate broker against the nonresident owner to recover a commission for the sale of the real estate. Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).

A nonresident of Arkansas who contracted to buy Arkansas land is subject to the personal jurisdiction of an Arkansas court in a foreclosure suit on the land. Ratliff v. Thompson, 267 Ark. 349, 590 S.W.2d 291 (1979).

State courts had personal jurisdiction over persons who not only owned the property in the state that was the subject of foreclosure, but also lived on the property when they negotiated and consummated the defaulted loan, which was the basis of the suit. Horne v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 295 Ark. 182, 747 S.W.2d 580 (1988).

Special Appearance.

Special appearance in an Arkansas court to contest the jurisdiction of the court and move for continuance did not subject nonresident to “long arm” personal jurisdiction. Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981).

Tortious Injury.

Nonresident putative father was not subject to personal jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(c) of this section on ground that child was conceived in Arkansas, since sexual intercourse between consenting adults is not a “tortious act” so as to confer jurisdiction. Howard v. County Court, 272 Ark. 205, 613 S.W.2d 386 (1981).

In a suit against United States for damages for death of enlisted person due to sexual harassment by sergeant, former subdivision C.1.(c) of this section did not provide basis for jurisdiction over sergeant who had no contacts with Arkansas. Stubbs v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984).

While nonresident driver committed a tortious injury in Arkansas which served as a basis for personal jurisdiction over him in action for personal injuries, that tortious act did not give rise to cause of action for failure to settle under driver's insurance policy, which failure was an act of insurer and not of driver; the trial court erred in holding that driver's conduct was sufficient to support personal jurisdiction under this section in that action. Franklin v. Griffith, 282 Ark. 271, 668 S.W.2d 518 (1984).

When personal jurisdiction is based solely upon the provisions that “only a cause of action or claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted” against a defendant, there must be a relationship between the defendant's connection with Arkansas and the injury complained of. Slocum v. Sandestin Beach Resort Hotel, 679 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

In order to exercise jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section, the tortious injury must occur in Arkansas, but the business activities of the defendant need not be related to the tortious injury. Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

A fair interpretation of the allegations made by plaintiff allowed the conclusion that her inability to find a job in Arkansas resulted from allegedly defamatory statements attributed to defendant; therefore, regarding the claim of defamation, the amended complaint stated a claim as to personal jurisdiction under this statute. Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state trucking company was not dependent on this section where, at trial, the proof was not in dispute as to the situs of the collision; thus, Arkansas acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant under § 16-58-120 because the plaintiff's cause of action arose directly from an act committed in this state by the agent of the defendant. Watkins Motor Lines v. Hedrick, 316 Ark. 683, 873 S.W.2d 814 (1994).

—Injury in State Caused by Action Outside State.

Under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section, an Arkansas court had jurisdiction over foreign corporations in action for tort and breach of warranty even though the corporations had no offices or agents within the state and their products entered the state only through being incorporated in the products of others sold within the state or through sale by manufacturer's agents and independent brokers. Pennsalt Chem. Corp. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 244 Ark. 638, 426 S.W.2d 417 (1968).

Nonresident corporation deriving substantial revenue from goods sold in Arkansas held subject to jurisdiction. International Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 249 Ark. 298, 459 S.W.2d 62 (1970); Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Marshall Constr. Co. v. M. Berger Co., 533 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Ark. 1982).

Where nonresident manufacturer engaged in a persistent course of conduct or derived substantial revenue from use of its goods in Arkansas, there were sufficient substantial contacts with the state for this section to apply, and this result was not changed by the fact that the complaint sounded in warranty rather than negligence or strict liability since former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section applies both to actions for breach of warranty and to actions in tort. Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chems. Co., 519 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Defendant's contacts with the state, which were the mailing of monthly payments to, and maintaining an escrow account at, the plaintiff bank within the state, were insufficient to render her subject to personal jurisdiction under former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section. Union Nat'l Bank v. Thornton, 293 Ark. 385, 738 S.W.2d 103 (1987).

—Injury Outside State.

Arkansas courts held not to have jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where injury occurred in another state. Krone v. AMI, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Jeanway Indus., Inc. v. Knudson Mfg. Co., 533 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Carter v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 58, 648 S.W.2d 472 (1983).

To confer jurisdiction on court under this section, the connection between defendant's activities in Arkansas and plaintiff's injuries in another state must be actual and not merely antecedent. Martin v. Kelley Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1974).

Where nonresident manufacturer engaged in a persistent course of conduct or derived substantial revenue from use of its goods in Arkansas, there were sufficient substantial contacts with the state for this section to apply, and this result was not changed by the fact that the complaint sounded in warranty rather than negligence or strict liability since former subdivision C.1.(d) of this section applies both to actions for breach of warranty and to actions in tort. Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chems. Co., 519 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Tortious acts in Arkansas held to confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where injury occurred in another state. Wright v. Newman, 539 F. Supp. 1331 (W.D. Ark. 1982), vacated, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. Mo. 1984).

The failure to allege facts connecting the transaction of Arkansas business to the accident in a foreign state was fatal to the cause of action, where such allegations were required by the long-arm statute to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

In a premises liability case arising from an injury that occurred in defendant's Louisiana store, the contacts between the defendant company and the Arkansas plaintiff were sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over the company, which should not have been surprised to be haled into court in Arkansas because it sought to have Arkansas residents patronize its Louisiana store; and the company was located roughly 30 miles from the forum, so the argument regarding an inconvenient forum was weak. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, 2017 Ark. App. 44, 511 S.W.3d 883 (2017), vacated, remanded, 138 S. Ct. 237, 199 L. Ed. 2d 2 (U.S. 2017) (remanded for further consideration in light of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017)).

Circuit court properly dismissed a customer's premises liability suit against a Louisiana retail sporting-goods store that advertised and conducted promotional activities in Arkansas for lack of specific personal jurisdiction. A fundamental connection did not exist between the cause of action and Arkansas, as the cause of action did not arise from or relate to defendant's contact with Arkansas as required under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017). The customer's trip and fall undisputedly occurred in Louisiana, and any alleged negligence related to the incident in Louisiana did not arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with Arkansas. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865 (2019).

Transacting Business.

Neither marriage nor living with a person constitutes transacting any business in the state on which personal jurisdiction can be exercised by the chancery court in a divorce action. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 257 Ark. 137, 514 S.W.2d 701 (1974).

Nonresident defendant held to have transacted business in state so as to confer jurisdiction on Arkansas courts. Shannon v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 259 Ark. 186, 531 S.W.2d 958 (1976); Stivers v. Pacific Bldg., Inc., 269 Ark. 294, 601 S.W.2d 822 (1980); Helm v. Mid-America Indus., Inc., 301 Ark. 521, 785 S.W.2d 209, cert. denied, Helm v. Mid-America Industries, Inc., 498 U.S. 850, 111 S. Ct. 142, 112 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1990); American Gen. Fire & Cas. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

Nonresident defendant held not to have transacted business in state so as to subject itself to Arkansas jurisdiction. Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S. Ct. 573, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1978); Roger N. Joyce & Assocs. v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Pearrow v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1983); Williams v. GMC, 573 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Davis v. Kroger Co., 576 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D. Ark. 1983).

Where a Pennsylvania corporation began transacting business within this state, those transactions would not render the corporation subject to the in personam jurisdiction of an Arkansas court in a suit arising from activities which occurred prior to that time. Carter Oil Co. v. Apex Towing Co., 532 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1981).

The purpose of the “transacting business” provision is to permit the trial court to exercise the maximum personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant allowable by due process, and the provision should be given a broad and liberal interpretation. Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Moran v. Bombardier Credit, Inc., 39 Ark. App. 122, 839 S.W.2d 538 (1992); Glenn v. Student Loan Guarantee Found., 53 Ark. App. 132, 920 S.W.2d 500 (1996).

The Arkansas legislature intended the term “transacting business” to be construed to expand jurisdiction to the modern constitutional limit. Meachum v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 229, 682 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844, 106 S. Ct. 132, 88 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1985); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

In an action by a local broker against the president of a commodities brokerage business for fraud and market manipulation under the Commodities Exchange Act, the district court properly asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant where the defendant telephoned and visited the local broker's office to trade on both customer accounts and personal accounts. Dudley v. Dittmer, 795 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1986).

Although the Arkansas legislature intended the term “transacting business” to be construed to expand the in personam jurisdiction of its courts over nonresident defendants to the maximum allowed by due process, the use of arteries of interstate mail and telephone is insufficient, standing alone, to satisfy due process. Slocum v. Sandestin Beach Resort Hotel, 679 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

Where the defendant has created continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and because his activities are shielded by the benefits and protections of the forum's laws, it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well. Ultimatics, Inc. v. Minimatic, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Where defendant's employee, pursuant to contract for jointly purchased aircraft engine, stopped in Marion, Arkansas while en route from Texas to Indiana on other business, and attempted delivery to plaintiff but left none of the engine because a dispute arose over identity of property agreed upon, defendant engaged in a purposeful act sufficiently substantial to subject it to long-arm jurisdiction in Arkansas. Papachristou v. Turbines Inc., 902 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1990).

Telephone and mail transactions of foreign company not qualified to do business in Arkansas do not, standing alone, satisfy the minimum contacts required by due process to bring company within Arkansas's jurisdiction. CDI Contractors v. Goff Steel Erectors, Inc., 301 Ark. 311, 783 S.W.2d 846 (1990).

Where nonresident defendant had no offices, agents, or property in Arkansas, was not licensed to conduct business in Arkansas and contended it did not, and at no time did any employee or representative of defendant come to Arkansas to deal with plaintiff, defendant's activities did not rise to the status of transacting any business in this state and did not have the minimum contacts required with the State of Arkansas for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dickson v. Hawker-Siddeley Power Eng'g, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Ark. 1991).

In this action for action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the publisher for lack of personal jurisdiction was reversed and remanded where (1) the fact that defendant publisher contracted to receive monthly sales reports, especially if these reports were to display sales on a state by state basis, would permit an inference that the publisher had reasonable expectations and knowledge that its products were going to be offered in the Arkansas market; and (2) there was also evidence that the publisher was actively involved in marketing plans and promotions of books placed in stores. Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 939, 129 S. Ct. 223, 172 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2008).

In this action for action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against one corporate entity was affirmed where (1) the entity argued that it did not contract with the staff member, did not publish the novel, and was not party to the distribution agreement; and (2) plaintiff offered no credible evidence that the entity had any involvement in the publication or distribution of the novel and instead made merely conclusory allegations about the entity's alleged role. Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 939, 129 S. Ct. 223, 172 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2008).

Facts alleged in a company's breach of contract complaint provided a sufficient basis to subject defendant to specific personal jurisdiction in Arkansas under subsection B. of this section; defendant reached into Arkansas and initiated contact with the company in order to conduct business. Pritchett v. Evans, 2013 Ark. App. 679, 430 S.W.3d 223 (2013).

Cited: Rose's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Rex Financial Corp., 383 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Ark. 1974); William Penn Fraternal Ass'n v. Hickman, 256 Ark. 308, 506 S.W.2d 823 (1974); Turner v. McClain, 459 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Ark. 1978); United States v. Blackmon, 496 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Oden Optical Co. v. Optique Du Mond, Ltd., 268 Ark. 1105, 598 S.W.2d 456 (1980); Burton v. Bank of Tuckerman, 276 Ark. 538, 637 S.W.2d 577 (1982); Tucker Enters., Inc. v. Hartje, 278 Ark. 320, 650 S.W.2d 559 (1983); SD Leasing, Inc. v. RNF Corp., 278 Ark. 530, 647 S.W.2d 447 (1983); Weatherford v. State, 286 Ark. 376, 692 S.W.2d 605 (1985); Zolper v. AT&T Info. Sys., 289 Ark. 27, 709 S.W.2d 74 (1986); Keene v. National Medical Care, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Akin v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 Ark. App. 341, 758 S.W.2d 14 (1988); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1991); Carpetland of N.W. Ark., Inc. v. Howard, 304 Ark. 420, 803 S.W.2d 512 (1991); Brown v. PST Vans, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 327 Ark. 504, 938 S.W.2d 847 (1997);

Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (1981); Eagle Material Handling of Ark., Inc. v. Acme Dock Specialists, Inc., 273 Ark. 362, 616 S.W.2d 716 (1981); Marchant v. Peeples, 274 Ark. 233, 623 S.W.2d 523 (1981); Cotton v. Cotton, 3 Ark. App. 158, 623 S.W.2d 540 (1981); Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 566 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Jagitsch v. Commander Aviation Corp., 9 Ark. App. 159, 655 S.W.2d 468 (1983); Kilcrease v. Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1992).

16-4-102. Service.

A. Manner and Proof of Service.

  1. When the law of this state authorizes service outside this state, the service, when reasonably calculated to give actual notice, may be made:
  2. Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is made for proof of service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction. When service is made by mail, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.
  3. Service under this section does not, of itself, require the recognition or enforcement of an order, judgment, or decree rendered outside this state.
  1. By personal delivery in the manner prescribed for service within this state;
  2. In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;
  3. By any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed receipt;
  4. As directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory; or
  5. As directed by the court.

B. Individuals Eligible to Make Service. Service outside this state may be made by any individual permitted to make service of process under the law of this state or the law of the place in which the service is made or who is designated by a court of this state. In addition, any attorney for a party is eligible to make service of process in the manner prescribed in subparagraphs (c) and (e) of paragraph 1 of subsection A. of this section.

C. Individuals to Be Served; Special Cases. When the law of this state requires that in order to effect service, one (1) or more designated individuals be served, service outside this state under this section must be made upon the individual or individuals.

D. Assistance to Tribunals and Litigants Outside this State.

1. Any court of record of this state may order service upon any person who is domiciled or can be found within this state of any document issued in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside this state. The order may be made upon application of any interested person or in response to a letter rogatory issued by a tribunal outside this state and shall direct the manner of service.

2. Service in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside this state may be made within this state without an order of court.

E. Other Provisions of Law Unaffected. This section does not repeal or modify any other law of this state permitting another procedure for service.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 2; 1973, No. 37, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2503.

Cross References. Method of service, §§ 16-58-12016-58-128, § 16-58-130.

Summons, ARCP 4(c).

Case Notes

Alternative Service.

Where, under the circumstances, plaintiff was denied in its efforts to give defendants actual or personal service provided for out-of-state persons under the methods set forth under subdivision A.1. of this section and ARCP 4(e), plaintiff was relegated to obtain service of process on defendants under ARCP 4(f), which is another effective procedure for service under this section, the long-arm law; subsection E. of this section provides this section does not repeal or modify any other law of this state permitting another procedure for service. Horne v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 295 Ark. 182, 747 S.W.2d 580 (1988).

Individuals Eligible to Make Service.

Summons could be served by the sheriff of the county in which property was located. Stivers v. Pacific Bldg., Inc., 269 Ark. 294, 601 S.W.2d 822 (1980).

Refusal of Summons.

One who is subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of a court of Arkansas cannot defeat jurisdiction by the simple expedient of refusing to accept a registered letter containing a summons. Merriott v. Whitsell, 251 Ark. 1031, 476 S.W.2d 230 (1972).

Service on Agent.

The long-arm statute displaced the common law principle of the transitory cause of action as a rationale for asserting jurisdiction over corporate defendants and required that the cause of action arise out of prescribed conduct such as the transaction of business in Arkansas. To the extent that Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578 (1957), stands for the principle that service upon an agent appointed by a foreign corporation to receive process in this state confers personal jurisdiction in a transitory action regardless of the long-arm statute, it is overruled. Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

Validity of Service.

In a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, where a copy of the complaint and summons, which was mailed to the out-of-state address of defendant's brother, was returned marked “undelivered,” plaintiff failed to exercise the reasonable diligence required in determining defendant's last known address and, therefore, the default judgment based on the purported service was void. Canal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 259 Ark. 797, 536 S.W.2d 702 (1976).

If a summons misstated the amount of time allowed for an answer, that discrepancy would not render the summons fatally defective so as to prevent service under this section. Stivers v. Pacific Bldg., Inc., 269 Ark. 294, 601 S.W.2d 822 (1980).

Nonresident corporation not authorized to do business in Arkansas was not properly served with notice under this section where the attempt to use the Secretary of State resulted in the notice being returned. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc. v. Burnside, 282 Ark. 27, 665 S.W.2d 288 (1984).

Cited: Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. v. Youngblood, 359 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Ark. 1973); Renault Cent., Inc. v. International Imports of Fayetteville, Inc., 266 Ark. 155, 583 S.W.2d 10 (1979); Watling Ladder Co. v. Aldridge, 3 Ark. App. 27, 621 S.W.2d 499 (1981); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1991).

16-4-103. [Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act (U.L.A.), Article III, which concerns the taking of depositions, was not adopted in Arkansas.

16-4-104. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning proof of official records, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Acts 1963, No. 101, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2505.

16-4-105. Other provisions of law unaffected.

Except as otherwise provided herein, this chapter does not repeal or modify any law of this state:

  1. Authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction on any bases other than the bases specified in § 16-4-101;
  2. Permitting a procedure for service or for obtaining testimony, documents, or other things for use in this state or in a tribunal outside this state other than the procedures prescribed in § 16-4-102; or
  3. Authorizing the proof of official records or any entry or lack of entry therein by any method other than the methods prescribed in § 16-4-104 [superseded].

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2506.

16-4-106. Uniformity of interpretation.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purposes to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2507.

16-4-107. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2507n.

16-4-108. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act”.

History. Acts 1963, No. 101, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2501.

16-4-109, 16-4-110. [Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act (U.L.A.), §§ 6.05 and 6.06, which concern repeal and time of taking effect, respectively, were not adopted in Arkansas.

Chapter 5 Nonliability Of Volunteer Fire Fighters, Etc.

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 189, § 3: Mar. 13, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that volunteer firefighters, fire department board members and administrative personnel of volunteer fire departments should not suffer civil liability for personal injuries or property damage resulting from acts or omissions of volunteer firefighters while engaged in carrying out their responsibilities as firefighters provided that such acts or omissions were performed in good faith and did not constitute gross negligence; that the law does not now provide such civil immunity; that the present state of the law results in inequitable burdens being placed upon such persons, and that this Act is immediately necessary to eliminate such inequity. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-5-101. Volunteer firefighters, etc. — Nonliability.

  1. No volunteer firefighter or board member of a volunteer fire department nor administrative personnel of a volunteer fire department shall be civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from any act or omission of a volunteer firefighter in carrying out his or her official duties as a firefighter if the act or omission was in good faith and did not constitute gross negligence.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to volunteer fire departments of incorporated cities or towns.

History. Acts 1987, No. 189, § 1.

Cross References. Dues for volunteer fire departments, § 14-20-108.

16-5-102. Damage resulting from installation of free smoke alarms — Liability.

  1. No volunteer firefighter shall be civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from any act or omission in the installation of a smoke alarm provided free of charge if the act or omission did not constitute intentional wrongdoing.
  2. No board member of any fire department nor administrative personnel of any fire department shall be civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from any act or omission of a volunteer firefighter in installation of a smoke alarm provided free of charge.

History. Acts 1991, No. 891, § 1.

Chapter 6 Volunteer Immunity

Cross References. Liabilities of attorneys, § 16-22-301 et seq.

Division of Volunteerism, § 25-10-128.

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 8: Mar. 25, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that many persons contribute their valuable knowledge and services as unpaid volunteers in the promotion and performance of various programs administered by State and local agencies which are designed to meet the needs of the State and the several communities and that such persons should not be held civilly liable for their acts or omissions in carrying out their authority and responsibilities as volunteers if such acts or omissions were performed in good faith and did not constitute gross negligence; that the law does not now specifically provide such civil immunity; that the present state of the law results in inequitable burdens being placed upon such persons; and that this Act is immediately necessary to eliminate such inequity. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Torts, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 609.

Case Notes

Charitable Immunity.

Although Arkansas still recognizes the common-law doctrine of charitable immunity, it is very narrowly construed; the following list is illustrative but not determinative of the factors used to determine whether an organization is entitled to charitable immunity: (1) whether the organization's charter limits it to charitable or eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization's charter contains a “not-for-profit” limitation; (3) whether the organization's goal is to break even; (4) whether the organization earned a profit; (5) whether any profit or surplus must be used for charitable or eleemosynary purposes; (6) whether the organization depends on contributions and donations for its existence; (7) whether the organization provides its service free of charge to those unable to pay; and (8) whether the directors and officers receive compensation. Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).

Subchapter 1 — Volunteers Generally

A.C.R.C. Notes. Because Acts 1997, No. 276 enacted a subchapter 2, the existing provisions of this chapter have been designated as subchapter 1.

16-6-101. Title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Arkansas Volunteer Immunity Act”.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 2.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Sampson, Nonprofit Risk; Nonprofit Insurance, 2008 Ark. L. Notes 83.

16-6-102. Purpose.

Since the spirit of volunteerism has long animated citizens of this state to give of their time and abilities to help others, the State of Arkansas would be wise to ensure that qualified volunteers shall not be civilly liable for personal injury or property damage resulting from any act or omission in carrying out their authority or responsibilities as volunteers. While there are no known recent instances in Arkansas where a volunteer has been subjected to personal liability for negligence in performing volunteer duties and there are no cases presently known to be pending, the recent publicity generated in relation to the perceived insurance crisis has heightened concern among many who would provide volunteer services, making it more difficult to provide certain important services, cultural and educational events, and other opportunities to the citizens of the State of Arkansas through voluntary services. This subchapter limits and defines the liability of volunteers in order to diminish their concern with regard to personal liability associated with volunteer work in order that the state might maximize this important human resource.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 1.

16-6-103. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Qualified volunteer” means any person who of free will provides goods or services without financial compensation to or through any volunteer agency in connection with a volunteer program;
  2. “Volunteer agency” means any volunteer program of all departments, institutions, and divisions of state government, community volunteer organization, or any not-for-profit corporation which has received a 501(c)(3) designation from the United States Internal Revenue Service, other than one established principally for the recreational benefit of its stockholders or members; and
  3. “Volunteer activity” means any activity within the scope of any project, program, effort, or other regular activity sponsored by a volunteer agency with the intent to effect a charitable purpose or confer other public benefit, including, but not limited to, enhancement of the cultural, civic, religious, educational, scientific, or economic resources of the community.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 3.

U.S. Code. The phrase “a 501(c)(3) designation” refers to an exemption codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

16-6-104. Volunteer not vicariously liable — Construction of subchapter.

  1. A qualified volunteer shall not be held vicariously liable for the negligence of another in connection with or as a consequence of his or her volunteer activities.
  2. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the liability of a person acting outside the scope of the volunteer program.
  3. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the liability of any volunteer agency.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, §§ 4, 6, 7.

Case Notes

Volunteer Agency.

A juvenile rehabilitation camp housing juvenile offenders, as a volunteer agency, was not entitled to immunity under this subchapter, nor entitled to charitable immunity under the common-law doctrine of charitable immunity. Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).

16-6-105. Nonliability for damages — Exceptions.

A qualified volunteer shall not be liable in damages for personal injury or property damage sustained by one who is a participant in or a recipient, consumer, or user of the services or benefits of a volunteer by reason of any act or omission of a qualified volunteer in connection with the volunteer except as follows:

  1. Where the qualified volunteer is covered by a policy of insurance, in which case liability for ordinary negligence is limited to the amount of coverage provided;
  2. Where the qualified volunteer acts in bad faith or is guilty of gross negligence;
    1. Where the qualified volunteer negligently operates a motor vehicle, aircraft, boat, or other powered mode of conveyance.
    2. If the actionable conduct of the qualified volunteer is covered by a policy of liability insurance, his or her liability for ordinary negligence shall be limited to the amount of the coverage provided; or
    1. Where the qualified volunteer negligently performs professional services extended to an individual which the qualified volunteer is licensed under state law to perform, including, but not limited to, legal, engineering, and accounting services.
      1. If the volunteer agency either provides or requires its professional volunteers to carry professional liability insurance in an amount customarily carried by a member of the profession involved, liability for ordinary negligence in rendering professional service shall be limited to the amount of coverage available or the amount required by the agency, whichever is larger.
      2. This exception does not apply to nurses or similar health care providers rendering health care services or other professionals rendering professional services to a government entity, business, or volunteer agency.

History. Acts 1987, No. 390, § 5; 1997, No. 276, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Pursuant to § 16-6-201(d), the provisions of this section regarding licensed medical professionals are superseded by § 16-6-201.

Cross References. Volunteer immunity for licensed health care professionals, § 16-6-201.

Case Notes

Cited: King v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 301 Ark. 148, 782 S.W.2d 574 (1990); Elliott v. Hurst, 307 Ark. 134, 817 S.W.2d 877 (1991).

Subchapter 2 — Healthcare Professionals

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in subchapter 1 may not apply to this subchapter which was enacted subsequently.

Cross References. Immunity from liability for volunteer services by retired physicians and surgeons, § 17-95-106.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 120, § 2: Feb. 16, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that indigent individuals in this state are in need of professional dental care; that dental professionals are not sufficiently protected from liability for rendering their services voluntarily to indigent individuals; and that this act is immediately necessary because the lack of immunity causes dental professionals to be reluctant to provide dental services voluntarily and without compensation. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-6-201. Indigent care — Rules — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “healthcare professional” means a person who:
    1. Is licensed or certified under Subtitle 3 of Title 17; or
    2. Is a student or resident of a healthcare profession program leading to a professional degree, a license, or certification under Subtitle 3 of Title 17 who is:
      1. Providing services within the scope of the training of that student or resident; and
      2. Under the supervision of a person who is licensed in the healthcare profession for which the student is seeking a degree, a license, or a certification.
  2. A healthcare professional who renders healthcare services voluntarily and without compensation to any person at any free or low-cost healthcare clinic located in the State of Arkansas and registered by the State Board of Health that accepts no insurance payments and provides healthcare services free of charge to persons unable to pay or provides healthcare services for a nominal fee shall not be liable for any civil damages for any act or omission resulting from the rendering of the healthcare services unless the act or omission was the result of the healthcare professional's gross negligence or willful misconduct.
    1. The board may promulgate rules necessary to provide for the registration of free or low-cost healthcare clinics under this section.
    2. The rules shall require that each person to whom healthcare services are provided:
      1. Has been fully informed before any treatment by the healthcare professional providing the services or by the staff of the healthcare clinic of the immunity from civil suit provisions of this section; and
      2. Has acknowledged that fact in writing on a form approved or designated by the Department of Health.
  3. The board and its members and the department and its agents and employees are exempt and immune from liability for any claims or damages when performing their duties under this section.
  4. The provisions of this section supersede the exception for licensed medical professionals under the Arkansas Volunteer Immunity Act, § 16-6-101 et seq.

History. Acts 1997, No. 276, § 1; 2007, No. 120, § 1; 2007, No. 837, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1286.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment substituted “health care” for “medical” throughout the section; substituted “Physicians, dentists, or other health care professionals” for “Physicians and health care professionals” in (a); substituted “health care professional” for “physician” in (b)(2); inserted “and Human Services” in (b)(2)(B) and (c); and added (e).

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in the introductory language of (c)(2).

Cross References. Program for indigent medical care, § 20-77-107.

Chapter 7 Dispute Resolution

Preambles. Acts 1993, No. 641 contained a preamble which read:

“WHEREAS, formal judicial process can on occasion be disproportionately time consuming and costly for adequate resolution of certain kinds of disputes which arise in this state; and

“WHEREAS, the cumulative burden of disputes for which formal judicial proceedings are inadequate can be substantial; and

“WHEREAS, the ensuing frustrations springing from unresolved disputes vex our citizens, and neglected disputes have the potential for escalating into more serious social consequences; and

“WHEREAS, the various forms of dispute resolution processes can increase access of the public to enhanced dispute resolution opportunities, and thereby amplify public regard and usage of the legal system and reduce the volume of matters which encumber the court system of this state.

“Therefore, ….”

Research References

Am. Jur. Am. Jur. 2d (new topic service), Alt. Disp. Res. § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission

A.C.R.C. Notes. Due to the enactment of subchapter 1 of this chapter by Acts 1995, No. 673, the former provisions of this chapter have been redesignated as subchapter 2.

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 250, § 258: Feb. 24, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 1211 of 1995 established the procedure for all state boards and commissions to follow regarding reimbursement of expenses and stipends for board members; that this act amends various sections of the Arkansas Code which are in conflict with the Act 1211 of 1995; and that until this cleanup act becomes effective conflicting laws will exist. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governer [sic], it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1997, No. 1354, § 51: Apr. 14, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act affects the method of selection of alternate members of the Legislative Council and Legislative Joint Auditing Committee and that this act is immediately necessary for proper continuity and efficiency in State government. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Kilpatrick, How Much Do You Know (or Care) About Alternative Disputer Resolution?, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 53.

16-7-101. Purpose.

The purpose of this subchapter is to encourage, promote, and develop voluntary alternative processes throughout the state to resolve disputes, cases, and controversies of all kinds.

History. Acts 1995, No. 673, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-7-101 has been renumbered as § 16-7-201.

16-7-102. Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission established — Terms of members — Meetings — Rules — Quorum.

      1. There is hereby created the Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission, which shall consist of seven (7) members.
        1. Three (3) members shall be attorneys appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, one (1) of whom shall have been recommended to the court by the Arkansas Bar Association.
        2. One (1) member shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
        3. One (1) member shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.
        4. Two (2) members shall be appointed by the Governor.
    1. All members shall have demonstrated prior interest or involvement in alternative dispute resolution.
    2. At least one (1) commission member shall be an Arkansas resident considered to be a representative of voluntary or nonprofit alternative dispute resolution programs in the State of Arkansas.
    3. Each member shall serve for six (6) years.
    4. If any member dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to serve prior to the expiration of the term, the appointing entity shall appoint a successor to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
    5. The members of the commission shall elect a chair.
  1. Members of the commission may receive expense reimbursement in accordance with § 25-16-902.
  2. The commission shall hold regular quarterly meetings each year on dates fixed by the commission and such special meetings as the commission determines are necessary.
  3. The commission may issue rules and shall publish rules for the regulation of its proceedings.
  4. A majority of the commission shall constitute a quorum.

History. Acts 1995, No. 673, §§ 2-5; 1997, No. 250, § 115; 1997, No. 1354, § 34; 2001, No. 1288, § 13; 2019, No. 315, § 1287.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-7-102 has been renumbered as § 16-7-202.

As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 673, subdivision (a)(4) began:

“The first members of the commission shall draw for terms of two (2), four (4), or six (6) years and shall serve until their successors are appointed. Thereafter, …”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (d).

16-7-103. Staffing.

  1. General staff support, facilities, and operating assistance for the Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission shall be provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts from funds appropriated for that purpose by the General Assembly.
  2. The commission shall select a Coordinator of Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs who shall be an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  3. Other employees may be added by the commission as are needed to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1995, No. 673, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-7-103 has been renumbered as § 16-7-203.

16-7-104. Powers and duties of commission.

The Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission shall have the authority and responsibility to:

  1. Promote in a systematic manner the appropriate use of alternative dispute resolution;
  2. Provide education to the courts, other government agencies, and the public on the methods, advantages, and applications of alternative dispute resolution;
    1. Establish standards and rules for the certification, professional conduct, discipline, and training of persons who shall be eligible and qualified to serve as compensated mediators, negotiators, conciliators, arbitrators, or other alternative dispute resolution neutrals in and for state and local courts.
    2. However, nothing in this subchapter or in the standards and rules promulgated by the commission shall in any way prevent the parties to the litigation from utilizing any recognized voluntary or nonprofit program of dispute resolution;
  3. Develop recommended guidelines, including the types of disputes which may be subject to alternative dispute resolution and standard procedures for mediation, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution;
  4. Assist state and local courts and governmental and other agencies with the development and implementation of alternative dispute resolution programs;
  5. Develop standardized forms for use in state and local courts and governmental and other agencies for the reference of cases to alternative dispute resolution and for the purpose of monitoring the use of alternative dispute resolution in the state;
  6. Establish fees to be levied by the courts and governmental and other agencies and paid by parties utilizing alternative dispute resolution processes;
  7. Apply for and accept gifts or grants from any public or private source for use in maintaining and improving alternative dispute resolution programs in the state; and
  8. Collect fees for tuition and registration of educational programs and to assist in maintaining a roster of third-party neutrals.

History. Acts 1995, No. 673, § 7; 1999, No. 602, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1288.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-7-104 has been renumbered as § 16-7-204.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (3)(B).

16-7-105 — 16-7-107. [Transferred.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former §§ 16-7-10516-7-107 have been renumbered as §§ 16-7-20516-7-207, respectively.

Subchapter 2 — Dispute Resolution Processes

A.C.R.C. Notes. Due to the enactment of subchapter 1 of this chapter by Acts 1995, No. 673, the former provisions of this chapter have been redesignated as subchapter 2.

Preambles. Acts 1993, No. 641 contained a preamble which read:

“WHEREAS, formal judicial process can on occasion be disproportionately time consuming and costly for adequate resolution of certain kinds of disputes which arise in this state; and

“WHEREAS, the cumulative burden of disputes for which formal judicial proceedings are inadequate can be substantial; and

“WHEREAS, the ensuing frustrations springing from unresolved disputes vex our citizens, and neglected disputes have the potential for escalating into more serious social consequences; and

“WHEREAS, the various forms of dispute resolution processes can increase access of the public to enhanced dispute resolution opportunities, and thereby amplify public regard and usage of the legal system and reduce the volume of matters which encumber the court system of this state.

“Therefore, ….”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Kilpatrick, How Much Do You Know (or Care) About Alternative Disputer Resolution?, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 53.

16-7-201. Legislative purpose and intent.

It is the intent of the General Assembly to:

  1. Encourage and authorize the use of dispute resolution processes throughout this state to resolve disputes, cases, and controversies of all kinds. Such processes include, but are not limited to, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, private judging, moderated settlement conferences, mediation-arbitration, fact finding, mini-trials, and summary jury trials;
  2. Encourage the development of new and the improvement of existing processes in this state; and
  3. Encourage the courts, the officers and employees of the courts of this state, state and local officers, departments, state and local governments and administrative agencies, state and local enforcement officers and agencies, prosecuting authorities and public defenders, and all other state and local officials, agencies, districts, and authorities to become versed in, accept, use, develop, and improve processes appropriate to the fair, just, and efficient resolution of disputes, cases, and controversies of all kinds in this state.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-101.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Moberly and Levine, The New Arkansas Appellate-Mediation Program, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 429.

Case Notes

Cited: Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 2020 Ark. App. 140, 597 S.W.3d 114 (2020).

16-7-202. Duty and authority of the courts.

    1. It is the duty of each trial and appellate court of this state and each court is hereby vested with the authority to encourage the settlement of cases and controversies pending before it by suggesting the referral of a case or controversy to an appropriate dispute resolution process agreeable to the parties.
    2. On motion of all the parties, the court must make such an order of reference and continue the case or controversy pending the outcome of the selected dispute resolution process.
  1. In addition, each circuit and appellate court of this state is vested with the authority to order any civil, juvenile, probate, or domestic relations case or controversy pending before it to mediation.
  2. If a case or controversy is ordered to mediation, the parties may:
    1. Choose an appropriate mediator from a roster provided by the Arkansas Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission of those mediators who meet the commission's requirement guidelines for that type of case; or
    2. Select a mediator not on the commission's roster, if approved by the court.
    1. A party may move to dispense with the order to mediate for good cause shown.
    2. For purposes of this subsection, “good cause shown” shall include, but not be limited to, a party's inability to pay the costs of mediation.
  3. Each court is further granted the discretionary authority to make at the request of a party appropriate orders to confirm and enforce the results produced by the dispute resolution process.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 2; 2003, No. 1179, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-102.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Mediation, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 448.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Writ of prohibition was denied in a case challenging the constitutionality of subsection (b) of this section because a circuit court had jurisdiction to hear a motion relating to estate administration due to Ark. Const., Amend. 80, § 6, and the constitutionality of a statute could have been heard by a circuit court and appealed. Ellis v. Reynolds, 368 Ark. 572, 247 S.W.3d 845 (2007).

Abuse of Discretion.

After the parties failed to reach an agreement during mediation and did not agree on which issues had been mediated, the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to hold a hearing and in dismissing portions of the wife's motion to compel concerning issues that the parties agreed were mediated. Smyth v. Smyth, 2019 Ark. App. 12, 570 S.W.3d 472 (2019).

Circuit court's directive was to schedule mediation within 10 days, which was done, but when the circuit court learned the mediation was not scheduled to occur for approximately two and a half months, it amended the directive to have the mediation take place within 10 days; dismissing the wife's contempt petition because mediation did not take place within 10 days was an abuse of discretion, as the wife was not dilatory in scheduling the mediation, and this short window was punitive. Smyth v. Smyth, 2019 Ark. App. 12, 570 S.W.3d 472 (2019).

16-7-203. Duty and authority of state and local officers and agencies and governments.

  1. It is the duty of all the elements of government expressed or implied by § 16-7-201(3), and they are hereby authorized, to use dispute resolution processes in resolving any and all disputes, cases, or controversies in which they may be directly or indirectly involved, whether between themselves and members of the public or between any other state or local officer, agency, government, or entity of this state or of any other state or any element or entity of the federal government.
  2. The elements of government expressed or implied by § 16-7-201 are authorized to use arbitration, private judging, mediation-arbitration, fact finding, mini-trials, and summary jury trials in resolving any and all disputes, cases, or controversies in which they may be directly or indirectly involved, whether between themselves and members of the public, or their employees or bona fide employee organizations, or corporations, or nonprofit organizations, or any other state or local officer, agency, government, or entity of this state or of any other state or any element or entity of the federal government, so long as the parties have agreed to participate. This subsection is permissive and not mandatory.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 3; 2007, No. 1206, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-103.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added (b) and made a related change.

16-7-204. Counseling by attorneys.

An attorney licensed in this state when practicing in this state is encouraged to advise his or her client about the dispute resolution process options available to him or her and to assist him or her in the selection of the technique or procedure, including litigation, deemed appropriate for dealing with the client's dispute, case, or controversy.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-104.

16-7-205. Duty to keep records of dispute resolution efforts and to file annual reports.

The courts and all the other elements of government expressed or implied by § 16-17-201(3) may keep information concerning all their efforts to use dispute resolution processes, whether or not such efforts lead to successful outcomes.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-105.

16-7-206. Confidentiality of communications in dispute resolution procedures.

  1. Except as provided by subsection (c) of this section, a communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in a dispute resolution process, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial proceedings, is confidential and is not subject to disclosure and may not be used as evidence against a participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
  2. Any record or writing made at a dispute resolution process is confidential, and the participants or third party or parties facilitating the process shall not be required to testify in any proceedings related to or arising out of the matter in dispute or be subject to process requiring disclosure or production of information or data relating to or arising out of the matter in dispute.
  3. If this section conflicts with other legal requirements for disclosure of communications or materials, the issue of confidentiality may be presented to the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings to determine in camera whether the facts, circumstances, and context of the communications or materials sought to be disclosed warrant a protective order of the court or whether the communications or materials are subject to disclosure.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-106.

Case Notes

Construction.

While this section does prevent revealing the particulars of the communications relating to the subject matter of the mediation, the Court of Appeals does not read this section to mean that the circuit court is prevented from knowing the subject matter of the mediation; otherwise, the circuit court could never know if there had been an attempt to mediate issues before motions were filed in the circuit court. Here, the circuit court refused to hold a hearing to make this determination. Smyth v. Smyth, 2019 Ark. App. 12, 570 S.W.3d 472 (2019).

Discovery.

It was error to grant at this point in the case defendant subcontractor's motion to compel discovery of the confidential settlement agreement between plaintiff and defendant general contractor that resulted from mediation, when the subcontractor sought contribution and apportionment of fault, because (1) any right of contribution does not arise until one joint tortfeasor pays more than the tortfeasor's share of liability, and no damages had been awarded yet, and (2) it was error to find the general contractor and subcontractor were joint tortfeasors before any evidence was presented. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, however, the Civil Justice Reform Act, § 16-55-201 et seq., did not eliminate contribution among “joint tortfeasors”. Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 2020 Ark. App. 140, 597 S.W.3d 114 (2020).

16-7-207. Immunity of impartial third parties.

No impartial third party administering or participating in a dispute resolution process shall be held liable for civil damages for any statement or decision made in connection with or arising out of the conduct of a dispute resolution process unless the person acted in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct.

History. Acts 1993, No. 641, § 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-7-107.

Chapters 8, 9 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 2. Courts and Court Officers

Chapter 10 General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in subchapters 1 and 2 may not apply to subchapters 3-10 which were enacted subsequently.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Smith, The Influence of the Arkansas Supreme Court's Opinions on Policy Made by the General Assembly: A Case Study, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 441.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Gingerich, Out of the Morass: The Move to State Funding of the Arkansas Court System, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Preambles. Acts 1959, No. 5 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association provides that if a judge should decide to become a candidate for any office not judicial, he should resign in order that it cannot be said that he is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his own candidacy;

“Whereas, the Canons of Professional Ethics and Judicial Ethics have been approved by the bench and bar of the State of Arkansas….”

Acts 1981, No. 477 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas there are approximately 30,000 deaf citizens residing in the State of Arkansas; and

“Whereas, there is no provision in the laws of this State providing for an impartial and verbatim translation of court proceedings wherein deaf persons are either parties thereto or called as witnesses therein; and

“Whereas, this Act is necessary in order to insure the integrity of our judicial process in the eyes and minds of our deaf citizens;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1931, No. 153, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1971, No. 536, § 2: Apr. 5, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly hereby finds that backlogs of criminal cases existing in some circuits may require the assignment of additional judges to said circuits in accordance with Act 496 of 1965; that it may be excessively time consuming and expensive to select a jury panel for said judges unless this act is passed; that this Act is necessary to fully implement Act 496 0f 1965; therefore, this Act being necessary for the expeditious dispatch of criminal cases within the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 599, § 3: Apr. 7, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salary of the executive secretary of the Judicial Department should be fixed from time to time by the General Assembly and the Appropriation Act establishing the biennial appropriation for the Judicial Department; and that the retirement benefits of the executive secretary should be clarified; and that only by the immediate passage of this Act may such objectives be accomplished. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 209, § 4: Feb. 21, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “Because of drastic increases in the price of gasoline and other travel expenses in recent years and many judges are now suffering personal losses, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 82, § 3: Feb. 7, 1979; Acts 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 3: Jan. 25, 1980. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in some courts in the State there is a serious backlog of cases, some of which have been pending in excess of a year; that it is essential to the effective administration of justice that civil matters which have been pending on court dockets for a long period of time be heard and disposed of as soon as possible; that this Act is designed to provide a procedure for the prompt disposition of those cases that have been pending in the courts a year or more and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 357, § 3: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 5, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload for many courts in this State results in lengthy delays in the disposition of civil cases; that the appointment of licensed attorneys to litigate claims on agreement of the parties would greatly relieve the courts of this State from the burden of overcrowded dockets; and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide such relief. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 981, § 4: became law without Governor's signature, Apr. 8, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “Because of drastic increases in the costs and maintenance of an automobile and in the price of gasoline and other travel expenses, and in the costs of supplies, equipment and other actual expenses in the performance of judicial duties in recent years, and that many judges are now suffering personal losses by being forced to pay the expenses of carrying on judicial duties from their salaries, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 334, § 6: July 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1985 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1985 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1985.”

Acts 1985, No. 569, § 3: Mar. 26, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there has been a tremendous increase in the number of offenses perpetrated against children in this State, that children of very tender years have increasing difficulty remembering past events necessary for a criminal prosecution the longer the length of time between the event and the trial, and that offenses against children are especially serious as to require, as nearly as possible, immediate removal of the offender from society. Therefore, this Act is necessary to shorten the time between the occurrence of the criminal offense and the trial and punishment of the perpetrator. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 4: June 22, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly, meeting in Extraordinary Session, that because of drastic increases in the costs and maintenance of an automobile and in the price of gasoline and other travel expenses, and in the costs of supplies, equipment and other actual expenses in the performance of judicial duties in recent years, and that many judges are now suffering personal losses by being forced to pay the expenses of carrying on judicial duties from their salaries, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 4, § 15: July 1, 1993. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1993 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1993 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1993.”

Acts 1995, No. 3, § 17: July 1, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1995 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1995 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1995.”

Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 23: Apr. 13, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 209, § 9: July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-First General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1999, No. 1508, § 19: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act makes various technical corrections in the Arkansas Code; that this act further clarifies the law to provide that the Arkansas Code Revision Commission may correct errors resulting from enactments of prior sessions; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to be applicable during the codification process of the enactments of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 1314, § 2: Apr. 5, 2001. Emergency Clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2001 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2001 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2003, No. 932, § 6: July 1, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2003 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2003 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2003.”

Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 7: Apr. 2, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the ‘Task Force to Study the Disparity in Sentencing for Persons Convicted of Non-violent Crimes’ has found that it appears that some Arkansas citizens do not receive equitable sentences under the law; that it is necessary to compile statistical sentencing information in order to determine if disparities exist; and that this act is immediately necessary to allow the compiling of the needed statistical information in the first quarter of 2003. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 698, § 2: Mar. 27, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts provides a vital function concerning the operation of the judiciary; that the position of Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts will soon be vacant due to the departure of the current director; and that this act is immediately necessary because the Supreme Court feels it is necessary to consider as many qualified persons as necessary to fill the position. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Disqualification, for bias, of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Delaying or obstructing discovery as basis for contempt proceeding. 8 A.L.R.4th 1181.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Failure of attorney to attend court, or tardiness, as contempt. 13 A.L.R.4th 122.

Prior representation or activity as prosecuting attorney as disqualifying judge from sitting or acting in criminal case. 16 A.L.R.4th 550.

Practice of law: statute prohibiting judge from engaging in. 17 A.L.R.4th 829.

Disqualification of judge because of assault or threat against him by party or person associated with party. 25 A.L.R.4th 923.

Failure to rise in courtroom as constituting criminal contempt. 28 A.L.R.4th 1250.

Oral communications insulting to particular state judge, made to third party out of judge's physical presence, as criminal contempt. 30 A.L.R.4th 155.

Attorney's use of objectionable questions and examination of witness in state judicial proceeding as contempt of court. 31 A.L.R.4th 1279.

Contrary order issued by another court: contempt based on violation of original court order. 36 A.L.R.4th 978.

Disqualification of judge in state proceedings to punish contempt against or involving himself in open court and in his actual presence. 37 A.L.R.4th 1004.

Failure to rise in state courtroom as constituting criminal contempt. 38 A.L.R.4th 563.

Intoxication as contempt of court. 46 A.L.R.4th 238.

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 16 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

Administration of the Courts in Arkansas: Challenge, Performance, and Prospects, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 1 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Gingerich, Out of the Morass: The Move to State Funding of the Arkansas Court System, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

16-10-101. Administrative responsibilities of the Supreme Court.

  1. The Supreme Court shall have general superintending control over the administration of justice in all courts in the State of Arkansas. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be directly responsible for the efficient operation of the judicial branch and of its constituent courts and for the expeditious dispatch of litigation therein and the proper conduct of the business of the courts.
    1. Under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice may require reports from all courts of the state and may issue such orders, rules, and regulations as may be necessary for the efficient operation of those courts to ensure the prompt and proper administration of justice and may assign, reassign, and modify assignments of circuit and district court judges to hold, upon a temporary basis, regular or special sessions for the transaction of civil or criminal business within any other such court.
    2. The lower courts shall keep such adequate and uniform records as are required by law or as may be required by rule or order of the Supreme Court.
  2. The Supreme Court, with the assistance of the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, shall devise a uniform system of numbering, cataloging, and classifying cases in all the courts of record in this state, and the courts of record shall utilize the system in conducting the business of the courts.
  3. In the event of the absence of the Chief Justice or his or her inability to perform the duties described in this section, or as required by rule or order of the Supreme Court, the duties may be performed by the several associate justices of the Supreme Court in the order of their seniority of service on the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1965, No. 496, § 1; 1973, No. 237, § 1; 1981, No. 489, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-142; Acts 1989, No. 760, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 38; 2019, No. 315, § 1289.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1711, § 1, provided:

“(a) In order to assist the Arkansas General Assembly and the Arkansas Supreme Court with the respective duties and responsibilities which they are assigned under the Arkansas Constitution to establish the jurisdiction of state courts and to set the number and boundaries of circuit court districts, there is created the Circuit Court Apportionment Commission to be composed of the following persons:

“(1) The Chairman of the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary or his or her designee, plus two (2) other members of the committee to be selected by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate;

“(2) The Chairman of the House Interim Committee on Judiciary or his or her designee, plus two (2) other members of the committee to be selected by the Speaker of the House;

“(3) The Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court or his or her designee, who shall serve as chair of the commission;

“(4) The President of the Arkansas Judicial Council;

“(5)(A) Two (2) circuit judges appointed by the Arkansas Judicial Council, one (1) of whom shall be a minority.

“(B) The judges shall be from different congressional districts;

“(6) The President of the Arkansas Bar Association or his or her designee; and

“(7) Two (2) persons appointed by the Governor, one (1) of whom shall be a minority.

“(b) In addition to the voting members identified in subsection (a) of this section, the following persons shall serve as nonvoting ex-officio members of the commission:

“(1) The Prosecutor Coordinator or his or her designee;

“(2) The Executive Director of the Public Defender Commission or his or her designee;

“(3) The dean of the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville School of Law, or his or her designee; and

“(4) The dean of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law or his or her designee.

“(c) The commission shall meet at the call of the chair and hold hearings between July 1, 2004, and December 31, 2004.

“(d) The commission shall review the current jurisdiction of state courts and the number and location of circuit court districts and make a recommendation to the Eighty-Fifth General Assembly and the Arkansas Supreme Court.

“(e) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide necessary meeting space, staff, clerical support, and technical assistance to the commission.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 3, provided that the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in each of the Eighth, Twelfth, and Nineteenth Circuit and Chancery Districts and the additional circuit judgeship created in the Sixth Circuit and Chancery District by § 1 of the act would be subject to the assignment authority of the Chief Justice, pursuant to this section, and requested that the Chief Justice utilize the services of these circuit-chancery judges in alleviating heavy caseloads in other circuit and chancery districts by use of such assignments.

As to name changes involving the Administrative Office of the Courts, see Publisher's Notes, § 16-10-102.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “rules” preceding “and regulations” in (b)(1).

Case Notes

Assignments.

It is the parties' or trial court's responsibility to apprise the Supreme Court as to whether an assignment is necessary under this section. Once that assignment is made, that responsibility continues. Neal v. Wilson, 321 Ark. 70, 900 S.W.2d 177 (1995), overruled in part, Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 189, 461 S.W.3d 687 (2015).

Newly Elected Judges.

Fact that a new circuit judge had been elected after judge's assignments did not, in itself, suggest the new circuit judge was not recused from trying the case. Neal v. Wilson, 321 Ark. 70, 900 S.W.2d 177 (1995), overruled in part, Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 189, 461 S.W.3d 687 (2015).

Special Judges.

The exchange of circuits upon agreement of the circuit judges or the appointment of a judge by the Chief Justice were alternative methods of selecting a judge to preside over the impaneling of a grand jury to investigate the trial judge of the circuit court. State v. George, 250 Ark. 968, 470 S.W.2d 593 (1971).

Where special judge, lawfully elected pursuant to Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 21 [repealed], had already exercised jurisdiction over pending case, his judgment would take priority over the judgments of a judge assigned at a later date pursuant to this section. Wessell Bros. Foundation Drilling Co. v. Crossett Public School Dist., 287 Ark. 415, 701 S.W.2d 99 (1985).

Cited: Henry v. Powell, 262 Ark. 763, 561 S.W.2d 296 (1978); Weston v. State, 265 Ark. 58, 576 S.W.2d 705; Hall v. Lowery, 545 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Burris v. Britt, 281 Ark. 225, 663 S.W.2d 715 (1984); Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Templeton, 298 Ark. 390, 769 S.W.2d 404 (1989); Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993); Lee v. Lee, 330 Ark. 310, 954 S.W.2d 231 (1997); State v. Armstrong, 331 Ark. 294, 960 S.W.2d 451 (1998); Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 189, 461 S.W.3d 687 (2015).

16-10-102. Administrative Office of the Courts — Director — Cooperation of court officers.

    1. There shall be an office for the administration of the nonjudicial business of the judicial branch which shall be known as the “Administrative Office of the Courts”.
    2. There shall be a Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts who shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court and the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc. Subsequent to the appointment, the director shall hold office at the pleasure of the Supreme Court.
  1. The director shall meet the qualifications as determined by the Supreme Court.
  2. The director shall receive such salary as may be fixed from time to time by the biennial appropriations salary act for the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  3. The director shall not engage directly or indirectly in the practice of law and shall hold no other office or employment.
  4. The director, subject to the direction of the Supreme Court, shall perform the following functions:
    1. Examine the administrative methods of the courts and make recommendations to the Supreme Court for their improvement;
    2. Examine the state of the dockets of the courts, secure information as to their needs for assistance, if any, prepare statistical data and reports of the business of the courts, and advise the Supreme Court to the end that proper action may be taken;
    3. Examine the estimates of the courts of the state for appropriations and present to the Supreme Court recommendations concerning them;
    4. Examine the statistical systems of the courts and make recommendations to the Supreme Court for a uniform system of judicial statistics;
    5. Collect, analyze, and report to the Supreme Court statistical and other data concerning the business of the courts;
    6. With the approval of the Supreme Court and at the request of the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc., the director shall act as Secretary of the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc., and shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him or her;
    7. Examine the data processing needs of the courts and make recommendations to the Supreme Court as to the purchase and use of hardware and software for computer systems, telecommunications systems, and microfilming systems, and provide education to the courts on the use of such systems so as to improve the quality and efficiency of justice in the state;
    8. Assist the Supreme Court in the operation of the Supreme Court Library; and
    9. Attend to the other nonjudicial business of the judicial branch under such rules as the Supreme Court may by order adopt.
  5. The director shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court, appoint such assistants as may be necessary. He or she shall be provided with such office facilities as may be required.
  6. The director shall advise and assist clerks of trial courts in the keeping of records of their proceedings and shall make reports and recommendations in connection therewith to the Supreme Court, the trial judges, and the clerks of those courts.
  7. The clerks, officers, and employees of the courts shall comply with all requests of the director for information and statistical data relating to the business of the courts and the expenditure of public funds for their maintenance and operation. The director shall notify the Supreme Court of any noncompliance with such requests.

History. Acts 1965, No. 496, § 2; 1971, No. 599, § 1; 1973, No. 237, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-143; Acts 1989, No. 760, § 2; 2017, No. 698, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1290.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 1, provided:

“Intent.

(a) Ethnic minorities appear to be over represented in the population of persons who are involved in the criminal justice system, charged as defendants, convicted, and incarcerated throughout the United States criminal justice systems.

“(b) It is the responsibility of criminal justice agencies and the courts in the State of Arkansas to ensure that all actions taken are based upon reasons other than the race of the defendant.

“(c) In order to allow the General Assembly to conduct a thorough review of the Arkansas criminal justice process, information on actions taken by criminal justice agencies and the courts must be reported in a timely, uniform, and consistent manner.”

Act 2015, No. 598, § 5, provided: “AOC RESPONSIBILITY FOR COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS.

“(a) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall be responsible for the financial oversight of the Official Court Reporters of the Circuit Courts and Trial Court Administrators, which shall include but not be limited to biennial and annual budget requests, all budgeting activities, monitoring expenses, travel, substitute expenses, indigent transcript payments and to ensure projected annual expenditures do not exceed total available funding.

“(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Arkansas Judicial Council shall establish an official procedure or rules for all new hires, terminations and salary adjustments for Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters. The official procedures or rules shall be implemented prior to July 1, 2015 and shall be administered for all Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters.

“The provisions of this sections shall be in effect only from July 1 2015, through June 30, 2016.”

Act 2015, No. 598, § 6, provided: “FUNDING FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUND.

“(a)(i) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall be responsible for requesting and verifying the need for any additional appropriation, any position change level, and any increase in the Administration of Justice Fund Allocation Section as authorized annually through special language in the Department of Finance and Administration's Disbursing Act, for the Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters.

“(ii) Any annual or biennial request for an increase in the Administration of Justice Fund allocation section for Trial Court Administrators and/or Official Court Reporters shall not exceed the total or projected total revenues available for the Trial Court Administrator Fund or the Court Reporter's Fund from the Administration of Justice Fund as determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Department of Finance and Administration.

“(b)(i) During a fiscal year the Administrative Office of the Courts shall not approve any change level in salary, operating expense and other distributions for Trial Court Administrators which will exceed actual or projected fund balances in the Trial Court Administrator Fund.

“(ii) During a fiscal year the Administrative Office of the Courts shall not approve any change level in salary, operating expense and other distributions for Court Reporters which will exceed actual or projected fund balances in the Court Reporter's Fund.

“The provisions of this sections shall be in effect only from July 1 2015, through June 30, 2016.”

Act 2016, No. 80, § 5, provided: “AOC RESPONSIBILITY FOR COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS.

“(a) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall be responsible for the financial oversight of the Official Court Reporters of the Circuit Courts and Trial Court Administrators, which shall include but not be limited to biennial and annual budget requests, all budgeting activities, monitoring expenses, travel, substitute expenses, indigent transcript payments and to ensure projected annual expenditures do not exceed total available funding.

“(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Arkansas Judicial Council shall establish an official procedure or rules for all new hires, terminations and salary adjustments for Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters. The official procedures or rules shall be implemented prior to July 1, 2015 and shall be administered for all Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Act 2016, No. 80, § 6, provided: “FUNDING FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUND.

“(a)(i) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall be responsible for requesting and verifying the need for any additional appropriation, any position change level, and any increase in the Administration of Justice Fund Allocation Section as authorized annually through special language in the Department of Finance and Administration's Disbursing Act, for the Trial Court Administrators and Official Court Reporters.

“(ii) Any annual or biennial request for an increase in the Administration of Justice Fund allocation section for Trial Court Administrators and/or Official Court Reporters shall not exceed the total or projected total revenues available for the Trial Court Administrator Fund or the Court Reporter's Fund from the Administration of Justice Fund as determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Department of Finance and Administration.

“(b)(i) During a fiscal year the Administrative Office of the Courts shall not approve any change level in salary, operating expense and other distributions for Trial Court Administrators which will exceed actual or projected fund balances in the Trial Court Administrator Fund.

“(ii) During a fiscal year the Administrative Office of the Courts shall not approve any change level in salary, operating expense and other distributions for Court Reporters which will exceed actual or projected fund balances in the Court Reporter's Fund.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 761, § 1, provided:

“(a) From and after the passage of this act, the ‘Arkansas Judicial Department’ shall be known and designated as the ‘Administrative Office of the Courts’, and the ‘Executive Secretary’ of the Arkansas Judicial Department shall be known as the ‘Director’ of the Administrative Office of the Courts.

“(b) Any and all statutes of the State of Arkansas now in force in which the institution now designated as ‘Arkansas Judicial Department’ shall be construed to refer to the ‘Administrative Office of the Courts.’ Said ‘Administrative Office of the Courts’ shall succeed to all rights and benefits and assume all the responsibilities of said ‘Arkansas Judicial Department.’

“(c) Any and all statutes of the State of Arkansas now in force in which the official now designated as ‘executive secretary’ of the Arkansas Judicial Department shall be construed to refer to the ‘director’ of the Administrative Office of the Courts. Said ‘director’ shall succeed to all rights and benefits and assume all the responsibilities of said ‘executive secretary’.”

The Per Curiam Order of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, dated June 28, 1993, provided, in part:

“All Supreme Court Committees, the Supreme Court Library, and the Director of Professional Programs will hereafter operate under the Administrative Office of the Courts and subject to the administrative authority of the Director of that Office. We do not place the constitutional offices of Supreme Court Reporter and Supreme Court Clerk, see Ark. Const. art. 7, § 7, under the Administrative Office of the Courts. They will remain directly responsible to the Supreme Court although we may choose to transfer certain administrative functions which have been handled by the Clerk to the Administrative Office of the Courts.”

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “meet the qualifications as determined by the Supreme Court” for “possess the same qualifications and shall be subject to the same restrictions as district judges” in (b).

The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (e)(9).

Case Notes

Cited: Hall v. Lowery, 545 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Ark. 1982).

16-10-103. Training and education of court personnel.

  1. The state's responsibility for training and providing additional judicial education to circuit judges, district judges, city judges, circuit clerks, municipal clerks, case coordinators, court reporters, and all other personnel directly associated with the state's courts shall be administered by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall have the authority to assess and collect fees for tuition and registration for educational programs it offers.

History. Acts 1985, No. 334, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-158; Acts 2001, No. 1314, § 1.

16-10-104. Courts of record.

The Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all circuit and county courts shall be courts of record and shall keep just and faithful records of their proceedings.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-101; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 39.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to county courts. Adams v. Tackett, 236 Ark. 171, 365 S.W.2d 125 (1963).

Unauthorized Practice of Law.

Circuit court did not err in dismissing a company's tax assessment appeal for lack of jurisdiction when its tax manager, a nonlawyer, initiated the appeal on its behalf because the company invoked the legal process and its nonattorney representative engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; the company, through a nonlawyer, lodged its appeal in the county court, initiating the appeal process in a court of record. Desoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Hill, 2017 Ark. 326, 531 S.W.3d 396 (2017).

Cited: Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975).

16-10-105. Sittings of courts to be public.

The sittings of every court shall be public, and every person may freely attend the sittings of every court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 19; C. & M. Dig., § 2103; Pope's Dig., § 2707; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-109.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, Keeping the Courthouse Doors Open, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 51.

Ark. L. Rev.

Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268.

Notes, The Free Press-Fair Trial Controversy: A New Standard for Closure Motions in Criminal Proceedings, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 403.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section prohibits a trial court judge from excluding members of the public from a “Denno” hearing conducted pursuant to § 16-89-107 and from excluding a newspaper reporter unless she agrees to a censorship of any story she might write about the hearing. Shiras v. Britt, 267 Ark. 97, 589 S.W.2d 18 (1979).

Jury Selection.

Jury selection is a stage of the proceedings where openness is particularly appropriate under the guarantee of a public trial provided for in U.S. Const., Amend. 6, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10, and this section. Memphis Publishing Co. v. Burnett, 316 Ark. 176, 871 S.W.2d 359 (1994).

Presence of Officers.

In trials attracting large audiences, it is not improper to have enough officers to enforce order and to protect the accused from violence and to prevent his escape or possible rescue. Thus, in prosecution for murder, presence in the courtroom of numerous officers in uniform as well as certain United States Marines who attended either as spectators or as witnesses, the deceased having been a Marine, was a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Rayburn v. State, 200 Ark. 914, 141 S.W.2d 532 (1940).

Pretrial Proceedings.

In order to overcome the presumption of open pretrial hearings, the proponent of closure must demonstrate a substantial probability that (1) irreparable damage to the defendant's fair trial right will result from an open hearing, and (2) alternatives to closure will not adequately protect the right to a fair trial. Additionally, the trial court's findings must be articulated and sufficiently specific to demonstrate on review that these requirements have been satisfied. Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 281 Ark. 152, 662 S.W.2d 174 (1983).

Pretrial proceedings and their record must be open to the public, including representatives of the news media, and before an exception to that general rule is made, the test set out in Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 281 Ark. 152, 662 S.W.2d 174 (1983), must be met; if that standard is met and a pleading is ordered sealed, it must be opened to the public as soon as the probability of irreparable damage to the accused's right to a fair trial no longer exists. Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson, 281 Ark. 213, 662 S.W.2d 826 (1984).

Pretrial proceedings should not have been closed to the public where there was no showing that a substantial probability that irreparable damage to the defendant's fair trial right would result from an open hearing and that alternatives to closure would not adequately protect the right to a fair trial. Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson, 281 Ark. 213, 662 S.W.2d 826 (1984).

Requirement Met.

Circuit court's decision to hold the trial in chambers over a corporation's objection was affirmed where the trial was transcribed by a court reporter, the public had access to the proceedings so that it could ascertain whether the court was properly carrying out its duties responsibly, and counsel for the corporation admitted in oral argument that he could not say whether the in-chambers trial affected the outcome of the case. Ashley Bancstock Co. v. Meredith, 2017 Ark. App. 598, 534 S.W.3d 762 (2017).

Voir Dire.

The trial court lacks the authority to prohibit the public and press from the voir dire examination. Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977).

In accordance with this section and Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10, the voir dire examination of the jury must be held in open court; the right to an open trial may be asserted by the public, the press, and the accused. Taylor v. State, 284 Ark. 103, 679 S.W.2d 797 (1984).

Cited: In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 271 Ark. 358, 609 S.W.2d 28 (1980); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hardy, 316 Ark. 119, 871 S.W.2d 352 (1994).

16-10-106. Power to issue writs and process.

All courts shall have power to issue all writs and process which may be necessary in the exercise of their respective jurisdiction, according to the principles and usages of law.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 20; C. & M. Dig., § 2104; Pope's Dig., § 2708; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-110.

Case Notes

Contempt.

Failure to comply with order of county court could be punished as contempt by proper proceeding. Penix v. Shaddox, 165 Ark. 152, 263 S.W. 389 (1924).

Scope of Authority.

Although this section provides that all courts shall have the power to issue process which may be necessary in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, it does not provide the trial court with carte blanche authority to issue orders of body attachment, detention, and custody, while ignoring portions of statutory provisions relating to contempt proceedings, such as § 16-10-108(c), and without affording procedural protections of due process of law to the parties being placed in arrest and custody. Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 888 S.W.2d 642 (1994).

Supersedeas.

The circuit court may issue supersedeas to stay proceedings in case appealed to that court in order to preserve the status quo. Reese v. Steel, 73 Ark. 66, 83 S.W. 335 (1904); Williams v. Buchanan, 84 Ark. 404, 106 S.W. 202 (1907); Strangways v. Ringgold, 106 Ark. 433, 153 S.W. 619 (1913).

Cited: Hunter Wasson Pulpwood v. Banks, 270 Ark. 404, 605 S.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1980).

16-10-107. Process and proceedings to be in English language.

All writs, process, proceedings, and records in any court shall be in the English language, except that the proper and known name of process and technical words may be expressed in the language commonly used. They shall be made out on paper or parchment, in a fair and legible character, in words at length and not abbreviated; but such abbreviations as are commonly used in the English language may be used. Numbers may be expressed by Arabic figures or Roman numerals in the customary way.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 2102; Pope's Dig., § 2706; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-108.

16-10-108. Contempt.

  1. Every court of record shall have power to punish, as for criminal contempt, persons guilty of the following acts and no others:
    1. Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the court's sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority;
    2. Any breach of the peace, noise, or disturbance directly tending to interrupt its proceedings;
    3. Willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by it;
    4. Resistance willfully offered by any person to the lawful order or process of the court; and
    5. The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness and when so sworn a similar refusal to answer any legal and proper interrogatory.
    1. Punishment for contempt is a Class C misdemeanor.
    2. A court shall always have power to imprison until its adjournment.
    3. When any person is committed to prison for the nonpayment of any such fine, he or she shall be discharged at the expiration of thirty (30) days.
  2. Contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be punished summarily. In other cases, the party charged shall be notified of the accusation and shall have a reasonable time to make his or her defense.
    1. Whenever any person is committed for a contempt under the provisions of this section, the substance of his or her offense shall be set forth in the order or warrant of commitment.
    2. Nothing in subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall be construed to extend to any proceedings against parties or officers, as for contempt, for the purpose of enforcing any civil right or remedy.
  3. A person punished for contempt under subsections (a)-(d) of this section shall, notwithstanding, be liable to an indictment for the contempt if the contempt is an indictable offense, but the court before which a conviction may be had on such an indictment shall, in forming its sentence, take into consideration the punishment previously inflicted.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 37-42; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1484-1489; Pope's Dig., §§ 1784-1789; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-901 — 34-906; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 410.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote (b)(1); inserted “or she” in (b)(3); and inserted “or her” in (c) and (d)(1).

Cross References. Contempts not committed in presence or hearing of courts, or in disobedience of process, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Becker, The Remedial Side of Contempt When Injunctions are Disregarded, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 5.

Brill, A Proposed Arkansas Contempt Statute, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 29.

Gitelman, The Zealous Advocate and Contempt of Court: Attorney Contempt in Arkansas and the Need for Change, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 39.

Ark. L. Rev.

Attorneys — Contempt — Language in a Motion as Direct Contempt, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 172.

Legal Liability for the Exercise of Free Speech, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 155.

Crabtree, Contempt Law in Arkansas, 51 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Constitutional Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 161.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section, which sets forth the powers of the court in punishing criminal contempt, is not a limitation on the power of the court to inflict punishment for disobedience of process, for, under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26, the legislature cannot abridge the power of the courts to punish for contempt in disobedience of their process; the constitution specially reserved this inherent power in the courts when delegating authority to the legislature to regulate punishments for contempts. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 295 Ark. 211, 748 S.W.2d 123 (1988).

Where a juvenile was deprived of his right to counsel during a contempt proceeding because the juvenile only had the services of an attorney ad litem and not a defense attorney, the juvenile's due process rights were violated and the court's orders were invalid. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mainard, 358 Ark. 204, 188 S.W.3d 901 (2004).

In General.

Contempt is divided into criminal contempt and civil contempt. In determining whether a particular action by a judge constitutes a finding of criminal or civil contempt, the focus is on the character of relief rather than the nature of the proceeding. Criminal contempt carries an unconditional penalty, and the contempt cannot be purged. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Arkansas law also distinguishes between direct and indirect contempt, the former being committed in the presence of the court. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Purpose.

The purpose of a criminal contempt proceeding is that it is brought to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of its order. A civil contempt proceeding is instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for the benefit of those parties. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).

Applicability.

Subsection (b) of this section does not apply to contempts committed by offering physical violence to judge at time when court is not in session. Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of contempt against the attorney where the attorney frequently interrupted the judge and argued with him; however, the appellate court found that the justification for contempt would be served by reducing the attorney's jail sentence from 10 days to three days, with credit given for time served. McCullough v. State, 353 Ark. 362, 108 S.W.3d 582 (2003).

Contrary to the attorney's argument, the father, through his guardian ad litem, did not file a motion for contempt under subsection (c) of this section, but rather filed a motion to quash the deposition, which contained a request for sanctions under Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 11; the trial court did not enter a contempt order against the attorney, but he argued such on appeal and did not develop an argument regarding the Rule 11 sanctions, and because he failed to do so, the court refused to develop an argument for him and thus the court affirmed. McDermott v. Sharp, 371 Ark. 462, 267 S.W.3d 582 (2007).

A judge's power to punish for criminal contempt is not limited by this section. Morris v. State, 2017 Ark. 157, 518 S.W.3d 70 (2017).

When the circuit court found an attorney in contempt for failing to appear on time for a first-degree murder trial and fined him $4,000, the circuit court was acting under its inherent power and was not constrained by the $500 limit that the Legislature has authorized for a Class C misdemeanor; however, as the purpose of the contempt punishment would be accomplished by a lesser fine, the appellate court reduced the fine to $2,000. Morris v. State, 2017 Ark. 157, 518 S.W.3d 70 (2017).

Actions Constituting Contempt.

Interfering with property in custody of law with or without consent of the attaching officer is contempt. Atkins v. Swope, 38 Ark. 528 (1881).

Preventing a party from attending court is contempt. Turk v. State, 123 Ark. 341, 185 S.W. 472 (1916).

—Disobeying Order.

Court may refuse to hear a party in contempt for disobeying its order. Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177 (1885).

It is a contempt of the Supreme Court for a clerk to contumaciously disobey an order to furnish a transcript of the record in a case when commanded by writ of error, mandamus, or other legal method. Barstow v. Pine Bluff, M. & N.O.R.R., 54 Ark. 551, 16 S.W. 574 (1891).

When a receiver has been appointed and has taken possession of property under his appointment, it is a contempt to attempt to deprive him of that possession by force or by judicial proceedings without the permission of the court that made the appointment. Walker v. Geo. Taylor Comm'n Co., 56 Ark. 1, 18 S.W. 1056 (1892).

Party held guilty of contempt for willful disobedience of court's order. Hervey v. Hervey, 186 Ark. 179, 52 S.W.2d 963 (1932); Hall v. State, 237 Ark. 293, 372 S.W.2d 603 (1963).

Where the failure or refusal to abide by an order of the court is the issue, the appellate court does not look behind the order to determine whether the order is valid. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Attorney's actions in disobeying the court's order fell within the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26 and the court was not bound by the limitations set out in this section. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Attorney jailed five days for criminal contempt for his willful and continued disobedience of the Supreme Court's per curiam orders directing him to file the abstract and brief in a criminal appeal. Pipkin v. State, 320 Ark. 159, 896 S.W.2d 432 (1995).

Attorneys, found in contempt for failing to comply with directives, demonstrated not only mismanagement of their client's affairs, but also an inability to fulfill their obligations to the Supreme Court in failing to file a brief, even after extensions of time were granted to do so. Stone v. State, 321 Ark. 501, 902 S.W.2d 231 (1995).

Actions in violating orders enjoining parties' massive Christmas light displays fell within the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt. Osborne v. Power, 322 Ark. 229, 908 S.W.2d 340 (1995).

The court denied a petition for writ of certiorari on the issue of whether a citation for contempt was appropriate where a circuit court held two prosecuting attorneys in contempt and incarcerated them after they refused to proceed with the jury trial in a criminal case in contravention of the scheduling order. Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000).

In a criminal contempt case under subdivision (a)(3) of this section, substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that defendant willfully violated the court's orders requiring her to make restitution payments because defendant testified that she received a monthly disability check in the amount of $633 but did not use the money to make restitution payments. Summers v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 247 (2012).

In a case in which an attorney appealed a circuit court's order finding him in contempt and fining him $100, he unsuccessfully argued that he did not interrupt the court but that the rhythms of the colloquy reflected the normal ebb and flow of a sometimes tense discussion. He had repeatedly interrupted the judge despite numerous warnings not to interrupt, and both the transcript and the audio recording of the hearing showed that the circuit's court's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Benca v. Benton County Circuit Court, 2013 Ark. 448 (2013).

Attorney was properly held in contempt because the attorney admittedly asked witnesses about issues into which an order barred the attorney from inquiring. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Substantial evidence supported the circuit court's decision finding a county supervisor in contempt where a caseworker testified that the supervisor told her to release the emergency hold, the circuit court found the caseworker credible, and the emergency-hold order was clear that the child was to be taken into Department of Human Services custody. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hellyer, 2017 Ark. App. 294, 521 S.W.3d 158 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in holding father in contempt for violating the terms of the paternity order to provide health insurance for the child. Williams v. Lofton, 2018 Ark. App. 606, 569 S.W.3d 872 (2018).

—Disobeying Process.

Where a party having actual notice of the issuance of a writ of injunction against him evades the service of the writ and violates the injunction, he is guilty of contempt, if the court had jurisdiction to make the order. Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S.W. 742 (1909).

One who, even without force or intimidation or direct refusal to obey process, hinders or prevents the prompt service thereof by deception or artifice is guilty of contempt of court. Bryan v. State, 99 Ark. 163, 137 S.W. 561 (1911).

Petitioner held guilty of contempt for failure to respond to subpoena. Morrow v. Roberts, 250 Ark. 822, 467 S.W.2d 393 (1971).

Process, in the sense of this section, is a comprehensive term which includes all writs, rules, orders, executions, warrants, or mandates issued during the progress of an action, even those used to carry a judgment into effect, including a commitment to prison for a criminal offense or for contempt. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

The portion of a commitment order of the court concerning custody of defendant constituted process of the court. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

This section is not a limitation on the power of the courts to impose punishment for disobedience of process, because under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26 the legislature cannot abridge the power of the courts to punish for contempt in disobedience of their process. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 810 S.W.2d 331 (1991).

Refusal to comply with a court order was “disobedience of process” even though the order was not in writing. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Substantial evidence supported the circuit court's finding that appellant willfully disobeyed or resisted the process or order of the court; when confronted with registration and lien information, appellant denied ownership of the vehicles, and he took steps to avoid execution of a writ to the sheriff to take possession of the vehicles. Burrow v. J.T. White Hardware & Lumber Co., 2018 Ark. App. 212, 547 S.W.3d 500 (2018).

—Failure to Answer Question.

A witness adjudged in contempt for failure to answer, after stating that to answer would criminate himself, was denied an appeal. Cossart v. State, 14 Ark. 538 (1854).

The fact that the questions asked a witness are irrelevant or improper furnishes no reason for impeaching the commitment for contempt. Ex parte Butt, 78 Ark. 262, 93 S.W. 992 (1906).

—Intoxication.

Defendant who appeared in court intoxicated was guilty of contempt even if defendant intended no disrespect. Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931 S.W.2d 100 (1996).

—Publications.

Any citizen has the right to comment upon proceedings and decisions of the court, to discuss their correctness and the fitness or unfitness of the judges, but he has no right to degrade the court by libelous publications which are an abuse of the liberty of the press. State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).

Distribution of pamphlet tended to interfere with the orderly conduct of the judiciary by creating a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, and provided basis for contempt conviction. Tupy v. State, 234 Ark. 821, 354 S.W.2d 728 (1962).

—Statements.

It was a contempt of court for an attorney to assert in open court that he had heard the court was corrupt. Davies v. State, 73 Ark. 358, 84 S.W. 633 (1903).

Mere spoken words to a lawyer out of the presence of the court, which make no threat or attempt to interfere in any proceeding, do not amount to criminal contempt. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).

Attorney's argument that the chancellor was biased and had already made her mind up about the case, that she had allowed a worst case scenario to take place, and that she would not even listen to him, was disrespectful and tended to impair the respect due the court's authority. Thus, it was contumacious. Hodges v. Gray, 321 Ark. 7, 901 S.W.2d 1 (1995).

Actions Not Constituting Contempt.

Filing repeated motions which are thought to be for the purpose of vexation or delay does not constitute contempt. Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S.W. 143 (1908).

Evidence insufficient to establish contempt. Ex parte Winn, 105 Ark. 190, 150 S.W. 399 (1912).

Motion asking judge to recuse himself which contained allegations of criminal misconduct was not contemptuous and was not sufficient to form the basis of a conviction for criminal contempt. Clark v. State, 291 Ark. 405, 725 S.W.2d 550 (1987).

Trial court had not issued an order commanding defense attorney from raising issue of informant's prior arrest and misdemeanor convictions for the purpose of showing informant's motive, plan or intent and could not find him in contempt for doing so. McCullough v. Lessenberry, 300 Ark. 426, 780 S.W.2d 9 (1989).

Attorney was wrongly held in contempt because an order barring the attorney's inquiry into witnesses' juvenile probation or juvenile offenses did not bar the attorney's inquiry into the witnesses' states of mind at the time of an occurrence. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Trial court erred in holding a former husband in contempt because he did not willfully disobey the requirements of a final order since it was not definite in its commands regarding the notice to be given and did not clearly express what duties it imposed; the express terms of the order requiring notice of a proposed sale for purposes of the other party's right of first refusal did not require the seller to give “market information” about a mere offer that was presented. Elder v. Elder, 2018 Ark. App. 276, 549 S.W.3d 919 (2018).

Actions Outside Court's Presence.

In contempts not committed in the court's presence, the court may initiate the proceeding to punish the contemnor by a statement or order spread upon the record, but notice thereof should be given to the defendant and a reasonable time afforded him to make his defense. Lee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, 143 S.W. 909 (1912).

There must be an accusation in court and notice to accused when contempt is committed outside presence of the court. Ex parte Coulter, 160 Ark. 550, 255 S.W. 15 (1923).

Contempt, as defined in this section, also includes breach of the peace in matters occurring outside the courtroom which tend to interrupt its proceedings; of course, willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court is considered contumacious conduct. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).

This section merely requires, where the contempt is not committed in the court's presence, that the party charged be notified and have reasonable time to make this defense. Nelson v. Nelson, 20 Ark. App. 85, 723 S.W.2d 849 (1987).

Persons accused of criminal attempt committed outside the court's view must be first notified by a writing, sufficiently definite to inform them to a reasonable degree of certainty of the charge against them, and then be afforded a reasonable time and opportunity to prepare and defend themselves against the charge. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shipman, 25 Ark. App. 247, 756 S.W.2d 930 (1988).

An attorney's conduct in failing to appear occurs outside of presence of court and thus is indirect contempt which may not be summarily punished. Allison v. Dufresne, 340 Ark. 583, 12 S.W.3d 216 (2000).

Appeal.

All criminal contempt cases are to be reviewed by appeal instead of certiorari. Frolic Footwear, Inc. v. State, 284 Ark. 487, 683 S.W.2d 611 (1985).

The proper procedure for the review of a citation holding a party's attorney in criminal contempt is for the attorney, not the party, to appeal the conviction. Marsh v. Hoff, 15 Ark. App. 272, 692 S.W.2d 270 (1985).

In an appeal of a case of criminal contempt, the appellate court will view the record in the light most favorable to the decision of the trial judge and sustain that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

The Arkansas Supreme Court has jurisdiction of appeals in cases involving the discipline of attorneys-at-law, including contempt citations, pursuant to S. Ct. & Ct. App. Rule 1-2(a)(5). Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 171, 889 S.W.2d 769 (1994).

A writ of prohibition is not an appropriate vehicle for requesting that a contempt citation be reviewed and set aside. Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 171, 889 S.W.2d 769 (1994).

Attorney's Fees.

Evidence that appellant actively and knowingly interfered with the process of court was of sufficient force and character for the circuit court to have held appellant in criminal contempt. Because the evidence supported the circuit court's finding of criminal contempt, which is subject to a higher standard of review than a finding of civil contempt, the circuit court did not err when it awarded attorney's fees, which are in the nature of civil contempt. Burrow v. J.T. White Hardware & Lumber Co., 2018 Ark. App. 212, 547 S.W.3d 500 (2018).

Authority of Court.

The right to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. Neel v. State, 9 Ark. 259 (1849); Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).

This section is merely declaratory of what the law was before its passage; the prohibiting clause is entitled to respect as an opinion of the legislature but is not binding upon the courts. State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).

Courts may go beyond the powers given by statute to enforce their constitutional powers when acts in contempt invade them. Lee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, 143 S.W. 909 (1912).

Subsection (b) of this section is not a limitation on power of courts to punish for contempt for disobedience of process. Spight v. State, 155 Ark. 26, 243 S.W. 860 (1922).

Order of chancery court appointing committee to investigate a law firm on charges of contempt and alleged violation of Code of Professional Ethics exceeded jurisdiction of court. Davis v. Merritt, 252 Ark. 659, 480 S.W.2d 924 (1972).

The fact that the actions on which the charge is based may constitute a criminal offense does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to punish the offender for contempt. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

Power to punish for contempt includes the right to inflict reasonable and appropriate punishment upon an offender against the authority and dignity of the court. Edwards v. Jameson, 284 Ark. 60, 679 S.W.2d 195 (1984).

Inherent power to punish for contempt resides in all courts, and such power cannot be removed by enactment of laws to the contrary. Smith v. Smith, 28 Ark. App. 56, 770 S.W.2d 205 (1989).

The standard regarding the inherent power of the court to sentence someone for contempt under this section is included in Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 26. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Subdivision (a)(3) of this section is not a limitation on the power of the court to impose punishment for disobedience of process. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

Although § 16-10-106 provides that all courts shall have the power to issue process which may be necessary in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, it does not provide the trial court with carte blanche authority to issue orders of body attachment, detention, and custody, while ignoring portions of statutory provisions relating to contempt proceedings, such as subsection (c) of this section, and without affording procedural protections of due process of law to the parties being placed in arrest and custody. Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 888 S.W.2d 642 (1994).

Whether or not defendant's behavior falls into one of the five categories in subsection (a) of this section, a court has inherent power to punish contemptuous behavior committed in its presence, without regard to the restrictions imposed by subsection (a); summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931 S.W.2d 100 (1996).

Attorney was wrongly held in contempt as to certain citations because the citations were issued one and four days after the alleged contempt, so subsection (c) of this section required notice and a chance to defend, which were absent. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Court Orders.

Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, that order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him, and the command must be expressed rather than implied. McCullough v. Lessenberry, 300 Ark. 426, 780 S.W.2d 9 (1989).

When an attorney was held in contempt for inquiring into areas which the attorney was barred from asking about, the attorney could not claim, on appeal, that the attorney's cross-examination was unconstitutionally limited because the attorney was required to follow the order, whether or not the order was erroneous. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Issuing a contempt order on Sunday did not invalidate the order because a verdict was received at the same time. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Direct Contempt.

Summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

In a matter involving direct contempt, the circuit court's decision to hold an attorney for the Department of Human Services (DHS) and a DHS caseworker in contempt was supported by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, when the attorney directed the caseworker to leave court to prevent the other parties and the court from presenting or considering evidence in a dependency-neglect hearing concerning change of custody. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Because the conduct in question occurred in the presence of the circuit court judge, the contempt was direct; thus, the circuit court's decision was not subject to the restrictions outlined in subsection (a) of this section, and the circuit court was within its power to punish the alleged contempt summarily. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the circuit court's decision, substantial evidence supported holding an attorney in contempt and imposing a fine; when the circuit court told the attorney the court would not proceed with a guardianship hearing without a written medical report, the attorney questioned the judge's integrity in open court, persisted with that theory after the court explained the court's reasoning, interrupted the court at least three times, and was unwilling to reconsider the accusation after being given an opportunity, displaying a lack of regard for the court's integrity and demonstrating disrespect. Streit v. State (In re Bevill), 2019 Ark. 218, 576 S.W.3d 27 (2019).

Due Process.

The Due Process Clause, as applied in criminal proceedings, requires that an alleged contemnor be notified that a charge of contempt is pending against him and be informed of the specific nature of that charge, and where notice of the charge and the nature thereof are not given, the judgment of conviction for contempt must be reversed. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).

Appellant was not denied due process in contempt proceedings where he was afforded the rights required under this section, appellant acknowledged receipt of the motions which explained how he failed to comply with the order requiring him to provide certain financial information, he was given notice of the contempt hearing, and he was given the opportunity to present a defense at that hearing. Stilley v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist., 367 Ark. 193, 238 S.W.3d 902 (2006).

Circuit court erred in holding an attorney in contempt for obtaining its signature on an amended judgment and commitment order by misrepresenting the state's approval and consent because a letter the circuit court addressed to the attorney provided adequate notice that a hearing would occur, but it did not give the attorney adequate notice that criminal contempt charges were pending against her; both Arkansas law and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were clear that the attorney was entitled to notice not only that the circuit court was investigating the possibility of her misrepresentation but also that it was considering holding her in criminal contempt for alleged misrepresentation. Bloodman v. State, 2010 Ark. 169, 370 S.W.3d 174 (2010).

Circuit court did not err in finding a witness in criminal contempt because he did not inform counsel for a legislative audit committee that he had a conflict, but merely left a voicemail that he was not going to appear at the hearing, his reasons for failing to answer a subpoena did not amount to good cause, the petition and order to show cause sufficiently provided the witness with notice that he was accused of criminal contempt, and he did not preserve his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. Valley v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 112, 431 S.W.3d 916 (2014).

Holding an attorney in contempt did not violate the attorney's rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard because the attorney willfully violated a court order in the court's presence, so the attorney could be summarily punished. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

Wife was afforded due process in a contempt proceeding where case law, subsection (c) of this section, and constitutional law required only that she be notified of the accusation and given a reasonable time to make her defense, and the order to show cause clearly gave notice that her failure to abide by the divorce decree regarding spending her daughter's funds subjected her to the possibility of being held in contempt and provided nearly two months' preparation time. Coleman v. Coleman, 2016 Ark. App. 324, 497 S.W.3d 688 (2016).

County supervisor's due process claim was rejected as the motion for contempt provided the supervisor sufficient notice that she personally faced contempt charges, she and the Department of Human Services were represented at the contempt hearing, she testified at the hearing, and there was no requirement for a verified petition or affidavit. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hellyer, 2017 Ark. App. 294, 521 S.W.3d 158 (2017).

Erroneous Contempt Finding.

It was error to hold a father in indirect contempt for failure to pay child support because the Office of Child Support Enforcement presented no evidence of noncompliance, as counsel's unsworn statements that the father had not paid were not testimony or evidence required to prove indirect contempt occurring outside the court's presence, so there was no such evidence before the court. Williams v. State Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2015 Ark. App. 225, 459 S.W.3d 321 (2015).

Jurisdiction.

Trial court erred in finding the defendant in contempt of court at his third probation revocation hearing because it lost jurisdiction to do so after it executed his sentence at his second revocation hearing by accepting his guilty plea and ordering him to pay a balance of fines, fees, and court costs. Pike v. State, 344 Ark. 478, 40 S.W.3d 795 (2001), superseded by statute as stated in, Carter v. State, 350 Ark. 229, 85 S.W.3d 914 (2002), superseded by statute as stated in, Mills v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 128 (Feb. 11, 2004), superseded by statute as stated in, Rudder v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Ark. App. LEXIS 466 (June 15, 2005).

Notice.

In action for contempt of court where accused was informed of the basis of the alleged contempt in the attachment, was further advised of facts constituting the charge at the outset of the hearing, and was given an opportunity to make his defense, which he presented, that procedure was in full compliance with this section. Hall v. State, 237 Ark. 293, 372 S.W.2d 603 (1963).

Contempt order held deficient and set aside where it failed to inform defendant with reasonable certainty of the facts constituting the offense. Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 252 Ark. 1078, 483 S.W.2d 189 (1972).

Notice held sufficient. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

There is no statutory requirement that the accused be given notice prior to the issuance of an order to show cause. Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978); Clark v. State, 287 Ark. 221, 697 S.W.2d 895 (1985).

Notice held waived. Clark v. State, 287 Ark. 221, 697 S.W.2d 895 (1985).

Where defendant, who had appeared for a hearing on a petition to revoke a suspended sentence, was then first made aware of a criminal contempt charge and the nature and degree of the offense charged, his conviction of criminal contempt was reversed. Sellers v. State, 50 Ark. App. 32, 901 S.W.2d 853 (1995).

The Department of Human Services received constitutionally adequate notice of a show cause order on contempt; although it did not receive written notice of the first scheduled hearing, it was served with notice of the second scheduled hearing. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

Notice of a criminal contempt proceeding was adequate where (1) the contemnor was personally served with a show cause order for the first hearing, (2) although the order did not describe the offense or order that was violated, she was present at the hearing where the matter was discussed, and (3) she was informed by telephone of the date of the second hearing. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

Defendant attorney had to be notified of the accusation of criminal contempt and be afforded a reasonable time to make his defense, and the finding that the petition for order to show cause was deposited with the U.S. Postal Service with first-class mail postage was not sufficient to provide defendant with notice that he was accused of criminal contempt for his failure to appear at a client's hearing; as the record failed to show constitutionally sufficient notice, the judgment was reversed. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

Because a former husband's alleged contemptuous actions occurred outside the immediate view and presence of the trial court, the husband was entitled to notice of the accusation and a reasonable time to make his defense; the former wife's motion did not contain the term “contempt”, and the husband's responding to the wife's motion and appearing before the trial court to defend against it was not synonymous with being notified of and defending against a specific contempt charge. Elder v. Elder, 2018 Ark. App. 276, 549 S.W.3d 919 (2018).

Circuit court erred in finding the father in contempt for nonpayment of child support because he was entitled to notice of the contempt accusation and a reasonable time to defend it, which he did not receive, as the mother did not file a motion for contempt on the issue of the child-support arrearages. Wadley v. Wadley, 2019 Ark. App. 549, 590 S.W.3d 754 (2019).

Circuit court's criminal contempt finding against former wife did not violate due process or this section because the former husband's contempt petition and the wife's response to it belied her argument that she was not informed of the alleged misconduct—not making timely child support payments—or of the possible consequences of it. Crowe v. Crowe, 2020 Ark. App. 37 (2020).

Penalty.

An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character whereas a conditional penalty is civil because it is specifically designed to compel the doing of some act. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).

Where a fine is unconditional and is to be paid to the court, the punishment is punitive in nature as it has no coercive or compensatory aspect, and the contempt proceeding is criminal in nature. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).

Where a circuit court judge held two prosecuting attorneys in contempt after they refused to proceed with the jury trial in a criminal case in contravention of the scheduling order and ordered them incarcerated, the court modified the contempt punishment to time already served in jail and assessed a $100 fine against each prosecutor. Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000).

Punishment.

Imprisonment for contempt in disobeying an order to turn over specific funds found to be in defendant's hands is not an imprisonment for debt. Meeks v. State, 80 Ark. 579, 98 S.W. 378 (1906).

An order for the restitution of specific property or funds will be enforced by punishment for contempt only where the court has first found that such property or funds are in possession or under the control of the person ordered to make the restitution. Dodson v. Butler, 101 Ark. 416, 142 S.W. 503 (1912).

Punishment held excessive. Morrow v. Roberts, 250 Ark. 822, 467 S.W.2d 393 (1971).

Only contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the trial court may be summarily punished; in all other cases, the party charged with contempt shall be notified of the accusation and afforded a reasonable time to make a defense. Harvell v. Harvell, 36 Ark. App. 24, 820 S.W.2d 463 (1991).

A sentence of 90 days in jail was held excessive. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993).

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's mistrial motion when defendant's alibi witness was arrested in the jury's presence because the witness disobeyed a court order in the jury's presence; thus, the court was entitled to summarily punish the witness. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 573, 473 S.W.3d 583 (2015).

Imposing 20 days' incarceration on a wife who admittedly violated a divorce decree requiring her to notify the court before spending her daughter's funds was not an abuse of discretion where the wife admittedly and repeatedly violated a known court order over several years, and the court could have imposed up to 30 days' of incarceration under § 5-4-401(b)(3). Coleman v. Coleman, 2016 Ark. App. 324, 497 S.W.3d 688 (2016).

Circuit court's punishment of an unconditional penalty (eight hours of community service and a one-page paper) is treated by the law as criminal contempt. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Relation to Other Law.

Criminal contempt findings do not violate an automatic bankruptcy stay. Crowe v. Crowe, 2020 Ark. App. 37 (2020).

Right to Appeal.

Because defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor of criminal contempt, he had the right to appeal under § 16-91-101 and Rule 1(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure—Criminal. The mootness doctrine did not bar a direct appeal, despite the fact that he had already served his criminal contempt sentence. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

Defendant was clearly convicted of a misdemeanor because this section, which he was found guilty of violating, states that punishment for contempt is a Class C misdemeanor. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

A defendant's right to a direct appeal from his criminal conviction continues after his service of confinement. Thus, Swindle v. State, 373 Ark. 519, 285 S.W.3d 200 (2008), was clearly wrong to the extent that it conflicted with the Supreme Court's present holding that the mootness doctrine did not bar defendant's direct appeal of his criminal contempt conviction. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

Right to Jury Trial.

Wife was not entitled to a jury trial after the circuit court found her in indirect criminal contempt because there was no dispute that the sentence imposed on the wife for the five counts was less than six months and that §§ 16-10-108 and 5-4-401 did not authorize a sentence in excess of six months, and, while the court did not provide a statutory cap as requested, there was nothing to indicate from the court's colloquy with the wife's counsel that the court contemplated imposing a sentence greater than six months. Damron v. Damron, 2019 Ark. App. 160, 574 S.W.3d 166 (2019).

Service of process.

Service in a criminal contempt proceeding was governed by this section, rather than ARCrP 6.3. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

Time of Hearing.

Circuit court's order finding an attorney in contempt for violating an order was affirmed; although the attorney argued that the contempt hearing was held less than 20 days after the motion was filed, in violation of Ark. R. Civ. P. 6(c), this section sets no fixed time for a party's response to a charge of contempt and the attorney failed to identify any prejudice. Jackson v. Stratton, 2016 Ark. App. 6 (2016).

Cited: Hilton Hilltop, Inc. v. Riviere, 268 Ark. 532, 597 S.W.2d 596 (1980); Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992).

16-10-109. Reading of record — Signing.

Full entries of the orders and proceedings of all courts of record of each day shall be read in open court on the morning of the succeeding day. However, on the last day of the term, the minutes shall be read and signed at the rising of the court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 16; C. & M. Dig., § 2100; Pope's Dig., § 2704; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-106.

Case Notes

Judgments.

This section contemplates that the judgments entered do not become the pronouncements of the court until they have been approved by the court. Stanton v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 194 Ark. 135, 106 S.W.2d 584 (1937).

Signing.

This section does not require the circuit judge to sign the record of the preceding day every morning, but only at the close of the term, and the omission of the judge to sign the record at the close of the term will not invalidate judgments and decrees of the term, though such omission would be gross negligence and subject the judge to animadversion. Ex parte Slocomb Richards & Co., 9 Ark. (4 English) 375 (1849).

16-10-110. Seals.

  1. The Supreme Court and each of the circuit, district, city, and county courts shall preserve and keep a seal, with such emblems and devices as the court shall think proper.
  2. The impression of the seal of any court by stamp shall be sufficient sealing in all cases where sealing is required.
  3. When no official seal is provided, the clerk may use his or her private seal for the authentication of any record, process, or proceeding required by law to be authenticated by the seal of his or her court. The attestation of the clerk stating that he or she has no seal of office and that he or she has affixed his or her private seal shall be received as sufficient authentication without requiring any proof of the private seal or that it was affixed by the clerk.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 8, 11, 12; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2095, 2097, 2098; Pope's Dig., §§ 2699, 2701, 2702; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-102 — 22-104; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 40.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Official seals, § 1-4-108.

Case Notes

Cited: Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975); Unimeks, LLC v. Purolite, 2012 Ark. 20, 386 S.W.3d 419 (2012).

16-10-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning failure to hold court on first day of term, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 41. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 25-27; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2108, 2109, 2209, 2210; Pope's Dig., §§ 2713, 2714, 2850, 2851; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-115 — 22-117.

16-10-112. Proceedings not affected by lapse of term.

No writ, process, plea, or proceeding whatsoever, civil or criminal, shall be deemed discontinued or abated by the failure of any term or session of any court, nor by the failure to enter a continuance of any suit or cause on the record. The suit or cause shall be continued and proceed as if no such failure had happened.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 35; C. & M. Dig., § 2110; Pope's Dig., § 2715; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-118.

16-10-113. Change of term not to affect proceedings.

When any change is made by law in the times of holding any court in this state, the change shall in no way operate to affect or impair, avoid, annul, or discontinue any suit, action, appeal, recognizance, bail bond, notice, or process, original, mesne, or final, taken, instituted, or pending in that court, or returnable to or in that court. However, the suit, action, appeal, etc., shall be and stand valid and effectual in the court at the new term, in every respect, as if no change had been made in the time of holding court.

History. Acts 1856, § 3, p. 27; C. & M. Dig., § 2111; Pope's Dig., § 2716; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-119.

16-10-114. Courts not to open on Sunday — Exceptions.

  1. No court shall be opened or transact business on Sunday unless it is for the purpose of receiving a verdict or discharging a jury.
  2. Every adjournment of a court on Saturday shall always be to some other day than Sunday, except such adjournment as may be made after a cause has been committed to a jury.
  3. This section shall not prevent the exercise of the jurisdiction of any magistrate when it may be necessary in criminal cases to preserve the peace or arrest the offenders; nor shall this section inhibit the exercise of the jurisdiction of any magistrate on Sunday in disposing of misdemeanor cases where the defendant desires to and does enter a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 36; C. & M. Dig., § 2113; Pope's Dig., § 2718; Acts 1955, No. 30, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-120.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Courts Not to Be Open on Sunday — Exceptions, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 393.

Case Notes

Accepting Plea on Sunday.

Where the trial court accepted appellant's plea for capital felony murder on a Sunday, the statutory violation did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction over the matter; further, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was not the proper method with which to claim a statutory violation. Noble v. Norris, 368 Ark. 69, 243 S.W.3d 260 (2006).

Administrative Boards.

An order of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners suspending a chiropractor's license made at the conclusion of a hearing held on Sunday was void. Chester v. Ark. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exmrs., 245 Ark. 846, 435 S.W.2d 100 (1968).

Receiving Verdict on Sunday.

Court, after receiving verdict on Sunday, may adjourn court over to some other day. Eyer v. State, 112 Ark. 37, 164 S.W. 756 (1914).

Issuing a contempt order on Sunday did not invalidate the order because a verdict was received at the same time. James v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 305, 439 S.W.3d 19 (2014).

16-10-115. Trial by temporary judge.

  1. On stipulation of the litigant parties, any court of this state, except in criminal causes, may order a cause to be tried by a temporary judge who is licensed in Arkansas to practice law. The temporary judge shall be sworn and empowered to act until final determination of the cause.
  2. The stipulation of the litigant parties shall include the amount of compensation to be paid the temporary judge for trying the cause and the method of paying the compensation.
  3. The Supreme Court may adopt rules setting forth the procedure for implementing this section.

History. Acts 1981, No. 357, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-147.

Research References

ALR.

Construction and validity of state provisions governing designation of substitute, pro tempore, or special judge. 97 A.L.R.5th 537.

Case Notes

Cited: Worch v. Kelly, 276 Ark. 262, 633 S.W.2d 697 (1982).

16-10-116. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning assignment of judge in civil action pending one year or more, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 42. The section was derived from Acts 1979, No. 82, § 1; 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-146.

16-10-117. Judge temporarily assigned in district — Jury list.

A judge assigned pursuant to § 16-10-101 on a temporary basis to a judicial district other than his or her own may share by concurrence with the judge of any division of the circuit court within that district the division's set of commissioners, jury wheel or box, list of jurors, and panel of jurors.

History. Acts 1971, No. 536, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-142.1.

16-10-118. Judicial officeholder as candidate for nonjudicial office — Resignation — Warrants void.

  1. Whenever the holder of a judicial office in the State of Arkansas becomes a candidate at any primary or general election for a nonjudicial office, he or she shall immediately resign his or her judicial office and thereafter shall be ineligible to hold that judicial office for the balance of the term for which he or she was elected or appointed.
  2. Any warrant issued to the holder of the judicial office after he or she shall become a candidate for a nonjudicial office shall be void.
  3. As used in this section, “judicial office” is defined to mean the office of district judge, circuit judge, Judge or Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, and Associate Justice or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1959, No. 5, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-137 — 22-139; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 43.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-10-119. Travel expenses of judges.

  1. From the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for trial judges' expenses, a circuit judge is authorized to be reimbursed for those travel expenses at the rate as authorized for state employees and for mileage at the rate established in the state travel rules for state employees while traveling within the state in the performance of their official duties.
  2. When a circuit judge is appointed by the Chief Justice to hear a case or cases in a jurisdiction outside of that in which he or she is elected, he or she shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel expenses and mileage as provided in subsection (a) of this section.

History. Acts 1993, No. 4, § 7; 1995, No. 3, § 5; 1997, No. 496, § 1; 2011, No. 274, § 2; 2019, No. 315, § 1291.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-10-119, concerning expenses of judges, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 4, § 6. The former section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 209, § 1; 1981, No. 981, § 1; 1985 (1st Ex Sess.), No. 11, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-141.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “to the Auditor of State” in (a); and added (b).

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (a).

16-10-120, 16-10-121. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the judicial qualifications commission and discipline or removal of judges, were repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1296, § 57. They were derived from the following sources:

16-10-120. Acts 1977, No. 418, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-144, 22-145.

16-10-121. Acts 1977, No. 418, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-145. For present law, see Ark. Const., Amend. 66.

16-10-122. Sheriffs of courts.

The sheriffs of the several counties shall be sheriffs of the several courts in their respective counties, and the sheriff in the county in which the Supreme Court is held shall be sheriff of that court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 21; C. & M. Dig., § 2105; Pope's Dig., § 2709; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-111.

16-10-123. Furnishing fuel, blank books, and stationery.

The several sheriffs are authorized and required to furnish the fuel which may be necessary for the use of the several courts in their respective counties, and the clerks shall furnish all blank books and stationery for the use of the several courts in their respective counties.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 43; C. & M. Dig., § 2114; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-123.

16-10-124. Enforcement of return of writ or process and payment of moneys.

Each court may enforce by attachment the return of any writ or process issued out of the same court and the payment of moneys had and received by any sheriff, coroner, constable, attorney, or collector in his or her official capacity, and the delivery of papers entrusted to him or her officially, and unlawfully withheld.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 22; C. & M. Dig., § 2106; Pope's Dig., § 2710; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-112.

16-10-125. Audit of accounts of sheriff and clerk.

The several courts shall audit and adjust the accounts of the sheriff and clerk for all expenditures made under this act and certify the balance accordingly.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 44; C. & M. Dig., § 2115; Pope's Dig., § 2719; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-124.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, codified as §§ 16-10-10416-10-112, 16-10-114, 16-10-12216-10-125, 16-10-128, 16-11-106, 16-11-108, 16-11-113, 16-13-214, 16-13-219, 16-13-312, 16-13-324, 16-14-103, 16-14-109, 16-15-111, 16-15-113, 16-19-206.

16-10-126. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning investigative assistance to courts in juvenile matters, was repealed by Acts 1991, No. 1081, § 5. The section was derived from Acts 1955, No. 184, §§ 1, 2, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-133, 22-134, 22-136.

16-10-127. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning court interpreters, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1981, No. 477, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-151 — 22-153; Acts 2001, No. 424, § 1.

16-10-128. Transcripts — Bills of exceptions.

In making out transcripts of records, except on writs of error and appeals, the bills of exception shall not be inserted unless specially required by the applicant therefor.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 17; C. & M. Dig., § 2101; Pope's Dig., § 2705; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-107.

16-10-129. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning abolition of judicial districts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 44. The section was derived from Acts 1931, No. 153, §§ 1-4; Pope's Dig., §§ 2592-2595; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-126 — 22-129.

16-10-130. Precedence given to criminal trials when victim under age of fourteen.

Notwithstanding any rule of court to the contrary and in furtherance of the purposes of Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.1, all courts of this state having jurisdiction of criminal offenses, except for extraordinary circumstances, shall give precedence to the trials of criminal offenses over other matters before the court, civil or criminal, when the alleged victim is a person under the age of fourteen (14).

History. Acts 1985, No. 569, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-159.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 569, § 1, is also codified as § 16-80-102.

Enforcement of § 16-10-130, Administrative Order No. 6, Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Appendix, Rules Volume.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The legislature did not intend to create on behalf of youthful victims standing to pursue active involvement in pending criminal cases. This section mandates the urgent scheduling of those cases for trial in preference to all other cases, absent extraordinary circumstances, and the wording of this section does not suggest that anything other than a priority is intended. Thompson v. Erwin, 310 Ark. 533, 838 S.W.2d 353 (1992).

16-10-131. Exemption from overtime parking penalties.

  1. No judge or his or her court reporter of any court of this state shall be subject to a fine or other penalty for the offense of overtime parking incurred while the person was on duty as a judge or court reporter.
  2. Any person attempting to enforce any fine or other penalty notwithstanding the provisions of this section shall be subject to contempt proceedings before the judge of the court being served by the person so charged.
  3. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to give immunity from fine or penalty other than for the offense of overtime parking.

History. Acts 1971, No. 364, § 1; 1971, No. 729, §§ 3, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-119, 39-120; Acts 1987, No. 711, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1971, No. 364, § 1 and 1971, No. 729, §§ 3, 4 are also codified as § 16-31-105.

16-10-132. Addresses of parties.

The records of all judgments rendered in any circuit, county, district, or city court shall contain the addresses of all parties when reasonably ascertainable.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1087, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 45.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-10-133. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning trial court staff, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 268, § 14. The section was derived from Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 16; 1997, No. 209, § 3; 1997, No. 788, § 27; 1997, No. 1341, § 26; 1999, No. 1508, § 7; 2003, No. 932, § 3.

16-10-134. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning trial court staff and their credit for county service, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 268, § 15. The section was derived from Acts 1997, No. 1355, § 10.

16-10-135. Aids for the hearing or visually impaired.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall employ the most cost-efficient method of procuring auxiliary aids for persons with hearing and visual impairments.
  2. These methods may include entering into a contractual arrangement with another state agency or with a private entity that is capable of providing these services.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1355, § 9.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1418, § 24, provided:

“Procurement-Auxiliary Aids. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall employ the most cost efficient method of procuring auxiliary aids for persons with hearing and visual impairments. These methods may include entering into a contractual arrangement with another state agency or with a private entity that is capable of providing these services. The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2003.”

Cross References. Interpreters for visually or hearing impaired jurors, § 16-31-108.

16-10-136. Extrajudicial activities of justices and judges.

Restrictions on extrajudicial activities found in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, shall not preclude a justice or judge from:

  1. Being a member of a reserve unit of any branch of the United States armed forces;
  2. Being a member of the National Guard;
  3. Teaching;
  4. Serving on any state or United States boards or commissions which relate to the law for the administration of justice;
  5. Serving in an extrajudicial capacity that is not prohibited by the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct; or
  6. Serving as judge of a city court.

History. Acts 2001, No. 914, § 1; 2005, No. 1934, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (6) and made a related change.

16-10-137. Administrative Office of the Courts — Annual report.

  1. On July 31 of each year, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall submit an annual report to the Legislative Council showing the number of persons charged in circuit court for each criminal offense classification, comparing the state and each judicial district.
  2. The report shall include a breakdown by race of all persons charged in each criminal offense classification.
  3. The report shall include the same data for those cases in which a final disposition has been entered by the court.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 3; 2011, No. 1132, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 1, provided:

“Intent.

(a) Ethnic minorities appear to be over represented in the population of persons who are involved in the criminal justice system, charged as defendants, convicted, and incarcerated throughout the United States criminal justice systems.

“(b) It is the responsibility of criminal justice agencies and the courts in the State of Arkansas to ensure that all actions taken are based upon reasons other than the race of the defendant.

“(c) In order to allow the General Assembly to conduct a thorough review of the Arkansas criminal justice process, information on actions taken by criminal justice agencies and the courts must be reported in a timely, uniform, and consistent manner.”

The Commission on Disparity in Sentencing, referred to in (a), was to be created by HB 2264 of the 2003 session, which did not pass.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a), substituted “On July 31 of each year” for “Beginning July 21, 2003, and on July 31 of each year thereafter” and deleted “and the Commission on Disparity in Sentencing” following “Legislative Council.”

16-10-138. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning mandatory reporter training, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 375, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 703, § 13.

16-10-139. Specialty court program evaluation and approval — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “specialty court program” means one of the following:
    1. A pre-adjudication program under § 5-4-901 et seq.;
    2. An approved drug court program under the Arkansas Drug Court Act, § 16-98-301 et seq.;
    3. The Swift and Certain Accountability on Probation Pilot Program under § 16-93-1701 et seq.; and
    4. Any other specialty court program that has been approved by the Supreme Court, including without limitation specialty court programs known as:
      1. A DWI court;
      2. A mental health court;
      3. A veteran's court;
      4. A juvenile drug court;
      5. A “HOPE” court;
      6. A “smarter sentencing” court; and
      7. A mental health crisis intervention center.
  2. A specialty court program operated by a circuit court or district court must be approved by the Supreme Court in the administrative plan submitted under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14.
    1. The Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee shall evaluate and make findings with respect to all specialty court programs operated by a circuit court or district court in this state and refer the findings to the Supreme Court.
    2. An evaluation under this section shall reflect nationally recognized and peer-reviewed standards for each particular type of specialty court program.
    3. The Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee shall also:
      1. Establish, implement, and operate a uniform specialty court program evaluation process to ensure specialty court program resources are uniformly directed to high-risk and medium-risk offenders and that specialty court programs provide effective and proven practices that reduce recidivism, as well as other factors such as substance dependency, among participants;
      2. Establish an evaluation process that ensures that any new and existing specialty court program that is a drug court meets standards for drug court operation under § 16-98-302(b); and
      3. Promulgate rules to be approved by the Supreme Court to carry out the evaluation process under this section.
  3. A specialty court program shall be evaluated under the following schedule:
    1. A specialty court program established on or after April 1, 2015, shall be evaluated after its second year of funded operation;
    2. A specialty court program in existence on April 1, 2015, shall be evaluated under the requirements of this section prior to expending resources budgeted for fiscal year 2017; and
    3. A specialty court program shall be reevaluated every two (2) years after the initial evaluation.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 15.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

16-10-140. Accumulation of data concerning sexual offenses — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Family or household member” means the same as defined in § 5-26-302; and
    2. “Sex offense” means the same as defined in § 12-12-903.
    1. Consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Office of the Courts is encouraged to individually track or design a method to track and accumulate data on the familial or residential status of the victim of a sex offense in relation to the offender.
    2. A method designed under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall:
      1. Indicate whether the victim was a family or household member of the offender at the time of the sex offense; and
      2. Protect against revealing the identity of the victim, either directly or indirectly.

History. Acts 2017, No. 571, § 1.

16-10-141. District court costs and fees — Specialty courts.

  1. As used in this section, “specialty court program” means the same as defined in § 16-10-139.
  2. A district court judge presiding over a specialty court program that has been approved by the Supreme Court may order the offender to pay:
    1. Court costs as provided in § 16-10-305;
    2. Treatment costs;
    3. Drug testing costs;
    4. A local specialty court program user fee;
    5. Necessary supervision fees, including any applicable residential treatment fees;
    6. Global Positioning System monitoring costs; and
    7. Continuous alcohol monitoring fees.
    1. The district court judge presiding over a specialty court program shall establish a schedule for the payment of specialty court program costs and fees.
    2. The costs for treatment, drug testing, continuous alcohol monitoring and supervision shall be set by the treatment and supervision providers and made part of the order of the district court judge presiding over a specialty court program for payment.
    3. Specialty court program user fees shall be set by the district court judge presiding over a specialty court program.
    4. The costs for treatment, drug testing, continuous alcohol monitoring, and supervision shall be paid to the respective providers.
      1. Court costs and local specialty court program user fees assessed by the district court judge presiding over the specialty court program shall be paid to the county, town, or city official, agency, or department that is primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed by the district court under § 16-13-709 for remittance into a local fund entitled the “District Court Specialty Court Program Fund”.
      2. Installment payments shall be considered a payment toward court costs under § 16-10-305 until the court costs have been collected in full.
      3. Any remaining payments representing collections of other fees and costs as authorized in this section shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the city treasurer of the city in which the district court is located to be deposited into the fund.
      4. A district court that is funded solely by the county shall remit all remaining funds by the tenth day of each month to the county treasurer of the county in which the district court is located to be deposited into the fund.
      5. Expenditures from the fund shall require the approval of the district court judge presiding over the specialty court program and shall be authorized and paid by law concerning the appropriation and payment of county or municipal expenditures by the governing body or, if applicable, governing bodies, that contribute to the expenses of the district court.
        1. Expenditures from the fund shall be used solely for the support, benefit, and administration of the specialty court program.
        2. Expenditures may be made for indirect expenses related to the specialty court program, including training and travel expenses, program user incentives, graduation costs, and supplies.
    5. Court orders for costs and fees shall remain an obligation of the offender and shall be monitored by the district court until fully paid.
  3. A grant awarded to a specialty court program presided over by a district court judge, as well as all memorials, honorariums, and other monetary gifts to the specialty court program shall be deposited into the fund.
  4. A fee or costs under this section may be waived in whole or in part if the district court finds that the person subject to paying the cost or fee is indigent.

History. Acts 2019, No. 1044, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Accounting Practices

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Cross References. Arkansas Governmental Compliance Act, § 10-4-301 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1991, No. 904, § 28: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the language of certain court cost statutes lacks uniformity; that such lack of uniformity is detrimental to the proper collection of such court costs; and that such language should be standardized to promote the proper collection of such costs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1999, No. 1508, § 19: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act makes various technical corrections in the Arkansas Code; that this act further clarifies the law to provide that the Arkansas Code Revision Commission may correct errors resulting from enactments of prior sessions; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to be applicable during the codification process of the enactments of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2011, No. 1174, § 10: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2013, No. 282, § 17: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-10-201. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and cited as the “Arkansas District Courts Accounting Law”.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1101; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 46, 47; 2007, No. 663, § 21.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “and City Courts” following “Courts.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-202. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Citation” means a written order or electronic ticket issued by a law enforcement officer or employee of the department of public safety of a city or incorporated town who is authorized to make an arrest, requiring a person accused of violating the law to appear in a designated court or governmental office at a specified date and time;
  2. “Court” means a district court in the State of Arkansas; and
  3. “Electronic ticket” means an electronic citation or warning printed by a law enforcement officer and issued to a person accused of violating the law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1102; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 46, 47; 2007, No. 663, § 22; 2011, No. 908, §§ 1, 2; 2011, No. 1174, § 1.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “unless the context otherwise requires” following “subchapter” and “and city” following “district.”

The 2011 amendment by No. 908 inserted (1) and (3) and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and deleted “unless the context otherwise requires” from the end of the introductory language.

The 2011 amendment by No. 1174 inserted (1) and (3) and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and deleted “unless the context otherwise requires” at the end of the introductory language.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-203. Applicability of subchapter.

This subchapter shall apply to any district court within the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1102; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 46, 47; 2007, No. 663, § 23.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “and city courts” following “courts.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-204. Bank accounts for court funds.

    1. Each municipal police department and each city or town marshal shall maintain court funds separately in depositories approved for those specific purposes by law.
    2. Court funds must be deposited into an account styled “(Name of Municipality) Police Department Bond and Fine Account”, and the funds shall be disbursed only on the signature of the chief of police or marshal of the municipality and the signature of one (1) other authorized person.
    1. Each office of county sheriff shall maintain court funds separately in depositories approved for those specific purposes by law.
    2. Court funds must be deposited into an account styled “(Name of County) County Sheriff's Bond and Fine Account”, and the funds shall be disbursed only on the signature of the sheriff of the county and the signature of one (1) other authorized person.
    1. Each court shall maintain court funds separately in depositories approved for those specific purposes by law.
    2. Court funds must be deposited into an account styled “(Name of Court) Court Account”, and the funds shall be disbursed only upon the signature of the court clerk and the signature of one (1) other person to be authorized by the court's presiding judge.
  1. All disbursements from the accounts in this section must be evidenced by prenumbered checks.
  2. Subsections (a) and (b) of this section do not apply if the court clerk has been designated to be primarily responsible for the collection of fines under § 16-13-709.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1103; Acts 2011, No. 1174, § 2.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted former (a) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; added “maintain court funds separately in depositories approved for those specific purposes by law” in present (a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1); and added present (d) and (e).

16-10-205. Citations.

  1. Each municipal police department, city or town marshal, and county sheriff's office shall maintain and issue uniform written citations or electronic citations for violation of all municipal and state laws.
    1. All uniform written citation books must be prenumbered by the printer and a printer's certificate shall be furnished to the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office, and the certificate shall be made available for inspection.
    2. The certificate must state the printing date, the numerical sequence of citations printed, and the printer's name.
  2. All void or spoiled written citations must be accounted for by attaching all copies to the hard copy in the uniform citation book.
    1. All written citations must have at least an original and three (3) copies used and distributed as follows:
      1. Hard copy: Violator's copy;
      2. White copy: Police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office copy;
        1. Yellow copy: Court clerk's copy, to be forwarded to the Office of Driver Services as provided in this subdivision (d)(1)(C).
        2. Within five (5) business days after a conviction or forfeiture of bail of a person charged with a violation of any law regulating the operation of vehicles on a highway, § 3-3-203(a) or § 5-27-503(a)(3), the clerk shall forward the yellow copy covering the case in which the person was convicted or forfeited bail.
        3. The yellow copy shall be certified by the person required to prepare it and shall include the name and address of the party charged, the registration number of the vehicle involved, the nature of the offense, the date of hearing, the plea, the judgment or whether bail was forfeited, and the amount of the fine or forfeiture.
        4. Within five (5) business days after the disposition of any case, the clerk shall forward the yellow copy of the citation and the resulting disposition of the case.
        5. A court using the case management system provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts or the electronic reporting system of the Office of Driver Services is not required to submit the yellow copy to the Office of Driver Services but must enter the disposition or judgment of conviction into the case management system or the electronic reporting system within the time required in this section; and
      3. Pink copy: Remains in uniform citation book.
    2. The citations shall be given to the police department, marshal's office, sheriff's office, or court clerk at least seven (7) business days before the court date.
  3. If an electronic citation is used:
    1. The electronic citation shall indicate whether or not there was a person under eighteen (18) years of age present at the time of the offense for which the electronic citation was issued;
    2. A printed copy of the electronic citation shall be given to the violator;
    3. A copy of the electronic citation must be maintained by the issuing police department, marshal's office, or county sheriff's office; and
      1. A copy of the electronic citation shall be forwarded to the court clerk in either electronic or written format, as designated by the court clerk, at least seven (7) business days before the court date.
      2. The court clerk's copy shall be forwarded to the Office of Driver Services as provided in subdivision (d)(1)(C) of this section.
  4. If an electronic citation system is used, the system must be in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
  5. Controls for citations.
    1. A list of all uniform written citation books and the corresponding range of citations in each book shall be kept in the police department, office of city or town marshal, or sheriff's office.
    2. The chief of police, marshal, or sheriff shall issue the uniform written citation books, unless the chief of police, marshal, or sheriff designates in writing another person to perform this duty.
    3. The chief of police, marshal, or sheriff shall ensure that all citations issued are entered on the arrest report or in the electronic case management system.
    4. Upon completion, each uniform written citation book shall immediately be filed with the court clerk and made available for inspection.
    5. Upon case adjudication, the police department, office of city or town marshal, or sheriff's office shall file its copy of the citation either alphabetically or numerically.
  6. A citation issued by a school resource officer under § 16-81-118 is exempt from the requirements of this section.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1104; Acts 2009, No. 456, § 1; 2011, No. 44, § 1; 2011, No. 908, § 3; 2011, No. 1174, § 3; 2015, No. 1179, § 2; 2017, No. 714, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (d).

The 2011 amendment by No. 44, in (d)(1)(C)(v), inserted “or the electronic reporting system of the Office of Driver Services” and “or the electronic reporting system.”

The 2011 amendment by No. 908 inserted “written or electronic” in (a); inserted “written” following “All” at the beginning of (b), (c), and (d)(1); and added (e).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1174 substituted “Citations” for “Uniform traffic tickets” in the section heading; substituted “written citations or electronic citations” for “traffic ticket books, sometimes called citation books, summons books, or ticket books” in (a); in (b)(1), substituted “written citation” for “traffic ticket” and deleted “or other evidence” following “the certificate”; inserted (b)(2); in (c), substituted “written citations” for “tickets” and “uniform citation” for “traffic ticket”; substituted “written citations” for “uniform traffic ticket books” in the introductory language of (d)(1); in (d)(1)(C)(v), inserted “or the electronic reporting system of the Office of Driver Services” and “or the electronic reporting system”; rewrote (d)(2); and added (e) through (g).

The 2015 amendment added (h).

The 2017 amendment added (e)(1) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; substituted “shall” for “must” in (e)(2) and (e)(4)(A); and inserted “county” preceding “sheriff's” in (e)(3).

16-10-206. Court docket.

  1. All violations shall be docketed and all judgments shall be rendered by the court's presiding judge.
  2. The court docket shall reflect the complete history of the violation and the disposition of each case, and shall contain the following information:
    1. The citation number;
    2. The date and nature of the violation;
    3. The date the court convened to hear the case;
    4. The names of arresting officers and witnesses, if any;
    5. The judgment rendered by the court;
    6. The signature or initials of the judge;
    7. The total amount of the fine and costs;
    8. The receipt number and dollar amount evidencing payment of fine and costs; and
    9. If applicable, the check number and dollar amount evidencing authorized bond refund. The check itself will indicate the docket number evidencing authorization.
  3. The docket shall be numbered by the court clerk in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the State of Arkansas.
    1. For manual dockets, the docket pages shall be prenumbered by the printer, and a printer's certificate or other evidence shall be furnished to the court's clerk which shall be made available for inspection.
    2. Docket pages must be either bound or loose-leaf, provided that accountability and control are maintained over loose-leaf docket pages.
  4. For manual or electronic dockets, the docket pages shall be numbered independently of court docket numbers assigned by the court clerk.
  5. The court clerk shall keep separate court dockets, one (1) for city cases and one (1) for county cases.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1105; Acts 2005, No. 1934, § 2; 2011, No. 1174, § 4.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (c) inserted “the Rules of the” and deleted “Administrative Ruling No. 73-240, beginning with the last two (2) digits of the current year and the number assigned to the case beginning with the number one (1), e.g., 77-1” from the end.

The 2011 amendment deleted “sheet” following “The court docket” in the introductory language of (b); substituted “citation number” for “uniform traffic ticket number” in (b)(1); in (b)(7), inserted “total” and deleted “itemized” following “costs”; inserted “For manual dockets” in (d)(1); inserted present (d)(2); and deleted former (e) and redesignated former (d)(2) as present (e).

16-10-207. Police department and marshals' and sheriffs' offices — Activities and clerical duties required.

The following activities and clerical duties relating to court functions shall be required of all police departments, city or town marshals, and sheriffs' offices:

  1. Preparation and Submission of Arrest Report.
    1. Separate arrest reports shall be prepared for city cases and county cases.
    2. The arrest report shall contain the following information:
      1. Citation number;
      2. Violator's name;
      3. Nature of the offense;
      4. Name of the arresting officer;
      5. Receipt number, if applicable;
      6. Fine and costs collected, if applicable; and
      7. Any other additional information deemed appropriate or necessary.
    3. Before the court date, the arrest report shall be prepared from the citations accumulated in the court date file in the police department office, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
    4. If applicable, the fine and costs collected shall be totaled, and a check shall be drawn payable to the court fund that represents moneys collected and receipts issued by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office for those citations contained on the arrest report.
    5. A completed copy of the arrest report accompanied by the police department's, marshal's office, or sheriff's office check, if applicable, shall be delivered to the court clerk at least seven (7) business days before the court date; and
  2. Collection, Receipt, and Deposit Procedures.
    1. This subdivision (2) does not apply if the court clerk has been designated to be primarily responsible for the collection of fines under § 16-13-709.
    2. A prenumbered receipt must be issued for all moneys collected.
    3. Prenumbered manual receipts must meet the following minimum standards:
      1. All receipt books must be prenumbered by the printer, and a printer's certificate shall be furnished to the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office, which shall be made available for inspection;
      2. The certificate must state the printing date, the numerical sequence of receipts printed, and the printer's name; and
      3. All void or spoiled receipts must be accounted for by attaching the original copy of the receipt to the duplicate copy of the receipt in the receipt book, with the reason for the void or spoiled receipt documented and retained for audit purposes.
    4. If an electronic receipting system is used, the system must be in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    5. The receipt shall be issued in the name of the violator regardless of who paid the bond or fine or who collected the bond or fine and must indicate the method of payment, such as cash, check, money order, or credit card.
      1. Receipts shall be deposited intact daily into the bank account maintained by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
      2. All receipt numbers shall be entered on the arrest report by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
    6. The police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office may maintain separate bank accounts for city cases and county cases.
      1. The bank deposit slips prepared by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office shall contain the range of receipt numbers evidencing such collections.
      2. In addition, the receipts issued shall be reconciled with the monthly bank deposits.
    7. A bank reconciliation shall be made at the end of each month, and any balance remaining in the bank account shall be identified with receipts issued but not yet entered on the arrest report.
      1. A cash receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be established.
      2. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing must indicate the receipt number, receipt date, violator's name, amount of the receipt, and classification of the receipt.
      3. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      4. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the bank statements.
      1. A cash disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be established.
      2. The disbursements journal or electronic check register must indicate the date, payee, check number, amount for each check written, and the classification of the disbursement.
      3. The disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      4. The disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the bank statements.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1106; Acts 2007, No. 627, § 1; 2009, No. 456, § 2; 2011, No. 1174, § 5.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment inserted “or her” following “him” in (1)(C); deleted former (1)(F); and made related changes.

The 2009 amendment deleted (2), which was entitled “Issuance of Uniform Traffic Tickets.”

The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

16-10-208. Court clerk or court administrator — Eligibility.

The court clerk or court administrator shall not be a member of the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1107; Acts 2011, No. 1174, § 6.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “or court administrator.”

16-10-209. Court clerk — Activities and clerical duties.

The following activities and clerical duties relating to court functions shall be required of all court clerks:

  1. Collection, Receipt, and Deposit Procedures.
    1. A prenumbered receipt must be issued for all moneys collected.
    2. Prenumbered manual receipts must meet the following minimum standards:
      1. All receipt books must be prenumbered by the printer, and a printer's certificate shall be furnished to the court clerk, which shall be made available for inspection;
      2. The certificate must state the printing date, the numerical sequence of receipts printed, and the printer's name; and
      3. All void or spoiled receipts must be accounted for by attaching the original copy of the receipt to the duplicate copy of the receipt in the receipt book, with the reason for the void or spoiled receipt documented and retained for audit purposes.
    3. If an electronic receipting system is used, the system must be in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
      1. For those checks forwarded with the arrest reports, the receipt shall be issued in the name of the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
      2. For those receipts issued at court date, the court clerk shall issue such receipts in the name of the defendant, regardless of who paid the bond or fine or who collected the bond or fine, indicating on the receipt the method of payment, such as cash, check, money order, or credit card.
    4. Receipts shall be deposited intact daily into the separate bank account maintained by the court clerk.
      1. The bank deposit slips prepared by the court clerk shall contain the range of receipt numbers evidencing such collections.
      2. Additionally, the receipts issued shall be reconciled with the monthly bank deposits.
    5. A bank reconciliation shall be made at the end of each month, and any balance remaining in the bank account shall be identified with receipt numbers for cases not yet adjudicated and the payments made on all unpaid individual time accounts.
    6. The court clerk may maintain separate bank accounts for city cases and for county cases;
  2. Preparation and Submission of Distribution Report.
    1. The distribution report shall contain the following information:
      1. The citation number;
      2. The defendant's name;
      3. The nature of the offense;
      4. The name of arresting officer;
      5. The court docket number;
      6. The disposition or date continued;
      7. The receipt number;
      8. The total fine and costs collected;
      9. The fine;
      10. The fees and costs itemized;
      11. The bond refund amount;
      12. The bond refund check number; and
      13. The installment payment amount.
    2. The court clerk at each court date shall prepare the distribution report from the arrest report supplied by the police department, marshal's office, or sheriff's office.
    3. At the end of each court date, the court clerk shall complete the distribution report for the court date and total the dollar amounts contained in the report.
    4. The distribution reports prepared each court date shall be summarized at least monthly.
    5. The court clerk shall make a direct monetary settlement on or before the tenth day of the next-following month with each of the following:
      1. The city treasurer;
      2. The county treasurer;
      3. The Administration of Justice Funds Section; and
      4. Any other state agency or entity which receives fines or fees assessed by the court and collected pursuant to law.
    6. The court clerk shall submit electronically or in writing a monthly distribution report describing the direct monetary settlements under subdivision (2)(E) of this section no later than the tenth day of each month to the county treasurer;
  3. Minimum Bookkeeping Requirements.
      1. The court clerk shall maintain a cash receipts journal or electronic receipts listing.
      2. The court clerk may maintain separate cash receipts journals or electronic receipts listings for city cases and county cases.
      3. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing must indicate the receipt number, receipt date, violator's or payor's name, amount of the receipt, and classification of the receipt.
      4. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      5. The receipts journal or electronic receipts listing shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the bank statements.
      1. The court clerk shall maintain a cash disbursements journal or electronic check register.
      2. The court clerk may maintain separate cash disbursements journals or electronic check registers for city cases and county cases.
      3. The disbursements journal or electronic check register must indicate the date, payee, check number, amount for each check written, and classification of the disbursement.
      4. The disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      5. The disbursements journal or electronic check register shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the bank statements;
  4. Bond Refunds.
    1. All bond refunds shall be made only upon the authorization of the presiding judge and shall be indicated as such on the court docket.
      1. All bond refunds shall be made only by a check drawn on the court's bank account.
      2. Additionally, the check shall indicate the court docket number for authorization.
    2. The court clerk shall enter all bond refunds on the applicable distribution report;
  5. Installment Payments.
    1. Installment payments shall be allowed only upon the authorization of the presiding judge and shall be indicated as such on the court docket.
      1. The court clerk shall establish and maintain individual installment payment account ledger records, with a duplicate copy of the ledger record being furnished to and maintained by the county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts.
      2. The ledger records shall contain the following minimum information:
        1. Name of the individual;
        2. Court docket number and court date;
        3. Nature of the violation;
        4. Total fine and costs assessed;
        5. Receipt number, date, and amount of payment; and
        6. Unpaid balance of fine, fees, and costs.
    2. The county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts shall be responsible for collecting all installment payments and shall enter all collected installment payments on each applicable arrest or distribution report.
      1. The court clerk shall establish and maintain a control total for installment payments, which is a summary of all unpaid individual installment payment accounts.
      2. The control total shall be reconciled monthly with the individual installment payment accounts.
      1. The court clerk shall furnish the county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts and the presiding judge monthly with a list of all unpaid installment payment accounts for which a payment has not been received within the past thirty (30) days.
      2. The presiding judge shall then take the necessary action deemed appropriate in the circumstances.
      1. All installment payments shall initially be deemed to be collections of court costs until the court costs have been collected in full, with any remaining installment payments representing collections of restitution, and then fines.
      2. If court costs, restitution, and fines are fully paid, all remaining installment payments shall be allocated to remaining amounts due.
      3. A municipal or county governing body that adopted municipal or county legislation before July 1, 2012, to provide an alternative method of installment payment allocation as then authorized by state law shall remain in effect until repealed; and
  6. Reconciliation of Completed Citation Books.
    1. The court clerk shall reconcile on a quarterly basis on or before the fifteenth day of the month following the end of the calendar quarter the individual citations in the completed citation book to the individual citations as reflected on the arrest reports or court dockets.
      1. For any discrepancies noted in the reconciliation in subdivision (6)(A) of this section, the court clerk shall prepare a list and present this list to the court's judge for his or her appropriate action.
      2. This list shall be maintained for audit purposes.
    2. If the court clerk is designated under § 16-13-709 to be primarily responsible for the collection of fines, the reconciliation of completed citation books described in this subdivision (6) shall be performed by someone outside of the court clerk's office as determined by the court judge.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 7; 1985, No. 677, §§ 1, 2; 1985, No. 776, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1107; Acts 1991, No. 904, § 21; 1997, No. 788, § 3; 1997, No. 1341, § 3; 1999, No. 1081, §§ 1, 2; 1999, No. 1508, § 7; 2003, No. 1765, § 7; 2005, No. 1934, § 3; 2011, No. 1174, § 7; 2013, No. 282, § 3; 2015, No. 903, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment by No. 1132 deleted “in conjunction with the making of the monetary settlement in subdivision (2)(E)(ii) [repealed] of this section” following “The court clerk” in the introductory language of (2)(F).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1174 rewrote the section.

The 2013 amendment rewrote (5)(F)(ii); and added (5)(F)(iii).

The 2015 amendment added (2)(F).

Cross References. Establishment of city and county shares, § 16-10-602.

Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-10-210. Accounting systems above minimum.

  1. Any official charged with the maintenance of accounting or bookkeeping records under the provisions of this subchapter whose system of bookkeeping is such that it does not strictly adhere to the provisions of this subchapter, but in that official's opinion equals or exceeds the basic requirements prescribed by this subchapter, may request the court's presiding judge to request a review by the staff of the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
  2. Upon the committee's concurrence with the official's opinion regarding the capability of the existing system of bookkeeping, a letter shall be issued by the committee to the court's presiding judge stating that the official's accounting system is of such a degree of sophistication that the basic requirements of this subchapter are being met.
  3. After issuance of the letter by the committee under subsection (b) of this section, the official is exempt from the requirements of the particulars of the procedures prescribed by this subchapter, provided the official's system of bookkeeping is not altered.

History. Acts 1977, No. 332, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1108; Acts 2007, No. 627, § 2.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added the (a), (b) and (c) designations; in (a), substituted “Any” for “In the event any”, substituted “whose system” for “who feels his system,” inserted “does not strictly adhere to the provisions of this subchapter but, in that official's opinion,” substituted “basic requirements” for “basic system,” deleted “he” preceding “may” and inserted “staff of the” preceding “Legislative”; substituted “the official's opinion regarding the capability of the existing system of bookkeeping, a letter shall be issued by the committee to the court's presiding judge” for “such facts, the committee may issue a certificate to that official” in (b); and in (c), substituted “After issuance of the letter by the committee under subsection (b) of this section, the official is exempt” for “and exempting the official,” substituted “procedures” for “system” and inserted “provided the official's system of bookkeeping is not altered” following “subchapter.”

16-10-211. Record retention schedule.

  1. All towns, cities, and counties of the State of Arkansas shall maintain records for the district courts and are to:
    1. Permanently maintain:
      1. Case indices for all district courts;
      2. Case dockets for all district courts;
      3. Active warrants;
      4. Waivers;
      5. Expungement and sealed records;
      6. Files concerning convictions under the Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.; and
      7. Domestic battering files;
    2. Maintain for a period of at least seven (7) years and in no event dispose of before being audited:
      1. Complete case files and written exhibits for all district courts, not including civil or small claims division cases in which the judgment is not satisfied;
      2. Show cause orders;
      3. Case information, including arrest reports and affidavits; and
      4. Files concerning cases resulting in a suspended imposition of sentence; and
    3. Maintain for a period of at least three (3) years and in no event dispose of before being audited:
      1. Bank reconciliations;
      2. Check book registers and check listings;
      3. Cancelled checks;
      4. Bank statements;
      5. Receipts;
      6. Deposit collection records;
      7. Receipts listings;
      8. Distribution reports;
      9. Receipt and disbursement journals;
      10. Time payment records;
      11. Citation book logs;
      12. Citation books from each police department and sheriff's office;
      13. Served, recalled, or quashed arrest warrants;
      14. Copies of citations;
      15. Alternative service or community service time sheets;
      16. Uniform filing fees collection remittance forms and fine reports;
      17. Miscellaneous fee and fine collection reports; and
      18. Served or unexecuted search warrants.
  2. After a town, city, or county has maintained records for the time periods required by subdivision (a)(2) or subdivision (a)(3) of this section and after the records described in subdivision (a)(2) or subdivision (a)(3) of this section have been audited, the records may be destroyed.
  3. When records are destroyed under subsection (b) of this section, the town, city, or county shall document the destruction by the following procedure:
    1. An affidavit is to be prepared stating:
      1. Which records are being destroyed and to which period of time the records apply; and
      2. The method of destruction; and
    2. The affidavit is to be signed by the town, city, or county employee performing the destruction and one (1) employee of the governing body or, if applicable, governing bodies that contribute to the expenses of the court.
  4. In addition to the procedure described in subsection (c) of this section, the approval of the governing body or, if applicable, governing bodies that contribute to the expenses of the court shall be obtained before the destruction of district court records and an appropriate note of the approval indicated in the minutes of the governing body or bodies along with the destruction affidavit.

History. Acts 2007, No. 627, § 3; 2009, No. 633, § 6; 2011, No. 1174, § 8; 2015, No. 299, § 17; 2015, No. 584, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote (a); deleted former (c)(2)(A) and (d)(1) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and, in present (c)(2), deleted “For district court records” at the beginning and deleted “described in subdivision (c)(1) of this section” following “affidavit.”

The 2015 amendment by No. 299 inserted “or BWI” following “Omnibus DWI” in (a)(1)(F).

The 2015 amendment by No. 584 inserted “district” preceding “courts” in (a)(1)(A) and (B); inserted “district” preceding “courts” and added “not including civil … is not satisfied” in (a)(2)(A); inserted “recalled, or quashed arrest” in (a)(3)(M); and added (a)(3)(R).

16-10-212. City courts — Loss of authority — Enforcement by legislative audit. [Effective until January 1, 2012.].

  1. If the Division of Legislative Audit determines that a city court is not in substantial compliance with this subchapter, the division shall report the findings to the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    1. If a public official or a private accountant determines that a city court is not in substantial compliance with this subchapter, the official or accountant shall notify the committee of his or her findings.
    2. Upon notification, the committee shall direct the division to review the city court's compliance with this subchapter.
    3. Upon confirmation of a substantial lack of compliance, the division shall report the findings to the committee.
    1. Upon notification of noncompliance by the division, the committee shall notify in writing the mayor, the city or town council, the city court judge, and the city court clerk that the city court's accounting records are not in substantial compliance with this subchapter.
    2. The city court shall have ninety (90) days after the date of notification to bring the city court's accounting records into substantial compliance with this subchapter.
      1. After the ninety (90) days allowed for compliance or upon request by the appropriate city court officials, the division shall review the city court's accounting records to determine if the city court is in substantial compliance with this subchapter.
      2. The division shall report its findings to the committee.
  2. If the city court has not achieved substantial compliance within the ninety-day period, the committee shall notify both the Administrative Office of the Courts and the city court of the noncompliance and inform the city court that it no longer has authority to operate.

History. Acts 2009, No. 488, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Uniform Filing Fees and Court Costs

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

References to “this chapter” in subchapters 1 and 2 may not apply to this subchapter which was enacted subsequently.

Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 8, provided:

“(a) The following court costs shall not be immediately affected by this act and shall continue to be assessed and collected until such time as the Arkansas Division of Legislative Audit shall certify in writing that the debt service for the original construction for which the revenues generated by the court costs have been applied shall have been paid in full:

“(1) The costs assessed by the city, municipal, and circuit courts in Garland County pursuant to § 12-41-617 [repealed] for the purpose of building a new jail;

“(2) The costs assessed by the city, municipal, and circuit courts in Lawrence County pursuant to § 12-41-617 [repealed] for the purpose of building a new jail;

“(3) The costs assessed by the city and municipal courts of Pulaski County pursuant to §§ 16-17-111 and 16-17-113 [repealed] for the purpose of completing the municipal court renovation.

“(4) The costs assessed pursuant to Act 685 of 1971, as amended, by the city and county courts of Pulaski County for the purpose of retiring the indebtedness on the Pulaski County Law Center.

“(5) The costs assessed by the circuit and chancery courts in Saline County pursuant to § 21-6-403 in effect on January 1, 1995, and used for the purpose of renovation, refurbishing, and equipping of the Saline County Courthouse.

“(6) Any other costs assessed by the city, municipal, circuit, chancery, or probate courts which are dedicated on the effective date of this act for the purpose of retiring any debt service for construction, when certified by the Arkansas Division of Legislative Audit.

“(b) For each court in which a court cost included in paragraph (a) of this section shall be continued, that cost shall be in addition to the uniform court costs and filing fees provided in Section 3 through Section 7 of this act.

“(c) The additional costs specified in paragraph (a) shall not be remitted to the Department of Finance and Administration with the uniform court costs and filing fees provided for in Section 3 through Section 7 of this act, but shall be remitted to the city or county treasurer and credited to the fund and for the limited purpose as provided for in Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 12-41-617 [repealed], 16-17-111 and 16-17-113 [repealed] and Act 685 of 1971 as amended.”

Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 17, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 3, provided:

“The uniform filing fees and court costs established by Sections 3 through 7 of this act shall become effective on July 1, 1995; however, from the period beginning July 1, 1995, through September 30, 1995, all courts shall deduct from the uniform fees and costs the individual fees and costs owed to local, county, and state level agencies and disburse those funds in accordance with this act. Excess funds shall be retained by the city or county and utilized as directed by the governing body, but are, however, intended to provide a sufficient level of funds as to allow for the change in the disbursement of funds as required by Sections 12 and 13 of this act.”

Publisher's Notes. Former subchapter 3, concerning judicial ethics, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 536, § 4. The former subchapter was derived from the following sources:

§ 16-10-301. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1001.

§ 16-10-302. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1002.

§ 16-10-303. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1003.

§ 16-10-304. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1004.

§ 16-10-305. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1004.

§ 16-10-306. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1004.

§ 16-10-307. Acts 1977, No. 853, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1002.

Effective Dates. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 23: Apr. 13, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1999, No. 1508, § 19: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act makes various technical corrections in the Arkansas Code; that this act further clarifies the law to provide that the Arkansas Code Revision Commission may correct errors resulting from enactments of prior sessions; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to be applicable during the codification process of the enactments of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 177, § 15: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this bill affects the structure of the Arkansas District Judge Retirement System and the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System and the ideal time to make revisions to the retirement systems is at the beginning of the state's fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2013, No. 282, § 17: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2013, No. 504, § 5: Mar. 26, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-10-301. Legislative intent.

  1. It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state. It is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible. Finally, it is determined that the lack of any reliable data on the current cost of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time.
  2. It is, therefore, the intent of this act to eliminate the current system of collecting and assessing a large number of individual court costs and filing fees, to replace it with uniform costs and fees to be applied statewide, and to prohibit the implementation of new costs and fees for specific programs in the future.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 1, subsection (b) of this section also provided:

“It is, further, the intent of this act to put in place a reporting system which will allow the General Assembly to obtain accurate data to determine the cost to the state for the funding of the judicial system, so as to allow the state, in the 1997-1999 biennium, to fund the cost of the judicial system from the costs, fees, fines, and such other sources as the General Assembly shall determine.”

As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 1, this section also contained a subsection (c) which provided:

“(c) The General Assembly hereby advises all individuals, programs, and agencies which are affected by this act and which receive or expend funds as a part of the state judicial system to be prepared to provide information on the level of expenditures, number of staff, and related information which were in place and existing during the period January 1, 1994 — December 31, 1994 to the 1997 session of the General Assembly.”

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1995, No. 1256, codified as §§ 5-65-115, 5-65-307, 14-20-102, 14-42-112, 16-10-133, 16-10-30116-10-310, 16-14-105, 16-17-402, 16-17-705, 16-21-106, 16-21-113, 16-21-1103, 16-21-1503, 20-7-123, 20-18-502, 21-6-403, 24-8-315.

16-10-302. Court costs and filing fees — Generally.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this act, all filing fees and all court costs shall be uniform for each type of case in all general and limited jurisdiction courts of this state.
  2. In all cases filed in such courts on or after July 1, 1995, the court costs and filing fees shall be assessed and distributed according to this act.
  3. In all cases filed in such courts prior to July 1, 1995, all court costs and filing fees shall be assessed according to law in existence on the date of the filing, but shall be disbursed in accordance with this act.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 2; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 1; 2001, No. 1809, § 1.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-10-301.

16-10-303. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section is repealed by Acts 2007, No. 663, § 24, effective January 1, 2012.

16-10-304. State actions exempt from filing fees.

Prosecuting attorneys filing actions on behalf of the state, with the exception of child support cases, shall be exempt from paying filing fees.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 2; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 1.

16-10-305. Court costs.

  1. There shall be levied and collected the following court costs from each defendant upon each conviction, each plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or each forfeiture of bond:
    1. In circuit court, one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for a misdemeanor or felony violation of state law, excluding a violation of:
      1. The Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.;
      2. The Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq.;
      3. Section 5-75-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 27-23-114;
      5. Section 15-42-127; or
      6. Section 27-37-701 et seq.;
    2. In district court, one hundred dollars ($100) for an offense that is a misdemeanor or violation of state law, excluding a violation of:
      1. The Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.;
      2. The Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq.;
      3. Section 5-75-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 27-23-114;
      5. Section 15-42-127; or
      6. Section 27-37-701 et seq.;
    3. In circuit court or district court, seventy-five dollars ($75.00) for a traffic offense that is a misdemeanor or violation under state law or local ordinance, excluding a violation of:
      1. The Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.;
      2. The Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq.;
      3. Section 5-75-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 27-23-114;
      5. Section 15-42-127; or
      6. Section 27-37-701 et seq.;
    4. In district court, for a nontraffic offense that is a misdemeanor or violation under local ordinance, twenty-five dollars ($25.00);
    5. In circuit court or district court, three hundred dollars ($300) for violations of:
      1. The Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.;
      2. The Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq.;
      3. Section 5-75-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 27-23-114; or
      5. Section 15-42-127;
      1. In circuit court or district court, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for a violation of the mandatory seat belt use law, § 27-37-701 et seq.
      2. A defendant is not required to pay the court costs under subdivision (a)(6)(A) of this section if he or she pays the applicable fines under §§ 27-37-706 and 16-17-129 before his or her first appearance and shall not be assessed any additional court costs associated with the violation; and
    6. In circuit court or district court, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for failure to present proof of insurance at the time of a traffic stop, §§ 27-22-103, 27-22-104, and 27-22-111.
    1. The costs set forth in this section shall be imposed at the conclusion of any criminal case enumerated in subsection (a) of this section that does not end in an acquittal, dismissal, or, with the consent of the prosecution, an order nolle prosequi.
    2. The costs shall be imposed at the conclusion of cases involving a suspended or probated sentence even though that sentence may be expunged or otherwise removed from the defendant's record.
  2. No county, city, or town shall be liable for the payment of the costs taxed under this section in any instance where they are not collected, or in any case in which the defendant pays the costs by serving time in a jail, on a county farm, or at any other official place of detention or work.
  3. No town, city, or county shall authorize and no district court or circuit court shall assess or collect any other court costs other than those authorized by this act, unless specifically provided by state law.
  4. This section shall become effective July 1, 2001, and the revised court costs shall be imposed on all cases which come before the court for final disposition on or after July 1, 2001.
    1. There shall be levied and collected from each defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to an offense, is found guilty of an offense, or forfeits bond in city court on or before December 31, 2011, the court costs applicable in city court at that time.
    2. The court costs applicable in district court shall be levied and collected in all cases filed in city court in which a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to an offense, is found guilty of an offense, or forfeits bond in district court on or after January 1, 2012.
  5. For each conviction for an offense under § 5-26-301 et seq., an additional court cost of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) shall be assessed and remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the court clerk for deposit into the Domestic Peace Fund, § 19-6-491.
    1. An additional court cost of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) shall be assessed and remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the court clerk or designee under § 16-13-709(a) for deposit as special revenues into the Domestic Violence Shelter Fund if a person is convicted of a domestic abuse offense or is the respondent on a permanent order of protection entered by a court under the Domestic Abuse Act of 1991, § 9-15-101 et seq.
    2. When a convicted person is authorized to make installment payments under § 16-13-704, the court cost assessed under subdivision (h)(1) of this section shall be collected from the initial installment payment first.
    3. The court clerk or designee under § 16-13-709(a) shall disburse all court costs collected each month under subdivision (h)(1) of this section to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the fifteenth working day of the following month.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 7; 1997, No. 788, § 4; 1997, No. 1341, § 4; 1999, No. 1081, §§ 3, 12; 1999, No. 1508, § 7; 2001, No. 1632, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 49; 2007, No. 663, § 25; 2011, No. 730, § 4; 2011, No. 1218, § 1; 2013, No. 282, § 4; 2013, No. 1107, § 12; 2013, No. 1357, § 1; 2015, No. 299, §§ 18-21; 2015, No. 895, § 16; 2017, No. 583, § 3; 2019, No. 113, § 1; 2019, No. 743, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2007 amendment substituted “town or city” for “local” in (a)(3); in (a)(4), substituted “town, city, or county” for “local” and deleted “or city” following “district”; deleted “or city court” preceding “three” in (a)(5); deleted former (a)(6) and (7); added (f); and made related changes throughout.

The 2011 amendment by No. 730 inserted (a)(6).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1218 rewrote (a).

The 2013 amendment by No. 282 substituted “violation” for “violations” and variations thereof throughout the section; in the introductory language of (a)(2) and (a)(3) and in (a)(4), substituted “an offense” for “offenses” and substituted “is a misdemeanor or violation” for “are misdemeanors or violations”; in (a)(4), substituted “In district court, for a” for “For” and deleted “in district court” following “ordinance”; in (a)(6)(A), substituted “In circuit court or district court, three hundred dollars ($300) for” for “For knowingly” and deleted “in circuit court, district court, or city court, three hundred dollars ($300)”; inserted “of this section” in (a)(6)(B); and added (a)(7).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1107 substituted “Division of Behavioral Health Services” for “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (a)(6)(B).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1357 added (g).

The 2015 amendment by No. 299 inserted “or BWI” and “or BUI” throughout (a); and deleted (a)(1)(D), (a)(2)(D), (a)(3)(D), and (a)(5)(D), and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

The 2015 amendment by No. 895 repealed (a)(6).

The 2017 amendment added (h).

The 2019 amendment by No. 113 inserted “or designee under § 16-13-709(a)” in (h)(1) and (h)(3); and substituted “is convicted of a domestic abuse offense” for “is a convicted perpetrator of domestic abuse” in (h)(1).

The 2019 amendment by No. 743 added (a)(1)(F), (a)(2)(F), and (a)(3)(F); deleted (a)(6) [Repealed.]; redesignated (a)(7) as (a)(6)(A) and (a)(7) and added (a)(6)(B); and added “In circuit court or district court, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for” in (a)(7).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

16-10-306. Administration of Justice Funds Section.

  1. There is created in the Department of Finance and Administration an Administration of Justice Funds Section.
  2. The court costs and filing fees enumerated in §§ 16-10-305, 16-17-705, and 21-6-403, which are assessed and collected in the district courts and circuit courts in this state, shall be remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section.
  3. The Administration of Justice Funds Section shall:
    1. Deposit the court costs and filing fees remitted under subsection (b) of this section into the State Administration of Justice Fund; and
    2. Keep an accurate account of all receipts by type of case and type and location of court from which the court costs and filing fees are submitted.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 9; 2003, No. 1185, § 50; 2007, No. 663, § 26; 2013, No. 282, § 5; 2013, No. 504, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, the amendments to this section by Acts 2013, No. 282, § 5, are superseded by the amendments to this section by Acts 2013, No. 504, § 1. Acts 2013, No. 282, § 5, amended this section to read as follows:

“(a) There is created in the Department of Finance and Administration an Administration of Justice Funds Section, to which shall be remitted the court costs and filing fees enumerated in §§ 21-6-403, 16-17-12 705, and 16-10-305, which are assessed and collected in the district courts and circuit courts in this state.

“(b) The section shall deposit the court costs and filing fees enumerated in §§ 21-6-403, 16-17-705, and 16-10-305 into the State Administration of Justice Fund.

“(c) The section shall keep an accurate account of all receipts by type of case and type and location of court from which the court costs and filing fees enumerated in §§ 21-6-403, 16-17-705, and 16-10-305 are submitted.”

Amendments. The 2007 amendment, in (b)(1), deleted “16-14-105” following “21-6-403,” “16-10-303” following “16-17-705,” and “city courts” preceding “district” and made related changes; and deleted (c).

The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-307. County administration of justice fund.

  1. There is hereby created in each county a fund in the office of the county treasurer to be known as the “county administration of justice fund”.
  2. The county administration of justice fund shall be used to defray a part of the expenses of the administration of justice in the county. From the fund, the county shall continue to finance the following county agencies and programs which are currently funded, in whole or in part, by filing fees and court costs, at a funding level equal to not less than the greater of the amount which was collected by the county from filing fees and court costs for the agency or program in the calendar year ending December 31, 1994, or the amount appropriated by ordinance enacted prior to December 31, 1994, or on February 13, 1995, or on February 14, 1995, or by resolution dated February 9, 1995, to the agency or program for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995:
    1. The prosecuting attorney fund, including all grant funds awarded and appropriated for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995;
    2. The prosecuting attorney's victim-witness program fund;
    3. The public defender/indigent defense fund and public defender investigator fund, including all grant funds awarded and appropriated for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995;
    4. The county law library fund;
    5. The county jail fund; and
    6. The intoxication detection equipment fund.
      1. The county administration of justice fund of each county may retain an amount equal to the amount which was collected by the county from court costs and filing fees for county administration of justice expense in the calendar year ending December 31, 1994, or the amount appropriated from court costs and filing fees by ordinance enacted prior to December 31, 1994, or on February 13, 1995, or on February 14, 1995, or by resolution dated February 9, 1995, for county administration of justice expense from court costs and filing fees for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995, plus, for calendar years 1995 — 2001, an additional amount based upon the average percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or its successor, as published by the United States Department of Labor for the two (2) years immediately preceding.
        1. The amount retained during calendar years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 shall be the amount retained during calendar year 2001.
        2. Except as provided in subdivision (c)(1)(B)(iii) of this section, for calendar years beginning 2014 and each calendar year thereafter, an additional amount shall be added to the amount to be retained based upon the lesser of the average percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or its successor, as published by the United States Department of Labor, for the two (2) years immediately preceding or the percentage rate of increase in collections of the State Administration of Justice Fund for the two (2) years immediately preceding.
        3. The provisions of subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) of this section shall not be effective if the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State determines that the additional amount retained under subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) of this section has exceeded one million dollars ($1,000,000) in a calendar year and any additional amount to be retained must be authorized by the General Assembly.
      2. All local ordinances of the counties and cities authorized and adopted under § 24-8-318 shall remain in full force and effect.
    1. For the calendar year beginning January 1, 1998, the base amount to be retained shall be:
      1. Increased by any increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers as provided for in subdivision (c)(1) of this section; and
      2. Decreased by eighty-five percent (85%) of the total dollar amount which was certified by the county as having been collected during calendar year 1994 and for the purpose of funding the office and operation of the public defender and public defender investigator.
  3. Nothing in this section shall prevent the county from funding any additional costs for the administration of justice from these or other county funds.
  4. The county shall remit on or before the fifteenth day of each month all sums received in excess of the amounts necessary to fund the expenses enumerated in subsections (b) and (c) of this section during the previous month from the uniform filing fees provided for in §§ 21-6-403 and 9-15-202, and the uniform court costs provided for in § 16-10-305 to the Administration of Justice Funds Section for deposit into the State Administration of Justice Fund.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, §§ 10, 12; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 7; 1997, No. 788, § 6; 1997, No. 1341, § 6; 2001, No. 1611, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 51; 2005, No. 434, § 1; 2005, No. 2212, § 1; 2007, No. 177, § 2; 2013, No. 282, §§ 6, 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 10, this section contained an additional subsection which provided:

“Nothing in this act shall prevent the county from funding any additional costs for the administration of justice from other county funds or as disbursed by the county as required and authorized by the 80th General Assembly meeting in regular session.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment by No. 434 substituted “fifteenth day of each month” for “tenth day of November 1995 and on or before the tenth day of each month thereafter” in (e).

The 2005 amendment by No. 2212 redesignated former (c)(1)(B) as present (c)(1)(B)(i); substituted “years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005” for “year 2002 and each calendar year thereafter”; and added (c)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(1)(B)(iii) and (c)(1)(C).

The 2007 amendment deleted “Notwithstanding the creation of the Arkansas District Judge Retirement System on January 1, 2005” at the beginning of (c)(1)(C), and made a related change.

The 2013 amendment, in (c)(1)(B)(ii), substituted “2014” for “2006,” inserted “lesser of the” preceding “average percentage,” and added “or the percentage rate of increase in collections of the State Administration of Justice Fund for the two (2) years immediately preceding” at the end; and, in (e), substituted “§§ 21-6-403 and 9-15-202” for “§ 21-6-403,” inserted “Administration of Justice Funds Section of the Office of Administrative Services of the,” and deleted “Administration of Justice Funds Section” preceding “for deposit.”

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Use of County Jail Fund for supervision and transportation of inmates, § 12-41-716.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The intent of this section and § 16-87-306 is to provide representation for indigents in cases in which there is a potential for loss of liberty, but the provision of § 14-20-102 that grants authority for the trial court to appoint attorneys for minors in civil litigation to be paid by county funds, was not incorporated in the statutes establishing and defining the duties and responsibilities of the Commission. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Burnett, 340 Ark. 233, 12 S.W.3d 191 (2000).

Applicability.

This section, which allocates to the Public Defender Commission a portion of county funds established by § 14-20-102, does not contain language authorizing the Commission to expend funds for the civil representation of a minor. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Burnett, 340 Ark. 233, 12 S.W.3d 191 (2000).

16-10-308. City administration of justice fund.

    1. There is hereby created in each town or city which operates a district court a fund in the office of the city treasurer to be known as the “city administration of justice fund”.
      1. A town or city operating a city court that becomes a department of district court shall continue to maintain the city administration of justice fund as originally established by this section.
      2. The city administration of justice fund of any town or city shall cease to exist on and after the effective date of the ordinance that abolishes the department of district court for that town or city pursuant to state law.
  1. The city administration of justice fund shall be used to defray a part of the expense of the administration of justice in the town or city. From the fund, the town or city shall continue to finance the following town or city agencies and programs which are currently funded, in whole or in part, by filing fees and court costs, at a funding level equal to not less than the greater of the amount which was collected by the town or city from court costs and filing fees for the agency or program in the calendar year ending December 31, 1994, or the amount appropriated by ordinance enacted prior to December 31, 1994, to the agency or program for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995:
    1. The municipal court judge and clerk retirement fund for disbursement as otherwise provided by law;
    2. The police and fire pension fund;
    3. The intoxication detection equipment fund;
    4. All municipal-level programs and agencies funded in whole or in part by court costs and filing fees assessed and collected by the district court, notwithstanding the repeal by this act of laws authorizing the collection of court costs and filing fees; and
    5. All county-level programs and agencies funded in whole or in part by court costs and filing fees assessed and collected by the district court, notwithstanding the repeal by this act of laws authorizing the collection of court costs and filing fees and the disbursement of all or a part thereof to the county.
      1. The city administration of justice fund of each town or city may retain an amount equal to the amount which was collected by the town or city from court costs and filing fees for city administration of justice expense in the calendar year ending December 31, 1994, or the amount appropriated from court costs and filing fees by ordinance enacted prior to December 31, 1994, for city or county administration of justice expense from court costs and filing fees for the calendar year ending December 31, 1995, plus, for calendar years 1995-2001, an additional amount based upon the average percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or its successor, as published by the United States Department of Labor for the two (2) years immediately preceding.
        1. The amount retained during calendar years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 shall be the amount retained during calendar year 2001.
        2. Except as provided in subdivision (c)(1)(B)(iii) of this section, for calendar years beginning 2014 and each calendar year thereafter, an additional amount shall be added to the amount to be retained based upon the lesser of the average percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers or its successor, as published by the United States Department of Labor, for the two (2) years immediately preceding or the percentage rate of increase in collections of the State Administration of Justice Fund for the two (2) years immediately preceding.
        3. The provisions of subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) of this section shall not be effective if the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State determines that the additional amount retained under subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) of this section has exceeded one million dollars ($1,000,000) in a calendar year, and any additional amount to be retained must be authorized by the General Assembly.
      2. All local ordinances of the counties and cities authorized and adopted under § 24-8-318 shall remain in full force and effect.
    1. For the calendar year beginning January 1, 1998, the base amount to be retained shall be:
      1. Increased by any increase in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers as provided for in subdivision (c)(1) of this section; and
      2. Decreased by eighty-five percent (85%) of the total dollar amount which was certified by the town or city as having been collected during calendar year 1994 for the purpose of funding the office and operation of the public defender and public defender investigator.
  2. Nothing in this act shall prevent the town or city from funding any additional costs for the administration of justice from other town or city funds.
  3. The town or city shall remit, on or before the fifteenth day of each month, all sums received in excess of the amounts necessary to fund the expenses enumerated in subsections (b) and (c) of this section during the previous month from the uniform filing fees provided for in § 16-17-705 and the uniform court costs provided for in § 16-10-305 to the Administration of Justice Funds Section for deposit into the State Administration of Justice Fund.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, §§ 11, 13; 1997, No. 788, § 8; 1997, No. 1341, § 8; 2001, No. 1611, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 52, 53; 2005, No. 1934, § 4; 2005, No. 2212, § 2; 2007, No. 177, § 3; 2007, No. 663, § 27; 2013, No. 282, § 8.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment by No. 177 deleted “Notwithstanding the creation of the Arkansas District Judge Retirement System on January 1, 2005” at the beginning of (c)(1)(C), and made a related change.

The 2007 amendment by No. 663 inserted “town or” preceding “city” throughout the section; in (a), substituted “town or city which operates a district court” for “municipality which operates a police, city, or district court” in (1) and added (2); added “for disbursement as otherwise provided by law” in (b)(1); substituted “district” for “municipal, city, or police”: in (b)(4) and (5); substituted “§ 16-17-705” for “§§ 16-10-303 and 16-17-705” in (e); and made related changes.

The 2013 amendment, in (c)(1)(B)(ii), substituted “2014” for “2006,” inserted “lesser of the” preceding “average percentage,” and added “or the percentage rate of increase in collections of the State Administration of Justice Fund for the two (2) years immediately preceding” at the end.

Cross References. Additional funding sources for the municipal court judges' and court clerks' retirement benefits, §§ 24-8-317 and 24-8-318.

District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-309. Failure to submit funds or reports.

  1. In the event a town, city, or county fails to timely or adequately submit funds and reports required by § 16-10-306, § 16-10-307(e), § 16-10-308(e), or other state law requiring a town, city, or county to submit funds and reports to the Administration of Justice Funds Section:
        1. The Attorney General may file a civil suit in circuit court against the town, city, or county alleged to have failed to submit the funds.
        2. If the town, city, or county is found by the court to have failed to submit the funds and reports, the court shall impose a civil penalty on the town, city, or county of ten percent (10%) of the amount required to be remitted for the period of time the town, city, or county has failed to be in compliance.
        3. The action may be brought in the circuit court of the subject county or the Pulaski County Circuit Court.
        4. The Attorney General shall be allowed to recover costs and attorney's fees associated with the civil suit from the town, city, or county found to have failed to be in compliance.
      1. The Chief Fiscal Officer of the State, upon a finding that the town, city, or county has failed to submit the funds and reports, may withhold from month to month an equal amount from the town's, city's, or county's share of the state turnback funds owed to the town, city, or county until the funds required to be paid have been submitted; and
      1. Provided that the failure to act continues for a period of sixty (60) days, the state, upon a finding by the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State, may require the town, city, or county to remit all costs, fees, or other funds, however designated under subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
      2. The town, city, or county will thereafter receive its share of these funds at a time and in the manner prescribed by rules of the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State.
    1. All funds received under § 16-10-306, § 16-10-307(e), or § 16-10-308(e) shall be transferred to the State Administration of Justice Fund to be held and distributed under this subchapter.
    2. All other funds received shall be transferred to the appropriate state fund as provided by law.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 14; 2005, No. 1934, § 5; 2007, No. 133, § 1; 2009, No. 166, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1292.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “town” throughout this section; inserted “or other state … and Administration” in (a); inserted the present subdivision designations in (a)(1)(A) and (a)(2); deleted “required by this act” at the end of (a)(1)(A)(i) and following “and reports” in (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B); deleted “with this act” from the end of (a)(1)(A)(ii); substituted “failed to be in compliance” for “violated thd provisions of this act” in (a)(1)(A)(iv); deleted “by this act” following “to be paid” in (a)(1)(B); in (a)(2)(A), inserted “or other funds however designated” and substituted “under subsection (a) of this section” for “generated by this act”; redesignated former (b) as present (b)(1); in (b)(1), substituted “under § 16-10-306, § 16-10-307(d), or § 16-10-308(e)” for “pursuant to subsection (a) of this section,” and “under this subchapter” for “pursuant to this act”; added (b)(2) and made minor stylistic and related changes.

The 2007 amendment substituted “subdivision (a)(1)” for “subsection (a)” in (a)(2)(A); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendment substituted “compliance” for “compliance; and” in (a)(1)(A)(iv) and made a minor punctuation change.

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (a)(2)(B).

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-10-301.

16-10-310. State Administration of Justice Fund — Distribution of revenue.

  1. At the close of books on or before the twentieth working day of each month, the Department of Finance and Administration shall distribute revenue credited to the State Administration of Justice Fund and received for the previous month as provided in this section.
  2. The revenue described in subsection (a) of this section shall be distributed to the following state programs and state agencies in monthly installments of at least one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual allocation provided for each state program or state agency from the State Administration of Justice Fund subject to the limitations stated in this section:
    1. The Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas for the purpose of and as regulated by §§ 6-64-604 — 6-64-606;
    2. The Public Health Fund and the Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Fund for use in the drug abuse prevention and treatment program of the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services;
    3. The Division of Arkansas State Police for the State Police Retirement Fund;
    4. The Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund for the purpose of and as regulated by the Arkansas Crime Victims Reparations Act, § 16-90-701 et seq.;
    5. The Prosecutor Coordinator's office for deposit into the Law Enforcement and Prosecutor Drug Enforcement Training Fund;
    6. The Crime Information System Fund;
    7. The Justice Building Construction Fund;
    8. The District Court Judge and District Court Clerk Education Fund;
    9. The Judges Retirement Fund;
    10. The State Central Services Fund for the benefit of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission;
    11. The Court Reporter's Fund;
    12. The Justice Building Fund;
    13. The Arkansas Counties Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Crime Prevention Program Fund;
    14. The Administrative Office of the Courts to fund the Trial Court Administrator Fund;
    15. The Division of Arkansas State Police Fund;
    16. The State Central Services Fund for the benefit of the Division of Dependency-Neglect Representation of the Administrative Office of the Courts;
    17. The Miscellaneous Agencies Fund Account for the benefit of the State Crime Laboratory;
    18. The Arkansas District Judges Council Inc. for the Executive Director of the Arkansas District Judges Council Inc.;
    19. The Public Legal Aid Fund;
    20. The Administrative Office of the Courts for county reimbursements for jurors; and
    21. The Administrative Office of the Courts to reimburse the State Central Services Fund for the Drug Court Coordinator.
  3. If the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State determines that the State Administration of Justice Fund balance and estimated revenue to be received by the State Administration of Justice Fund are inadequate to fully fund all authorized monthly allocations from the State Administration of Justice Fund:
      1. The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocation for:
        1. The Court Reporter's Fund;
        2. The Arkansas District Judges Council Inc. for the Executive Director of the Arkansas District Judges Council Inc.; and
        3. The Administrative Office of the Courts to fund the Trial Court Administrator Fund.
      2. Funds or allocations for a state program or state agency listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section shall not be affected if a deficit occurs in other State Administration of Justice Fund appropriations, allocations, or funds not listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section for that particular state program or state agency;
    1. The Chief Fiscal Officer of the State shall notify the disbursing officer of each state agency and state program not listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section of the amount of the state agency's or state program's portion of any reduction required from the state agency's or state program's authorized allocation in order to maintain the State Administration of Justice Fund with a projected positive balance; and
      1. The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the distribution is made under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section shall be distributed to the state programs and state agencies not listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section in an amount equal to the proportion of the State Administration of Justice Fund that each state program would have received under subsection (b) of this section.
      2. A funding shortage from one (1) month shall be recouped from future months' payments as funds become available.
    1. If required to help meet the commitments of the State Administration of Justice Fund and if funds are determined to be available, the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State may transfer a sum not to exceed four million dollars ($4,000,000) during any fiscal year from the Budget Stabilization Trust Fund to the State Administration of Justice Fund.
    2. As determined by the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State, if a positive fund balance remains in the State Administration of Justice Fund at the end of a fiscal year, the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State may transfer the positive fund balance from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the Budget Stabilization Trust Fund to reimburse for any transfers made under subdivision (d)(1) of this section.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 15; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 2; 1997, No. 788, § 10; 1997, No. 1341, § 10; 2003, No. 1185, § 54; 2009, No. 166, § 2; 2011, No. 1132, § 3; 2013, No. 504, § 2; 2013, No. 1107, § 13; 2015, No. 268, §§ 1, 2; 2017, No. 913, § 40.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Highway Safety Program referred to in (b)(3) was the former Highway Safety Special Fund, a fund repealed by Acts 1997, No. 298.

The language removed in former (b)(3) relating to the Highway Safety Special Fund was only in reference to the previously repealed special revenue fund by that name and in no way alters the distribution to the miscellaneous fund by that name.

Acts 2013, No. 1443, § 58, provided: “DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUNDS.

In the event that the fund balance in the Administration of Justice Fund is inadequate to fund the monthly allocation to State Agencies, the funds will be distributed as follows:

“(a) The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocations found in Section 59 herein for

“(1) the Auditor of State to fund the Trial Court Administrative Assistants Fund,

“(2) the District Judges Association for the District Court Coordinator, and

“(3) the Court Reporter Fund.

“(b) The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the monthly distribution is made under subdivision (a) of this section shall be distributed to the remaining state programs and state agencies listed in Section 59 herein but not listed in subdivision (a) of this section and shall be funded in the percentage of the total funds available in the Administration of Justice Fund; that is, if less than 100% of the total monthly allocation is available for distribution, monthly allocations for the remaining agencies will be funded at an equal percentage consistent with the remaining available funds, provided that any of the allocations listed in Section 59 that have been fully pledged prior to January 1, 2001 to the repayment of a bond issue or bond issues shall not be reduced below the amount listed in Section 59. Any shortage from one month will be adjusted in future months' payments as funds become available.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.”

Acts 2014, No. 105, § 36, provided:

“TRANSFER AUTHORITY. The Department of Finance and Administration shall transfer funds, from time to time, from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund in such amounts as are required to reimburse the State Central Services Fund for a portion of the expenses of the Administrative Office of the Courts — Division of Dependency-Neglect Representation.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015.”

Acts 2014, No. 285, § 61, provided:

“DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUNDS. In the event that the fund balance in the Administration of Justice Fund is inadequate to fund the monthly allocation to State Agencies, the funds will be distributed as follows:

“(a) The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocations found in Section 62 of this Act for

“(1) The Auditor of State to fund the Trial Court Administrative Assistants Fund,

“(2) the District Judges Association for the District Court Coordinator, and

“(3) the Court Reporter Fund.

“(b) The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the monthly distribution is made under subdivision (a) of this section shall be distributed to the remaining state programs and state agencies listed in Section 62 of this Act but not listed in subdivision (a) of this section shall be funded in the percentage of the total funds available in the Administration of Justice Fund; that is if less than 100% of the total monthly allocation is available for distribution, monthly allocations for the remaining agencies will be funded at an equal percentage consistent with the remaining available funds, provided that any of the allocations listed in Section 62 that have been fully pledged prior to January 1, 2001 to the repayment of a bond issue or bond issues shall not be reduced below the amount listed in Section 62 of this Act. Any shortage from one month will be adjusted in future months' payments as funds become available.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 1070, § 59, provided: “DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUNDS

In the event that the fund balance in the Administration of Justice Fund is inadequate to fund the monthly allocation to State Agencies, the funds will be distributed as follows:

“(a) The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocations found in Section 59 of this Act for

“(1) The Auditor of State to fund the Trial Court Administrative Assistants Fund,

“(2) the District Judges Association for the District Court Coordinator, and

“(3) the Court Reporter Fund.

“(b) The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the monthly distribution is made under subdivision (a) of this section shall be distributed to the remaining state programs and state agencies listed in Section 59 of this Act but not listed in subdivision (a) of this section shall be funded in the percentage of the total funds available in the Administration of Justice Fund; that is if less than 100% of the total monthly allocation is available for distribution, monthly allocations for the remaining agencies will be funded at an equal percentage consistent with the remaining available funds, provided that any of the allocations listed in Section 59 that have been fully pledged prior to January 1, 2001 to the repayment of a bond issue or bond issues shall not be reduced below the amount listed in Section 59 of this Act. Any shortage from one month will be adjusted in future months' payments as funds become available.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 239, § 39, provided: “TRANSFER AUTHORITY. The Department of Finance and Administration shall transfer funds, from time to time, from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund in such amounts as are required to reimburse the State Central Services Fund for a portion of the expenses of the Administrative Office of the Courts — Division of Dependency-Neglect Representation.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Acts 2016, No. 251, § 59, provided: “DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FUNDS.

In the event that the fund balance in the Administration of Justice Fund is inadequate to fund the monthly allocation to State Agencies, the funds will be distributed as follows:

“(a) The available revenue and remaining State Administration of Justice Fund balance shall be distributed first to fully fund the monthly allocations found in the ALLOCATION RESTRICTIONS SECTION of this Act for

“(1) The Auditor of State to fund the Trial Court Administrative Assistants Fund,

“(2) the District Judges Association for the District Court Coordinator, and

“(3) the Court Reporter Fund.

“(b) The total funds remaining in the State Administration of Justice Fund after the monthly distribution is made under subdivision (a) of this section shall be distributed to the remaining state programs and state agencies listed in the ALLOCATION RESTRICTIONS SECTION of this Act but not listed in subdivision (a) of this section shall be funded in the percentage of the total funds available in the Administration of Justice Fund; that is if less than 100% of the total monthly allocation is available for distribution, monthly allocations for the remaining agencies will be funded at an equal percentage consistent with the remaining available funds, provided that any of the allocations listed in the ALLOCATION RESTRICTIONS SECTION that have been fully pledged prior to January 1, 2001 to the repayment of a bond issue or bond issues shall not be reduced below the amount listed in the ALLOCATION RESTRICTIONS SECTION of this Act. Any shortage from one month will be adjusted in future months' payments as funds become available.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1997, No. 855, § 5, set out the maximum allocation to each fund for fiscal years 1997-98 and 1998-99.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (2), deleted (7) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; substituted “Judges Retirement” for “Arkansas Judicial Retirement System” in (10); inserted “State” in (15); added (16) through (22); and made related changes.

The 2011 amendment deleted “of the Division of Behavioral Health of the Department of Human Services” following “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (b)(2); deleted former (b)(3) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and, in (b)(18), substituted “Arkansas District Judges Council” for “District Judges Association” and “Executive Director” for “District Court Coordinator.”

The 2013 amendment by No. 504 added “State Administration of Justice Fund” to the section heading; rewrote (a) and the introductory language of (b); inserted “the Arkansas Crime Victims Reparations Act” in (b)(4); rewrote (b)(14); and added (c) and (d).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1107 substituted “Division of Behavioral Health Services” for “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (b)(2).

The 2015 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” and “Trial Court Administrator” for “Trial Court Administrative Assistant” in (b)(14) and (c)(1)(A)(iii).

The 2017 amendment substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” in (b)(2).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-10-311. Transfer of funds from State Administration of Justice Fund.

The Department of Finance and Administration may transfer funds, from time to time, from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund in such amounts as may be required to reimburse the State Central Services Fund for expenses of the Administration of Justice Funds Section of the Department of Finance and Administration.

History. Acts 1997, No. 855, § 4.

16-10-312. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the distribution of the State Administration of Justice Fund, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 504, § 3. The section was derived from Acts 1997, No. 855, § 8.

16-10-313. Support for State Crime Laboratory.

Notwithstanding §§ 16-10-306, 16-10-307, 16-10-603, 16-10-604, and 19-5-993 or any other law to the contrary, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) of the uniform filing fee collected in circuit court under § 21-6-403(b)(1) shall be deposited into the State Treasury as special revenues to the credit of the Miscellaneous Agencies Fund Account, there to be used solely for the operations and support of the State Crime Laboratory. These moneys shall be in addition to all other sources of funding for the State Crime Laboratory and shall not be used to supplant any other source of funding for the State Crime Laboratory.

History. Acts 2005, No. 65, § 2.

16-10-314. Support for Arkansas publicly funded law schools.

  1. Notwithstanding §§ 16-10-306, 16-10-307, 16-10-603, 16-10-604, and 19-5-993 or any other law to the contrary, fifteen dollars ($15.00) of the uniform filing fee collected in circuit court under § 21-6-403(b)(1) shall be deposited as follows:
    1. Fifty percent (50%) of the revenues shall be deposited into the State Treasury as special revenues to the credit of the University of Arkansas Fund, there to be used for the support of the University of Arkansas School of Law; and
    2. Fifty percent (50%) of the revenues shall be deposited into the State Treasury as special revenues to the credit of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Fund, there to be used for the support of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
  2. These moneys shall be in addition to all other sources of funding for the law schools and shall not be used to supplant any other source of funding for the law schools.

History. Acts 2005, No. 431, § 2.

16-10-315. City courts — Loss of authority — Enforcement by Department of Finance and Administration. [Effective until January 1, 2012.]

  1. If the Department of Finance and Administration determines that a city court is not in substantial compliance with § 16-10-306 or § 16-10-308, the department shall report the findings to the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    1. Upon notification of noncompliance by the department, the committee shall notify in writing the mayor, the city or town council, the city court judge, and the city court clerk that the city court is not in substantial compliance with this subchapter.
    2. The city court shall have ninety (90) days after the date of notification to substantially comply with this subchapter.
      1. After the ninety (90) days allowed for compliance or upon request by the appropriate city court officials, the department shall review the city court's records to determine if the city court is in substantial compliance with this subchapter.
      2. The department shall report its findings to the committee.

(d) If the city court has not achieved substantial compliance within the ninety-day period, the committee shall notify both the Administrative Office of the Courts and the city court of the noncompliance and inform the city court that it no longer has authority to operate.

History. Acts 2009, No. 488, § 2.

Subchapter 4 — Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 505, § 11: July 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1993 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1993 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1993.”

Acts 1997, No. 250, § 258: Feb. 24, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 1211 of 1995 established the procedure for all state boards and commissions to follow regarding reimbursement of expenses and stipends for board members; that this act amends various sections of the Arkansas Code which are in conflict with the Act 1211 of 1995; and that until this cleanup act becomes effective conflicting laws will exist. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governer [sic], it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges, § 50 et seq.

C.J.S. 48A C.J.S., Judges, § 40 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Legal Profession, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 649.

Averill, Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 281.

16-10-401. Definitions.

The word “judge” in this subchapter means anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of the judicial system performing judicial functions, including an officer such as a referee, special master, court commissioner, or magistrate, whether full-time or part-time.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 1.

16-10-402. Creation.

  1. There is hereby established a commission to be known as the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, hereinafter referred to as the “commission”, consisting of nine (9) members, each of whom shall be residents of Arkansas, and shall be appointed as follows:
    1. Three (3) members shall be judges of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, circuit court, or municipal court appointed by the Arkansas Supreme Court;
    2. Three (3) members shall be lawyers admitted to practice in Arkansas who are not judges or former or retired judges, one (1) of whom shall be appointed by the Attorney General, one (1) by the President of the Senate, and one (1) by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
    3. Three (3) members, who are neither lawyers, or judges, or former or retired judges, appointed by the Governor.
    1. A commission member shall serve for a term of six (6) years and shall be eligible for reappointment to a second full term.
    2. A member appointed to a term of less than six (6) years or to fill an unexpired term may be reappointed to two (2) full terms.
    3. The appointing authority for each category of commission membership shall also appoint an alternate member for each regular member appointed. An alternate member shall be appointed for a term of six (6) years and may be reappointed for a second term. An alternate member appointed to fill an unexpired term shall be eligible for an appointment for two (2) full terms.
  2. If a commission member or an alternate commission member moves out of the jurisdiction, ceases to be eligible for appointment to represent the category for which he or she was appointed, or becomes unable to serve for any reason, a vacancy shall occur. An appointment to fill a vacancy for the duration of its unexpired term shall be made by the appropriate appointing authority, effective no later than sixty (60) days from the occurrence of the vacancy. If a vacancy is not filled in accordance with this subsection, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, appoint, from the category to be represented, a member who shall serve for the duration of the unexpired term.
  3. Commission members shall serve without pay, but may receive expense reimbursement in accordance with § 25-16-901 et seq.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2; 1997, No. 250, § 116.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2, provided, in part, that initial appointments shall be made so that the terms of one member in each of the three categories shall expire every other year.

Acts 1989, No. 632, § 2, also provided:

“When initial appointments are made, the appointing authority for each category of commission membership shall also appoint an alternate member for each regular member appointed.”

Ark. Const., Am. 80, § 19(A)(2) provided that all circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges “in office at the time this Amendment takes effect shall continue in office as Circuit judges…” Amendment 80 further provided in § 19(B)(1) that the circuit courts would “assume the jurisdiction of Circuit, Chancery, Probate and Juvenile Courts.” Accordingly, the reference to “circuit court, chancery court” in subdivision (a)(1) has now been made “circuit court” in conformity with Amendment 80. This change made by Amendment 80 took effect July 1, 2001. Amendment 80 also provides that many of the lower courts will combine into district courts. The first portion of Amendment 80, § 19(B)(2) state “District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005.”

Cross References. Judicial Discipline And Disability Commission, Ark. Const. Amend. 66.

16-10-403. Director — Staff.

  1. The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall employ a director and such additional professional and clerical staff as may be authorized, from time to time, by appropriation passed by the General Assembly.
  2. Effective July 1, 1994, the Director of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall be an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Arkansas.
  3. The director shall not engage in the practice of law nor serve in a judicial capacity during his or her employment.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2; 1993, No. 505, § 5.

16-10-404. Duties — Records.

  1. The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall initiate or shall receive information, conduct investigations and hearings, and make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning:
    1. Allegations of judicial misconduct;
    2. Allegations of physical or mental disability of judges requiring leave or involuntary retirement; and
    3. Matters of voluntary retirement or leave for disability.
    1. Investigatory records, files, and reports of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission are confidential, and no disclosure of information, written, recorded, or oral, received or developed by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission in the course of an investigation related to alleged misconduct or disability of a judge shall be made except as follows:
      1. Upon waiver in writing by the judge at any stage of the proceedings;
      2. Upon inquiry by an appointing authority or by a state or federal agency conducting investigations on behalf of such authority in connection with the selection or appointment of judges;
      3. In cases in which the subject matter or the fact of the filing of charges has become public, if deemed appropriate by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, it may issue a statement in order to confirm the pendency of the investigation, to clarify the procedural aspects of the proceedings, to explain the right of the judge to a fair hearing, and to state that the judge denies the allegations;
      4. Upon inquiry in connection with the assignment or recall of a retired judge to judicial duties, by or on behalf of the assigning authority;
      5. Upon the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission's taking final action with respect to a complaint about a judge, notice of the final action shall become public information;
      6. Where the circumstances necessitating the initiation of an inquiry include notoriety, or where the conduct in question is a matter of public record, information concerning the lack of cause to proceed shall be released by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission;
      7. If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of any rules of professional conduct of attorneys at law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to any committee, commission, agency, or body within or outside of the state empowered to investigate, regulate, or adjudicate matters incident to the legal profession;
      8. If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of a law or rule falling under the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Ethics Commission, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may release such information to the Arkansas Ethics Commission; or
      9. If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission reasonably believes that there may have been a violation of criminal law, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall release such information to the appropriate prosecuting attorney.
    2. All proceedings held prior to a determination of probable cause and the filing of formal charges shall be confidential. Any hearing scheduled after the filing of formal charges shall be open to the press and to the public, except that following the completion of the introduction of all evidence, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may convene to executive session for the purpose of deliberating its final conclusions and recommendations, provided that, upon completion of the executive session, the final action of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall be announced in an open and public session.
    3. The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission is authorized to request the appropriate prosecuting authorities to seek to obtain immunity from criminal prosecution for a reluctant witness using the procedure outlined in § 16-43-601 et seq.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 2; 1993, No. 1078, § 1; 2013, No. 1115, § 2; 2015, No. 1152, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 1078, § 2, provided:

“It is hereby found that an Arkansas Supreme Court en banc decision, dated May 14, 1990 has left statues in conflict with the Commission's Rules of Procedure. In addition, because the commission is an agency of limited jurisdiction, strict confidentiality requirements have prevented the Commission from cooperating with enforcement agencies like the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct and prosecuting attorneys. This legislation is necessary to conform statutes to the commission's Rules of Procedure and to provide an avenue of cooperation between the above mentioned enforcement agencies.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment redesignated former (b)(1)(G) as present (b)(1)(G)(i); substituted “Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission” for “commission” throughout present (b)(1)(G)(i); and added (b)(1)(G)(ii).

The 2015 amendment redesignated (b)(1)(G)(i) and (b)(1)(G)(ii) as (b)(1)(G) and (b)(1)(H); and redesignated former (b)(1)(H) as (b)(1)(I).

Case Notes

Notice Requirements.

The commission was not required to comply retroactively with the amended notice requirements of Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission Rule 7. Gannett River States Pub. Co. v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Com., 304 Ark. 244, 801 S.W.2d 292 (1990).

Review.

Circuit court properly dismissed an individual's complaint for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus against the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, stemming from the Commission's decision not to file formal charges against a judge, because the circuit court properly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Review of the Commission's decisions lies exclusively with the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Since the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction was lacking. Perroni v. Sachar, 2017 Ark. 59, 513 S.W.3d 239 (2017).

Pursuant to Ark. Const. Amend. 66, as well as §§ 16-10-401 through 16-10-411 and the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, a review of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission's decision lies exclusively with the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Perroni v. Sachar, 2017 Ark. 59, 513 S.W.3d 239 (2017).

Cited: In re Badami, 309 Ark. 511, 831 S.W.2d 905 (1992); Daily World v. Phillips County Circuit Court, 361 Ark. 146, 205 S.W.3d 134 (2005); Helena Daily World v. Simes, 365 Ark. 305, 229 S.W.3d 1 (2006).

16-10-405. Rules.

The Supreme Court shall adopt rules with regard to all matters of Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission operations and all disciplinary and disability proceedings and promulgate rules of procedure.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 9.

Case Notes

Cited: Gannett River States Pub. Co. v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Com., 304 Ark. 244, 801 S.W.2d 292 (1990).

16-10-406. Immunity from suit.

Members of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, referees, commission counsel, and staff shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct in the course of their official duties.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 8.

Case Notes

Cited: Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Digby, 302 Ark. 333, 789 S.W.2d 731 (1990); Comm'n on Judicial Discipline & Disability v. Digby, 303 Ark. 24, 792 S.W.2d 594 (1990).

16-10-407. Leave.

Grounds for leave consist of a temporary physical or mental incapacity which impairs the ability of the judge to substantially perform the duties of his or her judicial office and which exists or is likely to exist for a period of one (1) year or less. Leave cannot be granted to exceed one (1) year.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 3.

16-10-408. Suspension with pay.

A judge may be suspended by the Supreme Court with pay:

  1. While a recommendation to the Supreme Court by the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission for his or her removal or involuntary disability retirement is pending; or
  2. When articles of impeachment have been voted by the House of Representatives.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 4; 2015, No. 938, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted former (1) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

Case Notes

Cited: In re Switzer, 303 Ark. 288, 796 S.W.2d 341 (1990).

16-10-409. Mandatory suspension.

    1. A judge shall be suspended from office with pay by the Supreme Court if:
      1. An indictment or information charges the judge in any court in the United States with a crime punishable as a felony under the laws of Arkansas or the United States or with any other offense that involves moral turpitude; or
      2. In any court in the United States he or she pleads guilty or no contest to, or is found guilty of, an offense punishable as a felony under the laws of Arkansas or the United States or any other offense that involves moral turpitude.
      1. If the judge requests a hearing on a suspension under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the Supreme Court shall:
        1. Hold the hearing no later than ten (10) days after the request to determine whether the suspension with pay remains in effect during the pendency of criminal proceedings against the judge; and
        2. Notify the requesting judge and the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission of the date of the hearing.
      2. In the hearing under this subdivision (a)(2) the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission shall act as the opposing party of the requesting judge.
      3. The suspension with pay under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section shall be removed and the judge shall be allowed to perform his or her duties as a judge if the judge shows at the hearing by a preponderance of the evidence that:
        1. The performance of his or her duties as a judge while charges are pending will not impair the public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary; and
        2. The charges are not likely to result in a conviction.
  1. If his or her conviction becomes final, he or she may be removed from office pursuant to § 16-10-410.
    1. If his or her conviction is reversed and he or she is cleared of the charge, by order of the court, whether without further trial or after further trial and a finding of not guilty, his or her suspension terminates.
    2. If the judge is suspended under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section and the charge is subsequently dismissed, the judge's suspension terminates.
  2. Nothing in this section shall prevent the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission from determining that a judge be disciplined or removed according to § 16-10-410.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 5; 2015, No. 938, § 2.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment rewrote the section.

16-10-410. Removal from office.

  1. The grounds for removal conferred by this subchapter shall be both alternative and cumulative to the power of impeachment provided by the Arkansas Constitution and removal otherwise provided by law.
  2. A judge may be removed from office on any of the following grounds:
    1. Conviction of any offense punishable as a felony under the laws of Arkansas or the United States;
    2. Conviction of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects;
    3. The commission of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
    4. The commission of conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
    5. Willful violation of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct or the Model Rules of Professional Conduct;
    6. Willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office; or
    7. Habitual intemperance in the use of alcohol or other drugs.
  3. In considering recommending removal, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission may consider the frequency of the offense, the motivation of the conduct, the length of time since the conduct in question, and similar factors.
  4. [Repealed.]

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 6; 1995, No. 1296, § 58; 2001, No. 5, § 1; 2015, No. 939, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 939, § 1, provided: “Legislative Intent. The intent of this act is to repeal § 16-10-410(d) as the Supreme Court has held this provision unconstitutional under Proctor v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 206 (2010).”

Amendments. The 2015 amendment repealed (d).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

In a judge's declaratory action, this section was held unconstitutional, as it added a qualification to the office of circuit judge, encroaching on the power of the judiciary to interpret the law. Proctor v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 206, 392 S.W.3d 360 (2010).

Federal Review Barred.

Complaint was dismissed because each of the judge's asserted wrongs were either directly encompassed in the state supreme court's judgment, or, as the bar from seeking re-election, “inextricably intertwined” with those claims already adjudicated in state court. The relief the judge sought was, therefore, barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Proctor v. Hannah, 688 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Ark. 2010).

Removal Appropriate.

Removal of the judge from office was proper under subdivision (b)(5) of this section because he willfully violated the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct when he, in part, acted inappropriately with defendants under his jurisdiction and when he enforced the payment of civil fees, knowing that the funds would go to a probation-type program that he started. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n v. Proctor, 2010 Ark. 38, 360 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, isability Comm'n, 561 U.S. 1027, 130 S. Ct. 3516, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (2010).

Cited: In re Switzer, 303 Ark. 288, 796 S.W.2d 341 (1990).

16-10-411. Vacancy.

The granting of leave, suspension, with or without pay, removal, or involuntary disability retirement pursuant to this subchapter shall create a vacancy in the judicial office.

History. Acts 1989, No. 637, § 7.

Subchapter 5 — Circuit Court Judgeships and Redistricting

16-10-501. Development of criteria for new judgeships or redistricting.

  1. The Arkansas Judicial Council, hereinafter referred to as the “council”, is authorized and directed to develop criteria for new judgeships or redistricting of the circuit court districts of this state and to make recommendations to the regular session, fiscal session, or special session of the General Assembly regarding the number and boundaries of the circuit court districts in the state, the number of judges in each of such districts, and such other matters regarding circuit courts in the state as it determines to be appropriate.
  2. In establishing circuit court districts of this state, the council shall take into consideration caseload, geographic area to be served by the respective circuit courts, and such other matters as the council determines to be appropriate.
  3. The council shall meet on or before November 1 of each even-numbered year to finalize criteria for establishing additional judgeships or redistricting during the next regular session of the General Assembly.

History. Acts 1989, No. 864, §§ 1-3; 2003, No. 1185, § 55; 2009, No. 962, § 34.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “session, fiscal session” preceding “or special session” in (a).

Subchapter 6 — Funding

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

16-10-601. Legislative intent.

  1. It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state. It is further determined that, with the passage and implementation of Acts 1995, No. 1256, a uniform structure for the accounting and distribution of court-generated funds has been established and reliable data on the cost of providing court services and the revenue produced by the court system now exists.
  2. It is, therefore, the intent of this act to begin to phase in the responsibility of the funding of a part of the state trial court system from county government to the state. It is, further, the intent of this act to continue and improve the reporting of information from cities and counties concerning the costs of providing the court system and the revenues produced from court costs, fees, and fines.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 1; 1997, No. 1341, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. For the codification of Acts 1995, No. 1256, referred to in this section, please consult Tables Volume B.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1997, No. 788, codified as §§ 5-76-103, 16-10-133, 16-10-209, 16-10-305, 16-10-307, 16-10-308, 16-10-310, 16-10-60116-10-604, 16-10-701 [repealed], 16-13-512, 16-14-105(a), 16-87-203(a), 16-87-204(b), 16-87-210, 16-87-212(a), 16-87-215, 16-87-30116-87-307, 16-96-403, 19-5-1087, 21-6-403, 26-60-112; and Acts 1997, No. 1341, codified as §§ 5-76-103, 16-10-133, 16-10-209, 16-10-305, 16-10-307, 16-10-308, 16-10-310, 16-10-60116-10-604, 16-10-701, 16-13-512, 16-14-105(a), 16-87-203(a), 16-87-204(b), 16-87-210, 16-87-212(a), 16-87-215, 16-87-30116-87-307, 16-96-403, 21-6-403, 26-60-112.

16-10-602. Establishment of city and county shares.

  1. Pursuant to §§ 16-10-307(c) and 16-10-308(c), each town, city, and county may retain a portion of the uniform court costs and filing fees collected and deposited into the city or county administration of justice fund.
  2. On or before the first day of October of each year, the Department of Finance and Administration shall certify in writing to each county and to each town or city which operates a district court the amount of money which may be retained during each month of the following calendar year by the town, city, or county.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 5; 1997, No. 1341, § 5; 2001, No. 1809, § 11; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 56, 57; 2007, No. 663, § 28.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment inserted “town” preceding “city” throughout the section; deleted “or city court” following “district court” in (b); and made related changes.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 57: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-10-603. Procedure — County administration of justice funds.

    1. Pursuant to § 16-10-307, each county is to create a county administration of justice fund.
    2. Each county treasurer should deposit into the fund:
      1. All receipts from the collection of uniform filing fees established by § 21-6-403 which are collected by the circuit clerk, county clerk, or other official and remitted to the county treasurer;
      2. All receipts from the collection of uniform court costs established by § 16-10-305 which are collected by the county official, agency, or department designated pursuant to § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in circuit court and remitted to the county treasurer;
      3. All receipts of the county's share of uniform filing fees established by § 16-17-705 which are collected by the district courts within the county and remitted to the county treasurer; and
      4. All receipts of the county's share of uniform court costs established by § 16-10-305 which are collected by the official, agency, or department of the county, town, or city designated pursuant to § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts within the county and remitted to the county treasurer.
  1. From the county administration of justice fund, the county treasurer is to make, on a monthly basis, the following fund transfers or disbursements:
      1. Pursuant to § 16-10-307(c), the Department of Finance and Administration will certify for each county the county's monthly share of uniform court costs and filing fees to be retained by the county.
        1. Each year the quorum court shall establish the amount of uniform filing fees and court costs to be appropriated to each of the county programs or agencies enumerated in § 16-10-307(b) from the county's share of uniform court costs and filing fees.
        2. Each program or agency shall receive, as a minimum, the amount established by § 16-10-307(b); and
    1. The excess of the monthly receipts into the fund from subdivisions (a)(2)(A) and (B) of this section, less the county's certified monthly share and the county treasurer's commission, if any, as authorized by § 21-6-302, shall be remitted to the Department of Finance and Administration, pursuant to § 16-10-307(e).

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 7; 1997, No. 1341, § 7; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 58, 59; 2007, No. 663, § 29.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment, in (a), rewrote (2)(B), in (2)(C), substituted “§ 16-17-705” for “§§ 16-17-705 and 16-10-303” and deleted “and city” following “district”, and rewrote (2)(D); in (b), substituted “§ 16-10-307(c)” for “§§ 16-10-307(c) and 21-6-403” in (1)(A), deleted “provided, that each program or agency shall receive, as a minimum, the amount established by § 16-10-307(b); and” from the end of (1)(B)(i), and added (1)(B)(ii); and made related changes.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-10-604. Procedure — City administration of justice funds.

    1. Pursuant to § 16-10-308, each town or city which operates a district court is to create a city administration of justice fund.
      1. Any town or city operating a city court that becomes a department of district court shall continue to maintain the city administration of justice fund as originally established pursuant to § 16-10-308.
      2. The city administration of justice fund of any town or city shall cease to exist on and after the effective date of an ordinance that abolishes the department of district court for the town or city pursuant to state law.
    2. There shall be deposited into the fund:
      1. All receipts from the collection of uniform filing fees established by § 16-17-705 which are collected by the district court operated by the town or city; and
      2. All receipts from the collection of uniform court costs, established by § 16-10-305 which are collected by the county, town, or city official, agency, or department designated pursuant to § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the district court operated by the town or city.
  1. From the city administration of justice fund, the following fund transfers or disbursements shall be made on a monthly basis:
      1. Pursuant to § 16-10-308(c), the Department of Finance and Administration will certify for each town or city the town's or city's monthly share of uniform court costs and filing fees to be retained by the town or city.
        1. Each year the town or city council shall establish the amount of uniform filing fees and court costs to be appropriated to each of the town or city programs or agencies enumerated in § 16-10-308(b) from the town's or city's share of uniform court costs and filing fees.
        2. Each program or agency shall receive, as a minimum, the amount established by § 16-10-308(b).
      2. Each program or agency shall be paid, by warrant or fund transfer, a monthly installment of at least one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual appropriation provided for each by the town or city council;
      1. Pursuant to § 16-10-308(b)(5), the town or city shall remit to the county treasurer for deposit into the county administration of justice fund a portion of the town's or city's share of uniform court costs and filing fees.
      2. The amount of the remittance shall be based upon the amount, if any, of uniform court costs and filing fees which had been remitted by the town or city to the county to fund county-level programs and agencies during the base year defined in § 16-10-308(b).
      3. By common agreement, towns, cities, and counties may establish a different fixed dollar amount or percentage of the town's or city's monthly share of filing fees and court costs which shall be remitted to the county treasurer;
    1. For the calendar year beginning January 1, 1998, the amount of the remittance shall be based upon the amount, if any, of uniform court costs and filing fees which had been remitted by the town or city to fund county-level programs and agencies during the base year defined in § 16-10-308(b), less eighty-five percent (85%) of the total dollar amount which was certified by the town or city as having been collected during calendar year 1994 for the purpose of funding the office and operation of the public defender and public defender investigator; and
    2. The excess of the monthly receipts into the fund, less the town's or city's certified monthly share, shall be remitted to the department, pursuant to § 16-10-308(e).
    1. If a district court is operated solely by a county rather than a town or city and all of the uniform court costs and filing fees collected by the court are remitted to the county, the town or city shall not be required to create a city administration of justice fund.
    2. The town's or city's share of uniform court costs and filing fees shall be remitted directly to the county treasurer for deposit into the county administration of justice fund.
      1. For any district court which was created after January 1, 1994, such that the base year used to calculate the town's or city's share pursuant to § 16-10-308 was not complete, the town or city share shall be deemed to be fifty percent (50%) of the uniform court costs and filing fees collected and remitted to the city administration of justice fund.
      2. District courts created pursuant to § 16-17-901 et seq. shall not be considered for purposes of this section to have been created after January 1, 1994, or to have a base year that is not complete if the district court is merely a continuation of a district or city court that was in existence on December 31, 2007, or December 31, 2011 .
      3. From the fifty-percent share described in subdivision (d)(1)(A) of this section, the town or city shall disburse or transfer fifty percent (50%) of the funds to the local programs or agencies pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of this section and fifty percent (50%) to the county treasurer pursuant to subdivision (b)(2) of this section.
    1. The remaining fifty percent (50%) shall be remitted to the Department of Finance and Administration, pursuant to § 16-10-308(e).

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 9; 1997, No. 1341, § 9; 2001, No. 1809, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 60, 61; 2007, No. 663, § 30.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment inserted “town or” preceding “city” or variant throughout the section; rewrote (a); substituted “§ 16-10-308(c)” for “§§ 16-10-308(c) and 21-6-403” in (b)(1)(A); deleted “provided that each” following “fees” in (b)(1)(B)(i); subdivided (c) into (1) and (2); deleted “rather, the” following “fund” in present (c)(1) and added “The town's or” at the beginning of present (c)(2); substituted “district” for “municipal, city, or police” in (d)(1)(A); added present (d)(1)(B) and redesignated former (d)(1)(B) as present (C); inserted “described in subdivision (d)(1)(A) of this section”; and made related changes.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Subchapter 7 — Additional Filing Fees and Court Costs

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-10-701. Additional fees for specialty court programs — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Pre-adjudication” means the period of time after:
      1. The prosecuting attorney files a criminal information or an indictment is filed in circuit court;
      2. The person named in the criminal information or indictment is arraigned on the charge in circuit court; and
      3. The person enters a specialty court program without a guilty plea or the person enters a plea of guilty but before the circuit court enters a judgment and pronounces a sentence against the person; and
    2. “Specialty court program” means:
      1. A pre-adjudication program under § 5-4-901 et seq.;
      2. An approved drug court program under the Arkansas Drug Court Act, § 16-98-301 et seq.;
      3. A Swift and Certain Accountability on Probation Pilot Program under § 16-93-1701 et seq.; and
      4. Any other specialty court program that has been approved by the Supreme Court, including without limitation specialty court programs known as:
        1. A DWI court;
        2. A mental health court;
        3. A veteran's court;
        4. A juvenile drug court;
        5. A “HOPE” court;
        6. A “smarter sentencing” court; and
        7. A mental health crisis intervention center.
  2. In addition to any other court cost or court fee provided by law:
    1. A specialty court program user fee of up to two hundred fifty dollars ($250) shall be assessed on any participant in a specialty court program and remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the court clerk for deposit into the State Treasury as special revenues credited to the Specialty Court Program Fund; and
    2. A specialty court program public defender user fee not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) may be assessed by the court for a defendant who participates in a specialty court program designed for preadjudication purposes and who is appointed representation by a public defender and remitted to the Administration of Justice Funds Section by the court clerk for deposit into the State Treasury to the credit of the Public Defender User Fees Fund within the State Central Services Fund.
  3. A district court or circuit court may not assess and collect a fee under this section if the district court or circuit court is operating a specialty court program that has not been previously approved by or no longer meets the approval criteria of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 17.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, the amendment to this section by Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 62 and 63, were superseded by the repeal of this section by Acts 2003, No. 1474, § 1.

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-10-701, concerning adoption of additional court costs and filing fees, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1474, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1997, No. 788, § 29; 1997, No. 1341, § 28.

Subchapter 8 — Substitute Trial Court Administrators

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 3, substituted “Administrators” for “Staff Persons” in the subchapter heading.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

16-10-801. Temporary employment authorized.

As authorized by § 16-13-3302, in the absence or unavailability of the trial court administrator the circuit judge may temporarily employ the services of a substitute trial court administrator if the temporary employment is essential to prevent a disruption of the business of the court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 1; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment rewrote the section.

16-10-802. Information provided to Administrative Office of the Courts.

  1. When a circuit judge temporarily employs a substitute trial court administrator, the circuit judge may certify to the Administrative Office of the Courts upon forms prepared by the office that he or she has temporarily employed a substitute trial court administrator and that the temporary employment was essential to prevent a disruption of the business of his or her court.
  2. The circuit judge shall further furnish to the office the name, address, and Social Security number of the substitute trial court administrator and the number of days the substitute trial court administrator was or will be temporarily employed, plus any other information concerning the employment requested by the office.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 2; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” and “administrator” for “staff person” throughout; in (a), substituted “When” for “Whenever,” inserted “circuit” before “judge may,” deleted “the services of” following “employed,” and deleted “necessary and” preceding “essential”; and inserted “circuit” preceding “judge” in (b).

16-10-803. Payment.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts may pay from funds specifically appropriated for this purpose a substitute trial court administrator for the services furnished to the circuit judge under this subchapter.
  2. The substitute trial court administrator shall be paid at the rate of one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per day.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 3; 2001, No. 509, § 1; 2005, No. 461, § 1; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “the rate of one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per day” for “a daily rate, based upon the daily pay rate of the trial court staff person for whom he or she is substituting” in (b).

The 2015 amendment substituted “administrator” for “staff person” throughout; in (a), substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts may” for “Auditor of State is authorized to” and added “under this subchapter” to the end; and substituted “shall” for “will” in (b).

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-10-804. Extended employment periods.

  1. If a substitute trial court administrator is employed for a period that extends beyond the normal payroll period for the position, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall make an interim disbursement of the salary that has accrued during that period.
  2. In any one (1) fiscal year, however, the office shall not pay for the services of a substitute trial court administrator for any one (1) circuit judge in excess of thirty (30) working days unless approved and ordered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 4; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” and “administrator” for “staff person” throughout; in (a), substituted “If a” for “In the event the” and “that” for “which”; and, in (b), substituted “shall” for “will” and “thirty (30)” for “eighty (80),” and deleted “Arkansas” preceding “Supreme Court.”

16-10-805. Employment of county staff.

This chapter does not preclude or prohibit any circuit judge from obtaining payment for the services of a substitute trial court administrator from the county or counties composing the circuit judge's judicial district rather than from the Administrative Office of the Courts.

History. Acts 1999, No. 393, § 5; 2015, No. 268, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “This chapter does not” for “Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to,” “administrator” for “staff person,” “composing” for “comprising,” and “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” and inserted “circuit” preceding “judge's.”

Subchapter 9 — Compensation for Retired Judges Appointed to Temporary Service

A.C.R.C. Notes. The references throughout this subchapter to Amendment 78 are to Ark. Const., Amend. 78, as proposed by 1999 Senate Joint Resolution 9. This subchapter became effective when Ark. Const., Amend. 78 was adopted at the November 2000 general election and approved by a vote of 427,407 for and 355,943 against.

16-10-901. “Retired judge” defined.

For purposes of this subchapter, a retired judge is a former circuit judge, chancery judge, circuit-chancery judge, Court of Appeals judge, or Supreme Court justice receiving benefits under the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

16-10-902. Amount of compensation.

  1. A retired judge appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as a special judge under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court shall receive compensation, in addition to his or her retirement benefits, at one-half (½) the rate as fixed by law for a regularly elected circuit judge.
  2. The compensation shall be paid from the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for special and recalled judges for the circuit courts.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 2; 2001, No. 1071, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 64; 2011, No. 274, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a), substituted “by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as a special judge” for “to temporary service” and inserted “and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court”; and added (b).

16-10-903. Retirement benefits.

The judge or justice shall not be entitled to a change in membership status or to any increase, decrease, or other modification to his or her retirement benefits as a result of his or her service after retirement.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

16-10-904. Mileage and expenses.

In addition to the per diem compensation provided by this subchapter, a special judge serving under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, shall receive expenses and mileage reimbursement from the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for special and recalled judges for the circuit courts at the rate as prescribed in § 16-10-119.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 4; 2001, No. 1071, § 2; 2011, No. 274, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “special” for “temporary” and “Amendment 80” for “Amendment 78”; and added “from the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for special and recalled judges for the circuit courts.”

16-10-905. Amount of per diem compensation.

  1. Per diem compensation prescribed in § 16-10-902 shall be for each day or portion of a day the judge serves on the bench.
  2. For each day or portion of a day that a special judge appointed under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, performs his or her judicial duties other than on the bench, the judge shall receive compensation as prescribed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 390, § 5; 2011, No. 274, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As to the effective date of this subchapter and Ark. Const., Amend. 78, see A.C.R.C. Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

“[Contingent Effective Date]” language was removed after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment subdivided the previously undesignated section into (a) and (b); and, in (b), substituted “special” for “temporary” and “Amendment 80” for “Amendment 78.”

Subchapter 10 — Arkansas Court Security Act

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 3, provided:

“The General Assembly recommends:

“(1) That the Supreme Court develop a comprehensive policy on security and emergency preparedness for the judicial branch of the government;

“(2) That the Supreme Court establish standards for every county for the development of a local security and emergency preparedness plan for circuit courts in the county and establish standards for every city in which a district court is located for the development of a local security and emergency preparedness plan for district courts in the city; and

“(3)(A) That the Supreme Court create a Security and Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee.

“(B) The committee should be inclusive of judges, law enforcement officers, sheriffs, city and county executive officers, emergency preparedness officials, legislators, and others involved in providing security to the courts.

“(C) Legislative representation on the committee should be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.”

16-10-1001. Title.

This subchapter shall be known as the “Arkansas Court Security Act”.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

16-10-1002. Purpose and findings.

  1. Recent incidents involving serious court security failures resulting in death or injury to judges and others in court facilities across the United States indicate that court security is an issue requiring an immediate response from this state.
  2. It is a valid expectation that every person who attends or is present in a court proceeding in a district, circuit, or appellate court in this state is entitled to a reasonably safe and secure environment.
  3. It is a goal of this state to provide citizens, litigants, jurors, attorneys, court employees, and judges with a safe and secure venue in which to work and conduct business.
  4. It is the purpose of this subchapter to establish a general program for security and emergency preparedness for the judicial branch of government.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

16-10-1003. Administrative Office of the Courts — Duties — Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall:
    1. Assist the Supreme Court with the creation and management of a state security and emergency preparedness plan for the judicial branch of government; and
    2. Provide assistance and support to city and county governments of this state for the adoption and implementation of local security and emergency preparedness plans for circuit and district courts.
    1. There is created within the Administrative Office of the Courts a Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness for the judicial branch of government. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide space and administrative assistance to support the work of the Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness.
    2. The Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness shall report to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
    3. The Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness shall:
      1. Assist with the development and adoption of a state security and emergency preparedness plan for the judicial branch of government;
      2. Assist agencies of this state and local governments of this state with the development and adoption of local security and emergency preparedness plans for circuit and district courts;
      3. Assist in the development and provision of training and education on court security and emergency preparedness to judges, court employees, and court security officers;
      4. Conduct periodic assessments of state and local security and emergency preparedness plans for courts and note deficiencies and areas of improvement; and
      5. Serve as the point of contact on state court security and emergency preparedness issues for the judicial branch of government and act as the representative of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to executive and legislative branch officials involved with the issues of court security and emergency preparedness.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

16-10-1004. Court security officers — Definition.

    1. There is established a training and certification program for court security officers.
    2. As used in this section, “court security officer” means an individual who is assigned the duty of providing security or security-related services at the request of an appellate court, circuit court, or district court in this state.
      1. A court security officer may be employed directly by an appellate court, circuit court, district court, or a law enforcement agency of this state or a city or county in this state.
      2. A court security officer may provide services to a court on either a full-time or part-time basis.
  1. The duties of a court security officer may include:
    1. The attendance in court when court is in session;
    2. The supervision and maintenance of order in a courtroom or courthouse;
    3. Providing security for individuals involved in court proceedings; and
    4. Other incidental and related duties at the direction of a court.
  2. In order to be eligible to provide services in an appellate court, circuit court, or district court in this state, a court security officer shall:
      1. Be certified as a law enforcement officer by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training under the laws and rules of this state.
      2. A court security officer shall complete the law enforcement certification requirement within one (1) year of beginning his or her term of service as a court security officer.
      3. A court security officer shall maintain the law enforcement certification during the term of his or her service as a court security officer; and
      1. Complete an additional training program for court security officers approved by the commission.
      2. A court security officer shall complete the additional training program for court security officers within one (1) year of beginning his or her term of service as a court security officer.
  3. A court or law enforcement agency employing a court security officer shall:
    1. Ensure that a court security officer meets or attains the certification required under subdivisions (c)(1)(B) and (c)(2)(B) of this section; and
    2. Require submission of and maintain records for the documentation of the court security officer's certification as a law enforcement officer and of the court security officer's completion of the additional training program for court security officers.
    1. Subject to the certification requirements of the commission, the officers of the Supreme Court police may offer and provide training for court security officers as required by this section.
    2. In addition to the general powers of a specialized law enforcement officer, Supreme Court police officers may, in the course of their official duties, provide security for members of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals when either court shall convene for the purpose of considering oral arguments or conferencing in any location within the State of Arkansas, including the authority to act as a peace officer to arrest, with or without warrant, any person within the boundaries of the State of Arkansas who is or is reasonably believed to be committing an offense against any laws of the State of Arkansas or against the ordinances of the city in which the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals is convened, and to deliver the person before any court of competent jurisdiction to be dealt with according to law.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1; 2009, No. 236, § 1; 2011, No. 1132, § 4; 2019, No. 315, § 1293.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The reference in subdivision (c)(2)(A) to the “Supreme Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee” refers to Acts 2007, No. 576, § 3, which provided:

“The General Assembly recommends:

“(1) That the Supreme Court develop a comprehensive policy on security and emergency preparedness for the judicial branch of the government;

“(2) That the Supreme Court establish standards for every county for the development of a local security and emergency preparedness plan for circuit courts in the county and establish standards for every city in which a district court is located for the development of a local security and emergency preparedness plan for district courts in the city; and

“(3)(A) That the Supreme Court create a Security and Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee.

“(B) The committee should be inclusive of judges, law enforcement officers, sheriffs, city and county executive officers, emergency preparedness officials, legislators, and others involved in providing security to the courts.

“(C) Legislative representation on the committee should be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.”

Acts 2009, No. 236, § 2, provided: “A person who is a court security officer on the effective date of this act shall complete the additional training program for court security officers in Arkansas Code § 16-10-1004(c) by December 31, 2009, or within one (1) year of the beginning of his or her term of service as a court security officer, whichever is later.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (c)(2) and (d).

The 2011 amendment deleted “recommended by the Supreme Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee and” following “court security officers” in (c)(2)(A).

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (c)(1)(A).

16-10-1005. Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training — Duties.

The Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training shall:

  1. Establish the standards and requirements for the training and certification program for court security officers;
  2. Work with the Administrative Office of the Courts to develop curriculum specific to the needs and requirements of a court security officer;
  3. Maintain an official roster of individuals who have successfully completed the training of a court security officer;
  4. Establish minimum curriculum requirements and approve courses and programs offered and operated by or for this state or its political subdivisions for the specific purpose of offering training to a court security officer; and
  5. Consult and cooperate with counties, municipalities, agencies of this state, other governmental agencies, universities, colleges, junior colleges, community colleges, and other institutions or organizations concerning the development of court security officer programs or courses of instruction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

16-10-1006. Court security grant program.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall administer a court security grant program for the purpose of providing financial assistance from funds specifically appropriated for that purpose to city and county governments to assist in the implementation of local security and emergency preparedness plans for circuit courts and district courts.
    1. Guidelines for the court security grant program shall be developed by the Administrative Office of the Courts by December 31, 2007, and shall be approved by the Legislative Council prior to the disbursement of any grant funds.
    2. Beginning July 31, 2008, and on July 31 of every year, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide an annual report to the Legislative Council that shall include the number of grant requests received from cities and counties and the number and amount of grants approved.

History. Acts 2007, No. 576, § 1.

Subchapter 11 — Court Interpreters

16-10-1101. Purpose.

  1. The State of Arkansas requires that court proceedings be conducted in the English language under § 16-10-107.
  2. Recognizing that a person with limited English proficiency cannot fully participate in the legal process and exercise the rights afforded to him or her, a court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to assist a person with limited English proficiency in a court proceeding.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1102. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Interpret” means to convey spoken English in a manner understood by a person who has limited English proficiency by using American Sign Language and transliteration, Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART) services or similar procedures, or a language in which the person is fluent, and to convey the communication made by that person into spoken English; and
  2. “Limited English proficiency” means either:
    1. The inability of a person to adequately understand or communicate effectively in English in a court proceeding because the person has not developed fluency in English; or
    2. The inability of a person to adequately hear, understand, or communicate effectively in English in a court proceeding due to a speech impairment, hearing loss, deafness, deaf-blindness, or other disability.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1103. Court interpreter for persons with limited English proficiency.

  1. A person with limited English proficiency who is a party to or a witness in a court proceeding is entitled to a qualified interpreter to interpret for the person throughout the court proceeding.
    1. The Supreme Court shall administer an interpreter program to appoint and use interpreters in court proceedings and to ensure interpreter certification, continued proficiency, and discipline.
    2. Staff and administrative support required by the Supreme Court relating to the program shall be provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the program may include:
      1. Establishing and administering a comprehensive testing and certification program for foreign language interpreters;
      2. Establishing and adopting standards concerning written and verbal proficiency in English and the foreign language to be interpreted;
      3. Establishing and adopting recognized standards for interpreters for the deaf and hearing impaired, including without limitation certification by the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc., or similar registries;
      4. Conducting periodic examinations to ensure the availability of certified interpreters;
      5. Charging reasonable fees as necessary for testing and certification;
      6. Ensuring reciprocity of certification for interpreters from other jurisdictions provided that the criteria for certification in the other jurisdiction is comparable to that established by the office;
      7. Establishing a schedule of reasonable fees for services rendered by interpreters in court proceedings;
      8. Establishing a process to review and respond to allegations of misconduct by interpreters; and
      9. Addressing other matters relating to interpreters in the courts.
    1. The General Assembly may appropriate to the office funds as necessary to establish a program to facilitate the use of interpreters and otherwise satisfy the requirements of this subchapter.
    2. Implementation of this subchapter is contingent upon the availability of appropriated funds to carry out its purposes.
    1. With the support of the office, all court personnel shall make a reasonable effort to ensure public awareness of interpreter services.
    2. Clerks of courts shall clearly publicize the availability of interpreter services.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1; 2015, No. 1152, § 2.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “other” for “foreign” preceding “jurisdiction is comparable” in (b)(2)(F).

16-10-1104. Appointment of interpreter.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall compile, maintain, and disseminate a certified registry of qualified interpreters for the courts.
  2. When an interpreter is requested or when the court determines that a party to or a witness in a court proceeding has limited English proficiency, a qualified interpreter shall be appointed under procedures adopted by the Supreme Court.
  3. An attorney, a clerk of court, employee or officer of a law enforcement agency, or a party to or a witness in a court proceeding shall notify the court as soon as the need for an interpreter is identified.
  4. If a qualified interpreter is not available through the office's registry, the court may appoint an interpreter qualified under procedures adopted by the court, and the interpreter shall take the oath under § 16-10-1105.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1105. Interpreter oath.

Before commencing his or her duties, an interpreter appointed under this subchapter shall take an oath in substantially the following form: “Do you [swear] [affirm] that you will make a true and impartial interpretation using your best skills and judgment in accordance with the standards and ethics of the interpreter profession and that you will abide by the Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters in the Judiciary, [so help you God][under the penalty of perjury]?”

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1106. Replacement of interpreter.

  1. A court that appoints an interpreter shall dismiss the interpreter and obtain the services of a qualified interpreter under procedures adopted by the Supreme Court:
    1. If the interpreter fails to follow the standards prescribed by law or by the Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters in the Judiciary;
    2. If the interpreter is unable to effectively communicate; or
    3. For other reasons prescribed by the Supreme Court.
  2. A court that appoints an interpreter shall notify the Administrative Office of the Courts in writing if the court dismisses an interpreter, setting forth the reason for the dismissal.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1107. Confidential communications in presence of interpreter.

An interpreter appointed under this subchapter shall not be compelled to testify in a court proceeding as to any statements made by the person with limited English proficiency and interpreted by the interpreter when the person with limited English proficiency is engaged in a privileged communication recognized by the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

16-10-1108. Compensation of interpreter.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the payment of the cost of providing an interpreter appointed under this subchapter shall be the responsibility of the local government responsible for funding the court that has jurisdiction over the court proceeding.
  2. If an interpreter from the registry maintained by the Administrative Office of the Courts is appointed by a court, the court may certify upon prescribed forms upon the conclusion of the interpreter's services those services to the office for payment from funds specifically appropriated for this purpose at the rate set by the office.
  3. A person with limited English proficiency who is a party to or witness in a court proceeding shall not be denied the services of an interpreter because he or she is unable to pay for the services.
  4. A defendant in a criminal proceeding shall not be required to pay a fee for the services of a court-appointed interpreter.
  5. If costs are assessed or collected by the court under the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, the disposition of the costs shall be at the discretion of the court, and the court may order reimbursement to the local government responsible for funding the court or the office for its responsibilities under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 1.

Chapter 11 Supreme Court

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 221, § 8, provided: “ACCESS TO JUSTICE.

The General Assembly finds that the Access to Justice Foundation serves a public purpose, therefore financial accounting, general bookkeeping, management and administrative services may be provided by employees of the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Bar of Arkansas in support of the Arkansas Access to Justice Foundation, Inc.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 232, § 8, provided: “ACCESS TO JUSTICE. The General Assembly finds that the Access to Justice Foundation serves a public purpose, therefore financial accounting, general bookkeeping, management and administrative services may be provided by employees of the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Bar of Arkansas in support of the Arkansas Access to Justice Foundation, Inc.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Smith, The Influence of the Arkansas Supreme Court's Opinions on Policy Made by the General Assembly: A Case Study, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 441.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1991, No. 7, § 6, provided:

“The General Assembly recognizes that each judge of the Arkansas Supreme Court incurs considerable expense in carrying out his or her responsibilities to the people of the State of Arkansas, including expenses for housing; the purchase and maintenance of an automobile; the acquisition, maintenance and equipping of a home-office where the judge can work nights, weekends and other times when it is inappropriate or impractical to work in his or her regular office; for attending bar, civic and social meetings and in otherwise carrying out their responsibilities as judges of the Arkansas Supreme Court; and that said judges should be entitled to a monthly expense allowance to cover such expenses.

“The funds appropriated by Item (10) of Section 1 herein may be used by each judge of the Arkansas Supreme Court to cover his expenses. The monthly allowance for fiscal year 1991-92 shall not exceed $550 per month and for fiscal year 1992-93 shall not exceed $550 per month.

“The amount prescribed herein shall be paid monthly upon vouchers submitted by such judges, with each such voucher to state only that it is for expenses incurred by such judge in carrying out his or her responsibilities to the people of the state as described herein.

“Upon receipt of each such voucher, the Auditor of State shall issue a warrant payable to the judge claiming such expense allowance and the State Treasurer is hereby authorized to pay the same from the funds appropriated for such purpose. The balance of the appropriation for housing and transportation which remains at the close of business of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992, shall be carried forward into the fiscal year ending June 30, 1993, there to be used for the same purpose.”

Preambles. Acts 1977, No. 545 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the Model Criminal Jury Instructions Committee has devoted considerable time and energy to the development of proposed Model Criminal Jury Instructions, to be followed in the several circuit courts of this State in criminal cases; and

“Whereas, upon completion of the Committee's work, such Model Criminal Jury Instructions will be submitted to the Arkansas Supreme Court for its consideration; and

“Whereas, it is essential that the Model Criminal Jury Instructions as considered and approved by the Arkansas Supreme Court be published in an appropriate manner, to be made available to the trial courts, prosecuting attorneys, members of the Bar, and to the public, and that provision also be made for the publication of supplements to said publication that may be developed and approved by order of the Supreme Court from time to time;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1868 (Adj. Sess.), No. 1, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1874 (Spec. Sess.), No. 9, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 145, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1925, No. 205, § 5: approved Mar. 21, 1925. Emergency clause provided: “That the Supreme Court of this state being more than a year behind with its docket hereby causing unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, constitutes an emergency making it necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, that this act take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1961, No. 132, § 3: Feb. 22, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the funds available to the Supreme Court for the maintenance and improvement of the Supreme Court Library are grossly inadequate, that there is urgent need for additional funds, and that enactment of this bill will provide the additional necessary funds. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1963, No. 6, § 3: approved Feb. 1, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It has been determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present restrictions in the law make it difficult to employ competent personnel and causes great hardships on the citizens of this state and only the provisions of this act will correct the situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the same shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1985, No. 665, § 5: July 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1985, is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in the Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1985, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and providing of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1985.”

Acts 2013, No. 1026, § 11: July 1, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2013 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2013 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2013.”

Acts 2019, No. 780, § 10: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2019 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2019 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 16 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

A New Judicial System for Arkansas, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 8, 319, 320.

16-11-101. Terms of court — Recess — Adjournment.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas shall begin its annual term on the second Monday of September in each year and may recess and adjourn from time to time as the court orders.

History. Acts 1874 (Spec. Sess.), No. 9, § 1, p. 12; C. & M. Dig., § 2121; Pope's Dig., § 2723; Acts 1961, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-205; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 3.

16-11-102. Adjournment of court in absence of quorum.

If a quorum of the court is not present at the time and place fixed by law for holding court, the court shall stand adjourned until the first Monday next following. If a quorum is not present on that day, the court shall stand adjourned by operation of law, from day to day, until a quorum appears, and then proceed to business and continue in session until all business ready for trial is adjudicated.

History. Acts 1868 (Adj. Sess.), No. 1, § 3, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2123; Pope's Dig., § 2729; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-209.

16-11-103. Divisions of court.

  1. The court may sit in two (2) divisions to be designated Division I and Division II.
  2. Each division shall be composed of three (3) justices.
    1. The Chief Justice shall alternate in presiding over these divisions. In addition, he or she shall have a vote and the same power as an associate justice.
    2. At each sitting, the division not being presided over by the Chief Justice shall be presided over by the justice in that division having the highest seniority by reason of service as a justice.
  3. In case of a tie in either division, the cause shall be transferred to the court en banc for decision.

History. Acts 1925, No. 205, §§ 2, 3; Pope's Dig., §§ 2725, 2726; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-206, 22-207.

Case Notes

Remedies.

Where defendant sought to establish its right to receive water service from city unencumbered by the previous tenants' unpaid bill, writ of mandamus was not the proper remedy as mandamus may not be used to establish a legal right, and defendant should have sought relief under this section by filing a petition for declaratory relief. Buttolph Trust v. Jarnagan, 302 Ark. 393, 789 S.W.2d 466 (1990).

Cited: Citizens Bank v. Estate of Pettyjohn, 282 Ark. 222, 667 S.W.2d 657 (1984).

16-11-104. Cases heard en banc.

  1. In all cases where the construction of the Arkansas Constitution is involved, or in a capital criminal case, the cause shall be heard by the court en banc.
  2. In each case heard by the court en banc, the concurrence of four (4) judges shall be necessary to a decision.

History. Acts 1925, No. 205, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 2725; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-206.

Case Notes

Affirmance.

Judgment of the lower court is affirmed where majority of judges agree to it though they differ as to reason therefor. Pollock v. C. Hennicke Co., 64 Ark. 180, 46 S.W. 185 (1897) (decision under prior law).

When the judges of the court are equally divided on a case, the judgment of the lower court will not be disturbed. Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 77 Ark. 590, 92 S.W. 858 (1906) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Citizens Bank v. Estate of Pettyjohn, 282 Ark. 222, 667 S.W.2d 657 (1984); Arkansas Intercollegiate Conference v. Parnham, 309 Ark. 170, 828 S.W.2d 828 (1992).

16-11-105. Rules and laws applicable to court.

  1. All rules of the Supreme Court and all laws respecting the Supreme Court shall apply to the Supreme Court sitting in divisions and en banc.
  2. The Supreme Court may make such further rules as may be necessary for the transaction and dispatch of business.
  3. The Supreme Court may, by general rules, provide what causes shall have a preference on the docket.

History. Civil Code, § 17; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [17], p. 219; 1925, No. 205, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 2126; Pope's Dig., §§ 2727, 2732; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-208, 22-213; Acts 2019, No. 315, § 1294.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (b).

Case Notes

Preference on Docket.

A cause will not be advanced on the ground of public interest unless it appears that some department of the government will be embarrassed by the delay. Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 55 Ark. 460, 18 S.W. 632 (1892).

16-11-106. Issuance of writs and process.

The Supreme Court shall have power to direct the forms of writs and process which are not contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this state.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 2126; Pope's Dig., § 2732; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-212.

Case Notes

Attorney General.

On appeal of the order granting a permanent guardianship of appellant's son to his grandmother, the Supreme Court of Arkansas did not address the merits of appellant's constitutional challenge to the guardianship statutes, §§ 28-65-101 to 28-65-707, because the attorney general was not notified of the challenge as required by subsection (b) of this section and there had not been a complete adversarial development of the constitutional issues. Mahavier v. Mahavier (In re A.M.), 2012 Ark. 278 (2012).

Writs.

A writ of prohibition is issued to prohibit a court from acting, while a writ of certiorari is issued to direct a judge to perform a duty. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

A writ of certiorari lies where there is a lack of jurisdiction or there has been an act in excess of jurisdiction that is apparent on the face of the record; it is not to be used to look beyond the face of the record to ascertain the actual merits of a controversy, or to control discretion, or to review a finding of facts, or to reverse a trial court's discretionary authority. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

A writ of prohibition is never issued to prevent a trial court from erroneously exercising jurisdiction; it is issued only where the trial court is wholly without jurisdiction. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is granted only when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction, when there are no disputed facts, when there is no adequate remedy otherwise, and when the writ is clearly warranted. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994).

16-11-107. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the senior justice presiding in absence of Chief Justice, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 65. The section was derived from Acts 1868 (Adj. Sess.), No. 1, § 4, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2124; Pope's Dig., § 2730; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-210.

16-11-108. Disqualification of justice.

No justice of the Supreme Court shall sit on the determination of any case in which he or she is interested in the outcome, is related to any party within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, has been counsel in the case or presided over it in any inferior court, or is otherwise disqualified under the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, unless the parties waive the disqualification, as provided in the code.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 23; C. & M. Dig., § 2125; Pope's Dig., § 2731; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-211; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 66.

Cross References. Motions requesting disqualification, S. Ct. & Ct. App. Rule 6-4.

Case Notes

Interest in Suit.

Justice of Supreme Court is disqualified when his salary is involved. Ferrell v. Keel, 103 Ark. 96, 146 S.W. 494 (1912).

Recusal.

Appellee's motion for vacatur, treated as a Letter of Suggestion of Disqualification under former S. Ct. Rule 27 (now S. Ct. and Ct. App. Rule 6-4), alleging that the Chief Justice had a social relationship with an attorney involved in this case and that because of this relationship, all members of the Arkansas Supreme Court should be disqualified, was denied. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 312 Ark. 516, 849 S.W.2d 525 (1993).

16-11-109. Law clerks.

No person shall be employed as a law clerk by the Arkansas Supreme Court unless that person is a licensed attorney or a graduate of a law school approved by the State Board of Law Examiners.

History. Acts 1961, No. 244, § 1; 1963, No. 6, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-241.

16-11-110. Library — Librarian.

    1. Except as provided in this section, the Supreme Court Library shall be under the exclusive control and supervision of the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are hereby authorized to make such rules regarding its use and operation as they may deem proper.
      1. There shall be a Director of the Supreme Court Library who shall be nominated by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
      2. Subsequent to the appointment, the Director of the Supreme Court Library shall hold office at the pleasure of the Supreme Court.
  1. All books obtained and placed in the library shall be the absolute property of the state, subject to the control and management of the Supreme Court, except:
    1. Items deposited in the library by the United States Superintendent of Documents under the Federal Depository Library Program; and
    2. The reports of the Supreme Court directed to be placed in the library, which may be exchanged by the Director of the Supreme Court Library for the reports of the other states or of the United States courts or for other law books, under the direction of the Supreme Court.
    1. The Director of the Supreme Court Library shall have the authority to accept any donation of books, money, or property to increase the library.
    2. Any donation of money shall be deposited in the Supreme Court Library Fund.
  2. The Secretary of State is directed, upon demand, to deliver to the Director of the Supreme Court Library, whenever there are two (2) or more copies of any statute book, book of reports of any court of the United States, or any other law book in his or her office, one (1) copy of every such statute book or book of reports or law book.
    1. Every person who is enrolled as an attorney in the Supreme Court shall pay a fee determined by rule of the Supreme Court for enrolling and recording the license and the certified transcript thereof furnished to the attorney.
    2. The clerk shall deposit this fee in the Supreme Court Library Fund to be used by the Supreme Court for the maintenance and improvement of the library.
    1. The Director of the Supreme Court Library is authorized and empowered at any time to dispose of any books, magazines, papers, or files which may be in the custody or care of the library and which may be found by the Supreme Court to be no longer useful.
      1. The disposition may be by any method permitted by law, as the Director of the Supreme Court Library may determine.
      2. If the disposition is by sale, then the proceeds shall be placed in the Supreme Court Library Fund.

History. Acts 1851, §§ 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, p. 89; 1895, No. 145, § 7, p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2141, 4572, 9776a, 9776d-9776f, 9776h, 9776i; Pope's Dig., §§ 2747, 5656, 13310, 13313-13315, 13317, 13318; Acts 1961, No. 132, § 1; 1961, No. 133, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1709, 22-232, 22-234 — 22-238; Acts 1999, No. 960, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1295.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (a)(1).

16-11-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning disposal of books, papers, magazines, and files, was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 960, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1957, No. 67, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-239, 22-240.

16-11-112. Authorization to contract for publication of Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.

  1. The Arkansas Supreme Court is authorized to provide for the publication by private publishing firms of the Arkansas Model Criminal Jury Instructions and the Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions for use in the trial courts of this state.
  2. The Supreme Court shall solicit proposals from reputable publishing firms and may enter into contracts with the publishing firms which are deemed by the court to offer the best proposals for the separate publication of the Arkansas Model Criminal Jury Instructions and the Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions, with provision being made for the publication from time to time of pocket part supplements containing revisions or additions to the instructions if the prices at which the publishers propose to sell the Arkansas Model Criminal Jury Instructions and the Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions are deemed to be reasonable and adequate by the Supreme Court and upon the publisher's agreeing to pay to the Supreme Court a reasonable market-rate royalty for the use and benefit of the Supreme Court Library Fund.
  3. The Supreme Court may delegate to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, or to any other employee or official of the court as the court may designate, the responsibility for soliciting and tabulating bid proposals and performing other duties as may be directed by the Supreme Court.
  4. The awarding of contracts to private publishers for the publication of the Arkansas Model Criminal Jury Instructions and the Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions shall be by a majority vote of the justices of the Supreme Court sitting in session for that purpose.

History. Acts 1977, No. 545, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-250, 22-251; Acts 2001, No. 625, § 1.

16-11-113. Expenses of Supreme Court.

  1. All expenditures for fuel, blank books, and stationery accruing in the Supreme Court shall be paid out of the State Treasury from any moneys appropriated for the contingent expenses of the Supreme Court.
  2. The Auditor of State shall draw his or her warrant for the amount of the expenditures. The certificate of the court shall be a sufficient voucher.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, §§ 45, 46; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2116, 2117; Pope's Dig., §§ 2720, 2721; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-214, 22-215.

16-11-114. Salaries of Chief Justice and associate justices.

The salary of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be seventy-one thousand eight hundred seventy dollars ($71,870) per annum, and the salary of each associate justice of the Supreme Court shall be sixty-six thousand ten dollars ($66,010) per annum.

History. Acts 1985, No. 665, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-140.

16-11-115. Compensation of special justice.

Each special justice of the Supreme Court who is not a retired judge or justice or an active circuit or district judge, appointed under the provisions of the Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13, shall receive, as full compensation for services rendered, the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for each case in the special justice's or special judge's commission. When the case or cases shall be decided, this amount shall be certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court after having been approved by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1981, No. 607, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-130; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 67.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-11-116. Employees of the Supreme Court — Bar of Arkansas.

  1. Pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 28, the Supreme Court is charged with the authority and responsibility to regulate the practice of law. As of July 1, 2013, those persons who are employed by the Supreme Court to carry out these responsibilities and who are paid from the Bar of Arkansas account shall be considered employees of the State of Arkansas administered by the Supreme Court.
  2. For all purposes involving annual leave, sick leave, and career service recognition as a state employee, years of service as an employee of the Supreme Court — Bar of Arkansas shall be recognized as eligible service as a state employee.
  3. Notwithstanding § 19-4-801 or any other law to the contrary, employees shall be paid from cash funds of the Supreme Court derived solely from revenues received from attorney license fees and any other fees, fines, interest income, or other revenues derived from the regulation of the practice of law that may be deposited into the Bar of Arkansas account as determined by the Supreme Court.
      1. On July 1, 2013, the Bar of Arkansas Employees Pension Plan shall be abolished, and its power, duties, plan liabilities and assets shall be transferred to and assumed by the Arkansas Public Employees’ Retirement System, together with all accrued service credit due its members.
      2. All current members and beneficiaries of the Bar of Arkansas Employees Pension Plan shall be members of the Arkansas Public Employees’ Retirement System and covered by that system's eligibility, retirement and beneficiary provisions, except that those employees who were members of the Bar of Arkansas Employees Pension Plan and who were eligible for the lump-sum distribution provisions of that plan as referenced in Section 9.2(h) of the official plan document shall retain those rights as provided by the Bar of Arkansas Employees Pension Plan.
    1. Employees of the Supreme Court — Bar of Arkansas who are hired after July 1, 2013, shall be enrolled in the Arkansas Public Employees’ Retirement System as a condition of employment as provided for in § 24-4-301.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1026, § 8.

16-11-117. Access to Justice Foundation.

The General Assembly finds that as the Access to Justice Foundation Inc. serves a public purpose, financial accounting, general bookkeeping, and management and administrative services may be provided by employees of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court — Bar of Arkansas in support of the Arkansas Access to Justice Foundation Inc.

History. Acts 2019, No. 780, § 7.

Subchapter 2 — Supreme Court Reports

Effective Dates. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 15: approved Mar. 30, 1915. Emergency declared.

Acts 1981, No. 803, § 5: Mar. 28, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Third General Assembly that courts in Arkansas are faced with a tremendous increase in their workload; that appeals from the trial courts will continue their upward trend in view of the continued record-shattering number of cases filed in these courts; that appeals from these courts which will increase in number will add to the workload of the Supreme Court; that the newly created Court of Appeals was necessary to relieve some of the workload of the Supreme Court, but the Court of Appeals has, also, caused an increased burden on the Reporter of the Supreme Court who reports the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals; and that it is this increase in workload that requires the Reporter of the Supreme Court to have assistance in reporting opinions of both these courts. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, §§ 76, 77.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 224.

16-11-201. Clerk to furnish Reporter with copy of decisions.

It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the Supreme Court to furnish the Reporter of the Supreme Court with a copy of all decisions of the court within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the time allowed for filing motions for reconsideration.

History. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 9776k; Pope's Dig., § 13320; Acts 1971, No. 257, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-219.

Cross References. Copies of opinions to be furnished to Reporter, § 16-20-206.

16-11-202. Preparation of syllabus, headnotes, corrections — Publication.

It shall be the duty of the Reporter of the Supreme Court to:

  1. Prepare the syllabus without delay after the Clerk of the Supreme Court furnishes him or her with a copy of the decisions of the court;
  2. Prefix notes to each published decision containing the points decided therein;
  3. Edit the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and make technical corrections thereto;
  4. Oversee publication and distribution of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in such format and medium as the Supreme Court may direct; and
  5. Perform other duties as the Supreme Court assigns.

History. Acts 1915, No. 326, §§ 2, 11, 13; C. & M. Dig., §§ 9776k, 9776o, 9776q; Pope's Dig., §§ 13320, 13324, 13326; Acts 1971, No. 257, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-219, 22-221, 22-222; Acts 2009, No. 221, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted gender-neutral language in (1); inserted “published” in (2); rewrote (3) and (4); and added (5).

16-11-203. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning authority to omit opinions, was repealed by Acts 2009, No. 221, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1915, No. 326, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 9776o; Pope's Dig., § 13324; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-220.

16-11-204. Assistant to Reporter of the Supreme Court.

  1. The Reporter of the Supreme Court is authorized to employ an assistant to aid the Reporter in the preparation of the headnotes for the published decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and in the supervision of the distribution and publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
  2. No person shall be employed as an assistant by the Reporter in accordance with this section unless he or she is a licensed attorney.
  3. The position of assistant to the Reporter shall be state-funded at a salary to be set by the General Assembly.

History. Acts 1981, No. 803, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-219.1 — 22-219.3; Acts 2009, No. 221, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (a); and inserted “in accordance with this section” and “or she” in (b).

16-11-205. Reporter to superintend distribution and publication of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

It shall be the duty of the Reporter of the Supreme Court to superintend the distribution and publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in such format and medium as the Supreme Court may direct.

History. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 9776l; Pope's Dig., § 13321; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-225; Acts 2009, No. 221, § 4.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote the section.

16-11-206 — 16-11-209. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning proofreader and proof sheets furnished by printer, delivery of printed volumes, payment of printing and binding bills, and contractor's failure to perform, forfeiture, and letting new contracts, were repealed by Acts 2009, No. 221, §§ 5-8. The sections were derived from:

16-11-206. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 9776r; Pope's Dig., § 13327; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-226.

16-11-207. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 8; C. & M. Dig., § 9776n; Pope's Dig., § 13323; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-229; Acts 1991, No. 549, § 9.

16-11-208. Acts 1915, No. 326, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 9776n; Pope's Dig., § 13323; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-230; Acts 1991, No. 549, § 10.

16-11-209. Acts 1915, No. 326, §§ 6, 7; C. & M. Dig., § 9776m; Pope's Dig., § 13322; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-227, 22-228.

Subchapter 3 — Procedural Rules

Cross References. Rules for conduct of appeals, § 16-67-302.

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 470, § 6: Mar. 1, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds that pleading, practice, and procedure in criminal cases and proceedings in the inferior courts of law of this state is not efficient, certain, or responsive to the reasonable expectations and legitimate needs of the people of this state; that the system of administering criminal justice in the state of Arkansas is in need of immediate reform; and, that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to empower the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas, which the General Assembly finds to be the proper authority for prescribing rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in criminal cases and proceedings in the courts of this state to effectuate such needed reforms. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after March 1, 1971.”

Acts 1979, No. 333, § 5: Mar. 9, 1979.

Acts 1981, No. 312, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 5, 1981. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this Act is necessary to clarify the authority granted by the legislative branch of government to the judicial branch of government, and that this Act is in keeping with the separation of powers provision of Section 2 of Article 4 of the Arkansas Constitution, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 82 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Cox and Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court That Came in From the Code, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 124 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Spears, Comment: The 1979 Civil Procedure Rules, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 89.

Heller, Survey of Civil Procedure, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 172.

Case Notes

Uniform Rules of Evidence.

Under its own rule-making power and under existing statutory authority, the Supreme Court adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence as the law in this state. Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986).

16-11-301. Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure — Supersession.

All statutes concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts shall be deemed superseded by rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 3, or pursuant to the Supreme Court's constitutional, inherent, or statutory authority prior to the effective date of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80.

History. Acts 1971, No. 470, §§ 1-3; 1979, No. 333, § 1; 1981, No. 312, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-242 — 22-244; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 68.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Constitutional Law — Child Hearsay Exception in Sexual Abuse Cases — New Arkansas Supreme Court Rule Conflicts with New General Assembly Rule: Which Controls? Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992), 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 143.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The legislature's delegation of power to prescribe rules of criminal procedure is not unconstitutional nor outside the enabling act, provided the rule in question is truly procedural. Miller v. State, 262 Ark. 223, 555 S.W.2d 563 (1977).

This section is not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority; it merely recognizes and is harmonious with the court's inherent powers rather than conferring an express power. Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 137, 74 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1982).

Amendment of Rules.

Since the Supreme Court has the inherent power to make the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it follows that it has the inherent power to amend those rules. Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 137, 74 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1982).

Application.

Petition to revive a foreign judgment was properly granted because it was authenticated under Ark. R. Civ. P. 44 where it was signed by a clerk for a United States Bankruptcy Court; the Arkansas Supreme Court's rule-making authority over procedural matters was exclusive. It was argued that the proper authentication process was not followed when a certified copy of the judgment was attached to an application. Bird v. Shaffer, 2012 Ark. App. 464 (2012).

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § 16-66-601 et seq., was enacted before Ark. Const. Amend. 80 and this section, and Ark. R. Civ. P. 44 therefore supersedes it with respect to how foreign judgments must be filed with an Arkansas court. Agility Fin. Credit Union v. Largent, 2018 Ark. App. 358, 552 S.W.3d 471 (2018).

Cited: Gardner v. State, 252 Ark. 828, 481 S.W.2d 342 (1972); Adams v. State, 269 Ark. 548, 601 S.W.2d 881 (1980); Clines v. State, 282 Ark. 541, 669 S.W.2d 883 (1984).

16-11-302. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in civil cases, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 69. The section was derived from Acts 1973, No. 38, §§ 1-6; 1979, No. 333, § 2; 1981, No. 312, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-245 — 22-249, 22-249n.

Chapter 12 Court Of Appeals

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1991, No. 7, § 7, provided:

“The General Assembly recognizes that each judge of the Arkansas Court of Appeals incurs considerable expense in carrying out his or her responsibilities to the people of the State of Arkansas, including expenses for housing; the purchase and maintenance of an automobile; the acquisition, maintenance and equipping of a home-office where the judge can work nights, and other times when it is inappropriate or impractical to work in his or her regular office; for attending bar, civic and social meetings and in otherwise carrying out their responsibilities as judges of the Arkansas Court of Appeals; and that said judges should be entitled to an expense allowance to cover such expenses.

“The funds appropriated by Item (13) of Section 1 herein may be used by each judge of the Arkansas Court of Appeals to cover his expenses. The monthly allowance for fiscal year 1991-92 shall not exceed $550 per month and for fiscal year 1992-93 shall not exceed $550 per month.

“The amount prescribed herein shall be paid monthly upon vouchers submitted by such judges, with each such voucher to state only that it is for expenses incurred by such judge in carrying out his or her responsibilities to the people of the state as described herein.

“Upon receipt of each such voucher, the Auditor of State shall issue a warrant payable to the judge claiming such expense allowance and the State Treasurer is hereby authorized to pay the same from the funds appropriated for such purpose. The balance of the appropriation for housing and transportation which remains at the close of business of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992, shall be carried forward into the fiscal year ending June 30, 1993, there to be used for the same purpose.”

Acts 1999, No. 889, §§ 1-4, provided:

“Section 1. At the November 2000 general election, the electors of each of the six (6) existing Court of Appeals districts created in accordance with Act 208 of 1979 shall elect an additional Court of Appeals judge from each district to begin office on January 1, 2001. The newly-elected judges shall each be elected to serve for four (4) years, or until such later date as the boundaries of the existing Court of Appeals districts are redefined and judges from those districts are elected.

“Section 2. The elected judges of the Court of Appeals now serving shall be designated as position 1 within their respective districts, and the new judges elected under this act shall be designated position 2 within their districts.

“Section 3. Those present judges of the court, who were appointed pursuant to Acts 11 and 15 of 1995 (First Extraordinary Session), shall be entitled to seek election at the November 2000 general election from the district in which they reside.

“Section 4. Except as provided in Section 1, members of the Court of Appeals shall serve eight (8) year terms.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1973, No. 231, § 6: Mar. 7, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that doubt and confusion exists as to the proper construction of existing statutes pertaining to the effective date of orders of the Arkansas Public Service Commission and with respect to the proper procedures to follow to obtain judicial review of such orders; that such doubt and confusion could lead to a miscarriage of justice through a technical failure to comply with these statutes as ultimately construed by the courts; and that enactment of this bill will resolve said doubt and confusion. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 208, § 9: July 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload of the Supreme Court has constantly risen, that the case filings have reached the point that the Court cannot adequately dispose of the appeals, and that the people of this State, through the passage of Amendment 58 to the Constitution of Arkansas, recognized the necessity for a Court of Appeals. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1979.”

Acts 1983, No. 410, § 5: Aug. 1, 1983.

Acts 1985, No. 665, § 5: July 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “There is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1985 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in the Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1985 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and providing of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1985.”

Acts 1985, No. 770, § 4: Apr. 3, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the practice of requiring circuit court judicial review of Public Service Commission orders works an undue hardship on the people of this State by creating undue delay in the final implementation of just and reasonable rates, and immediate correction of this hardship is necessary in order to preserve the public safety, health, peace, and general welfare of the State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 959, § 6: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that the caseload of the Court of Appeals has risen so dramatically in recent years that it has created the potential for a severe backlog in the prompt decision of matters before the court. This act is necessary to alleviate this backlog particularly since the present normal term of the Court of Appeals would expire before this act would otherwise become effective. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 12: §§ 6-11 effective July 1, 1995.

Acts 1995, No. 1323, § 13: became law without Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 19, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act amends Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-12-101 and uncodified sections of Acts 1993, No. 1085; the judicial positions created by § 16-12-101 are to become effective July 1, 1995 and this act would delay the effect of Act 1085 until January 1, 1996; and that in the event of the extension of the regular session the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1995 would work irreparable harm on the proper administration of this act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), Nos. 11 and 15, § 7: Oct. 23, 1995, and Oct. 24, 1995, respectively. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act amends Uncodified Act 1085 of 1993 and is needed to provide for the appointment of additional Court of Appeals judges from the state of Arkansas since the 80th General Assembly meeting in regular session failed to prescribe new districts and irreparable harm to the proper administration of justice would result if this act is not given immediate effect. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 113, § 6: Feb. 7, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 10 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1995 abolished the Joint Interim Committee on Judiciary and in its place established the House Interim Committee and Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary; that the Arkansas Code 21-9-203 refers to the Joint Interim Committee on Judiciary and should be corrected to refer to the House and Senate Interim Committees on Judiciary; that this act so provides; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to make the laws compatible as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 16 et seq.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 319.

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence, Four Observations and an Inquiry About the Practice and Frequency of Dissenting Votes by the Judges of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, 1994 Ark. L. Notes 89.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller, Survey of Civil Procedure, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 172.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Distinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.

Watkins, Division of Labor between Arkansas's Appellate Courts, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 177.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. Because of the enactment of subchapter 2 of this chapter by Acts 2003, No. 1812, the existing provisions of this chapter have been designated as subchapter 1.

16-12-101. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 889, § 7. Section 5 of Acts 1999, No. 889, amended uncodified Section 1 of Acts 11 and 15 of 1995, First Extraordinary Session rather than the codified version.

Acts 1999, No. 889, § 5, provided:

“(a) There is created, pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 58, the Arkansas Court of Appeals, to be composed of six (6) members until January 1, 1996.

“(b) On or after January 1, 1996, the Court of Appeals shall be composed of nine (9) judges. On or after January 1, 1997, the Court of Appeals shall be composed of twelve (12) judges. The terms of office of the six (6) Court of Appeals judges currently holding office shall not be affected by this act.

“(c) Three additional judgeships created by subsection (b) of this section shall be effective on and after January 1, 1996 and three shall be effective on or after January 1, 1997. The Governor shall appoint three (3) persons from the state at large to serve from January 1, 1996 through December 31, 1998 and shall appoint three (3) persons from the state at large to serve from January 1, 1997 through December 31, 1998.”

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning creation of court and apportionment board, composition, and establishment of districts, was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 889, § 7. The section was derived from Acts 1979, No. 208, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1201; Acts 1993, No. 1085, §§ 1, 3; 1995, No. 1323, § 1; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 1; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 15, § 1; 1997, No. 113, § 1; 1999, No. 889, § 5.

16-12-102. Election of judges.

  1. Except as provided in § 16-12-106, all judges of the Court of Appeals shall be elected for full eight-year terms.
  2. Each elected judge shall be a resident of the district from which he or she is elected.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1202; Acts 1991, No. 959, § 1; 2005, No. 1448, § 1; 2007, No. 213, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 2, provided, in part, that at the 1980 general election, six persons should be elected to serve as judges of the Court of Appeals beginning January 1, 1981, that one judge should be elected from each of the six districts established by the board, and that the terms of office of the initial six judges should be determined by lot by the board so that two judges should be elected to four-year terms, two judges should be elected to six-year terms, and two judges should be elected to eight-year terms.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted the subsection (a) and (b) designations; and added (c).

The 2007 amendment deleted (c) relating to eligibility of appointed judges.

Cross References. Court of Appeals transition, § 16-12-202.

16-12-103. Location of court.

The Court of Appeals shall be located in Little Rock and shall have offices as convenient to the State Capitol and the law library in the Justice Building as can be arranged, but the court en banc, or any division thereof, may sit in any county seat for the purpose of hearing argument in cases before it.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1203; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 6; 1995, No. 1323, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1323, this section began:

“Effective January 1, 1996.”

16-12-104. Authority of court.

The Court of Appeals shall have authority to issue any writs, directives, orders, and mandates that are appropriate, and only those that are appropriate, for the determination of cases within its jurisdiction.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1204.

16-12-105. Chief Judge.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall designate one (1) of the judges of the Court of Appeals as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. The appointment as Chief Judge shall be for a four-year term, and the person so named shall be eligible for reappointment, subject to the discretion of the Chief Justice.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1205.

16-12-106. Special judges.

  1. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may commission special judges pursuant to the Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13.
  2. Each special judge of the Court of Appeals who is not a retired judge or justice or an active circuit or district judge, appointed under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, shall receive as full compensation for services rendered the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for each case in the special justice's or special judge's commission. When the cases are decided, this amount shall be certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court, after having been approved by the Chief Justice.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 6; 1981, No. 607, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-130, 22-1206; Acts 1991, No. 959, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 70.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-12-107. Salaries.

  1. The judges of the Court of Appeals shall receive such compensation as provided by law.
  2. The salary of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals shall be sixty-four thousand eight hundred eighty-seven dollars ($64,887) per annum, and the salary of each of the judges of the Court of Appeals shall be sixty-three thousand seven hundred sixty-three dollars ($63,763) per annum.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 7; 1985, No. 665, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-140.4, 22-1207.

16-12-108. Staff.

  1. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve as Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
  2. The Reporter of the Supreme Court shall serve as Reporter of the Court of Appeals.
  3. The sheriff of the county wherein the Court of Appeals is sitting shall be the bailiff of that court.
  4. Each judge of the Court of Appeals shall have a secretary and a law clerk to be selected by the judge personally.
  5. The Clerk of the Supreme Court is authorized to select two (2) additional persons as deputies. He or she may assign deputies to primarily handle all matters relative to the Court of Appeals, including, but not limited to, filing cases which have been appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning briefs and motions to the judges, submitting cases, keeping all court records, notifying counsel of oral argument, preparing the payroll, and any and all other duties connected with the Court of Appeals.
    1. Law clerks for the Court of Appeals shall receive the same salaries as Supreme Court law clerks.
    2. All other employees of the Court of Appeals shall be of the same grade classification as Supreme Court employees performing the same duties, except that the original salaries may be in accordance with Step 2 of that grade as set out in § 21-5-209.

History. Acts 1979, No. 208, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1208.

16-12-109 — 16-12-114. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Court of Appeals, divisions, decisions and rehearings, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 71. These sections were derived from the following sources:

16-12-109. Acts 1983, No. 410, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-1209, 22-1210; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 7; 1995, No. 1323, § 3; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 2; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 15, § 2.

16-12-110. Acts 1983, No. 410, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1212; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 8; 1995, No. 1323, § 4.

16-12-111. Acts 1983, No. 410, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1211; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 9; 1995, No. 1323, § 5.

16-12-112. Acts 1973, No. 231, § 3; 1985, No. 770, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 73-229.1.

16-12-113. Acts 1983, No. 410, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1211; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 10; 1995, No. 1323, § 6; 1999, No. 924, § 1.

16-12-114. Acts 1983, No. 410, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-1211; Acts 1993, No. 1085, § 11; 1995, No. 1323, § 7; 1999, No. 924, § 2.

Subchapter 2 — Reapportionment of the Court of Appeals Districts

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1812, § 1, provided:

“(a) Under Act 889 of 1999, the Arkansas Court of Appeals Apportionment Commission was created to review the electoral districts for the Court of Appeals and make a recommendation on the changes to be made effective January 1, 2004. The commission has reviewed the current districts and the data from the 2000 census, received input from judges, lawyers, and the general public, and considered the requirements and restrictions of federal and state law. Because of major shifts in population which have occurred since the current districts were created utilizing the 1970 census, a realignment of these districts is necessary.

“(b) The Arkansas Court of Appeals consisted of six (6) judges when it was first created. The number of members grew to nine (9) judges in 1996, and to twelve (12) judges in 1997. However, when the new judgeships were created, no plan was made to stagger the dates of the end of the terms for each of the judges. As a result, the terms of eight (8) of the twelve (12) judges end in 2004. In order to provide for an orderly transition of members and create a reasonable level of stability on the court, it is necessary to adjust the current terms of office.

“(c) It is the purpose of this act to create new electoral districts for the Arkansas Court of Appeals and to establish the dates for electing the judges within each of these districts.”

Acts 2003, No. 1812, § 4, provided:

“Each currently serving member of the Court of Appeals shall continue in office until his or her position shall be subject to election, as provided for under this act, regardless of the date otherwise set as the expiration of his or her term, and regardless of any changes in the geographical boundaries in the district from which he or she was elected.”

Publisher's Notes. Because Acts 2003, No. 1812 enacted a subchapter 2, the existing provisions of this chapter have been designated as subchapter 1.

16-12-201. Court of Appeals — Districts.

The State of Arkansas is divided into the following seven (7) districts for the election of judges to the Court of Appeals:

  1. District 1 shall be composed of Clay, Craighead, Crittenden, Cross, Greene, Lonoke, Mississippi, Monroe, Poinsett, Prairie, White, and Woodruff counties;
  2. District 2 shall be composed of Baxter, Boone, Cleburne, Conway, Faulkner, Fulton, Independence, Izard, Jackson, Lawrence, Marion, Newton, Pope, Randolph, Searcy, Sharp, Stone, and Van Buren counties;
  3. District 3 shall be composed of Benton, Carroll, Crawford, Franklin, Johnson, Madison, and Washington counties;
  4. District 4 shall be composed of Clark, Garland, Hempstead, Hot Spring, Howard, Little River, Logan, Miller, Montgomery, Pike, Polk, Scott, Sebastian, Sevier, and Yell counties;
  5. District 5 shall be composed of Ashley, Bradley, Calhoun, Cleveland, Columbia, Dallas, Drew, Grant, Lafayette, Lincoln, Nevada, Ouachita, and Union counties;
  6. District 6 shall be composed of Pulaski, Perry, and Saline counties; and
  7. District 7 shall be composed of Arkansas, Chicot, Desha, Jefferson, Lee, Phillips, and St. Francis counties.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1812, § 2.

16-12-202. Court of Appeals — Transition.

The elections under this section shall be for an eight-year term as follows:

  1. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 2, Position 2”, shall continue to be designated “District 2, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 2;
  2. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 4, Position 1”, shall continue to be designated “District 4, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 4;
  3. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 4, Position 2”, shall continue to be designated “District 4, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 4;
  4. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 5, Position 1”, shall be designated “District 5” and shall be subject to election in District 5;
  5. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 3, Position 2”, shall continue to be designated “District 3, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 3;
  6. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 1, Position 2”, shall be designated “District 1, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 1;
  7. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 5, Position 2”, shall be designated “District 1, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 1;
  8. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 6, Position 2”, shall continue to be designated “District 6, Position 2”, and shall be subject to election in District 6;
  9. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 1, Position 1”, shall be designated “District 7” and shall be subject to election in District 7;
  10. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 6, Position 1”, shall continue to be designated “District 6, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 6;
  11. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 2, Position 1”, shall continue to be designated “District 2, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 2; and
  12. The judgeship designated prior to July 16, 2003, as “District 3, Position 1”, shall continue to be designated “District 3, Position 1”, and shall be subject to election in District 3.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1812, § 3; 2011, No. 1132, § 5.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “designated prior to July 16, 2003” for “currently designated” throughout the section; deleted “in 2004” following “shall be subject to election” in (1) through (4); deleted “in 2006” following “shall be subject to election” in (5) through (8); deleted “in 2008” following “shall be subject to election” in (9) and (10); and deleted “in 2010” following “shall be subject to election” in (11) and (12).

Chapter 13 Circuit Courts

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1987, No. 846, § 5, provided:

“The State Board of Judicial Reapportionment, created and established by Act 826 of 1985, will continue to exist until December 31, 1988, at which time such Board will cease to exist, and prior to December 31, 1988, such State Board of Judicial Reapportionment shall prepare a comprehensive plan reapportioning the existing judicial circuits of this State, and recommending the number and type of judges required under such reapportionment. The Board shall present such plans and recommendations to the Arkansas General Assembly for its consideration during its regular session in 1989.”

The subchapter placement of certain judicial circuits had to be rearranged after publication of the 1999 Replacement Volume 14A.

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 8, provided:

“(a) The House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee shall conduct a joint study on the composition of the judicial circuits and allocation of circuit court judgeships statewide and issue recommendations concerning the reassignment of judicial circuits and the reapportionment of circuit court judgeships, if necessary, to the General Assembly for consideration during the 2021 Regular Session.

“(b) The recommendations, if any, under this section shall be made no later than September 1, 2020, in order to be available for potential budgetary considerations during hearings of the Joint Budget Committee before the 2021 Regular Session”.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 1224, § 4, provided:

“It is the intent of the 79th General Assembly that the authorization of seven additional Circuit & Chancery Judge positions created in response to the United States District Court Order in the case of Eugene Hunt, et al v. State of Arkansas, et al be discontinued as the terms of the displaced incumbent judges expire pursuant to the court order.”

Cross References. Uniform filing fees and court costs, § 16-10-105.

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 25 et seq.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 9 et seq., § 186 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery Courts: Historical Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 215.

Averill, Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 281.

Case Notes

Complaint.

In an action by a county resident against officials of the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, alleging that the Commission used public funds to enter into gas leases with private commercial enterprises and diverted the monies generated from those leases to unauthorized expenditures, the resident failed to state a claim for illegal extraction under this section because the monies at issue did not arise from taxation but were generated from the Commission's gas leases with private, third-party companies. Dockery v. Morgan, 2011 Ark. 94, 380 S.W.3d 377 (2011).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 649, § 3: Apr. 7, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the compensation presently provided for special circuit and chancery judges is not adequate to compensate said judges for their services and that the same will result in a delay in the administration of justice, this act is immediately necessary to correct the situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 665, § 5: July 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “There is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1985 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in the Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1985 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and providing of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1985.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 7: Nov. 7, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload of the Second and Sixth Judicial Districts necessitates the appointment of additional circuit-chancery judges immediately; and that this Act so provides and should therefore be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-101. Reassignment of case upon disqualification of judge.

When it appears that the circuit judge before whom a case is pending is disqualified under § 16-13-214, the case shall be reassigned to another judge.

History. Acts 1925, No. 127, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 2712; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-114; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 72.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed] did not operate to preclude enactment of this section. Thus, this section does not contravene Ark. Const., Art. 7, §§ 21 [repealed], 22 [repealed]. Black v. Cockrill, 239 Ark. 367, 389 S.W.2d 881 (1965).

Purpose.

This section tends to carry out the intention of Ark. Const., Art 7, § 20 [repealed]. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Applicability.

This section applies whether or not the related presiding judge of the division is actually presiding at the trial. Black v. Cockrill, 239 Ark. 367, 389 S.W.2d 881 (1965).

Personal Interest.

The “interest” which is disqualifying under this section is a personal proprietary or pecuniary interest or one affecting the individual rights of the judge, and the liability, gain, or relief to the judge must turn on the outcome of the suit. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Transfer Required.

The terms of this section are mandatory and transfer is required on motion of any party. Black v. Cockrill, 239 Ark. 367, 389 S.W.2d 881 (1965); Ennis v. Brainerd, 240 Ark. 16, 397 S.W.2d 809 (1966).

16-13-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning salaries of circuit and chancery judges, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 73. The section was derived from Acts 1985, No. 665, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-140.1.

16-13-103. Special judges — Compensation — Expenses.

    1. A licensed attorney who is elected as a special judge of the circuit court under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court may request compensation at one-half (½) the rate as fixed by law for a regularly elected circuit judge.
    2. This section does not allow a special judge to receive compensation for any days that he or she is not actually serving in his or her appointed capacity.
  1. The compensation provided for in this section shall be paid from the appropriation provided to the Auditor of State for special and recalled judges for the circuit courts, upon certification by the clerk of the court in which the special circuit judge was elected stating the number of days or a portion of a day served, under the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1971, No. 649, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-131, 22-131.1; Acts 2011, No. 274, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote (a) and (b).

Case Notes

Special Judge.

A special judge who granted extension of time for filing bill of exceptions for a period running beyond expiration of his term of court could approve the bill of exceptions after lapse of his term but could not exercise a separate and new judicial act to grant a further extension of time. Patterson v. Carpenter, 207 Ark. 539, 181 S.W.2d 465 (1944).

16-13-104. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning ineligibility for an appointed circuit judge as a candidate, was repealed by Acts 2007, No. 213, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 2005, No. 1448, § 2.

Subchapter 2 — Circuit Courts Generally

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1899, No. 62, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1943, No. 202, § 3: approved Mar. 15, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas Initiated Act Number 5 adopted by the People November 6, 1936, provided that Circuit Courts are open at all times for Criminal proceedings; and whereas considerable confusion exists in determining the powers of a circuit court in civil proceedings when convened in special or adjourned sessions, and whereas Pretrial procedure, rendition of consent judgments and other court actions between the terms fixed by law for holding the several courts in the judicial districts in this state will expedite litigation and reduce the expense of court sessions and this act being for the speedy administration of justice, an emergency is hereby declared, and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1943, No. 290, § 4: approved Mar. 23, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas in the event a regular judge shall enter the armed services of the United States, a special election of the members of the bar upon the second day of the term in each county in the district must be held to elect a special judge, and whereas, the special judge is allowed only ten dollars [$10.00] per day for his services, and no expenses; and whereas, such procedure would result in great expense and delay to litigants difficulty in securing a competent and qualified attorney to fill such position, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary to promote the public peace, health and welfare, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 257, § 6: Mar. 8, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Because of the geographical extent and number of courts required to be held, and to expedite the disposition of court matters and actions, and to better facilitate the disposition of same by consent of parties and thereby avoid delays, and to save costs, and for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval by the governor.”

Acts 1961, No. 14, § 2: approved Jan. 30, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “The legislature having determined that the appointment of a law clerk for counties with population of 240,000 or more would expedite the handling of litigation in the circuit courts of said counties, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 66, §§ 2, 4: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1968, and salaries payable from that date. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present requirement that the law clerk of the circuit court be a licensed attorney renders it difficult if not almost impossible to employ a person to fill said position; that the present law prescribing qualifications for the law clerks of the Arkansas Supreme Court require only that the law clerks be licensed attorneys or graduates of approved law schools; that the qualifications of law clerks for circuit courts should be the same as but no greater than those for the Supreme Court Clerks; and, that this Act is immediately necessary to revise the qualifications of circuit court law clerks to conform to the qualifications of Supreme Court law clerks and to make it possible to employ persons to fill the position of circuit court law clerk and thereby to further the administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary to the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.” Became law without Governor's signature, February 27, 1968.

Acts 1975, No. 68, § 3: approved Feb. 7, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “The Legislature having determined that the appointment of a case coordinator for districts with populations of two hundred forty thousand (240,000) or more would expedite the handling of litigation in the circuit courts of said counties and because the number or cases being filed is increasing rapidly, an emergency is hereby declared to exist. This Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1979, No. 580, § 4: Mar. 26, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the volume of work required by the circuit courts which have judicial districts comprising 240,000 or more has greatly increased in recent years, and that it is immediately necessary to provide additional support for the circuit judges in order to assure the orderly disposition of cases in order to facilitate the prompt administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force from and after the date of its approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Law and Equity in Arkansas: Will Liles v. Liles Lead Us Out of the Morass?, 1987 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 Ark. L. Notes 29.

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration — Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 5.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

Administration of the Courts in Arkansas: Challenge, Performance, and Prospects, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Distinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

16-13-201. Jurisdiction.

  1. Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned pursuant to the Arkansas Constitution.
    1. Circuit courts shall have appellate jurisdiction of the judgments and final orders of county courts, district courts, city courts, and police courts in all civil actions.
    2. On appeal from such judgments and final orders, the case shall be tried de novo, and the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court shall extend to errors of fact as well as errors of law.
  2. The circuit courts shall have appellate jurisdiction from the decision of any inferior board, council, or tribunal in the contest of any county, township, or municipal office, and on such appeals the case shall be tried de novo.

History. Civil Code, §§ 18-20; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [19], p. 249; 1873, No. 88, § 1 [18, 19], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2228, 2233, 2234; Pope's Dig., §§ 2856, 2861, 2862; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-301, 22-304, 22-308; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 74.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Research References

ALR.

Criminal jurisdiction of municipal or other local court. 102 A.L.R.5th 525.

Case Notes

Administrative Determinations.

The legislature has the right, in authorizing a civil service commission, to vest in the circuit court the power to review judicially, either by way of original proceeding or by way of appeal, the action of the commission. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943).

Appellate Jurisdiction.

The circuit court can acquire no jurisdiction by appeal from a court or justice of the peace that was without jurisdiction. Little Rock, Miss. R. & Tex. R.R. v. Manees, 44 Ark. 100 (1884); Bynum v. Patty, 207 Ark. 1084, 184 S.W.2d 254 (1944).

Where a cause is appealed to the circuit court from the county court, the former court obtains jurisdiction to the same extent as if it had been originally brought in that court and should enter final judgment therein and remand the same to the county court with directions to enter that judgment. Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496, 140 S.W. 712 (1911).

The circuit court has jurisdiction to review on appeal the action of the county court relative to the organization of a road district. Horn v. Baker, 140 Ark. 168, 215 S.W. 600 (1919).

If the county court had jurisdiction to hear a contest over the result of a stock law election, which was not decided, a judgment of that court dismissing a petition attacking the legality of the election was not void on its face, however erroneous it may have been, and a review of it must be by appeal to the circuit court and not by certiorari. Patterson v. Adcock, 157 Ark. 186, 248 S.W. 904 (1923).

The circuit court had jurisdiction to try a case on appeal by a taxpayer from a judgment of the county court allowing a claim against the county and the fact that a warrant had been issued and paid before the case was tried in the circuit court was immaterial. McLain v. Miller County, 180 Ark. 828, 23 S.W.2d 264 (1930), superseded by statute as stated in, Lott v. Circuit Court, 328 Ark. 596, 945 S.W.2d 922 (1997).

Appeals from the county court to the circuit court shall be granted as a matter of right. Watts & Sanders v. Myatt, 216 Ark. 660, 226 S.W.2d 800 (1950).

The chancery court had no jurisdiction to order repayment of a claim allowed by the county judge in paying dues to the Arkansas Association of County Judges; in the absence of fraud, the remedy was by appeal to the circuit court. Ark. Ass'n of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960).

Exclusive Jurisdiction.

The chancery court has exclusive jurisdiction of all cases involving matters of child support; neither the municipal nor circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with chancery court to enforce an agreement for child support. Boren v. Boren, 318 Ark. 378, 885 S.W.2d 852 (1994).

Circuit court cannot decide a claim of breach of contract or otherwise enforce a child support agreement since under subsection (a) of this section it does not have concurrent jurisdiction. Granquist v. Randolph, 326 Ark. 809, 934 S.W.2d 224 (1996).

Regardless of the context in which a support order is entered, whether divorce, paternity, abandonment, or any other situation, a trial court has the power to enter a child-support order; thus, where a father was held in contempt for failure to pay support, and appealed, even though the trial court did not have jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage because there was no corroboration of residence, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter contempt orders for the father's failure to pay support. Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Ark. App. 430, 97 S.W.3d 429 (2003).

Original Jurisdiction.

The correct method of ascertaining the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the circuit courts is to see what cases or classes of cases are confided by the Constitution exclusively to the jurisdiction of other tribunals, and the great residuum belongs exclusively, or concurrently, to the circuit courts. State v. Devers, 34 Ark. 188 (1879).

Jurisdiction to hear and determine contests of elections for a city office, not being vested elsewhere, is in the circuit court. Whittaker v. Watson, 68 Ark. 555, 60 S.W. 652 (1901); Doherty v. Cripps, 82 Ark. 529, 102 S.W. 394 (1907).

If the law does not expressly vest jurisdiction to hear an action, it falls within the general jurisdiction of the circuit courts. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Sams, 81 Ark. 39, 98 S.W. 955 (1906); Patterson v. Adcock, 157 Ark. 186, 248 S.W. 904 (1923).

Circuit court has jurisdiction to determine liability of county depository for interest on county funds. Price v. Madison County Bank, 90 Ark. 195, 118 S.W. 706 (1909).

Where the trial court accepted appellant's plea for capital-felony murder on a Sunday in violation of § 16-10-114, the statutory violation did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction over the matter; further, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was not the proper method with which to claim a statutory violation. Noble v. Norris, 368 Ark. 69, 243 S.W.3d 260 (2006).

—Jurisdictional Amount.

The circuit court has jurisdiction of mechanics' liens enforceable against land regardless of the amount. White v. Millbourne, 31 Ark. 486 (1876).

Where no one of several debts sued on exceeds the sum of one hundred dollars, the plaintiff cannot combine them so as to give the circuit court jurisdiction. Mannington v. Young, 35 Ark. 287 (1880).

Circuit courts have jurisdiction in tort action in the nature of a fraud without regard to the amount. Bagley v. Shoppach, 43 Ark. 375 (1884).

In actions for damages to personal property, jurisdiction is determined by the damages asked. Little Rock, Miss. R. & Tex. R.R. v. Manees, 44 Ark. 100 (1884).

Since garnishment is only an attachment of the debt, the jurisdiction of the court over the funds in the hands of the garnishee is not dependent upon the amount of the indebtedness. Moore v. Kelley, 47 Ark. 219, 1 S.W. 97 (1886).

A complaint for breach of contract alleging damages sufficient to give the circuit court jurisdiction is a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, and in the absence of a special plea or charge that the allegation was illusive and fraudulent, the court could correctly assume jurisdiction. Neale v. Smith, 61 Ark. 564, 33 S.W. 1058 (1896).

If the question is raised whether or not the amount claimed was a lien on real estate, the circuit court has jurisdiction without regard to the amount involved. Sanders v. Brown, 65 Ark. 498, 47 S.W. 461 (1898); Naylor v. McNair, 92 Ark. 345, 122 S.W. 662 (1909).

If a demurrer (now abolished) is sustained to one of two paragraphs of complaint and the remaining paragraph demands an amount less than the jurisdictional requirement, the circuit court is without jurisdiction to proceed. Harris-Damon Lumber Co. v. Craddock, 72 Ark. 334, 80 S.W. 228 (1904).

Complaint which alleged that party possessed title to a vehicle valued at $3,900.00 which she obtained under divorce decree and which was being unlawfully detained was a replevin action properly within the jurisdiction of the county circuit court, and, as a consequence, a writ of prohibition did not lie. Bonnell v. Smith, 322 Ark. 141, 908 S.W.2d 74 (1995).

—Misdemeanors.

Circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace in misdemeanor cases. Walker v. State, 35 Ark. 386 (1880); McClure v. State, 37 Ark. 426 (1881).

It is not in the power of the legislature, under the provisions of the Constitution, to deprive the circuit courts of all original jurisdiction of misdemeanors. Naylor v. McNair, 92 Ark. 345, 122 S.W. 662 (1909).

—Petitions.

The issue of the sufficiency of a petition for a local option election is one over which chancery court has no jurisdiction. Zaruba v. Phillips, 320 Ark. 199, 895 S.W.2d 544 (1995).

Proceedings on Appeal.

Appeals from final orders and judgments of the county courts are tried de novo. Marion County v. Estes, 79 Ark. 504, 96 S.W. 165 (1906); Thomas v. Burke, 91 Ark. 595, 121 S.W. 1060 (1909); Jones v. Coffin, 96 Ark. 332, 131 S.W. 873 (1910); Thornton v. Allen, 101 Ark. 106, 141 S.W. 499 (1911); Stephens v. School Dist., 104 Ark. 145, 148 S.W. 504 (1912).

Circuit court may permit record to be amended so as to show allowance of appeal by the county court. Drainage Dist. v. Rolfe, 110 Ark. 374, 161 S.W. 1034 (1913).

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an appeal where the original papers were not filed before the trial date, inasmuch as certified copies had been filed and there was no showing that appellees were in any manner prejudiced. Woollard v. Circuit Court, 222 Ark. 287, 258 S.W.2d 886 (1953).

—Petitioners for Drainage District.

A petitioner may appeal to the circuit court from an order of the county court refusing a petition for the establishment of a drainage district. Sharum v. Fry, 95 Ark. 385, 129 S.W. 818 (1910).

The petitioners, as well as the remonstrants, have a right to appeal from an order of the county court adverse to their interests and relative to the formation of a drainage district. Collins v. Stewart, 117 Ark. 4, 173 S.W. 824 (1915).

—School Districts.

Where it is sought to annex certain territory of one school district to another, the district whose territory is to be annexed may appeal from a judgment of the county court to the circuit court without its board of directors first appearing in the county court. School Dist. v. Rural Special School Dist., 128 Ark. 383, 194 S.W. 241 (1917).

School district properly appealed from an order approving a bond. Hulbert Special Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 180 Ark. 29, 20 S.W.2d 322 (1929).

—Taxpayers.

If a county court has proceeded irregularly in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction to make a contract for the building of a courthouse, citizens, residents, and taxpayers have a remedy to correct that irregularity by becoming parties to the proceeding and appealing to the circuit court, but a bill in equity will not lie to restrain the making of such a contract for irregularity only. Bowman v. Frith, 73 Ark. 523, 84 S.W. 709 (1905).

One who is a citizen of the county and taxpayer in a drainage district and who is interested in an order of the county court allowing a claim against the district is entitled to appeal therefrom. Huddleston v. Coffman, 90 Ark. 219, 118 S.W. 1010 (1909).

One who is a citizen or resident and a taxpayer has the right to appeal from an order of allowance against the county, whether he intervenes before or after the allowance is made. Van Hook v. McNeil Monument Co., 101 Ark. 246, 142 S.W. 154 (1911).

A citizen and taxpayer may appeal from an order designating a county depository. Casey v. Independence County, 109 Ark. 11, 159 S.W. 24 (1913).

Where the county court made an order establishing a road through certain lands, a citizen and taxpayer owning lands taken by the road may make himself a party to the proceedings and appeal from the order of the court. McMahan v. Ruble, 135 Ark. 83, 204 S.W. 746 (1918).

A taxpayer is authorized to appeal from an order of the county court allowing a claim against the county and confirming a sale of county property in satisfaction thereof without becoming a party to the proceedings. Wright v. LeCroy, 184 Ark. 837, 44 S.W.2d 355 (1931).

The county court, in passing on a claim presented to it, acts in a judicial capacity. Any citizen of any county, city, or town may institute suit in behalf of himself and others interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever, and their proper remedy is to appeal to the circuit court. Ark. Ass'n of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960).

Cited: Norman v. Fife, 61 Ark. 33, 31 S.W. 740 (1895); Morgan v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 106 Ark. 74, 152 S.W. 1023 (1912); Lee v. McNeil, 308 Ark. 114, 823 S.W.2d 837 (1992).

16-13-202. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning rules, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 1132, § 6. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 18; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [18], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., § 2231; Pope's Dig., § 2859; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-309.

16-13-203. Supervision of county courts and county, local, and municipal boards or officers.

  1. The circuit courts shall have superintending control over the judgments, final orders, and proceedings of county courts and county boards or officers.
  2. The circuit courts shall have supervision and control over all local, county, and municipal boards or officers in their actions or proceedings in the taxing, assessing, seizing, or sale of property.

History. Civil Code, § 19; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [19], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2239, 2240; Pope's Dig., §§ 2867, 2868; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-305, 22-306.

Case Notes

Continuing Jurisdiction.

Upon appeal to the circuit court from order of the county court disallowing claim for damages, the circuit court acquired exclusive jurisdiction of the case and thereafter, it had the jurisdiction to issue such orders as were necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Dobbins Bros. v. Anderson, 199 Ark. 635, 135 S.W.2d 325 (1940).

Correction of Illegal Levy.

There is no provision to correct an illegal or erroneous levy by the county court, and, in that case, the taxpayer must look to the superintending control and appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts over the county courts, and where no remedy by appeal is provided, he is entitled to relief by certiorari or prohibition. Floyd v. Gilbreath, 27 Ark. 675 (1872).

16-13-204. Issuance of writs, orders, or process.

  1. The circuit courts and their judges shall have the power to issue all proper writs, orders, or process in the cases mentioned in §§ 16-13-201(b)(1) and 16-13-203.
  2. The circuit courts and their judges shall have power to issue all writs, orders, and process which may be necessary in the exercise of their jurisdiction, according to the principles and usages of law.

History. Civil Code, § 19; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [19], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., § 2241; Pope's Dig., § 2869; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-307.

Cross References. Power to issue writs and process, § 16-10-106.

Case Notes

Bail.

Where probable cause for detention in a felony matter had been found in municipal court, and the case had been bound over to circuit court, then the circuit court had jurisdiction to reduce the bail set by the municipal court. State v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 326 Ark. 886, 934 S.W.2d 915 (1996). See also State v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 327 Ark. 287, 938 S.W.2d 815 (1997).

Restraining Order.

On appeal to the circuit court from order of county court disallowing claim for damages, circuit court had jurisdiction to issue restraining order enjoining county judge from allowing claims except for essential county purposes authorized by law, and in the absence of the circuit judge from the county, the chancellor, acting for him, had jurisdiction to issue the order, but the order would be that of the circuit court, having been made by the chancellor for that court, and would not vest jurisdiction in the chancery court or deprive the circuit court of its jurisdiction, and the continuance or dissolution of the order would be a matter within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Dobbins Bros. v. Anderson, 199 Ark. 635, 135 S.W.2d 325 (1940).

Cited: Shelton v. State, 44 Ark. App. 156, 870 S.W.2d 398 (1994).

16-13-205. Writs of certiorari — Temporary restraining orders — Enforcement.

  1. The circuit courts shall have power to issue writs of certiorari to any officer or board of officers, city or town council, or any inferior tribunal of their respective counties in order to correct any erroneous or void proceeding or ordinance and to hear and determine the proceeding or ordinance.
    1. Application for a writ of certiorari may be made to the court or the judge thereof in vacation on reasonable notice.
    2. A temporary restraining order may be granted upon the application for a writ of certiorari on bond and good security being given, in a sum to be fixed by the court or the judge in vacation, conditioned that the applicant will perform the judgment of the court.
    1. Affidavits may be read on such applications, and evidence dehors the record may be introduced by either party on the hearing.
    2. The record of any such inferior judicial tribunal shall be conclusive as far as the record extends, but the acts of any executive officer or board of that inferior tribunal shall only be prima facie evidence of their regularity and legality.
  2. The court shall have power in such cases to enforce its judgment by mandamus, prohibition, and other appropriate writs.

History. Civil Code, § 18; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [18], p. 213; 1899, No. 62, § 1, p. 112; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2237, 2238; Pope's Dig., §§ 2865, 2866; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-302, 22-303.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Certiorari in Arkansas, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 163.

Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies in Arkansas, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 397.

Case Notes

Boards or Officers.

Certiorari does not lie to review action of election commissioners. Graves v. McConnell, 162 Ark. 167, 257 S.W. 1041 (1924).

Certiorari is available for the purpose of giving opportunity to review decision of a board in removing an officer pursuant to the terms of the statute. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

Under this section, circuit court had jurisdiction over Eclectic State Medical Board (now Arkansas State Medical Board) and, upon finding that board was failing or refusing to act in accordance with court's order to conduct a hearing, court could act in lieu of board. Schirmer v. Cockrill, 223 Ark. 817, 269 S.W.2d 300 (1954).

City Councils.

In certiorari proceeding to review resolution of city council declaring vacant the position of commissioner of street improvement district, circuit court acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter when the petition was filed and procedural matters, including issuance of writ, could be waived. Jones v. Leighton, 200 Ark. 1015, 142 S.W.2d 505 (1940).

The action of the city commission in revoking a permit to operate a taxicab is subject to review by certiorari in circuit court, and that court's action is subject to review by certiorari in the supreme court. Veteran's Taxicab Co. v. City of Ft. Smith, 213 Ark. 687, 212 S.W.2d 341 (1948).

Discretion of Court.

Certiorari, being a writ of discretion, may be denied by the court to which application is made where the law does not expressly or by clear implication direct that it shall be issued. McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940).

Unless trial court abuses its discretion in denying or granting a writ of certiorari, Supreme Court will not reverse that decision. Ricci v. Poole, 253 Ark. 324, 485 S.W.2d 728 (1972).

The writ is not one of right, but is to be granted or denied within the discretion of the court from which it is sought. Gran v. Hale, 294 Ark. 563, 745 S.W.2d 129 (1988).

Evidence.

Where the writ of certiorari is limited as at common law, the court is confined in its review of the evidence to the determination of whether there was substantial evidence to sustain the judgment. Hall v. Bledsoe, 126 Ark. 125, 189 S.W. 1041 (1916).

Records of a legislative body are conclusive and, on application for certiorari, evidence not appearing in the record would be inadmissible. McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940).

On hearing the writ of certiorari, circuit court does not proceed de novo and try the case as if it had never been heard in the inferior court; the office of the writ is to review errors of law, one of which may be the legal sufficiency of the evidence. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

On certiorari, circuit court may hear evidence dehors the record in order to ascertain what evidence was heard by the inferior tribunal and to determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the judgment of that tribunal. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

Neither circuit court nor Supreme Court had authority on writ of certiorari to pass on the question of the preponderance of the evidence supporting action of agency. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

Hearing.

A hearing is contemplated on a petition for certiorari under this section. Carrier v. Beck, 227 Ark. 92, 296 S.W.2d 446 (1956).

Inferior Tribunals.

The errors of a mayor's court, having jurisdiction of a case of assault and battery, in overruling a plea of former conviction and refusing to dismiss for want of a bond for costs, are not jurisdictional and cannot be corrected on certiorari. Salem v. Colley, 70 Ark. 71, 66 S.W. 195 (1901).

Judgment in action of writ of certiorari, refusing to quash a judgment of a justice of the peace, was proper where petition merely alleged that petitioner had a meritorious defense but did not show the facts constituting the defense. Overton v. Alston, 199 Ark. 96, 132 S.W.2d 834 (1939).

A wife's petition for certiorari to quash a divorce decree would be denied where the circumstances and conditions which arose since the decree would render it inequitable and unjust to an innocent third party to grant the writ, and because the petition did not allege fraud or inequitable conduct in obtaining the decree or a defense to the divorce action. Whaley v. Whaley, 213 Ark. 232, 209 S.W.2d 871 (1948).

Other Remedy.

The writ of certiorari should not be issued in any case where there is, or has been, a right to appeal, unless the opportunity for appealing has been lost without fault of the petitioner. Payne v. McCabe, 37 Ark. 318 (1881). See Vance v. Gaylor, 25 Ark. 32 (1867); Wyatt & Hensley v. Burr, 25 Ark. 476 (1869); Smith v. Parker, 25 Ark. 518 (1869); Vance v. City of Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435 (1875); Burke v. Coolidge, 35 Ark. 180 (1879); Burgett v. Apperson, 52 Ark. 213, 12 S.W. 559 (1889).

Judgment will not be quashed if there was other adequate remedy. Aven v. Wilson, 61 Ark. 287, 32 S.W. 1074 (1895); Gates v. Hayes, 69 Ark. 518, 64 S.W. 271 (1901).

Certiorari will not lie at the instance of the creditors of a decedent's estate to set aside the classification of a claim allowed by the probate court in favor of another creditor as the appeal by the personal representative provided in such case furnishes an adequate remedy. Merchants & Planters Bank v. Fitzgerald, 61 Ark. 605, 33 S.W. 1064 (1896).

The Department of Human Services (DHS) was not entitled to a writ of certiorari ordering the Claims Commission to dismiss a claim pending before it since the pending claim was within the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission and the DHS had an adequate remedy of appealing the Claims Commission's ruling to the General Assembly. Hanley v. Arkansas State Claims Comm'n, 333 Ark. 159, 970 S.W.2d 198 (1998).

Record.

On certiorari, the record is conclusive as far as it extends. Countz v. Markling, 30 Ark. 17 (1875).

Clerk should return transcript of record with his response. Phillips v. Desha, 58 Ark. 250, 24 S.W. 249 (1893).

Though equalization board had finally adjourned when assessment of taxpayer's mineral rights were made, taxpayer was not without right of redress since he had the right, by certiorari from the circuit court directed to the county clerk, to have the record brought up for review and correction. Stout Lumber Co. v. Parker, 197 Ark. 65, 122 S.W.2d 180 (1938).

Scope of Writ.

This section does not enlarge the writ of certiorari into an appeal or writ of error for the correction of mere errors in judicial proceedings; the practice is still to affirm or quash the judgment on the trial of the certiorari. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Barnes, 35 Ark. 95 (1879); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Sangster, 210 Ark. 294, 195 S.W.2d 549 (1946).

The writ of certiorari cannot be used by the circuit courts for the correction of errors of inferior courts as upon appeal; but where the inferior judgment shows upon its face that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, or the person of the defendant, it may be quashed upon certiorari. State ex rel. Izard County v. Hinkle, 37 Ark. 532 (1881); Street v. Stuart, 38 Ark. 159 (1881); Baskins v. Wylds, 39 Ark. 347 (1882); Haynes v. Semmes, 39 Ark. 399 (1882); Pettigrew v. Washington County, 43 Ark. 33 (1884); Burgett v. Apperson, 52 Ark. 213, 12 S.W. 559 (1889).

Certiorari cannot be converted into injunction suit. Moore v. Turner, 43 Ark. 243 (1884).

A writ of certiorari may be quashed after the return when it is made to appear that it will not serve the ends of justice; but it will not be quashed where the return shows that the bill of exceptions (now abolished) as certified does not conform to that which was originally filed. Martin v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 53 Ark. 250, 13 S.W. 765 (1890).

A judgment void upon its face will be quashed on certiorari. Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Landers Chevrolet Co., 183 Ark. 669, 37 S.W.2d 873 (1931).

The scope of a writ of certiorari at common law is not enlarged by this section. McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940).

Writ of certiorari can be used by the circuit court in the exercise of its appellate power and superintending control over inferior courts, where the tribunal to which it is issued has exceeded its jurisdiction, where party applying for it had the right of appeal but lost it through no fault of his own, and where circuit court has superintending control over a tribunal which has proceeded illegally and no other mode has been provided for directly reviewing its proceedings; but it cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error, for the correction of errors or irregularities in proceedings of inferior courts. McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942).

Neither mandamus, certiorari, nor prohibition may be used as a substitute for appeal. Gran v. Hale, 294 Ark. 563, 745 S.W.2d 129 (1988).

Cited: Eclectic State Medical Bd. v. Beatty, 203 Ark. 294, 156 S.W.2d 246 (1941); Carrier v. Beck, 227 Ark. 92, 296 S.W.2d 446 (1956).

16-13-206. Term of court — Court to remain open.

    1. The circuit court of each county and of each division in each county having two (2) or more divisions of circuit court shall be open by operation of law at the beginning of each regular term of that court, as fixed by law, and shall remain open until the beginning of the next term of the court.
    2. When any circuit court is duly convened for a regular term, the court shall remain open for all criminal, civil, or special proceedings until its next regular term.
  1. No term of the court shall lapse by reason of the fact that the court was not formally opened at the beginning of the term.

History. Acts 1943, No. 202, § 1; 1951, No. 207, § 1; 1955, No. 49, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-311, 22-312.

Cross References. Change of term not to affect proceedings, § 16-10-113.

County court terms not to conflict with terms of circuit court, § 16-15-103.

Case Notes

Cited: Bean v. Roberts, 240 Ark. 9, 397 S.W.2d 784 (1966); Higginbotham v. State, 251 Ark. 832, 475 S.W.2d 522 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977).

16-13-207. Sessions.

    1. Each circuit court may by a rule or order fix times and places when the court will be in session for the transaction of business. However, the scheduled sittings of the court shall not preclude the transaction of business by the court at other times or places.
    2. No jury, however, shall be convened at a place other than the regular and customary place for holding court in each county or district thereof, as the case may be.
  1. When any circuit court is duly convened for a regular term, the court may be in session at any time the judge thereof may deem necessary. However, no session of the court shall interfere with any other court to be held by the same judge.
  2. Two (2) or more circuit courts of the same district may be concurrently in session.

History. Acts 1943, No. 202, § 1; 1951, No. 207, § 1; 1955, No. 49, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-311, 22-312.

Case Notes

Continuance.

Motion of defendant for a continuance on the ground that court was not properly in session, since court was in session in another district in the same county, was properly overruled, since evidence failed to show that the court was in session in another district in the same county, and even if the court was in session in another district, that did not interfere with the holding of session of any other court. McGaha v. State, 216 Ark. 165, 224 S.W.2d 534 (1949).

Discretion of Court.

When the regular term of court has been convened, the judge at his discretion may adjourn and convene court as he “may deem necessary.” Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948).

Cited: Bean v. Roberts, 240 Ark. 9, 397 S.W.2d 784 (1966); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977).

16-13-208. Adjournments — Recess.

There shall be no adjournments of circuit courts. However, courts shall be deemed in recess while not engaged in the transaction of business.

History. Acts 1951, No. 207, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-312.

Case Notes

In General.

Under this section, there is no longer any such thing as a final adjournment after the first session of each term, for the court remains open until the last instant of each regular term. Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961).

Cited: Bean v. Roberts, 240 Ark. 9, 397 S.W.2d 784 (1966); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977).

16-13-209. Notice of proceedings.

Where the defendant or respondent has answered or otherwise pleaded and if the time has not been set by the court, all interested parties, together with their attorneys, shall receive notice from the clerk of the court of any proceeding affecting their rights and shall be given time to prepare to meet the proceeding. However, this section shall not apply in cases wherein all interested parties are required by law to take notice.

History. Acts 1943, No. 202, § 1; 1955, No. 49, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-311.

Case Notes

In General.

This section does not require that the court clerk give notice to all interested parties in all cases, but only in those cases where the time has not been fixed by the court and in those cases where parties are not required by law to take notice. Harris v. State, 6 Ark. App. 89, 638 S.W.2d 698 (1982).

Due Process.

While a circuit court is authorized to affirm a judgment of a lower court if the appellant fails to appear when his case has been scheduled for trial, due process dictates that appellant be afforded proper notice and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding involving the deprivation of life, liberty or property; that interested parties as well as their attorneys receive notice from the clerk of the court of proceedings scheduled; and that time shall be afforded counsel to prepare for trial. Rawls v. State, 266 Ark. 919, 587 S.W.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1979).

Where a bonding company failed to show that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice of an original bond forfeiture order prior to the entry of the nunc pro tunc order correcting the name of the bonding company that was subject to the same, it could not prove that its due process rights were violated; because the nunc pro tunc judgment was correct, reflecting an accurate correction of the clerical error in the earlier order, nothing would be gained by setting aside the order and immediately reentering it. Holt Bonding Co. v. State, 353 Ark. 136, 114 S.W.3d 179, 2003 Ark. LEXIS 250 (2003).

Failure to Give Notice.

Circuit court has no power to render a default judgment, without notice, in a county other than that in which the action is pending. Howell v. Van Houten, 227 Ark. 84, 296 S.W.2d 428 (1956).

Record.

If court was not in session on a certain day, authority to hear witnesses and make their testimony a part of the record in the original proceeding was lacking unless this section had been complied with or no notice had been waived. Vaccinol Prods. Corp. v. State ex rel. Phillips County, 201 Ark. 1066, 148 S.W.2d 1069 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Sufficiency.

Notice held to be insufficient. Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977); Davis v. Univ. of Ark. Medical Ctr. & Collection Serv., Inc., 262 Ark. 587, 559 S.W.2d 159 (1977); Rawls v. State, 266 Ark. 919, 587 S.W.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1979); Prine v. State, 267 Ark. 304, 590 S.W.2d 25 (1979).

Notice held sufficient. Harris v. State, 6 Ark. App. 89, 638 S.W.2d 698 (1982).

Since defense attorney had two days notice before the trial date and knew that the case would be reset for a day within ten days or two weeks and there was no reason shown for the attorney's stated inability to contact defendant in Iowa so that he could be present for trial, statutory and due process requirements were met. Whitmire v. State, 50 Ark. App. 34, 901 S.W.2d 20 (1995).

16-13-210. Circuit judge may hear and adjudicate causes pending in the circuit.

    1. Any circuit judge of this state, at any time while mentally and physically competent and physically present in the geographical area of the judicial circuit which he or she serves as judge, may hear, adjudicate, or render any appropriate order with respect to any cause or matter pending in any circuit court over which he or she presides, subject to such notice of the time, place, and nature of the hearing being given as may be required by law or by rule or order of the court.
    2. However, no contested case may be tried outside the county of the venue of the case, except upon the agreement of the parties interested.
  1. A circuit judge assigned to a cause or matter, either by regular docket assignment or by Supreme Court order, may render or sign orders in that cause or matter in a geographical location other than the judicial circuit in which the cause or matter is pending.
  2. A retired circuit judge, chancellor, or circuit-chancery judge assigned to a cause or matter by Supreme Court order may render or sign orders in that cause or matter in a geographical location other than the judicial circuit in which the cause or matter is pending.

History. Acts 1961, No. 81, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-313; Acts 2003, No. 1000, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Power to Sign Orders Outside Judicial Circuit, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 447.

Case Notes

In General.

Section 16-88-105, this section, and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 13 [repealed], provide that a circuit judge may act in a criminal case only when he is within the geographical area of the judicial district in which the charge is filed; it has been so for over 150 years. Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993).

A circuit judge has the authority to preside over proceedings in any courtroom, in any county, within the judicial district for which that judge was elected. Davis v. Reed, 316 Ark. 575, 873 S.W.2d 524 (1994).

The constitution and applicable statutes provide that a circuit judge may act in a criminal case only when he is within the geographical area of the judicial district in which the charge is filed. State v. Vaughan, 343 Ark. 293, 33 S.W.3d 512 (2000).

Charge and Sentence in Different Districts.

It was not error to charge the defendant with having committed a crime in one district in a county in the circuit, and have him sentenced by the circuit judge in another. Renfro v. State, 264 Ark. 601, 573 S.W.2d 53 (1978).

Dismissal of Action.

Court granted physician's petition for a writ of certiorari in administratrix's third medical negligence and wrongful death action as the trial judge's reversal of his order dismissing the administratrix's second complaint, which was assigned to another judge, had no bearing on whether the trial judge could make a ruling on the motion to dismiss the third complaint. Jordan v. Circuit Court, 366 Ark. 326, 235 S.W.3d 487 (2006).

16-13-211. Proceedings during vacation of court or in chambers.

  1. The circuit judges of the circuit courts constituting the judicial districts over which they have jurisdiction and preside are empowered and authorized to deliver opinions and make and sign judgments in cases taken under advisement and submitted to that court at a term of court, or by consent and agreement of interested parties in vacation, either in chambers or at the regular place of holding court in the respective counties constituting the judicial district.
  2. By consent of interested parties and counsel, where a jury is waived and a cause is submitted for trial before the court sitting as a jury, the trial and hearing may be held in chambers in the county of the residence of the regular presiding circuit judge.
  3. Consent judgments, ex parte proceedings, and matters not requiring the services of a jury may be made and hearings had in chambers in the county of the residence of the regular presiding circuit judge.
  4. Any opinion, judgment, or order rendered and made under and pursuant to this section shall be signed by the presiding circuit judge. This opinion, judgment, or order shall become effective when entered of record in the county where the action or matter originated or was filed.
  5. The purpose of this section is to better facilitate the disposition of court matters where the services of a jury are not required and to expedite, by consent of interested parties and counsel, legal matters and actions which otherwise would be delayed until the regular convening of a term of court and to save the costs of such regular convening.

History. Acts 1949, No. 257, §§ 1-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-314 — 22-318.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies only to actions of the court in vacation and would not require that the trial judge sign the judgment sentencing a criminal defendant. Shipman v. State, 261 Ark. 559, 550 S.W.2d 424 (1977).

Consent of Interested Parties.

Persons who were not parties to action, did not intervene therein, did not employ attorney to act for them, and did not even communicate their desires to parties or their attorneys, could not have judgment in action set aside on ground that parties to action committed fraud on court by agreeing to try action in chambers in county of judge's residence. Morrell v. Hill, 218 Ark. 552, 237 S.W.2d 467 (1951).

16-13-212. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning counterclaims and setoffs exceeding inferior court's jurisdiction, was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 431, § 8. The section was derived from Acts 1963, No. 488, §§ 2-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2010—27-2013.

16-13-213. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning special judges, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 75. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 761; C. & M. Dig., § 2226; Pope's Dig., § 2854; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-339.

16-13-214. Disqualification of judges.

No judge of the circuit court shall sit on the determination of any case in which he or she is interested in the outcome, is related to any party within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, has been of counsel in the case or presided over it in any inferior court, or is otherwise disqualified under the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, unless the parties waive the disqualification as provided therein.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2107, 6400; Pope's Dig., §§ 2711, 8362; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-113; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 76.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24, is also codified as §§ 16-13-312 [repealed], 16-14-103 [repealed], 16-15-111, and 16-19-206 [repealed].

Cross References. Computing degrees of consanguinity, § 28-9-212.

Disqualification of judges, Ark. Const., Amend. 80, § 12.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Brill, The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 247.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Justice Robert L. Brown, Essay: Judicial Recusal: It’s Time to Take Another Look Post-Caperton, 38 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 63 (2015).

Case Notes

Purpose.

This section and § 16-13-101 tend to carry out the intention of Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed]. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Continuance.

It is no ground of error that a judge who was incompetent to sit in a cause took jurisdiction of it so far as to grant a continuance, for it would have been continued by operation of law, without action of the judge, he being incompetent to try it. Stone v. Robinson, 9 Ark. (4 English) 469 (1849).

Grounds.

A trial judge is not disqualified in a criminal case because the defendant claims to have entered a plea of guilty upon an agreement with the judge and prosecuting attorney that certain other pending indictments would be dismissed where the agreement was denied by the judge. Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191 (1933), cert. denied, Hudspeth v. Arkansas, 296 U.S. 642, 56 S. Ct. 178, 80 L. Ed. 456 (1935).

—Acting as Counsel.

The objection that a judge was disqualified by reason of having appeared for the plaintiffs in a previous suit against the defendants upon the same cause of action which had been dismissed for want of prosecution will be deemed waived where the case was allowed to proceed to judgment without calling the judge's attention to his disqualification. Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 139 Ark. 130, 213 S.W. 7 (1919).

—Bias or Prejudice.

Prejudice is not ground for disqualifying judge. Jones v. State, 61 Ark. 88, 32 S.W. 81, 1895 Ark. LEXIS 81 (1895).

Evidence did not establish bias or prejudice warranting disqualification of judge. Norman v. State, 236 Ark. 476, 366 S.W.2d 891 (1963), cert. denied, Norman v. Arkansas, 375 U.S. 933, 84 S. Ct. 337, 11 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1963); Van Hook v. Van Hook, 270 Ark. 27, 603 S.W.2d 434 (1980); Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983); Welch v. State, 283 Ark. 281, 675 S.W.2d 641 (1984).

The fact that a judge may have, or may develop during the trial, an opinion, a bias or a prejudice does not make the trial judge so biased and prejudicial as to require his disqualification in further proceedings. Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

Whether a judge has become biased to the point that he should disqualify himself is a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge; the reason is that bias is a subjective matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the trial judge. Thus, absent some objective demonstration of prejudice, it is a communication of bias which will cause an appellate court to reverse a trial judge's decision on disqualification. Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

Arkansas Supreme Court Justices were entitled to a writ of mandamus to dismiss an action filed by a trial judge after the justices permanently barred him from presiding over death penalty cases based on his alleged anti-death penalty bias in violation of Ark. Code Jud. Conduct 2.11; extraordinary circumstances warranted the writ and the judge stated no plausible claims for relief. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1176, 203 L. Ed. 2d 199 (2019).

—Interest.

The interest which disqualifies a judge is not the kind of interest which one feels in public proceedings or public measures; it must be a pecuniary or property interest or one affecting his individual rights; and the liability of pecuniary gain or relief must occur upon the event of the suit and not result remotely in the future from the general operation of laws and government upon the status fixed by the decision. Osborne v. Board of Imp., 94 Ark. 563, 128 S.W. 357 (1910).

A judge who was the victim of alleged criminal libel by publisher was disqualified from presiding as judge in proceedings under several indictments returned against the publisher since he himself was a party within the necessary degree as used in this section and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed]. Copeland v. Huff, 222 Ark. 420, 261 S.W.2d 2 (1953).

The exchange of circuits was a proceeding in which the self-disqualified trial judge should not have exercised the discretionary powers of his office since he was personally affected. State v. George, 250 Ark. 968, 470 S.W.2d 593 (1971).

Judge passing on compromise settlement between injured employee and tort-feasors in which insurance carrier had subrogation rights did not have a disqualifying interest in the case because he had pending an action for injury to his own hand involving the same liability carrier. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Billingsley, 256 Ark. 947, 511 S.W.2d 476 (1974).

The “interest” which is disqualifying under this section, § 16-13-101, and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed], is a personal proprietary or pecuniary interest or one affecting the individual rights of the judge, and the liability, gain or relief to the judge must turn on the outcome of the suit. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Motion for recusal was properly denied where the trial judge had no interest in underlying action beyond that of general interest which any other taxpayer or property owner had, and thus, he did not have a personal or pecuniary interest that justified disqualification. Worth v. Benton County Circuit Court, 351 Ark. 149, 89 S.W.3d 891 (2002).

—Relationship.

The husband of the aunt is related to the husband of her niece within the fourth degree of affinity. Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657 (1852).

A circuit judge is not disqualified to preside where he is related by affinity, within the constitutional degrees, to one of the parties in a cause who is merely a trustee and has no interest in the determination of the cause. Fowler v. Byers, 16 Ark. (3 Barber) 196 (1855).

An application to the Supreme Court, in the first instance, for a writ of certiorari to a justice of the peace because the circuit judge is of kin to the petitioner, and disqualified, should show how he was related. Ex parte Allston, 17 Ark. (4 Barber) 580 (1856).

A judge is disqualified when related within prohibited degree to attorney in the case who has a contingent interest in that his fee is dependent upon the determination of the cause. Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S.W. 143 (1908).

Notwithstanding the conclusion that the trial judge acted in utmost good faith, a person convicted of murder was entitled to a new trial when he was in ignorance, at the time of trial, of the fact that the judge's wife was a cousin of the victim. Byler v. State, 210 Ark. 790, 197 S.W.2d 748 (1946).

Murder defendant who pleaded guilty after the death penalty was waived was not prejudiced by a father-in-law/son-in-law relationship between the judge and one of defendant's court-appointed counsel. Fuller v. State, 256 Ark. 998, 511 S.W.2d 474 (1974).

When the relationship is within the proscribed limits, neither the frequency of contact nor the closeness of the individuals bears on the result. Morton v. Benton Publishing Co., 291 Ark. 620, 727 S.W.2d 824 (1987).

Where one spouse's relationship with a judge comes within the prohibition of Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed], this section, and §§ 16-13-312 [repealed], 16-14-103 [repealed], 16-15-111, or 16-19-206 [repealed], the other spouse shares the same degree of relationship by affinity to the judge. Morton v. Benton Publishing Co., 291 Ark. 620, 727 S.W.2d 824 (1987).

Presumption.

Where the record fails to show that the court acted on a suggestion of disqualification, it will be presumed that he found that he was not disqualified. Davis v. Atkinson, 75 Ark. 300, 87 S.W. 432 (1905).

Cited: Braswell v. Gehl, 263 Ark. 706, 567 S.W.2d 113 (1978).

16-13-215. Entry of judge into armed services — Discharge — Vacancy.

  1. The entry of a regular judge into the armed services of the United States shall not have the effect of vacating his or her office, but during the period of his or her service, he or she shall not be entitled to receive or enjoy the salary or emoluments of the office.
  2. Upon certifying to the Governor his or her discharge from the service, the judge shall be entitled to resume his or her office and thereafter to receive and enjoy the salary and emoluments until a regular judge shall be elected and qualified.
  3. In the event a regular judge enters the armed services of the United States and is killed upon the field of battle, dies, is reported missing for twelve (12) months, or is unheard from for a period of twelve (12) months so that his or her whereabouts are unknown, his or her office shall become vacant upon proclamation by the Governor of such fact, and such vacancy shall be filled as provided by law.

History. Acts 1943, No. 290, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-347.

Cross References. Military leave of absence, election of emergency circuit judge, § 21-4-306.

16-13-216. Clerk and court reporter — Assistants — Salaries.

  1. The circuit judge of any judicial district which had a total population between forty-two thousand (42,000) and forty-four thousand (44,000) according to the 1960 Federal Decennial Census may appoint for the district some person who is either a lawyer, or who has served as an official court reporter prior to February 27, 1968, to serve as clerk and court reporter for the judicial district.
    1. The official so provided for in this section for such a judicial district shall receive a salary of five thousand four hundred dollars ($5,400) per year for such work.
    2. The salary is to be paid in monthly or quarterly payments by the various counties of the judicial district out of proper and appropriate funds and as set out in this section.
    1. The circuit judge of the judicial circuit is authorized, empowered, and directed to employ and appoint a person to assist the clerk or court reporter at the request of the clerk or court reporter at wages to be designated by the circuit judge.
    2. The wages of the assistant shall be paid out of the salary of the clerk or court reporter appointed under this section to serve the judicial district.
    1. The annual salary of the clerk and court reporter shall be paid by the respective counties comprising the judicial districts which may be affected by this section according to an assessment or assessments to be fixed, made, determined, and proportioned among the counties comprising the judicial district by the presiding judge of the judicial district at such time as he or she may deem proper and necessary.
    2. The proportioning, fixing, prorating, and determining of the amounts each county shall pay shall be determined on a basis of assessed valuation of the property in the counties or in the district as a whole.
    3. The salary shall be paid as provided in subsection (b) of this section by the various counties from appropriate county funds.
  2. Nothing in this section shall affect the fees chargeable by court reporters of the judicial districts with a total population of between forty-two thousand (42,000) and forty-four thousand (44,000) according to the 1960 Federal Decennial Census for transcripts and such services as may be now in force and effect.

History. Acts 1961, No. 14, § 1; 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 66, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-361.

16-13-217. Law clerks — Service as court reporters and masters.

    1. A circuit judge of any judicial district, any county of which has a population of two hundred forty thousand (240,000) or more according to the most recent federal census, may appoint one (1) law clerk for the county who shall be a licensed attorney or a graduate of a law school approved by the State Board of Law Examiners.
    2. In any judicial district having more than one (1) division of a circuit court, the appointment of the law clerk shall be by concurrence of a majority of the judges of that district.
  1. The law clerk may, in addition, serve as court reporter for the court or any division of the court.
  2. Each circuit judge of a judicial district having a population of two hundred forty thousand (240,000) or more according to the most recent federal census may appoint a law clerk who may also serve as master who shall be a graduate of a law school approved by the State Board of Law Examiners.
  3. The law clerk shall serve at the discretion and under the direction of the circuit judge to whom he or she is assigned.
  4. The powers and duties of the law clerk shall be to administer oaths and affirmations; to take acknowledgments, affidavits, and depositions; to conduct pretrial and prejudgment hearings; and to make recommendations for dispositions to the circuit judge.
  5. A law clerk may be assigned such additional duties at the discretion of the circuit judge as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the State of Arkansas.
    1. The salary of a law clerk for circuit court provided for under this section shall be the same salary as provided for a circuit court reporter in the district in which the law clerk is appointed.
    2. Should the law clerk serve both as court reporter and law clerk, he or she shall receive in addition thereto the sum of six hundred dollars ($600) per annum.

History. Acts 1961, No. 14, § 1; 1963, No. 29, § 1; 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 66, § 1; 1979, No. 580, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-361 — 22-362.

Case Notes

Judicial Authority.

The letter opinion of the judge's law clerk informing the defendant that his petition for post-conviction relief was denied was invalid because a trial judge may not delegate his judicial authority to a law clerk, and the General Assembly has not attempted to give law clerks the power to decide cases. Brown v. State, 290 Ark. 289, 718 S.W.2d 937 (1986).

16-13-218. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning case coordinators, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 77. The section was derived from Acts 1975, No. 68, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-364.

16-13-219. Court expenses — Payment.

  1. The expenses accruing in the circuit courts shall be paid out of the county treasury in which each court is held in the same manner as other demands.
    1. These expenses shall include reasonable sums for the employment of secretaries by circuit judges and for reasonable office expenses and office supplies of the circuit judges.
    2. In the event any circuit judge employs a secretary under the provisions of this section, the salary of each secretary shall be fixed by the quorum court of the county or counties involved.
  2. In any case where a particular judicial district is comprised of more than one (1) county, the expenses shall be prorated among the counties comprising the district in such manner as the circuit judge may by order direct.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47; C. & M. Dig., § 2118; Pope's Dig., § 2722; Acts 1977, No. 751, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-125.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47, is also codified as §§ 16-13-324, 16-14-109, and 16-15-113.

Case Notes

Jurors' Fees.

The compensation of jurors is part of the current expense of holding the circuit court and is not taxable as costs. Independence County v. Dunkin, 40 Ark. 329 (1883).

16-13-220. Counsel for incompetents.

In addition to all other authority granted by law, every circuit court is authorized to appoint legal counsel to represent a person the court deems incompetent due to minority or mental incapacity in civil and criminal actions.

History. Acts 1987, No. 96, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 78.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1987, No. 96, § 2, is also codified as § 16-13-325.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

16-13-221. Legal counsel to personnel.

The Attorney General shall serve as the legal counsel to probation officers and support personnel of circuit courts and shall represent them in any action brought as a result of their official duties.

History. Acts 1989, No. 433, § 1.

16-13-222. Private hearings by circuit courts.

    1. The circuit courts of the various judicial districts of the state shall hear the case or matter in privacy, upon application of all litigants to a divorce action, proceeding for alimony or separate maintenance, proceeding touching the maintenance or custody of children, proceeding for annulment of marriage, adoption proceeding, or any other proceeding pertaining to domestic relations.
    2. To this end, circuit judges are empowered to exclude from any such hearing and from the courtroom all individuals other than the litigants, their counsel, and the officers of the court.
  1. A circuit judge, upon his or her own initiative, may hear such cases and matters in chambers or in privacy where he or she deems it in the best interests of the parties and the best interests of society.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 79.

16-13-223. Sale and confirmation of property.

A circuit court may make orders for the sale of property in the custody of the court and may confirm the sale, but the sale shall not be confirmed until all parties have reasonable notice and an opportunity to be present and resist the confirmation.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 79.

16-13-224. Temporary exchange of districts — Assignment.

  1. Circuit judges may temporarily exchange judicial districts by joint order, and any circuit judge who consents may be assigned to another district for temporary service under rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
  2. When a circuit judge is serving temporarily in a judicial district other than his or her own, he or she shall not thereby be disqualified from conducting court or performing the usual and customary functions of his or her office in his or her own judicial district.
  3. A circuit judge on temporary duty by exchange or assignment:
    1. Shall have the same power and authority as a regularly elected or appointed judge for the judicial district; and
    2. May sign any judgment, order, document, or other paper relating to any case heard by the judge, either in the judicial district where the cause or matter is pending or in his or her own district, and the judgment, order, document, or other paper shall for all intents have the same effect, irrespective of the district in which it is signed.
  4. The sheriff and the circuit clerk in the county where a circuit judge is on temporary duty by exchange or assignment shall perform the same duties and functions in carrying out the operation of the court as they perform in cases assigned to the regularly elected or appointed judges.
  5. If a circuit judge who is on temporary duty by exchange or assignment needs a jury for the disposition of any case, he or she may use the regular or special panel of the circuit court of that county. If the regular and special panels are exhausted, he or she may summon the circuit clerk and have him or her select the required number of qualified jurors.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 79; 2017, No. 600, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “circuit clerk and have him or her” for “jury commissioners previously appointed and have them” in the second sentence of (e).

16-13-225. Juvenile cases — Information system.

  1. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop for the circuit courts a case-based management information system, capable of capturing information at each stage of the process of juvenile cases, with the capacity to serve basic administration, operations, planning, evaluation, and monitoring needs.
  2. A judge of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan adopted pursuant to Order 14 of the Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court shall designate an employee of the court to be responsible for the timely completion and submission of information to the Administrative Office of the Courts.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 79.

16-13-226. Installment payments by a criminal defendant in circuit court — Priority of payment.

  1. An installment payment by a criminal defendant to a circuit court shall initially be deemed to be a collection of court costs until the court costs have been collected in full, with any remaining installment payments representing collections of restitution, and then any applicable fines.
  2. If court costs, restitution, and fines are fully paid, all remaining installment payments shall be allocated to remaining amounts due as ordered by the circuit court.
  3. A municipal or county governing body that adopted municipal or county legislation before January 1, 2017, to provide an alternative method of installment payment allocation as then authorized by state law shall remain in effect until repealed by the municipal or county governing body.

History. Acts 2017, No. 885, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Juvenile Division of Circuit Court Generally

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 66, § 1, provided:

“(a) There is hereby created the position of Chancery Judge at Large, which shall be appointed by the Governor as authorized by law and assigned by the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-10-101 from those Chancery Judges who lost two years of their elected terms pursuant to the United States District Court Consent Decree in the case of Eugene Hunt et al. v. State of Arkansas et al.

“(b) The Chancery Judge at Large shall have original jurisdiction in all matters of equity in judicial districts where assigned and shall serve until December 31, 1996, when the provisions of this act shall expire.

“(c) The Chancery Judge at Large shall receive compensation at the same rate as fixed by law for regularly elected Chancery Judges.

“(d) The Chancery Judge at Large may appoint a court reporter as provided by law, whose salary and expenses shall be paid from the Court Reporter's Fund.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 8: Mar. 8, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 61 and 62, § 8: Aug. 26, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to address the problem of juvenile crime it is necessary to authorize the commitment of delinquent juveniles to juvenile detention facilities; that present law now limits to two thousand dollars ($2,000) the amount a juvenile can be required to pay as restitution to victims, and that amount is becoming increasingly too low; that this act remedies both situations and should go into effect immediately in order to better protect the citizens of this state from the acts of delinquent juveniles and more adequately compensate the victims through restitution. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 321, § 5: Mar. 3, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that juvenile officers serve a vital function; that the present law concerning state reimbursement to counties for a portion of the cost of providing juvenile officers is inadequate; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to adequately provide for this necessary function. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1999, No. 460, § 8: July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1999 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1999 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1999.”

Acts 2005, No. 1398, § 7: July 1, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2005 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2005 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2005.”

Acts 2009, No. 956, § 34: Apr. 6, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that laws concerning juveniles need to be amended and updated; that the fair and efficient administration of juvenile law is highly important to society at large; and that this act is immediately necessary because the judiciary needs to begin addressing these changes in laws involving juveniles. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2016, No. 87, § 7: July 1, 2016. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2016 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2016 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2016.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Law and Equity in Arkansas: Will Liles v. Liles Lead Us Out of the Morass?, 1987 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 Ark. L. Notes 29.

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration — Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 12.

The Arkansas Judiciary at the Crossroads, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 259.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

La Dolce Vita — Law and Equity Merged at Last! III. A Continuing Saga, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 162.

Cox and Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court That Came in From the Code, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Killenbeck, And Then They Did …? Abusing Equity in the Name of Justice, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

16-13-301 — 16-13-317. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning establishment and operation of chancery courts, and duties and appointment of chancellors, masters, clerks and sheriffs in chancery courts, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 80. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-13-301. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 1, p. 314; C.& M. Dig., § 2186; Pope's Dig., § 2797; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-401.

16-13-302. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 14, p. 314; C.& M. Dig., § 2200; Pope's Dig., § 2825; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-402.

16-13-303. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 14, p. 314; C.& M. Dig., § 2200; Pope's Dig., § 2825; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-402.

16-13-304. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 4, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2188; Pope's Dig., § 2814; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-404; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 2; 1995, No. 1016, § 1; 1995, No. 1298, § 13; 2001, No. 1153, § 1.

16-13-305. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 17, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2203; Pope's Dig., § 2828; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-403.

16-13-306. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 14, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2200; Pope's Dig., § 2825; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-402.

16-13-307. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.1.

16-13-308. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.2.

16-13-309. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 5, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2189; Acts 1937, No. 171, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 2795, 2816; Acts 1973, No. 52, § 1; 1979, No. 211, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-409, 22-411, 22-432.

16-13-310. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 11, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2197; Pope's Dig., § 2822; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-436.

16-13-311. Acts 1941, No. 417, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-437 — 22-440.

16-13-312. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2107, 6400; Pope's Dig., §§ 2711, 8362; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-113.

16-13-313. Acts 1967, No. 37, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-449.

16-13-314. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 10, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2196; Pope's Dig., § 2821; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-441.

16-13-315. Acts 1943, No. 42, §§ 1-7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-442 — 22-447, 22-448; Acts 1987, No. 283, §§ 1, 2; 1987, No. 364, §§ 1, 2.

16-13-316. Acts 1951, No. 6, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-407.1.

16-13-317. Acts 1951, No. 6, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-407.1.

16-13-318. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning private hearings by chancery courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 81. This section was derived from Acts 1953, No. 277, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-404.1.

16-13-319. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning decisions of chancellors, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 82. The section was derived from Acts 1903, No. 166, § 11, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2197; Pope's Dig., § 2822; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-436.

16-13-320. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning sale and confirmation of property, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 83. The section was derived from Acts 1913, No. 82, § 2, p. 318; C. & M. Dig., § 2191; Pope's Dig., § 2818; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-434.

16-13-321 — 16-13-325. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning issuance of injunctions in absence of chancellors, appeals, court expenses and payment, and counsel for incompetents, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 84. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-13-321. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 12, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2198; Pope's Dig., § 2823; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-435.

16-13-322. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.3.

16-13-323. Acts 1903, No. 166, § 4, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 2188; Pope's Dig., § 2814; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-404.

16-13-324. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47; C. & M. Dig., § 2118; Pope's Dig., § 2722; Acts 1977, No. 751, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-125.

16-13-325. Acts 1987, No. 96, § 2.

16-13-326. Circuit court juvenile division funds.

    1. All court costs, fines, and fees assessed by the juvenile division of circuit court shall be deposited and accounted for by the county in which they are received.
    2. The court shall have the authority to direct that the fees, court costs, and fines shall be collected by either the juvenile officer, the sheriff, or the clerk of the juvenile division of circuit court or other person designated by the court for the county in which the fees, court costs, and fines are charged.
    1. The officer designated by the court to collect juvenile fees, court costs, and fines shall deposit the fees, court costs, and fines into the appropriate fund and monthly deposit the fees, court costs, and fines into the fund in the county treasury of the county where the fees are collected.
      1. In a judicial district with multiple judges designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14, the majority of the judges shall determine who is to be in charge of the collection and accounting of fees, court costs, and fines.
      2. If there is no majority, the administrative judge is to determine who shall be in charge of the collection and accounting of fees, court costs, and fines as provided by this section.
      1. However, in judicial districts having more than one (1) county, the majority of the judges or the administrative judge may designate the treasurer of one (1) of the counties in the district as the depository of all juvenile and diversion fees, court costs, and fines collected in the district.
      2. The treasurer so designated by the court shall maintain a separate account of the juvenile fees, court costs, and fines collected in each county in the district so that fees, court costs, and fines collected in a county are spent to support the juveniles and juvenile division court services and programs in that county.
      3. Money remaining at the end of the fiscal year shall not revert to any other fund but shall remain in the circuit court juvenile division fund and carry over to the next fiscal year.
  1. The funds derived from the collection of juvenile fees, court costs, and fines shall be used by agreement of the judge or judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14, originally issued April 6, 2001, and the quorum court of the county to provide services and supplies to juveniles and support court programs at the discretion of the juvenile division of circuit court, including without limitation:
    1. Juvenile drug courts;
    2. Teen courts;
    3. Volunteer probation programs;
    4. Court-appointed special advocates; and
    5. After-school and community-based programs.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 5; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 61, § 3; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 62, § 3; 1995, No. 1204, § 1; 2003, No. 1809, § 14; 2011, No. 1175, § 13.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

Case Notes

Custodian.

The trial court cannot assess a probation fee against a custodian under § 9-27-330 or § 9-27-331, because § 9-27-330 does not authorize the assessment of a probation fee against a custodian, and a juvenile court's authority to assess a probation fee is based upon subsection (a) of this section, which is silent on assessing a probation fee against a custodian. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993).

16-13-327. Probation officers.

  1. Each juvenile division of circuit court shall be provided with no fewer than one (1) probation officer to manage the probation services and needs of the court.
  2. Each probation officer shall:
    1. Be an employee of the judge or judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, originally issued April 6, 2001; and
    2. Serve at the pleasure of the judge or judges.
    1. A probation officer:
      1. Shall be certified as a juvenile probation officer according to the laws of this state;
      2. Must complete initial certification requirements within one (1) year of the officer's employment; and
      3. Must maintain the certification during the terms of his or her employment.
    2. The Juvenile Intake and Probation Officers' Certification Committee, composed of juvenile officers and judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in their district plan under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14 originally issued April 6, 2001, and staffed by an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts, shall establish certification standards for intake and probation officers.
    3. The office shall collect and maintain records for the juvenile officers' certification documentation.
      1. The salary of the probation officer shall be paid by the county or counties in which the probation officer works.
      2. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(3) of this section, the state shall pay a portion of the salary of a full-time probation officer:
        1. Who is certified according to the laws of this state; and
        2. Whose salary has been paid by the county or counties for a period of one (1) year.
    1. The portion to be paid by the state shall be the lesser of:
      1. Fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) per year; or
      2. One-half (1/2) the probation officer's average salary as calculated over the last twelve (12) months.
    2. For reimbursement under the requirements of this subsection, the state shall reimburse a county only for salaries paid to the number of probation officers that:
      1. Meet the requirements of subdivision (d)(1) of this section; and
      2. Do not exceed two hundred fifty (250) positions authorized by the counties for probation and intake officers, subject to state funding.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 1; 1997, No. 1171, § 1; 2003, No. 1166, § 33; 2005, No. 1398, § 2; 2009, No. 956, § 31.

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, referred to in this section, is published in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated's annual Court Rules volume immediately preceding the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted the present subdivision designations in (d)(1) and made related changes; substituted “except as provided in subdivision (d)(3)” for “beginning August 1, 1990” in present (d)(1)(B); and added (d)(3).

The 2009 amendment made a minor stylistic change in (d)(1)(B); deleted (d)(3)(B)(i); rewrote (d)(2) and redesignated it as (d)(3)(B); and made a related change.

Case Notes

Salary.

Where circuit and chancery judge issued an order setting salaries of the judicial district's probation officer and intake officer at $18,000.00 per year, and petitioners, members of the county quorum court, voted to pay county's share of the salary, but at the rate of only $15,000.00 per year and judge ordered petitioners to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for not complying with his order, petitioners had not failed to fund the court, there was no showing that level of funding was so low that the court could not effectively operate, the inherent authority doctrine did not apply, and court had no authority to hold petitioners in contempt for not complying with its order. Abbott v. Spencer, 302 Ark. 396, 790 S.W.2d 171 (1990).

16-13-328. Intake officers.

  1. Each juvenile division of circuit court shall be provided with no fewer than one (1) intake officer to manage the intake needs of the court.
  2. Each intake officer shall:
    1. Be employed by the judge or judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district's plan under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, originally issued April 6, 2001; and
    2. Serve at the pleasure of the judge or judges.
    1. Each intake officer:
      1. Shall be certified as a juvenile intake officer according to the laws of this state;
      2. Must complete initial certification requirements within one (1) year of the officer's employment; and
      3. Must maintain the certification during the terms of employment.
    2. The Juvenile Intake and Probation Officers' Certification Committee, composed of juvenile officers and judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in the district plan under the order and staffed by an employee of the office, shall establish certification standards for intake and probation officers.
    3. The office shall collect and maintain records for the juvenile officers' certification documentation.
      1. The salary of the intake officer shall be paid by the county or counties in which the intake officer works.
      2. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(3) of this section, the state shall pay a portion of the salary of a full-time intake officer:
        1. Who is certified according to the laws of this state; and
        2. Whose salary has been paid by the county or counties for a period of one (1) year.
    1. The portion to be paid by the state shall be the lesser of:
      1. Fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) a year; or
      2. One-half (½) the intake officer's average salary as calculated over the last twelve (12) months.
    2. The state shall reimburse a county only for a portion of salaries paid to the number of intake officers that:
      1. Meet the requirements of subdivision (d)(1) of this section; and
      2. For reimbursement under the requirements of this subsection, do not exceed two hundred fifty (250) positions authorized by the counties for probation and intake officers, subject to state funding.
    1. Each circuit judge whose primary responsibility is conducting hearings for the involuntary admission or commitment of persons to the Arkansas State Hospital or any other public or private hospital with a fully trained psychiatrist on the active or consultant staff shall be provided with no fewer than one (1) intake officer to manage the intake needs of the court.
    2. The salaries of the intake officers shall be paid by the county or counties in which the intake officers work, with the state's paying a portion, e.g., the lesser of either fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) per year or one-half (½) of each full-time intake officer's annual salary.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 2; 1991, No. 794, § 1; 1997, No. 1171, § 2; 2003, No. 1166, § 34; 2005, No. 1398, § 3; 2009, No. 956, § 32.

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, referred to in this section, is published in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated's annual Court Rules volume immediately preceding the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted the present subdivision designations in (d)(1) and made related changes; substituted “except as provided in subdivision (d)(3)” for “beginning August 1, 1990” in present (d)(1)(B); and added (d)(3).

The 2009 amendment deleted (d)(3)(B)(i); rewrote (d)(3)(B)(ii) and incorporated it as part of (d)(3)(B); and made related changes.

16-13-329. Dual role precluded.

A person shall not serve as both a juvenile probation officer and a juvenile intake officer.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 4; 2003, No. 1166, § 35.

16-13-330. Contract providers.

Intake and probation services deemed necessary by the court may be provided by contract providers by contract between the county or counties in a judicial district and the contract provider, upon approval of the judge or judges of the circuit court designated to hear juvenile cases in their district plan under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, originally issued April 6, 2001. Persons providing juvenile intake and probation services by contract shall be certified in the same manner as juvenile intake and probation officers employed by the judge or judges.

History. Acts 1989, No. 418, § 3; 1991, No. 787, § 1; 2003, No. 1166, § 36.

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, referred to in this section, is published in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated's annual Court Rules volume immediately preceding the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil.

16-13-331. State reimbursement.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall administer the state reimbursement to the counties for the juvenile officers' previous year's salaries.
  2. In order for a county to receive the state reimbursement for juvenile officers, the county must submit the following documentation to the office, including, but not limited to:
    1. Proof of each juvenile officer's certification and continuing education hours;
    2. A copy of each juvenile officer's W-2 form for the salary year that is being reimbursed; and
    3. A completed form concerning the employment status of the officer which shall be designed and distributed by the office.
  3. If a county contracts with a service provider to provide juvenile services pursuant to § 16-13-330, the county must submit documentation to the office, including, but not limited to:
    1. A copy of the contract for the salary year that is being reimbursed;
    2. A copy of each juvenile officer's certification and continuing education hours;
    3. A copy of each juvenile officer's W-2 form for the salary year that is being reimbursed; and
    4. A completed form concerning the employment status of each officer which shall be designed and distributed by the office.
    1. A county may determine that part-time service of a juvenile officer is sufficient to meet the needs of the county.
      1. Multiple counties in a judicial district may share the cost of the salary of the juvenile officer.
      2. One (1) county may be designated as the county to be reimbursed by the state, or each county shall designate the portion of the salary that it pays for juvenile services.
      1. A county may contract with a service provider for full-time or part-time juvenile officer services, and the county shall indicate the percentage of the contractor's time that is spent providing juvenile officer services for the county.
      2. The county or the contractor shall be reimbursed for one-half (1/2) of the portion of the salary that is used for such services, up to fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000).
  4. Nothing in this section removes the obligation of each circuit judge designated to hear juvenile cases in a district plan under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14, originally issued April 6, 2001, to have a minimum of one (1) intake officer, pursuant to § 16-13-328, and one (1) probation officer, pursuant to § 16-13-327.
  5. Funds appropriated for county reimbursement as provided in this section and for which a county has not submitted reimbursement documentation by January 1 of each year as required under subsection (b) of this section may be distributed to a county based on the following factors:
    1. The use of or inability of a county to use risk assessment and behavioral health screenings;
    2. The financial need of the county;
    3. The juvenile crime rate of the county;
    4. The juvenile division of circuit court reduction in commitments and the need for community service in the county; and
    5. The plan of the juvenile division of circuit court or the county for the use of funds for the provision of juvenile officer services.

History. Acts 1997, No. 321, § 1; 1999, No. 460, § 2; 2003, No. 1166, § 37; 2016, No. 87, § 4; 2019, No. 941, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 351, § 2 amended this section to read as follows:

“(a) The Auditor of State shall administer the state reimbursement to the counties for the juvenile officers' previous year salaries.

“(b) In order for a county to receive the state reimbursement for juvenile intake and probation officers the county must submit the following documentation to the Auditor of State, including but not limited to: (1) Proof of the juvenile officers' certification and continuing education hours; (2) A copy of the juvenile officers' W-2 form for the salary year that is being reimbursed; and (3) A completed form concerning the employment status of the officer which shall be designed and distributed by the Auditor of State.

“(c) If a county contracts with a service provider to provide juvenile intake and probation services pursuant to § 16-13-330, the county must submit documentation to the Auditor of State, including but not limited to: (1) A copy of the contract for the salary year that is being reimbursed; (2) A copy of the juvenile officers' certification and continuing education hours; (3) A copy of the juvenile officers' W-2 form for the salary year that is being reimbursed; and (4) A completed form concerning the employment status of the officer which shall be designed and distributed by the Auditor of State.

“(d) A county may determine that part-time service of a juvenile officer is sufficient to meet the needs of a county. (1) Multiple counties in a judicial district may share the cost of the salary of the intake and probation officer. One county may be designated as the county to be reimbursed by the state or each county shall designate the portion of the salary that it pays for juvenile intake and probation services. (2) The county may contract with a service provider for full or part-time juvenile intake and probation officer services and the county shall indicate the percentage of the contractors' time that is spent providing juvenile intake and probation officer services for the county. The county or the contractor shall be reimbursed for one-half (½) of the portion of the salary that is used for such services up to fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000).

“(e) Nothing in this section removes the obligation for each juvenile judge to have a minimum of one (1) intake officer, pursuant to § 16-13-328 and one (1) probation officer, pursuant to § 16-13-327.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2003.”

Publisher's Notes. The language set forth in Acts 2001, No. 351, § 2 is nearly identical to the language in this section. Because the amendment is temporary, it was not incorporated into this section at the direction of the Arkansas Code Revision Commission and the Arkansas General Assembly.

Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14, referred to in this section, is published in the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated's annual Court Rules volume immediately preceding the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” throughout the section.

The 2019 amendment deleted “intake and probation” following “juvenile” in the introductory language of (b) and (c), and in (d)(2)(B) and twice in (d)(3)(A); substituted “the county” for “a county” in (d)(1); substituted “juvenile officer” for “in-take and probation officer” in (d)(2)(A); and added (f).

Subchapter 4 — Exchange of Cases

16-13-401. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transfer of cases between circuit and chancery courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 85. The section was derived from Acts 1885, No. 106, § 12, p. 171; 1891, No. 156, § 9, p. 266; 1893, No. 9, § 9, p. 12; 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 37, § 9, p. 90; C. & M. Dig., § 2185; Pope's Dig., § 2794; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-405.

16-13-402. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning exchange or substitution upon judge's request, temporary or special judges and proceedings, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 86. The section was derived from Acts 1961, No. 135, §§ 1-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-342 — 22-346.

16-13-403 — 16-13-405. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning exchange of districts, powers and authority of exchange judges, and authority of exchange judges to sign papers in either district, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 87. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-13-403. Acts 1881, No. 68, § 1, p. 134; C. & M. Dig., § 2224; Acts 1933, No. 160, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 2852; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-340; Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 51, § 1.

16-13-404. Civil Code, § 758; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [758], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 2225; Acts 1933, No. 160, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 2853; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-341.

16-13-405. Acts 1963, No. 239, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-341.1.

Subchapter 5 — Court Reporters

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2010, No. 167, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Acts 2011, No. 927, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Acts 2012, No. 110, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Acts 2013, No. 1028, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Acts 2014, No. 111, § 3, provided: “TRANSCRIPTS. Official Court Reporters shall prepare transcripts, which are to be included within a record on appeal, pursuant to the time requirements that are outlined in the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. In the event an official Court Reporter fails to complete a transcript within the prescribed time, he or she shall immediately inform the judge, for whom he or she is employed, and the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners. Failure of a Court Reporter to report to his or her judge and to the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners shall result in the immediate suspension of the Court Reporter's license, pending a hearing before the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 1: Nov. 25, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined that some of the provisions of Act 824 of 1981, which provides that the official court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts in the State are state employees, and provide for the levy and collection of additional court costs to pay the salaries and expenses of reporters, are vague and difficult to interpret, and that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice that this Act be given effect immediately to clarify the law relating to court reporters. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 27, § 5: Dec. 1, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Third General Assembly, meeting in Extraordinary Session, that the passage of this Act is necessary for continued efficient operation of the circuit and chancery courts and to pay authorized salaries for the official court reporters. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 868, § 4: Mar. 28, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that since court reporters are now State employees, indigent defendants should be provided a free transcript without the necessity of paying additional fees to the court reporters, and that this Act is immediately necessary to so provide. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 581, § 2: Apr. 4, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the compensation to court reporters, of the circuit, chancery, and probate courts, for making transcripts of court proceedings is inadequate, and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide adequate compensation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 677, § 4: Mar. 20, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the inability of judges on assignment and the Arkansas Judicial Department to employ substitute court reporters is creating an urgent and immediate problem in the court system of this state, and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to insure there is an orderly and efficient administration of justice in the state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 11, 1997. Effective July 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

Acts 2019, No. 716, § 13: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2019 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2019 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2019”.

16-13-501. Court reporters made state employees.

  1. The official court reporters of the circuit courts in this state are employees of the State of Arkansas.
  2. The Administrative Office of the Courts may employ or contract with a court reporter previously employed by the state for services provided at any time after his or her separation from state employment, regardless of a limitation otherwise provided under § 19-11-709(d).
  3. The office is responsible for the financial oversight of the court reporters employed by the circuit court, which includes without limitation:
    1. Biennial and annual budget requests;
    2. Relevant budget activities;
    3. Monitoring expenses;
    4. Travel;
    5. Substitute expenses;
    6. Indigent transcript payments; and
    7. Ensuring projected annual expenditures do not exceed total available funding.
  4. The office, with the assistance of the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc., shall establish an official procedure or rules for:
    1. The hiring of court reporters;
    2. The termination of court reporters; and
    3. Salary adjustments for court reporters.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-366.3; Acts 2015, No. 268, § 4; 2019, No. 716, § 8.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted the second sentence.

The 2019 amendment added (b) through (d) and designated the former section as (a).

16-13-502. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning employment of court reporters, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 88. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 432, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-366.

16-13-503. Appointment — Compensation — Leave.

  1. Each judge of each circuit court may appoint one (1) or more court reporters as may be authorized by law.
    1. The salaries of the court reporters shall:
      1. Be exempt from the provisions of the Uniform Classification and Compensation Act, § 21-5-201 et seq.;
      2. Not exceed the maximum annual salary rate authorized by the General Assembly in the applicable appropriation act; and
      3. Be determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
    2. The salaries, together with other expenses authorized by law for the court reporters to be paid from state funds, shall be paid with moneys appropriated for the salaries and other expenses by the General Assembly from the Court Reporter's Fund.
    3. The total amount of salaries paid to court reporters and other distributions of the Court Reporter's Fund shall not exceed:
      1. The total annual allocation authorized by the General Assembly to the Court Reporter's Fund from the State Administration of Justice Fund as supplemented, if necessary, by any real property transfer tax revenues under § 26-60-112(b)(2); and
      2. Any remaining balances in the Court Reporter's Fund.
    1. Notwithstanding the exemption provided by § 21-4-203, the circuit judge of the circuit court served by a court reporter shall administer the attendance and leave policies for the court reporter in the manner prescribed for state employees by the Uniform Attendance and Leave Policy Act, § 21-4-201 et seq.
    2. The court reporter shall forward all approved requests for leave to the office on a regular and timely basis for payroll purposes.
    3. The office shall prescribe the procedures for obtaining all relevant leave information, including without limitation the forms, method of transmittal, and format for obtaining the leave information.
    1. Rules for the regulation of the practice of court reporting in this state, including, but not limited to, certification, discipline, and provisions for the retention of court reporter records, shall be the responsibility of the Supreme Court.
    2. Provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall permit the Supreme Court to require that counties or county officials provide space for the storage of court reporter records.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-366.3; Acts 1995, No. 743, § 1; 2003, No. 1363, § 1; 2015, No. 268, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted by the General Assembly, Acts 2003, No. 1363, § 1, provided in part:

“(d)(2) The person employed in the position paid through the Court Reporters' Fund and who is assigned and providing services as the coordinator of the Post Adjudication Court of the Ninth Division of the Sixth Judicial Circuit is not required to be certified as a court reporter as provided in subsection (d)(1).”

Amendments. The 2015 amendment rewrote (b)(1); in (b)(2), substituted “other expenses” for “such expenses as may be” and “for the salaries and other expenses” for “therefor”; added (b)(3); redesignated and rewrote (c) as (c)(1); and added (c)(2) and (c)(3).

Case Notes

Cited: Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995).

16-13-504. Salary implementation procedures.

  1. If a court reporter was an official court reporter in the state on June 30, 1981, the increase eligibility date for purposes of salary implementation shall be July 1, 1982.
  2. If an official court reporter was appointed after June 30, 1981, the increase eligibility date for purposes of salary implementation shall be determined by the date of appointment.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 27, § 1; 1983, No. 868, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-366.4, 22-367.5; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 89; 2015, No. 268, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The reference to the Uniform Classification and Compensation Plan in (a) refers to the “Uniform Classification and Compensation Act”, § 21-5-201 et seq., which was partially amended by Acts 2009, No. 688, effective July 1, 2009. All career service plans for state agencies and institutions were reclassified within §§ 21-5-208 and 21-5-209.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 27, § 1, provided, in part, effective January 1, 1982, for the compensation of court reporters who were official court reporters in the state on June 30, 1981.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted “Initial annual salary of court reporters” from the section heading and rewrote the section.

16-13-505. Court reporters — Reimbursement for expenses.

    1. A court reporter for a circuit court is entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred for meals, lodging, and transportation costs for attending court away from the court reporter's official station.
    2. Notwithstanding the exemption from state travel rules provided by § 19-4-904, if a court reporter uses a personal vehicle for transportation, he or she is entitled to reimbursement for mileage at the same rate prescribed by the Department of Finance and Administration for executive branch employees.
  1. Reimbursements for actual expenses and mileage under subsection (a) of this section shall be made monthly by the Administrative Office of the Courts upon claims by the respective court reporters certified by the circuit judge.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 6; 1985, No. 63, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-367.3; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 89; 2005, No. 461, § 2; 2015, No. 268, § 7; 2019, No. 315, § 1296.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 6, is also codified as § 16-14-107.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted the former last sentence in (a), which read: “However, no court reporter shall be entitled to receive reimbursement for such meals, lodging, and transportation in excess of four thousand five hundred dollars ($4,500) per year.”

The 2015 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “A court reporter for a circuit court is” for “The official court reporters of the respective circuit courts shall be” and “the court” for “a”; in (a)(2), substituted “Notwithstanding the exemption from state travel regulations provided by § 19-4-904, if a court” for “If the” and “is” for “shall be,” inserted “same” and “by the Department of Finance and Administration,” substituted “executive branch” for “state,” and deleted “in the state travel regulations” at the end; and, in (b), substituted “actual expenses and mileage under subsection (a) of this section” for “expenses” and “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (a)(2).

16-13-506. Court reporters — Transcript fees.

    1. When required to make a transcript of court proceedings, each court reporter of the circuit courts shall be entitled to compensation at the rate of four dollars and ten cents ($4.10) per page for the original and two (2) copies and at the rate of fifty cents (50¢) per page for each additional copy.
    2. When required to prepare photocopied evidence as part of a transcript, each reporter shall be entitled to compensation at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per page, for an original and two (2) copies and at the rate of fifty cents (50¢) per page for each additional copy thereafter, with the cost to be paid by the parties ordering transcripts.
      1. In indigent and in forma pauperis proceedings, the compensation to the court reporter for transcripts provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be paid by the State of Arkansas.
      2. However, in such proceedings, the court reporters shall be entitled to compensation from the state only for the original and two (2) copies of the transcript.
    1. The payments shall be made only upon certification of the payments by the presiding circuit judge and shall be paid by the Administrative Office of the Courts from funds appropriated out of the Court Reporter's Fund.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 7; 1983, No. 868, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-367.4; Acts 1987, No. 581, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 90; 2005, No. 461, § 2; 2015, No. 268, § 8.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 7, as amended is also codified as § 16-14-106.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “four dollars and ten cents ($4.10)” for “three dollars and ten cents ($3.10)” in (a)(1).

The 2015 amendment, in (b)(2), substituted “of the payments” for “thereof,” inserted “circuit,” and substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State.”

16-13-507. Liability for loss of records.

Court reporters shall not be liable, criminally or civilly, for the unintentional loss, damage, or destruction of their official records which are more than five (5) years old.

History. Acts 1981, No. 154, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-366.2.

16-13-508. Court Reporter's Fund established.

There is created on the books of the Auditor of State, Treasurer of State, and Chief Fiscal Officer of the State a fund to be known as the Court Reporter's Fund which fund shall be used exclusively for paying such salaries, transcript fees, and expenses of court reporters as may be provided by law to be paid from state funds.

History. Acts 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-157.

Cross References. Court Reporter's Fund, § 19-5-1082.

16-13-509. Substitute court reporters.

    1. In the absence or unavailability of the official court reporter, the circuit judge or circuit judge on assignment as authorized by § 16-10-101 may temporarily employ the services of a substitute court reporter if the temporary employment is essential to prevent a disruption of the business of the circuit court.
    2. The substitute court reporter shall be a court reporter certified by the Certified Court Reporter Examiners Board.
    1. When a circuit judge or circuit judge on assignment temporarily employs a substitute court reporter, the circuit judge shall certify to the Administrative Office of the Courts, upon forms prepared by the office, that he or she has temporarily employed the services of a substitute court reporter and that the temporary employment was essential to prevent a disruption of the business of the circuit court.
    2. The circuit judge or circuit judge on assignment shall further furnish to the office the name, address, and Social Security number of the substitute court reporter and the number of days the substitute court reporter was temporarily employed, plus any other information concerning the employment requested by the office.
    1. The office may pay the substitute court reporter for the court reporting services furnished to the circuit judge from funds specifically appropriated for that purpose.
    2. The substitute court reporter shall be paid at the rate of one hundred seventy-five dollars ($175) per day.
    3. The substitute court reporter is entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred for meals, lodging, and transportation costs for attending court under § 16-13-505.
  1. If a trial court administrator employed under § 16-13-3302 and also certified under subsection (a) of this section is appointed to act temporarily as a substitute court reporter, he or she is not entitled to be paid an additional salary but is entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred for meals, lodging, and transportation costs when attending court away from his or her official station, under § 16-13-505.
  2. In any one (1) fiscal year, however, the office shall not pay for the services of a substitute court reporter or substitute court reporters for any one (1) circuit judge or circuit judge on assignment in excess of thirty (30) working days, unless approved and ordered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
  3. This subchapter does not preclude or prohibit any circuit judge from obtaining payment for the services of a substitute court reporter from the county or counties composing the circuit judge's judicial district rather than from the office.

History. Acts 1987, No. 373, §§ 1-4; 1989, No. 677, § 1; 1989, No. 762, § 1; 1997, No. 1169, § 1; 2001, No. 510, § 1; 2005, No. 461, § 3; 2015, No. 268, § 9.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted “or chancery judge” at the end of (c)(1); and substituted “the rate of one hundred and seventy-five dollars ($175) per day” for “a daily rate, based upon the daily pay rate of the court reporter for whom he or she is substituting” in (c)(2).

The 2015 amendment substituted “Administrative Office of the Courts” for “Auditor of State” throughout the section; in (b)(1), substituted “shall certify” for “may certify” and deleted “necessary and” preceding “essential”; inserted “or circuit judge on assignment” in (b)(2); added (c)(3); substituted “a trial court administrator employed under § 16-13-3302” for “any trial court administrative assistant employed pursuant to § 16-10-133” in (d); substituted “thirty (30) working days” for “twenty (20) working days” in (e); and made stylistic changes.

16-13-510. Complete record required — Waiver.

  1. In all cases before a circuit court of this state, a complete record of the proceedings shall be made by the official court reporter, or other reporter designated by the court. Upon the request of either party or the circuit judge, said record shall be transcribed, certified by the reporter as true and correct, and filed with the clerk of the court in which the proceedings were had, not less than ten (10) days before the expiration of time allowed for appeal.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the parties, with the permission of the circuit court, from waiving a complete record of the proceeding.
  3. The court reporter's duty to transcribe and certify the record may be conditioned upon the payment, when requested by the court reporter, of up to fifty percent (50%) of the estimated cost of the transcript.

History. Acts 1989, No. 844, §§ 1, 2; 1993, No. 812, § 1.

Case Notes

Child Custody.

The clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not allow anything less than a complete record of the proceedings to be made and this requirement cannot be waived; thus, a record must be made of in-camera interviews in matters of child custody. Mattocks v. Mattocks, 66 Ark. App. 77, 986 S.W.2d 890 (1999).

Harmless Error.

Although the trial court's failure to make a verbatim record of the in-chambers conference was error, it was not reversible error since the record was settled by the trial court. Smith v. State, 324 Ark. 74, 918 S.W.2d 714 (1996).

Motion to Compel Arbitration.

In a case involving a trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration, remand was necessary because, in its order denying the motion to compel arbitration, the trial court said that it had announced its decision in open court during a hearing but there was no transcript of such a hearing either in the addendum or in the record. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. Kolesar, 2013 Ark. App. 195 (2013).

Notice of Appeal.

Failure to lodge the record was due to the dilatory actions of the husband's attorney, because while the notice of appeal stated that the attorney had ordered the transcript, it was apparent that she failed to provide the court reporter with a copy of the notice of appeal or otherwise inform court reporter that she needed the transcript until just before the original deadline to lodge the record. Eggestein v. Eggestein, 2009 Ark. 262, 308 S.W.3d 144 (2009).

Circuit court erred in granting a city's motion for extension of time to file the record in its appeal of condemnation action because the city failed to strictly comply with Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 5 where it failed to make the financial arrangements necessary for the court reporter to prepare the stenographically recorded material until the very last day that an extension could be granted. It would make little sense to hold that an extension was necessary for the court reporter to include the stenographically reported material in the record when the city was at fault in creating the necessity by failing to pay the court reporter the required deposit. City of Little Rock v. Hermitage Dev. Corp., 2015 Ark. 453, 476 S.W.3d 788 (2015).

Silence Not Waiver.

Because the state and the defense did not waive their right to a verbatim record, the trial court's failure to make a verbatim record of the in-chambers conferences on the defendant's directed-verdict motion was error; although the state voiced no objection to the trial court's handling of the directed-verdict motion in this manner, the Supreme Court of Arkansas would not construe the state's silence on the issue at trial as implying a waiver of this requirement and warned that in the future the record requirement would be strictly construed and enforced. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003).

Cited: Valley v. Bogard, 341 Ark. 302, 20 S.W.3d 271 (2000); Arkansas Realtors Ass'n v. Real Forms, LLC, 2014 Ark. 385, 442 S.W.3d 845 (2014); Terry v. State, 2019 Ark. 342 (2019).

16-13-511. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transfer of funds to the court reporters' fund from county aid fund to pay salaries and expenses, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 788, § 31 and No. 1341, § 30. The section was derived from Acts 1991, No. 479, § 1.

16-13-512. Funding of official court reporters.

  1. The state, rather than individual counties, shall bear the responsibility of funding the salaries and expenses of official state court reporters.
  2. Each county or counties within a judicial district shall continue to bear the responsibility of providing, at the county's expense, each official court reporter with appropriate office space and operating expenses, when approved in advance by the quorum court.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 30; 1997, No. 1341, § 29.

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Subchapter 6 — Juvenile Division of Chancery Court

16-13-601, 16-13-602. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning legislative intent and creation of the Juvenile Division of the Chancery Court, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 91. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-13-601. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 1.

16-13-602. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 2.

16-13-603. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning jurisdiction of the Juvenile Division of the Chancery Court, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 92. The section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 294, §§ 2, 5, 7; 1995, No. 1016, § 2.

16-13-604 — 16-13-607. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning judges and clerks of the Juvenile Division of the Chancery Court, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 93. These sections were derived from the following source:

16-13-604. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 3.

16-13-605. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 3.

16-13-606. Acts 1989, No. 294, §§ 3, 4.

16-13-607. Acts 1989, No. 294, § 6.

16-13-608. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transfer of dockets and records, etc, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1296, § 59. The section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 294, § 6.

Subchapter 7 — Enforcement of Fines

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2013, No. 282, § 17: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-13-701. Scope — Definition.

  1. The procedures established by this subchapter shall apply to the assessment and collection of all fines, however designated, imposed by circuit courts and district courts for criminal convictions, traffic convictions, civil violations, and juvenile delinquency adjudications and shall be utilized to obtain prompt and full payment of all fines.
  2. As used in this subchapter, “fine” means a monetary penalty imposed by a court, including without limitation:
    1. A monetary fine;
    2. Court costs;
    3. Court-ordered restitution;
    4. Probation fees;
    5. Supervision fees;
    6. Public service supervisory fees; and
    7. Other court-ordered fees.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 1; 1997, No. 941, § 1; 2001, No. 1809, § 12; 2003, No. 1765, § 8; 2005, No. 1934, § 6; 2007, No. 663, § 31; 2019, No. 113, § 2.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “or city courts” for “city courts, or police courts” in (a).

The 2007 amendment, in (a), deleted “or city courts” following “district courts” and made a related change.

The 2019 amendment added “Definition” in the section heading; deleted “monetary” following “collection of all” in (a); rewrote (b); and made a stylistic change.

Cross References. City courts generally, § 16-96-101 et seq.

District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-13-702. Immediate payment.

    1. When a court has imposed a fine, as described in § 16-13-701, the imposition of such a fine constitutes an order to pay the full amount of the fine in accordance with this subchapter.
    2. Following imposition of the fine, the court shall inform the defendant that full payment of the fine is due immediately and shall inquire of the defendant what arrangements he or she has made to comply with the court's order to pay the fine.
    3. Without utilizing the provisions of § 16-13-704, the court may allow the defendant a period of time, not to extend beyond the time of the close of the clerk's office on the following day, within which to return to the court and tender payment of the fine.
        1. If the defendant fails to appear as directed, the court shall issue an order of arrest.
        2. The arrest order shall be carried out by the sheriff.
      1. The court may also, upon the defendant's failure to appear, utilize any of the enforcement mechanisms authorized by this subchapter.
      1. If the defendant claims an inability to pay the fine, the court shall inquire into the defendant's ability to pay and shall make a determination of the defendant's financial ability to pay the fine.
      2. If the court finds that the defendant has the financial ability to make immediate payment of the fine in full, the court shall order him or her to pay the fine.
      3. Failure or refusal to pay as ordered by the court shall subject the defendant to imprisonment, as provided in § 16-13-703.
    1. When a corporation is sentenced to pay a fine or costs, it is the duty of the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation to pay the fine or costs.
    2. If such disbursements require approval of the board of directors, it is the duty of the board to authorize disbursements to pay the fine or costs.
    3. Failure to comply with the duties imposed by this subsection shall render the person or directors subject to imprisonment under § 16-13-703.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, §§ 2, 4.

Case Notes

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court had the right to order installment payments, nothing in this section authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-703. Imprisonment.

  1. When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine defaults in the payment thereof, or of any installment, the court, upon its own motion or that of the prosecuting attorney, may require him or her to show cause why he or she should not be imprisoned for nonpayment.
  2. The court may issue a warrant of arrest or summons for his or her appearance.
    1. Unless the defendant shows that his or her default was not attributable to a purposeful refusal to obey the sentence of the court or to a failure on his or her part to make a good-faith effort to obtain the funds required for payment, the court may order the defendant imprisoned in the county jail or other authorized institution designated by the court until the fine or specified part thereof is paid.
      1. The period of imprisonment shall not exceed one (1) day for each forty dollars ($40.00) of the fine, thirty (30) days if the fine was imposed upon conviction of a misdemeanor, or one (1) year if the fine was imposed upon conviction of a felony, whichever is the shorter period.
      2. The total amount of fines owed shall not automatically be reduced by the period of imprisonment, but the court may credit forty dollars ($40.00) for each day of imprisonment against the total fine, excluding any amount owed for restitution, the defendant has been sentenced to pay.
    2. This subsection is in addition to the revocation options contained in § 16-93-308.
  3. If the court determines that the default in payment of the fine is not attributable to the causes specified in subsection (c) of this section, the court may enter an order allowing the defendant additional time for payment, reducing the amount of each installment, or revoking the fine or the unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 4; 2003, No. 1765, § 9; 2013, No. 225, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment inserted “excluding any amount owed for restitution” in (c)(2)(B); and rewrote (c)(3).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Bryan Altman, Comment: Improving the Indigent Defense Crisis Through Decriminalization, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 769 (2017).

Case Notes

Improper Judicial Conduct.

Finding that the judge be removed from office was appropriate, in part because he had contact with probationers when he collected money and such conduct did not pass the test for appearance of impropriety nor did this section cure the appearance of impropriety. A circuit court was not authorized to collect the fine itself and it was clear that the judge's collection of money from defendants in open court would create in reasonable minds a perception that his ability to carry out his judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence was impaired. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n v. Proctor, 2010 Ark. 38, 360 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, isability Comm'n, 561 U.S. 1027, 130 S. Ct. 3516, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (2010).

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though this section authorizes imprisonment for failure to pay a fine, nothing in it authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-704. Installment payments — Definition.

    1. If the court concludes that the defendant has the ability to pay the fine, but that requiring the defendant to make immediate payment in full would cause a severe and undue hardship for the defendant and the defendant's dependents, the court may authorize payment of the fine by means of installment payments in accordance with this subchapter.
      1. When a court authorizes payment of a fine by means of installment payments, it shall issue, without a separate disclosure hearing, an order that the fine be paid in full by a date certain and that in default of payment, the defendant must appear in court to explain the failure to pay.
      2. In fixing the date of payment, the court shall issue an order which will complete payment of the fine as promptly as possible without creating a severe and undue hardship for the defendant and the defendant's dependents.
    2. When a person is authorized to pay a fine on an installment basis, any court cost assessed under § 9-15-202(d) or § 16-10-305(h) shall be collected from the initial installment payment first.
      1. In addition to the fine and any other assessments authorized by this subchapter, an installment fee of five dollars ($5.00) per month shall be assessed on each person who is authorized to pay a fine on an installment basis.
      2. This fee shall be collected in full each month in which a defendant makes an installment payment.
      3. This fee shall accrue each month that a defendant does not make an installment payment and the fine has not been paid in full.
        1. One-half (½) of the installment fee collected in circuit court shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the Administration of Justice Funds Section of the Office of Administrative Services of the Department of Finance and Administration, on a form provided by that office, for deposit into the Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund established by § 16-13-712.
        2. The other half of the installment fee shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the county treasurer to be deposited into a fund entitled the “circuit court automation fund” to be used solely for circuit court-related technology.
        1. Expenditures from the circuit court automation fund shall be approved by the administrative circuit judge of each judicial circuit and shall be authorized and paid under the state laws governing the appropriation and payment of county expenditures.
        2. Expenditures may be made for indirect expenses related to implementation of new court-related technology, including overtime pay, personnel or travel expenses, and technology-related supplies.
        3. Funds in each county in a judicial district may be pooled for expenditure pursuant to a circuit-wide technology plan approved by the administrative circuit judge.
      1. One-half (½) of the installment fee collected in district court shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the Administration of Justice Funds Section, on a form provided by that section, for deposit into the Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund established by § 16-13-712.
      2. The other half of the installment fee collected in district court shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the city treasurer of the city in which the district court is located to be deposited into a fund entitled the “district court automation fund” to be used solely for district court-related technology.
      3. In any district court which is funded solely by the county, the other half of this fee shall be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the county treasurer of the county in which the district court is located to be deposited into the district court automation fund to be used solely for district court-related technology.
        1. Expenditures from the district court automation fund shall be approved by a district judge and shall be authorized and paid under state laws governing the appropriation and payment of county or municipal expenditures by the governing body or, if applicable, governing bodies, that contribute to the expenses of a district court.
        2. Expenditures may be made for indirect expenses related to implementation of new court-related technology, including overtime pay, personnel or travel expenses, and technology-related supplies.
        1. In circuit court only, an installment fee of an additional five dollars ($5.00) per month shall also be assessed on the first day of each month on each person who is ordered to pay a fine on an installment basis with the additional five dollars ($5.00) to be remitted to the collecting official to be used to defray the cost of fine collection.
        2. In district court only, an installment fee of an additional five dollars ($5.00) per month shall also be assessed on the first day of each month on each person who is ordered to pay a fine on an installment basis with the additional five dollars ($5.00) to be remitted by the tenth day of each month to the Administration of Justice Funds Section on a form provided by that section for deposit into the State Administration of Justice Fund.
  1. Any defendant who has been authorized by the court to pay a fine by installments shall be considered to have irrevocably appointed the clerk of the court as his or her agent upon whom all papers affecting his or her liability may be served, and the clerk shall forthwith notify the defendant thereof by ordinary mail at his or her last known address.
  2. “Ability to pay” means that the resources of the defendant, including all available income and resources, are sufficient to pay the fine and provide the defendant and his or her dependents with a reasonable subsistence compatible with health and decency.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 3; 2001, No. 1809, § 13; 2003, No. 1185, § 94; 2003, No. 1765, § 10; 2005, No. 1934, § 7; 2007, No. 663, § 32; 2011, No. 1138, §§ 1, 2; 2011, No. 1218, § 2; 2013, No. 282, § 9; 2017, No. 583, § 4.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “or city court” following “district court” in (b)(3)(A); deleted former (b)(3)(B)(ii) and (b)(3)(E); and made related changes.

The 2011 amendment by No. 1138 inserted (b)(3)(E).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1218 rewrote (b)(2)(B) and (b)(3)(D).

The 2013 amendment redesignated (b)(3)(E) as (b)(3)(E)(i); substituted “is ordered to” for “is authorized to” in (b)(3)(E)(i); and added (b)(3)(E)(ii).

The 2017 amendment added (a)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

Due Process.

Circuit court properly denied the city a directed verdict in a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process in charging installment fees even if the fine was paid off early. The lack of notice, as established by the evidence at trial, precluded satisfaction of due process; there was no evidence showing that plaintiff mother was advised of a refund or reconsideration of the fee, but instead, she was simply told by the court cashier that she had to pay the entire sum. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

In a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process, an appeal under Ark. R. Crim. P. 36 would not have provided an adequate procedure for the return of an illegal fee because an appeal would have placed defendant at risk of a harsher sentence solely to avoid the imposition of the unlawfully assessed installment fee. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

Circuit court properly denied the city a directed verdict in a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process because the installment fee policy constituted a governmental policy or custom to which municipal liability could attach; the district court judge consulted with deputy city attorneys and others in implementing the policy and the policy was automatically applied to all district court defendants on an installment plan. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

Illegal Fee.

Due process violation arising from a district court judge's installment fee policy could be imputed to the city because the judge was an employee of the city since the Little Rock District Court had not yet been reorganized as a state district court at the times relevant to the case; the Little Rock District Court was not part of the state district court program at the time of the events alleged in the complaint. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court had the right to order installment payments, nothing in this section authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-705. Personal checks.

  1. The court shall accept personal checks drawn in the favor of a designated official, as provided in § 16-13-709, in payment of any fine or associated charge assessed by the court if the person issuing the check furnishes satisfactory proof of residence in this state and if the personal check is drawn on a banking institution located in this state.
    1. If any personal check offered in payment pursuant to this section is returned without payment, for any reason, a reasonable charge for the returned check, not to exceed the actual costs incurred by the court or designated agency, may be imposed to recover processing and collection costs.
    2. This charge may be added to, and become part of, any underlying obligation.
  2. The acceptance of a personal check pursuant to this section constitutes payment of the obligation owed to the court to the extent of the amount of the check as of the date of acceptance when, but not before, the check is duly paid.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 5.

Case Notes

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court had the right to order installment payments, nothing in this section authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-706. Credit or debit card payments.

  1. The court or the agency designated under § 16-13-709 or § 16-92-118 may accept payment of fines and associated costs by an approved credit card or debit card.
    1. The court or designated agency may enter into contracts with credit card companies and pay those companies fees normally charged by those companies for allowing the court to accept their credit cards in payment as authorized by subsection (a) of this section.
    2. When the offender pays fines or court costs by an approved credit card or debit card, the court may assess the offender a transaction fee.
    1. All courts are authorized to enroll for service with and accept payments from a third-party entity for the acceptance and collection of fines and associated costs with an approved credit card for which the third-party entity may charge the offender a transaction fee.
    2. The State of Arkansas or any of its political subdivisions shall not charge a transaction fee for electronic payments of a court-ordered fine paid through a third-party entity.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 6; 2003, No. 1765, § 11; 2009, No. 328, § 3; 2009, No. 782, § 2; 2011, No. 1218, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 328 inserted “card or debit” in (a) and (b)(2); inserted “or § 16-92-188” in (a); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendment by No. 782 rewrote (b)(2); and added (c).

The 2011 amendment substituted “transaction fee” for “service or convenience fee” in (b)(2); substituted “transaction fee” for “service or convenience fee if the credit card company will allow the charge” in (c)(1); and substituted “a transaction fee” for “an access fee” in (c)(2).

Case Notes

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court had the right to order installment payments, nothing in this section authorizes a district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-707. Lien on property.

  1. When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine defaults in the payment thereof or of any installment, the fine may be collected by any means authorized for the enforcement of money judgments in civil actions.
  2. A judgment that the defendant pay a fine shall constitute a lien on the real and personal property of the defendant in the same manner and to the same extent as a money judgment in a civil action.
  3. A judgment entered by a district court shall not become a lien against real property unless a certified copy of the judgment, showing the name of the judgment debtor and the date and amount thereof, shall be filed in the office of the circuit clerk of the county in which the land is situated.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 7; 2001, No. 1809, § 14; 2003, No. 1765, § 12.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Case Notes

Right to Appeal.

City could not rely on the application of this section to claim that defendants' appeal had to be dismissed for the failure of defendants to pay an appeal bond because, even though the court could collect the fine by any means authorized for the enforcement of money judgments in civil actions for the failure to pay a fine, nothing in this section authorizes the district court to demand payment of the fine as a prerequisite for taking an appeal to circuit court. Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 222 S.W.3d 182 (2006).

16-13-708. Revocation of registration or license.

  1. The court may certify in writing to the Department of Finance and Administration that a debtor has failed to make satisfactory arrangements for the payment of fines and request the department to revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew the debtor's motor vehicle registration or driver's license.
  2. For driver's license revocation, the court must provide the department with the debtor's full name, social security number, and last known address.
  3. For motor vehicle registration revocation, the court must provide the department with the debtor's full name and the license plate number or vehicle identification number of the debtor's vehicle.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 8.

16-13-709. Responsibility for collection.

        1. The quorum court of each county of the state shall designate a county official, agency, or department which shall be primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the circuit courts of this state.
        2. All fines collected each month in circuit court by the designated county official, agency, or department shall be disbursed by the fifth working day of the following month to the State Administration of Justice Fund, the county administration of justice fund, and the appropriate county fund, state entity, or state agency as provided by law.
        3. The sheriff shall remain responsible for collecting bail or money deposited in lieu of bail on behalf of defendants discharged from incarceration pursuant to law in circuit court.
        1. The quorum court may delegate the responsibility for the collection of delinquent fines assessed in circuit court to a private contractor.
        2. The contractor may receive, under a written contract, a commission on delinquent fines collected for circuit court.
        1. The commission agreed to be received by the private contractor shall be a portion of the total fine owed by a defendant.
        2. The court shall credit the defendant with the gross amount remitted to the private contractor.
        3. The private contractor shall remit the gross amounts collected to the county official, agency, or department designated under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section on at least a monthly basis.
        4. Payment of the commission shall be through the county claims process.
        5. The county treasurer shall make a pro rata disbursement of the remaining fines to the State Administration of Justice Fund, the county administration of justice fund, and the appropriate county fund, state entity, or state agency as provided by law.
        1. The governing body or, if applicable, each governing body of a political subdivision which contributes to the expenses of a district court shall designate a county, town, or city official, agency, or department who shall be primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the district courts of this state.
        2. All fines collected each month in district court or a department of district court by the designated county, town, or city official, agency, or department shall be disbursed by the tenth working day of the following month pursuant to § 16-17-707.
      1. The chief of police of the town or city in which a district court is located shall remain responsible for collecting bail or money deposited in lieu of bail on behalf of defendants discharged from incarceration pursuant to law in district court.
        1. The governing body or, if applicable, each governing body of a political subdivision which contributes to the expenses of a district court may delegate the responsibility for the collection of delinquent fines assessed in district court to a private contractor.
        2. The contractor may receive under a written contract a commission on delinquent fines collected for district court.
        3. The commission agreed to be received by the private contractor shall be a portion of the total fine owed by a defendant.
        4. The court shall credit the defendant with the gross amount remitted to the private contractor.
        5. The private contractor shall remit the gross amount collected to the county, town, or city official, agency, or department designated under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section on a monthly basis.
        6. The commission expense shall be apportioned among each governing body of a political subdivision which contributes to the expenses of a district court in proportion to the gross amount of fines collected for that political subdivision.
        7. Payment of the commission shall be according to accounting procedures prescribed by law.
        8. The remainder of fines received shall be disbursed pro rata under this section and §§ 16-10-209, 16-10-308, and 16-17-707.
    1. “Delinquent” means any fines assessed in the circuit courts or district courts of this state which have not been paid as ordered for a period of ninety (90) days or three (3) payments, either consecutive or concurrent, since payment was ordered or since last partial payment was received.
    2. A copy of the ordinance making the designation shall be provided to the Administrative Office of the Courts.
    1. If a private contractor is selected to collect delinquent fines, then to ensure the integrity of the court and to protect the county, town, or city, the contractor shall register with the Secretary of State and shall file with the Secretary of State a surety bond or certificate of deposit.
    2. The amount of the surety bond or certificate of deposit shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    3. The county, town, city, or any person suffering damage by reason of the acts or omissions of the contractor may bring action on the bond for damages.
    4. A contractor shall be ineligible to provide such services if the owner, operator, partner, or employee has been convicted of a felony.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 9; 1997, No. 941, § 2; 1999, No. 1081, § 10; 2001, No. 1809, § 15; 2003, No. 1185, § 95; 2003, No. 1765, § 13; 2005, No. 1934, § 8; 2007, No. 663, § 33.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended in 2001, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provided:

“on or before January 1, 2002.”

As amended in 2001, subdivision (a)(2)(A) provided:

“on or before January 1, 2002.”

Pursuant to § 1-2-207, this section is set out as amended by Acts 2003, No. 1765, § 13. This section was also amended by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 96, effective Jan. 1, 2005, amended (a)(2) to read as follows:

“(2)(A) The quorum court of each county of the state or the governing body of the city in which the court is located, or both, on or before January 1 of each year, shall designate a county or city official, agency, department, or private contractor who shall be primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the district courts or city courts of this state.

“(B)(i) In the event the quorum court or the governing body of the city in which the court is located, or both, delegates such responsibility to a private contractor, such contractor may receive, pursuant to state accounting laws, a portion agreed upon in advance by the quorum court or the governing body of the city in which the court is located, or both, as commission for the collection of any and all delinquent fines assessed in the district courts or city courts of this state.

“(C) ‘Delinquent’ means any fines assessed in the circuit courts, district courts or city courts of this state which have not been paid as ordered for a period of ninety (90) days or three (3) payments, either consecutive or concurrent, since payment was ordered or since last partial payment was received.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C) and made related changes; redesignated former (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C)(i)-(vii) as present (a)(2)(D) and (a)(2)(B)(iii)-(ix); rewrote present (a)(1)(C)(v); deleted references to “police court” throughout this section, substituted “pro rata under this section and” for “under” in (a)(2)(D)(ix); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2007 amendment inserted “town” preceding “or city” throughout the section; rewrote (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(C)(v); in (a)(2)(A)(i), deleted “or the governing body of the city in which a city court is located” following “district court” and “city courts, or police courts” preceding “of this state”; deleted former (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C)(viii) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; deleted “or city court” twice in (a)(2)(B) and once in (a)(2)(C)(i); deleted “or the governing body of the city in which a city court is located” following “district court” in (a)(2)(C)(i); added “of this section” in (a)(2)(C)(v); substituted “§§ 16-10-209, 16-10-308, and 16-17-707” for “§§ 14-44-108, 14-45-106, 16-10-209, 16-10-308, 16-17-707 and 16-18-104” in present (a)(2)(C)(viii); deleted “or city courts” following “district courts” in (a)(3); and made related changes.

The 2009 amendment, in (a)(2), inserted “or the sheriff” in (a)(2)(C), inserted “and by mutual agreement” in (a)(2)(D)(i), deleted “and 16-18-104” following “16-17-707” in (a)(2)(D)(ix), and made related and minor stylistic changes.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-13-710. Automated collection procedures.

The Administrative Office of the Courts shall have the responsibility to assist circuit courts and district courts in the assessment and collection of fines and the management and reporting of fine revenue.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 11; 2001, No. 1809, § 16; 2003, No. 1185, § 97; 2003, No. 1765, § 14; 2007, No. 663, § 34.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment deleted “and city courts” following “district courts” and made a related change.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 97: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-13-711. Form of orders.

When an order assessing a fine or penalty is entered, information on the order shall include, but is not limited to, the defendant's name, current address, social security number, driver's license number, name and address of employment, amount of fine, and the agreed upon payment terms and conditions.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 10.

16-13-712. Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund.

  1. There is hereby created on the books of the Treasurer of State the “Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund”, into which the time-payment fees established by § 16-13-704 shall be deposited.
    1. From the revenues deposited into the fund, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall purchase computer hardware to make available to entities designated in § 16-13-709 and responsible for fine collection in each county in order to assist with the assessment, collection, and reporting of fines.
    2. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall also purchase or develop computer software to provide for the uniform assessment, collection, management, and reporting of fines.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1262, § 11.

Subchapter 8 — [Reserved.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 1, provided:

“First Judicial Circuit.

“(a) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by L.T. Simes, II shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by Harvey Yates shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Bentley Story shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(d) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Kathleen Bell shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as the Juvenile Division and presently held by Baird Kinney shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1911, No. 138, § 10: Aug. 1, 1911.

Acts 1921, No. 3, § 5: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Jan. 20, 1921.

Acts 1955, No. 74, § 3: July 1, 1955.

Acts 1967, No. 12, § 4: Jan. 26, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly of the State of Arkansas hereby finds and determines that the matters affected by this Act have a direct relation to the smooth, efficient and timely administration of justice in the counties affected, and that in order for the judges of the courts so affected to properly schedule their case loads for the terms of Court established by this Act, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 56, §§ 3, 4: July 1, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “There is a possibility that the 66th General Assembly will be extended, in which event considerable confusion could evolve concerning the effective date of legislation which does not contain an emergency clause. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall be in effect from and after the date of passage.” Approved Feb. 9, 1967.

Acts 1979, No. 556, § 8: Mar. 23, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that since the redistricting of the circuit and chancery courts in the State, the dates set for the beginning of terms of the circuit courts of the various counties comprising the First Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit are not appropriate and the beginning term dates in some of the counties in such circuit are in conflict with the beginning term dates of other counties in such circuit; that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the First Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit that dates be prescribed by law for the commencement of the terms of the circuit courts in all counties comprising the First Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit; that this Act is designed to establish such dates and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-901. Composition.

The First Judicial Circuit shall be composed of the counties of Cross, Lee, Monroe, Phillips, St. Francis, and Woodruff.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-902. Terms of court.

    1. The terms of court of the Circuit Court of Cross County in the First Judicial District shall commence on the fourth Monday in January.
    2. The term of court shall be for one (1) year.
    3. Grand and petit juries will serve for a period in accordance with Arkansas law.
    1. The terms of court of the Circuit Court of Woodruff County in the First Judicial District shall commence on the second Monday in January.
    2. The term of court shall be for one (1) year.
    3. Grand and petit juries will serve for a period in accordance with Arkansas law.
    1. The terms of court of the Circuit Court of Monroe County in the First Judicial District shall commence on the third Monday in January.
    2. The term of court shall be for one (1) year.
    3. Grand and petit juries will serve for a period in accordance with Arkansas law.
  1. The terms of court of the Circuit Court of St. Francis County in the First Judicial District shall commence on the first Monday in January.
    1. The terms of court of the Circuit Court of Lee County in the First Judicial District shall commence on the first Monday in February.
    2. The term of court shall be for one (1) year.
    3. Grand and petit juries will serve for a period in accordance with Arkansas law.
    1. The terms of court of the Circuit Court of Phillips County in the First Judicial District shall commence on the second Monday in February.
    2. The term of court shall be for one (1) year.
    3. Grand and petit juries will serve for a period in accordance with Arkansas law.
  2. The terms of court in this section may be amended or modified by agreement of all circuit judges in the First Judicial District.

History. Acts 1891, No. 62, § 2, p. 110; 1893, No. 56, § 4, p. 84; 1911, No. 138, § 8; 1921, No. 3, § 3; 1943, No. 85, § 1; 1953, No. 318, § 1; 1955, No. 74, § 1; 1965, No. 505, § 8; 1967, No. 12, § 1; 1967, No. 56, § 1; 1979, No. 556, §§ 1-6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-310, 22-310n; Acts 2009, No. 489, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (a) through (f), and added (g).

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-903. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the First Judicial District shall elect:
    1. Two (2) circuit judges;
    2. Two (2) chancellors; and
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
    1. Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-904. Additional judgeship. [Referred to Arkansas Judicial Council for approval.]

  1. There is created in the First Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
  2. As soon as possible after July 30, 1999, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the First Judicial District circuit judgeship created by subsection (a) of this section, and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 2000, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.
    1. The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge created by this section at the November 2000 general election to take office on January 1, 2001.
    2. The additional judge shall be elected from the district and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
    3. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.
  3. The counties which compose the First Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by this section, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.
  4. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.
  5. The Attorney General shall, if it is determined to be necessary, present the provisions of this section to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas pursuant to the decision in Eugene Hunt, et al. v. State of Arkansas et al., No. PB-C-89-406.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1522, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. “Eugene Hunt, et al. v. State of Arkansas et al., No. PB-C-89-406”, referenced in (f), is an unpublished opinion.

16-13-905. Approval by Arkansas Judicial Council. [Referred to Arkansas Judicial Council for approval.]

  1. The provisions of § 16-13-904 and this section shall be effective only if approved by the Arkansas Judicial Council which said approval shall be in writing to the chairs of the Senate and House Committees on Judiciary.
  2. The council is hereby directed to review the provisions of § 16-13-904 and this section together with all other acts passed and approved by the Eighty-second General Assembly regarding the division of, or the adding of judgeships to, the First Judicial District, and approve the plan which the council determines to be the best solution to the problems facing the First Judicial District.
  3. If it is determined by the council that none of the acts passed regarding the First Judicial District is meritorious, then none of the acts should be approved by the council and none of the acts shall take effect even after passage and approval by the Eighty-second General Assembly.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1522, § 2.

Subchapter 10 — Second Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-13-1001 to 16-13-1004 may not apply to § 16-13-1005, § 16-13-1006, or § 16-13-1007, which were enacted subsequently.

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 2, provided:

“Second Judicial Circuit.

  1. The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Howard Templeton shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Graham Partlow shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by David Burnett shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(d) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 4 and presently held by Rice Van Ausdall shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 5 and presently held by Ralph Wilson, Jr. shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.

“(f) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 6 and presently held by Victor Hill shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 6.

“(g) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 7 and presently held by David Goodson shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 7.

“(h) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancer Division 8 and presently held by John Fogleman shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 8.

“(i) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 9 and presently held by David Laser shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 9.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided: “The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided: “Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1911, No. 138, § 10: Aug. 1, 1911.

Acts 1927, No. 219, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1967, No. 12, § 4: Jan. 26, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly of the State of Arkansas hereby finds and determines that the matters affected by this Act have a direct relation to the smooth, efficient and timely administration of justice in the counties affected, and that in order for the judges of the courts so affected to properly schedule their case loads for the terms of Court established by this Act, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 224, § 7 and 1981, No. 982, § 7: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1981. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload in the counties and districts of the Second Judicial Circuit has greatly increased in recent years; that there exists a disparity in the number of cases pending among the counties of the circuit; that the present statutory terms of circuit court are no longer adequate to effectively handle the caseload existing in the various counties and districts within the circuit; and that the circuit judges of the circuit should be given more discretion in scheduling court among the counties where the caseload is heaviest and thereby alleviate case backlog and provide a more efficient administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect retroactive to January 1, 1981.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 94, § 7: Feb. 11, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the case load in the Second Judicial District requires the appointment of a case-coordinator for the District and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary for the proper administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 471, § 5: Feb. 27, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the separation of the courts of law and equity combined with the amount of travel required of judges in the Second Judicial District creates an inefficient system of justice which can be greatly improved and streamlined by converting the circuit judges of the Second Judicial District into circuit-chancery judges with jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 311, § 5: Feb. 28, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the orderly, effective and efficient administration of justice is fostered by combining circuit and chancery jurisdiction since there generally exists a disparity in the number of cases pending before the circuit and chancery judges of the Second Judicial District, and the ability to freely schedule and exchange cases among the judges will alleviate backlogs. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1997, No. 403, § 7: Mar. 10, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty- First General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload of the Second Judicial District necessitates the appointment of an additional circuit-chancery judge immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 1186, § 2: Mar. 29, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-third General Assembly that the caseload of the Second Judicial District necessitates the appointment of an additional circuit judge. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 168, § 7: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of the various judicial districts; that the caseloads of the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District necessitate the appointment of an additional circuit judges; and that this act is necessary to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice in the counties affected. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 9: July 1, 2019, except § 2. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that certain judicial districts under this act have an immediate need for additional circuit court judges due to the number of cases pending in the judicial district. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and all Sections except Section 2 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-13-1001. Composition.

The Second Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Clay, Craighead, Crittenden, Greene, Mississippi, and Poinsett.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1002. Terms of court — Adjournment — Recess.

    1. The terms of the circuit courts of the counties and districts of the Second Judicial District shall commence at the times and places provided for below and shall run for a period of one (1) year:
        1. In the Eastern District of Clay County: On the first Monday in January;
        2. In the Western District of Clay County: On the third Monday in January;
        1. In the Western District of Craighead County: On the first Monday in January;
        2. In the Eastern District of Craighead County: On the third Monday in February;
        1. In the Chickasawba District of Mississippi County: On the first Monday in January;
        2. In the Osceola District of Mississippi County: On the fourth Monday in February;
      1. In Crittenden County: On the fourth Monday in January;
      2. In Greene County: On the second Monday in February; and
      3. In Poinsett County: On the fourth Monday in March.
    2. In the event any of the dates provided in this subsection should fall upon a legal holiday, the term shall commence on the next succeeding day.
  1. The circuit courts of the Second Judicial District shall always be open for the transaction of business on all matters over which they have jurisdiction, except on those days now excluded by law, if any.
  2. There shall be no final adjournments, but the circuit courts of the counties and districts of the district may adjourn from day to day as business within the district demands. Those adjournments shall be considered recesses and shall not prohibit the circuit courts from sitting at any time.

History. Acts 1891, No. 62, § 2, p. 110; 1891, No. 89, § 1, p. 158; 1911, No. 138, § 8, p. 110; 1927, No. 219, §§ 1, 2; 1949, No. 18, § 1; 1965, No. 505, § 8; 1967, No. 12, § 1; 1981, No. 224, §§ 1, 2; 1981, No. 982, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-310, 22-310n.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-1003. Judges and chancellors.

    1. The qualified electors of the Second Judicial District shall elect:
      1. Three (3) circuit judges;
      2. Three (3) chancellors;
      3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge; and
      4. One (1) circuit-chancery judgeship.
      1. There is created in the Second Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.
        1. The additional judge shall be elected from the district and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
        2. The judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
      2. The counties which compose the Second Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.
      3. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.
    1. The judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1)(C) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(1)(C) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
    3. The circuit-chancery judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1)(D) of this section shall primarily perform the duties of a judge of the juvenile division of chancery court and conduct hearings for the involuntary admission or commitment of persons to the Arkansas State Hospital or any other public or private hospital with a fully trained psychiatrist on the active or consultant staff and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, and probate courts as time permits.
  1. Effective February 27, 1995, the subdistrict 2.2, division 2, and division 3 circuit judgeships shall become circuit-chancery judgeships which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
  2. All circuit judges and all chancery judges of the Second Judicial District which have not already been converted to circuit-chancery judges on February 28, 1997, shall be converted to circuit-chancery judges at the expiration of their present term of office, and, upon election, their successors shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
    1. Effective July 1, 2007, there is created in the Second Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.
    2. The Governor shall appoint a qualified person who is a resident of the district to temporarily fill the Second Judicial District circuit judgeship created by subdivision (e)(1) of this section, and the appointed person shall serve until January 1, 2009, or until a successor has been elected and qualified.
      1. The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge created by subdivision (e)(1) of this section at the 2008 preferential primary election to take office on January 1, 2009.
      2. The additional circuit judge shall be elected from the district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
      3. The circuit judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
    3. The counties that compose the Second Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (e)(1) of this section, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties and out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for these purposes.
    4. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (e)(1) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.
  3. There is created in the Second Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1; 1995, No. 471, § 1; 1997, No. 311, § 1; 2001, No. 1186, § 1; 2007, No. 168, § 2; 2019, No. 1003, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1, provided, in part, that:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1, also provided, in part, that:

“As soon as possible after the effective date of this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Second and Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judgeships created by this act, and such persons shall serve until December 31, 1990, or until their successors have been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 2, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes. Provided, however, that the additional judgeship for the Sixth Judicial District who is to conduct commitment hearings shall be provided courtroom and office facilities and supplies by the Arkansas State Hospital located in Pulaski County.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which additional circuit-chancery judgeships are created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided court reporters whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

The judgeships referred to in subsection (c) are presumably the circuit judgeships created in subdivision (a)(1).

As originally amended in 2001, subdivision (a)(2)(A) began: “Effective July 1, 2001.”

As originally amended in 2001, subdivision (a)(2) contained two additional sentences which read:

“The Governor shall appoint a qualified person who is a resident of the district to temporarily fill the Second Judicial District circuit judgeship created by this subsection (e), and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 2002, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last. The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge created by this subsection (e), at the November 2002 general election to take office on January 1, 2003.”

Acts 2007, No. 168, § 1, provided: “The Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of various judicial districts and has determined that to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice additional circuit judgeships are needed in the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District. This act authorizes the establishment of five (5) additional circuit judgeships, articulates the applicable appointment and election process of the additional circuit judges, and identifies various resources that will be available.”

In Acts 2007, No. 168, § 2, the term “2008 Nonpartisan Judicial General Election” should have been used in place of “2008 preferential primary election” Circuit judges are now elected on a nonpartisan basis pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 17.

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 6, provided: “For the circuit judgeships created in the Second, Fourth, and Nineteenth-West Judicial Circuits the vacancies shall be filled by election at the 2020 preferential primary election, with the elected circuit judge to take office on January 1, 2021”.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added (e).

The 2019 amendment added (f).

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980); Barnett v. State, 328 Ark. 246, 942 S.W.2d 860 (1997).

16-13-1004. Case coordinator.

    1. The judges of the chancery and probate courts for the Second Judicial District may appoint one (1) case coordinator for said judicial district for chancery and probate matters.
    2. The judges of the circuit court for the Second Judicial District may appoint one (1) case coordinator for said judicial district for circuit matters.
  1. The principal duties of the case coordinators shall be to maintain the court calendar, schedule dates for the trial of cases and for the hearing of motions, and other related and incidental duties at the direction of the judges.
    1. Each case coordinator provided for in this section shall receive a salary of not less than twenty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($21,500) nor more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per calendar year, which salary shall be prorated between the counties composing the Second Judicial District, based on the number of annual case filings in each of such counties.
    2. When the county quorum courts raise the salaries of county employees, they shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the case coordinators provided for in this section.
  2. The reasonable expenses accruing in the offices of the case coordinators shall be prorated among the counties comprising the district in the same manner as the salaries set forth above and be paid out of the county treasury.

History. Acts 1991, No. 94, §§ 1-3; 1993, No. 188, § 1.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-1005. Additional judgeship.

  1. Effective immediately upon passage and approval of this act, there is hereby created in the Second Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
  2. As soon as possible after March 10, 1997, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Second Judicial District circuit-chancery judgeship created herein, and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 1998, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.
  3. The qualified electors of the Second Judicial District shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created herein at the November 1998 general election to take office on January 1, 1999. The additional judge shall be elected at large and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.
  4. With the consideration of the creation of this judgeship, the General Assembly is aware of the requirements of the federal Voting Rights Act and the consent decree entered in Eugene Hunt, et al. vs. State of Arkansas, et al. After thorough review of the caseload statistics from the Second Judicial Circuit, the distribution of these cases between the various counties within the judicial circuit, the demographic makeup of the general voting age population and the licensed attorneys within the district, the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the requirements of the federal law, and based upon the recommendation of the Arkansas Judicial Council, the judgeship is to be elected in the manner and as specified in subsection (c) of this section.

History. Acts 1997, No. 403, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-13-100116-13-1004 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

Publisher's Notes. The case of Hunt v. Arkansas, No. PB-C-406 (Nov. 7, 1991), referred to in this section, is an unpublished opinion. Two cases which discuss the consent decree are Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995) and Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 919 S.W.2d 943 (1996).

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1997, No. 403, codified as §§ 16-13-100516-13-1007.

U.S. Code. The Voting Rights Act, referred to in this section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 403, was signed by the Governor on March 10, 1997, and became effective pursuant to its emergency clause on March 10, 1997.

16-13-1006. Additional judge — Facilities.

The counties which comprise the Second Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by § 16-13-1005 which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.

History. Acts 1997, No. 403, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-13-100116-13-1004 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

16-13-1007. Additional judge — Staff.

There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this subchapter a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.

History. Acts 1997, No. 403, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-13-100116-13-1004 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

Subchapter 11 — Third Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 3, provided:

“Third Judicial Circuit.

“(a) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is presently held by Harold Erwin shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The chancery judgeship which is presently held by Tom L. Hilburn shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Publisher's Notes. As amended in 2001, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provided:

“Effective immediately, there is created in the Third Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 39, § 22: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1895, No. 36, § 3: effective 60 days after passage.

Acts 2001, No. 114, § 2: Feb. 7, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-third General Assembly that the caseload of the Third Judicial District necessitates the appointment of an additional judge immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-13-1101. Composition.

The Third Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Jackson, Lawrence, Randolph, and Sharp.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1102. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Third Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Jackson County: On the second Monday after the fourth Monday in August and the second Monday after the third Monday in January;
    1. In the Western District of Lawrence County: On the fourth Monday in August and the third Monday in January;
    2. In the Eastern District of Lawrence County: On the sixth Monday after the fourth Monday in August and the seventh Monday after the third Monday in January;
  2. Randolph County: On the third Mondays in January and July;
  3. Sharp County: On the first Monday in January and the second Monday in July.

History. Acts 1891, No. 62, § 3, p. 110; 1893, No. 39, § 4, p. 56; 1895, No. 36, §§ 1, 2, p. 40; 1903, No. 99, § 1, p. 167; 1933, No. 110, § 1; 1971, No. 459, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-1103. Judges and chancellors.

    1. The qualified electors of the Third Judicial District shall elect one (1) circuit judge and one (1) chancellor.
    2. Effective July 1, 1999, the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall become a circuit-chancery judgeship and shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
    1. There is hereby created in the Third Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
      1. The additional judge shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts.
      2. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
      1. There is created in the Third Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
      2. Pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, the additional judgeship shall become a circuit judgeship on July 1, 2001.
      3. The judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
    1. The counties which compose the Third Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the judgeship created by this subsection, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.
    2. There shall be provided for the judge of the judgeship created by this subsection a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1995, No. 582, § 2; 1999, No. 1355, § 1; 2001, No. 114, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

As amended by Acts 1999, No. 1355, subdivision (b)(1) began:

“Effective January 1, 2001.”

As amended by Acts 1999, No. 1355, subdivision (b)(2) began with a sentence which read:

“The qualified electors of the Third Judicial District shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created in subsection (c)(1) of this section at the November 2000 general election to take office on January 1, 2001.”

The 2001 amendment added subsection (c) and as originally enacted, began “Effective immediately.”

Acts 2001 No. 114 § 1, provided:

“(2) The Governor shall appoint a qualified person who is a resident of the district to temporarily fill the Third Judicial District judgeship created by this subsection (c), and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 2002, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.

“(3)(A) The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge, created by this subsection (c), at the November 2002 general election to take office on January 1, 2003.

“(3)(B) The additional judge shall be elected from the district and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1999, No. 1355, § 2, provided:

“Notwithstanding the passage and approval of this act by the Eighty-Second General Assembly, its provisions shall be effective only when and if approved by the Judicial Resources Assessment Committee which said approval shall be in writing to the chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

Subchapter 12 — Fourth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 4, provided:

“Fourth Judicial Circuit.

“(a) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by William Storey shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by Kim Smith shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Mike Mashburn shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.

“(d) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Mark Lindsay shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 6.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Stacey Zimmerman shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(f) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 4 and presently held by Mary Ann Gunn shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided: “The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided: “Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1887, No. 38, § 10: effective on passage.

Acts 1989, No. 272, § 7: Mar. 1, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that due to increased workload in the Fourth Judicial District and the financial pressures of inflation that the compensation now provided for the secretary-court reporter-case coordinators of the Fourth Judicial District is inadequate to compensate such secretary-court reporter-case coordinators for the additional workload and responsibilities, and that this act is immediately necessary to provide adequate compensation for such secretary-court reporter-case coordinators. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 975, § 5: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that due to an increased workload in the Fourth Judicial District and the financial pressures of inflation that the compensation now provided for the secretary-court reporter-case coordinators of the Fourth Judicial District is inadequate. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect immediately from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 570, § 5: Mar. 18, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that due to an increased workload in the Fourth Judicial District and the financial pressures of inflation that the compensation now provided for the secretary-court reporter-case coordinators of the Fourth Judicial District is inadequate. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect immediately from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 636, § 5: became law without Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 14, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “ It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that due to an increased workload in the Fourth Judicial District and the financial pressures of inflation that the compensation now provided for the secretary-court reporter-case coordinators of the Fourth Judicial District is inadequate. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-1201. Composition.

The Fourth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Madison and Washington.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1202. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Fourth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Washington County: On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1; and
  2. Madison County: On the first Mondays in March and September.

History. Acts 1887, No. 38, §§ 3, 6, p. 47; 1887, No. 62, § 2, p. 88; 1967, No. 304, §§ 1-3; 1973, No. 814, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-1203. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Fourth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. Two (2) circuit judges;
    2. Two (2) chancellors; and
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
    1. Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
  2. There is created in the Fourth Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1; 2019, No. 1003, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 6, provided: “For the circuit judgeships created in the Second, Fourth, and Nineteenth-West Judicial Circuits the vacancies shall be filled by election at the 2020 preferential primary election, with the elected circuit judge to take office on January 1, 2021”.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (c).

Case Notes

Construction.

This section and § 16-13-403 [repealed] are not conflicting. Rowlins v. State, 319 Ark. 323, 891 S.W.2d 56 (1995).

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1204. Secretary-court reporter-case coordinator.

  1. The chancellors, circuit judges, and circuit-chancery judges of the Fourth Judicial District may each employ one (1) secretary-court reporter-case coordinator to perform such duties as may be assigned by the respective judges.
  2. The secretaries authorized by this section shall be appointed by the respective judges, shall be sworn officers of the court, and each shall hold office at the discretion of and during the term of the judge who appointed him or her, except that he or she may be dismissed for incompetency, neglect of duty, or misbehavior.

History. Acts 1989, No. 272, §§ 1-3; 1991, No. 975, § 1; 1993, No. 570, § 1; 1995, No. 636, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was amended by Acts 1991, Nos. 972 and 975; however, the amendments were irreconcilable. Acts 1993, No. 570, § 4 repealed the version of this section as amended by Acts 1991, No. 972.

Acts 1995, No. 636, § 1, also enacted subsections (c)-(e), which provided:

“(c) The secretaries authorized by this section shall each be paid a salary for calendar year 1995 of twenty-three thousand four hundred ninety-five dollars ($23,495) and an annual salary each year thereafter of twenty-four thousand four hundred fifty-eight dollars ($24,458), payable by the counties comprising the Fourth Judicial District. The salaries shall be apportioned between the two (2) counties on the basis of the assessed value of property in the counties, which is determined to be ninety-three and one-half percent (93.5%) for Washington County and six and one-half percent (6.5%) for Madison County, and in the following amounts:

1995 1996 Washington County $21,967.00 $22,868.00 Madison County $ 1,528.00 $ 1,590.00 TOTAL $23,495.00 $24,458.00

Click to view table.

“(d) The salaries shall be payable in twenty-six (26) equal installments by the paying offices of the respective counties.

“(e) The provisions of this section and the salaries prescribed herein shall be retroactive to January 1, 1995.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 570, § 1 provided, in part, that:

“The provisions of this section and the salaries prescribed herein shall be retroactive to January 1, 1993.”

Acts 1995, No. 636 became law without the Governor's signature.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-1205. Additional judgeship.

  1. Effective January 1, 1999, there is hereby created in the Fourth Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
  2. The qualified electors of the Fourth Judicial District shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created in subsection (a) of this section at the November 1998 general election to take office on January 1, 1999. The additional judge shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.

History. Acts 1997, No. 319, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 16-13-1205 should be merged with § 16-13-1203 for consistency and in conformity with Code style. Pursuant to § 1-2-303, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission is unable to effect the merger.

16-13-1206. Additional judge — Facilities.

The counties which comprise the Fourth Judicial District shall provide the courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by § 16-13-1205(a), which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.

History. Acts 1997, No. 319, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 16-13-1206 should be merged with § 16-13-1203 for consistency and in conformity with Code style. Pursuant to § 1-2-303, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission is unable to effect the merger.

In this section “comprise” should be replaced by “compose,” but pursuant to § 1-2-303, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission is unable to effect the change.

16-13-1207. Additional judge — Staff.

There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by § 16-13-1205(a) a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.

History. Acts 1997, No. 319, § 3

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 16-13-1207 should be merged with § 16-13-1203 for consistency and in conformity with Code style. Pursuant to § 1-2-303, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission is unable to effect the merger.

16-13-1208. Additional judgeship.

  1. There is created in the Fourth Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship.
  2. The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge created by subsection (a) of this section at the 2010 general election for nonpartisan judicial offices held on the same dates and at the same times and places as the preferential primary election to take office on January 1, 2011.
    1. The additional circuit judge shall be elected from the district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
    2. The circuit judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
  3. The counties that compose the Fourth Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subsection (a) of this section which shall be paid out of the county treasury in the same manner as other demands against the county and out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county for these purposes.
  4. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subsection (a) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.

History. Acts 2009, No. 293, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2009, No. 293, § 1, provided: “The Judicial Resources Assessment Committee of the Arkansas Judicial Council has reviewed the caseloads of various judicial districts and has determined that to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice an additional circuit judgeship is needed in the Fourth Judicial District. This act authorizes the establishment of one (1) additional circuit judgeship, articulates the election process of the additional circuit judge, and identifies various resources that will be available.”

Subchapter 13 — Fifth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 5, provided:

“Fifth Judicial Circuit.

“(a) The circuit judgeship which is presently held by John S. Patterson shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The chancery judgeship which is presently held by Richard Gardner shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is presently held by Ken Coker, Jr. shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(d) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is presently held by Dennis Sutterfield shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1889, No. 31, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1947, No. 120, § 4: approved Feb. 26, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that an established time for holding circuit court being necessary for the functioning of our government, an emergency is hereby declared to exist. This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the State of Arkansas, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1955, No. 146, § 3: July 1, 1955.

Acts 1965, No. 96, § 8: Feb. 23, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of Arkansas that due to the large number of cases pending before the courts of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, there is an unusual and undesirable delay in the adjudication of the rights of parties involved in litigation in said courts; that this Act is immediately necessary to relieve said undesirable situation by providing for an additional Division of court and an additional judge to expedite the clearing of the dockets in said courts and thereby to expedite the administration in said Judicial Circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 317, § 4: Mar. 7, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that, due to court redistricting effective January 1, 1979, there is confusion as to which law sets terms of court and court personnel salaries and that this Act is immediately necessary to replace the obsolete law. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 1246, § 5: became law without Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 12, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the case load of the Fifth Judicial District is increasing significantly; that it is extremely important to retain qualified and experienced court personnel to assure the efficient and swift disposition of the work of the court; that the present salary of the personnel affected by this act is inadequate; that this act will adjust the salary to a more reasonable level; and that this act should be given effect immediately in order to eliminate the inequities as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-1301. Composition.

The Fifth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Franklin, Johnson, and Pope.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1302. Terms of court.

The terms of court for the circuit court of the Fifth Judicial District shall begin on the following days:

    1. Franklin County, Charleston District: On the first Mondays in February and September; and
    2. Franklin County, Ozark District: On the third Mondays in February and September;
  1. Johnson County: On the first Mondays in March and October; and
  2. Pope County: On the first Mondays in April and November.

History. Acts 1889, No. 31, §§ 1, 3, 4, p. 38; 1947, No. 120, §§ 1, 2; 1955, No. 146, § 1; 1965, No. 96, § 5; 1971, No. 198, § 2; 1979, No. 317, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-310, 22-310n.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-1303. Judges and chancellors.

The qualified electors of the Fifth Judicial District shall elect:

  1. One (1) circuit judge;
  2. One (1) chancellor;
    1. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
      1. Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (3)(A) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court.
      2. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (3)(A) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits; and
    1. An additional circuit-chancery and juvenile judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
    2. The additional judge shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts.
    3. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1999, No. 1151, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

As amended by Acts 1999, No. 1151, subdivision (4)(A) began:

“Effective January 1, 2001, there is hereby created in the Fifth Judicial District.”

As amended by Acts 1999, No. 1151, subdivision (4)(B) began with a sentence which read:

“The qualified electors of the Fifth Judicial District shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created in subsection (c)(1) of this section at the November 2000 general election to take office on January 1, 2001.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1304. Case coordinator.

    1. The Judge of the Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial District may appoint one (1) case coordinator for said district for circuit matters.
    2. The Judge of the Chancery and Probate Court for the Fifth Judicial District may appoint one (1) case coordinator for the district for chancery and probate matters.
  1. The principal duties of the case coordinators shall be to maintain the court calendar, schedule dates for the trial of cases and for the hearing of motions, and other related and incidental duties at the direction of the judges.
  2. The case coordinators authorized by this section shall be appointed by the respective judges, shall be sworn officers of the court, and shall hold office at the discretion of and during the term of the judge who appointed them, except that they may be dismissed for incompetency, neglect of duty, or misbehavior.
  3. Each case coordinator shall receive expenses and automobile allowances as authorized for county employees. The same shall be prorated among the counties comprising the district in the same manner as the salary set forth above and be paid out of the county treasury.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1246, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 1246, present subsection (d) of this section was subsection (g) and this section contained subsections (d)-(f) and (h) which provided:

“(d) Each case coordinator authorized by this section shall receive a salary of not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) nor more than twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000) per calendar year payable in the following manner: two-thirds (2/3) from Pope County, one-sixth (1/6) from Johnson County, and one-sixth (1/6) from Franklin County.

“(e) The salaries shall be payable in twenty-six (26) equal installments by the paying offices of the respective counties.

“(f) The beginning salary of each case coordinator shall be determined by the judge of each court with consideration given to the case load of each court.

“(h) When the Pope county quorum court raises the salaries of Pope county employees, the participating counties shall also raise salaries in a proportionate amount for the case coordinators provided for in this section.”

Subchapter 14 — Sixth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 286, § 15, provided:

“All of the employees covered by this act who were on the county payroll on or after July 10, 1987, shall receive a four percent retroactive reimbursement under this act for those days employed on or after July 10, 1987 in a position covered by this act. Also, all of the employees covered by this act who were on the county payroll on or after December 26, 1987, shall receive an additional compound four percent retroactive reimbursement under this act for those days employed on or after December 26, 1987 in a position covered by this act. Also, all of the employees covered by this act who were on the county payroll on or after December 24, 1988, shall receive an additional compound four percent retroactive reimbursement under this act for those days employed on or after December 24, 1988 in a position covered by this act. Further, any person not currently employed by Pulaski County shall be excluded from any retroactive reimbursement. Further, any employee that changed from a job covered by this act to another job covered by this act shall be included in and entitled to the retroactive reimbursement effect of this act, on a daily pro rata basis, for any time employed in a job covered by this act.

“All employees entitled to retroactive reimbursement of salary increases under this section shall be paid in a lump sum payment.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 6, provided:

“Sixth Judicial Circuit.

  1. The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by Marion Humphrey shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by Chris Piazza shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 3 and presently held by John Ward shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(d) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 4 and presently held by John W. Langston shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(e) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 5 and presently held by Willard Proctor, Jr. shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.

“(f) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 6 and presently held by David Bogard shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 6.

“(g) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 7 and presently held by John B. Plegge shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 7.

“(h) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Alice Gray shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 12.

“(i) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Collins Kilgore shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 13.

“(j) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Vann Smith shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 14.

“(k) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 4 and presently held by Robin Mays shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 15.

“(l) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 5 and presently held by Ellen Brantley shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 16.

“(m) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 6 and presently held by Mackie Pierce shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 17.

“(n) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 7 and presently held by Rita Gruber shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 11.

“(o) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 8 and presently held by Wiley Branton shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 8.

“(p) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 9 and presently held by Mary McGowan shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 9.

“(q) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 10 and presently held by Joyce Williams Warren shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 10.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 286, § 11, provided:

“All of the above salary increases shall apply retroactively as provided in Section 15 and shall apply prospectively to all employees covered by this act. Further, the above salary increases shall not operate to prevent salary increases as otherwise provided by this act or any other legislative act or county ordinance.”

Preambles. Acts 1985, No. 336 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the case of Venhaus v. State, et al, Sup. Ct. #84-205; held that the quorum courts of the various counties cannot set the salaries of court employees under Amendment 55 to the Constitution of Arkansas, and the same case held that the judges of the courts of the various judicial districts cannot set the salaries of the courts' employees within a legislatively specified range; and

“Whereas, there is currently no legal authority to pay many employees of the various courts, other than the inherent powers of said courts to impound funds to pay the lawful expenses of the administration of justice; and

“Whereas, the six circuit courts and the four chancery courts of the Sixth Judicial District have one of the highest case loads in the State; and

“Whereas, the judges of the Sixth Judicial Circuit have historically been among the highest in disposal rates in the State of Arkansas, it is hereby found that the several judges are in need of additional staff in order to continue to perform their duties as required by law….”

Acts 1989, No. 286 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, this Act consolidates all separate salary Acts; and

“Whereas, this Act provides authority for the Quorum Court of Pulaski County to treat all county employees in the same manner; and

“Whereas, certain county employees have not received salary increases due to a question concerning the Quorum Court having the legal authority to grant salary increases to these employees; and

“Whereas, it is desirable to bring into equal balance the salaries of Pulaski County employees;

“Now therefore …”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1913, No. 64, § 13: approved Feb. 20, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1923, No. 100, § 3: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Feb. 9, 1923.

Acts 1979, No. 211, § 9: Feb. 23, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Sixth Circuit-Chancery Circuit that this Act be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 248, § 6: Mar. 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the investigation of a defendant's record and standing in the community prior to and subsequent to sentencing would be beneficial and helpful to the court in passing judgment in particular cases and that this Act is necessary to provide such services to the Fourth Division Circuit Court of Pulaski County. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 5: Jan. 1, 1982. Emergency clause provided: “It being determined by the General Assembly that the proper and effective management of the State Judicial System and the administration of justice requires that the provisions of this Act be implemented as soon as possible and this Act is necessary for the proper management of the judicial system of the State, therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after January 1, 1982.”

Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 23, 25: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that adequate lawful funding and staff should be provided for the Sixth Judicial Circuit; and that the lawful funding and staff are currently inadequate; and that this Act is immediately necessary to grant such authority. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 13, 1985.

Acts 1987, No. 344, § 6: effective retroactive to Jan. 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that adequate lawful funding should be provided for the Sixth Judicial District; and that the lawful funding is currently inadequate; and that this Act is immediately necessary to grant such authority. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Became law without Governor's signature. Noted in Governor's office on Mar. 19, 1987.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 7: Nov 7, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload of the Second and Sixth Judicial Districts necessitates the appointment of additional circuit-chancery judges immediately; and that this Act so provides and should therefore be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 601, § 7: Mar. 18, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that the Third Division of the Sixth Judicial District should be provided a bailiff as are the other courts in the Sixth Judicial District to maintain order and provide security for the judge, jury, witnesses and defendants, and that this act is immediately necessary. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 51, § 7: Mar. 17, 1992. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court in the case of Tony A. Lee v. Andre McNeil, Chancellor and Probate Judge et al., #CR 91-153, delivered January 27, 1992, cast substantial doubt on the legality of the exchange of circuits between and among circuit judges and chancellors within the same numbered and geographically defined districts-circuits; and that the inability of respective judges so to exchange circuits will seriously impair the timely and expeditions dispatch of the business of such courts and will entail unnecessary and expensive delay in the termination of cases in such courts. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 283, § 7: Noted: Mar. 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload of the Sixth Judicial District necessitates the appointment of additional circuit-chancery judges immediately; and that this act so provides and should therfore be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-1401. Composition.

The Sixth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Perry and Pulaski.

History. Acts 1977, No. 342, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1402. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Sixth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Pulaski County: On the fourth Monday in September and first Monday in March; and
  2. Perry County: On the first Monday in February and third Monday in July.

History. Acts 1893, No. 56, §§ 1, 8; 1923, No. 100, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-1403. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Sixth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. Six (6) circuit judges;
    2. Four (4) chancellors;
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge; and
    4. Two (2) circuit-chancery judgeships.
    1. In the Sixth Judicial District, there is created one (1) additional circuit judgeship and two (2) additional chancery judgeships.
    2. The circuit judges and chancery judges subject to this subsection may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time. The judges subject to this subsection may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their judicial district.
    1. Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. Further, the chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may designate by agreement not more than two (2) of the chancery judges who shall serve as judges of the juvenile division of chancery court in addition to the circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section.
    3. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
    4. Of the judgeships created by subdivision (a)(4) of this section within the Sixth Judicial District, the chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may designate by agreement one (1) of the Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judges whose primary responsibility shall include conducting hearings for the involuntary admission or commitment of persons to the Arkansas State Hospital or any other public or private hospital with a fully trained psychiatrist on the active or consultant staff and may designate by agreement one (1) of the Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judges whose primary responsibility shall be to perform the duties of a judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. Each of these judges shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate courts as time permits.
    1. There is hereby created in the Sixth Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-365, 22-373; Acts 1987, No. 846, §§ 1, 3; 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1; 1993, No. 283, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1987, No. 846, § 2, provided:

“The additional circuit judges, chancery judges, and circuit-chancery judges provided for in this Act shall be elected at the General Election in 1988, to take office on January 1, 1989, and thereafter as provided by law.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1, provided, in part, that:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1, also provided, in part, that:

“As soon as possible after the effective date of this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Second and Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judgeships created by this Act, and such persons shall serve until December 31, 1990, or until their successors have been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 2, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes. Provided, however, that the additional judgeship for the Sixth Judicial District who is to conduct commitment hearings shall be provided courtroom and office facilities and supplies by the Arkansas State Hospital located in Pulaski County.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which additional circuit-chancery judgeships are created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided court reporters whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 283, § 1, subdivision (d)(1) began: “Effective July 1, 1993…”

Acts 1993, No. 283, § 1, provided, in part:

“(c) The qualified electors of the Sixth Judicial District shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created herein at the November 1994 general election to take office on January 1, 1995. The additional judge shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.

“(d) As soon as possible after the effective date of this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Sixth Judicial District Circuit-Chancery judgeship created herein, and said person shall serve until December 31, 1994, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.”

Acts 1993, No. 283, § 2, provided:

“The counties which comprise the Sixth Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this act, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 229, identical to Acts 1993, No. 283, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1193.

Case Notes

Assignment of Cases.

Exchange of paternity cases among the Sixth District Juvenile and Chancery Courts was intra-district in nature, and expressly authorized by subdivision (b)(2) of this section. Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992).

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1404. Chancery court reporters.

  1. Each chancellor of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint one (1) court reporter to serve his or her court.
  2. Each of the circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges provided for in § 16-13-1403(b) are authorized to employ a court reporter. The court reporters shall receive such compensation as is provided by law.
  3. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by § 16-13-1403(d) a court reporter, whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.

History. Acts 1979, No. 211, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-417.12; Acts 1987, No. 846, § 4; 1993, No. 283, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 229, identical to Acts 1993, No. 283, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1193.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-1405. Chancery court case coordinators.

  1. Each chancellor of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint one (1) case coordinator whose principal duties will be the maintenance of the court calendar, setting dates for trial of cases and for hearing of motions, and other related and incidental duties as directed by the chancellor, including, but not limited to, duties in the clerk's office.
  2. The case coordinator shall receive an annual salary of not less than twelve thousand six hundred dollars ($12,600) nor more than the salary provided by law for the chancery court reporters of the Sixth Judicial District.
  3. For the purposes of any retirement act or system, case coordinators shall be treated in the same manner and to the same effect as chancery court reporters.

History. Acts 1979, No. 211, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-417.16.

16-13-1406. Chancery court assistant case coordinators-computer operators.

  1. The chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint one (1) assistant case coordinator-computer operator.
  2. The duties of the assistant case coordinator-computer operator shall include all the duties in § 16-13-1409(b) in addition to the operation of the computer for the Sixth Judicial District.
  3. The salary of the assistant case coordinator-computer operator shall be eighteen thousand five hundred dollars ($18,500) per calendar year, which salary shall be paid by Pulaski County.
    1. The salary of all case coordinators in the Sixth Judicial District set by this section and by county ordinance shall be amended to provide for an increase of the minimum salaries of four percent (4%) as of July 10, 1987; another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 26, 1987; and another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 24, 1988, unless a higher salary is provided by any other legislative act or county ordinance.
    2. All of the salaries shall be paid by Pulaski County. All of the salaries shall be paid bi-weekly by Pulaski County.
    3. When the county quorum court raises salaries for county employees, it shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the employees provided for in this subsection.
    4. The employees covered by this subsection shall be treated by Pulaski County in the same manner as other Pulaski County employees for all other purposes.

History. Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 20-22; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310n; Acts 1989, No. 286, §§ 6, 12-14.

16-13-1407. Chancery court law clerks.

  1. The chancellors of the Sixth Judicial District, by concurrence of a majority of themselves, may appoint one (1) law clerk who shall be a licensed attorney or graduate of an accredited law school.
  2. The law clerk shall receive the same salary as provided for chancery court reporters in the Sixth Judicial District.

History. Acts 1979, No. 211, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-417.15.

16-13-1408. Location of chancery courts.

The county judges of the counties of the Sixth Judicial District shall provide adequate space in their courthouses for the holding of chancery court.

History. Acts 1979, No. 211, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-417.13.

16-13-1409. Case coordinators.

  1. The judges of each division of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint one (1) case coordinator for each division.
  2. The principal duties of the case coordinator shall be to maintain the court calendar, set dates for the trial of cases and for the hearing of motions, and other related and incidental duties at the direction of the judge.
  3. The case coordinator provided for in this section shall receive a salary of twenty-four thousand dollars ($24,000) per calendar year, which salary shall be paid by Pulaski County.
    1. The salary of all case coordinators in the Sixth Judicial District set by this section and by county ordinance shall be amended to provide for an increase of the minimum salaries of four percent (4%) as of July 10, 1987; another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 26, 1987; and another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 24, 1988, unless a higher salary is provided by any other legislative act or county ordinance.
    2. All of the salaries shall be paid by Pulaski County. All of the salaries shall be paid bi-weekly by Pulaski County.
    3. When the county quorum court raises salaries for county employees, it shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the employees provided for in this subsection.
    4. The employees covered by this subsection shall be treated by Pulaski County in the same manner as other Pulaski County employees for all other purposes.

History. Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 11-13; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310n; Acts 1989, No. 286, §§ 6, 12-14.

Case Notes

Administrative Leave.

The court properly dismissed the action for mandamus brought by court employees seeking rescission of the judge's executive order denying them administrative leave, even though the employees were originally granted administrative leave by the judge, because the original grant of leave had been without authority and because under this section circuit court employees must be treated the same as other county employees. Lee v. Villines, 328 Ark. 189, 942 S.W.2d 844 (1997).

16-13-1410. Law clerks.

    1. Each judge of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint a law clerk, who may also serve as master, who shall be a graduate of a law school approved by the State Board of Law Examiners.
    2. Each law clerk shall serve at the discretion and under the direction of the judge.
    1. The powers and duties of the law clerks shall be to administer oaths and affirmations, to take acknowledgments, affidavits, and depositions, to serve as master, and to conduct pretrial and prejudgment hearings and recommendations for disposition to the circuit, chancery, or probate judge.
    2. The law clerks may be assigned such additional duties at the discretion of the respective judges as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the State of Arkansas.
  1. The salary of each law clerk for the Sixth Judicial District shall be set as follows:
    1. The salary of each senior law clerk for the Sixth Judicial District previously set by this section and by county ordinance shall be amended to provide for an increase of the minimum salaries of four percent (4%) as of July 10, 1987; another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 26, 1987; and another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 24, 1988, unless a higher salary is provided by any other legislative act or county ordinance.
    2. The salary of each junior law clerk for the Sixth Judicial District set by this section and by county ordinance shall be amended to provide for an increase of the minimum salaries of four percent (4%) as of July 10, 1987; another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 26, 1987; and another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 24, 1988, unless a higher salary is provided by any other legislative act or county ordinance.
    3. All of the salaries shall be paid by Pulaski County. All of the salaries shall be paid bi-weekly by Pulaski County.
    4. When the county quorum court raises salaries for county employees, it shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the employees provided for in this subsection.
    5. The employees covered by this subsection shall be treated by Pulaski County in the same manner as other Pulaski County employees for all other purposes.

Item No. Title Years Experience Annual Salary 1 Law Clerk I 0-1 $24,000.00 2 Law Clerk II 1-2 24,666.66 3 Law Clerk III 2-3 25,333.32 4 Law Clerk IV 3-4 25,999.98 5 Law Clerk V 4-5 26,666.64 6 Law Clerk VI 5-6 27,333.30 7 Law Clerk VII 6-7 27,999.96 8 Law Clerk VIII 7-8 28,666.62 9 Law Clerk IX 8-9 29,333.28 10 Law Clerk X 9-10 29,999.94

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310n; Acts 1987, No. 344, §§ 1-3; 1989, No. 286, §§ 4, 7, 12-14.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)(1) and subsection (c) of this section are deemed to be superseded by the current provisions. The former provisions were derived from Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 1 (part), 2 (part), and 3.

Case Notes

Administrative Leave.

The court properly dismissed the action for mandamus brought by court employees seeking rescission of the judge's executive order denying them administrative leave, even though the employees were originally granted administrative leave by the judge, because the original grant of leave had been without authority and because under this section circuit court employees must be treated the same as other county employees. Lee v. Villines, 328 Ark. 189, 942 S.W.2d 844 (1997).

16-13-1411. Secretaries.

  1. The judges of each division of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint one (1) secretary.
  2. Secretaries so appointed shall provide clerical, stenographic, and other secretarial services and may be assigned such additional duties at the discretion of the respective judges as are not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the State of Arkansas.
  3. The salary of the secretaries of the Sixth Judicial District shall be sixteen thousand five hundred dollars ($16,500) per calendar year, which salary shall be paid by Pulaski County.
    1. The salary of each secretary employed by the Sixth Judicial District set by this section and by county ordinance shall be amended to provide for an increase of the minimum salaries of four percent (4%) as of July 10, 1987; another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 26, 1987; and another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 24, 1988, unless a higher salary is provided by any other legislative act or county ordinance.
    2. All of the salaries shall be paid by Pulaski County. All of the salaries shall be paid bi-weekly by Pulaski County.
    3. When the county quorum court raises salaries for county employees, it shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the employees provided for in this subsection.
    4. The employees covered by this subsection shall be treated by Pulaski County in the same manner as other Pulaski County employees for all other purposes.

History. Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 4-6; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310n; Acts 1989, No. 286, §§ 5, 12-14.

Case Notes

Administrative Leave.

The court properly dismissed the action for mandamus brought by court employees seeking rescission of the judge's executive order denying them administrative leave, even though the employees were originally granted administrative leave by the judge, because the original grant of leave had been without authority and because under this section circuit court employees must be treated the same as other county employees. Lee v. Villines, 328 Ark. 189, 942 S.W.2d 844 (1997).

16-13-1412. Circuit court probation officers.

  1. The circuit judges of the First and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint a chief probation officer and a deputy probation officer.
    1. The duties of the chief probation officer shall include the supervision of all persons on probation, the investigation of all matters referred to him or her by the court relating to the granting of suspended sentences, and the investigation of any other matters that may be referred to him or her by the court.
    2. The deputy probation officer shall perform all duties delegated to him or her by the chief probation officer, and all those referred to him or her by the court.
    3. The chief probation officer and the deputy probation officer, in the performance of their duties, may exercise all the powers of a deputy sheriff, which powers shall include the powers to make arrests, carry weapons, and serve summonses.
    1. The salary of the chief probation officer shall be twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per calendar year, which salary shall be paid by Pulaski County.
    2. The salary of the deputy probation officer shall be twenty-three thousand five hundred dollars ($23,500) per calendar year, which salary shall be paid by Pulaski County.
    3. Any probation officer funded through or by the Board of Corrections is specifically excluded from the provisions of this section.
  2. Nothing in the provisions of this section shall be construed to repeal or modify the laws now in effect relating to the duties of the State Parole Officer.
    1. The salaries of the chief probation officer and coordinator probation officers set by this section and by county ordinance shall be amended to provide for an increase of the minimum salaries of four percent (4%) as of July 10, 1987; and another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 26, 1987; and another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 24, 1988, unless a higher salary is provided by any other legislative act or county ordinance.
    2. All of the salaries shall be paid by Pulaski County. All of the salaries shall be paid biweekly by Pulaski County.
    3. When the county quorum court raises salaries for county employees, it shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the employees provided for in this subsection.
    4. The employees covered by this subsection shall be treated by Pulaski County in the same manner as other Pulaski County employees for all other purposes.

History. Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 7-10; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310n; Acts 1989, No. 286, §§ 1, 12-14; 2011, No. 200, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 323, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent. The General Assembly, in Act 549 of 1993, established the Arkansas Department of Community Punishment and delineated its purposes. Confusion in the public's perception, with regard to the purposes of the department, exists and will persist because of the inconsistency between the name of the department and its established purposes. The purpose of this act is to provide the department with a name that more accurately describes its role as an agency that is intended to fulfill the legislatively established purposes of supervision, treatment, rehabilitation, and restoration of adult offenders as useful law-abiding citizens within the community and to provide its supervisory board with a name consistent with the department's name change.”

Acts 2001, No. 323, § 3, provided:

“The ‘Board of Correction and Community Punishment’, as established in Arkansas Code 12-27-104 and 16-93-1203, shall hereafter be known as the ‘Board of Corrections’.”

Acts 2001, No. 323, § 5, provided:

“(a) The Arkansas Code Revision Commission shall make appropriate name changes in the Arkansas Code to implement this act.

“(b) The Arkansas Code Revision Commission is not required to codify this act.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted “Fourth” following “First” in (a).

Case Notes

Administrative Leave.

The court properly dismissed the action for mandamus brought by court employees seeking rescission of the judge's executive order denying them administrative leave, even though the employees were originally granted administrative leave by the judge, because the original grant of leave had been without authority and because under this section circuit court employees must be treated the same as other county employees. Lee v. Villines, 328 Ark. 189, 942 S.W.2d 844 (1997).

16-13-1413. Court bailiffs.

      1. The circuit judges of the Sixth Judicial District may each appoint one (1) court bailiff.
      2. If a circuit judge hears criminal cases, one (1) assistant court bailiff may also be appointed.
    1. The chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may each appoint one (1) court bailiff.
    2. The circuit-chancery judges of the Sixth Judicial District may each appoint one (1) court bailiff.
    1. The duties of the bailiffs shall include their attendance in their respective courts when court is in session and the supervision and maintenance of order in their respective courtrooms, providing security for individuals involved in court proceedings, officers of the court, and judges, and other incidental and related duties at the direction of the judges.
    2. The bailiffs shall exercise all the powers of a deputy sheriff, including the power to make arrests, carry a weapon, and serve summonses, and shall be certified law enforcement officers.
    3. The circuit-chancery judges may appoint at least one (1) probation officer to serve as assistant bailiff.
  1. The bailiffs and assistant bailiffs of each of the courts shall receive a salary as set by the Pulaski County Quorum Court.
    1. When the quorum court raises salaries for county employees, it shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the above employees.
    2. Those employees covered by this section shall be treated by Pulaski County in the same manner as other Pulaski County employees for all other purposes.

History. Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 14-16; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310n; Acts 1989, No. 286, §§ 2, 12-14; 1991, No. 601, §§ 1-3; 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 51, § 2; 1993, No. 572, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 572, § 1, subdivision (b)(2) concluded with “provided that bailiffs currently employed may be continued in their duties, without regard to certification.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 51, § 3, provided:

“The provisions of this act are procedural in nature and therefor shall apply to all cases presently pending or subsequently filed in any circuit, chancery or probate court within the State of Arkansas.”

Case Notes

Administrative Leave.

The court properly dismissed the action for mandamus brought by court employees seeking rescission of the judge's executive order denying them administrative leave, even though the employees were originally granted administrative leave by the judge, because the original grant of leave had been without authority and because under this section circuit court employees must be treated the same as other county employees. Lee v. Villines, 328 Ark. 189, 942 S.W.2d 844 (1997).

16-13-1414. Circuit court presentence officers.

  1. The circuit judges of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial District may appoint one (1) presentence officer.
  2. The duties of the presentence officer shall include the investigation of defendants and the making of such reports to the circuit court as it deems desirable as to the past conduct of any defendant that appears before the court.
  3. The salary of the presentence officer shall be fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) per calendar year, which salary shall be paid by Pulaski County.
    1. The salaries of the presentence officer set by this section and by county ordinance shall be amended to provide for an increase of the minimum salaries of four percent (4%) as of July 10, 1987; another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 26, 1987; and another increase of four percent (4%) beginning December 24, 1988, unless a higher salary is provided by any other legislative act or county ordinance.
    2. All of the salaries shall be paid by Pulaski County. All of the salaries shall be paid bi-weekly by Pulaski County.
    3. When the county quorum court raises salaries for county employees, it shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the employees provided for in this subsection.
    4. The employees covered by this subsection shall be treated by Pulaski County in the same manner as other Pulaski County employees for all other purposes.

History. Acts 1985, No. 336, §§ 17-19; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310n; Acts 1989, No. 286, §§ 3, 12-14.

Case Notes

Administrative Leave.

The court properly dismissed the action for mandamus brought by court employees seeking rescission of the judge's executive order denying them administrative leave, even though the employees were originally granted administrative leave by the judge, because the original grant of leave had been without authority and because under this section circuit court employees must be treated the same as other county employees. Lee v. Villines, 328 Ark. 189, 942 S.W.2d 844 (1997).

16-13-1415. Pulaski County — Proceedings generally.

  1. All writs and processes returnable to the Pulaski County Circuit Court shall be issued and returned as the law provides.
  2. All appeals to circuit court in civil and criminal cases shall be taken in the time and manner provided by Rule 9 of the District Court Rules.
  3. All criminal appeals shall stand for trial ten (10) days after being docketed.

History. Acts 1913, No. 64, §§ 4-6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-326.7 — 22-326.9; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 98.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section is mandatory. Loveland v. State Pharmacy, 123 Ark. 320, 185 S.W. 288 (1916).

16-13-1416. Pulaski County — Chancery clerk.

  1. The chancellors of the Sixth Judicial District shall appoint a Chancery Clerk for Pulaski County. If the chancellors are unable to agree on the appointment, the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court shall name the Chancery Clerk for Pulaski County.
  2. The Chancery Clerk of Pulaski County may appoint as many deputies as necessary to carry out the duties of the clerk's office.

History. Acts 1979, No. 211, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-417.11.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 286, § 10, provided:

“The salaries of the employees of the Chancery Clerk previously set by Act 14 of 1987, Act 121 of 1987 and by county ordinance shall remain as set, unless a higher salary is provided by any other legislative act or county ordinance. Also, the fund for the hiring of part-time employees in the Chancery Clerk's office shall remain at least $11,300.00, unless the Quorum Court may provide for additional funds for said purpose as it may find necessary.”

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-1417. Pulaski County — Referral to master.

The chancellors of the Sixth Judicial District may refer any case on their respective dockets, as provided by law, to the Master in Chancery of Pulaski County.

History. Acts 1979, No. 211, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-417.14.

16-13-1418. Pulaski County — Field investigator.

  1. There is created the office of field investigator for the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial District.
  2. The field investigator shall be appointed by the judge of the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial District, and shall serve at the will of the judge.
    1. The duties of the field investigator shall be to investigate all matters referred to him or her by the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial District, including presentence reports and follow-up reports on persons placed on probation by the court.
    2. The field investigator shall perform outside investigative duties as may be requested of him or her from time to time by the probation officer of the court.
    3. The field investigator may exercise all the powers of a deputy sheriff.
  3. The field investigator shall receive an annual salary of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) to be paid by Pulaski County.

History. Acts 1979, No. 248, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-363.5 — 22-363.8.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-1419. Pulaski County — Probate clerk.

  1. The chancery and probate judges of Pulaski County shall designate a probate clerk who shall serve as clerk in all probate matters and as custodian of all probate papers and records.
  2. It shall be the duty of the Pulaski County Probate Clerk and clerk's deputies to perform the work and services under the supervision of the Pulaski County chancery and probate judges.
    1. The Pulaski County Probate Clerk shall collect all fees related to probate matters, as provided by law. The fees collected shall be paid into the Pulaski County General Fund and dispersed pursuant to law.
    2. The salaries of the Pulaski County Probate Clerk and clerk's deputies shall be paid as established by law.

History. Acts 1991, No. 286, §§ 1-4.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

Subchapter 15 — Seventh Judicial Circuit

16-13-1501 — 16-13-1505. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 827, § 9, effective January 1, 1999.

The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-13-1501. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

16-13-1502. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 2, p. 84; 1955, No. 109, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

16-13-1503. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1987, No. 846, §§ 1, 3; 1989, No. 949, § 1.

16-13-1504. Acts 1987, No. 846, § 4.

16-13-1505. Acts 1993, No. 1307, § 1.

For present law, see § 16-13-3101 et seq.

Subchapter 16 — Eighth Judicial Circuit

16-13-1601 — 16-13-1603. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 1207, § 8, effective January 1, 1999.

For Eighth Judicial District law effective after January 1, 1999, see § 16-13-3201 et seq.

The former subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-13-1601. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

16-13-1602. Acts 1907, No. 460, § 1, p. 1238; 1943, No. 212, § 1; 1965, No. 398, §§ 1, 2; 1981, No. 292, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310; Acts 1991, No. 533, § 1.

16-13-1603. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-365, 22-373; Acts 1989, No. 54, § 1; 1989, No. 440, § 1; 1989, No. 949, § 1.

Subchapter 17 — Ninth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 10, provided:

“Ninth Judicial Circuit East. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is presently held by John Thomas shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 11, provided:

“Ninth Judicial Circuit West.

  1. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Ted Capeheart shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Charles Yeargan shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1891, No. 52, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1907, No. 460, § 4: effective first Monday in June, 1907.

Acts 1923, No. 354, § 2: Mar. 9, 1923.

Acts 1943, No. 212, § 3: approved Mar. 15, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “In view of the fact that the need for the protection of the public peace, health and safety, and the efficient and prompt enforcement of the laws and the administration of justice are apparent, an emergency is declared to exist and the immediate operation of this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1995, No. 39, § 8: Jan. 26, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload of the Ninth Judicial District necessitates the transferring of Pike County to the Ninth Judicial District-West and the appointment of an additional circuit-chancery judge immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-1701. Composition.

  1. The Ninth Judicial District-East shall be composed of Clark County.
  2. The Ninth Judicial District-West shall be composed of the counties of Howard, Little River, Sevier, and Pike.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1979, No. 834, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1995, No. 39, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended by Acts 1995, No. 39, § 1, subsections (a) and (b) began:

“Effective immediately upon passage and approval of this act.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1702. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Ninth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Clark County: On the fourth Mondays in January and July;
  2. Howard County: On the fourth Mondays in February and August;
  3. Little River County: On the first Mondays in January and July;
  4. Pike County: On the third Mondays in March and September; and
  5. Sevier County: On the first Mondays in February and August.

History. Acts 1891, No. 52, § 2, p. 87; 1907, No. 460, § 1, p. 1238; 1923, No. 354, § 1; 1943, No. 212, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-1703. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Ninth Judicial District-East shall elect one (1) circuit-chancery judge who shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
    1. The qualified electors of the Ninth Judicial District-West shall elect one (1) circuit-chancery judge who shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
      1. There is hereby created in the Ninth Judicial District-West an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
      2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division of chancery court, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and he or she shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1979, No. 834, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1995, No. 39, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 39, subdivision (b)(2)(A) began “Effective immediately upon passage and approval of this act.”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 39, this section contained two additional subsections, which read:

“(c) As soon as possible after the effective date of this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Ninth Judicial District-West Circuit-Chancery judgeship created herein, and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 1996, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.

“(d) The qualified electors of the Ninth Judicial District-West shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created herein at the November 1996 general election to take office on January 1, 1997. The additional judge shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1995, No. 39, § 3, provided:

“The counties which comprise the Ninth Judicial District-West shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this act, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1995, No. 39, § 4, provided:

“There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this act a court reporter, whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.”

Acts 1995, No. 564, §§ 1, 2 provided:

“SECTION 1. The person selected to fill the additional circuit-chancery judge position created in the Ninth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit West by the Eightieth General Assembly shall be entitled to employ a case coordinator whose primary responsibility shall be to maintain the court calendar, schedule dates for the trial of cases and for the hearing of motions and to perform other related and incidental duties at the direction of the judge.

“SECTION 2. The case coordinator provided for in Section 1 shall receive an annual salary of not less than sixteen thousand dollars ($16,000) nor more than twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000). The salary and expenses of the case coordinator shall be paid by the counties comprising the Ninth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit West, with the proportion thereof to be paid by each county to be determined by the judge after giving consideration to the assessed value of property in each county, the population of each county and the case load of the court in each county. The salary provided for herein shall be paid by each county in equal monthly installments on the first day of each month.”

Acts 1995, No. 762, §§ 1-3, provided:

“SECTION 1. The circuit/chancery judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit-East, may employ a case coordinator to serve the judge at the pleasure of the appointing judge, at an annual salary based upon the classification in the table in Section 2 payable in equal monthly installments by Clark County.

“SECTION 2. No payment of salary may be made except in conformity with the salary rates assigned in the table below and only after the appointing judge has certified in writing the term of the employee's experience to the County Clerk:

“GRADE EXPERIENCE SALARY “I Entry Level $19,000.00 “II 12 Months $20,000.00 “III 24 Months $21,000.00 “IV 36 Months $22,000.00 “V 48 Months $23,000.00 “VI 60 Months $24,000.00 “VII 72 Months $25,000.00

Click to view table.

“The appointing judge shall have discretion in certifying or omitting to certify increases in salary above the entry level.

“SECTION 3. It is found and determined by the General Assembly that the case coordinators of the State have varying experience and beginning in 1995, classifications in Section 2 should be implemented and is necessary to the proper administration of justice in the Ninth Judicial Circuit-East.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1704. Exchange of districts.

The judges of the Ninth Judicial District-East and the Ninth Judicial District-West may by agreement temporarily exchange districts or hold court for each other, as they deem necessary or appropriate.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1979, No. 834, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

Subchapter 18 — Tenth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 12, provided:

“Tenth Judicial Circuit.

“(a) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by Don Glover shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by Sam Pope shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Robert C. Vittitow shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(d) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Jerry Mazzanti shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Bynum Gibson shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1911, No. 290, § 2: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1919, No. 102, § 2: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Feb. 20, 1919.

Acts 1953, No. 199, § 19: approved Mar. 3, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, in order to properly and promptly dispatch the work now pending in the several courts of Desha County; and whereas this vitally affects the peace, health and safety of the citizens of this State, an emergency is therefore hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1985, No. 159, § 5: Feb. 19, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the workload of the circuit and chancery courts of the Tenth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit has increased substantially in recent years; that the crowded court dockets in the Tenth Circuit result in serious delay in the administration of justice in the district; that this Act is designed to provide additional judges to serve the Tenth Circuit and to thereby improve and promote the administration of justice in the circuit and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 7, § 4: June 22, 1985; Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 22, § 4: June 26, 1985. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 159 of 1985 created an additional circuit judgeship and additional chancery judgeship for the Tenth Circuit; that in order to provide for the efficient and effective administration of justice in the Tenth Circuit, the circuit court and chancery court of that circuit should be divided into divisions; and that this Act so provides and therefore should be given effect immediately in order to allow its implementation at the time the additional judges are appointed under Act 159 of 1985. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-1801. Composition.

The Tenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Ashley, Bradley, Chicot, Desha, and Drew.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980); Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995).

16-13-1802. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Tenth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Ashley County: On the third Monday in March and the third Monday in October;
  2. Bradley County: On the first Monday in February and the second Monday in September;
  3. Chicot County: On the second Monday in July and the first Monday in December; and
  4. Drew County: On the third Monday in February and the third Monday in September.

History. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 6, p. 84; 1911, No. 290, § 1; 1919, No. 102, § 1; 1953, No. 199, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310; Acts 1991, No. 290, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1991, No. 290, § 1, provided:

“Effective January 1, 1992, the separate circuit, chancery and probate courts now provided by law in Desha County of the Tenth (10th) Judicial District and known as the Arkansas City District and the McGehee District are abolished.”

Acts 1991, No. 290, § 2, provided:

“From and after the effective date of this act, when the separate judicial districts of Desha County are abolished, the municipal courts of McGehee and Dumas shall each have concurrent jurisdiction which is coextensive with Desha County.”

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-1803. Judges and chancellors generally.

  1. The qualified electors of the Tenth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. Two (2) circuit judges and two (2) chancellors, including the additional judges provided for in Acts 1985, No. 159, § 2; and
    2. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
    1. The judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(2) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(2) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1985, No. 159, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-365, 22-375; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 159, § 2, provided that an additional circuit judge and an additional chancery judge should be appointed by the Governor to take office on July 1, 1985, and to serve until January 1, 1987, and until their successors were elected and qualified, and further provided that the successor judges should be elected at the general election in 1986, to take office on January 1, 1987, and thereafter as provided by law.

Acts 1985, No. 159, § 4, authorized each of the additional circuit and chancery judges to employ an additional court reporter who should receive such compensation as provided by law.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1804. Assignment of cases.

  1. The circuit and chancery judges of the Tenth Judicial District may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts in the Tenth Judicial District and may hear and try matters pending in any of the courts or may hear and try matters pending in the same court at the same time.
  2. The judges of the Tenth Judicial District may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of the Tenth Judicial District.

History. Acts 1985, No. 159, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-375.2.

16-13-1805. Divisions of court.

    1. The circuit court of the Tenth Judicial District is divided into two (2) divisions.
    2. The circuit judge serving on June 22, 1985, and his or her successor shall be the circuit judge of the first division, and the circuit judge appointed pursuant to Acts 1985, No. 159, § 2, and his or her successor shall be the circuit judge of the second division.
    1. The chancery court of the Tenth Judicial District is divided into two (2) divisions.
    2. The chancery judge serving on June 22, 1985, and his or her successor shall be the chancery judge of the first division, and the chancery judge appointed pursuant to Acts 1985, No. 159, § 2, and his or her successor shall be the chancery judge of the second division.

History. Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 7, §§ 1, 2; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 22, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-330, 22-330.1.

Publisher's Notes. As to the provisions of Acts 1985, No. 159, § 2, see Publisher's Notes to § 16-13-1803.

Subchapter 19 — Eleventh Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 13, provided:

“Eleventh Judicial Circuit East. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is presently held by Russell Rogers shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 14, provided:

“Eleventh Judicial Circuit West.

  1. The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by Berlin Jones shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by H.A. Taylor shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Eugene “Kayo” Harris shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(d) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Leon Jamison shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Fred D. Davis shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.

“(f) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 4 and presently held by Thomas E. Brown shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 6.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981, No. 609, § 4, provided that the division of the Eleventh Judicial District into East and West districts was effective January 1, 1983.

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1911, No. 290, § 2: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1919, No. 102, § 2: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Feb. 20, 1919.

Acts 1921, No. 3, § 5: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Jan. 20, 1921.

Acts 1947, No. 245, § 3: July 1, 1947.

Acts 1947, No. 246, § 2: effective 30 days after passage. Emergency declared. Approved Mar. 18, 1947.

Acts 1979, No. 771, § 11: Apr. 6, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and hereby declared by the General Assembly that because of the passage of Act 432 of 1977, the counties making up the Thirteenth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit of Arkansas were changed effective January 1, 1979; that the terms of circuit court in the various counties of the circuit were left in conflict; that no provision was made for divisions in the multi-judge Thirteenth Court Circuit and no method was fixed to assign cases to the various judges of the court circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 922, § 18: July 1, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fourth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1983 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1983 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs; and that the immediate effectiveness of Section 3 of this Act is essential to maintaining the fiscal integrity of the Judges Retirement Fund which would otherwise work irreparable harm upon the provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect as follows: Section 3 of this Act shall be effective immediately upon passage and approval of this Act; and all other sections and provisions of this Act shall be effective from and after July 1, 1983.”

Acts 1987, No. 444, § 7: Mar. 27, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the case load of the courts of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit-West has increased significantly in recent years and that this is due largely to the fact that various actions filed by and proceedings concerning inmates of the State Department of Correction must be handled in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit-West; that it is essential to the prompt, effective and efficient administration of justice in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit-West that an additional judgeship be created with combined circuit and chancery jurisdiction and to have the primary responsibility for handling matters involving inmates of the Department of Correction; that this act is designed to accomplish this purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-13-1901. Composition.

  1. The Eleventh Judicial District-East shall be composed of Arkansas County.
  2. The Eleventh Judicial District-West shall be composed of the counties of Jefferson and Lincoln.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981, No. 609, § 1; 1983, No. 922, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1902. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Eleventh Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

    1. In the Northern District of Arkansas County: On the first Mondays in April and November; and
    2. In the Southern District of Arkansas County: On the second Monday in March and the first Monday in August;
  1. Jefferson County: On the first Mondays in March and October; and
  2. Lincoln County: On the second Mondays in February and September.

History. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 6, p. 84; 1911, No. 290, § 1; 1919, No. 102, § 1 (Special Acts); 1921, No. 3, §§ 1, 2; 1943, No. 85, § 1; 1947, No. 245, § 1; 1947, No. 246, § 1; 1953, No. 318, § 1; 1979, No. 771, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-310, 22-310n.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-1903. Judges, chancellors, and prosecuting attorney.

    1. The qualified electors of the Eleventh Judicial District-West shall elect:
      1. Two (2) circuit judges;
      2. Two (2) chancellors;
      3. One (1) combination circuit-chancery judge;
      4. One (1) circuit-chancery judge; and
      5. One (1) prosecuting attorney.
    2. The judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created for the Eleventh Judicial District-West by subdivision (a)(1)(C) of this section shall devote one-half (½) of his or her time to the chancery and probate proceedings and one-half (½) of his or her time to the circuit proceedings, including, but not limited to:
      1. Presiding over all post-conviction proceedings in the Eleventh Judicial District-West;
      2. Presiding over all matters involving acts committed by inmates of the Division of Correction over which the Eleventh Judicial District-West has jurisdiction; and
      3. Hearing all civil actions filed by inmates of the Division of Correction over which the Eleventh Judicial District-West has jurisdiction.
      1. The judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1)(D) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
      2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(1)(D) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
  1. The qualified electors of the Eleventh Judicial District-East shall elect one (1) circuit-chancery court judge, who shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981, No. 609, § 1; 1983, No. 922, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1987, No. 444, §§ 1, 3; 1989, No. 949, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 852.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Acts 1997, No. 274, § 1 provided:

“(a) There is hereby created the temporary position of a Fifth Division of the Chancery Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit-West, which position shall expire on December 31, 1998.

“(b) The position of chancellor of the Fifth Division of the Chancery Court shall be filled by appointment by the Governor as authorized by law.

“(c) The judge of the Fifth Division of the Chancery Court shall be assigned cases by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; that the chancellor of the Fifth Division shall handle all cases of the First and Second Divisions of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit-West in which the judges of those courts have recused and such other duties in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit-West as may be assigned by the Chief Justice.

“(d) In addition to the duties prescribed in subsection (c) above, the chancellor of the Fifth Division may be assigned to any and all other chancery circuits of the State of Arkansas where the local chancellor or chancellors have recused or have been disqualified.

“(e) The chancellor of the Fifth Division shall receive compensation at the same rate as fixed by law for regularly elected chancery judges.

“(f) The chancellor of the Fifth Division may appoint a court reporter as provided by law, whose salary and expenses shall be paid from the Court Reporter's Fund.

“(g) The chancellor of the Fifth Division shall also employ one staff person in accordance with § 10-16-133 to perform secretarial duties, management services, and such other duties as may be prescribed by the chancellor; that pursuant to § 10-16-133 the chancellor of the Fifth Division shall have the authority to select and hire the person who will serve, and any person so employed shall serve at the will and pleasure of the judge.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C).

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1904. Exchange of districts.

The judges of the Eleventh Judicial District-East and the Eleventh Judicial District-West may, by agreement, temporarily exchange districts or hold court for each other as they deem necessary or appropriate.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981, No. 609, § 1; 1983, No. 922, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-1905. Court reporter, case coordinator, and other personnel.

The circuit-chancery judge of the Eleventh Judicial District-West created by § 16-13-1903(a)(1)(C) is authorized to employ a court reporter, a case coordinator, and such other personnel as shall be necessary for the court to effectively and efficiently carry out its responsibilities.

History. Acts 1987, No. 444, § 4.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-1906. Case coordinators.

  1. Each of the circuit and chancery judges of the Eleventh Judicial District-West shall be empowered and directed to employ a case coordinator for each division whose duties shall be the maintenance of the court calendar, setting dates for trial of cases and for hearing of motions, and other related and incidental duties as directed by said judges.
  2. The case coordinators shall be appointed by the judges of the Eleventh Judicial District-West, one (1) for each court, and shall serve at the will of the respective judge.
  3. In lieu of any other expenses incurred by each court provided by law for the Eleventh Judicial District-West, each county of the district shall be responsible each year for the following amounts:
    1. Lincoln County Two thousand dollars ($2,000); and
    2. Jefferson County All other expenses not otherwise provided for by law.

History. Acts 1989, No. 7, §§ 1, 2, 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 63, § 3, provided:

“(a) The salary of each of the Case Coordinators of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit-West for the period July 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989, shall be not less than at the rate of Nineteen Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty-one dollars ($19,961) per year, and shall be paid by the counties in the Circuit, as follows:

“Jefferson County at the rate of Nineteen Thousand Seventy-nine dollars ($19,079) per year, payable to each Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Lincoln County at the rate of Eight Hundred Eighty-two dollars ($882) per year, payable to each Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“(b) The salary of each of the Case Coordinators of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit-West beginning January 1, 1990, shall be at the rate of Twenty-two Thousand Sixty Dollars ($22,060) per year and shall be paid by the counties in the Circuit as follows:

“Jefferson County at the rate of Twenty-one Thousand One Hundred Seventy-eight Dollars ($21,178) per year, payable to each Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Lincoln County at the rate of Eight Hundred Eighty-two Dollars ($882) per year, payable to each Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“(c) Beginning July 1, 1989 Lincoln County shall no longer be responsible for the expenses provided in Section 4 of Act 7 of 1989.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 7, § 5, provided that this act shall be retroactive to January 1, 1989.

Acts 1989, No. 7, § 8, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent the respective Quorum Courts of the counties in the district from paying more than the amounts set forth in this act.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

Subchapter 20 — Twelfth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 15, provided:

“Twelfth Judicial Circuit.

“(a) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by J. Michael Fitzhugh shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by Jim Marschewski shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 6.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Norman Wilkinson shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(d) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Harry Foltz shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(e) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Jim Spears shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(f) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 4 and presently held by Mark Hewett shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided: “The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided: “Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1889, No. 31, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 5: Jan. 1, 1982. Emergency clause provided: “It being determined by the General Assembly that the proper and effective management of the State Judicial System and the administration of justice requires that the provisions of this Act be implemented as soon as possible and this Act is necessary for the proper management of the judicial system of the State, therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after January 1, 1982.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, Nos. 97 and 147, § 5: Feb. 12, 1991 and Feb. 18, 1991, respectively. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the new judgeship created herein is necesssary to insure the orderly and efficient administration of justice within the Twelfth (12th) District. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 9: July 1, 2019, except § 2. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that certain judicial districts under this act have an immediate need for additional circuit court judges due to the number of cases pending in the judicial district. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and all Sections except Section 2 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-13-2001. Composition.

The Twelfth Judicial District shall be composed of Sebastian County.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1995, No. 900, § 1.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2002. Terms of court.

The terms of court in the Twelfth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. In the Fort Smith District of Sebastian County: On the first Mondays in February, June, and October; and
  2. In the Greenwood District of Sebastian County: On the second Mondays in March and September.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1995, No. 900, § 2.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2003. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Twelfth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. Two (2) circuit judges;
    2. Two (2) chancellors; and
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
    1. In the Twelfth Judicial District there shall be one (1) additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
    2. Effective July 1, 1991, the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this subsection shall become a circuit judgeship which shall have jurisdiction only in law.
  2. Effective July 1, 1991, there is hereby created an additional chancery judgeship in the Twelfth Judicial District which shall have jurisdiction in equity and probate.
    1. Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the Twelfth Judicial District.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
  3. There is created in the Twelfth Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-365, 22-373; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1991, No. 97, § 1; 1991, No. 147, § 1; 2019, No. 1003, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Acts 1991, Nos. 97 and 147, § 1, provided, in part, that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in the position created in subsection (c) from July 1, 1991 through December 31, 1992, and that the qualified electors shall elect the judge at the November, 1992 general election to take office January 1, 1993. The section further authorized the chancery judge created by subsection (c) to employ a court reporter, a case coordinator, and such other personnel as shall be necessary for the court to effectively and efficiently carry out its responsibilities.

Acts 1995, No. 900, § 5, provided:

“As of January 1, 1997, the Circuit Judge Division 1 of the Twelfth Judicial District is hereby designated as the Circuit/Chancery Judge of the Twenty-First Judicial District.”

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 7, provided: “(a) For the circuit judgeships being created in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit and the Twenty-first Judicial Circuit, the Governor shall appoint qualified persons who are residents of the judicial districts that are the subject of this act to temporarily fill the newly created circuit court judgeships, and each of the appointed persons shall serve until January 1, 2021, or until a successor has been elected and qualified.

“(b)(1) The qualified electors of the applicable judicial districts shall elect the additional circuit court judges whose judgeships are created by this act at the 2020 preferential primary election, to take office on January 1, 2021.

“(2) The additional circuit court judges shall be elected from within the judicial district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by existing law for judges of the circuit courts.

“(3) The circuit court judges shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.

“(c) The counties receiving a new circuit court judgeship shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies, which shall be paid for as provided by law”.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (e).

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980); Lee v. Lee, 330 Ark. 310, 954 S.W.2d 231 (1997).

Subchapter 21 — Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 16, provided:

“Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.

  1. The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by David Guthrie shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 6.

“(b) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Hamilton Singleton shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Edward Jones shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(d) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Edwin Keaton shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 4 and presently held by Carol Anthony shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(f) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 5 and presently held by Larry Chandler shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1907, No. 460, § 4: effective first Monday in June, 1907.

Acts 1939, No. 22, § 5: approved Jan. 27, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that by reason of the large increase in litigation due to the discovery of the new oil field in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, and to the extension of the Second Division of the Chancery Court of the Seventh Chancery Circuit to include the County of Columbia, and the readjustment of the time of holding Court in the Seventh Chancery Circuit, which includes all the Thirteenth Circuit, and to the conflicts of the time for holding the regular terms of court of the Chancery and Circuit Courts, in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, thereby resulting in serious losses to the litigants and affecting their property rights, an emergency has arisen and is hereby declared to exist and for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1941, No. 49, § 3: July 1, 1941.

Acts 1949, No. 52, § 14: approved Feb. 8, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that by reason of the increase of litigation due to the development of the oil fields in the counties affected, which litigation in a large part is over the production of oil and gas, to delay which would seriously affect rights of persons and property rights, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and that this Act is immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and the same shall take effect and be in force upon its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 130, § 2: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Feb. 21, 1949.

Acts 1979, No. 771, § 11: Apr. 6, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and hereby declared by the General Assembly that because of the passage of Act 432 of 1977, the counties making up the Thirteenth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit of Arkansas were changed effective January 1, 1979; that the terms of circuit court in the various counties of the circuit were left in conflict; that no provision was made for divisions in the multi-judge Thirteenth Court Circuit and no method was fixed to assign cases to the various judges of the court circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 922, § 18: July 1, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fourth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1983 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1983 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs; and that the immediate effectiveness of Section 3 of this Act is essential to maintaining the fiscal integrity of the Judges Retirement Fund which would otherwise work irreparable harm upon the provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect as follows: Section 3 of this Act shall be effective immediately upon passage and approval of this Act; and all other sections and provisions of this Act shall be effective from and after July 1, 1983.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 41, § 7: Jan. 26, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload of the Thirteenth Judicial District necessitates the appointment of an additional circuit-chancery judge immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1999, No. 5, § 6: Jan. 27, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that conversion of the Circuit Division 1 judgeship of the Thirteenth Judicial District to a circuit-chancery judgeship is immediately necessary to insure the orderly and efficient administration of justice within the Thirteenth Judicial District; that the judge of Circuit Division 1 is the only judge in Columbia County; that converting the judgeship to a circuit-chancery judgeship will greatly improve and streamline the judicial system in Columbia County; and that this act is immediately necessary to more adequately distribute the caseload in the Thirteenth Judicial District. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expi ration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-13-2101. Composition.

The Thirteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Calhoun, Cleveland, Columbia, Dallas, Ouachita, and Union.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1983, No. 922, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2102. Terms of court.

The terms of the circuit court of the Thirteenth Judicial District shall begin in each county of the district as follows:

  1. Calhoun County: On the second Mondays in January and July;
  2. Union County: On the second Mondays in March and September;
  3. Columbia County: On the second Mondays in April and October;
  4. Ouachita County: On the second Mondays in May and November;
  5. Dallas County: On the second Mondays in June and December; and
  6. Cleveland County: On the second Mondays in February and August.

History. Acts 1907, No. 460, § 2, p. 1238; 1939, No. 22, § 1; 1941, No. 49, § 1; 1949, No. 52, § 11; 1949, No. 130, § 1; 1957, No. 402, § 1; 1959, No. 172, § 1; 1979, No. 771, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-310, 22-310n.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2103. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Thirteenth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. One (1) circuit judge;
    2. Two (2) chancellors;
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge, juvenile division; and
    4. Two (2) circuit-chancery judges.
      1. The judicial position of circuit judge created by Acts 1873, No. 53, and currently designated as Circuit Division 1, is converted to a circuit-chancery judge position and shall be designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 5.
      2. The judge of Circuit-Chancery Division 5 shall continue to be responsible for the duties formerly assigned to Circuit Division 1.
    1. The judicial position of circuit judge created by Acts 1925, No. 27, shall be designated as Circuit Division 2.
    1. The judicial position of chancellor created by Acts 1903, No. 166, shall be designated as Chancery Division 1.
    2. The judicial position of chancellor created by Acts 1923, No. 372, shall be designated as Chancery Division 2.
    1. The judicial position of circuit-chancery judge, juvenile division, created by Acts 1989, No. 949, shall be designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 for all jurisdictions.
    2. This judge shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate to hear other cases as time permits.
  2. The judicial position of circuit-chancery judge created by Acts 1995, No. 41, shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate and shall be designated Circuit-Chancery Division 4 in all jurisdictions.
  3. If any additional judgeship is created, an additional division shall be established and the judge shall serve as the judge of the additional division.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1983, No. 922, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1995, No. 41, § 1; 1997, No. 1141, § 1; 1999, No. 5, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

As enacted, subsection (c) began “Effective immediately upon passage and approval of this act.”

Acts 1995, No. 41, § 1, provided, in part, that as soon as possible after the effective date of this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Thirteenth Judicial District Circuit-Chancery judgeship created herein, and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 1996, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.

Acts 1995, No. 41, § 1, further provided:

“The qualified electors of the Thirteenth Judicial District shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created herein at the November 1996 general election to take office on January 1, 1997. The additional judge shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1995, No. 41, § 2, provided:

“The counties which comprise the Thirteenth Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this act, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1995, No. 41, § 3, provided:

“There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this act a court reporter, whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2104. Divisions of court.

  1. There shall be four (4) divisions of circuit court and five (5) divisions of chancery court in the Thirteenth Judicial District of Arkansas as established in § 16-13-2103.
  2. A judge shall be elected for each division of the circuit and chancery courts of the Thirteenth Judicial District, and candidates for the offices shall designate and qualify as candidates for the particular division of the court to which they seek election.
    1. The judges of the circuit court may try cases, hear matters, make orders, and take action in any division of the court and may assign or reassign any case from one (1) division to another by administrative order of the judges of the Thirteenth Judicial District.
    2. The judges of the chancery court may try cases, hear matters, make orders, and take action in any division of the court and may assign or reassign any case from one (1) division to another by administrative order of the judges of the Thirteenth Judicial District.
    3. The clerks of the circuit and chancery courts shall assign cases to the divisions therein in accordance with administrative orders of the judges of the Thirteenth Judicial District.
  3. Each division may have separate petit juries, or the divisions by concurrence of the judges may share a single petit jury wheel or box, or a single list of petit jurors.
  4. If any additional judgeship is created, the divisions created in subsection (a) of this section shall increase in accordance with the number of additional judgeships created.

History. Acts 1979, No. 771, §§ 1, 4-9; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-333.19, 22-333.22 — 22-333.27; Acts 1997, No. 1141, § 2; 1999, No. 5, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Case Notes

Judicial Authority.

The letter opinion of the judge's law clerk informing the defendant that his petition for post-conviction relief was denied was invalid because a trial judge may not delegate his judicial authority to a law clerk, and the General Assembly has not attempted to give law clerks the power to decide cases. Brown v. State, 290 Ark. 289, 718 S.W.2d 937 (1986).

Cited: Nation v. State, 283 Ark. 250, 674 S.W.2d 939 (1984).

Subchapter 22 — Fourteenth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 300, § 3: Feb. 19, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-third General Assembly that the caseload of the Fourteenth Judicial District necessitates the appointment of additional circuit-chancery judges immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 17, provided:

“Fourteenth Judicial Circuit.

  1. The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by Robert McCorkindale shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(b) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Roger Logan shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Gary Isbell shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1895, No. 36, § 3: effective 60 days after passage.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-2201. Composition.

The Fourteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Baxter, Boone, Marion, and Newton.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2202. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Fourteenth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Baxter County: On the second Monday in March and the second Monday in September;
  2. Boone County: On the third Monday in April and the third Monday in October;
  3. Newton County: On the first Mondays in March and September; and
  4. Marion County: On the first Mondays in April and October.

History. Acts 1891, No. 62, § 4, p. 110; 1895, No. 36, §§ 1, 2, p. 40; 1955, No. 227, § 1; 1979, No. 696, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-310, 22-310n.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2203. Judges and chancellors.

    1. The qualified electors of the Fourteenth Judicial District shall elect:
      1. One (1) circuit judge;
      2. One (1) chancellor; and
      3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
      1. There is created in the Fourteenth Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
      2. The additional judge shall be elected from the district and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
      3. The judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
      4. The counties which comprise the Fourteenth Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.
      5. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.
    1. The judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1)(C) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(1)(C) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1; 2001, No. 300, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Acts 2001, No. 300, § 2, provided:

“The Eighty-third General Assembly finds that it is very important that the judges appointed or elected to serve the Fourteenth Judicial District provide an adequate judicial presence and adequate judicial resources to each county in the Fourteenth Judicial District. Therefore, it is the express desire of the members of the Eighty-third General Assembly that the person appointed or elected to the judgeship created by this act maintain an office in Marion or Newton county throughout the duration of the term of office to which the person has been appointed or elected.”

As amended in 2001, this section also contained a subsection (c) which provided:

“(c)(1) Effective immediately, there is created in the Fourteenth Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate. (2) The Governor shall appoint a qualified person who is a resident of the district to temporarily fill the Fourteenth Judicial District circuit-chancery judgeship created by this subsection (c), and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 2002, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last. (3) The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge, pursuant to Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution approved at the November 7, 2000, General Election, created by this subsection (c), at the November 2002 general election to take office on January 1, 2003. The additional judge shall be elected from the district and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts. The judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years. (4) The counties which comprise the Fourteenth Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this subsection (c), which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes. (5) There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this subsection (c) a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

Subchapter 23 — Fifteenth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 18, provided:

“Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.

  1. The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by Paul Danielson shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Van Taylor shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by William Bullock shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1889, No. 31, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 5, § 22: effective on passage.

Acts 1955, No. 146, § 3: July 1, 1955.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-2301. Composition.

The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Conway, Logan, Scott, and Yell.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2302. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Fifteenth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Conway County: On the first Monday in March and the first Monday in October;
    1. In the Southern District of Logan County: On the third Mondays in April and October;
    2. In the Northern District of Logan County: On the first Mondays in January and August;
  2. Scott County: On the first Mondays in May and November;
    1. In the Danville District of Yell County: On the third Monday in January and the third Monday in August;
    2. In the Dardanelle District of Yell County: On the third Monday in February and the third Monday in September.

History. Acts 1889, No. 31, §§ 1-3, p. 38; 1901, No. 5, § 11, p. 5; 1939, No. 210, § 1; 1945, No. 11, § 1; 1955, No. 146, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2303. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Fifteenth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. One (1) circuit judge;
    2. One (1) chancellor; and
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
    1. The judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

Subchapter 24 — Sixteenth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 19, provided:

“Sixteenth Judicial Circuit.

  1. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 1 and presently held by John Dan Kemp shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by John Norman Harkey shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Stephen Choate shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 36, § 3: effective 60 days after passage.

Acts 1905, No. 62, § 2: Mar. 2, 1905.

Acts 1979, No. 242, § 3: Mar. 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that since the redistricting of the circuit and chancery courts in the State, the dates set for the beginning of terms of circuit court in the respective counties of the Sixteenth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit are not appropriate; that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Sixteenth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit and in the respective counties thereof that dates be prescribed by law for the commencement of the terms of circuit court in said counties; that this Act is designed to establish such dates and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2001, No. 816, § 2: Mar. 19, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload of the Sixteenth Judicial District necessitates the appointment of an additional judge immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-13-2401. Composition.

The Sixteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Cleburne, Fulton, Independence, Izard, and Stone.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2402. Terms of court.

The terms of court of the circuit court in the respective counties of the Sixteenth Judicial District shall commence on the following dates:

  1. Cleburne County: On the second Tuesdays in May and November;
  2. Fulton County: On the second Tuesdays in January and July;
  3. Independence County: On the second Tuesdays in February and August;
  4. Izard County: On the second Tuesdays in March and September; and
  5. Stone County: On the second Tuesdays in April and October.

History. Acts 1891, No. 62, § 3, p. 110; 1893, No. 56, § 3, p. 84; 1895, No. 36, §§ 1, 2, p. 40; 1903, No. 99, § 1, p. 167; 1905, No. 62, § 1, p. 163; 1955, No. 227, § 1; 1979, No. 242, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-310, 22-310n.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2403. Judges and chancellors.

    1. The qualified electors of the Sixteenth Judicial District shall elect:
      1. One (1) circuit judge;
      2. One (1) chancellor; and
      3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
      1. There is created in the Sixteenth Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
      2. The additional judge shall be elected from the district and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
      3. The judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
      4. The counties which compose the Sixteenth Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section which shall be paid for out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties and out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.
      5. There shall be provided for the judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.
    1. The judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1)(C) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(1)(C) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division of chancery court, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
  1. Effective January 1, 1999, the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section and the chancery judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section shall become circuit-chancery judgeships and shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1995, No. 582, § 1; 2001, No. 816, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Publisher's Notes. As amended in 2001 subdivision (a)(2) provided:

“Effective July 1, 2001, There is created in the Sixteenth Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate. (2) The Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Sixteenth Judicial District circuit judgeship created by this subsection, and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 2002, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last. (3) The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge created by this subsection at the November 2002 General Election to take office on January 1, 2003.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2404. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning quorum court fees funding a case coordinator, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 21, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 5. The section was derived from Acts 1995, No. 1243, §§ 1, 2.

Subchapter 25 — Seventeenth and Twenty-Third Judicial Circuits

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 20, provided:

“Seventeenth Judicial Circuit.

  1. The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by Bill Mills shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Darrell Hickman shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Robert Edwards shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 28, provided:

“Twenty-third Judicial Circuit.

(a) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Lance Hanshaw shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Phillip Whiteaker shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1999, No. 456, § 7, provided:

“Subject to review by the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary of the Arkansas General Assembly, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission is authorized and directed to prepare a technical corrections bill for introduction in the next regular or special session of the Arkansas General Assembly to make the necessary changes to the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated consistent with the provisions of this act. Specifically, in addition to other necessary changes determined to be consistent with this act and subject to review by the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission shall prepare legislation to change references to the Seventeenth Judicial District-East and the Seventeenth Judicial District-West, as well as similar and related references used throughout the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated to references consistent with the Seventeenth Judicial District and the Twenty-Third Judicial District, or divisions thereof, for purposes of uniformity and style.”

Acts 1999, No. 456, § 8, provided:

“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to decrease the term of office of the judges and prosecuting attorneys of the Seventeenth Judicial District-East or the Seventeenth Judicial District-West serving on the effective date of this Act. The judges and prosecuting attorneys shall continue to serve in their respective capacities in the Seventeenth Judicial District and the Twenty-Third Judicial District until the expiration of their terms.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1921, No. 3, § 5: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Jan. 20, 1921.

Acts 1955, No. 74, § 3: July 1, 1955.

Acts 1967, No. 56, §§ 3, 4: July 1, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “There is a possibility that the 66th General Assembly will be extended, in which event considerable confusion could evolve concerning the effective date of legislation which does not contain an emergency clause. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall be in effect from and after the date of passage.” Approved Feb. 9, 1967.

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 7: Nov. 7, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload of the Second and Sixth Judicial Districts necessitates the appointment of additional circuit-chancery judges immediately; and that this Act so provides and should therefore be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 29, § 8: Aug. 23, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload of the Seventeenth Judicial District (West) necessitates the appointment of an additional circuit-chancery judge immediately; that the salary cap for the Waldron Municipal Court Clerk must be raised in order to retain efficient court personnel and that this act so provides and should therefore be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1999, No. 456, § 12: Mar. 8, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Seventeenth and the Twenty-Third Judicial Districts, and is necessary to avoid confusion between the two districts. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 168, § 7: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of the various judicial districts; that the caseloads of the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District necessitate the appointment of an additional circuit judges; and that this act is necessary to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice in the counties affected. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2007.”

16-13-2501. Composition.

  1. The Seventeenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Prairie and White.
  2. The Twenty-third Judicial District shall be composed of Lonoke County.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1983, No. 669, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1999, No. 456, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended by Acts 1999, No. 456, § 1 subsections (a) and (b) began: “Effective immediately.” As to the effective date of Acts 1999, No. 456, see the Effective Date Notes at the beginning of this subchapter.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2502. Terms of court.

  1. The terms of court in the Twenty-third Judicial District shall commence on the third Monday in February and the first Monday in September.
  2. The terms of court in each county in the Seventeenth Judicial District shall commence on the following dates:
      1. In the Northern District of Prairie County, on the third Mondays in March and September;
      2. In the Southern District of Prairie County, on the first Monday in March and the third Monday in August; and
      1. In White County, on the third Monday and the tenth Monday after the third Monday in January and the third Monday and the tenth Monday after the third Monday in July.
      2. However, grand and petit juries selected at the January and July terms of the court may serve for a period of six (6) months.

History. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 4, p. 84; 1921, No. 3, § 2; 1943, No. 85, § 1; 1953, No. 318, § 1; 1955, No. 74, § 1; 1967, No. 56, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310; Acts 1999, No. 456, § 2.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2503. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Seventeenth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. One (1) circuit judge;
    2. One (1) chancery judge; and
      1. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
      2. The circuit-chancery judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section within the Seventeenth Judicial District, whose primary responsibility shall be to perform the duties of a judge of the juvenile division of chancery court, shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, and probate courts as time permits.
    1. The qualified electors of the Twenty-third Judicial District shall elect one (1) circuit-chancery judge who shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
        1. Effective January 1, 1995, there is hereby created in the Twenty-third Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
        2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created herein shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
        3. The additional judge shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts.
        4. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.
      1. The county which comprises the Twenty-third Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this subdivision (b)(2) which shall be paid out of the county treasury, in the same manner as other demands against the county, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county for such purposes.
      2. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this subdivision (b)(2) a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.
    1. Effective July 1, 2007, there is created in the Twenty-third Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.
    2. The Governor shall appoint a qualified person who is a resident of the district to temporarily fill the Twenty-third Judicial District circuit judgeship created by subdivision (c)(1) of this section, and the appointed person shall serve until January 1, 2009, or until a successor has been elected and qualified.
      1. The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge created by subdivision (c)(1) of this section at the 2008 preferential primary election to take office on January 1, 2009.
      2. The additional circuit judge shall be elected from the district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
      3. The circuit judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
    3. The county that composes the Twenty-third Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (c)(1) of this section, which shall be paid out of the county treasury in the same manner as other demands against the county and out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county for these purposes.
    4. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (c)(1) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1983, No. 669, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 29, §§ 1-3; 1999, No. 456, § 3; 2007, No. 168, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1, provided, in part, that:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 1, also provided, in part, that:

“As soon as possible after the effective date of this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Second and Sixth Judicial District circuit-chancery judgeships created by this Act, and such persons shall serve until December 31, 1990, or until their successors have been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 2, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes. Provided, however, that the additional judgeship for the Sixth Judicial District who is to conduct commitment hearings shall be provided courtroom and office facilities and supplies by the Arkansas State Hospital located in Pulaski County.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 28, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which additional circuit-chancery judgeships are created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided court reporters whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Following the 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment to this section, the Arkansas Code Revision Commision redesignated former (a)(3) as (a)(3)(A) and former (c) as (a)(3)(B).

As enacted, Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 29, § 1, provided, in part:

“The qualified electors of the Seventeenth Judicial District-West shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created herein at the November 1994 general election to take office on January 1, 1995.”

As enacted, Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 29, § 1, also provided, in part:

“(1) Since the provisions of this act will not be effective until after the 1994 Preferential Primaries have taken place, on the effective date of this act, there shall be a ‘vacancy in nomination,’ which the political parties shall fill in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated § 7-7-104.

“(2) If needed, the Governor shall issue a proclamation specifying the date on which the special primary election shall be held, but not less than thirty (30) days prior to the November 1994 general election, and the date on which a runoff primary election shall be held in the event a candidate does not receive a majority vote, but not more than one week after the special primary election. The proclamation shall also establish the deadline for filing as a candidate for nomination which shall also be the deadline for filing petitions of independent candidates to file nomination petitions of not less than fifty (50) nor more than one thousand (1,000) electors from the district. If no special primary election is to be held, the Governor shall, in a proclamation, establish the filing period for independent candidates.”

Acts 2007, No.168, § 1, provided:

“The Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of various judicial districts and has determined that to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice additional circuit judgeships are needed in the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District. This act authorizes the establishment of five (5) additional circuit judgeships, articulates the applicable appointment and election process of the additional circuit judges, and identifies various resources that will be available.”

In Acts 2007, No. 168, § 3, the term “2008 Nonpartisan Judicial General Election” should have been used in place of “2008 preferential primary election”. Circuit judges are now elected on a nonpartisan basis pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 17.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1983, No. 669, § 4, provided that the division of the Seventeenth Judicial District-Chancery Court District into the Seventeenth Judicial District-East and the Seventeenth Judicial District-West would be effective January 1, 1985. The section further provided that nothing in the act should be so construed as to decrease the term of office of the judges and prosecuting attorneys of the Seventeenth Judicial District serving on July 4, 1983, and that those persons would continue to serve in their respective capacities in the Seventeenth Judicial District-East until the expiration of their terms.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added (c).

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2504. Exchange of districts.

The judges of the Twenty-third Judicial District and the Seventeenth Judicial District may, by agreement, temporarily exchange districts or hold court for each other as they deem necessary and appropriate.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1983, No. 669, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1999, No. 456, § 4.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

Subchapter 26 — Eighteenth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 21, provided:

“Eighteenth Judicial Circuit East.

  1. The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by John Homer Wright shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by David Switzer shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Tom Smitherman shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(d) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Vicki Cook shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 22, provided:

“Eighteenth Judicial Circuit West. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is presently held by Gayle Ford shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1891, No. 52, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1911, No. 114, § 5: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Mar. 23, 1911.

Acts 1923, No. 354, § 2: Mar. 9, 1923.

Acts 1953, No. 76, § 3: Feb. 17, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the change of the dates of the Circuit Court in Montgomery County will act for the more convenient and expeditious handling of litigation therein. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1963, No. 49, § 5: Feb. 8, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the docket of the Circuit Judge of the 18th Judicial Circuit is extremely overloaded; that the proper administration of justice in Montgomery County Circuit Court will be expedited by transferring such court to the 9th Judicial Circuit; and that only by the immediate passage of this Act may this purpose be accomplished. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1963, No. 262, § 3: Mar. 18, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the change of the dates of the Circuit Court in Montgomery County will result in more convenient and expeditious handling of litigation therein. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 300, § 3: Mar. 10, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and determined by the General Assembly that the change of the dates of the Circuit Court in Garland County will result in more convenient and expeditious handling of litigation therein. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 19, § 3: July 1, 1970.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2001, No. 1529, § 2: Apr. 12, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges of the Eighteenth Judicial District — East should be provided bailiffs as are other courts in the state to maintain order and provide security for the judge, jury, witnesses, and defendants. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-13-2601. Composition.

  1. The Eighteenth Judicial District-East shall be composed of Garland County.
  2. The Eighteenth Judicial District-West shall be composed of the counties of Montgomery and Polk.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980); Riviere v. Hardegree, 278 Ark. 167, 644 S.W.2d 276 (1983).

16-13-2602. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Eighteenth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Garland County: On the second Fridays in January and July;
  2. Montgomery County: On the third Mondays in May and November; and
  3. Polk County: On the third Mondays in April and October.

History. Acts 1891, No. 52, § 2, p. 87; 1911, No. 114, §§ 1, 2; 1923, No. 354, § 1; 1953, No. 76, § 1; 1963, No. 49, § 1; 1963, No. 262, § 1; 1967, No. 300, § 1; 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 19, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2603. Judges and chancellors.

    1. The qualified electors of the Eighteenth Judicial District-East shall elect:
      1. One (1) circuit judge and one (1) chancellor to serve the Eighteenth Judicial District-East, each of whom shall be a resident of the Eighteenth Judicial District-East; and
      2. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
      1. In the Eighteenth Judicial District-East, there is created one (1) additional circuit-chancery judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate.
      2. The circuit judges, chancery judges, and circuit-chancery judges of the districts subject to this subsection may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts in their respective districts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time. The judges subject to this subsection may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their district.
      1. The judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
      2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
  1. The qualified electors of the Eighteenth Judicial District-West shall elect one (1) circuit-chancery judge to serve the Eighteenth Judicial District-West who shall be a resident of the Eighteenth Judicial District-West.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1987, No. 846, §§ 1, 3; 1989, No. 949, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1987, No. 846, § 2, provided:

“The additional circuit judges, chancery judges, and circuit-chancery judges provided for in this Act shall be elected at the General Election in 1988, to take office on January 1, 1989, and thereafter as provided by law.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2604. Exchange of districts.

The judges of the Eighteenth Judicial District-East and the Eighteenth Judicial District-West may, by agreement, temporarily exchange districts or hold court for each other, as they deem necessary or appropriate.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2605. Court reporters.

Each of the circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges provided for in § 16-13-2603 is authorized to employ a court reporter. The court reporters shall receive such compensation as is provided by law.

History. Acts 1987, No. 846, § 4.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-2606. Secretary-case coordinator.

  1. Each circuit judge, chancery judge, circuit-chancery judge, and circuit-chancery judge of the juvenile division of chancery court, Eighteenth Judicial District-East, may employ a secretary-case coordinator to serve each judge at the pleasure of the appointing judge, at an annual salary based upon the classification in the table in subdivision (b)(1) of this section, payable in equal monthly installments by Garland County.
    1. No payment of salary may be made except in conformity with the salary rates assigned in the table below and only after the appointing judge has certified in writing the term of the employee's experience to the county clerk:
    2. The appointing judge shall have discretion in certifying or omitting to certify increases in salary above the entry level.

GRADE EXPERIENCE SALARY I Entry level $19,500.00 II 18 months $20,250.00 III 36 months $21,000.00 IV 54 months $21,630.00 V 72 months $22,278.90 VI 90 months $22,947.26 VII 108 months $23,635.68

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1993, No. 313, §§ 1, 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 313, § 3, provided that:

“It is hereby determined by the General Assembly that the secretary-case coordinators of the several courts of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit-East have varying experience and beginning in 1993, classifications in Section 2 should be implemented and is necessary to the proper administration of justice.”

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-2607. Bailiffs.

  1. The circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges of the Eighteenth Judicial District - East may each appoint one (1) court bailiff and, by concurrence of a majority of the judges in the judicial district, two (2) at-large bailiffs to serve as circumstances warrant.
    1. The duties of the bailiffs shall include:
      1. The supervision and maintenance of order in the courtroom;
      2. Providing security for the judges, officers of the court, jurors, and other individuals involved in court proceedings;
      3. Administering oaths; and
      4. Other related duties as assigned by the judges.
    2. When acting within the scope of their duties, the bailiffs shall exercise all the powers necessary and proper to perform their duties, including the powers of a deputy sheriff and the power to make arrests, carry a weapon, and serve summons.
    3. The bailiffs shall have and maintain law enforcement certification as is necessary to fully perform the functions of their office.
      1. The compensation package of the bailiffs shall be determined by the Garland County Quorum Court.
      2. If the quorum court raises salary benefits for county employees, it shall also raise salary or benefits an equivalent amount for the bailiffs.
    1. Any other employment or salary considerations will be governed by Garland County's Job Evaluation Salary Administration Program.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1529, § 1.

Subchapter 27 — Nineteenth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Current subchapter 27, “Nineteenth Judicial Circuit”, which includes both counties of Benton and Carroll as one entity, has been expanded upon by subchapter 30, which designates Carroll County as “Nineteenth Judicial District-East” and Benton County as “Nineteenth Judicial District-West”. Therefore, subchapter 27 currently will be retained as § 16-13-3002(f) states: “All existing laws not in conflict herewith pertaining to the Nineteenth Judicial District shall apply to the Nineteenth Judicial District-East and the Nineteenth Judicial District-West.”

Please also see subchapter 30 for division of 19th Judicial District into 19th Judicial District - East and 19th Judicial District - West.

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 23, provided:

“Nineteenth Judicial Circuit West.

  1. The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by Tom Keith shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by David Clinger shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Xollie Duncan shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(d) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Donald R. Huffman shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Jay Finch shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 24, provided:

“Nineteenth Judicial Circuit East. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is presently held by Alan Epley shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Cross References. Nineteenth Judicial District, Prosecuting Attorney's expenses, § 16-21-2401 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1887, No. 38, § 10: effective on passage.

Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 5: Jan. 1, 1982. Emergency clause provided: “It being determined by the General Assembly that the proper and effective management of the State Judicial System and the administration of justice requires that the provisions of this Act be implemented as soon as possible and this Act is necessary for the proper management of the judicial system of the State, therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after January 1, 1982.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 789, § 5: Mar. 30, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges of the Nineteenth Judicial District should be provided bailiffs as are other courts in the state, to maintain order and provide security for the judge, jury, witnesses and defendants, and that this act is immediately necessary. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-13-2701. Composition.

The Nineteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Benton and Carroll.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2702. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Nineteenth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Benton County: On the third Mondays in March and September; and
  2. Carroll County: On the third Mondays in February and August.

History. Acts 1887, No. 38, § 3, p. 47; 1887, No. 62, § 1, p. 88; 1967, No. 304, §§ 1, 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2703. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Nineteenth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. One (1) circuit judge;
    2. One (1) chancellor; and
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
  2. In the Nineteenth Judicial District, there shall be one (1) additional circuit judgeship which shall have jurisdiction only in law.
  3. There is hereby created and established, in addition to all other circuit judgeships, chancery judgeships, and circuit-chancery judgeships in the Nineteenth Judicial District, one (1) additional chancery judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in equity and probate.
  4. The chancery judge created pursuant to subsection (c) of this section is authorized to employ a court reporter, a case coordinator, and such other personnel as shall be necessary for the court to effectively and efficiently carry out its responsibilities.
    1. The judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    2. The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-365, 22-373; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

As enacted, the 1989 amendment in (b) provided for jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate until July 1, 1989, when this judgeship shall be converted to a circuit judgeship which shall have jurisdiction only in law.

As enacted, the 1989 amendment in (c) began “Effective July 1, 1989.”

Acts 2007, No. 168, § 1, provided: “The Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of various judicial districts and has determined that to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice additional circuit judgeships are needed in the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District. This act authorizes the establishment of five (5) additional circuit judgeships, articulates the applicable appointment and election process of the additional circuit judges, and identifies various resources that will be available.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 949, § 4, provided, in part, as to the judgeship created in (c), that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in such position from July 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990, and that the qualified elector shall elect the judge at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980); Cook v. State, 321 Ark. 641, 906 S.W.2d 681 (1995).

16-13-2704. Bailiffs.

  1. The circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges of the Nineteenth Judicial District may each appoint one (1) court bailiff.
    1. The duties of the bailiffs shall include the supervision and maintenance of order in their respective courtrooms, providing security for the judges, officers of the court, jurors, and other individuals involved in court proceedings, administering oaths, and other incidental and related duties at the direction of the respective judges.
    2. When acting within the scope of their duties, the court bailiffs shall exercise all the powers necessary and proper to the performance of their duties, including the powers of a deputy sheriff and the power to make arrests, carry a weapon, and serve a summons.
    3. A bailiff may maintain law enforcement certification existing or acquired during his or her service as bailiff.
  2. The pay of the bailiffs shall be determined by the quorum courts.

History. Acts 1993, No. 789, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-13-2705. [Removed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section was removed pursuant to § 1-2-303 and codified as § 16-13-3003.

Subchapter 28 — Twentieth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 951, § 25, provided:

“Twentieth Judicial Circuit.

  1. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 1 and presently held by David Reynolds shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Linda Collier shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Charles E. Clawson, Jr. shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.

“(d) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 4 and presently held by Mike Maggio shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 56, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1947, No. 120, § 4: approved Feb. 26, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that an established time for holding circuit court being necessary for the functioning of our government, an emergency is hereby declared to exist. This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the State of Arkansas, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1955, No. 146, § 3: July 1, 1955.

Acts 1965, No. 96, § 8: Feb. 23, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of Arkansas that due to the large number of cases pending before the courts of the Fifth Judicial Circuit there is an unusual and undesirable delay in the adjudication of the rights of parties involved in litigation in said courts; that this Act is immediately necessary to relieve said undesirable situation by providing for an additional Division of court and an additional judge to expedite the clearing of the dockets in said courts and thereby to expedite the administration in said Judicial Circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 802, § 10: Mar. 21, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the duties incumbent upon the Case Coordinators of the Circuit and Chancery Courts of the Twentieth Judicial District of Arkansas have materially increased because of increases in population, caseload and the trial dockets of said Circuit and Chancery District, and that there has been a substantial increase in the costs of living, necessitating an increase in salaries in order to properly cope with the prevailing conditions and prevent hardship. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exit and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 8: Mar. 27, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the juvenile division of chancery court is to be created to replace the juvenile court system provided for in Act 14 of 1987 and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to insure that there is an orderly and efficient administration of the juvenile justice system of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 131, § 7: Feb. 15, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the combination of the separation of the courts of law and equity in Arkansas and the amount of travel required of judges in the Twentieth District creates an inefficient system of justice. It is further found that the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Tony A. Lee v. Andre McNeil casts some doubt on the ability of judges within a single judicial district to exchange courts, and that this inability will seriously impair the timely and expeditious dispatch of business of the courts and cause unnecessary and expensive delay in the resolution of cases. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 170, § 8: Feb. 6, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload of the Twentieth Judicial District necessitates the appointment of an additional circuit-chancery judge immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2007, No. 168, § 7: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of the various judicial districts; that the caseloads of the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District necessitate the appointment of an additional circuit judges; and that this act is necessary to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice in the counties affected. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2007.”

16-13-2801. Composition.

The Twentieth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Faulkner, Searcy, and Van Buren.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2802. Terms of court.

The terms of court in each county in the Twentieth Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:

  1. Faulkner County: On the first Monday in May and the first Monday in December;
  2. Searcy County: On the third Mondays in April and October; and
  3. Van Buren County: On the first Mondays in May and November.

History. Acts 1891, No. 62, § 4, p. 110; 1893, No. 56, § 3, p. 84; 1947, No. 120, §§ 1, 2; 1955, No. 146, § 1; 1955, No. 227, § 1; 1965, No. 96, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-310.

Case Notes

Cited: Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Midwest Timber Prods. Co. v. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959); Fitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959); Hammond v. Kirby, 233 Ark. 560, 345 S.W.2d 910 (1961); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Fields v. State, 246 Ark. 1249, 441 S.W.2d 803 (1969); Thorne v. State, 247 Ark. 346, 445 S.W.2d 481 (1969); McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 23, 484 S.W.2d 345 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Peek v. Meadors, 255 Ark. 347, 500 S.W.2d 333 (1973); Bakri v. State, 261 Ark. 765, 551 S.W.2d 215 (1977); Campbell v. State, 264 Ark. 372, 571 S.W.2d 597 (1978); Walker v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1980); Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Anderson v. Hargraves, 272 Ark. 259, 613 S.W.2d 587 (1981); State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

16-13-2803. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Twentieth Judicial District shall elect:
    1. One (1) circuit judge;
    2. One (1) chancellor; and
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge.
    1. The judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court and shall be designated division 2 in all jurisdictions.
    2. The judge shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
  2. The circuit judgeship created by subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be a circuit-chancery judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate and shall be designated division 1 in all jurisdictions.
  3. Effective January 1, 1997, the chancery judgeship created by subdivision (a)(2) of this section shall become a circuit-chancery judgeship which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate and shall be designated division 3 in all jurisdictions.
  4. There is hereby created in the Twentieth Judicial District an additional circuit-chancery judgeship, which shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, and probate and shall be designated division 4 in all jurisdictions.
    1. Effective July 1, 2007, there is created in the Twentieth Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.
    2. The Governor shall appoint a qualified person who is a resident of the district to temporarily fill the Twentieth Judicial District circuit judgeship created by subdivision (f)(1) of this section, and the appointed person shall serve until January 1, 2009, or until a successor has been elected and qualified.
      1. The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge created by subdivision (f)(1) of this section at the 2008 preferential primary election to take office on January 1, 2009.
      2. The additional circuit judge shall be elected from the district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
      3. The circuit judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
    3. The counties that compose the Twentieth Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (f)(1) of this section, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties and out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for these purposes.
    4. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (f)(1) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365; Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1; 1993, No. 131, § 1; 1995, No. 170, §§ 1, 4; 2007, No. 168, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 1, provided, in part, that the judgeships created by that section shall be effective on and after August 1, 1989, and that the Governor shall appoint a person to serve in each position from August 1, 1989, through December 31, 1990.

The section further provided:

“The qualified electors of the respective judicial circuits shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judges at the November, 1990, General Election to take office on January 1, 1991. The additional judges shall be in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses and other allowances as provided by law for judges of circuit-chancery courts. The judges shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 3, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judge is created pursuant to this Act, the county or counties located in the judicial circuit shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies required for the juvenile division of the chancery court of the county, which shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county or counties in the same manner as other demands against the county or counties, out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county or counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1989, No. 949, § 5, provided:

“In each judicial circuit in which an additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created pursuant to this Act, there shall be provided a court reporter whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.”

As originally amended by Acts 1993, No. 131, § 1, this section also provided, in part, that: “Effective upon passage of this act and terminating January 1, 1997, any judge created by this section may, by written agreement, and pursuant to A.C.A. 16-13-403 as amended by Act 51 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1992, sit on exchange and hear cases for any other judge or judges created by this section and hold court for each other for such length of time as may seem practicable and in the best interest of their respective courts. The agreements shall be signed by the judges so agreeing and entered on the record of the court or courts so to be held.”

As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 170, § 1, subsection (e) began:

“Effective immediately upon passage and approval of this act.”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 170, § 1, this section contained two additional subsections, which read:

“As soon as possible after the effective date of this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person to temporarily fill the Twentieth Judicial District Circuit-Chancery judgeship created herein, and the appointed person shall serve until December 31, 1996, or until a successor has been elected and qualified, whichever occurs last.

“The qualified electors of the Twentieth Judicial District shall elect the additional circuit-chancery judge created herein at the November 1996 general election to take office on January 1, 1997. The additional judge shall be elected in the same manner and shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit-chancery courts. The judge shall serve for elected terms of four (4) years.”

Acts 1995, No. 170, § 2, provided:

“The counties which comprise the Twentieth Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this act, which shall be paid out of the county treasuries in the same manner as other demands against the counties, out of funds appropriated by the respective quorum courts of the counties for such purposes.”

Acts 1995, No. 170, § 3, provided:

“There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this act a court reporter, whose salary shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters of the circuit-chancery courts of this state.”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 170, § 4, subsection (c) began:

“Effective January 1, 1995.”

Acts 2007, No. 168, § 1, provided:

“The Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of various judicial districts and has determined that to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice additional circuit judgeships are needed in the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District. This act authorizes the establishment of five (5) additional circuit judgeships, articulates the applicable appointment and election process of the additional circuit judges, and identifies various resources that will be available.”

In Acts 2007, No. 168, § 4, the term “2008 Nonpartisan Judicial General Election” should have been used in place of “2008 preferential primary election”. Circuit judges are now elected on a nonpartisan basis pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 17.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added (f).

Case Notes

Mandamus.

This section creates a right in the people to select by the election process separate persons to serve as circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges for the twentieth district. The only practical method of enforcing this right is the remedy of mandamus. Lee v. McNeil, 308 Ark. 114, 823 S.W.2d 837 (1992).

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-13-2804. Responsibility for expenses.

  1. In lieu of any other expenses incurred by each court provided by law for the Twentieth Judicial District, each county of the circuit shall be responsible for the following amounts:
    1. Searcy County … One thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500);
    2. Van Buren County … Five hundred dollars ($500); and
    3. Faulkner County … All other expenses not otherwise provided for by law.
  2. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the respective quorum courts of the counties in the district from paying more than the amounts set forth herein.

History. Acts 1989, No. 802, §§ 5, 9.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 802, § 4, provided:

“(a) The salary for the period January 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989 for the Chancery Case Coordinator shall be not less than at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Dollars ($16,000.00) per year and for the Circuit Case Coordinator shall be not less than at the rate of Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($19,500.00), and shall be paid by the counties in the Circuit, as follows:

“Faulkner County at the rate of Eleven Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-six Dollars ($11,936.00) per year, payable to the Chancery Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments and Fourteen Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Dollars ($14,820.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Van Buren County at the rate of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Four Dollars ($2,704.00) per year, payable to the Chancery Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments and Three Thousand One Hundred Fifty-nine Dollars ($3,159.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Searcy County at the rate of One Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Dollars ($1,360.00) per year, payable to the Chancery Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments and One Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-one Dollars ($1,521.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“(b) The salary of the Chancery Case Coordinator beginning January 1, 1990, shall remain at the amount set above.

“(c) The salary of the Circuit Case Coordinator beginning January 1, 1990, shall be at the rate of Twenty-one Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00) per year and shall be paid by the counties in the Circuit as follows:

“Faulkner County at the rate of Fifteen Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars ($15,950.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Van Buren County at the rate of Three Thousand Four Hundred Two Dollars ($3,402.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Searcy County at the rate of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars ($1,638.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.”

Acts 1989, No. 802, § 4(b), was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 131, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 802, § 6, provided that this act shall be retroactive to January 1, 1989.

16-13-2805. Case coordinators.

  1. Hereafter, each of the judges of the Twentieth Judicial District shall be empowered and directed to employ a case coordinator, whose duties shall be the maintenance of the court calendar, setting dates for trial of cases and for hearing of motions, and other related and incidental duties as directed by said judges.
  2. The case coordinators shall be appointed by the judges of the Twentieth Judicial District, one (1) for each court, and shall serve at the will of the respective judge.

History. Acts 1989, No. 802, §§ 1-3; 1993, No. 131, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 802, § 4, provided:

“(a) The salary for the period January 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989 for the Chancery Case Coordinator shall be not less than at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Dollars ($16,000.00) per year and for the Circuit Case Coordinator shall be not less than at the rate of Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($19,500.00), and shall be paid by the counties in the Circuit, as follows:

“Faulkner County at the rate of Eleven Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-six Dollars ($11,936.00) per year, payable to the Chancery Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments and Fourteen Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Dollars ($14,820.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Van Buren County at the rate of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Four Dollars ($2,704.00) per year, payable to the Chancery Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments and Three Thousand One Hundred Fifty-nine Dollars ($3,159.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Searcy County at the rate of One Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Dollars ($1,360.00) per year, payable to the Chancery Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments and One Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-one Dollars ($1,521.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“(b) The salary of the Chancery Case Coordinator beginning January 1, 1990, shall remain at the amount set above.

“(c) The salary of the Circuit Case Coordinator beginning January 1, 1990, shall be at the rate of Twenty-one Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00) per year and shall be paid by the counties in the Circuit as follows:

“Faulkner County at the rate of Fifteen Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars ($15,950.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Van Buren County at the rate of Three Thousand Four Hundred Two Dollars ($3,402.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.

“Searcy County at the rate of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars ($1,638.00) per year, payable to the Circuit Case Coordinator in equal monthly installments.”

Acts 1989, No. 802, § 9, provided:

“Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the respective quorum courts of the counties in the district from paying more than the amounts set forth herein.”

Acts 1989, No. 802, § 4(b), was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 131, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 802, § 6, provided that this act shall be retroactive to January 1, 1989.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

Subchapter 29 — Twenty-First Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1995, No. 1148, § 4, provided, in part: “Provided, however, that in the event that the district is separated into two districts or one county is removed from the district by state action, the shared time personnel currently funded by Sebastian County will be funded full time by Sebastian County. Provided further, that in the event that a Deputy within the district is selected to be interim Prosecutor said Deputy may take a leave of absence to fulfill this duty. Upon completion of said duty, the Deputy shall be entitled to return to either District's Prosecutor's Office with the consent of the Prosecuting Attorney at the level of funding that said Deputy would have been paid at had he not accepted the appointment duty. The Prosecutor of the Twelfth Circuit, at the request of the interim Prosecutor of the new District, may designate a Deputy to serve as the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the new District. In the event that this procedure is followed, that Deputy shall be able to return to Sebastian County at the same pay as he is receiving at the time he is transferred back to Sebastian County from Crawford County at the end of the interim Prosecutor's term or any time before hand. For purposes of this Act, the new District shall be considered the one which is formed with Crawford County as a member county. Upon division, the prosecutor shall transfer all district equipment to Crawford County that is currently placed within the Crawford County Office at the time of the effective date of this Act and all equipment assigned to full time Crawford County personnel at the effective date of the separation Act.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 26, provided:

“Twenty-first Judicial Circuit. (a) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Floyd Rogers shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Gary Cottrell shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided: “The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided: “Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 9: July 1, 2019, except § 2. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that certain judicial districts under this act have an immediate need for additional circuit court judges due to the number of cases pending in the judicial district. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and all Sections except Section 2 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-13-2901. Composition.

The Twenty-first Judicial District shall be composed of Crawford County.

History. Acts 1995, No. 900, § 3.

16-13-2902. Terms of court.

The terms of court in the Twenty-first Judicial District shall be the first Monday in March, the second Monday in July, and the third Monday in November.

History. Acts 1995, No. 900, § 4.

16-13-2903. Circuit court judges.

  1. The qualified electors of the Twenty-first Judicial District shall elect two (2) circuit judges.
  2. There is created in the Twenty-first Judicial District a circuit judgeship in addition to the judgeships created under subsection (a) of this section that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.

History. Acts 1995, No. 900, § 7; 2019, No. 1003, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

As enacted, this section provided:

“At the 1998 General Election, the qualified electors of the Twenty-first Judicial District shall elect two circuit-chancery judges to take office on January 1, 1999. It is the intent of this act to not create the additional judgeship until January 1, 1999, and that no person be appointed for that position between the effective date of this act and the person elected in 1998 taking office on January 1, 1999.”

Acts 1995, No. 900, § 5, provided:

“As of January 1, 1997, the Circuit Judge Division 1 of the Twelfth Judicial District is hereby designated as the Circuit/Chancery Judge of the Twenty-First Judicial District.”

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 7, provided:

“(a) For the circuit judgeships being created in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit and the Twenty-first Judicial Circuit, the Governor shall appoint qualified persons who are residents of the judicial districts that are the subject of this act to temporarily fill the newly created circuit court judgeships, and each of the appointed persons shall serve until January 1, 2021, or until a successor has been elected and qualified.

“(b)(1) The qualified electors of the applicable judicial districts shall elect the additional circuit court judges whose judgeships are created by this act at the 2020 preferential primary election, to take office on January 1, 2021.

“(2) The additional circuit court judges shall be elected from within the judicial district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by existing law for judges of the circuit courts.

“(3) The circuit court judges shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.

“(c) The counties receiving a new circuit court judgeship shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies, which shall be paid for as provided by law”.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Circuit court” for “Election of” in the section heading; added the (a) designation; substituted “circuit” for “circuit-chancery” in (a); and added (b).

Subchapter 30 — Nineteenth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Current subchapter 27, “Nineteenth Judicial Circuit”, which includes both counties of Benton and Carroll as one entity, has been expanded upon by subchapter 30, which designates Carroll County as “Nineteenth Judicial District-East” and Benton County as “Nineteenth Judicial District-West”. Therefore, subchapter 27 currently will be retained as § 16-13-3002(f) states: “All existing laws not in conflict herewith pertaining to the Nineteenth Judicial District shall apply to the Nineteenth Judicial District-East and the Nineteenth Judicial District-West.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 23, provided:

“Nineteenth Judicial Circuit West.

“(a) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 1 and presently held by Tom Keith shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1

“(b) The circuit judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit Division 2 and presently held by David Clinger shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Xollie Duncan shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 4.

“(d) The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Donald R. Huffman shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 5.

“(e) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Jay Finch shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 24, provided: “Nineteenth Judicial Circuit East. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is presently held by Alan Epley shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided: “The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to 'subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided: “Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or selected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 168, § 7: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of the various judicial districts; that the caseloads of the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District necessitate the appointment of an additional circuit judges; and that this act is necessary to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice in the counties affected. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 9: July 1, 2019, except § 2. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that certain judicial districts under this act have an immediate need for additional circuit court judges due to the number of cases pending in the judicial district. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and all Sections except Section 2 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-13-3001. Composition.

  1. Effective January 1, 1999, there is created the Nineteenth Judicial District-East, which shall be composed of Carroll County.
  2. Effective January 1, 1999, there is created the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, which shall be composed of Benton County.

History. Acts 1997, No. 797, § 1.

16-13-3002. Judges and chancellors.

  1. As of January 1, 1999, the Circuit-Chancery Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial District, who sits as judge of the juvenile division and Division Three of the circuit and chancery courts, is hereby designated as the Circuit-Chancery Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial District-East and shall sit as the judge of the circuit, chancery and probate courts and the juvenile division.
  2. At the 1998 General Election, the qualified electors of the Nineteenth Judicial District-East shall elect the circuit-chancery judge to take office on January 1, 1999.
  3. As of January 1, 1999, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West shall be served by one (1) Circuit Judge of the First Division; one (1) Circuit Judge of the Second Division; one (1) Chancery Judge of the First Division; one (1) Chancery Judge of the Second Division; and an additional circuit-chancery judge who shall perform the duties of the judge of the juvenile division and sit as judge of the circuit, chancery or probate court as time permits. The additional circuit-chancery judge shall be elected in 1998 to take office on January 1, 1999.
  4. As of the 1998 general election, the circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges of the Nineteenth Judicial District-West shall hereafter be elected by qualified electors of the Nineteenth Judicial District-West. The current chancery judges shall serve the balance of their terms in the Nineteenth Judicial District-West.
  5. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.
  6. All existing laws not in conflict herewith pertaining to the Nineteenth Judicial District shall apply to the Nineteenth Judicial District-East and the Nineteenth Judicial District-West.
  7. The judges of the Nineteenth Judicial District-East and the Nineteenth Judicial District-West may, by agreement, temporarily exchange districts or hold court for each other as they deem necessary or appropriate.
    1. Effective January 1, 2009, there is created in the Nineteenth Judicial District-West an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.
      1. The qualified electors of the Nineteenth Judicial District-West shall elect the additional circuit judge created by subdivision (h)(1) of this section at the 2008 preferential primary election to take office on January 1, 2009.
      2. The additional circuit judge shall be elected from the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
      3. The circuit judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
    2. The county that composes the Nineteenth Judicial District-West shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (h)(1) of this section, which shall be paid out of the county treasury in the same manner as other demands against the county and out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county for these purposes.
    3. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (h)(1) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.
  8. There is created in the Nineteenth Judicial District-West an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.

History. Acts 1997, No. 797, § 2; 2007, No. 168, § 5; 2019, No. 1003, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 2007, No. 168, § 1, provided:

“The Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of various judicial districts and has determined that to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice additional circuit judgeships are needed in the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District. This act authorizes the establishment of five (5) additional circuit judgeships, articulates the applicable appointment and election process of the additional circuit judges, and identifies various resources that will be available.”

In Acts 2007, No. 168, § 5, the term “2008 Nonpartisan Judicial General Election” should have been used in place of “2008 preferential primary election”. Circuit judges are now elected on a nonpartisan basis pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 17.

Acts 2019, No. 1003, § 6, provided: “For the circuit judgeships created in the Second, Fourth, and Nineteenth-West Judicial Circuits the vacancies shall be filled by election at the 2020 preferential primary election, with the elected circuit judge to take office on January 1, 2021”.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added (h).

The 2019 amendment added (i).

16-13-3003. Prosecuting attorneys.

  1. At the 1998 general election, the qualified electors of Carroll County shall elect a person who shall serve as the prosecuting attorney for the Nineteenth Judicial District-East beginning January 1, 1999.
  2. At the 1998 general election, the qualified electors of Benton County shall elect a person who shall serve as the prosecuting attorney for the Nineteenth Judicial District-West beginning January 1, 1999.

History. Acts 1997, No. 797, § 3.

Subchapter 31 — Seventh and Twenty-Second Judicial Circuits

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 7, provided:

“Seventh Judicial Circuit.

“(a) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 1 and presently held by John W. Cole shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Phillip H. Shirron shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 27, provided:

“Twenty-second Judicial Circuit.

  1. The chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Robert Garrett shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Gary Arnold shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Grisham Phillips shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1999, No. 7, § 12: Jan. 28, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly, that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Seventh and Twenty-Second Judicial Districts, and is necessary to avoid confusion between the two districts. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 168, § 7: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of the various judicial districts; that the caseloads of the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District necessitate the appointment of an additional circuit judges; and that this act is necessary to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice in the counties affected. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2007.”

16-13-3101. Composition.

  1. There is created the Twenty-second Judicial District which shall be composed of Saline County.
  2. There is created the Seventh Judicial District composed of Grant County and Hot Spring County.

History. Acts 1997, No. 827, § 1; 1999, No. 7, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1999, No. 7, § 8, provided:

“Subject to review by the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary of the Arkansas General Assembly, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission is authorized and directed to prepare a technical corrections bill for introduction in the next regular or special session of the Arkansas General Assembly to make the necessary changes to the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated consistent with the provisions of this act. Specifically, in addition to other necessary changes determined to be consistent with this act and subject to review by the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission shall prepare legislation to change references to the Seventh Judicial District-North and the Seventh Judicial District-South, as well as similar and related references used throughout the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated to references consistent with the Seventh Judicial District and the Twenty-Second Judicial District, or divisions thereof, for purposes of uniformity and style.”

16-13-3102. Terms of court.

  1. The terms of court in each county in the Twenty-second Judicial District shall commence on the third Mondays in March and September.
  2. The terms of court in each county in the Seventh Judicial District shall commence on the dates set forth below:
    1. Grant County: On the fourth Mondays in February and August; and
    2. Hot Spring County: On the second Mondays in January and July.

History. Acts 1997, No. 827, § 2; 1999, No. 7, § 2.

16-13-3103. Judges and chancellors.

  1. The qualified electors of the Twenty-second Judicial District shall elect:
    1. One (1) chancery judge of the First Division;
    2. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the Second Division; and
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the Third Division.
  2. The qualified electors of the Seventh Judicial District shall elect:
    1. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the First Division; and
    2. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the Second Division.
      1. The chancery judge and circuit-chancery judges of the Twenty-second Judicial District may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts in their respective districts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time.
      2. The judges subject to subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their judicial district.
      1. The circuit-chancery judges of the Seventh Judicial District may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts in their respective districts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time.
      2. The judges subject to subdivision (c)(2)(A) of this section may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their judicial district.
      1. The judge of the Second Division in each district shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court.
      2. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the judicial district.
    1. The judge of the Second Division in each district shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery, or probate court as time permits.
    1. Effective January 1, 2009, there is created in the Twenty-second Judicial District an additional circuit judgeship that shall have jurisdiction in law, equity, probate, and juvenile matters.
      1. The qualified electors of the district shall elect the additional circuit judge created by subdivision (e)(1) of this section at the 2008 preferential primary election to take office on January 1, 2009.
      2. The additional circuit judge shall be elected from the district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law for judges of the circuit courts.
      3. The circuit judge shall serve for elected terms of six (6) years.
    2. The county that composes the Twenty-second Judicial District shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (e)(1) of this section, which shall be paid out of the county treasury in the same manner as other demands against the county and out of funds appropriated by the quorum court of the county for these purposes.
    3. There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit judgeship created by subdivision (e)(1) of this section a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in the manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit courts of this state.

History. Acts 1997, No. 827, § 3; 1999, No. 7, § 3; 2007, No. 168, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2007, No. 168, § 1, provided:

“The Judicial Resources Assessment Committee has reviewed the caseloads of various judicial districts and has determined that to ensure the smooth, efficient, and timely administration of justice additional circuit judgeships are needed in the Second Judicial District, the Nineteenth Judicial District-West, the Twentieth Judicial District, the Twenty-second Judicial District, and the Twenty-third Judicial District. This act authorizes the establishment of five (5) additional circuit judgeships, articulates the applicable appointment and election process of the additional circuit judges, and identifies various resources that will be available.”

In Acts 2007, No. 168, § 6, the term “2008 Nonpartisan Judicial General Election” should have been used in place of “2008 preferential primary election”. Circuit judges are now elected on a nonpartisan basis pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 17.

16-13-3104. Additional circuit-chancery judges.

  1. The chancery judge of the Seventh Judicial District-North is hereby designated as the chancery judge of the Twenty-second Judicial District.
  2. At the 1998 general election, the qualified electors of the Twenty-second Judicial District shall elect two (2) circuit-chancery judges to take office on January 1, 1999.
  3. At the 1998 general election, the qualified electors of the Seventh Judicial District shall elect two (2) circuit-chancery judges to take office on January 1, 1999.

History. Acts 1997, No. 827, § 4; 1999, No. 7, § 4.

16-13-3105. Court reporters.

  1. Each of the chancery and circuit-chancery judges provided for in this subchapter is authorized to employ a court reporter.
  2. The court reporters shall receive such compensation as is provided by law.

History. Acts 1997, No. 827, § 5; 1999, No. 7, § 5.

16-13-3106. Bailiffs.

    1. The circuit-chancery judges of the Twenty-second Judicial District may each appoint so many court bailiffs as the quorum courts of the district shall fund.
    2. The circuit-chancery judges of the Seventh Judicial District may each appoint so many court bailiffs as the quorum court of the district shall fund.
    1. The duties of the bailiffs shall include:
      1. Their attendance in their respective courts when court is in session and the supervision and maintenance of order in their respective courtrooms;
      2. Providing security for criminal defendants, juries, and judges; and
      3. Other incidental and related duties at the direction of the respective judges.
    2. When acting within the scope of their duties as court bailiffs, the bailiffs shall exercise all the powers of a deputy sheriff, which shall include the power to make arrests, carry a weapon, and serve summonses, and may maintain law enforcement certification existing or acquired during their service as bailiffs.

History. Acts 1997, No. 827, § 6; 1999, No. 7, § 6.

16-13-3107. Prosecuting attorneys.

  1. The qualified electors of Saline County shall elect a person who shall serve as the prosecuting attorney for the Twenty-Second Judicial District.
  2. The qualified electors of Hot Spring County and Grant County shall elect a person who shall serve as the prosecuting attorney for the Seventh Judicial District.

History. Acts 1997, No. 827, § 8; 1999, No. 7, § 7; 2011, No. 1132, § 7.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a) and (b), deleted “At the 1998 general election” at the beginning and deleted “beginning January 1, 1999” at the end.

Subchapter 32 — Eighth Judicial Circuit

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all sitting circuit, chancery, and circuit chancery judges at the time the amendment took effect were to continue in office as circuit judges and that circuit courts were to have jurisdiction of all matters previously dealt with by circuit, chancery, and probate courts, including juvenile matters.

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 8, provided:

“Eighth Judicial Circuit North.

  1. The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Jim Gunter shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Duncan Culpepper shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 9, provided:

“Eighth Judicial Circuit South.

(a) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 1 and presently held by Joe Griffin shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 1.

“(b) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 2 and presently held by Jim Hudson shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 2.

“(c) The circuit-chancery judgeship which is currently designated as Circuit-Chancery Division 3 and presently held by Philip B. Purifoy shall be known and designated as Circuit Court, Division 3.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 29, provided:

“The word ‘Division’ as used in this act shall refer only to the designation of the judicial positions for election purposes and does not refer to ‘subject matter divisions’ pursuant to Amendment 80, Section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.”

Acts 2001, No. 951, § 30, provided:

“Should any additional circuit judgeships be created in a judicial circuit, there shall be created within that judicial circuit, an additional Division which shall be numbered sequentially and the judge appointed or elected thereto shall serve as the judge of the additional Division.”

16-13-3201. Composition.

  1. Effective January 1, 1999, there is created the Eighth Judicial District-North composed of Hempstead and Nevada counties.
  2. Effective January 1, 1999, there is created the Eighth Judicial District-South composed of Lafayette and Miller counties.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1270, § 1.

16-13-3202. Judges and chancellors in the Eighth Judicial District-North.

  1. The qualified electors of the Eighth Judicial District-North shall elect:
    1. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the First Division; and
    2. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the Second Division.
    1. The judge of the First Division of the Eighth Judicial District-North shall sit as the judge of the circuit court, chancery court, and probate court.
    2. The judge of the Second Division of the Eighth Judicial District-North shall sit as judge of the circuit court, chancery court, probate court, and the juvenile division of the chancery court.
  2. If any additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created, an additional division shall be established, and the judge shall serve as the judge of the additional division.
  3. A judge shall be elected, every four (4) years, for each division of the circuit-chancery court of the Eighth Judicial District-North, and candidates for the offices shall designate and qualify as candidates for the particular division of the court to which they seek election.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1270, § 2.

16-13-3203. Judges and chancellors in the Eighth Judicial District-South.

  1. The qualified electors of the Eighth Judicial District-South shall elect:
    1. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the First Division;
    2. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the Second Division; and
    3. One (1) circuit-chancery judge of the Third Division.
  2. The judges of the Eighth Judicial District-South shall sit as judges of the circuit court, chancery court, probate court, and juvenile division of the chancery court.
  3. If any additional circuit-chancery judgeship is created, an additional division shall be established, and the judge shall serve as the judge of the additional division.
  4. A judge shall be elected, every four (4) years, for each division of the circuit-chancery court of the Eighth Judicial District-South, and candidates for the offices shall designate and qualify as candidates for the particular division of the court to which they seek election.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1270, § 3.

16-13-3204. Additional judges.

  1. At the 1998 general election, the qualified electors of the Eighth Judicial District-North shall elect two (2) circuit-chancery judges to take office on January 1, 1999.
  2. At the 1998 general election, the qualified electors of the Eighth Judicial District-South shall elect three (3) circuit-chancery judges to take office on January 1, 1999.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1270, § 4.

16-13-3205. Prosecuting attorneys.

  1. The qualified electors of Hempstead and Nevada counties shall elect a person who shall serve as the prosecuting attorney for the Eighth Judicial District-North.
  2. The qualified electors of Lafayette and Miller counties shall elect a person who shall serve as the prosecuting attorney for the Eighth Judicial District-South.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1270, § 7; 2011, No. 1132, § 8.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a) and (b), deleted “At the 1998 general election” at the beginning and deleted “beginning January 1, 1999” at the end.

16-13-3206. Additional judge — Staff.

There shall be provided for the judge of the circuit-chancery judgeship created by this subchapter a court reporter and a trial court administrative assistant whose salaries shall be fixed and paid in a manner provided by law for court reporters and trial court administrative assistants of the circuit and chancery courts of this state.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1270, § 6.

Subchapter 33 — Trial Court Administrators

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 16: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the act entitled ‘AN ACT TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES AND OPERATING EXPENSES FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR THE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS AND TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’ requires the passage of this act; that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2015, is essential to the operation of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2015, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 2015.”

Acts 2019, No. 716, § 13: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2019 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2019 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2019”.

16-13-3301. Trial court administrators made state employees.

  1. A trial court administrator of a circuit court is an employee of the State of Arkansas.
  2. The Administrative Office of the Courts is responsible for the financial oversight of the trial court administrators employed by the circuit court, which includes without limitation:
    1. Biennial and annual budget requests;
    2. Relevant budget activities;
    3. Monitoring expenses;
    4. Travel;
    5. Substitute expenses;
    6. Indigent transcript payments; and
    7. Ensuring projected annual expenditures do not exceed total available funding.
  3. The office, with the assistance of the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc., shall establish an official procedure or rules for:
    1. The hiring of trial court administrators;
    2. The termination of trial court administrators; and
    3. Salary adjustments for trial court administrators.

History. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 10; 2019, No. 716, § 9.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (b) and (c) and designated the former section as (a).

16-13-3302. Trial court administrator position created.

    1. The position of trial court administrator is authorized and funds shall be appropriated to the Administrative Office of the Courts from the State Administration of Justice Fund to provide one (1) trial court administrator for each of the circuit judges.
      1. The trial court administrator may be employed to assist the circuit judge in the administration and management of the circuit court.
        1. The office shall create and maintain a detailed job description for the trial court administrator position.
        2. The job description may be used by a circuit judge for the hiring, evaluation, and management of a trial court administrator.
    2. Each circuit judge shall report to the office his or her intention to employ a trial court administrator.
    3. Two (2) or more circuit judges within a judicial district may employ jointly, within their discretion, one (1) trial court administrator if coordinated with the office.
    1. A circuit judge authorized by subsection (a) of this section to employ a trial court administrator may select and hire the trial court administrator.
    2. The trial court administrator shall serve at the will and pleasure of the circuit judge.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (c)(2) of this section, a county shall not supplement the base salary of a trial court administrator.
    2. If a county with quorum court approval employed a trial court administrative assistant on or before July 1, 2014, and supplemented his or her base salary under former § 16-10-133, the county shall continue to provide the supplement so long as the now titled trial court administrator continues to be employed by the county in that position.
    1. Notwithstanding the exemption provided by § 21-4-203, the circuit judge employing a trial court administrator shall administer the attendance and leave policies for the trial court administrator in the manner prescribed for state employees by the Uniform Attendance and Leave Policy Act, § 21-4-201 et seq.
    2. The trial court administrator shall forward all approved requests for leave to the office on a regular and timely basis for payroll purposes.
    3. The office shall prescribe the procedures for obtaining all relevant leave information, including without limitation the forms, method of transmittal, and format for obtaining the leave information.

History. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 10.

16-13-3303. Salaries for trial court administrators.

  1. The salary of a trial court administrator shall:
    1. Be exempt from the provisions of the Uniform Classification and Compensation Act, § 21-5-201 et seq.;
    2. Not exceed the maximum annual salary rate authorized by the General Assembly in the applicable appropriation act; and
    3. Be determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. The salaries, together with expenses authorized by law for trial court administrators to be paid from state funds, shall be paid with moneys appropriated by the General Assembly from the Trial Court Administrator Fund.
  3. The total amount of salaries paid to trial court administrators and other distributions of the Trial Court Administrator Fund shall not exceed:
    1. The total annual allocation authorized by the General Assembly from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the Trial Court Administrator Fund; and
    2. Any remaining balances in the Trial Court Administrator Fund.

History. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 10.

16-13-3304. Trial court administrators — Reimbursement for expenses.

    1. A trial court administrator of a circuit court is entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred for meals, lodging, and transportation costs for attending court away from the trial court administrator's official station.
    2. Notwithstanding the exemption from state travel rules provided by § 19-4-904, if a trial court administrator uses a personal vehicle for transportation, he or she is entitled to reimbursement for mileage at the same rate prescribed by the Department of Finance and Administration for executive branch employees.
  1. Reimbursements for actual expenses and mileage under subsection (a) of this section shall be made monthly by the Administrative Office of the Courts upon claims by the respective trial court administrators certified by the circuit judge.

History. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 10; 2019, No. 315, § 1297.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (a)(2).

16-13-3305. Trial court administrators — Credit for county service.

A trial court administrator who converted on July 1, 1996, from county employment to state employment and was employed under former § 16-10-134 shall be given credit for his or her length of service with the county for purposes of accrual rates for sick leave and annual leave and attainment of career service recognition awards.

History. Acts 2015, No. 268, § 10.

Subchapter 9 — First Judicial Circuit

Chapter 14 Probate Courts

16-14-101 — 16-14-316. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This chapter, concerning probate courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 99. The chapter was derived from the following sources:

16-14-101. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.1.

16-14-102. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.2.

16-14-103. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2107, 6400; Pope's Dig., §§ 2711, 8362; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-113.

16-14-104. Acts 1961, No. 135, §§ 1-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-342 — 22-346.

16-14-105. Acts 1983, No. 898, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-522 — 22-525; Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 4; 1997, No. 788, § 11; 1997, No. 1341, § 11; 1999, No. 1081, § 5; 2001, No. 1045, § 1.

16-14-106. Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 7; 1983, No. 868, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-367.4; Acts 1987, No. 581, § 1.

16-14-107. Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 6; 1985, No. 63, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-367.3.

16-14-108. Acts 1969, No. 358, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-406.3.

16-14-109. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47; C. & M. Dig., § 2118; Pope's Dig., § 2722; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-125.

16-14-201. Acts 1941, No. 448, §§ 5, 6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-512, 22-512n.

16-14-202. Acts 1941, No. 448, § 1; 1943, No. 84, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-508.

16-14-203. Acts 1941, No. 448, § 1; 1943, No. 84, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-508.Acts 1941, No. 448, § 1; 1943, No. 84, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-508.

16-14-204. Acts 1941, No. 448, § 1; 1943, No. 84, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-508.

16-14-205. Acts 1941, No. 448, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-509.

16-14-206. Acts 1987, No. 520, § 1.

16-14-301. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-518.

16-14-302. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-513.

16-14-303. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-514.

16-14-304. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-514.

16-14-305. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-514.

16-14-306. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-514.

16-14-307. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-515.

16-14-308. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-517.

16-14-309. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-521.

16-14-310. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-516.

16-14-311. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 12 A.S.A. 1947, § 22-514.

16-14-312. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-513.

16-14-313. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-519.

16-14-314. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-519.

16-14-315. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-520.

16-14-316. Acts 1939, No. 138, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-519.

Chapter 15 County Courts

Publisher's Notes. County government was reorganized in 1977 by the Arkansas County Government Code, § 14-14-101 et seq. For the current provisions regarding the jurisdiction and powers of the county courts, see § 14-14-1101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 30: effective on passage.

Acts 1875, No. 55, § 80: effective on passage.

Acts 1875, No. 73, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1879, No. 50, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1887, No. 107, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1963, No. 214, § 9: Mar. 8, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that great confusion now exists concerning the terms of county courts, that there is urgent need for definitive procedural legislation, and that enactment of this bill will provide for more efficient administration of the county courts. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

The Arkansas Judiciary at the Crossroads (Oscar Fendler), 17 Ark. L. Rev. 259.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

A New Judicial System for Arkansas, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

Comment, County Government Reorganization in Arkansas, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 226.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 105.

16-15-101. Terms of court.

  1. The regular terms of the county courts of the several counties of this state shall commence on the first Mondays in January, April, July, and October of each year.
    1. The county court shall be open, by operation of law, at the beginning of each regular term of the court, as set forth in subsection (a) of this section, and shall remain open until the beginning of the next term of the court.
    2. No term of the court shall lapse by reason of the fact that the court was not formally opened at the beginning of the term.

History. Acts 1963, No. 214, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-603, 22-603.1.

Cross References. Change of term not to affect proceedings, § 16-10-113.

16-15-102. Special terms.

  1. The county judge of any county may hold a special term of the county court when the public good of the county demands it.
  2. Before any special term of a county court shall be held, the county judge shall give a notice ten (10) days before the special term is held by posting ten (10) written or printed notices in ten (10) of the most public places in the county, including one (1) notice on the door of the office of the clerk of the county.

History. Acts 1879, No. 50, §§ 1, 2, p. 60; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2269, 2270; Pope's Dig., §§ 2896, 2897; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-606, 22-607.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section did not apply to a quorum court levying appropriations which was lawfully in session on giving notice of the session to the justices of the peace affected, since the session was an emergency session. Cleveland County v. Pearce, 171 Ark. 1145, 287 S.W. 593 (1926).

16-15-103. Change of term upon conflict with circuit court — Exception.

    1. Whenever it shall happen that the time for holding the county court and circuit court in any county shall be on the same day, the county judge shall not commence his or her court until two (2) weeks thereafter.
    2. This section shall not apply to counties having separate county clerks, as provided for in Arkansas Constitution, Article 7, § 19.
  1. All process of whatever description shall be returnable and have day and trial in the same manner as if the county court had been held at the regular time prescribed by law.

History. Acts 1875, No. 55, § 77, p. 138; 1887, No. 107, § 1, p. 198; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2267, 2268; Pope's Dig., §§ 2894, 2895; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-604, 22-605.

Publisher's Notes. Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 19, which provided, in part, for the election of a separate county clerk in those counties having a population exceeding 15,000 inhabitants, was modified by Ark. Const. Amend. 41, providing that the provisions for the election of a county clerk upon a population basis were abolished and that “there may be elected a county clerk in like manner as a circuit clerk.”

Cross References. Terms of county courts to be held at times prescribed for supervisor's courts, § 14-14-1001.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not apply to terms of levying court. Hilliard v. Bunker, 68 Ark. 340, 58 S.W. 362 (1900).

16-15-104. Adjournment — Recess.

There shall be no adjournments of county courts, but the county courts shall be deemed in recess when not engaged in the transaction of business.

History. Acts 1963, No. 214, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-603.2.

16-15-105. Sessions.

  1. Each county court may, by rule or order, fix times and places when the court will be in session for the transaction of business; but such scheduled sittings of the court shall not preclude the transaction of business by the court at other times or places.
  2. In counties having more than one (1) judicial district, the county court shall be concurrently in session in each district.

History. Acts 1963, No. 214, §§ 4, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-603.3, 22-603.4.

16-15-106. Punishment for contempt.

The county court of each county, for an interruption of its proceedings or any contempt offered it while in session, shall have the power to impose a Class C misdemeanor.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 22, p. 53; C. & M. Dig., § 2284; Pope's Dig., § 2911; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 411.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “Class C misdemeanor” for “fine not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00) and to imprison the offender or offenders for each offense, not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours.”

Cross References. Contempt of court, § 16-10-108.

16-15-107. Approval of bonds in vacation.

The judge of the county court shall have power, in vacation, to approve any bond requiring the approval of the court by law. The bond, so approved by the judge, shall be submitted to the court, at its next regular meeting, for their approval or rejection, and, if rejected, a new bond and surety shall be given.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 29, p. 53; C. & M. Dig., § 2278; Pope's Dig., § 2905; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-611.

16-15-108. Special judges.

  1. When any county judge of the state shall be physically unable to attend to the business of his or her court to the extent that the business of the county court shall suffer on account of the physical disability, the circuit judge of the district in which the county is located shall have authority to certify to the Governor the physical disability of the county judge. The Governor shall appoint someone to hold the county court until such time as the regular county judge shall be physically able to resume his or her official duties.
  2. Every person appointed to serve as special judge of a county court shall be entitled to receive compensation at the rate of forty dollars ($40.00) per day for each day he or she shall sit, to be paid out of the county treasury.

History. Acts 1875, No. 73, § 3, p. 163; 1915, No. 340, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2276, 8728; Pope's Dig., §§ 2903, 11419; Acts 1975, No. 345, § 1; 1977, No. 765, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-132, 22-613.

16-15-109. Interest in county contracts or transactions prohibited.

    1. It shall be unlawful for any county judge to be interested, either directly or indirectly, in any contract or transaction made or entered into in his or her county or on behalf of his or her county or to accept or receive any property, money, or other valuable thing for his or her use or benefit on account of, connected with, or growing out of any contract or transaction had or made for his or her county.
    2. If, in the purchase of any materials, supplies, equipment, or machinery for the county, any discounts, credits, or allowances are given or allowed, they shall be for the benefit of the county. It shall be unlawful for the county judge to accept or retain the discounts, credits, or allowances for his or her own use or benefit. All such discounts, credits, or allowances must be given to the county.
  1. A violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be a misdemeanor, and upon conviction the county judge shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). In addition, the county judge shall be removed from office, and his or her successor shall be appointed as is provided by law.

History. Acts 1953, No. 218, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-612.1, 22-612.2.

Case Notes

County Contractor Bond Loan.

Judge who guaranteed a bond loan for a county contractor had an “interest” in a county contract in violation of subsection (a) of this section and was properly removed from office pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. Moncrief v. State, 325 Ark. 173, 925 S.W.2d 776 (1996).

Improvements.

Interest of a county judge in an improvement to which the county contributes with its labor and machinery is a violation of this section just as much as if the county had paid out cash. McGhee v. Glenn, 244 Ark. 1000, 428 S.W.2d 258 (1968).

16-15-110. Judge not to be interested party in county contracts, projects, buildings, etc.

It shall be unlawful for any county judge in this state to be either directly or indirectly interested, in his or her own county, in:

  1. The building or repairing of any public building or the building or repairing of any public bridge;
  2. Any toll bridge or causeway;
  3. Any public ferry;
  4. The keeping, feeding, or clothing of any pauper or poor or insane person;
  5. Any real or personal property, stationery, furniture, wood, or other materials purchased for the use of the county; or
  6. Any internal improvement to be paid for, in whole or in part, by the county.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 21, p. 53; C. & M. Dig., § 2277; Pope's Dig., § 2904; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-612.

Cross References. Violation of provisions governing claims against counties, §§ 14-23-106, 14-23-202.

Case Notes

Jury Question.

Evidence that county judge received rentals for use of an air compressor on the public roads of the county, which compressor he had received, at the time he was sheriff, in a trade of a county-owned rock crusher, was sufficient to present a question of fact for the jury. State v. Anderson, 200 Ark. 588, 139 S.W.2d 682 (1940).

Office Expenses.

Practice of county judge of reimbursing himself from county funds for out-of-pocket office expenses was illegal, but taxpayer could not recover amount of withdrawals for the county if county received full value. Ward v. Farrell, 221 Ark. 363, 253 S.W.2d 353 (1952).

16-15-111. Disqualification of judges.

No judge of the county court shall sit on the determination of any case in which he or she is interested in the outcome, is related to any party within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, has been of counsel, or is otherwise disqualified under the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, unless the parties waive the disqualification as provided therein.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2107, 6400; Pope's Dig., §§ 2711, 8362; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-113; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 100.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24, is also codified as § 16-13-214, 16-13-312 [repealed], 16-14-103 [repealed], 16-19-206 [repealed].

Cross References. Computing degrees of consanguinity, § 28-9-212.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Brill, The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 247.

Case Notes

Purpose.

This section and § 16-13-101 tend to carry out the intention of Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed]. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Acting as Counsel.

The objection that a judge was disqualified by reason of having appeared for the plaintiffs in a previous suit against the defendants upon the same cause of action which had been dismissed for want of prosecution will be deemed waived where the cause was allowed to proceed to judgment without calling the judge's attention to his disqualification. Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 139 Ark. 130, 213 S.W. 7 (1919).

Bias or Prejudice.

Prejudice is not ground for disqualifying judge. Jones v. State, 61 Ark. 88, 32 S.W. 81, 1895 Ark. LEXIS 81 (1895).

Whether a judge has become biased to the point that he should disqualify himself is a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge; the reason is that bias is a subjective matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the trial judge. Thus, absent some objective demonstration of prejudice, it is a communication of bias which will cause an appellate court to reverse a trial judge's decision on disqualification. Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

Continuance.

It is no ground of error that a judge who was incompetent to sit in a cause took jurisdiction of it so far as to grant a continuance, for it would have been continued by operation of law, without action of the judge, he being incompetent to try it. Stone v. Robinson, 9 Ark. (4 English) 469 (1849).

Interest.

The interest which disqualifies a judge is not the kind of interest which one feels in public proceedings or public measures; it must be a pecuniary or property interest or one affecting his individual rights; and the liability of pecuniary gain or relief must occur upon the event of the suit and not result remotely in the future from the general operation of laws and government upon the status fixed by the decision. Osborne v. Board of Imp., 94 Ark. 563, 128 S.W. 357 (1910).

The “interest” which is disqualifying under this section, § 16-13-101, and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed], is a personal proprietary or pecuniary interest or one affecting the individual rights of the judge, and the liability, gain or relief to the judge must turn on the outcome of the suit. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

Presumption.

Where the record fails to show that the court acted on a suggestion of disqualification, it will be presumed that he found that he was not disqualified. Davis v. Atkinson, 75 Ark. 300, 87 S.W. 432 (1905).

Relationship.

The husband of the aunt is related to the husband of her niece within the fourth degree of affinity. Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657 (1852).

At common law, a judge was not disqualified by reason of relationship to one of the parties to the suit. Morrow v. Watts, 80 Ark. 57, 95 S.W. 988 (1906).

A judge is disqualified when related within prohibited degree to attorney in the case who has a contingent interest in that his fee is dependent upon the determination of the cause. Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S.W. 143 (1908).

When the relationship is within the proscribed limits, neither the frequency of contact nor the closeness of the individuals bears on the result. Morton v. Benton Publishing Co., 291 Ark. 620, 727 S.W.2d 824 (1987).

Where one spouse's relationship with a judge comes within the prohibition of Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20 [repealed], this section, and §§ 16-13-214, 16-13-312 [repealed], 16-14-103 [repealed], or § 16-19-206 [repealed], the other spouse shares the same degree of relationship by affinity to the judge. Morton v. Benton Publishing Co., 291 Ark. 620, 727 S.W.2d 824 (1987).

Cited: Braswell v. Gehl, 263 Ark. 706, 567 S.W.2d 113 (1978).

16-15-112. Sheriff's attendance at court sessions.

It shall be the duty of the sheriff to attend each regular or special session of the county court for his or her county, either in person or by deputy, and to execute all orders and precepts made by the court. For his or her attendance, the sheriff shall be entitled to receive such fees as are allowed by law to sheriffs for executing the orders and precepts made by the county courts.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 6, p. 53; C. & M. Dig., § 2272; Pope's Dig., § 2899; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-614.

Cross References. Sheriff of court, § 16-10-122.

Case Notes

Absence of Sheriff.

Although a sheriff can be forced to attend a session of the county court, sessions held without the presence of the sheriff are valid, and a holding that a sheriff could prevent a session from being valid by merely staying away would be unreasonable. Adams v. Tackett, 236 Ark. 171, 365 S.W.2d 125 (1963).

Contempt.

A suit by a county judge to enjoin a sheriff from interfering with an order of the county court does not lie; the proper remedy is to cite the sheriff for contempt upon his refusal to obey. Penix v. Shaddox, 165 Ark. 152, 263 S.W. 389 (1924).

16-15-113. Court expenses — Payment.

The expenses accruing in the county courts shall be paid out of the county treasury in which the court is held in the same manner as other demands.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47; C. & M. Dig., § 2118; Pope's Dig., § 2722; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-125.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 47, is also codified as §§ 16-13-219, 16-13-324, and 16-14-109.

Chapter 16 Courts Of Common Pleas

16-16-201 — 16-16-1115. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This chapter was repealed by Acts 2001, No. 915, § 1. The chapter was derived from the following sources:

16-16-201. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-202. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-203. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-204. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-205. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-206. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-207. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-208. Acts 1915, No. 339, §§ 6, 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-209. Acts 1915, No. 339, §§ 12, 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-210. Acts 1915, No. 339, §§ 4, 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-211. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-212. Acts 1915, No. 339, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-213. Acts 1915, No. 339, §§ 9-11; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-301. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 2, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-302. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 1, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-303. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 3, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-304. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 4, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-305. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 10, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-306. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 9, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-307. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 8, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-308. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 19, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-309. Acts 1909, No. 352, §§ 8, 19, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-310. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 18, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-311. Acts 1909, No. 352, §§ 5, 6, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-312. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 11, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-313. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 7, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-314. Acts 1909, No. 352, § 12, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-315. Acts 1909, No. 352, §§ 13-17, p. 1028; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-401. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 1, p. 364; 1961, No. 13, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-402. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 5, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-403. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 4, p. 364; 1923, No. 95, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-404. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 9, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-405. Acts 1905, No. 149, §§ 2, 3, p. 364; 1919, No. 220, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-406. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 6, p. 364; 1919, No. 220, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-407. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 7, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-408. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 8, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-409. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 5, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-410. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 10, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-411. Acts 1905, No. 149, §§ 14, 15, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-412. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 11, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-413. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 12; p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-414. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 13, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-415. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 20, p. 364; 1963, No. 198, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-416. Acts 1905, No. 149, §§ 21, 22, p. 364; 1963, No. 198, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-417. Acts 1905, No. 149, §§ 19, 23, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-418. Acts 1905, No. 149, § 24, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-419. Acts 1905, No. 149, §§ 16-18, p. 364; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-501. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 1, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-502. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 2; p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-503. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 3, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-504. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 9, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-505. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 8, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-506. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 6, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-507. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 11, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-508. Acts 1917, No. 311, §§ 6, 7, 18, 19, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-509. Acts 1917, No. 311, §§ 20, 21, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-510. Acts 1917, No. 311, §§ 16, 17, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-511. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 4, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-512. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 5, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-513. Acts 1917, No. 311, § 10, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-514. Acts 1917, No. 311, §§ 12-15, p. 1622; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-601. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-602. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-603. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-604. Acts 1931, No. 100, §§ 9, 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-605. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-606. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-607. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-608. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-609. Acts 1931, No. 100, §§ 6, 7, 18, 19; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-610. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-611. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-612. Acts 1931, No. 100, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-613. Acts 1931, No. 100, §§ 13-16; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-701. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 2, p. 123; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-702. Acts 1883, No. 134, § 1, p. 320; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-703. Acts 1883, No. 134, § 1, p. 320; 1885, No. 25, § 1, p. 29; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-704. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 3, p. 123; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-705. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 4, p. 123; 1883, No. 134, § 2, p. 320; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-706. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 13, p. 123; 1879, No. 12, § 1, p. 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-707. Acts 1883, No. 134, § 1, p. 320; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-708. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 12, p. 123; 1891, No. 103, § 1, p. 186; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-709. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 9, p. 123; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-710. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 16, p. 123; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-711. Acts 1975, No. 653, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-712. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, §§ 10, 11, 23-25, p. 123; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-713. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 4, p. 123; 1883, No. 134, § 2, p. 320; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-714. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, §§ 21, 22, p. 123; 1887, No. 83, § 1, p. 120; 1889, No. 112, § 1, p. 163; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-715. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, §§ 5-8, p. 123; 1883, No. 134, §§ 3, 4, p. 320; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-716. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 14, p. 123; 1883, No. 134, § 5, p. 320; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-717. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, § 15, p. 123; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-718. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 61, §§ 17-20, p. 123; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-719. Acts 1885, No. 133, §§ 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19-21, p. 217; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-801. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 2, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-802. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 1, p. 109; 1921, No. 217, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-803. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 3, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-804. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 4, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-805. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 11, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-806. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 10, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-807. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 9, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-808. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 14, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-809. Acts 1889, No. 82, §§ 9, 21, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-810. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 20, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-811. Acts 1889, No. 82, §§ 5-8, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-812. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 12, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-813. Acts 1889, No. 82, § 13, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-814. Acts 1889, No. 82, §§ 15-19, p. 109; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-901. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 1, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-902. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 5, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-903. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 4, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-904. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 9, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-905. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 2, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-906. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 3, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-907. Acts 1917, No. 98, §§ 6, 7, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-908. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 8, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-909. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 5, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-910. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 10, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-911. Acts 1917, No. 98, §§ 14, 15, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-912. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 11, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-913. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 12, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-914. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 13, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-915. Acts 1917, No. 98, §§ 21-23, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-916. Acts 1917, No. 98, §§ 19, 20, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-917. Acts 1917, No. 98, § 24, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-918. Acts 1917, No. 98, §§ 16-18, p. 461; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1001. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 1, p. 2042; 1959, No. 125, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1002. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 2, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1003. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 3, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1004. Acts 1917, No. 452, §§ 9, 10, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1005. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 8, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1006. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 6, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1007. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 12, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1008. Acts 1917, No. 452, §§ 6, 7, 19, 20, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1009. Acts 1917, No. 452, §§ 17, 18, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1010. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 4, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1011. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 5, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1012. Acts 1917, No. 452, § 11, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1013. Acts 1917, No. 452, §§ 13-16, p. 2042; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1101. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 1, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1102. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 2, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1103. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 3, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1104. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 9, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1105. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 8, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1106. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 6, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1107. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 11, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1108. Acts 1893, No. 110, §§ 6, 7, 18, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1109. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 3, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1110. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 17, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1111. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 4, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1112. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 5, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1113. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 10, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1114. Acts 1893, No. 110, § 13, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

16-16-1115. Acts 1893, No. 110, §§ 12, 14-16, p. 190; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-615n.

Chapter 17 District Courts

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 30 and § 36 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration — Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 10.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

A New Judicial System for Arkansas, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 102.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Cross References. Allocation of portion of fines to Youth Accident Prevention Program, § 14-20-116.

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 80, § 5: approved Feb. 20, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It has been ascertained, and it is hereby declared, that all cities subject to the provisions of this act maintain and support competent city police forces, and that the counties in which the cities and townships affected by this act are located maintain their sheriffs and deputies on a salary and not on a fee basis; that in certain cities and townships subject to the provisions of this act, abuses exist which are inherent in the fee system of compensating constables in criminal cases; that great injury is being suffered, and will continue to be suffered, by the citizens and students of the cities and townships affected by this act; that on account of such abuses, it is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety that this act take effect at once, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1941, No. 118, § 4: approved Mar. 6, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, welfare and safety, an emergency is hereby declared and the same shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 275, § 4: Mar. 19, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It is the finding of the General Assembly that some scientific means of determination of the fact and degree of intoxication is necessary to the administration of justice in cases where drunkenness is an element of the offense, and that such cases have increased appreciably in the recent past, and this act being necessary to the administration of justice, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1961, No. 67, § 5: Feb. 9, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly of the State of Arkansas hereby finds and declares that the matters affected by this Act have a direct relation to the administration of justice and the preservation of order in the areas affected, and that therefore, an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in full force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1961, No. 121, § 4: approved Feb. 22, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there is conflict as to whether municipal court clerks have the authority to issue warrants, and many judges have the duty of issuing warrants, and to do so they must in advance listen to the testimony and statements of complainants, in order to prepare a proper affidavit and warrant, which process is detrimental to fair, impartial, and unprejudicial justice, and such complaints should be made to the prosecuting attorney or city attorney, it is found that this Act is in the furtherance of the administration of justice, and is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, welfare, and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared and this Act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1961, No. 159, § 5: Mar. 3, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “The general assembly of the state of Arkansas hereby finds and declares that the matters affected by this Act have a direct relation to the administration of justice and the preservation of order in the areas affected, and that therefore, an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in full force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 102, § 4: Feb. 16, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there are certain established municipal courts in this State in which there is periodically a vacancy in the position of municipal judge by virtue of the fact that there is no attorney in the area qualified to serve as judge of such court or because no qualified attorney in the area desires to run for and be elected to the office of judge of such court; that it is essential to the administration of justice in the areas where such courts are located that a judge be provided for the court; that it is in the best interest of justice and the municipality involved that the governing body of the municipality be authorized to employ any attorney within the county or the judge of another municipal court in the county to serve as judge of such court and to pay the person so employed such salary or remuneration as is provided by law or may be contracted for by the governing body of the employing municipality, and that this Act will accomplish this purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 157, § 3: Feb. 26, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is presently no specific authority for the judges of municipal courts in this State to appoint deputy municipal court clerks; that it is essential to the proper and efficient administration of justice in the municipal courts in this State that the judge be given this authority, subject to approval of the governing body of such city and that this Act should be given immediate effect in order to provide such authority. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1973, No. 40, § 3: Jan. 31, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there are certain established municipal courts in this State in which there is a vacancy in the office of municipal judge by reason of the fact that there is no qualified attorney residing in the county or by reason of the failure of any qualified attorney in the county to be elected to such office; that it is essential to the administration of justice in the areas where such courts are located that a qualified person be selected to serve as judge of such courts; that this Act is designed to permit the appointment or employment of a qualified person residing in an adjoining county to serve as judge in such municipal court and should be given effect immediately in order to further the administration of justice in such areas. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1085, § 6: Jan. 30, 1976. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the cost of law enforcement resulting from the necessity of having several municipal courts in a single county may in some cases become prohibitive; that it is in the best interest of the proper efficient and effective administration of justice in the various counties that two or more municipalities be authorized to enter into agreements whereby a single person would serve a judge of the municipal court of each of the agreeing municipalities; that it is in the best interest of the citizens of those counties affected that the agreeing municipalities and the county be permitted to enter into agreements regarding the compensation and place of holding municipal court for the various agreeing municipalities; that this Act is designed to accomplish this purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 801, § 4: Apr. 10, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that funds derived from fines, penalties and costs collected in municipal courts subject to the provisions of Act 87 of 1915 and Act 60 of 1927 in counties of over 250,000 persons have traditionally been used to finance the municipal courts and for other municipal purposes; that it would create a serious financial hardship on such municipalities if they were required to remit a portion of the funds so collected to the county in which they are located; that there is some confusion regarding the present state of law relating to this matter and that this Act is designed to clarify this situation and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 144, § 3: became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 9, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salary of the municipal judge of the Pulaski County Municipal Court is inadequate and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide more equitable compensation for such municipal court judge. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 621, § 4: emergency failed to pass. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the 74th General Assembly that the Judicial Retirement System does not have adequate funding, and that the funds heretofore appropriated by the General Assembly have not been sufficient to adequately fund the Judicial Retirement System; that such Judicial Retirement System is in need of sound funding so as to put it upon a sound actuarial basis; and that the money must be available immediately to provide funds for this purpose. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the day of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 759, § 3: Mar. 24, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the pressures on the municipal courts are such that the municipal court judges should be allowed to appoint magistrates to make the administration of justice more efficient and effective. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 918, § 16: Mar. 30, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fourth General Assembly that the act of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or drugs constitutes a serious and immediate threat to the safety of all citizens of this State, and that increasing the penalty for this dangerous conduct may serve as a deterrent to such behavior. Further, it is found that increased income derived from the levying of such penalties can best be utilized to provide immediate alcohol and drug safety and rehabilitation and treatment programs both to prevent an increase in the use of intoxicating alcoholic beverages and drugs and to rehabilitate persons convicted of related offenses. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 246, § 3: Mar. 4, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that municipalities having city or police courts now have no specific authority to levy court costs for the criminal justice fund; that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice that such cities be granted such authority as soon as possible and that this Act should be given effect immediately to grant such authority. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 955, §§ 3, 4: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1985, except as otherwise provided in Section 1. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salaries currently prescribed by law for judges of the various municipal courts in the State are inadequate to compensate the judges of such courts for their services; that the effective and efficient operation of the municipal courts in the State are essential to the administration of justice and that this Act is necessary to assure the effective and efficient operation of such courts and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 5: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the compensation currently provided for the grand jury stenographer of the First Judicial Circuit and for the municipal judge of the city of Rogers is inadequate to compensate said officials for their services; that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the First Judicial Circuit and in the Rogers Municipal Court that such officers be adequately compensated for their services; and that this Act is designed to accomplish this essential purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 139, § 2: July 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Sixth General Assembly that the present method of remitting the additional court costs by the collecting officers directly to the State Treasurer for the benefit of the Judicial Retirement System does not provide adequate internal accounting controls; and that by remitting such additional court costs to the Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System will provide the necessary mechanism in order to enhance the internal accounting control procedures of the State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1987.”

Acts 1987, No. 431, § 10: July 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Amendment 64 has an effective date of July 1, 1987, that the smooth implementation of the Amendment requires that this law be enacted; that should the General Assembly extend the session beyond the sixtieth day, there exists a danger that this law would not be in effect on July 1, 1987; therefore, this shall be effective July 1, 1987.”

Acts 1987, No. 871, § 6: Apr. 13, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that because of the case Ricarte v. State, CR 86-31, a question has arisen over the validity of Act 1085 of the Extended Session of 1976; that this Act is a reenactment of the former law; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to clarify the state of the law on this issue. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 1031, § 5: Apr. 14, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salaries currently prescribed by law for judges of the various municipal courts in the State are inadequate to compensate the judges of such courts for their services; that the effective and efficient operation of the municipal courts in the State are essential to the administration of justice and that this Act is necessary to assure the effective and efficient operation of such courts and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 49, § 4: June 26, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that because of unclear language regarding the application of the additional court cost some jurisdictions have not levied the cost and that currently only cities may receive funds generated by this additional court cost, which impairs the adequate financing of municipal court operations by county governments, and it is thereby necessary to clarify the application of this court cost and to provide cities and counties the option to change the proportion of funds received by various jurisdictions in order to provide for the efficient and effective administration of justice in each county. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 425, § 5: approved Mar. 9, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the preservation of justice requires that certain salaries be affixed by law; that it is necessary for the continuation of administration of justice that this act take effect immediately. Therefore, this act being necessary for the preservation of the public health, welfare, and safety shall become effective immediately upon passage.”

Acts 1989, No. 443, § 7: Mar. 9, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the preservation of justice requires that certain salaries be affixed by law; that it is necessary for the continuation of administration of justice that this act take effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 706, § 7: Mar. 20, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the preservation of justice requires that certain salaries be affixed by law; that it is necessary for the continuation of administration of justice that this act take effect immediately. Therefore, this act being necessary for the preservation of the public health, welfare, and safety shall become effective immediately upon passage.”

Acts 1989, No. 873, § 6: Mar. 22, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Seventh General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the salaries currently prescribed by law for judges of the various municipal courts in the State are inadequate to compensate the judges of such courts for their services; that the effective and efficient operation of the municipal courts in the State are essential to the administration of justice and that this act is necessary to assure the effective and efficient operations of such courts and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 35, § 5: Jan. 1, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the maximum salary for the DeQueen Municipal Court clerk is inadequate; that this Act eliminates the cap on that salary; and that until this Act goes into effect the city and county will be restricted by the inadequate limitation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after January 1, 1991.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 28: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the language of certain court cost statutes lacks uniformity; that such lack of uniformity is detrimental to the proper collection of such court costs; and that such language should be standardized to promote the proper collection of such costs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 982, § 5: Apr. 8, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salaries currently prescribed by law for judges of the various municipal courts in the State are inadequate to compensate the judges of such courts for their services; that the effective and efficient operation of the municipal courts in the State are essential to the administration of justice and that this act is necessary to assure the effective and efficient operation of such courts and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 1234, § 5: Apr. 10, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that an alternative to bail is desirable and necessary for pretrial detainees and that the alternative to bail would aid the administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from the after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 5: Feb. 27, 1992. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Act 982 of 1991 inadvertently failed to set a salary range for the municipal court judge and clerk of the Fordyce municipal court, but rather set a specified salary which is not reflective of the salary the judge and clerk are currently paid and is not reflective of the salary approved by the Fordyce City Council and the Dallas County Quorum Court. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 5: Feb. 27, 1992. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the maximum salary of the Lonoke Municipal Court Judge is inadequate and that until this act goes into effect, the city and county will be restricted by the inadequate limitation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 33, § 7: Mar. 10, 1992. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the maximum annual salary for the Marianna municipal court judge is inadequate and should be increased as soon as possible and that this act will accomplish the same. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 29, § 8: Aug. 23, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload of the Seventeenth Judicial District (West) necessitates the appointment of an additional circuit-chancery judge immediately; that the salary cap for the Waldron Municipal Court Clerk must be raised in order to retain efficient court personnel and that this act so provides and should therefore be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 1032, § 13: July 1, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly, that in order for the Department of Health to become more efficient in accounting and budgetary practices due to the transfer of the Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, changes in various funds are needed; and that the provisions of this Act provide such changes. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1995.”

Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 424, § 5: Mar. 10, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the caseload, and thusly, the workload of the Magnolia Municipal Court has increased and the salary cap for the Magnolia Municipal Court Clerk and Deputy Clerk must be raised in order to retain efficient court personnel, and this act so provides and should therefore be given immediate effect. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 1243, § 2: Apr. 2, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that there is a substantial risk of continued failures to appear by persons served with notice to appear in municipal courts, thus weakening enforcement of the traffic and criminal laws of Arkansas and endangering travelers on Arkansas' highways. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 1693, § 3: July 1, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that with the approval by the voters of Arkansas of Amendment 80 of the Arkansas Constitution, the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 2001 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 2001 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after July 1, 2001.”

Acts 2003, No. 1188, § 2: Apr. 9, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that for over six (6) months the Arkansas Department of Correction has failed to pay county governments millions of dollars for state prisoners backlogged into the county jails; that counties are in desperate need of additional revenues to maintain criminal detention facilities; that without additional revenues, the county criminal detention facilities will begin to release dangerous prisoners from custody and threaten the public safety; and that unless this act goes into effect immediately those additional revenues will not be available to the county governments. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2005, No. 1373, § 2: Mar. 29, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that questions have arisen regarding the interpretation of Act 1188 of 2003; that the fiscal burdens of incarcerating prisoners in city and county jails are increasing; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to provide financial relief to defray the cost of city and county prisoners. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 177, § 15: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this bill affects the structure of the Arkansas District Judge Retirement System and the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System and the ideal time to make revisions to the retirement systems is at the beginning of the state's fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2007.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2009, No. 209, § 3: July 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the increasing costs of incarcerating or otherwise keeping prisoners in county jails creates an economic hardship; that maximum fines allowed by statute for convicted persons are too low; and that this act is immediately necessary because county jails are overcrowded. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2009.”

Acts 2011, No. 1191, § 18: Jan. 1, 2012. “The effective date of Section 18 [17] of this act is January 1, 2012.”

16-17-101. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning agreements by municipalities to be served by a single judge, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 102, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1975 (Extended Sess. 1976), No. 1085, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-703.1 — 22-703.4; reen. Acts 1987, No. 871, §§ 1-4.

16-17-102. Exchange of jurisdictions by district court judges.

  1. District judges may temporarily exchange districts by joint order entered of record in their respective courts. They may hold court for each other for such length of time as may seem practicable and for the best interest of their respective courts.
  2. District judges exchanging jurisdictional authority or districts shall have the same power or authority, holding courts for each other, as the district judge for the district in which the court or courts shall be held.
  3. No city or county shall be held liable for nor shall incur any expense whatsoever for any special pay or travel costs arising out of any exchange of judicial districts between district judges.

History. Acts 1961, No. 88, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-748 — 22-750; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 103.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 103: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

16-17-103. Residency requirement of judges.

The judge of a district court shall be a qualified elector within the geographical area from which he or she is chosen.

History. Acts 1963, No. 21, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-704.3; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 104.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 104: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

16-17-104. Law license requirement for district judges.

District judges shall have been licensed attorneys of this state for at least four (4) years immediately preceding the date of assuming office.

History. Acts 1963, No. 538, § 1; 1967, No. 151, § 1; 1969, No. 51, § 1; 1981, No. 640, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-704.4; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 105.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 105: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Case Notes

Cited: Lawson v. City of Mammoth Spring ex rel. Smith, 287 Ark. 12, 696 S.W.2d 712 (1985).

16-17-105. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the vacancy or inability of a judge to serve in the municipal courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 106 effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1971, No. 102, § 1; 1973, No. 40, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-705.1, 22-705.2.

16-17-106. Deputy district court clerks generally.

    1. The judge of the district court of any city in this state may, with the approval of the governing body of the city, appoint one (1) or more deputy district court clerks to serve under the judge's supervision.
    2. The deputy district court clerk employed by a city or county is governed by the employee handbook and policies of the city or county.
    3. If a deputy district court clerk is employed by more than one (1) city or county, then the employing cities, counties, or both, shall determine by written agreement the apportionment of expenses and the applicable employee handbook and policies.
    4. The district court judge shall ensure compliance with the applicable employee handbook, policies, procedures, practices, ordinances, and resolutions of the city or county, or both, consistent with Canon 2 of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct.
    1. The salary of a deputy district court clerk may be less than, but not more than, the salary paid to the district court clerk.
    2. The salary designated for the office of district court clerk may be apportioned by the city council between and among the district court clerks and any deputy district court clerks.
  1. A deputy district court clerk may perform all duties and exercise all powers granted to the district court clerk and shall post bond in the same manner and amount as required of the district court clerk.

History. Acts 1971, No. 157, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-713.1; Acts 2015, No. 587, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment inserted “district” in the section heading; substituted “deputy district court clerk” for “deputy clerk” or a variant throughout the section; redesignated former (a) as (a)(1); substituted “judge's supervision” for “supervision of the district court clerk” at the end of (a)(1); added (a)(2) through (4); redesignated former (b) as (b)(1) and (2); substituted “any deputy district court clerks” for “any or all of the deputies” at the end of (b)(2); and substituted “may” for “are empowered to” in (c).

16-17-107. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning municipal court magistrates, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 107. The section was derived from Acts 1983, No. 759, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-766, 22-766.1; Acts 1987, No. 979, § 1.

16-17-108. Salaries of personnel and other requirements of various district courts.

  1. Unless otherwise provided by law, the salaries of the judges and other personnel of the various district courts shall be established as follows:
      1. The Arkansas County District Court — Northern District Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), the district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirteen thousand eight hundred thirty-four dollars and ninety-two cents ($13,834.92) nor more than forty-four thousand dollars ($44,000), and the deputy court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than eleven thousand four hundred seventy-five dollars ($11,475) nor more than thirty-one thousand dollars ($31,000).
      2. The salaries shall be as determined by the governing body of the City of Stuttgart and the Arkansas County Quorum Court and paid one-half (½) by the city and one-half (½) by the county;
    1. The Arkansas County District Court — Southern District Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), the district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) nor more than thirty-nine thousand dollars ($39,000), and the deputy clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-three thousand dollars ($23,000) nor more than thirty-one thousand dollars ($31,000). The salaries shall be determined by the governing body of the City of DeWitt and the Arkansas County Quorum Court and paid one-half (½) by the city and one-half (½) by the county;
      1. The Ashley County District Court — Crossett Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000).
      2. The salary shall be in an amount within the range prescribed in this subdivision (a)(3), as agreed upon by the Ashley County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Crossett;
      1. The Ashley County District Court — Hamburg Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000).
      2. The salary shall be in an amount within the range prescribed in this subdivision (a)(4), as agreed upon by the Ashley County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Hamburg;
    2. The Baxter County District Court Clerk shall receive compensation in an amount as may be provided by the City of Mountain Home and the Baxter County Quorum Court. The salary shall be paid one-half (½) by the City of Mountain Home and one-half (½) by Baxter County;
      1. The Calhoun County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) nor more than twenty-four thousand dollars ($24,000), as may be determined by the Hampton City Council and the Calhoun County Quorum Court.
      2. The salary shall be paid by the City of Hampton and Calhoun County in equal monthly installments;
    3. The Camden District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) to be paid by the City of Camden and Ouachita County;
        1. The Chicot County District Court — Dermott Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000).
        2. However, the district court clerk's position may be a full-time or part-time position.
      1. The salary shall be in an amount within the range prescribed in subdivision (a)(8)(A)(i) of this section as agreed upon by the Chicot County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Dermott.
      2. The salary of the district court clerk shall be paid as follows:
        1. Fifty percent (50%) to be paid by the City of Dermott; and
        2. Fifty percent (50%) to be paid by Chicot County;
      1. The Chicot County District Court — Eudora Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000).
      2. The salary shall be in an amount within the range prescribed in subdivision (a)(9)(A) of this section as agreed upon by the Chicot County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Eudora.
      3. The salary of the district court clerk shall be paid as follows:
        1. Fifty percent (50%) to be paid by the City of Eudora; and
        2. Fifty percent (50%) to be paid by Chicot County;
        1. The Chicot County District Court — Lake Village Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000).
        2. If authorized by the governing body of the City of Lake Village and the Chicot County Quorum Court, the district court judge shall be authorized to employ a full-time or part-time deputy district court clerk at an annual salary of not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than twenty-three thousand dollars ($23,000).
        3. The salaries shall be in an amount within the range prescribed in this subdivision (a)(10)(A), as agreed upon by the Chicot County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Lake Village.
      1. The salary of the district court clerk shall be paid as follows:
        1. Fifty percent (50%) to be paid by the City of Lake Village; and
        2. Fifty percent (50%) to be paid by Chicot County;
    4. The Clark County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) nor more than forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000), to be established annually by the Clark County Quorum Court. Upon approval by the Clark County Quorum Court, the Clark County District Court Judge may appoint one (1) deputy district court clerk to receive a salary as established by the Clark County Quorum Court;
      1. The Clay County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), to be paid, as well as other current benefits, in equal monthly installments by Clay County.
      2. Fifty percent (50%) of the amount shall be reimbursed by the City of Corning, the City of Piggott, and the City of Rector at eighteen and five-tenths percent (18.5%), eighteen and five-tenths percent (18.5%), and thirteen percent (13%), respectively, to the county treasury.
      3. The clerks of the respective district courts shall receive an annual salary of not less than four thousand five hundred dollars ($4,500) nor more than eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000), to be paid, as well as other current benefits, in equal monthly installments by Clay County.
      4. Fifty percent (50%) of the amount shall be reimbursed by the respective cities;
    5. The Cleveland County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) nor more than twenty-four thousand dollars ($24,000), as may be determined by the Rison City Council and the Cleveland County Quorum Court;
    6. The Columbia County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-four thousand dollars ($24,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). Any salaries paid over the minimum salaries set in this subdivision (a)(14) shall be paid only upon the approval of the governing bodies of the City of Magnolia and Columbia County;
      1. The Conway County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-two thousand five hundred dollars ($32,500) nor more than forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000).
      2. However, the salary may be increased by such an amount as may be agreed to by the Conway County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Morrilton by ordinances adopted by their respective bodies;
      1. The Craighead County District Court Judge shall maintain dockets and hold court, as deemed necessary, in each of the county seats of Craighead County and may establish dockets and hold court in other cities and towns in Craighead County, as deemed necessary by ordinance adopted by the Craighead County Quorum Court.
      2. Necessary expenses appropriated for the Craighead County District Court shall be apportioned among and paid to the county from the respective cities of the first class and cities of the second class, incorporated towns, and the government of Craighead County as a prorated amount based on the number of cases filed from each of the towns and cities and the county during the preceding calendar year;
      1. The Cross County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-three thousand dollars ($33,000) nor more than forty-four thousand dollars ($44,000).
      2. This salary and the salaries of all court employees shall be as determined by the governing body of the City of Wynne;
    7. The Dallas County District Court Clerks shall receive an annual salary of not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) nor more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), as may be determined by the Fordyce City Council and the Dallas County Quorum Court, and the salaries shall be paid by the City of Fordyce and Dallas County in equal monthly installments;
      1. The Desha County District Court — Dumas Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), and the deputy district clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fourteen thousand five hundred dollars ($14,500) nor more than twenty-eight thousand dollars ($28,000).
      2. The salary shall be paid one-half (½) by the Desha County Quorum Court and one-half (½) by the City of Dumas and shall be determined by the Desha County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Dumas;
    8. The Desha County District Court — McGehee Department Clerk shall be employed and paid by the City of McGehee at such a salary as the governing body of the City of McGehee shall determine;
    9. The East Camden District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than three thousand eight hundred fifty-nine dollars ($3,859) nor more than twenty-three thousand dollars ($23,000), to be paid by the City of East Camden;
    10. The Washington County District Court — Elkins Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000);
      1. The Franklin County District Court — Charleston District Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000).
      2. The salaries and costs may be set and the payment may be apportioned by agreement between the governing body of the City of Charleston and the Franklin County Quorum Court;
      1. The Franklin County District Court — Ozark District Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-two thousand six hundred dollars ($22,600) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
      2. The salary and costs may be set and the payment of the salary and costs may be apportioned by agreement between the governing body of the City of Ozark and the Franklin County Quorum Court;
        1. The Fulton County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000) nor more than forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000).
        2. The annual salary of the Fulton County District Court Clerk shall be not less than seventeen thousand seven hundred forty-eight dollars ($17,748) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000).
        1. The expense of salaries, along with all other necessary and customary expenses of the court, shall be shared by Fulton County, the City of Salem, and the City of Mammoth Spring, based on a percentage of the actual number of cases handled through the court for each governmental entity.
        2. The percentage shall be determined annually by dividing the total number of cases handled by the district court into the number of cases handled annually for each of the aforementioned governmental entities.
        3. On January 1 of each year, each share shall be estimated based on the number of cases handled by the district court for each of the respective governmental entities for the preceding year.
        4. However, on December 31 of each year, each share shall be adjusted to reflect the actual percentage for each governmental entity for that year based on the actual case load.
      1. The salaries and expenses shall be paid in equal monthly installments by Fulton County, and the City of Salem and the City of Mammoth Spring shall reimburse the county on a monthly basis for their respective shares of salaries and expenses;
      1. The Garland County District Court Judges, Departments 1 and 2, each shall receive an annual salary of not less than sixty-five thousand dollars ($65,000) nor more than ninety-five thousand dollars ($95,000), and the Garland County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-six thousand dollars ($26,000) nor more than sixty-eight thousand four hundred dollars ($68,400).
      2. The salaries shall be determined by the governing body of the City of Hot Springs and the Garland County Quorum Court;
      1. The Grant County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-one thousand dollars ($21,000) nor more than thirty-six thousand dollars ($36,000), as approved by the Grant County Quorum Court.
      2. The district court clerk's salary shall be paid as follows:
        1. Twenty-seven percent (27%) to be paid by the City of Sheridan; and
        2. Seventy-three percent (73%) to be paid by Grant County;
      1. The Greene County District Court — Paragould District Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than nineteen thousand eight hundred fifty-six dollars ($19,856) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), the chief deputy district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than sixteen thousand six hundred twenty-four dollars ($16,624) nor more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000), and the deputy district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirteen thousand three hundred fourteen dollars ($13,314) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000).
      2. The salaries shall be determined by the Greene County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Paragould and shall be paid in twelve (12) equal monthly installments;
      1. The Hempstead County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-six thousand dollars ($36,000) nor more than forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000).
      2. The amount of the salary shall be determined by agreement between the governing body of the City of Hope and the Hempstead County Quorum Court;
    11. The Hot Spring County — Malvern Department District Court Judge shall be entitled to an additional deputy district court clerk whose salary shall be determined by the governing body of the City of Malvern and the Hot Spring County Quorum Court, and the salary shall be paid by the city and county in the same proportion as the city and county shared in the revenues generated by the court in the previous year;
        1. The Howard County District Court Judge shall have an annual salary of not less than twenty-one thousand dollars ($21,000).
        2. The Howard County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) nor more than nineteen thousand dollars ($19,000), unless provided for otherwise by ordinance of the Howard County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Nashville.
      1. The salaries are to be paid one-half (½) by the City of Nashville and one-half (½) by Howard County;
      1. The Izard County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than ten thousand two hundred dollars ($10,200) nor more than forty-two thousand dollars ($42,000), and the district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than seven thousand four hundred dollars ($7,400) nor more than thirty-three thousand dollars ($33,000).
      2. However, the salaries shall be subject to the approval of the Melbourne City Council and the Izard County Quorum Court;
      1. The Jackson County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) nor more than fifty-five thousand dollars ($55,000).
      2. The salary of the district court judge shall be paid one-half (½) by the City of Newport and one-half (½) by Jackson County;
    12. The Jacksonville District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-three thousand nine hundred thirty-seven dollars ($33,937) nor more than thirty-six thousand nine hundred dollars ($36,900);
      1. The Newton County District Court — Jasper Department District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-eight thousand six hundred dollars ($28,600) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000).
      2. All salaries and all other expenses of the office shall be paid one hundred percent (100%) by the county;
    13. The Jefferson County District Court clerks for Division 1 and Division 2 shall receive annual salaries of not less than thirty-one thousand dollars ($31,000) nor more than fifty-four thousand dollars ($54,000), as may be approved by the Jefferson County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Pine Bluff;
      1. The Johnson County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) nor more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000).
      2. This expense, as well as all other expenses related to the operation of the Johnson County District Court, is to be divided among the county and all cities within the county based on the percentage of the total fine money collected during the year by each participating entity;
      1. The Lafayette County — Lewisville Department District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000), and the City of Lewisville shall pay to the district court clerk at least eight thousand eight hundred dollars ($8,800) but not more than fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000) of the salary, and Lafayette County shall pay to the district court clerk not less than thirteen thousand two hundred dollars ($13,200) but not more than twenty-one thousand dollars ($21,000) of the salary.
      2. The amount and manner of payment of the salary of the district court clerk may be established within the ranges specified in subdivision (a)(38)(A) of this section by mutual agreement of the Lafayette County Quorum Court and the Lewisville City Council, as well as the amount and manner of payment of all other expenses of operation of the Lafayette County — Lewisville Department District Court;
      1. The Lawrence County District Court — Hoxie Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirteen thousand seven hundred forty dollars ($13,740) nor more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), to be paid by the City of Hoxie and approved by its governing body.
      2. The Lawrence County District Court — Walnut Ridge Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than fifty-one thousand dollars ($51,000) nor more than sixty thousand dollars ($60,000), one-half (½) of the salary to be paid by the City of Walnut Ridge and the other one-half (½) to be paid by Lawrence County;
      1. The Little River County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-two thousand eight hundred dollars ($32,800) nor more than sixty-five thousand dollars ($65,000), as determined by the governing body of the City of Ashdown and the Little River County Quorum Court.
      2. The salary shall be paid sixty-two percent (62%) by Little River County and thirty-eight percent (38%) by the City of Ashdown, unless otherwise agreed by the Little River County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Ashdown;
    14. The Logan County District Court — Northern District Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000) nor more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000), as may be determined by the Paris City Council and the Logan County Quorum Court and shall be payable one-half (½) by the City of Paris and one-half (½) by Logan County and shall be paid in twelve (12) equal monthly installments;
    15. The Logan County District Court — Southern District Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000) nor more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000), as may be determined by the Booneville City Council and the Logan County Quorum Court and shall be payable one-half (½) by the City of Booneville and one-half (½) by Logan County and shall be paid in twelve (12) equal monthly installments;
    16. The Lonoke County District Court — Northern District Cabot Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), as may be determined by the governing body of the City of Cabot;
    17. The Lonoke County District Court — Northern District Ward Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), as may be determined by the governing body of the City of Ward;
    18. The Lonoke County District Court — Southern District Carlisle Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than four thousand five hundred dollars ($4,500) nor more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000);
    19. The Lonoke County District Court — Southern District England Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than four thousand five hundred dollars ($4,500) nor more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000);
      1. The Lonoke County District Court — Southern District Lonoke Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), as may be determined by the governing body of the City of Lonoke.
        1. Necessary expenses appropriated by the City of Lonoke for the district court shall be apportioned among and paid to the City of Lonoke by the cities of the first class, cities of the second class, incorporated towns, and the county as a prorated amount based on the number of cases filed from each of the cities of the first class, cities of the second class, incorporated towns, and the county during the preceding year.
        2. An itemized bill shall be prepared by the City of Lonoke fixing the apportioned expenses, and payment shall be made no later than sixty (60) days following the submission by the City of Lonoke of the bills;
      1. The Maumelle District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than seventeen thousand five hundred dollars ($17,500) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
      2. The salary of the district court clerk shall be as determined by the City of Maumelle Board of Directors;
      1. The Miller County District Court shall have two (2) departments, the City of Texarkana Department and the Miller County Department.
      2. The Miller County District Court — City of Texarkana Department shall hear all civil and criminal cases arising out of violations of city ordinances and those cases arising out of violations of state laws committed within the corporate limits of the City of Texarkana and all other cases in controversy arising within the corporate limits of the city within the jurisdiction of a district court as established by law. The Miller County District Court — City of Texarkana Department shall have a chief district court clerk whose salary shall be paid by the City of Texarkana in an amount to be determined by its governing body.
      3. The Miller County District Court — Miller County Department shall hear all civil and criminal cases arising out of violations of any of the laws of the state committed outside the corporate limits of the City of Texarkana and all other cases in controversy arising outside the corporate limits of the city within the jurisdiction of a district court as established by law. The Miller County District Court — Miller County Department shall have a chief district court clerk whose salary shall be paid by Miller County in an amount to be determined by its quorum court;
    20. The Monroe County District Court — Brinkley Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than ten thousand two hundred dollars ($10,200) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000), and the Monroe County District Court — Brinkley Department Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than ten thousand four hundred eighty-eight dollars ($10,488) and not more than twenty-seven thousand five hundred dollars ($27,500);
    21. The Monroe County District Court — Clarendon Department Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than four thousand eight hundred dollars ($4,800) and the Monroe County District Court — Clarendon Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than eight thousand nine hundred eighty-eight dollars ($8,988);
      1. The Montgomery County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) to be paid in equal monthly installments.
      2. The district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than nineteen thousand dollars ($19,000) nor more than twenty-seven thousand dollars ($27,000), and the district court secretary shall receive an annual salary of not less than sixteen thousand dollars ($16,000) nor more than twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000).
      3. Montgomery County shall pay eighty percent (80%) of the salaries, and the City of Mt. Ida shall pay twenty percent (20%) of the salaries;
      1. The Nevada County District Court Clerk salary shall be not less than twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) nor more than eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000).
      2. The salary for the district court clerk shall be established within these ranges by the Nevada County Quorum Court and the Prescott City Council, and the salary shall be paid sixty percent (60%) by Nevada County and forty percent (40%) by the City of Prescott. The salary shall be paid in equal monthly installments;
    22. [Repealed.]
      1. The North Little Rock District Court Judges, Divisions 1 and 2, are each authorized to employ a chief district court clerk, whose salary shall be at least thirty-two thousand five hundred dollars ($32,500) but not more than fifty-five thousand five hundred dollars ($55,500), a deputy district court clerk, whose salary shall be at least thirty-two thousand dollars ($32,000) but not more than forty-two thousand five hundred dollars ($42,500), and two (2) district court clerks, whose salaries shall each be at least twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) but not more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000).
      2. The North Little Rock District Court Judges, Divisions 1 and 2, subject to the approval of the governing body of North Little Rock, may each employ an additional district court clerk whose salary shall be at least twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) but not more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000);
    23. The Perry County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary to be paid by Perry County of not less than twenty-three thousand five hundred dollars ($23,500) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000);
    24. The Pike County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than six thousand dollars ($6,000) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), and the district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than three thousand dollars ($3,000) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000). Seventy-five percent (75%) of the salaries shall be paid by Pike County, and twenty-five percent (25%) shall be paid by the City of Murfreesboro;
      1. The Poinsett County District Court shall consist of five (5) departments located in Harrisburg, Lepanto, Marked Tree, Trumann, and Tyronza.
      2. All five (5) departments shall be served by one (1) judge.
      3. The salary of the district court clerk of each department will be as determined by the Poinsett County Quorum Court and the governing body of each municipality where the department is located.
      4. The salary of each district court clerk shall be payable one-half (½) by Poinsett County and one-half (½) by the municipality.
      5. Each municipality shall receive from the county each month the county's share of the district court clerk's salaries;
    25. The Polk County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-two thousand dollars ($32,000) nor more than forty-six thousand dollars ($46,000) to be paid in equal monthly installments, with fifty-six percent (56%) to be paid by Polk County, twenty-seven percent (27%) to be paid by the City of Mena, and seventeen percent (17%) to be paid by the town of Grannis;
    26. The Pope County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-three thousand dollars ($23,000) nor more than forty-eight thousand dollars ($48,000), the chief deputy district court clerk of the court shall receive an annual salary of not less than eighteen thousand five hundred dollars ($18,500) nor more than thirty-nine thousand dollars ($39,000), and the deputy district court clerk of the court shall receive an annual salary of not less than sixteen thousand five hundred dollars ($16,500) nor more than thirty-two thousand dollars ($32,000);
    27. The Washington County District Court — Prairie Grove Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500) nor more than fifty-one thousand dollars ($51,000);
    28. The Pulaski County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fifty-two thousand eight hundred sixty-eight dollars ($52,868) nor more than seventy-two thousand three hundred fifty dollars ($72,350), and the district court bailiff shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-two thousand dollars ($32,000) nor more than fifty-five thousand three hundred fifty-five dollars ($55,355);
      1. The Randolph County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than nineteen thousand dollars ($19,000) nor more than forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000), and the district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than six thousand dollars ($6,000) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000).
      2. The salaries shall be payable one-half (½) by the City of Pocahontas and one-half (½) by Randolph County and shall be payable in twelve (12) equal monthly installments;
      1. The Saline County District Court — Benton Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
      2. The salary shall be as determined by the governing body of the City of Benton and the Saline County Quorum Court;
      1. The Scott County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-seven thousand dollars ($27,000) nor more than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000), and the district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirteen thousand dollars ($13,000) nor more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
      2. The salaries shall be subject to the approval of the Waldron City Council and the Scott County Quorum Court and shall be paid in equal monthly installments, one-half (½) to be paid by the City of Waldron and one-half (½) to be paid by Scott County;
      1. The Searcy County District Court — Marshall Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-four thousand seven hundred twenty dollars ($24,720) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), as determined by the Searcy County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Marshall by ordinances or resolutions adopted by the respective bodies.
      2. The salary of the district court clerk shall be paid fifty percent (50%) by Searcy County and fifty percent (50%) by the City of Marshall.
      3. The salary shall be paid in equal monthly installments;
      1. The Sebastian County District Court — Fort Smith District Judges, Departments 1, 2, and 3, shall jointly appoint a qualified elector of the state to serve as district court clerk.
        1. The district court clerk shall have at least five (5) years' previous experience as a court clerk or deputy court clerk or equivalent education, training, and experience as determined by the Director of Human Resources for the City of Fort Smith.
        2. Appointment and removal of the district court clerk shall be in conformance with the City of Fort Smith's current personnel policies in place at the time of appointment and removal of the district court clerk.
      2. The salaries of the district court clerk, deputy district court clerks, court personnel, and any special district court judges authorized by this subdivision (a)(67) and the operating expenses of the Sebastian County District Court — Fort Smith District shall be paid seventy percent (70%) by the City of Fort Smith and thirty percent (30%) by Sebastian County;
      1. The Sebastian County District Court — Greenwood District salaries of the district court clerk and the district court clerk's deputies shall be set by the Sebastian County Quorum Court.
      2. The salaries shall be paid ninety percent (90%) by Sebastian County and ten percent (10%) by the City of Greenwood.
      3. In order to defray the expenses of operating the Sebastian County District Court — Greenwood District, ninety percent (90%) of the Sebastian County net fines, ten percent (10%) of the City of Greenwood net fines, and fifteen percent (15%) of all other cities' net fines processed by the Sebastian County District Court — Greenwood District may or shall be deposited into a bank account entitled the “Greenwood District Court Operating Fund” to be administered by the Sebastian County District Court — Greenwood District Judge under a budget approved as follows:
        1. The district court judge shall submit a proposed annual budget to a committee composed of the members of the quorum court that represent the Greenwood District of Sebastian County;
        2. The committee shall approve the district court judge's budget or formulate a reasonable budget that shall be approved by the Sebastian County Quorum Court, unless found by a majority of the quorum court to be clearly excessive; and
        3. If funds provided from the fines as set out in this subdivision (a)(68) become insufficient or excessive, the committee shall adjust the percentage of fines on a pro rata basis to increase or decrease the funds necessary to operate the district court pursuant to the budget established in this subdivision (a)(68).
      4. The Sebastian County District Court Judge — Greenwood District shall be bonded in accordance with §§ 19-1-401 — 19-1-403;
      1. The Sevier County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) nor more than eighty percent (80%) of the annual salary established by law for circuit court judges.
      2. The Sevier County District Court Clerk shall have an annual salary of not less than fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000).
      3. The salaries, expenses, and operating costs of the Sevier County District Court shall be paid equally by the City of DeQueen and Sevier County;
    29. The Sharp County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) nor more than forty thousand dollars ($40,000), and the Sharp County District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than seventeen thousand six hundred eighty dollars ($17,680) nor more than thirty-three thousand two hundred eighty dollars ($33,280), as determined by the Sharp County Quorum Court and to be paid by Sharp County;
      1. The Sherwood District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) nor more than seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000).
      2. The salary shall be determined by the governing body of the City of Sherwood;
      1. The Stone County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than eight thousand dollars ($8,000) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), and the district court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than six thousand dollars ($6,000) nor more than twenty-three thousand dollars ($23,000).
      2. The salaries shall be subject to the approval of the Mountain View City Council and the Stone County Quorum Court;
    30. The Van Buren County District Court — Clinton Department Clerk and any district court clerk deputy salaries shall be apportioned between the county and any city in the county by agreement between the respective governing bodies;
    31. The Washington County District Court — West Fork Department annual salary for each district court clerk shall be not less than twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500) nor more than sixty thousand dollars ($60,000);
    32. The White County District Court — Beebe Department Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-five thousand two hundred ten dollars ($25,210) nor more than forty thousand nine hundred ninety dollars ($40,990);
    33. The Woodruff County District Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000) nor more than thirty-six thousand dollars ($36,000);
      1. The Wrightsville District Court Clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than ten thousand nine hundred twenty-six dollars ($10,926) nor more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
      2. The salary shall be determined by the City of Wrightsville Board of Directors;
    34. The Yell County District Court — Northern District Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than ten thousand one hundred six dollars ($10,106) nor more than twenty-one thousand six hundred forty-three dollars ($21,643), as determined by the Yell County Quorum Court; and
    35. The Yell County District Court — Southern District Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than ten thousand one hundred six dollars ($10,106) nor more than twenty-one thousand six hundred forty-three dollars ($21,643), as determined by the Yell County Quorum Court.
  2. The local salary supplement paid to a district court judge under § 16-17-115(c) shall not be used when calculating the salary established in this section.

History. Acts 1989, No. 425, §§ 1, 2; 1989, No. 443, § 3; 1989, No. 706, § 3; 1989, No. 873, § 1; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 1; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 29, § 1; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 67, §§ 1-6; 1991, No. 35, § 1; 1991, No. 715, §§ 1, 4; 1991, No. 982, § 1; 1991, No. 1152, § 1; 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 1; 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 1; 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 33, §§ 1, 3; 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 39, § 1; 1993, No. 1260, § 1; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 29, § 4; 1995, No. 1346, § 1; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 6; 1997, No. 424, § 1; 1997, No. 1349, § 1; 1999, No. 1470, § 1; 2001, No. 1714, § 1; 2003, No. 1475, § 1; 2005, No. 1814, § 1; 2005, No. 2194, § 1; 2005, No. 2220, § 1; 2007, No. 737, § 1; 2009, No. 1446, § 1; 2011, No. 15, § 1; 2011, No. 1191, §§ 1-17; 2013, No. 1346, § 1; 2015, No. 1064, § 1; 2015, No. 1072, § 1; 2017, No. 657, § 1; 2019, No. 786, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended by Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 67, former subsection (jjjj) (now (llll)) provided, in part:

“For the remainder of 1989, the salaries and expenses shall be shared as follows: Fulton County, Arkansas — 78%, the City of Salem, Arkansas — 13%, and the City of Mammoth Spring, Arkansas — 9%. On December 31, 1989, the shares shall be adjusted as set forth above based on the actual cases handled for 1989.”

As enacted, subdivision (y)(2) provided, in part:

“All cases on the docket of the Municipal Court of Jonesboro or the Lake City Branch of the Municipal Court on the effective date of this act shall continue to be on the docket and shall be heard by the Municipal Court of Craighead County.”

As enacted, former subsection (uuuu) (now (wwww)) provided, in part:

“On and after the effective date of this act, the El Dorado Municipal Court shall hereafter be known as the Union County Municipal Court.”

As enacted, former subsection (yyyy) (now (aaaaa)) provided, in part:

“The Warren Municipal Court shall hereafter be known as the Bradley County Municipal Court.”

It is not clear what is meant by the use of “may/shall” in former subsection (mm) (now (nn)).

Acts 1989, No. 873, § 3 provided:

“Except as otherwise provided in any subsection of Section 1 hereof, the provisions of this act and the salaries prescribed herein shall be retroactive to January 1, 1989.”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1346, § 1, subsection (mm) provided:

“The qualified electors of the City of Fort Smith shall elect, in addition to the presently elected municipal judge, an additional municipal judge for the Second Division of the Fort Smith Municipal Court. The qualified electors shall elect the judge at the general election for a four-year term.”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1346, § 1, subsection (iii) began:

“Retroactive to January 1, 1992.”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1346, § 1, subsection (yyy) provided:

“Effective immediately, the Osceola Municipal Court shall have jurisdiction over the Osceola District of Mississippi County.”

Pursuant to § 1-2-207, this section is set out above as amended by Acts 1997, No. 1349. Subsection (hhh) of this section was also amended by Acts 1997, No. 424 to read as follows:

“(hhh) Retroactive to January 1, 1995, the Magnolia Municipal Court Judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than twenty-three thousand dollars ($23,000) nor more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), the municipal court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than fourteen thousand nine hundred twenty-six dollars ($14,926) nor more than twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000), and the deputy court clerk shall receive an annual salary of not less than thirteen thousand three hundred ninety-seven dollars ($13,397) nor more than eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000). Any salaries paid over the minimum salaries set in this subsection shall be paid only upon the approval of the governing bodies of the City of Magnolia and Columbia County.”

Acts 2003, No. 464, §§ 1-3, provided:

“Section 1. (a) Effective January 1, 2005, there is created the District Court of Marion.

“(b) The court shall be styled ‘The District Court of Marion’ and shall have all the rights and powers provided by law for other district courts of this state.

“(c) The jurisdiction of the District Court of Marion shall be county-wide.”

“Section 2. (a) At the November 2004 General Election and each four (4) years thereafter, the qualified electors of Crittenden County shall elect a judge of the Marion District Court on a non-partisan basis.

“(b) The judge of the Marion District Court shall be licensed to practice law in the State of Arkansas and shall have been admitted to practice law before the courts of the State of Arkansas for at least four (4) years prior to his or her election.

“(c) The judge of the District Court of Marion is authorized to appoint a clerk of the court who shall serve at the pleasure of the judge.”

“Section 3. The judge and clerk of the District Court of Marion shall receive a salary as determined by agreement between the governing body of the City of Marion and the Crittenden County Quorum Court, or as otherwise provided by law.”

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-17-108, concerning salaries of personnel of various municipal courts was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 873, § 2. The former section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 870, § 5; 1987, No. 1031, § 1; 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 21, § 9; 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 54, § 9. A preceding version of the section was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 1031, § 3. That version was derived from Acts 1981, No. 710, §§ 5, 6, 8; 1983, No. 144, § 1; 1985, No. 503, §§ 2, 3; 1985, No. 541, § 1; 1985, No. 955, § 1; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-704n, 22-704.1, 22-763.5, 22-763.6, 22-763.8, and 22-763.9.

Acts 1991, No. 1152, § 1 provided that, with respect to the City of Fort Smith, the Governor shall appoint a person to serve as the Second Division Municipal Judge from January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1992. The qualified electors shall elect the judge at the November 1992 general election to take office January 1, 1993 for a two-year term and thereafter at the general election for a four-year term.

Acts 1995, No. 1346, became law without the Governor's signature.

As amended in 2001, subdivision (bbbb)(2)(A) provided:

“The qualified electors of the City of Pine Bluff shall elect in addition to the presently elected municipal judge an additional municipal judge for the Second Division of the Pine Bluff Municipal Court. If it is determined by the Jefferson County Quorum Court and the governing body of the City of Pine Bluff that this additional judge is needed prior to January 1, 2001, then the Governor shall appoint a person to serve as the Second Division Municipal Judge through December 31, 2000, and the qualified electors shall elect the judge at the November 2000 General Election to take office January 1, 2001, for a four-year term.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment by No. 1814 rewrote the last sentence in present (42).

The 2005 amendment by No. 2194 rewrote present (69).

The 2005 amendment by No. 2220 rewrote this section.

The 2007 amendment rewrote (a).

The 2009 amendment rewrote (a).

The 2011 amendment by No. 15, in (a)(85), substituted “1, 2, and 3, each” for “1 and 2” and deleted the former last sentence.

The 2011 amendment by No. 1191 increased salary ranges throughout (a)(2), (a)(6), (a)(17), (a)(39), (a)(40), (a)(42), (a)(46), (a)(54), (a)(57), (a)(61), (a)(70), (a)(72), (a)(84), (a)(89), (a)(95), and (a)(96); substituted “paid one-half (½) by the city and one-half (½) by the county” for “paid equally by the city and the county” in (a)(2); in (a)(72), inserted “by the Poinsett County Quorum Court and” and deleted “The county shall also pay one-half (½) of the expenses of all departments of the court” at the end; and added (c).

The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2015 amendment by No. 1064, in (a)(2), substituted “twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000)” for “forty thousand dollars ($40,000)” and “twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)” for “thirty thousand dollars ($30,000)”; substituted “forty thousand dollars ($40,000)” for “thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000)” in the second sentence of (a)(26); in (a)(29), substituted “forty thousand dollars ($40,000)” for “thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000)” in the first sentence, and substituted “of the salary and costs” for “thereof” in the second sentence; in (a)(31), substituted “ninety-five thousand dollars ($95,000)” for “eighty-six thousand dollars ($86,000)” and “fifty-seven thousand dollars ($57,000)” for “fifty-two thousand dollars ($52,000)”; substituted “fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)” for “forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000)” in (a)(41); substituted “twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000)” for “nineteen thousand dollars ($19,000)” in (a)(53) and (a)(54); substituted “thirty thousand dollars ($30,000)” for “fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000)” in the first sentence of (a)(70); in (a)(73), substituted “forty-two thousand dollars ($42,000)” for “forty thousand dollars ($40,000)” and “thirty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($31,500)” for “twenty-seven thousand five hundred dollars ($27,500)”; and, in (a)(79), substituted “fifty two thousand eight hundred sixty-eight dollars ($52,868)” for “thirty-seven thousand dollars ($37,000)” and “fifty-one thousand one hundred eighty dollars ($51,180)” for “forty-eight thousand three hundred dollars ($48,300).”

The 2015 amendment by No. 1072 inserted designation (a)(84)(A); in (a)(84)(A), substituted “shall jointly appoint” for “each shall appoint” and inserted “of the state”; inserted (a)(84)(B); inserted designation (a)(84)(C); and in (a)(84)(C), substituted “clerk, deputy district court clerks, court personnel, and” for “clerks and.”

The 2017 amendment rewrote (a); deleted former (b); and redesignated former (c) as (b).

The 2019 amendment rewrote (a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (a)(19)(A), (a)(22), (a)(23)(A), (a)(24)(A), (a)(26)(A), (a)(28)(A), (a)(29)(A), (a)(35)(A), (a)(36), (a)(61), (a)(66)(A), (a)(70), and (a)(74); and repealed (a)(54).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Miscellaneous, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 175.

Case Notes

Construction with Other Laws.

Residency in the City of Pine Bluff is required to be eligible as a nominee for Pine Bluff second-division municipal judge, notwithstanding that § 16-17-120 [repealed] states a general intent to abandon the city-residency requirement for municipal-court-judge candidates and electors, since this section, specifically states that only the qualified electors of the city of Pine Bluff may elect an additional municipal judge for the Second Division of the Pine Bluff Municipal Court and Ark. Const., Art. 19, § 3, provides that one must possess the qualifications of an elector to be elected to an office. Benton v. Gunter, 342 Ark. 543, 29 S.W.3d 719 (2000).

County Liability for Salary.

The trial court's decision that Searcy County was liable to pay one-half of the minimum salary requirements of the Marshall, Arkansas, municipal court judge and clerk under former similar section was affirmed, despite the appellants' contention that such a requirement deprived the rural citizens of Searcy County of equal protection and due process under the law, where that contention was raised for the first time on appeal. Taylor v. Patterson, 283 Ark. 11, 670 S.W.2d 444 (1984).

Election of Judges.

The appropriate procedure and deadline for filing as an independent candidate for the office of municipal judge is governed by § 7-7-103. Oliver v. Simons, 318 Ark. 402, 885 S.W.2d 859 (1994).

Cited: Williams v. Butler, 802 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1986).

16-17-109 — 16-17-113. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The repeal of § 16-17-110 by Acts 1995, No. 1256 has been deemed to supersede its amendment by Acts 1995, No. 1032. Acts 1995, No. 1032, § 9, purported to repeal nonexistent § 16-17-110(c), and subdivision (b)(2)(A)(ii) was amended by Acts 1995, No. 1032, § 2, to read as follows:

“(b)(2)(A)(ii) Sixteen and seven-tenths percent (16.7%) to the Public Health Fund.”

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning additional costs upon conviction of drunkenness or driving while under the influence of intoxicants; disposition of additional court costs imposed by § 5-65-113 [repealed]; additional court costs for municipal court administration; additional costs for benefit of judicial retirement system; additional costs for administration of justice purposes; and intergovernmental agreements, were repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. They were derived from the following sources:

16-17-109. Acts 1951, No. 275, §§ 1-3; 1971, No. 290, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-706.1 — 22-706.3; Acts 1991, No. 904, §§ 5, 20.

16-17-110. Acts 1983, No. 918, § 1; 1995, No. 1032, §§ 2,9; A.S.A. 1947, § 75-2531.

16-17-111. Acts 1981, No. 942, §§ 1, 2; 1983, No. 860, §§ 1, 2; 1985, No. 246, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-706.4, 22-706.5; Acts 1987, No. 580, § 1; 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 57, §§ 1, 2; 1991, No. 357, § 1; 1991, No. 904, §§ 6, 20.

16-17-112. Acts 1983, No. 621, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-706.6 — 22-706.8; Acts 1987, No. 139, § 1.

16-17-113. Acts 1983, No. 860, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-706.9; Acts 1987, No. 853, § 2; 1991, No. 904, §§ 7, 20.

For present law, see § 16-10-301 et seq.

16-17-114. Restriction on receipt of fees and costs by constables in certain localities.

  1. This section shall apply to:
    1. All cities in which there are located, or may be located, state-supported educational institutions with campus enrollments of no fewer than one thousand five hundred (1,500) students; and
    2. The townships in which those cities are situated.
  2. No constable nor deputy constable shall be allowed to receive, and shall not receive, any fee, costs, penalty, payment, or compensation of any kind or nature in any criminal suit, prosecution, or arrest, or in any criminal proceeding whatsoever. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the payment to constables of the fees now provided by law in civil cases.
  3. Any constable or deputy constable who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense. Each criminal suit, prosecution, arrest, or proceeding in which a constable or deputy constable accepts payment or compensation shall constitute a separate offense.
  4. In addition to the penalty provided in subsection (c) of this section, a violation of this section shall constitute malfeasance in office punishable as provided by law.

History. Acts 1941, No. 80, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-716 — 22-718; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 108.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 108: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

16-17-115. County's, town's, and city's portion of district court expenses — Appropriation.

  1. Except as authorized otherwise, the county in which a district court is held shall pay one-half (½) of the salaries of the district court judge and each chief district court clerk of any district court organized in that county under § 16-17-901 et seq., and the quorum court in a county subject to § 16-17-901 et seq. at its annual meeting shall make an appropriation of a sum sufficient to pay the county's proportion of the expenses of any such district court. These payments shall be made out of the general revenues of the county.
      1. Except as authorized otherwise, the town or city in which a district court is held shall pay:
        1. One-half (½) of the salaries of the district court judge and the chief district court clerk; and
        2. The operational expenses of the district court organized in that town or city under § 16-17-901 et seq. unless otherwise agreed to by the political subdivisions that contribute to the expenses of the district court.
      2. The governing body of the town or city in a town or city subject to § 16-17-901 et seq. shall make at its annual meeting an appropriation of a sum sufficient to pay the town's or city's proportion of the salaries and operational expenses of the district court.
    1. These payments shall be made out of the general revenues of the town or city.
    1. Any town or city operating a city court on December 31, 2011, that becomes a department of a district court shall continue to pay the amount paid as the base salary of the city court judge to the district court judge who has assumed the responsibility of attending the former city court.
    2. The base salary to be paid to the district court judge under subdivision (c)(1) of this section in calendar year 2012 and subsequent years shall be the amount paid by the city or town to the city court judge for the calendar year 2011.
    1. A town or city operating a city court on December 31, 2011, that becomes a department of district court shall continue to pay the salary of the district court clerk and provide for the operational expenses of that department of district court unless otherwise agreed to by the political subdivisions that contribute to the expenses of the district court.
    2. Subdivision (d)(1) of this section does not apply to any town or city that has abolished a department of district court pursuant to state law.
  2. A district court operated solely by the county shall have the salaries and operational expenses of that district court paid solely by the county unless otherwise agreed to by the political subdivisions that contribute to the expenses of the district court.

History. Acts 1951, No. 45, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-720.1; Acts 1987, No. 431, § 7; 2003, No. 1185, § 109; 2007, No. 663, § 35; 2015, No. 530, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Arkansas District Judge Retirement System, § 24-8-801 et seq. referred to in (c)(3) was repealed by Acts 2009, No. 654, § 2.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment inserted “town's, and city's” in the section heading; rewrote (a); added (b) through (e); and made related changes.

The 2015 amendment deleted “district court cost fund and” preceding “general revenues” in (a) and (b)(2); deleted (c)(3); inserted “district” preceding “court paid” in (e); inserted “court” preceding “judge” and “district” preceding “court clerk” throughout the section; and made stylistic changes.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

Mandamus.

Circuit court properly issued a writ of mandamus ordering a county to abide by a prior order to pay a proportion of the district court's expenses in addition to the salaries because the prior order reflected that it was the intent of the parties to follow statutory law and the language in the amended statute preserved existing agreements between the county and the city. Lonoke County v. City of Lonoke, 2013 Ark. 465, 430 S.W.3d 669 (2013).

16-17-116. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning change of venue from municipal courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 110. The section was derived from Acts 1941, No. 118, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-721 — 22-723.

16-17-117. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning issuance of arrest warrants by clerk of court, was repealed by Acts 2009, No. 633, § 10. The section was derived from Acts 1961, No. 121, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-751 — 22-753.

16-17-118. Power to postpone or suspend sentence in misdemeanor cases.

Each judge of the district court shall have the same power to postpone or suspend sentence in misdemeanor cases as is conferred upon the circuit judges of the state.

History. Acts 1961, No. 67, § 2; 1961, No. 159, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-754.

16-17-119. Counties with populations over 250,000 — District court expenses.

    1. The salaries and operational expenses of district courts in any county having a population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) or more inhabitants according to the most recent federal census shall be paid by the city or town in which the court is located.
    2. No portion of these expenses shall be paid by the county in which the court is located.
  1. This section shall not apply to a district court funded solely by a county.
  2. This section shall not apply to any town or city that has abolished a department of a district court pursuant to state law.

History. Acts 1979, No. 801, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-764, 22-765; Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 39, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 111; 2007, No. 663, § 36.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1915, No. 87, referred to in this section, provided for the establishment of municipal courts in certain first-class cities.

Acts 1927, No. 60 is codified as §§ 16-17-201, 16-17-202 [repealed], 16-17-20316-17-207, 16-17-20916-17-215, 16-17-216 [repealed], 16-17-217, 16-17-21916-17-222, 16-17-223 [repealed], 16-17-224, 16-19-401, and 16-19-41016-19-412.

For text of section effective until January 1, 2012, see the preceding version.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment substituted “District court expenses” for “Collection of Fees” in the section heading; deleted former (a); redesignated former (b) as (a)(1) and (2); substituted “in any county having a population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) or more inhabitants according to the most recent federal census” for “described in this section” in (a)(1); and added (b) and (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

Reorganization.

Due process violation arising from a district court judge's installment fee policy could be imputed to the city because the judge was an employee of the city since the Little Rock District Court had not yet been reorganized as a state district court at the times relevant to the case; the Little Rock District Court was not part of the state district court program at the time of the events alleged in the complaint. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

16-17-120. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning candidate requirements for the election of municipal judges, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 112. The section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 90, § 1; 1999, No. 1574, § 1.

16-17-121. Salary increases — Factors to consider.

  1. In the event the General Assembly establishes a district court cost fund to be used exclusively for the operation and expenses of the district court, any district court judge's, clerk's, or other employee's salary authorized by § 16-17-108 may be increased from the minimum salary upward to any amount not exceeding the maximum salary authorized in § 16-17-108 and may be paid from the fund as set forth hereafter.
  2. The city council or the county quorum court, or both, if authorized, of the local governmental jurisdictions responsible for paying the salaries of the district court judge, clerks, and other employees may authorize salary increases for the various court personnel as authorized above after considering the following factors:
    1. The amount and availability of funds in the district court cost fund;
    2. The volume of caseload;
    3. The backlog of cases, if any, on the court docket;
    4. The time required in dealing with cases;
    5. The skill required in dealing with cases; and
    6. The amount of time taken away from the judge's private practice, if applicable.

History. Acts 1987, No. 1031, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 113.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-122. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the disposition of fines in the event of a change of venue, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 114. The section was derived from Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 54, § 1.

16-17-123. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the filing fee for civil actions, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 816, § 1. For present law, see § 16-10-301 et seq.

16-17-124. Fee for appeal transcript — Disposition.

  1. When required to make a certification of disposition of court proceedings, including without limitation certified copies of the docket, certified copies of civil or small claims judgments, and appeal transcripts, the district court shall collect a fee of not less than five dollars ($5.00) per case for preparation of the original.
  2. All funds derived from the fee shall be paid into the general fund of the treasury of each political subdivision that contributes to the expenses of the district court based on the percentage of the expenses contributed by the political subdivision to be appropriated for any permissible use in the administration of the district court.

History. Acts 1989, No. 901, §§ 1, 2; 2003, No. 1765, § 15; 2005, No. 1934, § 9; 2015, No. 530, § 2.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (b), deleted “city” preceding “treasury” and inserted “of each political subdivision … subdivision.”

The 2015 amendment inserted “without limitation” in (a); in (b), inserted “general fund of the” and substituted “that” for “which.”

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Case Notes

Appellate Jurisdiction.

Circuit court erred in granting the State's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction for failure to pay the $5 fee required by this section and Ark. R. Crim. P. 36(c), where the record demonstrated that defendant, consistent with Ark. R. Crim. P. 36(d), had filed an affidavit with the required information concerning the district court clerk's failure to timely certify the record, and served the clerk of the district court and the prosecuting attorney with the affidavit to place jurisdiction in the circuit court. The filing of defendant's affidavit triggered jurisdiction of his appeal from the district court and strictly complied with Ark. R. Crim. P. 36(d) to commence an appeal from the district court to the circuit court. Treat v. State, 2019 Ark. 326, 588 S.W.3d 10 (2019).

16-17-125. Pretrial release alternative administration fee.

  1. An administrative fee may be levied and collected, in district court or city court, from each pretrial detainee charged with either a felony or misdemeanor who is placed under the supervision of the court pending trial.
  2. The administrative fee authorized by this section may be levied only by the district court or city court which places a pretrial detainee under the supervision of the court pending trial.
  3. A district judge may impose such administrative fee for supervision if the judge finds it necessary to impose conditions of release requiring supervision of a criminal defendant pending trial and the judge does not require the posting of any bail that requires the defendant to pay a bondsman or post any form of cash or security.
  4. Such supervised pretrial release program is optional for both the court and the defendant and is an alternative to continued incarceration pending trial or to posting bond set by the court. The court shall be solely responsible for determining which defendants may be placed on the program. The defendant must agree to be placed on the program as an alternative to continued incarceration pending trial or to posting bond set by the court.
  5. All funds derived from the collection of such administrative fee shall be used by the municipality solely for the administration of justice.
  6. The administrative fee authorized by this section may be reduced or waived based on indigency.

History. Acts 1991, No. 1234, § 1.

16-17-126. Fee for filing and issuing writs — Disposition — Fee for issuing summons.

    1. The district court clerk shall collect a fee of ten dollars ($10.00) for filing or issuing writs, including writs of garnishment and executions.
    2. The fee under subdivision (a)(1) of this section is in addition to fees and costs established by law for specific purposes or as authorized by the county quorum court or municipality.
    1. The district court clerk shall collect a fee of two dollars and fifty cents ($2.50) for drawing and issuing, or sealing, a summons or subpoena if the summons or subpoena follows the form incorporated into Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
    2. A fee shall not be collected under this subsection if the summons or subpoena follows the form incorporated into Rule 4 of the Arkansas District Court Rules and the summons or subpoena is not a separate document.
  1. All funds derived from the fees under this section shall be paid into the general fund of the treasury of each political subdivision that contributes to the expenses of the district court based on the percentage of the expenses contributed by the political subdivision to be appropriated for any permissible use in the administration of the district court.

History. Acts 1991, No. 262, §§ 1-3; 2003, No. 1185, § 115; 2003, No. 1765, § 16; 2005, No. 1934, § 10; 2015, No. 530, § 3; 2015, No. 585, § 1; 2019, No. 675, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (b), deleted “city” preceding “treasury,” and inserted “of each political subdivision … political subdivision.”

The 2015 amendment by No. 530 redesignated (a) as (a)(1) and (2); in (a)(2), deleted “those” preceding “fees and costs” and substituted “as authorized” for “where authorized”; and, in (b), inserted “general fund of the” and substituted “that” for “which.”

The 2015 amendment by No. 585 deleted “of garnishment and executions” following “writs” in the section heading; redesignated former (a) as (a)(1) and (2); inserted “including writs” in (a)(1); substituted “The fee under subdivision (a)(1) of this section” for “This fee” in (a)(2); and, in (b), inserted “under subdivision (a)(1) of this section,” inserted “general fund of the,” and substituted “that” for “which.”

The 2019 amendment added “Fee for issuing summons” to the section heading; inserted (b); redesignated former (b) as (c); and in (c), deleted “subdivision (a)(1) of” following “under”.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-127. Contractors providing certain services.

  1. Upon request of the district court judge or city court judge, the governing body in which a district court or city court is located or, if applicable, each governing body of a political subdivision that contributes to the expenses of a district court may contract with a person that has registered with the Secretary of State and filed a surety bond or certificate of deposit with the Secretary of State to provide any of the following services:
    1. Probation services;
    2. Pretrial supervised release programs;
    3. Alternate sentencing programs; or
    4. The collection and enforcement of delinquent fines and costs.
    1. The amount of the surety bond or certificate of deposit shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
    2. The city or county or any person suffering damage by reason of the acts or omissions of the person or an employee of the person in the performance of services subject to this section may bring action on the bond for damages.
  2. A person is ineligible to provide services subject to this section if the person or an owner, operator, or any stockholder has been convicted of a felony.
  3. For the purposes of this section, “person” means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other business entity.
  4. A district court or city court may require a defendant to pay reasonable fees, in an amount to be established by the court, relating to private contractors providing probation services, pretrial supervised release programs, or alternate sentencing programs authorized by law.
    1. Notwithstanding § 16-13-701 et seq., a private contractor may collect and retain only the fees established by the court for services provided pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
      1. When the order of the district court or city court requires a defendant to use the services or programs of a private contractor, the designated contractor shall report on or before the fifth day of each month all fees collected.
      2. The report shall be provided to the mayor and county judge of the political subdivision or subdivisions that contribute to the expenses of the district court or city court and to the district court clerk or city court clerk for inclusion in the court's monthly report as required by law.
    2. The report of the private contractor, as required in this section, shall contain columns with the following information by defendant:
      1. Uniform traffic ticket number;
      2. Defendant's name;
      3. Court docket number;
      4. Receipt number;
      5. Amount collected; and
      6. Total of all fees collected.
  5. A private contractor providing the collection of delinquent fines and court costs shall follow the procedures in § 16-13-701 et seq.
  6. This section shall not apply to the alcohol treatment or education programs authorized by § 5-65-115 and § 5-65-307.
  7. This section shall not apply to a company whose service is limited to the acceptance of credit card payments for fines, fees, and costs and does not engage in affirmative acts of collection and enforcement of delinquent fines and costs.

History. Acts 1991, No. 447, § 1; 2001, No. 1809, § 3; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 116, 117; 2003, No. 1765, § 17; 2005, No. 2239, § 2; 2009, No. 782, § 3.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote (a); and added (e)-(h).

The 2009 amendment made a minor stylistic change in (c), and added (i).

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 117: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-128. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning payment of fines by credit card, was repealed by Acts 2009, No. 633, § 11. Former § 16-17-128 was also amended by Acts 2009, No.782, § 1, which was subsequently subject to this repeal. The section was derived from Acts 1997, No. 864, § 1.

16-17-129. Levy to defray cost of incarcerating city and county prisoners.

      1. In addition to all fines now or as may hereafter be provided by law, the governing body of each town or city in which a district court is located may by ordinance levy and collect an additional fine not to exceed twenty dollars ($20.00) from each defendant upon each conviction, each plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or each bond forfeiture in all cases in the first class of accounting records as described in § 16-17-707.
      2. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(1)(C) of this section, all sums collected from the additional fine described in subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section shall be paid into the town or city treasury to be deposited into a fund to be used exclusively to help defray the cost of incarcerating town or city prisoners, including the construction and maintenance of the town or city jail and payments to other entities for incarcerating town or city prisoners.
      3. All sums collected from the additional fine described in subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section in any district court that is funded solely by the county shall be paid into the county treasury to be deposited into a fund to be used exclusively to help defray the cost of incarcerating county prisoners, including the construction and maintenance of the county jail.
      1. In addition to all fines provided by law, the governing body of each town or city that has a police department or city marshal, and which contributes to the expenses of a district court under § 16-17-1203, by ordinance may levy and collect an additional fine not to exceed twenty dollars ($20.00) from each defendant upon each conviction, each plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or each bond forfeiture for any misdemeanor or traffic violation in cases from the contributing town or city filed in the district court to which the town or city contributes.
      2. All sums collected from the additional fine described in subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section shall be paid into the town or city treasury to be deposited into a fund to be used exclusively to help defray the cost of incarcerating town or city prisoners, including the construction and maintenance of the town or city jail and payments to other entities for incarcerating town or city prisoners.
    1. In addition to all fines now or as may hereafter be provided by law, the quorum court of each county may by ordinance levy an additional fine not to exceed twenty dollars ($20.00) to be collected from each defendant upon each conviction, each plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or each bond forfeiture in all cases in the first and second class of accounting records as described in § 16-17-707. A county ordinance enacted under this subdivision (b)(1) applies to all district courts in the county.
    2. All sums collected from the additional fine described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section as to cases in the first class shall be paid into the county treasury to be deposited into a fund to be used exclusively to help defray the cost of:
      1. The construction, maintenance, and operation of the city, county, or regional jail;
      2. Deferring the costs of incarcerating county prisoners held by a county, a city, or any entity;
      3. The transportation and incarceration of city or county prisoners;
      4. The purchase and maintenance of equipment for the city, county, or regional jail; and
      5. Training, salaries, and certificate pay for jail personnel.
    3. All sums collected from the additional fine described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section as to cases of the second class shall be paid into the county treasury to be deposited into a fund to be used exclusively to help defray the cost of:
      1. The construction, maintenance, and operation of the city, county, or regional jail;
      2. Deferring the costs of incarcerating county prisoners held by a county, a city, or any entity;
      3. The transportation and incarceration of city or county prisoners;
      4. The purchase and maintenance of equipment for the city, county, or regional jail; and
      5. Training, salaries, and certificate pay for jailers and deputy sheriffs.
    1. In counties having a county regional detention facility, the additional fine levied by the county under this section shall be deposited into a special fund within the county treasury.
    2. The revenues generated by the additional fine shall be used exclusively for maintenance, operation, and capital expenditures of the regional detention facility.
  1. It is the intention of the General Assembly that the revenues derived from the additional fines levied under this section shall not offset or reduce funding from other sources for the maintenance, operation, and capital expenditures of the regional detention facilities.
    1. The additional fine authorized in subsection (a) of this section shall apply to each charge, count, violation, or offense that a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, is found guilty of, or forfeits bond for, including each misdemeanor or traffic violation.
    2. The fine may be imposed:
      1. By all courts within a city of the first class, city of the second class, incorporated town, or county in this state that has by ordinance levied the fine; and
      2. In all cases classified as county cases or city cases.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1336, §§ 1, 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 118; 2003, No. 1188, § 1; 2005, No. 1373, § 1; 2007, No. 1417, §§ 1, 2; 2009, No. 209, § 2; 2013, No. 1365, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (e).

The 2007 amendment rewrote (a) and (b).

The 2009 amendment substituted “twenty dollars ($20.00)” for “five dollars “($5.00)” in (a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), and (b)(1); and in (b)(2), inserted “as to cases in the first class,” deleted “incarcerating county prisoners, including the construction and maintenance of the county jail” following “defray the cost of,” added (b)(2)(A) through (b)(2)(E), and made a related change.

The 2013 amendment, in (a)(2)(A), deleted “now or as may hereafter by” following “fines,” substituted “that has a police department or city marshal, and which contributes to the expenses of a district court under § 16-17-1203” for “in which a city court is located may,” added “may,” and substituted “cases from the contributing town or city filed in the district court to which the town or city contributes” for “the city court of the city or town.”

Case Notes

Additional Fine.

This section did not authorize a county to collect an additional $5 fine in city courts to help defray the expense of housing prisoners in the county detention center where the legislature's clear intent was to give a county the same authority to collect the fine in district court as a city's authority to collect the fine in city court. White County v. City of Judsonia, 369 Ark. 151, 251 S.W.3d 275 (2007).

16-17-130. Single district judge to be elected countywide.

The judge of any district court located in a county with only one (1) district court shall hereafter be elected countywide.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1118, § 1.

16-17-131. Suspension of license for failure to appear.

  1. A person required to appear before a district court in this state, having been served with any form of notice to appear for any criminal offense, traffic violation, or misdemeanor charge, shall appear at the time and place designated in the notice.
    1. If a person fails to appear as required in subsection (a) of this section, the presiding judge may suspend the person's driver's license.
    2. The license shall be suspended until the person appears and completes the sentence ordered by the court.
    3. After the person satisfies all requirements of the sentence, the Department of Finance and Administration shall assess the current fees for reinstatement of a driver's license.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1243, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 119.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-132. District court generally.

  1. All fines, penalties, and costs received by the district courts shall be collected and distributed in the manner provided by laws affecting the former municipal courts, unless and until the General Assembly establishes a new method of distribution.
  2. All salaries, retirement benefits, programs, and moneys of judges, clerks, and court employees of the former municipal courts will continue to be vested and paid to the judges, clerks, and court employees of the district courts, pending further acts of the General Assembly.
  3. A vacancy in a district court judgeship shall be filled in the same manner and subject to the same restrictions as for vacancies under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 29.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1693, §§ 1, 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 120.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 120: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

16-17-133. Limitation of the incarceration of juvenile defendants in district courts.

    1. District courts have jurisdiction of juvenile defendants for violation of local codes or ordinances, game and fish violations, and traffic offenses.
    2. Juveniles charged with these offenses are subject to the same penalties as adults unless otherwise provided in this section.
  1. A juvenile subject to the jurisdiction of a district court shall not be incarcerated unless the juvenile:
    1. Commits a second offense for which the court has jurisdiction within one (1) year of the first offense;
    2. Willfully violates probation; or
    3. Willfully fails to pay a fine or perform community service work or other sanction properly ordered by the court.
  2. As an alternative to incarceration on a first offense or otherwise, the district court may place a juvenile on residential detention, which may be supervised by electronic monitoring for up to thirty (30) days.
    1. For a juvenile to be found in contempt for violating a court order, the order must have been in writing and served on the juvenile and the juvenile's parent or guardian.
    2. If a juvenile is found in contempt of court, the court may:
      1. Order that the juvenile be committed for a period not to exceed ten (10) days; or
      2. Place the juvenile on residential detention, which may be supervised by electronic monitoring for up to thirty (30) days.
    1. Any juvenile incarcerated under this section shall be separated from individuals eighteen (18) years of age or older.
    2. Where space is available, a juvenile who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, an offense under this section may be placed in a juvenile detention facility rather than in the county jail.
    3. Juveniles being detained on allegations of delinquency or who have been adjudicated delinquent shall have priority for juvenile detention beds over juveniles sentenced in district court.
    1. A district court may also order the juvenile, the juvenile's parent, both parents, or the guardian of any juvenile punishable as provided for in this section to be liable for the cost of the incarceration or electronic monitoring.
    2. Prior to ordering payment, a district court shall take into account:
      1. The financial ability of the parent, both parents, or the guardian to pay for the detention or electronic monitoring;
      2. The past efforts of the parent, both parents, or the guardian to correct or prevent the juvenile's misconduct;
      3. If the parent is a noncustodial parent, the opportunity the parent has had to correct the delinquent juvenile's misconduct; and
      4. Any other factors the court deems relevant.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1807, § 1.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

16-17-134. Change of venue from lower courts in certain counties to municipal court.

Notwithstanding § 16-19-409 or any other law to the contrary:

    1. In any criminal case brought before any city court in a county with a population between eighty-nine thousand (89,000) persons and one hundred fifty-three thousand (153,000) persons according to the 2000 Federal Decennial Census and in which a district court exists, the judge shall grant a change of venue to the district court, upon the defendant's motion, without the prepayment or tender of any fees.
    2. Upon filing the motion, the court shall have no further jurisdiction in the case, except for the purpose of preparing a transcript for the district court;
  1. In the event of any change of venue from a city court to a district court in a county with a population between eighty-nine thousand (89,000) persons and one hundred fifty-three thousand (153,000) persons according to the 2000 Federal Decennial Census and in which more than one (1) district court exists, the case shall be transferred to the district court geographically nearest in the county; and
  2. In no event shall any change of venue lie from any district court in a county with a population between eighty-nine thousand (89,000) persons and one hundred fifty-three thousand (153,000) persons according to the 2000 Federal Decennial Census to any city court in criminal cases.

History. Acts 2003, No. 673, § 1; 2011, No. 1132, § 9.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “§ 16-19-409” for “§§ 16-17-218 [Repealed] and 16-19-409” in the introductory language; and substituted “city court” for “justice of the peace in any township, police court, city court, corporation court, or any court of common pleas” with minor variations in (1)(A), (2), and (3).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-135. Counties authorized to employ and compensate district court judges as criminal magistrates.

    1. A county may employ one (1) or more district court judges to act as criminal magistrates in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1.8(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure or in accordance with per curiam orders issued by the Arkansas Supreme Court.
    2. A district court judge acting as a criminal magistrate may be authorized to perform any of the duties described in Rule 1.8(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  1. A county with a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000) persons may compensate a district court judge acting as a criminal magistrate in excess of his or her salary as a district court judge in an annual amount not to exceed fifty percent (50%) of the district court judge's maximum annual salary as set forth in § 16-17-108.
  2. A county, city, or town that contributes to the salary of a district judge may treat the increased payment for magistrate duties as salary to be calculated for purposes of the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System, § 24-4-101 et seq.
  3. The compensation for a district court judge acting as a criminal magistrate for a circuit court judge shall be set by the county quorum court by ordinance and may be paid by the county from the county administration of justice fund or the county general fund as appropriated by ordinance.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1938, § 1; 2007, No. 177, § 4.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment substituted “the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System” for “the Arkansas District Judge Retirement System, § 24-8-801 et seq.” in (c).

16-17-136. Waiver of appearance and entry of plea to traffic violations in district court.

Notwithstanding any rule of criminal procedure to the contrary:

  1. A person who is charged in district court with committing an offense, excluding a violation of the Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq., or the Underage DUI or BUI Law, § 5-65-301 et seq., or any other offense for which a court appearance is mandatory, may waive appearance and trial and plead guilty or nolo contendere by a signed statement;
    1. With the signed statement, the person shall pay the fine and court costs in an amount as established by the district court or city court within the limits prescribed by law.
    2. Fines and court costs shall be paid to the county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the district courts and city courts of this state;
  2. The court shall accept the signed statement accompanied by the fine and court costs assessed as a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and shall proceed accordingly; and
  3. Submitting payment under subdivision (2)(A) of this section through a website constitutes an agreement to be bound by an electronic record under the Arkansas Electronic Records and Signatures Act, § 25-31-101 et seq., and complies in all respects with the requirements of this section.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1934, § 25; 2009, No. 633, § 12; 2011, No. 1218, § 4; 2015, No. 299, § 22.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment, in (1), substituted “an offense” for “a traffic offense that is a violation under state law or local ordinance,” and substituted “or any other offense for which a court appearance is mandatory” for “and in which the only sentence available is a monetary fine and court costs,” and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2011 amendment added (4).

The 2015 amendment, in (1), deleted “or city court” preceding “with committing” and inserted “or BWI” and “or BUI.”

16-17-137. Jurisdiction over certain criminal matters.

  1. If authorized by the administrative plan for the judicial circuit required by Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14, a state district court judge may preside over the following criminal matters:
    1. A drug court program authorized under the Arkansas Drug Court Act, § 16-98-301 et seq.;
    2. A probation supervision program; and
    3. A parole supervision program.
  2. The administrative judge of the judicial district may withdraw authorization under this section at any time.

History. Acts 2011, No. 1137, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 1137, § 1, provided:

“Legislative findings.

“(a) In a per curiam opinion dated February 9, 2011, the Supreme Court addressed the recommendations of the District Court Resource Assessment Board, one (1) of which stated that the General Assembly could authorize a state district court judge to preside over a drug court program, probation revocation proceeding, or a parole revocation proceeding. In Re Amendments to Administrative Order Nos. 4 and 18 and Regulations of the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners § 1, 2011 Ark. 57 (2011).

“(b) That the General Assembly finds that allowing a state district court judge to preside over a drug court, a probation revocation proceeding, or a parole revocation proceeding promotes the sound and efficient administration of justice.”

16-17-138. Mandatory holding of court for departments of a district court.

    1. A district court shall hold court in each department of the district court at least one (1) time a month unless mutually waived by the district court judge and the governing body of the city or town in which the department is located.
    2. The agreement under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be in writing and adopted by ordinance of the governing body of the city or town in which the department is located.
  1. If the district court does not have a case at the time court is scheduled to be held in a month, the requirement of subsection (a) of this section is waived and court shall be held at the next scheduled time.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1031, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Establishment in Cities of 2,400 or More and County Seat Towns of Less Than 2,400

Effective Dates. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 27: approved Feb. 28, 1927. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist for the reason that in cities falling within the provisions of this act, there now exists much litigation which is being handled in justice of peace courts which are unable to try the civil and criminal cases coming before them in such a manner as to render justice, and make possible an efficient enforcement of the law. It is therefore declared that this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1929, No. 224, § 4: approved Mar. 27, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It appearing that in certain communities there are irregularities in inferior courts which this act is intended to correct, an emergency is declared and this act shall be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1935, No. 187, § 3: Mar. 26, 1935; Acts 1939, No. 93, § 3: Feb. 15, 1939. Emergency clauses provided: “It being ascertained and hereby declared that in certain cities subject to the provisions of this act there are great irregularities in the inferior courts as now constituted; that great injustice is being suffered by litigants and unnecessary expense is being incurred; that severe financial losses are being suffered by both litigants and the communities in which such courts would be located because of the unsystematic and disorderly administration of justice by the courts now constituted, and that immediate operation of this act is essential for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; and an emergency is therefore declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1941, No. 280, § 2: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of property, public health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and the same shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 210, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1951, No. 63, § 4: Feb. 9, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist for the reason that there are irregularities, needless delays and injustices being suffered by litigants in inferior courts in cities subject to this Act. This Act shall take effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1951, No. 280, § 2: Mar. 19, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained that other county and city officials have, since the passage of Act No. 60 of 1927 secured increases in their salaries and that municipal clerks covered by said Act No. 60 of 1927 have had no increase in salary and due to the increased volume of work placed upon municipal clerks covered by said Act No. 60 and increased costs of living generally and for the better and more efficient operation of the office of municipal clerks covered by said act an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be enforced from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1955, No. 160, § 3: effective 90 days after approval.

Acts 1961, No. 39, § 2: Feb. 6, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly that under existing law, municipal judges in certain cities having a city manager form of government, are elected at city election held in odd numbered years; that in such cities the only reason for holding odd year city elections is to elect a municipal judge; that immediate provision should be made to authorize the election of municipal judges in such cities at the regular biennial general election held in even numbered years and thereby remove the necessity for holding the odd year city elections in such cities. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1963, No. 57, § 2: Feb. 15, 1963; Acts 1963, No. 175, § 2: Mar. 7, 1963; Acts 1975, No. 873, § 2: Apr. 4, 1975. Emergency clauses provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly that because of the increased volume of work placed on the municipal court clerks and the increase in the cost of living in general, it is extremely difficult to secure the services of qualified persons as municipal court clerks; that such condition jeopardizes the administration of justice; that enactment of this measure will provide the needed remedy. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 3: Feb. 20, 1968. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly that under existing law the procedures for the election of Municipal Judges in Cities having the City Manager form of government is not clear, and that immediate provisions should be made to clarify such procedures so as to authorize the election of Municipal Judges in such cities at the regular biennial General Election, upon petition as is provided for the nomination of candidates for Boards of Directors. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, the same shall be in force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 913, § 3: Apr. 16, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the inability to serve process by mail in civil cases pending in municipal courts is unfair and unreasonably costly and that this Act is necessary to cure such inequity. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 431, § 10: July 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Amendment 64 has an effective date of July 1, 1987, that the smooth implementation of the Amendment requires that this law be enacted; that should the General Assembly extend the session beyond the sixtieth day, there exists a danger that this law would not be in effect on July 1, 1987; therefore, this act shall be effective July 1, 1987.”

Acts 1989, No. 142, § 4: Feb. 21, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that uncertainty in the area of municipal court jurisdiction interferes with the administration of the criminal justice system of this state, and that this act should go into effect immediately upon passage to clarify the law in this area. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 28: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the language of certain court cost statutes lacks uniformity; that such lack of uniformity is detrimental to the proper collection of such court costs; and that such language should be standardized to promote the proper collection of such costs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-17-201. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1929, No. 224, § 3, provided that the act should only apply to courts established or to be established under Acts 1927, No. 60.

This section, concerning applicability of this subchapter, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 121, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1927, No. 60, § 1; 1929, No. 224, § 1; 1935, No. 187, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9897; Acts 1939, No. 93, § 1; 1951, No. 63, § 1; 1953, No. 313, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-701.

Case Notes

Cited: Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968); Littleton v. Blanton, 281 Ark. 395, 665 S.W.2d 239 (1984).

16-17-202. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning construction with police court laws and justice of the peace laws, was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 431, § 8. The section was derived from Acts 1927, No. 60, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 9904; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-708.

16-17-203 — 16-17-207. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning with other laws, the creation of district courts, the name and seal of district courts and the abolishment of police courts, the jurisdiction of district courts, and number of judges and their term, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 123, effective January 1, 2005. These sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-203. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 26; Pope's Dig., § 9922; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-731; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 122, 123.

16-17-204. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 1; 1929, No. 224, § 1; 1935, No. 187, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9897; Acts 1939, No. 93, § 1; 1951, No. 63, § 1; 1953, No. 313, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-701; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 122, 123.

16-17-205. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9898; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-702; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 122, 123.

16-17-206. Acts 1927, No. 60, §§ 9, 11; 1929, No. 224, § 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 9905, 9907; Acts 1955, No. 160, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-709, 22-710, 22-712; Acts 1987, No. 431, § 8; 1989, No. 142, § 1; 1995, No. 1296, § 60; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 122, 123.

16-17-207. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 3; 1935, No. 187, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9899; Acts 1939, No. 93, § 2; 1951, No. 63, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-703; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 122, 123.

16-17-208. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning election of judges in cities having city manager form of government, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 124. The section was derived from Acts 1961, No. 39, § 1; 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 38, § 1.

16-17-209. Qualifications of district judge — Term.

  1. District judges shall be qualified electors within the geographical area from which they are chosen and shall have been licensed attorneys of this state for at least four (4) years immediately preceding the date of assuming office.
  2. Pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 16(C), district judges shall serve four-year terms.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60 § 4; Pope's Dig., § 9900; Acts 1949, No. 210, § 1; 1951, No. 63, § 3; 1951, No. 254, § 1; 1953, No. 313, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-704; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 125, 126; 2019, No. 445, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2019, No. 445, § 2, provided: “(a) The enabling legislation for Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, did not contain language concerning the date of the first election for district judges under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, though the first election for district judges after passage of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, occurred at the 2004 general election.

“(b) To avoid confusion in some areas of the state concerning the cycle for elections of district judges, the next election for a district judge in 2020 at the same date and at the same times and places as provided by law for preferential primary elections”.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 16(C), district” for “District” in (b).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 126: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The imposition of part of the expenses of municipal courts on the counties in which they are established is not violative of constitutional provisions vesting county courts with original jurisdiction in all matters relating to county affairs. Crawford County v. City of Van Buren, 201 Ark. 798, 146 S.W.2d 914 (1941).

This section does not violate the Constitution on the ground that it constitutes an encroachment by the legislature on the city in the matter of finances, since section does not impose court on any city, but merely sets minimum salary for municipal court established by the city. City of Stuttgart v. Elms, 220 Ark. 722, 249 S.W.2d 829 (1952).

Salary Increase.

Municipal judge was not estopped from recovering increased salary voted by legislature on the ground that he had agreed to take an increase in a less amount than that provided by the legislature, since contract was not binding in law. City of Stuttgart v. Elms, 220 Ark. 722, 249 S.W.2d 829 (1952).

Taxpayer Suit.

A resident taxpayer of a city is the equitable owner of public funds and is the proper party to bring suit to enjoin and collect the illegal payment of public funds to a person acting as municipal judge. Revis v. Harris, 217 Ark. 25, 228 S.W.2d 624 (1950).

Cited: Logan v. Harris, 213 Ark. 37, 210 S.W.2d 301 (1948); Russell v. Miller, 253 Ark. 583, 487 S.W.2d 617 (1972); Littleton v. Blanton, 281 Ark. 395, 665 S.W.2d 239 (1984); Lawson v. City of Mammoth Spring ex rel. Smith, 287 Ark. 12, 696 S.W.2d 712 (1985); Beshear v. Clark, 292 Ark. 47, 728 S.W.2d 165 (1987); State ex rel. Robinson v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 300 Ark. 405, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989).

16-17-210. Special judges.

  1. If a district judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve, or if the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall determine that there is other need for a special judge to be temporarily appointed, a special judge may be assigned by the Chief Justice or elected by the bar of the district court, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, to serve during the period of temporary disqualification, absence, or need.
  2. A special judge shall have the same power and authority in the court as the regular district judge would have if present and presiding and shall have the same qualifications as are required by law for the regular district judge.
  3. A district judge who is assigned by the Chief Justice to act as a special judge under this section shall receive reimbursement of expenses for his or her service at the rate provided for in § 16-17-1108.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 9901; Acts 1973, No. 165, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-705; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 125, 126; 2011, No. 274, § 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (c), substituted “district judge who is assigned by the Chief Justice to act as a special judge” for “special judge assigned or elected,” “reimbursement of expenses” for “compensation,” and “at the rate provided for in § 16-17-1108" for “as provided by law.”

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 126: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Case Notes

Substantial Compliance.

Special judge called at the suggestion of defendant's attorney after the clerk stated that regular judge was out of the city, where prosecuting attorney and defendant's attorney were the only attorneys present, was selected in substantial compliance with this section. Freeman v. Allen, 193 Ark. 432, 100 S.W.2d 679 (1937).

Cited: Littleton v. Blanton, 281 Ark. 395, 665 S.W.2d 239 (1984).

16-17-211. District court clerks generally.

    1. The judge of any district court may appoint a clerk for the court, who shall be designated and known as the district court clerk.
    2. The district court clerk employed by a city or county is governed by the employee handbook and policies of the city or county.
    3. If a district court clerk is employed by more than one (1) city or county, then the employing cities or counties, or both, shall determine by written agreement the apportionment of expenses and the applicable employee handbook and policies.
    4. The district court judge shall ensure compliance with the applicable employee handbook, policies, procedures, practices, ordinances, and resolutions of the city or county, or both, consistent with Canon 2 of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct.
    1. The city council of the city in which the court is located shall fix the salary of the district court clerk at a reasonable sum, the salary to be computed on an annual basis.
    2. However, where the county in which the court is located is to pay any portion of the clerk's salary, the salary must also be approved by the quorum court of that county. Further, if the expenses and salaries of any district court are paid entirely by the county in which the court is located, the salary of the clerk shall be fixed by the quorum court of the county and not by the city council.
  1. The district court clerk shall keep a fair record of all the acts done and proceedings had in the court and shall enter all judgments of the court, under the direction of the judge.
  2. The district court clerk shall:
    1. Administer oaths, including special judges of district court under § 16-17-210;
    2. Take affidavits required or permitted in the progress of the action;
    3. Keep a complete docket of all proceedings to the extent and in the manner directed by the judge;
    4. Record the judgments, rules, orders, and other civil or criminal proceedings of the court and keep an alphabetical index thereof;
    5. Keep such other dockets, books, and indices as may be required by law or by the judge; and
    6. Issue and attest all process.
  3. Where the duties of the office of district court clerk do not require a full-time employee, the city council may require that the duties of the clerk be performed by any other officer of the city, except a member of the police department or marshal's office.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 12; Pope's Dig., § 9908; Acts 1951, No. 280, § 1; 1953, No. 313, § 3; 1963, No. 57, § 1; 1963, No. 175, § 1; 1975, No. 873, § 1; 1981, No. 74, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-713; Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 125; 2003, No. 1765, § 18; 2009, No. 633, § 13; 2011, No. 1174, § 9; 2017, No. 323, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “including special judges of district court under § 16-17-210” in (d)(1); deleted (d)(3); and made a related change.

The 2011 amendment subdivided (b); deleted “and payable in equal monthly installments” at the end of (b)(1); substituted “Record” for “Seasonably record” in (d)(4); deleted former (e) and redesignated the following subsection accordingly; and added the exception at the end of present (e).

The 2017 amendment redesignated former (a) as (a)(1) and added (a)(2) through (a)(4).

Case Notes

City Employee.

Federal district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's § 1983 action alleging that defendant city violated her constitutional rights by failing to document that she paid certain fines and requesting issuance of a warrant for her arrest, as the complaint stated at least a plausible claim that the Phillips County district court clerk was a city official at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, rather than a state official, in which case the city could be accountable for actions of the clerk that established or carried out an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality. Evans v. City of Helena-West Helena, 912 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2019).

It was not until after the events alleged in the complaint that Phillips County was one of several counties that were reorganized as state district courts and served by a state district court judge. Before that time, state law gave cites and counties authority to set salaries for the district court clerk, and the complaint alleged that employees of the district court were hired by the city and paid by the city. Evans v. City of Helena-West Helena, 912 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2019).

16-17-212. Fees and costs generally.

  1. The only fees and costs that shall be allowed in civil and criminal suits, prosecutions, and proceedings in district court are those specifically authorized by statute.
  2. Nothing in this section or subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the collection by the prosecuting attorney or his or her deputies, the clerks of the district court, or the sheriff and constable or their deputies, of any costs or fees from the county in the trial of misdemeanors.
  3. Constables and deputies shall be allowed only those fees and costs specifically authorized by statute.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 9902; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-706; Acts 1991, No. 904, § 18; 2003, No. 1185, § 125.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 904, § 22, provided:

“It is hereby found that the passage of many court cost bills over several legislative sessions has caused confusion in the collection of such costs and that reasonable people can interpret the varying language of such court costs statutes differently. This legislation is necessary to standardize the language of such court cost statutes to provide that such costs are collected in a uniform manner statewide.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 23, provided:

“This act is hereby declared to be remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed to effect its purpose.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 24, provided:

“Nothing herein shall prohibit courts from assessing reasonable probation fees.”

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-213. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section has been deemed superseded by AICR 9 (now ADCR 9). See Hawkins v. City of Prairie Grove, 316 Ark. 150, 357 S.W.2d 871 (1994).

This section, concerning filing appeal transcripts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 127. The section was derived from Acts 1927, No. 60, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 9903; Acts 1939, No. 323, § 1; 1941, No. 280, § 1; 1953, No. 203, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-707, 26-1307; Acts 1987, No. 431, § 8.

16-17-214. Collection of fines in district court — Reports to mayor.

  1. The county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in district courts shall pay over to the district court clerk by the fifth working day of each month all sums collected.
  2. The county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 shall render to the governing body or, if applicable, each governing body of a political subdivision that contributes to the expenses of a district court for each month, a report under oath of all fines, penalties, forfeitures, fees, and costs collected during the month and attach to the report receipts of the district court clerk for all sums collected during the period.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 13; Pope's Dig., § 9909; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-714; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 128; 2003, No. 1765, § 19; 2005, No. 1934, § 11.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (a), deleted “shall collect all fines, penalties, forfeitures, fees, and costs assessed in district court and” preceding “shall pay over” and substituted “by the fifth working day of each month” for “daily”; and, in (b), substituted “governing body or, if applicable, each governing body of a political subdivision that contributes to the expenses of a district court” for “mayor” and deleted “giving the title of the cause and the arresting officer” preceding “and attaching.”

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-215. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section concerning the return of fines and costs by sheriff and constables, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1765, § 20. The section was derived from the following source: Acts 1927, No. 60, § 14; Pope's Dig., § 9910; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-715.

16-17-216. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning maintenance of separate accounts of fines and costs by clerk — settlement of accounts by municipal court and county court, was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 431, § 8. The section was derived from Acts 1927, No. 60, § 15; Pope's Dig., § 9911; Acts 1957, No. 218, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-719.

16-17-217 — 16-17-220. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-17-218, concerning change of venue from justice of the peace to municipal court, is deemed to be superseded by this section. The former section was derived from Acts 1927, No. 60, § 21; Pope's Dig., § 9917; Acts 1961, No. 178, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-725.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 17, is also codified as § 16-19-401.

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 55, § 1, is also codified as § 16-19-409.

These sections, concerning jurisdiction of justices of the peace in townships having a municipal court, change of venue from justice of the peace to municipal court, additional compensation of justices of the peace in townships having a municipal court, and filing of reports of fees and costs by justice of the peace, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 129. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-217. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 17; Pope's Dig., § 9913; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-724.

16-17-218. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 55, § 1.

16-17-219. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 18; Pope's Dig., § 9914; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-726.

16-17-220. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 22; Pope's Dig., § 9918; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-727.

Cross References. Improper venue of action, § 16-19-408.

16-17-221. Improper use of process — Granting privileges — Failure to report or pay over fines — Penalty.

  1. Any district judge who makes use, directly or indirectly, of the process of his or her own court, either as a party litigant or in interest or as an attorney or agent for any party litigant or in interest, or who offers or gives by way of remission of fees or otherwise any pecuniary inducements to the institution or maintenance of any suits, prosecutions, or proceedings in his or her court and any sheriff, constable, police chief, or district court clerk who fails to report or pay over fines, penalties, forfeitures, fees, or costs collected by him or her shall be guilty of a violation and upon conviction for each of such offenses shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).
  2. A conviction under this section shall work a forfeiture of office.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, sheriffs and constables may retain the fees and costs due them out of each cause.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 23; Pope's Dig., § 9919; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-728; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 130; 2005, No. 1994, § 81.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 23, is also codified as § 16-19-412.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “violation” for “misdemeanor” in present (a).

16-17-222. Fees of prosecuting attorney.

The prosecuting attorney or his or her deputies shall receive the same fees for prosecuting cases in the district court as they are allowed by law for the prosecution of misdemeanors in the circuit courts.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 24; Pope's Dig., § 9920; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-729; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 131.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-223. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the power of the court to issue process, was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 431, § 8. The section was derived from Acts 1927, No. 60, § 10; Pope's Dig., § 9906; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-711.

16-17-224. Manner of service of summons and other process.

  1. All summons and other process in any civil cause pending in any district court shall be served in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
  2. Where an arrest for a violation of state law committed within the township wherein the court sits is made upon a warrant filed by the prosecuting attorney or his or her deputy, such warrant to arrest shall be directed to the constable of the township or the sheriff of the county wherein the court sits. Where a warrant for arrest is issued for a violation of state law committed outside the township wherein the court sits but in a county subject to this subchapter, upon an information filed by the prosecuting attorney or his or her deputy, the warrant of arrest shall be directed to the sheriff of the county, and all other process in the proceeding shall be directed to the sheriff. However, any sheriff or constable of any township in a county subject to this subchapter may arrest an offender for a violation of any state law committed anywhere in the county and may bring the offender before the district court for trial, and that officer shall serve all process in the cause.
  3. The chief of police and his or her assistants shall serve all process for violations of city ordinances of the city wherein the district court sits and shall serve all criminal process for violations of state laws inside the city limits of a city subject to this subchapter, where the arrest is made by a police officer of the city or the information is filed by the city attorney of the city.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 25; Pope's Dig., § 9921; Acts 1953, No. 346, § 1; 1979, No. 913, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-730, 22-730.1; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 132.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Subchapter 3 — County Seat District Court Act

16-17-301. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning providing for the use and benefit of cities of the second class was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 134, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1947, No. 128, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-738; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 133, 134.

16-17-302. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning govening the courts created and established pursuant to this subchapter, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 135, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1947, No. 128, §§ 3-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-734 — 22-736.

16-17-303. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the establishment of district courts in county seat towns becoming cities of second class, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 137, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1947, No. 128, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-732; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 136, 137.

16-17-304. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section concerning, the city recorder and compensation, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 139, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1947, No. 128, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-733; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 138, 139.

16-17-305. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning jury trials, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 141, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1947, No. 128, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-737; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 140, 141.

Subchapter 4 — Establishment in Cities of First and Second Class and Incorporated Towns

16-17-401 — 16-17-403. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the qualifications, election and compensation of judges, the establishment of district courts by two or more cities or incorporated towns within the same county, and the election of a presiding judge where two or more cities establish a district court was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 143, effective January 1, 2005. These sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-401. Acts 1973, No. 240, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-755; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 142, 143.

16-17-402. Acts 1973, No. 240, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-756; Acts 1989, No. 878, § 1; 1991, No. 904, §§ 8, 20; 1995, No. 1256, § 20; 1995 (Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 142, 143.

16-17-403. Acts 1973, No. 240, § 3; 1977, No. 780, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-757; Acts 1999, No. 1354, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 142, 143.

Subchapter 5 — Establishment in Cities of Less Than 2,400 Population

16-17-501 — 16-17-503. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning permission for cities with populations under 3,000 to create a district court, the jurisdiction and powers of district courts, and the manner of selection and qualifications of district court judges and court expenses was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 145, effective January 1, 2005. These sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-501. Acts 1985, No. 251, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-767; Acts 1995, No. 338, § 1; 1995, No. 1015, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 144, 145.

16-17-502. Acts 1985, No. 251, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-768; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 144, 145.

16-17-503. Acts 1985, No. 251, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-769; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 144, 145.

Subchapter 6 — Small Claims Procedure

16-17-601. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning title, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 146, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.

16-17-602. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning small claims division to be established in district courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 148, January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.1; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 1; 1997, No. 746, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 147, 148.

16-17-603. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, the amendment to this section by Acts 2003, No. 1765, § 21, was superseded by the repeal of this section by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 149.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning referees, appointment, qualifications, and compensation, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 149. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.1; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 1; 1999, No. 1081, § 8.

16-17-604, 16-17-605. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning entities restricted from bringing actions and actions by and against corporations, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 150, effective January 1, 2005. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-604. Acts 1977, No. 725, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.2.

16-17-605. Acts 1979, No. 905, § 1; 1983, No. 314, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.16; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 12; 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 29, § 1; 1997, No. 694, § 1.

16-17-606. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning venue of civil actions, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 151, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.3.

16-17-607. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning commencement of action, form of claim and notice to defendant, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 153, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, § 5; 1983, No. 280, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.4; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 152, 153.

16-17-608 — 16-17-610. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning preparation of claim form, service of process, and answer by defendant, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 154, effective January 1, 2005. These sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-608. Acts 1977, No. 725, §§ 6, 7, 8; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-758.5, 22-758.6, 22-758.7; Acts 1987, No. 430, §§ 3-5.

16-17-609. Acts 1977, No. 725, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.6; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 4.

16-17-610. Acts 1977, No. 725, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.7; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 5.

16-17-611. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the form of defendant answers and claims of affirmative relief, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 156, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.9; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 6; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 155, 156.

16-17-612. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning restrictions on participation by attorneys, the taking of evidence and third-party practice, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 158, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, §§ 9, 11, 12; 1983, No. 280, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-758.8, 22-758.10, 22-758.11; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 8; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 157, 158.

16-17-613. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning judgements, orders, the awarding of costs and appeals, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 160, effective January 1, 2005. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, §§ 9, 11, 14-16; 1983, No. 280, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-758.8, 22-758.10, 22-758.13 — 22-758.15; Acts 1987, No. 430, §§ 7, 10, 11; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 159, 160.

16-17-614. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning fees for filing claim, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 725, § 13; 1981, No. 369, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-758.12; Acts 1987, No. 430, § 9. For present law, see § 16-17-705.

Subchapter 7 — District Court Civil Jurisdiction Act

Preambles. Acts 1997, No. 746 contained a preamble which read:

“WHEREAS, Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 64 authorizes the General Assembly to increase or decrease the jurisdictional limit by a two-thirds vote of each house of the General Assembly.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 431, § 10: July 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Amendment 64 has an effective date of July 1, 1987, that the smooth implementation of the Amendment requires that this law be enacted; that should the General Assembly extend the session beyond the sixtieth day, there exists a danger that this law would not be in effect on July 1, 1987; therefore, this shall be effective July 1, 1987.”

Acts 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 4: July 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 431 of 1987 has an effective date of July 1, 1987, that the smooth implementation of the Amendment 64 requires that this law be enacted on the same date; therefore, this shall be effective July 1, 1987.”

Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 23: Apr. 13, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56(a): Jan. 1, 2008.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56(b): Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2009, No. 345, § 57: July 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act is immediately necessary to coincide with the beginning of the 2009 — 2010 fiscal year to further the goal of a unified court system in order to provide judicial economy and the fair administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2009.”

16-17-701. Title.

This subchapter shall be known as the “District Court Civil Jurisdiction Act”.

History. Acts 1987, No. 431, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 161.

16-17-702. Proceedings subject to rules.

All civil cases filed in district court shall be subject to the procedural rules adopted by the Supreme Court for such cases.

History. Acts 1987, No. 431, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 161, 162.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 162: effective Jan. 1, 2003, by its own terms.

Case Notes

Transfers.

As is provided by Arkansas's statutory law and court rules, the municipal court had authority to transfer cause to the Washington County Circuit Court after concluding replevin action exceeded the jurisdictional amount. Bonnell v. Smith, 322 Ark. 141, 908 S.W.2d 74 (1995).

16-17-703. Right to jury trial.

There shall be no jury trials in district court. In order that the right of trial by jury remains inviolate, all appeals from judgment in district court shall be de novo to circuit court.

History. Acts 1987, No. 431, § 3; 2003, No. 1185, § 163.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

While former § 16-17-704(a)(6) does provide for concurrent jurisdiction, nothing in Acts 1987, No. 431 suggests an intent by the legislature to abrogate the constitutional right to a trial by jury in tort actions triable in circuit court. To the contrary, this section, which deals with appeals from municipal court, clearly demonstrates the legislature's concern that the right secured by Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 7 not be diminished. McClanahan v. Gibson, 296 Ark. 304, 756 S.W.2d 889 (1988).

Construction with Other Law.

Although a DWI conviction is tried de novo in circuit court on appeal, the appeal does not affect the validity of the judgment of the district court until that judgment is overturned; thus, defendant's prior driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction, which was on appeal to the circuit court, was properly used to determine defendant's fourth-offense DWI status at sentencing in a subsequent case. Swint v. State, 356 Ark. 361, 152 S.W.3d 226 (2004).

Circuit Court.

In a tort case in circuit court, there is a right to trial by jury regardless of the amount in controversy. McClanahan v. Gibson, 296 Ark. 304, 756 S.W.2d 889 (1988).

Default Judgment.

A defendant has a direct right of appeal to circuit court from the entry of a default judgment in municipal court. Murdock v. Slater, 326 Ark. 1067, 935 S.W.2d 540 (1996).

Failure to Appear.

The trial court complied with Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 7 by setting defendant's case for trial by jury even though defendant failed to appear at trial and, therefore, was precluded from exercising that right. Rischar v. State, 307 Ark. 429, 821 S.W.2d 25 (1991).

Cited: Gran v. Hale, 294 Ark. 563, 745 S.W.2d 129 (1988); Edwards v. City of Conway, 300 Ark. 135, 777 S.W.2d 583 (1989); State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 80, 913 S.W.2d 259 (1996); Johnson v. State, 337 Ark. 196, 987 S.W.2d 694, 1999 Ark. LEXIS 172 (1999); Tackett v. Merchant's Sec. Patrol, 73 Ark. App. 358, 44 S.W.3d 349 (2001).

16-17-704. Jurisdiction — Civil Cases.

The district courts shall have subject matter jurisdiction as established by Supreme Court rule.

History. Acts 1987, No. 431, § 4; 1993, No. 961, § 1; 1997, No. 746, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 163, 164.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 164: effective Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Civil Procedure, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 135.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

While former subdivision (a)(6) of this section does provide for concurrent jurisdiction, nothing in Acts 1987, No. 431 suggests an intent by the legislature to abrogate the constitutional right to a trial by jury in tort actions triable in circuit court. To the contrary, § 16-17-703, which deals with appeals from municipal court (now district court), clearly demonstrates the legislature's concern that the right secured by Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 7 not be diminished. McClanahan v. Gibson, 296 Ark. 304, 756 S.W.2d 889 (1988).

Appeal.

Arkansas law, constitutional and statutory, provides municipal courts with no authority to hear and decide actions concerning damages to land. Accordingly, a municipal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of a trespass on land action, and because the municipal court has no jurisdiction cause, the circuit court acquires none on appeal. Miles v. Southern, 297 Ark. 274, 760 S.W.2d 868 (1988).

Fraud.

Legal malpractice action brought against an attorney in the small claims division of the municipal court was really a claim based on fraud and, as such, the municipal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the attorney was proper because it could not acquire subject-matter jurisdiction on appeal, however, the court could consider the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim on a summary judgment motion, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). French v. Webb, 80 Ark. App. 357, 96 S.W.3d 740 (2003).

Personal Property.

Whether personal property becomes a fixture by annexation to the land depends upon the annexer's manifested intention, which can be shown by material considerations such as the character of the fixture as related to the use to which the land is being put and the manner in which the property is attached to the land. Sanders v. Putman, 315 Ark. 251, 866 S.W.2d 827 (1993).

Trial by Jury.

In a tort case in circuit court, there is a right to trial by jury regardless of the amount in controversy. McClanahan v. Gibson, 296 Ark. 304, 756 S.W.2d 889 (1988).

Persons are not entitled to a jury trial in municipal court except that such right to a jury trial remains inviolate when they pursue their appeal to circuit court where their case is to be tried de novo. Edwards v. City of Conway, 300 Ark. 135, 777 S.W.2d 583 (1989); State v. Roberts, 321 Ark. 31, 900 S.W.2d 175 (1995).

Cited: Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1994); State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 80, 913 S.W.2d 259 (1996).

16-17-705. Filing fees and costs.

    1. The uniform filing fee to be charged by the clerks of the district courts for initiating a cause of action in district court in this state shall be as prescribed in this section.
    2. No portion of the filing fee shall be refunded.
    1. For initiating a cause of action in the civil division of district court $65.00
    2. For initiating a cause of action in the small claims division of district court $50.00
  1. A town, city, or county shall not authorize and a district court clerk shall not assess or collect any other filing fees than those authorized by this section, unless specifically provided by state law.

History. Acts 1987, No. 431, § 5; 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 1; 1995, No. 1256, § 5; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 165, 166; 2005, No. 2212, § 3; 2007, No. 663, § 3; 2009, No. 345, § 1.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment, in (b)(2), deleted “if that division is established pursuant to the Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 7(D)” following “court” and substituted “$50.00” for “$25.00”; and substituted “town, city, or county” for “municipality” in (c).

The 2009 amendment substituted “$65.00” for “50.00” in (b)(1); and made minor stylistic changes in (c).

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1995, No. 1256, codified as §§ 5-65-115, 5-65-307, 14-20-102, 14-42-112, 16-10-133, 16-10-30116-10-310, 16-14-105, 16-17-402, 16-17-705, 16-21-106, 16-21-113, 16-21-1103, 16-21-1503, 20-7-123, 20-18-502, 21-6-403, 24-8-315.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The imposition of part of the expenses of municipal courts on the counties in which they are established is not violative of constitutional provisions vesting county courts with original jurisdiction in all matters relating to county affairs. Crawford County v. City of Van Buren, 201 Ark. 798, 146 S.W.2d 914 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Appropriation Not Made.

If a municipal court was created after the last prior meeting of the quorum court and no appropriation was made for the payment of the services of the judge and clerk, they could recover from the county on its liability for one-half of their salaries, provided there was a balance more than sufficient to pay those salaries. Jackson County v. Pickens, 208 Ark. 15, 184 S.W.2d 591 (1945) (decision under prior law).

Association Dues.

There is no provision in the Constitution or the statutes which gives the county court the specific authority to pay dues to the county judges' association. Ark. Ass'n of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960).

16-17-706. Venue.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the venue of civil actions instituted under this subchapter shall be as in like actions instituted in the circuit courts.
  2. If a small claims division of the district court is established pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 7, venue in civil actions instituted in the small claims division shall be as follows:
    1. When a defendant has contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, an action based on that obligation may be commenced and maintained either in the county where the obligation is to be performed or in the county in which the defendant resides at the commencement of the action;
    2. When the action is for injury to person or to personal property, either the county where the injury occurred or the county where the defendant resides at the commencement of the action shall be the proper venue; and
    3. In all other cases, actions shall be commenced and maintained in the county in which the defendant resides.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 167.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 167, purports to amend former § 16-17-706, which had previously been repealed by Acts 1997, No. 788, § 32 and No. 1341, § 31; the 2003 act has been treated as an enactment.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-17-706, concerning disposition of filing fees and the municipal court costs fund, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 788, § 32 and No. 1341, § 31. The section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 431, § 5; 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 167: effective Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

16-17-707. Separate accounting records of fines, etc. — Disbursements.

  1. The district court clerk shall keep three (3) separate accounting records of all fines, penalties, forfeitures, fees, and costs received by him or her for any of the officers of the town, city, or county, as provided in this subchapter:
    1. The first class of accounting records shall embrace all sums collected in the district court in all nontraffic cases which are misdemeanors or violations of the town or city ordinances and all cases which are misdemeanors or violations under state law or traffic offenses which are misdemeanors or violations under state law or town or city ordinance committed within the corporate limits of the town or city where the court sits, where the arresting officer was a police officer or other officer of the town or city, a Division of Arkansas State Police officer or other certified law enforcement officer of the state, or an officer of a private or public college or university located within the corporate limits of the town or city where the court sits;
    2. The second class of accounting records shall embrace all sums collected in the district court in all nontraffic cases which are misdemeanors or violations of county ordinances or are misdemeanors or violations of any of the laws of the state where the arresting officer was the county sheriff or a deputy sheriff or was not a police officer or other officer of the town or city where the court sits, and the offense was committed outside the corporate limits of the town or city where the court sits, and in all other criminal or traffic proceedings not specifically enumerated in this section; and
      1. The third class of accounting records shall embrace all sums collected in the district court in all civil and small claims cases.
      2. The uniform filing fee collected under § 16-17-705 shall be remitted to the city administration of justice fund.
      3. The uniform court costs collected under § 16-10-305 shall be remitted to the city administration of justice fund.
      4. All other fees and interest earned on the court account shall be disbursed to the treasurers of the political subdivisions which contribute to the expense of the district court in accordance with a written agreement among the political subdivisions.
      1. After deducting the fees due the police department and marshal's office and sheriff's office, the district court shall pay into the town or city treasury all sums collected from the first class of accounting records.
      2. The district court shall pay all sums collected from the second class of accounting records into the county treasury.
    1. Any district court that is funded solely by the county shall pay all sums collected from the first or second class of accounting records into the county treasury and shall pay all uniform filing fees and court costs collected into the county administration of justice fund.
    2. A town or city that has a police department and does not operate a district court shall receive only the prorated sums collected as provided in § 16-17-1203.
    3. Direct monetary settlements shall be made with state entities or agencies as provided by law.
  2. All disbursements from all three (3) classes of accounting records shall be pursuant to the provisions set forth in the Arkansas District Courts Accounting Law, § 16-10-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1987, No. 431, § 6; 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 168; 2003, No. 1765, § 22; 2005, No. 1934, § 12; 2007, No. 663, § 37; 2009, No. 411, § 1; 2009, No. 633, § 14.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment added present (b)(3), and redesignated the former (b)(3) as present (b)(4); deleted “and City Courts” following “District Courts” in (c); and made minor punctuation changes.

The 2009 amendment by No. 411 inserted present (b)(3) and redesignated former (b)(3) as (b)(4).

The 2009 amendment by No. 633 inserted “and interest earned on the court account” in (a)(3)(D).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Subchapter 8 — Appeals

16-17-801. Notice.

  1. Whenever any person appeals any civil or criminal judgment rendered in any district court of this state and requests a trial de novo in circuit court, no hearing shall be held or trial shall commence in circuit court without ten (10) days' written notice being given either to the parties, to the defendant, or to the attorneys of record, whichever is applicable, by the clerk of the court or by the case coordinator.
  2. In the event that the defense requests a continuance because of this section, the time which the trial is delayed is excludable for purposes of speedy trial.

History. Acts 1997, No. 996, § 1.

16-17-802. Combining multiple misdemeanor court convictions.

If a person who has been convicted of more than one (1) related misdemeanor offense in district court shall present otherwise lawfully sufficient documents to the circuit clerk for an appeal of the related convictions, accompanied by an affidavit of the person or his or her attorney stating that the convictions arise out of the same set of facts and circumstances, the circuit clerk shall:

  1. Combine the convictions;
  2. Prepare and file the appeal as one (1) case; and
  3. Charge only one (1) filing fee for the appeal.

History. Acts 1999, No. 232, § 1; 2001, No. 1809, § 10; 2011, No. 1132, § 10; 2015, No. 1152, § 3; 2017, No. 253, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “district court or city court” for “municipal court, district court, city court, or police court” in the introductory language.

The 2015 amendment redesignated (2)(A) and (2)(B) as (2) and (3).

The 2017 amendment deleted “or city court” following “district court”.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Subchapter 9 — Judicial Districts — Judges For District Courts

Effective Dates. Acts 2005, No. 72, § 7: Feb. 7, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the districts courts in various counties must have departments located in various parts of the county to ensure that sufficient courtrooms and resources are available for the operation of the court system in the counties; that the statutes creating the district courts must be clarified to reflect the establishment of the various departments; and that this act is immediately necessary to ensure the continued operation of the departments of the district courts. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Acts 2009, No. 345, § 57: July 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act is immediately necessary to coincide with the beginning of the 2009 — 2010 fiscal year to further the goal of a unified court system in order to provide judicial economy and the fair administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2009.”

16-17-901. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Department” means the physical location where sessions of district court are held; and
  2. “Division” means the subject matter division of the district court.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 1; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment inserted “district” preceding “court” in (1) and (2).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-902. Counties having one district court.

  1. Each of the following counties shall have one (1) district court and one (1) district judge:
    1. Howard;
    2. Montgomery;
    3. Perry;
    4. Polk;
    5. Randolph;
    6. Scott;
    7. Sevier; and
    8. Stone.
  2. The district court shall be located in the county seat of each county listed in subsection (a) of this section.
    1. The judge of any district court located in a county with one (1) district court shall be elected countywide.
    2. If there is only one (1) district court in a county, it shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 2; 2005, No. 72, § 1; 2007, No. 663, §§ 4, 38; 2009, No. 345, § 2; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (a)(2), deleted “Lawrence,” “Poinsett,” “Sharp” and “Woodruff” and made related changes.

The 2007 amendment by No. 663, § 4, in (a), deleted former (1), (2), (17) and (38), and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

The 2007 amendment by No. 663, § 38 rewrote (a).

The 2009 amendment deleted (a)(4), which read: “Cleburne,” and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

The 2017 amendment rewrote (a).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-903. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning Crittenden County District Courts, was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 3; 2007, No. 663, § 39.

16-17-904. Arkansas County District Courts.

  1. Arkansas County shall have the following district courts and judges:
    1. The Northern District shall have:
      1. One (1) district court located in Stuttgart; and
      2. One (1) district judge; and
      1. The Southern District shall have one (1) district court with three (3) departments:
        1. One (1) located in DeWitt;
        2. One (1) located in Gillett; and
        3. One (1) located in St. Charles.
      2. All three (3) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  2. The judge of any district court located in Arkansas County shall be elected by the electors of the judicial district in which the court is located.
  3. In Arkansas County, the jurisdiction of the district court shall be limited to the judicial district in which the court is located.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 4; 2005, No. 72, § 2; 2007, No. 663, §§ 5, 40; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “and Mississippi” for “Mississippi, and Prairie” throughout this section.

The 2007 amendment by No. 663, § 5 substituted “and Logan” for “Logan, and Mississippi” throughout the section.

The 2007 amendment by No. 663, § 40 rewrote the section heading and rewrote the section.

The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-905, 16-17-906. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Sebastian County District Courts and the Craighead County District Court, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-905. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 5; 2007, No. 663, § 6.

16-17-906. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 6; 2005, No. 72, § 6.

16-17-907. Clay County District Court.

    1. Clay County shall have one (1) district court with three (3) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Corning;
      2. One (1) located in Piggott; and
      3. One (1) located in Rector.
    2. All three (3) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Clay County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Clay County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 7; 2005, No. 72, § 3; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote (a).

The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-908 — 16-17-911. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Ashley County District Courts, the Benton County District Courts, the Chicot County District Court, and the Desha County District Court, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-908. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 8.

16-17-909. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 9; 2003 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 45, § 1; 2007, No. 663, § 7; 2011, No. 1132, § 11.

16-17-910. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 10.

16-17-911. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 11.

16-17-912. Garland County District Court.

    1. Garland County shall have one (1) district court with three (3) departments:
      1. Two (2) located in Hot Springs; and
      2. One (1) located in Mountain Pine.
    2. All three (3) departments are to be served by two (2) judges.
  1. The judges of Garland County District Court shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Garland County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 12; 2007, No. 663, § 41; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment rewrote (a).

The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-913. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning Jefferson County District Courts, was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 13; 2007, No. 663, § 42.

16-17-914. Lonoke County District Courts.

  1. Lonoke County, having two (2) judicial districts, shall have the following district courts and judges:
      1. The Northern District of Lonoke County shall have one (1) district court, with three (3) departments:
        1. One (1) located in Cabot;
        2. One (1) located in Ward; and
        3. One (1) located in Austin.
      2. All three (3) departments are to be served by one (1) district judge; and
      1. The Southern District of Lonoke County shall have one (1) district court with five (5) departments as follows:
        1. One (1) located in Lonoke;
        2. One (1) located in England;
        3. One (1) located in Carlisle;
        4. One (1) located in Allport; and
        5. One (1) located in Humnoke.
      2. All five (5) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  2. The district court boundaries in Lonoke County shall be as follows:
    1. The Northern District of Lonoke County shall consist of the townships of Butler, Caroline, Cleveland, Eagle, Goodrum, Magness, Oak Grove, Prairie, Totten, Ward, and York; and
    2. The Southern District of Lonoke County shall consist of the townships of Carlisle, Crooked Creek, Dortch, Fletcher, Furlow, Gum Woods, Gray, Hamilton, Indian Bayou, Isbell, Lafayette, Lonoke, Pettus, Richwoods, Pulaski, Scott, Williams, and Walls.
  3. The judge of any district court in Lonoke County shall be elected by the qualified electors of the judicial district in which the court is located.
  4. The jurisdiction of each district court in Lonoke County shall be limited to the judicial district in which the court is located.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 14; 2003 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 76, § 1; 2005, No. 72, § 4; 2007, No. 663, § 43; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 rewrote (a)(1)(A).

The 2007 amendment rewrote (a); and inserted “judicial” in (d).

The 2017 amendment deleted former (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C); redesignated former (a)(2)(D) as (a)(2)(B); and substituted “All five (5) departments” for “All three (3) departments in Carlisle, Allport, and Humnoke” in (a)(2)(B).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-915. Monroe County District Court.

    1. Monroe County shall have one (1) district court with three (3) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Brinkley;
      2. One (1) located in Clarendon; and
      3. One (1) located in Holly Grove.
      1. The department in Brinkley is to be served by one (1) judge.
      2. The two (2) departments in Clarendon and Holly Grove are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The judges of the Monroe County District Court shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Monroe County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 15; 2007, No. 663, § 44; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment rewrote (a).

The 2017 amendment substituted “department in Brinkley” for “Brinkley Department” in (a)(2)(A).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-916. Ouachita County District Courts.

  1. Ouachita County shall have the following district courts and judges:
    1. Camden shall have:
      1. One (1) district court; and
      2. One (1) judge; and
      1. East Camden shall have one (1) district court with four (4) departments:
        1. One (1) located in Bearden;
        2. One (1) located in Chidester;
        3. One (1) located in East Camden; and
        4. One (1) located in Stephens.
      2. All four (4) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
    1. The judge of the Camden District Court shall be elected countywide.
    2. The Camden District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.
    1. The judge of the East Camden District Court shall be elected countywide.
    2. The East Camden District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 16; 2007, No. 663, § 45; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment rewrote (a); and inserted “countywide” in (c)(1) and (2).

The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-917 — 16-17-921. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Phillips County District Court, the Saline County District Court, the Washington County District Courts, the White County District Court, and the Pulaski County District Courts, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-917. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 17; 2007, No. 39, § 1; 2007, No. 663, § 46.

16-17-918. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 18; 2007, No. 663, § 8.

16-17-919. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 19; 2003 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 24, § 1; 2007, No. 55, § 1; 2007, No. 663, § 47.

16-17-920. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 20; 2007, No. 663, § 48.

16-17-921. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 21; 2007, No. 663, § 49.

16-17-922. Yell County District Courts.

    1. Yell County, having two (2) judicial districts, shall have two (2) district courts with one (1) department located in the Northern District.
    2. The two (2) judicial districts shall each have one (1) part-time judge serviced by the one (1) department in the Northern District.
  1. The judge of each district court in Yell County shall have jurisdiction within each respective Northern and Southern District.
  2. The judge shall be elected within each respective district.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 22; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment deleted former (b); and redesignated former (c) and (d) as (b) and (c).

Cross References. District court generally, § 16-17-132.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, §§ 6, 19.

16-17-923, 16-17-924. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning district courts established and election of district judges and the Poinsett County District Court, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-923. Acts 2003, No. 1727, § 24.

16-17-924. Acts 2005, No. 72, § 5; 2007, No. 663, § 9.

16-17-925. Sharp County District Court.

    1. Sharp County shall have one (1) district court with two (2) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Ash Flat; and
      2. One (1) located in Cherokee Village.
    2. Both departments are to be served by (1) judge.
  1. The Sharp County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Sharp County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2005, No. 72, § 5; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

16-17-926. Woodruff County District Court.

    1. Woodruff County shall have one (1) district court with four (4) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Augusta;
      2. One (1) located in Cotton Plant;
      3. One (1) located in McCrory; and
      4. One (1) located in Patterson.
    2. All four (4) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Woodruff County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Woodruff County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2005, No. 72, § 5; 2011, No. 1218, § 5; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “four (4)” for “three (3)” in the introductory language of (a)(1) and in (a)(2); and inserted (a)(1)(D).

The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

16-17-927. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning Prairie County District Courts, was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2005, No. 72, § 5.

16-17-928. Lawrence County District Court.

    1. Lawrence County shall have one (1) district court with four (4) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Walnut Ridge;
      2. One (1) located in Hoxie;
      3. One (1) located in Black Rock; and
      4. One (1) located in Portia.
    2. All four (4) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Lawrence County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Lawrence County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2005, No. 72, § 5; 2007, No. 663, § 50; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment substituted “four (4)” for “two (2)” in (a)(1); added (a)(1)(C) and (D); substituted “All four (4)” for “Both” in (a)(2); and made related changes.

The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-929 — 16-17-932. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Mississippi County District Courts, the Greene County District Court, the Carroll County District Courts, and the Pope County District Court, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-929. Acts 2007, No. 663, §§ 10, 51.

16-17-930. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 11.

16-17-931. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-932. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 12.

16-17-933. Franklin County District Courts.

  1. Franklin County, having two (2) judicial districts, shall have the following district courts and judges:
    1. The Charleston District shall have:
      1. One (1) district court located in Charleston; and
      2. One (1) district judge; and
      1. The Ozark District shall have one (1) district court with two (2) departments:
        1. One (1) located in Ozark; and
        2. One (1) located in Altus.
      2. Both departments are to be served by one (1) district judge.
  2. The judge of any district court located in Franklin County shall be elected by the electors of the judicial district in which the court is located.
  3. In Franklin County, the jurisdiction of the district court shall be limited to the judicial district in which the court is located.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-934. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the Baxter County District Court, was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 663, § 13.

16-17-935. Logan County District Courts.

  1. Logan County, having two (2) judicial districts, shall have the following district courts and judges:
    1. The Northern District shall have:
      1. One (1) district court located in Paris; and
      2. One (1) district judge; and
      1. The Southern District shall have one (1) district court with two (2) departments:
        1. One (1) located in Booneville; and
        2. One (1) located in Magazine.
      2. Both departments are to be served by one (1) district judge.
  2. The judge of any district court located in Logan County shall be elected by the electors of the judicial district in which the court is located.
  3. In Logan County, the jurisdiction of the district court shall be limited to the judicial district in which the court is located.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment deleted the comma following “Logan County” in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-936, 16-17-937. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Cleburne County District Court and the Boone County District Court, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-936. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2015, No. 1001, § 1.

16-17-937. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 14.

16-17-938. Columbia County District Court.

    1. Columbia County shall have one (1) district court with two (2) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Magnolia; and
      2. One (1) located in Waldo.
    2. Both departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Columbia County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Columbia County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-939. Conway County District Court.

    1. Conway County shall have one (1) district court with four (4) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Morrilton;
      2. One (1) located in Menifee;
      3. One (1) located in Oppelo; and
      4. One (1) located in Plumerville.
    2. All four (4) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Conway County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Conway County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2011, No. 1218, § 6; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “four (4)” for “three (3)” in the introductory language of (a)(1) and in (a)(2); and inserted (a)(1)(D).

The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-940. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the Crawford County District Court, was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-941. Cross County District Court.

    1. Cross County shall have one (1) district court with three (3) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Wynne;
      2. One (1) located in Cherry Valley; and
      3. One (1) located in Parkin.
    2. All three (3) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Cross County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Cross County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-942, 16-17-943. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Dallas County District Court and the Faulkner County District Court, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-942. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-943. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-944. Fulton County District Court.

    1. Fulton County shall have one (1) district court with two (2) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Salem; and
      2. One (1) located in Mammoth Spring.
    2. Both departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Fulton County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Fulton County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-945. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the Hot Spring County District Court, was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-946. Izard County District Court.

    1. Izard County shall have one (1) district court with two (2) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Melbourne; and
      2. One (1) located in Horseshoe Bend.
    2. Both departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Izard County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Izard County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “two (2)” for “three (3)” in the introductory language of (a)(1); deleted former (a)(1)(B); redesignated former (a)(1)(C) as (a)(1)(B); and substituted “Both” for “All three (3)” in (a)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-947. Jackson County District Court.

    1. Jackson County shall have one (1) district court with four (4) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Newport;
      2. One (1) located in Diaz;
      3. One (1) located in Swifton; and
      4. One (1) located in Tuckerman.
    2. All four (4) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Jackson County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Jackson County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-948. Johnson County District Court.

    1. Johnson County shall have one (1) district court with three (3) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Clarksville;
      2. One (1) located in Lamar; and
      3. One (1) located in Coal Hill.
    2. All three (3) departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Johnson County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Johnson County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-949, 16-17-950. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the Lafayette County District Court and the Lincoln County District Court, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-949. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-950. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-951. Little River County District Court.

    1. Little River County shall have one (1) district court with three (3) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Ashdown;
      2. One (1) located in Foreman; and
      3. One (1) located in Winthrop.
    2. All departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Little River County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Little River County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2011, No. 1218, § 7; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “three (3)” for “two (2)” in the introductory language of (a)(1); and inserted (a)(1)(C).

The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-952. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning Marion County District Court, was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-953. Pike County District Court.

    1. Pike County shall have one (1) district court with two (2) departments:
      1. One (1) located in Murfreesboro; and
      2. One (1) located in Glenwood.
    2. Both departments are to be served by one (1) judge.
  1. The Pike County District Court Judge shall be elected countywide.
  2. The Pike County District Court shall have countywide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2017, No. 723, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment made no changes to this section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-954 — 16-17-957. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the St. Francis County District Court, the Van Buren County District Court, the Perry County District Court, and the Clark County District Court, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-954. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-955. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51.

16-17-956. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2011, No. 1218, § 8.

16-17-957. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 51; 2011, No. 1218, § 9.

Subchapter 10 — District Court Resource Assessment

16-17-1001. Legislative findings.

The General Assembly finds that:

  1. The goal expressed by Arkansas citizens with the adoption of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution was the creation of a three-tiered, unified court system;
  2. The current structure of limited jurisdiction courts consists of a combination of full-time and part-time district and city court judges funded by city and county governments;
  3. Based on availability of local resources, the cumulative effect of the creation and funding of those courts by local governments has been an unequal level of access to and an inequitable distribution of judicial services to communities;
  4. While Amendment 80 does not require the state to fund the district court system, there is a state interest in providing a more uniform level of judicial resources to all citizens of the state;
  5. Because the current system of limited jurisdiction courts is not uniform, it is contrary to the interest of the state to merely shift the funding of the system from local government to state government without addressing the district court system's structure;
  6. A way of addressing the shortage of resources for circuit courts in some areas of the state is the expansion of the jurisdiction of the district court, which will shift cases from the circuit court to the district court and reduce expenses for the state;
  7. A state-funded district court system should include an analysis by the state that furthers the goal of a unified and equitable system for the delivery of judicial services; and
  8. It is the intent of this subchapter to begin that analysis process by establishing a pilot program that creates a limited number of state-funded district court judgeships and a process for the study and consideration of establishing additional district courts in the future.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

16-17-1002. District Court Resource Assessment Board.

  1. There is created the District Court Resource Assessment Board.
    1. The board shall consist of eleven (11) members appointed as follows:
      1. Two (2) members of the Senate appointed by the Chair of the Senate Committee on Judiciary;
      2. Two (2) members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Chair of the House Committee on Judiciary; and
      3. Seven (7) members appointed by the Supreme Court as follows:
        1. Two (2) members of the Arkansas District Judges Council;
        2. One (1) member of the Association of Arkansas Counties;
        3. One (1) member of the Arkansas Municipal League;
        4. One (1) Justice of the Supreme Court;
        5. One (1) member of the Arkansas Bar Association who is engaged in the full-time private practice of law; and
        6. One (1) circuit judge.
    2. The board shall have three (3) ex officio members who shall serve as nonvoting members:
      1. The Chair of the Senate Committee on Judiciary or his or her designee;
      2. The Chair of the House Committee on Judiciary or his or her designee; and
      3. The Attorney General or his or her designee.
      1. Each member of the board shall serve a term of four (4) years.
      2. However, the initial board members shall serve terms to be determined by lot so that:
        1. Two (2) members serve an initial term of one (1) year;
        2. Three (3) members serve an initial term of two (2) years;
        3. Three (3) members serve an initial term of three (3) years; and
        4. Three (3) members serve an initial term of four (4) years.
      3. A member may be reappointed successively for one (1) four-year term.
    3. If a vacancy occurs on the board, the original appointing authority shall appoint a successor to serve the remainder of the unexpired term.
    4. The board shall elect annually one (1) member to serve as chair and one (1) member to serve as secretary.
    5. The board shall meet:
      1. Initially whenever called by the Supreme Court;
      2. On or before the first Tuesday of the December before each regular session of the General Assembly to consider making a recommendation to the General Assembly for:
        1. The creation and placement of new state-funded district court judgeships;
        2. Any redistricting of the district courts; and
        3. The reorganization, consolidation, abolition, or creation of any district court or district court judgeship;
      3. Upon the end of the term, resignation, retirement, death, or election to another judicial office of any district judge to:
        1. Recommend the reorganization, consolidation, abolition, or continuation of that district court judgeship to the General Assembly; and
          1. Evaluate the status of the vacated district court judgeship and make a recommendation to the General Assembly before the next regular session, fiscal session, or special session or during a current session.
          2. An appointment or election to fill a vacant district court judgeship does not affect the mandatory evaluation required by subdivision (b)(6)(C)(ii)(a ) of this section; and
      4. Upon the call of the chair or a majority of the board.
    6. Six (6) members of the board is a quorum for the transaction of business.
    7. Members of the board shall serve without pay, but may be reimbursed for expenses under § 25-16-902.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 1; 2009, No. 962, § 35.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “session, fiscal session” preceding “or special session” in (b)(6)(C)(ii)(a).

16-17-1003. Duties of the District Court Resource Assessment Board.

The District Court Resource Assessment Board shall recommend to the General Assembly at each regular session:

  1. Criteria for the creation and placement of full-time, state-funded district court judgeships;
  2. Revisions of current district court judgeships or the redistricting of the district court districts of this state after considering:
    1. The caseload and the geographic area of the district court district;
    2. The November 25, 2002, per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court; and
    3. Any other matter the board determines to be appropriate; and
  3. The number and placement of full-time, state-funded district court judgeships.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 1.

Subchapter 11 — Pilot State District Courts

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56(a): Jan. 1, 2008.

Acts 2009, No. 345, § 57: July 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act is immediately necessary to coincide with the beginning of the 2009 — 2010 fiscal year to further the goal of a unified court system in order to provide judicial economy and the fair administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2009.”

Acts 2009, No. 356, § 2: Mar. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Alpena and Salesville were inadvertently left out of Act 663 of 2007; and that this act is immediately necessary to further the goal of unified court system to provide judicial economy and fair administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 172, § 2: Feb. 15, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that a state district court has been approved in Green Forest; that it is in the interest of Arkansas and the Third District to promote an efficient and fair judiciary; and that this act is immediately necessary because the people served by the Third District are entitled to the operation of a district court in Green Forest. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 935, § 4: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the twenty-fifth judicial district has an immediate need for an additional district court judge due to the number of cases pending in the judicial district. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-17-1101. Legislative findings.

The General Assembly finds that:

  1. The goal expressed by Arkansas citizens with the adoption of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution was the creation of a three-tiered unified court system;
  2. The current structure of limited jurisdiction courts consists of a combination of full-time and part-time district and city courts funded by city and county governments;
  3. Based on availability of local resources, the cumulative effect of the creation and funding of those courts by local governments has been an unequal level of access to and an inequitable distribution of judicial services to communities;
  4. While Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution does not require the state to fund the district court system, there is a state interest in providing a more uniform level of judicial resources to all citizens of the state;
  5. Because the current system of limited jurisdiction courts is not uniform, it is contrary to the interest of the state to merely shift the funding of the system from local government to state government without addressing the structure of the district court system;
  6. A way of addressing the shortage of resources for circuit courts in some areas of the state is the expansion of the jurisdiction of the district court which will shift cases from circuit court to district court and reduce expenses for the state;
  7. A state-funded system should include an analysis by the state that furthers the goal of a unified and equitable system for the delivery of judicial services;
  8. The District Court Resource Assessment Board, created in § 16-17-1001 et seq., has studied the effectiveness of the state's creation of pilot district courts and found that they are successful in creating a more uniform and equitable judicial system, reducing the number of district and city court judges, maintaining the level of service to the communities served by district and city courts, allowing the shift of cases from circuit to district courts, decreasing the number of conflicts requiring the appointment of special judges, and improving public access to the court system;
  9. The state should continue the incremental creation of state district courts served by full-time judges and designate geographic districts that have sufficient caseloads to justify a full-time judge until the system is implemented and operating statewide on January 1, 2017; and
  10. For purposes of the program, cities and counties should keep one hundred percent (100%) of all their current revenue from fines and costs with the exception of the adjustment from the cost-sharing formula.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 2; 2011, No. 1219, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote (8); inserted present (9) and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and deleted “pilot” preceding “program” in (10).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

District Court Clerk.

Federal district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's § 1983 action alleging that defendant city violated her constitutional rights by failing to document that she paid certain fines and requesting issuance of a warrant for her arrest, as the complaint stated at least a plausible claim that the Phillips County district court clerk was a city official at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, rather than a state official, in which case the city could be accountable for actions of the clerk that established or carried out an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality. Evans v. City of Helena-West Helena, 912 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2019).

It was not until after the events alleged in the complaint that Phillips County was one of several counties that were reorganized as state district courts and served by a state district court judge. Before that time, state law gave cites and counties authority to set salaries for the district court clerk, and the complaint alleged that employees of the district court were hired by the city and paid by the city. Evans v. City of Helena-West Helena, 912 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2019).

Reorganization.

Due process violation arising from a district court judge's installment fee policy could be imputed to the city because the judge was an employee of the city since the Little Rock District Court had not yet been reorganized as a state district court at the times relevant to the case; the Little Rock District Court was not part of the state district court program at the time of the events alleged in the complaint. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

16-17-1102. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Department” means the physical location where sessions of court are held;
  2. “District” means the geographical area in which a state district court may exercise jurisdiction and from which a state district court judge is elected;
  3. “Division” means the designation of the judicial positions for case management or election purposes and does not refer to “subject matter divisions” under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 7;
  4. “Local district court” includes a department of a district court;
    1. “State district court” means a district court that is created by this subchapter and has:
      1. Criminal jurisdiction, as established by the General Assembly; and
      2. Civil jurisdiction, as established by the Supreme Court.
    2. “State district court” includes a department of a state district court; and
  5. “State district court judge” means a full-time judge:
    1. Whose salary is paid by the state;
    2. Who is not engaged in the private practice of law; and
    3. Who is available for work in circuit court under rules adopted by the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 2; 2011, No. 1219, § 2.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted former (1) through (3) and inserted present (1) through (6).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-1103. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning creation of pilot state district court judgeships, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 1219, § 3. The section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 663, § 2; 2009, No. 345, § 3.

16-17-1104. State district court judges — Salaries.

  1. The judges who are appointed or elected to serve the courts created under this subchapter are state district court judges.
  2. The salaries of the state district court judges are uniform and shall be paid with moneys appropriated from the Constitutional Officers Fund, § 19-5-205, by the General Assembly.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 2; 2009, No. 345, § 4; 2011, No. 1219, § 4.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “16-17-1103” for “16-17-1003” in (a).

The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-1105. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning consolidation of city courts with district courts, was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 663, § 2; 2009, No. 345, § 5; 2009, No. 356, § 1.

16-17-1106. Salary of state district court judges — Cost-sharing.

  1. The state shall pay the salary and benefits of state district court judges created under this subchapter.
      1. Each county and town or city in a district in which a state district court judgeship is created under this subchapter shall pay to the state an amount equal to its proportionate share of one-half (½) of the base salary established by law for state fiscal year 2009 for that district's state district court judge.
        1. The proportionate share is calculated as follows:
          1. Determine the sum total of the base salary paid by each county and town or city in a district to that county and town or city's district court judge or city court judge for the calendar year immediately preceding the creation of the state district court judgeship; and
          2. Determine the proportion of the base salary of each county and town or city to the sum total base salary of the district.
        2. Each county and town or city shall pay to the state its proportionate share as determined in subdivision (b)(1)(B)(i)(a) of this section of one-half (½) of the base salary established by law for state fiscal year 2009 for each state district court judge in the district at the time the county and town or city had a state district court judgeship created.
      2. On a form provided by the Administration of Justice Funds Section, each county and town or city in a district shall certify annually on or before October 31 the amount to be paid to the state for its share of one-half (½) of the salary as determined in this section for that district's state district court judge.
      1. This section does not prohibit a county and town or city in a district in which a state district court judgeship is created under this subchapter from agreeing in writing on the amount to be paid to the state by the county and the town or city for its proportionate share of one-half (½) of the salary as determined in this section for that district's state district court judge.
      2. If a written agreement is reached under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, the county and town or city shall submit on or before October 31 a copy of that written agreement to the Administration of Justice Funds Section.
  2. The amount of the state district court judge's salary initially paid by the county and the town or city in a district and annually afterwards shall be the amount determined under subsection (b) of this section.
    1. Beginning with its annual meeting of 2011, the quorum court in each county in a district in which a state district court judgeship is created under this subchapter and the council in each town or city in a district in which a state district court judgeship is created under this subchapter shall appropriate annually from its general revenues an amount sufficient to pay its share of the state district court judgeship salary allocated to it under subsection (b) of this section.
    2. The duty under subdivision (d)(1) of this section may be enforced in a court of competent jurisdiction.
  3. On or before December 15, 2011, and annually afterwards, the Administration of Justice Funds Section shall certify to the county and the town or city in each district the amount of its share of one-half (½) of the base salary established under subsection (b) of this section.
  4. On or before January 15, 2012, and annually afterwards, the county and the town or city shall remit to the Administration of Justice Funds Section for deposit into the Constitutional Officers Fund the sum necessary to fund its share of the base salary allocated to it under subsection (e) of this section.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 2; 2011, No. 1219, § 5.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-1107. Salary of judges serving city or county.

This subchapter shall not in any way limit the power and authority of local district courts currently existing. Except for the state district court judgeships created under this subchapter, a judge serving in another full-time or part-time local district court position shall continue to be an employee of the cities or counties, or both, that he or she serves and shall be paid according to state law.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 2; 2011, No. 1219, § 6.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “local district courts” for “other district courts” and substituted “part-time local district court position” for “part-time district court position.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

District Court Clerk.

Federal district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's § 1983 action alleging that defendant city violated her constitutional rights by failing to document that she paid certain fines and requesting issuance of a warrant for her arrest, as the complaint stated at least a plausible claim that the Phillips County district court clerk was a city official at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, rather than a state official, in which case the city could be accountable for actions of the clerk that established or carried out an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality. Evans v. City of Helena-West Helena, 912 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2019).

It was not until after the events alleged in the complaint that Phillips County was one of several counties that were reorganized as state district courts and served by a state district court judge. Before that time, state law gave cites and counties authority to set salaries for the district court clerk, and the complaint alleged that employees of the district court were hired by the city and paid by the city. Evans v. City of Helena-West Helena, 912 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2019).

Reorganization.

Due process violation arising from a district court judge's installment fee policy could be imputed to the city because the judge was an employee of the city since the Little Rock District Court had not yet been reorganized as a state district court at the times relevant to the case; the Little Rock District Court was not part of the state district court program at the time of the events alleged in the complaint. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

16-17-1108. Travel expense reimbursement.

  1. From the appropriation provided for the expenses of state district court judges, a state district court judge is authorized to be reimbursed for those travel expenses at the rate as authorized for state employees and for mileage at the rate established in the state travel rules for state employees while traveling within the state in the performance of official duties.
  2. When a state or local district judge is appointed by the Chief Justice to hear a case or cases in a jurisdiction outside that in which he or she is elected, the judge shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel expenses and mileage as provided in subsection (a) of this section.

History. Acts 2009, No. 345, § 6; 2011, No. 274, § 8; 2011, No. 1219, § 7; 2019, No. 315, § 1298.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 274, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 13(C), provides that the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court may appoint a special judge to serve in circuit court or district court whenever a judge is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve or when there is other need for a temporary appointment, under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

“(b) Special judges may include retired justices or judges, active circuit judges or district judges, or licensed attorneys.

“(c) The current laws that govern the payment of special judges have not been revised since the adoption of Amendment 80 and are in conflict and need of clarification.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment by No. 274 deleted “pilot” twice preceding “state district court” in (a); and added (b).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1219 deleted “pilot” preceding “state district court” in two places.

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (a).

16-17-1109. Jurisdiction.

    1. State district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with criminal jurisdiction as defined by the General Assembly and by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 7, and civil jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
    2. State district courts may be given greater criminal and civil jurisdiction than that provided for local district courts, subject to the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, §§ 7 and 10.
  1. Under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, a state district court judge may hear cases filed in the circuit court that arise within the territorial jurisdiction of the state district court judge.
    1. Under rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, a state district court judge may be assigned by the Chief Justice to hear cases outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
    2. When assigned, the state district court judge is entitled to the reimbursement of travel expenses under § 16-17-1108.

History. Acts 2011, No. 1219, § 8.

16-17-1110. Organization and designation.

The following state district courts shall be organized and designated in numbered judicial districts as follows:

    1. The First District is composed of Benton County.
    2. The First District has fourteen (14) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Rogers;
      2. One (1) located in Bentonville;
      3. One (1) located in Siloam Springs;
      4. One (1) located in Gentry;
      5. One (1) located in Decatur;
      6. One (1) located in Bethel Heights;
      7. One (1) located in Cave Springs;
      8. One (1) located in Centerton;
      9. One (1) located in Gravette;
      10. One (1) located in Little Flock;
      11. One (1) located in Lowell;
      12. One (1) located in Pea Ridge;
      13. One (1) located in Sulphur Springs; and
      14. One (1) located in Bella Vista.
      1. The district is served by four (4) state district court judges.
      2. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1.
      3. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2.
      4. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 3.
      5. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 4.
    3. The assignment of judges to departments under subdivision (1)(B) of this section is determined by the mutual agreement of the state district court judges.
    4. For the purpose of venue, the district court boundaries in Benton County are as follows:
      1. Division 1 — Rogers District Court:
        1. All of District 94, District 95, and District 96 of the House of Representatives as drawn by The Board of Apportionment in 2002;
        2. That part of District 98 of the House of Representatives as drawn by The Board of Apportionment in 2002 that is in Benton County Quorum Court District 1 as established by the Benton County Election Commission;
        3. That part of Benton County Quorum Court District 6 as established by the Benton County Election Commission that is in District 96 and District 98 of the House of Representatives as drawn by The Board of Apportionment in 2002; and
        4. All of precinct 43, precinct 44, and precinct 49 as they existed on January 1, 2011;
      2. Division 2 — Bentonville District Court:
        1. All of District 7, District 8, District 9, and District 10 except for the now-existing precinct 22, of the Benton County Quorum Court as established by the Benton County Election Commission;
        2. All of District 99 of the House of Representatives as drawn by The Board of Apportionment in 2002 except for the now-existing precinct 43, precinct 44, and precinct 49; and
        3. All of precinct 45 as it existed on January 1, 2011;
      3. Division 3 — Siloam Springs District Court:
        1. All of District 97 of the House of Representatives as drawn by The Board of Apportionment in 2002; and
        2. All of precinct 7, precinct 14, precinct 16, and precinct 17 as they existed on January 1, 2011; and
      4. Division 4 — Benton County West District Court:
        1. All of Benton County Quorum Court District 11 as established by the Benton County Election Commission; and
        2. All of precinct 6, precinct 15, precinct 18, precinct 19, and precinct 22 as they existed on January 1, 2011.
    5. The First District judges are elected districtwide.
    6. The First District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Second District shall be composed of Washington County and the city limits of Springdale as of January 1, 2011, including that portion of the City of Springdale which extends into Benton County.
    2. The Second District shall have ten (10) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Springdale;
      2. One (1) located in Elm Springs;
      3. One (1) located in Johnson;
      4. One (1) located in Fayetteville;
      5. One (1) located in Elkins;
      6. One (1) located in West Fork;
      7. One (1) located in Greenland;
      8. One (1) located in Prairie Grove;
      9. One (1) located in Lincoln; and
      10. One (1) located in Farmington.
    3. The Second District shall be served by four (4) state district court judges:
      1. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1;
      2. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2;
      3. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 3; and
      4. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 4.
    4. The presiding judge of the departments under subdivision (2)(B) of this section shall be determined by the mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Second District.
    5. The Second District judges shall be elected districtwide.
    6. The Second District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Third District shall be composed of Carroll County and Madison County.
    2. The Third District shall have four (4) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Berryville;
      2. One (1) located in Eureka Springs;
      3. One (1) located in Huntsville; and
      4. One (1) located in Green Forest.
    3. The Third District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Third District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Third District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Fourth District shall be composed of Boone County, the City of Alpena in Carroll County, Newton County, and Searcy County.
    2. The Fourth District has four (4) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Alpena;
      2. One (1) located in Harrison;
      3. One (1) located in Marshall; and
      4. One (1) located in Jasper.
    3. The Fourth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Fourth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Fourth District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Fifth District shall be composed of Crawford County.
    2. The Fifth District shall have five (5) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Van Buren;
      2. One (1) located in Mountainburg;
      3. One (1) located in Alma;
      4. One (1) located in Mulberry; and
      5. One (1) located in Dyer.
    3. The Fifth District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Fifth District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Fifth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Sixth District is composed of the Greenwood District of Sebastian County and the Fort Smith District of Sebastian County.
    2. The Greenwood District of Sebastian County has one (1) district court with one (1) judge and three (3) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Greenwood;
      2. One (1) located in Barling; and
      3. One (1) located in Central City.
      1. The Fort Smith District of Sebastian County has one (1) district court with three (3) departments and one (1) judge for each department.
      2. One (1) judgeship shall be designated Division 1.
      3. One (1) judgeship shall be designated Division 2.
      4. One (1) judgeship shall be designated Division 3.
    3. The assignment of judges to departments under subdivision (6)(C) of this section is determined by the mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Sixth District.
    4. The judge of any district court in Sebastian County shall be elected by the electors of the judicial district in which the court is located.
    5. The jurisdiction of the district courts in Sebastian County shall be limited to the judicial district in which the court is located;
    1. The Eighth District is composed of Pope County.
    2. The Eighth District has five (5) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Russellville;
      2. One (1) located in Atkins;
      3. One (1) located in Dover;
      4. One (1) located in London; and
      5. One (1) located in Pottsville.
    3. The Eighth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Eighth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Eighth District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Ninth District shall be composed of Faulkner County and Van Buren County.
    2. The Ninth District shall have seven (7) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Conway;
      2. One (1) located in Greenbrier;
      3. One (1) located in Guy;
      4. One (1) located in Mayflower;
      5. One (1) located in Vilonia;
      6. One (1) located in Clinton; and
      7. One (1) located in Damascus.
    3. The Ninth District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges:
      1. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1; and
      2. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2.
    4. The assignment of judges to departments under subdivision (8)(B) of this section shall be determined by the mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Ninth District.
    5. The Ninth District judges shall be elected districtwide.
    6. The Ninth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Tenth District is composed of Baxter County and Marion County.
    2. The Tenth District has ten (10) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Briarcliff;
      2. One (1) located in Cotter;
      3. One (1) located in Gassville;
      4. One (1) located in Lakeview;
      5. One (1) located in Mountain Home;
      6. One (1) located in Norfork;
      7. One (1) located in Salesville;
      8. One (1) located in Yellville;
      9. One (1) located in Bull Shoals; and
      10. One (1) located in Flippin.
    3. The Tenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Tenth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Tenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Thirteenth District is composed of Cleburne County.
    2. The Thirteenth District has four (4) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Heber Springs;
      2. One (1) located in Greers Ferry;
      3. One (1) located in Concord; and
      4. One (1) located in Quitman.
    3. The Thirteenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Thirteenth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirteenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction.
    6. Court costs in the Cleburne County District Court —
    1. The Fourteenth District is composed of Independence County.
    2. The Fourteenth District has one (1) department located in Batesville.
    3. The Fourteenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Fourteenth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Fourteenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Seventeenth District is composed of Greene County.
    2. The Seventeenth District has two (2) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Paragould; and
      2. One (1) located in Marmaduke.
    3. The Seventeenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Seventeenth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Seventeenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Eighteenth District shall be composed of the Chickasawba District and the Osceola District in Mississippi County.
    2. The Eighteenth District has five (5) departments in the Chickasawba District as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Blytheville;
      2. One (1) located in Manila;
      3. One (1) located in Leachville;
      4. One (1) located in Gosnell; and
      5. One (1) located in Dell.
    3. The Eighteenth District has one (1) department located in Osceola in the Osceola District.
    4. The Eighteenth District is served by two (2) state district court judges, with one (1) elected from the Chickasawba District and one (1) elected from the Osceola District.
    5. Each district court within the Eighteenth District only has jurisdiction within each of the district court's respective districts;
    1. The Nineteenth District shall be composed of Craighead County.
    2. The Nineteenth District shall have two (2) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) department located in Jonesboro; and
      2. One (1) department located in Lake City.
    3. The Nineteenth District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges:
      1. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1; and
      2. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2.
    4. The assignment of judges to departments under subdivision (14)(B) of this section shall be determined by the mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Nineteenth District.
    5. The Nineteenth District judges shall be elected districtwide.
    6. The Nineteenth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twentieth District is composed of Poinsett County.
    2. The Twentieth District has five (5) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Marked Tree;
      2. One (1) located in Trumann;
      3. One (1) located in Tyronza;
      4. One (1) located in Lepanto; and
      5. One (1) located in Harrisburg.
    3. The Twentieth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Twentieth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Twentieth District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twenty-First District shall be composed of Crittenden County.
    2. The Twenty-First District shall have seven (7) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Earle;
      2. One (1) located in Gilmore;
      3. One (1) located in Jennette;
      4. One (1) located in Jericho;
      5. One (1) located in Marion;
      6. One (1) located in Turrell; and
      7. One (1) located in West Memphis.
    3. The Twenty-First District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Twenty-First District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Twenty-First District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twenty-Second District shall be composed of Lee County and Phillips County.
    2. The Twenty-Second District shall have five (5) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Marianna;
      2. One (1) located in Helena-West Helena;
      3. One (1) located in Lake View;
      4. One (1) located in Elaine; and
      5. One (1) located in Marvell.
    3. The Twenty-Second District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Twenty-Second District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Twenty-Second District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twenty-Third District shall be composed of White County and Prairie County.
    2. The Twenty-Third District shall have thirteen (13) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Beebe;
      2. One (1) located in Searcy;
      3. One (1) located in Bald Knob;
      4. One (1) located in Bradford;
      5. One (1) located in Judsonia;
      6. One (1) located in McRae;
      7. One (1) located in Kensett;
      8. One (1) located in Pangburn;
      9. One (1) located in Rose Bud;
      10. One (1) located in Des Arc;
      11. One (1) located in Hazen;
      12. One (1) located in Biscoe; and
      13. One (1) located in De Valls Bluff.
    3. The Twenty-Third District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges:
      1. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1; and
      2. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2.
    4. The assignment of judges to departments under subdivision (18)(B) of this section shall be determined by the mutual agreement of the state district court judges of the Twenty-Third District.
    5. The Twenty-Third District judges shall be elected districtwide.
    6. The Twenty-Third District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twenty-Fifth District is composed of St. Francis County.
    2. The Twenty-Fifth District has three (3) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Forrest City;
      2. One (1) located in Madison; and
      3. One (1) located in Palestine.
    3. The Twenty-Fifth District is served by two (2) state district court judges.
    4. The Twenty-Fifth District judges are elected districtwide.
    5. The Twenty-Fifth District courts have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twenty-Sixth District shall be composed of Ashley County.
    2. The Twenty-Sixth District shall have two (2) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Crossett; and
      2. One (1) located in Hamburg.
    3. The Twenty-Sixth District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Twenty-Sixth District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Twenty-Sixth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twenty-Seventh District shall be composed of Desha County and Chicot County.
    2. The Twenty-Seventh District shall have five (5) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Dermott;
      2. One (1) located in Eudora;
      3. One (1) located in Lake Village;
      4. One (1) located in Dumas; and
      5. One (1) located in McGehee.
    3. The Twenty-Seventh District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Twenty-Seventh District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Twenty-Seventh District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twenty-Eighth District shall be composed of Bradley County and Drew County.
    2. The Twenty-Eighth District shall have two (2) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Monticello; and
      2. One (1) located in Warren.
    3. The Twenty-Eighth District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Twenty-Eighth District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Twenty-Eighth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Twenty-Ninth District shall be composed of Jefferson County and Lincoln County.
    2. The Twenty-Ninth District shall have nine (9) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Pine Bluff;
      2. One (1) located in Altheimer;
      3. One (1) located in Humphrey;
      4. One (1) located in White Hall;
      5. One (1) located in Wabbaseka;
      6. One (1) located in Redfield;
      7. One (1) located in Star City;
      8. One (1) located in Grady; and
      9. One (1) located in Gould.
    3. The Twenty-Ninth District shall be served by three (3) state district court judges:
      1. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1;
      2. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2; and
      3. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 3.
    4. The assignment of judges to departments under subdivision (23)(B) of this section shall be determined by the mutual agreement of the state's district court judges of the Twenty-Ninth District.
    5. The Twenty-Ninth District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    6. The Twenty-Ninth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Thirty-First District is composed of Pulaski County.
    2. The Thirty-First District shall have eleven (11) departments that shall be served by eight (8) state district judges. All the following judges shall be elected districtwide and shall have districtwide territorial jurisdiction:
      1. The Jacksonville District Court and the Maumelle District Court shall be served by one (1) judge;
      2. The Little Rock District Court — First Division shall be served by one (1) judge;
      3. The Little Rock District Court — Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge;
      4. The Little Rock District Court — Third Division, the Wrightsville District Court, and the Cammack Village District Court shall be served by one (1) judge;
      5. The North Little Rock District Court — First Division shall be served by one (1) judge;
      6. The North Little Rock District Court — Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge;
      7. The Pulaski County District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; and
      8. The Sherwood District Court shall be served by one (1) judge.
      1. Any judge serving as a local district judge in the Thirty-First District whose base annual salary is paid by a city and whose base annual salary is more than the annual salary paid to a state district judge, upon becoming a state district judge, shall continue to be paid by the city the differential amount between his or her annual salary as of December 31, 2016, and the annual salary established by the state for a state district judge.
      2. The differential amount as calculated as of December 31, 2016, shall continue as long as the judge continues to serve as a state district judge.
      3. Upon leaving office of state district court judge, by retirement or otherwise, his or her successor shall be paid only the salary established for a state district judge without regard to the differential amount provided for in this section;
    1. The Thirty-Second District is composed of Saline County and the City of Alexander in Pulaski County.
    2. The Thirty-Second District has six (6) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Benton;
      2. One (1) located in Bryant;
      3. One (1) located in Alexander;
      4. One (1) located in Bauxite;
      5. One (1) located in Haskell; and
      6. One (1) located in Shannon Hills.
      1. The Thirty-Second District is served by two (2) state district court judges.
      2. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 1.
      3. One (1) judgeship shall be designated as Division 2.
    3. The assignment of judges to departments under subdivision (25)(B) of this section is determined by the mutual agreement of the state district court judges in the Thirty-Second District.
    4. The Thirty-Second District judges are elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirty-Second District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Thirty-Third District shall be composed of Grant County and Hot Spring County.
    2. The Thirty-Third District shall have three (3) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Sheridan;
      2. One (1) located in Malvern; and
      3. One (1) located in Rockport.
    3. The Thirty-Third District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Thirty-Third District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirty-Third District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Thirty-Fourth District shall be composed of Calhoun County, Cleveland County, and Dallas County.
    2. The Thirty-Fourth District shall have four (4) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Hampton;
      2. One (1) located in Rison;
      3. One (1) located in Fordyce; and
      4. One (1) located in Sparkman.
    3. The Thirty-Fourth District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Thirty-Fourth District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirty-Fourth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Thirty-Fifth District is composed of Union County.
    2. The Thirty-Fifth District has one (1) department located in El Dorado and one (1) state district court judge.
    3. The Thirty-Fifth District judge is elected districtwide.
    4. The Thirty-Fifth District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Thirty-Seventh District is composed of Miller County and Lafayette County.
    2. The Thirty-Seventh District has five (5) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Lewisville;
      2. One (1) located in Bradley;
      3. One (1) located in Stamps; and
      4. Two (2) located in Texarkana.
    3. The Thirty-Seventh District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Thirty-Seventh District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirty-Seventh District court has districtwide jurisdiction;
    1. The Thirty-Eighth District shall be composed of Hempstead County and Nevada County.
    2. The Thirty-Eighth District shall have two (2) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Hope; and
      2. One (1) located in Prescott.
    3. The Thirty-Eighth District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Thirty-Eighth District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirty-Eighth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction; and
    1. The Fortieth District shall be composed of Clark County.
    2. The Fortieth District shall have four (4) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Arkadelphia;
      2. One (1) located in Amity;
      3. One (1) located in Caddo Valley; and
      4. One (1) located in Gurdon.
    3. The Fortieth District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Fortieth District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Fortieth District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

Quitman Department shall be allocated as described in § 16-10-604(d)(1)(A);

History. Acts 2011, No. 1219, § 9; 2015, No. 1081, § 1; 2017, No. 723, § 3; 2019, No. 935, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Minor corrections were made to the designations of the district courts in consultation with the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Acts 2019, No. 935, § 3, provided: “(a) For the district court judgeship created under this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person who is a resident of the judicial district that is the subject of this act to temporarily fill the newly created district court judgeship, and the appointed person shall serve until January 1, 2021, or until a successor has been elected and qualified.

“(b)(1) The qualified electors of the judicial district shall elect the additional district court judge created by this act at the 2020 preferential primary election to take office on January 1, 2021.

“(2) The additional district court judge shall be elected from the judicial district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law.

“(3) The district court judge shall serve for an elected term of four (4) years.

“(c) The counties receiving the new district court judgeship shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies as provided by law”.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted former (9)(A) and (9)(F) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; in present (9)(A), substituted “January 1, 2017” for “January 1, 2021” and inserted “the Chickasawba District and the Osceola District in”; inserted “in the Chickasawba District” in the introductory language of present (9)(B); rewrote the introductory language of present (9)(C); and rewrote present (9)(D) and (9)(E).

The 2017 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2019 amendment substituted “served by two (2) state district court judges” for “served by one (1) state district court judge” in (19)(C); substituted “District judges are elected” for “District judge is elected” in (19)(D); and substituted “District courts have districtwide” for “District court has districtwide” in (19)(E).

Case Notes

Reorganization.

In a private probation company’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging two Craighead County district court judges’ implementation of an amnesty program forgiving probation fees, the Craighead County district court judges became employees of the State before the events in the case and thus their actions could not be imputed to the county or city defendants. Justice Network Inc. v. Craighead Cty., 931 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2019).

Due process violation arising from a district court judge's installment fee policy could be imputed to the city because the judge was an employee of the city since the Little Rock District Court had not yet been reorganized as a state district court at the times relevant to the case; the Little Rock District Court was not part of the state district court program at the time of the events alleged in the complaint. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

16-17-1111, 16-17-1112. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 16-17-1112 is set out as repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, § 5. Section 16-17-1112(b)(2) was amended by Acts 2017, No. 172, § 1 to add an additional department to the Third District at Green Forest. This change to the Third District is also incorporated in Acts 2017, No. 723, § 3 at § 16-17-1110(3).

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning reorganization of local district courts to state district courts as of January 1, 2013 and as of January 1, 2017, were repealed by Acts 2017, No. 723, §§ 4, 5. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-17-1111. Acts 2011, No. 1219, § 10.

16-17-1112. Acts 2011, No. 1219, § 11; 2013, No. 1489, § 1; 2015, No. 1081, § 2; 2017, No. 172, § 1.

16-17-1113. Reorganization of local district courts to state district courts as of January 1, 2021.

    1. Beginning January 1, 2021, the following cities and counties that are currently served by local district courts pursuant to § 16-17-901 et seq. shall be reorganized as state district courts and served by state district court judges as assigned.
    2. The new state district court judgeships created by this section shall become effective January 1, 2021, and shall be placed on the ballot to be elected in the 2020 nonpartisan judicial election from the newly constructed state district court district.
    3. The cities and counties that were previously served by local district courts and will be served by state district courts shall comply with the cost-sharing requirements established in § 16-17-1106, effective January 1, 2021.
    1. The Seventh Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Franklin and Johnson.
    2. The Seventh District shall have six (6) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Charleston;
      2. One (1) located in Ozark;
      3. One (1) located in Altus;
      4. One (1) located in Clarksville;
      5. One (1) located in Coal Hill; and
      6. One (1) located in Lamar.
    3. The Seventh Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Seventh Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Seventh Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.
    1. The Eleventh Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Randolph, Sharp, and Lawrence.
    2. The Eleventh District shall have seven (7) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Pocahontas;
      2. One (1) located in Ash Flat;
      3. One (1) located in Cherokee Village;
      4. One (1) located in Walnut Ridge;
      5. One (1) located in Hoxie;
      6. One (1) located in Black Rock; and
      7. One (1) located in Portia.
    3. The Eleventh Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges.
    4. The Eleventh Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Eleventh Judicial District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.
    1. The Twelfth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Logan, Yell, and Conway.
    2. The Twelfth District shall have nine (9) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Morrilton;
      2. One (1) located in Menifee;
      3. One (1) located in Oppelo;
      4. One (1) located in Paris;
      5. One (1) located in Booneville;
      6. One (1) located in Magazine;
      7. One (1) located in Danville;
      8. One (1) located in Plumerville; and
      9. One (1) located in Dardanelle.
    3. The Twelfth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Twelfth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Twelfth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.
  1. [Repealed.]
  2. [Repealed.]
    1. The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Jackson and Woodruff.
    2. The Fifteenth District shall have eight (8) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Newport;
      2. One (1) located in Diaz;
      3. One (1) located in Swifton;
      4. One (1) located in Tuckerman;
      5. One (1) located in Augusta;
      6. One (1) located in Cotton Plant;
      7. One (1) located in McCrory; and
      8. One (1) located in Patterson.
    3. The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Fifteenth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Fifteenth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.
  3. [Repealed.]
    1. The Seventeenth District is composed of the counties of Clay and Greene.
    2. The Seventeenth District has five (5) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Paragould;
      2. One (1) located in Marmaduke;
      3. One (1) located in Corning;
      4. One (1) located in Piggott; and
      5. One (1) located in Rector.
    3. The Seventeenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Seventeenth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Seventeenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction.
    1. The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Scott, Polk, and Montgomery.
    2. The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall have three (3) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Waldron;
      2. One (1) located in Mena; and
      3. One (1) located in Mt. Ida.
    3. The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.
    1. The Twenty-Fifth District is composed of the counties of St. Francis and Cross.
    2. The Twenty-Fifth District has six (6) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Forrest City;
      2. One (1) located in Madison;
      3. One (1) located in Palestine;
      4. One (1) located in Wynne;
      5. One (1) located in Cherry Valley; and
      6. One (1) located in Parkin.
    3. The Twenty-Fifth District is served by two (2) state district court judges.
    4. The Twenty-Fifth District judges are elected districtwide.
    5. The Twenty-Fifth District courts have districtwide jurisdiction.
    1. The Thirtieth District shall be composed of Lonoke County.
    2. The Thirtieth District shall have six (6) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Cabot;
      2. One (1) located in Ward;
      3. One (1) located in Austin;
      4. One (1) located in Lonoke;
      5. One (1) located in England; and
      6. One (1) located in Carlisle.
    3. The Thirtieth District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges.
    4. The Thirtieth District court judges shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirtieth District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.
    1. The Thirty-First District is composed of the counties of Pulaski and Perry.
    2. The Thirty-First District has twelve (12) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Jacksonville, to be known as “Jacksonville District Court”;
      2. Four (4) located in Little Rock, to be known as:
        1. “Little Rock District Court — First Division”;
        2. “Little Rock District Court — Second Division”;
        3. “Little Rock District Court — Third Division”; and
        4. “Pulaski County District Court”;
      3. One (1) located in Maumelle, to be known as “Maumelle District Court”;
      4. Two (2) located in North Little Rock, to be known as:
        1. “North Little Rock District Court — First Division”; and
        2. “North Little Rock District Court — Second Division”;
      5. One (1) located in Sherwood, to be known as “Sherwood District Court”;
      6. One (1) located in Wrightsville, to be known as “Wrightsville District Court”;
      7. One (1) located in Cammack Village, to be known as “Cammack Village District Court”; and
      8. One (1) located in Perryville, to be known as “Perryville District Court”.
    3. The Thirty-First District shall be served by eight (8) state district judges. All the following judges shall be elected districtwide and shall have districtwide jurisdiction:
      1. The Jacksonville District Court and the Maumelle District Court shall be served by one (1) judge;
      2. The Little Rock District Court — First Division shall be served by one (1) judge;
      3. The Little Rock District Court — Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge;
      4. The Little Rock District Court — Third Division, the Wrightsville District Court, and the Cammack Village District Court shall be served by one (1) judge;
      5. The North Little Rock District Court — First Division shall be served by one (1) judge;
      6. The North Little Rock District Court — Second Division shall be served by one (1) judge;
      7. The Pulaski County District Court shall be served by one (1) judge;
      8. The Sherwood District Court shall be served by one (1) judge; and
      9. The Perryville District Court shall be served by one (1) of the district court judges listed under subdivisions (m)(3)(A)-(H) of this section.
    1. The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Ouachita and Columbia.
    2. The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall have seven (7) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Magnolia;
      2. One (1) located in Waldo;
      3. One (1) located in Camden;
      4. One (1) located in East Camden;
      5. One (1) located in Bearden;
      6. One (1) located in Chidester; and
      7. One (1) located in Stephens.
    3. The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirty-Ninth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.
    1. The Forty-First Judicial District shall be composed of Garland County.
    2. The Forty-First District shall have three (3) departments as follows:
      1. Two (2) located in Hot Springs; and
      2. One (1) located in Mountain Pine.
    3. The Forty-First Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges.
    4. The Forty-First Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Forty-First Judicial District courts shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1081, § 3; 2019, No. 814, § 1; 2019, No. 868, §§ 1, 2; 2019, No. 909, § 1; 2019, No. 935, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2019, No. 935, § 3, provided:

“(a) For the district court judgeship created under this act, the Governor shall appoint a qualified person who is a resident of the judicial district that is the subject of this act to temporarily fill the newly created district court judgeship, and the appointed person shall serve until January 1, 2021, or until a successor has been elected and qualified.

“(b)(1) The qualified electors of the judicial district shall elect the additional district court judge created by this act at the 2020 preferential primary election to take office on January 1, 2021.

“(2) The additional district court judge shall be elected from the judicial district, shall satisfy the same qualifications for holding office, and shall receive the same salary, expenses, and other allowances as provided by law.

“(3) The district court judge shall serve for an elected term of four (4) years.

“(c) The counties receiving the new district court judgeship shall provide courtroom and office facilities and supplies as provided by law”.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by No. 814 substituted “two (2) state district court judges” for “one (1) state district court judge” in (l)(3); substituted “court judges” for “judge” in (l)(4); and substituted “courts” for “court” in (l)(5).

The 2019 amendment by No. 868 repealed (e) and (h).

The 2019 amendment by No. 909 repealed (f).

The 2019 amendment by No. 935 substituted “two (2) state district court judges” for “one (1) state district court judge” in (k)(3); substituted “judges are elected” for “judge is elected” in (k)(4); and substituted “courts have” for “court has” in (k)(5).

16-17-1114. Reorganization of local district courts to state district courts as of January 1, 2025.

    1. Beginning January 1, 2025, the following cities and counties that are currently served by local district courts under § 16-17-901 et seq. shall be reorganized as state district courts and served by state district court judges as assigned.
    2. The new state district court judgeships created by this section shall become effective January 1, 2025, and shall be placed on the ballot to be elected in the 2024 nonpartisan judicial election from the newly constructed state district court district.
    3. The cities and counties that were previously served by local district courts and will be served by state district courts shall comply with the cost-sharing requirements established in § 16-17-1106, effective January 1, 2025.
    1. The Thirty-Sixth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Little River, Sevier, Pike, and Howard.
    2. The Thirty-Sixth Judicial District shall have seven (7) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Ashdown;
      2. One (1) located in Foreman;
      3. One (1) located in Winthrop;
      4. One (1) located in De Queen;
      5. One (1) located in Nashville;
      6. One (1) located in Murfreesboro; and
      7. One (1) located in Glenwood.
    3. The Thirty-Sixth Judicial District shall be served by two (2) state district court judges.
    4. The Thirty-Sixth Judicial District judges shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirty-Sixth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1081, § 4; 2019, No. 817, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “2025” for “2029” in the section heading and throughout (a); substituted “2024” for “2028” in (a)(2); inserted “Pike” in (b)(1); substituted “seven (7)” for “five (5)” in the introductory language of (b)(2); added (b)(2)(F) and (G); substituted “two (2) state district court judges” for “one (1) state district court judge” in (b)(3); substituted “judges” for “judge” in (b)(4); deleted (c); and a made stylistic change.

16-17-1115. Reorganization of local district courts to state district courts as of January 1, 2025.

    1. Beginning January 1, 2025, the following cities and counties, currently being served by a local district court under § 16-17-901 et seq. shall be reorganized as a state district court district and served by state district court judges as assigned.
    2. The new state district court judgeship created by this section shall become effective January 1, 2025, and shall be placed on the ballot to be elected in the 2024 nonpartisan judicial election from the newly constructed state district court district.
    3. The cities and counties that were previously served by local district courts and will be served by state district courts shall comply with the cost-sharing requirements established in § 16-17-1106, effective January 1, 2025.
    1. The Thirteenth District is composed of the counties of Stone and Cleburne.
    2. The Thirteenth District has five (5) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Heber Springs;
      2. One (1) located in Greers Ferry;
      3. One (1) located in Concord;
      4. One (1) located in Quitman; and
      5. One (1) located in Mountain View.
    3. The Thirteenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Thirteenth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Thirteenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction.
    1. The Sixteenth Judicial District shall be composed of the counties of Monroe and Arkansas.
    2. The Sixteenth District shall have seven (7) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Stuttgart;
      2. One (1) located in De Witt;
      3. One (1) located in Gillett;
      4. One (1) located in St. Charles;
      5. One (1) located in Brinkley;
      6. One (1) located in Clarendon; and
      7. One (1) located in Holly Grove.
    3. The Sixteenth Judicial District shall be served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Sixteenth Judicial District judge shall be elected districtwide.
    5. The Sixteenth Judicial District court shall have districtwide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2019, No. 868, § 3.

16-17-1116. Reorganization of local district courts to state district courts as of January 1, 2025.

    1. Beginning January 1, 2025, the following cities and counties under this section that are currently being served by a local district court under § 16-17-901 et seq. shall be reorganized as a state district court and served by state district court judges as assigned.
    2. The new state district court judgeship created by this section shall become effective January 1, 2025, and shall be placed on the ballot to be elected in the 2024 nonpartisan judicial election from the newly constructed state district court district.
    3. The cities and counties that were previously served by local district courts and will be served by state district courts shall comply with the cost-sharing requirements established in § 16-17-1106, effective January 1, 2025.
    1. The Fourteenth District is composed of the counties of Independence, Fulton, and Izard.
    2. The Fourteenth District has six (6) departments as follows:
      1. One (1) located in Batesville;
      2. One (1) located in Melbourne;
      3. One (1) located in Calico Rock;
      4. One (1) located in Horseshoe Bend;
      5. One (1) located in Salem; and
      6. One (1) located in Mammoth Spring.
    3. The Fourteenth District is served by one (1) state district court judge.
    4. The Fourteenth District judge is elected districtwide.
    5. The Fourteenth District court has districtwide jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2019, No. 909, § 2.

Subchapter 12 — City Court Consolidation

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56(b): Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-1201. Findings and intent. [Effective January 1, 2012.]

  1. The General Assembly finds that:
    1. The intent of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution was to create a unified court system to provide judicial economy and a fair administration of justice;
    2. The judicial system in this state should be composed of three (3) tiers to accomplish the intent of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution:
      1. Appellate courts to be composed of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals;
      2. General jurisdiction trial courts to be composed of the circuit courts; and
      3. Limited jurisdiction courts to be composed of the district courts;
    3. The city courts of this state should be consolidated with district courts in order to provide judicial and administrative functions in limited jurisdiction courts that are both necessary and cost-effective; and
    4. City courts provide a valuable service for the citizens of towns and cities that operate city courts and also revenue for those towns and cities and for this state. However, many towns and cities provide law enforcement officers for the safety of citizens but do not operate a city court.
  2. It is the intent of the General Assembly that a town or city that has operated a city court is to continue to receive revenue from cases that originate in its town or city limits and to establish a procedure to allow a town or city that has never operated a city court but that now or in the future may have law enforcement officers to be able to receive a portion of the revenue from cases that originate in its town or city limits.
  3. It is also the intent of the General Assembly that this subchapter will consolidate all limited jurisdiction courts in the state as of January 1, 2012.
    1. On January 1, 2012 , the district courts shall be regarded as a continuation of the city courts now existing.
      1. All papers and records pertaining to the city courts shall be transferred to the appropriate district courts and no suit or prosecution of any kind or nature shall abate because of any change made by this subchapter.
      2. Except as modified in accordance with this subchapter, any of the following existing on January 1, 2012 , shall continue unaffected:
        1. A writ;
        2. An action;
        3. A suit;
        4. A proceeding;
        5. Civil liability;
        6. Criminal liability;
        7. A prosecution;
        8. A judgment;
        9. A decree;
        10. An order;
        11. A sentence;
        12. A regulation;
        13. A cause of action; and
        14. An appeal.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 16.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-1202. Consolidation of city courts with district courts.

  1. As used in this subchapter, “district court” shall include a department of a district court.
    1. Effective January 1, 2012, all city courts shall be consolidated with district courts and continue to exist as departments of district courts unless a city court is abolished by town or city ordinance pursuant to this subchapter.
    2. A city court formerly known as the “________ City Court” shall be redesignated as the “________ District Court, ____________ Department”.
    1. A district court that has a department or departments shall maintain a docket in each department and set court dates for hearing the docket in the town or city in which the department is located, as required by the Arkansas District Courts Accounting Law, § 16-10-201 et seq.
    2. By common agreement, a district court and the town or city where the department of the district court is located may provide locations and dates for hearing the docket.
      1. A town or city that prior to January 1, 2012, operated a city court that becomes a department of a district court may by ordinance of the town or city in which the department is located abolish the department of district court.
      2. A copy of the ordinance abolishing the department of a district court shall be sent to the Administrative Office of the Courts.
      1. On and after the effective date of the ordinance abolishing the department of a district court, the nearest district court in the county shall be regarded as a continuation of the department of district court that was abolished.
      2. All papers and records pertaining to a department of a district court abolished by ordinance shall be transferred to the appropriate district court, and no suit or prosecution of any kind or nature shall abate because of any change made by this subchapter.
      3. Except as modified in accordance with this subchapter, any of the following existing on the effective date of the ordinance abolishing the department of a district court shall continue unaffected:
        1. A writ;
        2. An action;
        3. A suit;
        4. A proceeding;
        5. Civil liability;
        6. Criminal liability;
        7. A prosecution;
        8. A judgment;
        9. A decree;
        10. An order;
        11. A sentence;
        12. A regulation;
        13. A cause of action; and
        14. An appeal.
  2. No town or city shall have the authority to reinstate a department of district court abolished by ordinance.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 16; 2011, No. 1218, § 10.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 19 of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution provided that all municipal courts were to become district courts on January 1, 2005, and that they should assume the jurisdiction previously vested in municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas. Those courts were abolished by the amendment. City courts were to continue, but if abolished by the governing body of the city or by the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the city court would then vest in the nearest district court.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted the last sentence in (d)(2)(A).

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

16-17-1203. Procedure for expense cost sharing.

      1. Any town or city that has a police department but does not have a district court may contribute to the operational expenses of the nearest district court in the county where the town or city is located pursuant to a written agreement.
      2. A written agreement is mandatory and is to be entered into between the governing body of the town or city and the governing bodies of the political subdivisions that contribute to the operational expenses of the district court.
      1. The contribution to the operational expenses of a district court described in subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be a prorated amount based on the number of cases filed in the district court from each of the towns and cities and the county during the preceding calendar year.
      2. The prorated amount of operational expenses shall apply to all fines, fees, and costs not obligated under law that are collected pursuant to § 16-13-701 et seq. in all:
        1. Nontraffic cases that are misdemeanors or violations of a town or city ordinance;
        2. Cases that are misdemeanors or violations under state law; and
        3. Traffic offenses that are misdemeanors or violations under state law or town or city ordinance committed within the corporate limits of a town or city that is a party to an agreement described in subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
  1. Apportionment of the costs of a district court shall be by order of the district court upon certification of the cases filed by the clerk of the district court.
  2. On and after the effective date of the agreement described in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, all fines, fees, penalties, and costs received by a town or city that is a party to the agreement shall be collected and distributed in the manner provided by laws affecting district courts.

History. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 16; 2009, No. 411, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. This section is being set out to reflect an amendment by Acts 2009, No. 411, § 3 which was omitted from the 2010 bound volume.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment divided former (a)(1) into (a)(1)(A) and (B); and added “A written agreement is mandatory and is to be” to the beginning of (a)(1)(B).

Chapter 18 Certain Inferior Courts [Repealed.]

Effective Dates. Acts 1995, No. 1032, § 13: July 1, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly, that in order for the Department of Health to become more efficient in accounting and budgetary practices due to the transfer of the Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, changes in various funds are needed; and that the provisions of this Act provide such changes. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1995.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration—Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 15.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

16-18-101 — 16-18-104. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the jurisdiction, compulsory attendance, rules, reports, and fees of certain inferior courts, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 169. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-18-101. Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 1.

16-18-102. Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 2.

16-18-103. Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 3.

16-18-104. Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 4.

16-18-105. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning fees of witnesses, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 171. The section was derived from Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 5; 2003, No. 1185, § 170.

16-18-106. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning disposition of additional court costs, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 788, § 32 and No. 1341, § 31. The section was derived from Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 6.

16-18-107 — 16-18-109. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning appeals, seals, elections, and terms in certain inferior courts, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 172. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-18-107. Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 7.

16-18-108. Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 8.

16-18-109. Acts 1995, No. 1245, § 9.

16-18-110. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning police courts in cities of the second class created by city council, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 175, § 3. The section was derived from Acts 1949, No. 215, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 22-808, 22-809.

16-18-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning establishment of city court in lieu of municipal court in certain cities of the first class, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 173. The section was derived from Acts 1967, No. 98, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-811; Acts 1995, No. 175, § 1; 2001, No. 1645, § 1.

16-18-112. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning schedule of fees or monthly allowance for judge of city court, jurisdiction, and designation of substitute judge, was repealed by Acts 2007, No. 663, § 52. The section was derived from Acts 1969, No. 229, § 1; 1971, No. 48, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-812; Acts 1995, No. 175, § 2; 1995, No. 1245, § 10; 2003, No. 1185, § 174.

Chapter 19 Justice Of The Peace Courts

Research References

Am. Jur. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Justices of the Peace, § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration—Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 17.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

C.J.S. 51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace, § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-19-101 — 16-19-104. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning justice of the peace courts generally, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 175. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-19-101. Rev. Stat., ch. 86, §§ 16-20; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1490-1494; Pope's Dig., §§ 1790-1794; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-701 — 26-705.

16-19-102. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 120, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6502; Pope's Dig., § 8464; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1201.

16-19-103. Acts 1875, No. 35, §§ 1, 2, p. 111; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6503, 6504; Pope's Dig., §§ 8465, 8466; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1202, 26-1203.

16-19-104. Acts 1879 No. 70 §§ 1-3, p. 92; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6463-6465; Pope's Dig., §§ 8425 — 8427; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1401 — 26-1403.

Subchapter 2 — Justices

16-19-201 — 16-19-208. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning justices of the peace, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 175. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-19-201. Rev. Stat., ch. 86, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 2822; Pope's Dig., § 3540; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-121.

16-19-202. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 4, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6408, 6409; Pope's Dig., §§ 8370, 8371; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-120.

16-19-203. Acts 1871, No. 64, §§ 1-3, p. 312; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6390 — 6392; Pope's Dig., §§ 8352 — 8354; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-108 — 26-110.

16-19-204. Acts 1843, §§ 2, 3, 5 — 9, p. 47; C. & M. Dig., § 6391; Pope's Dig., § 8353; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-111 — 26-113, 26-115 — 26-118.

16-19-205. Acts 1939, No. 182, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-105, 26-106.

16-19-206. Rev. Stat., ch. 43, § 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2107, 6400; Pope's Dig., §§ 2711, 8362; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-113.

16-19-207. Acts 1868 (Adj. Sess.), No. 5, § 6, p. 6; C. & M. Dig., § 6394; Pope's Dig., § 8356; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-119.

16-19-208. Rev. Stat., ch. 86, § 23; C. & M. Dig., § 6396; Pope's Dig., § 8358; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-107.

Subchapter 3 — Constables

Cross References. Payment of funds into county treasury, § 26-39-201.

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

Acts 1941, No. 12, § 3: approved Jan. 30, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that law enforcement in the several townships of the state should not be impeded or delayed; and for said reasons it is declared that an emergency exists and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Sheriff, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 80 C.J.S., Sheriffs & Constables, § 1 et seq.

16-19-301. Peacekeeping duties and authority — Neglect of duty.

  1. Each constable shall be a conservator of the peace in his township and shall suppress all riots, affrays, fights, and unlawful assemblies, and shall keep the peace and cause offenders to be arrested and dealt with according to law.
  2. If any offense cognizable before a justice of the peace in his township is committed in his presence, the constable shall immediately arrest the offender and cause him to be dealt with according to law.
  3. Nothing in subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section shall be construed to deprive a constable of authority to serve warrants, summons, writs, and other process as provided by law.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prevent the fresh pursuit by a constable of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony in his township, though no felony has actually been committed, if there are reasonable grounds for so believing. “Fresh pursuit” as used in this section shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
  5. If it comes to the knowledge of any constable that an offense mentioned in this section has been committed in his township, it shall be the duty of the constable to present the offender to a justice of the peace of the township in order that the offender may be arrested and brought to trial as prescribed by law.
  6. If a constable fails, refuses, or neglects to perform the duties imposed upon him by this section, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, by indictment in the circuit court, shall be fined not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 29, § 15; Acts 1848, §§ 2-4, p. 36; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1448-1451; Pope's Dig., §§ 1749-1752; Acts 1941, No. 12, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-210 — 26-213.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Article, If the Constable Blunders, Does the County Pay?: Liability Under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 519.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section does not conflict with § 16-81-301. Reed v. State, 330 Ark. 645, 957 S.W.2d 174, 1997 Ark. LEXIS 685 (1997).

Powers and Duties.

A constable is a peace officer and, as such, has authority to arrest offenders against the law; but he is not authorized to execute a warrant of arrest or other process directed to the sheriff unless deputized in the manner provided by law. Winkler v. State, 32 Ark. 539 (1877).

Constable is required to discharge his duties in a lawful and prudent manner. Whitlock v. Wood, 193 Ark. 695, 101 S.W.2d 950 (1937).

A constable is authorized to make an arrest and issue a valid citation charging one with the offense of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, first offense, which is committed in his presence within the township for which he was elected. Credit v. State, 25 Ark. App. 309, 758 S.W.2d 10 (1988).

Although a constable's general powers and duties are established by this section, a constable's authority to engage in the fresh pursuit of criminal suspects, whether suspected of committing felonies or misdemeanors, is derived from § 16-81-301. Reed v. State, 330 Ark. 645, 957 S.W.2d 174, 1997 Ark. LEXIS 685 (1997).

County ordinance setting constable salaries at $25 per month did not violate equal protection because the evidence and testimony before the circuit court demonstrated that the quorum court had a rational basis for setting the $25-per-month salary for constables. Graves v. Greene County, 2013 Ark. 493, 430 S.W.3d 722 (2013).

Cited: Catlett v. Stewart, 304 Ark. 637, 804 S.W.2d 699 (1991).

16-19-302. Proceedings against constables upon default.

  1. A justice of the peace shall, upon the demand of the party injured, or his agent, issue a summons against a constable to whom any execution has been delivered, or who has received any money upon any judgment of the justice, whether with or without execution:
    1. If the constable fails to make return of the execution according to the command thereof;
    2. If he makes a false return;
    3. If he fails to have any money collected by him on execution before the justice on the return day thereof, ready to be paid over to the party entitled thereto, or the receipt of such person therefor; or
    4. If he fails to pay over on demand to the person entitled thereto, or his agent, any money received by him in payment of any judgment.
  2. The summons shall require the constable to appear before the justice at a place and time to be specified therein, not exceeding ten (10) days, and show cause why an execution should not be issued against him for the amount due upon the execution placed in his hands, or for the amount received by him upon the judgment, according to the nature of the case. The summons shall be served at least four (4) days before the return day thereof and may in other respects be executed in the same manner as an original summons.
  3. If the constable fails to appear, or if he appears but fails to show good cause in reply to the matters alleged against him, the justice shall render judgment against him for the amount due on the execution, or for the amount received by him without execution, according to the nature of the case, together with interest thereon, at the rate of one hundred percent (100%) per annum, from the time the execution ought to have been returned, and from the time the money ought to have been had before the justice ready to be paid over to the parties entitled thereto, or from the time the money was received on the judgment without execution, or was demanded by the party or his agent.
  4. Any process issued against any constable shall be served and executed by a special deputy, who shall be appointed by the justice for that purpose and who shall have the same power to execute and return such process as a constable, and whose return shall be sworn to.
  5. Upon a judgment against a constable pursuant to this section, there shall be no stay of execution, but an appeal may be had as in other cases and with like effect.
  6. The party injured may proceed against the constable as provided in this section or may institute a suit against him on his official bond. When proceeding on the constable's official bond, the injured party shall be entitled to the same recovery as upon a summons against the constable.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 88-94, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6506-6511; Pope's Dig., §§ 8468-8473; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1501 — 26-1507.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Where a constable was sued before a justice of the peace for a false return on execution, the justice was without jurisdiction as the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional amount. Merfield v. Burkett, 56 Ark. 592, 20 S.W. 523 (1892).

16-19-303. Removal from office.

  1. If any constable fails to pay over any money collected by him after demand is made, or fails to return any execution or other process within the time specified in the process, or fails or neglects to perform any other duty required by law, he shall be removed from office by the county court on motion on charges exhibited against him.
  2. A copy of the charges, together with notice of the time of hearing the charges, shall be served on the constable at least five (5) days before the commencement of the term of the court at which the motion is made, which may be served in the same manner as a summons, and by any person over the age of twenty-one (21) years who would be a competent witness.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 29, §§ 19, 20; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1453, 1454; Pope's Dig., §§ 1754, 1755; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1508, 26-1509.

16-19-304. Failure to pay moneys collected — Responsibility of sureties — Relief from liability.

  1. If any constable receives from any person any bonds, bills, notes, or accounts for collection and gives his receipt therefor in his official capacity, and fails to pay to that person on demand the amount he may have collected, and fails to return the bonds, bills, notes, or accounts, if they have not been collected, the constable and his securities shall be responsible on his official bond for the amount of the bonds, bills, notes, or accounts not paid over or returned.
  2. No constable shall be responsible for any bond, bill, or note for which he may have given his receipts and on which suit may have been brought.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 29, §§ 21, 22; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1455, 1456; Pope's Dig., §§ 1756, 1757; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1510, 26-1511.

16-19-305. Continuance in office upon division of township.

If any township is divided, the constable in office at the time of the division shall continue in office and be constable of the township in which he resides.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 29, § 23; C. & M. Dig., § 1457; Pope's Dig., § 1758; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-207.

16-19-306. Restriction on constables' authority to appoint deputies.

Constables in the various townships in this state shall have no authority to appoint deputies.

History. Acts 1977, No. 358, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-206.1; Acts 1999, No. 6, § 1.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment deleted the former second and third sentences.

Subchapter 4 — Jurisdiction and Venue

Cross References. Change of venue to municipal court, § 16-17-218.

Exclusive, concurrent, and criminal jurisdiction of justices of the peace, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 40.

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

Acts 1875, No. 78, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 171, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1927, No. 60, § 27: approved Feb. 28, 1927. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist for the reason that in cities falling within the provisions of this act, their now exists much litigation which is being handled in justice of peace courts which are unable to try the civil and criminal cases coming before them in such a manner as to render justice, and make possible an efficient enforcement of the law. It is therefore declared that this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1937, No. 216, § 2: Mar. 8, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “That this act being necessary for the welfare, peace and health, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1949, No. 224, § 2: approved Mar. 3, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, under the present laws limiting the venue of actions before justice of the peace and municipal courts, considerable delay is caused by reason of the fact that there exists no procedure for the transfer of causes wherein the venue is improper, therefore this Act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety and an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1983, No. 918, § 16: Mar. 30, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fourth General Assembly that the act of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or drugs constitutes a serious and immediate threat to the safety of all citizens of this State, and that increasing the penalty for this dangerous conduct may serve as a deterrent to such behavior. Further, it is found that increased income derived from the levying of such penalties can best be utilized to provide immediate alcohol and drug safety and rehabilitation and treatment programs both to prevent an increase in the use of intoxicating alcoholic beverages and drugs and to rehabilitate persons convicted of related offenses. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 1032, § 13: July 1, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly, that in order for the Department of Health to become more efficient in accounting and budgetary practices due to the transfer of the Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, changes in various funds are needed; and that the provisions of this Act provide such changes. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1995.”

Case Notes

Cited: Griffin v. State, 297 Ark. 208, 760 S.W.2d 852 (1988).

16-19-401. Jurisdiction in townships having a municipal court.

  1. Justices of the peace in the townships subject to this act shall have original jurisdiction coextensive with the county.
  2. The jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall be:
    1. Concurrent with the municipal courts and exclusive of the circuit court in all matters of contract where the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars ($100), excluding interest;
    2. Concurrent with the municipal courts and with the circuit court in matters of contract where the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of three hundred dollars ($300), exclusive of interest;
    3. Concurrent with the municipal courts and with the circuit court in suits for the recovery of personal property where the value of the property does not exceed the sum of three hundred dollars ($300);
    4. Concurrent with the municipal courts and with the circuit court in all matters of damage to personal property where the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars ($100).
  3. Justices of the peace in townships subject to this act shall also have jurisdiction to sit as examining courts and commit, discharge, or recognize offenders to the court having jurisdiction for further trial, and to bind persons to keep the peace or for good behavior, and for purposes set out in this section they shall have power to issue all necessary process.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 17; Pope's Dig., § 9913; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-724.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 17, is also codified as § 16-17-217.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1927, No. 60, codified as §§ 16-17-201, 16-17-202 [repealed], 16-17-20316-17-207, 16-17-20916-17-215, 16-17-216 [repealed], 16-17-217, 16-17-218 [superseded], 16-17-21916-17-222, 16-17-223 [repealed], 16-17-224, 16-19-401, 16-19-409 [superseded], and 16-19-41016-19-412.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of municipal courts, § 16-17-206.

Case Notes

Criminal Offense.

The Arkansas Constitution prohibits the City of Springdale from having jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed in Benton County. Sexson v. Municipal Court, 312 Ark. 261, 849 S.W.2d 468 (1993).

Evidence.

Evidence dehors the record may be received, when it does not tend to contradict the record itself, for the purpose of showing jurisdiction in the suit. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Lindsay, 55 Ark. 281, 18 S.W. 59 (1892) (decision under prior law).

Garnishment.

In garnishment, jurisdiction is coextensive with the county. Foster v. Pollack, 173 Ark. 48, 291 S.W. 989 (1927).

Presumption.

Nothing can be presumed which is necessary to give the justice jurisdiction, but where jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings, mere errors or irregularities are not subject to collateral attack; the attack must go to the jurisdiction. Webster v. Daniel, 47 Ark. 131, 14 S.W. 550 (1886) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Lovell v. State, 283 Ark. 425, 678 S.W.2d 318 (1984).

16-19-402. Venue generally.

  1. Actions cognizable before a justice of the peace, instituted by summons or warrant, shall be brought before a justice of the peace in the township wherein the defendant resides or is found. If there are defendants in different townships, then the action shall be brought in the township where any one of the defendants resides or is found.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, in a township having a population of less than three thousand (3,000) as shown by the most recent federal census, actions by attachment, actions for the recovery of personal property, actions for provisional remedy, and all criminal actions and proceedings may be brought before any justice of the peace in the county, although in counties where there is a municipal court having countywide or districtwide jurisdiction, actions by attachment, actions for the recovery of personal property, actions for provisional remedy, and all criminal actions, unless brought in, or transferred to, the municipal court, shall be tried before a justice of the peace in the township where any defendant to the action resides, or in the township where the property or money involved is found.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 2, p. 430; 1875, No. 78, § 1, p. 187; C. & M. Dig., § 6401; Acts 1929, No. 282, § 1; 1937, No. 216, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 8363; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-301.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1929, No. 282, § 2, provided, in part, that this section should be cumulative to existing laws.

Case Notes

Attachment.

A judgment for the amount of the debt in an attachment suit based on service of process in the county outside of the township of the justice of the peace is valid though no property is found on which to levy the writ of attachment. Ribelin v. Wilks, 135 Ark. 599, 205 S.W. 977 (1918).

Cited: Griffin v. State, 297 Ark. 208, 760 S.W.2d 852 (1988).

16-19-403. Joinder of defendants in different townships — Service of process by constable.

If there are several defendants who reside in different townships and who are jointly liable to a suit, the suit may be brought in any of the townships against all of the defendants. The constable of the township in which the suit may be brought shall serve the process in the several townships wherein the defendants may reside.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 2, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6402; Pope's Dig., § 8364; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-302.

16-19-404. Venue where no justice of the peace in township or all justices disqualified.

Whenever there is no justice of the peace within the township where any suit cognizable before a justice ought to be brought, or when all the justices of the township are interested in any such suit or otherwise disqualified by law from trying the suit, every such suit may be brought before a justice in the same county.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 3, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6403; Pope's Dig., § 8365; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-303.

16-19-405. Venue where defendants residing in different counties.

In any civil action cognizable before any justice of the peace in a township of the county in which any of the defendants resides, suit may be brought before any justice of the peace in the township of the county in which any one of the defendants resides. The summons or other process against the other defendants shall issue to any constable in the counties in which the other defendants may reside, which summons or other process, when served, shall give the justice before whom the suit is brought the same jurisdiction he would have if all of the defendants resided in his county.

History. Acts 1893, No. 171, § 1, p. 301; C. & M. Dig., § 6404; Pope's Dig., § 8366; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-304.

Case Notes

Improper Service.

Where nonresident defendant was not properly served and objected to lower courts' assumption of jurisdiction in apt time, the judgment against him would be reversed and dismissed. Seelbinder v. Witherspoon, 124 Ark. 331, 187 S.W. 325 (1916).

Waiver.

Where the defendant in an action before a justice of the peace filed an affidavit for appeal from a judgment against him rendered by that court and also gave an appeal bond, he will be held to have entered his appearance in the circuit court and cannot object to want of jurisdiction of his person in the lower court. German Inv. Co. v. Westbrook, 101 Ark. 124, 141 S.W. 510 (1911).

Cited: Peel v. Kelley, 268 Ark. 90, 594 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-19-406. Change of venue to another justice upon showing of interest or prejudice.

  1. Either party in a suit before a justice of the peace may take a change of venue from one justice of the peace to another in the same township, but it shall be the duty of the party so applying, before the commencement of the trial, to file an affidavit among the papers in the action alleging that the justice is a material witness for the affiant, or of near relation to the other party, or so prejudiced against the affiant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial before that justice. The justice shall thereupon transmit all the original papers in the case and a certified transcript of the proceedings to the nearest justice of the peace in the same township, who shall proceed in the case in the same manner as if the suit had originally been commenced before him.
  2. If there is no other justice of the peace in the township competent to try the case, it shall be certified to the nearest justice in any adjoining township, who shall try and determine the case in the same manner as if the parties were residents of his township and the suit had been originally commenced before him.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the same party shall not be allowed to file an affidavit pursuant to this section against two (2) justices in the same case.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 20, 21, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6418, 6419; Pope's Dig., §§ 8380, 8381; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-306, 26-307.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where a mayor of a town in a prohibition district institutes a summary proceeding for the destruction of liquors kept therein for sale contrary to law, he is acting as mayor and not as “ex officio” justice of the peace, and this section is not applicable. Betts v. Ward, 79 Ark. 146, 95 S.W. 148 (1906).

Waiver of Disqualification.

When a party to an action, knowing that the justice before which the action is pending is related to the opposing party, permits the judgment to go by default and afterward appeals to the circuit court, he will be held to have waived that disqualification. Morrow v. Watts, 80 Ark. 57, 95 S.W. 988 (1906).

Cited: Peel v. Kelley, 268 Ark. 90, 594 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-19-407. Change of venue from township.

  1. Either party, at the calling of a cause before a justice of the peace, may make an affidavit to the effect that he verily believes he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the township in which the action is pending and may include in his affidavit one (1) township in addition to the one in which the action is pending, and the opposite party may, without affidavit, object to the same number of townships to which the party making the application has objected. Thereupon, it shall be the duty of the justice to make an order for the change of venue to a justice in a township to which there is no valid objection and which is in his judgment most convenient to the parties and their witnesses. The justice shall then transmit, without delay, the original papers in the case and a transcript of the proceedings to the justice to whose court the venue is changed, for which the transmitting justice shall receive five cents (5¢) per mile to and from the office of the justice to whom the cause is transmitted, which shall be taxed and collected as other costs in the case, together with his costs for making out the transcript.
  2. If the justice of the peace to whom the papers are so transferred cannot immediately, upon the reception and filing of the papers, proceed to try the case, it shall be his duty at once to fix a time therefor, of which all parties shall take notice.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 22, 23, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6420, 6421; Pope's Dig., §§ 8382, 8383; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-308, 26-309.

16-19-408. Improper venue of action.

  1. Whenever an objection is made by a defendant in any action cognizable before a justice of the peace or a municipal court, instituted by summons or warrant, or in an action by an attachment, an action for the recovery of personal property, an action by provisional remedy, or in any criminal action or proceeding, that the action was brought before a justice of the peace or a municipal court wherein the venue is improper under the laws of the State of Arkansas, the court shall immediately hear proof on the question. If it is established by proof that the venue is improper, then all further proceedings shall be discontinued and the justice of the peace or clerk of the municipal court shall transmit to a justice of the peace or municipal court wherein the venue is proper all the original papers in the case, including the bail bond, if there is any.
  2. If the defendant is in custody, he shall be taken and delivered before the justice of the peace or the municipal court, and the bail, if any, shall be liable for the appearance of the defendant in the court to which the papers are transmitted.
  3. The court to which the papers are transmitted shall proceed to try the action in all respects as if the action had been originally brought to the court.

History. Acts 1949, No. 224, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-310.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Acts 1949 General Assembly—Act 224 Change of Venue in Inferior Courts, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 359.

16-19-409. Change of venue from justice of peace to municipal court.

  1. In any case, either civil or criminal, brought before a justice of the peace in any township in the county wherein a municipal court exists, the judge may grant a change of venue to the municipal court, upon defendant's motion and a showing of good cause, without the prepayment or tender of any fees. Upon granting of the motion, the justice of the peace shall have no further jurisdiction in the case, except for the purpose of preparing a transcript for the municipal court.
  2. In the event of any change of venue from a justice of the peace to a municipal court in the counties where more than one (1) municipal court exists, the case shall be transferred to the nearest municipal court geographically in the county.
  3. In no event shall any change of venue lie from any municipal court to any justice of the peace in either civil or criminal cases.

History. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 55, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-19-409, concerning change of venue from justice of peace to municipal court, is deemed to be superseded by this section. The former section was derived from Acts 1927, No. 60, § 21; Pope's Dig., § 9917; Acts 1961, No. 178, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-725.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 55, § 1, is also codified as § 16-17-218.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Divestment of jurisdiction from the city court is not contrary to Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 43, which gives the General Assembly authority to set jurisdiction of corporation courts. City Court v. Tiner, 292 Ark. 253, 729 S.W.2d 399 (1987).

City Court.

Jurisdiction of city court, like that of the justice of peace, is subject to a motion to transfer to municipal court when a state offense is involved, and upon the filing of a motion to take a change of venue, jurisdiction is withdrawn from the city court. City Court v. Tiner, 292 Ark. 253, 729 S.W.2d 399 (1987).

Mandamus.

Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel justice of the peace to transfer case to municipal court when motion is filed. Brickell v. Guaranty Loan & Trust Co., 192 Ark. 652, 93 S.W.2d 656 (1936).

Mayor's Court.

The jurisdiction of the mayor's court, like that of the justice of the peace, is subject to a motion to transfer to municipal court when a state offense is involved. Russell v. Miller, 253 Ark. 583, 487 S.W.2d 617 (1972).

This section does not automatically allow change of venue away from a mayor's court, as § 16-88-101 also applies. McKnight v. Newkirk, 256 Ark. 342, 507 S.W.2d 98 (1974).

Prohibition.

Writ of prohibition held proper where trial court was entirely without jurisdiction. City Court v. Tiner, 292 Ark. 253, 729 S.W.2d 399 (1987).

Request.

The defendant charged with a misdemeanor before a justice of the peace may have a trial in the municipal court only by requesting a change of venue to that court. Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).

Cited: Overton v. Alston, 199 Ark. 96, 132 S.W.2d 834 (1939); Griffin v. State, 297 Ark. 208, 760 S.W.2d 852 (1988).

16-19-410. Additional compensation of justices of the peace in townships having a municipal court.

A justice of the peace in a township subject to this act shall receive as compensation for his services the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per year, in equal quarterly installments, payable by the county, in addition to the compensation provided for by Acts 1875, No. 55, § 76 [repealed], and such fees as are allowed to justices of the peace by law for solemnizing marriages, taking and certifying acknowledgments of instruments, and attending to the duties of coroner, and for service in relation to estrays.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 18; Pope's Dig., § 9914; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-726.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 18, is also codified as § 16-17-219.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-19-401.

16-19-411. Filing of reports of fees and costs.

Justices of the peace in townships subject to this act shall, on or before the first day of county court, at each term thereof, file in the office of the county clerk a report, under oath, of all fees and costs taxed and collected in civil actions during the preceding quarter, giving the title of the cause and attaching to the report receipts of the county treasurer of all fees and costs collected during the period.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 22; Pope's Dig., § 9918; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-727.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 22, is also codified as § 16-17-220.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-19-401.

16-19-412. Improper use of process — Granting privileges — Failure to report or pay over fines.

Any municipal judge, or any justice of the peace in townships subject to this act, who makes use, directly or indirectly, of the process of his own court, either as a party litigant or in interest or as an attorney or agent for any party litigant or in interest, or who offers or gives by way of remission of fees or otherwise any pecuniary inducements to the instituting or maintaining of any suits, prosecutions, or proceedings in his court, and any justice of the peace, or constable in townships subject to this act, or sheriffs in counties subject to this act, or clerks of the municipal court, or chief of police in any city subject to this act, who fails to report or pay over fines, penalties, forfeitures, fees, or costs collected by him, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction for each of these offenses, shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). A conviction under this section shall work a forfeiture of office. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, sheriffs and constables may retain the fees and costs due them out of each cause.

History. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 23; Pope's Dig., § 9919; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-728.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1927, No. 60, § 23, is also codified as § 16-17-221.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-19-401.

16-19-413. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, the amendment to this section by Acts 1995, No. 1032, §§ 4 and 9, was superseded by the repeal of this section by Acts 1995, No. 1256.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning disposition of additional court costs imposed by § 5-65-113 [repealed], was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1983, No. 918, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 75-2531; Acts 1995, No. 1032, §§ 4, 9.

Subchapter 5 — Process

Effective Dates. Acts 1845, § 3, p. 46: effective on passage.

Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

Acts 1875, No. 77, § 53: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 171, § 5: effective on passage.

16-19-501. Authority to issue subpoenas.

Justices of the peace shall have the same power to issue subpoenas for witnesses in civil and criminal actions pending before them and in preliminary examinations being heard by them, where such witnesses reside outside of their counties, as is given by law in similar cases to the circuit court.

History. Acts 1893, No. 171, § 2, p. 301; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3322, 6405; Pope's Dig., §§ 4170, 8367; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-508.

16-19-502. Payment in advance for issuance of process.

In all civil cases before a justice of the peace, the same advance payments shall be made, or bond and security given, as are provided for clerks for the issuance of any writ or process.

History. Acts 1875, No. 77, § 35, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., § 4602; Pope's Dig., § 5691; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-509.

16-19-503. Service of process by constable — Fees.

    1. The summons and other process mentioned in § 16-19-405 and the subpoenas mentioned in § 16-19-501 shall be directed to and shall be served by any constable in the county in which the party or parties to be served reside. The constables are given as full powers to serve such process as they are given by law to serve the process of justices of the peace of their own county.
    2. Each constable may execute civil process throughout the county.
  1. In no case shall the constable be allowed mileage for the service of any process he may serve outside of his township, other than from the residence of the defendant in such process to the nearest justice of the peace in the township in which that defendant resides.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 29, § 26; Acts 1893, No. 171, § 3, p. 301; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1458, 6406; Pope's Dig., §§ 1759, 8368; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-502, 26-505.

16-19-504. Vacancy in constable's office — Service by constable of adjoining township — Mileage fees.

  1. When the office of constable in any township becomes vacant by death, resignation, refusal or neglect to qualify, or failure to elect, any constable of any adjoining township, during the vacancy, shall execute and return all process which are issued by any justice of the peace in the township where the constable's office is vacant and which are directed to him, against any person in the township where the vacancy exists.
  2. In addition to the fees now allowed by law, the constable shall receive for the service of each and every summons or subpoena, or other process, except executions, so directed to him, two and one-half cents (2½¢) per mile, going and returning from his own residence to that of the person named in the process residing farthest from him.

History. Acts 1845, § 1, p. 46; C. & M. Dig., § 1459; Pope's Dig., § 1760; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-503.

16-19-505. Appointment of special agents to execute process — Endorsement on writ.

Justices of the peace shall have power to appoint special agents to execute orders of arrest, attachments, and other provisional remedies and the summons which accompanies them, whenever an affidavit is filed with the justice by the plaintiff or his agent to the effect that he believes that, owing to the absence or difficulty of procuring a proper officer, the process or other order cannot be executed without injurious delay. In cases where there is no constable in the township, and the appointment provided for in this section shall be made, an endorsement shall be made on the writ or order and signed by the justice.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 8, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6414, 6415; Pope's Dig., §§ 8376, 8377; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-504.

16-19-506. Manner of service and return.

  1. The service and return thereto of the process provided for in this chapter shall be made in the same manner as in the circuit court, except that no service other than is provided for in this chapter shall be made by publication, nor shall any return made by anyone other than the sheriff, coroner, or constable of the county be valid unless sworn to.
  2. The service of process shall be by:
    1. Delivering to the defendant a copy of the summons, and, if he refuses to receive it, the offer of it to him shall be a sufficient service; or
    2. Leaving a copy of such summons at the usual place of abode of the defendant with some person who is a member of his family over the age of fifteen (15) years; or
    3. Reading it to and in the presence of the defendant.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 9, 10, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6416, 6417; Pope's Dig., §§ 8378, 8379; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-506, 26-507.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in its Per Curiam of November 24, 1986, that subsection (a) of this section was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Arkansas Rules for Inferior Courts.

Case Notes

Delivery to Neighbor.

Delivery of a copy of the summons to a neighbor of the defendant was insufficient to sustain a judgment. Nelson v. Freeman, 136 Ark. 396, 206 S.W. 667 (1918).

Subchapter 6 — Trial

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 71, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 171, § 5: effective on passage.

16-19-601. Trial by court or jury.

After the parties appear and the issues have been made up, the matters in controversy may be submitted by them to the justice. If a jury is demanded by either party, the justice shall order a jury to be forthwith summoned and impaneled to try the action.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 24, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6431; Pope's Dig., § 8393; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-608.

Case Notes

Equity.

A justice may apply equitable doctrines to the solution of questions properly coming within his jurisdiction, but he cannot administer the flexible remedies of equity jurisprudence. Whitesides v. Kershaw & Driggs, 44 Ark. 377 (1884); Thompson v. Ogle, 55 Ark. 101, 17 S.W. 593 (1891).

16-19-602. Adjournment.

If from any cause, the justice of the peace is unable to attend the trial at the time fixed, or if a jury is demanded, the justice may adjourn the case for a period not exceeding three (3) days, but shall not make more than two (2) adjournments for that cause.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 14, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6425; Pope's Dig., § 8387; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-604.

16-19-603. Continuances — Testimony of adverse party's witness.

  1. Either party may obtain a postponement of the cause not exceeding thirty (30) days, on account of the absence of evidence by filing an affidavit like that required in § 16-63-402, subject to such terms as the court may impose.
  2. Either party who shall apply for the postponement of a cause shall, if required by the adverse party, consent that the testimony of any witness of the adverse party who is in attendance be then taken to be used on the trial of the cause.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 18, 19, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6429, 6430; Pope's Dig., §§ 8391, 8392; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-606, 26-607.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Continuances in Arkansas, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 449.

16-19-604. Jurors — Number and qualifications.

The jury shall be composed of six (6) jurors who shall be qualified as required in the circuit courts. However, a lesser number of jurors may be agreed upon by the parties.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 24, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6431; Pope's Dig., § 8393; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-608.

16-19-605. Challenges to jurors.

  1. In the formation of a jury, each party shall be entitled to three (3) peremptory challenges, and any deficiencies in the number of jurors summoned, arising from any cause, may be supplied by summoning others in their stead.
  2. In all cases before justices of the peace in this state, it shall be a legal cause for challenge that anyone selected as a juror has served as a juror in a justice's court in the same county within three (3) months prior to the institution of the suit in which the juror is selected.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 25, p. 430; 1893, No. 71, § 1, p. 116; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3321, 6432, 6433; Pope's Dig., §§ 4169, 8394, 8395; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-609, 26-610.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Peremptory Challenges After Purkett v. Elam, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 514 U.S. 765, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995): How to Judge a Book By Its Cover Without Violating Equal Protection, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

Case Notes

Prosecutorial Misconduct.

Both in this case and in the trial preceding Miller v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Ark. 1994), the prosecutor consistently and systematically excluded African-Americans from participating as jurors through the use of peremptory challenges. Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995).

Standard of Review.

—Racial Discrimination.

A constitutional violation involving the selection of jurors in a racially discriminatory manner is a “structural defect” in the trial mechanism which cannot be subjected to a harmless error analysis. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995).

16-19-606. Jurors — Oath.

The justice of the peace shall administer to each juror an oath well and truly to try the matter in controversy between , plaintiff, and , defendant, and a true verdict give according to the evidence, unless discharged by the justice of the peace.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 26, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6434; Pope's Dig., § 8396; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-611.

16-19-607. Jury to hear evidence in a body.

After the jury are sworn, they shall sit together and hear the allegations and proofs of the parties, which shall be delivered publicly in their presence.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 27, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6435; Pope's Dig., § 8397; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-612.

16-19-608. Witnesses generally.

  1. Every person offered as a witness, before any testimony shall be given by him, shall be duly sworn that the evidence he shall give relating to the matter between , plaintiff, and , defendant, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
  2. If a witness, on being produced, shall be objected to as incompetent, or his testimony, when offered, shall be objected to as irrelevant, the objections shall be heard and determined by the justice.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 28, 29, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6436, 6437; Pope's Dig., §§ 8398, 8399; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-613, 26-614.

16-19-609. Examination of adversary — Effect of refusal to submit to examination — Application on appeal.

  1. Either party may examine the other on oath and for that purpose may cause him to be summoned to attend the trial if he resides in the county or, if he resides out of the county, may file written interrogatories with the court or magistrate before whom the trial is to be had, together with an affidavit that he believes the answers to them are necessary to his obtaining justice, and cause a copy of the interrogatories to be delivered to the party required to answer them, who shall make out, swear to, and file with the court or magistrate, on or before the day of trial, a plain, direct response to the interrogatories, which may be read by either party.
  2. The court shall render judgment against the party who refuses to attend and be examined, when summoned two (2) days before trial, or to make proper responses to interrogatories when a copy has been delivered to him three (3) days before the trial, when he resides within fifty (50) miles of the place of trial, and one (1) additional day for every thirty (30) miles he may reside therefrom. However, the court may grant further time for attending or answering.
  3. Subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall apply to circuit courts upon the trial of appeals from judgments of justices of the peace.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 30-32, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6438-6440; Pope's Dig., §§ 8400-8402; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-616 — 26-618.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Adverse Party as a Witness, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 136.

16-19-610. Witness and juror attendance and mileage fees.

  1. The quorum court of any county may, by a majority vote of the members thereof, fix the fees payable to witnesses and jurors for attendance or service in the justice of the peace court at any sum not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) per day.
    1. Witnesses subpoenaed to attend a justice's court outside of their own county as provided in § 16-19-501 shall have the same mileage and per diem for attending such courts as is provided by law in like cases in the circuit court.
    2. They shall have the same right to demand and receive their mileage and per diem in advance as is provided by law for witnesses subpoenaed to attend the circuit court.

History. Acts 1893, No. 171, § 4, p. 301; C. & M. Dig., § 6407; Pope's Dig., § 8369; Acts 1959, No. 71, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-615, 26-622.

Cross References. Witness fees, § 16-43-801 et seq.

16-19-611. Verdict — Entry on docket.

  1. The jurors must all agree to the verdict.
  2. When the jurors shall have agreed upon their verdict, they shall deliver the verdict to the justice publicly, who shall enter it on his docket.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 27, 33, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6435, 6441; Pope's Dig., §§ 8397, 8403; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-612, 26-619.

16-19-612. Failure of jury to agree — Retrial.

Whenever a justice is satisfied that a jury sworn in a cause before him, after having been out a reasonable time, cannot agree on their verdict, he may discharge them and shall immediately issue a new summons for another to appear, at a time therein fixed, not more than three (3) days distant, unless the parties consent that the justice may render judgment upon the evidence already before him, which he may do in that case, or unless they consent that the new trial, upon a new hearing of the evidence to be adduced by the parties, shall be by the justice.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 34, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6442; Pope's Dig., § 8404; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-620.

Case Notes

Continuance.

Jurisdiction of the subject matter is not lost by continuance beyond three days. Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co. v. Donahoe, 49 Ark. 318, 5 S.W. 342 (1887).

16-19-613. New trial granted on motion — Exception.

A new trial or rehearing may be granted by a justice of the peace, except on trial by jury, upon motion made within ten (10) days after a judgment or final order has been made or rendered. Notice of the motion shall be given to the opposite party. However, no motion for a new trial or a rehearing in a cause tried by a jury shall be entertained by a justice of the peace.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 41, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6449, 6450; Pope's Dig., §§ 8411, 8412; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-621.

Case Notes

Appeal after New Trial Granted.

Where a defendant asked for a new trial in a justice's court which was granted and the case was set for retrial and subsequently the defendant withdrew his application for a new trial and prayed an appeal to the circuit court which was granted, the effect of the proceedings was to leave the original judgment in force and the circuit court acquired jurisdiction on appeal. Cathey v. Bowen, 70 Ark. 348, 68 S.W. 31 (1902).

Correction of Errors.

While a justice of the peace has power to set aside a void judgment or to quash void process and an appeal will lie from his judgment either granting or refusing that relief, he has no power to modify or change the judgment or to grant a rehearing for the correction of errors after ten days from the rendition of the judgment. Betterton v. Anderson, 171 Ark. 74, 283 S.W. 364 (1926).

Subchapter 7 — Dismissal, Default, Etc.

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

16-19-701. Dismissal for want of prosecution generally.

If the plaintiff fails to appear in person, or by his agent or attorney, on the return day of the summons, or at any other time fixed for the trial, the justice may dismiss the action for want of prosecution, except in the case provided for in § 16-19-703(a).

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 35, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6443; Pope's Dig., § 8405; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-801.

Case Notes

Appeal.

Where judgment by default was rendered by a justice of the peace since, on day of trial, the plaintiffs as well as the defendants failed to appear, the plaintiffs should have been nonsuited and this error might have been corrected by appeal. Shaver & Son v. Shell, 24 Ark. 122 (1863).

Where a justice of the peace in a garnishment proceeding determined that an interpleader was entitled to the fund garnished as against the plaintiff, the justice could not, by dismissing the plaintiff's motion for want of jurisdiction, prevent the plaintiff from taking an appeal, unless the plaintiff first moved to set aside the judgment of the justice. Ellis v. Citizens' State Bank, 178 Ark. 191, 10 S.W.2d 8 (1928).

16-19-702. Judgment on proof on defendant's nonappearance generally.

When the plaintiff's claim is not founded on a written instrument as described in § 16-19-703(a) and the defendant does not appear, the justice shall proceed to hear the allegations and proofs of the plaintiff, and shall render judgment thereon for the amount to which he shows himself entitled, not exceeding the amount claimed in the action.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 38, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6446; Pope's Dig., § 8408; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-804.

16-19-703. Actions founded on written instruments liquidating the claim of the plaintiff — Effect of failure of parties to appear.

  1. When the suit is founded on an instrument of writing purporting to have been executed by the defendant, in which the demand of the plaintiff is liquidated, and if the signature of the defendant is not denied under oath, and if the instrument has been filed with the justice of the peace previous to the day for appearance, he may proceed with the cause, whether the plaintiff appears or not. The instrument of writing shall be competent proof in the case.
  2. In the case provided for in subsection (a) of this section, if the defendant does not appear in obedience to the summons, judgment shall be rendered against him for the amount of the plaintiff's claim.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 36, 37, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6444, 6445; Pope's Dig., §§ 8406, 8407; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-802, 26-803.

16-19-704. Setoff on written instrument.

In the cases contemplated in §§ 16-19-702 and 16-19-703(b), if the defendant has previously filed a setoff, founded on a written instrument purporting to have been signed by the plaintiff, calling for a certain sum, and if the signature of such plaintiff is not denied under oath, the justice shall allow the setoff in the same manner as if the defendant had appeared and shall render judgment accordingly.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 39, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6447; Pope's Dig., § 8409; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-805.

16-19-705. Setting aside judgment by default or dismissal for want of prosecution.

A judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution, or judgment by default, may be set aside by the justice at any time within ten (10) days after being rendered if the party applying therefor can show a satisfactory excuse for his default, and a meritorious cause of action or meritorious defense. Upon such a showing of a satisfactory excuse for default and a meritorious cause of action or defense, a new day shall be fixed for trial, and notice shall be given to the opposite party, and any execution which may in the meantime have been issued shall be recalled in the same manner as in cases of appeal. The cause shall proceed to trial as though no such judgment had been taken.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 40, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6448; Pope's Dig., § 8410; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-806.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not apply where the parties appeared and had trial. Carroll v. Texport Oil Co., 148 Ark. 18, 228 S.W. 390 (1921).

Remedies.

There are three remedies against default judgment: motion to set aside, appeal to circuit court, and certiorari when appeal lost without fault of appellant. Twin City Bank v. J.S. McWilliams Auto. Co., 182 Ark. 1086, 34 S.W.2d 229 (1931).

Trial Fee.

A justice of the peace is entitled to a trial fee even if the case goes by default. Reigler v. Quinn, 54 Ark. 37, 14 S.W. 1103 (1890).

16-19-706. Compromises — Confession of judgment.

  1. After an action for the recovery of money is brought in a justice of the peace court, the defendant may offer to compromise or to confess judgment in the manner prescribed for, and with the same effect as he could or might do, in the circuit court, and shall be entitled to all the benefits to be derived therefrom to the same extent as on similar proceedings in the circuit court.
  2. The rules and proceedings governing confessions of judgment, as they may apply to the circuit courts, are made to apply to justice of the peace courts.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 52, 121, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6461; Pope's Dig., §§ 8423, 8463; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-407, 26-807.

Cross References. Agreed cases, § 16-118-101.

Case Notes

Evidence of Appearance.

When an entry of a judgment by confession in the docket of a justice does not show, except by inference, that the defendant personally appeared in the justice court, as provided by law, and where it is shown by parol testimony that defendant did not appear, the judgment against him will be void. Smith v. Finley, 52 Ark. 373, 12 S.W. 782 (1889).

Judgment for Interpleader.

A judgment entered by the justice of the peace in favor of an interpleader in an attachment suit containing a recital that the plaintiff's attorney “acknowledged judgment for the property” will not, on appeal, be treated as a judgment by confession where the plaintiff's attorney resisted the interplea, and no authority is shown to have been possessed by him to confess judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. Jansen v. Strayhorn, 59 Ark. 330, 27 S.W. 230 (1894).

Subchapter 8 — Judgment

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

16-19-801. Mutual judgments.

  1. Mutual judgments between the same parties rendered by the same or different justices of the peace may be set off against each other.
  2. When judgments are rendered by the same court, the justice shall strike the balance as it appears from the judgments on his docket and shall issue executions therefor in favor of the party to whom the balance appears to be due.
    1. If the judgment proposed to be set off was rendered by another justice of the peace, the party offering it must obtain a transcript thereof, with a certificate of the justice of the peace who rendered it endorsed thereon, stating that no appeal has been taken and that the transcript was obtained for the purpose of being used as a setoff in that case. However, the transcript shall not be given until the time for taking an appeal has elapsed.
    2. The justice so giving a transcript shall make an entry in his docket, and all other proceedings in his court shall be stayed.
      1. When the transcript is presented to the justice who has rendered a judgment between the same parties, as aforesaid, if execution has not been issued on the judgment rendered by him, he shall strike a balance between the judgments and issue execution for such balance.
      2. If, at the time of filing the transcript, execution has already been issued, the justice of the peace shall also issue execution on the transcript filed with him, and deliver it to the same officer who has the other execution. Such officer shall treat the lesser execution as so much cash collected on the larger and proceed to collect the balance then found due.
      1. When the judgment is allowed to be set off, as provided in this section, the transcript thereof shall be filed among the papers of the case in which it is so used and the proper entry made in the docket of the justice of the peace.
      2. However, if the justice of the peace refuses the judgment as a setoff, he shall so certify on the transcript and return it to the party who offered it. When the transcript is filed in the office of the justice of the peace who gave it, proceedings may be held by him in the same manner as if no such transcript had been certified by him.
  3. The costs in suits where mutual judgments have been obtained shall not be set off unless the balance of cash actually collected on the larger judgment be sufficient to pay the costs of both judgments, and such cost shall be paid therefrom accordingly.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 44-51, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6453-6460; Pope's Dig., §§ 8415-8422; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-903 — 26-910.

16-19-802. Remittitur.

If any sum is found in favor of a party, either by verdict of a jury or upon a hearing of the cause before a justice, exceeding the sum for which the justice is authorized to give judgment, the party may remit and release the excess and take judgment for the residue, but shall never thereafter be allowed to institute any suit for the recovery of the excess so remitted and released.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 55, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6462; Pope's Dig., § 8424; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-911.

Subchapter 9 — Stay of Execution

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

Acts 1889, No. 66, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 29, § 3: effective on passage.

16-19-901. Stay of execution generally.

The execution from a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace may be stayed in the manner and form as provided in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 56, p. 430; 1889, No. 66, § 3, p. 82; 1899, No. 29, § 1, p. 37; C. & M. Dig., § 6466; Pope's Dig., § 8428; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1001.

16-19-902. Cases in which no stay to be allowed.

No stay shall be allowed against any collecting officer, or attorney at law or agent, for a delinquency or default in executing or discharging the duties of his office or place or for failing to pay over money collected by him in such capacity, or against a principal by his surety on a stay bond or otherwise, or on a judgment for specific property, or for the property or its value. In the cases mentioned in this section in which a stay is not allowed, the justice of the peace shall note the same on his docket on the day of the rendition thereof.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 67, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6477; Pope's Dig., § 8439; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1012.

16-19-903. Bond.

  1. To entitle any person to a stay of execution, some responsible person, to be approved by the justice of the peace, who is not a party to the judgment, must enter into an obligation before the justice of the peace to the adverse party, in a sum sufficient to secure the payment of the judgment, conditioned that the obligation shall be void on payment of the judgment at the expiration of the stay.
  2. The obligation must be signed by the party entering into it, must be attested by the justice of the peace before whom it may be taken, and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace.
  3. The bond may be in the following form:
  4. The justice shall file the obligation among the papers in the case and make a note in his docket of the day and date thereof.
  5. The stay of execution in all sums under the jurisdiction of the court shall be for six (6) months from the rendition of the judgment.

“I , acknowledge myself indebted to in the sum of dollars, to be void upon this condition: Whereas, obtained a judgment before , a justice of the peace of township, in the County of , on the day of , 19 , against . Now, if such judgment shall be paid at the expiration of months from the time it was rendered, this obligation shall be void. Approved: , J.P.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 58, 59, p. 430; 1899, No. 29, § 2, p. 37; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6468, 6469; Pope's Dig., §§ 8430, 8431; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1002, 26-1004.

16-19-904. Agreed period of stay.

If all the parties agree upon any other period, the stay shall be for the time so agreed upon.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 57, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6467; Pope's Dig., § 8429; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1003.

16-19-905. Stayed judgment lien on personal property.

In all cases where execution is stayed on any judgment rendered by a justice of the peace under the provisions of this subchapter, the judgment shall be a lien upon all the personal property subject to execution belonging to the defendant at the time of the rendition of the judgment.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 62, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6472; Pope's Dig., § 8434; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1007.

Case Notes

Limitation of Lien.

The lien is confined to defendant's personal property in the township in which the judgment was rendered. Carroll v. Gillespie & Bro., 41 Ark. 468 (1883).

16-19-906. Revocation of execution.

If a judgment is stayed in the manner prescribed in this subchapter after an execution shall have been issued thereon, the justice of the peace shall revoke the execution in the same manner and with like effect as he is directed to revoke an execution after an appeal has been allowed.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 66, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6476; Pope's Dig., § 8438; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1011.

Case Notes

Cited: McBride v. Mullinix, 299 F. 162 (8th Cir. 1924).

16-19-907. Immediate issuance of execution to prevent fraud.

If the plaintiff or his agent makes an oath before the justice of the peace rendering the judgment that he has reason to believe that the defendant is secreting his property or is putting it out of his hands for the purpose of defrauding his just creditors and that he verily believes the debt will be lost if execution is not immediately issued, the justice of the peace shall immediately issue execution on such judgment.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 60, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6470; Pope's Dig., § 8432; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1005.

16-19-908. Execution issued where bond insufficient.

If any plaintiff, in any judgment rendered before a justice of the peace upon which execution has been stayed, satisfies the justice of the peace before whom an obligation for the stay may have been entered into, by affidavit or by evidence, that the obligation or the security therein is insufficient and that unless execution be immediately issued on such judgment he will be in danger of losing his debt, the justice of the peace shall immediately issue execution regardless of the stay.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 61, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6471; Pope's Dig., § 8433; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1006.

16-19-909. Failure to satisfy judgment — Levy against principal and security — Judgment for bail.

  1. If at the expiration of the stay, any judgment is not paid, the execution shall be issued against both principal and security.
    1. If the principal does not satisfy the execution, and the officer cannot find sufficient property belonging to him upon which to levy, he shall levy upon the property of the bail, and in his return shall state what amount of the money collected by him on the execution was collected from the bail and the time the money was received.
      1. After the return of the execution, the bail shall be entitled, upon motion, to a judgment before the justice of the peace for the amount collected from him in satisfaction of the execution, with interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. The return of the officer shall be evidence of the amount of money paid by the bail.
      2. No such motion shall be made after the expiration of four (4) months from the return day of the execution.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 63-65, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6473-6475; Pope's Dig., §§ 8435-8437; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1008 — 26-1010.

Subchapter 10 — Execution, Levy, and Sale

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

Acts 1941, No. 333, § 3: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “Many causes of action are now pending before various courts of this state and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

16-19-1001. Issuance generally.

  1. Upon every judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, execution shall be issued by the justice of the peace in the manner prescribed in this subchapter, at any time on demand, unless the execution has been stayed.
  2. The execution shall be directed to any constable of the county.
  3. The execution must be dated, as on the day on which it is issued and made returnable within thirty (30) days thereafter, and may be substantially in the form used in the circuit court.
  4. Before any execution shall be delivered, the justice of the peace shall state in his docket and also on the back of the execution an account of debt, damages, and costs and of the fees due to each person separately, and the officer receiving the execution shall endorse thereon the time of receiving the execution.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 54, 70, 76, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6482, 6483; Pope's Dig., §§ 8444, 8445; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1102, 26-1103, 26-1105n.

Case Notes

Recall.

A justice has control of an improper or improvident execution issued by him, and may recall and quash it. Scanland v. Mixer, 34 Ark. 354 (1879); Dunnagan v. Shaffer, 48 Ark. 476, 3 S.W. 522 (1886).

16-19-1002. Issuance of execution — Time limitations.

Executions for the enforcement of judgments in a justice of the peace court, except when filed in the clerk's office of the circuit court of the county in which the judgment was rendered, may be issued by the justice of the peace before whom judgment was rendered on the application of the party entitled thereto at any time within five (5) years from the entry of the judgment, but not afterwards.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 53, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6481; Pope's Dig., § 8443; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1101.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The five-year limitation on issuance of execution on judgment does not apply to suits on judgment which may be brought at any time within the limitation prescribed by § 16-56-114. A. Karcher Candy Co. v. Hopkins, 211 Ark. 810, 202 S.W.2d 588 (1947).

Revival of Judgment.

No execution can be issued after five years from the rendition of the judgment, and there can be no revivor of the judgment by scire facias or any of the modes peculiar to courts of superior jurisdiction. Trammell v. Anderson, 52 Ark. 176, 12 S.W. 328 (1889).

16-19-1003. Execution by other than regular justice.

  1. Whenever a justice of the peace in any township in any county in this state, before whom a judgment has been obtained and upon whose docket the judgment appears against any person or persons, is absent from his office so that he cannot be found or has resigned or died and no successor been appointed, or when there is a judgment on the docket against the justice of the peace, it shall be the duty of any other qualified and acting justice of the peace in the township, or in the county, at the request of the plaintiff and the judgment, or at the request of the plaintiff's attorney or agent, or of the constable or other officer having the collection of the judgment, to issue an execution upon the judgment against the party against whom the judgment was obtained, and the same proceedings shall be had thereon as are prescribed by law.
    1. In order to carry out the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, it shall be the duty of every justice of the peace before whom a judgment has been obtained, whenever he is about to be absent from the township or county for more than ten (10) days, or has resigned and his successor has not been appointed, to deposit his docket or to cause his docket to be deposited with the nearest justice of the peace in his township or county.
    2. When the docket has been so deposited, it shall be lawful for the justice of the peace with whom the docket is deposited, upon application as provided in subsection (a) of this section, to issue an execution upon any judgment which appears unsatisfied upon the docket against any person or persons.
  2. It may be lawful for any justice of the peace in the same township, in the absence of the justice of the peace before whom the judgment has been obtained against any person or persons, when so requested by the persons provided for in subsection (a) of this section, after he has examined the judgment on the docket of the absent justice of the peace, to issue an execution on the judgment, as provided for in this section.
  3. When such other justice of the peace as contemplated in this section shall issue an execution upon a judgment rendered upon the docket of another justice of the peace, the execution shall be in the following form:
  4. The execution shall be directed to the constable of the township where the justice of the peace resides, unless when it is otherwise specially provided, shall be dated on the day it is issued, and shall be made returnable in thirty (30) days after its issuance.

“County of The State of Arkansas to any constable of the township of , greetings: Whereas, it appears from an examination of the docket of , a justice of the peace in and for the township of , in the County of , in the State of Arkansas, that , on the day of , 19 , obtained judgment before said justice against for dollars for his debt (or damages) and dollars for his damages, and also dollars for his costs; and, whereas, an execution has been ordered out on said judgment by said (or his attorney, agent, or constable, charged with the collection of the same, as the case may be), which judgment bears interest at the rate of percent on debt and damages from its date. You are therefore commanded to levy the same on the goods and chattels of the said according to law. You are further commanded to return this writ to the undersigned justice, on the day of , 19 . Given under my hand this day of , 19 . , J.P.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 71-75, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6485-6488; Pope's Dig., §§ 8447-8450; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1105 — 26-1107, 26-1107n, 26-1108.

16-19-1004. Issuance against goods and chattels — Real estate exempt.

  1. The execution shall be against the goods and chattels of the person against whom the execution is issued.
  2. No real estate shall be levied upon or sold by virtue of any execution issued from a justice of the peace court.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 54, 122, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6482, 6495; Pope's Dig., §§ 8444, 8457; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1102, 26-1115.

Case Notes

Cited: Smith v. Credit Serv. Co., 339 Ark. 41, 2 S.W.3d 69 (1999).

16-19-1005. Levy outside of township.

In case the defendant resides outside of the township where the judgment was rendered, or does not have sufficient goods and chattels therein to satisfy the judgment, the constable to whom the execution is directed may levy the execution upon the goods and chattels of the defendant in any township in the county where the defendant resides and where his goods and chattels may be found.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 77, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6484; Pope's Dig., § 8446; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1104.

16-19-1006. Renewal of execution upon return unsatisfied.

  1. On executions issued and returned not satisfied, it shall be the duty of the justice of the peace to renew all such executions by endorsing the renewal on such executions to that effect, signed by him and dated when the renewal is made.
  2. Every such endorsement shall renew the execution in full force, in all respects for twelve (12) months and no longer.
  3. An entry of the renewal shall be made in the docket of the justice. However, execution so docketed shall be subject to be acted upon at any time at the instance of the plaintiff in all such cases as provided for.
  4. If part of the execution has been satisfied, the endorsement of renewal shall express the sum due on the execution.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 78-80, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6489-6491; Pope's Dig., §§ 8451-8453; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1109 — 26-1111.

Case Notes

Lien.

An execution constitutes a lien from the time of issuance and levy and continues as a lien during the period of its renewal. McCabe v. Lee, 123 Ark. 82, 184 S.W. 448 (1916).

16-19-1007. Remedy of claimant of property levied upon.

No trial of the right to any property levied upon by a constable or justice of the peace shall be had before the constable. However, this section shall not bar the claimant of the property of his right to bring replevin therefor in the court having jurisdiction to try the action.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 123, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6500; Pope's Dig., § 8462; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1116.

16-19-1008. Sale of goods and chattels levied upon — Notice.

  1. The constable, after taking goods and chattels into his custody, by virtue of an execution, shall without delay give public notice by at least three (3) advertisements posted in three (3) public places in the township, of the time when and place where they will be exposed to sale. The notice shall describe the goods and chattels taken and shall be posted at least ten (10) days before the day of sale.
  2. At the time and place so appointed, if the goods and chattels are present for the inspection of bidders, the officer shall expose the goods and chattels for sale at public vendue, for cash in hand.
  3. No constable or other officer shall directly or indirectly purchase any goods or chattels at any sale made by him upon execution. Every such sale shall be absolutely void.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 81, 82, 84, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6492, 6493; Pope's Dig., §§ 8454, 8455; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1112, 26-1113, 26-1120.

Case Notes

Authority of Justice.

A justice has no authority to set aside a sale under execution; if the sale is void, the property is to be levied upon and sold again, but the justice has the authority, for legal cause, to quash an execution and its return, issued by him, thereby removing the only legal obstacle to another levy and sale. Dunnagan v. Shaffer, 48 Ark. 476, 3 S.W. 522 (1886).

Exhibition of Goods.

Unless the merchandise on which execution has been levied is exhibited at a sheriff's sale, the sale is void. Kennedy & Co. v. Clayton, 29 Ark. 270 (1874).

16-19-1009. Return of execution.

The constable shall return the execution and have the money before the justice of the peace at the time of making the return, ready to be paid over to the persons respectively entitled to the money.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 83, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6494; Pope's Dig., § 8456; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1114.

Cross References. Procedure when execution is returned unsatisfied, § 16-66-417.

16-19-1010. Payment of judgment to constable or justice of the peace — Recovery by party entitled.

    1. The constable of the township shall receive all money that may be tendered to him in payment of any judgment obtained before a justice of the peace of the township and shall give the person paying the money a receipt therefor. The receipt shall specify on what account the money was paid.
    2. The payment shall be valid against the judgment and, upon the production to the justice of the peace of the receipt therefor, shall be credited thereon.
  1. No payment of money upon a judgment made to a justice of the peace, either before or after execution thereon, shall be valid against the judgment, nor shall the justice of the peace be authorized or empowered to collect and receipt for the money.
  2. The person entitled to the money paid shall have the same remedies against the constable and his securities for the recovery thereof as if the money had been collected by the constable on execution.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 85-87, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6496, 6498, 6499; Pope's Dig., §§ 8458, 8460, 8461; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1117 — 26-1119.

16-19-1011. Suing out execution in circuit court — Procedure — Effect.

    1. Every justice of the peace, on the demand of any person in whose favor he has rendered judgment for more than ten dollars ($10.00), exclusive of costs, shall, upon payment of costs thereon, give to that person a certified copy of the judgment.
    2. The clerk of the circuit court of the same county in which the judgment was rendered, upon the production of any such transcript, shall file the transcript in his office and forthwith enter the judgment in the docket of the circuit court for judgments and decrees, and shall note therein the time of filing the transcript.
  1. The transcript may be filed, and execution may be sued out of the circuit court on the judgment, without an execution having been issued by the justice of the peace.
  2. Every such judgment, from the time of filing the transcript thereof, shall be a lien on the real estate of the defendant in the county, to the same extent as a judgment of the circuit court of the same county, and shall be carried into execution in the same manner and with like effect as the judgments of the circuit courts.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 68, 69, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6478-6480; Pope's Dig., §§ 8440-8442; Acts 1941, No. 333, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1121 — 26-1123.

Publisher's Notes. This section may be affected by AICR, Rule 8.

Case Notes

Limitation.

Where commissioner of revenues obtained judgment on certificate of indebtedness for gasoline taxes but did not procure a writ of scire facias or execution to collect or preserve its judgment within statute of limitation, the right of the state to claim a lien was barred. Lion Oil & Refining Co. v. Rex Oil Co., 195 Ark. 1021, 115 S.W.2d 556 (1938).

Priority.

Certificate of assessment for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes acquired status of judgment when filed in circuit court in accordance with § 11-10-718 and constituted a lien on debtor's realty which was superior to federal government's lien for taxes under former 26 U.S.C. § 3670, where state's lien was first in point of time and there was no allegation of insolvency to bring into play the former federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 191. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Schwartz, 130 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Ark. 1955).

Subsequently Acquired Land.

A judgment from a justice of the peace court, when filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court, becomes a lien on the real estate of the defendant, including land acquired after judgment, even though the clerk may neglect to enter the judgment in the docket of the circuit court. Petray v. Howell, 20 Ark. 615 (1859) (decision under prior law).

Where a judgment is obtained in the court of a justice of the peace and a transcript of the judgment is subsequently filed in the office of the circuit clerk, that judgment becomes a lien on land subsequently acquired by the judgment debtor by inheritance, and the lien cannot be displaced by the debtor's subsequently moving to the land and occupying it as a homestead. Cazort & McGehee Co. v. Byars, 104 Ark. 637, 150 S.W. 109 (1912).

Cited: St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Bowman, 76 Ark. 32, 88 S.W. 1033 (1905); Smith v. Watkins, 187 Ark. 852, 62 S.W.2d 41 (1933); McGehee Bank v. Charles W. Greeson & Sons, 223 Ark. 18, 263 S.W.2d 901 (1954); Thornbrough v. Mayner, 236 Ark. 480, 366 S.W.2d 889 (1963); Farm Serv. Coop. v. Goshen Farms, Inc., 267 Ark. 324, 590 S.W.2d 861 (1979).

Subchapter 11 — Appeal

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 127: effective on passage.

16-19-1101. Rule and attachment — Compelling justice of the peace to allow appeal.

If a justice of the peace fails to allow an appeal in a cause where the appeal ought to be allowed, the circuit court or the judge thereof in vacation, on such facts appearing satisfactorily, may by rule and attachment compel the justice of the peace to allow the appeal, and return the record of his proceedings in the suit, together with the papers required to be returned by him.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 106, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6522; Pope's Dig., § 8484; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1312.

16-19-1102. Rule and attachment — Compelling return of proceedings by justice of the peace.

Upon the appeal being made and allowed, the circuit court may by rule and attachment compel a return by the justice of the peace of the record of his proceedings in the suit and of the papers required to be returned by him.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 105, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6521; Pope's Dig., § 8483; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1311.

16-19-1103. Amendment of return.

Whenever the court is satisfied that the return of the record of the proceedings of the justice of the peace is substantially defective, the court may by rule and attachment compel him to amend the return.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 107, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6523; Pope's Dig., § 8485; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1313.

16-19-1104. Securing or correcting bond after allowance of appeal — No dismissal for want of bond.

No appeal allowed by a justice of the peace shall be dismissed because there is no bond or obligation or because the bond or obligation given is defective if the appellant, before the motion to dismiss is determined, enters before the circuit court into such obligation as he ought to have entered into before the allowance of the appeal and pays all costs that shall be incurred by reason of such defect or omission. However, any person appealing without bond and a suspension of the proceedings in the justice of the peace courts shall not be required to enter into bond before the circuit court, as required in this section.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 108, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6524; Pope's Dig., § 8486; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1314.

16-19-1105. Trial on appeal.

  1. Upon the return of the justice of the peace being filed in the clerk's office, the court shall be in possession of the cause and shall proceed to hear, try, and determine the cause anew on its merits, without any regard to any error, defect, or other imperfection in the proceedings of the justice of the peace.
  2. The same cause of action, and no other, that was tried before the justice of the peace shall be tried in the circuit court upon the appeal.
  3. No setoff shall be pleaded that was not pleaded before the justice of the peace if the summons was served on the person of the defendant.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 102, 113, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6518, 6529; Pope's Dig., §§ 8480, 8491; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1308, 26-1319.

Case Notes

Applicability.

While this section speaks to appeals from decisions of justices of the peace, it applies to appeals from municipal court misdemeanor convictions. Casoli v. State, 297 Ark. 491, 763 S.W.2d 650 (1989); Bussey v. State, 315 Ark. 292, 867 S.W.2d 433 (1993).

This section provides for de novo appeals from municipal courts to circuit courts. Johnson v. State, 312 Ark. 38, 846 S.W.2d 662 (1993).

Pursuant to Const. Art. 7, §§ 14 and 33, and the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear attorney's appeal of the fee awarded in municipal court. Johnson v. State, 312 Ark. 38, 846 S.W.2d 662 (1993).

Although a driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction is tried de novo in circuit court on appeal, the appeal does not affect the validity of the judgment of the district court until that judgment is overturned; thus, defendant's prior DWI conviction, which was on appeal to the circuit court, was properly used to determine defendant's fourth-offense DWI status at sentencing in a subsequent case. Swint v. State, 356 Ark. 361, 152 S.W.3d 226 (2004).

Altering Charge.

Municipal court erred and prejudiced defendant charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) when it changed the charge to driving under the influence (DUI) on its own motion, because DUI is not a lesser-included offense of DWI and altering the charge violated § 5-65-107; and the circuit court erred in trying and convicting defendant of DUI following his appeal from the municipal court, a judgment it was not authorized to render under this section. McElhanon v. State, 329 Ark. 261, 948 S.W.2d 89 (1997), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002).

Amendments.

The circuit court may permit amendments and allow new issues to be made, while keeping clear of new causes of action and setoffs not presented in the court below. Texas & St. Louis Ry. v. Hall, 44 Ark. 375 (1884); Birmingham v. Rogers, 46 Ark. 254 (1885); Greer v. Joyce, 138 Ark. 98, 210 S.W. 344 (1919).

Counterclaim and Setoff.

This section expressly excludes the right to present either a counterclaim or setoff in the circuit court on appeal where none was presented before the justice of the peace from whose judgment the appeal comes. McDaniel v. Jonesboro Trust Co., 127 Ark. 61, 191 S.W. 916 (1917); Greer v. Joyce, 138 Ark. 98, 210 S.W. 344 (1919); Upson v. Robison, 179 Ark. 600, 17 S.W.2d 305 (1929).

Defect.

The circuit court may disregard or cure by amendment any defect which the justice might have cured. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Lindsay, 55 Ark. 281, 18 S.W. 59 (1892).

Dismissal.

Dismissal of appeal leaves judgment appealed from in force. Burgess v. Poole, 45 Ark. 373 (1885).

Judgment.

On appeal, the circuit court can render no judgment that the justice could not have rendered. Whitesides v. Kershaw & Driggs, 44 Ark. 377 (1884); Townsend v. State, 292 Ark. 157, 728 S.W.2d 516 (1987).

The circuit court cannot render judgment for an amount exceeding jurisdiction of justice. Norman v. Fife, 61 Ark. 33, 31 S.W. 740 (1895) See Belding v. Sloan, 65 Ark. 175, 45 S.W. 245 (1898).

On appeal from a justice of the peace, the circuit court acquires such jurisdiction as the justice had and can render only such judgment upon the pleadings and proof as the justice could or should have rendered. Woolverton v. Freeman, 77 Ark. 234, 91 S.W. 190 (1905).

Jury Trial.

Since a case is tried anew on appeal to the circuit court, defendant was entitled to jury trial in circuit court on appeal from conviction and fine for violating municipal speeding ordinance. Johnston v. City of Pine Bluff, 258 Ark. 346, 525 S.W.2d 76 (1975).

Representation by Counsel.

Failure to assign counsel to an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case in the justice of the peace court does not deprive that defendant of his constitutional rights where, upon appeal to the circuit court, the cause is tried de novo and the defendant is represented by counsel. Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967).

Standing.

Default judgment against one railroad company could not be appealed from by another railroad company claiming to be aggrieved thereby. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Young, 85 Ark. 444, 108 S.W. 831 (1908).

Statute of Limitations.

Defendant may plead the statute of limitations in the circuit court for the first time. Meddock v. Williams, 91 Ark. 93, 120 S.W. 842 (1909).

Cited: Swift & Co. v. Cox, 138 Ark. 606, 212 S.W. 83 (1919); Rockefeller v. Hogue, 246 Ark. 712, 439 S.W.2d 805 (1969); Cox v. Farrell, 292 Ark. 177, 728 S.W.2d 954 (1987).

16-19-1106. Dismissal or failure to prosecute appeal — Effect.

If the party appealing moves to dismiss in the circuit court or fails to prosecute his appeal, it shall be at the option of the appellee either to proceed to trial on the appeal or have judgment rendered for the amount of the original judgment and costs where it was in his favor or in bar of the original judgment where it was against him.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 114, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6530; Pope's Dig., § 8492; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1320.

16-19-1107. Judgment on appeal and proceedings thereon.

In all cases of appeal from a justice of the peace, if the judgment of the justice of the peace is affirmed or if on the new trial in the circuit court the judgment is against the appellant, the judgment shall be rendered against the appellant and his securities in the bond or obligation for the appeal.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, § 115, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., § 6531; Pope's Dig., § 8493; A.S.A. 1947, § 26-1321.

Cross References. Retention of jurisdiction by circuit court until final judgment, § 16-67-206.

Case Notes

Liability of Sureties.

Where the circuit court affirmed the judgment of the justice of the peace and directed the defendant to restore the property levied on or account for its value, the plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment for the amount of the judgment rendered for him on the defendant's appeal bond since the appeal was not from the money judgment of the justice of the peace but was from the order of the justice allowing the claim of exemption, and the sureties were liable only for the satisfaction which the plaintiff would have obtained had the bond not been executed and the property then released. Peel & Co. v. Mooney, 162 Ark. 344, 258 S.W. 366 (1924).

Where the judgment against the appellant omits the sureties, a nunc pro tunc judgment may be rendered against them at a subsequent term. Burgener v. Spooner, 167 Ark. 316, 268 S.W. 6 (1925).

By executing an appeal bond, a surety makes himself a party to the proceeding and, therefore, is constructively present at every step of the litigation and must be deemed to have notice of all the orders made and to have assumed all the obligations imposed by law upon a surety. Judd v. Wilson, 182 Ark. 729, 32 S.W.2d 614 (1930).

Cited: T.J. Moss Tie Co. v. Miller, 169 Ark. 657, 276 S.W. 586 (1925).

16-19-1108. Satisfaction of judgment by security — Judgment for amount paid — Interest.

  1. After the return of an execution, satisfied in whole or in part out of the property of a security, the security shall be entitled to a judgment, upon motion, against the principal for the amount so paid by the security, together with interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the time of payment.
  2. The motion must be made within one (1) year after the return day of execution, and the return of the officer shall be evidence upon the hearing of the motion of the facts stated therein.

History. Acts 1873, No. 135, §§ 117, 118, p. 430; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6533, 6534; Pope's Dig., §§ 8495, 8496; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 26-1323, 26-1324.

Chapter 20 Clerks Of Court

Research References

ALR.

Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of clerk of court under state law. 34 A.L.R.4th 1186.

Am. Jur. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Ct., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Administration of the Courts in Arkansas: Challenge, Performance, and Prospects, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Courts., § 236 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1887, No. 46, § 1, provided that all official acts of any deputy clerk of any court of record in the state, done and performed theretofore when the deputy was under the age of twenty-one (21) years, were legalized and made as valid and binding as though the deputy had been of full and lawful age at the time the official acts were performed.

Cross References. Clerks not to act as attorney, § 16-22-210.

Settlement of moneys collected by clerks, § 26-39-201 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1883, No. 114, § 226: effective on passage.

Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 12: Nov. 25, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined that some of the provisions of Act 824 of 1981, which provides that the official court reporters of the circuit and chancery courts in the State are state employees, and provide for the levy and collection of additional court costs to pay the salaries and expenses of reporters, are vague and difficult to interpret, and that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice that this Act be given effect immediately to clarify the law relating to court reporters. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 404, § 5: Mar. 8, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that state law does not provide for the deposit of trust funds held by the probate clerk in interest bearing accounts; that this act is necessary to clarify that such deposit of trust funds is in the best interests of all parties involved. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 986, § 5: Apr. 6, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the County and Circuit Clerks Continuing Education Board is made up of only five (5) members; that small number of the members needs to be increased to better represent all 75 counties, and all areas and regions of the State of Arkansas; and that expanding the Board's membership will solve this problem in an immediate fashion. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-20-101. Endorsement of papers.

The clerk shall endorse, upon every paper filed in an action, the day it was filed; he shall endorse upon every order for a provisional remedy, and upon every bond taken thereunder, the day of its return to his office.

History. Civil Code, § 770; C. & M. Dig., § 1375; Pope's Dig., § 1636; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-101.

16-20-102. Docket entries.

Upon the return of every summons served, the clerk shall enter upon the docket the name of the defendant or defendants summoned and the day of the service upon each one. The entry shall be evidence of the service of summons in case of the loss thereof.

History. Civil Code, § 771; C. & M. Dig., § 1376; Pope's Dig., § 1637; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-102.

16-20-103. Oaths and affidavits.

The clerk may administer any oath or take any affidavit required or permitted in the progress of an action.

History. Civil Code, § 772; C. & M. Dig., § 1377; Pope's Dig., § 1638; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-103.

16-20-104. Bonds.

  1. The clerk shall prepare, in a proper manner, every bond to be taken by or given before him or his court.
  2. He shall refuse any surety offered in a bond to be taken by him who is, in his opinion, insufficient.

History. Civil Code, §§ 773, 774; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1378, 1379; Pope's Dig., §§ 1639, 1640; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-104, 23-105.

16-20-105. Circuit Clerks Continuing Education Board.

  1. There is created the Circuit Clerks Continuing Education Board which shall be composed of the following seven (7) members:
    1. Five (5) members of the Arkansas Circuit Clerks Association, designated by the Arkansas Circuit Clerks Association;
    2. The Auditor of State or a person designated by him or her; and
    3. One (1) member designated by the Association of Arkansas Counties.
    1. It shall be the responsibility of the board to establish a continuing education program for the circuit clerks of the various counties in the state.
    2. The program shall be designed to better equip persons elected to serve as circuit clerks to carry out their official responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. The program shall include requirements and procedures for an effective certification program for circuit clerks.
  2. It shall also be the responsibility of the board to disburse any funds made available to it from the Circuit Clerks Continuing Education Fund and to establish and maintain a continuing education program and a certification program for circuit clerks.

History. Acts 1983, No. 914, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-421, 23-422; Acts 1995, No. 986, § 1; 2009, No. 480, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally amended by Acts 1995, No. 986, § 1, subdivision (a)(3) ended:

“beginning with the County Clerks' Association, and then on a rotating basis annually.”

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “nine (9) members” for “five (5) members” in (a); substituted “Three (3) members” for “Two (2) members” in (a)(1) and (2); inserted (a)(3), redesignating former (a)(3) as (a)(4); and added (a)(5).

The 2009 amendment deleted “County and” preceding “Circuit Clerks” and “county clerks and” preceding “circuit clerks” throughout the section; in (a), substituted “seven (7)” for “nine (9)” in the introductory language, substituted “Five (5)” for “Three (3)” and “Circuit” for “County” twice in (a)(1), deleted (a)(2) and (a)(3), and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and made minor stylistic changes.

16-20-106. Fines, penalties, taxes, etc. — Collection and settlement — Accounting — Audit and adjustment.

  1. The clerks of the several courts of record of this state shall collect and pay over to the treasurer of their respective counties all taxes due on writs, executions, and official seals. They shall also collect and pay over other sums of money, by whatever name designated, coming to their hands and belonging to the state or county.
  2. The clerks of the several courts of record of the state shall render account at each term of their respective courts, verified by oath, of all moneys which have been received to the use of the state or county not before accounted for.
    1. The clerks shall keep a true account of all fines, penalties, forfeitures, and judgments imposed, adjudged, or rendered in favor of the state or any county by their respective courts, distinguishing those payable to the state from those payable to the county.
    2. The clerks shall keep the account open to the inspection of the judges of the respective courts and the members of the grand jury.
  3. It shall be the duty of the judges of such courts to audit and adjust the accounts of their respective clerks, according to the records, dockets, and papers of their respective courts, and to make two (2) separate bills of the several sums, wherewith their clerks shall be chargeable, specifying on what account the bill is payable. The judges shall certify a copy thereof to the clerk of the county court, who shall file and charge the bill accordingly. The copy shall be certified and delivered to the county treasurer.

History. Acts 1883, No. 114, §§ 179-181, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., §§ 10141-10143; Pope's Dig., §§ 13923-13925; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-107 — 23-109.

Case Notes

Forced Settlement.

If the circuit court neglects to require the circuit clerk to report during the term of his office, the county court may force him to settle. Lee County v. Abrahams, 31 Ark. 571 (1876) (decision under prior law).

Setting Off.

The circuit clerk cannot set off allowances made him by the county court against the amount of taxes in his hands. Lee County v. Govan, 31 Ark. 610 (1876) (decision under prior law).

16-20-107. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning collection and payment of additional fees and use of funds, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-156.

16-20-108. Investment of moneys held in trust — Disposition of funds.

  1. Moneys received by a clerk of the circuit, chancery, or probate court to be held by the clerk in trust shall hereafter be invested by the clerk in an interest-bearing account, unless a court with proper jurisdiction over the fund orders otherwise.
  2. The interest earned by such account shall be paid over to the general fund of the county, in the absence of an order to the contrary from a court of competent jurisdiction.

History. Acts 1981, No. 279, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-112; Acts 1991, No. 404, § 1.

16-20-109. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning facsimile copies transmitted as pleadings, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 176. The section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 58, § 1; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 19, § 1; 1997, No. 874, § 1.

16-20-110. County Clerks Continuing Education Board.

  1. There is created the County Clerks Continuing Education Board which shall be composed of the following seven (7) members:
    1. Five (5) members of the Arkansas Association of County Clerks, designated by the Arkansas Association of County Clerks;
    2. The Auditor of State or a person designated by him or her; and
    3. One (1) member designated by the Association of Arkansas Counties.
    1. It shall be the responsibility of the board to establish a continuing education program for the county clerks of the various counties in the state.
    2. The program shall be designed to better equip persons elected to serve as county clerks to carry out their official responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. The program shall include requirements and procedures for an effective certification program for county clerks.
  2. It shall also be the responsibility of the board to disburse any funds made available to it from the County Clerks Continuing Education Fund and to establish and maintain a continuing education program and a certification program for county clerks.

History. Acts 2009, No. 480, § 2.

Subchapter 2 — Supreme Court Clerk

Cross References. Appointment, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 7.

Effective Dates. Acts 1895, No. 145, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1937, No. 22, § 2: effective on passage.

16-20-201. Bond.

  1. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall, before he enters on the duties of his office, enter into bond to the state in any sum not less than three thousand dollars ($3,000), with good and sufficient security. The bond shall be approved by the court in term time, or by either of the justices thereof in vacation, conditioned upon the faithful discharge of his office, that he will seasonably record the judgments, decrees, orders, and proceedings of the court, and do and perform all other things that may be required of him by law, and that he, his executors, or administrators will deliver to his successor, safe and undefaced, all books, papers, records, seals, and furniture belonging to his office. The bond shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State.
  2. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be liable on his official bond for the acts of his deputies in the discharge of their duties as such.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 2; Acts 1895, No. 145, § 6, p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1351, 1356; Pope's Dig., §§ 1608, 1613; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-201, 23-205.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The operation of subsection (a) of this section was suspended by adoption of a self-insured fidelity bond program for public officers, officials and employees, effective July 20, 1987, pursuant to § 21-2-701 et seq. The subsection may again become effective upon cessation of coverage under that program. See § 21-2-703.

16-20-202. Preservation of seal and property of office — Office supplies and equipment.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall preserve the seals and other property belonging to the office and shall provide suitable books, stationery, furniture, and such other things as may be necessary for the office and the courts.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 1352; Pope's Dig., § 1609; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-202; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 4.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment rewrote this section.

16-20-203. Recording of judgments and opinions.

It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the Supreme Court to record the judgments, decrees, rules, orders, proceedings, and opinions of the courts and a complete alphabetical index to all the Clerk of the Supreme Court's books of record.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 1353; Pope's Dig., § 1610; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-206; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 5.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment rewrote this section.

16-20-204. Issuance of process.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue and attest all process and affix the seals of the courts thereto.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 1354; Pope's Dig., § 1611; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-209; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 6.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment rewrote this section.

16-20-205. Acknowledgments taken — Oaths administered.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Clerk of the Supreme Court's deputies shall have authority to take acknowledgments to deeds, mortgages, and other instruments and to administer oaths.

History. Acts 1937, No. 22, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 1614; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-210; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 7.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment rewrote this section.

16-20-206. Copies of opinions to be furnished to Reporter of the Supreme Court.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall furnish to the Reporter of the Supreme Court the names of counsel signing briefs and a true copy of the opinions of the courts in all cases.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, §§ 5, 6; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1357, 1358; Acts 1925, No. 357, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 1615, 1619, 13328; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-207, 23-208; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 8.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment rewrote this section.

Cross References. Time copy of decisions to be furnished to the Reporter of the Supreme Court, § 16-11-201.

16-20-207. Fees — Accounting — Audit.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a true and accurate account of all fees earned in the office in accordance with the guidelines as required by law, and such records shall be subject to inspection by the Auditor of State.

History. Acts 1895, No. 145, §§ 2-5, p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1359-1362; Pope's Dig., §§ 1620-1623; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-211 — 23-214; Acts 1995, No. 549, § 9.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment rewrote this section.

Cross References. Fees, § 21-6-401.

Subchapter 3 — Circuit Clerks

Publisher's Notes. Section 14-14-1301(a)(2), in part, provides that the clerk of the circuit court shall be ex officio clerk of the county and probate courts, and recorder. However, § 14-14-1301(a)(2) and (a)(3) also provide, in part, that a county clerk may be elected in the same manner as the clerk of the circuit court, and, in such cases, the county clerk shall be ex officio clerk of the probate court of the county until otherwise provided by the General Assembly.

Cross References. Fees, §§ 21-6-402, 21-6-403.

Supreme Court reports, custody and responsibility, § 25-18-214.

16-20-301. Preservation of seal and property of office.

  1. Each circuit clerk shall preserve the seal and other property belonging to his or her office and shall provide suitable books, stationery, furniture, and other things necessary for his or her office.
  2. A circuit clerk's seal shall be clear and legible and capable of photographic reproduction.
  3. The impression of the seal by stamp shall be sufficient sealing in a situation in which sealing is required.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, § 8; C. & M. Dig., § 1371; Pope's Dig., § 1632; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-307; Acts 2013, No. 469, § 2; 2015, No. 581, § 1; 2015, No. 1152, § 4.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment deleted “Office supplies and equipment” in the section heading; and rewrote the section.

The 2015 amendment by No. 581 added (c).

The 2015 amendment by No. 1152 inserted “circuit” in (a); and substituted “A circuit clerk’s seal” for “The seal” in (b).

Case Notes

Authority to Purchase.

The circuit clerk is authorized to purchase a typewriter under this section. Madison County v. Simpson, 173 Ark. 755, 293 S.W. 34 (1927).

16-20-302. Issuance and attestation of processes.

Every clerk shall seasonably issue and attest all processes when required by law.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 1374; Pope's Dig., § 1635; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-315.

Case Notes

Cited: Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975).

16-20-303. List of causes to be tried — Issuance of subpoenas — Penalty for noncompliance.

    1. The several clerks of the circuit courts shall, within twenty (20) days before the commencement of each term of the court, make out a docket of all causes, both civil and criminal, in which an issue of fact is to be tried, an inquiry of damages to be made, a special verdict, agreed case, demurrer, or other matter of law, to be argued at such term.
    2. The clerk shall arrange such causes or indictments upon the docket in the same order in which the original process was issued. However, all criminal matters shall be first set down. A proper portion of the causes shall be set for each day the term is supposed to continue.
  1. Every clerk, within the time specified in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, shall post in some convenient place in his office a list of all causes specified in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, distinguishing therein the day on which each cause is to be tried. He shall keep such list so affixed until the end of such term, for the inspection of the parties litigant, and their attorneys.
  2. Every clerk of the circuit court, upon the demand of any party or his attorney and upon the payment of the legal fee therefor, shall issue subpoenas for witnesses to appear and testify on the day for which the cause is set in which the subpoenas are demanded.
  3. Every clerk who neglects or refuses to make out the docket or to set and keep up such lists of causes, or to issue subpoenas according to the provisions of this section, shall, on motion, be fined by the court in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 116, §§ 144, 145; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1380, 1381; Pope's Dig., §§ 1641, 1642; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-316, 23-317.

16-20-304. Record and index of court proceedings.

  1. A clerk shall seasonably record the judgments, rules, orders, and other proceedings of the courts of which he or she is the clerk and shall make a complete alphabetical index of the judgments, rules, orders, and other proceedings of the court.
  2. A clerk may make only an electronic alphabetical index under subsection (a) of this section if he or she is able to electronically scan the judgments, rules, orders, or other proceedings of the court so that the judgments, rules, orders, or other proceedings of the court are accessible on an internet-based computer database searchable by name or case number.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 1374; Pope's Dig., § 1635; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-315; Acts 2019, No. 183, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (b) and designated the former section as (a); substituted “of the judgments, rules, orders, and other proceedings of the court” for “thereto” in (a); and made stylistic changes.

Cross References. Records to contain judgment debtor's social security number, § 16-65-122.

Case Notes

Cited: Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975).

16-20-305. Authority to remove records.

In case of danger from an invading enemy, the clerk may remove the records, papers, and other things belonging to his office to some secure place until the danger ceases.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 1373; Pope's Dig., § 1634; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-308.

16-20-306. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning masters or commissioners, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 177. The section was derived from Acts 1873, No. 53, § 7, p. 113; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1364, 1365; Pope's Dig., §§ 1625, 1626; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-314.

16-20-307. Account and settlement of arrearages accruing to county or state.

Every clerk shall keep a perfect account of all arrearages coming into his hands and accruing to the county or state on account of taxes, fines, or otherwise. He shall then make settlement with the proper court at each stated term and pay over all balances.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 1374; Pope's Dig., § 1635; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-315.

Case Notes

Cited: Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975).

16-20-308. Resignation, removal, or death — Delivery of records to successor.

If any clerk of the circuit court resigns, is removed from office, or dies, he or his executors or administrators shall deliver all records, papers, books, files, seals, and other things belonging to his office to his successor, as soon as he is qualified, who shall take charge of and make receipt for those items.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, § 19; C. & M. Dig., § 1382; Pope's Dig., § 1643; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-318.

Cross References. Delivery of records to successor, § 21-12-401.

Case Notes

Cited: Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975).

16-20-309. Resignation, removal, or death — Settlement of accounts.

  1. Any clerk who resigns or is removed from office, or the executor or administrator of any clerk who dies, shall render a perfect account to the proper court, at the next term after the death, resignation, or removal. This account, on oath, shall be made of all arrearages of moneys received by him by virtue of his office, not previously accounted for, and shall settle with the court as if the clerk were still in office.
  2. For this purpose, free access may be had to the office and the records, books, papers, and files therein.
  3. The court may compel such settlement and enforce the payment of any balance by attachment.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, § 20; C. & M. Dig., § 1383; Pope's Dig., § 1644; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-319.

16-20-310. Charges against or indictment of clerk — Proceedings — Removal.

    1. When any prosecuting attorney is required to prosecute charges against any clerk, if the offense is indictable, the prosecuting attorney shall submit the charges to the grand jury, in order that an indictment may be found.
      1. If the charges are for an offense not indictable, the prosecuting attorney shall make the charges out and file them in the court. He shall cause a copy thereof to be served on the clerk, together with a notice requiring him to appear before the circuit court of the county in which the clerk may reside, on some specified day in the term, and answer the charges.
      2. The notice and copy of the charges shall be delivered to the clerk at least fifteen (15) days before the day appointed for the answering thereof.
    1. The prosecuting attorney shall cause witnesses to be summoned to support such charges or any indictment that may have been found against the clerk and shall prosecute the charges or indictment with speed.
    2. The clerk shall appear and plead at the next term of the court unless further time is given for that purpose.
    3. If the clerk pleads not guilty to the charges or indictment, the court shall require a jury to be summoned to try the issue joined.
    4. If the jury finds the clerk guilty, or if he pleads guilty to the charges or indictment, it shall be the duty of the court to enter up an order removing the clerk from office. From that time he shall cease to be clerk of such court, and the vacancy shall be filled according to law.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, §§ 15-18; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1387-1390; Pope's Dig., §§ 1648-1651; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-322 — 23-325.

Subchapter 4 — County and Probate Clerks

Publisher's Notes. Section 14-14-1301(a)(2) provides, in part, that the clerk of the circuit court shall be ex officio clerk of the county and probate courts, and recorder. However, § 14-14-1301(a)(2) and (a)(3) also provide, in part, that a county clerk may be elected in the same manner as the clerk of the circuit court, and, in such cases, the county clerk shall be ex officio clerk of the probate court of the county until otherwise provided by the General Assembly.

Cross References. Fees, § 21-6-406.

Records to be kept when two judicial districts, § 14-15-901.

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 30: effective on passage.

Acts 1935, No. 170, § 12: Mar. 21, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas the status of the tax forfeiture laws of this state are such as to encourage tax delinquencies and has greatly decreased the efficient operation of the schools and various governmental functions, now, therefore, an emergency is declared and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, it shall become effective immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Identical Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 6 and 7, § 4: May 23, 2016. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are currently many vacancies in levee district boards across the state; that the current procedure for filling these vacancies makes the process more difficult; and that this act is immediately necessary because of the critical importance of the efficient functioning of levee district boards. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-20-401. Duties of clerk generally.

  1. The county clerk shall be clerk of the county court for his or her county, by virtue of his or her office.
  2. It shall be his or her duty to attend each regular or special session of the county court, either in person or by deputy, and to keep and preserve in his or her office a complete and correct record of the proceedings of the county court.
    1. When a report filed under § 14-86-103 or an affidavit of a district resident containing substantially the same information required under § 14-86-103(b) or § 14-86-103(c) and filed with the county clerk indicates a vacancy in a district board or district commission, the county clerk shall provide a written notice of the vacancy to:
      1. The members of the district board or the district commission; and
      2. The county court.
    2. A copy of the notice shall be published:
      1. In a newspaper of general circulation in the county; and
      2. On a county-owned or county-affiliated website, if any.
    1. When a report filed under § 14-86-103 or an affidavit of a district resident containing substantially the same information required under § 14-86-103(b) or § 14-86-103(c) and filed with the county clerk indicates a vacancy in a district board or a district commission has not been filled in the interval after the county clerk gave the notices required under subsection (c) of this section, the county clerk shall provide a written notice of the continuing vacancy to:
      1. The members of the district board or the district commission; and
      2. The county court.
    2. A copy of the notice shall be published on a county-owned or county-affiliated website, if any, and in a newspaper of general circulation in the county and shall contain:
      1. The time, date, and location of a hearing on the vacancy before the county court;
      2. The purpose of the hearing before the county court that requires the landowners in the district to appear; and
      3. Notice that the landowners in attendance by majority vote may fill the continuing vacancies in the district board or district commission.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 5, p. 53; C. & M. Dig., § 1392; Pope's Dig., § 1653; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-405; Acts 2009, No. 386, § 2; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 2; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 7, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (c) and (d).

The 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 6 and 7 inserted “county” in (b); added (c)(2) and (d)(2); inserted “§ 14-86-103(b) or” in the introductory language of (c)(1) and (d)(1); deleted former (d)(3); and made stylistic changes.

16-20-402. Duties as to accounts.

It shall be the duty of the clerk of the county court of each county:

  1. To keep a regular account between the treasurer and the county, charging him with all moneys paid into the treasury, and crediting him with the amount he may have disbursed, between the period of his respective settlements with the court;
  2. To keep just accounts between the county and all persons, bodies politic or corporate, chargeable with moneys payable into the county treasury;
    1. To file and preserve in his office all documents, vouchers, and other papers pertaining to the settlement of any account to which the county shall be a party;
    2. Copies of such documents, vouchers, and papers certified under the hand and seal of such clerk shall be admitted to be read in evidence in any of the courts of this state;
  3. To issue warrants on the treasury for all moneys ordered to be paid by the court, keep an abstract thereof, and present the abstract to the county court at every regular term;
  4. To balance and exhibit the accounts kept by him as often as required by the court; and
  5. To keep his books and papers at all times ready for the inspection of the county court or the presiding judge thereof.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 15; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1394-1398; Pope's Dig., §§ 1657-1661; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-406.

Cross References. Enforcement of Const., Amend. 10, § 14-23-107.

Fees for prosecuting cases in municipal court, § 16-17-222.

Fees generally, § 21-6-101 et seq.

Payment of funds into county treasury, § 26-39-201.

16-20-403. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning annual financial report of clerk, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 538, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1935, No. 170, §§ 11-A, 11-B; Pope's Dig., §§ 13799, 13800; Acts 1981, No. 678, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 23-408, 23-409.

16-20-404. Fee for making settlement with collector.

The clerks of the county courts and of the probate division of the circuit courts are authorized to charge a fee of not more than ten dollars ($10.00) per day for making settlement with the collector for each day employed, including quarterly apportionments, but not exceeding thirty (30) days during any calendar year.

History. Acts 1963, No. 491, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-420; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 178.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “and probate” following “of the county” and substituted “and of the probate division of the circuit courts” for “of the various counties in the state.”

16-20-405. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning a fiscal report to the quorum or levying court, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 232, § 11. The section was derived from Acts 1927, No. 340, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 13827; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-407.

16-20-406. Receipts for papers filed with clerk of circuit court.

Whenever the clerk of the county and probate court shall deliver to the clerk of the circuit court any original papers, he shall take a receipt therefor and file the receipt in place of the papers.

History. Civil Code, § 22; C. & M. Dig., § 2235; Pope's Dig., § 2863; A.S.A. 1947, § 23-411.

16-20-407. Additional marriage license fee.

  1. Each county clerk in this state shall charge an additional fee of thirteen dollars ($13.00) for each marriage license issued.
    1. The clerk shall deposit two dollars ($2.00) of the moneys collected under this section into the county treasury to the credit of the county clerk's cost fund as special revenue as provided under § 21-6-413(e)(2) and shall be appropriated and expended exclusively for the operation of the office of county clerk.
    2. The clerk shall transmit eleven dollars ($11.00) of the moneys collected under this section to the Treasurer of State who shall deposit it in the Domestic Peace Fund as special revenue.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1029, § 1; 2007, No. 745, § 1.

Cross References. Domestic Peace Fund, § 19-6-491.

16-20-408. Fee for filing a district report or affidavit.

The fee for filing a report or an affidavit under § 14-86-103 shall be the same as the fee for initiating a cause of action under § 21-6-415.

History. Acts 2009, No. 386, § 3.

Cross References. County court clerks — Uniform filing fees, § 21-6-415.

Chapter 21 Prosecuting Attorneys

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 1261, § 3, provided: “Interim study. The House Committee on Judiciary shall study during the interim whether a prosecuting attorney and his or her deputies should be full-time or part-time positions.”

Research References

ALR.

Prosecutor's power to grant prosecution witness immunity from prosecution. 4 A.L.R.4th 1221.

Availability of writ of prohibition or similar remedy against acts of public prosecutor. 16 A.L.R.4th 112.

Enforceability of agreement not to prosecute if accused would help in criminal investigation or would become witness against others. 32 A.L.R.4th 990.

Am. Jur. 63A Am. Jur. 2d, Pros. Attys., § 5 et seq.

C.J.S. 27 C.J.S., Dist. & Pros. Attys., § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-21-10116-21-150 may not apply to §§ 16-21-15116-21-158 which were enacted subsequently.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 5, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 59, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 80, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1937, No. 214, § 8: July 1, 1937.

Acts 1937, No. 286, § 7: approved Mar. 22, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “It appearing to the legislature that, without immediate legislation, the prosecuting attorney of the several judicial circuits of the State of Arkansas, will be without adequate assistants and authority to properly represent and protect the public, unless this act is made effective immediately, it is hereby declared that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in full force, from and after its passage.”

Acts 1947, No. 52, § 2: Feb. 7, 1947; Acts 1947, No. 151, § 2: Mar. 3, 1947. Emergency clauses provided: “In view of the increase in the volume of criminal cases in certain of the judicial districts of this state and in order to expedite and facilitate the function of justice, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and it being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health, safety and welfare, this act shall take effect and be in full force from and immediately after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1947, No. 152, § 2: approved Mar. 3, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, in recent months, it is evident that crime is increasing, particularly among juvenile offenders, and whereas, it is necessary that such cases be thoroughly investigated and prepared, and whereas, the present expense account of the prosecuting attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit is inadequate, now therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1947, No. 422, § 2: Mar. 28, 1947; Acts 1949, No. 213, § 2: Mar. 3, 1949; Acts 1949, No. 466, § 2: Mar. 29, 1949; Acts 1951, No. 61, §§ 2, 3: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1951. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby ascertained by the General Assembly that this act is necessary for the successful and efficient functioning of the judicial circuits of the State of Arkansas and that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the people of the State of Arkansas and an emergency is hereby declared to exist; and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1949, No. 94, § 4: approved Feb. 16, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, in recent months, it is evident that crime is increasing, particularly among juvenile offenders, and whereas, it is necessary that such cases be thoroughly investigated and prepared, and whereas, the present expense account of the prosecuting attorney of the Tenth Judicial Circuit is inadequate, now therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 17, § 2: approved Jan. 25, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It appearing to the legislature that without immediate legislation, the prosecuting attorneys of the counties affected by this Act will be without adequate funds for the contingent expense of his office to properly represent and protect the public unless this Act is made effective immediately, it is hereby declared that this Act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 32, § 4: approved Feb. 2, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It appearing that the present salary and contingent expense allowed the prosecuting attorney of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit is inadequate for the efficient and proper administration of the duties of the office, and that the expenses of such office has greatly increased within recent years, the legislature hereby declares an emergency to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall become effective from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 61, §§ 2, 3: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained by the General Assembly that this Act is necessary for the successful and efficient functioning of the judicial circuits of the state of Arkansas and that this Act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the people of the state of Arkansas and an emergency is hereby declared to exist; and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1951, No. 355, § 6; 1951, No. 387, § 4: both acts approved Mar. 20, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It appearing to the legislature that without immediate legislation, the prosecuting attorneys of the counties affected by this act will be without adequate funds for the contingent expense of his office to properly represent and protect the public, and it is hereby declared that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1957, No. 420, § 4: approved Mar. 28, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, this Act being necessary to the public peace, health and safety of the people of the state of Arkansas, and for the proper law enforcement in the 18th Judicial District, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1961, No. 176, § 2: Mar. 6, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby declared by the General Assembly that recent shifts in population and recent increases of assessed valuation within the judicial circuits within the state of Arkansas have changed the classification of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, and the law as now in effect, does not truly reflect the pay classification of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit; and, that only by the immediate passage of this Act may such condition be corrected. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1963, No. 454, § 4: July 1, 1963.

Acts 1963, No. 486, §§ 2, 4: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the salaries of the prosecuting attorneys for the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Judicial Circuits are insufficient to adequately compensate the person filling those offices, and that the salaries of those offices must be increased in order to maintain efficient operation of the courts and adminstration of justice. Therefore, this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety an emergency is declared to exist and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1965, No. 557, § 2: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1965.

Acts 1967, No. 16, § 4: Jan. 26, 1967; Acts 1973, No. 30, § 4: Jan. 31, 1973; Acts 1977, No. 117, § 6: Feb. 9, 1977; Acts 1979, No. 415, § 4: Mar. 29, 1979; Acts 1979, No. 514, § 4: Mar. 21, 1979; Acts 1981, No. 126, § 4: Feb. 19, 1981; Acts 1983, No. 5, § 4: Jan. 26, 1983. Emergency clauses provided: “It has been found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that due to the enormous increase in the volume of crime in the counties affected by this Act, that the sums previously appropriated are not sufficient to pay the contingency expenses of the prosecuting attorney's office. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 307, § 4: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is an unequal classification of the various judicial circuits of this State, and in order to maintain efficient operation of the courts and administration of justice and for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this Act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 13, 1967.

Acts 1967, No. 472, § 2: July 1, 1967.

Acts 1969, No. 317, § 3: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 25, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the contingency expense allowed the prosecuting attorney in certain judicial circuits is inadequate for the efficient and proper administration of the duties of the office; that in order to provide proper facilities for the prosecuting attorney of Garland County, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 384, § 4: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the prosecuting attorneys of the various Judicial Circuits in this State are inadequately compensated; that the case load of the various Circuits has increased substantially; that this Act is indispensable to assure the efficient administration of justice in these Circuits, and it is necessary that this Act become effective from and after January 1, 1971. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect upon passage and approval and shall be retroactive to January 1, 1971.”

Acts 1971, No. 430, §§ 2, 3: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the amount paid to the contingent expense fund of the prosecuting attorney in certain counties of this State is inadequate and must be increased immediately in order to assure proper and efficient administration of justice in such counties. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1973, No. 779, § 4: July 1, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Prosecuting Attorneys of the various Judicial Circuits in this State are inadequately compensated; that the case load of the various Circuits has increased substantially; that this Act is indispensable to assure the efficient administration of justice in these Circuits, and it is necessary that this Act become effective from and after July 1, 1973. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect upon passage and approval.” Approved April 16, 1973.

Acts 1975, No. 898, § 7: Apr. 7, 1975; Acts 1977, No. 319, § 5: Mar. 1, 1977; Acts 1979, No. 447, § 5: Mar. 21, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the prosecuting attorneys of the various judicial districts in this State are inadequately compensated; that the caseload of the various circuits has increased substantially; that this Act is indispensable to assure the efficient administration of justice in these circuits. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect upon passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 439, § 7: July 1, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-First General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1977 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1977, could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and providing of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1977.”

Acts 1977, No. 565, § 6: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 21, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is no practical means now in existence for the enforcement of collection of child support payments; that as a result many families are forced to accept Aid to Families with Dependent Children; and whereas this Act is indispensable in carrying out the purposes of the Federal Child Support Program (Title IV-D) of the Social Security Act of 1935. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its date of passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 662, § 2: Mar. 29, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Second General Assembly that the immediate passage and approval of this Act is necessary in order to allow city attorneys to prosecute violations of state misdemeanor laws in the name of the State; therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 5, § 4: Nov. 24, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Tenth Judicial Circuit was accidentally designated a Class B Judicial Circuit and that this Act is immediately necessary to redesignate the Tenth Judicial Circuit as a Division A Circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 450, § 4: Mar. 20, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that glaring errors were made in Act 526 of 1983, which was an Act providing needed assistance to victims and witnesses of crimes; that this Act is immediately necessary to correct these obvious errors. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 76, § 3: Feb. 19, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salaries of the prosecuting attorneys of the Third, Seventh, Eighth, Sixteenth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits are insufficient to adequately compensate the persons filling those offices; that designating those circuits as Division A circuits instead of Division B circuits will entitle the prosecuting attorneys for those circuits to increase compensation; and that such increased compensation cannot occur until this act becomes effective. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 221, § 7: July 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Sixth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1987 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1987 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1987.”

Acts 1989 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 21, § 7: July 1, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Seventh General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1989 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1989 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1989.”

Acts 1991, No. 79, § 10: July 1, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1991 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1991 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1991.”

Acts 1991, No. 1124, § 5: Apr. 9, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law pertaining to the funding of the Victim/Witness Programs is unclear; this Act clarifies the law by providing that the additional court cost levied under Arkansas Code § 16-21-106 must be used only to defray the cost of the Victim/Witness Program; and that this Act should go into effect immediately in order to clarify the law as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 33, § 7: Mar. 10, 1992. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the maximum annual salary for the Marianna municipal court judge is inadequate and should be increased as soon as possible and that this act will accomplish the same. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 995, § 5: Apr. 12, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the caseload of the First Judicial District has decreased substantially and that is no longer necessary for the Prosecuting Attorney to continue as a full time prosecutor. This act should go into effect as soon as possible to allow the current prosecuting attorney to establish a private law practice. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect upon passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 17 and 18, § 2: Jan. 1, 1995.

Acts 1995, No. 118, § 2: effective retroactively to Jan. 1, 1995. Secton 6, the emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifth Judicial District in this state is inadequately compensated; that the caseload of the circuit has increased substantially; and that this act is indispensable to assure the efficient administration of justice in this circuit. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effective upon passage and approval.” The date of approval was February 1, 1995.

Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 865, § 5: March 27, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Prosecuting Attorney of the Twenty-first Judicial District is inadequately compensated; that the caseload of the District has increased substantially; and that this act is indispensable to assure the efficient administration of justice in the District. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 18: January 1, 1998.

Acts 1999, No. 35, § 5: Feb. 9, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that designating the Eighth Judicial District North a Division A Judicial District results in the prosecuting attorney of that district being denied the privilege of engaging in a private law practice; that the Eighth Judicial District North would be best served by being designated a Division B Judicial District and thereby allow the prosecuting attorney to maintain a private law practice; that this act accomplishes that purpose; and that until this act becomes effective, the prosecuting attorney of the Eighth Judicial District North will be subjected to an unnecessary and burdensome restriction. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1999, No. 456, § 12: Mar. 8, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Seventeenth and the Twenty-Third Judicial Districts, and is necessary to avoid confusion between the two districts. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1999, No. 1044, § 21: July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1999 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1999 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1999.”

Acts 1999, No. 1508, § 19: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act makes various technical corrections in the Arkansas Code; that this act further clarifies the law to provide that the Arkansas Code Revision Commission may correct errors resulting from enactments of prior sessions; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to be applicable during the codification process of the enactments of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 203, § 2: Feb. 9, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the Eighty-third General Assembly that the Fifteenth Judicial District would operate more effectively with a Class B prosecutor in that it is no longer necessary for the Prosecuting Attorney to continue as a full time prosecutor. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2003, No. 67, § 2: Feb. 5, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Fourteenth Judicial District will operate more effectively and efficiently with a Class B prosecutor and that it is urgent that this change be given effect at the earliest date practical. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2003, No. 765, § 2: July 1, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is a sufficient current caseload and significant backlog of cases in the Northern District and Southern District of the Eleventh Judicial District-East to justify the prosecutor being fulltime. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2003.”

Acts 2005, No. 872, § 2: Mar. 15, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the workload of the Ninth Judicial District-East is burdensome; that the prosecuting attorney for the Ninth Judicial District-East should be employed on a full-time basis; that this act is indispensable to ensure the efficient administration of justice in the Ninth Judicial District-East. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 85, § 2: Feb. 9, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is sufficient current caseload and a significant backlog of cases in the Thirteenth Judicial District to justify the change to a Division A Judicial District with a full-time prosecuting attorney's position. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 459, § 2: July 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is sufficient current caseload and a significant backlog of cases in the Fifteenth Judicial District to justify the change to a Division A Judicial District with a full time prosecuting attorney's position. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2009.”

Acts 2011, No. 220, § 3: Mar. 1, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the workload of the Eighth Judicial District-North is burdensome and the prosecuting attorney for the Eighth Judicial District-North should be employed on a full-time basis; that the workload of the Ninth Judicial District-West does not justify Division A status; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to ensure the efficient administration of justice in the Eighth Judicial District-North. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on March 1, 2011.”

Acts 2013, No. 539, § 5: Mar. 28, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that a prosecuting attorney and his or her deputy prosecuting attorneys perform a vital public function and often are in dangerous situations due to the nature of the crimes they prosecute; and that this act is immediately necessary because allowing a prosecuting attorney and his or her deputy prosecuting attorneys to carry a firearm or concealed handgun is essential to the safe operation of criminal justice in this state. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 1261, § 4: July 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Thirteenth Judicial District and the Fifteenth Judicial District should be Division B judicial districts; that the fiscal year starts on July 1, 2015; and it is necessary for budgeting purposes that this act become effective on July 1, 2015. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2015.”

Identical Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 6 and 7, § 4: May 23, 2016. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are currently many vacancies in levee district boards across the state; that the current procedure for filling these vacancies makes the process more difficult; and that this act is immediately necessary because of the critical importance of the efficient functioning of levee district boards. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 328, § 2: July 1, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Fifteenth Judicial District should be a Division B Judicial District; that the fiscal year starts on July 1, 2017; and it is necessary for budgeting purposes that this act become effective on July 1, 2017. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2017.”

Acts 2017, No. 814, § 2: July 1, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Thirteenth Judicial District should be a Division B Judicial District; that the fiscal year starts on July 1, 2017; and it is necessary for budgeting purposes that this act become effective on July 1, 2017. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2017.”

Acts 2018, No. 198, § 7: July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, No. 715, § 6: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2019 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2019 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2019”.

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Misconduct related to performance of official duties as prosecuting attorney. 10 A.L.R.4th 605.

Writ of prohibition against acts of public prosecutor. 16 A.L.R.4th 112.

Limitations on state prosecuting attorney's discretion to initiate prosecution by indictment or information. 44 A.L.R.4th 401.

16-21-101. Residence.

Each prosecuting attorney shall reside in the judicial district for which he may be elected, under the provisions of the Constitution of this state.

History. Acts 1981, No. 888, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-135.

16-21-102. Opinion on criminal law matters to be given to public officers.

The prosecuting attorney, without fee or reward, shall give his opinion to any county or township office in his judicial district, on matters of criminal law in which the state or county is concerned, pending before the official.

History. Acts 1981, No. 888, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-136.

Case Notes

Cited: Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987).

16-21-103. Duty to commence and prosecute criminal actions.

Each prosecuting attorney shall commence and prosecute all criminal actions in which the state or any county in his district may be concerned.

History. Acts 1981, No. 888, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-135.

Case Notes

Appointment of Special Prosecutor Improper.

Certiorari relief was appropriate where a circuit court erred by disqualifying prosecutors and appointing a special prosecutor because there was no evidence that the prosecutors neglected a capital murder case or failed to attend court; the prosecutors attended and filed a nolle pros motion. There was no other remedy, and the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction; however, the circuit court was not directed to nolle pros the case because review of a discretionary decision was not allowed where certiorari was sought. Smith v. Simes, 2013 Ark. 477, 430 S.W.3d 690 (2013).

Cited: Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990).

16-21-104. Summoning witnesses before grand jury.

It shall be the duty of each prosecuting attorney, whenever he has information of the commission of any offense against the criminal and penal laws of this state or has reason to believe that any offense has been committed, to cause to be summoned all persons that he may think necessary to testify before the grand jury in relation to the offense.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 16, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 8318; Pope's Dig., § 10895; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-102.

Case Notes

Cited: Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987).

16-21-105. Justice of the peace to notify prosecutor of pendency of certain criminal proceedings — Duty of prosecutor.

  1. In any criminal action pending before any justice of the peace court, where the defendant is charged with any offense of carrying weapons unlawfully, unlawful sale of or being interested in the sale of intoxicating liquors, or gambling, by affidavit or otherwise, and pleads not guilty and secures the services of an attorney to represent him at the trial, it shall be the duty of the justice to cause the prosecuting attorney or deputy for the county to be notified of the nature of the charge and of the time and place of the trial.
    1. The prosecuting attorney shall attend and prosecute in behalf of the state.
    2. In case of a conviction, the prosecuting attorney shall be allowed the same fee as is allowed for similar cases in the circuit court. However, no prosecuting attorney or his deputy shall receive any fee unless he personally appears and prosecutes in the case, nor shall any court tax any fee where such officer does not appear and personally prosecute.

History. Acts 1895, No. 80, § 4, p. 106; C. & M. Dig., § 8310; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-123.

Case Notes

Fees.

Where a conviction obtained in a case prosecuted by a deputy was confirmed on appeal, the deputy was entitled to a fee for conviction in the justice court and the prosecuting attorney was entitled to a fee for conviction before the circuit court. Goad v. State, 73 Ark. 458, 84 S.W. 638 (1904).

A prosecuting attorney or his deputy cannot collect from a county contractor fees in a case where he was not personally present and prosecuting. Peay v. Pulaski County, 103 Ark. 601, 148 S.W. 491 (1912).

No fee is allowed the prosecuting attorney in prosecutions for vagrancy. Peay v. Pulaski County, 103 Ark. 601, 148 S.W. 491 (1912).

—Guilty Plea.

A deputy prosecuting attorney is not entitled to fees except when present and prosecuting and, therefore, is not entitled to a fee where the defendant appeared before a justice of the peace and pleaded guilty before the day set for trial. Allen v. Davis, 138 Ark. 154, 211 S.W. 151 (1919).

A deputy prosecuting attorney is entitled to a fee on conviction where he filed an information which caused the arrest of the accused and attended the court on the day of the trial, though the accused pleaded guilty. Brown v. Welch, 151 Ark. 142, 235 S.W. 997 (1920).

A prosecuting attorney is not entitled to a fee where the accused pleads guilty. State v. Staples, 158 Ark. 502, 250 S.W. 517 (1923); Duncan v. West, 167 Ark. 14, 267 S.W. 567 (1924).

16-21-106. Assistance to victims and witnesses of crimes — Victim of crimes case coordinator.

    1. The prosecuting attorneys shall, upon request, provide to a victim and the immediate family members of all homicide victims, whether or not they are witnesses in criminal proceedings, notice of critical events in the criminal justice process, which shall include, but not be limited to:
      1. Notice of motions or hearings to establish or reduce bail or authorize other pretrial release from custody;
      2. Notice of proceedings in which any plea agreement may be submitted;
      3. Notice of trial;
      4. Notice of any motion that may substantially delay the prosecution;
      5. Notice that a court proceeding for which the victim has been subpoenaed will not transpire as scheduled;
      6. Notice of the date, time, and place of the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer;
      7. The function of a presentence report, the name, street address, and telephone number of the agency preparing the report, and the defendant's right of access to the report;
      8. Notice of the victim's right under this act to present a victim impact statement and the defendant's right to be present at the sentencing proceeding;
      9. Notice of the date, time, and place of any sentencing proceeding;
      10. Notice of the date, time, and place of any hearing for reconsideration of a sentence imposed;
      11. Notice of any sentence imposed and any modification of that sentence; and
      12. Notice of the right to receive information from the Department of Corrections, Arkansas State Hospital, and any other facility to which the defendant is committed by the court.
    2. After a prosecution is commenced, the prosecuting attorney shall promptly inform a victim of:
      1. Relevant criminal justice procedures;
      2. The crime with which the defendant has been charged, including an explanation of the elements of the crime, if necessary to an understanding of the nature of the crime; and
      3. The file number of the case and the prosecuting attorney's name, office address, and telephone number.
      1. The notice may be accomplished by providing the victim or immediate family member with a telephone number to a computer notification program.
      2. Prosecutors remain responsible for providing the notice in instances where no computer notification program exists.
    3. When an immediate family member has been charged with the homicide, that person shall not be notified in accordance with this section.
    1. Prosecuting attorneys shall confer with the victim before amending or dismissing a charge or agreeing to a negotiated plea or pretrial diversion.
    2. Failure of the prosecuting attorney to confer with the victim does not affect the validity of an agreement between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or of an amendment, dismissal, plea, pretrial diversion, or other disposition.
    1. The prosecuting attorney of the county from which the inmate was committed shall notify the Parole Board at the time of commitment of the desire of the victim or member of the victim's family to be notified of any future parole or clemency hearings, and to forward to the board the last known address and telephone number of the victim or member of the victim's family.
    2. It shall be the responsibility of the victim or the victim's next of kin to notify the board after the date of commitment of any change in regard to the desire to be notified of any future parole or clemency hearings.
  1. The prosecuting attorneys and deputy prosecuting attorneys shall provide the following services to victims of crimes and witnesses of crimes and the family members of all homicide victims, whether or not they are witnesses in criminal proceedings:
    1. Assisting the persons in obtaining protection from harm and threats of harm arising out of their cooperation with law enforcement and prosecution efforts;
    2. Assisting the persons in applying for financial assistance and other social services available as a result of being a witness or victim of a crime;
    3. Assisting the persons in applying for any witness fees to which they are entitled;
    4. Providing, when possible, a secure waiting area during court proceedings that does not require the persons to be in close proximity to the defendants and families and friends of the defendants and otherwise make a reasonable effort to minimize unwanted contact between the victim, members of the victim's family, or prosecution witnesses and the defendant, members of the defendant's family, or defense witnesses before, during, and immediately after a judicial proceeding; and
    5. Interceding with the persons' employers to assure that the employers cooperate with the criminal justice process in order to minimize loss of pay and other benefits resulting from court appearances.
  2. In order to enable the prosecuting attorney to perform the additional duties provided in this section:
    1. The prosecutor may request the county judge of the county to designate or provide an appropriate room or area in the county courthouse, reasonably close to the courtroom, to serve as a waiting area during court proceedings to accommodate the families and friends of the defendants, as provided in subsection (d) of this section; and
    2. The prosecutor may request the quorum court of the county to provide additional employees for his or her office to be known as victim of crimes case coordinators at such salary as may be determined by the quorum court, to be in addition to any other position available to the prosecutor's office.

History. Acts 1983, No. 526, §§ 1, 2; 1985, No. 450, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-141, 24-142; Acts 1991, No. 904, §§ 14, 20; 1991, No. 1124, § 1; 1995, No. 1256, § 20; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4; 1997, No. 736, § 1; 1997, No. 1262, § 16; 1999, No. 1508, § 7; 2005, No. 1975, § 2; 2019, No. 910, § 853.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 2, codified as § 16-90-1102, provided:

“Failure to comply with this act does not create a claim for damages against a government employee, official, or entity.”

Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 15, codified as § 16-90-1115, provided:

“None of the provisions of this act shall be deemed to relieve any person of the duty of providing information or notices required by any other law.”

The amendment of this section by Acts 1997, No. 1262 conflicts with the amendment by Acts 1997, No. 736, and the resolution of the conflict is not governed by the later effective date of Acts 1997, No. 1262. As to the resolution of multiple legislation affecting a section, see §§ 1-2-207 and 1-2-303.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 904, § 22, provided:

“It is hereby found that the passage of many court cost bills over several legislative sessions has caused confusion in the collection of such costs and that reasonable people can interpret the varying language of such court costs statutes differently. This legislation is necessary to standardize the language of such court cost statutes to provide that such costs are collected in a uniform manner statewide.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 23, provided:

“This act is hereby declared to be remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed to effect its purpose.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 24, provided:

“Nothing herein shall prohibit courts from assessing reasonable probation fees.”

Amendments. The 1995 amendment by No. 1256, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4, repealed (b)(2)(B) and (C), redesignating (b)(2)(A) as (b)(2).

The 1997 amendment by No. 736 inserted present (a) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; and substituted “friends of the victims ” for “friends of the defendants ” in present (c)(1).

The 1997 amendment by No. 1262 rewrote this section.

The 1999 amendment repealed the version of this section as amended by Acts 1997, No. 736.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Department of Corrections” for “Department of Correction” in (a)(1)(L).

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1997, No. 1262, codified as §§ 16-21-106, 16-90-110116-90-1115, § 16-93-702(b), 16-97-102.

Cross References. Registration of sex and child offenders and community notification, § 12-12-901 et seq.

Victim notification system, § 12-12-1201 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Killenbeck, And Then They Did …? Abusing Equity in the Name of Justice, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

16-21-107. Victim/Witness Coordinator.

  1. This section shall be known as the “Victim/Witness Coordinator Act”.
  2. There is created a Victim/Witness Coordinator to provide technical assistance and support to all victims of crimes and their families and to witnesses to crimes who are involved in the criminal justice system, to establish programs intended to result in such support, and to provide a communication network for victim/witness programs.
  3. The Victim/Witness Coordinator shall be located in the Office of the Prosecutor Coordinator.

History. Acts 1985, No. 408, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-143 — 24-145.

16-21-108. Child support enforcement — Participation in federal programs — Collection and assessment of costs.

  1. The prosecuting attorneys of the several judicial districts in the State of Arkansas shall be designated as local units of government for the express purpose of permitting contracting with the Department of Finance and Administration for the provision of legal services under Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, as delegated to the states in 1975.
  2. All collections resulting from such a program shall be placed in a special account for each county, namely a child support enforcement account, and distributed in keeping with the requirements of Pub. L. No. 93-647 and rules and regulations promulgated by the department.
    1. In all cases when any circuit court shall levy a fine or forfeiture as a result of an appearance by the prosecutor or his or her deputy, the fine or forfeiture shall be deposited directly with the county treasurer, who shall enter the exact amount into a separate account and deposit the funds into the prosecuting attorney's fund.
    2. The county treasurer of those counties composing the Sixth Judicial District shall account for the prosecuting attorney's fund on a separate ledger sheet and shall provide a monthly statement to the prosecuting attorney of the district, itemizing the total by amount of fines, fees, forfeitures, and costs assessed for the month.
    1. In each case in which the prosecuting attorney shall make an appearance and the defendant is judged guilty, the court shall assess the defendant costs, which shall be paid directly to the prosecuting attorney's fund.
    2. The prosecuting attorney shall enforce the provisions of this section by action to compel assessment of costs, where necessary.
    1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District shall submit a proposed budget to the quorum courts of the counties composing the Sixth Judicial District for their advice and counsel.
    2. The quorum court shall then make advisory recommendations to both houses of the General Assembly concerning the prosecuting attorney's proposed budget.

History. Acts 1977, No. 565, §§ 1-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-130 — 24-134; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 262.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Child Support Enforcement Unit was transferred from the Department of Human Services to the Department of Finance and Administration as the Office of Child Support Enforcement.

U.S. Code. Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, referred to in this section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Public Law 93-647, referred to in this section, is codified primarily as 42 U.S.C. §§ 303, 602-604, 606, 622, 651-660, 1203, 1306, 1308, 1315, 1316, 1320b (note), 1353, 1383 (note), and 1397-1397f.

16-21-109. Fees in felony cases paid to general revenue fund of county.

The prosecuting attorney's fees provided by law shall be charged against the defendants in felony cases, and when they are collected shall be paid into the county treasury to the credit of the general revenue fund.

History. Acts 1937, No. 214, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 10908; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-116.

16-21-110. Report of, and payment over of, moneys received — Penalty for noncompliance.

  1. Each prosecuting attorney shall, on or before January 1 in each year, file in the office of the Auditor of State, and in the offices of the several county treasurers in his district, an account in writing, verified by the affidavit of such attorney, of all the moneys received by him by virtue of his office, during the preceding year, for the use of the state or any county and, at the same time, shall pay over all such moneys to the Treasurer of State or to any county treasurer entitled to receive the moneys.
  2. If any prosecuting attorney neglects to perform the duties required of him in subsection (a) of this section, he shall be deemed guilty of negligence in his office and shall be proceeded against accordingly.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 16, §§ 13, 14; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8321, 8322; Pope's Dig., §§ 10898, 10899; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-105, 24-106.

16-21-111. Law library.

  1. In all judicial districts in this state in which there is a county with more than one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) inhabitants according to the most recent federal census and where there are more than two (2) divisions of the circuit court and more than one (1) municipal court with countywide jurisdiction, and in which county the office of the prosecuting attorney is maintained permanently in the county courthouse, the prosecuting attorney may expend from the contingent fund provided by the county such sums as are necessary for the purchase and maintenance of an adequate law library.
  2. The law library, when purchased, shall become the property of the county.

History. Acts 1949, No. 245, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-124, 24-125.

Case Notes

Cited: Kendall v. Henderson, 238 Ark. 832, 384 S.W.2d 954, 384 S.W.2d 955 (1964).

16-21-112. Prosecuting attorney pro tempore.

  1. If any prosecuting attorney neglects, or fails from sickness or any other cause, to attend any of the courts of the district for which he was elected and to prosecute as required by law, it shall be the duty of the court to appoint some proper person, being an attorney at law, to prosecute for the state during the term. That person shall, on taking the oath of office, perform all the duties of the regular prosecuting attorney for the term.
    1. The person so appointed shall be entitled to receive the same fees on convictions as the prosecuting attorney, and the sum of forty dollars ($40.00) for each term of the court, for prosecuting as provided in subsection (a) of this section, to be paid by the Treasurer of State out of any money appropriated for that purpose.
    2. It shall be the duty of the Auditor of State, on receiving the certificate of the judge of the circuit court making the appointment of the prosecuting attorney pro tempore, to audit and allow the account and draw his warrant on the Treasurer of State for the payment thereof.
    3. The amounts allowed in this subsection for prosecuting attorneys pro tempore shall be deducted from the regular prosecuting attorney's salary whenever a failure occurs on his part which is not occasioned by sickness of himself or family.
  2. Judges of municipal courts shall have the same authority as judges of circuit courts to appoint a special prosecutor under the circumstances as prescribed in this section.

History. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 5, §§ 1, 2, p. 6; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8323, 8324; Pope's Dig., §§ 10900, 10901; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-117, 24-118; Acts 1989, No. 825, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds Nolle Prosequi Motion Does Not Trigger a Circuit Court's Statutory Power to Disqualify an Elected Prosecutor, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

Case Notes

Appointment.

The literal reading of this section expresses an intent that a special prosecutor shall be appointed when the prosecuting attorney both fails to attend court and to prosecute as required by law, and this section and § 16-21-116 fall short of providing authority for circuit court to appoint a special prosecuting attorney to assist the grand jury when the elected prosecuting attorney is allegedly involved in the commission of a crime. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 516 S.W.2d 895 (1974).

Since this section expressly provides how a special prosecutor is appointed, it excludes an appointment by an inferior court. Venhaus v. Hale, 281 Ark. 390, 663 S.W.2d 930 (1984).

Certiorari relief was appropriate where a circuit court erred by disqualifying prosecutors and appointing a special prosecutor because there was no evidence that the prosecutors neglected a capital murder case or failed to attend court; the prosecutors attended and filed a nolle pros motion. There was no other remedy, and the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction; however, the circuit court was not directed to nolle pros the case because review of a discretionary decision was not allowed where certiorari was sought. Smith v. Simes, 2013 Ark. 477, 430 S.W.3d 690 (2013).

Compensation.

The inherent power of the courts to order the expenditure of funds to compensate court-appointed prosecutors is limited by statute in Arkansas. An attorney appointed by a municipal court as a special prosecutor is not entitled to recover from the county for the services rendered by him in the absence of statutory authority for the appointment or the compensation. Venhaus v. Hale, 281 Ark. 390, 663 S.W.2d 930 (1984).

16-21-113. Deputies.

    1. The prosecuting attorneys of the several judicial districts of this state may appoint one (1) deputy in each of the several counties composing their districts. In counties having two (2) judicial districts, a deputy may be appointed for each district.
    2. The appointment shall not take effect until approved, in writing, by the judge of the circuit court of the district. The approval shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county for which such deputy is appointed.
  1. In judicial districts which contain a county which has two (2) levying courts or in those judicial districts where the prosecuting attorney and the circuit judge concur in the necessity therefor, the prosecuting attorney of the judicial districts may appoint one (1) or more deputies whose jurisdiction shall be the same as that of the prosecuting attorney.
    1. The deputy prosecuting attorney provided for in this section shall have authority to file an information with any justice of the peace, municipal court judge, or the circuit court of his judicial district, in the name of the prosecutor charging any person with the commission of any offense against the laws of this state.
    2. Upon the filing of the information, it shall be the duty of such justice of the peace or municipal court judge, or the clerk of the circuit court, to issue a warrant for the arrest of the offender. In such a case, no bond for cost of prosecution shall be required.
  2. When any person shall have been arrested under a warrant issued in accordance with the provisions of this section, it shall be the duty of the deputy prosecuting attorney to attend and prosecute such charges on behalf of the state. He shall in a similar manner attend and prosecute on behalf of the state in any criminal case pending before any justice of the peace or municipal court judge or in the circuit court of his judicial district, when so requested by the justice of the peace, municipal court judge, or the prosecuting attorney of the judicial district.
  3. In the event of a conviction, he shall be allowed the same fees as provided by law for the prosecuting of misdemeanor cases. However, the deputy prosecuting attorney shall not be entitled to fees for the prosecution of felony cases.
  4. The deputy prosecuting attorney shall receive no fees or salary from the state for his services and may be removed at any time by the prosecuting attorney appointing him.
  5. The special deputy prosecuting attorney for the Eleventh Judicial District shall be available to provide services to any other judicial district in the state in which state penal facilities are located or in which state penal matters are involved, when called upon by the prosecutor of any such judicial district.

History. Acts 1893, No. 59, § 3, p. 88; C. & M. Dig., § 8311; Acts 1937, No. 286, §§ 1, 3, 4; Pope's Dig., §§ 10884-10886, 10888; Acts 1947, No. 52, § 1; 1947, No. 151, § 1; 1977, No. 439, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-119 — 24-122; Acts 1987, No. 221, § 3; 1989 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 21, § 3; 1991, No. 79, § 3; 1995, No. 1256, § 20; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former versions of subsection (h) are deemed to be superseded by the current subsection enacted in 1991.

Acts 1989, No. 585, § 1, provided:

“In addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions, the prosecuting attorneys of the Eighth, Ninth-West, Tenth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth and Twentieth Judicial Districts shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Said investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, and have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this State and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district.”

Amendments. The 1995 amendment by No. 1256, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4, repealed former (f), redesignating former (g) and (h) as present (f), and (g).

Cross References. Authority to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys and employees, § 16-21-145.

Case Notes

Approval by Judge.

The approval by the judge as provided for in this section involves judicial discretion and is not a ministerial act and, consequently, cannot be controlled by mandamus; however, there must be good reason for failure to approve, and, the authority being judicial, the judge's action under this section is reviewable on certiorari. State ex rel. Pilkinton v. Bush, 211 Ark. 28, 198 S.W.2d 1004 (1947).

Authority.

Appellant's postconviction challenge to the adequacy of the deputy prosecutor's signature on the felony information was, on its face, without merit; the trial court correctly stated that the elected prosecuting attorney was not required to sign a felony information when the deputy prosecuting attorney signed on his/her behalf as long as the elected prosecuting attorney's name was made clear in the felony information. Todd v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 587, 535 S.W.3d 638 (2017).

General Assembly Member.

Since the deputy prosecuting attorney's office is a state office and he is a state officer, a member of General Assembly is prohibited from being appointed or serving as a deputy prosecuting attorney. Martindale v. Honey, 259 Ark. 416, 533 S.W.2d 198 (1976).

Reappointment.

Where deputy prosecuting attorney was not formally reappointed when prosecuting attorney began new term but continued to function as deputy with acquiescence of circuit judge, deputy was de facto official and his authority could not be collaterally attacked by motion to dismiss the informations he had filed as deputy. State v. Roberts, 255 Ark. 183, 499 S.W.2d 600 (1973).

Removal.

This section is read into the appointment the same as if fully written therein and prosecuting attorney could not make an appointment and abrogate his statutory right to remove the deputy. Sheffield v. Heslep, 206 Ark. 605, 177 S.W.2d 412 (1944).

Though appointment of deputy prosecuting attorney was for a fixed time, he was subject to removal at any time. Sheffield v. Heslep, 206 Ark. 605, 177 S.W.2d 412 (1944).

Ineligibility of successor deputy prosecuting attorney would not allow former appointee to hold over after his removal. Sheffield v. Heslep, 206 Ark. 605, 177 S.W.2d 412 (1944).

Cited: Ford v. State, 4 Ark. App. 135, 628 S.W.2d 340 (1982); Summers v. State, 300 Ark. 525, 780 S.W.2d 540 (1989).

16-21-114. County attorneys.

  1. A county civil attorney or county attorney may be selected pursuant to ordinance of the quorum court for each county in the state.
  2. The county attorney shall commence and prosecute or defend all civil actions in which his county is concerned.
  3. The county attorney shall give his opinion, without fee or reward, to any township or county official on any question of civil law concerning the county which is pending before the official.
  4. All civil duties provided by the laws of the State of Arkansas or the ordinances of the several counties to be performed by the prosecuting attorney shall be performed by the county attorney in those counties which have established the office of civil attorney.
  5. The office of county attorney shall be funded pursuant to ordinance of the quorum court of the county.
    1. In counties having a full-time office of county civil attorney or a contract county civil attorney, every municipality, school district, and other local taxing unit receiving ad valorem or other tax funds collected by county collectors shall reimburse the county for the taxing unit's pro rata share of the necessary legal costs incurred by the county in assessing property, collecting taxes, and receiving and disbursing revenues for the unit.
    2. Such legal costs shall include:
      1. Reasonable expenses incurred by a county civil attorney and his staff while providing tax-related legal services for the unit; and
      2. A percentage of the salaries and fringe benefits of a full-time county civil attorney and his staff based on the ratio between time spent on tax-related legal services for the taxing unit and time spent on all legal services; and
      3. A reasonable fee charged by a contract county civil attorney for services rendered regarding the assessment, collection, receipt, or disbursement of taxes.
    3. The amount to be reimbursed annually by each taxing unit, as its pro rata share of the county's necessary legal costs, shall be based on the proportion that the total of taxes collected for the benefit of each taxing unit bears to the total of taxes collected for the benefit of all taxing units.
    4. To facilitate reimbursement, there is hereby created a county attorney's fund, which shall be administered in the same manner as the county assessor's fund established in § 14-15-204.

History. Acts 1981, No. 888, §§ 3-6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-137 — 24-140; Acts 1989, No. 633, § 1.

Case Notes

Cited: Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987); Hollowell v. Gravett, 703 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

16-21-115. City attorneys.

A prosecuting attorney may designate the duly elected or appointed city attorney of any municipality within the prosecutor's district to prosecute in the name of the state in the district and city courts violations of state misdemeanor laws, which violations occurred within the limits of the municipality, if the city attorney agrees to the appointment.

History. Acts 1979, No. 662, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-122.1; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 179, 180.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “the district and city” for “municipal or other corporation.”

Case Notes

In General.

City attorney of a first-class city had authority to prosecute a state misdemeanor violation because he was acting as a de facto official. Chronister v. State, 55 Ark. App. 93, 931 S.W.2d 444 (1996).

Cited: Bigham v. State, 23 Ark. App. 108, 743 S.W.2d 405 (1988).

16-21-116. Indictment and punishment for misdemeanor in office or neglect of duty — Prosecution.

  1. Prosecuting attorneys may be indicted for any misdemeanor in office or neglect of duty and punished by fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
    1. When a bill of indictment has been found against any prosecuting attorney, for any offense whatever, it shall be the duty of the court in which the indictment is found to appoint some person, being an attorney at law, to conduct the prosecution against the prosecuting attorney.
    2. If the prosecuting attorney is convicted, the attorney conducting the prosecution shall be entitled to receive the sum of fifty dollars ($50.00) out of the salary of the prosecuting attorney. The Auditor of State, on receiving a certificate of the conviction of the prosecuting attorney, shall draw his warrant on the Treasurer of State for such sum, if so much of the attorney's salary is due.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 16, §§ 8-10; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8315-8317; Pope's Dig., §§ 10892-10894; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-107 — 24-109.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The adoption by the State of Arkansas of the Constitution of 1874 making the prosecuting attorney a constitutional officer did not void the provisions of this section. That part of this section providing for a fee for the special prosecutor if a conviction of the prosecuting attorney is obtained, is not violative of due process, since the amount involved is so small as to be inconsequential when compared to the overall expenses of prosecuting the prosecutor, and because the fee portion of this section is severable from the remainder so that if the fee portion were held unconstitutional the remainder could be severed and any error would be harmless error. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 516 S.W.2d 895 (1974).

Prosecuting Attorney as Witness.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant the defendant's motion to disqualify the prosecuting attorney and his entire staff on the ground that the prosecuting attorney was to appear as a witness in the criminal prosecution where the prosecuting attorney did not participate at all in the decision to charge, preparation of the case, pretrial matters, or the actual trial, except to testify. Ford v. State, 4 Ark. App. 135, 628 S.W.2d 340 (1982).

Special Prosecutor.

This section falls short of providing authority for circuit court to appoint a special prosecuting attorney to assist the grand jury when the elected prosecuting attorney is allegedly involved in the commission of a crime. However, Arkansas circuit courts have an inherent power to appoint a special prosecuting attorney where the elected prosecuting attorney is under investigation for alleged commission of a crime. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 516 S.W.2d 895 (1974).

The inherent power of the circuit court to appoint a special prosecuting attorney to investigate a charge, to assist the grand jury and prosecute the prosecuting attorney, surely includes the right to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate, assist the grand jury, and prosecute a person charged as co-conspirator with the prosecuting attorney. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 516 S.W.2d 895 (1974).

This section does not require that the special prosecuting attorney be a resident of the judicial district for which he is appointed. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 516 S.W.2d 895 (1974).

A special prosecutor does not displace the prosecuting attorney from his constitutional office, but in order for him to be effective in the investigation and prosecution of the matters for which he has been appointed, he must have the right to proceed in the same manner as the prosecuting attorney. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 516 S.W.2d 895 (1974).

16-21-117. Salaries of prosecuting attorneys — Classification of judicial districts.

For the purposes of fixing just and equitable salaries for the several prosecuting attorneys of the State of Arkansas, the judicial districts of the State of Arkansas are divided as follows:

    1. All judicial districts having a population in excess of one hundred fifteen thousand (115,000), with at least one (1) county having a population in excess of eighty-five thousand (85,000), or any judicial district with two (2) county seats, in which one of the county seats has a population in excess of sixty thousand (60,000) by the most recent federal census, or any other judicial district in which the prosecuting attorney executes and files with the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives an affidavit stating that:
      1. The workload of the district, in his opinion, justifies the designation of the district as a Division A Judicial District; and
      2. Adequate funds for the efficient operation of the office have been appropriated by the quorum court of the counties which comprise the district
    2. No district shall be changed from Division B to Division A except by legislative enactment of the General Assembly.
  1. All judicial districts not designated as Division A Judicial Districts shall be Division B Judicial Districts for the purposes of this section.

shall be designated Division A Judicial Districts for the purposes of this section.

History. Acts 1937, No. 214, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 10902, 10903; Acts 1947, No. 422, § 1; 1949, No. 213, § 1; 1949, No. 466, § 1; 1951, No. 32, § 1; 1951, No. 61, § 1; 1953, No. 57, §§ 1, 2; 1957, No. 420, § 1; 1961, No. 176, § 1; 1963, No. 454, § 1; 1963, No. 486, § 1; 1965, No. 406, § 1; 1967, No. 307, § 1; 1971, No. 384, §§ 1, 2; 1973, No. 779, §§ 1-3; 1975, No. 898, §§ 1, 2; 1977, No. 319, §§ 1, 2; 1979, No. 447, §§ 1, 2; 1979, No. 834, § 2; 1981, No. 193, § 1; 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 5, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-110, 24-111; Acts 1987, No. 76, § 1; 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 12, § 1; 1989, No. 13, § 1; 1989, No. 813, § 1; 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 33, § 2; 1993, No. 1306, § 11.

Publisher's Notes. Similar provisions to former subsection (b) may now be found at §§ 16-21-121—16-21-144.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment deleted former (b)(1) and (2).

Cross References. Salaries of prosecuting attorneys, Ark. Const. Amend. 21, § 2.

Case Notes

Appropriation.

Prosecuting attorneys are entitled to receive the salary fixed by law even where no legislative appropriation was made therefor, since no specific appropriation by the legislature is necessary. Smith v. Page, 192 Ark. 342, 91 S.W.2d 281 (1936) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Riviere v. Hardegree, 278 Ark. 167, 644 S.W.2d 276 (1983).

16-21-118. Division A Districts.

The prosecuting attorneys in the Division A Judicial Districts shall not engage in the private practice of law during their terms in office.

History. Acts 1937, No. 214, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 10904; Acts 1953, No. 57, § 3; 1959, No. 308, § 1; 1965, No. 557, § 1; 1967, No. 472, § 1; 1971, No. 384, § 3; 1975, No. 898, § 3; 1977, No. 319, § 3; 1979, No. 447, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-112; Acts 1999, No. 553, § 29.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment deleted (b).

16-21-119. Contingent expense funds generally.

  1. The prosecuting attorney of each judicial district shall be allowed a contingent expense of his office, including telephone, telegraph, postage, printing, office supplies and equipment, office rent, stationery, traveling expense, special service, operation of automobiles, and such other expenses which, within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, may be a proper expense of the office. It shall also include necessary expenses in connection with any proper investigation incident to any criminal law violation or trials before any grand jury, or any court within the judicial district, coming within the duties of his office.
  2. The expense provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be paid by the several counties of this state by vouchers signed by the prosecuting attorney and allowed by the county court as claims against the general revenue fund of said county, and for the purpose of providing a just and equitable manner and method of payment, the several counties of the State of Arkansas are classified as follows:
    1. All counties having a population of less than fifteen thousand (15,000) persons according to the most recent federal census and with an assessed valuation of less than two million dollars ($2,000,000) shall pay annually not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200). However, Cleveland County, Dallas County, Nevada County, Lafayette County, and Montgomery County shall pay annually not in excess of four hundred dollars ($400);
    2. All counties having a population in excess of fifteen thousand (15,000) persons and not in excess of twenty-five thousand (25,000) persons according to the most recent federal census and with an assessed valuation of less than five million dollars ($5,000,000) shall pay annually not in excess of four hundred dollars ($400). However, Drew County, Bradley County, and Clark County shall pay annually not in excess of six hundred dollars ($600) and Woodruff County shall pay annually not in excess of eight hundred dollars ($800);
    3. All counties now or hereafter having a population in excess of twenty-five thousand (25,000) persons and not in excess of twenty-nine thousand (29,000) persons according to the most recent federal census and with an assessed valuation of less than seven million five hundred thousand dollars ($7,500,000) shall pay annually not in excess of five hundred dollars ($500). However, Hempstead County, Chicot County, and Ashley County shall pay annually not in excess of eight hundred dollars ($800);
    4. All counties having a population in excess of twenty-nine thousand (29,000) persons and not in excess of forty thousand (40,000) persons according to the most recent federal census and with an assessed valuation of less than eleven million dollars ($11,000,000) shall pay annually not in excess of eight hundred dollars ($800). However, St. Francis County and White County shall pay annually not in excess of one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200), and Saline County shall pay annually not in excess of three thousand dollars ($3,000);
      1. All counties having a population in excess of forty thousand (40,000) persons and not in excess of fifty thousand (50,000) persons according to the most recent federal census and with assessed valuation of less than fifteen million dollars ($15,000,000) shall pay annually not in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000). However, Phillips County shall pay annually not in excess of one thousand four hundred dollars ($1,400);
      2. Any county with a population of not less than fifty-two thousand (52,000) persons nor more than sixty-one thousand (61,000) persons according to the 1970 federal census shall pay annually the sum of six thousand dollars ($6,000);
    5. All counties now or hereafter having a population in excess of fifty thousand (50,000) persons and not in excess of seventy-five thousand (75,000) persons according to the most recent federal census and with an assessed valuation of less than twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000) shall pay annually not in excess of one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200). However, Jefferson County shall pay annually not in excess of one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800);
    6. All counties having a population in excess of seventy-five thousand (75,000) persons and not in excess of one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) persons according to the most recent federal census and with an assessed valuation of less than fifty million dollars ($50,000,000) shall pay annually not in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500);
    7. All counties having a population in excess of two hundred forty thousand (240,000) persons according to the most recent federal census and with an assessed valuation of not less than fifty million dollars ($50,000,000) shall pay annually not less than one hundred twenty-seven thousand dollars ($127,000), nor more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), as established by the quorum court of the counties.
  3. Any county falling within one (1) classification according to population, but falling within a smaller classification according to the assessed valuation, shall be considered as being within, and shall pay expense according to, the larger classification.

History. Acts 1937, No. 214, §§ 4-6; Pope's Dig., §§ 10905-10907; Acts 1947, No. 152, § 1; 1949, No. 94, §§ 1-3; 1951, No. 17, § 1; 1951, No. 241, § 1; 1951, No. 387, §§ 1-3; 1951, No. 355, §§ 1-5; 1957, No. 420, §§ 2, 3; 1967, No. 16, § 1; 1969, No. 317, § 1; 1971, No. 430, § 1; 1973, No. 30, § 1; 1973, No. 322, § 1; 1977, No. 117, § 1; 1979, No. 415, § 1; 1979, No. 514, § 1; 1981, No. 126, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-113—24-115.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1977, No. 117, § 3, provided, in part, that the contingency allowances authorized in the act for the operation of the prosecuting attorney's office in the Sixth Judicial District should be provided by appropriation from the county general fund by the quorum court, and further provided that in the event the quorum court should fail to appropriate the funds, or should make an appropriation of funds less than the amount provided in the act, the circuit court might, upon petition of the prosecuting attorney of the Sixth Judicial District, enter an appropriate order compelling the payment of the full amount thereof by the appropriate county officials or in such amount as determined by the circuit court as being necessary for the efficient operation of the office.

Case Notes

Payment of Expenses.

Where the legislature has established payment of expenses to prosecuting attorneys by paying a monthly lump sum without itemization, a court has no power to inquire into the wisdom, amount, necessity or propriety of the legislative decision; in the absence of proof by the plaintiff taxpayers that the moneys were not used as expenses by the prosecuting attorney, the legislative authorization cannot be disregarded and the prosecuting attorney could not be required to repay monthly lump sum payments he received for expenses. Munson v. Abbott, 269 Ark. 441, 602 S.W.2d 649 (1980).

Services Outside County.

Where a county prosecuting attorney was paid for expenses for work done in another county, the prosecuting attorney could not be required to reimburse the county he served for those expense payments, since it was clear that the payments were for proper expenses of the prosecuting attorney's office and nothing in this section mandates the separation of expenses by the county. Munson v. Abbott, 269 Ark. 441, 602 S.W.2d 649 (1980).

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-21-120. Fees from persons issuing bad checks — Special fund — Expenditures — Reports.

  1. Fees collected under this act shall be deposited in a special fund to be administered by the prosecuting attorney.
  2. Expenditures from this fund shall be at the sole discretion of the prosecuting attorney and may be used only to defray the salaries and expenses of the prosecuting attorney's office, but in no event may the prosecuting attorney or any deputy prosecutor who is paid on the fee system supplement his or her own salary, nor may the prosecuting attorney increase any employee's salary, without approval of the quorum court of the county where employed from this fund.
  3. The prosecuting attorney shall annually prepare and present to the quorum courts of each county within his or her district a report showing all receipts and disbursements from the special fund created by this section.
  4. Nothing in this act shall be construed to decrease the total salaries, expenses, and allowances which a prosecuting attorney's office is receiving as of June 26, 1985.
  5. This act is cumulative to all other acts and shall not repeal any other act.

History. Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 33, §§ 3, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 67-728, 67-728n.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 33 is codified as §§ 5-37-307, 16-21-120, 21-6-411.

Cross References. Fees for collecting and processing certain checks, orders, or drafts, § 21-6-411.

Fee reports by agencies and public officials, § 16-21-205.

Power and authority of prosecutor and deputies, § 16-21-1703.

16-21-121. First Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney.

The First Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 995, § 1; Acts 2005, No. 1177, § 1.

16-21-122. The Second Judicial District.

The Second Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

16-21-123. The Third Judicial District.

The Third Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Acts 1987, No. 76, § 1, provided that the Third and Sixteenth Judicial Districts are Division A districts retroactive to January 1, 1987, the Eighth Judicial District is a Division A district as of March 1, 1987, the Seventh and Twentieth Judicial Districts are Division A districts as of July 1, 1987, the Eighth Judicial District will remain a Division B district until March 1, 1987, and the Seventh and Twentieth Judicial Districts will remain Division B districts until July 1, 1987.

16-21-124. The Fourth Judicial District.

The Fourth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

16-21-125. The Fifth Judicial District.

The Fifth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 1995, No. 118, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

16-21-126. The Sixth Judicial District.

The Sixth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

16-21-127. The Seventh Judicial District — The Twenty-second Judicial District.

  1. The Seventh Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.
  2. The Twenty-second Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1997, No. 827, § 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted in 1997, this section provided:

“(a) Effective January 1, 1999, the Seventh Judicial District-North shall be a Division A Judicial District.

“(b) Effective January 1, 1999, the Seventh Judicial District-South shall be a Division A Judicial District.”

Under Acts 1999, No. 7, codified as § 16-13-3101 et seq., the Seventh Judicial District-South became the Seventh Judicial District and the Seventh Judicial District-North became the Twenty-Second Judicial District.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-21-127, concerning the Seventh Judicial District, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 827, § 9. The section was derived from Acts 1993, No. 1305, § 1.

16-21-128. The Eighth Judicial District.

  1. The Eighth Judicial District-North shall be a Division A Judicial District.
  2. Effective January 1, 1999, the Eighth Judicial District-South shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 1997, No. 1270, § 5; 1999, No. 35, § 1; 2011, No. 220, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Acts 1987, No. 76, § 1, provided that the Third and Sixteenth Judicial Districts are Division A districts retroactive to January 1, 1987, the Eighth Judicial District is a Division A district as of March 1, 1987, the Seventh and Twentieth Judicial Districts are Division A districts as of July 1, 1987, the Eighth Judicial District will remain a Division B district until March 1, 1987, and the Seventh and Twentieth Judicial Districts will remain Division B districts until July 1, 1987.

The repeal of this section by Acts 1997, No. 1270, § 8, effective January 1, 1999, has been superseded by its 1999 amendment.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment, in (a), deleted “Effective January 1, 1999” from the beginning, and substituted “Division B” for “Division A.”

The 2011 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B” in (a).

16-21-129. The Ninth Judicial District-East.

The Ninth Judicial District-East shall be a Division B Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 2005, No. 872, § 1; 2007, No. 494, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Amendments. The 2007 amendment substituted “Division B” for “Division A.”

16-21-130. The Ninth Judicial District-West.

The Ninth Judicial District-West shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 17, § 1; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 18, § 1; 2011, No. 220, § 2; 2018, No. 198, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

As enacted by identical Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.) Nos. 17 and 18, § 1 began: “Beginning January 1, 1995.”

Amendments. The 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 17 and 18 substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

The 2011 amendment substituted “Division B” for “Division A.”

The 2018 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, No. 198, § 7: July 1, 2018.

16-21-131. The Tenth Judicial District.

The Tenth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

16-21-132. The Eleventh Judicial District-East.

The Eleventh Judicial District-East shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 2003, No. 765, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

16-21-133. The Eleventh Judicial District-West.

The Eleventh Judicial District-West shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

16-21-134. The Twelfth Judicial District.

The Twelfth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

16-21-135. The Thirteenth Judicial District.

The Thirteenth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 2009, No. 85, § 1; 2015, No. 1261, § 1; 2017, No. 814, § 1; 2019, No. 614, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

The 2015 amendment added (a); designated the existing language as (b); and added “Effective July 1, 2017” in (b).

The 2017 amendment deleted former (b); deleted the (a) designation; and substituted “The” for “Effective until July 1, 2017, the”.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B”.

16-21-136. The Fourteenth Judicial District.

The Fourteenth Judicial District shall be a Division B Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 2003, No. 67, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “Division B” for “Division A.”

16-21-137. The Fifteenth Judicial District.

The Fifteenth Judicial District shall be a Division B Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 1997, No. 322, § 1; 2001, No. 203, § 1; 2009, No. 459, § 1; 2015, No. 1261, § 2; 2017, No. 328, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Amendments. The 1997 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

The 2001 amendment substituted “ Division B” for “Division A.”

The 2009 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

The 2015 amendment added (a); designated the existing language as (b); and added “Effective July 1, 2017” in (b).

The 2017 amendment deleted former (b); deleted the (a) designation; and substituted “The” for “Effective until July 1, 2017, the”.

16-21-138. The Sixteenth Judicial District.

The Sixteenth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 2001, No. 249, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. By its own terms, the 2001 amendment is retroactive to January 1, 2001.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Acts 1987, No. 76, § 1, provided that the Third and Sixteenth Judicial Districts are Division A districts retroactive to January 1, 1987, the Eighth Judicial District is a Division A district as of March 1, 1987, the Seventh and Twentieth Judicial Districts are Division A districts as of July 1, 1987, the Eighth Judicial District will remain a Division B district until March 1, 1987, and the Seventh and Twentieth Judicial Districts will remain Division B districts until July 1, 1987.

Acts 1993, No. 360, § 1, provided that:

“Retroactive to January 1, 1993, the Sixteenth Judicial District Division A Prosecuting Attorney shall be reclassified as a Division B Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

16-21-139. The Seventeenth Judicial District.

The Seventeenth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 1999, No. 456, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1993, No. 168, § 1 provided:

“Retroactive to January 1, 1993 the Judicial District Seventeenth-East Division B Prosecuting Attorney shall be reclassified as a Division A Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney.”

As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Acts 1999, No. 456, § 7, provided:

“Subject to review by the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary of the Arkansas General Assembly, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission is authorized and directed to prepare a technical corrections bill for introduction in the next regular or special session of the Arkansas General Assembly to make the necessary changes to the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated consistent with the provisions of this act. Specifically, in addition to other necessary changes determined to be consistent with this act and subject to review by the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission shall prepare legislation to change references to the Seventeenth Judicial District-East and the Seventeenth Judicial District-West, as well as similar and related references used throughout the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated to references consistent with the Seventeenth Judicial District and the Twenty-Third Judicial District, or divisions thereof, for purposes of uniformity and style.”

Acts 1999, No. 456, § 8, provided:

“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to decrease the term of office of the judges and prosecuting attorneys of the Seventeenth Judicial District-East or the Seventeenth Judicial District-West serving on the effective date of this Act. The judges and prosecuting attorneys shall continue to serve in their respective capacities in the Seventeenth Judicial District and the Twenty-Third Judicial District until the expiration of their terms.”

Amendments. The 1999 amendment substituted “Seventeenth Judicial District” for “Seventeenth Judicial District-East.”

16-21-140. The Twenty-third Judicial District.

The Twenty-third Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1; 1999, No. 456, § 6; 2001, No. 199, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Acts 1999, No. 456, § 7, provided:

“Subject to review by the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary of the Arkansas General Assembly, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission is authorized and directed to prepare a technical corrections bill for introduction in the next regular or special session of the Arkansas General Assembly to make the necessary changes to the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated consistent with the provisions of this act. Specifically, in addition to other necessary changes determined to be consistent with this act and subject to review by the Senate Interim Committee on Judiciary, the Arkansas Code Revision Commission shall prepare legislation to change references to the Seventeenth Judicial District-East and the Seventeenth Judicial District-West, as well as similar and related references used throughout the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated to references consistent with the Seventeenth Judicial District and the Twenty-Third Judicial District, or divisions thereof, for purposes of uniformity and style.”

Acts 1999, No. 456, § 8, provided:

“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to decrease the term of office of the judges and prosecuting attorneys of the Seventeenth Judicial District-East or the Seventeenth Judicial District-West serving on the effective date of this Act. The judges and prosecuting attorneys shall continue to serve in their respective capacities in the Seventeenth Judicial District and the Twenty-Third Judicial District until the expiration of their terms.”

Amendments. The 1999 amendment substituted “Twenty-third Judicial District” for “Seventeenth Judicial District-West.”

The 2001 amendment substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

16-21-141. The Eighteenth Judicial District-East.

The Eighteenth Judicial District-East shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Acts 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 12, § 1, provides that the Eighteenth Judicial District-East Judicial District shall be a Division B Judicial District until January 1, 1989; at that time, the district shall become a Division A Judicial District.

16-21-142. The Eighteenth Judicial District-West.

The Eighteenth Judicial District-West shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1993, No. 844, § 1, provided:

“Retroactive to January 1, 1993 the Judicial District Eighteenth-West Division B Prosecuting Attorney shall be reclassified as a Division A Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney.”

As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

16-21-143. The Nineteenth Judicial District.

The Nineteenth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

16-21-144. The Twentieth Judicial District.

The Twentieth Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 1, this section ended “effective January 1, 1993.”

Acts 1987, No. 76, § 1, provided that the Third and Sixteenth Judicial Districts are Division A districts retroactive to January 1, 1987, the Eighth Judicial District is a Division A district as of March 1, 1987, the Seventh and Twentieth Judicial Districts are Division A districts as of July 1, 1987, the Eighth Judicial District will remain a Division B district until March 1, 1987, and the Seventh and Twentieth Judicial Districts will remain Division B districts until July 1, 1987.

16-21-145. Authority to appoint deputies and employees.

Prosecuting attorneys shall have the power to appoint all deputies and employees without confirmation of any court or tribunal.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 2.

Cross References. Appointment of deputies generally, § 16-21-113.

Restriction on publication of report, § 21-7-401.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-21-146. Appropriation of funds for salaries and expenses.

  1. The quorum courts of the respective counties of a judicial district shall annually appropriate sufficient amounts to cover the salaries and expenses of the prosecuting attorney's office.
  2. The quorum courts of the respective counties may appropriate any additional funds and create such additional deputy prosecutor positions as they deem necessary for the efficient operation of the office of the prosecuting attorney.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 3.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-21-147. Powers of deputy prosecuting attorney — Disposition of federal forfeiture funds.

  1. A deputy prosecuting attorney who is duly appointed in any county of a judicial district shall, with the prosecuting attorney's consent, have the authority to perform all official acts as a deputy prosecuting attorney in all counties within the district.
    1. A prosecuting attorney and those deputy prosecuting attorneys and other staff members he or she designates shall be considered law enforcement officers for the purposes of utilizing emergency, protective, and communication equipment in coordination with interagency cooperative investigations and operations.
    2. However, the prosecuting attorney and all members of his or her office shall have no greater arrest powers than those accorded all citizens under the Arkansas Constitution and the Arkansas Code.
    3. A prosecuting attorney and those deputy prosecuting attorneys designated by the prosecuting attorney may carry firearms.
    4. A prosecuting attorney who elects to carry a firearm or authorize his or her deputy prosecuting attorneys to carry a firearm shall adopt a weapons policy and a use of force policy.
  2. A prosecuting attorney shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys and other employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration's Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, as amended, or its successor.
  3. All federal forfeitures to a prosecuting attorney's office shall be deposited in a separate account pursuant to § 5-64-505(i)(4).

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 4; 1999, No. 1120, § 7; 2013, No. 539, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in subchapters 1-25 may not apply to §§ 16-21-121, 16-21-14516-21-158 and 16-21-170216-21-1704, which were enacted subsequently.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1999, No. 1120, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent. As stated in the comment to section 505 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, ‘Effective law enforcement demands that there be a means of confiscating the vehicles and instrumentalities used by drug traffickers in committing violations under this act. The reasoning is to prevent their use in the commission of subsequent offenses involving transportation or concealment of controlled substances and to deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility.’ The General Assembly recognizes the importance of asset forfeiture as a means to confront drug trafficking. However, the General Assembly also recognizes that under the system that existed prior to the enactment of this act, the lack of uniformity and accountability in forfeiture procedures across the state has undermined confidence in the system. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, ‘Forfeiture provisions are powerful weapons in the war on crime; like any such weapons, their impact can be devastating when used unjustly.’ In order to alleviate the problems resulting from the lack of uniformity and accountability, the General Assembly has determined that time limits for initiating forfeiture proceedings and stricter controls over forfeited property will help alleviate such problems while strengthening forfeiture as a vital weapon against drug trafficking. Specifically, it is the intent of § 5-64-505(a) that there be no forfeitures based solely upon a misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. However, if the prosecuting attorney can prove that other evidence exists to establish a basis for forfeiture, the property may be forfeited. It is the intent of § 5-64-505(d) to reduce the conflict between state and federal authorities over seizures executed by state law enforcement officers. It is the intent of § 5-64-505(h) to allow law enforcement agencies and drug task forces to maintain forfeited property for official use, provided that the final order disposing of such property defines the legal entity that is responsible for such property. Section 5-64-505(i)(1)(D) governs those situations in which a seizure results in the forfeiture of money and or property in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000). It is the specific intent of the General Assembly that forfeiture proceedings not be structured in such a way as to defeat the General Assembly's intent that money or property in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) be transferred to the Special State Assets Forfeiture Fund. It is determined that such fund can best be used to combat drug trafficking statewide.”

Amendments. The 1999 amendment substituted “deposited in a separate account pursuant to § 5-64-505(i)(4)” for “deposited in the drug control fund” in (d).

The 2013 amendment substituted “he or she” for “he” in (b)(1); in (b)(2), substituted “However” for “Provided that” and “his or her” for “his”; and added (b)(3) and (b)(4).

U.S. Code. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, referred to in this section, is P.L. 99-570 and is codified throughout the U.S. Code. Its successor is the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690 which is also codified throughout the U.S. Code.

16-21-148. Deputy prosecutor for civil asset forfeiture actions.

  1. In addition to the deputy prosecuting attorney positions created by § 16-21-113(a)(1) and other Arkansas Code provisions and laws, a prosecuting attorney shall have the power to enter into a contract for personal services with a licensed attorney whose duty it will be to act as a deputy prosecutor to prosecute civil asset forfeiture actions at such hourly amount as is deemed proper by the prosecuting attorney.
  2. This attorney may be paid from funds generated from § 5-64-505(i)(2).

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 5; 1999, No. 1120, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in subchapters 1-25 may not apply to §§ 16-21-121, 16-21-14516-21-158 and 16-21-170216-21-1704, which were enacted subsequently.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1999, No. 1120, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent. As stated in the comment to section 505 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, ‘Effective law enforcement demands that there be a means of confiscating the vehicles and instrumentalities used by drug traffickers in committing violations under this act. The reasoning is to prevent their use in the commission of subsequent offenses involving transportation or concealment of controlled substances and to deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility.’ The General Assembly recognizes the importance of asset forfeiture as a means to confront drug trafficking. However, the General Assembly also recognizes that under the system that existed prior to the enactment of this act, the lack of uniformity and accountability in forfeiture procedures across the state has undermined confidence in the system. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, ‘Forfeiture provisions are powerful weapons in the war on crime; like any such weapons, their impact can be devastating when used unjustly.’ In order to alleviate the problems resulting from the lack of uniformity and accountability, the General Assembly has determined that time limits for initiating forfeiture proceedings and stricter controls over forfeited property will help alleviate such problems while strengthening forfeiture as a vital weapon against drug trafficking. Specifically, it is the intent of § 5-64-505(a) that there be no forfeitures based solely upon a misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. However, if the prosecuting attorney can prove that other evidence exists to establish a basis for forfeiture, the property may be forfeited. It is the intent of § 5-64-505(d) to reduce the conflict between state and federal authorities over seizures executed by state law enforcement officers. It is the intent of § 5-64-505(h) to allow law enforcement agencies and drug task forces to maintain forfeited property for official use, provided that the final order disposing of such property defines the legal entity that is responsible for such property. Section 5-64-505(i)(1)(D) governs those situations in which a seizure results in the forfeiture of money and or property in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000). It is the specific intent of the General Assembly that forfeiture proceedings not be structured in such a way as to defeat the General Assembly's intent that money or property in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) be transferred to the Special State Assets Forfeiture Fund. It is determined that such fund can best be used to combat drug trafficking statewide.”

Amendments. The 1999 amendment substituted “§ 5-64-505(i)(2)” for “§ 5-64-505(k)(4)” in (b).

Cross References. Property subject to forfeiture — Procedure — Disposition of property, § 5-64-505.

16-21-149. Appointment of special deputy prosecuting attorneys.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the prosecuting attorney in every judicial district is authorized to appoint as special deputy prosecuting attorneys:
    1. Persons employed as attorneys in the office of the Prosecutor Coordinator; or
      1. With the consent of the Attorney General, persons employed as attorneys in the office of the Attorney General.
      2. In cases involving the appointment of a staff attorney from the office of the Attorney General, the authority conferred by the appointment is limited to the matter for which the appointment is sought.
  2. Appointment as a special deputy prosecuting attorney under this section shall not enable an attorney employed in the office of the Attorney General to receive any additional fees or salary from the state or counties for services provided pursuant to the appointment.
  3. The prosecuting attorney may revoke the appointment of a special prosecuting attorney under this section at any time.
  4. Nothing in this section shall obligate the Attorney General to provide an attorney for purposes of assisting the prosecuting attorney in criminal actions designated in subsection (b) of this section, and nothing in this section shall prevent the Attorney General from withdrawing from participation in such cases at any time.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 6; 1999, No. 1300, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The reference in subsection (d) to “subsection (b)” is in error.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment rewrote this section.

Cross References. Prosecutor Coordinator Act, § 16-21-201 et seq.

16-21-150. Prosecution of appeals.

No prosecuting attorney shall prosecute city misdemeanor cases or appeals to circuit or appellate courts unless the prosecuting attorney consents to do so.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 7, this section began “From and after the effective date of this act.” Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 7 was effective August 13, 1993.

16-21-151. Prosecutor's victim/witness fund.

  1. In those offices where the prosecuting attorney is desirous of paying for the victim/witness program from more than one (1) county or fund, the prosecuting attorney may establish a cash account.
  2. Notice of such shall be sent by the prosecuting attorney to the applicable county treasurers.
  3. Each month the county treasurers shall pay to the office of the prosecuting attorney those funds collected pursuant to § 16-21-106 in the special revenue account entitled “Prosecutor's victim/witness fund” or the portion of the county administration of justice fund allotted to the prosecuting attorney's victim/witness program fund.
    1. The prosecuting attorney shall deposit the funds in a bank account entitled “prosecutor's victim/witness fund”.
    2. Moneys deposited into the fund shall be used exclusively to pay the costs of the prosecuting attorney's victim/witness program.
  4. Expenditures and deposits must be made according to the Arkansas Prosecuting Attorneys Financial Management Guidelines as published by the Division of Legislative Audit in conjunction with the Prosecution Coordination Commission.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1221, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-21-10116-21-150 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 1221, § 1, subsection (c) of this section also provided that the county treasurers shall pay to the office of the prosecuting attorney those funds in the prosecutor's victim/witness fund “if created by the legislature in 1995.”

The General Assembly created the county administration of justice fund by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 10, codified as § 16-10-307.

16-21-152. The Twenty-first Judicial District.

The Twenty-first Judicial District shall be a Division A Judicial District.

History. Acts 1995, No. 900, § 6; 1997, No. 865, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted, this section began:

“At the 1996 General Election the qualified electors of Crawford County shall elect a person who shall serve as the prosecuting attorney for the Twenty-First Judicial District beginning January 1, 1997.”

References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-21-10116-21-158 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment added “Effective January 1, 1997”; and substituted “Division A” for “Division B.”

16-21-153. License — Confirmation — Vacancies.

  1. Each person selected as a deputy prosecuting attorney shall be licensed to practice law in the State of Arkansas.
  2. Deputy prosecuting attorneys shall be appointed by elected prosecuting attorneys without confirmation of any court or tribunal and may be removed at any time by the prosecuting attorneys appointing them.
  3. Vacancies in the office of deputy prosecuting attorney shall be filled in the same manner as the initial appointment.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1044, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1999, No. 1044, § 8, provided:

“LEAVE BENEFITS. Deputy prosecuting attorneys who convert from county or grant funded employment to state employment and are employed prior to July 1, 1999, shall have their length of service with the county recognized for purposes of accrual rates for sick leave and annual leave.”

16-21-154. Entry-level salary.

The entry level salaries of deputy prosecuting attorneys shall be consistent with that established by the state pay plan for the appropriate grade of each position.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1044, § 4.

16-21-155. Attendance and leave.

The deputy prosecuting attorneys shall be subject to the Uniform Attendance and Leave Policy Act, § 21-4-201 et seq., as administered by the elected prosecuting attorneys by whom they are employed.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1044, § 5.

16-21-156. Funding of expenses and additional employees of the prosecuting attorneys' offices.

Each county or counties within a judicial district shall continue to bear the responsibility and expense of providing, at the county's expense through an annual appropriation, the following, at sufficient levels for operation, but not less than the amounts appropriated by ordinance in effect January 1, 1999:

  1. The cost of facilities, equipment, supplies, salaries and benefits of existing support staff, and other office expenses for elected prosecuting attorneys and deputy prosecuting attorneys, and any and all other line item appropriations as approved in the 1999 county budget except for deputy prosecuting attorneys' salaries and benefits; and
  2. The county shall provide compensation of additional personnel and expenses within the office of prosecuting attorney and deputy prosecuting attorney, when approved by the quorum court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1044, § 10.

16-21-157. State employment and assignment of positions.

  1. On January 1, 2000, all deputy prosecuting attorneys shall become state employees.
  2. The number of positions authorized by this section equal the total number of county and grant-funded deputy prosecuting attorney positions in place as of January 1, 1999, less one (1) position.
    1. The initial allocation of the state funded deputy prosecuting attorney positions for the 1999-2001 biennium shall be determined by the Prosecution Coordination Commission and shall be consistent with the number of county and grant funded positions in place for each judicial district as of January 1, 1999, less one (1) position.
    2. The final allocations shall be reported to the Legislative Council for its review prior to July 1, 1999.
  3. The Prosecution Coordination Commission shall assist in the maintenance of a system which equitably serves all areas of the state by providing quality deputy prosecuting attorneys.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1044, § 11; 2019, No. 715, § 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (d).

16-21-158. Hour limitations — Part-time deputy prosecuting attorneys.

There are no upper limit restrictions on the number of hours which a part-time deputy prosecuting attorney may work.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1044, § 12.

16-21-159. Duty after receiving notice of vacancy on district board.

  1. A county judge who receives notice under § 16-20-401(d) of a continuing vacancy on a district board or district commission shall investigate the alleged vacancy, and after conducting a hearing under § 16-20-401(d), enter a county order reflecting the majority vote of the landowners of the district in attendance at the hearing to fill any continuing vacancies in the district board or district commission.
    1. The county judge's order may assess the district fines for violations as well as the costs of the required publications of notices.
    2. A fine under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each offense.
    3. A fine recovered under subdivision (b)(2) of this section shall be deposited into the county clerk's cost fund.

History. Acts 2009, No. 386, § 4; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 3; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 7, § 3.

Amendments. The 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 6 and 7 rewrote the section.

Subchapter 2 — Prosecutor Coordinator Act

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-21-20116-21-205 may not apply to §§ 16-21-206 and 16-21-207 which were enacted subsequently.

Acts 2001, No. 1786, § 5: Apr. 19, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the Eighty-third General Assembly that immediate clarification is needed with regard to the authority to administer funds provided to the State of Arkansas under the federal Victims of Crime Act, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act; and that this act, in order to comply with federal law, removes state legislative restrictions on the administration of such funds where the federal government has previously enacted legislation or regulations governing the authority to administer these funds. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-21-201. Title.

This subchapter shall be known as the “Prosecutor Coordinator Act of 1975”.

History. Acts 1975, No. 925, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-126.

16-21-202. Existing duties of prosecuting attorneys unaffected by subchapter.

No provision in this subchapter shall be construed to be in derogation of the already existing duties, authorities, responsibilities, or discretions of the various prosecuting and deputy prosecuting attorneys of this state.

History. Acts 1975, No. 925, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-129.

Cross References. Authority of prosecuting attorney to appoint the attorneys of the Prosecutor Coordinator's Office as deputy prosecuting attorneys, § 16-21-149.

16-21-203. Prosecution Coordination Commission.

    1. There is created a Prosecution Coordination Commission which shall be composed of seven (7) prosecuting attorneys elected by the prosecuting attorneys of the various judicial districts of this state from among their own members.
    2. The Prosecution Coordination Commission shall be elected by the prosecuting attorneys according to rules adopted by them for a term of one (1) year which shall run from January 1 through December 31 of each year.
  1. The commission members shall select from among their members a chairman, and they shall establish rules and procedures for the effective performance of their duties and responsibilities as set forth in this subchapter.
  2. The commission shall have the following duties and responsibilities:
    1. Accept and evaluate applications for the position of Prosecutor Coordinator and, by a majority vote of its members, appoint from among the applicants considered a Prosecutor Coordinator who shall serve in such capacity at the pleasure of the commission. However, any person serving in the capacity of Prosecutor Coordinator at any of the various times that the commission is elected pursuant to this section may continue to so serve, at the pleasure of the newly elected commission, without further consideration of other applicants;
    2. Advise the Prosecutor Coordinator as to the immediate needs and priorities of the prosecution function throughout the state;
    3. Establish the various duties and responsibilities of the Prosecutor Coordinator beyond those set forth in this subchapter;
    4. Develop long-range educational services and other support programs for the various prosecuting attorneys of this state;
    5. Serve as an advisory committee to the Prosecutor Coordinator for the production and supplementation of an office and trial manual and standardized criminal litigation forms; and
    6. Render assistance and advice in the investigation of organized crime as requested by any organized crime prevention council which may be created on a statewide basis.

History. Acts 1975, No. 925, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-127.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1367, § 4, provided: “LEGISLATIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the General Assembly, in the transition to a state-funded deputy prosecuting attorney system, to provide an appropriate and adequate level of legal representation through deputy prosecuting attorneys in all areas of the state. It is recognized by the General Assembly that in many areas of the state, resources have not been available to support deputy prosecuting attorney salaries at the necessary level. With the transition of local funding of deputy prosecuting attorney salaries to state funding, it is not the intent of the General Assembly to adversely affect those districts whose system has been working well or to implement a system which is too inflexible to respond to the needs of each judicial district. Therefore, the Prosecution Coordination Commission is charged with the responsibility of assisting in the maintenance of a system which equitably serves all areas of the state by providing quality deputy prosecuting attorneys.”

Acts 2014, No. 107, § 4, provided: “LEGISLATIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the General Assembly, in the transition to a state-funded deputy prosecuting attorney system, to provide an appropriate and adequate level of legal representation through deputy prosecuting attorneys in all areas of the state. It is recognized by the General Assembly that in many areas of the state, resources have not been available to support deputy prosecuting attorney salaries at the necessary level. With the transition of local funding of deputy prosecuting attorney salaries to state funding, it is not the intent of the General Assembly to adversely affect those districts whose system has been working well or to implement a system which is too inflexible to respond to the needs of each judicial district. Therefore, the Prosecution Coordination Commission is charged with the responsibility of assisting in the maintenance of a system which equitably serves all areas of the state by providing quality deputy prosecuting attorneys.”

Acts 2015, No. 976, § 5, provided: “LEGISLATIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the General Assembly, in the transition to a state-funded deputy prosecuting attorney system, to provide an appropriate and adequate level of legal representation through deputy prosecuting attorneys in all areas of the state. It is recognized by the General Assembly that in many areas of the state, resources have not been available to support deputy prosecuting attorney salaries at the necessary level. With the transition of local funding of deputy prosecuting attorney salaries to state funding, it is not the intent of the General Assembly to adversely affect those districts whose system has been working well or to implement a system which is too inflexible to respond to the needs of each judicial district. Therefore, the Prosecution Coordination Commission is charged with the responsibility of assisting in the maintenance of a system which equitably serves all areas of the state by providing quality deputy prosecuting attorneys.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 212, § 4, provided: “LEGISLATIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the General Assembly, in the transition to a state-funded deputy prosecuting attorney system, to provide an appropriate and adequate level of legal representation through deputy prosecuting attorneys in all areas of the state. It is recognized by the General Assembly that in many areas of the state, resources have not been available to support deputy prosecuting attorney salaries at the necessary level. With the transition of local funding of deputy prosecuting attorney salaries to state funding, it is not the intent of the General Assembly to adversely affect those districts whose system has been working well or to implement a system which is too inflexible to respond to the needs of each judicial district. Therefore, the Prosecution Coordination Commission is charged with the responsibility of assisting in the maintenance of a system which equitably serves all areas of the state by providing quality deputy prosecuting attorneys.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

16-21-204. Prosecutor Coordinator.

  1. There is created the position of Prosecutor Coordinator which shall be filled as specified in § 16-21-203.
  2. In addition to any other duties and responsibilities established by the commission, the Prosecutor Coordinator, for the benefit of the prosecuting attorneys of this state, shall:
    1. Produce and promote in-state training and continuing education programs at such intervals as shall be determined by the commission;
    2. Coordinate interjudicial district investigation and prosecution of organized criminal activities as so requested by police or prosecuting officials of this state or by any organized crime prevention council which may be created;
    3. Develop and supplement, in conjunction with the Criminal Justice Division of the Office of the Attorney General, an office and trial manual, standardized criminal litigation forms, and a comprehensive criminal law brief bank;
    4. Maintain a crisis center for emergency research for and assistance to prosecutors at trial; and
    5. Facilitate an exchange of information between the various prosecuting and deputy prosecuting attorneys and the Office of the Attorney General in the preparation of criminal appeals and in any other matter of mutual concern.

History. Acts 1975, No. 925, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-128.

16-21-205. Fee reports.

    1. All agencies and public officials receiving fees pursuant to § 5-37-307 or § 16-21-120 shall submit a report to the Prosecutor Coordinator's office monthly.
    2. The Prosecution Coordination Commission shall determine the contents of the report.
    3. This report shall be reviewed by the Prosecutor Coordinator's office.
    1. After three (3) months where the accounts and accounting systems are not reconciled or reports are not received by the Prosecution Coordination Commission, the commission shall have the authority, after a hearing, to suspend an agency's or officer's ability to have a hot check program for failure to comply with good governmental accounting procedures and practices and the reporting requirement mandated by this section.
    2. Any entity with a program suspended shall be reported to the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 12.

Cross References. Fees from issuing bad checks, § 16-21-120.

Knowingly issuing worthless checks, § 5-37-307.

16-21-206. Additional duties of commission.

In addition to existing duties, the Prosecution Coordination Commission may:

  1. Administer and disburse federal funds, grants, donations, and funds from public and private sources to carry out its responsibilities;
  2. Educate professionals, law enforcement, judges, state agencies, and victim services providers on:
    1. The role of the Arkansas Prosecuting Attorneys Association;
    2. The impact of crime on victims; and
    3. Prosecutor victim advocacy services;
  3. Maintain information on criminal justice information systems for prosecuting attorneys and victim services;
  4. Advise the Governor and the General Assembly as to the long-range and short-range goals and needs concerning crime rates and the criminal justice system and its impact on the victims of crime;
  5. Provide support, coordination, education, and technical assistance on issues of concern to prosecuting attorneys and crime victim services providers;
  6. Provide support, coordination, technical assistance, and training in accounting, programmatic, and service delivery to subgrantees;
  7. Establish peer-review panels in the course of the award and administration of grants; and
  8. Approve the expenditure of funds from the Law Enforcement and Prosecutor Drug Enforcement Training Fund.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1221, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-21-20116-21-205 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

16-21-207. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-21-2016-21-205 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning peer review of certain prosecution and law enforcement grant applications, was repealed by Acts 2001, No. 1786, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1995, No. 1221, § 3.

U.S. Code. The Violence Against Women Act, referred to in this section, is codified as a note to 42 U.S.C. § 13701.

Subchapters 3-5 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subchapter 6 — First Judicial District

Effective Dates. Acts 1983, No. 249, §§ 3, 4: effective retroactive to Sept. 1, 1982, for Monroe County; retroactive to Jan. 1, 1983, for other counties. Emergency clause provided: “It has been ascertained and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the expense allowance now provided by law for the prosecuting attorney of the First Judicial Circuit is inadequate to reimburse said prosecuting attorney for expenses incurred in the performance of his duties and that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the First Judicial Circuit that the expense allowance of said prosecuting attorney be increased immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 24, 1983.

16-21-601. Contingent expense allowance.

In lieu of any other contingent expense allowance provided by law for the Prosecuting Attorney of the First Judicial District, the prosecuting attorney shall receive an expense allowance to be borne by the respective counties of the First Judicial District as follows:

  1. Cross County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Cross County, not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) per annum; (2) Lee County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Lee County, not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) per annum; (3) Monroe County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Monroe County, not to exceed one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800) per annum; (4) Phillips County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Phillips County, not to exceed one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800) per annum; (5) St. Francis County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of St. Francis County, not to exceed one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800) per annum; and (6) Woodruff County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Woodruff County, not to exceed one thousand four hundred dollars ($1,400) per annum.

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1983, No. 249, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.12.

16-21-602. Funding of expenses and employees — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
      1. “Employee and assistant expenses” includes without limitation the following expenses and related expenses with respect to employees and assistants of the Prosecuting Attorney of the First Judicial District and deputy prosecuting attorneys:
        1. Salaries and benefits;
        2. Social Security;
        3. Matching;
        4. Retirement;
        5. Health insurance; and
        6. Other employee and assistant expenses determined by the prosecuting attorney to be a proper employee and assistant expense.
      2. “Employee and assistant expenses” does not include salaries and benefits for deputy prosecuting attorneys;
    1. “Investigative expenses” means necessary expenses in connection with an investigation incident to a criminal law violation or trial before a court within the First Judicial District that is within the duties of the prosecuting attorney's office; and
    2. “Office expenses” includes without limitation the cost of:
      1. Facilities, equipment, maintenance and operation, service contracts, capital outlay, telephones, copy machines, computers, and printers;
      2. Office supplies, postage, and copying;
      3. Contract labor;
      4. Travel;
      5. The Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated and Arkansas Model Jury Instructions; and
      6. Other office expenses determined by the prosecuting attorney to be a proper office expense.
  2. Through an annual appropriation at sufficient level for operation, each county within the district shall provide at the county's expense the office expenses, investigative expenses, and employee and assistant expenses of the prosecuting attorney and deputy prosecuting attorneys.

History. Acts 2017, No. 749, § 1.

16-21-603. Phillips County Prosecuting Attorney expenses.

  1. Through an annual appropriation at sufficient level for operation, Phillips County shall provide at the county's expense the office expenses under § 16-21-602(a) in such amount of no less than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) per year as appropriated by the quorum court and approved by the county judge.
    1. The office expenses under § 16-21-602(a) shall be paid in equal monthly installments from the county general fund, and the checks shall be made payable to the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the First Judicial District or as directed by the prosecuting attorney.
    2. Disbursements shall be made by the prosecuting attorney for the necessary expenses of the office based upon adequate documentation.
  2. The prosecuting attorney may also be allowed additional office expenses upon appropriation of the quorum court and approval of the county judge.
    1. In addition to office expenses, the prosecuting attorney shall be entitled to one (1) secretary and administrative assistant, whose salary shall not be less than twenty-eight thousand dollars ($28,000) per year.
    2. The salary, Social Security, matching, retirement, health insurance, and all related salary expenses of the secretary and administrative assistant shall be paid by Phillips County in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Phillips County.
  3. This section does not prohibit the quorum court in Phillips County from appropriating additional positions, salaries, or expenses greater than the amounts mandated in this section.
  4. The prosecuting attorney shall be allowed additional assistants and employees in Phillips County upon appropriation of the quorum court and approval of the county judge.
  5. The expenses required to be paid by this section are specifically declared to be separate and distinct from the responsibility of Phillips County to pay the contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney as provided in § 16-21-601 and § 16-21-119(b)(5)(A), and as otherwise provided by law.

History. Acts 2017, No. 749, § 2.

Subchapter 7 — Second Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 96, § 1, provided:

“In addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions, the prosecuting attorney of the Second Judicial District shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, case coordinators or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, and have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this State and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 96, § 2, provided:

“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the quorum courts or city governing bodies of the Second Judicial District from providing additional personnel or funds, from whatever sources available, to the prosecuting attorney's office for the Anti-Drug Abuse program. Further, nothing in this Act shall be construed as to imply that the employees authorized herein are employees of the State of Arkansas.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1981, No. 961, § 4: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1981. Became law without Governor's signature, April 8, 1981.

Acts 1987, No. 411, §§ 4, 6: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salaries and contingent expense allowances provided for herein are immediately necessary to provide adequate compensation and allowances for the officers provided for herein to assume the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Second Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Approved Mar. 25, 1987.

Acts 1991, No. 196, §§ 4, 7, 9: retroactive to January 1, 1991 and thereafter. Feb. 20, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the salaries and contingent expense allowances provided for herein are immediately necessary to provide adequate compensation and allowances for the officers provided for herein to assure the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Second Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 945, § 10: Apr. 6, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the salaries and contingent expense allowances, provided for herein are immediately necessary to provide adequate compensation and allowances for the officers provided for herein to assure the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Second Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-701. Expense allowance.

    1. The Prosecuting Attorney for the Second Judicial District shall be allowed the expenses of his office, including telephone, telegraph, postage, printing, office supplies and equipment, automobiles, office rent, and other expenses which, within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, may be a proper expense of the office, and also including necessary expenses in connection with any proper investigation instant to any criminal law violation or trials before any grand jury or any court within the judicial district, coming within the duties of his office.
    2. The expenses provided for in subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be borne by the counties comprising the Second Judicial District as follows:
      1. Clay County $2,300.00;
      2. Craighead County $8,500.00;
      3. Crittenden County $8,500.00;
      4. Greene County $2,703.96;
      5. Mississippi County $8,500.00; and
      6. Poinsett County $3,735.96.
    3. The expenses provided for in this subsection shall be paid on a monthly or quarterly basis by each county.
      1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Second Judicial District may appoint one (1) or more deputy prosecuting attorneys for Crittenden County at a combined salary not to exceed one hundred seventy thousand dollars ($170,000) per annum, and in such amounts within the total amounts provided in this subsection as may be designated by the prosecuting attorney, plus a combined contingent expense allowance in the amount established by the quorum court not to exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) per annum.
      2. The salaries provided for in this subsection shall be paid by the county court in twenty-four (24) semimonthly installments from the county general fund, and the expense allowance shall be paid monthly in an amount necessary to provide office rental, postage, printing, office supplies, equipment, stationery, secretarial assistance, automobile operation, and other proper expenses supported by written itemized claims filed by the deputy prosecuting attorney with the county judge and subject to the approval of the county judge.
      1. Expenses actually incurred by the deputy prosecuting attorney or attorneys in Crittenden County in excess of the contingent expense allowance provided for such attorney or attorneys shall be paid upon itemized claims filed by such deputy or deputies.
      2. The expense and allowances provided in subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be in addition to any necessary expense incurred in connection with any proper investigation incident to violations or alleged violations of the criminal laws or any hearing or trial before a grand jury or any court, including expenses of obtaining evidence and securing attendance of witnesses from within or outside of the State of Arkansas and any unusual travel expenses incurred in connection with the duties of his office, which shall be paid by the county from the county general revenue fund upon the filing of a proper claim by the deputy prosecuting attorney or by the person or firm entitled to compensation therefor and having the approval of the deputy prosecuting attorney, the prosecuting attorney, or the court in which such matter is pending.
    1. It is not the purpose of this subsection to repeal any laws now or hereafter enacted fixing the fees collectible as prosecuting attorney's fees, but rather to update and make possible a more efficient administration of justice and county government. All courts shall collect the fees heretofore provided by law as prosecuting attorney's fees and all such fees collected shall be paid into the county treasury as required by law regarding funds belonging to the county. It is the explicit legislative intent to provide the salaries and expense allowances set forth in this subsection without regard to the amount of prosecuting attorney's fees and emoluments earned or collected in the counties affected by the subsection. However, nothing in this subsection shall be so interpreted as to preclude Crittenden County from paying additional expense allowances in addition to those enumerated in this subsection upon proper action of the appropriate quorum courts.

History. Acts 1981, No. 961, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.16; Acts 1987, No. 343, § 1; 1987, No. 411, § 1; 1991, No. 196, §§ 1, 5; 1995, No. 945, §§ 1-3, 5; 1999, No. 1038, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The operation of subdivision (b)(3) may be affected by the enactment of Acts 1995, No. 1256.

Acts 1995, No. 945, § 4, provided:

“The provisions of this act shall be retroactive to January 1, 1995, and thereafter.”

Acts 1995, No. 945, § 6, provided:

“Beginning January 1, 1995 the clerk-secretary-case coordinator of the Ninth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit West shall receive an annual salary of not less than sixteen thousand five hundred dollars ($16,500), nor more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). The salaries and expenses shall be paid by each county comprising the Ninth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit West with the proportion to be paid by each county to be determined by the judge of the Circuit with consideration of the assessed value of all real and personal property in each county, the population of each county, and the case load of the court in each county. The salary provided for in this act shall be paid by each county as herein specified in equal monthly payments on the first day of each month.”

Amendments. The 1995 amendment repealed former (a)(2); redesignated former (b) and (c) as (a)(2) and (3); substituted “subdivision (a)(1)” for “subsection (a)” in present (a)(2); substituted “this subsection” for “this section” in present (a)(3); and added present (b).

The 1999 amendment substituted “one hundred seventy thousand dollars ($170,000)” for “one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000)” in (b)(1)(A); and made stylistic changes.

16-21-702. Disposition of fees — Payment of expenses.

  1. All fees earned and payable to the deputy prosecuting attorneys in Crittenden County under laws now or hereafter in effect, including fees under the Arkansas Hot Check Law, § 5-37-301 et seq., shall be deposited in the county treasury and shall be credited to the county general fund.
  2. Expenses actually incurred by the deputy prosecuting attorney or attorneys in Crittenden County in excess of the contingent expense allowance provided for the attorney or attorneys shall be paid upon itemized claims filed by the deputy or deputies.
  3. The expenses and allowances provided in § 16-21-701(a)(2) shall be in addition to any necessary expense incurred in connection with any proper investigation incident to violations or alleged violations of the criminal laws or any hearing or trial before a grand jury or any court, including expenses of obtaining evidence and securing attendance of witnesses from within or outside of the State of Arkansas and any unusual travel expenses incurred in connection with the duties of his office, which shall be paid by the county from the county general revenue fund upon the filing of a proper claim by the deputy prosecuting attorney, or by the person or firm entitled to compensation therefor and having the approval of the deputy prosecuting attorney, the prosecuting attorney, or the court in which the matter is pending.

History. Acts 1991, No. 196, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-21-702, concerning the disposition of fees — payment of expenses, is deemed to be superseded by this section. The former section was derived from: Acts 1987, No. 411, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 196, § 4 provided that the provisions of the act shall be retroactive to January 1, 1991, and thereafter.

16-21-703. Collection of fees.

  1. It is not the purpose of this section, § 16-21-701(a)(2), and § 16-21-702 to repeal any laws now or hereafter enacted fixing the fees collectible as prosecuting attorneys' fees, but rather to update and make possible a more efficient administration of justice and county government.
  2. All courts shall collect the fees heretofore provided by law as prosecuting attorneys' fees, and all such fees collected shall be paid into the county treasury as required by law regarding funds belonging to the county.
  3. It is the explicit legislative intent to provide the salaries and expense allowances set forth in this section, § 16-21-701(a)(2), and § 16-21-702 without regard to the amount of prosecuting attorneys' fees and emoluments earned or collected in the counties affected by this section, § 16-21-701(a)(2), and § 16-21-702. However, nothing in this section, § 16-21-701(a)(2), and § 16-21-702 shall be so interpreted as to preclude Crittenden County from paying additional expense allowances in addition to those enumerated herein upon proper action of the appropriate quorum courts.

History. Acts 1991, No. 196, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-21-703, concerning the collection of fees, is deemed to be superseded by this section. The former section was derived from: Acts 1987, No. 411, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 196, § 4, provided that the provisions of the act shall be retroactive to January 1, 1991, and thereafter.

Subchapter 8 — Third Judicial District

Effective Dates. Acts 1981, No. 945, § 10: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1981.

Acts 1993, No. 240, § 5: Noted Feb. 26, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law establishing the salary of deputy prosecuting attorney for Randolph County is inadequate; that this act will give Randolph County more flexibility in setting the salary for its deputy prosecuting attorney; and that until this act goes into effect the county will not have the necessary flexibility for establishing an adequate salary for the deputy prosecuting attorney. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1999, No. 1242, §§ 5, 6: effective retroactively to Jan. 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Third Judicial District. It is also determined that the prosecuting attorney of the Third Judicial District is in need of these personnel in order to fight the war on drugs and combat crime in the Third Judicial District. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2005, No. 458, § 3: Mar. 2, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system in the Third Judicial District; that this act will provide needed personnel to the prosecuting attorney of the Third Judicial District; and that this act is immediately necessary because the additional personnel are critical to the effort to combat crime in the Third Judicial District. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-21-801. Contingent expense allowance.

  1. The office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Third Judicial District shall receive not less than a contingent expense reimbursement for the expenses of his or her office, including, but not limited to, telephone, telegraph, postage, printing, office supplies and equipment, office rent, stationery, traveling expense, special service, operation of automobiles, and such other expense which, within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, may be a proper expense of the office, and also including necessary expenses in connection with any proper investigation incident to any criminal law violation or trials before any grand jury or any court within the judicial district coming within the duties of his or her office.
  2. The expenses provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be borne by the counties constituting the Third Judicial District as follows:
    1. Jackson $6,250 per year;
    2. Lawrence $6,250 per year;
    3. Randolph $6,250 per year; and
    4. Sharp $6,250 per year.
    1. The expenses provided for shall be paid in equal quarterly installments from each county general fund, and the checks shall be made payable to the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Third Judicial District.
    2. Disbursements shall be made by the prosecuting attorney for the necessary expenses of the office based upon adequate documentation.
    1. Each deputy prosecuting attorney of the Third Judicial District shall receive a reimbursement for the expenses of his or her office, including, but not limited to, maintenance and operation, capital outlay, office supplies, telephone, postage, copying, insurance, and library.
      1. Disbursements shall be made for the necessary expenses of the office based upon adequate documentation and upon appropriation of the respective county's quorum court and approval of each respective county judge.
      2. The prosecuting attorney or deputies may also be allowed additional expenses upon appropriation of the quorum court and approval of each respective county judge.
  3. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Third Judicial District shall be entitled to the following assistants and employees:
        1. One (1) administrative assistant, whose salary shall not be less than twenty-four thousand five hundred dollars ($24,500) per annum.
        2. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Jackson County.
        1. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Jackson County.
        2. The counties of Lawrence, Randolph, and Sharp each shall reimburse Jackson County for a pro rata share of the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses paid for the position in subdivision (e)(1)(A)(i) of this section;
        1. One (1) part-time secretary, whose salary shall not be less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per annum.
        2. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Lawrence County.
      1. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Lawrence County;
        1. One (1) full-time secretary, whose salary shall not be less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per annum.
        2. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Randolph County.
      1. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Randolph County;
        1. One (1) full-time secretary, whose salary shall not be less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per annum.
        2. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Sharp County.
      1. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Sharp County; and
        1. One (1) full-time Jackson County — Third Judicial District secretary, whose salary shall not be less than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) per annum.
        2. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Jackson County.
        1. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Jackson County.
        2. The counties of Lawrence, Randolph, and Sharp each shall reimburse Jackson County for a one-eighth (1/8) share of the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses paid for this position.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prevent or prohibit each quorum court in the respective counties in the Third Judicial District from appropriating additional positions, salaries, salary matching requirements, or expenses greater than the amounts mandated in this section should they deem it necessary to do so.
  5. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Third Judicial District shall be allowed additional assistance and employees in each county upon appropriation of the quorum court and approval of the county judge in each respective county.

History. Acts 1981, No. 945, §§ 8, 9; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-114.8b, 24-114.8c; Acts 1987, No. 120, §§ 1, 2; 1989, No. 394, § 1; 1993, No. 240, § 1; 1999, No. 1242, § 1; 2005, No. 458, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally amended by Acts 1993, No. 240, § 1, subsection (d) also provided, in part, that the salary and expenses provided therein shall apply retroactively to January 1, 1993.

Acts 2005, No. 458, § 2, provided:

“The provisions of this act shall be retroactive to January 1, 2005.”

Amendments. The 1993 amendment, all in (d), substituted “a minimum of twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500) and a maximum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)” for “eleven thousand dollars ($11,000),” substituted “a minimum of six thousand dollars ($6,000) and a maximum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000)” for “three thousand dollars ($3,000),” and deleted the third sentence.

The 1999 amendment, in (a), inserted “Office of the” preceding “Prosecuting Attorney” and substituted “shall receive not less than a contingent expense reimbursement for the expenses of his office, including, but not limited to” for “shall be allowed the contingent expense of his office, including”; in (b), substituted “$5,000” for “$2,700” twice, “$5,000” for “$2,400” and “$5,000” for “$200”; rewrote (c) and (d); added (e)-(g); and made stylistic changes.

Subchapter 9 — Fourth Judicial District

Effective Dates. Acts 1981, No. 992, § 8: became law without Governor's signature, Apr. 8, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the increase in the volume of crime, together with the establishment and maintenance in Washington and Madison counties of municipal courts, circuit courts, juvenile courts, and additional county civil litigation all of which require the services of the prosecuting attorney's office, that the personnel and funds previously authorized are now insufficient to pay the salaries and contingency expenses required of the prosecuting attorney's office. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-901. Office space, etc. — Contingent expense allowance.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Fourth Judicial District shall be furnished, by Washington County, suitable office space, telephone expenses, postage, printing, office supplies, and equipment.
    1. In addition, the prosecuting attorney shall be allowed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per annum as a contingent expense of his office for traveling expenses, special service, operation of automobiles, and such other expenses which, within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, may be proper expenses of the office, and also including necessary expense in connection with any proper investigation incident to any criminal law violation or trials before any grand jury, or any court within the Fourth Judicial District, coming within the duties of his office.
    2. The contingent expense is to be paid by Washington County in an amount of two thousand three hundred dollars ($2,300) per year and Madison County in an amount of two hundred dollars ($200) per year from the general revenue fund. However, the annual amount shall be paid in equal monthly installments by each county.

History. Acts 1981, No. 992, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.7.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

Subchapter 10 — Fifth Judicial District

Effective Dates. Acts 1983, No. 485, §§ 8, 11: July 1, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there has been an increase in the rate of crime in the State and that in order to curb this rise in the crime rate and to promote the orderly administration of criminal justice in the Fifth Judicial Circuit, it is necessary that this Act become effective July 1, 1983.”

Acts 1993, No. 878, § 12: Noted: Apr. 4, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of criminal justice within the Fifth Judicial District; that the Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifth Judicial Circuit is in need of personnel and expense funding in order to fight the war on crime. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-1001. Operating expenses.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifth Judicial District shall be entitled to an operating expense of not less than seventeen thousand five hundred dollars ($17,500) to cover the cost of printing, supplies, equipment, janitorial services, cleaning supplies, food, service contracts, accounting, postage, photocopies, travel, training, utilities, rent, juror and witness fees, and such other expenses which within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney may be proper expenses of the office in connection with the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity within the district. Said expenses shall be paid in equal monthly installments from the Pope County general fund.
  2. At the end of each quarter, one-third (1/3) of said sum shall be reimbursed to Pope County by Johnson County and Franklin County equally, being one-sixth (1/6) each.
  3. In addition, the telephone bill shall be submitted to the county for payment, this payment to be in addition to the operating expenses set forth in subsection (a) of this section.

History. Acts 1983, No. 485, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.13a; Acts 1993, No. 878, § 3.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment deleted “telephone” following “accounting” and made minor punctuation changes in the first sentence of (a), and added the second sentence; deleted former (b)(1); added “said” preceding “sum” in (b) and added (c).

Subchapter 11 — Sixth Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1997, No. 522, § 1, began:

“Effective January 1, 1997 and thereafter, Arkansas Code Annotated Title 16, Chapter 21, Subchapter 11 is amended to read as follows:”

Publisher's Notes. Former subchapter 11 was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 997, § 8. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-21-1101. Acts 1975, No. 870, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-119n.

16-21-1102. Acts 1975, No. 870, § 2; 1987, No. 542, §§ 1, 2; 1989, No. 656, §§ 1-3; 1991, No. 819, § 1.

16-21-1103. Acts 1989, No. 656, §§ 4, 9; 1991, No. 819, § 2.

16-21-1104. Acts 1989, No. 656, § 6.

16-21-1105. Acts 1989, No. 656, § 7.

16-21-1106. Acts 1989, No. 656, § 8.

16-21-1107. Acts 1989, No. 656, § 5.

16-21-1108. Acts 1991, No. 758, § 1.

Former § 16-21-1104 was also previously repealed by Acts 1991, No. 904, § 9.

Effective Dates. Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1999, No. 1234, § 7: Apr. 8, 1999, retroactive to January 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Sixth Judicial District. It is also determined that the prosecuting attorney of the Sixth Judicial District is in need of these personnel in order to fight the war on drugs and combat crime in the Sixth Judicial District. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Act 2005, No. 2201, § 12: Apr. 13, 2005. Emergency Clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee and the Division of Legislative Audit provide essential auditing and investigative services to the General Assembly and the State of Arkansas; that to avoid confusion, the General Assembly finds it is necessary to combine the Arkansas Code provisions concerning the Division of Legislative Audit and the local audit section of the division in one Arkansas Code chapter; that to avoid certain undue hardships on public entities of the state, it is also necessary for the General Assembly to provide a basis of financial statement presentation for certain public entities; that the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Statement on Auditing Standards Number 99 regarding the detection of fraud requires auditors to document unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in their working papers; and that this act is immediately necessary because the General Assembly finds that the public disclosure of such unsubstantiated allegations do not serve a public purpose and may cause irreparable harm to innocent individuals and public employees. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-21-1101. Applicability.

This subchapter shall apply to the Sixth Judicial District, which is composed of Pulaski County and Perry County.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 1; 1995, No. 803, § 1; 1997, No. 522, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment made no change in this section.

The 1997 amendment made no change in this section.

16-21-1102. Assistants and employees.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District shall be entitled to the following assistants and employees:
    1. To be paid by the county in which they serve:
      1. A minimum of thirty-five (35) deputy prosecuting attorneys, whose salaries shall be as follows:
        1. One (1) chief deputy at not less than seventy thousand three hundred fifty-five dollars ($70,355);
        2. Three (3) senior deputies at not less than forty-five thousand seven hundred one dollars ($45,701);
        3. A minimum of seven (7) division chiefs at not less than forty thousand one hundred dollars ($40,100);
        4. A minimum of eight (8) staff attorneys at not less than thirty-five thousand two hundred dollars ($35,200);
        5. A minimum of fourteen (14) staff attorneys at not less than thirty thousand nine hundred dollars ($30,900); and
        6. Two (2) trial attorneys at not less than forty thousand one hundred dollars ($40,100);
        1. A minimum of eight (8) investigators as follows:
          1. One (1) chief investigator at not less than twenty-two thousand four hundred one dollars ($22,401); and
          2. Seven (7) investigators at not less than twenty thousand seven hundred dollars ($20,700).
        2. In addition to the investigators listed in subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) of this section by salary, the prosecuting attorney shall have the authority to appoint other investigators as necessary for the administration of justice who shall serve without pay.
          1. All investigators authorized and so appointed shall have the authority to issue process, serve warrants, and possess all law enforcement officer powers.
          2. They shall be certified by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training and shall be defined as public safety members under Arkansas law.
          3. In the event that investigators shall issue process or serve warrants, the prosecutor's office shall be entitled to receive the same fee as provided in § 21-6-307, which shall be deposited into the hot check fees account;
      2. A minimum of forty-three (43) support personnel whose salaries shall be as follows:
        1. Two (2) lead case clerks at not less than sixteen thousand seven hundred dollars ($16,700);
        2. Twenty (20) case clerks at not less than fifteen thousand four hundred one dollars ($15,401);
        3. One (1) administrative coordinator at not less than thirty thousand nine hundred dollars ($30,900);
        4. One (1) budget administrator at not less than twenty-seven thousand one hundred dollars ($27,100);
          1. Two (2) executive secretaries who shall serve at the will of the prosecuting attorney.
          2. The executive secretaries shall receive a salary of not less than seventeen thousand nine hundred ninety-nine dollars ($17,999);
        5. One (1) hot check administrator at not less than twenty-two thousand four hundred one dollars ($22,401);
        6. Three (3) hot check accounting clerks III at not less than seventeen thousand nine hundred ninety-nine dollars ($17,999);
        7. One (1) victim assistance program coordinator at not less than twenty-seven thousand one hundred dollars ($27,100);
        8. One (1) volunteer coordinator at not less than twenty-four thousand six hundred dollars ($24,600);
        9. A minimum of seven (7) victim assistance case coordinators at not less than seventeen thousand nine hundred ninety-nine dollars ($17,999);
        10. One (1) systems analyst at not less than thirty-four thousand four hundred dollars ($34,400);
        11. Two (2) youth resource officers at not less than seventeen thousand nine hundred ninety-nine dollars ($17,999); and
        12. One (1) precharging division supervisor at not less than twenty-three thousand six hundred fifty-three dollars ($23,653);
      1. One (1) part-time deputy prosecuting attorney whose duties shall be to represent the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District in all cases involving food stamp fraud and Aid to Families with Dependent Children fraud referred to the prosecuting attorney by the Department of Human Services and any other responsibilities that may be delegated to him by the prosecuting attorney.
      2. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District shall contract with the Department of Human Services to determine the compensation of the deputy prosecuting attorney to be paid by the Department of Human Services.
      3. The part-time deputy prosecuting attorney so appointed shall be permitted to engage in the private practice of law in the area of civil cases only.
      4. At the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, this part-time deputy prosecuting attorney may be delegated other duties and made a full-time deputy prosecuting attorney and paid therefor from the existing appropriation for full-time deputy prosecuting attorneys;
    2. Four (4) deputy prosecuting attorneys, to be paid by the Prosecutor Coordinator and not through quorum court appropriations, to handle criminal and civil commitments, including involuntary admissions and alcohol and narcotic commitments and insanity acquittees and other deputy prosecuting attorney duties as requested;
    3. The prosecuting attorney may hire part-time, temporary, contract, or permanent paralegals, law clerks, or deputy prosecuting attorneys as authorized by the quorum court or provided for by law if deemed necessary for the proper administration of justice and for the efficient operation of the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District;
    4. The prosecuting attorney shall have the power to appoint additional deputy prosecuting attorneys and other employees at such salaries as are authorized in grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, including, but not limited to, the federal Drug Law Enforcement Program Anti-Abuse Act of 1986, as amended, or its successor, or any other grant funds so awarded; and
    5. In addition to the deputy prosecuting attorney positions created by this subchapter or any other Arkansas Code provisions, the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District shall have the authority to contract at such salary or compensation amounts as may be available or appropriated by the quorum court for such legal services as are necessary, to include, but not be limited to, asset forfeiture actions.
    1. The prosecuting attorney shall have the power to appoint the assistants and employees authorized in subsection (a) of this section without confirmation of any court or tribunal.
    2. Deputy prosecuting attorneys and other staff members so designated in this subchapter shall be considered law enforcement officers for all protective, emergency, investigative, and communication purposes, either individually or in coordination with interagency cooperative investigations and operations.
    3. Deputy prosecuting attorneys duly appointed shall have such authority as conferred by the prosecuting attorney to perform any official acts so designated in all counties within the district.
      1. The Pulaski County Quorum Court shall annually appropriate funds sufficient to cover salaries, maintenance and operations expenditures, and capital outlay as required by the prosecuting attorney for the administration of justice.
      2. All of the salaries shall be paid by Pulaski County.
      3. When the Pulaski County Quorum Court raises salaries for Pulaski County employees, it shall also raise salaries an equivalent amount for the above employees.
      4. Those employees covered by this subchapter shall be treated by Pulaski County in the same manner as other Pulaski County employees for all other purposes.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 2; 1995, No. 803, § 2; 1997, No. 522, § 1; 1999, No. 1234, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment rewrote (a); inserted the subdivision (b)(1) and (2) designations; and redesignated former (c) and (d) as (b)(3) and (4), respectively.

The 1997 amendment substituted “thirty-three (33)” for “thirty-two (32)” in (a)(1); rewrote (a)(1)(A); substituted “seven (7)” for “six (6)” in (a)(1)(C); substituted “thirty-four (34)” for “thirty-two (32)” in (a)(3); rewrote (a)(3)(D); substituted “Two (2) hot check account clerks” for “One (1) hot check account clerk” in (a)(3)(G); added (a)(3)(K); inserted “and insanity acquittees and other deputy duties as requested” following “narcotic commitments” in (a)(4)(B); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 1999 amendment rewrote (a).

U.S. Code. The reference in this section to the Drug Law Enforcement Program Anti-Abuse Act of 1986 is probably a reference to a former version of 42 U.S.C. § 3796h, repealed in 1988, which contained provisions relating to grants for drug law enforcement programs.

Case Notes

Investigators.

The powers afforded to special investigators of the Sixth Judicial District who operate without pay under subdivision (a)(2)(C) of this section appear to be significant; such investigators are authorized to use their official powers throughout the district, not merely within the city boundaries where they are employed. Mings v. State, 316 Ark. 650, 873 S.W.2d 559 (1994).

In subdivision (a)(2)(C) of this section, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language “all law enforcement officer powers” includes without question the power to stop an individual suspected of driving while intoxicated and to detain him. Mings v. State, 316 Ark. 650, 873 S.W.2d 559 (1994).

16-21-1103. Representation of Perry County.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District may designate a part-time deputy prosecuting attorney to represent the office of the Prosecuting Attorney in Perry County.
  2. Perry County shall reimburse the deputy prosecuting attorney on a monthly basis for said representation in Perry County.
    1. The prosecuting attorney may also choose to designate various deputy prosecuting attorneys on his staff to represent the office of the Prosecuting Attorney in Perry County.
    2. When this is done, Perry County shall reimburse the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District for said representation in Perry County.
  3. The Perry County Quorum Court shall appropriate not less than ten thousand nine hundred seven dollars ($10,907) annually for said representation, as determined by the Quorum Court of Perry County.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 3; 1995, No. 803, § 3; 1995, No. 1256, § 20; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4; 1997, No. 522, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment by No. 803 substituted “ten thousand nine hundred seven dollars ($10,907)” for “ten thousand dollars ($10,000)” in present (d).

The 1995 amendment by No. 1256, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4, repealed former (b); and added the present subsection designations.

The 1997 amendment made no changes to this section.

16-21-1104. Additional personnel or funds.

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prohibit the Quorum Court of Pulaski County and the Quorum Court of Perry County from providing additional personnel or funds from whatever source available, whether federal, state, county, or municipal, if deemed necessary for the efficient operation of the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 4; 1995, No. 803, § 4; 1997, No. 522, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment made no change in this section.

The 1997 amendment made no change in this section.

16-21-1105. Supplemental funding.

  1. The state may provide for supplemental funding directly to the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District, including, but not limited to, funds collected under the provisions of §§ 5-64-505, 16-21-120, and 21-6-411.
  2. These funds shall be in addition to appropriated funds of the local quorum court, but subject to state audit.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 5; 1995, No. 803, § 5; 1997, No. 522, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment added the subsection designations.

The 1997 amendment made no change in this section.

16-21-1106. Local appropriation for Pulaski County Division.

The Pulaski County Quorum Court shall appropriate not less than one hundred eighty-two thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($182,250) in funds for the maintenance and operations account of the Pulaski County Division of the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 6; 1995, No. 803, § 6; 1997, No. 522, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “two hundred nineteen thousand two hundred dollars ($219,200)” for “one hundred sixty-three thousand eight hundred eighty-nine dollars ($163,889).”

The 1997 amendment substituted “one hundred eighty-two thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($182,250)” for “two hundred nineteen thousand two hundred dollars ($219,200).”

16-21-1107. Appointment of employees.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District shall have the power to appoint the following employees without confirmation of any court or tribunal, if the prosecutor receives a federal grant award therefor, at such salaries as are indicated in this subsection or as are authorized in grants awarded from the Drug Law Enforcement Program of the Office of Intergovernmental Services of the Department of Finance and Administration:
  2. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys to handle cases involving violence against women if the prosecutor receives a federal grant award therefor pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, without confirmation of any court or tribunal, at such salaries as are authorized in the grant.
    1. The positions created in subsection (a) of this section shall be in addition to those created by §§ 16-21-113 and 16-21-1102, and other Arkansas Code provisions.
    2. In the event additional funding becomes available, the prosecuting attorney may employ such additional employees and have expense allowances as are authorized in the grant awards of the program.
  3. All law enforcement investigative positions shall have peace officer jurisdiction throughout the Sixth Judicial District and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the state.
      1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District shall administer the grant.
      2. Expenditures may be made only for purposes of the grant.
      3. All moneys from the grant are:
        1. Appropriated on a continuing basis;
        2. Subject to the prosecuting attorney's financial management system; and
        3. Subject to audit by Arkansas Legislative Audit.
    1. It is the explicit legislative intent that nothing in this section or §§ 16-21-1108 and 16-21-1109 shall be construed to decrease, supplant, or be substituted for employee positions, salaries, expenses, maintenance and operation expenses, or capital equipment expenditures which the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District will receive through quorum court appropriation from and after January 1, 1999.

Drug unit division chief $43,372 Civil litigation attorney $36,608 Trial attorney $38,071 Financial investigator $32,972 Civil litigation investigator $25,056 Administrative assistant $26,275 Secretary $20,248

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 7; 1995, No. 803, § 7; 1997, No. 522, § 1; 1999, No. 1234, § 2; 2005, No. 2201, § 9.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment rewrote the salaries in (a); inserted the subdivision designations in (b); rewrote (c); inserted the subdivision designations in (d)(1); and substituted “February 1, 1995” for “February 1, 1993” in (d)(2).

The 1997 amendment, in (a), inserted “federal” preceding “grant award,” and rewrote grant award amounts; inserted subsection (b) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; and substituted “January 1, 1997” for “February 1, 1995” in (e)(2).

The 1999 amendment rewrote (a); added “January 1, 1999” at the end of (e)(2); and made stylistic changes.

U.S. Code. The Violence Against Women Act, referred to in this section, is codified as a note under 42 U.S.C. § 13701.

16-21-1108. Federal funds.

The office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District is authorized to receive funds from the federal government in the name of the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District and to receive both federal and state asset forfeiture funds and to utilize and expend those funds for such purposes as are allowed for by law or specified in § 5-64-505.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 7; 1995, No. 803, § 8; 1997, No. 522, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment made no change in this section.

The 1997 amendment inserted “office of” preceding “prosecuting attorney.”

16-21-1109. Hot check funds.

The office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixth Judicial District is hereby authorized to establish a hot check program pursuant to state statute to collect fees for the hot check fund as authorized by the General Assembly and to expend those funds in official uses for the benefit of the office.

History. Acts 1993, No. 997, § 7; 1995, No. 803, § 9; 1997, No. 522, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment made no change in this section.

The 1997 amendment made no change in this section.

Subchapter 12 — Seventh Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 97, § 1, provided:

“In addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions, the prosecuting attorney of the Seventh Judicial District shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, case coordinators or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, and have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this State and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 97, § 2, provided:

“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the quorum courts or city governing bodies of the Seventh Judicial District from providing additional personnel or funds, from whatever sources available, to the prosecuting attorney's office for the Anti-Drug Abuse program.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1975, No. 188, §§ 4, 6: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Seventh Judicial District in the State of Arkansas that the compensation of deputy prosecuting attorneys in said district be specifically prescribed by law, and that the contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney in said district be prescribed and allocated to the various counties in the district; that this Act is immediately necessary to accomplish this purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 496, §§ 2, 3: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Seventh Judicial District in the State of Arkansas that the contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney in said district be increased and that the increase be given effect at the earliest possible date. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 458, § 5: Mar. 21, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Second General Assembly that the salaries of the support personnel and the expense allowance for the prosecutor of the Seventh Judicial Circuit are inadequate and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide for the efficient administration of justice in said circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 1180, § 5: Apr. 8, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Seventh Judicial District. It is also determined that the prosecuting attorney of the Seventh Judicial District is in need of these personnel in order to fight the war on drugs and combat crime in the Seventh Judicial District. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-21-1201. Contingent expense allowance.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Seventh Judicial District shall be entitled to a contingent expense allowance of not less than eleven thousand sixty-three dollars ($11,063) per annum to be paid by the respective counties of the Seventh Judicial District as follows:
    1. Saline County $7,463;
    2. Hot Spring County $2,400; and
    3. Grant County $1,200.
  2. Saline County may at any time increase its contribution to such contingent expense allowance.

History. Acts 1975, No. 188, § 3; 1977, No. 496, § 1; 1979, No. 458, § 1; 1981, No. 986, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.9.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-21-1202. Operating expenses — Staff.

  1. The office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Seventh Judicial District shall receive not less than a contingent expense reimbursement for the expenses of the office including, but not limited to, maintenance and operation, capital outlay, office supplies, telephone, postage, copying, insurance, and library in the following amounts to be borne by the respective counties of the of the Seventh Judicial District:
    1. Saline County $47,359;
    2. Grant County $14,800; and
    3. Hot Spring County $5,000.
  2. The counties shall pay the authorized annual amounts in equal quarterly installments from the county general fund of the respective counties and the checks shall be made payable to the office of the prosecuting attorney. Disbursements shall be made by the prosecuting attorney for the necessary expenses of the office based upon adequate documentation.
  3. The prosecuting attorney or deputies may also be allowed additional expenses upon appropriation of the quorum court and approval of the county judge.
  4. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Seventh Judicial District shall be entitled to the following assistants and employees:
    1. One (1) chief deputy prosecuting attorney for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than forty-six thousand two hundred dollars ($46,200) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Saline County;
    2. Two (2) deputy prosecuting attorneys for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than forty thousand seven hundred ninety-six dollars ($40,796) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Saline County;
    3. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Saline County;
    4. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses may be paid by Saline County. This deputy prosecuting attorney shall be allowed to engage in private practice;
    5. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for child support cases for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than eighteen thousand five hundred sixty-eight dollars ($18,568) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses may be paid by Saline County. This deputy prosecuting attorney shall be allowed to engage in private practice;
    6. One (1) victim/witness director for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than twenty-four thousand five hundred forty-eight dollars ($24,548) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Saline County;
    7. One (1) victim/witness coordinator for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than twenty thousand three hundred eleven dollars ($20,311) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Saline County;
    8. One (1) office manager for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than eighteen thousand three hundred seventy dollars ($18,370) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Saline County;
    9. One (1) hot check coordinator for Saline County, whose salary shall not be less than eighteen thousand nine hundred sixty-one dollars ($18,961) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Saline County;
    10. Two (2) secretaries for Saline County, whose salaries shall not be less than fourteen thousand seven hundred dollars ($14,700) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Saline County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Saline County;
    11. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for Hot Spring County, whose salary shall not be less than fourteen thousand seven hundred ninety dollars ($14,790) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Hot Spring County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses may be paid by Hot Spring County. This deputy prosecuting attorney shall be allowed to engage in private practice;
    12. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for child support cases for Hot Spring County, whose salary shall not be less than sixteen thousand six hundred twenty-seven dollars ($16,627) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Hot Spring County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses may be paid by Hot Spring County. This deputy prosecuting attorney shall be allowed to engage in private practice;
    13. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for Hot Spring County, whose salary shall not be less than eighteen thousand three hundred ninety-six ($18,396) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Hot Spring County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses may be paid by Hot Spring County;
    14. One (1) legal secretary/hot check coordinator/victim-witness director for Hot Spring County, whose salary shall not be less than nineteen thousand two hundred fifty eight dollars ($19,258) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Hot Spring County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Hot Spring County;
    15. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for Grant County, whose salary shall not be less than nineteen thousand seven hundred two dollars ($19,702) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Grant County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses may be paid by Grant County. This deputy prosecuting attorney shall be allowed to engage in private practice;
    16. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for Grant County, whose salary shall not be less than sixteen thousand five hundred dollars ($16,500) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Grant County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses may be paid by Grant County. This deputy prosecuting attorney shall be allowed to engage in private practice;
    17. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for child support cases for Grant County, whose salary shall not be less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Grant County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses may be paid by Grant County. This deputy prosecuting attorney shall be allowed to engage in private practice;
    18. One (1) legal secretary for Grant County, whose salary shall not be less than seventeen thousand six hundred forty dollars ($17,640) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Grant County. In addition to the salary, social security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Grant County; and
    19. The prosecuting attorney of the Seventh Judicial District shall be allowed additional assistance and employees in each county upon appropriation of the quorum court and approval of the county judge in each respective county.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1180, § 1.

16-21-1203. Searcy County — Deputy prosecuting attorney.

Pursuant to the direction of the Prosecution Coordination Commission, a part-time deputy prosecuting attorney from any additional personnel provided to the commission by the Eighty-Fourth General Assembly, at such rates and terms as may be determined by the commission and the elected prosecuting attorney, shall be situated in the Searcy County Courthouse within the Twentieth Judicial District.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1755, § 1.

16-21-1204. Funding.

  1. Searcy County shall continue to bear the responsibility and expense of providing at the county's expense through an annual appropriation the following at sufficient levels for operation, but not less than the amounts appropriated by ordinance in effect February 1, 2003, the cost of facilities, equipment, supplies, salaries, benefits of existing support staff, and other office expenses and an office for the elected prosecuting attorney and deputy prosecuting attorney, and any other line-item appropriation as approved in the 2003 county budget except for deputy prosecuting attorney salary and benefits.
  2. The county shall provide compensation of additional expenses within the office of the prosecuting attorney and deputy prosecuting attorney when approved by the quorum court.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1755, § 2.

Subchapter 13 — Eighth Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 585, § 1, provided:

“In addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions, the prosecuting attorneys of the Eighth, Ninth-West, Tenth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth and Twentieth Judicial Districts shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Said investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, and have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this State and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1988 (4th Ex. Sess.), No. 10, §§ 1, 2, and No. 20, §§ 1, 2, provide that, in addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other statutory provisions, the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighth Judicial District shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; that the investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this state, and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district; and that nothing in these acts shall be construed to prohibit the quorum courts or city governing bodies of the various judicial districts from providing additional personnel or funds, from whatever sources available, to the prosecuting attorneys' offices for the Anti-Drug Abuse program.

Effective Dates. Acts 1963, No. 64, §§ 3, 4: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It has been ascertained and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney of the Eighth Judicial Circuit is inadequate to reimburse said prosecuting attorney for expenses incurred in the performance of his duties, and that the efficient operation of the courts and the administration of justice in the Eighth Judicial Circuit has been jeopardized thereby. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 767, §§ 3, 5: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the contingent expense allowances of the prosecuting attorneys of the Eighth and Ninth Judicial Districts are insufficient to reimburse the prosecutors for expenses incurred in connection with their offices and that this Act is immediately necessary to increase such expense allowances. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 954, § 3: became law without Governor's signature, Apr. 8, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney of the Eighth Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit is inadequate to enable said prosecuting attorney to effectively and efficiently carry out his responsibilities; that this Act is designed to correct this situation and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-1301. Contingent expense allowances.

    1. In lieu of any other contingent expense allowance now provided by law for the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighth Judicial District-North and the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighth Judicial District-South, the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighth Judicial District-North and the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighth Judicial District-South shall receive contingent expense reimbursement funds as provided in this section.
    2. The contingent expense reimbursement funds authorized by this section shall be used solely for the purpose of reimbursing the costs of operating the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighth Judicial District-North and the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighth Judicial District-South.
    3. Reimbursements shall be based on itemized documentation, which shall be retained for audit purposes.
      1. The respective counties within the Eighth Judicial District-North shall contribute annually to the contingent expense fund such amount as shall be approved by the quorum courts of the respective counties within the prescribed minimum and maximum amounts set forth below:
      2. The respective counties within the Eighth Judicial District-South shall contribute annually to the contingent expense fund such amount as shall be approved by the quorum courts of the respective counties within the prescribed minimum and maximum amounts set forth below:
    1. The counties in the Eighth Judicial District-North and the Eighth Judicial District-South shall pay the approved allowance in equal monthly installments.

Nevada County Minimum $1,500 Maximum 7,500 Hempstead County Minimum 2,000 Maximum 7,500

Click to view table.

Lafayette County Minimum $2,000 Maximum 7,500 Miller County Minimum 2,700 Maximum 7,500

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1963, No. 64, § 1; 1979, No. 767, § 1; 1981, No. 954, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.2; Acts 1997, No. 1167, § 1; 1999, No. 1274, § 1.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment rewrote (a).

The 1999 amendment inserted “-North and the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighth Judicial District-South” following “Eighth Judicial District” throughout (a); in (b)(1)(A), inserted “-North” following “District”, substituted “7,500” for “3,500” and “7,500” for “5,000”; rewrote (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

Subchapter 14 — Ninth Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 585, § 1, provided:

“In addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions, the prosecuting attorneys of the Eighth, Ninth-West, Tenth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth and Twentieth Judicial Districts shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Said investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, and have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this State and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district.”

16-21-1401. Election.

  1. The qualified electors of Clark County and Pike County shall elect a prosecuting attorney to serve only the Ninth Judicial District-East.
  2. The qualified electors of Howard County, Little River County, and Sevier County shall elect a prosecuting attorney to serve only the Ninth Judicial District-West.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1979, No. 834, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-21-1402. Expense allowances.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Ninth Judicial District-East shall receive a contingent expense allowance of two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400) per annum to be paid one thousand six hundred dollars ($1,600) by Clark County and eight hundred dollars ($800) by Pike County.
  2. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Ninth Judicial District-West shall receive an expense allowance from each county in the district of no less than one hundred fifty dollars ($150) per month per county and no greater than seven hundred dollars ($700) per month per county payable in equal monthly installments.

History. Acts 1979, No. 834, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.15; Acts 1987, No. 656, § 1.

Subchapter 15 — Tenth Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 585, § 1, provided:

“In addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions, the prosecuting attorneys of the Eighth, Ninth-West, Tenth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth and Twentieth Judicial Districts shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Said investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, and have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this State and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1988 (4th Ex. Sess.), No. 10, §§ 1, 2, and No. 20, §§ 1, 2, provide that, in addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other statutory provisions, the Prosecuting Attorney of the Tenth Judicial District shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; that the investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this state, and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district; and that nothing in these acts shall be construed to prohibit the quorum courts or city governing bodies of the various judicial districts from providing additional personnel or funds, from whatever sources available, to the prosecuting attorneys' offices for the Anti-Drug Abuse program.

Effective Dates. Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-1501. Applicability.

This subchapter shall apply to the Tenth Judicial District, which is composed of Ashley County, Bradley County, Chicot County, Desha County, and Drew County.

History. Acts 1985, No. 1097, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.19.

16-21-1502. Contingent expense allowances.

In lieu of any other contingent expense allowance provided by law for the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Tenth Judicial District, the prosecuting attorney shall be authorized an expense allowance of not less than twenty-seven thousand dollars ($27,000) per year nor more than forty-seven thousand dollars ($47,000) per year, as shall be determined by the quorum courts, to be borne by the respective counties of the Tenth Judicial District as follows:

COUNTY MAXIMUM MINIMUM PERCENTAGE Ashley $13,630 $7,830 29% Bradley 4,700 2,700 10% Chicot 10,810 6,210 23% Desha 10,810 6,210 23% Drew 7,050 4,050 15%

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1985, No. 1097, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.17.

16-21-1503. Assessment and collection of prosecuting attorney's fees.

  1. At the end of each calendar month and within ten (10) days thereafter, the officers collecting the fees shall pay them into the treasury of the county, except as otherwise provided in Acts 1985, No. 1097, §§ 2 and 3, and shall receive from the treasurer his receipt in duplicate, a copy of which shall be filed with the county clerk, and the other copy kept by the office or person making the settlement with the treasury.
  2. It is further recognized that for the most important and complicated work performed by the prosecuting attorney of the counties affected by this subchapter, fees are not provided by law. Therefore, it specifically is the legislative intent to provide the salaries and office expenses set forth in this subchapter without regard to the amount of prosecuting attorney's fees and emoluments earned or collected in the judicial district affected by this subchapter.

History. Acts 1985, No. 1097, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.18; Acts 1993, No. 395, § 1; 1995, No. 1256, § 20; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 1097, §§ 2 and 3, referred to in this section, were special legislation applying to deputy prosecuting attorneys of the Tenth Judicial District.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment, in (a), deleted “except traffic offenses regarded as violations as defined and punished under the Arkansas Criminal Code” following “collect in all cases,” and substituted “§§ 21-6-410 and 15-42-121” for “§§ 12-1707 and 47-519.”

The 1995 amendment by No. 1256, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4, repealed former (a), redesignating former (b) and (c) as present (a) and (b).

Subchapter 16 — Eleventh Judicial District

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981, No. 609, § 4, provided that the division of the Eleventh District into East and West districts was effective January 1, 1983.

Effective Dates. Acts 1979, No. 459, §§ 4, 7: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the expense allowance presently provided for the prosecuting attorney of the Eleventh Judicial District and the compensation and allowances for deputy prosecuting attorneys in said district are inadequate to compensate the prosecuting attorney and his deputies for their services; that this Act is designed to provide adequate compensation and allowances for said officers and to thereby promote the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Eleventh Judicial District, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 3, § 3: became law without Governor's signature, Jan. 25, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the prosecuting attorney of the Eleventh East Judicial Circuit must be provided adequate secretarial hire, part-time deputy hire, and reimbursement for other reasonable and necessary expenses for the operation of said office; that the providing of adequate allowances for the efficient operation of the prosecuting attorney's office of the Eleventh East Judicial Circuit is essential to the administration of justice in said judicial circuit; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to provide said allowances in order to promote the administration of justice in said judicial circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 922, § 18: July 1, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fourth General Assembly that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of the Act on July 1, 1983 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1983 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs; and that the immediate effectiveness of Section 3 of this Act is essential to maintaining the fiscal integrity of the Judges Retirement Fund which would otherwise work irreparable harm upon the provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect as follows: Section 3 of this Act shall be effective immediately upon passage and approval of this Act; and all other sections and provisions of this Act shall be effective from and after July 1, 1983.”

Acts 1989, No. 7, § 9: Feb. 1, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the duties incumbent upon the Case Coordinators of the Circuit and Chancery Courts of the Eleventh Judicial District-West of Arkansas have materially increased because of increases in population, caseload and the trial dockets of said Circuit and Chancery District, and that there has been a substantial increase in the costs of living, necessitating an increase in salaries in order to properly cope with the prevailing conditions and prevent hardship. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-1601. Election.

  1. The qualified electors of the Eleventh Judicial District-East shall elect one (1) prosecuting attorney.
  2. The qualified electors of the Eleventh Judicial District-West shall elect one (1) prosecuting attorney.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1981, No. 609, § 1; 1983, No. 922, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981, No. 609, § 3, provided that, unless otherwise provided by law, the prosecuting attorney of the Eleventh District-West should continue to receive the salary and allowances provided by law for the office of prosecuting attorney for the Eleventh District, and for the purpose of determining the compensation and allowances of the prosecuting attorney of the Eleventh District-East, the Eleventh District-East should be classified a Division B Judicial District.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-21-1602. Contingent expense allowance.

  1. In lieu of any other contingent expense allowance provided by law for the prosecuting attorney of the Eleventh Judicial District, the prosecuting attorney shall be authorized a contingent expense allowance of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) per year, to be borne by the respective counties of the Eleventh Judicial District, as follows:
  2. The counties in the Eleventh Judicial District shall pay the above-prescribed annual amounts in equal monthly installments.

Jefferson County $17,000

Arkansas County 2,000

Lincoln County 1,000

History. Acts 1979, No. 459, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.10.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1979, No. 459, § 3, provided that the salaries and expenses prescribed in the act should be subject to the approval of the quorum courts of the respective counties.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-21-1603. Reimbursement of expenses to Prosecuting Attorney of Eleventh Judicial District-East.

  1. The Quorum Court of Arkansas County shall furnish the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial District-East reasonable reimbursement for secretarial hire, part-time deputy hire, social security and unemployment matching expenses, and for office supplies, in-state travel, telephone and other utilities, and office equipment rental and upkeep, as may be necessary for the operation of the office, in an amount not less than twenty-five thousand nine hundred sixty-one dollars ($25,961) per annum, or such additional amount as may be provided by the quorum court of the county.
  2. The prosecuting attorney shall file claims monthly for reimbursement of authorized items of expense incurred during the previous month, but in no event shall the amount of the reimbursement during any month be greater than one-twelfth (1/12) of the amount authorized in this section or such additional annual amount as may be approved by the quorum court.

History. Acts 1983, No. 3, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.10a.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

Subchapter 17 — Twelfth Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1993, No. 312, § 3, provided, in part, that:

“(d) The Prosecuting Attorney shall have the power to appoint Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys and other employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.

“(e) The Prosecuting Attorney acting through the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Drug Task Force shall have the authority to expend funds from the Department of Finance and Administration Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Those funds that are designated “overtime funds” are authorized under the grant to be paid to law enforcement officers who are certified with various police agencies in the State of Arkansas. Law enforcement personnel who are employed by police agencies or sheriffs' offices, including the State Police, may receive these funds without being considered employees of the Prosecuting Attorney's Office. In addition, overtime funds paid these officers under this Drug Task Force Grant procedure are not to be construed as violating any legislative salary cap accorded these officers in the normal course of employment with their various agencies. These funds are intended to supplement funds provided to these departments as salaries to enhance the drug-fighting capabilities of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Task Force and to a larger extent, the State of Arkansas, and will be paid with the knowledge of the cooperating agencies involved.

“(f) The Prosecuting Attorney's Office of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit is authorized to receive funds from the federal government in the name of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Task Force both from federal grants and from asset forfeiture funds, and utilize those for official purposes as described in the above paragraph (e).”

Effective Dates. Acts 1985, No. 500, § 8: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 25, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this Act is essential to the operation of criminal justice within the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 237, § 9: Feb. 26, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of criminal justice within the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit. It is also hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Prosecuting Attorney of the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit is in need of additional personnel in order to fight the war on drugs; that this act authorizes such additional personnel and expenditures, and that said personnel are cooperating with law enforcement agencies in manners such as to incur threats to their personal safety and the safety of persons they are working with, and that protective measures need to be taken in order to encourage the Prosecutor's Office to undertake such actions which result in greater cooperation between law enforcement agencies within the District and more effective and efficient law enforcement in all areas and particularly the war on drugs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 312, § 8: Noted: Mar. 2, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of criminal justice within the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit. It is also hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Prosecuting Attorney of the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit is in need of additional personnel in order to fight the war on drugs, and that this act authorizes such additional personnel and expenditures, and that said personnel are cooperating with law enforcement agencies in manners such as to incur threats to their personal safety and the safety of persons they are working with, and that protective measures need to be taken in order to encourage the Prosecutor's Office to undertake such actions which result in greater cooperation between law enforcement agencies within the District and more effective and efficient law enforcement in all areas and particularly the war on drugs. The Legislature recognizes that tax funds normally available for law enforcement agencies to increase manpower are unavailable and that the Federal Grant Program and Asset Forfeiture Programs are an excellent means of providing additional law enforcement help to combat drugs without depleting the treasuries of the state. The Legislature specifically intends that these funds are to be utilized to enhance manpower available by allowing the Prosecutor's Office to pay overtime to these officers as an incentive to increase anti-drug effectiveness of these agencies. The question of whether or not this may exceed normal salary caps is specifically addressed in the statute to provide that the salary caps shall not apply in the case of overtime funds expended under the provisions of this act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 1148, § 8: Apr. 6, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of criminal justice within the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit. It is also hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Prosecuting Attorney of the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit is in need of additional personnel in order to fight the war on drugs and combat violent crime, that this act authorizes such additional personnel and expenditures, and that said personnel are cooperating with law enforcement agencies in manners such as to incur threats to their personal safety and the safety of persons they are working with, and that protective measures need to be taken in order to encourage the Prosecutor's Office to undertake such actions which result in greater cooperation between law enforcement agencies within the District and more effective and efficient law enforcement in all areas and particularly the war on drugs and violent and juvenile crime. The Legislature recognizes that tax funds normally available for law enforcement agencies to increase manpower are unavailable and that the Federal Grant Program and Asset Forfeiture Programs are an excellent means of providing additional law enforcement help to combat drugs and violent crimes without depleting the treasuries of the state. The Legislature specifically intends that these funds are to be utilized to enhance manpower available by allowing the prosecutor's Office to pay overtime to these officers as an incentive to increase anti-drug and anti-crime effectiveness of these agencies. The question of whether or not this may exceed normal salary caps is specifically addressed in the code to provide that salary caps shall not apply in the case of overtime funds expended under the provisions of this act. Also, in the event that the Twelfth Circuit is subject to a division, an orderly transition must be set in place to ensure that the public is protected and to further guarantee that the division will not interfere with the effective and efficient operation of the Prosecuting Attorney's Office of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-1701. Contingent expense allowance.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Twelfth Judicial District shall receive a contingent expense allowance to provide for office expenses, including telephone, telegraph, postage, printing, office supplies and equipment, office rent, stationery, traveling expenses, special services, operation of automobiles, and such other expenses which, within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, may be a proper expense of the office, and also including necessary expense in connection with any proper investigation incidental to any criminal law violation or trials before any grand jury or any court within the Twelfth Judicial District, coming within the duties of his office.
    1. The contingent expense allowance is to be borne by the respective counties of the Twelfth Judicial District as follows:
      1. Crawford County $10,995.00; and
      2. Sebastian County $99,375.34.
    2. Provided, the counties in the Twelfth Judicial District shall pay the above-prescribed annual amounts upon vouchers signed by the prosecuting attorney and allowed as claims against the county general revenue funds of the respective counties.
  2. The quorum courts may increase these amounts in their discretion, if necessary.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1148, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former § 16-21-1701, concerning contingent expense allowance, is deemed to be superseded by this section. The former section was derived from Acts 1985, No. 500, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.4.

As enacted, subsection (a) began “Effective January 1, 1991, and thereafter.”

As originally amended by Acts 1993, No. 312, § 2, subsection (a) of this section began:

“Effective January 1, 1993, and thereafter.”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1148, § 2, subsection (a) began:

“Effective January 1, 1995, and thereafter.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 237, § 5, provided:

“It is not the purpose of this act to repeal any laws now or hereafter enacted fixing the fees of prosecuting attorneys. In the Fort Smith and Greenwood Districts of Sebastian and in Crawford County, the Justices of the Peace, Municipal Courts, Circuit Courts and other courts shall assess in all cases the prosecuting attorney's fees provided by law. At the end of each calendar month and within five (5) days thereafter, the officers collecting such fees shall pay the same into the treasury of the county, except as herein otherwise provided, and shall recieve from the treasurer his receipt in duplicate, one (1) copy of which shall be filed with the county clerk and the other copy kept by the officer or person making such settlement with the treasury. Any officer or person having in his hands any such fees who fails to settle with the county treasurer within the time and in the manner herein provided shall be suject to indictment, prosecution and punishment for embezzlement. It is further recognized that for the most important and complicated work performed by the prosecuting attorney of the counties affected by this act, fees are not provided by law. Therefore, it specifically is the legislative intent to provide the salaries herein set forth without regard to the amount of prosecuting attorney fees and emoluments earned or collected in the judicial circuit affected by this act.”

Amendments. The 1993 amendment redesignated former (c) as present (b)(2) and redesignated former (d) as present (c); in (b)(1), substituted “$19,498” for “$14,632” and “$53,409” for “$52,284”; and, in present (b)(2), added “Provided” at the beginning and substituted “above-prescribed annual amounts” for “annual amounts prescribed in this section.”

The 1995 amendment, in (b)(1), substituted “$10,995.00” for “$19,498” and substituted “$99,375.34” for “$53,409.”

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-21-1702. Appointment of deputies and employees.

The Prosecuting Attorney in the Twelfth Judicial District shall be entitled to the following assistants and deputies:

  1. Crawford County. Two (2) or more deputies and two (2) or more secretaries whose total salaries shall be one hundred three thousand eight hundred thirty-four dollars ($103,834) per annum; provided, that the quorum court may appropriate additional money for yearly salary increases or additional personnel in its discretion; and
  2. Sebastian County. Nine (9) or more deputies and eleven (11) or more secretaries, whose total salaries shall be five hundred seventy-two thousand six hundred fifty-four dollars ($572,654) per annum; provided, that the quorum court may appropriate additional money for yearly salary increases or additional personnel in its discretion.

History. Acts 1993, No. 312, § 1; 1995, No. 1148, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 312, § 1, this section began:

“Effective January 1, 1993, and thereafter.”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1448, § 1, subsection (a) of this section began:

“Effective January 1, 1995, and thereafter.”

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “one hundred three thousand eight hundred thirty-four dollars ($103,834)” for “ninety-two thousand three hundred seventy-nine dollars ($92,379)” in (1); and, in (2), substituted “Nine (9) or more deputies and eleven (11) or more secretaries” for “Eight (8) or more deputies and eight (8) or more secretaries” and substituted “five hundred seventy-two thousand six hundred fifty-four dollars ($572,654)” for “five hundred ninety-five thousand seven hundred ninety-nine dollars and forty-nine cents ($595,799.49); and made stylistic changes.

16-21-1703. Prosecutor and deputies — Power and authority.

  1. A deputy prosecuting attorney who is duly appointed in any county of the Twelfth Judicial District shall have the authority to perform all official acts as deputy prosecuting attorney in all counties within the Twelfth Judicial District.
  2. Deputy prosecuting attorneys in the Twelfth Judicial District shall not engage in the private practice of law.
    1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Twelfth Judicial District and those deputy prosecuting attorneys and other staff members he designates shall be considered law enforcement officers for the purposes of utilizing emergency, protective, and communications equipment.
    2. Provided, that the prosecuting attorney and all members of his office shall have no greater arrest powers than that accorded all citizens under the Arkansas Constitution and this Code.
  3. The prosecuting attorney shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys and other employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration Drug Law Enforcement Program, and the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 or other federal programs and may expend funds from any federal program that are tendered to the office for official purposes.
  4. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Twelfth Judicial District, acting through the Twelfth Judicial District Drug Task Force, shall have the authority to expend funds from the Department of Finance and Administration Drug Law Enforcement Program, and the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 or other federal law enforcement program, which tenders funds to the office to be used for official purposes. Those funds that are designated “overtime funds” are authorized under the grant to be paid to law enforcement officers who are certified with various police agencies in the State of Arkansas. Law enforcement personnel who are employed by police agencies or sheriffs' offices, including the Department of Arkansas State Police, may receive these funds without being considered employees of the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Twelfth Judicial District. In addition, overtime funds paid these officers under this drug task force grant procedure are not to be construed as violating any legislative salary cap accorded these officers in the normal course of employment with their various agencies. These funds are intended to supplement funds provided to these departments as salaries to enhance the drug-fighting and violent crime-fighting capabilities of the Twelfth Judicial District Task Force and, to a larger extent, the State of Arkansas.
  5. The office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Twelfth Judicial District is authorized to receive funds from the federal government in the name of the Twelfth Judicial District Task Force both from federal grants and from asset forfeiture funds and utilize those for official purposes as described in subsection (e) of this section.
  6. The prosecuting attorney's office is hereby authorized pursuant to this Code to collect fees for the hot check fund as authorized by the state legislature and to expend those funds in official uses for the benefit of the office.

History. Acts 1993, No. 312, § 3; 1995, No. 1148, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 312, § 3, this section provided, in part, that:

“(d) The Prosecuting Attorney shall have the power to appoint Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys and other employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.

“(e) The Prosecuting Attorney acting through the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit Drug Task Force shall have the authority to expend funds from the Department of Finance and Administration Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Those funds that are designated ‘overtime funds’ are authorized under the grant to be paid to law enforcement officers who are certified with various police agencies in the State of Arkansas. Law enforcement personnel who are employed by police agencies or sheriffs' offices, including the State Police, may receive these funds without being considered employees of the Prosecuting Attorney's Office. In addition, overtime funds paid these officers under this Drug Task Force Grant procedure are not to be construed as violating any legislative salary cap accorded these officers in the normal course of employment with their various agencies. These funds are intended to supplement funds provided to these departments as salaries to enhance the drug-fighting capabilities of the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit Task Force and to a larger extent, the State of Arkansas, and will be paid with the knowledge of the cooperating agencies involved.

“(f) The Prosecuting Attorney's Office of the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit is authorized to receive funds from the federal government in the name of the Twelfth (12th) Judicial Circuit Task Force both from federal grants and from asset forfeiture funds, and utilize those for official purposes as described in the above paragraph (e).”

As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1148, § 3, this section contained an additional subsection which provided:

“Account funds in the Restitution and Hot Check Accounts which are designated unclaimed by audit for a period of two years or more shall be placed in the Fee Account to be expended for official purposes only.”

Amendments. The 1995 amendment deleted “shall be residents of the Twelfth Judicial District and” following “District” in (b); deleted “in coordination with interagency cooperative investigations and operations” from the end in (c)(1); substituted “this Code” for “Arkansas statutes” in (c)(2); inserted (d)-(f), redesignating former (d) as (g); and substituted “this Code” for “state statutes” in (g).

U.S. Code. The reference in this section to the Drug Law Enforcement Program Anti-Abuse Act of 1986 is probably a reference to a former version of 42 U.S.C. § 3796h, repealed in 1988, which contained provisions relating to grants for drug law enforcement programs.

Cross References. Fees from persons issuing bad checks, § 16-21-120.

16-21-1704. Appropriations by quorum courts.

The quorum courts of the respective counties within the judicial district shall annually appropriate out of the general revenue funds sufficient to cover the salaries and contingent expense fund provided for in this subchapter, provided that the quorum courts shall not be required to pay any additional amounts except by their consent.

History. Acts 1993, No. 312, § 4; 1995, No. 1148, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended by Acts 1995, No. 1148, § 4, this section ended:

“Provided however, that in the event that the district is separated into two districts or one county is removed from the district by state action, the shared time personnel currently funded by Sebastian County will be funded full time by Sebastian County. Provided further, that in the event that a Deputy within the district is selected to be interim Prosecutor said Deputy may take a leave of absence to fulfill this duty. Upon completion of said duty, the Deputy shall be entitled to return to either District's Prosecutor's Office with the consent of the Prosecuting Attorney at the level of funding that said Deputy would have been paid at had he not accepted the appointment duty. The Prosecutor of the Twelfth Circuit, at the request of the interim Prosecutor of the new District, may designate a Deputy to serve as the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the new District. In the event that this procedure is followed, that Deputy shall be able to return to Sebastian County at the same pay as he is receiving at the time he is transferred back to Sebastian County from Crawford County at the end of the interim Prosecutor's term or any time before hand. For purposes of this Act, the new District shall be considered the one which is formed with Crawford County as a member county. Upon division, the prosecutor shall transfer all district equipment to Crawford County that is currently placed within the Crawford County Office at the time of the effective date of this Act and all equipment assigned to full time Crawford County personnel at the effective date of the separation Act.”

Amendments. The 1995 amendment deleted (b); and substituted “in this subchapter” for “herein.”

Subchapter 18 — Thirteenth Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 585, § 1, provided:

“In addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions, the prosecuting attorneys of the Eighth, Ninth-West, Tenth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth and Twentieth Judicial Districts shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Said investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, and have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this State and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1988 (4th Ex. Sess.), No. 10, §§ 1, 2, and No. 20, §§ 1, 2, provide that, in addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other statutory provisions, the Prosecuting Attorney of the Thirteenth Judicial District shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; that the investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisidiction throughout the judicial district served, have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this state, and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district; and that nothing in these acts shall be construed to prohibit the quorum courts or city governing bodies of the various judicial districts from providing additional personnel or funds, from whatever sources available, to the prosecuting attorneys' offices for the Anti-Drug Abuse program.

Effective Dates. Acts 1985, No. 1093, § 3: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It has been ascertained and determined that due to increased costs that the current laws pertaining to the expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit is inadequate and that the efficient operation of the courts and the administration of justice in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit will be jeopardized. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-1801. Contingent expense allowances.

  1. In implementation of § 16-21-119(a), and in lieu of any other contingent expense allowance provided by law for the Prosecuting Attorney of the Thirteenth Judicial District, the Prosecuting Attorney shall receive an expense allowance to be borne by the respective counties of the Thirteenth Judicial District as follows:
    1. Calhoun County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Calhoun County, not to exceed one thousand seven hundred eighty-two dollars ($1,782) per annum; (2) Columbia County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Columbia County, not to exceed three thousand seven hundred eighty dollars ($3,780) per annum; (3) Cleveland County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Cleveland County, not to exceed one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800) per annum; (4) Dallas County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Dallas County, not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) per annum; (5) Ouachita County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Ouachita County, not to exceed four thousand one hundred forty dollars ($4,140) per annum; and (6) Union County Such amount as may be approved by the Quorum Court of Union County, not to exceed six thousand six hundred sixty dollars ($6,660) per annum.
  2. The counties in the Thirteenth Judicial District shall pay the annual amounts prescribed in this section in equal monthly installments.
  3. There shall be no requirement that the prosecuting attorney submit vouchers to the respective counties in connection with the expenses.

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1985, No. 1093, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.3.

Subchapter 19 — Fourteenth Judicial District

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 950, §§ 4, 5: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined that the efficient operation of the office of the prosecuting attorney of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit is essential to the administration of justice and for the efficient operation of the county governments of said circuit, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to provide adequate contingent expenses and secretarial allowances for said prosecuting attorney. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 457, §§ 4, 6: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1979; Acts 1981, No. 952, §§ 4, 6: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1981. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit prosecuting attorney's office lacks sufficient manpower; and that in order to assure the proper administration of justice and the efficient functioning of the office of the prosecuting attorney for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 388, § 3: Mar. 10, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the contingent expense allowance for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit prosecuting attorney and the salary of the office stenographer for such prosecuting attorney should not be limited in amount by the General Assembly and this Act is immediately necessary to eliminate such limitations. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-1901. Legislative findings and intent.

  1. It is not the purpose of this subchapter to repeal any laws fixing the fees of prosecuting attorneys, but rather to update and make more efficient the administration of law and order and the operation of county governments in the Fourteenth Judicial District.
  2. It is further recognized that for the most important and complicated work performed by the prosecuting attorney of the several counties of the Fourteenth Judicial District affected by this subchapter, fees are not provided by law. Therefore, it is the intent of this subchapter to provide the salaries set forth in this subchapter without regard to the amount of the prosecuting attorney's fees and emoluments earned or collected in the counties comprising the Fourteenth Judicial District.

History. Acts 1977, No. 950, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.1b.

16-21-1902. Prosecuting attorney's fees.

In the Fourteenth Judicial District, the justices of the peace, municipal courts, circuit courts, and other courts shall assess, in all cases, the prosecuting attorney's fees provided by law, and all such fees shall be paid into the county treasury as provided by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 950, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.1b.

16-21-1903. Contingent expense allowance.

The contingent expenses of the Prosecuting Attorney for the Fourteenth Judicial District shall be limited to the sum of seven thousand eight hundred dollars ($7,800) per annum, to be paid quarterly and to be borne by the counties of the district as follows:

  1. Baxter County (36% by population) $2,808;
  2. Boone County (36% by population) 2,808;
  3. Marion County (16% by population) 1,248; and
  4. Newton County (12% by population) 936.

History. Acts 1977, No. 950, § 1; 1979, No. 457, § 1; 1981, No. 952, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.1.

16-21-1904. Office stenographer.

The salary for the office stenographer for the Prosecuting Attorney of the Fourteenth Judicial District shall be set at the sum of nine thousand dollars ($9,000) annually, to be paid in equal monthly installments and to be borne by the counties of the district as follows:

  1. Baxter County (36% by population) $3,240;
  2. Boone County (36% by population) 3,240;
  3. Marion County (16% by population) 1,440; and
  4. Newton County (12% by population) 1,080.

History. Acts 1977, No. 950, § 2; 1979, No. 457, § 2; 1981, No. 952, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.1a.

16-21-1905. Increase in amounts.

The amounts set forth in §§ 16-21-1903 and 16-21-1904 are minimum amounts, and each county quorum court may increase the amounts paid for either purpose when the quorum court feels it is justified and appropriate to do so without regard to similar increases by other counties in the judicial district.

History. Acts 1983, No. 388, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-114.1n, 24-114.1a note.

Subchapter 20 — Fifteenth Judicial District

Effective Dates. Acts 1981, No. 298, § 5: became law without governor's signature, Mar. 5, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is presently no law which provides adequate compensation and allowances for the prosecuting attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit; that this Act is designed to establish adequate allowances for said prosecuting attorney to enable him to effectively and efficiently carry out his duties; that it is essential to the effective administration of justice in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit that this Act be given effect at the earliest possible date; therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 425, § 5: Mar. 11, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an urgent need for additional personnel to fight the war on drugs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 361, § 5: Mar. 3, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that no attorney at law resides within Scott County who can legally serve as the deputy prosecuting attorney for the county; that this act authorizes a non-resident of Scott County to serve as the deputy prosecuting attorney for Scott County; and that this act should be given effect immediately in order to give the prosecuting attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial District the authority to provide services within the district as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2005, No. 2201. § 12: Apr. 13, 2005. Emergency Clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee and the Division of Legislative Audit provide essential auditing and investigative services to the General Assembly and the State of Arkansas; that to avoid confusion, the General Assembly finds it is necessary to combine the Arkansas Code provisions concerning the Division of Legislative Audit and the local audit section of the division in one Arkansas Code chapter; that to avoid certain undue hardships on public entities of the state, it is also necessary for the General Assembly to provide a basis of financial statement presentation for certain public entities; that the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Statement on Auditing Standards Number 99 regarding the detection of fraud requires auditors to document unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in their working papers; and that this act is immediately necessary because the General Assembly finds that the public disclosure of such unsubstantiated allegations do not serve a public purpose and may cause irreparable harm to innocent individuals and public employees. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-21-2001. Legislative findings and intent.

  1. It is not the purpose of this subchapter to repeal any laws fixing the fees of prosecuting attorneys.
  2. It is further recognized that for the most important and complicated work performed by the prosecuting attorney of the counties affected by this subchapter, fees are not provided by law. Therefore, it is specifically a legislative intent to provide the salaries set forth in this subchapter without regard to the amount of prosecuting attorney's fees and emoluments earned or collected in the judicial district affected by this subchapter.

History. Acts 1981, No. 298, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.11c.

16-21-2002. Office space and telephone expense — Contingent expense allowance.

    1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial District shall be furnished suitable office space and telephone expense.
    2. The office space is to be furnished in the county in which the prosecuting attorney resides and shall be paid for by that county monthly at the rate of two hundred dollars ($200) per month from the county general fund.
    3. The telephone expense shall be prorated one-fifth (1/5) from Scott County, the balance equally between Logan County, Yell County, and Conway County.
    1. In addition, the prosecuting attorney shall be allowed as contingent expense of this office, including postage, printing, office supplies and equipment, stationery, travel expense, special service, operation of automobiles, and such other expenses which, within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, may be proper expenses of the office, and also including necessary expense in connection with any proper investigation incident to any criminal law violation or trial before any grand jury or any court within the Fifteenth Judicial District, coming within the duties of his office, eleven thousand three hundred dollars ($11,300) per annum, to be allocated as follows:
      1. Scott County $2,500;
      2. Logan County $3,000;
      3. Yell County $2,500; and
      4. Conway County $3,300.
    2. The expenses are to be paid from the county general fund of the respective counties of the Fifteenth Judicial District and shall be paid in equal monthly installments by each county.

History. Acts 1981, No. 298, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.11a; Acts 1987, No. 415, § 1.

16-21-2003. Prosecutor's fees — Collection, payment, and settlement — Penalty for noncompliance.

  1. In all counties of the Fifteenth Judicial District, the justices of the peace, municipal courts, circuit courts, and other courts shall assess in all cases the prosecuting attorney's fee provided by law.
  2. At the end of each calendar month and within five (5) days thereafter, the officer collecting the fees shall pay the fees to the treasury of the county, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, and shall receive from the treasurer his receipt in duplicate, one (1) copy of which shall be filed with the county clerk, the other copy kept by the officer or person making the settlement with the treasurer.
  3. Any officer or person having in his hands any such fees who fails to settle with the county treasurer within the time and the manner provided for in this section shall be subject to indictment, prosecution, and punishment for embezzlement.

History. Acts 1981, No. 298, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.11c.

16-21-2004. Prosecutor's assistants generally — Salaries.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial District of Arkansas shall be entitled to the following assistants:
    1. Deputy prosecuting attorneys:
      1. Scott County $10,000;
      2. Logan County $16,000;
      3. Yell County $13,977;
      4. Conway County $18,000;
    2. Chief deputy prosecuting attorney:
      1. Scott County $3,300;
      2. Logan County $3,300;
      3. Yell County $3,240;
      4. Conway County $4,400;
    3. Secretary-stenographer:
      1. Scott County $1,850;
      2. Logan County $2,500;
      3. Yell County $2,333;
      4. Conway County $2,465; and
    4. Investigator:
      1. Scott County $2,750;
      2. Logan County $3,750;
      3. Yell County $3,600;
      4. Conway County $3,750.
  2. The salaries of the above deputy prosecutors, secretary-stenographer, and investigator shall be paid in twelve (12) monthly installments from the respective county general funds as set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
  3. The deputy prosecuting attorneys shall receive the salaries provided for in this subchapter in lieu of fees, and all such fees shall be deposited in the general funds of the respective counties.
  4. All deputies shall reside in the Fifteenth Judicial District; provided, however, that the deputy prosecuting attorney for Scott County may reside outside the Fifteenth Judicial District so long as he maintains a regular practice of law within Scott County.
  5. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial District shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, criminal investigators, and all other assistants without confirmation from any court or other tribunal.
  6. The investigator or warrant clerk shall have all powers granted to peace officers by the statutes of this state for the serving of all process issuing out of all courts or the prosecuting attorney's office.

History. Acts 1981, No. 298, §§ 1, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 24-114.11, 24-114.11b; Acts 1993, No. 361, § 1.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment added the proviso at the end of (d).

Case Notes

Cited: Bell v. State, 334 Ark. 285, 973 S.W.2d 806 (1998).

16-21-2005. Prosecutor's assistants — Expenses.

  1. The deputy prosecuting attorney's office shall be entitled to an expense allowance for travel, telephone, and other related expenses from the county general fund in a minimum amount as follows:
    1. Scott County $ 1,500;
    2. Logan County $ 4,000;
    3. Yell County $ 2,000; and
    4. Conway County $14,025.
  2. The chief deputy prosecuting attorney's office shall be entitled to an expense allowance for travel, telephone, and other related expenses from the county general fund in a minimum amount of two thousand three hundred five dollars ($2,305), payable from the county's general funds as follows:
    1. Scott County $550;
    2. Logan County $550;
    3. Yell County $500; and
    4. Conway County $705.
  3. The investigator's office shall be entitled to an expense allowance for travel, telephone, and other related expenses from the county general fund in a minimum amount of three thousand nine hundred ten dollars ($3,910), payable from the county's general funds as follows:
    1. Scott County $ 800;
    2. Logan County $1,075;
    3. Yell County $ 960; and
    4. Conway County $1,075.

History. Acts 1981, No. 298, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.11.

16-21-2006. Payment of salaries and expenses.

The levying or quorum court of the respective counties shall annually appropriate out of the general revenue fund sufficient amounts to cover the salaries and expenses provided for in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1981, No. 298, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.11b.

16-21-2007. Additional employees — Drug Law Enforcement Program grants.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial District shall have the power to appoint the following employees if the prosecutor receives a grant award therefor, without confirmation of any court or tribunal, at such salaries as are indicated below, or as are authorized in grants awarded from the Office of Intergovernmental Services of the Department of Finance and Administration and the Arkansas Drug Law Enforcement Program:
    1. The positions created in subsection (a) of this section shall be in addition to those created by § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions.
    2. In the event additional funding becomes available, the prosecuting attorney may employ such additional employees and have expense allowances as are authorized in the program grant awards.
    1. The office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial District shall administer its Drug Law Enforcement Program grant from the Office of Intergovernmental Services of the Department of Finance and Administration.
    2. Expenditures may be made only for purposes of the grant.
    3. All moneys from the grant are appropriated on a continuing basis and are subject to the prosecuting attorney's financial management system.
    4. All law enforcement agent positions shall have peace officer jurisdiction throughout the Fifteenth Judicial District and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the state.
  2. It is the explicit legislative intent that nothing in this section shall be construed to decrease, supplant, or be substituted for employee positions, salaries, or expenses, nor maintenance and operation expenses or capital equipment expenditures which the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial District will receive through quorum court appropriation from and after February 1, 1991.

Law enforcement project coordinator $26,000

Law enforcement field supervisor $22,000

Law enforcement undercover officer $16,500

Law enforcement undercover officer $15,125

Bookkeeper-secretary $14,000

Bookkeeper-secretary $11,000

History. Acts 1991, No. 425, § 1; 2005, No. 2201, § 10.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted (a) began “Effective February 1, 1991.”

Subchapter 21 — Sixteenth Judicial District

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 585, § 1, provided:

“In addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other Arkansas Code provisions, the prosecuting attorneys of the Eighth, Ninth-West, Tenth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth and Twentieth Judicial Districts shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Said investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, and have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this State and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1988 (4th Ex. Sess.), No. 10, §§ 1, 2, and No. 20, §§ 1, 2, provide that, in addition to the deputy prosecutor positions created by § 16-21-113 and other statutory provisions, the Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixteenth Judicial District shall have the power to appoint deputy prosecuting attorneys, investigators, or employees at such salaries as are authorized in the grant awards from the Department of Finance and Administration, Intergovernmental Services, Drug Law Enforcement Program, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; that the investigators and case coordinators shall have jurisdiction throughout the judicial district served, have the power granted to peace officers by the statutes of this state, and may serve process issuing out of all courts within the judicial district; and that nothing in these acts shall be construed to prohibit the quorum courts or city governing bodies of the various judicial districts from providing additional personnel or funds, from whatever sources available, to the prosecuting attorneys' offices for the Anti-Drug Abuse program.

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 1044, §§ 3, 5: effective retroactive to Jan. 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice in the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit that the prosecuting attorney of said circuit be provided adequate funds for expenses of his office and for carrying out his official functions and duties; that this Act makes provision for the funding of such expenses, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Became law without Governor's signature. Noted in Governor's office on Apr. 14, 1987.

16-21-2101. Expense allowance — Salary of deputy.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Sixteenth Judicial District may be allowed the expenses of his office, including telephone, telegraph, postage, printing, office supplies and equipment, office rent, stationery, traveling expenses, special services, operation of automobiles, secretarial and clerical expenses, and other expenses which, within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, may be a proper expense of the office and also including necessary expense in connection with any proper investigation incident to any criminal law violation or trials before any grand jury, or any court within the judicial district, coming within the duties of his office.
  2. Subject to approval of the several quorum courts, the expenses shall be borne by the counties comprising the Sixteenth Judicial District, as follows:
    1. Independence County forty percent (40%);
    2. Cleburne County twenty-seven percent (27%);
    3. Stone County eleven percent (11%);
    4. Izard County eleven percent (11%); and
    5. Fulton County eleven percent (11%).
  3. The expenses may be drawn in equal monthly installments or be contingent.
  4. The deputy prosecuting attorney for Stone County shall receive an annual salary of not less than twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) nor more than eighteen thousand eight hundred dollars ($18,800), as established by the Quorum Court of Stone County.

History. Acts 1987, No. 1044, §§ 1, 2; 1989, No. 470, § 1.

Subchapter 22 — Seventeenth Judicial District

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 262, §§ 3, 6: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney's office of the 17th Judicial Circuit and the salary of the official stenographer and grand jury reporter of said 17th Judicial Circuit are inadequate for the administration of justice in said circuit, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to provide sufficient allowances therefor and to promote the administration of justice and the enforcement of the criminal laws of said circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Approved March 10, 1971.

Acts 1979, No. 443, §§ 2, 5: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney's office of the 17th Circuit-Chancery Court Circuit is inadequate for the administration of justice in said circuit, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to provide sufficient allowances therefor and to promote the administration of justice and the enforcement of the criminal laws of said circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 1043, § 4: became law without Governor's signature, Apr. 15, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this Act is essential to the operation of criminal justice within the Seventeenth East Judicial Circuit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 886, § 7: became law without Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 31, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Seventeenth Judicial District-East. It is also hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Prosecuting Attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial District-East is in need of these personnel in order to fight the war on drugs and combat violent crime in the Seventeenth Judicial District-East. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 988, § 6: Apr. 1, 1997, retroactive to Jan. 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Seventeenth Judicial District-East. It is also determined that the prosecuting attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial District-East is in need of these personnel in order to fight the war on drugs and combat crime in the Seventeenth Judicial District-East. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1999, No. 1001, § 6: Mar. 31, 1999, retroactive to Jan. 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Seventeenth Judicial District-East. It is also determined that the prosecuting attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial District-East is in need of these personnel in order to fight the war on drugs and combat crime in the Seventeenth Judicial District-East. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-21-2201. Election.

  1. The qualified electors of the Seventeenth Judicial District-West shall elect one (1) prosecuting attorney.
  2. The qualified electors of the Seventeenth Judicial District-East shall elect one (1) prosecuting attorney.

History. Acts 1977, No. 432, § 1; 1983, No. 669, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-365.

Case Notes

Cited: Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

16-21-2202. Contingent expense allowance.

  1. In lieu of any other contingent expense allowance now provided by law for the Prosecuting Attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial District, the prosecuting attorney shall receive a contingent expense allowance of three thousand six hundred dollars ($3,600) per annum to be borne by the respective counties of the Seventeenth District as follows:
    1. White County $1,400;
    2. Lonoke County $1,200; and
    3. Prairie County $1,000.
    1. The counties shall pay the above authorized annual amounts in equal quarterly installments from the county general funds of the respective counties.
    2. The payment of each county's pro rata part of the contingent expense allowance shall be upon approval of the county judge of each of the respective counties.

History. Acts 1971, No. 262, § 2; 1979, No. 443, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.6.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

16-21-2203. Expense allowance — Seventeenth Judicial District-East.

  1. The office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial District shall receive a contingent expense reimbursement of two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400) per annum to be borne by the respective counties of the Seventeenth Judicial District as follows:
    1. White County $1,400
    2. Prairie County 1,000
  2. The counties shall pay the authorized annual amounts in equal quarterly installments from the county general fund of the respective counties, and the checks shall be made payable to the office of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial District. Disbursements shall be made by the prosecuting attorney for the necessary expenses of the office based upon adequate documentation.
  3. The prosecuting attorney or his or her deputies may also be allowed additional expenses upon appropriation of the quorum court and approval of the county judge.
  4. The prosecuting attorney shall be entitled to the following assistants and employees:
    1. One (1) chief deputy prosecuting attorney, whose salary shall be not less than forty-five thousand one hundred twenty-eight dollars ($45,128) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of White County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by White County;
      1. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for White County, whose salary shall be not less than thirty-five thousand eighteen dollars ($35,018) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of White County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by White County;
      2. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for White County, whose salary shall be not less than thirty-one thousand one hundred dollars ($31,100) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of White County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by White County;
      1. One (1) deputy prosecuting attorney for Prairie County, whose salary shall be not less than thirty-three thousand three hundred forty-two dollars ($33,342) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy for county employees of Prairie County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Prairie County.
      2. The deputy prosecuting attorney for Prairie County shall be entitled to actual operating expenses of not less than thirteen thousand six hundred forty-six dollars ($13,646) to cover the cost of telephone, printing, supplies, equipment, janitorial services, cleaning supplies, food, service contracts, accounting, postage, photocopies, travel, training, utilities, rent, juror and witness fees, and such other expenses which, within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, may be proper expenses of the office in connection with the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity within the district, to be paid by Prairie County;
    2. One (1) victim/witness coordinator and office manager, whose salary shall be not less than twenty-three thousand two hundred ninety-two dollars ($23,292). The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of White County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by White County;
    3. One (1) victim/witness clerk, whose salary shall be not less than eighteen thousand seven hundred forty-four dollars ($18,744). The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of White County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by White County;
    4. One (1) receptionist and municipal intake clerk, whose salary shall be not less than eighteen thousand seven hundred forty-four dollars ($18,744) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of White County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by White County;
    5. One (1) hot check clerk, whose salary shall be not less than seventeen thousand five hundred dollars ($17,500) per annum. The salary is to be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of White County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by White County; and
    6. One (1) clerk, whose salary shall be not less than twelve thousand six hundred dollars ($12,600) per annum. The salary shall be paid in accordance with the pay periods and payroll policy of Prairie County. In addition to the salary, Social Security, matching retirement, insurance, and all related salary expenses shall be paid by Prairie County.
    1. The quorum courts of the respective counties of the Seventeenth Judicial District shall annually appropriate out of the funds sufficient amounts to cover the salaries and expenses provided for in this section.
    2. The salaries and expenses provided for in this section are minimum provisions only, and the quorum courts of the respective counties may appropriate any additional funds they deem necessary for the efficient operation of the office of the prosecuting attorney.
  5. A deputy prosecuting attorney who is duly appointed in any county of the Seventeenth Judicial District shall have the authority to perform all official acts as deputy prosecuting attorney in all counties within the district.

History. Acts 1995, No. 886, §§ 1-3; 1997, No. 988, § 1; 1999, No. 1001, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted by Acts 1995, No. 886, § 1, subsection (d) of this section began:

“Retroactive to January 1, 1995 and thereafter.”

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-21-2203, concerning Seventeenth Judicial District-East expense allowance, was repealed by implication by Acts 1995, No. 886. The former section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 1043, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment rewrote this section.

The 1999 amendment rewrote this section.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

Subchapter 23 — Eighteenth Judicial District

16-21-2301. Expense allowance.

The Garland County Quorum Court may appropriate from the county treasury such funds as it deems necessary to defray the expenses of the Prosecuting Attorney of the Eighteenth Judicial District-East.

History. Acts 1987, No. 669, § 1.

Subchapter 24 — Nineteenth Judicial District

Cross References. Nineteenth Judicial District, § 16-13-2701 et seq. and § 16-13-3001 et seq. [repealed]. For present law, see § 16-21-2401 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1969, No. 71, §§ 2, 3: retroactive to Jan. 1, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It has been ascertained and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that on enactment of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, Act 304 of 1967, Section 6, a legal uncertainty as to contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney for the newly created Nineteenth Judicial Circuit was created; that the contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit is in equal amount of the total contingent expense allowance of the prosecuting attorney of the Fourth Judicial Circuit of which the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit was a part; that the stated contingent expense allowance is necessary to reimburse said prosecuting attorney for expenses incurred in the performance of his duties, and that the efficient operation of the courts and the administration of justice in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit has been jeopardized by this uncertainty as to the said expense allowance. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 19, 1969.

Acts 1983, No. 386, § 9: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 10, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Fourth General Assembly that because of the vagueness of Act 685 of 1979, legislation is immediately necessary to establish the financing of the prosecuting attorney's office for the 19th Judicial Circuit. The legislation is designed to allow the prosecuting attorney's office of the 19th Judicial Circuit to establish and operate at its current level and to provide for any future needs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-21-2401. Contingent expense allowance.

  1. In lieu of any other contingent expense allowance now provided by law for the Prosecuting Attorney of the Nineteenth Judicial District, the prosecuting attorney shall hereafter receive a contingent expense allowance to be borne by the respective counties of the Nineteenth Judicial District as follows:
    1. Benton County $1,750; and
    2. Carroll County $750.
  2. The counties in the Nineteenth Judicial District shall pay the above prescribed annual amounts in equal monthly installments.

History. Acts 1969, No. 71, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.5.

16-21-2402. Reimbursement of expenses of Benton County office.

  1. The Quorum Court of Benton County shall furnish the Prosecuting Attorney of the Nineteenth Judicial District and his Benton County staff adequate office space in the Benton County Courthouse or, in lieu thereof, appropriate funds for the rental of office facilities and all expenses associated therewith.
  2. The Benton County Quorum Court shall appropriate adequate funds for reimbursing the prosecuting attorney for the actual expenses of the Benton County office, including, but not limited to, telephone, telegraph, postage, printing, office supplies and equipment, stationery, traveling expenses, and such other expenses which the quorum court may deem a proper expense of the prosecutor's office.

History. Acts 1983, No. 386, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.14.

16-21-2403. Reimbursement of expenses of Carroll County office.

The Carroll County Quorum Court shall appropriate adequate funds for reimbursing the Prosecuting Attorney of the Nineteenth Judicial District for the actual expenses of the Carroll County office, including, but not limited to, telephone, telegraph, postage, printing, office supplies and equipment, stationery, traveling expenses, and such other expenses which the quorum court may deem a proper expense of the prosecutor's office.

History. Acts 1983, No. 386, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 24-114.14a.

Subchapter 25 — Twentieth Judicial District

Effective Dates. Acts 1999, No. 1238, § 5: Apr. 8, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act is essential to the operation of the criminal justice system within the Twentieth (20th) Judicial District. It is also hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the prosecuting attorney for the Twentieth (20th) Judicial District is in need of these personnel in order to combat crime in the Twentieth (20th) Judicial District. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 794, § 2: Apr. 3, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that investigators are a vital tool used in the prosecution of criminal offenders; that currently their powers are not specifically provided; and that this act is immediately necessary because the immediate need for empowered investigators is of vital public interest. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-21-2501. Investigators.

  1. The prosecuting attorney of the Twentieth Judicial District is hereby authorized to appoint and employ certified law enforcement officers as investigators for the prosecuting attorney's office.
  2. In addition to the investigators listed in subsection (a) of this section, the prosecuting attorney shall have the authority to appoint or employ with or without pay at his or her discretion other investigators necessary for the administration of justice.
    1. An investigator authorized and appointed shall:
      1. Have the authority to issue process, serve warrants, and possess all powers of a law enforcement officer;
      2. Be a certified law enforcement officer commissioned by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training; and
      3. Be defined as a public safety member.
      1. If an investigator issues process or serves warrants, the office of the prosecuting attorney shall be entitled to receive the same fee a sheriff is authorized to charge under § 21-6-307.
      2. The fee is to be deposited into the hot check fees account.
  3. A deputy prosecuting attorney and a staff member designated by the prosecuting attorney shall be considered a law enforcement officer for all protective, emergency, investigative, and commercial purposes, either individually or in coordination with interagency cooperative investigation and operations.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1238, § 1; 2009, No. 794, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “and employ” in (a); rewrote (b); and added (c) and (d).

Subchapter 26 — Twenty-First Judicial District

[Reserved]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1995, No. 1148, § 4, provided, in part:

“Provided, however, that in the event that the district is separated into two districts or one county is removed from the district by state action, the shared time personnel currently funded by Sebastian County will be funded full time by Sebastian County. Provided further, that in the event that a Deputy within the district is selected to be interim Prosecutor said Deputy may take a leave of absence to fulfill this duty. Upon completion of said duty, the Deputy shall be entitled to return to either District's Prosecutor's Office with the consent of the Prosecuting Attorney at the level of funding that said Deputy would have been paid at had he not accepted the appointment duty. The Prosecutor of the Twelfth Circuit, at the request of the interim Prosecutor of the new District, may designate a Deputy to serve as the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the new District. In the event that this procedure is followed, that Deputy shall be able to return to Sebastian County at the same pay as he is receiving at the time he is transferred back to Sebastian County from Crawford County at the end of the interim Prosecutor's term or any time before hand. For purposes of this Act, the new District shall be considered the one which is formed with Crawford County as a member county. Upon division, the prosecutor shall transfer all district equipment to Crawford County that is currently placed within the Crawford County Office at the time of the effective date of this Act and all equipment assigned to full time Crawford County personnel at the effective date of the separation Act.”

Cross References. Composition, § 16-13-2901 et seq.

The Twenty-first Judicial District, § 16-21-152.

Subchapter 27 — Twenty-Second Judicial District

16-21-2701. Investigators.

  1. The Prosecuting Attorney of the Twenty-second Judicial District shall be entitled to appoint and employ one (1) investigator at not less than twenty-one thousand dollars ($21,000), to be paid by Saline County when approved by the quorum court and payment is approved by the county judge.
  2. In addition to the investigator listed by salary in subsection (a) of this section, the Prosecuting Attorney of the Twenty-second Judicial District shall have the authority to appoint and employ other investigators as necessary for the administration of justice.
    1. All investigators authorized and so appointed shall have the authority to issue process, serve warrants, and possess all law enforcement officer powers.
    2. They shall be certified law enforcement officers commissioned by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training and shall be defined as public safety members under Arkansas law.
    3. In the event that investigators shall issue process or serve warrants, the prosecutor's office shall be entitled to receive the same fee as provided in § 21-6-307, which shall be deposited into the hot check fees account.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1419, § 1; 2007, No. 211, § 1.

Chapter 22 Attorneys At Law

Research References

Am. Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attys., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

Brill, The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 247.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-22-101. Lawyer referral services.

  1. It is unlawful for any person or organization to operate a lawyer referral service without prior approval of the Arkansas Supreme Court. “Lawyer referral service” means referring clients to attorneys and receiving compensation for the referral.
    1. Any court of competent jurisdiction may order any person or organization violating this section to cease and desist from operating a lawyer referral service.
    2. Any person or entity failing to comply with the court order shall be deemed in contempt of court and subject to such punishment as prescribed by the court.

History. Acts 1991, No. 55, §§ 1, 2.

Case Notes

Cited: In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 323 Ark. 203, 913 S.W.2d 768 (1996).

16-22-102. Delinquent noncustodial parents.

The Office of Child Support Enforcement of the Revenue Division of the Department of Finance and Administration, upon reaching a cooperative agreement with the Arkansas Supreme Court, is hereby authorized to develop procedures under which the Clerk of the Supreme Court may each year furnish the Office of Child Support Enforcement with a list of those persons who possess a law license and the office shall notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court regarding a review of the law license whenever a noncustodial parent on the list is delinquent on a court-ordered child support payment or an adjudicated arrearage in an amount equal to six (6) months' obligation or more or is the subject of an outstanding failure to appear warrant, body attachment, or bench warrant pursuant to a child support order.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1253, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Admission and Practice

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this subchapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules Governing Admission to the Bar.

Cross References. Regulating practice of law, Const., Amend. 28.

Effective Dates. Acts 1917, No. 361, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1917, No. 362, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1927, No. 199, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 182, § 7: approved Mar. 23, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1935, No. 168, § 5: approved Mar. 21, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and its passage.”

Acts 1958 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 2: Sept. 12, 1958. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and declared by the General Assembly that the orderly administration of the educational facilities of Arkansas have been subjected to abuse by reason of the exemption granted them under the terms of Act 182, Ark. Acts of 1929, § 5 and it is to the public interest that our public schools be administered without such interference, and the passage of this act will tend to alleviate such a situation. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 2011, No. 858, § 2: Mar. 31, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are many indigent, poor, or disadvantaged persons in Arkansas who need legal representation; that there are nonprofit corporations and voluntary associations that already are authorized to provide legal assistance to those in need; and that this act is immediately necessary to ensure that citizens in Arkansas have the opportunity to receive legal services in a timely manner. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Law student acting as counsel. 3 A.L.R.4th 358.

Failure to pay creditors affecting applicant's moral character for purposes of admission to the bar. 4 A.L.R.4th 436.

Solicitation of business by or for attorney. 5 A.L.R.4th 866.

Right of party mitigant to defend or counterclaim on ground that opposing party or his attorney is engaged in unauthorized practice of law. 7 A.L.R.4th 1146.

Lay person's assistance to party in divorce proceeding as unauthorized practice of law. 12 A.L.R.4th 656.

Reciprocity provisions for admission to bar. 14 A.L.R.4th 7.

Impersonations and other irresponsible conduct as bearing on moral character. 30 A.L.R.4th 1020.

Bar admission or reinstatement of attorney as affected by alcoholism or alcohol abuse. 39 A.L.R.4th 567.

Formal educational requirement for bar admission. 44 A.L.R.4th 910.

Am. Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attys, § 12 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Legal Education in Arkansas, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 191.

Legal Profession — Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 101.

C.J.S. 7 C.J.S., Atty & C., § 10 et seq.

16-22-201. Qualifications for admission.

  1. Every citizen of the age of twenty-one (21) years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability may, upon application and in the manner provided for in this subchapter, be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in the courts of this state.
  2. It shall be lawful for the Supreme Court to admit to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in the courts of this state any citizen under the age of twenty-one (21) years who is of good moral character and who possesses the other requisite qualifications of learning and ability, and who is a graduate of any accredited, recognized, or Class A law school.

History. Civil Code, § 760; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [760], p. 213; 1917, No. 362, § 1, p. 1787; C. & M. Dig., § 596; Acts 1927, No. 199, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 633; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-101.

Cross References. Removal of disqualification for criminal offenses, § 17-1-103.

Research References

ALR.

Sexual conduct or orientation as ground for denial of admission to bar. 105 A.L.R.5th 217.

Falsehoods, misrepresentations, impersonations, and other irresponsible conduct as bearing on requisite good moral character for admission to bar — Conduct related to admission to bar. 107 A.L.R.5th 167.

Failure to pay creditors as affecting applicant's moral character for purposes of admission to the bar. 108 A.L.R.5th 289.

Criminal record as affecting applicant's moral character for purposes of admission to the bar. 3 A.L.R.6th 49.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Sallings, Survey of Arkansas Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 277.

Case Notes

Rules.

Authority of court in regulating the practice of law includes the preparation of rules determining and setting out the qualifications of one who desires to take the bar examination. In re Pitchford, 265 Ark. 752, 581 S.W.2d 321, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 131, 62 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1979).

16-22-202. Examination required — Petition.

Every applicant for admission to practice law in the courts of this state shall be examined pursuant to rules of the Supreme Court of this state and shall, before his or her admission, produce to the court, by sworn petition, satisfactory proof of the qualifications found in § 16-22-201.

History. Civil Code, § 760; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [760], p. 213; 1917, No. 361, § 1, p. 1786; C. & M. Dig., § 598; Acts 1929, No. 32, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 638; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-103.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1917, No. 361, § 1, provided in part that the provisions of that act would not apply to any person to whom a license to practice law in any court of record in the state had theretofore been issued.

Case Notes

Cited: Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Exmrs., 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971); Taylor v. Safly, 276 Ark. 541, 637 S.W.2d 578 (1982).

16-22-203. Board of examiners.

The Supreme Court may appoint a board of examiners from practitioners in the Supreme Court for each judicial district to conduct the examinations for license, according to a standard adopted by the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1917, No. 361, § 2, p. 1786; C. & M. Dig., § 599; Pope's Dig., § 639; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-104.

Publisher's Notes. For exclusion of certain persons from provisions of this section, see Publisher's Note to § 16-22-202.

16-22-204. Authority of Justice or judge to license.

No Justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the circuit or other court shall have power to license any applicant to practice law, but such power shall be exercised by the courts of this state, by proper orders, duly recorded.

History. Civil Code, § 760; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [760], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., § 597; Pope's Dig., § 634; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-102.

16-22-205. Oath.

Any person admitted to practice law in this state shall make oath to support the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Arkansas and to faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which he is about to enter.

History. Civil Code, § 760; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [760], p. 213; 1917, No. 361, § 1, p. 1786; C. & M. Dig., § 598; Acts 1929, No. 32, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 638; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-103.

Publisher's Notes. For exclusion of certain persons from provisions of this section, see Publisher's Note to § 16-22-202.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation — The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 1.

Case Notes

Cited: Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Exmrs., 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971); Taylor v. Safly, 276 Ark. 541, 637 S.W.2d 578 (1982).

16-22-206. Entitlement to practice.

No person shall be licensed or permitted to practice law in any of the courts of record of this state until he has been admitted to practice by the Supreme Court of this state, and every person so admitted shall be entitled to practice in all the courts of this state.

History. Civil Code, § 760; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [760], p. 213; 1917, No. 361, § 1, p. 1786; C. & M. Dig., § 598; Acts 1929, No. 32, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 638; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-103.

Publisher's Notes. For exclusion of certain persons from provisions of this section, see Publisher's Note to § 16-22-202.

Case Notes

In General.

Only the Supreme Court can license persons to practice law. McGehee v. State, 182 Ark. 603, 32 S.W.2d 308 (1930).

The court did not deny assistance of counsel to the plaintiff when it did not allow two non-attorneys to represent him in court. Hooker v. Deere Credit Servs., Inc., 62 Ark. App. 293, 971 S.W.2d 267 (1998).

Where couple's attorneys admitted that they were licensed in Oklahoma, but not Arkansas, they were unauthorized to practice law in Arkansas and the complaint they filed on behalf of the couple was properly dismissed. Preston v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 354 Ark. 666, 128 S.W.3d 430 (2003).

Trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for default judgment because the answer filed on behalf of defendant was a nullity under Ark. R. Civ. P. 11(a) and this section as it was not signed by defendant or a person authorized to practice law in Arkansas. Defendant's mother was not authorized to sign the answer on his behalf, and there was nothing in the record to show that she held a valid power of attorney. Because no valid answer was timely filed, a default judgment should have been entered in favor of plaintiff. White v. Clay, 2013 Ark. App. 166 (2013).

Admission Pro Hac Vice.

Where appellants' attorneys, who were licensed in Oklahoma but not in Arkansas, filed appellants' medical malpractice complaint on the last day of the limitations period but did not file motions for admission pro hac vice until eight months later, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint; since Ark. R. Admis. Bar. XIV required that the pro hac vice motions be filed before the attorneys practiced law in Arkansas, the complaint was a nullity and, thus, no valid complaint was filed within the limitations period. Preston v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 354 Ark. 666, 128 S.W.3d 430 (2003).

License.

It is illegal to practice law in Arkansas without a license. All City Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. McGraw Hill Info. Sys. Co., 295 Ark. 520, 750 S.W.2d 395 (1988).

After trial court entered order finding that child was a member of a family in need of services the father attempted to appeal on the child's behalf but he was not a licensed attorney who could represent the child on an appeal, and the matter was not a final order. Bass v. State, 93 Ark. App. 411, 219 S.W.3d 697 (2005).

Out-of-State Attorney.

Appeal from a decision in a workers' compensation case was dismissed as untimely where an attorney from Texas filed notices of appeal on behalf of an insurer since he failed to comply with Ark. R. Admis. Bar XIV until later. As such, the pleadings were rendered a nullity. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v. Hickok, 370 Ark. 41, 257 S.W.3d 43 (2007).

Pro Se Appearances.

Appellant, who appeared pro se, but tendered a motion on behalf of other appellants, is not a licensed attorney, may not practice law in Arkansas, and may not represent other appellants in this case. Abel v. Kowalski, 323 Ark. 201, 913 S.W.2d 788 (1996).

Because appellant, who was appearing pro se, filed motions on behalf of himself and other parties in the lawsuit, a motion to dismiss the appeal as to all parties besides appellant was granted because he was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Davidson Props., LLC v. Summers, 368 Ark. 283, 244 S.W.3d 674 (2006).

Cited: Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Exmrs., 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971); Taylor v. Safly, 276 Ark. 541, 637 S.W.2d 578 (1982); SMG 1054, Inc. v. Thompson, 2014 Ark. App. 149 (2014); SMG 1054, Inc. v. Thompson, 2014 Ark. App. 524, 443 S.W.3d 574 (2014).

16-22-207. Register of licensed attorneys.

It shall be the duty of the clerk of each court of record to keep a register in which he shall register and enroll every attorney or counselor at law licensed to practice in the court of which he is clerk.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 600; Pope's Dig., § 640; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-105.

Cross References. Fees of officers of the court, § 21-6-401 et seq.

16-22-208. Barratry or maintenance — Disciplinary action by circuit and chancery courts.

  1. Any person, not a member of the Bar of Arkansas, who shall commit or who shall conspire to commit any act defined by the law of this state to be barratry or maintenance, or who shall solicit for himself or for another person who is not a member of the Bar of Arkansas in any manner or by any method the handling of claims or litigation involving injuries to persons or damage to property, in such a manner as would constitute the practice of law, shall be deemed to have submitted himself to the personal jurisdiction of any circuit or chancery court having territorial jurisdiction of the county where the act was committed for disciplinary proceedings in the same manner as if he were a member of the Bar of Arkansas.
  2. In addition to any other lawful action the court might take in proceedings under this section, the court shall be authorized to enter an injunction restraining the commission of any acts mentioned in subsection (a) of this section and may enforce the injunction with contempt proceedings as provided by law in other cases.
  3. It is declared to be the intent of this section to be in aid of and subordinate to the right of the Supreme Court of Arkansas to regulate and define the practice of law and prevent and prohibit the unauthorized or unlawful practice thereof by appropriate rules, orders, and penalties.

History. Acts 1961, No. 438, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-215 — 25-217.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Eaton and Benton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas Committee on Professional Conduct: Restrictions on Legal Advertising, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 549.

Case Notes

Cited: Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Exmrs., 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971); McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 500 S.W.2d 357 (1973).

16-22-209. Practicing without license — Contempt of court.

Every person who shall attempt to practice law in any court of record without being licensed, sworn, and registered, as required in this subchapter, shall be deemed guilty of a contempt of court and shall be punished as in other cases of contempt.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 601; Pope's Dig., § 641; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-106.

Research References

ALR.

What constitutes unauthorized practice of law by paralegal. 109 A.L.R.5th 275.

Unauthorized Practice of Law as Contempt. 40 A.L.R.6th 463.

Case Notes

Admission Pro Hac Vice.

Where appellants' attorneys, who were licensed in Oklahoma but not in Arkansas, filed appellants' medical malpractice complaint on the last day of the limitations period but did not file motions for admission pro hac vice until eight months later, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint; since Ark. R. Admis. Bar. XIV required that the pro hac vice motions be filed before the attorneys practiced law in Arkansas, the complaint was a nullity and, thus, no valid complaint was filed within the limitations period. Preston v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 354 Ark. 666, 128 S.W.3d 430 (2003).

Real Estate Brokers.

For a discussion of the unlawful practice of law by real estate brokers, see Ark. Bar Ass'n v. Block, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 836, 80 S. Ct. 87 (1959), overruled in part, Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963).

Scope of License.

Every attorney regularly licensed and duly admitted to practice in the courts of this state possesses a license to appear in those courts for any suitors who may retain him; but his license is not of itself an authority to appear for any particular person until he is in fact employed or retained by him. Cartwell v. Menifee, 2 Ark. 356 (1840).

Cited: Tally v. Reynolds, 1 Ark. 99 (1838); Conway County v. Little Rock & F.S. Ry., 39 Ark. 50 (1882); Visart v. Bush, 46 Ark. 153 (1885); Concrete Wallsystems of Ark., Inc. v. Master Paint Indus. Coating Corp., 95 Ark. App. 21, 233 S.W.3d 157 (2006); Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v. Hickok, 370 Ark. 41, 257 S.W.3d 43 (2007).

16-22-210. Clerk or sheriff not to act as attorney.

No clerk of any court of record in this state or sheriff, while he continues to act as such, shall under any pretense whatever act as an attorney at law in the court of which he is clerk or in the county in which he is sheriff.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 602; Pope's Dig., § 642; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-107.

Cross References. Judges barred from practicing law, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 25.

16-22-211. Corporations or associations — Practice of law or solicitation prohibited — Exceptions — Penalty.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association to practice or appear as an attorney at law for any person in any court in this state or before any judicial body, to make it a business to practice as an attorney at law for any person in any of the courts, to hold itself out to the public as being entitled to practice law, to tender or furnish legal services or advice, to furnish attorneys or counsel, to render legal services of any kind in actions or proceedings of any nature or in any other way or manner, or in any other manner to assume to be entitled to practice law or to assume or advertise the title of lawyer or attorney, attorney at law, or equivalent terms in any language in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is entitled to practice law or to furnish legal advice, service, or counsel or to advertise that either alone or together with or by or through any person, whether a duly and regularly admitted attorney at law or not, it has, owns, conducts, or maintains a law office or any office for the practice of law or for furnishing legal advice, services, or counsel.
  2. It also shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association to solicit itself by or through its officers, agents, or employees any claim or demand for the purpose of bringing an action thereon or of representing as attorney at law or for furnishing legal advice, services, or counsel to a person sued or about to be sued in any action or proceeding or against whom an action or proceeding has been or is about to be brought, or who may be affected by any action or proceeding that has been or may be instituted in any court or before any judicial body, or for the purpose of so representing any person in the pursuit of any civil remedy.
  3. The fact that any officer, trustee, director, agent, or employee shall be a duly and regularly admitted attorney at law shall not be held to permit or allow any such corporation or voluntary association to do the acts prohibited in this section, nor shall that fact be a defense upon the trial of any of the persons mentioned for a violation of the provisions of this section.
  4. This section does not apply to a:
    1. For-profit corporation or voluntary association lawfully engaged in:
      1. The examination and insuring of titles to real property; or
      2. Employing an attorney or attorneys in and about its own immediate affairs or in any litigation to which it is or may become a party;
    2. Nonprofit corporation or voluntary association lawfully engaged in representing or assisting an indigent, poor, or disadvantaged person as a client in a civil or criminal matter, if any legal services rendered by the nonprofit corporation or voluntary association are furnished through licensed attorneys in accordance with rules governing the practice of law in Arkansas; or
    3. Nonprofit corporation, voluntary association, or instrumentality of the government recognized under 26 U.S.C. § 115 that is engaged in representing or assisting as a client in a civil matter one (1) of the following entities, if any legal services rendered are furnished through licensed attorneys in accordance with rules governing the practice of law in Arkansas:
      1. A city, county, or public school district;
      2. The officers and employees of a city, county, or public school district;
      3. A self-funding group of a city, county, or public school district as required under § 14-60-101 et seq., § 14-26-101 et seq., or § 6-17-1401 et seq.; or
      4. A self-insurance risk pool of a city, county, or public school district.
    1. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent a corporation from furnishing to any person lawfully engaged in the practice of law such information or such clerical services in and about his or her professional work as may be lawful, except for the provisions of this section, if at all times the lawyer receiving such information or such services shall maintain full professional and direct responsibility to his or her clients for the information and services so received.
    2. However, no corporation shall be permitted to render any services that cannot lawfully be rendered by a person not admitted to practice law in this state nor to solicit directly or indirectly professional employment for a lawyer.
    1. Any corporation or voluntary association violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a violation and punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
    2. Every officer, trustee, director, agent, or employee of the corporation or voluntary association who directly or indirectly engages in any of the acts prohibited in this section or assists such a corporation or voluntary association to do such prohibited acts shall be guilty of a violation and shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History. Acts 1929, No. 182, §§ 1-6; Pope's Dig., §§ 3630-3635; Acts 1958 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-205 — 25-210; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 82; 2011, No. 858, § 1; 2017, No. 558, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added (d)(2); inserted “For-profit” at the beginning of (d)(1); and deleted “nor shall it prohibit a corporation or a voluntary association from” at the beginning of (d)(1)(B).

The 2017 amendment substituted “does” for “shall” in the introductory language of (d); in (d)(2), substituted “if” for “provided that”, substituted “the nonprofit” for “a nonprofit”, and deleted “duly” preceding “licensed”; and added (d)(3).

Research References

ALR.

What constitutes unauthorized practice of law by paralegal. 109 A.L.R.5th 275.

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of Garnishment: Does a Corporate Garnishee Need a Lawyer to Answer the Writ?, 1997 Ark. L. Notes 95.

Ark. L. Rev.

Legal Profession — Unauthorized Practice — Practice of Law by Banks, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 67.

Professional Corporations — A Current Appraisal, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 215.

Swimming Upstream: A Final Attempt at Persuasion on the Issue of Corporate Pro Se Representation in Arkansas State Court, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 475 (2001).

Rachel A. Orr, Recent Developments: Nonlawyer's Pro Se Representation of a Corporation in Arbitration Proceedings Constitutes the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 517 (2012).

Dwayne D. Hedges, Case Note: Brown v. Kelton: The Arkansas Prohibition on the Use of Employee Attorneys to Defend the Insured, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 953 (2012).

Suzannah R. McCord, Comment: Corporate Self-Representation: Is It Truly the Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 371 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Pierce G. Hunter, Note: Constitutional Law — Unauthorized Practice of Law: Driving Legal Business Without a License, 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 201 (2014).

Case Notes

Activities Not Prohibited.

A banking corporation is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when it advertises its services as a fiduciary, recommends that the public consult with their attorneys, and does not attempt to perform legal services in general. A banking corporation, through its employee attorneys, is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when it compiles and drafts inventories and accounts in probate. Ark. Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954).

Appearance.

An appeal in an action by a foreign corporation was dismissed where, inter alia, the corporation was not represented by a person authorized to practice law in Arkansas. Roma Leathers, Inc. v. Ramey, 68 Ark. App. 1, 2 S.W.3d 82 (1999).

Arbitration Proceedings.

Nonlawyer's representation of a corporation in arbitration proceedings constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Arbitration proceedings bear significant indicia of legal proceedings under the Uniform Arbitration Act, which has been adopted by Arkansas, and if a hearing is held during arbitration, the parties have the right to be heard, present evidence material to the controversy, and cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing. NISHA, LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Group, LLC, 2012 Ark. 130, 388 S.W.3d 444 (2012).

Insurers.

Insurance company was prohibited by this section from appointing one of its in-house attorneys to represent a defendant insured in litigation arising out of an accident. It was undisputed that the insurer was not and would not become a party to the lawsuit as provided in one of the exceptions to this section. Brown v. Kelton, 2011 Ark. 93, 380 S.W.3d 361 (2011).

Self-Representation.

A banking corporation cannot practice law directly or indirectly through employee attorneys, except that it may represent itself in the courts through employee attorneys in its own business affairs. Ark. Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954).

Although individuals may represent themselves, corporations must be represented by licensed attorneys. All City Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. McGraw Hill Info. Sys. Co., 295 Ark. 520, 750 S.W.2d 395 (1988).

Unlawful Practice.

A banking corporation, through its employee attorneys, is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when its attorneys draft fiduciary instruments, prepare and file court papers, appear in court in pending litigation or to invoke processes for its beneficiaries, cofiduciaries or others than the corporation, or advise persons other than the corporation as to legal matters. Ark. Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954).

Where abstract and title insurance companies draft and prepare for others instruments involving real property and do title examination and curative work for others, they are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 362 S.W.2d 900 (1959).

County, circuit, and appellate courts lacked jurisdiction over a corporate taxpayer's appeal because, while the taxpayer maintained that it was represented by an attorney at all stages of the case, its petitions for appeal filed in county court were signed by its accounting manager and not its attorney, the accounting manager was practicing law in violation of Arkansas law when he signed the petitions, and the petitions were null and void. Stephens Prod. Co. v. Bennett, 2015 Ark. App. 617 (2015).

Despite § 26-27-318(a)(1)(A) and a property owner's right to appeal an assessment, corporations are prohibited from acting pro se or representing themselves in legal actions. Desoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Hill, 2017 Ark. 326, 531 S.W.3d 396 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in dismissing a company's tax assessment appeal for lack of jurisdiction when its tax manager, a nonlawyer, initiated the appeal on its behalf because the company invoked the legal process and its nonattorney representative engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Because the notices of appeals were consequently a nullity and the deadline for filing an appeal under § 26-27-318 had lapsed when the amended notices were filed, the petitions of appeal were a nullity. Desoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Hill, 2017 Ark. 326, 531 S.W.3d 396 (2017).

Validity of Instruments Unlawfully Prepared.

Deed prepared by nonlawyer, who also gives advice as to its legal effect, is not void, although amounting to the unauthorized practice of law, since this section only penalizes the persons engaged in the unlawful practice. Gaylor v. Gaylor, 224 Ark. 644, 275 S.W.2d 644 (1955).

Cited: Ark. Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954); SMG 1054, Inc. v. Thompson, 2014 Ark. App. 149 (2014); SMG 1054, Inc. v. Thompson, 2014 Ark. App. 524, 443 S.W.3d 574 (2014).

16-22-212. Disbarment in another state — Effects.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person to practice law or attempt to practice law in any court in this state or to solicit business as or in any manner represent himself or herself to be an attorney at law when such a person so practicing or attempting to practice law or soliciting business as or representing himself or herself to be an attorney at law has previously been disbarred from the practice of law in any other state of the United States of America while a resident of that state.
    1. No person shall be admitted to practice law in this state who has been disbarred from the practice of law in any other state.
    2. The disbarment of any person from the practice of law in any other state shall operate as a disbarment of the person from the practice of law in this state under any license, permit, or enrollment issued to the person by any court in this state prior to his or her disbarment in the other state.
    3. A certified copy of the order, judgment, or decree of the disbarment in the other state shall be prima facie evidence of the disbarment in the other state when filed in any court in this state.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any judge of any court of record, district judge, mayor, or other judge or magistrate to knowingly permit any person to practice law or attempt to practice law, or to appear in any manner as an attorney at law before him or her or in his or her court in violation of any of the terms and provisions of this section.
    1. Any person violating the terms of this section shall be guilty of a violation and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not less than five hundred dollars ($500) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
    2. Each violation of this section shall constitute a separate offense.

History. Acts 1935, No. 168, §§ 1-4; Pope's Dig., §§ 633, 635-637; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-201 — 25-204; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 181; 2005, No. 1994, § 82.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1935, No. 168, § 1, provided in part that the act would not apply to any person who had been disbarred in another state and who had been reinstated in the state where the disbarment occurred prior to January 1, 1935.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), deleted “of the courts of record, municipal courts, justice courts, or any other” preceding “court in this state”; and made gender neutral and minor punctuation changes.

16-22-213. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning advertising to directly solicit clients or encourage litigation, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994 § 525. The section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 317, §§ 1, 2.

Subchapter 3 — Rights and Liabilities

Publisher's Notes. Former §§ 16-22-30116-22-304, concerning attorney liens, were repealed by Acts 1989, No. 293, § 3. They were derived from the following sources:

16-22-301. Acts 1941, No. 59, § 1; 1941, No. 306, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-301.

16-22-302. Acts 1941, No. 59, § 1; 1941, No. 306, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-301.

16-22-303. Acts 1941, No. 59, § 1; 1941; No. 306, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-301.

16-22-304. Acts 1909, No. 293, § 2, p. 892; C. & M. Dig., § 629; Pope's Dig., § 669; Acts 1983, No. 755, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-302.

Cross References. Attorney's fees, award of in refund action brought under Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 13, § 26-35-902.

Volunteers, liability for negligence in rendering legal services, § 16-6-104.

Effective Dates. Acts 1915, No. 240, § 3: approved Mar. 24, 1915. Emergency declared.

Acts 1987, No. 661, § 5: Apr. 6, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the liability of accountants and attorneys to persons not in privity of contract with them should be specifically outlined by legislative enactment; that this Act establishes the limits of such liability; and that this Act should go into effect as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 293, § 4: Mar. 2, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Supreme Court in Henry, Walden and Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25 (1987), limited the existing Attorney's Lien Law by allowing only a quantum meruit recovery in a case in which the attorney was dismissed by the client; that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Attorney Lien Law is contrary to what was intended by the enactment of Acts 59 and 306 of 1941, the Attorney Lien Law; that an attorney should have the right to rely on his contract with his client; and that the Attorney's Lien Law should be reenacted to protect the contractual rights of attorneys. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

State statute or court rule fixing maximum fees for attorney appointed to represent indigent. 3 A.L.R.4th 576.

Attorney's death as affecting compensation under contingent fee contract. 9 A.L.R.4th 191.

Charging excessive fee as ground for disciplinary action. 11 A.L.R.4th 133.

Statute establishing contingent fee scale for attorneys representing parties in medical malpractice actions. 12 A.L.R.4th 23.

Statute or rule providing for arbitration of fee disputes between attorneys and their clients. 17 A.L.R.4th 993.

Attorney's charging lien as including services rendered or disbursements made in other than instant action or proceeding. 23 A.L.R.4th 336.

Referral fee agreement between attorneys. 28 A.L.R.4th 665.

“Structured settlement” and attorney's fees arrangements in relation thereto. 31 A.L.R.4th 95.

Priority between judgment creditor's lien and attorney's lien. 34 A.L.R.4th 665.

Retaining lien as affected by action to collect legal fees. 45 A.L.R.4th 198.

Am. Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attys, § 183 et seq., § 357 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Legal Profession — Non-Compromise Provisions in Attorney-Client Contracts, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 474.

Attorney-Client — Compensation of Attorney as Condition Precedent to Substitution, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 140.

Legal Malpractice, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 452.

Note, Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman: The Value of a Discharged Attorney's Contingent Fee Contract in Arkansas, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 549.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Legal Profession, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 649.

C.J.S. 7 C.J.S., Atty & C., § 131 et seq.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The statutory lien provided in this subchapter is available to attorneys who have been dismissed only if they have been fired without cause. Crockett & Brown v. Wilson, 314 Ark. 578, 864 S.W.2d 244 (1993).

Scope.

Act 293 of 1989, codified as § 16-22-301 et seq., explicitly provides that attorneys may rely on their contractual rights with clients and are entitled to obtain a lien for services based on such agreements. The Attorneys Lien Law also provides that, under appropriate circumstances, the lien may be enforced not only against the client but against anyone, including another attorney, who knowingly settles with an opposing litigant without the consent of the attorney, and being remedial legislation, Act 293 is not confined to prospective operation. Lockley v. Easley, 302 Ark. 13, 786 S.W.2d 573 (1990).

16-22-301. Legislative intent.

It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Supreme Court, in Henry, Walden, and Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25 (1987), limited the existing Attorney's Lien Law by allowing only a quantum meruit recovery in a case in which the attorney was dismissed by the client; that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Attorney Lien Law is contrary to what was intended by the enactment of Acts 59 and 306 of 1941, the Attorney Lien Law; that an attorney should have the right to rely on his contract with his client; and that the Attorney's Lien Law should be reenacted to protect the contractual rights of attorneys. Therefore, it is the intent of §§ 16-22-30216-22-304 to allow an attorney to obtain a lien for services based on his or her agreement with his or her client and to provide for compensation in case of a settlement or compromise without the consent of the attorney.

History. Acts 1989, No. 293, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. As to repeal of former provisions relating to lien of attorney, see Publisher's Notes to this subchapter.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Equity and the Restitutionary Remedies: Constructive Trust, Equitable Lien, and Subrogation, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey—Miscellaneous, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 235.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The attorney's lien statutes, this section through § 16-22-304, do not apply to cases in which an attorney is terminated for cause. Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197, 890 S.W.2d 260 (1995).

An attorney's lien extends only to fees and disbursements rendered in the particular action in which they were incurred, and does not cover a general balance due the attorney, charges rendered in other causes, or charges in causes not intimately connected with the particular action. Grayson v. Bank of Little Rock, 334 Ark. 180, 971 S.W.2d 788 (1998).

Attorney that had been retained by an employee to represent the employee in a workers' compensation case, but then had been told by the employee that he wanted to end the case, was entitled to assert a lien on a final settlement that was reached after the employee hired a second lawyer instead of abandoning the case; the fact that the attorney had been involved in the case before there was any controversy did not preclude the attorney from imposing a lien for fees. Wren v. DeQueen Sand & Gravel Co., 87 Ark. App. 212, 189 S.W.3d 522 (2004).

Attorney-Client Relationship.

Without an attorney-client relationship, there is no basis for claiming an attorney's fee under the statute. Fox v. AAA U-Rent It, 341 Ark. 483, 17 S.W.3d 481 (2000).

Attorneys are entitled to obtain a lien for services based on agreements with their clients and, while an attorney's lien may in some instances be enforceable against another attorney, such a lien is not created where there is no attorney-client relationship; thus, a former employer was not entitled to such a lien on a settlement obtained by a former employee in a class action suit. Morgan v. Chandler, 367 Ark. 430, 241 S.W.3d 224 (2006).

Cited: Lockley v. Easley, 302 Ark. 13, 786 S.W.2d 573 (1990); Haskins Law Firm v. American Nat'l Property & Cas. Co., 304 Ark. 684, 804 S.W.2d 714 (1991); Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992); Finnegan v. Johnson, 326 Ark. 586, 932 S.W.2d 344 (1996).

16-22-302. Compensation governed by contract.

The compensation of an attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor for his services is governed by agreement, expressed or implied, which is not restrained by law.

History. Acts 1989, No. 293, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. As to repeal of former provisions relating to lien of attorney, see Publisher's Notes to this subchapter.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey—Miscellaneous, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 235.

Case Notes

Construction.

Former similar section was remedial in character and was to be liberally construed. Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Applicability.

The attorney's lien statutes, §§ 16-22-30116-22-304, do not apply to cases in which an attorney is terminated for cause. Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197, 890 S.W.2d 260 (1995).

Compliance.

Strict compliance with the statute is not required, substantial compliance will suffice. Gary Eubanks & Assocs. v. Black & White Cab Co., 34 Ark. App. 235, 808 S.W.2d 796 (1991).

Attorney failed to comply with this section where the letter did not contain notice of intent to assert an attorney's lien on the proceeds of the claim, the letter was not dispatched by registered mail, and did not contain the signature of attorney or client. Gary Eubanks & Assocs. v. Black & White Cab Co., 34 Ark. App. 235, 808 S.W.2d 796 (1991).

Contingency Fees.

Contingency contracts for legal services are valid and enforceable, and when those services have been performed as contemplated in contract, attorney is entitled to fee fixed in the contract and to lien granted by attorney's lien provisions. Former statute did not authorize an attorney to recover full contingency fee under contract where contract had not been fully performed, and attorney was limited to recovery of a reasonable fee for his services. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003) (decision under prior law).

Contract.

There was no requirement under former statute that a contract for the compensation of attorney be in writing. Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979) (decision under prior law).

Discharge for Cause.

An attorney discharged for cause is entitled only to a “reasonable fee” rather than a contract fee. Crockett & Brown v. Wilson, 314 Ark. 578, 864 S.W.2d 244 (1993).

Where attorney was discharged for cause, this section was not applicable, and the chancellor properly awarded a reasonable fee for attorney's services rendered to the date of termination, rather than at the contracted rate. Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197, 890 S.W.2d 260 (1995).

Discharge Without Cause.

Where an attorney was retained to represent an heir in the settlement of an estate upon an agreement that he should receive a certain percentage of the heir's interest in the estate and was discharged without cause before the estate was settled and suit was brought at once, he was entitled to recover his expenses and the value of his services but not to recover the amount of compensation agreed upon, as the amount that would be due under the contract could not be ascertained until the estate was settled. Weil v. Finneran, 70 Ark. 509, 69 S.W. 310 (1902) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992); Fox v. AAA U-Rent It, 341 Ark. 483, 17 S.W.3d 481 (2000).

16-22-303. Compromise or settlement without attorney's consent — Effect.

  1. Any agreement, contract, or arrangement between litigants or any conduct of the one seeking affirmative relief at the instance and procurement of his adversary which deprives the litigant of his asserted right against his adversary shall constitute a compromise or settlement of his cause of action within the meaning of this section.
    1. In case a compromise or settlement is made by the parties litigant to the action after service of the notice by certified mail and before the filing of suit, or if made after suit is filed upon the action and such compromise or settlement is made without the consent of such attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor, the court of proper jurisdiction shall, upon motion, enter judgment for a reasonable fee or compensation against all of the parties to the compromise or settlement so made without the consent of the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor, and the amount of the fee or compensation shall not be necessarily limited to the amount, if any, of the compromise or settlement between the parties litigant.
    2. If the compromise or settlement is effected by an agent or agents of such party, the judgment shall be entered against the agent or agents as well as against those parties from whom the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor is entitled to judgment for the fee or compensation, and, if the compromise or settlement is made with the knowledge or advice of the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor of those parties from whom the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor is entitled to judgment for the fee or compensation, the court shall also enter judgment against such attorneys at law, solicitors, or counselors as well.

History. Acts 1989, No. 293, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. As to repeal of former provisions relating to lien of attorney, see Publisher's Notes to this subchapter.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey—Miscellaneous, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 235.

Case Notes

Construction.

Former similar section was remedial in character and must be liberally construed. Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Applicability.

The attorney's lien statutes, §§ 16-22-30116-22-304, do not apply to cases in which an attorney is terminated for cause. Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197, 890 S.W.2d 260 (1995).

Abandonment of Client.

Counsel's protest to client and advice against making what he thought was an improvident settlement did not constitute abandonment of his client or forfeiture of any right he may have had under contract with client. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Hurst, 198 Ark. 546, 129 S.W.2d 970 (1939) (decision under prior law).

Collection of Fee.

The right of the attorney to collect his fee from his client's adversary is dependent upon this section and he must bring his case in conformity therewith. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Geurin, 200 Ark. 755, 140 S.W.2d 691 (1940) (decision under prior law).

Where client settles claim without attorney's knowledge, attorney can recover fee by separate action in the court in which his client's action was instituted and is not limited to file a motion in the origianl suit. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Judgment for a reasonable fee may be against any of the parties litigant. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003) (decision under prior law).

Because it was “patently clear” that the attorney's Pulaski County suit over disputed contingency fees from a former client's settlement with the insurer had no chance of success and was a collateral attack, where the settlement was entered in Cleburne County, and the proper venue was in Cleburne County, and because the attorney attempted to manufacture venue by claiming unwarranted costs and expenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against the attorney under Ark. R. Civ. P. 11. Pomtree v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 353 Ark. 657, 121 S.W.3d 147 (2003).

—Lien.

Probate court had jurisdiction to enforce attorney's lien pending in that court for case tried before that court. Baxter Land Co. v. Gibson, 236 Ark. 664, 367 S.W.2d 741 (1963) (decision under prior law).

If a proceeding to collect attorney's fee is against the client, the amount of the fee is to be governed by their agreement and, to ensure payment of that fee, the attorney is entitled to a lien upon the client's cause of action which attaches to any settlement recovered by the client; however, when the attorney proceeds against the other party, this section contains no provision for a lien upon the cause of action which might attach to a settlement recovered by the other party and the attorney is entitled only to a reasonable fee or compensation. Jarboe v. Hicks, 281 Ark. 21, 660 S.W.2d 930 (1983); Cato v. Arkansas Mun. League Mun. Health Benefit Fund, 285 Ark. 419, 688 S.W.2d 720 (1985) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Where attorney filed suit for accounting and aided in preparing divorce suit, which was dismissed, and there was no showing that client received tangible assets in return for the dismissal of her claim, no useful purpose would be served by reopening suit for purposes of enforcing attorney's lien. Myers v. Muuss, 281 Ark. 188, 662 S.W.2d 805 (1984) (decision under prior law).

Entitlement to Fee.

Defendant, by compromising and settling with client, recognizes the attorney's absolute right to recover a fee of some amount and the attorney is entitled to a recovery without having to prove that client could recover in the original case. Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943) (decision under prior law).

When a client settles a claim without the attorney's consent, with or without a monetary consideration for the settlement, the attorney is nevertheless entitled to a reasonable fee. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Attorney who, when it developed at the trial that client's suit had been settled without his knowledge, entered a nonsuit, did not lose his right to an attorney's fee. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943) (decision under prior law).

In suit by attorneys to recover fees where parties to a suit have compromised, attorneys need not show that suit would have been successful, if tried, or that client received any consideration for the compromise or settlement. Hamm v. Howard, 216 Ark. 326, 225 S.W.2d 333 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Attorney was entitled to fee for services rendered in suing debtor where debtor paid client directly, if client had agreed to pay attorney a reasonable cash fee for any services performed. Stevens v. Gilliam, 220 Ark. 867, 251 S.W.2d 241 (1952) (decision under prior law).

To be entitled to a fee under this section the attorney does not have to show that the suit would have been successful. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (decision under prior law).

An attorney discharged with or without cause can recover the reasonable value of his or her services to the date of discharge. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

Motion to Fix Fee.

Proof of a compromise or settlement after suit is filed and without the attorney's consent constitutes, under this section, the only prerequisite to the proper filing by the attorney of a motion to have his fee fixed. Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Reasonableness of Fee.

This section provides for a fee on a quantum meruit basis and in determining what would be a reasonable fee, court takes into consideration the amount of time and labor involved, the skill and ability of the attorney, and the nature and extent of the litigation. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Hurst, 198 Ark. 546, 129 S.W.2d 970 (1939) (decision under prior law).

Fee is not necessarily limited to the amount of the settlement; other elements may be considered in determining a reasonable fee on a quantum meruit. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Geurin, 200 Ark. 755, 140 S.W.2d 691 (1940) (decision under prior law).

For discussion of reasonableness of fee in various contexts, see St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Poe, 201 Ark. 93, 143 S.W.2d 879 (1940); Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943); Holland v. Harley, 206 Ark. 244, 174 S.W.2d 567 (1943); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943); Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979) (decisions under prior law).

Among the pertinent considerations in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee, not specifically fixed by contract, are: (1) the attorney's judgment, learning, ability, skill, experience, professional standing and advice; (2) the relationship between the parties; (3) the amount or importance of the subject matter of the case; (4) the nature, extent and difficulty of services in research; (5) the preparation of pleadings; (6) the proceedings actually taken and the nature and extent of the litigation; (7) the time and labor devoted to the client's cause, the difficulties presented in the course of the litigation and the results obtained. In making these determinations, both the trial court's and the appellate court's experience and knowledge of the character of such services may be used as a guide. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

Fee award held reasonable. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

There is no requirement that the trial judge consider his own experience and knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of a fee. Harper v. Shackleford, 41 Ark. App. 116, 850 S.W.2d 15 (1993).

Cited: Haskins Law Firm v. American Nat'l Property & Cas. Co., 304 Ark. 684, 804 S.W.2d 714 (1991).

16-22-304. Lien of attorney created.

    1. From and after service upon the adverse party of a written notice signed by the client and by the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor representing the client, which notice is to be served by certified mail and a return receipt being required to establish actual delivery of the notice, the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor serving the notice upon the adversary party shall have a lien upon his or her client's cause of action, claim, or counterclaim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, judgment, or final order in his or her client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosoever's hands they may come.
    2. The lien cannot be defeated and impaired by any subsequent negotiation or compromise by any parties litigant.
    3. However, the lien shall apply only to the cause or causes of action specifically enumerated in the notice.
  1. In the event that the notice is not served upon the adverse party by an attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor representing his client, the same lien created in this section shall attach in favor of the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor from and after the commencement of an action or special proceeding or the service upon an answer containing a counterclaim, in favor of the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor who appears for and signs a pleading for his or her client in the action, claim, or counterclaim in which the attorney at law, solicitor, or counselor has been employed to represent the client.
    1. This lien shall apply to proceedings before the Workers' Compensation Commission.
    2. The lien shall attach from the date a notice of claim is filed with the commission, if served by certified mail, return receipt requested, or from the date the commission mails notice of the claim to the employer or carrier, regardless of whether this mailing by the commission is by certified mail or regular mail, whichever date occurs first.
    1. This lien shall apply to procedures set forth in § 18-50-101 et seq.
    2. The lien shall attach on the date a mortgagee's power of attorney or beneficiary's appointment of substitute trustee is recorded pursuant to § 18-50-102.
    3. If a mortgagee's power of attorney or beneficiary's appointment of substitute trustee is not recorded, then the lien shall attach on the date a notice of default and intention to sell is mailed in accordance with § 18-50-104.
    4. The lien shall secure all work performed by the attorney for the mortgagee or beneficiary, including, but not limited to, expenses incurred by the attorney for abstracting and title insurance services and giving notice of the trustee's or mortgagee's sale.
  2. The court or commission before which an action was instituted, or in which an action may be pending at the time of settlement, compromise, or verdict, or in any circuit court of proper venue, upon the petition of the client or attorney at law, shall determine and enforce the lien created by this section.

History. Acts 1989, No. 293, § 1; 1991, No. 1229, § 1; 2003, No. 1047, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. As to repeal of former section, see Publisher's Notes to this subchapter.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment added the subdivision designations in (c); inserted present (d) and redesignated former (d) as present (e); substituted “circuit” for “chancery” in present (e); and made gender neutral and stylistic changes.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Attorneys Liens, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 448.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Contract Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 845.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former statute did not unconstitutionally deprive one of the right of trial by jury, since constitutional right of trial by jury applies only to rights that existed at common law before the adoption of the constitution, and does not apply to new rights created by the legislature since the adoption of the constitution. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003) (decision under prior law).

In General.

Former similar statute provided the only method by which an attorney's lien could be enforced. McNeill v. Percy, 201 Ark. 454, 145 S.W.2d 32 (1940) (decision under prior law).

An attorney's lien which has attached to the proceeds of litigation follows the property when it is conveyed to others. Nash v. Estate of Swaffar, 336 Ark. 235, 983 S.W.2d 942 (1999).

Construction.

Former statute was remedial in character and was to be liberally construed. Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 169 S.W.2d 571 (1943); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Rush v. Metrocentre Improv. Dist. No. 1, 686 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1982) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Attorney that had been retained by an employee to represent the employee in a workers' compensation case, but then had been told by the employee that he wanted to end the case, was entitled to assert a lien on a final settlement that was reached after the employee hired a second lawyer instead of abandoning the case; the fact that the attorney had been involved in the case before there was any controversy did not preclude the attorney from imposing a lien for fees. Wren v. DeQueen Sand & Gravel Co., 87 Ark. App. 212, 189 S.W.3d 522 (2004).

Attorneys are entitled to obtain a lien for services based on agreements with their clients and, while an attorney's lien may in some instances be enforceable against another attorney, such a lien is not created where there is no attorney-client relationship; thus, a former employer was not entitled to such a lien on a settlement obtained by a former employee in a class action suit. Morgan v. Chandler, 367 Ark. 430, 241 S.W.3d 224 (2006).

Purpose.

Purpose of former statute was to establish a lien for attorney's fees, after specified notice to adverse parties, which attached to proceeds of any settlement, verdict, report, decision, judgment, or final order. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003) (decision under prior law).

The 1989 amendments to the Attorney's Lien Law expressed a clear legislative intent that attorneys be allowed to rely on the contracts they make with their clients, regardless of whether the contract is for a contingent fee or otherwise. Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992).

Applicability.

The attorney's lien statutes, § 16-22-301 through this section, do not apply to cases in which an attorney is terminated for cause. Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197, 890 S.W.2d 260 (1995).

Court properly denied attorney a lien on client's real property because the case did not come within the province of the attorney's lien statute where the attorney sought to extend a lien over property that the client already owned and was not the subject of the litigation; this section is limited to cases where there has been an actual recovery of money or property. Northwest Ark. Recovery, Inc. v. Davis, 89 Ark. App. 62, 200 S.W.3d 481 (2004).

Appeal.

Where, upon appeal from suit in which appellants intervened, appellants filed an affidavit to the effect that they had not authorized an appeal, appeal was dismissed without prejudice to rights of counsel to pursue any action or lien which he may have had for services. Martin v. Pope, 226 Ark. 522, 290 S.W.2d 849 (1956) (decision under prior law).

Collection of Fee.

The right of the attorney to collect his fee from his client's adversary was dependent upon former statute and he had to bring his case in conformity therewith. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Geurin, 200 Ark. 755, 140 S.W.2d 691 (1940) (decision under prior law).

Where client settles claim without attorney's knowledge, attorney can recover fee by separate action in the court in which his client's action was instituted and is not limited to file a motion in the original suit. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Because it was “patently clear” that the attorney's Pulaski County suit over disputed contingency fees from a former client's settlement with the insurer had no chance of success and was a collateral attack, where the settlement was entered in Cleburne County, and the proper venue was in Cleburne County, and because the attorney attempted to manufacture venue by claiming unwarranted costs and expenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against the attorney under Ark. R. Civ. P. 11. Pomtree v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 353 Ark. 657, 121 S.W.3d 147 (2003).

—Lien.

Probate court had jurisdiction to enforce attorney's lien pending in that court for case tried before that court. Baxter Land Co. v. Gibson, 236 Ark. 664, 367 S.W.2d 741 (1963) (decision under prior law).

If a proceeding to collect attorney's fees is against the client, the amount of the fee is to be governed by their agreement and, to ensure payment of that fee, the attorney is entitled to a lien upon the client's cause of action which attaches to any settlement recovered by the client; however, when the attorney proceeds against the other party, former statute contained no provision for a lien upon the cause of action which might attach to a settlement recovered by the other party and the attorney was entitled only to a reasonable fee or compensation. Jarboe v. Hicks, 281 Ark. 21, 660 S.W.2d 930 (1983); Cato v. Arkansas Mun. League Mun. Health Benefit Fund, 285 Ark. 419, 688 S.W.2d 720 (1985) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Where attorney filed suit for accounting and aided in preparing divorce suit, which was dismissed, and there was no showing that client received tangible assets in return for the dismissal of her claim, no useful purpose would be served by reopening suit for purposes of enforcing attorney's lien. Myers v. Muuss, 281 Ark. 188, 662 S.W.2d 805 (1984) (decision under prior law).

Where the client did not receive a verdict in his favor in the interpleader action, and did not receive any portion of the interpled fund, no judgment existed on which his attorney could attach a lien. Birdsong Cabinet Shop, Inc. v. Bland, 307 Ark. 149, 817 S.W.2d 886 (1991).

The circuit court erred in making the particular declaration allowing attorney a 20% interest in client's potential recovery against the disputed trust and estate. The circuit court should have considered a declaration of whether or not the attorney was entitled to a fee based on quantum meruit. Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992).

Contingency Fee.

Where legal services had been fully performed as contemplated in a contingency fee contract, attorney was entitled to the fee fixed in the contract and to the lien granted by former statute. Former statute did not authorize an attorney to recover full contingency fee under contract where contract had not been fully performed, and attorney was limited to recovery of a reasonable fee for his services. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003) (decision under prior law). But see § 16-22-301.

Expenses.

Where client agreed to pay attorney one-third of amount recovered and, out of his share, any expenses properly incurred, expenses properly incurred were a part of the fee and within the purview of former statute. Moreover, compensation of assisting attorney should have been considered as one of expenses properly incurred and embraced in the attorney's lien. McNeill v. Percy, 201 Ark. 454, 145 S.W.2d 32 (1940) (decision under prior law).

The lien for an attorney's fee also includes the expenses properly incurred by the attorney in prosecuting the suit. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Interpleader.

Attorneys who contracted on a contingent fee basis to bring action against insurance companies for fire loss were entitled to fee based on total recovery even though a percentage of the amount would actually be paid to mortgagee in interpleader action, and attorneys were entitled to lien for that amount on mortgagor's portion of recovery. Consolidated Underwriters of S.C. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 136 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (decision under prior law).

Jurisdiction.

The lien must be enforced in the trial court. May v. Ausley, 103 Ark. 306, 146 S.W. 139 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Probate court had jurisdiction to enforce attorney's lien pending in that court for case tried before that court. Baxter Land Co. v. Gibson, 236 Ark. 664, 367 S.W.2d 741 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Even though petitioner argued that venue was improper under § 16-60-116(a) because he neither resided nor was summoned in Crawford County, but because the complaint was one quasi in rem to determine the rights to the money in the registry of the Crawford County Circuit Court and, specifically, his rights to attorney fees, Crawford County was the proper venue for hearing the complaint in intervention under subsection (d) of this section. Milligan v. Circuit Court, 331 Ark. 439, 959 S.W.2d 747 (1998).

Notice.

In suit to recover fee from adverse party, attorney should allege and prove that defendant had notice of his interest in the suit. Kansas City, F.S. & M.R. Co. v. Joslin, 74 Ark. 551, 86 S.W. 435 (1905); Rachels & Robinson v. Doniphan Lumber Co., 98 Ark. 529, 136 S.W. 658 (1911) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A letter to the adverse party from the attorney, even though not signed by his client, that he was impressing a lien constituted substantial compliance with former statute. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 241 Ark. 994, 411 S.W.2d 299 (1967) (decision under prior law).

Attorney not entitled to relief under this section where attorney failed to comply with this section's requirement of written notice signed by the client. Childs v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 55 Ark. App. 168, 934 S.W.2d 533 (1996).

Chancellor erred in finding that the attorney's lien could not be enforced upon the check the client gave her boyfriend based on a lack of notice to the boyfriend; once the attorney filed the petition for citation of contempt on behalf of the client, an attorney's lien attached to any judgment the client received as a result of the attorney's work. Froelich v. Graham, 349 Ark. 692, 80 S.W.3d 360 (2002).

Purpose of this section was to ensure that the adverse party was aware of the attorney's intention to claim a lien on the proceeds of the litigation before the settlement was paid; the record showed that the adverse parties' attorney sent a letter to the law firm and the client's new attorney acknowledging the law firm's claim such that there was no question that the adverse parties had actual notice of the asserted lien before any settlement money was paid to the client. Mack v. Brazil, Adlong & Winningham, PLC, 357 Ark. 1, 159 S.W.3d 291 (2004).

Priority.

Attorney's lien on judgment which was garnished by third party was held superior to garnishment, even though service of garnishment antedated attorney's petition to establish lien, because the lien attached and dated from the filing of the complaint and the issuance of summons thereon. McNeill v. Percy, 201 Ark. 454, 145 S.W.2d 32 (1940) (decision under prior law).

In action by mortgagor against insurance companies for fire loss, attorney's lien attached when complaints were filed and summons issued thereon and were superior to liens of mortgagor's creditors, including lien of judgment creditor under § 16-66-112, where judgment creditor had not obtained execution or garnishment against personal property or delivery of the writ to the officer in the proper county. Consolidated Underwriters of S.C. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 136 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (decision under prior law).

Mortgagee's right to the proceeds of fire policy containing open loss payable and standard mortgage clauses was superior to lien of attorneys who represented mortgagor in action to recover on policy. Consolidated Underwriters of S.C. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 136 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court properly granted priority to an attorney-fee lien in the sales proceeds of 46 acres where the validity of the attorney's lien, her right of foreclosure, and her right to one-third of the sales proceeds from the 46 acres had been established by the law of the case. Howard v. Adams, 2016 Ark. App. 222, 490 S.W.3d 678 (2016).

Procedure for Enforcement.

Where client settles claim without attorney's knowledge, attorney can recover fee by separate action in the court in which his client's action was instituted and is not limited to file a motion in the original suit. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. McDonald, 206 Ark. 270, 174 S.W.2d 944 (1943) (decision under prior law).

The procedure for enforcing an attorney's lien may be by motion in court where action is pending, or may be by separate suit in that court. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (decision under prior law).

Where suit began as a contract action in which the circuit court had proper subject matter jurisdiction, after the suit was amended to include a request for declaratory relief, the suit was still properly before the circuit court, as §§ 16-111-103 and 16-111-104 permit courts of record within their respective jurisdictions to declare relief in cases involving the interpretation of contracts. Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992).

Property Subject to Lien.

A solicitor has no lien upon his client's land for services rendered in removing a cloud from his title to it. Hershy v. Du Val, 47 Ark. 86, 14 S.W. 469 (1885) (decision under prior law).

Attorney is not entitled to lien on land allotted to client in partition suit. Gibson v. Buckner, 65 Ark. 84, 44 S.W. 1034 (1898); Weatherford v. Hill, 68 Ark. 80, 56 S.W. 448 (1900); Houpt v. Bohl, 71 Ark. 330, 75 S.W. 470 (1903) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Former statute did not give the attorney any interest in, or control over, the cause of action; he had a lien only on the fruits of the litigation. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Blaylock, 117 Ark. 504, 175 S.W. 1170 (1915) (decision under prior law).

An interest of one of the parties in certain oil leases was not subject to attorney's lien. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (decision under prior law).

Reasonable Fees.

Although former statute made no distinction between a contingency fee and a fee based on other criteria, it did not require that the fee should be anything other than reasonable. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003) (decision under prior law).

Once it was determined that a law firm was discharged by its client for cause, the firm's lien under this section, the Arkansas' attorney-lien statute, was determined on a quantum-meruit basis, despite a contingent-fee contract between the firm and the client, to provide compensation for the reasonable value of the firm's services. Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Kosin, 2011 Ark. 51, 378 S.W.3d 135 (2011).

Reopening Suit.

Where attorney filed suit for accounting and aided in preparing divorce suit, which was dismissed, and there was no showing that client received tangible assets in return for the dismissal of her claim, no useful purpose would be served by reopening suit for purposes of enforcing attorney's lien. Myers v. Muuss, 281 Ark. 188, 662 S.W.2d 805 (1984).

Settlement.

The right of an attorney to his fees is unaffected by a release executed by his client, relieving the defendant from liability. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Mooney, 111 Ark. 514, 164 S.W. 276 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Attempted compromise by one of distributees of proceeds of judicial sale, absent authority by other distributees, did not bind other distributees or defeat the contingent fee interest of their attorney. Holland v. Wait, 193 Ark. 1179, 102 S.W.2d 550 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Where an attorney, employed by finance company to collect balance due or repossess car from delinquent purchaser, called on defendant and received his promise to pay balance or deliver car on following day, and the attorney neither filed suit nor gave defendant a written notice by registered mail, and defendant made compromise settlement directly with finance company, the attorney had no right of action or lien against defendant for attorneys fees under former statute. Whetstone v. Daniel, 217 Ark. 899, 233 S.W.2d 625 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Where debtor of attorney's client settled with client without attorney's knowledge after registered letter had been sent to debtor informing him that client had instructed attorney to file suit on the account, attorney acquired statutory lien and was entitled to a reasonable fee from debtor for his services. Whetstone v. Travis, 223 Ark. 856, 269 S.W.2d 320 (1954) (decision under prior law).

A client's action in settling or dismissing his claim or cause of action without consulting his attorney could also entitle the latter to a lien for his fee under former statute. Martin v. Pope, 226 Ark. 522, 290 S.W.2d 849 (1956) (decision under prior law).

A client could dismiss or settle his cause of action without consulting his attorney, but if he does so, the attorney had a lien for his fee under former statute. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (decision under prior law).

Where a general contractor and an insurance company resolved claims between them by entering into a comprehensive settlement agreement which decreased the monetary obligations owed by the general contractor to the insurer, the agreement was a settlement in the general contractor's favor within the meaning of former statute and, therefore, the general contractor's attorney had a valid and enforceable lien which had attached to the settlement sum. Rush v. Metrocentre Improv. Dist. No. 1, 686 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1982) (decision under prior law).

By the language of the attorney's lien statute, the lien applies to “any settlement”; thus, where a law firm, that had agreed to represent a client for a contingent fee and later was fired, claimed an attorney's lien on behalf of its former client against any recovery, but entered into an express contract with the client's new attorney for a guaranteed attorney's lien for a specific dollar amount, the law firm bargained away its right to any future recovery by substituting a liquidated sum in exchange for surrendering its right to a percentage of any subsequent recovery. Haskins Law Firm v. American Nat'l Property & Cas. Co., 304 Ark. 684, 804 S.W.2d 714 (1991).

Time of Attachment.

Lien attaches when summons is issued. Union Sawmill Co. v. Pace, Campbell & Davis, 163 Ark. 598, 260 S.W. 428 (1924) (decision under prior law).

Attorney employed under written contract had a lien on client's cause of action from the date the complaint was filed and summons issued thereon. McNeill v. Percy, 201 Ark. 454, 145 S.W.2d 32 (1940) (decision under prior law).

In an action under former statute against an insurance company, the cause of action attached upon the happening of total and permanent disability, although not recoverable until due proof of disability was made, and the fact that notice was given prior to the furnishing of proof of disability would not defeat the lien. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 241 Ark. 994, 411 S.W.2d 299 (1967) (decision under prior law).

When an attorney fails to give the required written notice to the adverse party, a lien does not attach until summons, issued on the complaint, is placed in the hands of the proper sheriff. Home Ins. Co. v. Jones, 253 Ark. 218, 485 S.W.2d 190 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Teasley v. Hermann Cos., 92 Ark. App. 40, 211 S.W.3d 40 (2005).

16-22-305. Unnecessary costs satisfied by attorney.

If any attorney at law or other person admitted to conduct causes in any court in the State of Arkansas appears to have multiplied the proceedings in any cause before such court, so as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously, he shall be required, by order of the court, to satisfy any excess of costs so increased.

History. Acts 1915, No. 240, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 607; Pope's Dig., § 647; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-303.

Cross References. Liability of attorney for costs, §§ 16-68-306, 16-68-407.

16-22-306. Negligence of attorney resulting in dismissal — Liability for costs and damages.

If any suit in any court of record in this state is dismissed on account of the negligence of any attorney at law, or for his nonattendance at the court without having a just and reasonable excuse for such absence, it shall be at the costs of the attorney at law. Such attorney at law shall be liable for all damages his client may have sustained by the dismissal or by any other neglect by the attorney at law of his duty, in an action in any court within this state having jurisdiction thereof.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 608; Pope's Dig., § 648; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-304.

Case Notes

Good Faith.

In dealing with their clients, attorneys are required to exercise the utmost good faith. Weil v. Fineran, 78 Ark. 87, 93 S.W. 568 (1906).

Negligence.

An attorney is not liable in the discharge of his official duty for claims put into his hands to collect as an attorney, unless it is shown that he has been guilty of culpable negligence in the prosecution of his suit, and thereby the plaintiff has lost his debt. Cummins v. McLain, 2 Ark. 402 (1840); Sevier v. Holliday, 2 Ark. 512 (1840); Palmer & Southmayd v. Ashley & Ringo, 3 Ark. 75 (1840).

Statute of Limitations.

Clients' legal malpractice suit under this section for failure of a law firm to properly file a medical malpractice suit, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under § 16-56-105(3), because, under the occurrence rule, the clients' legal malpractice action ran no later than three years after the last day that their medical malpractice action could have been properly instituted. Rice v. Ragsdale, 104 Ark. App. 364, 292 S.W.3d 856 (2009).

Cited: Barr v. Cockrill, 224 Ark. 570, 275 S.W.2d 6 (1955).

16-22-307. Failure to pay over money — Judgment for money and costs — Penalized by court.

If any attorney at law receiving money for his client refuses or fails to pay the money over on demand, the attorney at law may be proceeded against in a summary way on motion before the circuit court, either in the county in which he may reside or in the county in which he received the money. The court shall render judgment against him for the amount of money received by the attorney at law for the use of his client, with costs, and he shall be further dealt with as the court may deem just under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 609; Pope's Dig., § 649; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-305.

Cross References. Judgment on motion obtained by client against attorney, § 16-65-201.

Case Notes

Basis of Liability.

An attorney cannot be held liable for money collected by him as such, unless a demand is made upon him and he refuses to pay it over or remit it according to instructions of his client. His liability depends upon the principle of agency, and he holds money when collected as bailee. Taylor v. Spears, 6 Ark. 381 (1846).

Notice of Collection.

It is the duty of an attorney who has collected money as such to give notice of the fact to his client within a reasonable time, and if he fails to do so he may be sued without previous demand. Jett v. Hempstead, 25 Ark. 462 (1869).

If the client has notice, he must make demand in a reasonable time. Whitehead v. Wells, 29 Ark. 99 (1874).

Summary Proceedings.

This section was not intended as a substitute for an ordinary action for money had and received, and where the attorney files a verified answer showing a meritorious defense, the court cannot render summary judgment upon the client's motion. Davies & Davies v. Patterson, 132 Ark. 484, 201 S.W. 504 (1917).

Suspension from Practice.

A complaint charging an attorney with failure to pay over client's funds, asking that the court deal with him as the court might deem just, is sufficient to base an order suspending defendant from practice. Nichols v. Little, 112 Ark. 213, 165 S.W. 301 (1914).

Wrongful Payment.

If an attorney, without authority, pays money of his client to another, who was not authorized to receive it, the client may recover it from the attorney. Wood & Henderson v. Claiborne, 82 Ark. 514, 102 S.W. 219 (1907), superseded by statute as stated in, Walker v. Stephens, 3 Ark. App. 205, 626 S.W.2d 200 (1981).

Cited: Wallis v. State, 54 Ark. 611, 16 S.W. 821 (1891).

16-22-308. Attorney's fees in certain civil actions.

In any civil action to recover on an open account, statement of account, account stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services, or breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.

History. Acts 1987, No. 519, § 1; 1989, No. 800, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1999, No. 135, § 5, provided: “All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed. Specifically, any other law or parts of law of general application regarding the award of attorneys' fees, as applied in litigation involving policies of insurance, are superseded by this Act. Specifically, the provisions of § 16-22-308 regarding the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a civil action for breach of contract are expressly superseded by the provisions of this Act.” Acts 1999, No. 135 amended § 23-79-208.

Cross References. Actions on bonds, notes, etc., § 16-107-101 et seq.

Costs generally, § 16-68-401 et seq.

Research References

ALR.

Recovery of Computer-Assisted Research Costs as Part of or in Addition to Attorney's Fees Under State Law. 33 A.L.R.6th 305.

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages, Fifth Edition, Chapter 30: Real Property, 2004 Arkansas L. Notes 9.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Crockett and Brown, P.A. v. Courson: Determining the Fee of an Attorney Discharged “For Cause,” 47 Ark. L. Rev. 725.

Recent Development, Attorney's Fees — Prevailing Party Status BKD, LLP v. Yates, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 1005.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds Attorney's Fees and Costs Available to Prevailing Parties in Wrongful-Discharge Actions Under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

Britta Palmer Stamps, Recent Developments: Attorney's Fees — Fees May Be Awarded Under Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act Regardless of Overall Prevailing Party, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 1111 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

Survey — Miscellaneous, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 219.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.

Stephanie Mantell, Note: Fee-Shifting Statutes and Landlord-Tenant Law—A Call for the Repeal of the English Rule “Loser Pays” System Regarding Contract Disputes and Its Effect on Low-Income Arkansas Tenants, 39 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2016).

Case Notes

In General.

Power to award attorney's fees under this section does not mean that the court can do so without first informing its discretion as to the reasonableness of the requested amount; in a wrongful termination case where the employer prevailed, the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded a substantial attorney's fee in the employer's favor before receiving any evidence regarding the work counsel had performed and before giving the employees a meaningful opportunity to challenge the fee. McCabe v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 2019 Ark. App. 566, 591 S.W.3d 335 (2019).

Construction.

This section covers the same subject as § 23-89-207 and aids in determining legislative intent for that section. Wenrick v. Crater, 315 Ark. 361, 868 S.W.2d 60 (1993).

The legislature's use of the word “may” in this section indicates that the legislature intended a court's award of attorney's fees pursuant to this section to be permissive and discretionary with the court rather than mandatory. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Tobi Eng'g, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

Trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party under this section, then ruling they were not recoverable as a “preliminary expense” under § 14-92-238; the attorney's fees and costs were not “preliminary expenses” and, hence, not subject to a tax levy against the district's land. Perkins v. Cedar Mt. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 43, 360 Ark. 50, 199 S.W.3d 667 (2004).

Applicability.

Statutes such as this section providing for attorney's fees to be taxed as costs are to be given retrospective application. Fayetteville v. Bibb, 30 Ark. App. 31, 781 S.W.2d 493 (1989).

This section, defining costs as including discretionary attorney's fees in certain cases, must be applied by federal court in a diversity case. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Tobi Eng'g, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

Plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees where he brought an action to recover on a materialman's lien, unjust enrichment and detrimental reliance and not on any of the instruments or contracts expressly listed in this section, and where plaintiff obtained only partial relief on its detrimental reliance claim and could not be said to have prevailed on its unjust enrichment claim. Westside Galvanizing Services, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 921 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1990).

This statute allows a trial court to assess a reasonable attorney's fee and is inapplicable upon appeal. University Hosp. v. Undernehr, 307 Ark. 445, 821 S.W.2d 26 (1991); 215 Club v. Devore, 311 Ark. 309, 843 S.W.2d 317 (1992); Precision Steel Whse., Inc. v. Anderson-Martin Mach. Co., 313 Ark. 258, 854 S.W.2d 321 (1993).

This section does not embrace tort actions such as deceit. Stein v. Lukas, 308 Ark. 74, 823 S.W.2d 832 (1992).

An attorney discharged with or without cause can recover the reasonable value of his or her services to the date of discharge. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

This section does not provide for a reasonable attorney's fee in tort actions. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Morgan, 312 Ark. 225, 850 S.W.2d 297 (1993).

While this section allows for attorney's fees in breach of contract cases, it does not allow attorney's fees in tort actions. Security Pac. Hous. Servs., Inc. v. Friddle, 315 Ark. 178, 866 S.W.2d 375 (1993).

A written agreement, specifically providing for the payment of attorney's fees incurred, is enforceable in accordance with its terms, and is independent of the statutory authorization providing for attorney's fees under the circumstances covered by this section. Griffin v. First Nat'l Bank, 318 Ark. 848, 888 S.W.2d 306 (1994).

This section is a general statute providing for the recovery of attorney's fees in actions on breach of contract, and a general statute does not apply where there is a specific statute covering a particular subject matter. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ark. App. 136, 892 S.W.2d 519 (1995).

As this section does not mention insurance policies or provide for attorney's fees for either insureds or insurers, it does not allow an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing insurer in an action seeking recovery for a claim under a policy. Village Mkt., Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 227, 975 S.W.2d 86 (1998).

Attorney’s fees should not have been awarded in an action involving a mortgagee's failure to cancel a mortgage because the action was not primarily based on contract; the action was based on a violation of § 18-40-104 and negligence. Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp. v. Hopkins, 82 Ark. App. 91, 114 S.W.3d 757 (2003).

Trial court abused its discretion in awarding all of appellees' requested attorney’s fees where only one of their causes of action provided for fees; nothing in this section or § 4-88-113(f) provides that a party is entitled to an award of all fees in cases where multiple claims have been pursued. FMC Corp. v. Helton, 360 Ark. 465, 202 S.W.3d 490 (2005).

Fireman who was reinstated to his previous rank and awarded backpay following a suspension and demotion in a disciplinary proceeding was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party because the fireman had no contract with the fire department; thus, this section was not applicable. City of Little Rock v. Hudson, 366 Ark. 415, 236 S.W.3d 509 (2006).

Attorney’s fee award, pursuant to this section, was premature because the prevailing party could not be determined until the end of the breach of contract action. Heflin v. Brackelsberg, 2010 Ark. App. 261, 374 S.W.3d 755 (2010).

Appellate court did not need to address if this section applied to an action for termination of alimony based on the cohabitation provision of a property-settlement agreement, as a trial court has inherent power to award attorney's fees in domestic-relations cases and whether the circuit court should award such fees and the amount thereof are matters within the circuit court's discretion. Collins v. Collins, 2015 Ark. App. 526 (2015).

Award of attorney's fees affirmed, but as the case was a judicial proceeding that involved the administration of a trust, attorney's fees should have been awarded under § 28-73-1004 rather than under this section. Reed v. Smith, 2018 Ark. App. 313, 551 S.W.3d 407 (2018).

Attorney's Duty.

The burden of obtaining a ruling from the trial court is on the attorney requesting fees; any objections and matters left unresolved below are waived and may not be raised on appeal. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

Bankruptcy.

A creditor's status as unsecured does not bar it from asserting a claim in bankruptcy court for attorney's fees under this section. In re Hunter, 203 B.R. 150 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996).

Mortgage lien was not perfected and could be avoided by a trustee under 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 544(a) and 550(a), who was also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, because an acknowledgement that did not comply with §§ 16-47-106 and 16-47-101 did not provide constructive notice. The omission of the debtor's name alone would not have been fatal, as the omitted information could have been filled in by reference to the document as a whole; however, omission of the name plus the use of a different gender led to an ambiguity that would have required extrinsic evidence. Williams v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 422 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009).

Chapter 12 debtors' in possession 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 cause of action allowed the debtors to set aside creditor bank's mortgage lien due to the debtors' bona fide purchaser status, but was a cause of action peculiar to the Bankruptcy Code and differed from the types of actions which this section addressed. Thus this section was inapplicable to the avoidance action and the debtors were not entitled to their attorney's fees. Caine v. First State Bank of Crossett (In re Caine), 462 B.R. 688 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2011), aff'd, No. 1:12-CV-1012, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43360 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2014).

Where LLC's operating agreement provided that in a dispute between members, the losing party would pay the prevailing party reasonable costs and expenses, and where the LLC and its member also claimed attorney's fees under Arkansas statute providing for a prevailing party fee award in a breach of contract action, and where judgment debt was found dischargeable under one provision of Bankruptcy Code and nondischargeable under two other sections, then remand was required for bankruptcy court to determine whether the fee provision in the operating agreement rendered all or any part of the fee award part of the nondischargeable debt. Clear Sky Props. LLC v. Roussel (In re Roussel), 504 B.R. 510 (E.D. Ark. 2013).

Bankruptcy court awarded a bank attorney’s fees and costs it incurred to enforce a settlement agreement it entered with a husband and wife who declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy because the husband and wife had not timely fulfilled their obligations under the agreement in an attempt to persuade the bank to accept changes to the agreement; although a Chapter 11 trustee argued that the husband and wife had substantially complied with their obligations under the agreement and the concept of substantial compliance was recognized in Arkansas law, the bank had bargained for strict compliance. In re Griffin, 509 B.R. 864 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2014).

Breach of Contract.

Although the supreme court held in O'Bar v. Hight, 169 Ark. 1008, 277 S.W. 533 (1925), that a covenantee could not recover attorney's fees from the covenantor in an action for breach of warranty, Act 800 of 1989 amended this section to permit a trial court to allow a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in an action for breach of contract. Murchie v. Hinton, 41 Ark. App. 84, 848 S.W.2d 436 (1993).

A warranty deed should be considered a contract between a grantor and his grantee who has accepted it for the purposes of this section. Murchie v. Hinton, 41 Ark. App. 84, 848 S.W.2d 436 (1993).

Since an implied-in-law contract, or quasi-contract, is indeed no contract at all, there was no authority for an award of attorney’s fees. Friends of Children, Inc. v. Marcus, 46 Ark. App. 57, 876 S.W.2d 603 (1994).

Where defendant prevailed against plaintiff's allegations that they breached their lease terms, the trial court was authorized to award reasonable attorney's fees under this section. Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Prod. Co., 320 Ark. 298, 896 S.W.2d 867 (1995).

The circuit court was authorized to award attorney’s fees not subject to a specified limit where the plaintiff's action was for breach of contract. Marshall Sch. Dist. v. Hill, 56 Ark. App. 134, 939 S.W.2d 319 (1997).

It was too late for the plaintiff to attempt to recharacterize her suit as one for breach of contract in order to trigger an attorney's fee award under this section where she previously characterized the suit as one for illegal exaction and entered into a settlement which provided for attorney's fees under § 26-35-902(a), which authorizes attorney's fees in illegal exaction cases. Barnhart v. City of Fayetteville, 335 Ark. 57, 977 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

This section does not allow the discretionary award of attorney's fees to a prevailing insurer in an action for breach of contract. Employers Surplus Ins. Co. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 338 Ark. 299, 993 S.W.2d 481 (1999).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to municipal improvement districts in a suit where the districts prevailed over the trustee of a public bond financing by proving a breach of contract claim against the trustee, resulting in reimbursement to bond funds of attorney's fees expended by the trustee in unwarranted litigation. First United Bank v. Phase II, Edgewater Addition Residential Prop. Owners Improvements Dist. No. 1 of Maumelle, 347 Ark. 879, 69 S.W.3d 33 (2002).

Where court found that the damages sought by home buyers were for the costs of correcting defects to the house, the complaint stated a cause of action on the contract; the buyers' action for breach of the implied warranty of fitness and habitability was an action in contract and, thus, the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to a home builder. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

In homeowners' defective construction case, the builder was entitled to a directed verdict because the statute of limitations had expired and, as it was an action “in contract” concerning the implied warranty of habitability, the trial court properly awarded the builder attorney's fees under this section. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Because the trial court did not give its reasons for failing to award tenants, the prevailing parties in litigation over an alleged breach of a lease, their attorney's fees, the case was remanded for the court to consider whether to make such an award. Vereen v. Hargrove, 80 Ark. App. 385, 96 S.W.3d 762 (2003).

Where the homeowner alleged that the builder breached an implied warranty because the home's foundation was defective due to the soil properties and sought damages in the amount of repairs made by the homeowner, the case was a contract action, as opposed to a tort action, and provided the trial court with a basis to award the builder, the prevailing party, attorney’s fees under this section. Curry v. Thornsberry, 81 Ark. App. 112, 98 S.W.3d 477 (2003), aff'd, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Minor should have been allowed to recover attorney’s fees in his action against a bank because the action sounded in contract; the bank's obligations would not have arisen had it not entered into a contract with the minor's guardian to accept funds' deposit. Jiles v. Union Planters Bank, 90 Ark. App. 245, 205 S.W.3d 187 (2005).

Plaintiff borrowers' argument that defendant bank's fee request was excessive because it included fees and costs on appeal was well-taken; fees could not be awarded on appeal of a contract case pursuant to this section. Even if there was authority to allow the fees, the court would have exercised its discretion not to do so in the instant case because on remand, the court granted summary judgment on an issue that could have been, but was not, argued in the appeals court and the failure to raise the issue earlier resulted in an unnecessary round of litigation following appeal. Mountain Pure LLC v. Bank of Am., No. 4:02CV00100 JLH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115227 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 2008).

Although plaintiff borrowers' breach of contract claim was submitted to arbitration, the court concluded that their remaining promissory estoppel claim was based on contract, and the court could not find any material way in which the briefs and arguments would have differed had there been no count alleging promissory estoppel; consequently, the court concluded that the action litigated was based primarily on the breach of contract claim so that fees could be awarded pursuant to this section to defendant bank as prevailing party. Mountain Pure LLC v. Bank of Am., No. 4:02CV00100 JLH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115227 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 2008).

In an action for breach of contract arising from an employment agreement and purchase agreement, the jury rendered a verdict for the company but the trial court denied its motion for attorney’s fees under this section. The trial court held that this section did not apply because the parties intended that in the event of dispute arising out of the agreements, each party would bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. Asbury Auto. Used Car Ctr. v. Brosh, 375 Ark. 121, 289 S.W.3d 88 (2008).

Award of attorney's fees under this section was proper because the debtor claimed the bank violated the promissory note when it failed to release the lien on the property after full payment. First State Bank of Crossett v. Fowler, 427 B.R. 1 (W.D. Ark. 2010).

Where the debtor objected to her deed of trust secured creditor's claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 502(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007, asserting breach of contract, and the claim was in part unenforceable due to the miscalculation of charges and interest, and misapplied payments, the debtor was entitled to an award of damages and reasonable attorney's fees for breach of contract under this section. Bateman v. S. Dev. Corp. (In re Bateman), 435 B.R. 600 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010).

Although a commercial tenant was a prevailing party in a breach of lease action against a landlord, and allowed to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, the trial court reduced the tenant's attorney fee request without explanation or reference to certain factors, which warranted a remand. Conway Commer. Warehousing, LLC v. FedEx Freight East, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 51, 381 S.W.3d 94 (2011).

Trial court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to real estate buyers in their breach of contract action because their request for fees was based on a contractual provision, not the statute; hence, the buyers' inclusion of a tort claim for damages was no impediment to an award of fees authorized under the real estate contract. Marx Real Estate Invs., LLC v. Coloso, 2011 Ark. App. 426, 384 S.W.3d 595 (2011).

In this breach of contract action, plaintiff was entitled to an attorney’s fee award in the amount of one-third of the total judgment because the attorneys were experienced and reputable attorneys with superior legal skills, the legal issues in this case arose from complicated and hotly disputed factual questions, and plaintiff entered a one-third contingency fee agreement with counsel. Razorback Concrete Co. v. Dement Constr. Co. LLC, No. 3:07CV00135 SWW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76761 (E.D. Ark. June 4, 2012).

Trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to appellees because its dismissal of appellant's complaint under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was improper; appellant alleged facts sufficient to support the application of fraudulent concealment and that the statutes of limitation were tolled. Russenberger v. Thomas Pest Control, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 86, 394 S.W.3d 303 (2012).

Appellee was properly awarded attorney’s fees because employees' breach of contract and wrongful discharge claims sounded in contract and appellee prevailed; the wrongful discharge claim was based on a violation of public policy. Marlow v. United Sys. of Ark., Inc., 2013 Ark. 460 (2013).

District court correctly determined that the award of attorney's fees was appropriate in this case because appellant's primary focus was its claim that appellee breached a contract with appellant as the first count of the complaint was for breach of an express contract and Count II raised a claim of breach of an implied contract. Futurefuel Chem. Co. v. Lonza, Inc., 756 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2014).

In a breach of contract action, the Supreme Court was unable to discern exactly on what basis the circuit court denied appellee's motion for attorney’s fees under this section; therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court for the limited purpose of making findings that would enable it to review the circuit court's fee decision. Arkansas Realtors Ass'n v. Real Forms, LLC, 2014 Ark. 385, 442 S.W.3d 845 (2014).

Damages could only have been for the breach of contract claim, and appellee was the prevailing party on that claim, and thus the award of attorney’s fees to appellee was allowable under the statute and was within the discretion of the circuit court. Cozart v. Logue, 2014 Ark. App. 626, 447 S.W.3d 133 (2014).

Where a hospital was entitled to recovery in its breach of contract suit against a doctor because the balance due on a promissory note was payable when the doctor resigned, and the doctor's shoulder injury did not excuse his obligation to pay the remaining note debt, the hospital was entitled to recovery of its attorney's fees; the contractual attorney's fees provision was enforceable independent of the statutory authorization, and, in any event, the hospital was clearly the prevailing party. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Halterman, 867 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the sellers of a business attorney's fees as the prevailing party on their breach of contract claim against the buyer of the business; although there were conversion claims involved and substantially more money was awarded for the tort claims than for the breach-of-contract claims, the action was based primarily in contract and the trial court considered the relevant factors in determining the amount of the attorney's fee award. DWB, LLC v. D&T Pure Trust, 2018 Ark. App. 283, 550 S.W.3d 420 (2018).

Case Law Factors.

Case law factors were not referred to in the denial of one company's motion for attorney’s fees, and thus the court reversed and remanded on this point so the proper analysis could be conducted. Knesek v. Cameron Hubbs Constr., Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 380 (2013).

Computation of Fees.

Although there is no fixed formula in determining the computation of attorney's fees, the courts should be guided by recognized factors in making their decision, including the experience and ability of the attorney, the time and labor required to perform the legal service properly, the amount involved in the case and the results obtained, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, the time limitations imposed upon the client or by the circumstances, and the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990).

Among the pertinent considerations in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee, not specifically fixed by contract, are: (1) the attorney's judgment, learning, ability, skill, experience, professional standing and advice; (2) the relationship between the parties; (3) the amount or importance of the subject matter of the case; (4) the nature, extent and difficulty of services in research; (5) the preparation of pleadings; (6) the proceedings actually taken and the nature and extent of the litigation; (7) the time and labor devoted to the client's cause, the difficulties presented in the course of the litigation and the results obtained. In making these determinations, both the trial court's and the appellate court's experience and knowledge of the character of such services may be used as a guide. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

There is no requirement that the trial judge consider his own experience and knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of a fee. Harper v. Shackleford, 41 Ark. App. 116, 850 S.W.2d 15 (1993).

Any attorney's fees awarded should be reasonable; there are established principles which a court should use in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee and, among others, these should include consideration of whether or not the actions taken by a party seeking such fees were meritorious and successful. Griffin v. First Nat'l Bank, 318 Ark. 848, 888 S.W.2d 306 (1994).

Where the trial court properly found that a company was entitled to attorney’s fees, but reduced the hourly rate charged without explanation, the appellate court remanded the matter back to the trial court to determine if the reduction in the hourly rate was proper. Swink v. Lasiter Constr., Inc., 94 Ark. App. 262, 229 S.W.3d 553 (2006).

In members' breach of contract action against a country club, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to the members in the amount of $6,000, even though their total recovery was only $5,242, because there was no fixed formula in determining what was a reasonable attorney’s fee. Millwood-RAB Mktg., Inc. v. Blackburn, 95 Ark. App. 253, 236 S.W.3d 551 (2006).

In awarding an attorney's fee pursuant to this statute, the court reduced the amount requested by 50% because it was a relatively simple slip and fall case, a discount was required for nonsuit in state court, the billing reflected too much time on discovery and other projects, and fees incurred reflected missed opportunities for compromise. Mo. & N. Ark. R.R. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-8-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139204 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 27, 2013).

Sufficient findings were not made for the court to review the amount awarded, and the court remanded and left the fee calculation issue to the trial court's discretion. Avery v. Warren Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 392 (2013).

Counter-claimant was entitled to attorney's fees under this section for the portion of a lawsuit primarily driven by the contract claims, as well as fees for work primarily driven by the trade secret claims, pursuant to § 4-75-607. The trial court determined that the counter-claimant was entitled to $2,174,073.11 in attorney's fees. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cuker Interactive, LLC, No. 5:14-CV-5262, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55242 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2018).

—Procedure.

Trial court's decision concerning entitlement to fees under this section required an inquiry separate from its decision on the merits of the underlying action — an inquiry which could not commence until party prevailed in the underlying action. Marsh & McLennan v. Herget, 321 Ark. 180, 900 S.W.2d 195 (1995).

Contingency Fees.

Award of attorney’s fees under this section in favor of a freight agent in its breach of contract suit against a carrier was proper even though it was based on a contingency fee that was significantly larger than the lodestar figure, as the district court considered all relevant factors in determining the amount of fees, such as counsel's experience, reputation, and skills; the degree to which the agent prevailed; and the time that counsel spent on the case, which included a six-month period where he turned away other clients. All-Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2009).

As long as a trial court is guided by the relevant factors, fee awards based in part on a contingency agreement are permissible under Arkansas law. The fact that the agreed upon fee was a contingency fee does not automatically entitle the attorney to that amount under this section. All-Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2009).

Court's Authority.

A trial court may not award an attorney's fee for services performed by an attorney on appeal after the case in which the fee is sought has been returned to the trial court by a mandate which does not order the fee. National Cashflow Systems, Inc. v. Race, 307 Ark. 131, 817 S.W.2d 876 (1991).

Where the additional award of costs on appeal was not awarded at the direction of the appellate court, was not of a ministerial nature, and was for the services of the prevailing party's attorney on appeal, the trial court was without authority to award attorney’s fees following the appeal. Race v. National Cashflow Sys., 34 Ark. App. 261, 810 S.W.2d 46 (1991), aff'd, National Cashflow Systems, Inc. v. Race, 307 Ark. 131, 817 S.W.2d 876 (1991).

This section permits trial courts, but not appellate courts, to assess attorney’s fees. Millwood-RAB Mktg., Inc. v. Blackburn, 95 Ark. App. 253, 236 S.W.3d 551 (2006).

Declaratory Judgment.

Statutory attorney's fees under this section were not available in an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act; however, costs were available under § 16-111-111. Hanners v. Giant Oil Co. of Ark., Inc., 373 Ark. 418, 284 S.W.3d 468 (2008).

Discretion of Court.

The word “may” is usually employed as implying permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, action or conduct and is construed in a permissive sense unless necessary to give effect to an intent to which it is used; and within the context in which the word “may” is employed in this section, allowance of attorney's fees is permissive and discretional with the trial court. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990).

This section is clearly not mandatory and the decision whether to award attorney’s fees in cases governed by this section is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Logue v. Seven-Hot Springs Corp., 926 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1991).

While this section allows for the award of attorney's fees in certain civil actions, including actions for breach of contract, the decision whether to award a fee in such cases is a decision within the trial court's discretion. Security Pac. Hous. Servs., Inc. v. Friddle, 315 Ark. 178, 866 S.W.2d 375 (1993).

Since the award of attorney's fees is discretionary under this section, and since neither party cited authority or presented argument indicating that the trial court abused its discretion, there was no abuse of discretion in denying attorney's fees pursuant to this section. Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co., 322 Ark. 751, 911 S.W.2d 586 (1995).

The statute is permissive and the award of attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the trial court. Ouachita Trek & Dev. Co. v. Rowe, 341 Ark. 456, 17 S.W.3d 491 (2000).

Language in buyer's e-mail did not constitute a sufficient writing for purposes of the statute of frauds because it did not evince an agreement between retailer/buyer and importer/seller on price markdowns; attorney’s fees in contract dispute were discretionary. General Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 320 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2003).

Under this section, no award of fees was mandatory, and an insurer was not entitled to attorney’s fees simply because it prevailed. Angelo Iafrate Constr., LLC v. Potashnick Constr., Inc., 370 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2004).

Beverage distributor was not improperly denied attorney's fees pursuant to this section after it had obtained a judgment against a beverage producer for breach of contract because no award of attorney's fees was mandatory under this section, the distributor was not considered a prevailing party by the district court since the producer had prevailed on a counterclaim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the distributor asserted no facts to support its contention that it merited an award of attorney's fees under this section despite its own breaching conduct. Southern Wine & Spirits of Nev. v. Mt. Valley Spring Co., 712 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2013).

Certain appellants failed to cite any evidence that demonstrated that the circuit court abused its broad discretion in not awarding them attorney’s fees, and as the award of attorney’s fees is discretionary and not mandatory, there was no abuse of discretion in granting appellee attorney’s fees and in denying of attorney’s fees to appellants. Cozart v. Logue, 2014 Ark. App. 626, 447 S.W.3d 133 (2014).

Election of Remedies.

The policy concern supporting the election doctrine (which operates to preclude a complainant from receiving an award that over-compensates and over-restores him for his injury by permitting recovery on two different theories) is not a valid consideration with respect to a fee request. Childs v. Adams, 322 Ark. 424, 909 S.W.2d 641 (1995).

Evidence.

The failure of an attorney to keep detailed time records is not fatal to his claim. Harper v. Shackleford, 41 Ark. App. 116, 850 S.W.2d 15 (1993).

Explanation by Court.

Court reversed and remanded the partial award of fees to a company, given that the trial court provided no explanation for granting less than one third of the fee request and the court could not determine why. Knesek v. Cameron Hubbs Constr., Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 380 (2013).

Fees Allowed.

Where plaintiff was awarded relief for failure to promote and back pay, the recovery he received was pay for labor or services and recovery could be had for attorney's fees. City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748 (1991).

As the holding of the trial court was that there was an employment contract which was breached, the awarding of an attorney's fee was not improper. Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 305 Ark. 566, 810 S.W.2d 910 (1991).

Fee award held reasonable. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

Appellees, guarantors, pursuant to contract and this section, awarded reasonable attorney's fees. Arkansas Indus. Dev. Comm'n v. FABCO of Ashdown, Inc., 312 Ark. 26, 847 S.W.2d 13 (1993).

Where the trial judge agreed with a crop lender that its security interest in a government crop check was superior to the farm owner's, an award of attorney's fees in that contract claim was appropriate, however, the trial judge erred in awarding attorney's fees regarding a conversion claim. Nef v. Ag Servs. of Am., Inc., 79 Ark. App. 100, 86 S.W.3d 4 (2002).

Attorney's fees were properly awarded to a prevailing party in an action seeking an accounting of a partnership's assets because the partnership was based on a contract. Harrison v. Harrison, 82 Ark. App. 521, 120 S.W.3d 144 (2003).

In a case where a teacher alleged that a school district breached its contract with the teacher by violating the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act (TFDA) and that such breach entitled him to all the monetary benefits which he had under the 1999-2000 contract, plus interest and attorney's fees, because the district failed to provide written notice of the problems or evaluations as required by § 6-17-1504 of the TFDA, the district failed to strictly comply with the statutory provisions of the TFDA and the teacher's contract was renewed by operation of law; however, the teacher's refusal to mitigate his damages limited his damages to the difference in what he earned under the 1999-2000 contract and what he could have earned had he accepted the offer of the district, but the teacher was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to this section. Sheets v. Dollarway Sch. Dist., 82 Ark. App. 539, 120 S.W.3d 119 (2003).

Although attorney’s fees were not available in a contract recission case, the case began as a proceeding to foreclose on a home and enforce a promissory note and the buyers prevailed on those grounds; therefore, they were the prevailing party in a foreclosure action entitling them to attorney’s fees. Hudson v. Hilo, 88 Ark. App. 317, 198 S.W.3d 569 (2004).

Defendant insurer was liable under the policy it issued to manufacturer for sums awarded to plaintiff farmers as attorney's fees in the underlying action by the farmers against the manufacturer for crop damage because, in addition to coverage for those sums insured became legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage to which the insurance applied, the policy also covered certain “supplementary payments” and the attorney's fee award was part of the “costs” taxed against the manufacturer in the underlying lawsuit; as such, the award was a “supplementary payment” covered under the policy. Ferrell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005).

Where supplier's bank wrongly encoded a check and supplier's claim against the supplier's bank was premised on its failure to use ordinary care in complying with the Uniform Commercial Code, attorney's fees were warranted because the amount of the claim was readily ascertainable. Douglas Cos. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of Texarkana, 419 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2005).

Trial court did not err in awarding home sellers attorney’s fees in buyers' action against sellers for breach of contract and fraud because the issue of whether the action was primarily a contract action in which attorney’s fees were authorized was moot; buyers paid the attorney’s fees and, in the absence of an explanation for the payment of a satisfaction of judgment, the court considered it as having been voluntarily paid, thus rendering the appeal of that judgment moot. Barringer v. Hall, 89 Ark. App. 293, 202 S.W.3d 568 (2005).

In a domestic relations case, the trial court appropriately granted an ex-wife's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to this section and § 9-12-309 because her ex-husband, in challenging the attorney's fee award, offered only his own reasoning and the language of the statutes in support of his argument; he cited no legal authority in support of his position, which was a sufficient reason to affirm the trial court's ruling. Artman v. Hoy, 370 Ark. 131, 257 S.W.3d 864 (2007).

Award of attorney’s fees to a corporation in a breach of contract action against a home builder was not unreasonable merely because the fee award was nearly the sum of the judgment. Crown Custom Homes, Inc. v. Buchanan Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 442, 319 S.W.3d 285 (2009).

In buyers' declaratory-judgment action, attorney’s fees were properly awarded to buyers under this section because the case involved a contract action—either through the seller's counterclaim or the fact that the declaratory-judgment action arose from the seller's breach of contract. Screeton v. Asco Vending, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 230, 374 S.W.3d 749 (2010).

As appellee was the prevailing party in a lawsuit involving a breach-of-contract claim, it was properly awarded attorney’s fees under this section. Crockett v. C.A.G. Invs., Inc., 2011 Ark. 208, 381 S.W.3d 793 (2011).

District court's calculation of an attorney’s fee award was supported by the detailed affidavits and time sheets attached to appellees' motion for attorney’s fees; because the case involved a complicated factual background, the potential for millions of dollars in liability, and a 10 count initial complaint that included 555 pages of exhibits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Retro TV Network, Inc. v. Luken Communs., LLC, 696 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2012).

Because counsel for defendants were experienced attorneys with excellent legal skills, potentially millions of dollars were at stake and defendants prevailed on all of plaintiff's claims, and the attorneys charged reasonable hourly rates, under this section, counsel for defendants were entitled to an award of $46,795 in attorney’s fees. Retro TV Network, Inc. v. Luken Communs., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00489-SWW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27679 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 2, 2012), aff'd, 696 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2012).

Even though the underlying case was in the nature of a quiet title action, it was necessitated by a dispute regarding the terms of leases covering the owners' property, and they sought fees, and the trial court limited the award of fees to those associated with the settlement agreement; the dispute arose out of the language in a lease, which was in the nature of a contract, and the manner in which the trial court decided the issue was not error. Stephens Prod. Co. v. Blackard, 2013 Ark. App. 530 (2013).

Damages awarded were based in contract, and the circuit court used equity to put the parties back where they were prior to the execution of the contract, rather than money damages to compensate for any tort liability; because appellants did not challenge the reasonableness of the fees awarded and the circuit court properly considered the appropriate factors, there was no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney's fees. Gladden v. Trustees of Pruitt Family Trust, 2015 Ark. App. 680, 477 S.W.3d 530 (2015).

In this action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, the creditor was awarded the sum of $2,000 in attorney's fees where the debtor conceded that (1) he wholly failed to perform under the terms of the contract and was in breach, and (2) his inability to obtain materials and pay employees, both circumstances attendant to the creditor closing its business, occasioned the default. Coleman v. Fields (In re Fields), 544 B.R. 156 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2016).

In a case involving the conveyance of mineral rights, litigation was contentious and presented novel and difficult issues, and the circuit court clearly considered the reasonable fee factors and did not abuse its discretion in awarding $17,500 in attorney's fees and $165 in costs to appellees. Mt. Pine Timber, Inc. v. Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 197, 487 S.W.3d 832 (2016).

In this case, the vast majority of the work was related to issues primarily based in contract, and it is certainly common and allowable for more than one lawyer to work on a case--especially a difficult one; the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney's fees. Patton Hospitality Mgmt., LLC v. Bella Vista Vill. Coopershares Owners Ass'n, 2016 Ark. App. 281, 493 S.W.3d 798 (2016).

Although dismissal was prompted by appellee's request for summary judgment on its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the resolution of each of the claims hinged on the interpretation of two contracts, and thus the action was clearly based primarily in contract, and the circuit court was authorized to award a reasonable attorney's fee. Patton Hospitality Mgmt., LLC v. Bella Vista Vill. Coopershares Owners Ass'n, 2016 Ark. App. 281, 493 S.W.3d 798 (2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a credit card holder attorney's fees where the trial court considered his counterclaims of conversion, outrage, and abuse of process as an integral part of his defense to the credit card company's breach of contract action, and he had successfully defended against the breach of contract action. Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Davenport, 2017 Ark. App. 105, 513 S.W.3d 880 (2017).

In an air-bag explosion case, in which a default judgment was entered against the car manufacturer, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $5,000 in attorney's fees, given the allegations of breach of express warranty and contract in the complaint. Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Harlan, 2017 Ark. App. 203, 518 S.W.3d 89 (2017).

Because the complaint was brought as a breach-of-contract action, the award of attorney's fees to the purchaser, as the prevailing party, was appropriate; the seller's lawsuit was filed as a breach-of-contract action and sounded entirely in contract, and the mere fact that the parties agreed to rescind that contract did not defeat the original nature of the action. Thompson v. Broussard, 2017 Ark. App. 423, 526 S.W.3d 899 (2017).

Fees Denied.

The trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees in an interpleader action. Construction Mach. v. Roberts, 307 Ark. 252, 819 S.W.2d 268 (1991).

An appeal from a decision of the Civil Service Commission is an action which does not fall within the language of this section and therefore attorney's fees are not authorized. City of Little Rock v. Quinn, 35 Ark. App. 77, 811 S.W.2d 6 (1991).

Where the contract for or purchase of materials was made by previous owners and the suit was a suit in rem against the property, the only recovery that could be made by the plaintiff was under the section that grants a lien against the property for materials and labor furnished, § 18-44-101, which does not provide that the supplier of the materials or labor has a lien for attorney's fees, so that attorney's fees were not recoverable. Transportation Properties, Inc. v. Central Glass & Mirror of N.W. Ark., Inc., 38 Ark. App. 60, 827 S.W.2d 667 (1992).

Costs for depositions, expert fees and travel expenses are not allowable. Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Prod. Co., 320 Ark. 298, 896 S.W.2d 867 (1995).

Award of attorney's fees was reversed where the plaintiff's action was based primarily in tort. Meyer v. Riverdale Harbor Mun. Prop. Owners Improvement Dist. No. 1, 58 Ark. App. 91, 947 S.W.2d 20 (1997).

The chancery court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award cross-appellants attorney's fees where their argument was nothing more than an assertion that they were entitled to attorney's fees because of the manner in which they prevailed, that is, by winning a motion to dismiss at the chancery court level. Jones v. Abraham, 67 Ark. App. 304, 999 S.W.2d 698 (1999), aff'd, 341 Ark. 66, 15 S.W.3d 310 (2000), overruled in part, Lamontagne v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. 190, 366 S.W.3d 351 (2010).

Attorney's fees were properly denied in an action to enforce an oral contract to make a will where the trial court found that the plaintiffs acted in good faith and that their attorneys did an excellent job under the constraints of Arkansas law and the rules of evidence and the fact that they were trying to prove something that occurred years and years ago with deceased witnesses. Jones v. Abraham, 341 Ark. 66, 15 S.W.3d 310 (2000).

Where mental health facility obtained a default judgment against psychiatrist and was awarded $775,000 for indemnification, because the trial court's order offered no statutory authority for awarding attorney’s fees to the mental health facility, and because that award was contrary to the general rule against awarding such fees in the absence of a statute or rule, that portion of the trial court's order was reversed. Jean-Pierre v. Plantation Homes of Crittenden County, Inc., 350 Ark. 569, 89 S.W.3d 337 (2002).

Attorney's fees were not awarded in an action seeking specific performance of a real estate contract because itemized bills were not provided to the circuit court and there was no showing as to why allegedly privileged information contained therein could not have been redacted. Van Carr Enters. v. Hamco, Inc., 365 Ark. 625, 232 S.W.3d 427 (2006).

Although two writings entered into for the construction of a house were not valid contracts, once the house was built and the debtors moved in, that took the contract out of § 4-59-101(a)(4), the statute of frauds, and based on the debtors' testimony regarding the parties' oral agreement with respect to the price to be paid, which the court found credible, the creditors' proof of claim for an additional amount was disallowed. Although the debtors were the prevailing party, they were not entitled to attorney’s fees under this section, as both parties were responsible for an incoherent agreement with no agreed upon purchase price. In re Cameron, 452 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).

As claims by an estate executrix of fraud, estoppel, and fiduciary-duty were paramount, and a contract claim was not the primary basis for the action, the trial court properly refused to awarded attorney’s fees to the prevailing party pursuant to this section. Gibbs v. Bumgarner, 2012 Ark. App. 81 (2012).

In an action seeking the cancellation of a lease, assignment, and deed, attorney's fees should not have been awarded because the litigation did not concern a breach of these documents. The issue was whether there were innocent purchasers of property. Walls v. Humphries, 2013 Ark. 286, 428 S.W.3d 517 (2013).

In an action to enforce an oral contract for services performed by a consulting company for an investment company, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the consulting company attorney's fees under this section as the prevailing party because the investment company's defense was taken in good faith. Steve's Outdoor Invs., LLC v. Reynolds Forestry Consulting-RFC, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 40 (2013).

While a debtor prevailed in an action brought under 11 U.S.C. § 525(b)(3) based on his employer terminating his employment solely because of the debtor's nonpayment of his obligation to the employer, the debtor was not entitled to attorney's fees because this section was inapplicable and the debtor was not able to direct the court to a basis for fees under a specific statute, rule, or other ground. Dwelle v. Arvest Bank (In re Dwelle), No. 6:12-bk-71728, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4514 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. May 27, 2015).

Circuit court properly denied an attorney's request for attorney's fees under this section because the attorney was not the prevailing party where the insurer's payment to the attorney was not made as a result of an adjudication by the circuit court resolving the merits of the issue. Swindle v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2015 Ark. 241, 464 S.W.3d 905 (2015).

Attorney's fees could not be recovered because no contract existed between the parties. Anderson's Taekwondo Ctr. Camp Positive, Inc. v. Landers Auto Group No. 1, Inc., 2015 Ark. 268 (2015).

Insured was not entitled to relief against an insurer under this section because the insured (1) did not bring a contract claim in a pleading or point to a contractual provision the insurer did not perform, and (2) first raised breach of contract in the insured's reply in opposition to the insurer's summary judgment motion. Cooper v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 827 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2016).

Circuit court erred in awarding a son attorney's fees because the litigation did not concern a breach of a contract but alleged a quiet title action; the quiet-title statutes do not authorize attorney's fees, and in the absence of statutory authority, attorney's fees are not available. Stokes v. Stokes, 2016 Ark. 182, 491 S.W.3d 113 (2016).

Circuit court erred in awarding a son attorney's fees because the son asserted an unjust-enrichment claim and thus was not entitled to attorney's fees. Stokes v. Stokes, 2016 Ark. 182, 491 S.W.3d 113 (2016).

Circuit court erred in awarding the sibling attorney's fees under this section; although the sibling's action referenced a warranty deed between the sibling and the father, the sibling did not allege that there had been a breach of contract, but merely sought reformation of the deed to reflect the property's correct legal description. Alexander v. Alexander, 2016 Ark. App. 554 (2016).

Where sister filed suit to dissolve a family farming partnership, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying two partners' requests for attorney's fees against the sister where the requesting partners never submitted time records or actual fees charged and paid. Hitt v. Lyle, 2020 Ark. App. 124 (2020).

Insurance.

Recovery of attorney's fees to insureds in an insurance-contract action is exclusively available under § 23-79-208, and an award under this section is prohibited; because this section does not contain a condition on a fee award, § 23-79-208 falls squarely within this section's exception that it does not apply when attorney's fees are “otherwise provided by law.” Gafford v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2015 Ark. 110, 459 S.W.3d 277 (2015).

Mandamus Actions.

Circuit court did not have discretion to award attorney's fees because a city prevailed on its petition for a writ of mandamus, not a breach-of-contract action, and nothing in Arkansas's statutory law on mandamus actions permitted recovery of attorney's fees even if a writ of mandamus was an action to enforce an underlying agreed order. Lonoke County v. City of Lonoke, 2013 Ark. 465, 430 S.W.3d 669 (2013).

Not Requested.

Although appellants claimed the trial court erred in not awarding them attorney’s fees under this section, the court could not discern that they filed a motion or otherwise requested such fees, there was no specific prayer for such in the complaint, and the trial court did not rule on the issue; a party could not complain on appeal about the trial court not granting a particular kind of relief when it was not requested. Grisanti v. Zanone, 2009 Ark. App. 545, 336 S.W.3d 886 (2009).

Prejudgment Interest.

Attorney was not entitled to an award of prejudgment interest in a fee dispute with a client because the court set the attorney's fee as a percentage of the future sales proceeds of a real estate property that the attorney obtained for a client in a dispute; thus, the fee could not be determined until the future sale of the property. Moreover, the attorney was not a prevailing party for the purpose of an award of attorney's fees. Adams v. Howard, 2014 Ark. App. 328, 436 S.W.3d 473 (2014).

Preservation for Review.

Trial court awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees, but the defendant did not object and failed to make a record before the trial court as required, and thus the appellate did not address the attorney’s fee issue. Washington v. Kingridge Enters., 2014 Ark. App. 705, 450 S.W.3d 685 (2014).

In upholding an award of attorney's fees under this section, the Supreme Court concluded that appellant's claim that certain meeting minutes did not fall into any of the categories outlined by this section was not preserved for the Supreme Court's review because appellant failed to make this argument to the superior court. Miracle Kids Success Acad., Inc. v. Maurras, 2019 Ark. 146, 573 S.W.3d 533 (2019).

Because there was no indication in the record that a landowner challenged—in a postjudgment motion or otherwise—a circuit court's failure to make specific findings when it awarded attorney's fees to a contractor, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. Reynolds Forestry Consulting & Real Estate, PLLC v. Colbey, 2019 Ark. App. 209, 575 S.W.3d 176 (2019).

Prevailing Party.

Where six of the seven counts contained in plaintiff's complaint were dismissed on defendant's motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief and jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on remaining count, plaintiff was the “prevailing party” under this section. ERC Mtg. Group, Inc. v. Luper, 32 Ark. App. 19, 795 S.W.2d 362 (1990).

Even though defendant was simply defending the cause of action on the basis that no contract existed between the parties, defendant was a prevailing party within the meaning of the statute and entitled to attorney's fees. Cumberland Fin. Group, Ltd. v. Brown Chem. Co., 34 Ark. App. 269, 810 S.W.2d 49 (1991).

Although the original request for fees was based on claims dismissed before trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the prevailing parties their attorney's fees under this section. TCBY Sys. v. RSP Co., 33 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 1994).

The chancellor did not abuse her discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the party she determined to be the prevailing party in a breach of contract action. Gill v. Transcriptions, Inc., 319 Ark. 485, 892 S.W.2d 258 (1995).

A third-party beneficiary may recover attorney's fees under this section. Little Rock Wastewater Util. v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 321 Ark. 303, 902 S.W.2d 760 (1995).

The court properly ruled that its award of attorney's fees could be recovered only from an estate's personal representative and not from the estate where three of the four of the cases were dismissed or nonsuited and, therefore, there was no prevailing party in those three cases. Boatmen's Trust Co. v. Buchbinder, 343 Ark. 1, 32 S.W.3d 466 (2000).

One must prevail on the merits in order to be considered a prevailing party; a dismissal without prejudice does not sufficiently conclude the matter such that a determination of the prevailing party can be stated with certainty. Burnette v. Perkins & Assocs., 343 Ark. 237, 33 S.W.3d 145 (2000).

In a landlord/tenant dispute pertaining to a fraternity house, the trial court erred in determining that there was no prevailing party where the fraternity prevailed on its claim for conversion of property and breach of lease, the officers of the fraternity prevailed in defending third-party claims by the landlord, and where the landlord was entitled to only $2,000, rather than the $40,000 sought, for damages. Marcum v. Wengert, 344 Ark. 153, 40 S.W.3d 230 (2001).

Award of an attorney's fee to husband as the “prevailing party” in company's action to recover on a credit card was improper because the company was the prevailing party where judgment was rendered in its favor on its complaint for a money judgment regarding the credit card account; as husband was ordered to pay a money judgment that he did not appeal, the trial court erred in declaring husband to be the prevailing party for purposes of this section. C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC v. Whittington, 90 Ark. App. 213, 205 S.W.3d 157 (2005).

Appellate court affirmed trial court's order denying attorney’s fees to a firm as the fact that the firm prevailed on the forum selection clause issue did not mean that it was the prevailing party as to the substantive issues, and the former partner's involuntary dismissal of the case without prejudice did not cause the firm to be the prevailing party where the substantive issues remained. BKD, LLP v. Yates, 367 Ark. 391, 240 S.W.3d 588 (2006).

Sixty-five thousand dollar attorney's fee award in a breach of contract case was upheld on review because the assertion of an unsuccessful counterclaim did not mean that a health organization was not the prevailing party where it successfully defended against doctor's contract claim; moreover, the amount was reasonable considering the legal expenses incurred. Perry v. Baptist Health, 368 Ark. 114, 243 S.W.3d 310 (2006).

When a corporation sought a retainage from a contractor, but the contractor refused to return the money because of alleged deficiencies in the corporation's work, the circuit court properly awarded attorney's fees to the contractor because the contractor was the prevailing party, as it had received three-fourths of the money at issue. CJ Bldg. Corp. v. TRAC-10, 368 Ark. 654, 249 S.W.3d 793 (2007).

Because the physician prevailed on two of the three issues he raised against the doctor and the professional association he, therefore, came out “on top” at the end of the case for purposes of this section. Further, the district court awarded the physician $12,000 in attorney's fees for successfully defending against the breach of contract counterclaim and did not abuse its discretion in so doing. Baptist Health v. Smith, 536 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2008).

An award of attorney's fees to the landowners as the prevailing party under this section in a lease dispute, was affirmed although the judgment was reversed on appeal because a farm did not preserve its prevailing party argument made on appeal of a denial of a motion to vacate the award under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Seidenstricker Farms v. Doss, 374 Ark. 123, 286 S.W.3d 142 (2008).

Trial court erred in a breach of contract action in holding that a buyer was not entitled to attorney’s fees after judgment was rendered in its favor because the language of the purchase agreement did not indicate that the parties intended that each party would pay its own attorney’s fees and costs in the event of litigation. Asbury Auto. Used Car Ctr. v. Brosh, 2009 Ark. 111, 314 S.W.3d 275 (2009).

Sellers who asserted a successful breach-of-contract claim against a buyer who moved into a home without paying the balance due were the prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees because even though the buyer prevailed on some warranty claims for unfinished household repairs, the sellers came out on top in the end. Carroll v. UV Props., LLC, 2009 Ark. App. 599 (2009).

In an action by home buyers against the sellers for recovery of the earnest money, in which the sellers asserted a counterclaim for damages for breach of contract, which resulted in a decision that the sellers were not entitled to damages but were entitled to keep the earnest money, neither party was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney's fees under this section or the terms of the parties' real estate contract, or for costs under Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Brackelsberg v. Heflin, 2011 Ark. App. 678, 386 S.W.3d 636 (2011).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the client was the prevailing party where she successfully defended the breach-of-contract claim; the court limited the fee award and a successful defendant in a contract action could be considered a “prevailing party” for the purposes of this section. Harrill & Sutter P.L.L.C. v. Kosin, 2012 Ark. 385, 424 S.W.3d 272 (2012).

Trial court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to the purchaser of an accounting office in a breach of contract action because the purchaser was the prevailing party; while the trial court dismissed the purchaser's claims for fraud, reimbursement of the purchase money for the building, and tortious interference, it awarded the purchaser all of the purchaser's requested fees. Spann v. Lovett & Co., 2012 Ark. App. 107, 389 S.W.3d 77 (2012).

While appellants were granted summary judgment on individual claims against them, appellee recovered a judgment against appellants' company, and thus appellee was a prevailing party in terms of the entirety of the case; thus, the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for attorney’s fees. Armstrong Remodeling & Constr., LLC v. Cardenas, 2012 Ark. App. 387, 417 S.W.3d 748 (2012).

Because the only issue remaining for trial was whether the rail service should be liable for the employer's share of a settlement amount, and at trial the district court determined that the rail service was not liable for any additional amount, the district court did not err when it found that the employer was not a prevailing party under this section. Rice v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 712 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 2013).

Because appellee prevailed in a breach of contract action under the theory of collateral estoppel, he was the prevailing party and an award of attorney’s fees to him was not in error. Rose v. Nutt, 2013 Ark. App. 688 (2013).

It was necessary to remand for a determination of whether defendant was entitled to attorney’s fees on its counterclaim under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act because a party who prevailed on a cause of action to recover actual damages under the Act was eligible for an award of attorney’s fees, in the discretion of the court, even when another party was the prevailing party in the overall action for purposes of the statute. G&K Servs. Co. v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc., 766 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2014).

Because the circuit court erred in denying a surety's motion for directed verdict, a subcontractor was no longer the prevailing party and was not entitled to attorney's fees under either the subcontractor or the attorney-fee statute, and it was not the “successful party” entitled to attorney's fees under the materialmen's lien statute. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Sweet's Contr., Inc., 2014 Ark. 484, 450 S.W.3d 229 (2014).

Trial court erred in finding that the consignees were not the prevailing parties and, consequently, denying their motion for attorney’s fees because, even though the jury awarded no damages, the consignees prevailed in the consignor’s breach-of-contract claim against them and in their breach-of-contract counterclaim against the consignor. Sluyter v. Toney, 2014 Ark. App. 247 (2014).

Circuit court, which awarded attorney's fees to a city pursuant to this section, erred in its analysis of determining the prevailing party; when considered as a whole, the contractor was the prevailing party because it was declared entitled to 100% of the amount it claimed in the litigation while the city was awarded only 53% of the amount it sought. Southern Bldg. Servs. v. City of Fort Smith, 2014 Ark. App. 437, 440 S.W.3d 346 (2014).

Appellees successfully held shareholders liable for breach of warranty of title in a case involving the conveyance of mineral rights; although appellees did not receive the full amount of damages they requested, they prevailed on their breach of warranty claim, and thus the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellees were the prevailing party in the action. Mt. Pine Timber, Inc. v. Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 197, 487 S.W.3d 832 (2016).

Rescission.

Remedy of rescission in a contract case does not foreclose this section's authorization for attorney's fees in a breach-of-contract case. Where a trial court's order and its oral findings indicate that a case sounded primarily in contract, rather than in tort, and the trial court was misled by dicta in case law, a remand was necessary for the reconsideration of a motion for fees. Beck v. Inter City Transp., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 370, 417 S.W.3d 740 (2012).

Reversal of Judgment.

Where trial court relied on this section in authorizing award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, the Supreme Court, in reversing judgment, also reversed the award of attorney's fees. Brookside Village Mobile Homes v. Meyers, 301 Ark. 139, 782 S.W.2d 365 (1990).

Since the judgment in favor of the prevailing party was reversed, the award of the attorney's fee was also reversed. American States Ins. Co. v. Tri Tech, Inc., 35 Ark. App. 134, 812 S.W.2d 490 (1991).

Assignee of trucking companies stood in the companies' position and was subject to any defenses a transportation company had against the companies, including fraud, and the trial court erred in finding otherwise; in addition, because the assignee was no longer a prevailing party, the appellate court also reversed the award of attorney’s fees under this section. Am. Transp. Corp. v. Exch. Capital Corp., 84 Ark. App. 28, 129 S.W.3d 312 (2003).

Where litigants failed in an action on a trust and the trial court dismissed their cross-claims for waste, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty, and rejected their arguments regarding the interpretation of the trust instrument, the trial court erred in awarding them conditional attorney's fees. Bailey v. Delta Trust & Bank, 359 Ark. 424, 198 S.W.3d 506 (2004).

School district was not required under this section to pay a county an attorney's fee because an order directing the district to reimburse the county for overtime pay provided by the county to the county clerk for work related to a school district election was reversed. Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Fluker, 371 Ark. 574, 268 S.W.3d 879 (2007).

Standard of Review.

Due to the trial judge's intimate acquaintance with the record and the quality of service rendered, the appellate court usually recognizes the superior perspective of the trial judge in assessing the applicable factors. Accordingly, an award of attorney's fees will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990).

Supreme court affirmed the circuit court's order denying a general contractor's motion for attorney's fees because the general contractor challenged the ruling that it was not the prevailing party, but it did not challenge the alternative, independent ruling that it could not be awarded attorney's fees due to its conduct in the case. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Sweet's Contr., Inc., 2014 Ark. 484, 450 S.W.3d 229 (2014).

Summary Judgment.

In a subcontractor's fraudulent inducement suit against a contract, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the contractor $40,000 in attorney's fees under this section, although the contractor prevailed on summary judgment, given the volume of discovery that was necessary before the contractor could determine that the subcontractor had violated § 17-25-103, defeating the subcontractor's claims. Meyer v. CDI Contrs., LLC, 102 Ark. App. 290, 284 S.W.3d 530 (2008).

Award of $200,000 in attorney's fees and costs to defendants was vacated on appeal from summary judgment because defendants were no longer the prevailing party in an action based on a non-compete contract; there was a genuine dispute of material fact about whether defendant employees' former employer assigned defendants' non-compete agreements to plaintiff. Stuart C. Irby Co. v. Tipton, 796 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2015).

Teachers.

An action brought pursuant to the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, § 6-17-1501 et seq., is both a civil action and a claim for labor or services, and thus covered by this section. Junction City Sch. Dist. v. Alphin, 56 Ark. App. 61, 938 S.W.2d 239 (1997); Hall v. Kingsland Sch. Dist., 56 Ark. App. 110, 938 S.W.2d 571 (1997).

Actions brought pursuant to the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 1983, § 6-17-1501 et seq., are actions in contract for labor or services such that attorney's fees may be awarded by the trial court pursuant to this section. Love v. Smackover Sch. Dist., 329 Ark. 4, 946 S.W.2d 676 (1997).

Court found no abuse of discretion in the decision to limit the attorney’s fees award to the work done on a teacher fair dismissal case, and the court affirmed the holding that services regarding the teacher's criminal case, child maltreatment case, and teacher license case should have been disallowed. Avery v. Warren Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 392 (2013).

Time Limitations.

There is no statute or local court rule that prescribes any specific time limit on a motion for an attorney's fee under this section. Therefore, because the essence of waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, it was impossible to waive right to request a fee award under this section by filing motion more than 30 days after the underlying judgment was rendered. Marsh & McLennan v. Herget, 321 Ark. 180, 900 S.W.2d 195 (1995).

District court's verdict was reversed on appeal where the applicable statute of limitations began to run at the latest date the plaintiff lessor learned its land had suffered a remediable injury, though it did not yet know the extent of the injury; thus, the award of attorney's fees was reversed and remanded for further consideration. Highland Indus. Park, Inc. v. BEI Def. Sys. Co., 357 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2004).

Trial court did not err in denying terminated county employee's motion for an award of attorney's fees as her motion seeking attorney's fees was not timely filed; the same result held true even if the time was measured from the denial of the county's motion for JNOV because the fee motion was filed 21 days after the order denying the motion was entered. Crawford County v. Jones, 365 Ark. 585, 232 S.W.3d 433 (2006).

Tort Action.

When the prevailing party's claim is based in tort, an award of attorney's fees cannot be justified under this section. Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 867 S.W.2d 446 (1993).

Where a case was submitted to the jury on alternate theories, both contract and tort, and the jury based its award on the tort theory, the trial judge did not err in declining to award attorney's fees. Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 867 S.W.2d 446 (1993).

Attorney's fees denied where the action was one for replevin and, alternatively, for conversion of two trucks; this section does not allow attorney's fees in tort actions. McQuillan v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 331 Ark. 242, 961 S.W.2d 729 (1998).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney's fees in a conversion action. Brown v. Blake, 86 Ark. App. 107, 161 S.W.3d 298 (2004).

Attorney’s fees should not have been awarded under this section because the action was not primarily based in contract; the case sounded primarily in tort because, in order for a cause of action for legal malpractice to be maintained, the contractual relationship requirement in § 16-22-310 had to be met. The core dispute was whether there was an oral contract to make a claim against an attorney and his legal-malpractice carrier. Howard v. Adams, 2012 Ark. App. 562, 424 S.W.3d 337 (2012).

Although attorney's fees and costs were recoverable under this section for successfully defending a contract claim, fees and costs associated with a third-party negligence claim were not recoverable. Carter v. Cline, 2013 Ark. 398, 430 S.W.3d 22 (2013).

Cited: Damron v. University Estates, Phase II, Inc., 295 Ark. 533, 750 S.W.2d 402 (1988); Meyers Gen. Agency v. Lavender, 301 Ark. 503, 785 S.W.2d 28 (1990); Lockley v. Easley, 302 Ark. 13, 786 S.W.2d 573 (1990); Eddings v. Lippe, 304 Ark. 309, 802 S.W.2d 139 (1991); Woodhaven Homes, Inc. v. Kennedy Sheet Metal Co., 304 Ark. 415, 803 S.W.2d 508 (1991); McElroy v. Grisham, 306 Ark. 4, 810 S.W.2d 933 (1991); Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992); Loewer v. National Bank, 311 Ark. 354, 844 S.W.2d 329 (1992); P.A.M. Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 315 Ark. 234, 868 S.W.2d 33 (1993); Hardison v. Jackson, 45 Ark. App. 49, 871 S.W.2d 410 (1994); Mason v. Jackson, 323 Ark. 252, 914 S.W.2d 728 (1996); City of Ozark v. Nichols, 56 Ark. App. 85, 937 S.W.2d 686 (1997); Nettleton Sch. Dist. v. Owens, 329 Ark. 367, 948 S.W.2d 94 (1997); Milligan v. Circuit Court, 331 Ark. 439, 959 S.W.2d 747 (1998); Arkansas Okla. Gas Corp. v. Waelder Oil & Gas, Inc., 332 Ark. 548, 966 S.W.2d 259 (1998); State Auto Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swaim, 338 Ark. 49, 991 S.W.2d 555 (1999); Bharodia v. Pledger, 66 Ark. App. 349, 990 S.W.2d 581 (1999); Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc., 337 Ark. 247, 987 S.W.2d 722 (1999); Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 338 Ark. 410, 994 S.W.2d 468 (1999); Stilley v. James, 347 Ark. 74, 60 S.W.3d 410 (2001); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 347 Ark. 184, 60 S.W.3d 458 (2001); GMAC v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 329 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2003); BAAN, United States v. USA Truck, Inc., 82 Ark. App. 202, 105 S.W.3d 784 (2003); Hickman v. Kralicek Realty & Constr. Co., 84 Ark. App. 61, 129 S.W.3d 317 (2003); Patton v. TPI Petroleum, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 921 (E.D. Ark. 2005); Taylor v. George, 92 Ark. App. 264, 212 S.W.3d 17 (2005); Sluyter v. Hale Fireworks P'ship, 370 Ark. 511, 262 S.W.3d 154 (2007); Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Fluker, 371 Ark. 574, 268 S.W.3d 879 (2007); Medical Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis Enters., 373 Ark. 525, 285 S.W.3d 233 (2008); Hearne v. Banks, 2009 Ark. App. 590, 376 S.W.3d 444 (2009); Booth v. Riverside Marine Remanufacturers, 2010 Ark. App. 366, 376 S.W.3d 450 (2010); Bonds v. Hunt, 2010 Ark. App. 415, 379 S.W.3d 57 (2010); Dunn v. Womack, 2011 Ark. App. 393, 383 S.W.3d 893 (2011); Worley v. City of Jonesboro, 2011 Ark. App. 594, 385 S.W.3d 908 (2011); Piping Indus. Co. v. Future Fuel Chem. Co., 2013 Ark. App. 549 (2013); Trakru v. Mathews, 2014 Ark. App. 154, 434 S.W.3d 10 (2014); Liberty Bank of Ark. v. Byrd, 2016 Ark. App. 86, 482 S.W.3d 746 (2016); Watson Chapel Sch. Dist. v. Vilches, 2016 Ark. App. 87, 482 S.W.3d 755 (2016); One Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Lenderman, 2017 Ark. App. 42, 512 S.W.3d 651 (2017).

16-22-309. Attorney's fees in actions lacking justiciable issue.

    1. In any civil action in which the court having jurisdiction finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party or his attorney, the court shall award an attorney's fee in an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), or ten percent (10%) of the amount in controversy, whichever is less, to the prevailing party unless a voluntary dismissal is filed or the pleadings are amended as to any nonjusticiable issue within a reasonable time after the attorney or party filing the dismissal or the amended pleadings knew, or reasonably should have known, that he would not prevail.
    2. This section shall not apply to actions arising out of a written instrument or agreement which entitles the prevailing party to an award of reasonable attorney's fees.
  1. In order to find an action, claim, setoff, counterclaim, or defense to be lacking a justiciable issue of law or fact, the court must find that the action, claim, setoff, counterclaim, or defense was commenced, used, or continued in bad faith solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring another or delaying adjudication without just cause or that the party or the party's attorney knew, or should have known, that the action, claim, setoff, counterclaim, or defense was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
  2. In awarding attorney's fees, the court may pronounce its decision on the fees at the conclusion of the trial or special proceedings without written motion and with or without presentation of additional evidence. The judgment for attorney's fees, if any, shall be included in the final judgment entered in the action.
  3. On appeal, the question as to whether there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue shall be determined de novo on the record of the trial court alone.

History. Acts 1987, No. 601, §§ 1-5.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Contract Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 845.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Although the filing of the petition may not have triggered the application of this section, the continuation of the suit beyond a reasonable time after this section became effective rendered the litigant subject to its terms. Ward v. Davis, 298 Ark. 48, 765 S.W.2d 5 (1989).

Burden of Proof.

This section is not applicable to appellate courts. Mosley Mach. Co. v. Gray Supply Co., 310 Ark. 448, 837 S.W.2d 462 (1992).

Subsection (c) makes it clear that it applies in trial rather than appellate courts and thus furnishes no authority for an award of fees requested for the first time on appeal. Cowan v. Schmidle, 312 Ark. 256, 848 S.W.2d 421 (1993).

Where it was obvious from the parties' arguments, the trial court's thorough opinion and the parties' written briefs on appeal that the plaintiffs made a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law and a good faith argument that defendant had waived its defenses, the defendant failed in meeting the burden of proving a violation of ARCP 11 or showing its entitlement to attorney's fees under this section. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 315 Ark. 136, 865 S.W.2d 643 (1993).

Defense and Counterclaim.

Chancellor abused his discretion in awarding fees to plaintiff where the issues raised by defendant in defending the action and in pursuing her counterclaim had a basis in fact and a partial basis in law. Lawson v. Sipple, 319 Ark. 543, 893 S.W.2d 757 (1995).

Whether counterclaims were filed with the purpose of delaying municipal court claim of $510 without just cause, it was clear that opponent knew or should have known that he could not prove all the elements or perhaps even one element of complaint. There was no justification for taking the counterclaims to trial when the settlement failed so that he would not be totally empty before the trial court. Wynn v. Remet, 321 Ark. 227, 902 S.W.2d 213 (1995).

Fees.

Attorney's fees allowed. Brown v. Minor, 305 Ark. 556, 810 S.W.2d 334 (1991).

As a general rule, attorney's fees are not allowed in Arkansas unless expressly authorized by statute; however, in any civil action which the court having jurisdiction finds there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party or his attorney, the court may award an attorney's fee in an amount not to exceed $5,000, or ten percent of the amount in controversy. Elliott v. Hurst, 307 Ark. 134, 817 S.W.2d 877 (1991).

Where there was no showing of bad faith or harassment in plaintiffs' claim that defective feed caused animals' deaths or that the claim was without any reasonable basis, and thus defendant was not entitled to attorney's fees under this section. Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co., 322 Ark. 751, 911 S.W.2d 586 (1995).

Attorney's fees were not awarded to the defendant city in an inverse condemnation action where there was nothing to indicate that the argument made by the plaintiffs was made in bad faith or solely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring the city. Thompson v. City of Siloam Springs, 333 Ark. 351, 969 S.W.2d 639 (1998).

Trial court did not err by denying a telecommunications company's motion for attorney's fees following the trial court's denial of a city's declaratory judgment action against the company because the trial court never made a finding of a complete absence of a justiciable issue, and the appellate court could not find that the city acted in bad faith by bringing the action. City of Fort Smith v. Didicom Towers, Inc., 362 Ark. 469, 209 S.W.3d 344 (2005).

Although appellant did not prevail, his claim was supported, and thus the court could not find that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue and the trial court erred in ordering the payment of fees. Laster v. Williams, 2012 Ark. App. 282 (2012).

Circuit court properly denied the landowners attorney's fees in a boundary dispute where the action was based on the contention that the adjacent owners were trespassing to access another tract owned by landowners, and although the circuit court found that the adjacent owners' claims were barred by res judicata and that there was a boundary by acquiescence, there was nothing to indicate that the argument was made in bad faith or that it was made solely for the purpose of harassing or of maliciously injuring the landowners. Cross v. Cross, 2016 Ark. App. 327, 497 S.W.3d 712 (2016) (sub. op. on reh'g).

Award of attorney's fees was justified under this section. Talley v. Peedin, 2017 Ark. App. 80, 515 S.W.3d 611 (2017).

Final Judgment.

The unliquidated award of attorney's fees pursuant to this section is not a final order. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Cassill, 41 Ark. App. 22, 847 S.W.2d 465 (1993).

This section specifically requires that judgment for attorney's fees be included in the final judgment entered in the action, but no such requirement appears in § 26-35-902. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Cassill, 41 Ark. App. 22, 847 S.W.2d 465 (1993).

Justiciable Issue.

Where there was not a complete absence of a justiciable issue, chancellor's award of attorney's fees was reversed. Bailey v. Montgomery, 31 Ark. App. 1, 786 S.W.2d 594 (1990); Cureton v. Frierson, 41 Ark. App. 196, 850 S.W.2d 38 (1993).

On appeal, the question as to whether there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue shall be determined de novo on the record of the trial court alone. Elliott v. Hurst, 307 Ark. 134, 817 S.W.2d 877 (1991).

To obtain an attorney's fee pursuant to subdivision (a)(1), a prevailing party must show there was a complete absence of a justifiable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party or his attorney; to obtain an attorney's fee or other sanction pursuant to ARCP 11, it must be shown that an attorney or party signed a pleading not ground in fact, not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for a change in the law, or filed for an improper purpose. Cowan v. Schmidle, 312 Ark. 256, 848 S.W.2d 421 (1993).

Court properly dismissed student's petition for a writ of mandamus requesting the court to enjoin school officials to reinstate his cancelled test scores in a voluntary reading program after he was accused of cheating as the court knew of no law to compel the school officials to reinstate the student's scores in a voluntary reading program; further, an award of attorney’s fees to appellees under this section was proper because no justiciable issue was raised. T.J. v. Hargrove, 362 Ark. 649, 210 S.W.3d 79 (2005).

Circuit court did not err in denying attorney’s fees because there was not a complete absence of justiciable issues; the applicability of § 17-42-107(b), regarding capacity to sue for real estate commissions, had not, until the instant appeal, been interpreted by Arkansas' courts and, further, the language of the statute was sufficiently unclear that a party or his attorney would be justified in making an argument regarding its meaning. Keahey v. Plumlee, 94 Ark. App. 121, 226 S.W.3d 31 (2006).

Trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees against a neighboring land owner, who had asserted a claim for an easement by prescription, because there was no bad faith shown. The neighboring land owner presented a valid claim, and offered some evidence that he used the roadway over the course of years. Drummond v. Shepherd, 97 Ark. App. 244, 247 S.W.3d 526 (2007).

There was no evidence in the record, other than the neighbor's bare, unfounded assertion, that the boundary line established and confirmed by all of the surveys was not in fact the boundary line, and there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue on the neighbor's part in his defense; pursuant to § 16-22-309, the landowners were entitled to attorney's fees. Adams v. Atkins, 97 Ark. App. 328, 249 S.W.3d 166 (2007).

In an easement dispute between adjoining landowners dismissed on res judicata grounds, the award of attorney's fees was reversed because precedent requires that the circuit court find a “complete absence of a justiciable issue” as a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees under this section, which was not done in this case. Shonting v. Connor, 2020 Ark. App. 154, 597 S.W.3d 129 (2020).

Limit on Amount.

Where the trial court found that plaintiff's complaint lacked merit, the defendant was entitled to an award of attorney's fees but subject to the limit prescribed by this section. Steward v. Wurtz, 327 Ark. 292, 938 S.W.2d 837 (1997).

Review.

Abstracts of the trial court's sanction ruling are required for an appellate court to determine whether the trial court erred in denying fees and costs pursuant to this section; appellate courts will not review the record to make this determination. McPeek v. White River Lodge Enters., 325 Ark. 68, 924 S.W.2d 456 (1996).

Claim that an attorney was entitled to fees under subdivision (a)(1) of this section for the filing of an allegedly nonjusticiable claim was not heard on review because the circuit court made no ruling on the issue. Morgan v. Chandler, 367 Ark. 430, 241 S.W.3d 224 (2006).

Summary Judgment.

Where Supreme Court determined there were disputed issues of material fact, reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment, it could not be said that plaintiffs were pursuing a claim not grounded in fact and that defendant was entitled to attorney's fees under ARCP 11 or this section. Chlanda v. Killebrew, 329 Ark. 39, 945 S.W.2d 940 (1997).

Cited: Martin v. Couey Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 308 Ark. 325, 824 S.W.2d 832 (1992); Wright v. Keffer, 319 Ark. 201, 890 S.W.2d 271 (1995); Marshall Sch. Dist. v. Hill, 56 Ark. App. 134, 939 S.W.2d 319 (1997); Jones v. Abraham, 67 Ark. App. 304, 999 S.W.2d 698 (1999); Jones v. Abraham, 341 Ark. 66, 15 S.W.3d 310 (2000); Stilley v. Hubbs, 344 Ark. 1, 40 S.W.3d 209 (2001); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. VJM Enters., LLC, 2017 Ark. App. 28, 511 S.W.3d 349 (2017).

16-22-310. Liability for civil damages.

  1. No person licensed to practice law in Arkansas and no partnership or corporation of Arkansas licensed attorneys or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders shall be liable to persons not in privity of contract with the person, partnership, or corporation for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services performed by the person, partnership, or corporation, except for:
    1. Acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentations; or
      1. Other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct if the person, partnership, or corporation was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action.
      2. For the purposes of subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, if the person, partnership, or corporation identifies in writing to the client those persons who are intended to rely on the services and sends a copy of the writing or similar statement to those persons identified in the writing or statement, then the person, partnership, or corporation or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders may be held liable only to the persons intended to so rely, in addition to those persons in privity of contract with the person, partnership, or corporation.
  2. This section shall apply only to acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services occurring or rendered on or after April 6, 1987.
  3. The appointment of an attorney as a successor trustee or attorney-in-fact as provided in § 18-50-101 et seq. shall not expand the liability of the attorney, the entity, or partnership employing the attorney, or the firm in which the attorney is a member or partner beyond the liability provided in this section.

History. Acts 1987, No. 661, §§ 2, 3; 2005, No. 1883, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section is also codified as §§ 16-114-30116-114-303, 17-12-701, and 17-12-702.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Morrison & George, Arkansas's Privity Requirement for Attorney and Accountant Liability, 51 Ark. L. Rev. 697.

Legal Malpractice: The Law in Arkansas and Ways to Avoid Its Reach, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 267.

Molly S. Magee, Comment: Who Is the Client? Who Has the Privilege?: The Attorney Client Privilege in Trust Relationships in Arkansas, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 637 (2012).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Tort Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1085.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section exempts from its privity requirement actions involving fraud, collusion, or malicious or tortious acts. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

This section does not apply to federal civil rights claims. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

As a general rule, an attorney is not liable to persons not in privity with him for negligence in the performance of his duties; the attorney is held liable only for conduct constituting fraud, intentional misrepresentations, or intentional torts. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

This section protects attorneys from liability to those not in privity with them but excepts from this protection actions for intentional fraud. Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85, 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993).

The contract contemplated by this section relates to a contract for professional services performed by the attorney for the client; thus, where the asserted contract did not relate to attorney's performance of professional services rendered to plaintiff, but rather the alleged breach appears to have been related to attorney's representation of plaintiff's husband in matters concerning divorce, the alleged contract did not involve attorney's legal representation of plaintiff, and privity of contract was lacking. Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark. 378, 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996).

Where wife's attorney in divorce suit negotiated the terms of a general settlement with the husband's attorney and the wife subsequently refused to accept the settlement agreement, the husband could not seek to hold the wife's attorney liable to him under a claim of breach of an implied promise; the wife's attorney was not in privity of contract with the husband and there were no allegations of fraud or misrepresentation by the wife's attorney. Nielsen v. Berger-Nielsen, 347 Ark. 996, 69 S.W.3d 414 (2002).

Because this section did not bar client's claim of professional negligence against the lawyer and a material fact remained as to whether the client was in privity with the lawyer, and a material fact remained as to whether there was an employer-employee relationship between the lawyer and the firm at the time of the lawyer's alleged negligence, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the lawyer and the law firm. Jackson v. Ivory, 353 Ark. 847, 120 S.W.3d 587 (2003).

Because insurers were not in direct privity with attorneys who allegedly provided inadequate representation to an insured, and a valuation sent to one insurer did not indicate that the insurer was a party intended to rely on the valuation, this section precluded the insurers from suing the attorneys for legal malpractice.Great American Ins. Co. v. Dover, 456 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2006).

In a negligence action, the real question was whether the property appraiser owed any legal duty to the plaintiff property owners, and the plaintiffs' reliance on §§ 4-86-101, 16-114-303, and 16-22-310 to support their proposition that privity of contract with an appraiser was not a requirement in their negligence suit was misplaced. Marlar v. Daniel, 368 Ark. 505, 247 S.W.3d 473 (2007).

Where heirs had filed an action against lawyers alleging negligence related to a will executed by their deceased relative, the lawyers were entitled to summary judgment because none of the heirs had ever had a lawyer-client relationship with the lawyers. Under this section, the lawyers were protected from such actions filed by persons with whom they were not in privity. Yeary v. Baptist Health Found., No. 4:06CV01702 JLH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1376 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008).

Dismissal was proper in an action by debtors against a law firm acting as a debt collector because the firm was immune from claims of abuse of process, civil conspiracy, constructive fraud, and negligence under this section. Born v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 2010 Ark. 292, 372 S.W.3d 324 (2010).

Bond counsel was not liable to the banks for malpractice for failing to indicate in the disclosure documents prepared for the bond underwriter that there was a prior lien on the real property pledged as security for the bonds because the banks did not have direct privity of contract or any attorney-client relationship with counsel. First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A., 2013 Ark. 159, 427 S.W.3d 47 (2013).

Constitutionality.

This section does not usurp Supreme Court's authority to regulate the practice of law as the statute enunciates the parameters for litigation by clients against attorneys and does not conflict with any rule or decision by the Supreme Court. Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark. 378, 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996).

Construction.

The language of this section appears to be nothing more than a restatement of the general rule of liability. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

Trial court properly concluded that the lawyer placed a lien on land in which he believed the landowner held an interest and that the acts were the lawful actions of an attorney representing his client; therefore, the lawyer was immune under this section and § 16-114-303 from the landowner's slander of title lawsuit. Fleming v. Cox Law Firm, 363 Ark. 17, 210 S.W.3d 866 (2005).

Purpose.

This section was not intended to make attorneys immune from liability for damages in the case of an intentional tort, but appears to be a legislative statement that the privity requirement still exists in connection with contract or negligence actions. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

If this section were to grant an attorney immunity from liability for abuse of process, then this section would be a shield behind which an attorney could take action to intentionally and improperly deprive someone of his property. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

Attorney’s Fees.

Attorney’s fees should not have been awarded under § 16-22-308 because the action was not primarily based in contract; the case sounded primarily in tort because, in order for a cause of action for legal malpractice to be maintained, the contractual relationship requirement in this section had to be met. The core dispute was whether there was an oral contract to make a claim against an attorney and his legal-malpractice carrier. Howard v. Adams, 2012 Ark. App. 562, 424 S.W.3d 337 (2012).

Employees.

Employer attorney was not entitled to the immunity protection of this section for her own negligence in not adequately supervising her employee, another attorney, who was suspected of dishonest conduct in his transaction with clients who were not in privity of contract with the employer attorney, as the employer attorney's negligence was not related to the performance of professional services as required under the statute, but instead involved her supervision of his conduct as his employer. Madden v. Aldrich, 346 Ark. 405, 58 S.W.3d 342 (2001).

Exceptions.

Although this section uses the terms fraud or intentional misrepresentation when discussing exceptions to the privity requirement, the exception includes intentional torts that are committed on third parties. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

A limited exception to the strict privity rule is commonly made when the third party is found to be a third party beneficiary. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

The exception to this section appears to be for intentional actions. Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85, 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993).

Exception in subdivision (a)(2) did not apply in the case of trustees who brought a legal malpractice action against a lawyer and others; the lawyer was aware that the purpose of the lawyer's relationship with the trustees as individuals was to benefit the trusts, and the trustees did not present any specific evidence that showed that the statutory requirements had been met. Giles v. Harrington, Miller, Neihouse & Krug, 362 Ark. 338, 208 S.W.3d 197 (2005).

Second exception to the general rule of privity in § 16-22-310(a)(2) on which trusts relied in their legal malpractice claims against attorneys was inapplicable because the trusts had no potential action against one attorney due to lack of the statutorily required privity of contract with him, and the trusts' claims that an attorney's acts during the second period of representation affected the 1999 claim regarding a sale of the family farm failed. While it was undisputed that counsel during the first period of representation was aware that the purpose of his relationship with the individuals was to benefit the trusts, the trusts did not present any specific evidence, such as specific documents or correspondence, that showed that the statutory requirements as to sending correspondence had been met. Giles v. Harrington, Miller, Neihouse & Krug, 362 Ark. 338, 208 S.W.3d 197 (2005).

Bond counsel could not be liable to the banks under subdivision (a)(2) of this section for failing to indicate in the disclosure documents prepared for the bond underwriter that there was a prior lien on the real property pledged as security for the bonds because there was no writing by which counsel identified the banks as persons counsel's services were intended to benefit or influence. First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A., 2013 Ark. 159, 427 S.W.3d 47 (2013).

Fraud.

Complaint alleging actual fraud and constructive fraud against the attorney for an opposing party in prior litigation dismissed for failure to state claim under ARCP 12(b)(6). Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85, 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993).

Where there was no factual basis for the conclusory allegation in plaintiff's amended complaint that attorney intentionally misrepresented his statement of neutrality in divorce case, the attorney was immune under this section. Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark. 378, 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996).

Pursuant to §§ 16-22-310(a)(1) and 16-114-303, an attorney and law firm were immune from a couple's slander of title claim where there was no privity between the parties, there were no factual assertions of fraud, and it appeared that a lis pendens action to enforce a child arrearage judgment obtained by the husband's ex-wife was simply filed in error. Fleming v. Cox Law Firm, 363 Ark. 17, 210 S.W.3d 866 (2005).

Bond counsel was not entitled to summary judgment on the claim that he committed malpractice by failing to indicate in the disclosure documents prepared for the bond underwriter that there was a prior lien on the real property pledged as security for the bonds because there remained genuine issues of material fact on whether the existence of the prior lien was a material item of information that should have been disclosed by bond counsel, whether the failure to disclose was an intentional omission, and whether the failure to disclose was done with the intent to defraud bond purchasers as a means to secure the fees bond counsel expected to realize from the bond transaction. First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A., 2013 Ark. 159, 427 S.W.3d 47 (2013).

Relation to Other Remedies.

Where this section precluded insurers from filing a legal malpractice claim against attorneys who allegedly provided inadequate representation for an insured, the insurers also could not recover from the attorneys under a theory of equitable subrogation; allowing the insurers to proceed under that alternative theory would contravene this section, which enunciates the parameters for litigation by clients against attorneys. Great American Ins. Co. v. Dover, 456 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2006).

Respondeat Superior.

Client's respondeat superior claims against the law firm were not barred by this section due to lack of privity between the client and the lawyer who worked for the law firm. Jackson v. Ivory, 353 Ark. 847, 120 S.W.3d 587 (2003).

Standing.

Privity of contract is not required in order to have a cause of action against an attorney for intentional misrepresentations or fraud. Calandro v. Parkerson, 327 Ark. 131, 936 S.W.2d 755 (1997).

A plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must be in direct privity with the attorney or entity being sued for legal malpractice; thus, the children of a decedent could not bring a legal malpractice action against the attorney who drafted the decedent's will either under a theory of indirect privity or as third-party beneficiaries of the contract for legal representation. McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 988 S.W.2d 9 (1999).

The children of a decedent did not have standing to bring a legal malpractice action against the attorney who drafted the decedent's will under the exception contained in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, as there was no evidence that the attorney ever sent a copy of the will to the children. McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 988 S.W.2d 9 (1999).

A decedent's personal representatives did not have standing to bring a legal malpractice action against the attorney who drafted the decedent's will as there was direct privity between the decedent and the attorney. McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 988 S.W.2d 9 (1999).

Although the law firm, lawyer's estate, and attorneys were in privity of contract with the individuals who created the trusts and became trustees, the existence of privity for the claims against the attorneys did not stand on its own because the actual claims of legal malpractice occurred during the lawyer's representation when the trustees had no privity with the firm; thus, the trustees were without standing to bring their legal malpractice suit and the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the case. Giles v. Harrington, Miller, Neihouse & Krug, 362 Ark. 338, 208 S.W.3d 197 (2005).

Trustees lacked standing to file legal malpractice claims against appellees, attorneys, and a law firm, because appellees provided legal services for the sale of a family farm to the trustees in their individual capacities, and not to the trusts of which the individuals were trustees. Although the parties were, in fact, the same individuals, they were different legal entities from the trusts; thus privity for the individuals did not necessarily equate to privity for the trusts, and the trustees had no privity of contract with appellees as required by § 16-22-310(a). Giles v. Harrington, Miller, Neihouse & Krug, 362 Ark. 338, 208 S.W.3d 197 (2005).

Where a decedent, prior to his death, and his wife retained the services of a lawyer to set up a revocable trust for the benefit of the decedent's son, where the decedent became incapacitated before executing deeds to transfer his assets to the trust, where the lawyer consulted with the decedent's son and wife and petitioned to have the son appointed guardian so that he could execute the deeds, where the lawyer did not disclose that, if the son did not sign the deed, he would inherit by intestate succession but that, if he executed the deeds, his stepmother would gain control and could divest him of the assets, and where the stepmother did just that after the decedent succumbed, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to attorneys hired to pursue a legal malpractice claim against the lawyer and in holding that no valid claim existed because the son lacked privity of contract with his father's lawyer. Summary judgment was improper because the evidence revealed conflicting accounts of the son's contractual relationship with the lawyer and gave rise to the implication that the lawyer had a duty to advise the son of his inheritance rights and the possibility that his stepmother could cut him out of the trust. Howard v. Adams, 2009 Ark. App. 621, 332 S.W.3d 24 (2009).

16-22-311. Reports of visits with incarcerated indigent clients.

    1. An attorney at law representing an indigent client who is incarcerated in any county jail, city jail, juvenile detention facility, or other facility operated by the Division of Youth Services in the State of Arkansas shall make a report of personal visits with the client.
    2. The report shall be on a sign-in document to be provided by the correctional facility or criminal detention facility in which the client is incarcerated.
    3. The sign-in document shall be designed in order to allow the attorney to record:
      1. The date of the visit;
      2. The time the attorney is signing in for the visit;
      3. The name of the inmate visited; and
      4. The time the attorney is signing out after the visit.
    1. Each county jail, city jail, juvenile detention facility, or other detention facility operated by the division shall furnish a sign-in document for attorneys required to make a report under this section.
    2. The facilities shall maintain the reports for a period of one (1) year following the release, discharge, or transfer of an inmate represented by an attorney who is required to make a report under this section.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1279, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Subchapter 4 — Suspension and Disbarment

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this subchapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Court Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law.

Cross References. Regulating professional conduct of attorneys, Ark. Const. Amend. 28.

Research References

ALR.

Solicitation of business by or for attorney. 5 A.L.R.4th 866.

Disciplinary action against attorney for misconduct related to performance of official duties. 10 A.L.R.4th 605.

Conduct in connection with malpractice claim as meriting disciplinary action. 14 A.L.R.4th 209.

Attorney's delay in handling decedent's estate as ground for disciplinary action. 21 A.L.R.4th 75.

Disciplinary action against attorney based on communications to judge respecting merits of cause. 22 A.L.R.4th 917.

Communication with party represented by counsel. 26 A.L.R.4th 102.

Election campaign activities as ground for disciplining attorney. 26 A.L.R.4th 170.

Mental or emotional disturbance as defense to or mitigation of charges in attorney disciplinary action. 26 A.L.R.4th 995.

Assumed or trade name: use as ground for disciplinary action. 26 A.L.R.4th 1083.

Privilege against self-incrimination in disbarment or other disciplinary proceedings. 30 A.L.R.4th 243.

Advertising as ground for disciplinary action against attorney. 30 A.L.R.4th 742.

Failure to co-operate with or obey disciplinary authorities as ground for disciplining attorney. 37 A.L.R.4th 646.

Bar admission or reinstatement of attorney as affected by alcoholism or alcohol abuse. 39 A.L.R.4th 567.

Initiating, or threatening to initiate, criminal prosecution as ground for disciplining counsel. 42 A.L.R.4th 1000.

Sexual misconduct as ground for disciplining attorney. 43 A.L.R.4th 1062.

Propriety of Website Attorney Advertisements, 26 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2018).

Am. Jur. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attys, § 25 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Discipline of Attorneys for Nonprofessional Misconduct, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 411.

Legal Malpractice, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 452.

Brill, The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct 1969-1979: A Call for Reform, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 571.

C.J.S. 7 C.J.S., Atty & C., § 59 et seq.

16-22-401. Grounds for removal or suspension.

Any attorney who is guilty of any felony or infamous crime, of improperly retaining his client's money, of any malpractice, deceit, or misdemeanor in his professional capacity, is an habitual drunkard, or is guilty of any ungentlemanly conduct in the practice of his profession may be removed or suspended from practice, upon charges exhibited against him, and proceedings thereon had as provided in this subchapter.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 12; C. & M. Dig., § 610; Pope's Dig., § 650; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-401.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

The trial court may remove or suspend an attorney, and its discretion in so doing will not be reversed unless abused. Maloney v. State ex. rel. Prosecuting Att'y, 182 Ark. 510, 32 S.W.2d 423 (1930). See McGehee v. State, 182 Ark. 603, 32 S.W.2d 308 (1930).

Due Process.

The circuit court has the inherent power to disbar an attorney who makes a personal attack upon the judge for his action as such; but the attorney is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard in defense, the usual practice being to make charges in writing against the attorney and issue a rule upon him to show cause why he should not be disbarred. Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149 (1860).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Where an attorney sold bonds of his clients, for theft of which they were at the time being prosecuted, the action of the court in suspending the attorney from practice for one year instead of disbarring him was not an abuse of discretion in view of his previous good conduct and professed intention to apply the proceeds on the judgment against his client. State ex rel. Greene County Bar Ass'n v. Huddleston, 173 Ark. 686, 293 S.W. 353 (1927).

Evidence that attorney concealed receipt of checks payable to clients in settlement of their claims, that he indorsed and deposited the drafts without clients' authorization and that he drew on the account for payment of personal expenses, was sufficient to support a disbarment order. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523 S.W.2d 900 (1975).

16-22-402. Venue.

The charges shall be exhibited in the county in which the offense has been committed, or in which the accused may reside.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 13; C. & M. Dig., § 611; Pope's Dig., § 651; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-402.

16-22-403. Time for hearing.

The court in which the charges may be exhibited shall fix a time for the hearing of the charges, allowing a reasonable time to notify the accused.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 612; Pope's Dig., § 652; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-403.

16-22-404. Service of citation.

  1. The clerk of the court in which the charges may be exhibited shall issue a citation, notifying the accused to appear at the time and place fixed for the hearing and answer the charges exhibited against him. A copy of the charges shall be attached to the citation.
    1. The citation may be served in any county in this state.
    2. The citation shall be served in the same manner as a summons in suits at law, and the service shall be at least ten (10) days before the return day thereof.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, §§ 15, 16; C. & M. Dig., §§ 613, 614; Pope's Dig., §§ 653, 654; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-404, 25-405.

16-22-405. Failure to appear — Compelling appearance.

If the accused fails to appear according to the command of the citation, his appearance may be compelled by attachment, or the court may proceed ex parte.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 17; C. & M. Dig., § 615; Pope's Dig., § 655; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-406.

16-22-406. Other charges — Suspension only.

Upon charges other than a conviction for an indictable offense, the court shall have power only to suspend the accused from practice until the facts shall be ascertained in the manner prescribed in this subchapter.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 19; C. & M. Dig., § 617; Pope's Dig., § 657; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-408.

16-22-407. Limitation of proceedings.

If the charges are for an indictable offense and no indictment is found or, if found, is not prosecuted to trial within six (6) months, the suspension shall be discontinued unless the delay is produced by the absence or the procurement of the accused, in which case the suspension may continue until the final decision.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 20; C. & M. Dig., § 618; Pope's Dig., § 658; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-409.

16-22-408. Record of conviction or acquittal of offense as evidence.

The record of conviction or acquittal of any indictable offense shall in all cases be conclusive evidence of the facts, and the court shall proceed thereon accordingly.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 21; C. & M. Dig., § 619; Pope's Dig., § 659; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-410.

16-22-409. Trial when offense not indictable.

When the matter charged is not indictable, the trial of the facts alleged shall be had in the court in which the charges are pending. The trial shall be by jury. If the accused fails to appear or, upon appearing, does not require a jury, the trial shall be by the court sitting without a jury.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 22; C. & M. Dig., § 620; Pope's Dig., § 660; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-411.

Case Notes

Disciplinary Proceedings.

The Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, after hearing charges of professional misconduct, may choose to proceed with disciplinary proceedings according to this section and § 16-22-410 or by the Rules Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys, and a formal statement of election is unnecessary. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523 S.W.2d 900 (1975).

Trial Without Jury.

The accused is deprived of no right of which he can complain where the case is tried by the court, if the evidence is uncontroverted. Wernimont v. State, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S.W. 194 (1911).

16-22-410. Verification of charges.

All charges exhibited under this subchapter shall be verified by affidavit and shall be prosecuted by the prosecuting attorney, prosecuting in the district in which the charges are pending.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 24; C. & M. Dig., § 622; Pope's Dig., § 662; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-413.

Case Notes

Disciplinary Proceedings.

The Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, after hearing charges of professional misconduct, may choose to proceed with disciplinary proceedings according to this section and § 16-22-409 or by the Rules Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys, and a formal statement of election is unnecessary. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523 S.W.2d 900 (1975).

16-22-411. Judgment.

  1. In all cases of conviction, the court shall pronounce judgment of removal or suspension, according to the facts found.
  2. Every judgment of removal or suspension made in pursuance of this subchapter shall operate, while it continues in force, as a removal or suspension from practice in all the courts of this state.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, §§ 23, 26; C. & M. Dig., §§ 621, 624; Pope's Dig., §§ 661, 664; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-412, 25-415.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

This section vests the trial court with discretion either to remove or suspend, which discretion will not be disturbed on appeal save for abuse. State ex rel. Greene County Bar Ass'n v. Huddleston, 173 Ark. 686, 293 S.W. 353 (1927).

Sufficiency of Punishment.

On a charge of having secured a divorce on perjured testimony, temporary suspension from practice for one year was sufficient under the circumstances. McGehee v. State, 182 Ark. 603, 32 S.W.2d 308 (1930).

16-22-412. Conviction in another state — Effect.

  1. In all cases of conviction for felony or other infamous crime of any attorney at law in any other state or territory of the United States, such conviction, on the production of a copy of the record thereof, shall have the same effect as if such attorney had been convicted in this state.
  2. In all cases of conviction of any of the crimes specified in the preceding section, if the attorney shall have been licensed in this state, after such conviction, his license shall be revoked in the same manner as if the conviction had been had after the granting of such license.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, §§ 27, 28; C. & M. Dig., §§ 625, 626; Pope's Dig., §§ 665, 666; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-416, 25-417.

16-22-413. Review by Supreme Court.

In all cases of a trial of charges, the accused may except to any decision of the court and may prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court, or writ of error, in all respects as in actions at law.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 15, § 25; C. & M. Dig., § 623; Pope's Dig., § 663; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-414.

Case Notes

Cited: Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149 (1860).

Subchapter 5 — Unauthorized Practice of Law

16-22-501. Prohibited activities.

  1. A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a direct economic benefit for himself or herself, the person:
    1. Contracts with any person to represent that person with regard to personal causes of action for property damages or personal injury;
    2. Advises any person as to the person's rights and the advisability of making claims for personal injuries or property damages;
    3. Advises any person as to whether or not to accept an offered sum of money in settlement of claims for personal injuries or property damages;
    4. Enters into any contract with another person to represent that person in personal injury or property damage matters on a contingent fee basis with an attempted assignment of a portion of the person's cause of action;
    5. Enters into any contract, except a contract of insurance, with a third person which purports to grant the exclusive right to select and retain legal counsel to represent the individual in any legal proceeding; or
    6. Contacts any person by telephone or in person for the purpose of soliciting business which is legal in nature, as set forth above.
  2. This section does not apply to a person currently licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or a foreign country and in good standing with the State Bar of Arkansas and the state bar or licensing authority of any and all other states and foreign countries where licensed.
  3. Except as provided by subsection (d) of this section, an offense under subsection (a) of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
  4. An offense under subsection (a) of this section is a Class D felony if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has previously been convicted under subsection (a) of this section.
  5. This section shall not apply to a person who is licensed as an adjuster or employed as an adjuster by an insurer as authorized by § 23-64-101.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1301, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. For the rules of Procedure established by the Supreme Court Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, see the Rules Volume.

Cross References. Regulating the practice of law, Ark. Const. Amend. 28.

Research References

ALR.

Unauthorized practice of law — Real estate closings. 119 A.L.R.5th 191.

Matters Constituting Unauthorized Practice of Law in Bankruptcy Proceedings. 32 A.L.R.6th 531.

Ark. L. Rev.

Bobbi J. Boyd, Do It in the Sunshine: A Comparative Analysis of Rulemaking Procedures and Transparency Practices of Lawyer-Licensing Entities, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 609 (2017).

Case Notes

Disciplinary Proceedings.

Where an attorney, after his license was temporarily suspended due to his felony conviction for DWI, held himself out as a landlord's attorney, advised the landlord's tenant that the tenant had to vacate leased premises, and represented the landlord at a city council meeting concerning a condemnation matter, the attorney was disbarred pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. Prof. Conduct P. § 13(D) because the special judge did not clearly err in concluding (1) that the DWI conviction constituted a serious crime under Ark. Sup. Ct. Prof. Conduct P. § 2(J); (2) that the attorney violated Ark. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b); and (3) that the attorney's DWI conviction and unauthorized practice of law in violation of § 16-22-501(a)(2) constituted serious misconduct under Ark. Sup. Ct. Prof. Conduct P. § 17(B). Ligon v. Stewart, 369 Ark. 380, 255 S.W.3d 435 (2007).

Chapter 23 Law Libraries

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 284, § 8: Mar. 15, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that a number of counties of this State are in need of legal educational materials and that such materials are immediately necessary for the continued improvement and development of legal education and the administration of justice. Therefore, it is declared, for these reasons, that an emergency exists, and this Act being essential for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 589, § 5: Mar. 27, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that at least one and possibly other county law libraries of this State are currently in need of additional financing to support the purchase of legal educational materials and that without the clear cut application of Act 284 of 1971 to apply to bond forfeitures in criminal cases, such libraries may well cease to exist causing a loss to the counties involved to the extent of books already purchased and depriving the public of a substantial investment which has heretofore been made. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 89, § 3: Jan. 31, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in some counties of the State there are fewer than three practicing attorneys and in such counties it is technically impossible to establish a county law library board as contemplated in the current law since the current law provides for a board of not less than three nor more than five persons all of whom shall be practicing attorneys residing in the county; that this Act is designed to permit such counties to establish a county law library board by providing that when there are fewer than three practicing attorneys in a county, the three (3) to five (5) member county law library board shall be composed of the practicing attorneys residing in the county together with other legal residents and qualified electors of the county appointed by the county court; that this Act should be given effect immediately in order to enable those counties in which there are fewer than three practicing attorneys to provide for the establishment and maintenance of a law library and to establish a county law library board to administer the county law library, at the the earliest possible date. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 652, § 3: Mar. 22, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in some counties of the state there are excess funds in the County Law Library Book Fund which under the present law cannot be used for any purposes other than the operation and maintenance of the law library, which excess funds could be used appropriately for improvement in the administration of justice in the county if this Act is amended, and this Act is necessary for improvement in the administration of justice in the several counties of the state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-23-101. Authorization.

  1. Any county of this state is authorized to own, operate, and maintain a county law library and, in connection therewith, to own, buy, sell, lend, borrow, receive bequests and donations of, and otherwise deal in and contract concerning books, volumes, treatises, pamphlets, and other educational materials useful for the purpose of legal education and to use therefor any available funds, including proceeds of the court costs levied and collected pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
  2. The funds derived from the levy of costs in criminal and civil cases as provided by this chapter may be used for any purpose relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of a county law library, including, but not limited to:
    1. Construction, renovation, and maintenance of facilities to house such libraries;
    2. The purchase of books, supplies, furnishings, and appointments;
    3. The payment of salaries and expenses of librarians and assistants; and
    4. Such other expenditures necessary to carry out the purpose and intent of this chapter.
    1. Each county which has two (2) judicial districts, an organized bar association organized in each district prior to March 1, 1991, and a county law library established prior to March 1, 1991, shall create a county law library to be located within each judicial district.
    2. The court costs levied under this chapter and collected by the courts within the judicial districts shall be used only for the county law library located within that judicial district.

History. Acts 1971, No. 284, § 1; 1985, No. 915, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-504; Acts 1991, No. 1241, § 1.

16-23-102. County law library boards.

    1. A county law library established pursuant to this chapter shall be under the control of a county law library board of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) persons, who shall be practicing attorneys residing in the county and who shall be appointed by the county court from attorneys nominated by the county bar association or, in counties where there is no county bar association, by a regional bar association which includes that county.
    2. In any county in which there are fewer than three (3) practicing attorneys, the board shall be composed of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) persons, including the practicing attorney or attorneys in the county together with one (1) or more additional persons who are legal residents and qualified electors of the county, appointed by the county court.
  1. Members of the board shall be appointed for a term of five (5) years, but the initial appointments shall be so arranged that the terms of each member initially appointed expire in succeeding years.
    1. The board shall have charge of the operation and maintenance of the county law library and the custody and care of the county law library's property. The board shall direct the expenditure of funds derived for county law library purposes under this chapter, and any other funds received by the county, or the board, for the use of the county law library.
    2. Any excess funds in the county law library book fund not needed for the operation and maintenance of the county law library may be expended by the board for any other purpose necessary for improvement in the administration of justice in the county.
      1. The board may dispose of any personal property of the county law library it determines is junk, scrap, discarded, or otherwise of no value to the county law library.
      2. The board may dispose of the personal property under subdivision (c)(3)(A) of this section by methods that include without limitation private sale, public sale, gift, or destruction.
    1. The board, subject to approval of the county court, is authorized, in implementation of the purposes of this chapter, to enter into agreements with any person, including other public bodies, in this state pertaining to the operation and maintenance of a county law library.
    2. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, agreements entered into pursuant to the provisions hereof may contain provisions:
      1. Making available to any institution of higher learning the county law library, and related facilities, and the books, volumes, treatises, pamphlets, and other educational materials located therein;
      2. Authorizing the institution to maintain, locate, and relocate in the county law library, select, replace, supervise the use of, buy, sell, lend, borrow, receive bequests and donations of, and otherwise deal in and contract concerning, such books, volumes, treatises, pamphlets, and other educational materials; and
      3. Providing for the operation, maintenance, and supervision of the county law library and related facilities for the benefit of the institution, the county, judges and attorneys, and the public.
    3. The agreements may make available to the institution all or a portion of the collections of the costs levied pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, for the purpose of performing the obligations of the institution thereunder.

History. Acts 1971, No. 284, §§ 4, 5; 1977, No. 89, § 1; 1983, No. 652, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 25-507, 25-508; Acts 2013, No. 43, § 1; 2015, No. 1152, § 5.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (c)(1), substituted “the county law library's” for “its” in the first sentence, and “The board” for “It” and “county law” for “law” in the second sentence; and added (c)(3).

The 2015 amendment inserted “county law” twice in (c)(3)(A).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not a “special act” within the meaning of the 14th Amendment to the Arkansas Constitution. Nahlen v. Woods, 255 Ark. 974, 504 S.W.2d 749 (1974).

16-23-103. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning levy of costs, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1971, No. 284, § 2; 1975, No. 589, § 1; 1985, No. 915, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-505; Acts 1987, No. 773, § 1.

16-23-104. Conditions precedent to levy and collection.

  1. The costs levied pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall not be levied and collected unless there has been filed with the county court of a county a resolution of the county bar association or, in counties where there is no county bar association, a resolution of the regional bar association which includes that county, signed by the president and attested to by the secretary of such bar association, requesting the levying and collecting of the costs levied pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
  2. After receipt of the resolution, the county court may enter an order levying the costs levied pursuant to the provisions of this chapter and directing their collection.

History. Acts 1971, No. 284, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-506.

16-23-105. County law library book fund.

All collections from costs levied pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall forthwith be paid over by the collecting officer to the county treasurer and by him credited on his records to a fund to be designated and known as the county law library book fund. The book fund shall be used for no other purposes than those provided in this chapter, and expenditures therefrom shall not require appropriation by the quorum court.

History. Acts 1971, No. 284, § 2; 1985, No. 915, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 25-505.

Chapter 24 Court Bailiffs

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-24-101. Oaths for court bailiffs.

  1. The following oath, in substance, shall be administered to a court bailiff at the start of a jury trial:
  2. The following oath, in substance, shall be administered to a court bailiff prior to the deliberation of a jury:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully, impartially, and to the best of my ability, discharge the duties of bailiff of this court, to which office I have been appointed, and strictly obey all orders of the court, as bailiff during the present session now being held.”

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will keep this jury together, not allowing any person to speak to them or overhear their deliberations, nor to speak to them myself, unless it is in the performance of my official duties as bailiff to this court.”

History. Acts 2007, No. 227, § 1.

Chapters 25-29 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 3. Juries And Jurors

Chapter 30 General Provisions

Cross References. Right to trial by jury, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 7; Ark. Const. Amend. 16.

Preambles. Acts 1963, No. 490 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, in many lengthy civil and criminal trials in circuit courts of this State it sometimes occurs that a juror may become ill, pass on or otherwise become incapacitated; and

“Whereas, the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas thinks it necessary in the interest of justice that alternate jurors be provided for, to be selected only within the sound discretion of the court; and

“Whereas, the utilization of alternate jurors may in many instances prevent mistrials and nonsuits, thus averting expensive retrials;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 29 provided: “This Act shall be effective on and after January 1, 1970, except that the procedures outlined in this Act to be carried out prior to the empaneling of a jury shall be effective on and after July 1, 1969, so that jurors empaneled at terms of any circuit court beginning after January 1, 1970, shall be selected as provided herein.”

Acts 2018 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 3: Mar. 19, 2018. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court regarding contractual jury waiver provisions leave parties in doubt about the applicability of their contracts; that this uncertainty must be resolved immediately; and that this uncertainty may only be resolved through the immediate effectiveness of this act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Case Notes

In General.

In this state, jurors are presumed to be unbiased. Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995).

Construction.

Acts 1969, No. 568 must be construed as mandatory and not as directory only. Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973).

Cited: Cantrell v. State, 265 Ark. 263, 577 S.W.2d 605, 1979 Ark. LEXIS 1336 (1979).

16-30-101. Multijudge and divided circuits.

  1. In multijudge circuits, the circuit judges may select one (1) of their number to perform any of the duties imposed upon a judge by this act.
  2. Divisions of any circuit court may either have separate jurors, or the circuit judges by concurrence may share a single jury wheel or box or a single list of jurors.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 28; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-220; Acts 2017, No. 600, § 4.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (b), deleted “jury commissioners and” following “separate”, inserted “circuit” preceding “judges”, and deleted “single set of commissioners, a” following “share a”.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1969, No. 568, codified as §§ 16-30-101, 16-30-103, 16-31-10116-31-104, 16-31-106, 16-31-107, 16-32-10116-32-104, 16-32-106, 16-32-107, 16-32-109.

16-30-102. Alternate jurors.

  1. When in the discretion of the court it shall be deemed advisable in the interests of the furtherance of justice, the court may direct that not more than three (3) jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
  2. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examinations and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.
  3. Each opposing side shall be entitled to one (1) peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law. The additional peremptory challenges may be used against an alternate juror only, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by these rules by this section may not be used against an alternate juror.

History. Acts 1963, No. 490, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-232 — 39-234.

Publisher's Notes. Committee comments to Rule 47 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that this section is superseded by Rule 47 with respect to civil proceedings but is probably not superseded with respect to criminal proceedings.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that subsections (a) and (c) of this section were deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Peremptory Challenges After Purkett v. Elam, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 514 U.S. 765, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995): How to Judge a Book By Its Cover Without Violating Equal Protection, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

Case Notes

Peremptory Challenges.

Both in this case and in Miller v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Ark. 1994), the prosecutor consistently and systematically excluded African-Americans from participating as jurors through the use of peremptory challenges. Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995).

Defendant's change-of-venue motion alleging adverse pretrial publicity was properly denied in light of the testimony introduced at the hearing which showed less-than-pervasive publicity, the failure of defendant to demonstrate during voir dire that there were publicity-affected jurors, and the fact that he did not use all his peremptory challenges. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

Presence in Jury Room.

Where the trial court found that no extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, nor was any outside influence brought to bear upon any juror as a result of an alternate juror's presence in the jury room for a short time, defendant did not show he suffered any prejudice. McDonald v. State, 37 Ark. App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992).

Standard of Review.

—Racial Discrimination.

A constitutional violation involving the selection of jurors in a racially discriminatory manner is a “structural defect” in the trial mechanism which cannot be subjected to a harmless error analysis. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995).

Cited: Buckley v. State, 341 Ark. 864, 20 S.W.3d 331 (2000).

16-30-103. Oaths.

  1. The following oath, in substance, shall be administered to the grand jurors:
  2. Petit jurors upon being impaneled pursuant to this act shall take the following oath:

“Saving yourselves and fellow jurors, you do swear that you will diligently inquire of, and present all treasons, felonies, misdemeanors, and breaches of the penal laws over which you have jurisdiction, of which you have knowledge or may receive information.”

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will well and truly try each and all of the issues submitted to me as a juror and a true verdict render according to the law and the evidence.”

History. Crim. Code, § 406; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [406], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 2979; Pope's Dig., § 3801; Acts 1969, No. 568, § 24; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-216, 43-904.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-30-101.

Case Notes

Criminal Cases.

The oath of jurors required in criminal cases is that prescribed by § 16-89-109. Chiles v. State, 45 Ark. 143 (1885); Mabry v. State, 50 Ark. 492, 8 S.W. 823 (1888) (decisions under prior law).

Grand Jurors.

The record entry of the swearing of the grand jury must show that all of them were sworn; otherwise, the judgment of conviction will be reversed and, upon return of the case, unless a nunc pro tunc order that all were sworn can be truthfully made, the prisoner may be held to answer a new indictment. Baker v. State, 39 Ark. 180 (1882), overruled, Hobbs v. State, 86 Ark. 360, 111 S.W. 264 (1908).

16-30-104. Contractual waiver of jury trial.

A written provision in a contract to borrow money or to lend money in which the parties agree to waive their respective rights to a trial by jury under Arkansas Constitution, Article 2, § 7, is valid and enforceable except upon those grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

History. Acts 2018 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2018 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 2, provided: “Retroactivity.

“(a) This act applies retroactively to a contract to waive a jury trial entered into before the effective date of this act.

“(b) This act applies retroactively to all judicial proceedings in which a contract to waive a jury trial is at issue if the judicial proceeding is still pending on the effective date of the act.” This act was effective March 19, 2018.

Chapter 31 Juror Qualifications and Exemptions

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 364, § 3: Mar. 23, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the present law is uncertain as to whether a petit juror is required to continue to report for his period of permitted service when the calendar year for which he is selected has ended and that this Act is needed in order to avoid confusion and provide for the proper administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 650, § 19: Mar. 28, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is a shortage of practitioners of veterinary medicine in the State of Arkansas and that the revision of the laws governing the practice of veterinary medicine including but not limited to the certification of animal technicians will help alleviate such shortage and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to provide a safeguard for the people of the State of Arkansas against dishonest, incompetent and unprincipled practitioners of veterinary medicine. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 6: Mar. 4, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Arkansas Code 16-31-102 disqualifies from acting as a juror any person who is mentally retarded or insane, and any person whose sense of hearing or seeing is substantially impaired; this act eliminates those disqualifications and in their place disqualifies from jury service persons who by reason of a physical or mental disability are unable to render jury services, with the exception that no person may be disqualified solely on the basis of loss of hearing or sight; this modification to Arkansas Code 16-31-102 will bring Arkansas law into compliance with federal law; and this act should go into effect immediately in order to allow those persons to begin serving as grand or petit jurors as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 897, § 5: Apr. 4, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act authorizes necessary additional auxiliary aids for persons with hearing impairments who are called for jury duty; this modification to Arkansas Code 16-31-108 is necessary to enable persons with hearing impairments to serve on Arkansas juries; and this act should go into effect immediately in order to allow for those accommodations as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2005, No. 87, § 12: Feb. 8, 2005. Emergency Clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present method of selecting grand jurors and petit jurors is inadequate to permit computerized random selection; that this act will provide for the computerized random selection of jurors; and that until this act becomes effective, the validity of findings and judgments issued by juries selected randomly by computer is subject to question. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 96 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas Civil Juries, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 527.

The Arkansas Jury Wheel Act of 1969, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 43.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

Gingerich, The Arkansas Grand Jury, Etc., 40 Ark. L. Rev. 55.

C.J.S. 50 C.J.S., Juries, § 134 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Sullivan, An Overview of the Law of Jury Selection for Arkansas Criminal Trial Lawyers, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 37.

Case Notes

Construction.

Acts 1969, No. 568, must be construed as mandatory and not as directory only. Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973).

Cited: Rathbun v. Ward, 315 Ark. 264, 866 S.W.2d 403 (1993).

16-31-101. Qualifications.

Every registered voter or, in counties where an enhanced prospective jury list is utilized, every registered voter, licensed driver, or person issued an identification card under § 27-16-805 who is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Arkansas and of the county in which he or she may be summoned for jury service is legally qualified to act as a grand or petit juror if not otherwise disqualified under the express provisions of this act.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-101; Acts 2003, No. 1404, § 6[5].

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1404, did not contain a Section 4.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment inserted “or, in counties where … under § 27-16-805.”

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1969, No. 568, codified as §§ 16-30-101, 16-30-103, 16-31-10116-31-104, 16-31-106, 16-31-107, 16-32-10116-32-104, 16-32-106, 16-32-107, 16-32-109.

Research References

ALR.

Prejudical effect of juror's inability to comprehend English. 117 A.L.R.5th 1.

Case Notes

Residency.

Where juror did not meet qualifications because she was not a resident of the county where the case was tried, but she did not knowingly answer falsely any question on voir dire relating to her qualifications, the verdict was not voidable. Bennett v. State, 308 Ark. 393, 825 S.W.2d 560 (1992).

Although defendant's jury included a woman who was a registered voter in the county where the trial was held but was not a resident of that county, defendant was not prejudiced or denied an impartial jury. Bennett v. Lockhart, 39 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, Bennett v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 1018, 115 S. Ct. 1363 (1995).

Cited: Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653, 460 S.W.2d 319 (1970); Renton v. State, 274 Ark. 87, 622 S.W.2d 171 (1981); Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1986); Farmers Bank v. Perry, 301 Ark. 547, 787 S.W.2d 645 (1990).

16-31-102. Disqualifications.

  1. The following persons are disqualified to act as grand or petit jurors:
    1. Persons who do not meet the qualifications of § 16-31-101;
    2. Persons who are unable to speak or understand the English language;
    3. Persons who are unable to read or write the English language, except that the circuit judge, in the exercise of his discretion, may waive these requirements when the persons are otherwise found to be capable of performing the duties of jurors;
    4. Persons who have been convicted of a felony and have not been pardoned;
    5. Persons who are:
      1. Not of good character or approved integrity;
      2. Lacking in sound judgment or reasonable information;
      3. Intemperate; or
      4. Not of good behavior;
    6. Persons who, by reason of a physical or mental disability, are unable to render satisfactory jury service, except that no person shall be disqualified solely on the basis of loss of hearing or sight in any degree; and
    7. Persons who are less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time they are required to appear.
  2. Except by the consent of all the parties, no person shall serve as a petit juror in any case who:
    1. Is related to any party or attorney in the cause within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity;
    2. Is expected to appear as a witness or has been summoned to appear as a witness in the cause;
    3. Has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the matter in controversy which may influence his judgment;
    4. May have a material interest in the outcome of the case;
    5. Is biased or prejudiced for or against any party to the cause or is prevented by any relationship or circumstance from acting impartially; or
    6. Was a petit juror in a former trial of the cause or of another case involving any of the same questions of fact.
  3. Nothing in this section shall limit a court's discretion and obligation to strike jurors for cause for any reason other than solely because of sight or hearing impairment.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, §§ 2, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-102, 39-105; Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 1; 2005, No. 87, § 1.

Amendments. The 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.) amendment inserted “persons” in the introductory language of (a); deleted former (a)(2) and (a)(6), redesignating the remaining subdivisions accordingly; added present (a)(6); and added (c).

Research References

ALR.

Prejudical effect of juror's inability to comprehend English. 117 A.L.R.5th 1.

Ark. L. Rev.

Witnesses, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 229.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The state has a legitimate interest in providing physically competent jurors for trials in criminal cases, and the disqualification from jury service of persons with substantial hearing impairments rationally relates to and furthers that interest and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that prospective jurors possess the physical and mental attributes necessary to adequately receive and evaluate the evidence presented. Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1978).

This section is not unconstitutional on its face because it can be put into effect without any racial discrimination whatever. Westbrook v. State, 274 Ark. 309, 624 S.W.2d 433 (1981).

Ability to Hear.

Whether a person is legitimately disqualified from jury service on account of a substantial hearing impairment is a question of law committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1978).

The presence of a thirteenth person serving as an interpreter for a deaf juror during jury deliberations would violate the secrecy of the jury room and thereby deprive an accused person of his right to trial by jury. Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1978).

Ability to Read or Write.

A trial court is not required to disclose to counsel a juror's inability to read or write. Illiteracy, as a disqualification for jury service, would be excepted in the discretion of the judge rather than of counsel. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Morgan, 256 Ark. 250, 506 S.W.2d 560 (1974).

Ability to Understand English.

Circuit court was within its discretion to excuse a juror because, during voir dire, the juror approached the bench and expressed to the judge that he did not know how to write English and could speak and read English “just a little bit”; when asked if he spoke some English but did not understand all the words, the juror replied that was correct; and, in response to questions by the court, the juror explained that his limited knowledge of English would impact his ability to understand the evidence in the case. Doll v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 153, 598 S.W.3d 47 (2020).

Affinity.

“Affinity” is the tie which arises from marriage between the husband and the blood relations of the wife, and between the wife and the blood relations of the husband; there is no affinity between the blood relations of the husband and the blood relations of the wife. Mitchell v. Goodall, 297 Ark. 332, 761 S.W.2d 919 (1988).

There can be no affinity between the blood relations of the husband and the blood relations of the wife, and juror would not be disqualified to serve on the jury under § 16-31-107 because her in-laws were related to plaintiffs by marriage. Farmers Bank v. Perry, 301 Ark. 547, 787 S.W.2d 645 (1990).

Bias.

Where a juror acknowledged during voir dire that his nephew was a drug undercover agent and that he had talked with the nephew about his experiences, the juror's presumptive bias, even after court interrogation, was sufficient to require his exclusion from the trial of defendant for sale and delivery of a controlled substance. Pickens v. State, 260 Ark. 633, 542 S.W.2d 764 (1976).

Jurors are assumed to be unbiased; the burden of demonstrating actual bias on the part of any member of the panel is on the petitioner. Urquhart v. State, 275 Ark. 486, 631 S.W.2d 304 (1982).

Denial of a motion for a new trial filed by injured parties and estate administrators (appellants) in their action against a motor company after a van rolled over and killed and injured 11 persons was appropriate because appellants failed to demonstrate that four jurors should have been stricken for cause given the questions as to whether appellants had challenged the jurors for cause; the jurors' indication that they would not impose a greater burden of proof on appellants, under subsection (b) of this section; and the fact that any potential bias was cured by the circuit court's inquiries and instructions. Herrington v. Ford Motor Co., 2010 Ark. App. 407, 376 S.W.3d 476 (2010).

Discretion of Court.

The question of a juror's qualification lies within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge and defendant has the burden of showing the prospective juror's disqualification. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

This section essentially codifies the existing case law and does not change the fact that the seating of a juror is a matter to be determined at the discretion of the trial judge. Irons v. State, 272 Ark. 493, 615 S.W.2d 374 (1981).

The impartiality of a prospective juror is a question of fact for the trial court to determine in its sound discretion. Urquhart v. State, 275 Ark. 486, 631 S.W.2d 304 (1982).

Felon.

A juror who, at the age of twelve or thirteen, was found guilty of burglary and sentenced to the Arkansas Boys' Industrial School, which sentence was suspended, was not a convicted felon within the meaning of this section and was not thereby disqualified to act as a juror. Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979, 455 S.W.2d 888 (1970).

Although subdivision (a)(5) of this section disqualifies convicted felons from serving on a jury, where no juror was asked during voir dire whether he or she had been convicted of a felony, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in finding the juror, who had been convicted of a felony, did not knowingly answer falsely to any question on voir dire, and thus, the jury's verdict was not void or voidable under § 16-31-107. Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993).

Law Enforcement Officer.

The fact that a venireman held a card showing him to be an honorary deputy sheriff was not sufficient reason to excuse him for cause. Cotton v. State, 256 Ark. 527, 508 S.W.2d 738 (1974).

Opinion.

Where juror, when examined by the court, showed clearly that he had not formed or expressed an opinion, this section had no application even though juror was employed by investment company in which witness for party was principal stockholder. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Kennedy, 233 Ark. 844, 349 S.W.2d 132 (1961) (decision under prior law).

This section does not make any substantial change in the law and whether venireman's opinion may influence his judgment is a matter to be determined by the trial judge. Satterfield v. State, 252 Ark. 747, 483 S.W.2d 171 (1972).

In a rape prosecution where the victim was a police officer, the fact that the prosecutor asked the jurors during voir dire to agree that a combat trained person could be raped with minimal force did not violate subdivision (b)(3) of this section, as the jurors were not asked to agree that rape could occur without force, but the questions were directed to the amount of force necessary. McElroy v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 533, 385 S.W.3d 406 (2011).

Relationship.

If the challenging party fails to make out a prima facie case of the juror's relationship within the prohibited degree by questions asked of the juror or by offer of other proof, there will be no error on the part of the court in pronouncing the juror competent. Shaffstall v. Downey, 87 Ark. 5, 112 S.W. 176 (1908) (decision under prior law).

That two of the jurors of the panel from which a drawn jury was to be selected were related to a person who was killed in the same automobile collision in which the plaintiff's intestate was killed did not render them disqualified. Roark Transp., Inc. v. West, 188 Ark. 941, 68 S.W.2d 1000 (1934) (decision under prior law).

The trial court did not commit reversible error in discharging a juror related to defendant within the prohibited degree. McDaniel v. State, 228 Ark. 1122, 313 S.W.2d 77 (1958) (decision under prior law).

The relationship of a juror to a witness did not per se disqualify the juror. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Bryant, 233 Ark. 841, 349 S.W.2d 349 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Where a close relative of a juror was a witness to a controverted issue in the case and matter was brought to the attention of the trial court before the jury was sworn, it was an abuse of discretion for trial court to refuse to strike relative from the jury for cause. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Young, 241 Ark. 765, 410 S.W.2d 120 (1967) (decision under prior law).

The trial court did not err in failing to excuse a juror who was the wife of an assistant police chief. Johnson v. State, 270 Ark. 871, 606 S.W.2d 381 (1980).

A juror was properly excused by the court after being accepted by both prosecution and defense when it was learned that he was a cousin to a secretary of the prosecuting attorney, since the judge has the discretion to excuse a juror even where the issue of bias may be more implied than actual and even though the situation does not clearly fall within this section or § 16-33-304, since it would be impossible for the statutes to cover every conceivable circumstance touching on a juror's possible bias. Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 617 S.W.2d 6 (1981), cert. denied, Ruiz v. Arkansas, 454 U.S. 1093, 102 S. Ct. 659 (1981).

Juror, whose husband was a cousin of a paralegal working for one party's law firm, was not shown to be within the prohibited degree of relationship. Carton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 315 Ark. 5, 865 S.W.2d 635 (1993).

Same Questions of Fact.

Where a number of cases involving the same issue are pending against the same defendant, a juror who sat in one of them and rendered a verdict, or who was a plaintiff in another of those actions, is presumed to be under a disqualifying bias against the defendant and is incompetent to sit as a juror in another of those cases. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Smith, 60 Ark. 221, 29 S.W. 752 (1895); Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Wells, 61 Ark. 353, 61 Ark. 354, 33 S.W. 208 (1895) (decisions under prior law).

The court did not abuse its discretion in not making the members of the regular panel available who had served on a connected case. Wells v. State, 247 Ark. 386, 446 S.W.2d 217 (1969) (decision under prior law).

The credibility of a government witness who had testified against different defendants in previous prosecutions for selling marijuana was not a “question of fact” within the meaning of subdivision (b)(6) of this section, and thus jurors who had served at the preceding trials were not disqualified from defendant's trial for sale of marijuana. Holland v. State, 260 Ark. 617, 542 S.W.2d 761 (1976); Pickens v. State, 260 Ark. 633, 542 S.W.2d 764 (1976).

Witness.

Where juror had been summoned as a witness but did not testify and no objection was made to his serving as a juror before he was sworn in as a juryman, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Bryant, 233 Ark. 841, 349 S.W.2d 349 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168 (1983); Harrod v. State, 286 Ark. 277, 691 S.W.2d 172 (1985); Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1986); Hulsey v. Sargent, 821 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1987); Bennett v. State, 308 Ark. 393, 825 S.W.2d 560 (1992); Hughes v. State, 98 Ark. App. 375, 255 S.W.3d 891 (2007).

16-31-103. Exemptions from service.

Any person may be excused from serving as a grand or petit juror or a jury commissioner for such period as the court deems necessary or may have his service deferred to another specified term of court when the state of his health or that of his family reasonably requires his absence, or when, for any reason, his own interests or those of the public will, in the opinion of the court, be materially injured by his attendance.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, §§ 7, 8; 1971, No. 374, § 1; 1975, No. 650, § 16; 1979, No. 612, § 1; 1981, No. 294, §§ 1, 2; 1985, No. 291, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-107, 39-108, 39-121, 39-122, 72-1147; Acts 1991, No. 379, § 1; 1993, No. 167, § 1.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment inserted “or may have his service deferred to another specified term of court.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555.

Survey—Civil Procedure, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 747.

Case Notes

Automatic Excusal.

The automatic excusal of 12 jurors and an alternate in one lot, however laudable the trial court's intention may have been to spare the previous jury a second consecutive trial and however well-known or established the court's policy may have been, it amounted to a systematic exclusion to exempt as a body the 13 jurors and, as such, was error. Jones v. State, 318 Ark. 704, 889 S.W.2d 706 (1994).

Discretion of Court.

Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing possible jurors to be excused for reasons stated in this section, where there was no deliberate exclusion of a large class of eligible jurors. Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 605 S.W.2d 430 (1980), cert. denied, Miller v. Arkansas, 450 U.S. 1035, 101 S. Ct. 1750 (1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994).

Trial court properly excused persons from the jury venire, without affording trial counsel a chance to voir dire them with respect to the reasons they did not wish to serve, since the trial court has the discretion to excuse any juror to protect the public interest or the court's interests. Collins v. State, 271 Ark. 825, 611 S.W.2d 182, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 973, 101 S. Ct. 3127 (1981); Race v. National Cashflow Sys., 30 Ark. App. 116, 783 S.W.2d 370 (1990).

A court's power to excuse jurors need not be exercised only for good cause shown; this section vests in the trial judge the discretion to excuse any juror. Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).

Excusal Held Proper.

The trial court did not err in excusing one of the selected jurors to allow the juror to attend a job interview on the day scheduled for trial. Latham v. State, 318 Ark. 19, 883 S.W.2d 461 (1994).

Farmers.

The wholesale excusal from the venire of individuals who claim farming as their occupation is reversible error if it is automatic and based solely on that fact. Jones v. State, 317 Ark. 131, 876 S.W.2d 262, 1994 Ark. LEXIS 318 (1994).

Where trial judge noted that the farmers were harvesting their crop and would suffer extreme hardship if they served, the trial court further stated that the farmers were excused only after requesting to be excused “either orally before the court or through questionnaires,” there was not a wholesale dismissal of potential jury members based solely on occupation. Jones v. State, 317 Ark. 131, 876 S.W.2d 262, 1994 Ark. LEXIS 318 (1994).

While the wholesale excusal from the venire of persons who claim farming as their occupation is reversible error if it is automatic and based solely on that fact, when each farmer is considered on an individual basis and the trial court determines that each would suffer extreme hardship, no systematic exclusion has occurred. Jones v. State, 318 Ark. 704, 889 S.W.2d 706 (1994).

Objection to Service.

Disqualification was waived by the juror's failure to claim the excuse of being over 65 years of age. Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 178, 359 S.W.2d 432 (1962), cert. denied, Edens v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 968, 83 S. Ct. 551 (1963) (decision under prior law).

This section does not provide for the automatic exclusion of persons within the classifications mentioned, but rather provides for exclusion if the individual objects to serving and makes the court aware of such objection before the jury is sworn. Penelton v. State, 277 Ark. 225, 640 S.W.2d 795 (1982).

Prejudice.

In cases involving alleged irregularities in the jury panel and its selection, the appellant must demonstrate prejudice as well as any error. Ruiz v. State, 299 Ark. 144, 772 S.W.2d 297 (1989).

Prejudice in jury selection is not presumed simply because error might have occurred; the basic issue decided by the appellate court on review is not whether it approves or disapproves of the procedure followed in jury selection, but whether there was prejudicial error. Race v. National Cashflow Sys., 30 Ark. App. 116, 783 S.W.2d 370 (1990).

Cited: Cotton v. State, 256 Ark. 527, 508 S.W.2d 738 (1974); Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984); Gardner v. State, 296 Ark. 41, 754 S.W.2d 518 (1988).

16-31-104. Limitations on frequency and period of service.

  1. Any person who is sworn as a member of a grand or petit jury shall be ineligible to serve on another grand or petit jury in the same county for a period of two (2) years from the date the person is excused from further jury service by the court or by operation of law.
  2. No petit juror shall be required to report for jury duty on more than ten (10) days or for more than a four-month period during the calendar year for which he or she is selected, except that any juror actually engaged in the trial of a case at the time of the expiration of the period of permitted service shall serve until the trial of the case is concluded.
  3. A summons to serve on jury duty shall include a description of the maximum periods of service under this section.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, §§ 3, 4; 1971, No. 364, § 1; 1983, No. 425, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-103, 39-104; Acts 2007, No. 225, § 1.

Cross References. Disqualification from further duty, § 16-32-107.

Case Notes

Frequency.

Upon retrial, trial court properly refused to quash jury panel on grounds that two of the jury commissioners who selected the wheel of jurors had served on a petit jury within the preceding two years and had in fact served on the petit jury which convicted the defendant at his first trial, where no possibility of prejudice was shown. Norris v. State, 262 Ark. 188, 555 S.W.2d 560, 1977 Ark. LEXIS 1772 (1977), cert. denied, Norris v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 970, 98 S. Ct. 1610 (1978).

Jury Wheel.

There was no statutory exclusion from new jury wheel of jurors whose names were in the prior wheel which had been quashed. Maxwell v. State, 259 Ark. 86, 531 S.W.2d 468 (1976).

Cited: Worley v. State, 259 Ark. 433, 533 S.W.2d 502 (1976); Ruiz v. State, 265 Ark. 875, 582 S.W.2d 915 (1979).

16-31-105. Exemption from overtime parking penalties.

  1. No person shall be subject to a fine or other penalty for the offense of overtime parking incurred while the person is engaged in actual service as a grand or petit juror in any court, federal or state, in this state.
  2. The person may evidence the fact of jury service by exhibiting to the appropriate official of the city or town offended by the violation a certificate of the clerk of the court similar to the form now in use to the effect that the person was engaged in jury service on the date of the violation and the hours of actual service.
  3. Any person attempting to enforce any fine or other penalty notwithstanding the provisions of this section shall be subject to contempt proceedings before the judge of the court being served by the person so charged.
  4. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to give immunity from fine or penalty other than for the offense of overtime parking.

History. Acts 1971, No. 729, §§ 1-4; 1979, No. 423, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-117 — 39-120.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1971, No. 364, § 1 and 1971, No. 729, §§ 3, 4 are also codified as § 16-10-131.

16-31-106. Penalty for employees' service prohibited.

    1. Any person who is summoned to serve on jury duty shall not be subject to discharge from employment, loss of sick leave, loss of vacation time, or any other form of penalty as a result of his or her absence from employment due to jury duty, upon giving reasonable notice to his or her employer of the summons.
    2. No employer shall subject an employee to discharge, loss of sick leave, loss of vacation time, or any other form of penalty on account of his or her absence from employment by reason of jury duty.
  1. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 3; 1983, No. 425, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-103.

Case Notes

Salary.

An employer is not legally required to pay an employee during her absence on jury duty. Frolic Footwear, Inc. v. State, 284 Ark. 487, 683 S.W.2d 611 (1985).

Cited: Ruiz v. State, 265 Ark. 875, 582 S.W.2d 915 (1979).

16-31-107. Effect of unqualified juror upon verdict or indictment.

No verdict or indictment shall be void or voidable because any juror shall fail to possess any of the qualifications required in this act unless a juror shall knowingly answer falsely any question on voir dire relating to his qualifications propounded by the court or counsel in any cause. A juror who shall knowingly fail to respond audibly or otherwise as is required by the circumstances to make his position known to the court or counsel in response to any question propounded by the court or counsel, the answer to which would reveal a disqualification on the part of the juror, shall be deemed to have answered falsely.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-106.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-31-101.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Former similar section applied to both criminal and civil cases. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Kennedy, 233 Ark. 844, 349 S.W.2d 132 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Affinity.

There can be no affinity between the blood relations of the husband and the blood relations of the wife, and juror would not be disqualified to serve on the jury under this section because her in-laws were related to plaintiffs by marriage. Farmers Bank v. Perry, 301 Ark. 547, 787 S.W.2d 645 (1990).

Burden of Proof.

To obtain a new trial on the grounds of juror misconduct, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to honestly answer a question or deliberately concealed a matter during voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Pineview Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore, Inc., 298 Ark. 78, 765 S.W.2d 924 (1989).

In a hearing on a motion for a new trial because of ineligibility of a juror, the complaining party has the burden of first establishing that: (1) diligence was used to ascertain the desired information and (2) he made known to the juror the specific information desired. Pineview Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore, Inc., 298 Ark. 78, 765 S.W.2d 924 (1989).

Duty of Court.

A trial court is not required to disclose to counsel a juror's inability to read or write. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Morgan, 256 Ark. 250, 506 S.W.2d 560 (1974).

Failure to Question Juror.

A new trial will not be granted on account of the disqualification of a juror by reason of relationship to the appellee where the bill of exceptions (abolished) does not disclose that any questions were asked on voir dire as to the relationship of the jurors to the parties. Fones Bros. Hdwe. Co. v. Mears, 182 Ark. 533, 32 S.W.2d 313 (1930) (decision under prior law).

Where court reporter failed to take shorthand notes on juror's voir dire and court refused to let the record show that juror was questioned as to his relationship with plaintiff, or his denial of same, uncontroverted affidavits of the other jurors and bystanders were taken as being true by the Supreme Court. Brundrett v. Thompson, 203 Ark. 726, 159 S.W.2d 65 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Where the question asked the juror was not one in which the silence of the juror amounted to an answer, the appellant failed to show due diligence to determine grounds for disqualification of that juror. Kane v. Erich, 250 Ark. 448, 465 S.W.2d 327 (1971) (decision under prior law).

Although § 16-31-102(a)(5) disqualifies convicted felons from serving on a jury, where no juror was asked during voir dire whether he or she had been convicted of a felony, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in finding the juror, who had been convicted of a felony, did not knowingly answer falsely to any question on voir dire, and thus, the jury's verdict was not void or voidable under this section. Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993).

A juror's failure to admit during voir dire a business connection with the defendant's insured did not amount to juror misconduct warranting a new trial where the plaintiff did not use due diligence in seeking information concerning the juror's relationship to the defendant's insured. Berry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 328 Ark. 553, 944 S.W.2d 838 (1997).

Failure to Reveal Disqualification.

Where a juror failed, upon questioning, to reveal his relationship to a witness for the prosecution, and such relationship would have disqualified him, the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Baysinger v. State, 261 Ark. 605, 550 S.W.2d 445 (1977).

Although juror's apparently unintentional failure to disclose disqualifying information was not done knowingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Bolls, 48 Ark. App. 23, 888 S.W.2d 319 (1994).

Judgment Valid.

Where juror did not meet qualifications because she was not a resident of county where the case was tried, but she did not knowingly answer falsely any question on voir dire relating to her qualifications, the verdict was not voidable. Bennett v. State, 308 Ark. 393, 825 S.W.2d 560 (1992).

Timely Objection.

A verdict in an action by a physician for professional services will not be set aside because of the relationship of a juror to another physician who assisted in performing the services and was in some way interested in the result of the suit, where the relationship was known before the trial. Arkansas S.R.R. v. Loughridge, 65 Ark. 300, 45 S.W. 907 (1898) (decision under prior law).

An objection to an unqualified person's serving as a juror must have been made before he was sworn as a juryman. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Bryant, 233 Ark. 841, 349 S.W.2d 349 (1961) (decision under prior law).

It was too late after rendition of verdict to raise the ineligibility of a juror to serve unless it could be shown by the complaining party that diligence was used to ascertain his disqualification and to prevent his selection as a juror. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Kennedy, 233 Ark. 844, 349 S.W.2d 132 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Morgan, 256 Ark. 250, 506 S.W.2d 560 (1974).

16-31-108. Interpreters for visually or hearing impaired jurors.

      1. The state, through the Administrative Office of the Courts, shall provide and pay the cost of reasonable accommodations for the hearing and visually impaired when necessary to enable a person with those disabilities to act as a venireperson or juror.
      2. Such accommodations may include a qualified sign language interpreter, real-time captioning, or other reasonable auxiliary aid for the hearing impaired or a reader for the visually impaired.
      3. In the event the juror indicates that he or she can be accommodated by several means, the Administrative Office of the Courts may consider the cost and availability of each accommodation when deciding which to provide.
    1. The interpreter, the person writing real-time captioning, and the reader, when necessary, shall be present throughout jury service, the trial, and when the jury assembles for deliberation.
    1. Whenever a sign language interpreter, real-time captioning, or a reader is utilized in judicial proceedings or in jury deliberations, the court will administer an oath to the interpreter, the person writing the real-time captioning, and the reader, to ensure objective and unbiased translation and complete confidentiality of the proceedings.
    2. The court shall also instruct the interpreter, the person writing the real-time captioning, and the reader to make a true and complete translation of all testimony and other relevant colloquy to the best of his ability.
    3. The court shall further instruct the interpreter, the person writing the real-time captioning, and the reader to refrain from participating in any manner in the deliberations of the jury, except for the complete translations of jurors' remarks made during deliberations.
  1. The verdict of the jury shall be valid notwithstanding the presence of the interpreter during deliberations.

History. Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 2; 1995, No. 897, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “reasonable accommodations for the hearing and visually impaired” for “reasonable services of, a qualified interpreter for the hearing impaired or a reader for the visually impaired” in (a)(1); and rewrote current (a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C), (a)(2) and (b).

Cross References. Court interpreters, § 16-10-127.

Method of procuring services, § 16-10-135.

Chapter 32 Selection and Attendance

Research References

Am. Jur. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 136 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration — Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 6.

Selection of Juries, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 384.

Arkansas Civil Juries, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 527.

The Arkansas Jury Wheel Act of 1969, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 43.

Gingerich, The Arkansas Grand Jury, Etc., 40 Ark. L. Rev. 55.

C.J.S. 50 C.J.S., Juries, § 155 et seq.

Case Notes

Venire.

Defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the absence of black males on his jury panel where he failed to produce any evidence that showed black males were systematically excluded from the venire or that the method used to assemble the venire produced a venire from which black males were systematically excluded. Gillie v. State, 305 Ark. 296, 808 S.W.2d 320 (1991).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-32-101 to 16-32-109 may not apply to § 16-32-110 which was enacted subsequently.

Effective Dates. Acts 1975, No. 485, § 7, provided: “This Act shall be effective on and after January 1, 1976, except that the procedures outlined in this Act to be carried out prior to the empaneling of a jury shall be effective on and after July 1, 1975, so that jurors empaneled at terms of any circuit court beginning after January 1, 1976 shall be selected as provided herein.”

Acts 1979, No. 816, § 4: July 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the method of selecting jurors is vital to the proper administration of justice and that this Act is necessary to establish the most equitable method of such selection. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1979.”

Acts 1997, No. 1021, § 5: April 2, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present method of selecting grand jurors and petit jurors is inadequate to assure random selection; that this act will provide for the random selection of jurors; and until this act becomes effective, the validity of findings and judgments issued by juries in this state is subject to question. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2005, No. 87, § 12: Feb. 8, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present method of selecting grand jurors and petit jurors is inadequate to permit computerized random selection; that this act will provide for the computerized random selection of jurors; and that until this act becomes effective, the validity of findings and judgments issued by juries selected randomly by computer is subject to question. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Case Notes

Construction.

Acts 1969, No. 568, must be construed as mandatory and not as directory only. Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973).

Irregularities.

While the provisions of the jury wheel act are mandatory, some sections of Acts 1969, No. 568 are more important than others, and any irregularity in the selection process does not per se invalidate the proceedings. Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 Ark. 551, 750 S.W.2d 406 (1988).

16-32-101. Selection pursuant to act required — Waiver.

No person shall be summoned to serve as a grand or petit juror who has not been selected under the provisions of this act unless this requirement is waived by the parties.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 26; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-218.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-32-104.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section must be complied with in the selection of a special grand jury under § 16-85-517. Streett v. Roberts, 258 Ark. 839, 529 S.W.2d 343 (1975).

16-32-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning jury commissioners, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 6. The section was derived from Acts 1969, No. 568, §§ 10-12; 1975, No. 485, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-201.1 — 39-204.

16-32-103. Master list.

  1. During the month of November or December of each year, the prospective jurors for the following calendar year shall be selected from among the current list of registered voters of the applicable district or county in the following manner:
    1. The circuit judge, in the presence of the circuit clerk, shall select at random a number between one (1) and one hundred (100), inclusive, which shall be the starting number, and the circuit court shall then select the person whose name appears on the current voter registration list in that numerical position, counting sequentially from the first name on the list;
    2. The circuit clerk shall then select the one hundredth voter registrant appearing on the list after the starting number. As an example, if the starting number is sixty-seven (67), which is the first selection, the second selection would be the one hundred sixty-seventh registered voter, the third selection would be the two hundred sixty-seventh registered voter, and so forth until the current registered voter list is exhausted; and
    3. The circuit judge and the circuit clerk shall then repeat the random selection process until the number of jurors set out in this subsection have been selected.
  2. The number of persons to be selected shall be based upon the number of qualified registered voters in the appropriate district or county as reflected by the current list of registered voters provided by the county clerk under legal requirements and, unless a larger number is designated by the circuit judge, the minimum number selected shall be as follows:
    1. After the list of prospective jurors has been submitted by the circuit clerk, the circuit judge may, in the exercise of his or her discretion, authorize clerical assistance in preparing the alphabetized master list and separate cards, chips, disks, or other appropriate means of including the names and addresses of the prospective jurors in the wheel or box.
    2. The expense of this clerical help shall be paid by the county as an expense of the administration of justice.
    3. Clerical employees shall take the following oath:
  3. Subsections (a)-(c) of this section shall be applicable to all circuit courts and counties within the state that are not using a computerized random jury selection process.
      1. All circuit clerks who maintain on computers voter registration lists or the enhanced list of prospective jurors authorized by § 16-32-302, whether in-house or contracted, may utilize the computers and associated equipment for the purpose of selecting jury panels from the voter registration lists or the enhanced list of prospective jurors instead of compiling a master list under subsections (a)-(c) of this section if the computer program is capable of randomly selecting names for the jury panels from the voter registration lists or enhanced list of prospective jurors.
      2. If the computer program is not capable of randomly selecting names for the jury panels from the voter registration lists or enhanced list of prospective jurors, the clerks may use the computers and associated equipment for the purpose of creating the master list under subsections (a)-(c) of this section.
    1. The master list of jurors' names and addresses shall not be available for public inspection, publication, or copying, but it may be examined in the presence of the circuit judge by litigants or their attorneys who desire to verify that names drawn from the wheel or box were placed there in the manner provided in this act by the commissioners.
      1. In counties where jury selection is conducted by a computerized random process, the source list of potential jurors' names and addresses shall not be available for public inspection, publication, or copying.
      2. The source list may be examined in the presence of the circuit judge by litigants or their attorneys who desire to verify that names randomly selected by computer were selected from the list.

Number of Registered Voters Minimum Number of Prospective Petit Jurors Minimum Number of Prospective Grand Jurors 90,000 or more 1,200 120 16,000 to 89,999 1,000 100 10,000 to 15,999 800 90 6,000 to 9,999 600 75 2,000 to 5,999 500 75 0 to 1,999 250 or 50% of the registered voters, whichever is smaller

Click to view table.

“I will not make known to anyone the names of the prospective jurors who have been selected and I will not, directly or indirectly, converse with anyone selected as a juror concerning the merits of any proceeding pending or likely to come before the grand jury or court until after the case is tried or otherwise finally disposed of.”

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 15; 1975, No. 485, § 2; 1979, No. 816, §§ 1, 2; 1981, No. 687, § 1; 1985, No. 1066, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-205.1, 39-205.1n, 39-205.2, 39-207; Acts 2005, No. 87, § 2.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-32-104.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is constitutional. Richardson v. Williams, 327 Ark. 156, 936 S.W.2d 752 (1997).

Construction.

Acts 1969, No. 568 must be construed as mandatory for to construe it as directory only would tend to exclude from jury service those voters who registered after the last full selection of the jury wheel. Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973).

This section is so clear that it needs no construction or interpretation, even though it contains a typographical error; it is a well-thought-out statute, has a solid foundation in public policy, and is to be followed by the circuit judges and clerks. Bates v. State, 322 Ark. 738, 912 S.W.2d 417, 1995 Ark. LEXIS 738 (1995).

Discrimination.

Where there was a 14% disparity between the percentage of blacks on the jury venire and the percentage of registered black voters and the jury venire was chosen by the subjective judgment of white jury commissioners who could exercise untrammeled discretion subject only to the requirement that persons selected be of good moral character, of approved integrity, sound judgment and reasonable information, a prima facie case of discrimination was established. Sanford v. Hutto, 394 F. Supp. 1278 (1975), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. Ark. 1975) (decision under prior law).

No defendant has a right to have jurors selected in a manner to assure him of a jury from his own ethnic group or occupation. Turner v. State, 258 Ark. 425, 527 S.W.2d 580 (1975) (decision under prior law).

To the extent that persons not registered to vote did not constitute a distinct and identifiable group, use of voter registration lists in the overall composition of petit and grand juries did not discriminate against unregistered citizens. Murrah v. Arkansas, 532 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1976) (decision under prior law).

Evidence insufficient to show that the Arkansas system of selecting jurors at random from the current list of registered voters unlawfully underrepresented blacks and persons between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four. Sullivan v. State, 287 Ark. 6, 696 S.W.2d 709 (1985).

When the panel is drawn by chance, a showing that its racial make-up does not correspond to that of the county does not in itself make a prima facie case of racial discrimination; therefore, the defendant's motion for a continuance to enable him to show that the particular panel was not representative of the population was properly refused. Thomas v. State, 289 Ark. 72, 709 S.W.2d 83 (1986).

This process of selecting jurors has been upheld frequently and while jury selection may not be the result of discrimination against racial groups, each jury need not have on it persons representative of each distinctive group in the population from which it is chosen; thus a jury of 15% African-Americans in county where the African-American population is 23% did not show purposeful discrimination. MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Capital murder defendant's challenge to the use of voter-registration records to select the jury panel on the grounds that African-Americans and women would be under-represented was properly rejected; where the venire was chosen using the random selection process required by this section, there was no possibility of a systematic or purposeful exclusion of any group. State v. Fudge, 361 Ark. 412, 206 S.W.3d 850 (2005).

Multi-District County.

Where jury was drawn only from one district of multi-district county, the trial court properly refused to grant motion quashing the jury panel since Ark. Const., Art. 13, § 5, and this section both clearly contemplate that a jury may properly be drawn from only one district within a county having more than one district. Morgan v. State, 273 Ark. 252, 618 S.W.2d 161 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).

The electoral subdistricts within the Tenth Judicial District are not judicial districts and that the venire in this case was properly drawn from Drew County as a whole. Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995), cert. denied, Caldwell v. Arkansas, 517 U.S. 1124, 116 S. Ct. 1361, 134 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1996).

Oath.

The trial court properly refused to quash the jury panel merely because a clerical employee who assisted in preparing the jury list had not taken the oath required by this section, since this section is not mandatory and no question about the integrity of the list had been shown. Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9, 642 S.W.2d 887, 1982 Ark. LEXIS 1606 (1982).

Sufficient Compliance.

Where the bailiff testified that he put the names in alphabetical order as a convenience to help him in locating the jurors and to help attorneys in matching the names with the jurors' information sheets, where the alphabetical listing was just as random and impartial as any other procedure, and where there was no hint that alphabetical order was chosen for a sinister purpose, in the absence of any showing whatever of possible prejudice, the trial judge was right in denying the motion to quash the panel. Welch v. State, 269 Ark. 208, 599 S.W.2d 717, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996, 101 S. Ct. 535, 66 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1980).

The fact that jurors were called for a particular term of court rather than for the calendar year in general did not offend the spirit of this section. Harrod v. State, 286 Ark. 277, 691 S.W.2d 172 (1985).

Jury selection satisfied requirements of this section. Sanders v. State, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334 (1989).

The trial court erred by selecting the random numbers outside the presence of the circuit clerk and by not being present when the selection was made, but the error was harmless where there was no hint that the circuit judge did anything other than randomly select the numbers, and there was no hint that the circuit clerk did anything other than correctly apply the random numbers to the voter registration list. Bates v. State, 322 Ark. 738, 912 S.W.2d 417, 1995 Ark. LEXIS 738 (1995).

Violation.

In a civil tort proceeding, the plaintiff has an equal protection right to jury-selection procedures that produce juries from a representative cross-section of his community; however, in order to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement, he must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Richardson v. Williams, 327 Ark. 156, 936 S.W.2d 752 (1997).

Cited: Williams v. State, 254 Ark. 799, 496 S.W.2d 395 (1973); Robillard v. State, 263 Ark. 666, 566 S.W.2d 735 (1978); Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983); Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1986); Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 Ark. 551, 750 S.W.2d 406 (1988); Gardner v. State, 296 Ark. 41, 754 S.W.2d 518 (1988); Mitchell v. State, 299 Ark. 566, 776 S.W.2d 332 (1989); Wainwright v. Norris, 872 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 194, 925 S.W.2d 402 (1996); Britt v. State, 334 Ark. 142, 974 S.W.2d 436 (1998); Thompson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 275, 461 S.W.3d 368 (2015).

16-32-104. Jury wheel or box.

    1. The names and last known addresses of the persons selected shall be placed, in the presence of the circuit judge and the circuit clerk, in a circular hollow wheel or a large box constructed of sturdy and durable material. In place of names and addresses, the court may cause cards or discs, numbered serially, to reflect the number of prospective jurors required to be placed in the box and shall cause the names on the master list to be numbered serially so that a juror on the list may be identified when his number is drawn for entry in the jury book.
      1. The wheel or box shall thereafter remain locked at all times, except when in use as provided in this subchapter, by the use of two (2) separate locks so arranged that the key to one will not open the other lock. The clasps into which the locks shall be fitted shall be so arranged that the wheel or box cannot be opened unless both locks are unlocked.
      2. The key to one (1) lock shall be kept by the circuit judge, and the key to the other shall be kept by the circuit clerk.
      3. The circuit clerk of each county shall keep the wheel or box, when not in use, in a safe and secure place.
    2. Whenever the circuit judge finds that there is sufficient reason to believe that the integrity of the contents of the wheel or box may have been compromised, he or she shall cause the names in the wheel or box to be compared with the names on the master list, and the verified names shall then be placed in the wheel or box in open court.
    3. Any person other than one acting in open court as authorized by this act who shall open a jury wheel or box with intent to remove, alter, or add to its contents shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one (1) year nor more than twenty-one (21) years.
  1. The courts are authorized to use a computer program that is capable of random selection of names from the list of registered voters or the enhanced list of prospective jurors authorized under § 16-32-302 instead of maintaining the jury wheel or box required under subdivisions (a)(1)-(4) of this section.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, §§ 14, 16, 27; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-206, 39-208, 39-219; Acts 2005, No. 87, § 3.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1969, No. 568, codified as §§ 16-30-101, 16-30-103, 16-31-10116-31-104, 16-31-106, 16-31-107, 16-32-10116-32-104, 16-32-106, 16-32-107, 16-32-109.

Case Notes

Special Grand Jury.

The jury wheel method of selection is mandatory when a special grand jury is selected under § 16-85-517. Streett v. Roberts, 258 Ark. 839, 529 S.W.2d 343 (1975).

Cited: Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Sadler, 248 Ark. 887, 454 S.W.2d 325 (1970); Mosby v. State, 249 Ark. 17, 457 S.W.2d 836 (1970); Williams v. State, 254 Ark. 799, 496 S.W.2d 395 (1973); Shelton v. State, 254 Ark. 815, 496 S.W.2d 419 (1973); Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983); Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1986).

16-32-105. Drawing for petit jurors.

    1. After the names have been placed in the wheel or box and not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the first jury trial in the year for which the prospective jurors have been selected, the circuit judge shall enter an order which shall be spread of record stating a time and place for the initial drawing for the names of petit jurors from the wheel or box.
    2. At the time and place designated, the wheel or box shall be unlocked in open court.
    3. After the names have been thoroughly mixed, the circuit judge shall cause to be drawn the number of names which in his or her opinion shall be necessary to provide a panel of qualified petit jurors for the trial of cases, after excuses from attendance have been granted to those who are entitled to be excused.
    4. As the names are drawn, they shall be recorded in the same order by the circuit clerk in a book to be provided for that purpose, and if the name of any person known to have died or found by the court upon inquiry to be unfit and disqualified under § 16-31-102(a) is drawn, that name shall be put aside and not used and a notation of the discarding of the name and reason therefor shall be made in the jury book.
    5. The same procedures outlined in this section shall be followed in the event all of the jurors whose names are listed in the jury book shall be excused from further service.
  1. The drawing and recording of jurors under subdivisions (a)(1)-(5) of this section may be accomplished by a computerized random jury selection process.

History. Acts 1975, No. 485, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-209.1; Acts 2005, No. 87, § 4.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section, on its face, does not require the presence of the judge when the names are drawn. Marshall v. State, 316 Ark. 753, 875 S.W.2d 814 (1994).

Alternative Procedure.

Where the bailiff testified that he put the names in alphabetical order as a convenience to help him in locating the jurors and to help attorneys in matching the names with the jurors' information sheets, where the alphabetical listing was just as random and impartial as any other procedure, and where there was no hint that alphabetical order was chosen for a sinister purpose, in the absence of any showing whatever of possible prejudice, the trial judge was right in denying the motion to quash the panel. Welch v. State, 269 Ark. 208, 599 S.W.2d 717, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996, 101 S. Ct. 535, 66 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1980).

Discrimination.

Fact that one of three jury commissioners testified that in selection of jurors he partly took into consideration whether selection of certain jurors would cause a hardship on them was not sufficient to establish that wage earners were systematically and unconstitutionally excluded from the jury so as to deprive defendant of a jury of his social and economic peers. Kimble v. State, 246 Ark. 407, 438 S.W.2d 705 (1969) (decision under prior law).

An accused in Arkansas has never had the right to have the jury commissioners select jurors in such a manner as to assure the accused of a jury from his own ethnic group or occupation. Pointer v. State, 248 Ark. 710, 454 S.W.2d 91 (1970), cert. denied, Pointer v. Arkansas, 400 U.S. 959, 91 S. Ct. 359 (1970) (decision under prior law).

Where the panel is drawn by chance from a jury wheel made up from a list of names taken from voter registration lists by jury commissioners appointed in accordance with statute and who were properly instructed to select jurors from a representative cross section of a county without discrimination as to race, the mere showing that the composition of a particular jury panel did not correspond to the racial makeup of the community did not in and of itself make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. One attacking the jury panel must show that there has been systematic and intentional exclusion of any particular group before the panel can be quashed on that account. Turner v. State, 258 Ark. 425, 527 S.W.2d 580 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Entry of Names in Jury Book.

Where names were withdrawn from the jury wheel for use by the chancery court, but had never been entered in the jury book, it was error not to quash the jury panel. Shelton v. State, 254 Ark. 815, 496 S.W.2d 419 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Where names of prospective jurors were recorded by circuit clerk on yellow legal pad instead of in jury book as required by this section, trial court properly denied defendant's motion to quash the jury panel because the motion was not timely presented at the pretrial conference but rather on the day of the trial. Beasley v. State, 258 Ark. 84, 522 S.W.2d 365 (1975) (decision under prior law).

The defendant was not prejudiced by the court clerk's practice of making a typewritten list of the names of jurors rather than recording the names in a jury book, where the typewritten list had been used all during that term of court and where defendant's objection to the list was not made until the morning of the trial. Huckaby v. State, 262 Ark. 413, 557 S.W.2d 875 (1977) (decision under prior law).

This section requires that the names be recorded in the jury book in the same order as they are drawn, but it does not specify the order in which they are to be summoned. Welch v. State, 269 Ark. 208, 599 S.W.2d 717, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996, 101 S. Ct. 535, 66 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1980) (decision under prior law).

The failure to list the names in the jury book of the twenty-three veniremen who were excused from serving as jurors, or to record the reasons for their excusal, was not reversible error where the names were recorded in a file retained by the clerk, as well as the reasons for excusal in all but a single instance, on individual questionnaires, which were also kept in a separate file. Harrod v. State, 286 Ark. 277, 691 S.W.2d 172 (1985).

Motion to Quash Jury Venire.

Where 300 jury summonses were mailed to prospective jurors, the court clerk received 200 responses, a number of prospective jurors were excused based upon their responses, and only 63 prospective jurors appeared for jury selection, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to quash the jury panel because there was no suggestion that the discrepancy in the number of venire persons scheduled for jury service and the number that actually appeared was the result of any attempt to influence the makeup of the jury panel. Because there was substantial compliance with this section and the record did not reflect the wholesale excusal of any distinctive group of prospective jurors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to quash the entire jury panel. Gwathney v. State, 2009 Ark. 544, 381 S.W.3d 744 (2009).

Cited: Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1986).

16-32-106. Summons of petit jurors.

  1. The persons whose names have been selected under § 16-32-105 shall be summoned to appear on a date set by the court to answer questions concerning their qualifications and unless excused or disqualified, to serve the required number of days or for the maximum period during the calendar year for which selected unless sooner discharged.
  2. Jurors shall be summoned by the court or by the sheriff, as the court directs, by:
    1. A notice dispatched by first-class mail;
    2. Notice given personally on the telephone; or
    3. Service of summons personally or by such other method as is permitted or prescribed by law.
      1. If a notice is dispatched by first-class mail, the prospective jurors shall be given a date certain to contact the sheriff or the court to confirm receipt of the notice.
      2. Not later than five (5) days before the prospective juror is to appear, the sheriff or the court shall contact the prospective juror if the prospective juror has failed to acknowledge receipt of the notice.
      3. The court shall have discretion to determine whether the sheriff or the court will be the prospective juror's primary contact.
    1. A notice dispatched by first-class mail shall be sent on a form approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts or it shall include the following language:
  3. Unless excused by the circuit judge, a juror who has been legally summoned and who shall fail to attend on any date when directed to do so may be fined in any sum not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). However, nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt. All excuses granted by the circuit judge shall be noted in the jury book or the computer program described in § 16-32-103.

“You are hereby notified that you have been chosen as a prospective juror. You must notify the sheriff [or the court] on or before (date) to confirm that you have received this notice. If you do not notify the sheriff [or the court] to confirm this notice, the sheriff [or the court] will contact you and there will be added cost. Please call the sheriff [or the court] at (phone number)

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, §§ 18, 19; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-210, 39-211; Acts 1989, No. 892, § 1; 2005, No. 87, § 5.

Cross References. Alternate jurors authorized, § 16-30-102.

Case Notes

Construction.

Subdivision (c)(1) did not require five days' notice to jurors; rather, it provides that when jurors were mailed a notice to serve, they were to confirm with the sheriff that it was received and if no confirmation was given, the sheriff was to follow up with a telephone call to the non-responsive panel member not later than five days before trial. Taylor v. State, 76 Ark. App. 279, 64 S.W.3d 278 (2001).

Borrowing Jurors.

It was proper for the chancery court to borrow jurors for trial of issues in equity as long as the jurors were taken from the jury book and returned to it for use in future trials. Shelton v. State, 254 Ark. 815, 496 S.W.2d 419 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Method of Summons.

Once trial was in progress, the trial judge was within his discretion in approving the most expeditious method of summoning additional prospective jurors, regardless of defendant's claim that the sheriff's use of the telephone to summon more jurors systematically excluded a large class of jurors. Huckaby v. State, 262 Ark. 413, 557 S.W.2d 875 (1977).

Although this section authorizes summoning of prospective jurors by telephone, it was reversible error for the trial court to permit telephone summoning of jurors only four hours prior to trial, especially where only about one-third of the prospective jurors could be so reached in time. Kitchen v. State, 264 Ark. 579, 572 S.W.2d 839 (1978).

Where, inter alia, the defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the fact that the jurors were summoned by ordinary mail and not by certified mail as required by this section, any error in the jury selection process was properly considered harmless. Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085, 105 S. Ct. 1847, 85 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1985).

Subdivision (c)(1) does not require five-days' notice to jurors, but only requires that if no confirmation is given, the sheriff must follow up with a telephone call to the nonresponsive panel member not later than five days before trial. King v. State, 312 Ark. 89, 847 S.W.2d 37 (1993).

16-32-107. Excess number of jurors drawn and listed.

  1. Whenever it shall appear that the names of more jurors have been drawn and listed in the jury book than are needed for jury service at the current or at any subsequent session of the court, the judge, if the jurors are present in court, shall designate the number of jurors required, the names of whom shall be taken from the jury book in the same order as they appear thereon.
  2. If the jurors are not present in court, the judge shall direct the sheriff to summon the number of jurors needed, the names of whom shall be taken from the jury book in the same order as they appear thereon, exempting those who have been excused from attendance.
  3. Persons whose names are drawn and recorded in the jury book shall not be disqualified from further duty as provided for in § 16-31-104(a) until they have been required to report for jury service and sworn therefor.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 21; 1985, No. 1066, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-213.

Case Notes

Preparation of List.

Even though defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice where the trial court prepared a list of jurors which excluded not only those persons excused from duty but also those persons who failed to appear at a prior impaneling of the jury or to answer the questionnaire and who had not been served in order to avoid the expense and time of calling jurors who had not responded to their call to duty, it is a better practice for the trial courts to follow the method of jury selection prescribed in the Arkansas Jury Wheel Act. Henry v. State, 29 Ark. App. 5, 775 S.W.2d 911 (1989).

Cited: Shelton v. State, 254 Ark. 815, 496 S.W.2d 419 (1973).

16-32-108. Additional jurors.

    1. If at any time it appears that a sufficient number of qualified jurors are not available to try scheduled cases, additional names may be drawn and recorded in the jury book in open court or randomly selected by computer program described in § 16-32-103. These jurors shall be summoned as provided in § 16-32-106(b).
      1. The circuit judge may direct the circuit clerk who selected the original names placed in the jury wheel or box to submit the names and last known addresses of additional registered voters whom the circuit clerk shall select in the manner provided by § 16-32-103(a)-(d).
      2. These names and addresses shall be placed by the circuit clerk within the jury wheel or box when it is next unlocked in open court and prior to any additional drawing of jurors, and a master list shall be presented to the court as provided in § 16-32-103(a)-(d).
  1. The drawing and recording of additional jurors pursuant to subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) of this section may be accomplished by a computerized random jury selection process.

History. Acts 1975, No. 485, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-212.1; Acts 2005, No. 87, § 6; 2017, No. 600, § 5.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment redesignated (a)(2) as (a)(2)(A) and (B); rewrote (a)(2)(A); and, in (a)(2)(B), substituted “circuit clerk” for “commissioners” and “jury wheel” for “wheel”.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

No abuse of discretion found when trial judge did not call additional jurors. Logan v. State, 300 Ark. 35, 776 S.W.2d 341 (1989).

Maintenance of Names.

There is no requirement that the minimum number of names be constantly maintained after the original panel has been drawn from it. Worley v. State, 259 Ark. 433, 533 S.W.2d 502 (1976).

Special Venire.

Where jury panel had been selected to try another case dependent on the same facts, when the defendant's case was called for trial and the other members of the regular panel were either engaged in the trial of another case or were excused for cause, it was not an abuse of discretion to call a special venire. Rose v. State, 178 Ark. 980, 13 S.W.2d 25 (1929) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Marshall v. State, 316 Ark. 753, 875 S.W.2d 814 (1994).

16-32-109. Selection upon challenge by litigant.

    1. A challenge to the use of the names selected by the circuit clerk and placed in the jury wheel or box for the drawing of trial panels from the jury wheel or box may be made only by a litigant in a particular case.
      1. If the trial judge sustains the challenge to the use of names in the jury wheel or box for the drawing of trial jurors, he or she shall instruct the circuit clerk to select such a number of persons as the trial judge may designate from the current voter registration list in the manner provided by § 16-32-103(a)-(d).
      2. The list of persons, upon being summoned, shall constitute the panel of jurors for the trial of the cause.
    2. If the panel is exhausted prior to the formation of the trial jury for any reason, the trial judge shall instruct the circuit clerk to select additional names as provided for in this section and place the additional names on the list to be summoned as special jurors in such numbers as is deemed necessary to complete the jury for the trial of the cause.
    1. A challenge to the jury drawn from the jury wheel or box may be made by a litigant in a particular case and shall be sustained by the court if it appears that there was a substantial irregularity in the drawing or summoning of the jury.
    2. In such a case, the court shall order in open court another panel drawn for the trial of the case and other cases in which a similar challenge is sustained.

History. Acts 1969, No. 568, § 23; 1975, No. 485, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-214.1, 39-215; Acts 2017, No. 600, § 6.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “circuit clerk” for “jury commissioners” in (a)(1); redesignated (a)(2) as (a)(2)(A) and (B); substituted “instruct the circuit clerk” for “appoint a jury commission of not less than three (3) persons, qualified and sworn as commissioners as provided by law” in (a)(2)(A); rewrote (a)(3); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Challenge.

Failure to present testimony in support of motion to quash jury panel, prior to jury's being sworn to try the case, on ground that jury commissioners allowed race to be factor in its determination of qualified jurors, waived right to challenge jury. Johnson v. State, 238 Ark. 15, 377 S.W.2d 865 (1964), cert. denied, Johnson v. Arkansas, 379 U.S. 948, 85 S. Ct. 444, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 38 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Evidence did not support claim that panel failed to constitute a reasonable cross section of the community. Harper v. State, 249 Ark. 1013, 462 S.W.2d 847 (1971); Mosby v. State, 253 Ark. 904, 489 S.W.2d 799 (1973) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Summoning of wrong juror through inadvertent error and writing of names on a yellow legal pad before transfer to the jury book were trivial errors and did not amount to such substantial irregularities as to be a basis for a challenge to the entire jury. Cassell v. State, 273 Ark. 59, 616 S.W.2d 485 (1981).

Method of Selection.

Discharge of original jury panel because of willful exclusion of blacks and selection of special panel by resummoning all but six of the quashed panel as new jurors, plus selection of six blacks because of their race, was improper, since members of jury must be selected as individuals on basis of individual qualifications and not included or excluded as members of a race. Thomas v. State, 238 Ark. 201, 379 S.W.2d 26, 1964 Ark. LEXIS 558 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Where commissioners were instructed to replace only the number of names used in the previous year, the deviation was prejudicial to the accused. Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973).

The number of persons to be selected by newly appointed jury commissioners to constitute the panel for the trial of a case after the jury wheel has been quashed is within the discretion of the trial judge. Maxwell v. State, 259 Ark. 86, 531 S.W.2d 468 (1976); Harris v. State, 259 Ark. 187, 532 S.W.2d 423 (1976) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Where three names appeared both in the original jury wheel which was quashed and in the new wheel, and where one of the three persons was seated after defendant exhausted all his peremptory challenges, defendant was not entitled to reversal of his conviction, since there was no statutory exclusion from the new wheel of jurors whose names were in the prior wheel. Maxwell v. State, 259 Ark. 86, 531 S.W.2d 468 (1976) (decision under prior law).

In a criminal prosecution, it was not error for the trial court to draw ten jurors from the panel of jurors selected for the civil division. Hewell v. State, 261 Ark. 762, 552 S.W.2d 213 (1977).

Recusal of Judge.

The judge's selection of a new jury commission subsequent to his disqualification was prejudicial error, for after his voluntary disqualification, the judge lost jurisdiction of the case and was without authority to act further in any judicial capacity except to make proper transfer of the case or take the appropriate steps for the selection of another judge. Bolden v. State, 262 Ark. 718, 561 S.W.2d 281 (1978).

Summons.

Although § 16-32-106 authorizes summoning of prospective jurors by telephone, it was reversible error for the trial court to permit telephone summoning of jurors only four hours prior to trial, especially where only about one-third of the prospective jurors could be so reached in time. Kitchen v. State, 264 Ark. 579, 572 S.W.2d 839 (1978).

16-32-110. Electronic random selection.

Beginning January 1, 1998, and thereafter, during every step in the procedure for the selection of grand jurors and petit jurors, electronic devices or mechanical devices shall be utilized to assure the random selection of all jury panels.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1021, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 16-32-101 to 16-32-109 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

16-32-111. Confidentiality of juror information — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “juror information” means:
    1. An original or a copy of a list of potential jurors;
    2. A list of potential jurors who were sworn and qualified;
    3. Any response to a juror questionnaire; and
    4. A list of an individual venire panel.
  2. Upon application by any person and findings on the record for good cause, any juror information submitted to a circuit court or circuit clerk from which the identity of a particular juror can be determined is confidential and shall not be released or otherwise made available except:
    1. To any attorney eligible to represent a party in a proceeding before the circuit court;
    2. To a party appearing pro se in a proceeding before the circuit court and limited to the juror information relevant to that particular proceeding;
    3. For any audit or similar activity conducted with the administration of any plan or program by any governmental agency that is authorized by law to conduct the audit or activity; or
    4. To a grand jury or court upon a finding that the juror information is necessary for the determination of an issue before the grand jury or court.
    1. The circuit clerk shall require a signed receipt from any person who receives juror information under subsection (b) of this section.
    2. The signed receipt shall be maintained in the jury records of the circuit clerk.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(2) of this section, no person to whom disclosure is made under this section may disclose to any other person juror information obtained under this section.
    2. Disclosure of juror information may be made to the following persons without violating subdivision (d)(1) of this section:
      1. A client or a legally authorized representative of a client of an attorney who receives the juror information;
      2. An employee of an attorney who receives the juror information;
      3. An attorney associated with an attorney who receives the juror information; or
      4. A person with whom an attorney or a party appearing pro se who receives the juror information may consult or confer regarding potential jurors in a specific case.
  3. A disclosure of juror information in violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

History. Acts 2007, No. 226, § 2.

Subchapter 2 — Criminal Proceedings

Effective Dates. Acts 1975, No. 485, § 7, provided: “This Act shall be effective on and after January 1, 1976, except that the procedures outlined in this Act to be carried out prior to the empaneling of a jury shall be effective on and after July 1, 1975, so that jurors empaneled at terms of any circuit court beginning after January 1, 1976 shall be selected as provided herein.”

Acts 2005, No. 87, § 12: Feb. 8, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present method of selecting grand jurors and petit jurors is inadequate to permit computerized random selection; that this act will provide for the computerized random selection of jurors; and that until this act becomes effective, the validity of findings and judgments issued by juries selected randomly by computer is subject to question. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 592, codified at §§ 16-32-202 and 16-32-203, was declared unconstitutional in Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994).

16-32-201. Selection of grand jury.

    1. The selecting, summoning, and impaneling of a grand jury shall be as prescribed by law.
      1. Circuit courts to which criminal cases are assigned may call grand jurors from the jury wheel or box from which petit jurors are drawn, or the circuit judge may direct the circuit clerk to provide the minimum number of names for a separate grand jury wheel or box in the minimum number set forth in § 16-32-103(a)-(d).
      2. In the event the circuit judge directs the circuit clerk to provide the minimum number of names for a separate grand jury wheel or box, the circuit clerk shall select the names of persons whom the circuit clerk believes to be qualified from the current voter registration list or the enhanced prospective juror list authorized by § 16-32-302.
    2. In either event, when a grand jury is selected, the names of a sufficient number of persons shall be drawn from the appropriate box or wheel to provide a panel of sixteen (16) qualified grand jurors, plus a reasonable number of alternates, after excuses from attendance have been granted to those who are entitled to be excused.
    3. As the names are drawn, they shall be recorded in the grand jury book, and the grand jurors shall be summoned and directed to appear in the same manner as provided for petit jurors.
    4. The grand jury shall be made up of the first sixteen (16) persons summoned whose names appear as grand jurors in the jury book after the elimination of the disqualified or excused persons.
      1. The remaining grand jurors whose names appear in the jury book after the elimination of disqualified or excused persons shall be considered as alternates and shall be designated in the order as they appear in the jury book to replace regular grand jurors who become incapacitated or who are unavailable.
      2. Alternate grand jurors shall not be disqualified from further jury duty as provided in § 16-31-104 until they have been required to report for grand jury service during the year.
    5. Grand jurors shall serve during the calendar year in which selected unless sooner discharged by the court.
  1. The drawing and recording of grand jurors under subsection (a) of this section may be accomplished by a computerized random jury selection process.
  2. In either event, when a grand jury is selected, the names of a sufficient number of persons shall be drawn from the appropriate box or wheel to provide a panel of sixteen (16) qualified grand jurors, plus a reasonable number of alternates, after excuses from attendance have been granted to those who are entitled to be excused.
  3. As the names are drawn, they shall be recorded in the grand jury book, and the grand jurors shall be summoned and directed to appear in the same manner as provided for petit jurors.
  4. The grand jury shall be made up of the first sixteen (16) persons summoned whose names appear as grand jurors in the jury book after the elimination of the disqualified or excused persons.
  5. The remaining grand jurors whose names appear in the jury book after the elimination of disqualified or excused persons shall be considered as alternates and shall be designated in the order as they appear in the jury book to replace regular grand jurors who become incapacitated or who are unavailable. Alternate grand jurors shall not be disqualified from further jury duty as provided in § 16-31-104 until they have been required to report for grand jury service during the year.
  6. Grand jurors shall serve during the calendar year in which selected unless sooner discharged by the court.

History. Crim. Code, § 98; C. & M. Dig., § 2977; Pope's Dig., § 3799; Acts 1975, No. 485, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-217.1, 43-901; Acts 2005, No. 87, § 7; 2017, No. 600, § 7.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (a)(2)(A), inserted “jury” preceding “wheel”, and substituted “circuit clerk” for “jury commissioners”; in (a)(2)(B), substituted “circuit clerk” for “jury commissioners” twice, and substituted “the circuit clerk believes” for “they believe”.

Cross References. Qualifications of grand jurors, § 16-31-101.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Case Notes

In General.

Grand jury may be lawfully selected pursuant to statutory provisions or where the circuit court causes them to be selected in the exercise of its inherent constitutional right. Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S. Ct. 641, 93 L. Ed. 1081 (1949).

Discrimination.

It is error not to permit accused black to show discrimination against his race in selection of grand jury. Castleberry v. State, 69 Ark. 346, 63 S.W. 670 (1901).

Evidence that a grand jury contained but one black, no women, no one under fifty years of age, and that all but one were business men or retired persons, and that all were college graduates or had some college training, was evidence that discrimination against the excluded groups was practiced in the selection of the grand jury and that the grand jury was unconstitutionally selected. Jewell v. Stebbins, 288 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Ark. 1968) (decision under prior law).

Method of Selection.

A motion to quash on the grounds that a juror was sworn under a different name than appeared on the jury list was properly refused where the court found that the juror was the same person selected by the commissioners. Boles v. State, 58 Ark. 35, 22 S.W. 887 (1893).

Objections.

Objections to the organization of the grand jury must be made by motion to set aside the indictment; by pleading to the indictment, the illegality of the grand jury is waived. Wright v. State, 42 Ark. 94 (1883); Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S.W. 900 (1896).

Any alleged illegal discrimination in the selection and impaneling of the grand jury will be raised by a motion to quash. Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S. Ct. 641, 93 L. Ed. 1081 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Presumption.

When the record discloses that persons named were duly impaneled as grand jury, it will be presumed, in the absence of a contrary showing, that the other persons who were summoned but did not serve as grand jurors were excused for cause; presumption is that grand jury was properly constituted. Wallis v. State, 54 Ark. 611, 16 S.W. 821 (1891); Bates v. State, 60 Ark. 450, 30 S.W. 890, 1895 Ark. LEXIS 186 (1895).

Cited: Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 Ark. 551, 750 S.W.2d 406 (1988).

16-32-202. Selection, summons, and composition of trial generally.

  1. The jurors for the trial of criminal prosecutions shall be selected and summoned as provided by law.
    1. Juries shall be composed of twelve (12) jurors.
    2. However, cases other than felonies may be tried by a jury of fewer than twelve (12) jurors by agreement of the parties.

History. Crim. Code, § 191; C. & M. Dig., § 3142; Pope's Dig., § 3977; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1901; Acts 1993, No. 592, § 1; 1995, No. 1296, § 61.

Publisher's Notes. This section, as amended by Acts 1993, No. 592, § 1, was declared unconstitutional in Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994). The court declared that the pre-amendment version remains viable and extant.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment redesignated the first and second sentences in (a) as (a)(1) and (a)(2); and substituted “in the discretion of the trial court judge, by a jury of six (6) jurors,” for “by a jury of less than twelve (12) jurors by agreement of the parties” in (b).

The 1995 amendment redesignated former (a)(1), (a)(2) and (b) as (a), (b)(1) and (b)(2), respectively; and substituted “by a jury of less than twelve (12) jurors by agreement of the parties” for “in the discretion of the trial court judge, by a jury of six (6) jurors” in present (b)(2).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Constitutional Law — Twelve Angry People. Arkansas Constitution Guarantees Right to Trial by Jury of Twelve Persons in Criminal Cases. Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994), 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 489.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Sullivan, An Overview of the Law of Jury Selection for Arkansas Criminal Trial Lawyers, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 37.

Seventeenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law — Constitutional Law, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 450.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The 1993 amendment of this section and § 16-32-203, which provided for a jury of six persons at the trial court's discretion, violates Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 7. Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994).

This section and § 16-32-203, as they existed prior to the enactment of Acts 1993, No. 592, remain viable and extant. Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994).

Agreement.

By agreement, misdemeanors may be tried by less than 12 jurors, but a mere failure to object to trial by less than 12 does not constitute such agreement within this section. Warwick v. State, 47 Ark. 568, 2 S.W. 335 (1886).

It is not error for a charge of manslaughter to be tried by a jury of eleven men where defendant not only agreed in open court to a jury of eleven, but also made no objections, saved no exceptions and did not assign this as error in his motion for a new trial. Ford v. State, 222 Ark. 16, 257 S.W.2d 30 (1953).

There is no federal rule binding the state courts to use a 12-member jury in state criminal prosecutions, and an agreement to proceed with an 11-member jury in accordance with state law and court rules is not a violation of the constitutional right to trial by jury. Vinston v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1988).

Composition.

Although selection of a jury from a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, there is no requirement that the jury which is chosen mirror the community and reflect the distinctive racial groups in the population. Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 194, 925 S.W.2d 402 (1996).

Right to Twelve Jurors.

Defendant was deprived of her right to be tried by a twelve-member jury for charges of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to arrest because she was tried by a jury composed of only six members. Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff, 322 Ark. 45, 907 S.W.2d 690 (1995).

Where the defendant was not able to show any prejudice, he was not entitled to a new trial even though the jury contained 13 people. Davies v. State, 64 Ark. App. 12, 977 S.W.2d 900 (1998).

16-32-203. Selection for misdemeanor trial.

The jury, for the trial of all prosecutions for misdemeanors, shall be selected in the following manner:

  1. Each party shall have three (3) peremptory challenges, which may be made orally; and
    1. The court shall cause the names of twenty-four (24) competent jurors, written upon separate slips of paper, to be placed in a box to be kept for that purpose, from which the names of eighteen (18) jurors shall be drawn and entered on a list in the order in which they were drawn, and numbered.
    2. Each party shall be furnished with a copy of the list, from which each may strike the names of three (3) jurors and return the list so stricken to the judge, who shall strike from the original list the names struck from the copies.
    3. The first twelve (12) names remaining on the original list shall constitute the jury.

History. Crim. Code, § 192; C. & M. Dig., § 3143; Pope's Dig., § 3978; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1902; Acts 1993, No. 592, § 2; 1995, No. 1296, § 61.

Publisher's Notes. This section, as amended by Acts 1993, No. 592, § 1, was declared unconstitutional in Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994). The court declared that the pre-amendment version remains viable and extant.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment rewrote this section.

The 1995 amendment deleted the former introductory language of (2); inserted “jurors” following “eighteen (18)” in (2)(A); and deleted former (3).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Peremptory Challenges After Purkett v. Elam, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 514 U.S. 765, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995): How to Judge a Book By Its Cover Without Violating Equal Protection, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The 1993 amendment of this section and § 16-32-202, which provides for a jury of six persons at the trial court's discretion, violates Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 7. Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994).

This section and § 16-32-202, as they existed prior to the enactment of Acts 1993, No. 592, remain viable and extant. Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994).

Right to Twelve Jurors.

Defendant was deprived of her right to be tried by a twelve-member jury for charges of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to arrest because she was tried by a jury composed of only six members. Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff, 322 Ark. 45, 907 S.W.2d 690 (1995).

Subchapter 3 — Enhanced Prospective Juror Pool

Effective Dates. Acts 2005, No. 87, § 12: Feb. 8, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present method of selecting grand jurors and petit jurors is inadequate to permit computerized random selection; that this act will provide for the computerized random selection of jurors; and that until this act becomes effective, the validity of findings and judgments issued by juries selected randomly by computer is subject to question. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-32-301. Enhanced prospective juror pool.

  1. The pool of names from which prospective jurors are chosen may be expanded from the list of registered voters to include the list of licensed drivers and persons issued an identification card under § 27-16-805.
  2. The qualifications for serving on a jury under § 16-31-101 and the disqualifications under § 16-31-102 shall apply to the enhanced prospective juror pool permitted under subsection (a) of this section.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1404, § 1; 2005, No. 87, § 8.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Case Notes

Enhancement Not Warranted.

In a capital murder case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to enhance the prospective jury pool because the decision to use a list of registered voters instead of a list of licensed drivers was clearly within the court's discretion pursuant to § 16-32-303. In addition, the jury venire was randomly selected by a computer program and race was not identified. Thomas v. State, 370 Ark. 70, 257 S.W.3d 92, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1025, 128 S. Ct. 620, 169 L. Ed. 2d 399 (2007).

Motion to Strike Denied.

Defendant's motion to strike the jury panels called for his trial was properly denied as he failed to provide any evidence of a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Although no African Americans presented themselves for jury duty, defendant failed to offer evidence that representation of African Americans in the jury pool was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of African Americans in the community, and defendant did not made a prima facie showing of systematic exclusion of African American jurors, as the jury manager/deputy clerk testified that the jury selection was done in compliance with the relevant statute, which generally provides for a random-selection process. Henderson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 220, 575 S.W.3d 617 (2019).

16-32-302. Enhanced list of prospective jurors.

    1. In order to allow for the use of the enhanced prospective juror pool, the Secretary of State shall compile and make available no later than November 1 of each year, and at other times determined by the Secretary of State, an enhanced list of prospective jurors in automated or nonautomated form, as provided for in subsection (b) of this section, for:
      1. Any circuit clerk requesting an enhanced list of prospective jurors for his or her county; and
      2. The Administrative Office of the Courts for use in its automated jury management system.
    2. Neither the enhanced list of prospective jurors nor its component parts may be released by the Secretary of State, the Administrative Office of the Courts, or any county or agency receiving the list or its component parts unless otherwise permitted by law.
    3. Unlawful release of the enhanced list of prospective jurors shall be a Class B misdemeanor.
    1. The Secretary of State shall receive from the Department of Finance and Administration at mutually agreeable times each year a list of all licensed drivers and persons issued identification cards under § 27-16-805 who are citizens of the United States and sixteen (16) years of age or older.
    2. The Department of Finance and Administration, the Arkansas Crime Information Center, the Department of Health, and the Administrative Office of the Courts shall assist the Secretary of State in developing a process whereby the Secretary of State will create a merged list from the voter registration list, the list of licensed drivers, and persons issued identification cards under § 27-16-805, who are citizens of the United States and who will be eighteen (18) years of age or older at the time the list is provided to the counties or the Administrative Office of the Courts.
      1. In order to improve the quality of the enhanced list of prospective jurors and to decrease the cost of summoning potential jurors, the Arkansas Crime Information Center and the Administrative Office of the Courts are authorized to provide information to the Secretary of State and the Department of Finance and Administration to identify which voters, licensed drivers, and persons issued identification cards under § 27-16-805 have been convicted of a felony and have not been pardoned.
      2. The Department of Health is authorized to provide information to the Secretary of State and the Department of Finance and Administration in order to identify which voters, licensed drivers, and persons issued identification cards under § 27-16-805 are deceased, have changed names, or have been married or divorced.
    3. The Arkansas Crime Information Center, the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the Department of Health are authorized to provide as much information as they agree is necessary and possible to enable the Secretary of State to compile the most accurate, timely, and complete merged list of voters, licensed drivers, and persons issued identification cards under § 27-16-805, who are citizens of the United States, eighteen (18) years of age or older, are still living, and who have not been convicted of a felony and have not been pardoned.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1404, § 2; 2005, No. 87, § 9.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

16-32-303. Judicial determination of need for expanded list.

  1. The administrative circuit judge for each county shall determine that either the list of registered voters or the enhanced list, but not both, shall be utilized in the selection of all prospective jurors for all circuit court divisions within the county, based upon a consideration of whether the use of registered voters creates a sufficient pool for the selection of jurors to offer an adequate cross section of the community.
  2. If the judge determines that the enhanced prospective juror list, as described in § 16-32-302, should be used by the county, then the judge on or before October 1 shall inform the circuit clerk who shall notify the Secretary of State and the Administrative Office of the Courts that the enhanced list will be requested for the county.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1404, § 3; 2005, No. 87, § 10.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Case Notes

Enhancement Not Warranted.

In a capital murder case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to enhance the prospective jury pool because the decision to use a list of registered voters instead of a list of licensed drivers was clearly within the court's discretion pursuant to this section. In addition, the jury venire was randomly selected by a computer program and race was not identified. Thomas v. State, 370 Ark. 70, 257 S.W.3d 92, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1025, 128 S. Ct. 620, 169 L. Ed. 2d 399 (2007).

16-32-304. List of disqualifications not affected.

This subchapter shall not affect the list of disqualifications from jury service found in § 16-31-102.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1404, § 5[4].

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1404, did not contain a Section 4.

Chapter 33 Examination and Challenge

Research References

ALR.

Statute or court rule prescribing number of challenges according to nature of offense or extent of punishment. 8 A.L.R.4th 149.

Propriety of asking prospective female jurors questions on voir dire not asked of prospective male jurors, or vice versa. 39 A.L.R.4th 450.

Am. Jur. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 195 et seq.

C.J.S. 50 C.J.S., Juries, § 247 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 2005, No. 87, § 12: Feb. 8, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present method of selecting grand jurors and petit jurors is inadequate to permit computerized random selection; that this act will provide for the computerized random selection of jurors; and that until this act becomes effective, the validity of findings and judgments issued by juries selected randomly by computer is subject to question. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-33-101. Examination of prospective jurors.

  1. In all cases, both civil and criminal, the court shall examine all prospective jurors under oath upon all matters set forth in the statutes as disqualifications.
  2. Further questions may be asked by the court or by the attorneys in the case, in the discretion of the court.
        1. If a court utilizes prospective juror questionnaires, the questionnaires may request a prospective juror's mailing or residential address or phone number.
        2. However, the address and phone number shall be redacted from the questionnaires before providing completed questionnaires to the attorneys for the parties.
      1. The attorneys for the parties shall be precluded from asking for that information during voir dire.
      2. However, the attorneys or the court may ask a prospective juror his or her city or town of residence.
    1. Except as provided in § 13-4-302, nothing in this section shall preclude the clerk of the court from keeping and maintaining records of potential jurors that contain mailing or residential addresses or phone numbers.

History. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 16, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3996; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-226; Acts 2001, No. 210, § 1; 2005, No. 87, § 11; 2007, No. 226, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure as to civil cases only.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment added (c).

The 2005 amendment redesignated former (c)(1)(A) as present (c)(1)(A)(i); substituted “may request” for “shall not request” in (c)(1)(A)(i); and added (c)(1)(A)(ii).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Sullivan, An Overview of the Law of Jury Selection for Arkansas Criminal Trial Lawyers, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 37.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

“Discretion of the court,” referred to in this section, does not invest trial court with an arbitrary, all powerful authority to transform discretion into prohibition, nor does it require that in the process of ascertaining the desired facts, counsel must utilize the court as a conduit through which communication must be megaphoned to the jury by way of the dais. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Johnson, 197 Ark. 1129, 126 S.W.2d 931 (1939); Griffin v. State, 239 Ark. 431, 389 S.W.2d 900 (1965).

Scope of voir dire examination is largely a matter lying within the sound discretion of the trial judge, the latitude of that discretion being rather wide and not subject to reversal in the absence of clear abuse, and this rule has not been materially affected by ARCrP 32.2. Finch v. State, 262 Ark. 313, 556 S.W.2d 434 (1977).

The scope of voir dire examination by counsel is largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and counsel's limitation of that examination is not reversible on appeal unless it is a clear abuse of discretion. Fauna v. State, 265 Ark. 934, 582 S.W.2d 18 (1979).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow defendant to strike members of the jury panel in chambers. Felty v. State, 306 Ark. 634, 816 S.W.2d 872 (1991).

Examination by Litigants.

This section does not change rule giving litigants right to examine jurors separately in order to determine whether jurors are subject to challenge for cause, or to elicit information on which to base the right of peremptory challenge, subject to the right of the court, acting in its sound discretion, to control the extent of such examination. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Johnson, 197 Ark. 1129, 126 S.W.2d 931 (1939); Griffin v. State, 239 Ark. 431, 389 S.W.2d 900 (1965).

There was no error in a felony case whereby prospective jurors were questioned on voir dire and subjected to challenges for cause and peremptory challenges two jurors at a time, as long as the state and the defendant were allowed to examine jurors individually and the state was required to exercise its peremptory challenges first. Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1987).

Presumption.

Where the record recited that certain jurors were duly selected, sworn and impaneled as members of the jury, it would be presumed on appeal that they were examined under oath as to whether they were qualified jurors. Wilfong v. State, 96 Ark. 627, 132 S.W. 928 (1910).

Questions.

“Further questions,” referred to in this section, includes any pertinent inquiry, respectfully addressed, through which qualifications may be determined, or by which counsel, regardless of the juror's qualifications, may secure information upon which to predicate peremptory challenge. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Johnson, 197 Ark. 1129, 126 S.W.2d 931 (1939).

Questions held to be proper. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Talley, 199 Ark. 835, 136 S.W.2d 688Certiorari or review denied by311 U.S. 722, 61 S. Ct. 5 (1940); Stovall v. State, 233 Ark. 597, 346 S.W.2d 212 (1961); Griffin v. State, 239 Ark. 431, 389 S.W.2d 900 (1965).

Trial court did not err in not permitting defendants to ask again the simple questions that had been answered on a jury questionnaire. Clark v. State, 258 Ark. 490, 527 S.W.2d 619 (1975), overruled, Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1987).

Refusal to permit certain questions held not prejudicial. Haight v. State, 259 Ark. 478, 533 S.W.2d 510 (1976).

Waiver.

Where counsel for defense was aware of failure to swear prospective jurors prior to voir dire examination but made no objection until after trial began, and judgment recited that defense counsel announced in open court that all members of the jury “were good for defendant”, the objection was waived. Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 996, 363 S.W.2d 923 (1963).

Where counsel was offered opportunity to question jurors, but declined, plaintiff was not deprived of any rights under this section. Hogg v. Darden, 237 Ark. 478, 374 S.W.2d 184 (1964).

Cited: Jones v. City of Newport, 29 Ark. App. 42, 780 S.W.2d 338 (1989).

Subchapter 2 — Civil Proceedings

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas Civil Juries, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 527.

16-33-201. Challenge to the array.

A challenge to the array shall be decided by the court.

History. Civil Code, § 345; C. & M. Dig., § 6379; Pope's Dig., § 8341; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-227.

16-33-202. Challenge for cause.

  1. A challenge for cause shall be decided by the court, and, in order to determine the challenge, the particular juror challenged may be sworn, or, at the instance of either party, all of the jurors may be sworn to make true and perfect answers to such questions as may be demanded of them, touching their qualifications as jurors.
  2. The court may allow other testimony in regard to the qualifications of any juror.

History. Civil Code, § 346; C. & M. Dig., § 6380; Pope's Dig., § 8342; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-228.

Case Notes

Examination by Litigants.

Litigants in civil cases, as well as criminal cases, have the right to examine the jurors separately in order to determine whether they are subject to challenge for cause, or to elicit information on which to base the right of peremptory challenge, subject to the right of the court to control extent of examination in its sound discretion. Baldwin v. Hunnicutt, 192 Ark. 441, 93 S.W.2d 131 (1936).

Harmless Error.

Error in overruling a challenge of a juror for cause is not prejudicial where the court afterwards allowed the defendant an additional peremptory challenge. Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S.W. 773 (1904).

Objection.

Objections to the qualifications of jurors must be made before they are sworn and impaneled; it is too late on a motion for a new trial even if the cause for disqualification could not have been discovered earlier. Whitehead v. Wells, 29 Ark. 99 (1874).

Opinion.

A prospective juror is not disqualified if, from reading newspapers, he has formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Daughtry v. State, 80 Ark. 13, 96 S.W. 748 (1906).

In a criminal case, a juror is not disqualified for cause if he holds to a fixed opinion based on hearsay or rumor, which opinion can be removed by evidence or if he states that he can go into a jury box and disregard such opinions and that he holds no bias or prejudice for or against the accused. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Stamps, 84 Ark. 241, 104 S.W. 1114 (1907); Jackson v. State, 103 Ark. 21, 145 S.W. 559 (1912).

Jurors held not to have formed disqualifying opinion. McElvain v. State, 101 Ark. 443, 142 S.W. 840 (1911).

Juror held to have formed disqualifying opinion. Collins v. State, 102 Ark. 180, 143 S.W. 1075 (1912).

A juror will not be rendered incompetent because of an opinion based upon rumor where he states that he can discard such opinion and try the defendant upon the evidence. Bealmear v. State, 104 Ark. 616, 150 S.W. 129 (1912).

Jurors are not incompetent by reason of having formed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence, where that opinion was based on rumor and where the jurors stated that they would disregard such opinions and base their verdict on testimony. Ham v. State, 179 Ark. 20, 13 S.W.2d 805 (1929).

Racial Bias.

Where the questioning allowed regarding racial bias was insufficient to focus the attention of the prospective jurors to any racial prejudice they might entertain, the trial court abused its discretion in restricting voir dire with reference to possible racial bias. Smith v. State, 33 Ark. App. 52, 800 S.W.2d 440 (1990).

16-33-203. Peremptory challenges — Panel.

  1. Each party shall have three (3) peremptory challenges, which may be made orally.
    1. However, if either party desires a panel, the court shall cause the names of twenty-four (24) competent jurors, written upon separate slips of paper, to be placed in a box to be kept for that purpose, from which the names of eighteen (18) shall be drawn and entered on a list in the order in which they were drawn, and numbered.
    2. Each party shall be furnished with a copy of the list, from which each may strike the names of three (3) jurors and return the list so struck to the judge, who shall strike from the original list the names so stricken from the copies, and the first twelve (12) names remaining on the original list shall constitute the jury.

History. Civil Code, § 347; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6381, 6383, 6384; Pope's Dig., §§ 8343, 8345, 8346; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-229.

Cross References. Peremptory challenge of alternate juror, § 16-30-102.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Peremptory Challenges After Purkett v. Elam, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 514 U.S. 765, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995): How to Judge a Book By Its Cover Without Violating Equal Protection, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

Case Notes

Construction.

Under this section, parties are entitled to have 18 jurors on the list before they are required to exercise the right of peremptory challenge; this requirement is mandatory, and a failure to comply with it is reversible error. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. James, 48 F. 148 (8th Cir. 1891); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Washington, 49 F. 347 (8th Cir. 1891).

This section is mandatory. Young v. Morrison, 159 Ark. 270, 251 S.W. 869 (1923).

Discrimination.

Where there were several black persons on the panel, the state had strikes remaining, and there was no indication of discrimination in the record, the defendant did not show such facts and circumstances to raise the inference that the prosecutor used strikes to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury solely on account of their race. Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2d 751 (1986).

Drawing from List.

It was error for the court, in response to claimant's motion for a drawn and struck jury, without subjecting the panel of jurors to challenges for cause and without drawing eighteen names from a list of twenty-four, to call a list of eighteen jurors and direct the parties to challenge peremptorily from that list. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Stanley, 237 Ark. 664, 375 S.W.2d 229 (1964).

Examination by Litigants.

Litigants in civil and criminal cases have right to examine the jurors separately in order to determine if they are subject to challenge for cause or to elicit information on which to base a peremptory challenge. Baldwin v. Hunnicutt, 192 Ark. 441, 93 S.W.2d 131 (1936).

Exhaustion of Challenges.

Where appellant had exhausted all of its peremptory challenges under this section, one of which was used to strike the juror in question, it was in a position to complain of any error of the trial court in refusing to strike a juror for cause. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Young, 241 Ark. 765, 410 S.W.2d 120 (1967).

Right to peremptory challenges is conferred as a means to reject jurors, not to select jurors, and until such time as a party is forced to take an objectionable juror without the privilege of exercising a peremptory challenge, he has shown no prejudice. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Dalrymple, 252 Ark. 771, 480 S.W.2d 955 (1972).

Method of Selection.

Method of selecting jurors and exercising challenges held to be proper. Young v. Morrison, 159 Ark. 270, 251 S.W. 869 (1923); Myers v. Martin, 168 Ark. 1028, 272 S.W. 856 (1925).

Substitution of different juror for one of the first 12 jurors on the list was harmless error. Falcon Zinc Co. v. Flippin, 171 Ark. 1151, 287 S.W. 394 (1926).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a drawn jury upon motion of plaintiffs after three names of prospective jurors had been stricken from the list by defendants and the list returned to the clerk, since defendants' challenges were not revealed to anybody. Caldarera v. Giles, 235 Ark. 418, 360 S.W.2d 767 (1962).

Multiple Parties.

In a suit for damages, where several tortfeasors are joined together as co-defendants, they are allowed but three peremptory challenges. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Burrows, 77 Ark. 74, 96 S.W. 336 (1905); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 117 Ark. 71, 174 S.W. 215 (1915).

Where causes of action against several defendants were improperly joined, all of the defendants were entitled jointly to the statutory number of challenges. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bailey, 153 Ark. 574, 241 S.W. 42 (1922).

Third-party defendants whose interests are in conflict with the regular defendants in the suit are not entitled to three peremptory challenges in the selection of the jury in addition to the three already allowed the regular defendant. Hogan v. Hill, 229 Ark. 758, 318 S.W.2d 580 (1958).

For the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges the court had some jurisdiction to group the parties. Utley v. Heckinger, 235 Ark. 780, 362 S.W.2d 13 (1962).

The owner of the fee and her lessee were entitled to a total of three peremptory challenges in a condemnation suit brought against them by the Arkansas State Highway Commission. Arkansas State Highway Com. v. Sisson, 238 Ark. 720, 384 S.W.2d 264 (Ark. 1964).

In an action in which the defendants interpleaded additional parties on a third-party complaint, it was not error to require the plaintiffs to share their three peremptory challenges with the primary defendants. Smith v. Goble, 248 Ark. 415, 452 S.W.2d 336 (1970).

Time of Challenge.

It is within the court's discretion to permit the state to challenge jurors peremptorily after they have been examined and accepted as jurors in the case. Carr v. State, 81 Ark. 589, 99 S.W. 831 (1907).

Where the defendant has not exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may permit the state to peremptorily challenge a juror after he has been accepted on the jury. Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582 (1914).

Subchapter 3 — Criminal Proceedings

Research References

ALR.

Additional peremptory challenges because of multiple criminal charges. 5 A.L.R.4th 533.

Necessity for presence of judge during voir dire examination of prospective jurors in state criminal case. 39 A.L.R.4th 465.

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Criminal Procedure — Voir Dire — Prosecutors Must Now Show That a Juror is Irrevocably Committed to Voting Against the Maximum Penalty Before Striking For Cause, Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 606 S.W.2d 563 (1980), 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 371.

Note, Peremptory Challenges in Felony Prosecutions, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 415.

Note, Peremptory Challenges After Purkett v. Elam, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 514 U.S. 765, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995): How to Judge a Book By Its Cover Without Violating Equal Protection, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 249.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow defendant to strike members of the jury panel in chambers. Felty v. State, 306 Ark. 634, 816 S.W.2d 872 (1991).

16-33-301. Challenge to grand juror.

  1. Every person held to answer a criminal charge may object to the competency of anyone summoned to serve as a grand juror, before he is sworn, on the ground that he is the prosecutor or complainant upon any charge against the person or that he is a witness on the part of the prosecution and has been summoned or bound in a recognizance as such.
  2. If the objection is established, the person so challenged shall be set aside and another juror summoned.

History. Rev. Stat. ch. 45, § 60; C. & M. Dig., § 3005; Pope's Dig., § 3827; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-902.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies only to those persons held to answer criminal charges which are to be investigated and acted upon by the grand jury, the formation of which they are entitled to challenge, and not to persons who are already indicted but against whom a second indictment is found for the same offense. Hudspeth v. State, 50 Ark. 534, 9 S.W. 1 (1888); Baker v. State, 58 Ark. 513, 25 S.W. 603 (1894).

Grounds.

In a prosecution for arson in burning a hotel, the son-in-law of the hotel owner was not incompetent as a grand juror. Dame v. State, 191 Ark. 1107, 89 S.W.2d 610 (1936).

Challenge to grand juror on ground he had unsuccessfully opposed defendant as a candidate for office was properly overruled. Rice v. State, 204 Ark. 236, 161 S.W.2d 401 (1942).

The practice of allowing jurors to socialize with prosecutors and discuss the intricate interaction that occurs amongst jurors during deliberations, when the panel is still being used and the prosecutor can use such information in its selection of jurors in future cases, is troubling; the state certainly cannot rely upon such secret and undocumented, nebulous hearsay, referred to simply as “information,” as a justification for the exercising of peremptory strikes against a cognizable racial group when the record discloses no other significant nonracial distinctions between the jurors stricken and the jurors accepted. Devose v. Norris, 867 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 53 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. Ark. 1995).

Opportunity to Challenge.

One accused of a felony cannot, on appeal, raise the objection that, although in jail, he was not afforded an opportunity to appear and object to the formation of the grand jury if, in his motion to quash the indictment, he did not show that any of the grand jury was disqualified. Eastling v. State, 69 Ark. 189, 62 S.W. 584 (1901).

An indictment will not be quashed on the ground that the accused was confined in jail at the time the grand jury was impaneled and was not given an opportunity to challenge the competency of any member thereof when it does not appear that he was prejudiced thereby or denied the benefit of any statutory right. Threet v. State, 110 Ark. 152, 161 S.W. 139 (1913).

Timeliness of Objection.

A disqualification of a grand juror is good cause for challenge before an indictment is found or of a plea in abatement before the trial, but it is too late to make such objection after verdict. Fenalty v. State, 12 Ark. 630 (1852).

An objection that the name of a member of the grand jury was indorsed on an indictment for burglary as a state witness and that he was cashier of the bank which was burglarized cannot be raised for the first time on appeal by one who, being held to answer a criminal charge, was in the court room when the grand jury was impaneled and was afforded an opportunity to challenge any member of the panel. Edwards v. State, 171 Ark. 778, 286 S.W. 935, 1926 Ark. LEXIS 526 (1926).

16-33-302. Challenge to trial jurors generally.

A challenge is an objection to the trial jurors and is of two (2) kinds:

  1. To the panel;
  2. To the individual juror.

History. Crim. Code, § 199; C. & M. Dig., § 3151; Pope's Dig., § 3986; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1910.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Sullivan, An Overview of the Law of Jury Selection for Arkansas Criminal Trial Lawyers, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 37.

Case Notes

Cited: Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973); Kelly v. State, 350 Ark. 238, 85 S.W.3d 893 (2002).

16-33-303. Challenge to trial jurors — Individual juror generally.

  1. The challenge to the individual juror is:
    1. For cause;
    2. Peremptory.
  2. The challenge must be taken before he is sworn in chief, but the court, for a good cause, may permit it to be made at any time before the jury is completed.
  3. The challenge to the juror shall first be made by the state and then by the defendant, and the state must exhaust its challenges to each particular juror before the juror is passed to the defendant for challenge or acceptance.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 203, 204, 216; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3153, 3154, 3164; Pope's Dig., §§ 3988, 3989, 4000; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1913, 43-1914, 43-1924.

Case Notes

Challenges.

There was no error in a felony case whereby prospective jurors were questioned on voir dire and subjected to challenges for cause and peremptory challenges two jurors at a time, as long as the state and the defendant were allowed to examine jurors individually and the state was required to exercise its peremptory challenges first. Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1987).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion under subsection (b) of this section in refusing to grant defendant's peremptory challenge after a jury had been selected as defendant failed to show good cause for the challenge; defendant's failure to timely strike the juror was due to defendant's counsel relying upon juror numbers, rather than juror names. Scales v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 395 (2011).

Discharge of Sworn Juror.

Court properly discharged a juror related to defendant within the prohibited degree after swearing in. McDaniel v. State, 228 Ark. 1122, 313 S.W.2d 77 (1958).

For Cause.

When a defendant has used all his peremptory challenges before a prospective juror is called, he may only challenge that juror for cause and not peremptorily, and it is reversible error to thereafter hold a biased juror competent. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

Where, during voir dire, a prospective juror indicated that there was a possibility that she could not consider sending anyone to the penitentiary for a crime of the type involved, the trial court did not err in excusing the juror for cause. Fisk v. State, 5 Ark. App. 5, 631 S.W.2d 626 (1982).

Because the trial court (a) failed to make a finding, from all relevant circumstances, as to the sufficiency of the state's gender-neutral explanation, and then (b) failed to conduct a sensitive inquiry into the basis for each of the challenges by the state, the evidence did not establish that the state's challenges were for valid reasons without any gender bias; therefore, the defendant's constitutional rights had not been protected and the trial court's error required a reversal and retrial. Cleveland v. State, 318 Ark. 738, 888 S.W.2d 629 (1994).

Prosecutorial Misconduct.

Both in this case and in Miller v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Ark. 1994), the prosecutor consistently and systematically excluded African-Americans from participating as jurors through the use of peremptory challenges. Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995).

Standard of Review.

—Racial Discrimination.

A constitutional violation involving the selection of jurors in a racially discriminatory manner is a “structural defect” in the trial mechanism which cannot be subjected to a harmless error analysis. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995).

Time of Challenge.

The refusal of the court to permit the defendant to challenge a juror peremptorily after accepting him is not error if no abuse of discretion is shown. Allen v. State, 70 Ark. 337, 68 S.W. 28 (1902).

In the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the challenge was made before the juror was sworn in chief. Daniels v. State, 76 Ark. 84, 88 S.W. 844 (1905).

Court may permit peremptory challenge by state after juror is accepted. Carr v. State, 81 Ark. 589, 99 S.W. 831 (1907).

The right of the state to challenge peremptorily after a juror has been accepted must be exercised before the defendant has exhausted his challenges. Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582 (1914). But see Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959).

It was not prejudicial error to permit the prosecuting attorney to exercise a peremptory challenge on a juror whom he had accepted where the defendants had a peremptory challenge left. Ruloff v. State, 142 Ark. 477, 219 S.W. 781 (1920). But see Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959).

It is not error to permit the state to interpose peremptory challenges to jurors who have been accepted by both parties even though defendant's challenges have been exhausted, unless it first be shown that the defendant will be prejudiced by the service of the venireman accepted in lieu of the juror excused. Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959).

Where there were grounds for disqualification of juror but the state reluctantly accepted the juror at first in a good faith attempt to get a jury, and the state's tardy request to strike came after it was apparent that additional prospective jurors had been called, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the tardy strike. Johnson v. State, 261 Ark. 13, 545 S.W.2d 639 (1977).

This section does not forbid a challenge for cause after a jury is impaneled and sworn. Strickland v. State, 74 Ark. App. 206, 46 S.W.3d 554 (2001).

Waiver of Objection.

Defendant could not object to the alleged bias of juror in original trial in a federal habeas corpus proceeding where counsel had not objected in state court as required by this section. Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1981).

Cited: Jeffries v. State, 255 Ark. 501, 501 S.W.2d 600 (1973).

16-33-304. Challenge to trial jurors — Individual juror for cause.

  1. The challenge for cause may be taken either by the state or by the defendant.
  2. It may be general, that the juror is disqualified in serving in any case, or particular, that he is disqualified from serving in the case on trial.
    1. Causes of general challenge are:
      1. A want of the qualifications prescribed by law;
      2. A conviction for a felony;
      3. Unsoundness of mind, or such defect in the faculties of the mind, or organs of the body, as renders him incapable of properly performing the duties of a juror.
    2. Particular causes of challenge are actual and implied bias.
      1. Actual bias is the existence of such a state of mind on the part of the juror, in regard to the case or to either party, as satisfies the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that he cannot try the case impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging.
      2. A challenge for implied bias may be taken in the case of the juror:
        1. Being related by consanguinity, or affinity, or who stands in the relation of guardian and ward, attorney and client, master and servant, landlord and tenant, employer and employed on wages, or who is a member of the family of the defendant or of the person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted;
        2. Being adverse to the defendant in a civil suit, or having complained against or being accused by him in a criminal prosecution;
        3. Having served on the grand jury that found the indictment or on the coroner's jury that inquired into the death of the party, whose death is the subject of the indictment;
        4. Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the offense charged in the indictment;
        5. Having been one of the former jury sworn to try the same indictment and whose verdict was set aside, or who were discharged without a verdict;
        6. Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged in the indictment;
        7. When the offense is punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty.
  3. An exemption from serving on a jury is not a cause of challenge. Having formed or expressed an opinion merely from rumor shall not be a cause of challenge.

History. Crim. Code §§ 207-212, 218; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3156-3160, 3163; Pope's Dig., §§ 3990-3995, 3999; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1915 — 43-1920, 43-1923.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Death-qualification of the jury in capital cases has been and continues to be a constitutional procedure. Jurors who are unalterably opposed to capital punishment should not be permitted to participate in the determination of guilt or innocence in capital cases and their exclusion is proper, for either of two reasons; first, because conviction proneness is neither inherently wrong nor destructive of the juror's impartiality, and second, because a jury system that has served its purpose admirably throughout the nation's history ought not to be twisted out of shape for the benefit of those persons least entitled to special favors. It has always been the law in Arkansas, except when the punishment is mandatory, that the same jurors who have the responsibility for determining guilt or innocence must also shoulder the burden of fixing the punishment; that is as it should be, for the two questions are necessarily interwoven. Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168 (1983), cert. denied, Rector v. Arkansas, 466 U.S. 988, 104 S. Ct. 2370, 80 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1984).

Construction.

This section is construed liberally toward insuring the constitutional right of a defendant to a trial by an impartial jury secured by Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

Implied bias arises by implication of law and is liberally construed in criminal cases. Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984), cert. denied, Linell v. Arkansas, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 1778 (1985).

Actual Bias.

It is within discretion of trial court to determine whether a juror has actual bias, and a judgment will not be reversed unless the court abuses that discretion. Henslee v. State, 251 Ark. 125, 471 S.W.2d 352 (1971).

When actual bias is in question, the qualification of a juror is within the sound discretion of the trial judge because he is in a better position to weigh the demeanor of the prospective juror's response to the questions on voir dire; jurors are assumed to be unbiased and the burden of demonstrating actual bias is on the appellant. Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984), cert. denied, Linell v. Arkansas, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 1778 (1985).

A prospective juror does not have to admit his bias before the trial court may excuse him. Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984).

Jurors are presumed unbiased and the burden of proving actual bias is on the party challenging the juror. Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984); Blann v. State, 15 Ark. App. 364, 695 S.W.2d 382 (1985).

It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to qualify a juror who indicated a number of times during the questioning that she was biased, where the defendant used all his peremptory challenges and demonstrated that he would have excused another juror if he'd had another peremptory challenge, thereby properly preserving his record. Bovee v. State, 19 Ark. App. 268, 720 S.W.2d 322 (1986).

—Failure to Disclose.

If a prejudiced juror does sit in the case, it is not grounds for a new trial unless it appears that he imposed himself upon the panel by concealment or prevarication. Colbert v. State, 156 Ark. 98, 245 S.W. 801 (1922).

Where a juror heard the testimony of the prosecuting witness at the examining trial and pronounced it the truth, but failed to disclose that fact on voir dire, he was disqualified as a juror notwithstanding that he testified that he entered the jury box without prejudice nor did it matter that the evidence established the defendant's guilt. Lane v. State, 168 Ark. 528, 270 S.W. 974 (1925).

—Preconceived Opinion.

When a juror admits that he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, the law regards him as an unfit person to compose part of such impartial jury as the bill of rights secures to the accused, but the disqualification is removed if he is able to state that such opinion is founded upon rumor in its proper sense and is not such as to bias or prejudice his mind. Meyer v. State, 19 Ark. 156 (1857).

When a juror states upon his voir dire that he has formed and expressed an opinion of the prisoner's guilt, but has no prejudice against him, and is accepted by the prisoner without examination as to his feelings and statements, the prisoner cannot afterward urge after-discovered statements of the juror showing strong bias and belief of his guilt, as a ground for a new trial. Werner v. State, 44 Ark. 122 (1884).

Persons offered as jurors who state upon their voir dire that they have formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused which it would take evidence to remove, are incompetent and should be rejected, notwithstanding that they further state that they can give the accused a fair and impartial trial. Polk v. State, 45 Ark. 165 (1885). See Caldwell v. State, 69 Ark. 322, 63 S.W. 59 (1901).

Evidence sufficient to find juror competent. Sneed v. State, 47 Ark. 180, 1 S.W. 68 (1886); Gibson v. State, 135 Ark. 520, 205 S.W. 898 (1918); Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284 (1982), cert. denied, Hill v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S. Ct. 180 (1982).

A preconceived opinion about the merits of the case renders a juror prima facie incompetent. Taylor v. State, 72 Ark. 613, 82 S.W. 495 (1904); Bealmear v. State, 104 Ark. 616, 150 S.W. 129 (1912); Davidson v. State, 109 Ark. 450, 160 S.W. 385 (1913); McGough v. State, 113 Ark. 301, 167 S.W. 857 (1914), overruled, Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959); Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582 (1914).

Opinion based upon hearsay or mere rumor or formed from reading newspapers does not disqualify, if the juror can try the case on the evidence only. Sullins v. State, 79 Ark. 127, 95 S.W. 159 (1906); Daughtry v. State, 80 Ark. 13, 96 S.W. 748 (1906); Decker v. State, 85 Ark. 64, 107 S.W. 182 (1908); McElvain v. State, 101 Ark. 443, 142 S.W. 840 (1911).

An opinion formed from talking with witnesses and stating that defendant should be lynched disqualifies. Collins v. State, 102 Ark. 180, 143 S.W. 1075 (1912).

Evidence sufficient to find juror incompetent. Snyder v. State, 151 Ark. 601, 237 S.W. 87 (1922).

Discharge of Sworn Juror.

After the jury was sworn, the court, on discovering that one of the jurors was on the bond of the defendant, discharged the juror; the defendant was not entitled to a release on the ground that he had been in jeopardy. Harris v. State, 177 Ark. 186, 6 S.W.2d 34 (1928).

Where, following selection and swearing in of jury, it was brought to the court's attention that one of the jurors was related to the defendant in the case and the court thereupon discharged the juror, the conclusion drawn by appellant that he had been placed in jeopardy was not tenable nor did the trial court commit reversible error in discharging a juror related to defendant within the prohibited degree. McDaniel v. State, 228 Ark. 1122, 313 S.W.2d 77 (1958).

Where there was no sound reason for discharging the jury and there was certainly no overruling necessity, the effect of declaring a mistrial, in view of the fact that defendant was perfectly willing to have relative of officer retained as juror, was to put the accused in jeopardy and his motion to be discharged because of a former jeopardy should have been granted. Jones v. State, 230 Ark. 18, 320 S.W.2d 645 (1959).

Discrimination.

Prima facie case of purposeful discrimination may be made by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, demonstrating total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires, or showing a pattern of strikes, or questions and statements, by a prosecuting attorney during voir dire. Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 733 S.W.2d 728 (1987), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998)(But see, Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990)) See also MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

The standard of review for reversal of a trial court's evaluation of the sufficiency of the state's racially neutral explanation of alleged discrimination must test whether the court's findings are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. In every instance, however, the court shall state, in response to the defendant's objections, its ruling as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the racially neutral explanation provided by the state. Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), overruled in part, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Upon a showing by a defendant of circumstances which raise an inference that the prosecutor exercised one or more of his peremptory challenges to exclude venire persons from the jury on account of race, the burden then shifts to the state to establish that the peremptory strike(s) were for racially neutral reasons. The trial court shall then determine from all relevant circumstances the sufficiency of the racially neutral explanation. Only if the state's explanation appears insufficient, must the trial court then conduct a sensitive inquiry into the basis for each of the challenges by the state. Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), overruled in part, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Exhaustion of Peremptory Challenges.

When defendant's peremptory challenges are exhausted, it is error to hold a biased juror competent. Snyder v. State, 151 Ark. 601, 237 S.W. 87 (1922).

When a defendant has used all his peremptory challenges before a prospective juror is called, he may only challenge that juror for cause and not peremptorily, and it is reversible error to thereafter hold a biased juror competent. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

A defendant may challenge any error of the trial court in refusing to strike a juror for cause if the record shows that, as a result of refusal to strike, defendant was forced to exercise peremptory challenge and a subsequent juror he objected to was forced upon him because he had exhausted his peremptory challenges. For that rule to be applicable, however, the defendant must not only show that the trial judge abused his discretion in not excusing the first juror for cause, but must also demonstrate from the record that he would have excused the subsequent juror had he been able to peremptorily challenge him. Miller v. State, 8 Ark. App. 165, 649 S.W.2d 407, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 806 (1983).

Failure to Challenge Juror.

Inmate's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge a juror for cause, and therefore the inmate's motion for relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37 was properly denied, because counsel testified that he did not believe he could prevail on such a challenge. While the juror seemed to favor the death penalty, she also replied affirmatively that she could consider the full range of punishment, that she would consider mitigating circumstances and weigh them against aggravating circumstances, and that she would have to listen to the evidence to make a decision. Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007).

Former Police Officer.

The trial court in a criminal prosecution did not commit prejudicial error by failing to excuse for cause a venireman, where the defendant peremptorily excused this venireman and the record reflected that no objectionable juror was forced upon the defendant without his having the privilege of exercising a peremptory challenge. Stephens v. State, 277 Ark. 113, 640 S.W.2d 94 (1982).

Illness.

It was not error to excuse a juror, after he had been accepted by both sides, where the juror stated that he was subject to spells and liable to be sick if confined with the jury. Caughron v. State, 99 Ark. 462, 139 S.W. 315 (1911).

Implied Bias.

The mere fact that a proposed juror ran a boat for the parties that searched for the body of the deceased does not disqualify him. Coats v. State, 101 Ark. 51, 141 S.W. 197 (1911).

Circumstances held not to warrant disqualification of juror. Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Jones v. State, 264 Ark. 935, 576 S.W.2d 198, 1979 Ark. LEXIS 1282 (1979); Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980); Moss v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1992).

Circumstances held to warrant disqualification of juror. Grigsby v. State, 260 Ark. 499, 542 S.W.2d 275 (1976); Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983); Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984).

The question of a juror's qualification lies within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge and defendant has the burden of showing the prospective juror's disqualification on grounds of implied bias. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

Where one juror said that her husband and son had been represented by the prosecuting attorney in a property matter, and another said the prosecutor had represented her adult daughter two years earlier, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the challenges for cause, for the jurors did not appear to be biased. Bliss v. State, 288 Ark. 546, 708 S.W.2d 74 (Ark. 1986).

Trial court has discretion to excuse a juror for implied bias, even if the bias does not clearly fall within one of the categories provided under subdivision (b)(2)(B), as it would be impossible for the statute to cover every conceivable circumstance touching on a juror's possible bias; therefore, where defendant was charged with evasion of use taxes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing for cause two prospective jurors who had been delinquent in paying personal property taxes even though subdivision (b)(2)(B) did not include that particular form of implied bias. Owens v. State, 354 Ark. 644, 128 S.W.3d 445 (2003).

Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to remove a juror and replace the juror with an alternate when midtrial, the juror informed the trial court that the juror belatedly realized that the juror attended church with the mother of one of the victims; the juror gave the trial court and counsel an opportunity to openly address the matter, defense counsel failed to ask any questions of the juror that would demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion, and no one questioned the juror about the meaning of the juror's statement that the juror did not want the case to “get thrown out or something” in the future, so the juror's response could not demonstrate prejudice. Childs v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 675 (2010).

—Capital Punishment.

It was not error, in a capital case, to permit the prosecuting attorney to challenge a juror peremptorily, after he had been accepted but before the jury was complete, where the juror informed the court that he had conscientious scruples against capital punishment. Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S.W. 773 (1904).

Where several veniremen on their voir dire stated that they would not return a verdict on circumstantial evidence and assess the death penalty, but would return a verdict on such evidence and assess life imprisonment, and the prosecuting attorney announced that he would waive the infliction of the death penalty, the selection of those veniremen as jurors was not prejudicial to the defendant. Rogers v. State, 136 Ark. 161, 206 S.W. 152 (1918).

It was proper for prosecutor to ask prospective juror if he had any scruples against death penalty, even though statute provided for either death penalty or life imprisonment. Needham v. State, 215 Ark. 935, 224 S.W.2d 785 (1949).

Trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense attorney in prosecution for rape to ask a prospective juror if he would feel obligated to impose death penalty rather than life imprisonment upon finding of guilty, as there is no statutory recognition of implied bias in favor of capital punishment; hence, court had the right to exercise its discretion. Needham v. State, 215 Ark. 935, 224 S.W.2d 785 (1949).

Where qualification of jury on the death penalty was done in accordance with this section, there was no error. Baxter v. State, 225 Ark. 239, 281 S.W.2d 931 (Ark. 1955).

Since this section, which recognizes implied bias when a juror entertains such conscientious opinions as would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death, necessarily shifts the implied bias from the mere finding of guilt to the imposition of the death penalty because the legislature gave the jury the option of imposing life imprisonment in all capital cases, it was not error not to examine the veniremen to determine whether they could even find the defendant guilty. Miller v. State, 273 Ark. 508, 621 S.W.2d 482, 1981 Ark. LEXIS 1399 (1981).

The removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors who state that they cannot under any circumstances vote for the imposition of the death penalty does not violate a defendant's right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution to have his guilt or innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a representative cross section of the community. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).

Since Arkansas recognizes the death penalty, jurors in a capital murder case must be able to consider imposing a death sentence if they are to perform their function as jurors; the trial court correctly decided that those excused jurors could not perform their duties because they could not consider imposing a death sentence. Williams v. State, 288 Ark. 444, 705 S.W.2d 888 (1986).

A state may not carry out a sentence of death imposed by a jury which was selected by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed religious or conscientious scruples against its infliction; the most that can be demanded of a prospective juror is that he or she be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he or she not be irrevocably committed before the trial has begun to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge. Orndorff v. Lockhart, 707 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd in part, vac'd in part, 906 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. Ark. 1990).

—Employer and Employee.

Employees of victimized corporation were biased by implication and should not have been allowed to sit on jury where defendant was charged with arson of property which belonged to the corporation and defendant had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Byrd v. State, 251 Ark. 149, 471 S.W.2d 350 (1971).

—Landlord and Tenant.

Where a juror testified that she was not the landlord of either of the defendants and that she did not rent from either of them, there was no merit to the contention that the juror was disqualified as being landlord of one of the appellees. Crouch v. Richards, 212 Ark. 980, 208 S.W.2d 460 (1948).

—Maximum Penalty.

Where, on voir dire, after stating the minimum and maximum penalties for the crimes charged, the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors whether they would consider the maximum penalty, the trial court properly allowed the inquiry, because the jurors were really only asked whether they would consider all the penalties provided by law. Stephens v. State, 277 Ark. 113, 640 S.W.2d 94 (1982).

Where a prospective juror was irrevocably committed to voting against the possible maximum penalties, regardless of the facts and circumstances that might have ensued in the course of the trial, the trial court did not err in excusing the venireman for cause. Stephens v. State, 277 Ark. 113, 640 S.W.2d 94 (1982).

—Prior Service.

It was prejudicial error for the trial court to require the defendant to peremptorily challenge a venireman who served on the grand jury which indicted the defendant where, before the jury was completed, the defendant exhausted all his peremptory challenges. Holman v. State, 115 Ark. 305, 171 S.W. 107 (1914).

Where some jurors in defendant's prosecution had previously sat on juries which convicted different defendants for the same offense based on the testimony of the same prosecuting witness who testified against defendant, this section did not apply, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify the jurors for cause on the grounds that the jurors had prejudged the credibility of the prosecuting witness. Holland v. State, 260 Ark. 617, 542 S.W.2d 761 (1976); Pickens v. State, 260 Ark. 633, 542 S.W.2d 764 (1976).

The plain language of subdivision (b)(2)(B)(iv) of this section permits persons accused of a crime the right to exclude all jurors who have served as jurors in the trial of a co-defendant; the right need not be extended to exclude potential jurors who had not actually served as a juror in a prior trial involving the same offense. McClendon v. State, 316 Ark. 688, 875 S.W.2d 55 (1994); Goins v. State, 319 Ark. 689, 890 S.W.2d 602 (1995).

—Relationship.

Juror was not disqualified by fact that his son had married a member of a family into which member of prosecuting witness' family had also married, since there was no relation of affinity between juror and prosecuting witness or any member of her family, and denial of new trial on ground of juror's failure to disclose the above relation was not abuse of discretion. Thornsberry v. State, 192 Ark. 435, 92 S.W.2d 203 (1936).

In prosecution for destroying school building by means of dynamite, juror, who was brother-in-law of fire chief whose city-owned car was dynamited on the same night as the school building, was not disqualified under this section because fire chief suffered no property damage and was not a witness during the trial. Lauderdale v. State, 233 Ark. 96, 343 S.W.2d 422 (1961).

A juror was properly excused by the court after being accepted by both prosecution and defense when it was learned that he was a cousin to a secretary of the prosecuting attorney, since the judge has the discretion to excuse a juror even where the issue of bias may be more implied than actual and even though the situation does not clearly fall within this section or § 16-31-102, since it would be impossible for the statutes to cover every conceivable circumstance touching on a juror's possible bias. Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 617 S.W.2d 6 (1981), cert. denied, Ruiz v. Arkansas, 454 U.S. 1093, 102 S. Ct. 659 (1981).

The trial court did not err when it denied the defendant's challenge of a juror for cause based on an alleged family relationship between the prosecutor's wife and the juror, where the evidence showed that the relationship between the juror and the deputy prosecuting attorney's wife was one merely of affinity, so distantly removed that the juror was not certain of its degree and could only guess that they were third cousins. Miller v. State, 8 Ark. App. 165, 649 S.W.2d 407, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 806 (1983).

The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial when, after the trial had commenced, a juror told the trial judge that he knew the prosecutrix where the juror stated that the prosecutrix had spoken to him during the lunch hour, that, after reflection, he had recalled meeting her three or four years earlier when he repaired a typewriter at the bank where she worked, that he had not seen her since that time, and that he could be a fair and impartial juror. Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2d 751 (1986).

Juror Improperly Excused.

Because the trial court (a) failed to make a finding, from all relevant circumstances, as to the sufficiency of the state's gender-neutral explanation, and then (b) failed to conduct a sensitive inquiry into the basis for each of the challenges by the state, the evidence did not establish that the state's challenges were for valid reasons without any gender bias; therefore, the defendant's constitutional rights had not been protected and the trial court's error required a reversal and retrial. Cleveland v. State, 318 Ark. 738, 888 S.W.2d 629 (1994).

Juror Properly Excused.

Trial court did not abuse discretion in excusing venireperson, acquaintance of defendant's daughter, for cause. Henry v. State, 309 Ark. 1, 828 S.W.2d 346 (1992).

Preserving Issue.

Defendant objected to seating a juror during voir dire and requested that the trial court dismiss her for cause, such that the point was preserved for review; case law does not support the argument that a party must make an additional objection at the conclusion of voir dire. Adams v. State, 2009 Ark. 375, 326 S.W.3d 764 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1021, 130 S. Ct. 1922, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010).

Refusal to Strike.

Petitioner was not denied his right to an impartial jury by the trial court's refusal to strike for cause a venireman whose mother had already been empaneled as a juror. The Arkansas trial and appellate courts found that the juror manifested no bias. Moss v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1992).

Once it was revealed that the juror knew the robbery victim's father through a golfing club and business matters, the trial court appropriately inquired as to the juror's ability to be fair and unbiased, and also allowed defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney to ask the juror questions; because the juror could set aside the his knowledge of the parties, decide the case on the facts, and abide by the law as given by the court, there was no for-cause basis to exclude the juror under this section. Miller v. State, 81 Ark. App. 337, 101 S.W.3d 860 (2003).

Juror did not evidence any specific bias against defendant, nor did she express any opinion concerning defendant's guilt and defendant failed to overcome the presumption of impartiality accorded the juror, nor had defendant shown actual prejudice resulting from the trial court's refusal to strike her from the jury for cause. Adams v. State, 2009 Ark. 375, 326 S.W.3d 764 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1021, 130 S. Ct. 1922, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010).

Trial court did not err in refusing to strike a juror for actual bias; although the juror initially equivocated about whether he could presume the innocence of defendant, when questioned by the trial judge, he agreed that he could in fact make a presumption of innocence in the case. Gwathney v. State, 2009 Ark. 544, 381 S.W.3d 744 (2009).

Trial court did not err in refusing to strike a juror for actual bias because the juror, when questioned by the trial judge, made clear that he could follow the law, put aside what he had seen about the case outside the courtroom, and judge the prosecution's case on its own merits. Gwathney v. State, 2009 Ark. 544, 381 S.W.3d 744 (2009).

Silence of Juror.

Defendant failed to raise an issue of actual or implied bias, where his sole contention was that he was effectively denied the right to challenge the juror, either for cause or peremptorily, because of the juror's silence in response to the question whether he knew the defendant. Sims v. State, 266 Ark. 922, 587 S.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 1979).

Standard.

The proper standard to be used in releasing a juror is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath. Williams v. State, 288 Ark. 444, 705 S.W.2d 888 (1986).

Statement of Impartiality.

While a venireman is generally impartial when he states that he can put aside any preconceived opinions and give the accused the benefit of all doubts that the law requires, it is not an automatic cure-all for opinions, relationships or information that could disqualify one; some opinions and relationships cannot be overcome by a mere recitation by the prospective jurors that they will set aside objectionable factors. Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983).

Cited: Cotton v. State, 256 Ark. 527, 508 S.W.2d 738 (1974); Kirk v. State, 270 Ark. 983, 606 S.W.2d 755 (1980); Hulsey v. Sargent, 821 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1987); Noel v. State, 28 Ark. App. 158, 771 S.W.2d 325 (1989); Threlkeld v. Worsham, 30 Ark. App. 251, 785 S.W.2d 249 (1990); National Bank of Commerce v. Beavers, 304 Ark. 81, 802 S.W.2d 132 (1990).

16-33-305. Challenge to trial jurors — Individual juror — Peremptory.

  1. The state shall be entitled to ten (10) peremptory challenges in prosecutions for capital murder, to six (6) peremptory challenges in prosecutions for all other felonies, and to three (3) peremptory challenges in prosecutions for misdemeanors.
  2. The defendant shall be entitled to twelve (12) peremptory challenges in prosecutions for capital murder, to eight (8) peremptory challenges in prosecutions for all other felonies, and to three (3) peremptory challenges in prosecutions for misdemeanors.

History. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, §§ 17, 18, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., §§ 3997, 3998; Acts 1981, No. 115, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1921, 43-1922.

Case Notes

In General.

There is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges. Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).

Although defendant was entitled to eight peremptory charges and the trial court erred by not requiring the state to prove purposeful discrimination after defendant gave race neutral reasons for the strikes, defendant's conviction was affirmed due to his failure to mount proper arguments on appeal. Childs v. State, 95 Ark. App. 343, 237 S.W.3d 116 (2006).

Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying defendant additional peremptory challenges was moot because defendant did not use all of the challenges he was allotted by statute. Tarver v. State, 2018 Ark. 202, 547 S.W.3d 689 (2018).

Burden of Proof.

In order to establish an equal protection violation, a defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury panel by showing that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the venire, and that the facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race; after a defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the government to articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. Devose v. Norris, 867 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 53 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. Ark. 1995).

The mere articulation of a nondiscriminatory reason is not always sufficient for establishing a lack of purposeful discrimination; the court should look at all relevant circumstances to determine if the articulated reason is pretextual. Devose v. Norris, 867 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 53 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. Ark. 1995).

Challenge Precluded.

In a driving while intoxicated case, appellant was unable to challenge the jurors on the basis of bias because appellant did not object at the end of the selection process, and there was no evidence that appellant was forced to accept a juror after having exhausted her three peremptory challenges. Carruth v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 305 (2012), modified, 2012 Ark. App. 305 (2012).

Challenges for Cause.

Where the defendant claimed that he was forced to exercise two of his peremptory challenges to exclude two jurors who should have been excluded for cause, but he made no such record at the close of the jury voir dire, the defendant did not present any possible basis for finding two other jurors that the defendant was forced to accept to have been objectionable. Watson v. State, 289 Ark. 138, 709 S.W.2d 817 (1986).

Discrimination.

Prima facie case of purposeful discrimination may be made by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, demonstrating total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires, or showing a pattern of strikes, or questions and statements, by a prosecuting attorney during voir dire. Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 733 S.W.2d 728 (1987), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998)(But see Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990)) See also MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Where all of state's peremptory challenges were used to exclude black people and state's explanation was unsatisfactory, state was found to have intentionally used its peremptory challenges to keep black people from the jury. Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 733 S.W.2d 728 (1987), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998). (But see Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990)) See also MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

The presence of minority members on the jury, while by no means determinative of the question of whether discrimination occurred, is of some significance. Thompson v. State, 301 Ark. 488, 785 S.W.2d 29 (1990).

Where black jurors were seated on the jury, the prosecutor still had peremptory challenges remaining, and number of black persons serving on the jury was greater than the number struck by the prosecutor, defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Thompson v. State, 301 Ark. 488, 785 S.W.2d 29 (1990).

Upon a showing by a defendant of circumstances which raise an inference that the prosecutor exercised one or more of his peremptory challenges to exclude venire persons from the jury on account of race, the burden then shifts to the state to establish that the peremptory strike(s) were for racially neutral reasons. The trial court shall then determine from all relevant circumstances the sufficiency of the racially neutral explanation. Only if the state's explanation appears insufficient, must the trial court then conduct a sensitive inquiry into the basis for each of the challenges by the state. Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), overruled in part, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

The standard of review for reversal of a trial court's evaluation of the sufficiency of the state's racially neutral explanation of alleged discrimination must test whether the court's findings are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. In every instance, however, the court shall state, in response to the defendant's objections, its ruling as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the racially neutral explanation provided by the state. Colbert v. State, 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), overruled in part, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Both in this case and in Miller v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Ark. 1994), the prosecutor consistently and systematically excluded African-Americans from participating as jurors through the use of peremptory challenges. Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995).

The Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified persons from the petit jury solely on account of their race. Devose v. Norris, 867 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 53 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. Ark. 1995).

Habeas corpus petitioner established, at his state trial, a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in the jury selection process and established that the state failed to articulate a believable neutral explanation for its strikes, thus violating petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Devose v. Norris, 867 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 53 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. Ark. 1995).

In defendant's trial for capital murder, the trial court erred in sustaining the State's Batson objection, where the State argued that defendant was using his peremptory challenges to strike jurors solely on the basis of race, because the State did not prove purposeful discriminatory intent, and because defendant offered race-neutral grounds for potential prejudice by those jurors; the trial court also erred in forcing defendant to accept at least one juror that should have been excused for cause. Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 124 S.W.3d 439 (2003).

—Standard of Review.

A constitutional violation involving the selection of jurors in a racially discriminatory manner is a “structural defect” in the trial mechanism which cannot be subjected to a harmless error analysis. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995).

Examination.

There was no error in a felony case whereby prospective jurors were questioned voir dire and subjected to challenges for cause and peremptory challenges two jurors at a time, as long as the state and the defendant were allowed to examine jurors individually and the state was required to exercise its peremptory challenges first. Chenowith v. State, 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1987).

The practice of allowing jurors to socialize with prosecutors and discuss the intricate interaction that occurs amongst jurors during deliberations, when the panel is still being used and the prosecutor can use such information in its selection of jurors in future cases, is troubling; the state certainly cannot rely upon such secret and undocumented, nebulous hearsay, referred to simply as “information,” as a justification for the exercising of peremptory strikes against a cognizable racial group when the record discloses no other significant nonracial distinctions between the jurors stricken and the jurors accepted. Devose v. Norris, 867 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 53 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. Ark. 1995).

Explanation Unnecessary.

Where jurors were not excused for cause by the court but were peremptorily stricken by the state, no explanation was necessary as to why a potential juror was being excused. Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284 (1982), cert. denied, Hill v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S. Ct. 180 (1982).

No stated reason is necessary in exercising peremptory challenges. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. Ark. 1985).

Joinder.

The appellant, although jointly indicted for homicide with other defendants, had the right, upon request, to a separate trial, in which event he would have been individually entitled to exercise the right to allotted number of peremptory challenges in selecting a jury; but not having asked to sever, and having consented to a joint trial, the defense only had the right to exercise the statutory number of challenges without regard to the number of persons on trial as defendants. Hearne v. State, 121 Ark. 460, 181 S.W. 291 (1915) (decision under prior law).

Number of Challenges.

Where the accused, before the arraignment, had exercised some of his challenges, he was entitled thereafter only to the number of additional challenges necessary to make up the quota of challenges allowed to him by statute. Herring v. State, 170 Ark. 352, 280 S.W. 353 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Defendant charged with capital offense was entitled to number of challenges allotted for capital offenses even though the state waived the death penalty. Tillman v. State, 251 Ark. 896, 475 S.W.2d 529 (1972) (decision prior to 1981 amendment).

Trial judge may not increase the number of peremptory challenges in a noncapitol felony case beyond the eight allowed under subsection (b). Logan v. State, 300 Ark. 35, 776 S.W.2d 341 (1989).

When more than one defendant is being tried for capital murder, the number of peremptory challenges allotted to a side remains at twelve. Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).

In an assault case, defendant preserved a jury selection error relating to the number of peremptory challenges under this section and the Sixth Amendment because the basis of defendant's motion was clear from the context and the arguments presented; however, no reversal or mistrial was requried because defendant failed to raise an objection until after the trial had started, and there was no prejudice because the objectionable jurors did not participate in the verdict. Smith v. State, 90 Ark. App. 261, 205 S.W.3d 173 (2005).

Cited: O'Neal v. State, 195 Ark. 357, 112 S.W.2d 615 (1938); Bowen v. State, 205 Ark. 380, 168 S.W.2d 836 (1943); Washington v. State, 213 Ark. 218, 210 S.W.2d 307; Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 178, 359 S.W.2d 432 (1962); Trotter v. State, 237 Ark. 820, 377 S.W.2d 14 (1964); Stewart v. Stephens, 244 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Brown v. State, 239 Ark. 909, 395 S.W.2d 344, 1965 Ark. LEXIS 1108 (1965); Pickens v. State, 6 Ark. App. 58, 638 S.W.2d 682 (1982); Miller v. State, 8 Ark. App. 165, 649 S.W.2d 407, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 806 (1983); Gardner v. State, 296 Ark. 41, 754 S.W.2d 518 (1988); Franklin v. State, 314 Ark. 329, 863 S.W.2d 268 (1993).

16-33-306. Challenge to trial jurors — Order.

The challenges of either party need not be all taken together, but may be taken separately, in the following order:

  1. To the panel;
  2. To the individual juror for general disqualification;
  3. To the individual juror for implied bias;
  4. To the individual juror for actual bias;
  5. Peremptory.

History. Crim. Code, § 217, C. & M. Dig., § 3165; Pope's Dig., § 4001; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1925.

16-33-307. Challenge to trial jurors — Several defendants.

When several defendants are tried together, the challenge of any one (1) of the defendants shall be the challenge of all.

History. Crim. Code, § 200, C. & M. Dig., § 3169; Pope's Dig., § 4005; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1929.

Case Notes

In General.

There is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges. Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).

Equal Protection.

The limitation of four defendants to a total of 12 peremptory challenges in the joint proceeding did not deny equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Orndorff v. Lockhart, 707 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd in part, vac'd in part, 906 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. Ark. 1990).

The fact that, had defendants been tried separately, each would have been entitled to twelve peremptory challenges, and the fact that they were limited to a total of twelve in the joint proceeding, did not deny them equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).

Number of Challenges.

Defendants jointly charged with manslaughter were entitled to a total of eight challenges, not eight challenges for each defendant. Lewis v. State, 220 Ark. 914, 251 S.W.2d 490 (1952), superseded by statute as stated in, Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993).

Where two defendants were being tried jointly for first-degree battery, they were entitled to only eight peremptory challenges as a pair, not eight challenges each. Williams v. State, 267 Ark. 527, 593 S.W.2d 8 (1980).

When more than one defendant is being tried for capital murder, the number of peremptory challenges allotted to a side remains at twelve. Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).

16-33-308. Challenge to trial jurors — Hearing.

  1. Challenges shall be tried and determined by the court in a summary manner, without the issues of law or of fact arising thereon being reduced to writing.
  2. The juror himself may be examined on oath by either party upon challenge.
  3. Other witnesses may also be examined and their attendance coerced.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 213-215; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3166-3168; Pope's Dig., §§ 4002-4004; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1926 — 43-1928.

Chapter 34 Fees and Expenses

Cross References. Deduction of jury fees from salary of public employee prohibited, § 21-5-104.

Effective Dates. Acts 1911, No. 89, § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1917, No. 352, § 2: approved Mar. 24, 1917. Emergency declared.

Acts 1953, No. 46, § 5: Feb. 9, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas it has been ascertained by the Arkansas general assembly that the rate per day being paid for jury service is wholly inadequate thereby forcing the jurors to serve at a financial loss, and there is urgent need for remedying this inequity which will be solved by the enactment of this bill. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-34-101, 16-34-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning exceptions and compensation and reimbursement of jurors generally, were repealed by Acts 2007, No. 1033, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-34-101. Acts 1911, No. 89, § 5; 1917, No. 352, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 4610; Pope's Dig., § 5699; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-306.

16-34-102. Acts 1911, No. 89, §§ 1, 4; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4605, 4606, 4609; Pope's Dig., §§ 5694, 5695, 5698; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 39-302, 39-305.

16-34-103. Per diem compensation for jurors and prospective jurors.

  1. Any person who receives official notice that he or she has been selected as a prospective juror or who is chosen as a juror is eligible to receive per diem compensation for service if:
    1. The person actually appears at the location to which the juror or prospective juror was summoned; and
    2. The person's appearance is duly noted by the circuit clerk.
    1. The per diem compensation payable to any person who is eligible for payment under subsection (a) of this section and who is selected and seated to serve as a member of a grand jury or petit jury is fifty dollars ($50.00) per day.
    2. Any person who is eligible for payment under subsection (a) of this section and who is excused or otherwise not selected and seated as a member of a grand jury or petit jury shall be provided per diem compensation of not less than fifteen dollars ($15.00) as established by ordinance of the county quorum court.

History. Acts 1953, No. 46, § 2; 1977, No. 320, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-301; Acts 1999, No. 629, § 1; 2007, No. 1033, § 2.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment substituted “a minimum of fifteen dollars ($15.00)” for “five dollars ($5.00)” in (2); substituted “a minimum fee of thirty-five dollars ($35.00)” for “a maximum fee of twenty dollars ($20.00), subject to the approval of the quorum court” in (3); and made stylistic changes.

16-34-104. Mileage reimbursement for jurors.

In the event and to the extent that a county quorum court adopts by ordinance a policy for reimbursement of mileage costs for jurors, any person who is eligible to receive per diem compensation under § 16-34-103 and whose primary place of residence is outside the city limits of the city where the court that summoned the juror or prospective juror is located may receive, in addition to the per diem compensation, a mileage reimbursement payment for mileage from and to his or her home by the most direct and practicable route at the rate prescribed by the county.

History. Acts 1911, No. 89, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 4607; Pope's Dig., § 5696; Acts 1983, No. 169, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-303; Acts 2007, No. 1033, § 3.

16-34-105. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning an account for mileage for jurors, was repealed by Acts 2007, No. 1033, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1911, No. 89, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 4608; Pope's Dig., § 5697; A.S.A. 1947, § 39-304.

16-34-106. Payment by county — Reimbursement by state.

  1. The per diem compensation under § 16-34-103 shall be paid promptly to each juror or prospective juror by a county from funds appropriated for that purpose by the quorum court.
      1. The state shall reimburse a county for a portion of the costs incurred for a payment under § 16-34-103(b)(1) if the county makes a request under subdivision (b)(3) of this section.
        1. If funds are available, the state shall reimburse a county for the cost of a prospective juror orientation for a juror eligible for payment under § 16-34-103(b)(2) up to fifteen dollars ($15.00) if the county makes a request under subdivision (b)(3) of this section.
        2. The reimbursement under this subdivision (b)(1)(B) shall not exceed the minimum per diem compensation under § 16-34-103(b)(2).
    1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall administer the state reimbursement to a county under subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
    2. A county may request reimbursement for costs incurred for a payment under § 16-34-103(b)(1) or § 16-34-103(b)(2) on a quarterly basis as follows:
      1. On or before May 1 of each year for costs incurred between January 1 and March 31 of that year;
      2. On or before August 1 of each year for costs incurred between April 1 and June 30 of that year;
      3. On or before December 1 of each year for costs incurred between July 1 and September 30 of that year; and
      4. On or before February 1 of each year for costs incurred between October 1 and December 31 of the prior year.
    3. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall consult with Arkansas Legislative Audit and shall prescribe the information that shall be documented and certified by a county in order to receive reimbursement under subdivision (b)(1) of this section.

History. Acts 2007, No. 1033, § 5; 2017, No. 276, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment redesignated former (b)(1) as (b)(1)(A); added (b)(1)(B); and inserted “or § 16-34-103(b)(2)” in (b)(3).

Chapters 35-39 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 4. Evidence And Witnesses

Chapter 40 General Provisions

Cross References. Admissibility of evidence and competency of witnesses in impeachment trials, § 21-12-206.

Evidence in military courts and tribunals, § 12-64-508.

Variance between pleading and proof, § 16-63-214.

Research References

Am. Jur. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evid., § 1 et seq.

81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses, § 75 et seq.

C.J.S. 31 C.J.S., Evid., § 1 et seq.

97 C.J.S., Witnesses, § 315 et seq.

16-40-101. Burden of proof.

  1. The party holding the affirmative of an issue must produce the evidence to prove it.
  2. The burden of proof in the whole action lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.

History. Civil Code, §§ 578, 579; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4112, 4113; Pope's Dig., §§ 5121, 5122; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-101, 28-102.

Cross References. Burden of proof, § 16-55-215.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Evidence — Civil Procedure — Burden of Proof on Issue of Statute of Limitations, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 484.

Judicial Regulation of Procedure, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 146.

Case Notes

Conveyance.

In a suit to set aside an absolute conveyance, plaintiff claiming that it was the conveyance of his equity of redemption under a mortgage previously executed, a prima facie case is made by showing that it was an extinguishment of such equity, then the burden shifts to defendant to show that such a conveyance was free from fraud, oppression or undue influence. Green v. Gilbert, 169 Ark. 537, 276 S.W. 8 (1925).

Deceit.

In a suit for deceit brought to recover money alleged to have been secured by fraud the burden of proof is on the plaintiff as he is “the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.” Looney v. Potts, 163 Ark. 310, 260 S.W. 23 (1924).

Election Contest.

Even though the proof connected the contestees with the spoilation of the poll books, this would not have relieved the contestants of the burden of proving the allegations of their petition that the election returns were fraudulent and void. Webb v. Bowden, 124 Ark. 244, 187 S.W. 461 (1916).

Foreclosure.

Where the plaintiffs bring an action in chancery to restrain the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by their deceased parents, which mortgage is barred on its face by the statute of limitations, the burden is upon the plaintiffs to allege and prove facts sufficient to justify the court in granting the relief prayed. Culberhouse v. Hawthorne, 107 Ark. 462, 156 S.W. 421 (1913).

Where a trial court heard the testimony of two conflicting expert opinions and decided that both experts were credible, it did not err when it placed the burden of proof upon contractors to show that their improvements increased the value of a property that had gone into foreclosure. Del Mack Constr., Inc. v. Owens, 82 Ark. App. 415, 118 S.W.3d 581 (2003).

Insanity.

In a suit to cancel a deed and a mortgage on the ground of insanity, where the prima facie case made by showing that the plaintiff had been adjudged insane was overcome by the agreed statement of facts, the burden was on plaintiff to show insanity. Field v. Koonce, 178 Ark. 862, 12 S.W.2d 772, 68 A.L.R. 1303 (1929).

Insurance.

Where a life insurance policy made payable to a bank as its interest may appear is, on the death of the insured, paid to the bank, an action brought by the deceased's administrator to recover on the policy alleging that deceased owed nothing at the time of his death and that payment to the bank was made in bad faith placed the burden on the administrator to prove these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Shelby v. Union Life Ins. Co., 177 Ark. 737, 7 S.W.2d 778 (1928).

Notes.

Where defendants, to whom widow had advanced money to pay note of her deceased husband under an agreement that they would probate and assign the claim to her, failed to do so, though admitting the agreement, the burden was on defendants. Pearson v. Humphreys, 170 Ark. 827, 281 S.W. 388 (1926).

In an action on a note given for corporate stock, where the defense is that the stock was sold in violation of the Blue Sky Law, the defendant has the burden of proof, entitling him to open and close the the argument. Kempner v. Stephens, 186 Ark. 877, 56 S.W.2d 580 (1933).

In action on foreign judgment on a note defended on ground note was a forgery, refusal to permit defendant's counsel to open and close the argument to the jury was proper, since plaintiff had burden to prove genuineness of note, execution of which had been denied under oath; defendant had burden to prove affirmative plea that note was a forgery, but the burden on the whole was on plaintiff. Motsinger v. Walker, 205 Ark. 236, 168 S.W.2d 385 (1943).

Personal Injury.

In an action for damages for personal injuries, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show the fact of the injury by the operation of the causative factor and the damages resulting therefrom. Huckaby v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry., 119 Ark. 179, 177 S.W. 923 (1915).

Statute of Limitations.

Whenever the bar of the statute of limitations does not appear from the pleadings and evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, the burden of proof is upon the defendant, who pleads the statute as a defense, to establish its application to bring him within its terms. Alston v. Bitely, 252 Ark. 79, 477 S.W.2d 446 (1972).

Warranty.

It is necessary for the buyer of a chattel to allege and prove, as a condition precedent to his right to recover on a warranty in the contract of sale, that he has complied with his part of the contract which was contained in the same writing with the warranty. Williams v. Newkirk, 121 Ark. 439, 181 S.W. 304 (1915).

Will.

That will contestants had good theory to prove invalidity of the will was not sufficient since they had burden to establish facts that would support that theory. Chauvin v. Johnson, 193 Ark. 600, 101 S.W.2d 432 (1937).

Cited: Johnson v. Mitchell, 164 Ark. 1, 260 S.W. 710 (1924); Turner v. Rust, 228 Ark. 528, 309 S.W.2d 731 (1958); Vern Barnett Constr. Co. v. J.A. Hadley Constr. Co., 254 Ark. 866, 496 S.W.2d 446 (1973).

16-40-102. Order of proof.

The order of proof shall be regulated by the court so as to expedite the trial and enable the tribunal to obtain a clear view of the whole evidence. However, the party who begins the case must ordinarily exhaust his evidence before the other begins.

History. Civil Code, § 649; C. & M. Dig., § 4182; Pope's Dig., § 5192; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-103.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Direct Examination of Witnesses, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 32.

Witnesses, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 229.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

As trial court has considerable discretion in regulating the mode and order of interrogation and presentation of proof, the court may allow a police officer, at the defendant's request, to return to the stand and testify, after his release from the witness rule and in the interruption of the plaintiff's order of proof, in order to allow the officer to testify as to his qualifications in particular area of expertise. Freeman v. Anderson, 279 Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983).

16-40-103. Modes of taking testimony of witnesses.

  1. The testimony of witnesses is taken in three (3) modes:
    1. By affidavit;
    2. By deposition;
    3. By oral examination.
  2. An affidavit is a written declaration under oath, made without notice to the adverse party.
  3. A deposition is a written declaration under oath, made upon notice to the adverse party, for the purpose of enabling that party to attend and cross-examine; or upon written interrogatories.
  4. An oral examination is an examination in the presence of the tribunal which is to decide the fact or to act upon it, the testimony being heard by the tribunal from the lips of the witness.

History. Civil Code, §§ 596-599; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4195-4198; Pope's Dig., §§ 5206-5209; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-104 — 28-107.

Case Notes

Affidavits.

Although letters were not under oath, they could be attached as exhibits to verified petition for relief, but the letters did not become affidavits. Jones v. Jones, 51 Ark. App. 24, 907 S.W.2d 745 (1995), rev'd, 326 Ark. 481, 931 S.W.2d 767 (1996).

Expert Witness.

Ex parte communication between an expert and the judge is improper, particularly if communications from the witness are not under oath. Jones v. Jones, 326 Ark. 481, 931 S.W.2d 767 (1996).

Cited: Cox v. State, 164 Ark. 126, 261 S.W. 303 (1924); Thomas v. Hawkins, 217 Ark. 787, 233 S.W.2d 247 (1950); King v. Westlake, 264 Ark. 555, 572 S.W.2d 841 (1978).

16-40-104. Judicial knowledge of laws of other states.

The courts of this state shall take judicial knowledge of the laws of other states.

History. Acts 1901, No. 98, § 1, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., § 4110; Pope's Dig., § 5119; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-109.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, A Guide to Choice of Law in Arkansas, 2005 Arkansas L. Notes 151.

Ark. L. Rev.

Evidence — Proof of Statutory Law of Another State, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 66.

Documentary Evidence — Arkansas, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 79.

Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 118.

Legislative and Judicial Dynamism in Arkansas: Poisson v. d'Avril, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 724.

Judicial Notice, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 171.

Case Notes

Failure to Take Judicial Notice.

The jury was not qualified to categorize defendant's past violent behavior in North Carolina as a “prior violent felony” because the trial court took no judicial notice of North Carolina law and ignored defense counsel's request that the jury be instructed on North Carolina law. Greene v. State, 335 Ark. 1, 977 S.W.2d 192 (1998).

Particular Cases.

Judicial notice taken of laws of other states in particular cases. Rice v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Ark. 498, 238 S.W. 772, 24 A.L.R. 143 (1922); Rumph v. Lester Land Co., 205 Ark. 1147, 172 S.W.2d 916 (1943); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 178 Ark. 84, 10 S.W.2d 356 (1928); Jones v. State, 198 Ark. 354, 129 S.W.2d 249 (1939).

Proof.

It is only necessary to plead foreign law, not to prove it. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977).

Cited: J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Johnson, 129 Ark. 384, 196 S.W. 465 (1917); Bridgeman v. Gateway Ford Truck Sales, 296 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Ark. 1969).

16-40-105. Death presumed after five years' absence.

Any person absenting himself beyond the limits of this state for five (5) years successively shall be presumed to be dead in any case in which his death may come into question, unless proof is made that he was alive within that time.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 4111; Pope's Dig., § 5120; A.S.A. 1947, § 62-1601.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Use of Presumptions in Arkansas, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 128.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies only to residents of the state at time of their disappearance, and not to a resident who ceased to be such before his final disappearance. Wilks v. Mutual Aid Union, 135 Ark. 112, 204 S.W. 599 (1918); Burnett v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 183 Ark. 729, 38 S.W.2d 24 (1931).

To bring a case within this section, the evidence must show that the insured was a resident of Arkansas. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 197 Ark. 883, 125 S.W.2d 441 (1939).

Absence Less Than Five Years.

There may be a proof of death by circumstantial evidence even though there was no absence for the length of time required to create a presumption of death under this section. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wilcoxon, 187 Ark. 992, 63 S.W.2d 522 (1933).

Death of absentee might be proved by circumstantial evidence, but party alleging death before expiration of statutory period must prove facts and circumstances connected with absence of person warranting reasonable conclusion of death within shorter period. Claywell v. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1934).

Where nonresident was last heard from less than five years prior to institution of suit, no presumption of death existed upon the date the suit was commenced. Allison v. Bush, 201 Ark. 315, 144 S.W.2d 1087 (1940).

Burden of Proof.

Both the residence and the absence beyond the limits of the state must be proved and may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but neither death nor the fact of absence can be inferred from the mere fact of disappearance. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 197 Ark. 883, 125 S.W.2d 441 (1939).

It is settled that neither the fact of death nor that of absence from the state can be inferred from the bare fact of a disappearance; petitioner has the burden of producing evidence from which the court might fairly conclude that absentee spouse had lived continuously outside the state for at least five years before the petitioner's second marriage. Baxter v. Baxter, 232 Ark. 151, 334 S.W.2d 714 (1960).

Presumption.

Evidence was sufficient to create a presumption of death under this section. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Fry, 184 Ark. 23, 41 S.W.2d 766 (1931).

Presumption does not arise until time limit required by this section had expired. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 195 Ark. 237, 112 S.W.2d 436 (1937).

Suit for Absentee.

Wife could not sue for husband under this section where it was not proved that husband at time of disappearance was a resident of the state. Edge v. Buschow Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 903, 239 S.W.2d 597 (1951).

Cited: Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Burney, 590 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Ark. 1984).

16-40-106. Privileged communications made to a certified peer support member by an emergency responder — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Approved training” means training including, at a minimum, the following subjects:
      1. The core elements of critical incident stress management, including how to help a person understand the need for further assistance;
      2. Psychological crisis and psychological crisis intervention;
      3. The individual aspects of a peer support event and how to work with the aspects of a peer support event through resistance, resiliency, and recovery;
      4. Situational crisis intervention with individual persons and groups;
      5. Practical communication skills and techniques to assist a person in a crisis situation;
      6. How a person reacts in a crisis and how to understand and work with the person in an intervention mode;
      7. Mechanisms to assist in dealing with a person in a crisis situation;
      8. Practical tools to use to work with individual persons and groups in a crisis situation; and
      9. Recognizing issues that may lead a person to have suicidal thoughts;
    2. “Certified peer support member” means a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or emergency medical technician of an emergency service agency or entity who has received approved training certified by the Arkansas Crisis Response Team, the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training, or the Arkansas Fire Protection Services Board in critical incident stress management and who is qualified to provide emotional or moral support to an emergency responder who needs emotional or moral support as a result of job-related stress or an incident in which the emergency responder was involved while acting in his or her official capacity; and
    3. “Peer support event” means any debriefing, defusing, or counseling session conducted by a certified peer support member that involves the emotional or moral support of an emergency responder who needs emotional or moral support as a result of job-related stress or an incident in which the emergency responder was involved while acting in his or her official capacity.
    1. A certified peer support member shall not be compelled, without the consent of the emergency responder making the communication, to testify or in any way disclose the contents of any communication made to the certified peer support member by the emergency responder while engaged in a peer support event.
    2. The privilege under subdivision (b)(1) of this section only applies when the communication was made to the certified peer support member during the course of an actual peer support event.
  2. The privilege under subdivision (b)(1) of this section does not apply if:
    1. The certified peer support member was an initial emergency service responder, a witness, or a party to the incident that prompted the providing of the peer support event to the emergency responder;
    2. A communication reveals the intended commission of a crime or harmful act and the disclosure is determined to be necessary by the certified peer support member to protect any person from a clear, imminent risk of serious mental or physical harm or injury or to forestall a serious threat to the public safety; or
    3. A crime has been committed and the crime is divulged to the certified peer support member.
  3. A certified peer support member who knowingly reveals the contents of a communication privileged under this section or any person who knowingly threatens, intimidates, or forcibly compels, or attempts to threaten, intimidate, or forcibly compel a certified peer support member to disclose the contents of a privileged communication upon conviction is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1353, § 1; 2019, No. 555, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment redesignated former (a)(1) and (a)(2) as (a)(2) and (a)(3); added (a)(1); and, in (a)(2), substituted “received approved training certified by the Arkansas Crisis Response Team, the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training, or the Arkansas Fire Protection Services Board in critical incident stress management” for “received training in critical incident stress management” and substituted “who is qualified to provide emotional or moral support” for “who is certified as a peer support member by the Arkansas Crisis Response Team to provide emotional or moral support”.

16-40-107. Evidence of sermons by a religious leader — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Religious leader or member of the clergy” includes without limitation a:
      1. Minister;
      2. Pastor;
      3. Preacher;
      4. Priest;
      5. Nun;
      6. Rabbi;
      7. Imam; or
      8. Layperson who is engaged in the ministering in, instruction of, or teaching of a religion; and
    2. “Religious organization” means an organization that qualifies as a religious organization under state or federal tax law.
  2. In a civil action or other civil administrative proceeding to which the state or a local government is a party, the state or the local government may not compel the:
    1. Production or disclosure of a written copy or an audio or video recording of a sermon, religious instruction, or religious teaching delivered by a religious leader or member of the clergy during religious services of a religious organization; or
    2. Religious leader or member of the clergy to testify regarding the sermon, religious instruction, or religious teaching described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
  3. This section does not apply to a civil action or other civil administrative proceeding to which the state or a local government is a party and that concerns a legitimate investigation into terrorism-related activities.

History. Acts 2019, No. 816, § 1.

Chapter 41 Uniform Rules of Evidence [Repealed.]

16-41-101. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This chapter, concerning the Uniform Rules of Evidence, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 2[7]. The chapter was derived from Acts 1975 (Extended Sess. 1976), No. 1143, § 1; 1985, No. 405, § 1; 1985, No. 462, § 1; reen. Acts 1987, No. 876, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-1001; Acts 1991, No. 361, § 1; 1992 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 66, § 1; 1997, No. 794, § 1; 2001, No. 629, § 1.

Chapter 42 Sexual Offenses

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 197, § 5: Feb. 18, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the introduction of opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, where such evidence does not directly pertain to the prosecution upon which the act is based, and the absence of a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of this evidence, has kept many victims of sex crimes from testifying against their attackers, has obscured the facts in sexual assault cases to the extent that juries have often reached improper verdicts, and has greatly hampered the administration of criminal justice in Arkansas. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 444, § 3: Mar. 20, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that young children who have been victims of sexual crimes suffer tremendous physical and mental trauma. Such trauma is compounded when the child must recount the crime in open court in unfamiliar surroundings. The General Assembly hereby finds that currently there is no provision in Arkansas law that authorizes the victim's parents or legal guardian be present in court during the examination and cross-examination of the child during the trial. Therefore, current law inadequately protects the mental well-being of the minors in this State and this Act is necessary to correct this problem. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2005, No. 536, § 2: Mar. 3, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is no rule or statute that allows the introduction of evidence of a defendant's commission of another sexual assault in a criminal case; and that such a rule or statute is necessary to assist in the prosecution of sexual assaults. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-42-101. Admissibility of evidence of victim's prior sexual conduct — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “sexual conduct” means deviate sexual activity, sexual contact, or sexual intercourse, as those terms are defined by § 5-14-101.
  2. In a criminal prosecution under § 5-14-101 et seq., the Human Trafficking Act of 2013, § 5-18-101 et seq., or § 5-26-202, or for criminal attempt to commit, criminal solicitation to commit, or criminal conspiracy to commit an offense defined in any of those sections, opinion evidence, reputation evidence, or evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, evidence of a person's prior sexual conduct when the person was a victim of human trafficking, which allegations the victim asserts to be true, or evidence offered by the defendant concerning prior allegations of sexual conduct by the victim with the defendant or any other person if the victim denies making the allegations is not admissible by the defendant, either through direct examination of any defense witness or through cross-examination of the victim or other prosecution witness, to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove consent or any other defense, or for any other purpose.
  3. Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in subsection (b) of this section, evidence directly pertaining to the act upon which the prosecution is based or evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person may be admitted at the trial if the relevancy of the evidence is determined in the following manner:
    1. A written motion shall be filed by the defendant with the court at any time prior to the time the defense rests stating that the defendant has an offer of relevant evidence prohibited by subsection (b) of this section and the purpose for which the evidence is believed relevant;
      1. A hearing on the motion shall be held in camera no later than three (3) days before the trial is scheduled to begin, or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit.
      2. A written record shall be made of the in camera hearing and shall be furnished to the Supreme Court on appeal.
      3. If, following the hearing, the court determines that the offered proof is relevant to a fact in issue, and that its probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature, the court shall make a written order stating what evidence, if any, may be introduced by the defendant and the nature of the questions to be permitted in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence; and
      1. If the court determines that some or all of the offered proof is relevant to a fact in issue, the victim shall be told of the court's order and given the opportunity to consult in private with the prosecuting attorney.
      2. If the prosecuting attorney is satisfied that the order substantially prejudices the prosecution of the case, an interlocutory appeal on behalf of the state may be taken in accordance with Rule 36.10 (a) and (c), Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
      3. Further proceedings in the trial court shall be stayed pending determination of the appeal. However, a decision by the Supreme Court sustaining in its entirety the order appealed shall not bar further proceedings against the defendant on the charge.
  4. In the event the defendant has not filed a written motion or a written motion has been filed and the court has determined that the offered proof is not relevant to a fact in issue, any willful attempt by counsel or a defendant to make any reference to the evidence prohibited by subsection (b) of this section in the presence of the jury may subject counsel or a defendant to appropriate sanctions by the court.

History. Acts 1977, No. 197, §§ 1-4; 1983, No. 889, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 41-1810.1 — 41-1810.4; Acts 1993, No. 934, §§ 1-3; 1997, No. 970, § 1; 2019, No. 842, § 1.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment inserted “evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct … if the victim denies making the allegations” in (b); substituted “prohibited by subsection (b) of this section” for “of the victim's prior sexual conduct” in (c)(1); and substituted “evidence prohibited by subsection (b) of this section” for “victim's prior sexual conduct” in (d).

The 1997 amendment substituted “§ 5-14-101 et seq. or § 5-26-202” for “§§ 5-14-1035-14-110” in (b).

The 2019 amendment, in (b), inserted “the Human Trafficking Act of 2013, § 5-18-101 et seq.” and inserted “evidence of a person’s prior sexual conduct when the person was a victim of human trafficking”; and made a stylistic change.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Cochran, Legislative Note: Act 197 of 1977: Arkansas' Rape-Shield Statute, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 806.

Recent Developments: Criminal Law — Evidence: What Constitutes Relevant Evidence in Rape Trial When Defense is Consent, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 826.

Recent Developments (State v. Babbs), 51 Ark. L. Rev. 647.

Note, The Arkansas Rape-Shield Statute: Does It Create Another Victim?, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 949.

Note, Fells v. State: Good Decision on Procedural Grounds, Dangerous Precedent for Future Application of Arkansas's Rape Shield Statute, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 943.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Evidence, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Legislative Survey, Evidence, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 127.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The exception to the general exclusionary policy and the in camera hearing, under this section, provide the accused with a full and fair opportunity to confront his accuser. Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 590 S.W.2d 288 (1979).

This section does not deny the equal protection of the law, in that it restricts the defendant's freedom to introduce evidence with no similar restriction upon the prosecution, inasmuch as the prosecution is actually restricted by the principle that it cannot bolster its case by proving that the same defendant committed another rape, and since the classification made by this section is not arbitrary, being based upon permissible considerations of public policy. Dorn v. State, 267 Ark. 365, 590 S.W.2d 297 (1979); Burrow v. State, 301 Ark. 222, 783 S.W.2d 52 (1990).

The statute is constitutional and does not violate due process or equal protection rights. Sera v. State, 341 Ark. 415, 17 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 998, 121 S. Ct. 495, 148 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2000).

Rape shield statute, subsection (b) of this section, did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense during defendant's trial for rape of a minor because defendant was able to cross-examine a physician, who testified that the injury to the victim's vaginal area was not a fresh injury, but occurred sometime in the past. Defendant was also able to cross-examine the victim about her allegations. Joyner v. State, 2009 Ark. 168, 303 S.W.3d 54, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1047, 130 S. Ct. 736, 175 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2009).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of four counts of sexual assault of a minor, the trial court properly upheld the constitutionality of the rape shield statute. The statute survived defendant's separation of powers challenge. Nelson v. State, 2011 Ark. 429, 384 S.W.3d 534 (2011).

—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Decision by defendant's attorney not to request a hearing under this section to explore the relevance of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct, may not, standing alone, be sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel; however, when considered together with counsel's failure to call a witness who would have testified that the eleven-year-old victim had told her that she had fabricated the allegations, the court properly concluded that attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of competence. Wicoff v. State, 321 Ark. 97, 900 S.W.2d 187 (1995).

In General.

This section prohibits evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct unless, on written motion and hearing, relevancy of the proffered evidence is established and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Terrell v. State, 26 Ark. App. 8, 759 S.W.2d 46 (1988).

This section broadly excludes evidence of specific instance of the victim's sexual conduct prior to the trial. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994).

Where defendant proffered the testimony of witnesses who confirmed prior false accusations of rape made by the victim, the victim's denial that she had formerly made false accusations of rape against another person meant that the rape-shield statute applied to the facts in defendant's case and, further, defendant had failed to file pretrial motion for a determination of relevancy pursuant to subsection (c). Taylor v. State, 355 Ark. 267, 138 S.W.3d 684 (2003).

Construction.

This section relates only to proof of the victim's prior “sexual conduct,” as defined in this section, and posing in the nude for a photograph does not fall within that definition of sexual conduct. Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5 (1979).

The “prior” acts mentioned in this section do not refer to sexual acts occurring before the incident in question, but merely any sexual conduct by the victim. Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986).

This section excludes evidence of any kind about the victim's prior “sexual conduct” and defines “sexual conduct” as deviate sexual activity, sexual contact, or sexual intercourse. West v. State, 290 Ark. 340A, 290 Ark. 329, 722 S.W.2d 284 (1987).

“Prior” sexual conduct includes all sexual behavior of the victim prior to the date of the trial. Slater v. State, 310 Ark. 73, 832 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1992).

Purpose.

Information regarding the sexual history of a victim is usually totally irrelevant to the charge of rape and this section was obviously designed to limit this type of examination and protect the victim from unnecessary humiliation. Duncan v. State, 263 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 1 (1978).

The primary purposes of this section were to protect the victim and encourage rape victims to participate in the prosecution of their attackers. Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 599 S.W.2d 141 (1980).

This section is intended to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges, paraded before the jury and the public, when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986); Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

The purpose of this section is to limit evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct and to protect the victim from unnecessary humiliation. Terrell v. State, 26 Ark. App. 8, 759 S.W.2d 46 (1988).

The purposes of this section is to protect the victim and encourage rape victims to participate in the prosecution of their attackers, and such purposes would be thwarted if defendants were allowed to present uncorroborated evidence that there had been prior consensual acts over the victim's denial that she had ever known her assailant before the incident. Graydon v. State, 329 Ark. 596, 953 S.W.2d 45 (1997).

The purpose of subsection (b) of this section is to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. Bond v. State, 374 Ark. 332, 288 S.W.3d 206 (2008).

Purpose of the rape shield statute, subsection (b) of this section, is to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. Joyner v. State, 2009 Ark. 168, 303 S.W.3d 54, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1047, 130 S. Ct. 736, 175 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2009).

Applicability.

This section did not apply where prosecutor elicited from victim testimony that she had been a virgin prior to the rape since this section relates to specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct while prosecutor's question did not relate the victim's prior sexual conduct but to the lack thereof. Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 599 S.W.2d 141 (1980).

This section is not a total bar to evidence of a victim's sexual conduct but instead makes its admissibility discretionary with the trial judge pursuant to the procedures set out at subdivisions (c)(1-3). Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

In order to set in motion a relevancy decision by the trial court regarding prior sexual conduct, subdivision (c)(1) of this section requires that the defendant file a written motion with the court before resting to the effect that the defendant desires to present evidence of the victim's past sexual activity. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994).

This section does not apply to a charge of violation of a minor. Donihoo v. State, 325 Ark. 483, 931 S.W.2d 69 (1996).

Subsection (b) of this section has no application to a prior inconsistent statement made by the victim as to the offense charged. Lindsey v. State, 54 Ark. App. 266, 925 S.W.2d 441 (1996).

Court rejected defendant's claim that the rape-shield statute did not apply; the evidence defendant sought to introduce clearly fell within the parameters of the rape-shield law because it was evidence of prior sexual conduct offered for the purpose of attacking the victim's credibility, and the trial court properly found that the probative value of the victim's inconsistent statements was slight and the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value, and defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's ruling in any event because defendant was able to achieve the purpose of impeaching the victim's veracity without touching upon her prior sexual conduct. Turner v. State, 355 Ark. 541, 141 S.W.3d 352 (2004).

In defendant's sexual abuse case, a court properly applied the rape shield law to exclude evidence relating to previous sexual molestation charges brought by the child victim against others where the victim testified that, although she did not remember much of the circumstances surrounding the allegations against another person because she was only four years old at the time, she remembered what he did to her, and she stated that the allegations against him were true; that testimony fell squarely within the ambit of subsection (b) of this section. Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004).

In defendant's sexual abuse case, the court properly applied the rape shield law where the fact that the victim, who was 12 years old at the time and did not disclose to her boyfriend that her father raped her when recounting the details of her involvement with her 18-year old stepfather, did not factor into her credibility; the proffered testimony would have prejudiced the jury to question the victim's reputation, which was exactly what the rape-shield statute prohibited. Parish v. State, 357 Ark. 260, 163 S.W.3d 843 (2004).

Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status of a rape victim is protected under Arkansas's rape-shield statute. Fells v. State, 362 Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005).

Admissibility.

Evidence properly held inadmissible. Duncan v. State, 263 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 1 (1978); Houston v. State, 266 Ark. 257, 582 S.W.2d 958 (1979); Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5 (1979); Hubbard v. State, 271 Ark. 937, 611 S.W.2d 526 (1981); Boreck v. State, 272 Ark. 240, 613 S.W.2d 96 (1981); Manees v. State, 274 Ark. 69, 622 S.W.2d 166 (1981); Fields v. State, 281 Ark. 43, 661 S.W.2d 359 (1983); Lackey v. State, 283 Ark. 150, 671 S.W.2d 757 (1984); Jackson v. State, 284 Ark. 478, 683 S.W.2d 606 (1985).

This section only excludes evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim, and the defendant may testify at trial as to the actions of the prosecuting witness on the night of the alleged rape. Kemp v. State, 270 Ark. 835, 606 S.W.2d 573 (1980).

Evidence of prior consensual sexual conduct is inadmissible unless such prior sexual activities were with the accused, and, even in that event, the testimony is allowed only to show that consent may have been given since this section clearly holds such evidence is inadmissible unless it meets certain tests outlined therein. Eskew v. State, 273 Ark. 490, 621 S.W.2d 220 (1981); Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

Acts of prior consensual intercourse with the accused are admissible only to show that consent may have been given, and where consent is not at issue, because the defendant denies that the act ever occurred, the prior sexual conduct of the prosecutrix is not relevant. State v. Small, 276 Ark. 26, 631 S.W.2d 616 (1982).

The trial court did not err when it refused to allow the defendant to testify that he was told by his codefendant that the codefendant had had prior sexual relations with the alleged rape victim, since the testimony was not coming directly from the codefendant and was, therefore, inadmissible hearsay evidence. Watson v. State, 277 Ark. 197, 640 S.W.2d 447 (1982).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing questioning of the victim about her prior sexual conduct, even where the physician stated that he found nonmotile sperm in her vagina and that sperm could remain motile for up to five days. Lackey v. State, 288 Ark. 225, 703 S.W.2d 858 (1986).

This section, on its face, does not deal with matters that may have occurred subsequent to the alleged offense, and therfore it was error to grant the state's motion in limine to preclude the defendant from offering or cross examining on the basis of the taped telephone conversation between the victim and her stepmother that occurred several months after the alleged rape, which included some references to sexual conduct of the victim some time after the alleged rape. Flurry v. State, 18 Ark. App. 64, 711 S.W.2d 163 (1986), rev'd, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986)Questioned bySlater v. State, 310 Ark. 73, 832 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1992)Questioned byFry v. State, 309 Ark. 316, 829 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1992), overruled, Doby v. State, 290 Ark. 408, 720 S.W.2d 694 (1986).

While evidence of the victim's and defendant's past relationship should be admitted into evidence, evidence of explicit sexual conduct that has no direct bearing on the events which occurred at the time of the alleged rape should be excluded. Terrell v. State, 26 Ark. App. 8, 759 S.W.2d 46 (1988).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing question regarding how old bruises were without reference to victim's prior sexual conduct. Harris v. State, 322 Ark. 167, 907 S.W.2d 729 (1995).

Court's decision to exclude from the evidence victim's allegations against her step-grandfather was not clearly erroneous. Samples v. State, 50 Ark. App. 163, 902 S.W.2d 257 (1995).

The court properly excluded evidence that, four years before the incident at issue, the victim filed a rape charge against another person, but withdrew the charge one day after filing her report. Booker v. State, 334 Ark. 434, 976 S.W.2d 918 (1998).

One should not conclude that a defendant can never present evidence of a rape victim's human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status when that evidence is relevant to a defense at trial; on the contrary, the rape-shield statute specifically contemplates the admission of such evidence once the required procedures have been followed and the trial court has determined that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Fells v. State, 362 Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005).

Trial court did not err by applying the rape shield statute to exclude evidence of the victims' sexual knowledge allegedly obtained while they were in foster care because: (1) there was no proof that the events actually occurred; (2) none of the prior sexual acts closely resembled the allegations that defendant raped the victims; (3) the alleged sexual acts with other minor children were irrelevant to defendant's having sexual intercourse with the victims; and (4) the acts were not prior to defendant's rape offenses. White v. State, 367 Ark. 595, 242 S.W.3d 240 (2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 904, 127 S. Ct. 2114, 167 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2007).

At the sentencing phase of a rape trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying, under the rape-shield statute, defendant's motion to introduce evidence of the victim's prior sexual abuse allegations against a third party because such evidence would have been more prejudicial to the victim than probative. Keller v. State, 371 Ark. 86, 263 S.W.3d 549 (2007).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to invoke the rape shield statute (this section) or for failing to argue that the victim had said someone else had raped her or investigate those statements because if counsel had exculpatory evidence to present, the only proper means to seek admission was through a request for a hearing, and even if counsel erred in failing to request such a hearing, the postconviction relief appellant did not establish that, had counsel requested a hearing, his arguments for admission of the evidence would have been effective; there was no basis to support a claim that the evidence was needed to rebut the inference that the child victim received her knowledge of sexual matters from alleged encounters with appellant, and appellant did not establish that there was potentially relevant evidence to be discovered, or that counsel could have sought to admit, that was suitably compelling so as to overcome its highly prejudicial nature through strong probative value, as subsection (c) of this section required. Bell v. State, 2010 Ark. 65, 360 S.W.3d 98 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for raping his daughter under § 5-14-103(a)(4)(A)(i) was appropriate because the evidence was sufficient and because the circuit court properly denied defendant's rape-shield motions. Consent was never an issue in a rape-by-guardian case, and when consent was not an issue, whether the victim had sexual relations with a third person was entirely collateral and irrelevant under subsections (b) and (c) of this section. Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 392, 384 S.W.3d 515 (2011).

—Expert Testimony.

Where physician's testimony in a rape case embraced the ultimate issue of forced sex, but did not mandate a legal conclusion because the testimony did not exclude other causes for the victim's injuries, it was not inadmissible opinion testimony on the ultimate issue. Davlin v. State, 320 Ark. 624, 899 S.W.2d 451 (1995).

—Impeachment of Non-Victim Witness.

Evidence of a sexual affair between the victim and a witness held inadmissible where defendant failed to show how evidence of the alleged sexual affair would impeach the witness' credibility. Davlin v. State, 320 Ark. 624, 899 S.W.2d 451 (1995).

—Impeachment of Victim Witness.

In defendant's sexual assault trial where defendant proffered testimony as evidence of child victim's prior inconsistent statements to undermine her credibility, the proffered testimony violated the rape-shield statute, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the proffered testimony was inadmissible. Butler v. State, 349 Ark. 252, 82 S.W.3d 152 (2002).

Although the rape shield statute is inapplicable to a juvenile delinquency charge, the trial court may otherwise correctly find that the prior sexual history of a victim is entirely irrelevant to the crime with which juvenile is charged; thus, the proper standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding a juvenile's proffered testimony on the basis of that testimony's relevance under the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. M. M. v. State, 350 Ark. 328, 88 S.W.3d 406 (2002).

Consent.

Acts of prior consensual conduct between the victim and the accused are admissible only when consent is at issue; where the victim is younger than the age of consent at the time of the alleged conduct, consent patently cannot be a defense. Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

Prior acts of sexual conduct are not within themselves evidence of consent in a subsequent sexual act, unless there is additional evidence connecting the prior acts to the consent alleged in the subsequent act. Graydon v. State, 329 Ark. 596, 953 S.W.2d 45 (1997).

The court properly ruled that the alleged victim's subsequent consensual sex with one of the defendants was relevant and probative on the consent issue to be raised at the trial of the defendants. State v. Babbs, 334 Ark. 105, 971 S.W.2d 774 (1998).

Allowing an alleged rape victim's prior sexual conduct into evidence was improper because defendant was charged with raping the victim while she was physically helpless and pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, a person who was physically helpless at the time of the rape was incapable of consent. Therefore, any prior sexual encounters between defendant and the victim, which might have been relevant if consent was a defense, were irrelevant where the victim could not have consented due to being physically helpless. State v. Parker, 2010 Ark. 173 (2010).

Cross-Examination.

The court correctly limited the scope of prosecutrix's cross-examination to allow examination as to the two defendants while excluding testimony about her relations with others. Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5 (1979).

What the victim told her father at the time of the rape or what motivated her to cause the charges to be filed was not open to questioning. Sterling v. State, 267 Ark. 208, 590 S.W.2d 254 (1979).

Where defense counsel sought to cross-examine prosecutrix about how long it had been before the rape when she had last had intercourse, the court properly refused to allow such cross-examination since proof of that kind is broadly forbidden by this section and since no written motion to permit such proof was filed before the trial, nor was there a showing of good cause for the matter having been delayed until the trial was in progress. Isom v. State, 280 Ark. 131, 655 S.W.2d 405 (1983).

Disclosure of Defense.

An accused must reveal, upon the state's request, the nature of any defense which he intends to establish at trial, and the names and addresses of the witnesses who will testify in support of those defenses; therefore, at the in camera hearing, it appears that the accused is not forced to reveal any more of his defense strategy than he is required to do under existing procedural rules. Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 590 S.W.2d 288 (1979).

Discretion of Court.

The appellate court could not decide whether the evidence of the victim's prior conduct was admissible where defendant failed to proffer what the evidence would have been. Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

The trial court is vested with a great deal of discretion in ruling whether prior sexual conduct of a prosecuting witness is relevant, and the appellate court does not overturn its decision unless it was clearly erroneous. Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

Under this section, the trial court, upon proper motion, may engage in a balancing test to assess whether the probative value of the testimony sought outweighs the inflammatory nature of the testimony. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994).

Court properly applied the rape shield law where the ruling did not impede the defense but merely prevented questioning the victim with regard to her admission that she had sex with another person subsequent to the crime by defendant; the trial court did allow defendant to argue that the victim was fabricating the allegations because she thought he was too strict with her. Hathcock v. State, 357 Ark. 563, 182 S.W.3d 152 (2004).

Exclusion Improper.

Rape-shield statute was intended to protect victims from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury; in this case, evidence that the victim was asking defendant for sex, offering him oral sex, attempting to undo his shorts, and touching his penis through his shorts, all within approximately 10 minutes of penetration, was conduct related to the charges pending and therefore relevant to the issue of consent, such that excluding the evidence was prejudicial. Herren v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 528, 563 S.W.3d 606 (2018).

Exclusion Upheld.

Three of the pieces of evidence defendant sought to admit fell squarely within this section, the rape-shield statute, and were properly excluded because the victim denied making the allegation that she performed oral sex on a boy at school and she stated that the allegations against other men were true. Burns v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 207 (2020).

Although the diary entries did not fall squarely within this section, defendant did not show prejudice from their exclusion because the diary entries would have been relevant only to attack the victim's credibility, and defendant did that by vigorously cross-examining the victim; it was impossible to say that admission of the two diary entries would have changed the outcome because the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. Burns v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 207 (2020).

Hearing.

The in camera hearing is not designed to be used as a subterfuge to obtain a discovery deposition from the alleged victim, and there is no requirement that the victim present herself for questioning by the accused. Sterling v. State, 267 Ark. 208, 590 S.W.2d 254 (1979).

Subdivision (c)(2)(A) of this section clearly provides that a hearing shall be held on a motion; however, the timing of the hearing is not mandatory and may occur closer to the trial as the court permits “for good cause.” Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

It was not error to refuse to allow defendant to present evidence that rape victim tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) because defendant failed to comply with the rape-shield statute; defendant never filed the required motion or gave the trial court an opportunity to hold a hearing to determine if the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its highly prejudicial effect. Fells v. State, 362 Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005).

Interlocutory Appeal.

A ruling on whether testimony is hearsay is not subject to an interlocutory appeal under this section. State v. Small, 276 Ark. 26, 631 S.W.2d 616 (1982).

The rape-shield law is a product of the General Assembly, and until it sees fit to provide for interlocutory appeal by the state of a trial court's decision with respect to admitting evidence of prior false allegations made by an alleged victim, or until some other jurisdictional basis by rule or constitutional provision appears, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. State v. Mills, 311 Ark. 363, 844 S.W.2d 324 (1992).

Where defendant was charged with the rape of his niece, he was permitted to introduce evidence concerning the victim's natural father having been found guilty of a sexual assault in California, but was prohibited from making any reference as to the identity of the victim in the father's case. State v. V. Rapp, 368 Ark. 387, 246 S.W.3d 858 (2007).

Because the Supreme Court of Arkansas had never required the “uniform administration of justice” analysis as it did in state appeals from the grant of a motion to suppress evidence or confessions, the state's appeal from an order allowing evidence under the rape-shield statute was treated as automatically appealable without resort to a normal Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 3 analysis. State v. Parker, 2010 Ark. 173 (2010).

Jurisdiction.

Because defendant's appeal involves a challenge under the rape-shield statute, the court's jurisdiction was pursuant to this section and Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 1-2(a)(8). Turner v. State, 355 Ark. 541, 141 S.W.3d 352 (2004).

Merits Not Considered.

Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding that evidence of sexual conversations between the victim and her boyfriend was encompassed by the rape-shield statute under this section but defendant acknowledged that the trial court allowed him to cross-examine the victim regarding her bias and allowed him to redact the messages in question to omit the sexual discussion, and defendant agreed with the trial court that the redacted version was sufficient to challenge the victim's credibility; thus, because defendant in essence agreed to the decision, the court did not reach the merits of this point on appeal. Rackley v. State, 371 Ark. 438, 267 S.W.3d 578 (2007).

It was unnecessary to decide if a trial court erred in excluding defendant's proffered testimony under the rape shield statute because overwhelming evidence supported defendant's convictions, so any error was harmless. Pigg v. State, 2014 Ark. 433, 444 S.W.3d 863 (2014).

Motions by Defendant.

It is the defendant's responsibility to pursue a motion requesting a hearing and to bring the matter of a hearing to the court's attention. Cupples v. State, 318 Ark. 28, 883 S.W.2d 458 (1994).

Subdivision (c)(1) of this section requires a written motion to be filed; failure to do so waives the right to challenge application of this section on appeal. Lindsey v. State, 319 Ark. 132, 890 S.W.2d 584 (1994).

Evidence barred where defendant failed to file a motion as required by subdivision (c)(2)(C); arguments made in response to the State's motion in limine to bar the evidence were insufficient to comply with this section. Mosley v. State, 325 Ark. 469, 929 S.W.2d 693 (1996).

Where there was no showing that a motion to admit the evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct was filed in writing, that the issue was timely raised, or that the trial court in any manner abused its discretion in not finding “good cause” to hold a relevancy hearing later than three days before the trial, the defendant failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (c). Bradley v. State, 327 Ark. 6, 937 S.W.2d 628 (1997).

In a rape prosecution, defendant was not entitled to introduce proof of the victim's prior sexual abuse due to his noncompliance with the rape-shield law; defendant failed to file a written motion as required by subdivision (c)(1) of this section. Hanlin v. State, 356 Ark. 516, 157 S.W.3d 181 (2004).

Trial court did not err under the rape shield law, subsection (b) of this section, in denying defendant's motion to permit testimony concerning prior claims of sexual abuse made by a minor victim because defendant failed to prove that the prior act of sexual abuse clearly occurred; the witness affidavits that defendant presented were determined to be hearsay. Joyner v. State, 2009 Ark. 168, 303 S.W.3d 54, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1047, 130 S. Ct. 736, 175 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2009).

Trial court properly disallowed questions about another man's DNA on the victim's sheets because the prosecutor did not “open the door” by inquiring about the victim's DNA, defendant's relevancy argument was not preserved for appeal, and defendant did not file a written motion to the trial court for its consideration. Gipson v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 651 (2013).

Objection Untimely.

Where record reflected the state had already asked and received answers to questions regarding witness's sexual relations with the defendant without objection, later objection to the same questioning was untimely, as failure to object at the first opportunity waives any right to raise the point on appeal. Laymon v. State, 306 Ark. 377, 814 S.W.2d 901 (1991).

Because defendant failed to follow the procedure set forth in this section and did not proffer testimony concerning his assertion that the victim had similar accusations against another grandfather, the error complained of was the result of defense counsel's inaction and neither the third nor the fourth Wicks exception applied. Fukunaga v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 4 (2014).

Preservation.

In a rape case, defendant failed to preserve his argument that bondage activity did not fall under the rape-shield statute where he argued before the trial court that evidence that he and the victim had engaged in “rough sex” before was relevant to the defense, highly probative, and went to the credibility of the victim. Moreover, an argument relating to the right to present a defense under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment was also abandoned because, although the argument was contained in a written motion, defendant did not ensure that a ruling was made on it. Rounsaville v. State, 372 Ark. 252, 273 S.W.3d 486 (2008).

Defendant failed to preserve for review his argument that a court erred during his rape trial in not allowing testimony concerning the victim's previous sexual conduct; he failed to follow the procedure set forth in subsection (c) of this section for establishing relevancy and admissibility of evidence otherwise excluded by the rape-shield statute. Stewart v. State, 2012 Ark. 349, 423 S.W.3d 69 (2012).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of three counts of second-degree sexual assault of two victims, defendant's argument that his motion to admit evidence of the first victim's prior sexual conduct was improperly denied was not preserved for review as he failed to proffer any testimony at the in camera hearing pursuant to the rape-shield statute; even if the circuit court already had knowledge of all the relevant details, defendant's failure to proffer evidence so that the appellate court could determine prejudice precluded review of the issue on appeal. Sweeten v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 590, 564 S.W.3d 575 (2018).

Prior Inconsistent Statements.

In a prosecution of a father for the rape and sexual abuse of his daughter over a four year period, the trial court properly refused to allow the victim's mother and grandmother to testify to prior inconsistent statements by the victim that other men, rather than her father, had perpetrated sexual abuse upon her. Hill v. State, 74 Ark. App. 28, 45 S.W.3d 406 (2001).

Relevance.

Virginity is not relevant per se in a rape case. Duncan v. State, 263 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 1 (1978).

Where the two defendants sought to show the prosecutrix's prior sexual relations with a third person both earlier on the same evening and in the same room as the alleged rape and at other times in the past, the court correctly allowed testimony about the incident of the same evening that occurred almost as part of the same episode, but that ruling did not establish the relevancy of any other sexual relations the third person may have had with her so as to render the court's order excluding evidence of his prior sexual relations with the prosecutrix erroneous. Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5 (1979).

Prior acts of sexual conduct are not within themselves evidence of consent in a subsequent sexual act; there must be some additional evidence connecting such prior acts to the alleged consent in the present case before the prior acts become relevant. Sterling v. State, 267 Ark. 208, 590 S.W.2d 254 (1979).

When a female at the very threshold of puberty maintains that her father has been having sexual intercourse with her on a regular basis, sometimes as often as two or three times a week since early childhood, the prosecution's medical evidence that the child demonstrates physical characteristics consistent with prolonged sexual activity has an unmistakable relevance to the factual issue, and is not made inadmissible by this section. Marcum v. State, 299 Ark. 30, 771 S.W.2d 250 (Ark. 1989).

Evidence of victim's past homosexual activity, sought to be admitted to impeach victim who stated defendant was the only person to have committed such acts with victim, was properly held not legally relevant. Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1057, 114 S. Ct. 722 (1994); Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

Victim's prior sexual conduct with separate males did not bear on or relate to whether she consented to a group-sex situation. State v. Sheard, 315 Ark. 710, 870 S.W.2d 212 (1994).

Evidence that the victim had a black eye the day before the rape occurred held admissible, but testimony that the victim's husband struck her because she was having an extra-marital affair held inadmissible as hearsay and because, although minimally relevant, its prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. Davlin v. State, 320 Ark. 624, 899 S.W.2d 451 (1995).

In a prosecution for several criminal counts related to three sexual encounters involving the use of the drug Rohypnol with two women, testimony by the defendant regarding a prior oral sexual encounter between himself and one of the victims, which the victim denied, has nothing to do with the episode at issue and was properly excluded. Sera v. State, 341 Ark. 415, 17 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 998, 121 S. Ct. 495, 148 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2000).

In defendant's trial for raping his step-granddaughter when she was six years old, the circuit court abused its discretion by granting defendant's motion to introduce evidence that his step-granddaughter was sexually assaulted by someone else when she was four years old; defendant's step-granddaughter's descriptions of the two incidents were substantially dissimilar and, because there was little evidence that the prior incident resembled the acts defendant allegedly committed, information about the prior incident was not relevant to the allegations against defendant. State v. Townsend, 366 Ark. 152, 233 S.W.3d 680 (2006).

Fact that the victim had sexual intercourse with a boy her own age was not related to whether defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with the minor victim; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to have the evidence admitted. Jackson v. State, 368 Ark. 610, 249 S.W.3d 127, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 850, 128 S. Ct. 112, 169 L. Ed. 2d 79 (2007).

Trial court erred, at a rape-shield hearing pursuant to § 16-42-101(c), in granting defendant's request to introduce evidence of the child victim's allegations of sexual abuse against three others in order to show that the victim obtained sexual knowledge from a source other than defendant where the victim's descriptions of the prior abuse and the charged act were very dissimilar. State v. Blandin, 370 Ark. 23, 257 S.W.3d 68 (2007).

Trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the victim's prior conduct under the rape-shield statute, subsection (b) of this section, during defendant's trial for raping his daughter because evidence of the victim's prior recantation against her stepfather was only slightly relevant, if at all, to the victim's credibility and such evidence was more prejudicial than probative; the victim's prior allegation against her stepfather was not false because the victim's mother had discovered sexually explicit photographs of the victim taken by her stepfather. Bond v. State, 374 Ark. 332, 288 S.W.3d 206 (2008).

In a case in which the Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction appealed a district court's decision to grant an inmate's 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which the inmate argued that the trial judge violated his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence of the victim's prior sexual history pursuant to this section, the rape shield statute, the trial court determined that the evidence was irrelevant, and the decision by the Supreme Court of Arkansas to uphold the evidentiary ruling of the trial court was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2011).

In a second-degree sexual assault and attempted rape case, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence from the victim's former classmates because the classmates' testimony about what the victim did in public would not have been similar to the testimony that the victim gave detailing what defendant did to her. The allegations against defendant did not occur in public places; moreover, the evidence that the victim was the aggressor was not relevant since the victim could not have consented. Bean v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 107, 432 S.W.3d 87 (2014).

In a case in which a jury convicted defendant of residential burglary and rape, the circuit court did not commit a manifest abuse of discretion in excluding, under this section, evidence of DNA from semen samples found on the victim's bedsheet and pillow that were inconsistent with defendant's DNA. Defendant failed to show a link between the semen samples found on the victim's bed and the residential burglary and rape. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65 (2015).

It was not clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion for the circuit court to exclude evidence of semen on the victim's bed. The potential humiliation and embarrassment to the victim, as well as the danger of unfairly prejudicing her character before the jury, outweighed the slight probative value of the evidence. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65 (2015).

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape and sexual assault, testimony that a victim and her boyfriend were having sexual intercourse was not admitted as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. The rape shield statute applied because defendant was charged with rape, not just violation of a minor. Thompson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 275, 461 S.W.3d 368 (2015).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to admit evidence of the victim's relationship with her boyfriend, where defendant contended that he had threatened to inform the victim's mother that the victim was sexually active with her boyfriend, which showed victim's motive to lie. Any explanation of motive was irrelevant in light of evidence that defendant's wet semen was on the victim's bed on the night of the alleged incident. Robinson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 550, 506 S.W.3d 881 (2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding DNA evidence found on the victim's clothes where defendant was accused of penetrating the victim with a broomstick, and thus DNA evidence was irrelevant. Sorum v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 384, 526 S.W.3d 50 (2017).

Sexual Conduct.

Partying, drinking, and flirting do not constitute sexual conduct under this section. Slater v. State, 310 Ark. 73, 832 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1992).

Masturbation by the victim is not included within the definition of “sexual conduct” under subsection (a) of this section; however, incidents of individual masturbation by a victim have no relevance when the question at hand is whether a defendant raped that victim. Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

As in the case of prior sexual conduct excluded under this section, there is a definite humiliation and embarrassment to the victim associated with a line of inquiry into victim's masturbation history which is not warranted when the evidentiary value of the evidence is weak. Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

Probative value of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct was outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the victim and the state's case; the evidence sought to be admitted by defendant was improper character evidence offered to show that the victim was an immoral person, thus, the trial court conducted the appropriate balancing test set out in subsection (c) of this section and concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial nature. Martin v. State, 354 Ark. 289, 119 S.W.3d 504 (2003).

Where defendant was charged with raping his girlfriend's six-year-old daughter, the circuit court did not err by excluding evidence of the uncle's molestation of the victim under the rape-shield statute, subsection (b) of this section. The sexual abuses perpetrated by defendant and the uncle hardly resembled each other; the victim spoke about the uncle's touching only after she had already told her therapist about defendant's abuse. Swaim v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 557 (2009).

During defendant's trial for sexual assault of a person less than 14 years old, the court erred in granting his motion to introduce evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct of the victim; because the victim asserted that a prior allegation of sexual conduct with her cousin was true, subsection (b) of this section precluded the admissibility of the evidence surrounding the allegation to attack her credibility. State v. Kindall, 2013 Ark. 262, 428 S.W.3d 486 (2013).

Circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct to show the res gestae of the rape charge where defendant failed to demonstrate how evidence of the victim's lap dances with a third party in the presence of the defendant the day before the offense was probative to whether defendant raped the victim the next evening while she was physically helpless and incapable of consent (defendant did not challenge on appeal the circuit court's rejection of his argument that the lap dances did not constitute sexual conduct). State v. Cossio, 2017 Ark. 297, 529 S.W.3d 620 (2017).

Cited: Pruitt v. State, 8 Ark. App. 350, 652 S.W.2d 51 (1983); Johnson v. State, 290 Ark. 166, 717 S.W.2d 805 (1986); Logan v. State, 300 Ark. 35, 776 S.W.2d 341 (1989); Rorex v. State, 31 Ark. App. 127, 790 S.W.2d 180 (1990); Dillard v. State, 313 Ark. 439, 855 S.W.2d 909 (1993); Cooper v. State, 317 Ark. 485, 879 S.W.2d 405 (1994); Evans v. State, 317 Ark. 532, 878 S.W.2d 750 (1994); Byrum v. State, 318 Ark. 87, 884 S.W.2d 248 (1994); Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 891 S.W.2d 42 (1995); Ridling v. State, 348 Ark. 213, 72 S.W.3d 466 (2002); Small v. State, 371 Ark. 244, 264 S.W.3d 512 (2007); Allen v. State, 374 Ark. 309, 287 S.W.3d 579 (2008); Woodall v. State, 2011 Ark. 22, 376 S.W.3d 408 (2011).

16-42-102. Presence of parent or custodian at proceedings involving minor sexual assault victims.

In any prosecution for a sexual offense or inchoate offense to a sexual offense, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after notice to opposing counsel, the court may, for good cause shown, allow the presence of the parent, stepparent, guardian, custodian, or other person with custody of an alleged minor victim of a sexual offense or inchoate offense to a sexual offense during the examination and cross-examination of the minor at any hearing, deposition, or trial.

History. Acts 1985, No. 444, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2038.

Cross References. Right of victim to be present at hearing, Evid. Rule 616.

16-42-103. Admissibility of evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases.

  1. In a criminal case where the defendant is accused of a sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual assault is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant, subject to the circuit court's consideration of the admissibility of any such evidence under Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.
  2. In a case where the prosecuting attorney intends to offer evidence under this section, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose the evidence to the defendant or the defendant's attorney if an attorney is representing the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony at least forty-five (45) days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause.
  3. This section shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence under any rule of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any law.
  4. For purposes of this section, the term “sexual assault” includes the following offenses:
    1. Rape, § 5-14-103;
    2. Sexual assault in the first degree, § 5-14-124; and
    3. Sexual assault in the second degree, § 5-14-125.

History. Acts 2005, No. 536, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Chapter 43 Witnesses Generally

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Witness Privileges, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 93.

16-43-101. Exemption of witnesses from summons when obeying subpoena.

A witness shall not be liable to be sued in a county in which he does not reside by being served with a summons in that county while going, returning, or attending in obedience to a subpoena.

History. Civil Code, § 595; C. & M. Dig., § 4171; Pope's Dig., § 5181; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-521.

Case Notes

In General.

A party cannot be lawfully served with civil process while he is in attendance on a court in a state other than that of his residence either as a party or a witness or while going thereto or returning therefrom. Martin v. Bacon, 76 Ark. 158, 88 S.W. 863 (1905).

Illustrative Cases.

A resident of the state, while attending the taking of depositions in a cause to which he is a party in a county not of his residence, is privileged from service of summons in another action there pending. Powers v. Arkadelphia Lumber Co., 61 Ark. 504, 33 S.W. 842 (1896).

An attorney, while attending court in his professional capacity in a county other than that of his residence, is not exempt from the service of summons in a civil action brought against him in that county. Paul v. Stuckey, 126 Ark. 389, 189 S.W. 676 (1916).

A member of the legislature may be served with summons in a civil action to appear at a future date after the legislature adjourns. Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. Munn, 151 Ark. 629, 238 S.W. 40 (1922).

Where a nonresident was served with summons in the course of a trial while he was there as a witness under subpoena, he was immune from such service and the service would have to be quashed. Frier v. Terry, 230 Ark. 302, 323 S.W.2d 415 (1959).

Cited: Caldwell v. Dodge, 179 Ark. 235, 15 S.W.2d 318 (1929); Terry v. Plunkett-Jarrell Grocery Co., 220 Ark. 3, 246 S.W.2d 415, 29 A.L.R.2d 1264 (1952).

16-43-102. Privilege from arrest while serving as witness.

All witnesses shall be privileged from arrest in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the peace during their attendance on any court where their attendance is required by subpoena, and going to and returning from the place where they may be required to appear to testify, allowing one (1) day for every twenty-five (25) miles from their residence.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 158, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 4159; Pope's Dig., § 5169; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-522.

Case Notes

Out-of-state Witnesses.

Subsection (c) of ARCP 45 does not provide for subpoena power over out-of-state witnesses testifying in a civil case. McNees v. Mountain Home, 993 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1993).

Because ARCP 45 does not give the Chancery Court authority to compel an out-of-state witness to appear to testify, a witness' appearance would be voluntary, and the witness would not be entitled to immunity from arrest under this section. McNees v. Mountain Home, 993 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1993).

16-43-103. Unlawful arrest — Abatement of suit — Fine.

Any person who causes a witness to be arrested, knowing him to be in attendance as such upon a subpoena, shall have his suit abated and shall be fined at the discretion of the court from which the subpoena issued, in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 158, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 4160; Pope's Dig., § 5170; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-523.

Subchapter 2 — Securing Attendance Generally

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this subchapter may be superseded by the ARCP pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Cross References. Securing testimony of material witness in grand jury investigation, § 16-85-508.

Effective Dates. Acts 1845, § 3, p. 44: effective on passage.

Acts 1875, No. 77, § 53: effective on passage.

Acts 1937, No. 160, § 7: approved Mar. 1, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “It is found to be a fact that the less frequent meeting of the grand jury necessitates vesting authority in the prosecuting attorney to subpoena witnesses in order to properly prepare criminal cases. Therefore, this Act being necessary for the public health, peace, and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall become effective immediately upon its passage.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Sufficiency of efforts to procure witnesses' attendance to justify admission of his former testimony — state cases. 3 A.L.R.4th 87.

Am. Jur. 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witn., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Witnesses, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 229.

C.J.S. 97 C.J.S., Witn., § 1 et seq.

16-43-201, 16-43-202. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that these sections, concerning subpoenas and compulsion of attendance of witnesses, were deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The sections were derived from the following sources:16-43-201. Acts 1973, No. 17, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-537—28-540.16-43-202. Civil Code, § 609; C. & M. Dig., § 4208; Pope's Dig., § 5220; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-519.

16-43-203. Excusing of witness when deposition given.

A witness shall not be compelled to attend court for oral examination where his deposition may be used unless he has failed, when duly summoned, to appear and give his deposition.

History. Civil Code, § 608; C. & M. Dig., § 4207; Pope's Dig., § 5219; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-520.

16-43-204. Attendance until discharged or case decided.

Any person subpoenaed to appear before any court of record of this state, or justice of the peace, to give evidence in any case brought before the court or justice shall attend each and every term, or from time to time, until the case is decided, or until the witness is discharged by the court or justice trying the case.

History. Acts 1845, § 1, p. 44; C. & M. Dig., § 4172; Pope's Dig., § 5182; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-509.

Cross References. Continuance for absence of witness, § 16-63-402.

16-43-205. Authorization for officials taking depositions to compel attendance of witnesses.

Every person in this state who is required to take depositions or examinations of witnesses by virtue of any commission issued out of any court of record of this or any other government shall have power to issue subpoenas for witnesses to appear and testify and to compel their attendance in the same manner and under the same penalties as any court of record of this state.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 4154; Pope's Dig., § 5164; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-504; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 182.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “judge, justice of the peace, or master in chancery” following “person” and “in pursuance of this act, or” following “witnesses,” and made a minor stylistic change.

Meaning of “this act”. Chapter 48 of the Revised Statutes, codified as §§ 16-43-205, 16-44-102 [superseded], 16-44-108 [superseded], 16-44-109 [superseded].

16-43-206. Discharge of contempt order.

A witness imprisoned or fined for contempt by an officer before whom his or her deposition is being taken may apply to the circuit judge, who shall have power to discharge the witness if it appears that the imprisonment is illegal.

History. Civil Code, §§ 587, 590-592; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4163, 4166-4168; Pope's Dig., §§ 5173, 5176-5178; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-512, 28-515 — 28-517; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 315.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section were deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Cross References. Contempt generally, § 16-10-108.

16-43-207. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning disobedience of subpoenas, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Civil Code, §§ 588, 589; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4164, 4165; Pope's Dig., §§ 5174, 5175; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-513, 28-514.

16-43-208. Criminal proceedings — Subpoenas for witnesses generally.

  1. The clerk of the court, upon request of the prosecuting attorney or upon request of the defendant or his attorney, shall issue subpoenas for witnesses.
  2. The state shall have the right to subpoena at the expense of the county six (6) witnesses if the charge is a misdemeanor and twelve (12) witnesses if it is a felony less than a capital offense. The defendant shall have the right to subpoenas at the expense of the county for six (6) witnesses in misdemeanor and twelve (12) witnesses in felony cases less than capital. There shall be no limit upon the number of witnesses who may be subpoenaed at the expense of the county in capital cases.
  3. Either party shall have the right to recall subpoenas before service and substitute the names of other witnesses for those for whom subpoenas were originally issued.
  4. Neither side shall in any event have at the expense of the county more than six (6) character witnesses in any type of case, capital or otherwise.

History. Crim. Code, § 151; C. & M. Dig., § 3109; Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 34, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3939; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2001.

Cross References. County not to pay for making more than two returns for subpoenas in any given case, § 21-6-504.

Right of accused to obtain witnesses by compulsory process, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10.

Case Notes

Capital Cases.

The right to subpoena unlimited witnesses in capital murder cases is not absolute when it pertains to out-of-state witnesses; thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying subpoenas for a federal prisoner incarcerated out-of-state and for various state prisoners where the defendant did not furnish any information which indicated that these witnesses were material to the defense and where the court specifically ruled on relevance. Henry v. State, 278 Ark. 478, 647 S.W.2d 419 (1983), cert. denied, Henry v. Arkansas, 464 U.S. 835, 104 S. Ct. 121 (1983).

This section, which provides for unlimited out-of-state witnesses in capital felony cases, must be read in conjunction with § 16-43-403, which provides that such witnesses must be material; such right to witnesses is not absolute but, rather, rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983).

In capital murder prosecution, trial court erred in refusing to subpoena out-of-state government witnesses who performed certain tests which were negative or inconclusive in linking defendant to crime; however, error was harmless where other evidence available to jury indicated that test results were negative. Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983).

Fees.

Witnesses were entitled to fees whether used or not, or, if used, their testimony excluded as incompetent. Peay v. Searcy County, 111 Ark. 386, 163 S.W. 1147 (1914).

Service.

This section does not impose upon the sheriff a duty to serve subpoenas authorized by this section. MacKintrush v. State, 60 Ark. App. 42, 959 S.W.2d 404 (1997), aff'd, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

The trial court properly dismissed a petition for mandamus to require the sheriff to serve a subpoena on a defense witness; the section is silent about the duty of the sheriff to serve subpoenas and there are other methods available for service. MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Cited: Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982); Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. Ark. 1989); Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 124 S.W.3d 439 (2003).

16-43-209. Criminal proceedings — Additional witnesses.

  1. Should either party desire additional witnesses at the expense of the county, he may file, in term time or in vacation of the court, his verified application for the additional witnesses with the judge of the court.
  2. The application shall contain a statement of the facts which the party expects to prove by each one of the additional witnesses sought and an affidavit that such facts cannot be adequately established by the witnesses for whom the party has had subpoenas issued. If any such affidavit is willfully false, the party making it may be punished as for contempt of court. If the judge finds the application should be granted, he shall direct the clerk to issue subpoenas for the additional witnesses he finds the party should have.
  3. After the trial of the case or after the witnesses have testified, and not before, the judge shall file the application with the clerk of the court, and it shall become a part of the record in the case. In no event shall the judge disclose the contents of the application until the case has been tried or the witnesses have testified.
  4. While the trial is actually in progress, the court in its discretion may direct the clerk to issue additional subpoenas at the expense of the county without affidavits required by this subchapter.
  5. In any event, either party may have additional witnesses who receive no compensation from the county for their services.

History. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 35, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3940; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2002.

Case Notes

Cited: Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. Ark. 1989).

16-43-210. Criminal proceedings — Attendance by witness in several criminal cases.

A witness subpoenaed to attend before any circuit court in more than one (1) criminal case at the same time shall be allowed pay, when the costs are paid by the county, in only one (1) case and only for the actual number of days he or she is in attendance, regardless of the number of cases in which he or she is summoned or called upon to testify.

History. Acts 1875, No. 77, § 40, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., § 4612; Pope's Dig., § 5701; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2003; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 263.

Case Notes

Cited: Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. Ark. 1989).

16-43-211. Criminal proceedings — Civil procedure to govern.

The provisions of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases shall apply to and govern summoning and coercing the attendance of witnesses and compelling them to testify in all prosecutions and all criminal or penal actions or proceedings, except that the attendance of witnesses residing in any part of the state may be coerced, and it shall never be necessary to tender to the witnesses any compensation for expenses or otherwise before process of contempt shall issue.

History. Crim. Code, § 152; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [152], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 3110; Pope's Dig., § 3941; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2004.

Publisher's Notes. The “Code of Practice in Civil Cases,” referred to in this section, means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference table in the tables volume.

Case Notes

Power of Prosecuting Attorney.

At most, this section merely gives the prosecuting attorney the power to coerce the attendance of witnesses at a hearing and force them to testify “in all prosecutions,” and does not give him the power to deny the presence of an attorney requested by a witness. Gill v. State ex rel. Mobley, 242 Ark. 797, 416 S.W.2d 269 (1967).

Pretrial Deposition.

Subpoena duces tecum directing corporate official to appear at pretial deposition with all records relating to work and pay records of co-workers involved in dispute was properly quashed despite defendant's claim that the information was relevant to his defense, since the issue of discrimination by the employer was irrelevant to dispute and, moreover, there was no statutory authority for the taking of a pretrial deposition in such circumstances. Kelley v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in, Conner v. State, 75 Ark. App. 418, 58 S.W.3d 865 (2001).

Cited: Copeland v. State, 226 Ark. 198, 289 S.W.2d 524 (1956); Williams v. State, 237 Ark. 569, 375 S.W.2d 375 (1964); Dickerson v. State, 546 S.W.2d 712 (1977); Spears v. State, 264 Ark. 83, 568 S.W.2d 492 (1978).

16-43-212. Criminal proceedings — Issuance of subpoenas pursuant to investigations.

  1. The prosecuting attorneys and their deputies may issue subpoenas in all criminal matters they are investigating and may administer oaths for the purpose of taking the testimony of witnesses subpoenaed before them. Such oath when administered by the prosecuting attorney or his or her deputy shall have the same effect as if administered by the foreman of the grand jury. The subpoena shall be substantially in the following form:
  2. The subpoena provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be served in the manner as provided by law and shall be returned and a record made and kept as provided by law for grand jury subpoenas. The fees and mileage of officers serving the subpoenas and of witnesses in appearances in answer to the subpoenas shall be the same and shall be paid in the same manner as provided by law for grand jury witnesses.
  3. The failure of any officer to serve the subpoena or of a witness to appear on the returned date shall constitute a Class B misdemeanor.

“The State of Arkansas to the Sheriff of County: You are commanded to summon to attend before the Prosecuting Attorney at , A.D. 20 .M., and testify in the matter of an investigation then to be conducted by the said Prosecuting Attorney growing out of a representation that has committed the crime of in said County. Witness my hand this , A.D. 20 . Prosecuting Attorney By Deputy Prosecuting Attorney”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1937, No. 160, §§ 1-3; Pope's Dig., §§ 3793-3795; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-801 — 43-803; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 395.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Hall, The Prosecutor's Subpoena Power, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 122.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The court rejected defendant's argument that he was denied due process when he was not allowed equal discovery rights to those given the state pursuant to this section. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1973) does not suggest that the due process clause requires states to adopt discovery procedures in criminal cases, but rather it held that, where a state imposes discovery against a defendant, equivalent rights must be given to a defendant. Alford v. State, 291 Ark. 243, 724 S.W.2d 151 (1987).

Attorney-Client Privilege.

Where an accident reconstructionist was hired by an attorney representing a driver who was involved in a car accident, the accident reconstruction report and testimony of the accident reconstructionist's employee were confidential, privileged communications that could not be subpoenaed. Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 182 S.W.3d 112 (2004).

Authority of Prosecutor.

A prosecuting attorney may not, under guise of an investigation of possible vote buying, subpoena the bank records of a political party's checking account and thereby ascertain the identity of all contributors to the party's campaign and the amounts of their contributions without a showing that such information is reasonably relevant to such investigation or that public interest in the disclosure of such information is sufficiently cogent and compelling to outweigh the legitimate and constitutionally protected interests of the party and its contributors in having that information remain private. Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 393 U.S. 14, 89 S. Ct. 47, 21 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1968).

The authority of the prosecuting attorney to subpoena witnesses for investigative purposes is limited to subpoenaing those witnesses to appear at a place in the county where the alleged offenses or matters to be investigated occurred. State ex rel. Streett v. Stell, 254 Ark. 656, 495 S.W.2d 846 (1973).

Use of the prosecutor's subpoena power to obtain the presence of a witness for questioning by a police officer, absent the prosecutor, was illegal. Duckett v. State, 268 Ark. 687, 600 S.W.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1980).

A prosecuting attorney who issues a subpoena pursuant to this section takes the place of a grand jury. Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1981).

While subpoenas may be used under this section to bring in witnesses to interrogate them about a case under investigation as well as to review their testimony before trial but after the case has been investigated, it was an abuse of the prosecutor's subpoena power to assemble all of the state's witnesses in the trial courtroom prior to trial and question them under oath and in the presence of each other regarding the crime, without the knowledge of the trial judge or defense attorney, since this procedure without cross-examination could pressure recalcitrant witnesses to conform their testimony with the others. Cook v. State, 274 Ark. 244, 623 S.W.2d 820 (1981).

In the absence of an abuse of the power, a prosecutor's subpoena may be used to prepare for trial after charges have been filed. Todd v. State, 283 Ark. 492, 678 S.W.2d 345 (1984).

Where, without a subpoena, police officers picked up the defendant ostensibly because the prosecutor wished to see her, but the prosecutor did not participate in the subsequent questioning, the defendant's subsequent statement should have been suppressed. Foster v. State, 285 Ark. 363, 687 S.W.2d 829 (1985).

A prosecutor's power to subpoena must be used only for the prosecutor's investigation; the prosecutor abused his power to subpoena when he commanded that records be produced for the police. State v. Hamzy, 288 Ark. 561, 709 S.W.2d 397 (1986).

Prosecutor's use of his subpoena power to subpoena three witnesses who did not testify at trial, and to subpoena defendant's school records, was for investigation and preparation and did not amount to an abuse of the power. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S. Ct. 1853, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1997).

Where a prosecutor issued a subpoena to obtain the defendant's medical records from a county health department after two people tested positive for HIV and reported that they believed they had contracted it from the defendant, the prosecutor properly used the subpoena as an investigatory tool and not as a tool for a police investigation. Weaver v. State, 66 Ark. App. 249, 990 S.W.2d 572, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 913, 120 S. Ct. 265, 145 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1999).

Defendant's first-degree murder conviction was overturned and the case was remanded for a new trial where a witness's prior inconsistent statement was improperly admitted. The prosecutor's subpoena of the witness was not used for the deputy prosecutor's investigation, but instead was used for a detective's investigation, and the detective was not an official authorized to take the witness's statement under § 16-43-212(a). Stephens v. State, 98 Ark. App. 196, 254 S.W.3d 1 (2007).

During a capital murder trial, the court did not err in admitting text messages from a cellular telephone number assigned to defendant because the prosecutor's subpoena requests were not unreasonable in scope or irrelevant; the prosecutor did not abuse the prosecutor's subpoena power. Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368, 423 S.W.3d 569 (2012).

Defense Witnesses.

Subpoena of defense witnesses several months after the charges were filed and only one month prior to the original trial date was not an abuse of the prosecutor's subpoena power. Neal v. State, 320 Ark. 489, 898 S.W.2d 440 (1995).

Federal Court Abstention.

The federal courts should abstain in a suit filed by a subpoena recipient who alleges that the prosecuting attorney subpoenaed papers and documents without probable cause. Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1981).

Right to Counsel.

Witnesses required to testify before the prosecuting attorney under this section are entitled to have their attorneys present. Gill v. State ex rel. Mobley, 242 Ark. 797, 416 S.W.2d 269 (1967).

Specificity of Subpoena.

A prosecuting attorney's subpoena issued under this section requiring a bank to produce records pertaining to the bank account of one of its depositors was not objectionable because it failed to specify the crime committed or the name of the person charged with committing it. First Nat'l Bank v. Roberts, 242 Ark. 912, 416 S.W.2d 316 (1967).

Statement Under Oath.

Prior inconsistent statement by witness given under oath to the deputy prosecuting attorney was properly admitted for its substantive content and a limiting instruction was not required since it was given to the prosecuting attorney as provided for in this section. Slavens v. State, 1 Ark. App. 245, 614 S.W.2d 529 (1981).

Waiver of Irregularities.

Defendant waived any irregularity in filing of information with the clerk instead of in open court, when he entered a plea of not guilty, as defendant was then in court. Ogles v. State, 214 Ark. 581, 217 S.W.2d 259 (1949).

Cited: Kiefer v. State, 297 Ark. 464, 762 S.W.2d 800 (1989); In re Badami, 309 Ark. 511, 831 S.W.2d 905 (1992).

16-43-213. Prisoner as witness — Attendance — Examination by deposition.

A person confined in any prison in this state for any cause other than a sentence for felony may, by order of the court, be required to be produced for oral examination in the county where he is imprisoned. However, in all other cases his examination must be taken by deposition.

History. Civil Code, § 593; C. & M. Dig., § 4169; Pope's Dig., § 5179; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-518.

Case Notes

Contempt.

Although a convict may be compelled to testify under this section, he cannot, upon refusal to testify, be punished for contempt and his sentence in the penitentiary suspended during his sentence for contempt. Williams v. State, 125 Ark. 287, 188 S.W. 826 (1916).

Felon.

Where a witness is a convicted felon and incarcerated in the state penitentiary, it is not error, in a criminal trial, for the court to overrule a motion by the defendant requesting that the attendance of the witness upon the trial be procured. Tiner v. State, 110 Ark. 251, 161 S.W. 195 (1913).

16-43-214. Prisoner from Division of Correction as witness.

  1. Upon presentation by the prosecuting attorney or interested defense counsel of a petition duly verified and for good cause, any circuit court having jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving a felony pending for trial in that court may have jurisdiction and authority to provide by proper order for the presence in court, and for the trial and as a witness, of any person incarcerated in the Division of Correction whose testimony would be material either for the State of Arkansas or for the defendant in the action.
  2. Upon the granting of a petition by the circuit court pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and upon presentation to the authorized officials of the division of a signed order or certified copy thereof by the circuit clerk of such court, the officials having custody of the prisoner are authorized and directed to transport or cause to be transported the prisoner by such means and methods as they deem proper, at the time and place as directed by the order of the circuit court.
  3. The custody of a prisoner sought to be used as a witness shall at all times remain in the authorized officials of the division, subject to the order and direction of the circuit court. Immediately upon the completion of the testimony by the prisoner in court or upon the completion of the trial requiring his or her presence, the prisoner shall be immediately returned to the division by the official having his or her custody.

History. Acts 1959, No. 162, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2022 — 43-2024; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 854.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in the section heading and throughout the section; and inserted “or her” twice in (c).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Witness Privileges, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 93.

Case Notes

Failure to Obtain Order.

Where no order was ever obtained under this section, trial court did not err in denying continuance requested because of absence of imprisoned witness. Walker v. State, 280 Ark. 17, 655 S.W.2d 370 (1983); Johnson v. State, 287 Ark. 426, 700 S.W.2d 786, 1985 Ark. LEXIS 2300 (1985).

Cited: Walker v. Lockhart, 807 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1986).

16-43-215. Videotaped deposition of State Crime Laboratory analyst — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, the term “videotaped deposition” means the visual recording on a magnetic tape, together with the associated sound, of a witness testifying under oath in the course of a judicial proceeding, upon oral examination, and where an opportunity is given for cross-examination in the presence of the defendant and intended to be played back upon the trial of the action in court.
    1. In all criminal trials in which the defendant is charged under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, § 5-64-101 et seq., upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after notice to the opposing counsel, the court, for good cause shown and sufficient safeguards to satisfy all state and federal constitutional requirements of oath, confrontation, cross-examination, and observation of the demeanor of the witness and testimony by the defendant, the court, and the jury, and absent a showing of prejudice by the defendant, may order the taking of a videotaped deposition of any State Crime Laboratory analyst.
    2. The videotaped deposition shall be taken at the State Crime Laboratory, or at a location ordered by the court, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's attorney.
    3. Examination and cross-examination of the analyst shall proceed at the taking of the videotaped deposition in the same manner as permitted at trial under the provisions of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.
    1. Any videotaped deposition taken under the provisions of this section shall be admissible at trial and received into evidence in lieu of the direct testimony of the analyst.
    2. However, neither the presentation nor the preparation of such videotaped deposition shall preclude the prosecutor or the defendant's attorney from calling the analyst to testify at trial if that is necessary to serve the interests of justice.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1234, § 1; 2013, No. 1148, § 7[8].

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (b)(3), deleted “Uniform” following “Arkansas” and “§ 16-41-101” following “Evidence.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

Subchapter 3 — Uniform Rendition of Prisoners as Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings Act

16-43-301. Interstate rendition of prisoners as witnesses — Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Witness” means a person who is confined in a penal institution in any state and whose testimony is desired in another state in any criminal proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or in any criminal action before a court;
  2. “Penal institutions” includes a jail, prison, penitentiary, house of correction, or other place of penal detention;
  3. “State” includes any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory of the United States.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2025.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

16-43-302. Hearing or request for presence of prisoner in another state.

A judge of a state court of record in another state, which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons confined in penal institutions within that state to attend and testify in this state, may certify:

  1. That there is a criminal proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or a criminal action pending in the court;
  2. That a person who is confined in a penal institution in this state may be a material witness in the proceeding, investigation, or action; and
  3. That his presence will be required during a specified time. Upon presentation of the certificate to any judge having jurisdiction over the person confined, and upon notice to the Attorney General, the judge in this state shall fix a time and place for a hearing and shall make an order directed to the person having custody of the prisoner requiring that the prisoner be produced before him at the hearing.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2026.

16-43-303. Finding of court — Order that prisoner be produced in other state.

If at the hearing the judge determines:

  1. That the witness may be material and necessary;
  2. That his attending and testifying are not adverse to the interests of this state or to the health or legal rights of the witness;
  3. That the laws of the state in which he is requested to testify will give him protection from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process because of any act committed prior to his arrival in the state under the order; and
  4. That as a practical matter the possibility is negligible that the witness may be subject to arrest or to the service of civil or criminal process in any state through which he will be required to pass, the judge shall issue an order, with a copy of the certificate attached:
    1. Directing the witness to attend and testify;
    2. Directing the person having the custody of the witness to produce him, in the court where the criminal action is pending or where the grand jury investigation is pending, at a time and place specified in the order; and
    3. Prescribing such conditions as the judge shall determine.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2027.

16-43-304. Contents of order — Safeguarding custody — Payment of expenses.

The order to the witness and to the person having custody of the witness shall provide for the return of the witness at the conclusion of his testimony, proper safeguards on his custody, and proper financial reimbursement or prepayment by the requesting jurisdiction for all expenses incurred in the production and return of the witness, and may prescribe such other conditions as the judge thinks proper or necessary. The order shall not become effective until the judge of the state requesting the witness enters an order directing compliance with the conditions prescribed.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2028.

16-43-305. Insane or mentally ill persons not subject to subchapter.

This subchapter does not apply to any person in this state confined as insane or mentally ill.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2029.

16-43-306. Certificate for obtaining prisoner from another state to testify in this state.

If a person confined in a penal institution in any other state may be a material witness in a criminal action pending in a court of record or in a grand jury investigation in this state, a judge of the court may certify:

  1. That there is a criminal proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or a criminal action pending in the court;
  2. That a person who is confined in a penal institution in the other state may be a material witness in the proceeding, investigation, or action; and
  3. That his presence will be required during a specified time. The certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of record in the other state having jurisdiction over the prisoner confined, and a notice shall be given to the Attorney General of the state in which the prisoner is confined.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2030.

16-43-307. Order for compliance with terms prescribed by court of other state.

The judge of the court in this state may enter an order directing compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by the judge of the state in which the witness is confined.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2031.

16-43-308. Prisoner from other state immune from arrest or process while being transported or held as witness.

If a witness from another state comes into or passes through this state under an order directing him to attend and testify in this or another state, he shall not while in this state pursuant to the order be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, because of any act committed prior to his arrival in this state under the order.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2032.

16-43-309. Uniformity of construction.

This subchapter shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2033.

16-43-310. Short title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Uniform Rendition of Prisoners as Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings Act”.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2034.

16-43-311. Severability.

If any provision of this subchapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the subchapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this subchapter are severable.

History. Acts 1959, No. 216, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2034n.

16-43-312. [Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. Section 12 of the ULA act, the effective date provision, was not adopted in Arkansas.

Subchapter 4 — Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases

Preambles. Acts 1953, No. 352 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, Act. No. 65 of the General Assembly of 1935 makes provision for the attendance of witnesses in criminal cases in this State under certain circumstances where the witness resides in another state, and also makes provisions for payment of these witnesses in advance of the sum of ten cents per mile to and from the court and $5.00 per day for their attendance; and

“Whereas, the same Act does not expressly provide for the method of payment of the aforesaid sums in advance; and

“Whereas, there has been some confusion in some of the judicial circuits of the State as to the correct manner of handling these payments in advance and handling the taxing of costs in the case; and

“Whereas, the General Assembly always intended the following procedure;

“Now, therefore….”

Publisher's Notes. For Comments regarding the Uniform Act to secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases, see Commentaries Volume B.

Effective Dates. Acts 1953, No. 352, § 2: Mar. 28, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “The purpose of this Act is to declare and clarify the legislative intent in Act 65 of 1935 and is designed to make uniform the procedures to be followed under such Act is immediately necessary for the administration of justice in this State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 453, § 5: approved Mar. 17, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “In 1935, the General Assembly passed Act 65 of 1935 which was Arkansas' version of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Cases. The Arkansas version of the Uniform Act omitted references to grand jury and special criminal proceedings. Arkansas never adopted the new Uniform Act which was amended to correct this deficiency.

“It is hereby found by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is presently no way a person can be compelled to attend a grand jury proceeding in another state unless the Arkansas Uniform Act so provides. Likewise, persons from other states cannot be compelled to attend before an Arkansas grand jury unless the version of the Uniform Act in both states so provides.

“It is further found by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there has been a tremendous growth of interstate crime. Most of these crimes are not within the United States Code, and the states must cooperate to prosecute them.

“Therefore, this Act being necessary for the efficient and adequate administration of criminal justice in the State, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be effective and in force from and after its passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Availability under Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings of subpoena duces tecum. 7 A.L.R.4th 836.

Witness certificate to secure attendance of out-of-state witness under Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without State in Criminal Proceedings. 12 A.L.R.4th 742.

Issuance of summons directing attendance of witness under Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings. 12 A.L.R.4th 771.

Ark. L. Rev.

Hall, The Prosecutor's Subpoena Power, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 122.

Case Notes

Cited: Thomas v. Pacheco, 293 Ark. 564, 740 S.W.2d 123 (1987).

16-43-401. [Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. Section 1 of the ULA act, which concerns definitions, was not adopted in Arkansas.

16-43-402. Attendance in another state.

If a judge of a court of record in any state which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within that state to attend and testify in this state certifies under the seal of such court that there is a criminal prosecution or criminal proceeding pending in such court, or that a grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigation has commenced or is about to commence, that a person being within this state is a material witness in such prosecution or proceeding or grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigation, and that his presence will be required for a specified number of days, and upon presentation of such certificate to any judge of a court of record in the county in which such person is, such judge shall fix a time and place for a hearing, and shall make an order directing the witness to appear at a time and place certain for the hearing.

If at a hearing the judge determines that the witness is material and necessary, that it will not cause undue hardship to the witness to be compelled to attend and testify in the prosecution or proceeding or a grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigation in the other state, and that the laws of the state in which the prosecution or proceeding is pending, or grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigation has commenced or is about to commence, and of any other state through which the witness may be required to pass by ordinary course of travel will give to him protection from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process, he shall issue a summons, with a copy of the certificate attached, directing the witness to attend and testify in the court where the prosecution or proceeding is pending, or where a grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigation has commenced or is about to commence at a time and place specified in the summons. In any such hearing the certificate shall be prima facie evidence of all the facts stated therein.

If the certificate recommends that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state to assure his attendance in the requesting state, such judge may, in lieu of notification of the hearing, direct that such witness be forthwith brought before him for the hearing; and the judge at the hearing being satisfied of the desirability of such custody and delivery, for which determination the certificate shall be prima facie proof of such desirability may, in lieu of issuing subpoena or summons, order that the witness be forthwith taken into custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state.

If the witness, who is summoned as above provided, after being paid or tendered by some properly authorized person the sum of twelve cents (12¢) a mile for each mile by the ordinary traveled route or the actual expense of travel, lodging, and meals to and from the court where the prosecution or proceeding is pending or the grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigation is being conducted and twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each day, that he is required to travel and attend as a witness, fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, he shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a summons issued from a court of record in this state.

As used in this subchapter, “prosecuting attorney's investigation” shall mean any investigation conducted by a prosecuting attorney in another state under a law substantially similar to § 16-43-212.

History. Acts 1935, No. 65, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 3942; 1977, No. 453, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2005.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

Case Notes

Cited: Hale v. State, 246 Ark. 989, 440 S.W.2d 550 (1969); Hill v. Lewis, 361 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Doles v. State, 275 Ark. 448, 631 S.W.2d 281 (1982); Lackey v. State, 288 Ark. 225, 703 S.W.2d 858 (1986); Bussard v. State, 300 Ark. 174, 778 S.W.2d 213 (1989).

16-43-403. Witness from another state.

If a person in any state, which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within its borders to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions or proceedings or grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigations commenced or about to commence, in this state, is a material witness in a prosecution or proceeding pending in a court of record in this state, or in a grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigation which has commenced or is about to commence, a judge of such court may issue a certificate under the seal of the court stating these facts and specifying the number of days the witness will be required. The certificate may include a recommendation that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of this state to assure his attendance in this state. This certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of record in the county in which the witness is found.

If the witness is summoned to attend and testify in this state he shall be tendered the sum of twelve cents (12¢) a mile for each mile by the ordinary traveled route or the actual expenses of travel, lodging, and meals to and from the court where the prosecution or proceeding is pending or the grand jury or prosecuting attorney's investigation is being conducted and twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each day that he is required to travel and attend as a witness. A witness who has appeared in accordance with the provisions of the summons shall not be required to remain within this state a longer period of time than the period mentioned in the certificate, unless otherwise ordered by the court. If such witness, after coming into this state, fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, he shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a summons issued from a court of record in this state.

History. Acts 1935, No. 65, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 3943; Acts 1953, No. 352, § 1; 1977, No. 453, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2006.

Case Notes

In General.

This section provides a mechanism for the defendant to request the court to order the attendance of the defendant's witnesses. Perry v. Norris, 879 F. Supp. 1503 (E.D. Ark. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 1997).

Capital Cases.

Section 16-43-208, which provides for unlimited out-of-state witnesses in capital felony cases, must be read in conjunction with this section; such right to witnesses is not absolute but, rather, rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983).

Trial court erred in refusing to subpoena out-of-state government witnesses who performed certain tests which were negative or inconclusive in linking defendant to crime; however, error was harmless where other evidence available to jury indicated that test results were negative. Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983).

Compulsory Process.

The right to compulsory process is not absolute. In order to be entitled to compulsory process, the defendant must show how the witness' testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense. Wright v. Lockhart, 914 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S. Ct. 1089, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1991), cert. denied, Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S. Ct. 1089, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1194 (1991).

In order to establish that noncompelled testimony is material, defendant must show that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Wright v. Lockhart, 914 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S. Ct. 1089, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1991), cert. denied, Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S. Ct. 1089, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1194 (1991).

Even if the denial of compulsory process amounts to constitutional error, federal circuit court will not reverse a conviction if the error is harmless. Wright v. Lockhart, 914 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S. Ct. 1089, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1991), cert. denied, Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S. Ct. 1089, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1194 (1991).

Trial court's refusal to compel the attendance of nonresident witnesses did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. Wright v. Lockhart, 914 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S. Ct. 1089, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1991), cert. denied, Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S. Ct. 1089, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1194 (1991).

Discretion of Court.

The issuance of a petition for certification of a material nonresident witness, which compels attendance at government expense, is not an absolute right and lies within the discretion of the trial court. Wright v. State, 267 Ark. 264, 590 S.W.2d 15 (1979); Logan v. State, 300 Ark. 35, 776 S.W.2d 341 (1989); Perry v. Norris, 879 F. Supp. 1503 (E.D. Ark. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 1997).

Although the court was unaware it had any authority to act under this section, the result was the same as if the trial court had knowingly exercised its discretion by deciding that it would not, under the facts and circumstances of this case, issue a certificate demanding that the Alabama authorities require the attendance of defendant's witnesses; the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated. Perry v. Norris, 879 F. Supp. 1503 (E.D. Ark. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 1997).

There is no absolute right to the certification process created by this section; the matter is within the discretion of the trial judge. Rowbottom v. State, 327 Ark. 76, 938 S.W.2d 224 (1997).

Expenses.

Where trial court had offered to allow the defendant to either bring four witnesses from out-of-state to testify at the trial or to take the depositions of an unlimited number of out-of-state witnesses, and the defendant chose to take the depositions, the defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the court's failure to also allow him expenses for out-of-state witnesses since apparently all of the witnesses suggested by the defendant appeared at the trial anyway. Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982).

Reasonable Efforts to Procure Witness.

It was reversible error to permit the reading in evidence of a transcript of evidence given by a witness at a previous trial because of the absence of the witness from the state when the state's efforts to obtain the presence of the witness at the trial was confined to the issuance of two subpoenas and did not include inquiries as to the exact whereabouts of the witness nor efforts to obtain his testimony under this section. Satterfield v. State, 248 Ark. 395, 451 S.W.2d 730 (1970).

Where state waited until it was too late to obtain witness under this section, the state's efforts were not reasonable; however, the state's misconduct in reading into the record the witness's testimony given at the first trial was harmless error, since the testimony was not critical because a rape victim's testimony need not be corroborated. Holloway v. State, 268 Ark. 24, 594 S.W.2d 2 (1980).

Refusal to Subpoena.

Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to subpoena out-of-state witnesses sought by the defendant in connection with his defense. Wright v. State, 267 Ark. 264, 590 S.W.2d 15 (1979).

Where defendant failed to support his claim that witness' out-of-state estranged husband was a material witness, the judge properly refused to compel his attendance. Rowbottom v. State, 327 Ark. 76, 938 S.W.2d 224 (1997).

Witness Taken into Custody.

Testimony of a material witness did not need to be suppressed because the witness was arrested and placed in jail for three days before she was transported back to this state; this section does contemplate that the material witness be taken into custody in the foreign state. Verdict v. State, 315 Ark. 436, 868 S.W.2d 443 (1993).

Cited: Coble v. State, 274 Ark. 134, 624 S.W.2d 421 (1981); Leshe v. State, 304 Ark. 442, 803 S.W.2d 522 (1991); Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004).

16-43-404. Witnesses immune from arrest.

If a person comes into this state in obedience to a summons directing him to attend and testify in a criminal prosecution in this state he shall not while in this state pursuant to such summons be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this state under the summons.

If a person passes through this state while going to another state in obedience to a summons to attend and testify in a criminal prosecution in that state or while returning therefrom, he shall not while so passing through this state be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this state under the summons.

History. Acts 1935, No. 65, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 3944; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2007.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Witness Privileges, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 93.

16-43-405. Uniformity of interpretation.

This subchapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which enact it.

History. Acts 1935, No. 65, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2008.

16-43-406. Short title — Uniform Act.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases”.

History. Acts 1935, No. 65, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2009.

16-43-407. Repealer.

All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this subchapter are hereby repealed.

History. Acts 1935, No. 65, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2009n.

16-43-408. [Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. Section 8 of the ULA act, the severability provision, was not adopted in Arkansas.

16-43-409. Effective date.

Whereas, under the present statutes of the State of Arkansas there is no adequate remedy whereby the attendance of witnesses from without the state may be enforced, and whereas, it is necessary for the immediate preservation of the peace of the State of Arkansas that adequate means be provided whereby the attendance of witnesses from without the state may be had, an emergency is hereby declared and this subchapter shall become operative and in effect and be in force from and after its passage.

History. Acts 1935, No. 65, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2009n.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1935, No. 65 was signed by the Governor and became effective on February 20, 1935.

Subchapter 5 — Competency — Criminal Proceedings

Effective Dates. Acts 1885, No. 82, § 2: effective on passage.

Research References

ALR.

Court's witnesses (other than expert) in state criminal prosecution. 16 A.L.R.4th 352.

Am. Jur. 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witn., § 69 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 377.

Character, Corruption and Contradiction in Arkansas, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 50.

C.J.S. 97 C.J.S., Witn., §§ 35 et seq., 49 et seq.

16-43-501. Accused as witness.

On the trial of all indictments, informations, complaints, and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses, and misdemeanors in this state, the person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness. The failure of the person so charged to make such a request shall not create any presumption against him.

History. Acts 1885, No. 82, § 1, p. 126; C. & M. Dig., § 3123; Pope's Dig., § 3957; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2016.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not apply to the admission of a voluntary statement made by accused at a coroner's inquest. Dunham v. State, 207 Ark. 472, 181 S.W.2d 242 (1944).

Comments on Failure to Testify.

Prosecutor's comments on defendant's failure to testify held improperly allowed. Curtis v. State, 89 Ark. 394, 117 S.W. 521 (1909); Porterfield v. State, 145 Ark. 472, 224 S.W. 957 (1920); Perry v. State, 188 Ark. 133, 64 S.W.2d 328 (1933); Freeman v. State, 214 Ark. 359, 216 S.W.2d 864 (1949); Bailey v. State, 287 Ark. 183, 697 S.W.2d 110 (1985).

This section does not authorize the defendant's counsel to offer explanation as to defendant's failure to testify, so that where counsel for defendant stated that he did not take the stand because it was not necessary, he cannot complain that the prosecuting attorney replied that he could have taken the stand and denied the charge. Collins v. State, 143 Ark. 604, 221 S.W. 455 (1920).

It is error, presumptively prejudicial, for the prosecuting attorney to call attention of the jury to the failure of the accused to testify. Bridgman v. State, 170 Ark. 709, 280 S.W. 982 (1926)Criticized byBradley v. State, 320 Ark. 100, 896 S.W.2d 425 (1995); Bradley v. State, 320 Ark. 100, 896 S.W.2d 425 (1995).

The prosecuting attorney's statement was not a comment on the defendant's failure to testify but merely an argument that the named witnesses' testimony should be believed because undisputed. Davis v. State, 174 Ark. 891, 298 S.W. 359 (1927).

Prosecutor's remark in his opening statement to the effect that the decedent could not tell his side of the story and that it would all have to come from the defendant resulted in pre-evidentiary coercion which may have forced the defendant to testify against her will. Clark v. State, 256 Ark. 658, 509 S.W.2d 812 (1974).

A violation of this section, although presumptively prejudicial, can be harmless error if it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. Bradley v. State, 320 Ark. 100, 896 S.W.2d 425 (1995).

Although the prosecutor made an impermissable comment regarding witness' failure to testify, the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt rendered the improper comment harmless. Landreth v. State, 331 Ark. 12, 960 S.W.2d 434 (1998).

Cross-Examination.

When a defendant in a criminal case becomes a witness in his own behalf, he may be impeached on cross-examination and may be questioned as to whether he has formerly been convicted of an infamous crime. Turner v. State, 100 Ark. 199, 139 S.W. 1124, 1911 Ark. LEXIS 336 (1911).

Directed Verdict.

Court cannot direct verdict of guilty, although there is sufficient evidence to convict and such evidence is undenied, since defendant's failure to testify cannot create a presumption against him. Paxton v. State, 114 Ark. 393, 170 S.W. 80 (1914).

Immunity from Testifying.

Statements made by a witness in the presence of the accused before the examining court did not call for a denial from him as he was not required to testify in the case. Maloney v. State, 91 Ark. 485, 121 S.W. 728 (1909).

Even after an indictment is found, the person charged cannot be made a witness in the trial except at his own request. Claborn v. State, 115 Ark. 387, 171 S.W. 862 (1914).

The trial court erred in requiring defendant to take the witness stand when called as a witness by his codefendant when they were tried together. Brown v. State, 259 Ark. 449, 534 S.W.2d 213, 1976 Ark. LEXIS 2088 (1976).

Instructions.

Where the accused has taken the stand as a witness and his testimony has been impeached by evidence of contradictory statements, it is the duty of the trial court to admonish the jury that the alleged conflicting statements are not to be considered as substantive proof of the accused's guilt. Pinkerton v. State, 126 Ark. 201, 190 S.W. 110 (1916).

An instruction that the defendant had a right to testify and the fact that he did not avail himself of this right was not to be considered against him, was not prejudicial to the defendant. Scott v. State, 169 Ark. 326, 275 S.W. 667 (1925).

Refusal of an instruction that the defendant's failure to testify was neither evidence nor presumption of guilt and should not be considered in determining guilt, was reversible error under this section. Cox v. State, 173 Ark. 1115, 295 S.W. 29 (1927). See Martin v. State, 151 Ark. 365, 236 S.W. 274 (1922).

Instruction that accused's failure to testify was not to be considered in determining his guilt, given without a request therefor, was not error. Thompson v. State, 205 Ark. 1040, 172 S.W.2d 234 (1943)Questioned byRussell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966).

16-43-502. Joint defendant as witness.

When two (2) or more persons are indicted in the same indictment, each defendant may testify in behalf of, or against, the other defendants.

History. Acts 1893, No. 89, § 1, p. 157; C. & M. Dig., § 3124; Pope's Dig., § 3958; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2017.

Cross References. Joint offender as witness before grand jury, § 16-85-506.

16-43-503. Party injured as witness.

No person shall be rendered incompetent to testify in criminal cases by reason of his being the person injured or defrauded, or intended to be injured or defrauded, or because he would be entitled to satisfaction for the injury or may be liable to pay the costs of prosecution.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 166; C. & M. Dig., § 3121; Pope's Dig., § 3955; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2018.

Subchapter 6 — Immunity — Criminal Proceedings

Preambles. Acts 1973, No. 561, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the law of the State of Arkansas is presently unsettled concerning the extent of authority of a prosecuting attorney to grant immunity from prosecution to persons testifying in criminal matters; and

“Whereas, said uncertainty results in difficulty for grand juries and prosecuting attorneys in obtaining necessary information about crimes committed in this State; and

“Whereas, because of the uncertainty as to the legality of prosecuting attorneys' granting of immunity, persons whose testimony may be material to an investigation or prosecution are reluctant to testify under circumstances which may incriminate them; and

“Whereas, it is essential that guidelines be established in order to facilitate prosecutions and investigations of criminal matters, and to clarify the authority of the prosecuting attorney to grant persons immunity from prosecution where the testimony of the said person is material to an investigation or prosecution by the prosecuting attorney or a grand jury;

“Now, therefore….”

Research References

ALR.

Right of defendant in criminal proceeding to have immunity from prosecution granted to defense witness. 4 A.L.R.4th 617.

Prosecutor's power to grant prosecution witness immunity from prosecution. 4 A.L.R.4th 1221.

Enforceability of agreement not to prosecute if accused would help in criminal investigation or would become witness against others. 32 A.L.R.4th 990.

Ark. L. Rev.

Farrow, New Jersey v. Portash: The Scope of Testimonial Immunity, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 306.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Criminal Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 153.

Note: An Equitable Treatment of Unauthorized Prosecutorial Promises of Immunity, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 389.

Davis, Survey of Arkansas Law: Criminal Law, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 193.

16-43-601. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Court” means the circuit court for the judicial district of this state in which the proceeding is or may be held;
  2. “Grand jury” means any grand jury impaneled in accordance with the laws of this state;
  3. “Prosecuting attorney” means the prosecuting attorney for the judicial district of this state in which the proceeding is or may be held and includes his duly appointed deputies.

History. Acts 1973, No. 561, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-531.

Case Notes

Special Prosecutor.

A special prosecutor appointed pursuant to § 16-21-112 or § 16-21-116 or by the inherent power of the circuit court may request the court to require that a person testify upon being granted immunity as provided by this section. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 516 S.W.2d 895 (1974).

Cited: Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977); Hodges v. Lamora, 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

16-43-602. Penalty.

Any person who refuses to give testimony after an order has been issued by the circuit court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held directing him or her to give such testimony, as provided in this subchapter shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. Each refusal of the witness to so testify shall constitute a separate offense.

History. Acts 1973, No. 561, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-535; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 396.

16-43-603. Immunity generally.

Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege of self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to a court, a grand jury, or a prosecuting attorney and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this subchapter, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. However, no testimony or other information compelled under the order, or any other information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in any criminal case except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.

History. Acts 1973, No. 561, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-532.

Case Notes

Purpose.

This section is not self-executing and its purpose is only to preserve the constitutional privilege of self-incrimination to one compelled to testify. Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977).

Standing to Contest Immunity.

A defendant has no standing to contest the kind of immunity granted to a witness; information gathered by virtue of witness' immunity, however, is a different matter, at least with respect to the use of such evidence against the person who was granted immunity. Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 871 S.W.2d 562 (1994).

Cited: Balentine v. State, 259 Ark. 590, 535 S.W.2d 221 (1976).

16-43-604. Issuance of order to testify.

  1. In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court, a grand jury, or a prosecuting attorney, the circuit court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section and upon the request of the prosecuting attorney for the district, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in this subchapter.
  2. A prosecuting attorney may request an order under subsection (a) of this section when, in his judgment:
    1. The testimony or other information from the individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
    2. The individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.

History. Acts 1973, No. 561, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-533; Acts 1995, No. 1296, § 62.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “this subchapter” for “§ 16-43-601” in (a).

Case Notes

Cited: Rood v. State, 4 Ark. App. 289, 630 S.W.2d 543 (1982).

16-43-605. Court order approving grant of immunity — Granting of immunity only after refusal to testify.

No prosecuting attorney shall grant immunity until he has applied for and obtained in each case a written order from the judge of the circuit court approving the grant of immunity. No such immunity shall be granted by a prosecuting attorney until after the individual has declined to answer questions or has requested immunity before answering questions.

History. Acts 1973, No. 561, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-534.

Case Notes

Purpose.

Where the testimony of a defense witness was offered to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness, to grant the defense witness immunity would defeat the purpose of this section, which is to aid the prosecution in apprehending criminals. Fears v. State, 262 Ark. 355, 556 S.W.2d 659 (1977).

Discretion of Prosecutor.

The granting of immunity is merely a statutory, not a constitutional, right and lies within the discretion of the prosecutor when he believes such grant is necessary to the public interest. Fears v. State, 262 Ark. 355, 556 S.W.2d 659 (1977).

No Immunity Granted.

The defendant in a prosecution for drug offenses was not entitled to immunity since there was never any agreement to grant immunity made by the prosecuting attorney and, even if there had been such an agreement, there was no written court approval for it. Tabor v. State, 333 Ark. 429, 971 S.W.2d 227 (1998).

Request for Immunity.

Where prosecuting attorney did not request immunity for a defense witness and there was no evidence that the defendant had ever requested that the prosecutor seek immunity for the witness, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant immunity to the witness who was also charged with a murder arising out of the same altercation, since there was no statutory authority for a request of a grant of immunity by anyone other than the prosecuting attorney. Rood v. State, 4 Ark. App. 289, 630 S.W.2d 543 (1982).

Cited: Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977); Hale v. State, 343 Ark. 62, 31 S.W.3d 850 (2000).

16-43-606. Limitation on immunity.

An individual who has once been granted immunity under the provisions of this subchapter for an offense in connection with which his testimony has been sought shall not again be granted immunity under this subchapter in connection with any subsequent offenses.

History. Acts 1973, No. 561, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-536.

Subchapter 7 — Examination

16-43-701 — 16-43-703. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning examination of witnesses, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 8[9]. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-43-701. Civil Code, § 659; C. & M. Dig., § 4192; Pope's Dig., § 5203; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-701.

16-43-702. Civil Code, § 651; C. & M. Dig., § 4184; Pope's Dig., § 5194; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-704.

16-43-703. Civil Code, § 657; C. & M. Dig., § 4190; Pope's Dig., § 5200; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-710.

Subchapter 8 — Compensation

Cross References. Fee bills, § 16-68-501.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 77, § 53: effective on passage.

Acts 1885, No. 121, § 3: effective on passage.

16-43-801. Witness fees generally.

Witnesses shall be allowed compensation as follows:

  1. For attendance before any circuit court, arbitration, auditor, commissioner, or other persons in civil cases, five dollars ($5.00) per day; and
  2. For attendance in criminal cases, five dollars ($5.00) per day.

History. Acts 1875, No. 77, § 39, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., § 4611; Pope's Dig., § 5700; Acts 1969, No. 157, § 1; 1975, No. 344, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-524; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 264.

Case Notes

Amount of Fee.

The language in subdivision (2) which provides that witnesses in criminal cases shall be paid at a rate of $5.00 per day is not intended to be a ceiling amount. Williams v. State, 304 Ark. 279, 801 S.W.2d 296 (1990).

Civil Cases.

In civil cases, witnesses are entitled to their ferriage and per diem in every case in which they are summoned, however numerous. Springfield & M.R.R. v. Lambert, 42 Ark. 121 (1883).

Expert.

An expert cannot demand extra compensation. Flinn v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895).

Informant.

Payment of an informant's expenses is not precluded under subdivision (2), nor is any payment made to him by his employer. Williams v. State, 304 Ark. 279, 801 S.W.2d 296 (1990).

16-43-802. Witness fees in county and probate courts.

Witnesses, duly summoned, shall be allowed for their attendance as such before either county or probate courts the sum of one dollar ($1.00) for each day's attendance, to be taxed as other costs and paid by the unsuccessful party.

History. Acts 1885, No. 121, § 2, p. 198; C. & M. Dig., § 4611; Pope's Dig., § 5700; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-525.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent it conflicts with ARCP 45(d).

16-43-803. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning mileage fees, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Acts 1875, No. 77, §§ 41, 42, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4613, 4614; Pope's Dig., §§ 5702, 5703; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-526, 28-527.

16-43-804. Proof of attendance.

  1. Every account for attendance of a witness shall be sworn to and shall state that he or she was summoned to attend as a witness in the cause upon which the charge is made, shall state the number of days he or she attended, and, if the witness was summoned outside the limits of the county in which he or she resides, shall state the number of miles he or she traveled in consequence of the summons.
  2. Every witness shall prove his or her attendance before any court, whether the case is determined or not, before the clerk of the court before which he or she may be summoned to appear.

History. Acts 1875, No. 77, §§ 43, 45, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4615, 4616; Pope's Dig., §§ 5704, 5705; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-528, 28-529; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 183.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (b), deleted “at each term he may attend” following “attendance,” “or each time he may attend before any justice of the peace” preceding “whether,” and “or the justice” preceding “before which” and made gender neutral changes.

Case Notes

In General.

This section does not require that the account be signed by the witness, nor that he make affidavit to it. Kansas City S. Ry. v. State, 98 Ark. 179, 135 S.W. 846 (1911).

Costs.

The fee for taking witnesses' affidavits to their attendance is part of the costs of the case, and taxable as such. Trimble v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 56 Ark. 249, 19 S.W. 839 (1892); Logan County v. Trimm, 57 Ark. 487, 22 S.W. 164 (1893).

Criminal Cases.

A witness is not entitled to attendance fee in criminal cases unless proved up in time. Fulks v. State, 64 Ark. 148, 41 S.W. 54 (1897); Lansing Wheelbarrow Co. v. Montgomery, 91 Ark. 600, 121 S.W. 1052 (1909).

Custom.

This section cannot be abrogated by custom. Lansing Wheelbarrow Co. v. Montgomery, 91 Ark. 600, 121 S.W. 1052 (1909).

16-43-805. Fee for ferriage.

Witnesses who leave home and attend any court in pursuance of a subpoena shall be allowed the amount necessarily paid out for crossing any ferry or toll bridge in going to and returning from the court.

History. Acts 1875, No. 77, § 46, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., § 4617; Pope's Dig., § 5706; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-530.

16-43-806. State employee as a witness.

  1. If a state employee is subpoenaed as a witness to give a deposition or testimony at a hearing in state or federal court or before any body with power to issue a subpoena, the state employee is:
    1. Entitled to retain any witness fees that may be tendered to him or her under state or federal law or court rules only if the matter is:
      1. Outside the employee's scope of state employment; or
      2. The employee is a party to the matter other than as a representative of the state employer; and
    2. Entitled to retain any mileage fees that may be tendered to him or her under state or federal law or court rules only if the matter is:
      1. Within the employee's scope of state employment and the employee uses a personal vehicle for travel in obeying the subpoena and the employee's employer does not reimburse the employee for travel expenses; or
      2. Outside the employee's scope of state employment and the employee does not use a state-owned vehicle for travel in obeying the subpoena.
  2. If the state employee is subpoenaed for purposes under subsection (a) of this section to appear on a nonwork day, the employee may retain any witness and mileage fees tendered to him or her.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1845, § 5.

Subchapter 9 — Paternity or Child Support

16-43-901. Competent witnesses.

  1. The biological mother of a child shall be a competent witness to testify in any court proceeding or administrative hearing as to who is the biological father of the child, the time and place of conception, access by the putative father and by her husband, support or lack of support for the child provided by the putative father or by her husband, and any other matters necessary to the establishment of paternity or a support obligation for the child.
  2. The husband of the biological mother shall be a competent witness to testify in any court proceeding or administrative hearing in which paternity or child support is an issue or may become an issue as to the following:
    1. Date of marriage;
    2. Period of cohabitation with the biological mother;
    3. Period of nonaccess with the biological mother; and
    4. Date of separation from the biological mother.
  3. The putative father of a child shall be a competent witness to testify in any court proceeding or administrative hearing in which paternity or child support is an issue or may become an issue as to the following:
    1. Period of cohabitation with the biological mother;
    2. Period of access with the biological mother; and
    3. Lack of sexual contact with the biological mother.
  4. Upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption of legitimacy of a child born of a marriage has been rebutted, the court shall:
    1. Relieve the putative father of further support liability;
    2. Attempt to identify and establish the biological father of the child, if possible; and
    3. Set a support obligation for the child to be paid by the biological father.
    1. To assist the court in this determination, the court may direct the biological mother, her husband, the putative father, and the child to submit to one (1) or more blood tests or other scientific examinations or tests as provided in § 9-10-108.
    2. Such test results shall be admissible as provided in § 9-10-108.
  5. In any case where the court is unable to determine paternity for the child, the lawful husband of the biological mother shall be presumed to be the father of the child, and the court shall establish a support obligation for the child unless blood tests or other scientific evidence conclusively eliminate him from paternity consideration.
    1. The purpose of this section is to enable the courts to receive into evidence relevant facts concerning the paternity of a child in any court proceeding or administrative hearing involving paternity or a support obligation for a child.
    2. The court shall consider foremost the interest of the child in making any determination hereunder and consider only testimony and evidence which will serve the best interest of the child in its findings pursuant to this section.
  6. As used in this section, “putative father” means any man, not deemed or adjudicated under the laws of the jurisdiction of the United States to be the biological father of a child, who claims or is alleged to be the biological father of the child.

History. Acts 1989, No. 657, § 1; 1993, No. 431, § 1.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment rewrote (d)(1); added “Attempt to identify and” at the beginning of (d)(2) and “if possible” at the end of (d)(2); added “to be paid by the biological father” at the end of (d)(3); designated the two sentences of (e) as (e)(1) and (e)(2); added “unless blood tests … consideration” at the end of (f); and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References. Paternity proceedings generally, § 9-10-101 et seq.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1021

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Family Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 631.

Legislative Survey, Family Law, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 131.

Case Notes

Presumption of Legitimacy.

In a divorce proceeding, the chancellor erred in illegitimizing the parties' eldest child, even though the evidence suggested the husband was not the child's father; such was not in the child's best interest nor was it the goal of either parent. Leach v. Leach, 57 Ark. App. 155, 942 S.W.2d 286 (1997).

Cited: Putt v. Suttles, 2011 Ark. App. 688, 386 S.W.3d 623 (2011).

Subchapter 10 — Minors

16-43-1001. Closed-circuit television.

    1. In any criminal proceeding, on motion of the prosecutor after notice to the defendant or on motion of the defense attorney, the court may, upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence that testifying in open court would be harmful or detrimental to the child, order that the testimony of a victim or witness who is a child twelve (12) years of age or under be taken outside the courtroom and the presence of the defendant and communicated to the courtroom by closed-circuit television.
    2. Any such motion shall only apply to the witnesses of the moving party and shall be filed no later than five (5) days before the trial is scheduled to begin, except in cases where, while testifying, it becomes apparent that the child cannot continue with his or her testimony.
  1. In ruling on the motion, the court shall consider the following factors:
    1. The age and maturity of the child;
    2. The possible effect that testimony in person may have on the child;
    3. The extent of the trauma the child has already suffered;
    4. The nature of the testimony to be given by the child;
    5. The nature of the offense, including, but not limited to, the use of a firearm or any other deadly weapon during the commission of the crime or the infliction of serious bodily injury upon the victim during the commission of the crime;
      1. Threats made to the child or the child's family in order to prevent or dissuade the child from attending or giving testimony at any trial or court proceeding or to prevent the child from reporting the alleged offense or from assisting in criminal prosecution.
      2. Threats under this subdivision (b)(6) may include, but not be limited to, threats of serious bodily injury to be inflicted on the child or a family member, threats of incarceration or deportation of the child or a family member, or threats of removal of the child from the family or dissolution of the family;
    6. Conduct on the part of the defendant or the defendant's attorney which causes the child to be unable to continue his testimony; and
    7. Any other matter which the court considers relevant.
      1. If the court orders that the child's testimony be taken by closed-circuit television, the testimony shall be taken outside the courtroom in the judge's chambers or in another suitable location designated by the judge.
      2. Examination and cross-examination of the child shall proceed as though he or she were testifying in the courtroom.
      3. The only persons who may be permitted in the room with the child during the child's testimony are:
        1. The judge or a judicial officer appointed by the court;
        2. The prosecutor;
        3. The defense attorney, except a pro se defendant;
        4. The child's attorney;
        5. Persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit television equipment; and
        6. Any person whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child.
    1. The defendant shall be afforded a means of private, contemporaneous communication with the defendant's attorney during the testimony.
  2. This section does not preclude the presence of both the victim and the defendant in the courtroom together for purposes of establishing or challenging the identification of the defendant when identification is a legitimate issue in the proceeding.
  3. This section does not apply if the defendant is an attorney pro se unless the defendant has a court-appointed attorney assisting the defendant in the defense, in which case only the court-appointed attorney shall be permitted in the room with the child during the child's testimony.
  4. Nothing in this section creates a right of a child witness to a closed-circuit television procedure in lieu of testifying in open court and the intent of this section is that testimony by closed-circuit television be used in limited circumstances.
  5. Videotapes of closed-circuit testimony which are part of the court record are subject to a protective order of the court for the purpose of protecting the privacy of the alleged victim.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1186, § 1.

16-43-1002. Certified facility dogs for child witnesses — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Certified facility dog” means a dog that has:
      1. Graduated from a program of an assistance dog organization that is a member of Assistance Dogs International or a similar nonprofit organization that attempts to set the highest standard of training for dogs for the purpose of reducing stress in a child witness by enhancing the ability of the child witness to speak in a judicial proceeding by providing emotional comfort in a high stress environment;
      2. Received two (2) years of training; and
      3. Passed the same public access test as a service dog;
    2. “Certified handler” means a person who has received training from an organization accredited by Assistance Dogs International, the American Kennel Club, Therapy Dogs Incorporated, or an equivalent organization on offering the person's animal for assistance purposes and has received additional training on the protocols and policies of courts, the expected roles of the person's animal assistance team, and the expected interaction so as not to interfere with the collection of evidence or the effective administration of justice; and
    3. “Child witness” means a witness testifying in a criminal hearing or trial whose age at the time of his or her testimony is eighteen (18) years of age or younger.
  2. Subject to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Arkansas Rules of Evidence, or other rule of the Supreme Court, if requested by either party in a criminal trial or hearing and if a certified facility dog is available within the jurisdiction of the judicial district in which the criminal case is being adjudicated, a child witness of the party shall be afforded the opportunity to have a certified facility dog accompany him or her while testifying in court.
  3. Before the introduction of a certified facility dog into the courtroom and outside the presence of the jury, the party desiring to utilize the presence of a certified facility dog shall file a motion certifying to the court the following information:
    1. The credentials of the certified facility dog;
    2. That the certified facility dog is adequately insured;
    3. That a relationship has been established between the child witness and the certified facility dog in anticipation of testimony; and
    4. That the presence of the certified facility dog may reduce anxiety experienced by the child witness while testifying in the criminal trial or hearing.
    1. If the court grants the motion under subsection (c) of this section, the certified facility dog shall be accompanied by the certified handler of the certified facility dog to the witness stand with the child witness in the absence of the jury.
    2. The jury shall be seated subsequent to the child witness’ and certified facility dog's taking their places in the witness stand.
  4. In the course of jury selection, with the court's approval under Rule 32.2 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, either party may voir dire prospective jury members on whether the presence of a certified facility dog to assist a child witness would create undue sympathy for the child witness or in any way serve as a prejudice to the defendant.
  5. In a criminal trial involving a jury in which the certified facility dog is utilized, the court shall present appropriate jury instructions that are designed to prevent prejudice for or against any party.

History. Acts 2015, No. 957, § 1.

Subchapter 11 — Disclosures of Genetic Information

16-43-1101. Compulsory disclosure.

No person or other entity who maintains genetic information shall be compelled to disclose such information pursuant to a request for compulsory disclosure in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding, unless:

  1. The request for compulsory disclosure is in accordance with court-ordered paternity testing in a civil action to determine paternity;
  2. The individual whose genetic information is requested is a party to the proceeding and the genetic information is at issue;
  3. The genetic information is for use in a law enforcement investigation or criminal trial; or
  4. The genetic information is for use in a law enforcement investigation where an insurer is reporting fraud or criminal activity.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1222, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

Subchapter 12 — Safeguards for Abused and Neglected Children Act

16-43-1201. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Safeguards for Abused and Neglected Children Act”.

History. Acts 2007, No. 703, § 15.

16-43-1202. Safeguards for child victims testifying in judicial and administrative proceedings.

In order to facilitate testimony that is fair and accurate, the following safeguards should be followed:

  1. The prosecuting attorney, victim-witness coordinator, attorney ad litem, or Office of Chief Counsel attorney shall inform the child about the nature of the judicial proceeding or administrative proceeding;
  2. The prosecuting attorney, victim-witness coordinator, attorney ad litem, or Office of Chief Counsel attorney shall explain:
    1. The oath that will be administered to the child; and
    2. That the judge will determine whether the child is competent to testify;
  3. The prosecuting attorney, victim-witness coordinator, attorney ad litem, or Office of Chief Counsel attorney shall explain to the child that if the child does not understand a question while testifying in the judicial proceeding or administrative proceeding, the child has a right to say that he or she does not understand the question;
  4. The prosecuting attorney, attorney ad litem, or Office of Chief Counsel attorney may file a motion to have the child testify at a time of day when the child is most alert and best able to understand questions posed in court;
  5. If it is in the child's best interests, the prosecuting attorney, attorney ad litem, or Office of Chief Counsel attorney may file a motion for the child to have a comfort item when testifying in a judicial or administrative proceeding;
  6. If it is in the child's best interests, the prosecuting attorney, attorney ad litem, or Office of Chief Counsel attorney may file a motion for the child to have a support person present when the child testifies in a judicial proceeding or an administrative proceeding; and
  7. The prosecuting attorney, attorney ad litem, or Office of Chief Counsel attorney shall consider the effect upon the child when the child is subjected to argumentative or harassing questions and shall make the proper objections when appropriate to ensure that the child is not subjected to argumentative or harassing questioning.

History. Acts 2007, No. 703, § 15.

Chapter 44 Depositions

Research References

Am. Jur. 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Depos. & Disc., § 108 et seq.

C.J.S. 26A C.J.S., Depos., § 1 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Constitutional Law—Confrontation ClauseArkansas Child Hearsay Exception Regarding Sexual Offenses, Abuse, Or Incest Is Unconstitutional. —George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792 (1991), 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 579.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Superseded]

16-44-101 — 16-44-121. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held, in Per Curiams dated November 24, 1986 and November 21, 1988, that this subchapter is superseded in its entirety by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, superseded §§ 16-44-107(a), 16-44-108, 16-44-114, and 16-44-11616-44-120; the Per Curiam of Nov. 21, 1988, superseded §§ 16-44-10116-44-106, 16-44-107(b), 16-44-10916-44-113, 16-44-115, and 16-44-121. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:16-44-101. Civil Code, § 606; C. & M. Dig., § 4205; Pope's Dig., § 5216; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-301.16-44-102. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, §§ 16, 17; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4212-4214; Pope's Dig., §§ 5224-5226; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-305, 28-306.16-44-103. Acts 1915, No. 290, § 17; C. & M. Dig., § 4206a; Pope's Dig., § 5218; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-308.16-44-104. Civil Code, § 626; C. & M. Dig., § 4222; Pope's Dig., § 5234; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-315.16-44-105. Civil Code, § 627; C. & M. Dig., § 4223; Pope's Dig., § 5235; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-316.16-44-106. Civil Code, § 628; C. & M. Dig., § 4224; Pope's Dig., § 5236; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-317.16-44-107. Civil Code, §§ 629, 637; Acts 1915, No. 290, § 20; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4225, 4230; Pope's Dig., §§ 5237, 5242; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-318, 28-323.16-44-108. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 4237; Pope's Dig., § 5249; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-332.16-44-109. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 20; C. & M. Dig., § 4238; Pope's Dig., § 5250; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-333.16-44-110. Civil Code, § 668; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4242, 4243; Pope's Dig., §§ 5254, 5255; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-336.16-44-111. Civil Code, § 669; C. & M. Dig., § 4244; Pope's Dig., § 5256; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-337.16-44-112. Civil Code, § 671; C. & M. Dig., § 4246; Pope's Dig., § 5258; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-339.16-44-113. Civil Code, § 642; C. & M. Dig., § 4247; Pope's Dig., § 5259; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-340.16-44-114. Civil Code, § 648; C. & M. Dig., § 4239; Pope's Dig., § 5251; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-346.16-44-115. Acts 1953, No. 335, Preliminary; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-347.16-44-116. Acts 1953, No. 335, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-348.16-44-117. Acts 1953, No. 335, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-349.16-44-118. Acts 1953, No. 335, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-350.16-44-119. Acts 1953, No. 335, § 6; 1957, No. 344, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-353.16-44-120. Acts 1953, No. 335, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-354.16-44-121. Acts 1957, No. 288, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-361.

Subchapter 2 — Criminal Proceedings

Effective Dates. Acts 1979, No. 1022, § 3: Apr. 18, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that there is presently great confusion as to whether present law allows the use of depositions in criminal cases by both the state and defense, that fundamental fairness requires that the use of depositions be reciprocal, and that there is need for clarification of the statute authorizing the taking of such depositions. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and for the effective and fair administration of justice, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 407, § 3: Mar. 13, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law authorizing videotaped depositions of minors who are victims of sexual offenses has been construed to preclude direct testimony by the minor victim at trial if a videotaped deposition is taken; that, in some circumstances, direct testimony should be allowed in addition to or in place of videotaped depositions; that the present interpretation has resulted in injustice, and this Act is immediately necessary to rectify the same. It is not the purpose of this Act to circumvent the original purpose of Act 368 of 1981, which was to protect the minor victim from the trauma of testifying in open court. However, it is recognized that in some limited circumstances the interest in protecting the child is outweighed by the interest in convicting a guilty defendant. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Accused's right to depose prospective witnesses before trial in state court. 2 A.L.R.4th 704.

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, Using the Freedom of Information Act as a Discovery Device, 1994 Ark. L. Notes 59.

Ark. L. Rev.

Jones, Lex, Lies & Videotape, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 613.

16-44-201. Authorization for deposition generally — Manner of taking — Use.

  1. The court or judge in vacation, or a Justice of the Supreme Court, may authorize either party to take the deposition of a material witness where there are reasonable grounds to apprehend that, before trial, the witness will die, will become mentally incapable of giving testimony or physically incapable of attending the trial, or will become a nonresident of the state. The materiality of the testimony and the reason for taking the deposition shall be shown by affidavit.
  2. The court or judge shall, by written order, prescribe the manner of taking the deposition whether by interrogatories or upon notice to the parties.
  3. Upon the death of the witness, or upon his becoming mentally incapable of testifying or a nonresident of the state and absent therefrom so that he could not be summoned, the deposition taken in pursuance of such order may be read as evidence, provided that the grounds of nonresidence and absence from the state shall not be sufficient unless the party wishing to use the deposition makes an affidavit that he has tried in good faith to procure the attendance of such witness and been unable to do so.

History. Crim. Code, § 154; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3112-3115; Pope's Dig., §§ 3946-3949; Acts 1979, No. 1022, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2011.

Cross References. Prisoners, deposition of, § 16-43-213.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Neither the Federal nor Arkansas Constitutions render this section unconstitutional on the basis that it does not provide for compulsory depositions in criminal proceedings. McDole v. State, 339 Ark. 391, 6 S.W.3d 74 (1999).

In General.

This section provides the method of taking depositions in criminal cases. Bailey v. State, 227 Ark. 889, 302 S.W.2d 796.

The right to take depositions in a law case rests upon statutory authority and in no case can the right be exercised unless the authority therefor exists. Russell v. State, 269 Ark. 44, 598 S.W.2d 96 (1980).

Due Diligence.

Mere issuance of a subpoena does not constitute due diligence that would justify continuance to take deposition of absent witness; the accused must also make an effort to ascertain what progress is being made in the due service of same. Jones v. State, 205 Ark. 806, 171 S.W.2d 298, 1943 Ark. LEXIS 247 (1943).

Defendant's application to take a deposition from a nonresident witness was properly overruled where the defendant did not exercise due diligence. Criner v. State, 236 Ark. 220, 365 S.W.2d 252 (1963).

Nonresidents.

Defendants in criminal cases are entitled to take the depositions of witnesses residing out of the state, and the Supreme Court will compel the circuit court by mandamus to make the order necessary to take depositions of nonresidents. Gibony v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 462 (1877).

Objection.

Where the prosecuting attorney signed a stipulation agreeing that the deposition of a certain witness might be taken before any notary public and waiving all formalities, and the deposition was taken before a justice of the peace and filed with the clerk six days before the trial, an objection at the trial that the deposition was not taken before a notary public was not taken in apt time. Seamster v. State, 74 Ark. 579, 86 S.W. 434 (1905).

Quashing Depositions.

It is proper to quash depositions not taken by consent or pursuant to order. McDonald v. State, 155 Ark. 142, 244 S.W. 20 (1922).

Subpoena duces tecum directing corporate official to appear at pretrial deposition with all records relating to work and pay records of co-workers involved in dispute was properly quashed despite defendant's claim that the information was relevant to his defense, since the issue of discrimination by the employer was irrelevant to the dispute and, moreover, there was not statutory authority for the taking of a pretrial deposition in such circumstances. Kelley v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in, Conner v. State, 75 Ark. App. 418, 58 S.W.3d 865 (2001).

Cited: State v. Russell, 271 Ark. 817, 611 S.W.2d 518 (1981); Shelton v. State, 287 Ark. 322, 699 S.W.2d 728 (1985).

16-44-202. Deposing witnesses upon showing of inability to attend trial — Use of depositions.

  1. If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or be prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that his or her testimony is material, and that it is necessary to take his or her deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice, the court at any time after the filing of an indictment or information may order, upon motion of either party and notice to the parties, that his or her testimony be taken by deposition and that any designated books, papers, documents, or tangible objects not privileged be produced at the same time and place. If a witness is committed for failure to give bail to appear to testify at a trial or hearing, the court on written motion of the witness and upon notice to the parties may direct that his or her deposition be taken. After the deposition has been subscribed, the court may discharge the witness.
  2. If a defendant is without counsel, the court shall advise him or her of the right provided for in subsection (a) of this section and assign counsel to represent him or her unless the defendant elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel. If it appears that a defendant at whose instance a deposition is to be taken cannot bear the expense thereof, the court may direct that the expenses of travel and subsistence of the defendant's attorney for attendance at the examination shall be paid by the state.
  3. A deposition shall be taken in the manner provided in civil actions. The court at the request of either party may direct that a deposition be taken on written interrogatories in the manner provided in civil actions.
  4. At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if it appears:
    1. That the witness is dead;
    2. That the witness is out of the State of Arkansas unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition;
    3. That the witness is unable to attend or testify because of sickness or infirmity; or
    4. That the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena. Any deposition may also be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness. If only a part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require him or her to offer all of it which is relevant to the part offered and any party may offer other parts.
  5. Objections to receiving in evidence a deposition or part thereof may be made as provided in civil actions.
  6. This section shall be applicable to city, district, and circuit courts of this state.

History. Acts 1971, No. 381, §§ 1, 4; 1979, No. 1022, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2011.1, 43-2011.4; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 184, 185.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “city, district” for “municipal, police” in (f).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' 1971 Criminal Discovery Act, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section authorized defendant, who was charged with drunken driving, to obtain for additional testing a perchlorate tube which the city police had used in making a blood-alchohol test. City of Rogers v. Municipal Court, 259 Ark. 43, 531 S.W.2d 257 (1976).

Error.

Where the deposition testimony of witnesses was obviously damaging to the defendant and it was especially critical that the jury be able to observe these witnesses on the stand, it was error to allow their testimony by deposition without any showing that the witnesses could not attend trial. Bennett v. State, 297 Ark. 115, 759 S.W.2d 799 (1988).

Expenses.

Where trial court had offered to allow the defendant to either bring four witnesses from out-of-state to testify at the trial or to take the depositions of an unlimited number of out-of-state witnesses, and the defendant chose to take the depositions, the defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the court's failure to also allow him expenses for out-of-state witnesses since apparently all of the witnesses suggested by the defendant appeared at the trial anyway. Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982).

Quashing Deposition.

Subpoena duces tecum directing corporate official to appear at pretrial deposition with all records relating to work and pay records of co-workers involved in dispute was properly quashed despite defendant's claim that the information was relevant to his defense, since the issue of discrimination by the employer was irrelevant to dispute and, moreover, there was no statutory authority for the taking of a pretrial deposition in such circumstances. Kelley v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in, Conner v. State, 75 Ark. App. 418, 58 S.W.3d 865 (2001).

Cited: Mosby v. State, 249 Ark. 17, 457 S.W.2d 836 (1970); Sanders v. State, 276 Ark. 342, 635 S.W.2d 222 (1982); Shelton v. State, 287 Ark. 322, 699 S.W.2d 728 (1985); Bussard v. State, 300 Ark. 174, 778 S.W.2d 213 (1989).

16-44-203. Videotaped deposition of alleged victim under 17 years of age in sexual offense prosecution.

  1. As used in this section, the term “videotaped deposition” means the visual recording on a magnetic tape, together with the associated sound, of a witness testifying under oath in the course of a judicial proceeding, upon oral examination and where an opportunity is given for cross-examination in the presence of the defendant and intended to be played back upon the trial of the action in court.
  2. In any prosecution for a sexual offense or criminal attempt to commit a sexual offense against a minor, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after notice to the opposing counsel, the court may, for good cause shown, order the taking of a videotaped deposition of any alleged victim under the age of seventeen (17) years. The videotaped deposition shall be taken before the judge in chambers in the presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's attorneys. Examination and cross-examination of the alleged victim shall proceed at the taking of the videotaped deposition in the same manner as permitted at trial under the provisions of the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence.
  3. Any videotaped deposition taken under the provisions of this section shall be admissible at trial and received into evidence in lieu of the direct testimony of the alleged victim. However, neither the presentation nor the preparation of such videotaped deposition shall preclude the prosecutor's calling the alleged victim to testify at trial if that is necessary to serve the interests of justice.
  4. Videotapes which are a part of the court record are subject to a protective order of the court for the purpose of protecting the privacy of the alleged victim.

History. Acts 1981, No. 368, §§ 1-3; 1983, No. 407, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2035 — 43-2037.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Notes, McGuire v. State: Arkansas Child Abuse Videotape Deposition Laws, Etc., 41 Ark. L. Rev. 155.

Jones, Lex, Lies & Videotape, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 613.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Arkansas Law Survey, Junean, Constitutional Law, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 111.

Survey—Evidence, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 205.

Note, Evidence — The Confrontation Clause — A Literal Right to a Face-to-Face Meeting, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 487 U.S. 1012, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988), 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 591.

Survey, Criminal Procedure, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 349.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section affords due process because it only applies to situations where the state has a compelling interest, the protection of children from sexual crimes against which children are virtually defenseless, and uses the least restrictive means of protecting that interest by applying only to sexual offenses against children. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986).

The state has a legitimate interest in the general welfare of minor victims of sex crimes and their protection against further trauma in relating the incident in a crowded courtroom, and this section applies the least restrictive means of carrying out that interest and adequately protects basic constitutional rights of the accused. Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710 S.W.2d 214 (1986).

This section provides a reasonable rule of thumb to guide judges in determining whether a videotaped deposition is justified; therefore, the term “good cause” is not unconstitutionally vague. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986); Davis v. State, 24 Ark. App. 152, 751 S.W.2d 11 (1988).

This section requires face-to-face confrontation between the victim, the defendant, and his attorney at the time the deposition is taken and provides the opportunity for cross-examination of the victim by the defendant; therefore, the defendant is not deprived of the right to confront his accuser or witnesses against him. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986).

This section involves procedure and evidence, but has not been preempted by rules of court, and is not an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990).

Construction.

The mandatory language of this section is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, when a videotaped deposition is taken of a minor victim, the victim's videotaped depositions must be viewed and heard at trial and entered into the record in lieu of the direct testimony of the alleged victim. State v. Lee, 277 Ark. 142, 639 S.W.2d 745 (1982).

Calling of Victim to Testify.

The provision in this section which permits the prosecutor to call the minor victim to testify even though the victim's testimony has been videotaped is not discriminatory; the advantage to the state, if any, resulting from that provision is rationally related to the state's interest in protecting young witnesses to the extent that the ends of justice will permit, and its exercise is conditioned upon a showing of necessity to serve the interest of justice. Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710 S.W.2d 214 (1986).

Competency.

The trial court did not err in failing to suppress a videotaped deposition of children's testimony on the ground that it contained no evidence that the children were qualified as to their competency to testify where, although the deposition as presented to the jury contained no questions pertaining to the children's competency to testify, the record clearly indicated that such questions were asked and answered but were inadvertently left off the videotape. Hendricks v. State, 15 Ark. App. 378, 695 S.W.2d 843 (1985).

The court declined to accept defendant's suggestion that it should alter its standard when reviewing the competency of witnesses in cases where testimony has been videotaped. In Arkansas the competency of children to testify in criminal matters has been found to be within the discretion of the trial court since at least 1869, and the court could see no good reason to adopt two different standards of review; one for cases where testimony is preserved on videotape, and another standard for when the witness testifies in person. Davis v. State, 24 Ark. App. 152, 751 S.W.2d 11 (1988).

Where competency of a witness is at issue on appellate review, there is no good reason to employ de novo review when testimony is by videotape and to employ an abuse-of-discretion standard of review when the witness testifies in person. Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990).

Where the victim's answers to questions were at times inconsistent, but more often than not she displayed a clear understanding of the undesirable consequences of telling a falsehood, and conversely, she understood the positive and desirable consequences of telling the truth, she clearly had “a moral awareness of the duty to tell the truth,” and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the victim was competent and in allowing her to testify by means of a videotaped deposition. Richard v. State, 306 Ark. 543, 815 S.W.2d 941 (1991).

Credibility.

Videotaped testimony does not deprive the jury of the opportunity of determining the victim's credibility. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986).

Good Cause.

Where the testimony of the grandparents indicated that the child could be seriously harmed if forced to appear before a jury, the evidence substantiated the trial judge's decision that it was in the best interest of the child to allow the videotaped deposition. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986).

This section does not require the state to submit its showing of good cause by expert testimony; therefore, the case-worker's testimony was properly accepted by the court as establishing good cause sufficient to allow a videotaped deposition, even though she had received no specialized training in dealing with victims of sexual abuse and had no contact with this victim prior to the crime. Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710 S.W.2d 214 (1986).

Trial judge made a finding of good cause, and in view of the girls' ages, the sexual abuse they had endured, and the social worker's testimony, judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting videotaped deposition. Cope v. State, 293 Ark. 524, 739 S.W.2d 533 (1987).

Although testimony about the emotional impact on the child witness would be desirable, under the facts in the case, the absence of such testimony was not fatal to the trial court's finding of good cause. Davis v. State, 24 Ark. App. 152, 751 S.W.2d 11 (1988).

Testimony of victim's mother provided ample basis for a finding of good cause. Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 884 S.W.2d 947 (1994).

Prejudicial Error.

Admission of videotaped deposition into evidence was prejudicial error in that the defendant was denied the right to cross-examine the child at the time she made her videotaped statement and the state was in effect permitted to offer the direct testimony of the victim twice, once through the videotape and once through live testimony. Cogburn v. State, 292 Ark. 564, 732 S.W.2d 807 (1987).

Cited: Lasiter v. State, 290 Ark. 96, 717 S.W.2d 198 (1986); Hegwood v. State, 297 Ark. 218, 760 S.W.2d 859 (1988); Logan v. State, 299 Ark. 255, 773 S.W.2d 419 (1989); Kester v. State, 303 Ark. 303, 797 S.W.2d 704 (1990); Cranford v. State, 303 Ark. 393, 797 S.W.2d 442 (1990).

Chapter 45 Affidavits

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the ARCP pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Effective Dates. Acts 1867, No. 102, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 83, § 4: effective on passage.

Research References

ALR.

Admissibility of affidavit to impeach witness. 14 A.L.R.4th 828.

Am. Jur. 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Affid., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 2A C.J.S., Affid., § 1 et seq.

16-45-101. Use of affidavits.

An affidavit may be read to verify a pleading; to prove the service of a summons, notice, or other process in an action; to obtain a provisional remedy, a stay of proceedings, or a warning order, upon a motion; and in any other case permitted by law.

History. Civil Code, § 600; C. & M. Dig., § 4199; Pope's Dig., § 5210; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-201.

Cross References. Proof of service by affidavit, § 16-58-116.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Sullivan, The Need for a Business or Payroll Records Affidavit for Use in Child Support Matters, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 651.

Case Notes

Opportunity to Cross-Examine.

An affidavit is not allowable on a trial of issues raised by the pleadings, unless an opportunity has been given the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant. Smith v. Feltz, 42 Ark. 355 (1883); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gillis, 89 Ark. 483, 117 S.W. 749 (1915); Johnson v. Johnson, 122 Ark. 276, 182 S.W. 897 (1916).

Cited: Hamlen & Son v. Allen, 186 Ark. 1104, 57 S.W.2d 1046 (1932).

16-45-102. Officials before whom affidavits may be made.

  1. An affidavit may be made in this state before a judge of the court, justice of the peace, notary public, clerk of a court, or mayor of a city or incorporated town.
  2. An affidavit may be made out of this state before a commissioner appointed by the Governor of this state to take depositions, or before a judge of a court, mayor of a city, notary public, or justice of the peace, whose certificate shall be proof of the time and manner of its being made.

History. Civil Code, §§ 602, 603; Acts 1895, No. 83, § 2, p. 111; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4202, 4203; Pope's Dig., §§ 5213, 5214; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-204, 28-205.

Cross References. Armed forces personnel making oath, affidavits before officers, § 16-2-104.

Case Notes

Validity.

An affidavit made to the correctness of a claim for a mechanic's lien is valid in this state when made in another state and valid under the law. Terry v. Klein, 133 Ark. 366, 201 S.W. 801 (1918).

Cited: Whitaker v. State, 37 Ark. App. 112, 825 S.W.2d 827 (1992).

16-45-103. Signature of affiant — Certificate of officer.

Every affidavit shall be subscribed by the affiant. The certificate of the officer before whom the affidavit is made shall be written separately following the signature of the affiant.

History. Civil Code, § 605; C. & M. Dig., § 4204; Pope's Dig., § 5215; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-206.

Case Notes

Construction.

The requirement that the affidavit shall be subscribed by the affiant is merely directory. Gill v. Ward, 23 Ark. 16 (1861); Mahan v. Owen, 23 Ark. (10 Barber) 347 (1861).

Compliance.

There was substantial compliance with statutory requirements with respect to consent to adoption where notary executed and acknowledged mother's signature, saw mother sign consent and heard explanation given to her by attorney, even though there was no evidence to effect that mother held up her hand while notary recited a formal oath. A & B v. C & D, 239 Ark. 406, 390 S.W.2d 116, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926, 86 S. Ct. 314, 15 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1965).

Cited: Thompson v. Self, 197 Ark. 70, 122 S.W.2d 182 (1938); Thomas v. Hawkins, 217 Ark. 787, 233 S.W.2d 247 (1950); Whitaker v. State, 37 Ark. App. 112, 825 S.W.2d 827 (1992).

16-45-104. Affidavit as to correctness of account.

    1. In a suit on an account, including without limitation a credit card account or other revolving credit account, in a court of this state, the affidavit of the plaintiff that the account is just and correct, taken and certified according to law, is sufficient to establish the account.
    2. However, if the defendant denies under oath the correctness of the account, the plaintiff is held to prove by other evidence the part of the account in dispute.
  1. An affidavit of account under subsection (a) of this section shall be attached to the complaint and shall contain:
    1. The name of:
      1. The creditor to whom the account is owed;
      2. The creditor pursuing collection of the account; and
      3. The debtor obligated to pay the account;
      1. A statement or disclosure of whether or not the debtor's account has been assigned or is held by the original creditor.
      2. If the account has been assigned, the affidavit shall state the name of the original creditor;
    2. A statement of the affiant's authority to execute the affidavit on behalf of the creditor, including the affiant's job title or relationship to the creditor;
    3. A statement that the affiant is familiar with the books and records of the creditor and the account;
    4. A statement that the information and amount stated in the affidavit is true and correct to the best of affiant's knowledge, information, and belief;
    5. The interest rate and the source of the interest rate; and
    6. The total amount due, including interest, at the time the affidavit is executed.

History. Acts 1867, No. 102, § 1, p. 210; C. & M. Dig., § 4200; Pope's Dig., § 5211; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-202; Acts 2011, No. 992, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added the (a) designation and rewrote (a); and added (b).

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not apply where, in an action on notes, an account is offered in evidence to show consideration for the notes. Boone v. Goodlett & Co., 71 Ark. 577, 76 S.W. 1059 (1903).

Default Judgment.

Where the action is not founded on a verified account, and the allegations of the complaint are denied in the answer, it is error to render judgment for plaintiff by default. Barnes v. Balz, 173 Ark. 417, 292 S.W. 391 (1927).

In action on open account supported by verified affidavit as to amount, judgment was properly entered in favor of plaintiff where defendant failed to appear. Terry v. Esso Std. Oil Co., 220 Ark. 694, 249 S.W.2d 577 (1952).

Where there was filed with the complaint a verified statement of the account, it was sufficient to support a default judgment. Walden v. Metzler, 227 Ark. 782, 301 S.W.2d 439 (1957)Questioned byMoore v. Robertson, 242 Ark. 413, 413 S.W.2d 872 (Ark. 1967)Questioned byEasley v. Inglis, 233 Ark. 589, 346 S.W.2d 206 (1961)Questioned byFitzwater v. Harris, 231 Ark. 173, 328 S.W.2d 501 (1959).

Failure to File.

A complaint in an action on a contract for services rendered is not, if it states a cause of action, demurrable (now, subject to motion to dismiss) because the plaintiff failed to file an affidavit to establish the account sued on, as required by this section. Bailey v. Fenter, 176 Ark. 1075, 5 S.W.2d 291 (1928).

Prima Facie Case.

Though an account sued on, duly verified, is prima facie correct, where the defendant does not deny its correctness under oath, such prima facie case may be overcome by the plaintiff's testimony showing that he had no account against the defendant. Wilbur v. Ellefson, 95 Ark. 403, 129 S.W. 812 (1910).

A verified account is prima facie correct. Chicago Crayon Co. v. Choate, 102 Ark. 603, 145 S.W. 197 (1912); Ike Stiel & Co. v. Geo. P. Ide & Co., 116 Ark. 244, 172 S.W. 871 (1915).

This section is merely a rule of evidence, and if the allegations of a verified complaint and the sworn-to items of the exhibit to that complaint are not controverted, the allegations sworn to would be a prima facie showing on which a judgment for the complainant would be sustained; the verity of the material in the statement may be denied by defendant by affidavit filed in the case, by verified answer, or by defendant's testimony under oath as a witness in the case. McWater v. Ebone, 234 Ark. 203, 350 S.W.2d 905 (1961).

Where plaintiff attached to his verified complaint a sworn statement of account listing only by numbers invoices with items of credit, such verified account was only prima facie evidence of its correctness, and defendant's answer denying each and every allegation of the complaint, together with his amended answer sworn to by his attorney and setting up a valid defense, was sufficient to join the issues of the case. McWater v. Ebone, 234 Ark. 203, 350 S.W.2d 905 (1961).

Company did not violate Ark. R. Civ. P. 10(d) by failing to attach to its complaint individual charge slips signed by a debtor; the complaint was accompanied by numerous documents on which its claim was based: a signed credit card application; invoices that bore the debtor's name and showed charges and payments made on the account; other statements of account; a card-member agreement containing contractual terms of usage and payment; and an affidavit of account. Cavalry SPV, LLC v. Anderson, 99 Ark. App. 309, 260 S.W.3d 331 (2007).

Sufficiency of Verification.

Judgment for plaintiff warranted. Clarke v. John Wanamaker, 184 Ark. 73, 40 S.W.2d 784 (1931); Cawood v. Pierce, 232 Ark. 721, 339 S.W.2d 861 (1960); Smith v. Chicot-Lipe Ins. Agency, 11 Ark. App. 49, 665 S.W.2d 907 (1984).

Affidavit of plaintiff, made before a notary public, was sufficient verification of itemized statement of open account. Burns v. Hall, 234 Ark. 943, 356 S.W.2d 235 (1962).

Cited: Rice v. Kroeck, 2 Ark. App. 223, 619 S.W.2d 691 (1981); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Adair, 15 Ark. App. 144, 690 S.W.2d 727 (1985).

16-45-105. Production of affiant for cross-examination upon motion to discharge provisional remedy.

Where a provisional remedy is granted upon an affidavit and a motion is made to discharge or vacate the remedy, either before or after pleading to the cause, the party against whom the remedy is granted may, by written notice to the party by whom it was obtained or by an order or rule of the court, require the production of the person who made the affidavit for cross-examination. Thereupon, the party notified shall produce the affiant within ten (10) days before an officer authorized to take depositions, at a time and place of which he shall give the adverse party three (3) days' notice. If the affiant is not produced, his affidavit shall be suppressed. If the affiant is produced, he may be examined by either party. If on cross-examination the affidavit shall be shown to be false, then the provisional remedy shall be discharged.

History. Civil Code, § 601; Acts 1895, No. 83, § 1, p. 111; C. & M. Dig., § 4201; Pope's Dig., § 5212; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-203.

Case Notes

Suppression.

It is only where the affidavit might be used as evidence that it can be suppressed, so that if an attachment is issued on an affidavit and the grounds of attachment are controverted, the affidavit cannot be used as evidence and should not be suppressed because of plaintiff's failure to produce the affiant for cross-examination. Churchill v. Hill, 59 Ark. 54, 26 S.W. 378 (1894).

Cited: Miller v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., 74 Ark. App. 237, 47 S.W.3d 288 (2001).

Chapter 46 Documentary Evidence Generally

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the ARCP pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Research References

Am. Jur. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evid., § 834 et seq.

C.J.S. 32 C.J.S., Evid., § 623 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. For comments regarding the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act, see Commentaries, Volume B.

Effective Dates. Acts 1953, No. 64, § 2: Feb. 13, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found that great difficulty and confusion exists in the application of rules of evidence respecting public and business records and that enactment of this law will greatly alleviate this situation and provide for more efficient administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1957, No. 294, § 5: Mar. 27, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “Because the alleged results of blind checking are being used by those engaged in contracting film and other forms of amusement and entertainment upon a percentage rental basis to intimidate exhibitors to settle rental claims for an amount in excess of the amount shown by the books of said exhibitors in order to avoid threats of litigation and the resulting adverse publicity, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 445, § 6: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 16, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that in order to insure candor, objectivity and the presentation of all pertinent information sought by committees reviewing the quality of medical and hospital care and thus contribute to the effective functioning of committees striving to determine and improve such care, an absolute privilege of confidentiality should be afforded to data elicited during the course of such inquiries and that the privilege of confidentiality should be provided for as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 885, § 5: became law without Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 31, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly that to protect the public and enhance patient care by allowing physicians to freely conduct peer review and quality review of medical and hospital care. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Admissibility of computerized private business records. 7 A.L.R.4th 8.

Admissibility in evidence of professional directories. 7 A.L.R.4th 638.

16-46-101. Recordation of certain certified copies — Photographic copies of business and public records.

    1. The clerk of any court of record may record any certified copy of any instrument by attaching the certified copy to his or her record book so as to make the copy be and become a part of the record to the extent that the copy cannot be detached, and the copy shall be legally recorded when the attachment has been made by the clerk. This subdivision (a)(1) shall apply to plats, blueprints, and photostatic copies only.
      1. The county recorders, municipal clerks and recorders, clerks of courts of record, and any public officers whose duty it is to make public records are authorized to use and employ an approved system of photographic recording, photostatic recording, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic recording, optical disc, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for reproducing the original when provided with equipment necessary for such method of recording.
      2. When any document is recorded by the means prescribed by subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, the original may be destroyed unless the document is over fifty (50) years old and handwritten or its preservation is otherwise required by law.
    1. If any business, institution, member of a profession or calling, or any department or agency of government, in the regular course of business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation, or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of the same to be recorded, copied, or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic, optical disk, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preservation is required by law.
    2. The reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether the original is in existence or not.
    3. An enlargement or facsimile of the reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of the court.
    4. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement, or facsimile does not preclude admission of the original.

History. Acts 1929, No. 189, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 5669; 1953, No. 64, § 1; 1963, No. 235, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-117, 28-932; Acts 1993, No. 1150, § 1; 1995, No. 454, § 1; 1995, No. 566, § 1; 1997, No. 636, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. For Comments regarding the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act, see Commentaries Volume B.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment inserted “optical disk” in (b)(1).

The 1995 amendment by No. 454 added (a)(2)(B); and inserted “photostatic recording, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic recording, optical disc, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for reproducing the original” in (a)(2)(A).

The 1995 amendment by No. 566 inserted “electronic imaging” in (b)(1).

The 1997 amendment inserted “municipal clerks and recorders” after “county recorders” in (a)(2)(A): and, in (a)(2)(B), inserted “the document is over fifty (50) years old and handwritten or” and inserted “otherwise.”

Cross References. Reproduction of records, § 14-2-201 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 332.

The Best Evidence Rule — A Rule Requiring the Production of a Writing to Prove the Writing's Contents, 14 Ark. L. Rev. 153.

Documentary Evidence — Arkansas, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 79.

Legislation — No. 235 — Photographic Copies of Documents Held in a Custodial or Fiduciary Capacity Admissible as Evidence, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 125.

Contents of Writings, Recordings and Photographs, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 357.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Sullivan, The Need for a Business or Payroll Records Affidavit for Use in Child Support Matters, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 651.

Case Notes

Docket Entries.

The docket entries of a justice of the peace are quasi-records and, when certified, are receivable in evidence. Gates v. Bennett, 33 Ark. 475 (1878).

Foundation.

There was no proper foundation made for the admission of a photostatic copy of a bill of lading, and under the best evidence rule or under the statutes the copy cannot be introduced until a proper foundation is made. Ebbert v. Hubbell Metals, Inc., 232 Ark. 971, 341 S.W.2d 768 (1961).

Where the microfilm copies of bank records were adequately identified by the bank's officer as being copies of records kept in the normal course of business, they were competent evidence. Reed v. State, 267 Ark. 1017, 593 S.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1980).

Cited: Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300, 241 Ark. 663, 408 S.W.2d 905 (1966); Simolin v. Wilson, 253 Ark. 545, 487 S.W.2d 603 (1972).

16-46-102. Writing filed with pleading read as genuine unless denied.

Where a writing purporting to have been executed by one (1) of the parties is referred to in and filed with a pleading, it may be read as genuine against that party unless he denies its genuineness by affidavit before the trial is begun.

History. Civil Code, § 580; C. & M. Dig., § 4114; Pope's Dig., § 5123; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-927.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to permit a party who files a written instrument with his pleadings to introduce it in evidence as genuine unless its genuineness is first denied under oath. J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Montgomery, 140 Ark. 487, 215 S.W. 638 (1919).

Affidavit.

The genuineness of the writing may be contested without filing the affidavits. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Smith, 82 Ark. 105, 100 S.W. 884 (1907); Hall v. T.M. Rea & Son, 85 Ark. 269, 107 S.W. 1176 (1908); Staggers v. White, 121 Ark. 328, 181 S.W. 139 (1915).

Though defendant filed an affidavit denying the genuineness of the note before trial, claiming that the amount filled in was incorrect, the note was properly admitted in evidence where he admitted signing it. Bailey v. Florsheim Bros. Dry Goods Co., 180 Ark. 293, 21 S.W.2d 171 (1929).

A note sued on was properly read in evidence where no affidavit was filed denying the genuineness of the signature. Winfrey v. Moss, 182 Ark. 525, 31 S.W.2d 956 (1930).

Company did not violate Ark. R. Civ. P. 10(d) by failing to attach to its complaint individual charge slips signed by a debtor; the complaint was accompanied by numerous documents on which its claim was based: a signed credit card application; invoices that bore the debtor's name and showed charges and payments made on the account; other statements of account; a card-member agreement containing contractual terms of usage and payment; and an affidavit of account. Cavalry SPV, LLC v. Anderson, 99 Ark. App. 309, 260 S.W.3d 331 (2007).

Burden of Proof.

Where, in a suit on a note or draft, its genuineness is denied by affidavit, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the execution of the note or draft. Ohio Galvanizing & Mfg. Co. v. Nichol, 170 Ark. 16, 279 S.W. 377 (1926); Ciscell v. Brazil, 206 Ark. 1019, 178 S.W.2d 250 (1944); United States v. Davis, 125 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Ark. 1954).

Where a defendant, sued on a note, relies on the defense that his signature as a joint maker is a forgery, the burden is his to show that fact where the note is filed as part of the original pleadings and is not denied before trial by answer or otherwise. Terrill v. Fowler, 175 Ark. 1010, 1 S.W.2d 75 (1928).

In a suit by a loan company to foreclose a mortgage, the canceled check bearing the mortgagor's endorsement was exhibited and the defendant denied that he received the money and alleged that their endorsement on the check or draft was a forgery, the burden was on the loan company to show that the mortgagors received the money. Lavender v. Buhrman-Pharr Hdwe. Co., 177 Ark. 656, 7 S.W.2d 755 (1928).

Where defendant before trial files an affidavit denying the execution of the instrument sued on, the plaintiff must prove its execution; but even without filing the affidavit, the defendant may show that it is void because of fraud. Harrell v. Southwest Mtg. Co., 180 Ark. 620, 22 S.W.2d 167 (1929).

In action against husband and wife on note allegedly executed by both, wife's affidavit, attached to answer, denying genuineness of signature, placed burden on holders to establish authenticity of her signature. Wasson v. Patton, 190 Ark. 397, 79 S.W.2d 276 (1935).

Failure to verify answer in foreclosure suit places upon defendant burden to prove she did not sign note and deed of trust and did not acknowledge the execution of the deed of trust. Callaway v. Ashby, 192 Ark. 929, 95 S.W.2d 907 (1936).

In action against husband and wife on note executed by husband and to foreclosure chattel mortgage also executed by him on an automobile in possession of his wife, wife, whose name did not appear on the note and mortgage, was not required to deny their genuineness by verified answer in order to prevent their being read in evidence against her. Bryant v. Lewis, 201 Ark. 288, 144 S.W.2d 37 (1940).

Directed Verdict.

Where defendant surety by affidavit denies the execution of the instrument sued on, and plaintiff offers no evidence on the issues so raised, it is proper to direct a verdict for defendant. J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Warren, 150 Ark. 542, 234 S.W. 618 (1921).

Prima Facie Evidence.

In an action on a promissory note, the note itself is prima facie evidence of its execution, in the absence of an affidavit by the purported maker denying the genuineness of his signature. Heathcock v. Brooke, 169 Ark. 73, 272 S.W. 843 (1925).

Mortgage, having been recorded, was admissible without proof of its execution, even though an affidavit of merit did not accompany the complaint. Jones v. Nix, 232 Ark. 182, 334 S.W.2d 891 (1960).

Writing Not Filed.

It was sufficient to invoke this section when the defendants answered plaintiff's request for admissions by denying execution under oath and alleging that the signatures to the note were forgeries when the note sued on was not attached to the complaint nor was defendants' answer verified. United States v. Davis, 125 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Ark. 1954).

Cited: Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Adair, 15 Ark. App. 144, 690 S.W.2d 727 (1985).

16-46-103. Surveys.

No survey made by any person except the county surveyor or his deputy shall be considered as legal evidence in any court of law or equity within this state unless the surveys are made under authority of the United States or by the mutual consent of the parties.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 1901; Pope's Dig., § 2418; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-918.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section, if literally construed, would be unconstitutional, but construed in connection with §§ 14-15-709, 14-15-710, and 14-15-712, it means that the certificate of any other surveyor than the county surveyor or his deputy shall not be admissible as documentary evidence of itself, without other proof. Smith v. Leach, 44 Ark. 287 (1884).

Prima Facie Evidence.

The only effect this section gives the county surveyor's certificate is to make it prima facie evidence of its correctness. Jeffries v. Hargus, 50 Ark. 65, 6 S.W. 328 (1887); Hobbs v. Clark, 53 Ark. 411, 14 S.W. 652 (1890).

The county surveyor's record of the survey made by him is only prima facie evidence of the correctness of the survey, and parol evidence of other surveys is admissible. Walters v. Meador, 211 Ark. 505, 201 S.W.2d 24 (1947).

16-46-104. Investigations of attendance at places of public amusement.

  1. No person employed as a private or confidential investigator shall undertake to determine the attendance or number of paid admissions at a public place of amusement and entertainment without first displaying to the owner or manager of such place his license or credentials as such investigator and receiving acknowledgment thereof in writing and filing a written and signed copy of such investigation and attendance record with the owner or manager immediately after the showing so checked and receiving acknowledgment thereof in writing.
  2. No evidence or testimony of any such investigator as to such admissions shall be admitted in any court in this state unless compliance with subsection (a) of this section is shown.
  3. Blind checking, also known as spot or random checking, of those attending public places of amusement and entertainment is declared to be against the public policy of the State of Arkansas, and any data, figures, or statistics compiled as a result of blind checking shall not be admitted as evidence in any case at law or equity.

History. Acts 1957, No. 294, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-714, 28-715.

16-46-105. Records of and testimony before committees reviewing and evaluating quality of medical or hospital care.

      1. The proceedings, minutes, records, or reports of organized committees of hospital medical staffs or medical review committees of local medical societies, or a committee organized by and operating pursuant to a written plan or policy under the auspices of a professional corporation or a professional limited liability company whose members are licensed to practice medicine in this state, having the responsibility for reviewing and evaluating the quality of medical or hospital care, and any records, other than those records described in subsection (c) of this section, compiled or accumulated by the administrative staff of such hospitals or a physician group peer review committee as defined under § 20-9-501 in connection with such review or evaluation, together with all communications or reports originating in such committees, shall not be subject to discovery pursuant to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or the Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq., or admissible in any legal proceeding and shall be absolutely privileged communications.
      2. The submission of such proceedings, minutes, records, reports, and communications to a hospital governing board or physician group peer review committee as defined under § 20-9-501 shall not operate as a waiver of the privilege.
    1. Neither shall testimony as to events occurring during the activities of such committees be subject to discovery pursuant to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure or the Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq., or admissible.
    1. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent disclosure of the data mentioned in subsection (a) of this section to appropriate state or federal regulatory agencies which by statute or regulation are entitled to access to such data, nor to:
      1. An organized committee of hospital medical staffs or governing boards where the medical practitioner seeks membership or clinical privileges; or
      2. A committee organized by and operating pursuant to a written plan or policy under the auspices of a professional corporation or a professional limited liability company whose members are licensed to practice medicine in this state.
    2. Further, nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent discovery and admissibility if the legal action in which such data is sought is brought by a medical practitioner who has been subjected to censure or disciplinary action by such agency or committee or by a hospital medical staff or governing board.
  1. Nothing in this section or § 20-9-308 shall be construed to apply to original hospital medical records, incident reports, or other records with respect to the care or treatment of any patient or to affect the discoverability or admissibility of such records.

History. Acts 1977, No. 445, §§ 1, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-934, 28-935; Acts 1995, No. 885, § 1; 1999, No. 1536, § 8; 2013, No. 441, §§ 3, 4.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment added the subdivision designations in (a); inserted “pursuant to … 25-19-101 et seq.” in (a)(1) and (a)(2); and inserted “subject to discovery” in (a)(2).

The 1999 amendment, in (a)(1), inserted “other than those records described in subsection (c) of this section” and added the last sentence; in (b), inserted the language “to organized … shall be construed,” inserted “agency or,” and added the language following “committee” in (b)(2); in (c), deleted “kept” preceding “with respect,” inserted “the care or treatment of,” and deleted “in the course of business of operating a hospital” following “any patient”; and made stylistic changes.

The 2013 amendment, in (a)(1)(A), inserted “or a committee organized . . . practice medicine in this state” and “or a physician group peer review committee as defined under § 20-9-501”; inserted “or physician group peer review committee as defined under § 20-9-501” in (a)(1)(B); inserted the (b)(1)(A) designation; substituted “An organized committee” for “organized committees” in (b)(1)(A); and added (b)(1)(B).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268.

Watkins, Access to Public Records Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 741.

Case Notes

Construction.

Circuit court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff surgeon's motion to compel discovery of peer review records regarding white physicians at the hospital in his suit alleging, inter alia, racial discrimination in the termination of his staff appointment and clinical privileges. Williams v. Baptist Health, 2019 Ark. App. 482, 587 S.W.3d 275 (2019), review granted, 2019 Ark. LEXIS 387 (Dec. 19, 2019), vacated, 2020 Ark. 350, 598 S.W.3d 487 (2020).

Plain language of subdivision (b)(2) of this section unambiguously provides an exception to the peer review privilege when the plaintiff in the legal action is the doctor who was adversely affected by the peer review proceedings. Nothing in the language of the exception supports the contention that it only allows a physician the right to obtain the medical records and documents reviewed and used in his own peer review proceedings. Williams v. Baptist Health, 2019 Ark. App. 482, 587 S.W.3d 275 (2019), review granted, 2019 Ark. LEXIS 387 (Dec. 19, 2019), vacated, 2020 Ark. 350, 598 S.W.3d 487 (2020).

Section 20-9-503(a)(1) is not read to forbid the use of peer review evidence in a doctor's lawsuit that challenges the peer review process. Rather, the statute appears to prohibit using peer review evidence in a lawsuit, such as a medical malpractice action, against a doctor that is based on the same conduct that led to the doctor's discipline. Williams v. Baptist Health, 2019 Ark. App. 482, 587 S.W.3d 275 (2019), review granted, 2019 Ark. LEXIS 387 (Dec. 19, 2019), vacated, 2020 Ark. 350, 598 S.W.3d 487 (2020).

Disciplinary Proceedings.

All records, documents and other information provided to the state medical board regarding revocation of the medical staff privileges of the defendant are absolutely privileged by Arkansas statutory provisions and cannot be discovered or admitted into evidence in a medical malpractice suit. Hendrickson v. Leipzig, 715 F. Supp. 1443 (E.D. Ark. 1989).

Nonprivileged Communications.

In a negligence action against doctors, hospital and nurses, the treating physician, who was a member of the hospital's pediatric committee, was allowed to testify as to his conversations with the manager and other hospital employees about the shortage of nurses. National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

Medication incident report was discoverable under subsection (c) because report was not prepared by or at the direction of any organized committee for committee purposes, rather, policy and procedures of hospital required such a report to be generated any time there was a variance between physician's orders with respect to administration of medication and actual administration of medication; medical incident reports were designed to contain contemporaneous statements. Cochran v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 909 F. Supp. 641 (W.D. Ark. 1995).

Personnel Records.

Response to reprimand was not a medical record, incident report, or other record kept with respect to any patient within the meaning of the language and intent of subsection (c), but instead was a record filed with the administrative staff which became a part of a disciplinary action kept with respect to one of hospital's personnel. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988).

Privileged Communications.

Trial court should have excluded nurse's written response as privileged communication as proscribed pursuant to subsection (a). HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988).

Records of a post-incident disciplinary proceeding were within the privilege of subsection (a). National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

Hospital statements taken from witnesses as part of a quality assurance or peer review proceeding were excluded from disclosure and were absolutely privileged communications pursuant to Arkansas statutes. Berry v. Saline Mem. Hosp., 322 Ark. 182, 907 S.W.2d 736 (1995).

Hospital's insurer did not have to respond to a production request seeking the production of documents reflecting the activities of the hospital's strategic quality management committee because those documents were protected by the quality assurance and review privilege provided for in this section. Clark v. Baka, No. 4:07-CV-00477 GTE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84570 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 9, 2008).

Statutory privilege set forth in this section encompasses records compiled by hospital administrative staff “in connection with” its quality-review process, not just the records from those cases that are ultimately referred to a quality-assurance committee (circuit court did not rule on plaintiff's argument concerning the subsection (c) exception, and thus it was not addressed on appeal). Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n v. Smith, 2019 Ark. App. 27, 569 S.W.3d 889 (2019).

Review of Discovery Orders.

In a patient's suit against a rehabilitation institute, where the institute was ordered to produce certain documents that it contended were privileged, certiorari was inappropriate because (1) the institute sought to reverse a discovery order, (2) the supreme court would be required to delve into the underlying merits of the controversy, and (3) the institute was asking the supreme court to interpret the statute at issue and determine whether the circuit court properly construed and applied it. Baptist Health v. Circuit Court, 373 Ark. 455, 284 S.W.3d 499 (2008).

Cited: Baxter County Newspapers, Inc. v. Medical Staff of Baxter Gen. Hosp., 273 Ark. 511, 622 S.W.2d 495 (1981); Saline Mem. Hosp. v. Berry, 321 Ark. 588, 906 S.W.2d 297 (1995).

16-46-106. Access to medical records.

    1. In contemplation of, preparation for, or use in any legal proceeding, any person who is or has been a patient of a doctor, hospital, ambulance provider, medical healthcare provider, or other medical institution shall be entitled to obtain access, personally or by and through his or her attorney, to the information in his or her medical records, upon request and with written patient authorization, and shall be furnished copies of all medical records pertaining to his or her case upon the tender of the expense of such copy or copies.
    2. Cost of each photocopy, excluding X-rays, shall not exceed fifty cents (50¢) per page for the first twenty-five (25) pages and twenty-five cents (25¢) for each additional page. A labor charge not exceeding fifteen dollars ($15.00) may be added for each request for medical records under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, and the actual cost of any required postage may also be charged.
    3. Provided, however, in the alternative to the labor charge described in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, a reasonable retrieval fee for stored records of a hospital, a physician's office, or an ambulance provider may be added to the photocopy charges, only if the requested records are stored at a location other than the location of the hospital, physician's office, or ambulance provider.
    4. Provided, further, this section shall not prohibit reasonable fees for narrative medical reports or medical review when performed by the physician or medical institution subject to the request, but only if a narrative medical report or medical review is requested by the person or entity requesting the records.
    1. If a doctor believes a patient should be denied access to his or her medical records for any reason, the doctor must provide the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney a written determination that disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the individual's health or well-being.
      1. At such time, the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney may select another doctor in the same type practice as the doctor subject to the request to review such information and determine if disclosure of such information would be detrimental to the patient's health or well-being.
      2. If the second doctor determines, based upon professional judgment, that disclosure of such information would not be detrimental to the health or well-being of the individual, the medical records shall be released to the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney.
    2. If the determination is that disclosure of such information would be detrimental, then it either will not be released or the objectionable material will be obscured before release.
    3. The cost of this review of the patient's record will be borne by the patient or the patient's guardian or attorney.
  1. Nothing in this section shall preclude the existing subpoena process; however, if a patient is compelled to use the subpoena process in order to obtain access to, or copies of, their own medical records after reasonable requests have been made and a reasonable time has expired, then the court issuing the subpoena and having jurisdiction over the proceedings shall grant the patient a reasonable attorney's fee plus costs of court against the doctor, hospital, or medical institution.
  2. This section does not apply to the Division of Correction.

History. Acts 1991, No. 767, §§ 1, 2; 1995, No. 708, § 1; 1999, No. 333, §§ 1, 2; 2007, No. 662, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 855.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment added the language beginning “however” in (c).

The 1999 amendment inserted “medical health care provider” following “ambulance provider” in (a)(1); and inserted “or an ambulance provider” following “records of a hospital” in (a)(3).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (d).

Case Notes

Sales Tax.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a records company and the Department of Department of Finance and Administration and denied a patient's motion because the company's transfer of copies of the patient's medical records to her was subject to sales tax where the transfer constituted a sale of tangible personal property, payment for the copies constituted valuable consideration, and the patient failed to demonstrate that her request for the copies was exempted from taxation. Holbrook v. Healthport, Inc., 2014 Ark. 146, 432 S.W.3d 593 (2014).

Cited: Chartone, Inc. v. Raglon, 373 Ark. 275, 283 S.W.3d 576 (2008).

16-46-107. Identification of medical bills at trial.

  1. Upon the trial of any civil case involving injury, disease, or disability, the patient, a member of his family, or any other person responsible for the care of the patient shall be a competent witness to identify doctor bills, hospital bills, ambulance service bills, drug bills, and similar bills for expenses incurred in the treatment of the patient upon a showing by the witness that such bills were received from a licensed practicing physician, hospital, ambulance service, pharmacy, drug store, or supplier of therapeutic or orthopedic devices, and that such expenses were incurred in connection with the treatment of the injury, disease, or disability involved in the subject of litigation at trial.
  2. Such items of evidence need not be identified by the person who submits the bill, and it shall not be necessary for an expert witness to testify that the charges were reasonable and necessary.

History. Acts 1993, No. 424, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Evidence, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 127.

Case Notes

Chiropractic Services.

Order finding plaintiff's medical expenses excessive in her personal injury action against defendant was upheld because plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony that her chiropractic treatment was medically necessary and reasonable; the only evidence presented was plaintiff's own self-serving testimony and an invoice from her chiropractor. Young v. Barbera, 92 Ark. App. 70, 211 S.W.3d 29 (2005), rev'd, 366 Ark. 120, 233 S.W.3d 651 (2006).

Expenses Incurred.

This section did not apply to orthodontic and dental estimates for future medical treatment. This section plainly states that a patient is competent to identify bills for expenses “incurred”, and plaintiff admitted that he had not incurred the expenses. Dale v. White, 2018 Ark. App. 172, 545 S.W.3d 812 (2018).

Jury Instruction.

Driver's medical bills were admitted into evidence, and that decision was made before the case went to the jury, and thus the statute had no relevance to the issues that would be before the jury; allowing a jury instruction, modified by the statute, would have been more confusing than helpful to the jury in this case. Reed v. Adamec, 2014 Ark. App. 170 (2014).

16-46-108. Photographically reproduced records admissible in court.

    1. Any record or set of records or photographically reproduced copies of such records which would be admissible under Rule 803(6) or (7) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence shall be admissible in evidence in any court in this state upon the affidavit of the person who would otherwise provide the prerequisites of Rule 803(6) or (7) that such records attached to such affidavit were in fact so kept as required by Rule 803(6) or (7), provided, further, that such record or records, along with such affidavit, are filed with the clerk of the court for inclusion with the papers in the cause in which the record or records are sought to be used as evidence at least fourteen (14) days prior to the day upon which the trial of said cause commences, and provided the other parties to said cause are given prompt notice by the party filing same of the filing of such record or records and affidavit, which notice shall identify the name and employer, if any, of the person making the affidavit, and such records shall be made available to the counsel for other parties to the action or litigation for inspection and copying.
    2. The expense for copying shall be borne by the party, parties, or persons who desire copies and not by the party or parties who file the records and serve notice of said filing in compliance with this rule.
    3. Notice shall be deemed to have been promptly given if it is served in the manner contemplated by Rule 27(a)(2) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure fourteen (14) days prior to commencement of the trial in said cause.
  1. A form for the affidavit of such person as shall make such affidavit as is permitted in subsection (a) of this section shall be sufficient if it follows this form, though this form shall not be exclusive, and an affidavit which substantially complies with the provisions of this rule shall suffice, to wit:

No. John Doe (Name of Plaintiff) v. John Roe (Name of Defendant) IN THE COURT OF COUNTY, Arkansas AFFIDAVIT Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared , who, being by me duly sworn, deposed as follows: My name is , I am of sound mind, capable of making this affidavit, and personally acquainted with the facts herein stated: I am the custodian of the records of . Attached hereto are pages of records from . These said pages of records are kept by in the regular course of business, and it was the regular course of business of for an employee or representative of , with knowledge of the act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis, recorded to make the record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such record; and the record was made at or near the time or reasonably soon thereafter. The records attached hereto are the original or exact duplicates of the original. Affiant SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me on the day of , 19 . My commission expires: Notary Public, State of Arkansas Notary's printed name

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1136, § 1.

Case Notes

Admissibility.

Finding in favor of the beneficiaries and against the intestate heirs in a will-contest action was proper where the beneficiaries satisfied the requirements of Ark. R. Evid. 803(6) and proved that the bank's records were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule and, even though the officer was not the custodian of the records, that did not bar the admission; further, the records were adequately authenticated under Ark. R. Evid. 901 because the officer repeatedly testified that the copies were true and accurate copies of the records that they depicted. Metzgar v. Rodgers, 83 Ark. App. 354, 128 S.W.3d 5 (2003).

In an action to collect unpaid credit card debt, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding business records which reflected a credit card debt owed by the cardholder because the documents were supported by an affidavit that complied with subsection (b) of this section. The cardholder never claimed a lack of notice and made no objection to the admission of the business records. Ozark Capital Corp. v. Pullen, 2012 Ark. App. 652 (2012).

Orthodontic and dental estimates were not admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 803(6) where plaintiff failed to cite this section or explain how his proffered certificate of acknowledgement met the statutory requirements. Dale v. White, 2018 Ark. App. 172, 545 S.W.3d 812 (2018).

Notice.

It is proper to exclude either the date of filing or the first day of trial when computing the 14-day statutory period pursuant to this section, but it is improper to exclude both dates from the computation. Phelan v. Discover Bank, 361 Ark. 138, 205 S.W.3d 145 (2005).

Prejudice or Confusion.

The fact that medical records fell within § 16-46-108 and Evid. Rule 803(6) did not equate to automatic admissibility, and the trial court properly excluded such evidence to prevent possible prejudice or confusion. Lovell v. Beavers, 336 Ark. 551, 987 S.W.2d 660 (1999).

Cited: Clater v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 92 (2020).

16-46-109. Proceedings, minutes, records, or reports confidential.

    1. The proceedings, minutes, records, or reports of the quality assurance committees having the responsibility for reviewing and evaluating the quality of medical, nursing, or other care delivered in a long-term care facility, or of professional consultants engaged by long-term care facilities to study quality-of-care issues identified by the committee, and any other records, other than those records described in subsection (c) of this section, compiled or accumulated by the staff of a facility in connection with the review or evaluation, together with all communications or reports originating in the committee are:
      1. Exempt from discovery and disclosure to the same extent that proceedings, minutes, records, or reports of committees evaluating quality of medical or hospital care are exempt under § 16-46-105(a)(1);
      2. Not admissible in any legal proceeding; and
      3. Absolutely privileged communication.
    2. Testimony as to events occurring during the activities of the committee is:
      1. Exempt from discovery and disclosure to the same extent that testimony before committees evaluating quality of medical or hospital care are exempt under § 16-46-105(a)(2); and
      2. Not admissible as evidence in any legal proceeding.
  1. This section does not prevent disclosure of the data mentioned in subsection (a) of this section to an appropriate state or federal regulatory agency that by statute, rule, or regulation is entitled to access to the data.
    1. This section does not apply to or affect the discovery or admissibility into evidence in a civil proceeding of the following records:
      1. Records or reports made in the regular course of business by a long-term care facility or other healthcare provider that are not created by or for the committee;
      2. Records or reports otherwise available from original sources, including without limitation the medical record of specific residents;
      3. Records or reports required to be kept by applicable law, rule, or regulation that are not created by or for the committee;
      4. Incident and accident reports;
      5. The long-term care facility's operating budgets; or
      6. Records of the committee's meeting dates.
    2. Without waiving any privilege, appointments to the committee are available to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Attorney General's office.

History. Acts 2009, No. 198, § 3; 2019, No. 315, §§ 1299, 1300.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “rule” in (b) and in (c)(1)(C).

Subchapter 2 — Public Records as Evidence Generally

Cross References. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 16-4-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1853, § 4, p. 199: effective on passage.

Acts 1949, No. 293, § 6: approved Mar. 19, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Due to the fact that litigants in the courts of this State are unable to make use of books of account and copies of the records of the agencies and departments of the United States and by reason thereof are compelled to expend huge sums and are denied the right of a speedy and economical disposition of their business in the courts of this State, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being also necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, the same shall take effect and be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1975, No. 285, § 4: Mar. 3, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared that uncertainty as to the admissibility in evidence of copies of schedules, classifications, and tariffs as provided for in this Act has resulted in delays and inefficiencies in the administration of judicial proceedings in the courts of this state and that it is essential to the welfare of this state and her inhabitants that these delays and inefficiencies be remedied. Therefore, this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Admissibility in state court proceedings of police reports, 31 A.L.R.4th 913.

Ark. L. Rev.

Documentary Evidence — Arkansas, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 79.

16-46-201 — 16-46-203. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning statute books and official documents of cities and towns as evidence, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 9[10]–11[12]. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-46-201. Rev. Stat., ch. 59, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 4115; Pope's Dig., § 5124; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-901.

16-46-202. Rev. Stat., ch. 59, §§ 2, 3; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4116, 4117; Pope's Dig., §§ 5125, 5126; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-902, 28-903.

16-46-203. Rev. Stat., ch. 59, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 4129; Pope's Dig., § 5138; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-904.

16-46-204. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning copies of proceedings before a justice of the peace as evidence, was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 19, § 1. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 59, §§ 4, 5; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4118, 4119; Pope's Dig., §§ 5127, 5128; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-905, 28-906.

16-46-205 — 16-46-210. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning certain copies of documents as evidence, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 12[13]–17[18]. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-46-205. Rev. Stat., ch. 18, § 6; Acts 1853, § 2, p. 199; Civil Code, § 487; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4122, 4123, 4128; Pope's Dig., §§ 5131, 5132, 5137; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-908 — 28-910.

16-46-206. Rev. Stat., ch. 59, §§ 11, 13; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4130, 4132; Pope's Dig., §§ 5139, 5141; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-912, 28-913.

16-46-207. Rev. Stat., ch. 59, § 12; C. & M. Dig., § 4131; Pope's Dig., § 5140; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-914.

16-46-208. Rev. Stat., ch. 59, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 4133; Pope's Dig., § 5142; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-915.

16-46-209. Rev. Stat., ch. 59, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 4120; Pope's Dig., § 5129; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-916.

16-46-210. Acts 1853, § 24, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 4127; Pope's Dig., § 5136; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-917.

16-46-211. Notary's protest.

  1. The protest made by a notary public under his hand and seal of office shall be evidence of the facts contained in the protest.
  2. The certificate of a notary public, under his hand and seal of office, that he forwarded notice of protest shall be prima facie evidence of the fact stated in the certificate.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 20, § 11; Acts 1859, No. 234, § 1, p. 300; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4125, 4126; Pope's Dig., §§ 5134, 5135; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-922, 28-923.

Cross References. Declarations, protests, and acknowledgments taken by notary admissible as evidence of facts, § 21-14-110.

Case Notes

Foreign Notary.

A certificate of protest of a note by a notary of another state attested by his seal is prima facie evidence that the acts indicated were done by him. Fletcher v. Arkansas Nat'l Bank, 62 Ark. 265, 35 S.W. 228 (1896).

Cited: Peters v. Hobbs, 25 Ark. 67 (1867).

16-46-212. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning authenticated copies or transcripts of federal documents, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 18[19]. The section was derived from Acts 1949, No. 293, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-931.

16-46-213. Records of United States Surface Transportation Board and Arkansas Department of Transportation.

Printed copies of schedules, classifications, and tariffs of rates, fares, and charges, and supplements to the printed copies, of all common carriers and contract carriers by railroad, motor vehicle, or otherwise, on file with the United States Surface Transportation Board or the Arkansas Department of Transportation and which reflect a United States Surface Transportation Board number and an effective date, or which reflect an Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department or Arkansas Department of Transportation number and an effective date, may be received in evidence in any proceeding before the courts or administrative agencies of this state, without certification or authentication, and shall be presumed to be correct copies of the original schedules, classifications, tariffs, and supplements on file with the United States Surface Transportation Board or on file with the Arkansas Department of Transportation.

History. Acts 1975, No. 285, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-933; Act 2017, No. 707, § 38.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “United States Surface Transportation Board” for “Interstate Commerce Commission” in the section heading and throughout the section; substituted “Department of Transportation” for “State Highway and Transportation Department” in the section heading and throughout the section; substituted “to the printed copies” for “thereto”, and inserted “or Arkansas Department of Transportation” preceding “number”; and made stylistic changes.

Subchapter 3 — Hospital Records Act

Effective Dates. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 10: Feb. 27, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that presently custodians of hospital records must appear personally in court to verify such records resulting in the waste of a large amount of time of hospital personnel with a resulting increase in cost of medical care; that medical records custodians should be allowed to certified their records for the court and not appear personally in court to verify the same; and that this Act is immediately necessary to so provide. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Admissibility of computerized private business records. 7 A.L.R.4th 8.

Physician-patient privilege as extending to patient's medical or hospital records. 10 A.L.R.4th 552.

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.

16-46-301. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Custodian” means the medical records librarian and the administrator or other chief officer of a duly licensed hospital, physician's office, or comprehensive community mental health center in this state and its proprietor, as well as his or her deputies and assistants, and any other persons who are official custodians or depositories of records; and
    1. “Records” means hospital records, physician's records, or medical records and includes an admitting form, discharge summary, history and physical, progress notes, physicians' orders, reports of operations, recovery room records, lab reports, consultation reports, medication records, nurses' notes, and other reports catalogued and maintained by the hospital's medical record department or by a physician's office.
    2. However, “records” shall not mean and include X-rays, electrocardiograms, and similar graphic matter.

History. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-936; Acts 1993, No. 274, § 1; 2007, No. 662, § 2.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment redesignated former (1) as (2) and (2) as (1); redesignated the two sentences of present (2) as (2)(A) and (B); in (1), inserted “or comprehensive community mental health center” and substituted “his deputies” for “their deputies”; and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Cited: Washington v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 565, 506 S.W.3d 893 (2016).

16-46-302. Furnishing copies of records in compliance with subpoenas.

Except as hereinafter provided, when a subpoena duces tecum is served upon a custodian of records of any hospital or physician's office duly licensed under the laws of this state in an action or proceeding in which the hospital or physician's office is neither a party nor the place where any cause of action is alleged to have arisen and such a subpoena requires the production of all or any part of the records of the hospital or physician's office related to the care or treatment of a patient in the hospital or physician's office, then it shall be sufficient compliance therewith if the custodian delivers, by hand or by registered mail to the court clerk or the officer, court reporter, body, or tribunal issuing the subpoena or conducting the hearing, a true and correct copy of all records described in the subpoena together with the affidavit described in § 16-46-305. However, a subpoena duces tecum for records shall not be deemed to include X-rays, electrocardiograms, and similar graphic matter unless they are specifically referred to in the subpoena.

History. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-937; Acts 2007, No. 662, § 3.

Cross References. Subpoena for production of documentary evidence, ARCP 45.

Case Notes

Admissibility.

Where the custodian of hospital X rays attached an affidavit to the X rays and hospital records stating that the records were authentic, the trial court did not err in allowing the state medical examiner to use the X rays in order to prove the identity of the murder victim. Surridge v. State, 279 Ark. 183, 650 S.W.2d 561 (1983).

Cited: Mosley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 29, 732 S.W.2d 861 (1987).

16-46-303. Sealing, identification, and direction of copies.

The copy of the records shall be separately enclosed in an inner envelope or wrapper, sealed, with the title and number of the action, the name of the custodian, and the date of subpoena clearly inscribed thereon. The sealed envelope or wrapper shall then be enclosed in an outer envelope or wrapper, sealed, and directed as follows:

  1. If the subpoena directs attendance in court, to the clerk or the judge of the court;
  2. If the subpoena directs attendance at a deposition, to the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken, at the place designated in the subpoena for the taking of the deposition or at his place of business;
  3. In other cases, to the officer, body, or tribunal conducting the hearing, at a like address.

History. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-938.

Case Notes

Cited: Mosley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 29, 732 S.W.2d 861 (1987).

16-46-304. Opening of sealed envelopes.

  1. Unless the sealed envelope or wrapper is returned to the custodian who is to appear personally, the copy of the records shall remain sealed and shall be opened only at the time of trial, deposition, or other hearing, upon the direction of the judge, court, officer, body, or tribunal conducting the proceeding, in the presence of all parties who have appeared in person or by counsel at such trial, deposition, or hearing. Before directing that the inner envelope or wrapper be opened, the judge, court, officer, body, or tribunal shall first ascertain that either:
    1. The records have been subpoenaed at the instance of the patient involved or his counsel of record; or
    2. The patient involved or someone authorized in his behalf to do so for him has consented thereto and waived any privilege of confidentiality involved.
  2. Records which are not introduced in evidence or required as part of the record shall be returned to the person or entity from whom received.

History. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-939.

Case Notes

Construction.

The legislature designed this section to be in accord with the other “physician privilege” statute, Evid. Rule 503, by limiting the privilege to confidential communications. McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73, 847 S.W.2d 28 (1993).

Blood tests.

The results of blood tests are not considered to be confidential information and therefore it is proper to admit them. McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73, 847 S.W.2d 28 (1993).

Noncompliance.

Blood alcohol report was introduced into evidence without compliance with this section where there was no indication whatsoever that the report was sealed in an inner envelope which was also sealed in an outer envelope. Mosley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 29, 732 S.W.2d 861 (1987).

16-46-305. Affidavit of custodian as to copies — Charges.

  1. The records shall be accompanied by an affidavit of a custodian stating in substance:
    1. That the affiant is the duly authorized custodian of the records and has authority to certify the records;
    2. That the copy is a true copy of all the records described in the subpoena; and
    3. That the records were prepared by personnel of the hospital, staff physicians, or persons acting under the control of either, or the physician, personnel of the physician's office, or persons acting under control of the physician, in the ordinary course of the hospital's or physician's office business at or near the time of the act, condition, or event reported therein.
  2. If the hospital or physician's office has none of the records described, or only part of them, the custodian shall state so in the affidavit and file the affidavit and any records as are available in the manner described in §§ 16-46-302 and 16-46-303.
  3. The custodian of the records may enclose a statement of costs for copying the records, and the costs of copying the records shall be borne by the party requesting the subpoena duces tecum for the records.

History. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-940; Acts 2007, No. 662, § 4.

16-46-306. Admissibility of copies and affidavits.

The copy of the record shall be admissible in evidence to the same extent as though the original record was offered and the custodian had been present and testified to the matters stated in the affidavit.

History. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-941.

16-46-307. Personal attendance of custodian — Production of original record.

  1. Where the personal attendance of the custodian is desired, the subpoena duces tecum shall contain a clause which reads: “The personal attendance of the custodian of records is necessary.”
  2. Where both the personal attendance of the custodian and the production of the original record are desired, the subpoena duces tecum shall contain a clause which reads: “The original records and the personal attendance of the custodian of records are necessary.”
  3. Where the personal attendance of the custodian is requested, the reasonable cost of producing the records and expenses for personal attendance shall be borne by the party requesting the subpoena.

History. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-942.

16-46-308. Substitution of copies for original records.

In view of the property right of the hospital or physician's office in its records, original records may be withdrawn after introduction into evidence and copies substituted unless otherwise directed by the court, judge, officer, body, or tribunal conducting the hearing. The custodian may prepare copies of original records in advance of testifying for the purpose of making substitution of the original record, and the reasonable charges for making the copies shall be borne by the party requesting the subpoena. If copies are not prepared in advance, they can be made and substituted at any time after introduction of the original record, and the reasonable charges for making the copies shall be borne by the party requesting the subpoena.

History. Acts 1981, No. 255, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 28-943; Acts 2007, No. 662, § 5.

Subchapter 4 — Patient Medical Records Privacy Act

16-46-401. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Patient Medical Records Privacy Act”.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1436, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

16-46-402. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

    1. “Medical records” means hospital or clinic records, physicians' records, or other healthcare records and includes an admitting form, discharge summary, history and physical, progress notes, physicians' orders, reports of operations, recovery room records, lab reports, consultation reports, medication records, nurses' notes, and other reports catalogued and maintained by the medical records department of a hospital, doctor's office, medical clinic, or any other medical facility.
    2. “Medical records” includes X-rays, computed tomography imaging, magnetic resonance imaging, electrocardiograms, radiographic studies, and other testing that generates a printed result; and
  1. “Party in litigation” means any person who requests copies of a patient's medical records from any doctor, hospital, or other custodian of records for use in any civil legal proceeding.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1436, § 1.

16-46-403. Notice required.

  1. Any party in litigation that receives or obtains a copy of a patient's medical records from a doctor, hospital, or other custodian of records by using a subpoena, court order, or consent form signed by the patient shall provide written notice of the receipt of the records to the:
    1. Patient; or
    2. Patient's attorney if the patient is represented by an attorney.
  2. The notice required by subsection (a) of this section may be made by:
    1. Any form of mail addressed to the person to be served with a return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee or the agent of the addressee; or
    2. Facsimile with a receipt or transaction report showing that the transmittal was received.
  3. The notice required by subsection (a) of this section shall include the name and address of the provider for each record that was obtained.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1436, § 1.

16-46-404. Use of medical records at trial.

If notice is not given as required by § 16-46-403, a party in litigation shall be prohibited from introducing the patient's medical records into evidence or referring to the patient's medical records in any manner in a legal proceeding relating to the patient.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1436, § 1.

16-46-405. Scope of subchapter.

  1. This subchapter shall apply to private litigants in civil actions only and shall not alter the rights, duties, or responsibilities of any person or entity in any other type of legal proceeding, including, but not limited to, actions under the Workers' Compensation Law, § 11-9-101 et seq.
  2. All provisions of this subchapter shall be subject to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191.
  3. Upon adoption of a Supreme Court rule which is substantially similar to the provisions of this subchapter, this subchapter shall be deemed superseded.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1436, § 1.

U.S. Code. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110, Stat. 1936, referred to in (b), is codified throughout Titles 18, 26, 29 and 42 of the U.S. Code.

Chapter 47 Acknowledgment and Proof of Instruments

Research References

Am. Jur. 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowl., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 1A C.J.S., Acknowl., § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 13, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1887, No. 91, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 150, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1919, No. 45, § 3: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Feb. 4, 1919.

Acts 1921, No. 233, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1923, No. 464, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1945, No. 263, § 3: Mar. 20, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “That due to the fact that a number of our citizens are far away from home and are out of the state and nation and have no opportunity to appear before some state officer for the purpose of having their signature acknowledged, and that a number of citizens of the State of Arkansas are in the armed forces and have been required and forced by law to sign various papers that should be properly acknowledged, it is hereby declared that an emergency exists and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, this act shall take effect and be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1955, No. 101, § 5: Feb. 23, 1955. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds it to be a fact, and so declares, that many instruments contain defective acknowledgments due to errors in the preparation thereof, without fault upon the part of the person, firm or corporation so executing said instruments; that these defective acknowledgments hamper the sale of real estate throughout the State and retard the development of industries and other businesses in the State of Arkansas; that this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 714, § 75: Mar. 25, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that existing law relating to such matters as homestead, dower, curtesy, statutory allowances payable from a decedent's estate, and the right of a surviving spouse to take against the will of a decedent, do not in all circumstances provide for equal treatment between the sexes, that the constitutionality of such existing law has been drawn into question by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court, and that there is an urgent need to insure that the law provides equality in the property rights and interest of married persons. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 2013, No. 999, § 6: Apr. 8, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that many instruments affecting title to real estate are being found to not provide constructive notice because of defects in the certificates of acknowledgment; and that this act is immediately necessary to protect property rights and interests. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Ark. L. Notes.

Atkinson, Laurence, The Avoidance by an Arkansas Bankruptcy Trustee of a Mortgage Defectively Acknowledged, 2003 Arkansas L. Notes 1.

16-47-101. Proof or acknowledgment as prerequisite to recording real estate conveyances.

All deeds and other instruments in writing for the conveyance of any real estate, or by which any real estate may be affected in law or equity, shall be proven or duly acknowledged in conformity with the provisions of this act, before they or any of them shall be admitted to record.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, § 22; C. & M. Dig., § 1525; Pope's Dig., § 1835; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-211.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, § 22, is also codified as § 18-12-201.

Meaning of “this act”. Chapter 31 of the Revised Statutes, codified as §§ 16-47-101, 16-47-10316-47-106, 16-47-110, 18-12-101, 18-12-102, 18-12-104, 18-12-105, 18-12-201, 18-12-20318-12-206, 18-12-209, 18-12-301, 18-12-402, 18-12-501, 18-12-502, 18-12-60118-12-603.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Property, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 225.

Case Notes

Defective Acknowledgment.

Even though an acknowledgment may have been defective, it would not affect the validity of the mortgage as between the makers. Rogers v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 304 Ark. 143, 801 S.W.2d 36 (1990).

Where a mortgage lien was defective because the mortgage deed failed to comply with the acknowledgement requirements in § 16-47-106 and this section, a creditor was not entitled to reformation of the contract because the trustee had the same rights as a bona fide purchaser under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(a)(3), and those rights would be prejudiced by the imposition of an equitable lien. Williams v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 422 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009).

Failure to Acknowledge.

Unacknowledged mortgage is not entitled to record, and, if recorded, its record is of no validity. Moore v. Ollson, 105 Ark. 241, 150 S.W. 1028 (1912).

Where neither the offer and acceptance nor the purchaser's agreement was acknowledged, they were not recordable and therefore the purchasers of the realty were without means of giving record notice to the world of their equitable interest in the property. Sorrells v. Bailey Cattle Co., 268 Ark. 800, 595 S.W.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1980).

Curative statute, § 18-12-208, did not operate to cure a mortgage deed that failed to comply with the acknowledgement requirements in this section and § 16-47-101 because the transaction occurred after the passage of the statute. Thus, a mortgage lien was not perfected and could be avoided by a trustee under 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 544(a) and 550(a). Williams v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 422 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009).

Recorded affidavit of lost mortgage, with a copy of the mortgage appended, was not constructive notice to a bankruptcy trustee of the mortgagee's interest in the subject property because the affidavit was not an “instrument of writing affecting title,” under § 14-15-404(a)(1), as (1) the affidavit did not affect title, since the affidavit's purpose was to give notice that there was a mortgage executed which was lost, and (2) an instrument affecting real estate had to be acknowledged before being admitted to record, under this section, but the grantor did not acknowledge the affidavit, nor was the grantor required to, as the affidavit was witnessed and notarized only for the purpose of attesting to the signature of the lender's employee who stated the mortgage was lost and the bank claimed an interest in the property, so the trustee, as a bona fide purchaser for value, under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544, could avoid the mortgagee's lien. Wetzel v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 2010 Ark. 242 (2010).

—Constructive Notice.

A recorded lease which was not acknowledged would not be constructive notice; however, the fact that it was recorded might be considered in determining whether the purchaser had actual notice before purchasing. Prince v. Alford, 173 Ark. 633, 293 S.W. 36 (1927).

Recorded contract of senior purchaser of real estate did not constitute constructive notice to junior purchasers where it was not properly acknowledged. Wyatt v. Miller, 255 Ark. 304, 500 S.W.2d 590 (1973).

Unacknowledged lease was not valid against purchasers who had no actual knowledge of the lease and could not be charged with constructive notice; accordingly, such lease was properly cancelled. George v. George, 267 Ark. 823, 591 S.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1979).

Mortgage lien was not perfected and could be avoided by a trustee under 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 544(a) and 550(a), who was also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees, because an acknowledgement that did not comply with§ 16-47-106 and this section did not provide constructive notice. The omission of the debtor's name alone would not have been fatal, as the omitted information could have been filled in by reference to the document as a whole; however, omission of the name plus the use of a different gender led to an ambiguity that would have required extrinsic evidence. Williams v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 422 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009).

Lis Pendens.

As a lis pendens is not an instrument in writing for the conveyance of any real estate or by which any real estate may be affected in law or equity, acknowledgment of the lis pendens is not required under this section. Benefit Bank v. Rogers, 2012 Ark. 419, 424 S.W.3d 812 (2012).

Cited: McGuire v. Bell, 297 Ark. 282, 761 S.W.2d 904 (1988); In re Bearhouse, Inc., 99 B.R. 926 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1989).

16-47-102. Forms of acknowledgments — Validity — Acknowledgments of married persons.

  1. Either the forms of acknowledgments now in use in this state or any other forms which specify, in the caption or otherwise, the state and county or other place where the acknowledgment is taken, and which set out the name of the person acknowledging and, in instances where he or she acknowledges otherwise than in his or her own right, the name of the person, association, or corporation for which he or she acknowledges, and which recite in substance or the equivalent that the execution of the instrument was acknowledged by the person so named as acknowledging, or any other form of acknowledgment provided by law, may be used in the case of all deeds and other instruments in writing for the conveyance of real or personal property, or whereby such property is to be affected in law or equity, and also in any other case where such acknowledgment is for any purpose required or authorized by law. An acknowledgment in any of these forms shall be sufficient to entitle the instrument to be recorded and to be read in evidence.
  2. The acknowledgment of a married person, both as to the disposition of his or her own property and as to the relinquishment of dower, curtesy, and homestead in the property of a spouse, may be made in the same form as if he or she were sole and without any examination separate and apart from a spouse, and without necessity for a specific reference therein to the interest so conveyed or relinquished.

History. Acts 1937, No. 44, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 1831; Acts 1981, No. 714, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-201.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1937, No. 44, § 1, as amended, is also codified as § 18-12-202.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Drafting Instruments for Purchase and Conveyancing of Land, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 26.

Case Notes

Failure to Acknowledge.

Unacknowledged lease was not valid against purchasers who had no actual knowledge of the lease and could not be charged with constructive notice; accordingly, such lease was properly cancelled. George v. George, 267 Ark. 823, 591 S.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1979).

Cited: Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 184 S.W.2d 906 (1945); Upshaw v. Wilson, 222 Ark. 78, 257 S.W.2d 279 (1953).

16-47-103. Officers authorized to take proof or acknowledgment of real estate conveyances.

  1. The proof or acknowledgment of every deed or instrument of writing for the conveyance of any real estate shall be taken by one of the following courts or officers:
    1. When acknowledged or proven within this state, before the Supreme Court, the circuit court, the chancery court, or any judges thereof, the clerk of any court of record, any county or probate judge, or before any justice of the peace or notary public;
    2. When acknowledged or proven outside this state, and within the United States or its territories, or in any of the colonies or possessions or dependencies of the United States, before any court of the United States, or any state or territory, or colony or possession or dependency of the United States, having a seal, or a clerk of any such court, or before any notary public, or before the mayor of any incorporated city or town, or the chief officer of any city or town having a seal, or before a commissioner appointed by the Governor of this state;
    3. When acknowledged or proven outside the United States, before any court of any state, kingdom, or empire having a seal; any mayor or chief officer of any city or town having an official seal; or before any officer of any foreign country who by the laws of that country is authorized to take probate of the conveyance of real estate of his own country if the officer has, by law, an official seal.
  2. The acknowledgment of any deed or mortgage, when taken outside the United States, may be taken and certified by a United States consul.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, § 13; Acts 1875, No. 13, § 1, p. 58; 1887, No. 91, § 1, p. 142; 1897, No. 26, § 1, p. 33; 1899, No. 150, § 1, p. 276; C. & M. Dig., § 1516; Acts 1921, No. 233, § 1; 1923, No. 464, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., § 1825; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 49-202, 49-203.

Publisher's Notes. For acts validating prior acknowledgments by certain officers, see Acts 1873, No. 36, § 2; 1875, No. 13, § 2; 1897, No. 26, § 2; 1899, No. 150, § 2.

Rev. Stat., ch. 31, § 13, as amended, is also codified as § 18-12-203.

Cross References. Commissioners in other states may take acknowledgments, § 25-16-204.

Notaries public may take acknowledgments, § 21-14-106.

Case Notes

Interested Party.

An acknowledgment taken by an officer who was a party to the deed does not entitle the instrument to record, and a record of it will impart no notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers; however, the defect may be cured by a proper curative statute. Green v. Abraham, 43 Ark. 420 (1884).

A notary public is not disqualified to take an acknowledgment to a mortgage by reason of the fact that he had acted as agent for the mortgagor in obtaining the loan of money which the mortgage was intended to secure. Penn v. Garvin, 56 Ark. 511, 20 S.W. 410 (1892).

A surety on a note secured by a mortgage has such an interest therein as will disqualify him from taking the mortgagor's acknowledgment. Leonhard v. Flood, 68 Ark. 162, 56 S.W. 781 (1900).

Officer of Other State.

An acknowledgment taken by a justice of the peace or chairman of a county court of another state is invalid. Worsham v. Freeman, 34 Ark. 55 (1879).

Uniform Acknowledgment Act.

This section was not superseded by § 16-47-201 et seq., as those sections merely provide an alternative law on the subject of acknowledgments. Rumph v. Lester Land Co., 205 Ark. 1147, 172 S.W.2d 916 (1943).

Cited: Biscoe v. Byrd, 15 Ark. 655 (1855).

16-47-104. Attestation of acknowledgments.

  1. In cases of acknowledgment or proof of deeds or conveyances of real estate taken within the United States or territories thereof, when taken before any court or officer having a seal of office, the deed or conveyance shall be attested under the seal of office. If the officer has no seal of office, then it shall be attested under the official signature of the officer.
  2. In all cases of deeds and conveyances proven or acknowledged outside the United States or its territories, the acknowledgment or proof must be attested under the official seal of the court or officer before whom the probate is had.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, §§ 14, 15; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1517, 1518; Pope's Dig., §§ 1826, 1827; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 49-204, 49-205.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, §§ 14, 15, are also codified as § 18-12-204.

Case Notes

Within United States.

Acknowledgment before a county court of another state must be authenticated by the seal of the court. Worsham v. Freeman, 34 Ark. 55 (1879).

16-47-105. Certificate of acknowledgment.

Every court or officer that shall take the proof or acknowledgment of any deed or conveyance of real estate, or the relinquishment of dower of any married woman in any conveyance of the real estate of her husband, shall grant a certificate thereof and cause the certificate to be endorsed on the deed, instrument, conveyance, or relinquishment of dower, which certificate shall be signed by the clerk of the court where probate is taken in court or by the officer before whom the probate is taken and sealed, if he has a seal of office.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, § 16; C. & M. Dig., § 1519; Pope's Dig., § 1828; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-206.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, § 16, is also codified as § 18-12-205.

Case Notes

Seal.

When an acknowledgment is taken before an officer having an official seal, it should be authenticated by such seal. Little v. Dodge, 32 Ark. 453 (1877).

The absence from a notary's seal of the emblems and devices required by statute does not invalidate his certificate of the acknowledgment of a deed. Sonfield v. Thompson, 42 Ark. 46 (1883).

Signature.

An acknowledgment to the execution of a deed of trust is invalid if the notary does not sign his name thereto, although he does affix the imprint of his official seal. Davis v. Hale, 114 Ark. 426, 170 S.W. 99 (1914).

Sufficiency of Certificate.

It is not sufficient for the officer to certify in general terms that the deed was proved; it should appear from the certificate that the witness was sworn, and that he stated that the party whose name appears to the deed signed it, or executed it, or acknowledged that he had done so, or some such language amounting to proof of the execution of the deed; and it must appear that such proof was made by one of the attesting witnesses, unless it is made to appear that the subscribing witnesses are dead or cannot be had. Trammell v. Thurmond, 17 Ark. 203 (1856).

The certificate of a clerk of a court of record of another state to the acknowledgment of the execution of a deed is admissible as evidence without attestation of his official character by the judge of the court. Ferguson v. Peden, 33 Ark. 150 (1878).

Where there is in fact an appearance and acknowledgment of a deed in some manner, then the official certificate of acknowledgment is conclusive of every fact appearing on its face, and evidence of what passed at the time of the acknowledgment is inadmissible to impeach the certificate, except in case of fraud or imposition in obtaining the acknowledgment, and where knowledge or notice of the fraud or imposition is brought home to the grantee. Holt v. Moore, 37 Ark. 145 (1881); Meyer v. Gossett, 38 Ark. 377 (1882).

16-47-106. Manner of making acknowledgment — Proof of deed or instrument — Proof of identity of grantor or witness.

  1. The acknowledgment of deeds and instruments of writing for the conveyance of real estate, or whereby such real estate is to be affected in law or equity, shall be by the grantor appearing in person before a court or officer having the authority by law to take the acknowledgment and stating that he had executed the deed or instrument for the consideration and purposes therein mentioned and set forth.
  2. When a deed or instrument referred to in subsection (a) of this section is to be proved, it shall be done by one (1) or more of the subscribing witnesses personally appearing before the proper court or officer and stating on oath that he saw the grantor subscribe the deed or instrument of writing or that the grantor acknowledged in his presence that he had subscribed and executed the deed or instrument for the purposes and consideration therein mentioned, and that he had subscribed the deed or instrument as a witness at the request of the grantor.
  3. If any grantor has not acknowledged the execution of a deed or instrument referred to in subsection (a) of this section, and the subscribing witnesses are dead or cannot be had, then the deed or instrument may be proved by the evidence of the handwriting of the grantor and of at least one (1) of the subscribing witnesses, which evidence shall consist of the deposition of two (2) or more disinterested persons, swearing to each signature.
  4. When any grantor in any deed or instrument that conveys real estate, or whereby any real estate may be affected in law or equity, or any witness to any like instrument, shall present himself before any court or other officer for the purpose of acknowledging or proving the execution of the deed or instrument, if the grantor or witness shall be personally unknown to the court or officer, his identity and his being the person he purports to be on the face of such instrument of writing shall be proven to the court or officer, which proof may be made by witnesses known to the court or officer, or by the affidavit of the grantor or witness if the court or officer shall be satisfied therewith. The proof or affidavit shall also be endorsed on the deed or instrument of writing.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, §§ 17-20; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1520-1523; Pope's Dig., §§ 1829, 1830, 1832, 1833; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 49-207 — 49-210.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, §§ 17-20, are also codified as § 18-12-206.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

The Best Evidence Rule — A Rule Requiring The Production of A Writing to Prove The Writing's Contents, 14 Ark. L. Rev. 153.

Authentication and Identification, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 332.

Case Notes

Proof of Acknowledgment.

Where there was no substantial evidence that the wife had signed or even knew of either a note or a mortgage which her husband had secured from bank for a loan to pay off his company's debts, the trial court properly denied the foreclosure of the mortgage on the lands belonging to the wife. Security Bank v. Paul, 268 Ark. 548, 594 S.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1980).

Where a mortgage lien was defective because the mortgage deed failed to comply with the acknowledgement requirements in this section and § 16-47-101, a creditor was not entitled to reformation of the contract because the trustee had the same rights as a bona fide purchaser under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(a)(3), and those rights would be prejudiced by the imposition of an equitable lien. Williams v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 422 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009).

Under §§ 21-14-111, 16-47-205, and 28-68-304(a)(3)(A), the decedent's attorney's secretary signed the certificate of acknowledgement for the November 20 power of attorney before the decedent signed the instrument, and this improper notarization of the acknowledgement was fatal to the validity of the November 20 power of attorney. Jones v. Owen, 2009 Ark. 505, 342 S.W.3d 265 (2009).

Sufficiency of Acknowledgment.

The acknowledgment must show that the deed was executed “for the consideration and purposes” therein expressed. The words “consideration” and “purposes” are both material, and if either is omitted, and no word of similar import is used, the acknowledgment is insufficient. Johnson v. Godden, 33 Ark. 600 (1878); Ford v. Burks, 37 Ark. 91 (1881); Drew County Bank & Trust Co. v. Sorben, 181 Ark. 943, 28 S.W.2d 730 (1930); Donham v. Davis, 208 Ark. 824, 187 S.W.2d 722 (1945).

The word “uses” is not of similar import or substantially the same as the word “consideration” required by this section. Martin v. O'Bannon, 35 Ark. 62 (1879).

An acknowledgment to a mortgage that it was “executed for the consideration and premises hereinafter set forth” sufficiently complied with this section to entitle the mortgage to be recorded. First Nat. Bank v. Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co., 188 Ark. 642, 67 S.W.2d 599 (1934).

A so called “deed within a deed” was not a proper instrument for recordation; the fact that it appeared within an instrument which was duly recorded did not cure the defect of the lack of acknowledgment required by this section. Additionally, title to the interests in question had already vested ownership, and so, although it may have been proper for the chancellor to have received this instrument into evidence, it was clearly error for him to decree that the defective “quit-claim deed” was cured by § 16-47-108. Andrews v. Heirs of Bellis, 297 Ark. 3, 759 S.W.2d 532 (1988).

Mortgage lien was not perfected and could be avoided by a trustee under 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 544(a) and 550(a), who was also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees, because an acknowledgement that did not comply with this section and § 16-47-101 did not provide constructive notice. The omission of the debtor's name alone would not have been fatal, as the omitted information could have been filled in by reference to the document as a whole; however, omission of the name plus the use of a different gender led to an ambiguity that would have required extrinsic evidence. Williams v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 422 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009).

Validity of Instruments.

If the acknowledgment fails to state the consideration, the mortgage, although recorded, is void against subsequent purchasers, even with notice; however, it is good between the parties. Conner v. Abbott, 35 Ark. 365 (1880).

The omission of the word “consideration” or words of similar import in the acknowledgment of a mortgage renders the record thereof no notice to third parties. Atlas Supply Co. v. McAmis, 185 Ark. 1168, 51 S.W.2d 982 (1932).

Where a deed was not properly acknowledged, this deficiency was not cured by the attempt after the grantor's death to authenticate the signature; therefore, this instrument was not entitled to the weight given to a properly recorded deed. Frazier v. Frazier, 263 Ark. 768, 567 S.W.2d 629 (1978).

Curative statute, § 18-12-208, did not operate to cure a mortgage deed that failed to comply with the acknowledgement requirements in this section and § 16-47-101 because the transaction occurred after the passage of the statute. Thus, a mortgage lien was not perfected and could be avoided by a trustee under 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 544(a) and 550(a). Williams v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 422 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009).

Witnessing Signature.

This section requires that two witnesses to a signature on an instrument actually witness the signing of the instrument rather than testify as to the authenticity of the signature. Frazier v. Frazier, 263 Ark. 768, 567 S.W.2d 629 (1978).

Cited: Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 184 S.W.2d 906 (1945); In re Bearhouse, Inc., 99 B.R. 926 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1989).

16-47-107. Forms for acknowledgment.

  1. For all deeds, conveyances, deeds of trust, mortgages, and other instruments in writing affecting or purporting to affect the title of any real estate situated in this state and executed by corporations, business trusts, estates, partnerships, limited liability companies, associations, joint ventures, or any other legal entities, the following form is deemed to be a valid acknowledgment and sufficient for recordation or entry into evidence under § 18-12-202:
  2. For all deeds, conveyances, deeds of trust, mortgages, and other instruments in writing affecting or purporting to affect the title of any real estate situated in this state and executed by individuals, the following form is deemed to be a valid acknowledgment and sufficient for recordation or entry into evidence under § 18-12-202:
  3. For all deeds, conveyances, deeds of trust, mortgages, and other instruments in writing affecting or purporting to affect the title of any real estate situated in this state and executed by attorneys in fact, the following form is deemed to be a valid acknowledgment and sufficient for recordation or entry into evidence under § 18-12-202:
  4. All deeds or instruments affecting or purporting to affect the title to land executed in the above and foregoing form listed in subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section as applicable, shall be good and sufficient.
  5. The bracketed language listed in subsections (a), (b), and (c) above, suggests alternate language and is not required to be in an acknowledgment when the alternate language is not applicable.
  6. The use of the present or past tense in the form of acknowledgment shall not affect the validity of the acknowledgement.
  7. The heading of the acknowledgment may list either:
    1. The county where the officer executing the acknowledgment resides; or
    2. The county where the acknowledgment occurred.

“State of County of On this day of , 20 , before me, , a Notary Public, (or before any officer within this State or without the State now qualified under existing law to take acknowledgments), duly commissioned, qualified and acting, within and for said County and State, appeared in person the within named and , (being the person or persons authorized by said corporation, [business trust, estate, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, or other legal entity] to execute such instrument, stating their respective capacities in that behalf), to me personally well known (or satisfactorily proven to be such person), who stated that [he, she, or they] was [were] the [and ] of the , a corporation [business trust, estate, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, or other legal entity], and was [were] duly authorized in [his, her, or their] respective capacity [capacities] to execute the foregoing instrument(s) for and in the name and behalf of said corporation [business trust, estate, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture or other legal entity], and further stated and acknowledged that [he, she, or they] had so signed, executed, and delivered said foregoing instrument for the consideration, uses, and purposes therein mentioned and set forth. “IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal this day of , 20 . (Notary Public)”

Click to view form.

“State of County of On this day of , 20 , before me, , a Notary Public, (or before any officer within this State or without the State now qualified under existing law to take acknowledgments), appeared the within named [and ], to me personally well known (or satisfactorily proven to be such person), who stated and acknowledged that [he, she, or they] had so signed, executed and delivered said foregoing instrument for the consideration, uses and purposes therein mentioned and set forth. “IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal this day of , 20 . (Notary Public)”

Click to view form.

“State of County of On this the day of , 20 , before me, , the undersigned officer, personally appeared , known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed as attorney in fact for , and acknowledged that [he or she] executed the same as the act of [his or her] principal for the consideration, uses, and purposes therein contained. IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF I hereunto set my hand and official seal. Title of Officer.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1919, No. 45, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 1526; Pope's Dig., § 1836; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-212; Acts 2013, No. 999, § 1[3]; 2015, No. 1152, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 999, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 1”.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1919, No. 45, § 1, is also codified as § 18-12-207.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “Forms for acknowledgment” for “Acknowledgment by corporations” in the section heading; in (a), substituted “corporations, business trusts, estates, partnerships, limited liability companies, associations, joint ventures, or any other legal entities, the following form is deemed to be a valid acknowledgment and sufficient for recordation or entry into evidence under § 18-12-202” for “corporations, the form of acknowledgment shall be as follows” and updated the form; and added (b), (c), (e), (f), and (g) and redesignated former (b) as (d).

The 2015 amendment, in (c), substituted “[he or she]” for “he” and substituted “[his or her]” for “his.”

Case Notes

Compliance.

A notary's certificate attached to a deed purported to be executed by a corporation, which recited that the president of the corporation had appeared and under oath stated that the seal of the corporation had been affixed to the deed by virtue of a resolution of the directors and had been signed by the president and secretary by virtue of such resolution, showed an acknowledgment, although a defective one. Steers v. Kinsey, 68 Ark. 360, 58 S.W. 1050 (1900).

This section must be substantially complied with, and courts cannot by intendment suggest important words. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rieff, 181 Ark. 798, 27 S.W.2d 1008 (1930).

16-47-108. Validation of instruments affecting title to property.

All deeds, conveyances, deeds of trust, mortgages, marriage contracts, and other instruments in writing, affecting or purporting to affect the title to any real estate or personal property situated in this state, which have been recorded and which are defective or ineffectual:

  1. Because of failure to comply with § 18-12-403; or
  2. Because the officer who certified the acknowledgment or acknowledgments to such instruments omitted any words required by law to be in the certificate or acknowledgments; or
  3. Because the officer failed or omitted to attach his seal to such certificate; or
  4. Because the officer attached to any such certificate a seal not bearing the words and devices required by law; or
  5. Because the officer was a mayor of a city or an incorporated town in the State of Arkansas and as such was not authorized to certify to executions and acknowledgments to such instruments, or was the deputy of an official duly authorized by law to take acknowledgments but whose deputy was not so authorized; or
  6. Because the notary public failed to state the date of the expiration of his commission on the certificate of acknowledgment, or incorrectly stated it thereon; or
  7. Because the officer incorrectly dated the certificate of acknowledgment or failed to state the county wherein the acknowledgment was taken; or
  8. Because the acknowledgment was certified in any county of the State of Arkansas by any person holding an unexpired commission as notary public under the laws of the state who had, at the time of the certification, ceased to be a resident of the county within and for which he or she was commissioned;

shall be as binding and effectual as though the certificate of acknowledgment or proof of execution was in due form, bore the proper seal, and was certified to by a duly authorized officer.

History. Acts 1955, No. 101, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-213.

Publisher's Notes. For prior validation acts, see Acts 1873, No. 11, §§ 5, 6, p. 13; Acts 1873, No. 17, §§ 1, 2, p. 25; Acts 1873, No. 41, §§ 1, 2, p. 83; Acts 1883, No. 69, § 6, p. 106; Acts 1883, No. 80, § 1, p. 128; Acts 1885, No. 117, § 1, p. 191; Acts 1893, No. 43, § 1, p. 66; Acts 1893, No. 172, § 1, p. 303; Acts 1895, No. 33, § 1, p. 37; Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 21, § 1, p. 58; Acts 1899, No. 56, § 1, p. 107; Acts 1899, No. 175, § 1, p. 313; Acts 1901, No. 41, § 1, p. 79; Acts 1903, No. 87, § 1, p. 150; Acts 1903, No. 87, § 2, p. 150; Acts 1907, No. 147, § 1, p. 354; Acts 1911, No. 24, § 1; Acts 1913, No. 148, § 1; Acts 1915, No. 54, § 1; Acts 1917, No. 142, § 1, p. 765; Acts 1917, No. 142, § 2, p. 765; Acts 1919, No. 333, § 1; Acts 1919, No. 524, § 1; Acts 1923, No. 80, § 1; Acts 1923, No. 185, § 1; Acts 1935, No. 72, § 1; Acts 1937, No. 352, § 1; Acts 1941, No. 422, § 1; Acts 1949, No. 291, § 1.

Acts 1955, No. 101, § 1, is also codified as § 18-12-208(a).

Cross References. Prior releases validated, § 18-40-108.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Validation of Instruments Affecting Title to Property, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 414.

Curative Statutes Affecting Title to Real Property in Arkansas, 12 Ark. L. Rev. 386.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Curative acts, such as Act 101 of 1955 as codified by this section, have retrospective operation and apply to past events and transactions, and do not apply to a transaction that takes place after the passage of the act. Merchants & Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Massey, 302 Ark. 421, 790 S.W.2d 889 (1990).

Acknowledgment by Interested Party.

An acknowledgment taken by an interested party does not authorize it to be recorded and it imparts no notice; however, such acknowledgments taken before Acts 1883, No. 69, were validated by § 6 of that act. Green v. Abraham, 43 Ark. 420 (1884) (decision under prior law).

Acts 1893, No. 43, did not cure an acknowledgment which was taken by a party to the deed. Meunse v. Harper, 70 Ark. 309, 67 S.W. 869 (1902) (decision under prior law).

Allegation of Defect.

Where complaint merely alleged that acknowledgment of the deed appeared to be defective, such allegation was merely a conclusion and the court was correct in holding that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. Sample v. Sample, 237 Ark. 178, 372 S.W.2d 609 (1963).

Failure to Sign.

Former curative act did not render valid a certificate of acknowledgment which the notary failed to sign although he affixed the imprint of his seal. Davis v. Hale, 114 Ark. 426, 170 S.W. 99 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Homesteads.

A mortgage of a homestead which was invalid because the grantors' wives did not join therein, was cured by former validating act. Sanders v. Flenniken, 172 Ark. 454, 289 S.W. 485 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Lack of Acknowledgment.

The curative provisions of this section cannot supply an acknowledgment when in fact there is none. Pardo v. Creamer, 228 Ark. 746, 310 S.W.2d 218 (1958).

A so called “deed within a deed” was not a proper instrument for recordation; the fact that it appeared within an instrument which was duly recorded did not cure the defect of the lack of acknowledgment required by § 16-47-106. Additionally, title to the interests in question here had already vested ownership, and so although it may have been proper for the chancellor to have received this instrument into evidence, it was clearly error for him to decree that the defective “quit-claim deed” was cured by this section. Andrews v. Heirs of Bellis, 297 Ark. 3, 759 S.W.2d 532 (1988).

Omission of Essential Words.

An acknowledgment valid in the state where made but ineffectual at the time of recordation in Arkansas because of failure to use words required by § 18-12-206 was held to have been cured by former validating acts. Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 184 S.W.2d 906 (1945) (decision under prior law).

Vested Rights.

Former acts, curing defective acknowledgments, did not interfere with vested rights. McGehee v. McKenzie, 43 Ark. 156 (1884) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Sample v. Sample, 237 Ark. 178, 372 S.W.2d 609 (1963).

16-47-109. Validation of acknowledgments of personnel of armed forces.

All acknowledgments taken before March 20, 1945, and subscribed by officers of the United States armed forces acknowledging the signatures of soldiers in the armed forces are validated in every respect.

History. Acts 1945, No. 263, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-214.

16-47-110. Recorded deed or written instrument affecting real estate.

  1. Every deed or instrument in writing which conveys or affects real estate and which is acknowledged or proved and certified as prescribed by this act may, together with the certificate of acknowledgment, proof, or relinquishment of dower, be recorded by the recorder of the county where such land to be conveyed or affected thereby is located, and when so recorded may be read in evidence in any court in this state without further proof of execution.
  2. If it appears at any time that any deed or instrument duly acknowledged or proved and recorded as prescribed by this act is lost or not within the power and control of the party wishing to use the deed or instrument, the record thereof or a transcript of the record certified by the recorder may be read in evidence without further proof of execution.
  3. Neither the certificate of acknowledgment nor the probate of any such deed or instrument, nor the record or transcript thereof, shall be conclusive, but it may be rebutted.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, §§ 26-28; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1530-1532; Pope's Dig., §§ 1840-1842; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 28-919 — 28-921.

Publisher's Notes. Rev. Stat., ch. 31, §§ 26-28, are also codified as § 18-12-209.

Meaning of “this act”. Chapter 31 of the Revised Statutes, codified as §§ 16-47-101, 16-47-10316-47-106, 16-47-110, 18-12-101, 18-12-102, 18-12-104, 18-12-105, 18-12-201, 18-12-20318-12-206, 18-12-209, 18-12-301, 18-12-402, 18-12-501, 18-12-502, 18-12-60118-12-603.

Cross References. Admissibility of deeds, § 18-12-605.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Documentary Evidence — Arkansas, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 79.

Case Notes

In General.

The acknowledgment of the execution of a deed of conveyance, as required by statute, does not alone authorize its introduction as evidence; it must also be filed and recorded or its execution proved at the trial. Wilson v. Spring, 38 Ark. 181 (1881); Watson v. Billings, 38 Ark. 278 (1881); Dorr v. School Dist., 40 Ark. 237 (1882).

Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof rests upon the person denying that he signed a deed or acknowledged it, to show the falsity of the certificate, which carries the presumption that the officer making it has certified to the truth. Polk v. Brown, 117 Ark. 321, 174 S.W. 562 (1915); Nevada County Bank v. Gee, 130 Ark. 312, 197 S.W. 680 (1917).

The burden of disproving the authenticity of the acknowledgment of a deed before a notary public is on the moving party in order to have the recorded deed declared void for forgery. Lytton v. Johnson, 236 Ark. 277, 365 S.W.2d 461 (1963).

Certificate.

The only showing upon which a deed can be admitted to evidence is the certificate of acknowledgment by the proper officer. Simpson v. Montgomery, 25 Ark. 365 (1869).

While it is competent for the maker of a deed to prove that there was no appearance before an officer to acknowledge its execution, and no acknowledgment in fact, yet if he did acknowledge it in some manner, the officer's certificate is conclusive as to the terms of the acknowledgment. Petty v. Grisard, 45 Ark. 117 (1885); Steers v. Kinsey, 68 Ark. 360, 58 S.W. 1050 (1900).

If a plaintiff in ejectment is not able to introduce an original deed in evidence, a purported copy from the record is not admissible unless certified by the recorder. Robert v. Brown, 157 Ark. 230, 247 S.W. 1058 (1923).

Parol Evidence.

Parol evidence that a deed has been executed, but not recorded, and lost, is sufficient to admit secondary evidence of its contents. Calloway v. Cossart, 45 Ark. 81 (1885); Crawford v. McDonald, 84 Ark. 415, 106 S.W. 206 (1907).

Parol evidence is admissible to prove true date of an acknowledgment. Merrill v. Sypert, 65 Ark. 51, 44 S.W. 462 (1898).

Prima Facie Evidence.

A recorded and properly acknowledged mortgage makes prima facie case thereon. Straughan v. Bennett, 153 Ark. 254, 240 S.W. 30 (1922).

Proof of Execution.

A certified copy of a recorded conveyance is admissible in evidence without proof of the execution. Apel v. Kelsey, 47 Ark. 413, 2 S.W. 102 (1886); Sibly v. England, 90 Ark. 420, 119 S.W. 820 (1909).

An unrecorded mortgage is inadmissible in evidence without proof of its execution. Gardner v. Hughes, 136 Ark. 332, 206 S.W. 678 (1918).

Record.

In a prosecution for forgery, it was not improper to permit the introduction of the record of certain deed, in the chain of title to the land, concerning which it was alleged that forged deed had been uttered by the defendant, without proof that the original deeds were either lost or destroyed. Temple v. State, 126 Ark. 290, 189 S.W. 855 (1916), overruled, Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959), overruled in part, Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959).

Subchapter 2 — Uniform Acknowledgment Act

Effective Dates. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 15: approved Mar. 4, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “That because many persons of this State are now in the armed forces of the United States and are now located in the various States of the United States, as well as in many foreign countries, and are unable to comply with the technical requirements of the Arkansas laws as to acknowledgments, an emergency is declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1971, No. 352, § 2: Mar. 22, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that among the multitude of real estate transactions and other transactions requiring acknowledgments, there are undoubtedly some which have not strictly complied with the present law; that such transactions raise clouds on title and create other difficulties in land transfers; and that only by the immediate passage of this Act can this situation be remedied. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2013, No. 999, § 6: Apr. 8, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that many instruments affecting title to real estate are being found to not provide constructive notice because of defects in the certificates of acknowledgment; and that this act is immediately necessary to protect property rights and interests. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Drafting Instruments for Purchase and Conveyancing of Land, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 26.

Authentication and Identification, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 332.

16-47-201. Acknowledgment of instruments.

Any instrument may be acknowledged in the manner and form provided by the laws of this state, or as provided by this act.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-101.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1943, No. 169, codified as §§ 16-47-20116-47-210, 16-47-21316-47-216.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

Case Notes

Alternative System.

Acts 1943, No. 169 did not repeal, modify or in any way impair any law of this state; it provides only an alternative system for acknowledgments. Rumph v. Lester Land Co., 205 Ark. 1147, 172 S.W.2d 916 (1943).

Cited: Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 184 S.W.2d 906 (1945).

16-47-202. Officials authorized to take within the state.

The acknowledgment of any instrument may be made in this state before:

  1. A judge of a court of record or before any former judge of a court of record who served at least four (4) or more years;
  2. A clerk of any court of record;
  3. A commissioner or registrar or recorder of deeds;
  4. A notary public;
  5. A justice of the peace; or
  6. A master in chancery or registrar in chancery.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 2; 1983, No. 850, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-102.

16-47-203. Officials authorized to take within the United States.

The acknowledgment of any instrument may be without the state but within the United States or a territory or insular possession of the United States and within the jurisdiction of the officer, before:

  1. A clerk or deputy clerk of any federal court;
  2. A clerk or deputy clerk of any court of record of any state or other jurisdiction;
  3. A notary public;
  4. A commissioner of deeds;
  5. Any person authorized by the laws of such other jurisdiction to take acknowledgments.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 3; 1957, No. 411, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-103.

16-47-204. Officials authorized to take without the United States.

The acknowledgment of any instrument may be made without the United States before:

  1. An ambassador, minister, charge d'affaires, counselor to or secretary of a legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, commercial attache, or consular agent of the United States accredited to the country where the acknowledgment is made.
  2. A notary public of the country where the acknowledgment is made.
  3. A judge or clerk of a court of record of the country where the acknowledgment is made.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-104.

16-47-205. Proof of identity of person making.

The officer taking the acknowledgment shall know or have satisfactory evidence that the person making the acknowledgment is the person described in and who executed the instrument.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-105.

Case Notes

Improper Notarization.

Under §§ 21-14-111, 28-68-304(a)(3)(A), and this section, the decedent's attorney's secretary signed the certificate of acknowledgement for the November 20 power of attorney before the decedent signed the instrument, and this improper notarization of the acknowledgement was fatal to the validity of the November 20 power of attorney. Jones v. Owen, 2009 Ark. 505, 342 S.W.3d 265 (2009).

Purpose Fulfilled.

Purpose of this section had been met where the mother admitted executing a deed conveying property to an LLC, and thus discrepancies in the testimony as to the persons present, including the notary public, at the time the mother executed the deed were of no matter. Franklin v. Waldron Nursing Ctr., Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 449, 527 S.W.3d 742 (2017).

16-47-206. Acknowledgment by a married woman.

An acknowledgment by a married woman may be made in the same form as though she were unmarried.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-106.

16-47-207. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning forms of certificates, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 999, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1943, No. 169, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-107.

16-47-208. Execution of certificate by officer.

The certificate of the acknowledging officer shall be completed by his signature, his official seal if he has one, the title of his office, and if he is a notary public, the date his commission expires.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-108.

16-47-209. Authentication of acknowledgments.

  1. If the acknowledgment is taken within this state or is made without this state but in the United States by one (1) of the officers designated in § 16-47-203, or without the United States by an officer of the United States, no authentication shall be necessary.
  2. If the acknowledgment is made without the United States and by a notary public or a judge or clerk of a court of record of the country where the acknowledgment is made, the certificate shall be authenticated by a certificate under the great seal of state of the country, affixed by the custodian of such seal, or by a certificate of a diplomatic, consular, or commercial officer of the United States accredited to that country, certifying as to the official character of such officer.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 9; 1957, No. 411, § 2; 1971, No. 365, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-109.

Case Notes

Outside State.

Acknowledgment of a deed by a sister state's notary public having a seal, but without certificate by a clerk of a court of record in the county where taken showing the official character of the notary who took the acknowledgment, was entitled to record because valid under § 16-47-103. Rumph v. Lester Land Co., 205 Ark. 1147, 172 S.W.2d 916 (1943).

16-47-210. Acknowledgments under laws of other states.

Notwithstanding any provision in this act contained, the acknowledgment of any instrument without this state in compliance with the manner and form prescribed by the laws of the place of its execution, if in a state, a territory or insular possession of the United States, or in the District of Columbia, or in the Philippine Islands, verified by the official seal of the officer before whom it is acknowledged, shall have the same effect as an acknowledgment in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this state for instruments executed within the state.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 10; 1971, No. 365, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-110.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-47-201.

16-47-211. Validation of unauthenticated writings affecting title to property.

All deeds, conveyances, deeds of trust, mortgages, mineral leases, marriage contracts, and other instruments in writing, affecting or purporting to affect title to any real estate or personal property situated in this state, which have been recorded or executed prior to July 19, 1971, and which may be defective or ineffectual because of the failure to have the authentication formerly required by Acts 1943, No. 169, §§ 9 and 10, prior to these amendments, shall be binding and effectual as though such instruments contained the required authentication.

History. Acts 1971, No. 365, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-110.1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1943, No. 169, §§ 9 and 10, referred to in this section, are codified as §§ 16-47-209, 16-47-210.

The words “these amendments” refer to Acts 1971, No. 365, which amended §§ 16-47-209 and 16-47-210 and enacted §§ 16-47-211 and 16-47-212.

16-47-212. Act cumulative.

This act shall be cumulative to other acts of the General Assembly relating to acknowledgments.

History. Acts 1971, No. 365, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-110.2.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1971, No. 365, codified as §§ 16-47-20916-47-212.

16-47-213. Acknowledgments by persons serving in or with the armed forces of the United States within or without the United States.

In addition to the acknowledgment of instruments in the manner and form and as otherwise authorized by this act, persons serving in or with the armed forces of the United States or their dependents may acknowledge the same wherever located before any commissioned officer in active service of the armed forces of the United States with the rank of second lieutenant or higher in the Army, Air Force or Marine Corps, or ensign or higher in the Navy or United States Coast Guard. The instrument shall not be rendered invalid by the failure to state therein the place of execution or acknowledgment. No authentication of the officer's certificate of acknowledgment shall be required but the officer taking the acknowledgment shall endorse thereon or attach thereto a certificate substantially in the following form:

“On this day of , 19 , before me, , the undersigned officer, personally appeared (Serial No. ) known to me or satisfactorily proven to be (serving in or with the armed forces of the United States) (a dependent of , (Serial No. ) a person serving in or with the armed forces of the United States) and to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same for the purposes therein contained. And the undersigned does further certify that he is at the date of this certificate a commissioned officer of the rank stated below and is in the active service of the armed forces of the United States. Signature of the Officer Rank and Serial No. of Officer and Command to which attached.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 11; 1961, No. 16, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-111.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1961, No. 16, § 2, provided that the act did not repeal or alter laws regarding acknowledgment of instruments which were in effect prior to enactment of the Uniform Acknowledgment Act and which provide an alternative method of acknowledging instruments.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-47-201.

16-47-214. Acknowledgments previously taken unaffected.

No acknowledgment heretofore taken shall be affected by anything contained in this act.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-112.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-47-201.

Case Notes

Cited: Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 184 S.W.2d 906 (1945).

16-47-215. Uniformity of interpretation.

This act shall be so interpreted as to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-113.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-47-201.

16-47-216. Title of act.

This act may be cited as the “Uniform Acknowledgment Act”.

History. Acts 1943, No. 169, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-114.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-47-201.

16-47-217. Validation of prior acknowledgments — Construction of uniform act.

It is the intent and purpose of this section that all acknowledgments taken subsequent to Acts 1957, No. 411 either in accordance with the Uniform Acknowledgment Act or in accordance with the laws of this state in effect at the time of adoption of the Uniform Acknowledgment Act be cured and validated for all purposes; and that neither Acts 1957, No. 411 nor the Uniform Acknowledgment Act to which it is amendatory shall be construed to repeal or modify any laws relative to the taking of acknowledgments and the authentication thereof which were in effect in this state at the time of adoption of the Uniform Acknowledgment Act, but that the Uniform Acknowledgment Act shall be deemed to provide an alternative system for taking and authenticating acknowledgments.

History. Acts 1959, No. 127, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-115.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1957, No. 411, referred to in this section, is codified as §§ 16-47-203 and 16-47-209. The Uniform Acknowledgment Act is codified as §§ 16-47-20116-47-210 and 16-47-21316-47-216.

Acts 1959, No. 127, § 1, validated acknowledgments taken subsequent to the effective date of Acts 1957, No. 411, in accordance with the Uniform Acknowledgment Act or in accordance with state law at the time of adoption of the uniform act.

16-47-218. Validation of acknowledgments — Construction of acts.

All acknowledgments taken subsequent to Acts 1959, No. 127 either in accordance with the Uniform Acknowledgment Act or in accordance with the laws of this state in effect at the time of adoption of the Uniform Acknowledgment Act are cured and validated for all purposes; and neither Acts 1959, No. 127 nor the Uniform Acknowledgment Act shall be construed to repeal or modify any laws relative to the taking of acknowledgments and the authentication thereof which were in effect in this state at the time of adoption of the Uniform Acknowledgment Act, but that the Uniform Acknowledgment Act shall be deemed to provide an alternative system for taking and authenticating acknowledgments.

History. Acts 1971, No. 352, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 49-115.1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1959, No. 127, referred to in this section, is codified as § 16-47-217. The Uniform Acknowledgment Act is codified as §§ 16-47-20116-47-210 and 16-47-21316-47-216.

Chapters 48-54 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 5. Civil Procedure Generally

Publisher's Notes. Section 857 of the Civil Code provided, in part, that the repeal of inconsistent statutes by that section did not revive any statute or law which may have been repealed or abolished by the repealed statutes or laws, nor did it affect any right already existing or any proceeding already taken, except as provided in the code.

Effective Dates. Code of Practice in Civil Cases, § 890: effective on passage for purposes of validity of proceedings but no proceeding before Jan. 1, 1869 rendered invalid; effective Jan. 1, 1869, for all purposes and proceedings.

Case Notes

Construction.

The Civil Code of 1869 was not designed to destroy rights or to alter principles of law, but only to formulate remedies, and should not be construed to repeal laws giving a remedy under circumstances where no other is provided under the code. State v. Arkansas Brick & Mfg. Co., 98 Ark. 125, 135 S.W. 843 (1911).

Purpose.

The Civil Code was only intended to change the forms of actions and abolish the old forms and modes of procedure. Whitehead v. Wells, 29 Ark. 99 (1874).

Chapter 55 General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this subchapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure, or the Arkansas Rules for Inferior Courts [now District Courts] pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Cross References. Motion day and hearings on motions, ARCP 78.

Effective Dates. Code of Practice in Civil Cases, § 890: effective on passage for purposes of validity of proceedings but no proceeding before Jan. 1, 1869, rendered invalid; effective Jan. 1, 1869, for all purposes and proceedings.

Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1915, No. 290, § 24: June 1, 1915.

Acts 1991, No. 470, § 7: Mar. 12, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that provisions of a lawsuit settlement contract which would prohibit any person's disclosure of the existence of an environmental hazard is contrary to public policy; that such provisions are included in may lawsuit settlement contracts; that this Act applies to such contracts entered into after its effective date; and that this Act should therefor go into effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

La Dolce Vita — Law and Equity Merged at Last!, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 162.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-55-101. Title of code.

This code shall be known as the “Code of Practice in Civil Cases” in this state.

History. Civil Code, Preliminary Provisions, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-101.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Case Notes

Cited: Hill v. Gallagher, 2016 Ark. 198, 491 S.W.3d 458 (2016).

16-55-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning definitions, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 186. The section was derived from Civil Code, Preliminary Provisions, §§ 3, 4; Civil Code, §§ 704, 705, 837-855; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1028, 1029, 1325, 1326, 9732-9750; Pope's Dig., §§ 1230, 1231, 1550, 1551, 13258-13276; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-106, 27-107, 27-109 — 27-115, 27-117 — 27-125, 27-127 — 27-129, 27-1201, 27-1202.

16-55-103. Applicability of code.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by law, this code shall regulate the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the courts of this state.
  2. Except as otherwise provided by law, the provisions of this code shall apply to and regulate the proceedings of all the courts of this state, though not expressly enumerated, and of all that may hereafter be created.

History. Civil Code, §§ 780, 796; C. & M. Dig., § 1026; Pope's Dig., § 1228; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-102, 27-103.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Civil Procedure — Application of Class Suits to Unincorporated Associations in Law Actions in Arkansas, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 474.

Case Notes

Contest of Wills.

The Civil Code repealed earlier laws relating to the contest or rejection of wills. Dowell v. Tucker, 46 Ark. 438 (1885).

Garnishment.

The Civil Code repealed former law relating to default against garnishee. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Richter, 48 Ark. 349, 3 S.W. 56 (1886).

Cited: Haller v. Ratcliffe, 215 Ark. 628, 221 S.W.2d 886 (1949); Thomas v. Dean, 245 Ark. 446, 432 S.W.2d 771 (1968); Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978); Hill v. Gallagher, 2016 Ark. 198, 491 S.W.3d 458 (2016).

16-55-104. Construction of code.

  1. The rule of common law that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall not be applied to the code.
  2. The provisions of the code, and all proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed, with a view to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining justice.

History. Civil Code, § 856; C. & M. Dig., § 9751; Pope's Dig., § 13277; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-131.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Case Notes

Pleadings.

To deny parties their day in court merely because the captions of their petition and claim recited the name of wrong county, the petition being timely filed and no one being misled or deceived, would be an injustice and not in keeping with Arkansas' liberalized form of pleadings. Edwards v. Brimm, 236 Ark. 588, 367 S.W.2d 433 (1963).

Process.

The statute directing the circuit courts to issue process upon an indictment being found should be liberally construed with a view to promote its object. State ex rel. Nixon v. Grace, 98 Ark. 505, 136 S.W. 670 (1911).

Cited: Woods v. Woods, 285 Ark. 175, 686 S.W.2d 387 (1985).

16-55-105. Amendment or repeal of code.

No act shall have the effect to amend or repeal or be construed as amending or repealing any title, chapter, article, section, clause, or provision of this code unless the intention is expressly stated, and the title, chapter, article, or section shall be particularly referred to and recited in the act amending or repealing it.

History. Civil Code, § 858; C. & M. Dig., § 9753; Pope's Dig., § 13279; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-134.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Legislative and Judicial Dynamism in Arkansas: Poisson v. d'Avril, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 724.

16-55-106, 16-55-107. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning courts having jurisdiction similar to circuit, probate, or justice of the peace courts and clerks' duties devolve on magistrates, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 187. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-55-106. Civil Code, § 797; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-104.

16-55-107. Civil Code, § 808; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-116.

16-55-108. Authority of deputies.

Any duty enjoined by this code upon a ministerial officer and any act permitted to be done by him or her may be performed by his or her lawful deputy.

History. Civil Code, § 781, C. & M. Dig., § 9754; Pope's Dig., § 13280; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-132.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Case Notes

Summons.

Summons was not defective where it did not contain the signature of the county circuit clerk, but was signed by the deputy clerk. Nucor Corp. v. Kilman, 358 Ark. 107, 186 S.W.3d 720 (2004).

16-55-109. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning masters, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 188. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 23, §§ 72, 74, 77; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7151, 7152, 7155; Pope's Dig., §§ 9137, 9138, 9141; Acts 1981, No. 900, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1801, 27-1802, 27-1805.

16-55-110. Boards — Authority of majority.

An authority conferred upon three (3) or more persons may be exercised by a majority of them and a majority of three (3) or more persons may do any act directed to be performed by them.

History. Civil Code, § 782; C. & M. Dig., § 9755; Pope's Dig., § 12511; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-133.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies only to boards whose appointment is provided by statute, and not to boards appointed by the court under agreement of the parties. Weaver v. McLean, 141 Ark. 406, 217 S.W. 10 (1919).

Board of Assessors.

Even if this section would be applicable to a board of assessors for an improvement district, the action of two members of the board, in the absence of the third, without notice to him or opportunity on his part to be present or participate, was unauthorized. Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. No. 1, 86 Ark. 1, 109 S.W. 526 (1908).

Cited: Ellison v. Oliver, 147 Ark. 252, 227 S.W. 586 (1921).

16-55-111. Classes of remedies.

Remedies in civil cases are divided into two (2) classes:

  1. Actions;
  2. Special proceedings.

History. Civil Code, Preliminary Provisions, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 1027; Pope's Dig., § 1229; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-105.

Case Notes

Cited: Coleman v. Coleman, 257 Ark. 404, 520 S.W.2d 239 (1975); Orlando v. Wizel, 443 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Ark. 1978).

16-55-112. Authority to grant provisional remedy.

A provisional remedy as provided in this code may be granted only by the judge of the court in which the action is brought, or by any circuit judge.

History. Civil Code, § 791; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [791], p. 219; 1873, No. 88 [791], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., § 5793; Pope's Dig., § 7509; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-108.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Case Notes

Habeas Corpus.

Where mother of child consented by verified pleading to appointment of welfare director as guardian for child, and later on the same day attempted to revoke authority, mother was not entitled to writ of habeas corpus, but must file a complaint in probate court to set aside prior order. Haller v. Ratcliffe, 215 Ark. 628, 221 S.W.2d 886 (1949).

16-55-113. Writ of ne exeat abolished.

The writ of ne exeat as a remedy in a civil action is abolished.

History. Civil Code, § 790; C. & M. Dig., § 1040; Pope's Dig., § 1242; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-202.

Case Notes

Cited: Ex parte Caple, 81 Ark. 504, 99 S.W. 830 (1907).

16-55-114. Notices — Form — Service generally.

    1. The notices mentioned in this code shall be in writing and may be served by a sheriff, constable, coroner, or marshal of a town or city, whose return thereon shall be proof of the service.
    2. Notices may also be served by any person not a party or interested in the action or proceeding, whose affidavit shall be proof of the service, or by acknowledgment thereon in writing by the party upon whom served.
  1. The service of a notice shall be by giving a copy to the person to whom it is directed, or if he or she cannot be found at his or her usual place of abode, by leaving a copy there with a person over the age of sixteen (16) years residing in the same family with him or her, or if no such person is there, then by affixing a copy to the front door of the place of abode. If the person to whom the notice is directed cannot be found and has no known place of abode in this state, the notice may be served by delivering a copy to his or her attorney.
  2. The return of the officer or the affidavit of the person who served the notice shall state the time and manner of the service. If a copy of the notice is not given to the person to whom it is directed, the return or affidavit shall state the facts authorizing the manner of service pursued.

History. Civil Code, §§ 706, 707; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1327, 1328; Pope's Dig., §§ 1552, 1553; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1203, 27-1204.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Case Notes

Notice to Railroad Companies.

This section is confined to notices mentioned in the Civil Code and has no application to service of notice to railroad companies to construct and maintain stock guards, as such notice must be served as required by § 23-12-304. Kansas City, Pittsburg & Gulf Ry. v. Lowther, 68 Ark. 238, 57 S.W. 518 (1900); Kansas City, Pittsburg & Gulf Ry. v. Pirtle, 68 Ark. 548, 60 S.W. 657 (1901).

16-55-115. Notice — Additional method of service.

  1. Wherever, in connection with the taking of depositions, the filing of motions, or in any other matters either during the pendency of a suit or prior to a litigation, the law requires the service of notice by one (1) person upon another, except in the case of service of a summons, that notice may be served by registered or certified mail, addressed to the person to be served at his or her last known address, or to his or her attorney, if he or she has an attorney employed in connection with the matter in which the notice is to be served, with return receipt requested. The return receipt of the person or his or her attorney or the affidavit of the person making the service shall be evidence of service of the notice.
    1. This section shall be cumulative of present methods provided by law for service of notice.
    2. Service shall be sufficient by:
      1. The method provided for in this section;
      2. Any method authorized by law prior to June 13, 1957; or
      3. Waiver in writing of service.

History. Acts 1957, No. 288, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1212.

16-55-116. Notice — Service upon certain persons.

    1. Where it is not otherwise specially provided, notice to a party in an action of any motion or proceeding to be made or taken in the action in court or before a judge may be served upon the party or his or her attorney.
    2. The service upon the attorney in any such case shall be by delivering to him or her a copy of the notice.
  1. A notice to a person constructively summoned and not appearing shall be served on the attorney appointed to defend for him or her.
  2. A notice to an infant or person of unsound mind shall be served on the guardian or next friend bringing or defending the action for him or her.
  3. A notice to a corporation may be served in the same manner as a summons in an action against it.
  4. Where the party has no known place of abode in this state and no attorney in the county where the action is pending, or where the parties, plaintiffs, or defendants are numerous, the court may direct the mode of serving notices and to which persons they shall be given.

History. Civil Code, §§ 708-710, 712, 713; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1329-1331, 1333, 1334; Pope's Dig., §§ 1554-1556, 1558, 1559; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1205 — 27-1207, 27-1209, 27-1210.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Subsection (d) is not confined to notices mentioned in the Civil Code; so a notice to a railroad company to construct a stock guard may be served upon any station agent of the railroad company in the county. St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Hale, 82 Ark. 175, 100 S.W. 1148 (1907).

Subsection (a) is applicable only to the notice to be given of a motion or proceeding to be made or taken before a judge or court and does not apply to a notice given by a surety to the obligee. Stocker v. Southwestern Co., 245 Ark. 350, 432 S.W.2d 481 (1968).

Garnishment.

A garnishee not served personally with a writ of garnishment has no notice of the suit by reason of service of the writ on an attorney not employed by the garnishee generally nor in the particular litigation. Woods v. Quarles, 178 Ark. 1158, 13 S.W.2d 617 (1929).

Motion to Vacate Judgment.

A notice of a motion to vacate a void judgment may be served on the attorney of the opposite party. State v. West, 160 Ark. 413, 254 S.W. 828 (1923)Questioned byHowell v. Van Houten, 227 Ark. 84, 296 S.W.2d 428 (1956).

16-55-117. Notice — Duty of officer serving.

  1. It shall be the duty of the sheriff and of every constable to whom any notice in an action may be delivered for service within his or her county to serve and return the notice to the party who delivered it to him or her.
  2. A failure to perform this duty may be punished as a disobedience of the process of the court.

History. Civil Code, § 715; C. & M. Dig., § 1336; Pope's Dig., § 1561; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1211.

16-55-118. Laws requiring notice or summons for specified time before term amended to permit action taken on any day court is in session.

Whether specifically mentioned in this act or not, any law or part of a law requiring notice or summons to be served or published a specific length of time before the beginning of a term before the steps authorized in the law may be had at such terms in any civil or special proceeding is hereby amended to permit such steps to be taken on any day that the court meets in regular or adjourned session after the expiration of the time required in the law for service.

History. Acts 1915, No. 290, § 23; C. & M. Dig., § 1210; Pope's Dig., § 1433; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-135.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1915, No. 290, codified as §§ 16-44-107, 16-55-118, 16-58-119, 16-58-126, 16-58-130, 16-63-202, 16-63-217, 16-63-218, 16-64-106, 16-64-107, 16-64-127, 16-110-103.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Civil Procedure, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 131.

16-55-119. Computation of time.

Where a certain number of days are required to intervene between two (2) acts, the day of one (1) only of the acts may be counted.

History. Civil Code, § 784; C. & M. Dig., § 9756; Pope's Dig., § 13281; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-130.

Case Notes

In General.

When a certain number of days are required to intervene between two acts, the day of one, only, of the acts is to be counted, but when a statute requires notice of at least a certain number of days before an act, this means so many full days, and the day of the notice and the act are both excluded from the computation. Jones v. State, 42 Ark. 93, 1883 Ark. LEXIS 58 (1883); Moore v. State, 52 Ark. 265, 12 S.W. 562 (1889).

July 1 notice to tenant whose tenancy expired December 31 was insufficient to constitute six months' notice. Gregory v. Walker, 239 Ark. 415, 389 S.W.2d 892 (1965).

Applicability.

This section does not apply to computation of time in rule of political party. Williamson v. Montgomery, 185 Ark. 1129, 51 S.W.2d 987 (1932).

Election Laws.

Where statute required certificate of nomination to be filed with election commissioners “not less than fifteen days before the election,” one day should be excluded in the computation. State v. Hunter, 134 Ark. 443, 204 S.W. 308 (1918).

First Day.

The general rule in calculating a limitations period is to exclude the first day from the computation. Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 Ark. 1, 759 S.W.2d 203 (1988).

The day on which a nonsuit is taken should be excluded from computation. Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 Ark. 1, 759 S.W.2d 203 (1988).

Limitation of Actions.

In computing time to ascertain whether action is barred by limitations, day on which right of action accrued must be excluded, and day of issuing summons included. Peay v. Pulaski County, 103 Ark. 601, 148 S.W. 491 (1912). But see Shinn v. Tucker, 33 Ark. 421 (1878).

The Supreme Court has followed the method of calculation in this section and in ARCP 6(a) in fixing a limitation period for the time for filing pleadings as well as for certain notices. Grubbs v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 479, 939 S.W.2d 290 (1997).

Unlawful Detainer.

In determining the time for bringing action for unlawful detainer under § 18-60-303 requiring three days' notice to quit, the day of serving notice may be counted. Whitner v. Thompson, 188 Ark. 240, 65 S.W.2d 28 (1933).

Cited: Widmer v. J.I. Case Credit Corp., 239 Ark. 12, 386 S.W.2d 702 (1965); Globe Life Ins. Co. v. Humphries, 258 Ark. 118, 522 S.W.2d 669 (1975); Synergy Gas Corp. v. H.M. Orsburn & Son, 15 Ark. App. 128, 689 S.W.2d 594 (1985).

16-55-120. Affirmation in lieu of oath.

Whenever an oath is required by this code, the affirmation of a person conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath shall have the same effect.

History. Civil Code, § 783; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-126.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Cross References. Affirmation in lieu of oath, § 16-2-101.

16-55-121. Successive actions on same contract or transaction.

Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract or transaction whenever, after the former action, a new cause of action has arisen therefrom.

History. Civil Code, § 789; C. & M. Dig., § 1083; Pope's Dig., § 1291; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-136.

Case Notes

Issues Raised.

When there is any uncertainty as to whether the precise question was raised and determined in the former suit and the record leaves the matter in doubt, extrinsic evidence showing the precise point involved and determined is admissible to remove the uncertainty. JeToCo Corp. v. Hailey Sales Co., 268 Ark. 340, 596 S.W.2d 703 (1980).

Plaintiff could maintain a suit to seek recovery of rentals accruing after previous trial, even though the parties were the same and the issues were basically the same as those involved in the earlier suit. JeToCo Corp. v. Hailey Sales Co., 268 Ark. 340, 596 S.W.2d 703 (1980).

Res Judicata.

Where it was determined upon a former trial that a contract between certain parties was rescinded, the determination of this question is binding on the parties and their privies and prevents a second adjudication of the same question in another suit; and this rule is unchanged by this section. National Sur. Co. v. Coates, 83 Ark. 545, 104 S.W. 219 (1907).

Res judicata held to bar later action. Hemingway v. Grayling Lumber Co., 125 Ark. 400, 188 S.W. 1186 (1916).

The true test of whether a particular point, question, or right has been concluded by a former suit and judgment is whether the point, question, or right was distinctly put in issue, or should have been put in issue, and was directly determined by the former suit and judgment. JeToCo Corp. v. Hailey Sales Co., 268 Ark. 340, 596 S.W.2d 703 (1980).

Where there is a dispute between the parties as to what was decided in the former case, the holding of the Supreme Court on appeal in that former case as to what had been determined in the trial court is conclusive. JeToCo Corp. v. Hailey Sales Co., 268 Ark. 340, 596 S.W.2d 703 (1980).

16-55-122. Contract provisions restricting disclosure of environmental hazards are void.

  1. Any provision of a contract or agreement entered into to settle a lawsuit which purports to restrict any person's right to disclose the existence or harmfulness of an environmental hazard is declared to be against the public policy of the State of Arkansas and therefore void.
  2. For purposes of this section, the term “environmental hazard” means a substance or condition that may affect land, air, or water in a way that may cause harm to the property or person of someone other than the contracting parties to a lawsuit settlement contract referred to in subsection (a) of this section.
  3. This section applies to settlement contracts or agreements entered into after March 12, 1991.

History. Acts 1991, No. 470, §§ 1-3.

Subchapter 2 — Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003

Preambles. Acts 2005, No. 1380, contained a preamble which read:

“WHEREAS, over the past three years, Arkansas has received two-hundred-forty million dollars ($240,000,000) from the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA); and

“WHEREAS, the State of Arkansas will receive a total of one billion six hundred twenty million dollars ($1,620,000,000) from the MSA over twenty-five (25) years; and

“WHEREAS, the MSA funds are used to fund important state programs, such as tobacco-use prevention, Medicaid expansion, prescription drug benefits, and hospital and medical services; and

“WHEREAS, the continued receipt of MSA funds is vital to the state's ability to finance these programs; and

“WHEREAS, the state has an important interest in ensuring that tobacco companies that have signed the MSA can appeal massive judgments against them by posting a bond under state law, rather than being forced into bankruptcy, which would disrupt their ability to make payments under the MSA; and

“WHEREAS, a limit on the bond required to stay the execution of a judgment pending appeal would guarantee that no tobacco company is forced into bankruptcy in order to appeal a judgment against it, thus preserving the state's continued receipt of MSA funds,

“NOW THEREFORE, …”

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 26: Mar. 25, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that in this state, existing conditions, such as the application of joint and several liability regardless of the percentage of fault, are adversely impacting the availability and affordability of medical liability insurance; that those existing conditions recently have caused several medical liability carriers to stop offering coverage in the state and have caused some medical care providers to curtail or end their practices; that the decreasing availability and affordability of medical liability insurance is adversely affecting the accessibility and affordability of medical care and health insurance coverage in this state; that long term care facilities are having great difficulty hiring qualified medical directors because physicians could be held liable for an entire judgment even if they are found to be minimally at fault; and that there is a need to improve access to the courts for deserving claimants; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to remedy these conditions and improve access to health care in this state. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2003, No. 1471, § 2: Apr. 16, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Act 649 of 2003 is now in effect; that its cap on punitive damage awards is unclear as to whether it applies to each plaintiff or to the judgment; that this act clarifies that the cap applies to each plaintiff and not the judgment; and that until this act goes into effect, confusion may exist. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2013, No. 1315, § 3: Apr. 18, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that school district litigation is a complex and costly endeavor; that a new venue statute would resolve many issues regarding where a lawsuit should be brought; and that this act is immediately necessary because future litigants are currently relying on venue statutes that would require litigation in an inconvenient forum. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Ark. L. Notes.

Leflar, The Civil Justice Reform Act and the Empty Chair, 2003 Ark. L. Notes 67.

16-55-201. Modification of joint and several liability.

  1. In any action for personal injury, medical injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for compensatory or punitive damages shall be several only and shall not be joint.
    1. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault.
    2. A separate several judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.
    1. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff with regard to each defendant by the percentage of each defendant's fault.
    2. That amount shall be the maximum recoverable against that defendant.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Developments, 56 Ark. L. Rev. 703 (2003).

Legislative Note, Arkansas's Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003: Who's Cheating Who?, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 651.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

Phantom Parties and Other Practical Problems with the Attempted Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 437.

Samuel T. Waddell, Comment: Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 485 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 442.

Sizing Up a Multi-Party Tortfeasor Suit in Arkansas: A Tale of Two Laws — How Fault Is, and Should Be, Distributed, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 251.

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Allegedly injured driver brought suit against another motorist, who then brought suit against a third party; the jury determined that the third party was 100 percent at fault. The allegedly injured driver attacked the constitutionality of this section and § 16-55-212; however, the supreme court refused to consider the arguments because the supreme court considered the matter to be moot. Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, 258 S.W.3d 744 (2007).

Construction.

Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), § 16-55-201 et seq., pertains to fault apportionment in a general way, and the Arkansas Comparative Fault Act, § 16-64-122, specifically defines fault and identifies whose fault can be apportioned. Because these two provisions address the same subject matter, it is reasonable to conclude that the general terms of the CJRA are intended to be subject to the specific terms of the Arkansas Comparative Fault Act. Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Civil Justice Reform Act, § 16-55-201 et seq., can not be interpreted to permit a jury to apportion fault in a tort suit to an immune nonparty employer because doing so would render the statute unconstitutional: (1) such an interpretation would violate Ark. Const., Art. 4, § 2, which bars the state legislature from encroaching on the Arkansas Supreme Court's authority to supervise court procedure; and (2) such an interpretation would violate the employer's fundamental constitutional rights because § 11-9-105(a), the exclusivity provision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law, § 11-9-101 et seq., deprives courts of subject matter jurisdiction over employers and protects employers from liability with regard to claims arising from a covered worker's employment-related injuries. Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Conversion does not necessarily involve damage to property, which would bring it within the reach of the statute and therefore, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003 (CJRA), codified at §§ 16-55-20116-55-220, does not automatically apply to actions under § 18-60-102; the CJRA clearly evinces an intent to alter the common law regarding joint and several liability for the causes of action listed, such as personal injury or property damage, but it does not, however, display such an intent regarding causes of action involving the conversion of property, and thus, the trial court did not err in finding the company, owner, and related individual jointly and severally liable with the business and business owner and with each other for the value of the landowner's timber. Shamlin v. Quadrangle Enters., 101 Ark. App. 164, 272 S.W.3d 128 (2008).

This section plainly provides that liability is to be apportioned with regard to “each defendant.” Where there is only one defendant, this section is inapplicable. ProAssurance Indem. Co. v. Metheny, 2012 Ark. 461, 425 S.W.3d 689 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the hospital's third-party complaint against the rehabilitation center because the hospital did not have a cause of action against the rehabilitation center under this section as it did not create a cause of action. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton, 2013 Ark. 38, 425 S.W.3d 761 (2013), superseded by statute as stated in, J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

When homeowners sued a general contractor, who sought contribution and indemnity from subcontractors, the Civil Justice Reform Act, § 16-55-201 et seq., abolishing joint liability, did not destroy the contribution claims because (1) Acts 2013, No. 1116, provided that the claim still existed, and (2) Act 1116 applied retroactively, as Act 1116 was remedial and procedural. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

The language of this section is clear; it speaks in terms of the allocation of fault among the “defendants” to the action but is silent as to the allocation of nonparty fault. Instead, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., addresses the allocation of nonparty fault and it does not allow for the apportionment of fault to an immune nonparty employer. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56, 595 S.W.3d 9 (2020).

Discovery.

It was error to grant at this point in the case defendant subcontractor's motion to compel discovery of the confidential settlement agreement between plaintiff and defendant general contractor that resulted from mediation, when the subcontractor sought contribution and apportionment of fault, because (1) any right of contribution does not arise until one joint tortfeasor pays more than the tortfeasor's share of liability, and no damages had been awarded yet, and (2) it was error to find the general contractor and subcontractor were joint tortfeasors before any evidence was presented. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, however, the Civil Justice Reform Act, § 16-55-201 et seq., did not eliminate contribution among “joint tortfeasors”. Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 2020 Ark. App. 140, 597 S.W.3d 114 (2020).

Jury Instructions.

In a medical negligence case that was brought against a liability insurer after a surgeon operated on the wrong side of the patient's brain, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit non-model jury instructions that would have required the jury to apportion liability to parties who were not defendants; the circuit court properly instructed the jury to allocate the fault of the hospital where the surgery was performed only to the insurer. ProAssurance Indem. Co. v. Metheny, 2012 Ark. 461, 425 S.W.3d 689 (2012).

Necessary Party.

Trial court did not err by finding that the rehabilitation center was not a necessary or indispensable party under Ark. R. Civ. P. 19 because the presence of the rehabilitation center was not indispensable to the determination of the hospital's separate liability under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton, 2013 Ark. 38, 425 S.W.3d 761 (2013), superseded by statute as stated in, J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

16-55-202. Assessment of percentages of fault.

  1. In assessing percentages of fault, the fact finder shall consider the fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or death or damage to property, tangible or intangible, regardless of whether the person or entity was or could have been named as a party to the suit.
    1. Negligence or fault of a nonparty shall be considered if the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or if the defending party gives notice that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault not later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the date of trial.
    2. The notice shall be given by filing a pleading in the action designating the nonparty and setting forth the nonparty's name and last known address, or the best identification of the nonparty which is possible under the circumstances, together with a brief statement of the basis for believing the nonparty to be at fault.
    1. Except as expressly stated in this section, nothing in this section shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which currently exist.
    2. Assessments of percentages of fault of nonparties shall be used only for accurately determining the percentage of fault of named parties.
    3. Where fault is assessed against nonparties, findings of fault shall not subject any nonparty to liability in any action or be introduced as evidence of liability in any action.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. This section was held unconstitutional in Thomas v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 (2009).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Samuel T. Waddell, Comment: Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 485 (2013).

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Issued Interim Report of Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases Regarding Possible Changes to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Because of the Invalidation of Civil Justice Reform Act, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Justice Robert L. Brown, A Judicial Retrospective: Significant Decisions by the Arkansas Supreme Court From 1991 Through 2011, 34 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 219 (2012).

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, district court did not have to address a constitutional challenge to this section, the nonparty notice provision of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), § 16-55-201 et seq., because the CJRA could be plausibly interpreted to comply with the United States and Arkansas Constitutions and to conform with the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law, § 11-9-101 et seq., and the Arkansas Comparative Fault Act, § 16-64-122. Pursuant to the canon of constitutional avoidance, the district court would not rule on the constitutionality of this section because doing so was not absolutely necessary. Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

This section was unconstitutional and conflicted with Ark. Const., Art. 4, § 2 and Ark. Const., Amend. 80, § 3 because rules regarding pleading, practice, and procedure were solely the responsibility of the supreme court; the nonparty-fault provision bypassed the rules of pleading, practice and procedure by setting up a procedure to determine the fault of a nonparty and mandating the consideration of that nonparty's fault in an effort to reduce a plaintiff's recovery. Thomas v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 (2009).

In a products liability action by an injured worker against the manufacturer of a defective chemical tank, the district court appropriately declined to allow the jury to assign a percentage of fault to the worker's employer, a nonparty, because the nonparty-fault provision in this section had been declared unconstitutional. McCoy v. Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, 593 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2010).

Application.

While a products liability defendant could issue a nonparty notice under subdivision (b)(2) of this section with regard to a nonparty equipment manufacturer, it could not issue an apportionment of damages notice under subdivision (b)(2) of this section with regard to an injured worker's employer and coemployee: (1) the purpose of the notice under this section was to allow an apportionment of liability with regard to the injured worker's damages; (2) a notice under this section could only be used with regard to an individual or entity that could be made a party to the suit by way of cross or third party claims; (3) defendant could file a notice under this section against the manufacturer, provided it filed a third party complaint and brought the manufacturer in as a party to the suit; and (4) defendant could not file a notice under this section against the employer or the coemployee because they were statutorily immune pursuant to § 11-9-105(a), the exclusive remedies provision of the Workers' Compensation Law, § 11-9-101 et seq.Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Interpretation.

Nonparty notice requirements set out in subdivision (b)(2) of this section apply in addition to state civil procedure rules. This section should be interpreted as being compatible with § 16-64-122(a), which limits the apportionment of fault to an individual or entity from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, which includes individuals and entities that are subject to being brought into a suit pursuant to a cross or third party claim under Ark. R. Civ. P. 13 and 14, but excludes nonparties who are otherwise immune from suit, including employers who are immune pursuant to § 11-9-105(a), the exclusive remedies provision of the Workers' Compensation Law, § 11-9-101 et seq.Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

16-55-203. Increase in percentage of several share.

    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 16-55-201 and 16-55-202, in the event a several judgment has been entered against multiple-party defendants, a plaintiff may move the court no later than ten (10) days after the entry of judgment to determine whether all or part of the amount of the several share for which a defendant is liable will not be reasonably collectible.
    2. If the court determines, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that any defendant's several share or multiple defendants' several shares will not be reasonably collectible, the court shall increase the percentage points of the several shares of each of the remaining defendants, subject to the limitations in subdivisions (a)(3) and (4) of this section.
      1. If a defendant's percentage of fault is determined by the finder of fact to be ten percent (10%) or less, then the percentage points of that defendant's several share shall not be increased.
      2. If a defendant's percentage of fault is determined by the finder of fact to be greater than ten percent (10%) but less than fifty percent (50%), then the percentage points of that defendant's several share shall be increased by no more than ten (10) percentage points.
      3. If a defendant's percentage of fault is determined by the finder of fact to be fifty percent (50%) or greater, then the percentage points of that defendant's several share shall be increased by no more than twenty (20) percentage points.
    3. Under no circumstances shall the combined percentage points of the remaining defendants' several shares exceed the lesser of:
      1. A total of one hundred (100) percentage points; or
      2. The total number of percentage points remaining after deducting the percentage of fault of the plaintiff, if any.
    4. Any defendant whose several share has been increased pursuant to this section, and who has discharged his or her obligation to pay the increased several share, has a right of contribution from the defendants whose several shares were determined by the court to be not reasonably collectible.
  1. The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any punitive damages award or judgment.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 3.

16-55-204. Applicability of § 16-55-203.

The provisions of § 16-55-203 shall not apply to a medical care provider who is named as a defendant in an action for personal injury, medical injury, or wrongful death based solely on his or her capacity as a medical director of a long-term care facility.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 4.

16-55-205. Acting in concert.

  1. Notwithstanding § 16-55-201, a party is responsible for the fault of another person or entity or for payment of the proportionate share of another person or entity if both the party and the other person or entity were acting in concert or if the other person or entity was acting as an agent or servant of the party.
    1. As used in this section, “acting in concert” means entering into a conscious agreement to pursue a common plan or design to commit an intentional tort and actively taking part in that intentional tort.
    2. “Acting in concert” does not mean the act of any person or entity whose conduct was negligent in any degree other than intentional.
    3. A person's or entity's conduct which provides substantial assistance to one committing an intentional tort does not constitute “acting in concert” if the person or entity has not consciously agreed with the other to commit the intentional tort.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 5.

16-55-206. Standards for award of punitive damages.

In order to recover punitive damages from a defendant, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and that either or both of the following aggravating factors were present and related to the injury for which compensatory damages were awarded:

  1. The defendant knew or ought to have known, in light of the surrounding circumstances, that his or her conduct would naturally and probably result in injury or damage and that he or she continued the conduct with malice or in reckless disregard of the consequences, from which malice may be inferred; or
  2. The defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct for the purpose of causing injury or damage.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 9.

Research References

ALR.

Exemplary or punitive damages for pharmacist's wrongful conduct in preparing or dispensing medical prescription — Cases not under Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 2072). 109 A.L.R.5th 397.

Allowance of Punitive Damages in Motor Vehicles Products Liability Cases, 17 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2018).

Case Notes

Conduct Not Warranting Punitive Damages.

Where plaintiff retailer sued defendant supplier on claims of fraud and deceptive trade practices in connection with the supplier's refusal to honor its rebate program for the retailer's customers, and the claims requiring any knowing or intentional wrongful act failed, and no reasonable jury could find that the supplier acted with malice or an intent to harm the retailer, the retailer was not entitled to pursue punitive damages under this section, especially since the standard under this section had to be met by clear and convincing evidence as required by § 16-55-207. Curtis Lumber Co. v. La. Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2010).

In this action for negligent hiring, training, supervision or monitoring, and retention, defendants were granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages because plaintiffs had not provided evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that defendants knew or ought to have known that their conduct would naturally and probably result in injury or damage to the victim. Perry v. Stevens Transp., Inc., No. 3:11CV00048 JLH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94942 (E.D. Ark. July 9, 2012).

Alleged violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations did not support a punitive-damages award, because there was no evidence that the driver had been drinking alcohol or using controlled substances prior to the accident or that he was or appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substances at the time of the accident. Brumley v. Keech, 2012 Ark. 263 (2012).

In an action regarding equipment supplied by defendant to plaintiff to heat-treat pipe, because plaintiff asserted punitive damages only on its gross negligence claim, and could not show gross negligence because defendant sincerely and consistently attempted to fix the defective equipment, the punitive damages claim was dismissed under this section. IPSCO Tubulars, Inc. v. Ajax TOCCO Magnathermic Corp., 779 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2015).

Relevant Evidence.

In a negligence case, a trial court erred by granting a motion in limine and excluding evidence of prior driving while intoxicated offenses because they were relevant under Ark. R. Evid. 401 to the determination of whether punitive damages under this section were warranted. Yeakley v. Doss, 370 Ark. 122, 257 S.W.3d 895 (2007).

Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on punitive damages because a reasonable juror could find that defendant property owner, acting on behalf of defendant entities, knew or had reason to know that proceeding with excavation of the hillside without a recommended retaining wall in place would inflict injury to plaintiff's property, but he proceeded with excavation with conscious indifference to the consequences, from which malice may be inferred. Rivercliff Co. v. Residences at Riverdale GP, LLC, No. 4:10CV00330 SWW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139158 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 2, 2011).

16-55-207. Burden of proof for award of punitive damages.

A plaintiff must satisfy the burden of proof required under § 16-55-206 by clear and convincing evidence in order to recover punitive damages from the defendant.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 10.

Research References

ALR.

Exemplary or punitive damages for pharmacist's wrongful conduct in preparing or dispensing medical prescription — Cases not under Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 2072). 109 A.L.R.5th 397.

Case Notes

Burden of Proof.

Where plaintiff retailer sued defendant supplier on claims of fraud and deceptive trade practices in connection with the supplier's refusal to honor its rebate program for the retailer's customers, and the claims requiring any knowing or intentional wrongful act failed, and no reasonable jury could find that the supplier acted with malice or an intent to harm the retailer, the retailer was not entitled to pursue punitive damages under § 16-55-206, especially since § 16-55-206's standard had to be met by clear and convincing evidence as required by this section. Curtis Lumber Co. v. La. Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2010).

Summary Judgment Denied.

Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on punitive damages because a reasonable juror could find that defendant property owner, acting on behalf of defendant entities, knew or had reason to know that proceeding with excavation of the hillside without a recommended retaining wall in place would inflict injury to plaintiff's property, but he proceeded with excavation with conscious indifference to the consequences, from which malice may be inferred. Rivercliff Co. v. Residences at Riverdale GP, LLC, No. 4:10CV00330 SWW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139158 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 2, 2011).

16-55-208. Limitations on the amount of punitive damages.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a punitive damages award for each plaintiff shall not be more than the greater of the following:
    1. Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000); or
    2. Three (3) times the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the action, not to exceed one million dollars ($1,000,000).
  2. Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply when the finder of fact:
    1. Determines by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of the injury, the defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct for the purpose of causing injury or damage; and
    2. Determines that the defendant's conduct did, in fact, harm the plaintiff.
  3. As to the punitive damages limitations established in subsection (a) of this section, the fixed sums of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) set forth in subdivision (a)(1) of this section and one million dollars ($1,000,000) set forth in subdivision (a)(2) of this section shall be adjusted as of January 1, 2006, and at three-year intervals thereafter, in accordance with the Consumer Price Index rate for the previous year as determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 11; 2003, No. 1471, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1471, § 1, amended this section as enacted by Acts 2003, No. 649, § 11.

Publisher's Notes. This section was held unconstitutional in Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822 (2011).

Research References

ALR.

Exemplary or punitive damages for pharmacist's wrongful conduct in preparing or dispensing medical prescription — Cases not under Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 2072). 109 A.L.R.5th 397.

Allowance of Punitive Damages in Motor Vehicles Products Liability Cases, 17 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2018).

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

Rachel A. Orr, Recent Developments: Punitive Damages Cap of Arkansas Tort Reform Act Held Unconstitutional — Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer , 65 Ark. L. Rev. 163 (2012).

Austin A. King, Case Note: A Problematic Procedure: The Struggle for Control of Procedural Rulemaking Power, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 759 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section was unconstitutional under Ark. Const. Art. 5, § 32, because it limited the amount of recovery outside of an employment relationship. Therefore, a punitive damage award of $42 million against a manufacturer of genetically altered rice that allowed its rice to contaminate conventional seed was upheld. Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822 (2011).

Cited: Holiday Inn Franchising v. Hotel Assocs., 2011 Ark. App. 147, 382 S.W.3d 6 (2011).

16-55-209. No right to punitive damages.

Nothing in § 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), 16-114-209, and 16-114-21016-114-212 shall be construed as creating a right to an award of punitive damages.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 12.

Research References

ALR.

Exemplary or punitive damages for pharmacist's wrongful conduct in preparing or dispensing medical prescription — Cases not under Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 2072). 109 A.L.R.5th 397.

16-55-210. No limitation on certain judicial duties.

Nothing in § 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), 16-114-209, and 16-114-21016-114-212 shall limit the duty of a court or the appellate courts to:

  1. Scrutinize all punitive damages awards;
  2. Ensure that all punitive damages awards comply with applicable procedural, evidentiary, and constitutional requirements; and
  3. Order remittitur where appropriate.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 13.

16-55-211. Bifurcated proceeding.

    1. In any case in which punitive damages are sought, any party may request a bifurcated proceeding at least ten (10) days prior to trial.
    2. If a bifurcated proceeding has been requested by either party, then:
      1. The finder of fact first shall determine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded; and
      2. After a compensatory damages award determination, the finder of fact then shall determine whether and in what amount punitive damages will be awarded.
  1. Evidence of the financial condition of the defendant and other evidence relevant only to punitive damages is not admissible with regard to any compensatory damages determination.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 14.

Publisher's Notes. Ark. R. Civ. P. 42 was amended, effective April 1, 2015. Per 2015 Ark. 88, “[w]ith the adoption of the amendment to Rule 42, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-211 is superseded pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-11-301.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Evidence.

Because a medical-malpractice trial was bifurcated, the patient was not entitled to present evidence to support an award of punitive damages until the jury returned a verdict on liability as an award of actual damages was a predicate for the recovery of punitive damages. Poff v. Elkins, 2014 Ark. App. 663, 449 S.W.3d 315 (2014).

16-55-212. Compensatory damages.

  1. Section 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), 16-114-209, and 16-114-210 — 16-114-212 do not limit compensatory damages.
  2. Any evidence of damages for the costs of any necessary medical care, treatment, or services received shall include only those costs actually paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff or which remain unpaid and for which the plaintiff or any third party shall be legally responsible.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 15.

Publisher's Notes. Subsection (b) of this section was held unconstitutional in Thomas v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 (2009).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Issued Interim Report of Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases Regarding Possible Changes to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Because of the Invalidation of Civil Justice Reform Act, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Allegedly injured driver brought suit against another motorist, who then brought suit against a third party; the jury determined that the third party was 100 percent at fault. The allegedly injured driver attacked the constitutionality of § 16-55-201 and this section; however, the supreme court refused to consider the arguments because the supreme court considered the matter to be moot. Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, 258 S.W.3d 744 (2007).

Court granted plaintiff's motion challenging the Arkansas Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, subsection (b) of this section, and allowed plaintiff to introduce evidence of the amounts billed to her for medical services necessitated by the injuries that were the subject of her lawsuit, regardless of any discount that she had received on those amounts because (1) if the Arkansas Supreme Court were considering the constitutionality of subsection (b), it would hold that subsection (b) infringed on its constitutional prerogative to prescribe rules of evidence under Ark. Const., Amend. 80, § 3, and was, therefore, unconstitutional because subsection (b) would, if enforced, work a reversal of the collateral source rule that had been recognized and approved by the Arkansas Supreme Court, yet the Arkansas Supreme Court did not “prescribe” subsection (b), and (2) the Arkansas Supreme Court would, if presented with the instant motion, find that subsection (b) violated Ark. Const., Art. V, § 32 as the Arkansas Supreme Court had held that a personal injury plaintiff was entitled, assuming a successful showing of liability, to recover the payments made (or written off) on her behalf by a collateral source, but subsection (b) would prevent her from doing that. Burns v. Ford Motor Co., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (W.D. Ark. 2008).

Medical costs provision, subsection (b) of this section, violated separation of powers under Ark. Const., Art. 4, § 2 and Ark. Const., Amend. 80, § 3, because rules regarding the admissibility of evidence were within the province of the supreme court. Thomas v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 (2009).

Plain Error Review.

In light of the Arkansas court's decision in Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 (2009), a district court erred by limiting the presentation of evidence relating to damages based on subsection (b) of this section, and because a court had to consider the law at the time of appeal when reviewing for plain error, the error was clear. But the error did not affect plaintiff parents' substantial rights; the objectionable portions of the closing argument related to the failure of plaintiffs to support their claim for damages, as well as any evidence presented concerning the financial aspects of their daughter's care and treatment, were rendered irrelevant by the jury's verdict in favor of defendant hospital and obstetrician on liability. Csiszer v. Wren, 614 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2010).

16-55-213. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning venue for civil actions, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 830, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 2003, No. 649, § 16; 2013, No. 1315, § 1.

For current law, see §§ 16-60-101 and 16-60-105.

16-55-214. Maximum appeal bond in civil litigation.

  1. Appeal bonds shall be determined under § 16-68-301 et seq., and Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil, Rule 8, except that the maximum appeal bond that may be required in any civil action under any legal theory shall be limited to twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000), regardless of the amount of the judgment.
  2. If a party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the party who has posted a bond in accordance with subsection (a) of this section is purposely dissipating or diverting assets outside of the ordinary course of its business for the purpose of evading ultimate payment of the judgment, the court may enter orders as are necessary to prevent dissipation or diversion, including requiring that a bond be posted equal to the full amount of the judgment.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 16-55-220, the maximum appeal bond for any cause of action brought under any legal theory shall be limited to twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000), regardless of the amount of the judgment or the date the cause of action accrued, subject to the provisions of § 16-55-214(b).

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 17; 2005, No. 1380, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (c).

16-55-215. Burden of proof.

Section 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), 16-114-209, and 16-114-21016-114-212 do not amend the existing law that provides that the burden of alleging and proving fault is upon the person who seeks to establish fault.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 6.

Cross References. Burden of proof, § 16-40-101.

16-55-216. Comparative fault.

Section 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-20916-114-212 do not amend existing law that provides that a plaintiff may not recover any amount of damages if the plaintiff's own fault is determined to be fifty percent (50%) or greater.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 7.

16-55-217. Cause of action not created.

  1. Section 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-209 — 16-114-212 do not create a cause of action.
  2. Section 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-14-209 — 16-114-212 do not alter the defenses or immunity of any person or entity.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 8.

16-55-218. Attorney General.

No provision of § 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-20916-114-212 shall apply to or alter existing law with respect to any claim, charge, action, or suit brought or prosecuted by the Attorney General.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 23.

16-55-219. Coroner or medical examiner.

Nothing in § 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-20916-114-212 shall be construed to diminish or enlarge the powers or duties of a coroner or medical examiner.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 24.

16-55-220. Applicability and severability.

  1. Section 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-209 — 16-114-212 shall apply to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.
  2. Section 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-209 — 16-114-212 shall not apply to any action filed or cause of action accruing prior to March 25, 2003.
  3. If any provisions of Section 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-209 — 16-114-212 or the application of § 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-209 — 16-114-212 to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of § 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-209 — 16-114-212 which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of § 16-55-201 et seq. and §§ 16-114-206(a), 16-114-208(a), 16-114-208(c)(1), and 16-114-209 — 16-114-212 are declared to be severable.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 25.

Chapter 56 Limitation Of Actions

Research References

Am. Jur. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Lim. Act., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 54 C.J.S., Lim. Act., § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Medical injury actions, § 16-114-203.

Product liability actions, § 16-116-103.

Wrongful death actions, § 16-62-102.

Effective Dates. Acts 1889, No. 70, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1891, No. 159, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 123, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1939, No. 398, § 1: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 30, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the county is in the midst of a period of adjustment and settlement of debts and demands by suits and otherwise an emergency is found and declared to exist and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1943, No. 159, § 3: Mar. 4, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “That because many persons of this state are now in the armed forces of the United States government and are unable to protect their respective rights under the law, an emergency is declared to exist, and it being necessary, for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, that this act go into immediate operation, this act shall be in force and effect from and after its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 471, § 3: Apr. 4, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that civil actions for alienation of affection may now be brought within five (5) years after the cause of action accrues; that a five (5) year statute of limitations is unduly long and is conducive to the loss of valuable testimony and the dimming of the memory of witnesses as to the event that gave rise to the original cause of action; and that in order to remedy this situation and to encourage the timely bringing of such actions, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 221, § 3: Feb. 28, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the law amended by this Act has been the subject of misinterpretation resulting in inequitable treatment of many plaintiffs, and that this Act is immediately necessary to clarify that law. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 894, § 3: Apr. 1, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the statute of limitations prescribed by Act 638 of 1983 is too short; that this Act should be given effect on April 1, 1985 because it is vital that this Act go into effect on the most reasonably immediate date certain; that unless this emergency clause is adopted this Act will not go into effect until ninety days after recess or adjournment of the General Assembly; and that April 1, 1985 is the date by which this Act can reasonably be expected to have been enacted. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after April 1, 1985.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 46, § 11: approved Nov. 14, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an urgent need to validate otherwise legal marriages declared void by court decisions, to declare and preserve the legitimacy of the children born of such marriages, and to validate all property rights between the parties themselves and third persons; that it is in the best interest of the state that this act declaring such marriages take effect immediately. It is further determined that it is in the best interest of the state that the actions of alienation of affection and criminal conversation be abolished immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 2003, No. 1328, § 7: July 1, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that proper registration and monitoring of the home inspectors in this state is vital to the protection of Arkansas home owners; that the current home inspector laws are not adequate and do not properly fund this important government function; and that this act is essential that a functioning Home Inspector Registration Board be in place at the beginning of the fiscal year to receive its funds to properly monitor Arkansas home inspectors. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2003.”

Research References

ALR.

Statute of limitations as to cause of action for development of latent industrial or occupational disease. 1 A.L.R.4th 117.

Malpractice of attorney: what statute of limitations governs damage actions. 2 A.L.R.4th 284.

What statute of limitations governs action arising out of transaction consummated by use of credit card. 2 A.L.R.4th 677.

Statute of limitations in dental malpractices. 3 A.L.R.4th 318.

Restrictive language of debtor accompanying part payment as presenting interruption of statute of limitations. 10 A.L.R.4th 932.

Limitation of actions involving defects in houses or other buildings caused by soil instability. 12 A.L.R.4th 866.

Consumer protection or state deceptive trade practices act: when statute commences to run. 18 A.L.R.4th 430.

Air pollution: when statute of limitations begins to run as to cause of action for nuisance. 19 A.L.R.4th 456.

Dissolved corporation: time for bringing action against former director, etc., for personal injuries incurred after final dissolution. 20 A.L.R.4th 414.

Inverse condemnation: state statute of limitations. 26 A.L.R.4th 68.

Tolling in favor of one commencing action despite existing disability. 30 A.L.R.4th 1092.

When statute begins to run upon action against attorney for malpractice. 32 A.L.R.4th 260.

Limitation of actions for invasion of right of privacy. 33 A.L.R.4th 429.

Time of discovery of defamation as determining accrual of action. 35 A.L.R.4th 1002.

Statute of limitations applicable to third person's action against psychiatrist, psychologist, or other mental health practitioner, based on failure to warn persons against whom patient expressed threats. 41 A.L.R.4th 1078.

Contesting will or its probate: fraud as extending statutory limitations period for. 48 A.L.R.4th 1094.

Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action. 49 A.L.R.4th 972.

16-56-101. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning application of limitations for nonresidents, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 19[20]. The section was derived from Acts 1844, § 3, p. 24; C. & M. Dig., § 6962; Pope's Dig., § 8940; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-230.

16-56-102. Application of limitations — Setoffs.

The provisions of this act shall be deemed and taken to apply to the case of any demand alleged by way of setoff on the part of any defendant, either by plea, notice, or otherwise. However, any demand, right, or cause of action, regardless of how it may have arisen, may be asserted by way of setoff in any action to the extent of the plaintiff's demand.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 33; C. & M. Dig., § 6978; Pope's Dig., § 8956; Acts 1939, No. 398, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-233.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, codified as §§ 4-59-101(c), 16-56-10216-56-105, 16-56-108, 16-56-109, 16-56-11516-56-117, 16-56-119, 16-56-120, 16-56-12216-56-124, 16-56-126, 16-56-127, 18-11-104, 18-61-102, 18-61-105.

Case Notes

In General.

When a plaintiff brings suit upon a claim arising from a certain transaction, the defendant may successfully assert a setoff that arose from a different transaction even though the claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations when the plaintiff's cause of action accrued. Little Rock Crate & Basket Co. v. Young, 284 Ark. 295, 681 S.W.2d 388 (1984).

Construction.

Although this section and § 16-65-603(a) permit judgments to be set off against each other, § 16-63-206(c) prevents the setoff of judgments assigned to the defendant after suit has been commenced against him. Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637, 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

This section and § 16-65-603(a) are provisions generally authorizing that a demand, right or course of action may be asserted by setoff and also permitting money judgments to be set off (having due regard to the legal and equitable rights of all persons interested in both judgments), while § 16-63-206(c) is a specific provision governing the timeliness of setoffs, disallowing those judgments assigned to a defendant after the plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant; because these three provisions can be read in harmony, neither this section nor § 16-65-603(a) impliedly repeal § 16-63-206(c). Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637, 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

Alimony and Child Support.

Statute of limitations did not bar former wife's claim for unpaid alimony and child support asserted as a defensive setoff against husband's claim to one half of the sales proceeds from a judicial sale of the house, although the amount of setoff would be limited to the amount of the husband's claim and any excess would be barred. Jones v. Jones, 22 Ark. App. 179, 737 S.W.2d 654 (1987).

Counterclaims.

There is no logical reason why a setoff should not serve as an affirmative defense to a counterclaim as well as to an original complaint, a crossclaim, or a third-party claim. Turner v. Eubanks, 26 Ark. App. 22, 759 S.W.2d 37 (1988).

Assertion of a compulsory counterclaim does not act as a waiver of the statute of limitations. Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 849 S.W.2d 513 (1993).

16-56-103. Actions not affected by Rev. Stat., Ch. 91.

  1. The provisions of this act shall not extend to any action which is or shall be otherwise limited by any statute, but the action shall be brought within the time limited by the statute.
  2. None of the provisions of this act shall apply to suits brought to enforce payment on bills, notes, or evidences of debt issued by any bank or moneyed corporation.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, §§ 18, 28; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6967, 6976; Pope's Dig., §§ 8945, 8954; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-214, 37-232.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-102.

Research References

ALR.

Application of Doctrine of Adverse Domination. 13 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).

Case Notes

Evidence of Debt.

Deposit slips were not evidences of debt. England v. Hughes, 141 Ark. 235, 217 S.W. 13 (1919).

Under the express terms of subsection (b) of this section, § 16-56-111(b) does not apply to suits to enforce payment of any bills, notes, or evidences of any debt issued by any bank. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

16-56-104. Actions with limitation of one year.

The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action shall accrue and not thereafter:

  1. All special actions on the case;
  2. Actions for:
    1. Assault and battery; and
    2. False imprisonment;
  3. All actions for words spoken slandering the character of another;
  4. All actions for words spoken whereby special damages are sustained; and
  5. All actions for damages suffered by a consumer as a result of any act or omission of a home inspector relating to a home inspection report.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 6951; Pope's Dig., § 8929; Acts 1967, No. 471, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-201; Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 46, § 7; 2003, No. 1328, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1328, § 5, provided:

“All regulations adopted by the Homes Inspector Advisory Board under § 17-52-107 shall remain in effect until the new Arkansas Inspector Registration Board adopts regulations, unless the regulations conflict with this act.”

Publisher's Notes. With regard to the words “special actions on the case”, see ARCP 2, which provides for one form of action.

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 46, § 8, provided that § 7 of the act does not apply to litigation pending before the effective date of the act.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment added (5); and made related and stylistic changes.

Cross References. Arkansas Home Inspectors Registration Act, § 17-52-301 et seq.

Research References

ALR.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of negligent act or omission. 11 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of sustaining damage or injury and other theories. 12 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Statement of rule and application of rule to providing client with allegedly negligent advice or failing to advise. 13 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to conduct of litigation and delay or inaction in conducting client's affairs. 14 A.L.R.6th 1.

Timeliness of action under medical malpractice statute of repose, aside from effect of fraudulent concealment of patient's cause of action. 14 A.L.R.6th 301.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to property, estate, corporate, and document cases. 15 A.L.R.6th 427.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to negligent misrepresentation, failure to supervise junior counsel, conflict of interest, billing disputes, and unspecified acts of negligence. 16 A.L.R.6th 653.

When statute of limitations begins to run in case of dental malpractice. 17 A.L.R.6th 159.

Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Deception as Estopping Reliance on Nonmedical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. 98 A.L.R.6th 417 (2014).

Accrual of Claims for Continuing Trespass or Continuing Nuisance for Purposes of Statutory Limitations. 14 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2015).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Family Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 631.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The purpose of a statute of limitations is to encourage the prompt filing of claims by allowing no more than a reasonable time within which to make a claim so a defendant is protected from having to defend an action in which the truth-finding process would be impaired by the passage of time. McEntire v. Malloy, 288 Ark. 582, 707 S.W.2d 773 (1986).

Alienation of Affections.

Prior to the 1967 amendment, this section did not apply in a suit for alienation of affections, the court holding that there was a clear distinction between the two separate torts of alienation of affection and criminal conversation. Gibson v. Gibson, 240 Ark. 827, 402 S.W.2d 647 (1966).

Plaintiffs' suit for alienation of a child's affection was barred by this section since the suit was filed well beyond the one year limit. Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981)Criticized byPoindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

Assault and Battery.

Cause of action not barred by one year statute of limitation, but subject to three year statute of limitation. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Mynott, 83 Ark. 6, 102 S.W. 380 (1907); Jefferson v. Nero, 225 Ark. 302, 280 S.W.2d 884 (1956).

An action for damages for shooting another person is an assault and battery and barred in one year even though there could have been a conviction for a higher crime. McAlister v. Gunter, 164 Ark. 611, 262 S.W. 636 (1924).

Where no special relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant and damages claimed by plaintiff were the result of alleged assault and battery, action is governed by the one year statute of limitations. Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ark. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. Ark. 1961).

Where the plaintiff was severely beaten by her husband in 1982, but did not discover the extent of her injuries until 1984, and she filed a personal injury action in 1985, the statute of limitations began to run when the battery was allegedly committed and the judge was correct in dismissing the action. McEntire v. Malloy, 288 Ark. 582, 707 S.W.2d 773 (1986).

Action for civil damages arising from a shooting involved a battery, not a trespass, and was barred when not brought within the limitations period. Andrews v. McDougal, 292 Ark. 590, 731 S.W.2d 779 (1987).

Allegations that a doctor had improperly touched, examined, and otherwise fondled plaintiffs' breasts during a physical examination did not allege a complaint of battery, governed by the one-year statute of limitations in this section, but stated a cause of action for the tort of outrage, which is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in § 16-56-105. McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 963 S.W.2d 583 (1998).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the owners of a trailer park because the gravamen of the tenant's claim was for assault and battery and/or negligence, not breach of contract, and the claim was therefore untimely where the tenant filed his complaint over four years after the incident, and no breach of contract was alleged that would bring the action under the five-year statute of limitations. The rental form, which was not specific to the tenant, contained no promise, specific or general, on the part of the owners to protect the tenant from harm. Moody v. Tarvin, 2016 Ark. App. 169, 486 S.W.3d 242 (2016).

Civil Rights Violation.

Allegation of deprivation of rights in violation of federal statute must bring action within statute of limitations most analogous to claim, which in this case would be as provided in § 16-56-105 rather than one year as provided in this section. Reed v. Hutto, 486 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1973).

Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accruing within a particular state are to be governed by that state's general personal-injury statute of limitations, not by statutes covering particular torts such as this one-year statute of limitations. The general personal-injury statute of limitations of three years governs § 1983 actions. Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992).

Contractual Interference.

The limitation period for a contractual interference claim is three years, not one year. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).

Deceit.

Although similar to an action for defamation, an action for deceit is distinct and is covered by the three year statute of limitations, not the one year statute. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).

Defamation.

In an action to recover damages for unrecorded defamation of character and reputation, the complaint stated a cause of action for slander which was barred by the one year statute of limitations. Parkman v. Hastings, 259 Ark. 59, 531 S.W.2d 481 (1976).

False Imprisonment, Etc.

Under this section an action alleging false imprisonment must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. Gilpin v. Tack, 256 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Ark. 1966).

Complaint asserting false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress was barred by the one year statute of limitations applicable to actions for false imprisonment and for assault and battery, and since no facts were alleged that would make the assertion of mental and emotional distress anything more than an element of damage flowing from the imprisonment and mistreatment, the same one year statute would apply. Turner v. Baptist Medical Center, 275 Ark. 424, 631 S.W.2d 275 (1982).

Husband and Wife.

Where wife's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, her husband's claim for damages based on wife's cause of action is also barred. Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ark. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. Ark. 1961).

Invasion of Privacy.

Only torts not enumerated in this section have the three year limitation period of § 16-56-105. The reason there must be a short limitation period of one year for actions based on spoken words which allegedly constitute invasion of privacy is simple: there is no written proof of the claim and such an action ought to be quickly resolved. This effects the underlying purpose of statutes of limitations; that is, to settle claims within a reasonable period of time after they arise and while the evidence is fresh in the witnesses' minds. Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984).

Malpractice.

The statute of limitations begins to run at the time the act of malpractice occurs, not from the time it is discovered. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

Personal Injuries.

An action by a husband for damages suffered in consequence of wrongful injury to his wife is not barred in one year. Emrich v. Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co., 71 Ark. 71, 70 S.W. 1035 (1902).

An action by a parent for damages for seduction of child is tort action for personal injuries, and the one-year statute does not apply. Breining v. Lippincott, 125 Ark. 77, 187 S.W. 915 (1916).

Slander.

Subdivision (4) provides that actions for slander shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues, which is the time of publication. Pinkston v. Lovell, 296 Ark. 543, 759 S.W.2d 20 (1988).

Plaintiffs' slander claim was time-barred where it was not brought within one year of publication and where the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the defendants acted to fraudulently conceal the allegedly slanderous statement. Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 937 S.W.2d 653 (1997).

Employee's complaint, filed on January 24, 2008, alleged that the slanderous statements were made on or about January 15, 2006; because the complaint was filed more than one year after the occurrence of the allegedly slanderous statements, the employee's defamation claim against the partnership was barred by the statute of limitations. Roeben v. BG Excelsior Ltd. P'ship, 2009 Ark. App. 646, 344 S.W.3d 93 (2009).

Special Actions on the Case.

The words “all special actions on the case” are limited to actions for criminal conversation. Emrich v. Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co., 71 Ark. 71, 70 S.W. 1035 (1902). See also Cockrill v. Cooper, 86 F. 7 (8th Cir. 1898).

Wrongful Killing.

This section has no applicability to an action brought under § 16-62-101 for wrongful killing. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Robertson, 103 Ark. 361, 146 S.W. 482 (1912).

Cited: Heuer v. Basin Park Hotel & Resort, 114 F. Supp. 604 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Crawford v. General Contract Corp., 174 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970); Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977); Phillips v. Sugrue, 800 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993); O'Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 942 S.W.2d 854 (1997); Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094 (1997).

16-56-105. Actions with limitation of three years.

The following actions shall be commenced within three (3) years after the cause of action accrues:

  1. All actions founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability not under seal and not in writing, excepting such as are brought upon the judgment or decree of some court of record of the United States or of this or some other state;
  2. All actions for arrearages of rent not reserved by some instrument in writing, under seal;
  3. All actions founded on any contract or liability, expressed or implied;
  4. All actions for trespass on lands;
  5. All actions for libels; and
  6. All actions for taking or injuring any goods or chattels.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 6950; Pope's Dig., § 8928; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-206.

Research References

ALR.

Insurance agents or brokers as professionals or nonprofessionals for purposes of malpractice statutes of limitations. 121 A.L.R.5th 365.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of negligent act or omission. 11 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of sustaining damage or injury and other theories. 12 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Statement of rule and application of rule to providing client with allegedly negligent advice or failing to advise. 13 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to conduct of litigation and delay or inaction in conducting client's affairs. 14 A.L.R.6th 1.

Timeliness of action under medical malpractice statute of repose, aside from effect of fraudulent concealment of patient's cause of action. 14 A.L.R.6th 301.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to property, estate, corporate, and document cases. 15 A.L.R.6th 427.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to negligent misrepresentation, failure to supervise junior counsel, conflict of interest, billing disputes, and unspecified acts of negligence. 16 A.L.R.6th 653.

When statute of limitations begins to run in case of dental malpractice. 17 A.L.R.6th 159.

Application of Relation Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Motor Vehicle Accident or Injury Cases: Individual Drivers, Parents, Owners or Lessors, and Passengers. 97 A.L.R.6th 375 (2014).

Application of Relation-Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Motor Vehicle Accident or Injury Cases: Corporations, Municipalities, Insurers, and Employers. 98 A.L.R.6th 93 (2014).

Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Deception as Estopping Reliance on Nonmedical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. 98 A.L.R.6th 417 (2014).

Application of Relation-Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Motor Vehicle Accident or Injury Cases: Estates, and Other or Unspecified Parties. 99 A.L.R.6th 1 (2014).

Application of Relation-Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Construction Cases. 104 A.L.R.6th 1 (2015).

Application of Doctrine of Adverse Domination. 13 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).

Accrual of Claims for Continuing Trespass or Continuing Nuisance for Purposes of Statutory Limitations. 14 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2015).

Ark. L. Notes.

Looney, When Third Means Fourth, Contract Includes Tort, and a Five-Year Statute of Limitation Actually Leaves Only Three Years or Less to File Suit: The Strange Saga of the Arkansas “Statute of Repose” in Construction Cases, 1993 Ark. L. Notes 87.

Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages, Fifth Edition, Chapter 30: Real Property, 2004 Arkansas L. Notes 9.

Ark. L. Rev.

Sales — Application of Statute of Limitations to Breach of Warranty, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 104.

Limitation of Action — Accrual of Cause of Action, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 264.

Note, The Law of Defamation: An Arkansas Primer, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 915.

Recent Developments, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 419.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds Retaliation Claims Under Arkansas Civil Rights Act Subject to Three-Year Statute of Limitations Period in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arey, Bank Directors' Duties Under the Common Law of Arkansas, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 629.

Note, Professional Malpractice — Limitation of Actions — Arkansas Extends the Occurrence Rule to Accountants and Recognizes a Tolling Provision in Attorney Malpractice Actions, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 115.

Survey, Contracts, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 329.

Fifteenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 427.

Dudley, The Continuous Representation Doctrine: Must You Sue Your Lawyer While She Still Represents You?, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 241.

Case Notes

Construction.

Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of a construction company in a negligent construction case because a lawsuit was not filed until after the three-year period in subsection (3) of this section had run; there was no evidence that the company had performed any repairs or that repairs were done on its behalf, and, even if repair work had been done on the company's behalf, the statute of limitations would have only been tolled during the period of repairs, which was not of sufficient length to render the claim timely. Without proof of the attempted repairs, the statute of repose in § 16-56-112(a) did not come into play, and there was no tolling of the three-year statute of limitations. Marshall v. Turman Constr. Corp., 2012 Ark. App. 686 (2012).

Applicability.

In an action involving fraud and a written instrument, the court looks to the gist of the action as alleged to determine which statute of limitations applies. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

In a claim where it was unclear whether plaintiffs were complaining of the circumstances surrounding the execution of a 1993 agreement, or seeking to enforce a 1981 contract breached in 1996, summary judgment based on the running of the 3 year statutes of limitations was improper. Ingram v. Chandler, 63 Ark. App. 1, 971 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Enforcement of environmental regulations intended to improve the environment for the benefit of the public are rights that belong to the public, and the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) represented the public at large; therefore, the State's exemption from the statute of limitations under subsection (3) of this section did not bar the DEQ's Remedial Action Trust Fund Act, § 8-7-501 et seq., and Arkansas Hazardous Waste Management Act, § 8-7-201 et seq., claims against the customers of the corporation, which was improperly disposing of hazardous wastes. Ark. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Brighton Corp., 352 Ark. 396, 102 S.W.3d 458 (2003).

IIn a dispute brought by condominium owners against corporations who were successors-in-interest to the original developers, the corporations attempted to argue that the owners' constructive fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations, however, the court found that the more specific provisions in § 18-14-403 controlled over the more general statute of limitations in this section. Nat'l Enters. v. Kessler, 363 Ark. 167, 213 S.W.3d 597 (2005).

Specific statute under the Time-Share Act (§ 18-14-403) controlled plaintiff time-share owners' claims against defendant developers, as opposed to the general limitations statute (§ 16-56-105); had the court adopted the developers' argument, it would have terminated the owners' right to seek relief before any injury was known to them, which was contrary to the General Assembly's intention to protect consumers under the Act. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Pyron, 363 Ark. 521, 215 S.W.3d 637 (2005).

Employee's ERISA claims for benefits under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a), (e)(1), and (f); penalties under § 1132(c)(1); and breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1105(a) and (b), were dismissed because (1) the three-year statute of limitations set forth in subdivision (3) of this section applied to the employee's claim for penalties, the employee requested the plan summary in December 2001 and again in January 2002 but waited until April 2005 to make further inquiries and another year to file a complaint, and the employee did not act with “due diligence,” to enforce her rights so she was not entitled to equitable tolling; (2) with regard to the employee's long-term disability (LTD) claim, the employee knew by December 2001 that her short-term (STD) claim had been denied, such denial served as notification to the employee that no more disability benefits would be approved, the employee should have known that LTD benefits were included and should have taken reasonable steps to enforce her claims, and the employer's failure to send the employee a plan summary did not excuse a four-year delay, so the three-year statute of limitation was not equitably tolled, and the employee's LTD claim was barred; (3) the employee's claim based on the employer's breach of fiduciary duty was also made too late because under the ERISA's statute of limitations, such claims had to be brought within three years under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1113(2); and (4) defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the employee's claim for STD benefits was construed as one for summary judgment and was granted because although the five-year limitations period set forth in § 16-56-111 applied to the claim, the statute of limitations was tolled because the amended claim for STD benefits related back to the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2), the employer offered an affidavit and documentation of its STD payments to the employee, and the employee did not respond to the employer's offer of proof. Gonser v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for trade secret misappropriation under § 4-75-601, intentional interference with contractual relationships or business expectancies, fraud, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy was denied because there were fact issues as to whether plaintiffs' claims accrued within the applicable three-year statute of limitations set forth in § 4-75-603 and this section and whether the application of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was appropriate, and further, plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Roach Mfg. Corp. v. Northstar Indus., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

Accountants.

The performance of audits in consecutive fiscal years is not presumptively a course of providing professional services that would call for the application of the continuous treatment doctrine. FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

The negligence statute of limitations applied to the clients' breach of contract action against their accountants, where the accountants' promise to represent the clients with diligence was not sufficiently specific to create a contract, and any violation of that promise was, by definition, negligence. Tony Smith Trucking v. Woods & Woods, Ltd., 75 Ark. App. 134, 55 S.W.3d 327 (2001).

Accrual.

Chicken growers' claims of fraud, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and negligence against a chicken processor were properly dismissed as time-barred; the last date the growers' cause of action accrued was the date on which they were informed that they would not be receiving a new contract, rather than the date of expiration of the last contract, and the growers' claims were filed more than three years after accrual. Crutchfield v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 121, 514 S.W.3d 499 (2017).

Actions for Accounting.

An action for an accounting of property held by one of three purchasers as trustee, brought after the death of the trustee which was 15 years after the time of purchase, was not barred. Lasker-Morris Bank & Trust Co. v. Gans, 132 Ark. 402, 200 S.W. 1029 (1918).

The three year statute is applicable to an action for an accounting between partners. Williams v. Walker, 148 Ark. 49, 229 S.W. 28 (1921).

If the three year statute of limitations is applicable to a suit against a county treasurer to require an accounting of fees and emoluments, the statute begins to run not from the date when the treasurer should have filed his annual settlement but from the date he actually filed it. McCoy v. State, 190 Ark. 297, 79 S.W.2d 94 (1935).

Mother's acceptance of care for ten years did not bar her from seeking accounting, and trial court correctly applied five year, rather than three year, statute of limitations to accounting since care-giver's obligation arose from written deeds, not oral or implied promise. Cluck v. Mack, 278 Ark. 506, 647 S.W.2d 442 (1983).

Attorneys.

The statute does not begin to run against an attorney's claim for fees until the relation of attorney and client is terminated. McNeil v. Garland & Nash, 27 Ark. 343 (1871).

The statute begins to run in favor of an attorney failing to pay over money from the time demand might have been reasonably made. Whitehead v. Wells, 29 Ark. 99 (1874); Leigh v. Williams, 64 Ark. 165, 41 S.W. 323 (1897); Crissman v. Carl Lee, 132 Ark. 32, 200 S.W. 133 (1918).

The statute begins to run in favor of an attorney guilty of negligence or misconduct from the date of the offense. White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 281 (1877)Criticized byWright v. Langdon, 274 Ark. 258, 623 S.W.2d 823 (1981).

An action to recover an attorney's fee is barred after three years. Parker v. Carter, 91 Ark. 162, 120 S.W. 836 (1909); Kinkead v. Estate of Kinkead, 51 Ark. App. 159, 912 S.W.2d 442 (1995).

The statute does not begin to run against an attorney claiming compensation for services in prosecuting a suit until the final determination of the suit. Boynton v. Brown, 103 Ark. 513, 145 S.W. 242 (1912).

Lien of attorney of estate could not be asserted eight years after land was sold, subject to lien of attorney. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

This section setting a three year limitations period governs the period for bringing attorney malpractice claims; and the cause of action arises when the alleged negligent act occurs, not when client discovers it. Cotton v. Mosele, 738 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1984).

The statute of limitations in an action against an attorney for negligence begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs, not when it is discovered by the client. Riggs v. Thomas, 283 Ark. 148, 671 S.W.2d 756 (1984); Goldsby v. Fairley, 309 Ark. 380, 831 S.W.2d 142 (1992).

The misconduct or negligence of an attorney triggers the statute of limitations. Rhoades v. Sims, 286 Ark. 349, 692 S.W.2d 750 (1985).

A legal malpractice claim based on the drafting of a partnership agreement in 1991 was time-barred where the complaint was filed in July, 1996. Dunn v. Westbrook, 334 Ark. 83, 971 S.W.2d 252 (1998).

A legal malpractice claim based on the revision of a partnership agreement on July 8, 1993 was not time-barred where the complaint was filed on July 5, 1996. Dunn v. Westbrook, 334 Ark. 83, 971 S.W.2d 252 (1998).

A malpractice suit alleging that the defendant attorneys breached their contract by failing to act with diligence as required by the contract is an action for negligence rather than for breach of contract, and the three year statute of limitations should apply. Sturgis v. Skokos, 335 Ark. 41, 977 S.W.2d 217 (1998).

Court properly found that an attorney's action against a client to recover fees was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the client admitted that payments were made in 1998 and 2001, and each payment extended the limitations period for three years. Northwest Ark. Recovery, Inc. v. Davis, 89 Ark. App. 62, 200 S.W.3d 481 (2004).

Circuit court did not err by dismissing appellants' legal malpractice claims against their attorney, because they were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under this section; although appellants attempted to categorize the claims differently, the “gist” of their complaint was legal malpractice. The circuit court did not err in failing to apply the discovery rule, because the traditional occurrence rule applied in Arkansas; and appellants did not bring their action within three years of the last alleged negligent act. Richardson v. Madden, 2012 Ark. App. 120 (2012).

Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

In an estate dispute where a sister sued her brother, who had held a power of attorney for the father, the circuit court did not err in finding that the sister's claim for breach of fiduciary duty was barred by the three-year statute of limitations, because, inter alia, a previous appellate decision had rejected the argument that the entire length of the fiduciary relationship should be considered and the sister did not offer any authority to support her suggestion that being a signatory on a bank account gives rise to a fiduciary relationship or that any such fiduciary relationship would have extended to her. Ellis v. Thompson, 2019 Ark. App. 579, 590 S.W.3d 774 (2019).

Burden of Proof.

Where statute is pleaded in action on account, burden is on plaintiff to show it is not barred. Watkins v. Martin, 69 Ark. 311, 65 S.W. 103 (1901).

Defendant invoking this statute has the burden of proof to bring himself within its terms. Smith v. Milam, 195 Ark. 157, 110 S.W.2d 1062 (1937).

Where executor pleaded the statute of limitations as a bar to claim against decedent's estate for amount of loans made to decedent, the burden was on claimant to show that the running of the statute had been tolled or revived by payment or otherwise. Taylor v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 236 Ark. 672, 367 S.W.2d 747 (1963).

Child Support.

This action does not apply to recovery of delinquent child support payments. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957).

The period of time for which the mother may recover for the reasonable and definite amount she has expended for the support of the children is governed by the language of the original divorce decree and where, as in the present case, there was no provision in the original divorce decree for support, the obligation of the father was one express or implied not in writing and would therefore come within the three year statute for such definite amounts as she had expended for the support of the minor children. Wilder v. Garner, 235 Ark. 400, 360 S.W.2d 192 (1962).

Although the three year statute of limitations was applicable to a paternity proceeding which was commenced more than four years after birth of the child, the statute of limitations did not bar the entire cause of action, but only recovery of support for the period more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint. Winston v. Robinson, 270 Ark. 996, 606 S.W.2d 757 (1980).

Where mother brought action for support of illegitimate child against putative father more than five years after the child's birth, it was error to grant the father summary judgment, since the child is the real party in interest and should thus not be barred by the mother's failure to bring the action. Dozier v. Veasley, 272 Ark. 210, 613 S.W.2d 93 (1981).

Cities.

Three-year statute of limitations applied to city's obligation to pay holiday compensation to its employees. City of Pocahontas v. Huddleston, 309 Ark. 353, 831 S.W.2d 138 (1992).

Civil Rights.

In an action for alleged deprivation of civil rights as a result of the arrest of defendant with alleged unnecessary force and violence, either the three year statute of limitations for actions founded on contract or liability, which has been construed to cover liability created by statute, or the five year general statute of limitations was applicable, and since the action was instituted within the statutory period of both statutes, it was timely. Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970)Questioned byKessel v. Schaff, 697 F. Supp. 1102 (D.N.D. 1987).

This section was the governing statute of limitations in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discriminatory employment practices, since 42 U.S.C. § 1981 creates statutory liabilities. Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977).

Where plaintiffs alleged both class-based and incidental individual sex and race discrimination in connection with hiring, wages, promotion and job assignment, and the employment discrimination in issue was only such as would amount to a deprivation of constitutional rights, the district court correctly applied the three year limitations period. Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1979).

Where the plaintiff brought a civil rights complaint involving the termination of the plaintiff's written employment contract, this section was the applicable statute of limitations, not § 16-56-111(a), which governs actions on written contracts. Wagh v. Dennis, 677 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1982).

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the general rule is to apply the state statute of limitations governing actions most analogous to the civil rights claim being asserted; therefore, in Arkansas, § 1983 claims are subject to the three year limitation found in this section. Weston v. Bachman, 682 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824, 104 S. Ct. 93 (1983); Whittle v. Wiseman, 683 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1982).

Trial court properly applied the three year statute of limitations of this section in dismissing civil rights action against federal employees. Roach v. Owen, 689 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1982).

This section was the applicable statute of limitations for a civil rights action brought pursuant to either 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 544 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. Ark. 1983).

This section is the appropriate statute of limitations for employment discrimination actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. McDowell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. Ark. 1985).

The limitations period in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions; thus, in Arkansas the applicable period is three years. Where a federal cause of action is involved, filing a complaint with the court commences the action pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and tolls the statute of limitations; for purposes of the statute of limitations, a complaint is “filed” when it is lodged with the court even though it is technically deficient under local rules. Lyons v. Goodson, 787 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1986).

Former employee's claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 was governed by three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, not the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-107(c)(3), and the employer's motion to dismiss was denied; as racial discrimination was a fundamental injury to the rights of a person, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 claims were, in essence, personal injury claims. Thompson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 842 (W.D. Ark. 2004).

Claims parents filed under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that a school district and a vice principal committed sex discrimination and violated their son's rights under the U.S. Constitution when they failed to protect their son from attacks by other students, were not necessarily barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in this section because some of the incidents they described in their complaint occurred more than three years before they filed their lawsuit. The parents alleged persistent harassment and discrimination which, over the course of time, rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Wolfe v. Fayetteville Ark. Sch. Dist., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (W.D. Ark. 2009).

Inmate was denied in forma pauperis status because his 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 complaint was time-barred under the applicable state law statute of limitations. Hendrix v. Vaughn, No. 09-CV-4062, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1345 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 8, 2010).

Claims Barred.

Inmate's civil claims were properly dismissed because, treating the facts alleged as true, (1) all acts giving rise to the claims of discrimination, civil conspiracy, and outrage arose more than three years before the inmate sued, (2) a three-year statute of limitations applied to all claims, (3) the inmate was aware of those acts when they occurred, and (4) the inmate provided no non-conclusory allegations of fraudulent concealment. Hutcherson v. Rutledge, 2017 Ark. 359, 533 S.W.3d 77 (2017).

Commencement.

This section begins to run when the negligent act occurs. Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989); Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

The statute of limitations begins to run when there is a complete and present cause of action. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

A cause of action accrues the moment the right to commence an action comes into existence, and the statute of limitations commences to run from that time. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

The bank's negligence in failing to properly establish a survivorship account occurred when it issued the final certificate and the surviving joint tenant's claim began to accrue at that time. Smackover State Bank v. Oswalt, 307 Ark. 432, 821 S.W.2d 757 (1991).

The limitations period found in subdivision (3) begins to run when there is a complete and present cause of action, and, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the injury occurs, not when it is discovered. Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 326 Ark. 895, 935 S.W.2d 258 (1996).

The statute of limitations applicable to the clients' malpractice action against their accountants began running, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurred, not when it was discovered. Tony Smith Trucking v. Woods & Woods, Ltd., 75 Ark. App. 134, 55 S.W.3d 327 (2001).

Court did not err in denying the State's motion for a JNOV where the statute of limitations did not begin to accrue against a gas station until it learned that gasoline contamination was caused, not by it, but by another gas station. State v. Diamond Lakes Oil Co., 347 Ark. 618, 66 S.W.3d 613 (2002).

Dismissal of borrowers' claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violations of federal law for failure to state a claim was affirmed where it was apparent from the complaint that the applicable statutes of limitations had all run and no basis for tolling was presented. Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2004).

Trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint for interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy and breach of an implied contract as the statute of limitations was three years under this section; the cause of action arose in January 1999, when defendant left plaintiff's employment, started a directly competing business and induced plaintiff's employees and customers to leave plaintiff's business, but the complaint was not filed until August 2002. Quality Optical of Jonesboro, Inc. v. Trusty Optical, L.L.C., 365 Ark. 106, 225 S.W.3d 369 (2006).

Putative father's action for breach of contract and negligence, brought after a 2003 DNA test indicated that a 1991 test had erroneous shown that he was a child's biological father, was untimely because the occurrence rule, rather than the discovery rule, applied to this section's 3-year statute of limitations. Tate v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 102 Ark. App. 354, 285 S.W.3d 261 (2008).

Contracts Generally.

This section applies to actions on all contracts, expressed or implied, which are not in writing and has regularly been applied to incidental obligations implied from written contracts. Scroggin Farms Corp. v. Howell, 216 Ark. 569, 226 S.W.2d 562 (1950).

Where there was no provision that caused the entire obligation to become automatically accelerated by the first default on a sales contract and subsequent defaults were within the period of this section, the statute of limitations could not be invoked as a bar to rescission. Hogue v. Pellerin Laundry Mach. Sales Co., 353 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1965).

The plaintiff's breach of contract claim based on an oral promise to hire her as a teacher was time barred, since this section provides for a three-year statute of limitation for oral contracts. Crutchfield v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 647 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Where the parties have entered into an agreement which requires a series of mutual acts, some unilateral and some bilateral in character, and have left the time of those acts open-ended, the cause of action does not accrue until one party has by word or conduct indicated to the other a repudiation of the agreement. Chadwell v. Pannell, 27 Ark. App. 59, 766 S.W.2d 38 (1989).

Trial court did not err in finding that written contract had been so altered by oral modification as to constitute a new oral contract subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided in this section, and action was therefore barred. Davis v. Patel, 32 Ark. App. 1, 794 S.W.2d 158 (1990).

A breach of contract action was barred by the statute of limitations where, by the plaintiff's own admission, she was on notice of the alleged breach in January, 1989 and the action was commenced in December, 1993. Elder v. Security Bank, 68 Ark. App. 132, 5 S.W.3d 78 (1999).

Statute of limitations found in this section did not bar an action on an indemnification provision in a contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor because the action accrued on the date that the general contractor wired a settlement to the customer, and the general contractor filed its second amended complaint against the subcontractor within five years of that date. Ray & Sons Masonry Contrs., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 114 S.W.3d 189 (2003).

Where the husband of a beneficiary under her parents' first mutual wills brought a tortious interference with contract suit against the beneficiaries under a second will, that right of action accrued in November 1999 when the will-contest was filed seeking probate of decedent's second will, however, the husband did not file his suit until April 2003, and the trial court did not err in dismissing the action because the three year statute of limitations had run. Shelnutt v. Laird, 359 Ark. 516, 199 S.W.3d 65 (2004).

Where the only documents that evidenced a loan between a lender and a borrower were the cashier's check and a transaction record of partial payments that had been made, the breach of contract action by the lender was governed by the three year statute of limitations. Cobb v. Leyendecker, 89 Ark. App. 167, 200 S.W.3d 924 (2005).

Written security agreement was a sufficient acknowledgment of a valid existing debt for attorney's fees so as to start the statute of limitations running anew. However, the written acknowledgement did not transform the oral agreement for fees into a written one, and the three-year statute applicable to oral agreements under this section still applied, rather than the five-year statute for written agreements under § 16-56-111, thereby barring an attorney's claim for fees. Still v. Perroni Law Firm, 2011 Ark. 447, 385 S.W.3d 182 (2011).

Trial court properly granted a title company summary judgment on the property owners' claim where the completion and delivery of a title search created an implied or express contract, a three-year limitations period applied to the title search under this section, and the claim had been filed a month after the limitations period had run. Brooks v. Terry Abstract Co., 2014 Ark. App. 212 (2014).

Owners' argument that the limitations period did not arise until they closed on the house was rejected because the claims arose at the time the title company completed the title search and delivered its findings to the owners. Brooks v. Terry Abstract Co., 2014 Ark. App. 212 (2014).

Five-year statute of limitations for contract claims applied to an investor's amended complaint against the investor's investment account manager, rather than the three-year statute of limitations for negligence claims, because the investor pleaded a breach of contract and a specific promise; the investor alleged there was a contract between the investor and the manager, that the manager specifically promised to process an account transaction in a timely manner, that the manager breached this specific promise, and that the investor suffered damages. Farris v. Conger, 2017 Ark. 83, 512 S.W.3d 631 (2017).

—Contractual Interference.

The limitation period for a contractual interference claim is three years. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).

—Oral Contracts.

Where a plain reading of resolution authorizing city manager to award franchise to wrecker service indicated that the city had not contractually bound itself in writing but had only authorized the city manager to award a contract to wrecker service, and where there was no evidence that the city manager signed a written contract with wrecker service, if the parties were contractually bound at all, it was pursuant to an oral contract; thus, plaintiff's attempt to bring an action five years later was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Jenkins v. City of Little Rock, 52 Ark. App. 113, 915 S.W.2d 298 (1996).

—Real Property Improvements.

Section 16-56-112(a) clearly establishes a maximum five-year period within which an injured party can bring suit against a person who deficiently constructs or repairs an improvement to real property which commences after the substantial completion of the improvement, but, in bringing such a suit, the injured party must still bring the action within the statute of limitations for that type of cause of action. If the breach or injury occurs immediately after the completion of the improvement, the injured party must still comply with subsection (3) and bring his action within three years from when the breach occurs but not later than the five-year period provided in § 16-56-112(a). East Poinsett County Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Union Std. Ins. Co., 304 Ark. 32, 800 S.W.2d 415 (1990).

The five-year limitations period contained in § 16-56-112(a) cannot be used to extend the three-year limitations period provided in subsection (3). East Poinsett County Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Union Std. Ins. Co., 304 Ark. 32, 800 S.W.2d 415 (1990).

General contractor's claims against a masonry subcontractor were time-barred because the contractor filed suit after the three-year period had expired; the failure to use a bonding agent in the mortar in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications constituted a material breach of the contract and started the running of the statute of limitations. C&R Constr. Co. v. Woods Masonry & Repair, LLC, 2020 Ark. App. 105, 596 S.W.3d 35 (2020).

—Third Party Beneficiaries.

Actions by third persons based on written contracts which are made for their benefit are governed by the limitation provided by § 16-56-111(a) rather than by this section. H.B. Deal & Co. v. Bolding, 225 Ark. 579, 283 S.W.2d 855 (1955).

Corporations.

Action under statute making officer of corporation liable for debts of corporation upon failure to file certificate required by statute is for a statutory liability and not a penalty, and this section and not § 16-56-108 governs. Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Walsh, 68 Ark. 433, 59 S.W. 952 (1900). See also McDonald v. Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 183 S.W. 751 (1916); Hospelhorn v. Burke, 196 Ark. 1028, 120 S.W.2d 705 (1938).

The statute of limitations runs against the president and secretary of a corporation who have failed to file the annual statement required by law as against the claim of a particular creditor from the time when a complete cause of action exists in favor of that creditor. McDonald v. Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 183 S.W. 751 (1916).

An action in equity by the stockholders of a corporation, against the directors for misconduct, is based on implied liability; the suit is a derivative one which must be brought within the time in which the corporation itself should have brought the suit; the minority of a stockholder will not suspend the rule. Magale v. Fomby, 132 Ark. 289, 201 S.W. 278 (1918).

An action to enforce collection of a stockholder's statutory liability incurred by reason of an assessment duly made is not a suit to enforce a penalty but is an action founded on a contract not in writing enforcible within three years. Vandover v. Lumber Underwriters, 197 Ark. 718, 126 S.W.2d 105 (1939).

Claims based on alleged statutory liability of corporate directors were barred by this section. Air Leases, Inc. v. Baker, 167 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Statute of limitations was not tolled as to Resolution Trust Corporation's claims against the officers or directors of a corporation as long as those officers and directors controlled the affairs of a corporation; Arkansas courts do not recognize the doctrine of adverse domination. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 1995).

Counties.

A claim against a county for fees due an officer is a liability not in writing within the meaning of this section. Baugh v. Prairie County, 66 Ark. 360, 50 S.W. 876 (1899).

The statute of limitations runs in favor of counties against their ordinary indebtedness. Boone County v. Skinner-Kennedy Stationery Co., 191 Ark. 329, 86 S.W.2d 18 (1935).

Action by individual taxpayer to recover amount of county funds allegedly unlawfully withdrawn by county judge was governed by three year limitation period, since action was based on an implied contract. Ward v. Farrell, 221 Ark. 363, 253 S.W.2d 353 (1952).

Debts.

Unwritten contracts, including those for the payment of borrowed money, may have a time for maturity depending on a future event, and this statute runs from the maturity thereof. Smith v. Milam, 195 Ark. 157, 110 S.W.2d 1062 (1937).

Complaint did not show on its face that debt was barred by limitation, and where defendant's evidence showed the debt became due less than three years from filing of suit, debt was not barred since cause of action on a debt does not accrue until after its maturity. Smith v. Milam, 195 Ark. 157, 110 S.W.2d 1062 (1937).

In suit on a note, maker's claim for credit for services in effecting sale of real estate for which payee agreed to credit money on the note was not barred by this statute, because pleaded as a setoff against the note, and, also, it was a closed transaction to which this section does not apply. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hammans, 204 Ark. 298, 161 S.W.2d 950 (1942).

In order to continue or revive a cause of action or remove it from bar of statute of limitation there must be either an express promise of debtor to pay the debt or an acknowledgment of debt from which a promise to pay is implied, or a conditional promise to pay the debt and evidence that the condition has been performed. Blake v. Commercial Factors Corp., 216 Ark. 664, 226 S.W.2d 986 (1950).

In determining whether there has been a sufficient acknowledgment in writing to toll the statute of limitation, the question to be determined is the intention of the debtor. The writing must show that the claim is a subsisting debt and the presumption must be clear and certain. Blake v. Commercial Factors Corp., 216 Ark. 664, 226 S.W.2d 986 (1950).

Where money was loaned on an oral agreement to repay and borrower endorsed and pledged an overdue note for a larger amount as security for the loan, endorsement of the note did not have the effect of reducing the loan to writing and the three year limitation of this section governed rather than the five year limitation of § 16-56-111(a). Shelton v. Harris, 225 Ark. 855, 286 S.W.2d 20 (1956).

Suit based on written support contract is a suit on a written instrument and is governed by the five year statute of limitations, and three year statute of limitations was not applicable. Altman v. Altman, 240 Ark. 370, 399 S.W.2d 501 (1966).

Payments on debt did not revive debts already barred by the three year statute of limitations where debtor was liable on another debt. Camp v. Nokes, 250 Ark. 819, 467 S.W.2d 730 (1971).

Three year statute of limitations on oral promise to pay commenced to run when promise was made, not when creditor paid a bank loan made to get money to loan debtor, although debtor promised to repay any interest creditor had to pay bank. Camp v. Nokes, 250 Ark. 819, 467 S.W.2d 730 (1971).

Oral agreement to assume and pay mortgage indebtedness was subject to three year statute of limitations. Hyde Wholesale Dry Goods Co. v. Edwards, 255 Ark. 211, 500 S.W.2d 85 (1973).

A debt otherwise barred by the statute of limitations can be revived by a letter in which the debtor unequivocally recognizes the indebtedness as a subsisting obligation and makes no statement repelling the presumption that he intends to pay; however, where the debtors' letter did not recognize the indebtedness as a subsisting obligation and fell far short of proving a revival by acknowledgment, collection of the debt was barred by this section. Wright v. Wright, 279 Ark. 35, 648 S.W.2d 473 (1983).

—Accounts.

To constitute a payment on an account so as to bar the running of the statute, the money or other thing must pass from the debtor to the creditor for the purpose of extinguishing the debt and the creditor must receive it for the same purpose. Pettus v. Rawls, 131 Ark. 125, 198 S.W. 874 (1917).

In an action on a written contract witnessed by correspondence, the five year statute of limitations applies though an account is filed specifying the items on which the three year statute would have applied if the action had been brought on the account. Sims v. Miller, 151 Ark. 377, 236 S.W. 828 (1922).

An action on an oral guaranty of an open account is barred after three years from the date the last item was furnished. Goldsmith v. First Nat'l Bank, 169 Ark. 1162, 278 S.W. 22 (1925).

Refusal to instruct that items of debit and credit in an account, incurred more than three years prior to the suit, were barred was error where the accounts were not mutual, open and current. St. Francis Valley Lumber Co. v. Orcutt, 174 Ark. 282, 295 S.W. 713 (1927).

Letter written acknowledging debt on account was, in the absence of a plea of inability to pay or a showing that there was no time within three years from the time the letter was written when the account could have been paid, sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Arkansas R. Co. v. New York C. R. Co., 195 Ark. 304, 111 S.W.2d 457 (1937).

In an action to recover a balance on an open account, where defendant pleaded this statute, contending that payment upon which plaintiff relied to toll this statute had been made with instructions to apply it to a separate account, while plaintiff contended that it was all a continuing account, instructions properly submitted the issues of fact involved. Thomason v. Wilcox, 201 Ark. 867, 147 S.W.2d 725 (1941).

Letter of buyer regarding buyer's account established a new period from which statute of limitations began to run. Blake v. Commercial Factors Corp., 216 Ark. 664, 226 S.W.2d 986 (1950).

Action on open account was not barred where summons was served less than three years after date of last payment on account. Bridgman v. Drilling, 218 Ark. 772, 238 S.W.2d 645 (1951).

Part payment upon an open account made after the bar of the statute has fallen is presumed to start the statute running anew in absence of circumstances indicating that the debtor did not thereby intend to recognize his obligation. Taylor v. Slayton, 231 Ark. 464, 330 S.W.2d 280 (1959).

Decedents' Estates.

The statute of limitations has no application to claims for expenses of administration where the administration is still pending. Holland v. Doke, 135 Ark. 372, 205 S.W. 648 (1918).

Claimant for services rendered to a decedent was not entitled to recover except for services rendered within three years immediately preceding the death of decedent. Beauchamp v. Jernigan, 189 Ark. 361, 72 S.W.2d 535 (1934); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Cohn, 194 Ark. 1098, 110 S.W.2d 42 (1937); Harris v. Whitworth, 213 Ark. 480, 211 S.W.2d 101 (1948); Trotter v. Kemp, 232 Ark. 681, 340 S.W.2d 274 (1960).

Claim against a deceased's estate was barred by statute of limitation. Johnson v. Murphy, 204 Ark. 980, 166 S.W.2d 9 (1942)Questioned byStarbird v. Cheatham, 243 Ark. 181, 419 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1967).

Where a claim against a deceased's estate is barred by the statute of limitation unless certain payments had been made, the mere fact that the payments were entered on the account and appear as credits, is insufficient to prove that those payments were in fact made. Johnson v. Murphy, 204 Ark. 980, 166 S.W.2d 9 (1942)Questioned byStarbird v. Cheatham, 243 Ark. 181, 419 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1967).

Court held that none of the indebtedness of decedent to landlord was barred by the statute of limitations where the limitation had not run before decedent's death. Goins v. Sneed, 229 Ark. 550, 317 S.W.2d 269 (1958).

This section does not apply to actions against a decedent's estate, but those actions must be brought within the time limit for filing claims against the estate even though the plaintiff is looking not to the assets of the estate but to the decedent's liability insurer for payment of his judgment. Swan v. Estate of Monette ex rel. Monette, 265 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. Ark. 1968).

Action for breach of fiduciary duty was timely where it was instituted within three years of the first action adverse to the estate. Jamison v. Estate of Goodlett, 56 Ark. App. 71, 938 S.W.2d 865 (1997).

In a will contest, the trial court erred in imposing the constructive trust because the three-year statute of limitations for breach of a fiduciary duty expired before appellee filed his petition for a constructive trust; the limitations clock started running when the alleged undue influence occurred and not at the repudiation or disavowal of any false promise or trust (however, the setting aside of the will was affirmed). Smith v. Smith (In re Estate of Smith), 2020 Ark. App. 113 (2020).

Employment.

—Retaliation.

Employment retaliation claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-108, was subject to the three-year limitation period applicable when a statutory claim had no limitation period under this section, rather than the one-year limitation provided in another part of the Act, § 16-123-107(c). Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2013 Ark. 502, 431 S.W.3d 200 (2013).

Employment Contracts.

Suit by employee for wrongful discharge based on violation of written collective bargaining contract was barred by three year limitation period for suits on oral contract where contract of employment with railroad was oral. Roberts v. Thompson, 107 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Ark. 1952)Questioned bySandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1970)Questioned by429 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1970).

Suit for wrongful discharge based on violation of written collective bargaining contract and written job application where contract of employment was oral would be barred by three year limitation period for oral contracts in this section, but filing of suit within three years after discharge with employee taking a nonsuit after the three years and bringing another action under § 16-56-126 was not barred. Smithey v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 127 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Ark. 1955), aff'd, 237 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. Ark. 1956).

Complaint against employed defendant which was filed more three years after termination of the defendant's employment was not timely filed. Tasby v. Peek, 396 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Ark. 1975).

Claim that publication of false and defamatory statements by defendants was a wrongful interference with plaintiff's employment contract and future economic and business expectancies sounds in tort and thus must be brought within three years or it is barred. Bankston v. Davis, 262 Ark. 635, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978).

Three-year statue of limitations set forth in this section applies to private causes of action brought pursuant to the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act, § 11-4-218(e), because § 11-4-218(e) constitutes a liability created expressly by statute, and it does not include a specific limitations provision; where a cause of action is brought pursuant to a statute that does not expressly provide a limitations period, this section is the appropriate limitations provision. Douglas v. First Student, Inc., 2011 Ark. 463, 385 S.W.3d 225 (2011).

Federal Preemption.

When a nonsuit is taken in a federal court and a new suit is begun in a state court within a year as provided in § 16-56-126, the new action is maintainable although begun more than three years after the cause accrued, as the pendency of the suit in the federal court for the same cause of action had the effect to toll the general statute. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Akin, 138 Ark. 10, 210 S.W. 350 (1919).

Where federal statute suspended the running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to violations of antitrust laws of the United States or subject to civil proceedings under any existing statute, act of suspension applied equally to private and government actions; Arkansas three year statute of limitations did not bar suit for treble damages brought by company under provisions of Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act. Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), rev'd, 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. Ark. 1951).

Federal statute of limitations rather than this section applies to an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside preferential payment by the bankrupt. Nicklaus v. McClure, 244 Ark. 23, 423 S.W.2d 562 (1968).

The limitation period for actions brought under the provisions of the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Securities Act of 1933 is that prescribed in § 23-42-106(f) and not that prescribed by this section. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

The three year limitation of this section was applicable to an action for common law fraud but not to an action for violation of § 10 of the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

Fraud and Deceit.

Where a suit is barred unless brought within three years after the cause of action accrues, yet there has been a fraudulent concealment of the cause of action, the statute is suspended until discovery of the fraud. Free v. Jordan, 178 Ark. 168, 10 S.W.2d 19 (1928).

An action for fraud and deceit is a tort and barred by the three year limitation. Air Leases, Inc. v. Baker, 167 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Plaintiff could not be heard to claim fraud or concealment as a bar to the statute based on an allegation in the complaint when the defendant had offered substantive proof that there was no fraud or concealment. Mining Corp. of Arkansas v. International Paper Co., 324 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Ark. 1971).

Where the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint for damages was that the defendant fraudulently concealed the illegal nature of a loan transaction so that plaintiff would be convicted of making illegal loans, the action was subject to the three year statute of limitations for actions founded on any contract or liability, express or implied. Lane v. Graves, 525 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1975).

Although similar to an action for defamation, an action for deceit is distinct and is covered by a different, three year statute of limitations. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).

In fraud actions, for purposes of determining when the statute of limitations begins to run, parties alleging fraud are charged with knowledge of any pertinent real estate conveyances from the time the conveyances are placed in public records, since filing for public record and concealment are mutually exclusive. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984).

Affirmative action on the part of the person charged with fraud to conceal a plaintiff's cause of action will toll the running of the statute of limitations. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984); Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987).

Fraud suspends the running of the statute of limitations, and the suspension remains in effect until the party having the cause of action discovers the fraud or should have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984); Talbot v. Jansen, 294 Ark. 537, 744 S.W.2d 723 (1988); Hickson v. Saig, 309 Ark. 231, 828 S.W.2d 840 (1992); First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), rehearing denied, First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 312 Ark. 95, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908, 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993).

The plaintiff's claim for misrepresenting arising from the alleged promise to give her a teacher's contract was time barred, where the latest possible date of any such promise would have been more than three years before the filing of the complaint. Crutchfield v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 647 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Where existence of cause of action has been fraudulently concealed, the statute of limitations begins to run no later than the day that the concealed matter was discovered; but concealment of facts, no matter how fraudulent or otherwise wrongful, has no effect on the running of a statute of limitations if the plaintiffs could have discovered the fraud or sufficient other facts on which to bring their lawsuit, through a reasonable effort on their part. Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987).

Fraud claim held barred. Moore v. Moore, 21 Ark. App. 165, 731 S.W.2d 215 (1987).

A cause of action for fraud is governed by this section. Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

The burden is on the plaintiff to exercise due diligence to discover the fraud if apprised of facts which should place the plaintiff on notice. Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

The statute of limitations on fraud is three years. Wages v. Robson, 148 B.R. 567 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).

There was no evidence of record that insurance company attempted to fraudulently conceal, cover-up, or misrepresent to an estate the problem of determining the proper beneficiary of an insurance policy. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), rehearing denied, First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 312 Ark. 95, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908, 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993).

Under Arkansas law, a cause of action for fraud is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

While an action for fraud must be brought within three years from the date the cause of action accrues, the fraud does suspend the running of the statute of limitations and the suspension remains in effect until the party having the cause of action discovered the fraud or should have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

The plaintiff's misrepresentation and/or constructive fraud claims were time barred where, by their own admission, plaintiffs knew the contract terms were being changed by defendant to their detriment more than three years prior to the filing of the suit. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

In an action for fraud or misrepresentation the statutory limitation period begins to run when the wrong occurs, not when it is discovered; in the absence of purposeful concealment of the wrong, the statute of limitations is not tolled. Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark. 771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994).

Where the dates on which defendant's alleged misrepresentations were made were one month apart, the latter date was controlling for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations. Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark. 771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994).

Where defendant did nothing to prevent plaintiff from discovering the falsity of his reputed representation that touching her breasts was necessary to a lymph node examination, plaintiff failed to show an affirmative act of concealment, and her cause of action advanced under either a medical injury or invasion of privacy theory accrued on her last treatment date. Norris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 899 S.W.2d 70 (1995).

Farmer's action for fraud against a corporation was not barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed within three years of the last time the corporation made a fraudulent misrepresentation to the farmer. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Davis, 347 Ark. 566, 66 S.W.3d 568 (2002).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to bank in customer's action for conversion, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, constructive fraud, and fraudulent concealment where the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations; the bank did not commit any act of fraud that would toll the running of the statute of limitations. Technology Partners, Inc. v. Regions Bank, 97 Ark. App. 229, 245 S.W.3d 687 (2006).

An unattested notation on the margin of a document was insufficient to extend the maturity date of the bonds at issue, and the bonds matured at the latest in 1954 and were purchased by the holder in 1974, 20 years after their maturity date, so any remaining claims would have to have been brought before the bonds became unenforceable. The holder did not contact the bank until 1984, 30 years after the maturity date and well after any applicable statute of limitations periods; therefore, the holder was barred by the three year statute of limitations under this section from bringing any of his breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, or negligence claims. Wilkins v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (W.D. Ark. 2007).

In a case arising out of a real property transaction, a fraud action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the cause of action arose when a deed was executed in 1996, and there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations period. Riddle v. Udouj, 99 Ark. App. 10, 256 S.W.3d 556 (2007), aff'd, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

Dismissal of appellant's tort action was appropriate because the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant had plenty of time and the opportunity after she should have, by reasonable diligence, discovered the asserted fraud to bring suit and to counter the defense of release with the present allegation that it had been fraudulently obtained. Pambianchi v. Howell, 100 Ark. App. 154, 265 S.W.3d 788 (2007).

Agent's claim against an insurance company for making false representations was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the limitations period began to run when the agent received a letter from the company notifying the agent that it wished to terminate the agent's contract. Gunn v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2010 Ark. 434, 372 S.W.3d 346 (2010).

In an action by a solicitor against a contractor and others, the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the solicitor's fraud claim as time-barred because the relevant dates of the alleged fraud, fraudulent concealment, or the solicitor's discovery of the fraud, from which the trial court could rule on the statute-of-limitations defense as a matter of law, were not discernible from the complaint. Nobles v. Tumey, 2010 Ark. App. 731, 379 S.W.3d 639 (2010).

Trial court did not err in granting a law firm's partial motion for summary judgment based on the three-year statute of limitations under subdivision (1) of this section, and dismissing an attorney's counterclaim for constructive fraud because the firm presented evidence that it was unaware of an erroneous fee percentage until after the litigation began, and the attorney failed to meet proof with proof. Grayson & Grayson, P.A. v. Couch, 2012 Ark. App. 20, 388 S.W.3d 96 (2012).

Goods and Chattel.

The statute of limitations does not run against the plaintiff in a replevin suit if he was a minor at the time of the commencement of the suit. Phipps v. Martin, 33 Ark. 207 (1878).

The statute does not begin to run against an action for the recovery of property fraudulently concealed until the fraud is discovered. Conditt v. Holden, 92 Ark. 618, 123 S.W. 765 (1909).

A bill of lading for shipping is a contract in writing, and where a carrier sues the shipper for a balance due under it, the five year statute of limitations applies. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 166 Ark. 226, 266 S.W. 82 (1924).

Where goods were taken upon arrival by company other than consignee and warehouse receipts were delivered to unauthorized person, there was a conversion, and action by shipper after more than three years from the taking of the goods and the delivery of the warehouse receipts was barred by this statute. Meacham v. Mid-South Cotton Growers Ass'n, 196 Ark. 78, 115 S.W.2d 1078 (1938).

Statute of limitations begins to run in favor of person charged with converting chattels at the time when the conversion takes place. Thomas v. Westbrook, 206 Ark. 841, 177 S.W.2d 931 (1944).

Action by assignee of note secured by chattel mortgage against maker of the note and third party who had converted the chattels was not a suit on a note nor a suit to foreclose a mortgage, but a suit for conversion subject to the limitation provided by this statute rather than the five year statute of limitations. Thomas v. Westbrook, 206 Ark. 841, 177 S.W.2d 931 (1944).

Where a producer wrongfully sold equities of redemption in warehouse receipts to two purchasers, and the second purchaser buys in good faith without notice of prior sale and redeems the receipt before the first purchaser demands the receipts, an action brought four years after notice of purchaser's redemption was barred by the statute of limitations. Scroggin Farms Corp. v. McFadden, 165 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1948).

Suit by assignee of stored goods to recover for cotton taken by subsequent assignee of original assignor was a suit for conversion and not for violation of contract, and therefore this section and not § 16-56-111(a) applies. Scroggin Farms Corp. v. Howell, 216 Ark. 569, 226 S.W.2d 562 (1950).

In a replevin action to recover personal property that remained on real property that was sold at a foreclosure sale, the circuit court did not err by finding that the replevin claim was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations in subdivision (6) of this section because the evidence supported a finding that defendants' possession of the front end loader was not adverse; one defendant and another witness testified they had told plaintiff's owner that he could retrieve the personal property after the sale of the real property, and emails between the parties showed that defendant recognized plaintiff's ownership interest in the property. Hermitage Newark, LLC v. Ark. Sand Co., 2020 Ark. App. 214 (2020).

—Bailments.

Statute does not run against a bailee until he does some act inconsistent with the relation. Chapman v. Hudson, 46 Ark. 489 (1885).

In bailments, an action for the property does not accrue nor the statute of limitations begin to run until demand is made therefor and delivery is refused. Lee County Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 165 Ark. 493, 265 S.W. 50 (1924).

Where relationship of bailor and bailee existed between shipper and warehouse company, delivery of warehouse receipts to unauthorized person would be a severance of that relationship, and statute of limitations against shipper's cause of action would begin to run as of the date the receipts were delivered. Meacham v. Mid-South Cotton Growers Ass'n, 196 Ark. 78, 115 S.W.2d 1078 (1938).

Where there has been a loan of a chattel for an indefinite period, the statute of limitations does not run against the bailor until a repudiation of his title is brought home to him. Shewmake v. Shifflett, 205 Ark. 875, 171 S.W.2d 309 (1943).

—Conversion.

The statute of limitations for conversion of personal property and the running of time for adverse possession are the same. Johnson v. Gilliland, 320 Ark. 1, 896 S.W.2d 856 (1995).

Implied Liability.

Implied obligations arising from mere acceptance of a deed are controlled by this section. Dismukes v. Halpern, 47 Ark. 317, 1 S.W. 554 (1886); Matthews v. Simmons, 49 Ark. 468, 5 S.W. 797 (1887). See also Percy v. Cockrill, 53 F. 872 (8th Cir. 1893).

A right of action by a joint maker of a note who paid it for contribution is based on an implied obligation and is barred in three years from the time payment was made. Hazel v. Sharum, 182 Ark. 557, 32 S.W.2d 315 (1930).

In action for breach of implied warranty in sale of goods, statute of limitation begin to run from the date of sale and delivery of goods. Peterson v. Brown, 216 Ark. 709, 227 S.W.2d 142 (1950).

Where owner of cafe shot and injured customer, cause of action of customer was governed by three year limitation of this section as founded on an implied liability growing out of the proprietor-invitee relationship rather than the one year limitation of § 16-56-104 governing assault and battery. Jefferson v. Nero, 225 Ark. 302, 280 S.W.2d 884 (1956).

Action fell within the implied obligation or liability provisions of this section. Carroll County v. Eureka Springs School Dist. # 21, 292 Ark. 151, 729 S.W.2d 1 (1987).

Insurance.

Where no time limit for making proof of disability is contained in insurance policy, proof of disability may be made at any time within this statute. National Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Cook, 194 Ark. 433, 108 S.W.2d 471 (1937).

As to all invalid warrants shown by any settlement to have been paid more than three years prior to the date suit was filed to recover the same, the cause of action was barred. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Columbia County, 197 Ark. 1027, 126 S.W.2d 293 (1939).

Limitations against action by excess liability insurance carrier against primary insurer did not begin to run until settlement payment was made. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 246 Ark. 1021, 441 S.W.2d 95 (1969).

Where the insurance carrier paid the insured for losses, in a damage suit filed by the insured the insurance carrier could not be substituted as plaintiff more than three years after the insurance claim was paid and after the three year statute of limitations had run. Ark-Homa Foods, Inc. v. Ward, 251 Ark. 662, 473 S.W.2d 910 (1971).

The theory of subrogation being that the subrogee steps into the shoes of subrogor, he takes subject to all defenses which the third party could have asserted against the subrogor, including the statute of limitations. Williams v. Globe Indem. Co., 507 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948, 95 S. Ct. 1679 (1975).

The equitable duty to reimburse, when an insured settles with a tortfeasor and thereby destroys the insurer's subrogation interest, is a liability implied by law with a three year limitations period. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Williams, 858 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

Insured's bad faith and negligence claims against insurer accrued when judgment was entered against her in the underlying state court action. Carpenter v. Automobile Club Interinsurance Exch., 58 F.3d 1296 (8th Cir. 1995).

The statute of limitations for an insurance agent's negligence commences at the time the negligent act occurs. Calcagno v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 55 Ark. App. 321, 934 S.W.2d 548 (1996), aff'd, 330 Ark. 802, 957 S.W.2d 700 (1997).

In actions based on negligence, a subrogee insurance company is subject to the same three-year statute of limitations period as its insured. Shelter Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 57 Ark. App. 8, 940 S.W.2d 505 (1997).

Insurance underwriter's negligence claim against its agent, arising from the agent's issuance of a general liability policy to an Alabama motel in violation of the parties' binding authority agreement, was time-barred under this section because the underwriter filed its suit more than three years after the date the agent acted negligently by issuing the policy. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Regions Ins., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

Insurance underwriter's equitable indemnification claim against its agent was not time-barred under this section: (1) the equitable indemnification claim arose from the fact that the underwriter paid settlements in two lawsuit filed against an insured motel after the agent, which had issued a general liability policy to the motel in violation of the parties' binding authority agreement, refused to provide defense and indemnification in the suits; (2) the underwriter's claim did not accrue until it actually paid to settle the suits; and (3) the equitable indemnification claim was timely asserted because the underwriter filed its suit less than three years after it tendered the settlement payments. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Regions Ins., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

Insured's unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy claims, which alleged a conspiracy to sell insurance policies of little or no value through a non-qualifying group, were untimely; the insured filed suit in October 6, 2014, he alleged the marketing, underwriting, and purchase of his policy occurred in 2001, and no tolling could have been found after 2006 because obtaining the policy for review or simply contacting the state's director of insurance any time after the 2006 coverage denials would have revealed the infirmities the insured alleged as the basis for his claims. Graham v. Catamaran Health Sols. LLC, No. 16-1161, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16133 (8th Cir. Aug. 23, 2017).

Knowledge.

Ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations in absence of fraudulent concealment by the defendant. Morrilton Homes, Inc. v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 226 Ark. 22, 287 S.W.2d 581 (1956); Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 913 S.W.2d 761 (1996).

Where the appellees admitted they attempted to complete the novation of contracts as secretly as possible, the statute did not begin to run until the appellants had or, by the exercise of due diligence, should have known, the facts that gave rise to their cause of action. Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992).

Libel.

Under this section an action alleging libel under Arkansas law must be brought within three years after the cause of action accrued. Gilpin v. Tack, 256 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Ark. 1966).

Malpractice.

In accountant malpractice cases, the statute of limitations begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs, not when it is discovered. Ford's Inc. v. Russell Brown & Co., 299 Ark. 426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989).

The limitations period for professional negligence is three years, and it begins to run at the time the tortious conduct is committed. FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

Three years is the applicable statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice actions. Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 849 S.W.2d 513 (1993).

Although the trial court determined that the five year statute of limitations applicable to written contracts applied, where the trial court based its finding of liability against the defendant completely upon the finding that defendant breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs as their attorney and thereby committed malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations as to defendant was three years. Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 849 S.W.2d 513 (1993).

The statute of limitations in legal malpractice cases begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the act of negligence occurs, not when it is discovered. Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993).

The three-year limitation period was tolled during the time the trial court's ruling was in effect until the court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court's ruling was delivered. Pope County v. Friday, Eldredge & Clark, 313 Ark. 83, 852 S.W.2d 114 (1993).

The limitation period begins to run in malpractice cases upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. Wright v. Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, 315 Ark. 213, 866 S.W.2d 387 (1993).

The statute of limitations for an insurance agent commences at the time the negligent act occurs, in keeping with the traditional rule in professional malpractice cases. Flemens v. Harris, 323 Ark. 421, 915 S.W.2d 685 (1996).

Statute of limitations applied to an action against a law firm handling the probate of an estate despite the fact that the firm signed a tolling agreement. Stoltz v. Friday, 325 Ark. 399, 926 S.W.2d 438 (1996).

This section applies to actions against an attorney for negligence; the period begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs, not when the negligence is discovered. Smothers v. Clouette, 326 Ark. 1017, 934 S.W.2d 923 (1996).

Arkansas has long adhered to the traditional occurrence rule in legal malpractice; thus, where plaintiff did not allege that her attorneys concealed their alleged wrongdoing, and she was not prevented from bringing suit, the trial court's finding that her case was barred by the three-year statute of limitations and the grant of summary judgment was correct. Ragar v. Brown, 332 Ark. 214, 964 S.W.2d 372 (1998).

Directing of a verdict in favor of employee on the employers' issue of accounting malpractice was inappropriate as Arkansas adhered to the “occurrence rule” and there was evidence that the employers did not accept the employee's tax advice until March 2000; if that was the case, then the action would not have been barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Morrow Cash Heating Air, Inc. v. Jackson, 96 Ark. App. 105, 239 S.W.3d 8 (2006).

Trial court properly dismissed a client's complaint against an attorney for breach of contract, deception, slander, and defamation of character because the three-year statute of limitations barred the complaint. The “gist” of the client's complaint was that the attorney failed to act diligently and timely file a proper appeal on the client's behalf; such inaction was clearly negligent. Kassees v. Guy Randolph Satterfield & Satterfield Law Firm, PLC, 2009 Ark. 91, 303 S.W.3d 42 (2009).

When the client sued the attorney in connection with the execution of a prenuptial agreement, her complaint was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for legal-malpractice claims under this section. There was no written contract to bring the action under the five-year statute of limitations set forth in § 16-56-111. Pounders v. Reif, 2009 Ark. 581 (2009).

Clients' legal malpractice suit under § 16-22-306 for failure of a law firm to properly file a medical malpractice suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under subdivision (3) of this section because, under the occurrence rule, the clients' legal malpractice action ran no later than three years after the last day that their medical malpractice action could have been properly instituted. Rice v. Ragsdale, 104 Ark. App. 364, 292 S.W.3d 856 (2009).

After the Arkansas Supreme Court held in 2015 in Earls that the summons used in debt collection cases by a law firm was defective, and then plaintiff filed suit in 2015 against the law firm arising out of its previous debt collection service agreement with the law firm, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. In legal malpractice cases, Arkansas follows the occurrence rule that claims accrue when the negligence occurs and not when it is discovered. The malpractice claim arose from the use of the defective summons, last used in 2011, and not from the Earls case, and at no point was plaintiff prevented from filing suit. Manuel Bail Bond Co. v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 2018 Ark. App. 631, 567 S.W.3d 542 (2018).

“Gist” of plaintiff's claim was legal malpractice rather than contract, and thus, the three-year statute of limitations that applied to legal-malpractice actions controlled; the debt-collection agreement was an ancillary contract for representation, and plaintiff failed to plead a viable cause of action regarding a breach of a separate and distinct written contract. Manuel Bail Bond Co. v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 2018 Ark. App. 631, 567 S.W.3d 542 (2018).

Miscellaneous.

When the right to a public office is contested, the right to receive the emoluments of the office depends upon an adjudication of the title which is made in the contest suit and until the title to the office is adjudicated, the right of action to recover emoluments is not mature, and a suit to collect the emoluments is not barred by limitations when brought within three years of the final adjudication of the title to the office. Bowen v. Lovewell, 119 Ark. 64, 177 S.W. 929 (1915).

The three year statute of limitations controls in an action by a surety to compel contribution by a cosurety. Cooper v. Rush, 138 Ark. 602, 212 S.W. 94 (1919); Pennington v. Karcher, 171 Ark. 828, 286 S.W. 969 (1926).

A suit on a highway contractor's bond to pay subcontractor may be maintained at any time within three years after the completion of the work where the sub-contract was not in writing. Tolbert Bros. & Co. v. Molinder, 178 Ark. 888, 12 S.W.2d 780 (1929).

Person holding and having physical possession of bank stock endorsed in blank by the person to whom issued acquired title by adverse possession three years after the person had notice of the adverse claim to title and title in the adverse possession 18 years later related back to the beginning of the three-year period, and dividends all belonged to the adverse possessor. Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 254 Ark. 427, 494 S.W.2d 452 (1973).

Plaintiff's claims were time-barred because his complaint was filed on the first day of the fourth year after the alleged wrongful release of plaintiff's records. Morton v. City of Little Rock, 934 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1991).

Occurrence Rule.

Where two cities solicited bids for the construction of the wastewater facility, engineers prepared a soil report on September 30, 2001; a contractor was the successful bidder for the construction project and contracted with the cities on June 7, 2002. When the contractor filed suit against the engineers on May 24, 2005 for professional negligence in the preparation of the soil report, the circuit court correctly applied the occurrence rule to determine that the professional negligence claim against the engineers was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in this section. Bryan v. City of Cotter, 2009 Ark. 457, 344 S.W.3d 654 (2009).

Pleadings.

It was held that, three years having elapsed between the time the plaintiff's cause of action accrued and the time the complaint was amended to make the defendant a party, the action against him was barred. Tedford Auto Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 116 Ark. 198, 172 S.W. 1006 (1915).

In an action by a company, a counterclaim was not barred because the cause of action thereon arose over three years before the complaint was filed if it was not barred when the plaintiff's cause of action accrued. Missouri & N.A. Ry. v. Bridwell, 178 Ark. 37, 9 S.W.2d 781 (1928)Questioned byLittle Rock Crate & Basket Co. v. Young, 284 Ark. 295, 681 S.W.2d 388 (1984).

In an action for assault, a cause of action for slander which was barred by statute before the assault could not be interposed as a counterclaim. Collier v. Thompson, 180 Ark. 695, 22 S.W.2d 562 (1929).

An amendment to a complaint filed after the statute had run was allowed where the effect of the amendment was only to correct the name of the party originally sued. Evans v. List, 193 Ark. 13, 97 S.W.2d 73 (1936).

Where original complaint on open account was not barred, neither was the complaint's amendment filed more than three years after date of last payment on account, where amendment merely amplified and expanded single cause of action stated in original complaint. Bridgman v. Drilling, 218 Ark. 772, 238 S.W.2d 645 (1951).

The defense of limitations may be raised by motion to dismiss. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

Where statute of limitations was not pleaded it could not be relied upon even though the face of the record indicated it might have been a good defense if pleaded. Ashley v. Eisele, 247 Ark. 281, 445 S.W.2d 76 (1969).

Where statute of limitations was pleaded and relied on by plaintiff, defendant had the right to plead and rely on any facts and circumstances which may have tolled the statute. Ashley v. Eisele, 247 Ark. 281, 445 S.W.2d 76 (1969).

Where the first counterclaim amended did not allege the cause of action for fraud and deceit but the later amendment at the end of the three year period stated that cause of action, the relief sought for the action was barred. Beam v. Monsanto Co., 259 Ark. 253, 532 S.W.2d 175 (1976).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a personal representative's wrongful death complaint as being untimely filed because the original pro se complaint filed by plaintiff, a nonlawyer, as the personal representative of the estate constituted the unauthorized practice of law and was a nullity and could not be amended; by the time an attorney filed a complaint, more than three years had passed since the decedent's death, and the personal representative's claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Henson v. Cradduck, 2020 Ark. 24, 593 S.W.3d 10 (2020).

Where homeowners mistakenly brought suit as individuals rather than in the name of the corporation that owned the real property, the circuit court did not err in denying their motion to substitute the corporation as the real party in interest because if the circuit court had granted the motion for substitution, it would have constituted a new complaint and would have been after the statute of limitations had run; relation back did not apply. C&R Constr. Co. v. Woods Masonry & Repair, LLC, 2020 Ark. App. 105, 596 S.W.3d 35 (2020).

Property Damage.

Damages arising under a contract to permit the defendant to use the plaintiff's wall in the construction of a building are original and begin to run when the building is negligently constructed and attached to the wall, and an action for damages for the negligent construction is barred after three years. Evans v. Pettus, 112 Ark. 572, 166 S.W. 955 (1914).

The fact that the sewers are of permanent construction does not render the nuisance permanent; when a sewer system was constructed and maintained so as to constitute a nuisance, the nuisance is of a continuing or recurring nature, and an action by plaintiffs on account of the nuisance is not barred by the three year statute. Jones v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 3, 119 Ark. 166, 177 S.W. 888 (1915).

In an action against a railroad for damages to a dwelling from maintenance of a coal chute, the limitation began to run upon the completion of the chute. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Davis, 186 Ark. 401, 53 S.W.2d 851 (1932); Baldwin v. Simpson, 191 Ark. 448, 86 S.W.2d 420 (1935).

Where a structure alleged to have caused diversion of water was erected more than three years before the suit was filed, the permanency of the structure is not wholly controlling. If it is of such a character that damage must necessarily result but the nature and extent of the damage may not be reasonably ascertained at the time of construction, then the damage is not original and the statute of limitations is not set in motion until the injury occurs. St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. Spradley, 199 Ark. 174, 133 S.W.2d 5 (1939).

Suit for injury to property brought within three years after plaintiff reached age of majority was not barred under this statute where plaintiff had a homestead interest in addition to a fee estate in the property. Andrews v. Johnson, 202 Ark. 1115, 155 S.W.2d 681 (1941).

Statute of limitations from damage caused by dam or floodgate runs from when damage actually occurs. Greasy Slough Outing Club, Inc. v. Amick, 224 Ark. 330, 274 S.W.2d 63 (1954); Naylor v. Eagle, 227 Ark. 1012, 303 S.W.2d 239 (1957).

In action for damages for maintenance of a nuisance, the statute of limitations begins to run from the happening of the injury complained of. Consolidated Chem. Indus., Inc. v. White, 227 Ark. 177, 297 S.W.2d 101 (1957).

The statute of limitations began to run against an action when the damage to the land became permanent, and it was a question of fact for the jury when the damage became permanent. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Thurman, 238 Ark. 789, 384 S.W.2d 482 (1964); Springdale v. Weathers, 241 Ark. 772, 410 S.W.2d 754 (1967).

Where gasoline retailer, having been sued for contamination of neighboring property, discovered the source of the contamination was from another gasoline retailer, the discovery rule was appropriately applied to the limitations statute, subdivision (4), applicable to the first retailer's claim against the second retailer. State v. Diamond Lakes Oil Co., 347 Ark. 618, 66 S.W.3d 613 (2002).

—Ditches, Embankments, Etc.

This section applies to suits against railroads for building levees causing an overflow of the plaintiff's land. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Morris, 35 Ark. 622 (1880); Fordyce v. Stone, 50 Ark. 250, 7 S.W. 129 (1887); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Biggs, 52 Ark. 240, 12 S.W. 331 (1889); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Yarborough, 56 Ark. 612, 20 S.W. 515 (1892).

A suit for damages for obstructing ditches is barred after three years. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Anderson, 62 Ark. 360, 35 S.W. 791 (1896).

Where the obstruction of a stream by reason of the construction of an embankment and ditch was of a permanent nature and necessarily injurious to the land of the adjacent proprietors, the damages thereby caused can be recovered only by suit brought within three years from the time the embankment and ditch were completed. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Magness, 93 Ark. 46, 123 S.W. 786 (1909).

Where a company constructs a culvert so that damage to adjoining property by overflow must necessarily result and the certainty, nature, and extent of the damage may be reasonably ascertained and estimated at the time of the construction of the culvert, then the damage is original and there can be but a single recovery, and the statute of limitations against the cause of action is set in motion on the completion of the obstructing culvert. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Humphreys, 107 Ark. 330, 155 S.W. 127 (1913).

Where a levee permanently obstructed the drainage of land and caused the same to overflow, and the owner of the land had knowledge of the condition, the damage was original and the cause of action therefor arose immediately upon the completion of the levee. Russell v. Board of Dirs. of Red River Levee Dist. No. 1, 110 Ark. 20, 160 S.W. 865 (1913).

Suit to enjoin obstruction and diversion of the natural flow of a creek by filling in a trestle spanning it and digging a ditch too small to accommodate the flow during heavy rains, thus causing the water to back up over the plaintiff's lands, is barred after three years from the completion of the embankment, the nuisance as well as the injuries being original and permanent. Boas v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 157 Ark. 446, 248 S.W. 283 (1923).

In a cause of action for overflow of subjacent land, where water broke through defendant's embankment and flooded the plaintiff's land, the statute began to run from the time the injury occurred. Baldwin v. Neal, 190 Ark. 673, 80 S.W.2d 648 (1935).

Where the defendant, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, dug ditches across plaintiff's land through which polluted water flowed, it was a taking of land to the extent of a dimunition thereof on value for which plaintiff was entitled to compensation; but an action to recover damages therefor must be brought within three years of the date of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jones, 199 Ark. 534, 134 S.W.2d 551 (1939).

Action instituted for damage allegedly caused by water overflowing plaintiff's land by reason of failure to keep ditches, culverts and drain pipes under roadbed open in two prior years was not barred by this statute, though ditches were constructed more than three years before, since damages were of a recurring nature. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Holman, 204 Ark. 11, 160 S.W.2d 499 (1942).

Where ditch which encroached on plaintiff's land was dug five years before the suit was instituted and it was apparent at the time it was dug that the water flowing through it would widen it by erosion, the injury to the plaintiff's land was certain and permanent and the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Cox v. Berry, 233 Ark. 910, 349 S.W.2d 661 (1961).

—Dumps.

Action for damages resulting from maintenance of dump was held barred by the three year statute. Davis v. Dunn, 157 Ark. 125, 247 S.W. 793 (1923).

Evidence sufficient to find that damages to plaintiff's land from dump occurred within three years before the filing of the complaint. Consolidated Chem. Indus., Inc. v. White, 227 Ark. 177, 297 S.W.2d 101 (1957).

Limitation of claims for damages resulting from dump to the three years prior to the suit was proper. Moore v. City of Blytheville, 1 Ark. App. 35, 612 S.W.2d 327 (1981).

—Power Plants.

Where the defendant's power plant threw soot, cinders, and ashes on the plaintiff's property inflicting damages which could have been estimated and compensated at the time the injury first occurred, there was an original and permanent injury so that the statute of limitations began to run at once. Brown v. Arkansas Cent. Power Co., 174 Ark. 177, 294 S.W. 709 (1927).

Where a power plant in its operation is such that damages must necessarily result and the certainty, nature, and extent of the damage can then be reasonably ascertained and estimated, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the construction. Brown v. Arkansas Cent. Power Co., 174 Ark. 177, 294 S.W. 709 (1927).

—Removals from Land.

An action for taking gravel from land is barred after three years. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Decker, 181 Ark. 1079, 28 S.W.2d 701 (1930).

A cause of action for removal of support to the surface arose when the subsidence occurred and the plaintiffs could bring their action for injuries within the statutory period after injuries to the surface occurred, irrespective of the date of the removal of support. Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Randolph, 191 Ark. 1115, 89 S.W.2d 741 (1936).

Real Estate Interests.

The right to enforce the collection of the amount bid at a sale of real estate sold in the pursuance of a decree of foreclosure, where the sale to the bidder is not confirmed by the court, is barred by the the three year statute of limitations. Cotham v. Lucy, 115 Ark. 84, 171 S.W. 113 (1914).

Statute does not apply where plaintiff claims title to the land. Sutton v. Lee, 181 Ark. 914, 28 S.W.2d 697 (1930).

Statute limiting time for bringing an action against purchaser of land sold on judicial sale does not apply against a person in possession of property in dispute. Forbus v. Gibbs, 216 Ark. 138, 224 S.W.2d 790 (1949).

Where plaintiff, formerly under guardianship, brought an action to reform tax deeds issued to wife during guardianship and alleged that wife and stepdaughter used funds of the guardianship to purchase deeds, plaintiff was estopped to assert three year statute of limitation barring right of stepdaughter to refund, where evidence showed that action for refund had been delayed due to promise of plaintiff to will her the property. Forbus v. Gibbs, 216 Ark. 138, 224 S.W.2d 790 (1949).

When action to divest person of any title and claim to land in question was brought within three years after that person asserted claim of title, the action was within the statute of limitation on actions in contract not reduced to writing. Fuller v. Fuller, 240 Ark. 475, 400 S.W.2d 283 (1966).

Where there is no written contract for the sale of land, a cause of action for breach of the contract, if oral, was barred after three years. Booth v. Mason, 241 Ark. 144, 406 S.W.2d 715 (1966).

An action brought to enforce a trust alleged to have been created sixteen years earlier by a father's conveyance of real estate to one of his sons which was repudiated by the widow of the grantee six years prior to the bringing of the action was barred by this section. White v. McBride, 245 Ark. 594, 434 S.W.2d 79 (1968).

—Abstractors.

The right of action against an abstractor for damages resulting from errors, defects, or omissions in an abstract of title prepared by him is not and cannot be based on the written certificate attached to the abstract because the written certificate is only evidence of the provisions of the preexisting oral or implied contract of employment. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

The right of action against an abstractor for damages resulting from errors, defects, or omissions in an abstract of title prepared by him accrues at the time of the delivery of the abstract. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

The statute of limitations in an action brought against an abstractor for damages resulting from an omission in the abstract of title, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, begins to run when the negligence occurs, not when it is discovered. Riggs v. Thomas, 283 Ark. 148, 671 S.W.2d 756 (1984).

Recovery of Money.

An action to recover money paid by mistake is barred in three years. Richardson v. Bales, 66 Ark. 452, 51 S.W. 321 (1899).

An action to recover a bank deposit is barred after three years. England v. Hughes, 141 Ark. 235, 217 S.W. 13 (1919).

An action to recover money, paid out under a void contract, which had been wrongfully converted sounded purely in tort and was not within this section but was governed by § 16-56-115. Core v. McWilliams Co., 175 Ark. 112, 298 S.W. 879 (1927).

This section is applicable to a claim of a county board of education for excess commissions and interest belonging to the common school fund and improperly credited to the county general fund. County Bd. of Educ. v. Morgan, 182 Ark. 1110, 34 S.W.2d 1063 (1931), overruled, Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989).

The three year and not five year statute of limitations was applicable to suit to recover from circuit clerk excess fees and commissions above the lawful salary allowed where there was no intentional fraud, corruption, or willful diversion on the part of the clerk. State ex rel. Garland County v. Jones, 198 Ark. 756, 131 S.W.2d 612 (1939).

Action to recover from fees alleged to have been wrongfully received by sheriff of the county was, since the fees were collected more than three years before the action was instituted, barred by the three year statute. Baker v. Allen, 204 Ark. 818, 164 S.W.2d 1004 (1942).

Where a sheriff uses his office to wrongfully obtain money from person and where suit is brought to recover the money, it is an action to recover money wrongfully obtained, and after three years the statute of limitations would bar a recovery. Wrinkles v. Brown, 217 Ark. 393, 230 S.W.2d 39 (1950).

Where commissioners of sewer improvement district did not learn of sewer connections until three years after they were made, suit filed more than three years after the connection was made to recover connection charges was barred by the limitation of this section. Morrilton Homes, Inc. v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 226 Ark. 22, 287 S.W.2d 581 (1956).

An action by taxpayers to compel a county judge to reimburse the county for use of county labor and equipment on private property for private benefit was governed by this section. McGhee v. Glenn, 244 Ark. 1000, 428 S.W.2d 258 (1968).

An action by county taxpayers to recover expense money paid or obtained through mistake by a prosecuting attorney, in the absence of fraud or corruption, is an action founded upon an implied contract, not in writing, and must be commenced within three years under this section. Munson v. Abbott, 269 Ark. 441, 602 S.W.2d 649 (1980).

Evidence sufficient to support conclusion that depositor had knowledge of unauthorized withdrawals and yet failed to act within the time allowed under the statute of limitations. Cooley v. First Nat'l Bank, 276 Ark. 387, 635 S.W.2d 250 (1982).

Service of Process.

Tort claim was time-barred, even though complaint was filed in a timely manner, where plaintiff did not obtain service on defendant within 120 days pursuant to ARCP 4(i). Sublett v. Hipps, 330 Ark. 58, 952 S.W.2d 140 (1997).

Negligence action for a slip and fall was improperly dismissed as being barred by the three-year limitations period because, under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an amendment correcting the name of a wrong owner as defendant related back to the original complaint in that the same allegations were made and the new owner was served within 120 days, as set forth in Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i). Bell v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Ark. App. 283, 241 S.W.3d 276 (2006).

Taxes.

Paying taxes on the lands of another under an express promise to repay entitles one to lien, but recovery is limited to three years where statute of limitations is pleaded. Person v. Cogbill, 180 Ark. 664, 22 S.W.2d 161 (1929).

A suit brought by commissioners of a road improvement district to collect taxes three years after they became delinquent was barred by limitation. Tallman v. Board of Comm'rs, 185 Ark. 851, 49 S.W.2d 1039 (1932).

Where one has mistakenly paid taxes on the property of another, the statute of limitations runs from the time of the payment. Brookfield v. Rock Island Imp. Co., 205 Ark. 573, 169 S.W.2d 662, 147 A.L.R. 451 (1943).

Tolling.

Former bank executive's annuity claims against the bank, which were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, were not saved by the doctrine of equitable tolling; while it may not have been beneficial for plaintiff as an executive officer to have filed a complaint to enforce the annuity agreement, there was no allegation that he was prevented from doing so and no allegation of fraudulent concealment. Loftin v. First State Bank, 2020 Ark. App. 66, 596 S.W.3d 16 (2020).

Tolling of Statute.

The running of the statute of limitations was tolled while default judgment was set aside; during that time, although the alleged negligent act had occurred, plaintiff had no claim against defendant, as he could have shown no injury. Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989).

Lack of knowledge of a cause of action does not stop the statute of limitations from running unless there has been fraud or concealment by the person invoking the defense of limitations or if the statute is otherwise tolled. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

Employer's offer of employment did not induce employees to forego filing their personal injury claims, and did not bar employer's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Burdine v. Dow Chem. Co., 923 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1991).

Surviving joint tenant's claim against funds in account commenced running upon the issuance of the certificate, but ceased to exist once he was paid the amount of the deposit, six months later, and the running of the statute was tolled until the probate court issued its order disallowing the accounting, therefore, the complaint, filed only two weeks after that date, was timely. Smackover State Bank v. Oswalt, 307 Ark. 432, 821 S.W.2d 757 (1991).

Where plaintiff's alleging fraud in a contract action did not fulfill their duty to exercise reasonable diligence in examining the contract they executed to uncover what they alleged was a fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendant, they could not complain on appeal that the statute of limitations should have tolled. Wilson v. GE Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 311 Ark. 84, 841 S.W.2d 619 (1992).

Where affirmative acts of concealment by the person charged with fraud prevent the discovery of that person's misrepresentations, the statute of limitations will be tolled until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Wilson v. GE Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 311 Ark. 84, 841 S.W.2d 619 (1992).

Statute of limitations was not tolled, and the statute ran before suit was filed. Scollard v. Scollard, 329 Ark. 83, 947 S.W.2d 345 (1997).

The defendant jeweler was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations in an action in which the plaintiff alleged that he had switched a diamond for a cubic zirconium since such a switch, if proven, would constitute fraudulent concealment and would toll the statute. Gibson v. Herring, 63 Ark. App. 155, 975 S.W.2d 860 (1998).

Any concealment or misrepresentation did not sufficiently toll the limitations period in an action for an alleged breach of contract in connection with a mortgage payment disability insurance policy where the action was not commenced until more than three years after the plaintiff received a copy of the policy. Elder v. Security Bank, 68 Ark. App. 132, 5 S.W.3d 78 (1999).

Client's claims of legal malpractice and breach of contract against her former attorney where properly dismissed as time-barred where the client did not file suit until more than three years after all of the allegations of negligence had occurred; the client's argument that the statute was tolled until she obtained her file was refuted by the client's earlier letter to the attorney asserting negligence. Parkerson v. Lincoln, 347 Ark. 29, 61 S.W.3d 146 (2001).

Three-year statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action was not tolled by fraudulent concealment due to an incorrect statement made by attorneys regarding a tax liability letter; there was no furtively planned or secretly executed acts, nor was there an affirmative act of concealment; rather, the client failed to act with reasonable diligence when he was informed of the tax liability by the State on two different times. Delanno, Inc. v. Peace, 366 Ark. 542, 237 S.W.3d 81 (2006).

Circuit court improperly granted two attorneys summary judgment on a shareholder's legal malpractice action based on subdivision (3) of this section (Repl. 2006) where the shareholder had produced evidence that the attorneys had set up and concealed shell corporations; it was unlikely that he could have discovered the concealment of the attorneys' wrongful acts, and as a result, there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the attorneys committed acts of fraudulent concealment that tolled the statute of limitations. Bomar v. Moser, 369 Ark. 123, 251 S.W.3d 234 (2007).

More than three years had elapsed since the commission of the alleged fraud, and thus the buyers had the burden to show that the statute of limitations in this section was tolled; however, the buyers failed to produce any evidence that the seller engaged in any act designed to conceal her alleged misrepresentation, and instead the buyers were aware of all the material facts surrounding the alleged fraud before taking possession of the land, and thus the trial court did not err in finding that the buyers' constructive fraud claim had expired. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

In a personal injury suit, when a pedestrian and his wife failed to properly serve a summons and complaint on a driver, and service was not completed within 120 days of the filing of the complaint, the complaint had to be dismissed without prejudice, but when service was not completed within the three-year statute of limitations period, the dismissal had to be with prejudice because the pedestrian and his wife failed to show fraud on the part of the driver, so the statute of limitations was not tolled. Brennan v. Wadlow, 372 Ark. 50, 270 S.W.3d 831 (2008).

Business owners' claims against auditors for fraud, constructive fraud, and professional negligence regarding a 1995 audit were time-barred by this section despite a tolling agreement signed by the auditors because the tolling agreement's purpose was to waive the statute of limitations as to claims arising out a 1994 audit and the claims with respect to the 1995 audit were not related to nor did they arise from the 1994 audit. Ernst & Young LLP v. Reid, 2010 Ark. 255 (2010).

Plaintiff's action was properly dismissed because his claims were clearly time-barred under this section and §§ 16-56-111, 4-88-115, and by failing to allege when and how he discovered defendant's alleged fraud, plaintiff failed to meet his burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), (f) of sufficiently pleading that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment saved his otherwise time-barred claims. Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2011).

Claims by mineral lessors, including under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 4-88-101 et seq., were properly dismissed as time-barred under this section and § 4-88-115 where they were brought more than five years after the leases were executed; fraud was not sufficiently shown for purposes of tolling. Hipp v. Vernon L. Smith & Assocs., 2011 Ark. App. 611, 386 S.W.3d 526 (2011).

Action alleging conspiracy to conceal evidence and malicious prosecution was time-barred, as the suit was brought more than three years after the former suspect's acquittal of a murder charge; the alleged concealment of an investigating officer's notes did not warrant equitable tolling, as the notes could not reasonably have been read to contradict a report that the officer provided to the state prosecutor. Jones v. Frost, 770 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2315, 191 L. Ed. 2d 979 (2015).

Torts.

Lex fori governs as to limitation of action for common law tort. Moores v. Winter, 67 Ark. 189, 53 S.W. 1057 (1899).

An action for damages for wrongful ejection from a train is within the three year limitation of this section. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Mynott, 83 Ark. 6, 102 S.W. 380 (1907).

The limitation fixed by this section governs the right of action for pain and suffering before death in a suit brought by the administrator for the benefit of the estate. Smith v. Missouri P. R. Co., 175 Ark. 626, 1 S.W.2d 48 (1927).

The three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort actions not otherwise limited by law, where the means of information as to the cause of the injury is equally accessible to both parties and the cause or extent of the injury was not fraudulently concealed. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934)Questioned byNorris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 899 S.W.2d 70 (1995)Questioned bySchenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

Tort action barred by statute of limitations. Brown v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 189 Ark. 885, 75 S.W.2d 804 (1934); Faulkner v. Huie, 205 Ark. 332, 168 S.W.2d 839 (1943)Questioned byMulligan v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 786 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1986); Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981)Criticized byPoindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Ark. 1994); Turner v. Baptist Medical Center, 275 Ark. 424, 631 S.W.2d 275 (1982); Simpson v. Bailey, 279 Ark. 27, 648 S.W.2d 464 (1983); Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 913 S.W.2d 761 (1996).

Tort action not barred by statute of limitations. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980).

This section governs actions brought under § 16-62-101(a) as well as personal injury suits brought by an injured party during his lifetime. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

Where deceased was injured as a result of negligence, his cause of action for injuries accrued on the date of injury; where deceased's action was barred by period of limitations, similar action by administratrix was also barred, as she occupied the same position as deceased in regard to the action. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

The three year limitation on an action for injury resulting from taking a drug manufactured by the defendant began to run when it became apparent that the injury was permanent. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

A right of action for injury resulting from taking drug accrued when the patient knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care for her health and safety, could have known that she was injured. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

The statute of limitations on a personal injury action did not run against an incompetent even though a guardian of his estate had been appointed prior to accrual of the cause of action. Mason v. Sorrell, 260 Ark. 27, 551 S.W.2d 184 (1976).

The three-year statute applies to all tort actions, including allegations of negligence with respect to sale of securities transaction. F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

Where the gist of the complaint clearly sounds in tort, and the court is unable to construe it to include another type action so as to permit the application of a longer statute of limitations, the cause of action will be barred by the three year statute of limitations for torts. O'Bryant v. Horn, 297 Ark. 617, 764 S.W.2d 445 (1989).

A cause of action for contribution accrues when one joint tortfeasor pays more than his or her pro rata share of common liability; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations under this section had not yet expired due to the fact that a settlement had just been entered where an executor and his wife agreed to pay more of their fair share in a trust dispute. Heinemann v. Hallum, 365 Ark. 600, 232 S.W.3d 420 (2006).

In a foreclosure case involving a construction loan, summary judgment was properly granted on the borrower's nonsuited counterclaims for negligence and interference with business expectancies, which were untimely under this section because they were filed more than three years after the lender refused further funding of the loan and were not saved by § 16-56-126 because they were filed more than two years after the voluntary nonsuit. Grand Valley Ridge, LLC v. Metro. Nat'l Bank, 2012 Ark. 121, 388 S.W.3d 24 (2012).

In a creditor's breach of contract suit arising from cross-defaulted loan agreements, counterclaims asserting causes of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices were time-barred. Bank of Am., N.A. v. JB Hanna, LLC, 766 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2014).

In a dispute over family burial plots, appellants' cause of action accrued in 2006 at the time the headstone was placed by appellee, signifying appellee's and her husband's intention to claim the property for their burial plot, because, at that moment, the injury to appellants' claim to the property had occurred and the three-year statute of limitations in subdivision (4) of this section began to run; however, because the cause of action was not filed within three years of that date and Arkansas did not recognize the tort theory of continuing trespass for limitations purposes, the trial court did not err in holding that the statute of limitations barred appellants' claim and in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. Cason v. Lambert, 2015 Ark. App. 213, 462 S.W.3d 681 (2015).

—Outrage.

Allegations that a doctor had improperly touched, examined, and otherwise fondled plaintiffs' breasts during a physical examination did not allege a complaint of battery, governed by the one-year statute of limitations in § 16-56-104, but stated a cause of action for the tort of outrage, which is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in this section. McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 963 S.W.2d 583 (1998).

Trespass.

An action for damages for trespass on real property instituted after more than three years since the cause of action arose, but within one year after final judgment was rendered on demurrer in a previous action on the same cause, was barred by limitations, since former judgment was not a nonsuit. Thompson v. Pulaski-Lonoke Drainage Dist., 192 Ark. 1178, 90 S.W.2d 237 (1936).

Evidence in trespass suit sufficient to bar cause of action by statute of limitation. Jones v. Brooks, 233 Ark. 148, 343 S.W.2d 99 (1961).

Court properly denied summary judgment to the oil company, which was one of the defendants in an action by the landowners for damages from defendants' dumping, where the court could not say that a reasonable jury would not find that the three year limitations period under subdivision (4) of this section was tolled under the continuing violation theory. Sewell v. Phillips Petro. Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (W.D. Ark. 2002).

District court's verdict was reversed on appeal where the applicable statute of limitations began to run at the latest date the plaintiff lessor learned its land had suffered a remediable injury, though it did not yet know the extent of the injury. Highland Indus. Park, Inc. v. BEI Def. Sys. Co., 357 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2004).

Estate administrator's amended complaint for the wrongful conversion of timber, brought on behalf of the estate, was time-barred under subdivisions (4) and (6) of this section, the three-year statute of limitations for trespass and conversion, and § 16-56-108, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to penal statutes where the penalty goes to the person suing, which included claims brought pursuant to § 18-60-102. It was also barred because the administrator failed to meet the bond requirement of § 28-42-103. Travis Lumber Co. v. Deichman, 2009 Ark. 299, 319 S.W.3d 239 (2009).

Trusts.

Although the beneficiary's claims nominally sounded in tort, they were predominantly assertions of a breach of trust; therefore, the statute of limitations in the Arkansas Trust Code in § 28-73-1005 controlled, rather than the more general three-year tort limitations period in this section. The beneficiary's allegations clearly involved claims that the trustee breached her duties as trustee in her administration of the trusts. Peck v. Peck, 2019 Ark. App. 190, 575 S.W.3d 137 (2019).

Cited: Meyer v. Cunningham, 196 Ark. 1097, 121 S.W.2d 90 (1938); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Neal, 212 Ark. 866, 208 S.W.2d 176 (1948); Collie v. Coleman, 223 Ark. 206, 265 S.W.2d 515 (1954); Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d 150 (1955); Booth v. Hayde, 228 Ark. 244, 307 S.W.2d 227 (1957); Baxter v. Young, 229 Ark. 1035, 320 S.W.2d 640 (1959); Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959); Wilson v. Wilson, 231 Ark. 416, 329 S.W.2d 557 (1959); Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ark. 1960); Carter v. Zachary, 243 Ark. 104, 418 S.W.2d 787 (1967); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970); Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Hogue v. Jennings, 252 Ark. 1009, 481 S.W.2d 752 (1972); Coleman v. Young, 256 Ark. 759, 510 S.W.2d 877 (1974); Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arkansas Nat'l Co., 260 Ark. 352, 538 S.W.2d 574 (1976); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 271 Ark. 404, 609 S.W.2d 84 (1980); Wright v. Langdon, 274 Ark. 258, 623 S.W.2d 823 (1981); Federal Land Bank v. Wilson, 533 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 550 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Okla Homer Smith Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc., 278 Ark. 467, 646 S.W.2d 696 (1983); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984); Freeman v. King, 10 Ark. App. 220, 662 S.W.2d 479 (1984); Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984); Lacey v. Bekaert Steel Wire Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1234 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Mulligan v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 786 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 803 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1986); Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986); Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987); Rogers Iron & Metal Corp. v. K & M, Inc., 22 Ark. App. 228, 738 S.W.2d 110 (1987); Carton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 295 Ark. 126, 747 S.W.2d 93 (1988); Fayetteville v. Bibb, 30 Ark. App. 31, 781 S.W.2d 493 (1989); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Atlanta Exploration, Inc. v. Ethyl Corp., 301 Ark. 331, 784 S.W.2d 150 (1990); Phillips v. Sugrue, 800 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kerr, 804 F. Supp. 1091 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992); Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 310 Ark. 179, 833 S.W.2d 366 (1992); Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993); Hicks v. Clark, 316 Ark. 148, 870 S.W.2d 750 (1994); Alexander v. Twin City Bank, 322 Ark. 478, 910 S.W.2d 196 (1995); Howard v. Northwest Ark. Surgical Clinic, 324 Ark. 375, 921 S.W.2d 596 (1996); Kingsbury v. Robertson, 325 Ark. 12, 923 S.W.2d 273 (1996); Grace v. Grace, 326 Ark. 312, 930 S.W.2d 362 (1996); Calcagno v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Ark. 802, 957 S.W.2d 700 (1997); Colonia Ins. Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 13 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Helms v. University of Missouri-Kansas City, 65 Ark. App. 155, 986 S.W.2d 419 (1999); Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999); Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 344 Ark. 177, 40 S.W.3d 733 (2001); Adams v. Wolf, 73 Ark. App. 347, 43 S.W.3d 757 (2001); Vanderpool v. Pace, 351 Ark. 630, 97 S.W.3d 404 (2003); Shelnutt v. Laird, 359 Ark. 516, 199 S.W.3d 65 (2004); Moody v. Tarvin, 2016 Ark. App. 169, 486 S.W.3d 242 (2016).

16-56-106. Recovery of charges for medical services.

  1. No action shall be brought to recover charges for medical services performed or provided prior to April 1, 1985, by a physician or other medical service provider after the expiration of a period of eighteen (18) months from the date the services were performed or provided.
  2. No action shall be brought to recover charges for medical services performed or provided after March 31, 1985, by a physician or other medical service provider after the expiration of a period of two (2) years from the date the services were performed or provided or from the date of the most recent partial payment for the services, whichever is later.

History. Acts 1983, No. 638, § 1; 1985, No. 894, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-245.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Limitation period in this section is both reasonable and constitutional. Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987); HCA Medical Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. Rodgers, 292 Ark. 359, 730 S.W.2d 229 (1987).

Applying this section to debt for hospital services incurred prior to the enactment of this section was not unconstitutional. Thomas v. Service Fin. Corp., 293 Ark. 190, 736 S.W.2d 3 (1987).

Applicability.

This section, and not § 16-56-111, covers all actions brought to recover charges for medical services. Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987).

Limitations period contained in this section, and not that of § 16-56-111, is applicable to a debt for hospital services. Thomas v. Service Fin. Corp., 293 Ark. 190, 736 S.W.2d 3 (1987).

Where Chapter 13 debtors filed a complaint alleging that a creditor violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., by filing a proof of claim in an attempt to collect a medical services debt that was potentially time-barred under this section, the court dismissed their complaint, as they could have simply objected to the proof of claim under one of the exceptions provided in the Bankruptcy Code or could have proceeded under the Bankruptcy Rules, arguing that the claim was not warranted by existing law. The FDCPA was not the controlling statute after debtors filed a voluntary petition, and debtors could not bypass procedural safeguards in the Bankruptcy Code in favor of asserting a potentially more lucrative claim under the FDCPA. Gatewood v. CP Medical LLC (In re Gatewood), No. 5:13-bk-73363, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2906 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Feb. 6, 2015), aff'd, Gatewood v. CP Med., LLC (In re Gatewood), 533 B.R. 905 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015) (“[f]iling in a bankruptcy case an accurate proof of claim containing all the required information, including the timing of the debt, standing alone, is not a prohibited debt collection practice”).

Fraud.

No mere ignorance on the part of the plaintiff of his rights, nor the mere silence of one who is under no obligation to speak, will prevent the statute bar; there must be some positive act of fraud, something so furtively planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff's cause of action concealed, or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself. And if the plaintiff, by reasonable diligence, might have detected the fraud, he is presumed to have had reasonable knowledge of it. Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1993).

Representations in a seller's promotional magazine which did not contain information regarding problems with a product did not rise to the level of affirmative conduct concealing buyer's cause of action sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1993).

Ignorance of Right.

A plaintiff's ignorance of his or her right to sue does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1993).

Medical Service Provider.

A psychologist is not a medical service provider within the meaning of this section. Southwestern Human Servs. Inst., Inc. v. Mitchell, 287 Ark. 59, 696 S.W.2d 722 (1985).

Hospital held medical service provider. Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987).

Partial Payment.

A partial payment begins the running of the statute of limitations; a five-dollar payment was sufficient. Jones v. Hempel, 316 Ark. 647, 873 S.W.2d 540 (1994).

Revival of Debt.

A lawsuit filed by injured party, in which he sought damages that included his medical expenses, did not demonstrate his acknowledgment of the debt to his medical service providers and was not sufficient to revive the debt. Kitchens v. Evans, 45 Ark. App. 19, 870 S.W.2d 767 (1994).

Cited: Dupree v. Twin City Bank, 300 Ark. 188, 777 S.W.2d 856 (1989); University Hosp. v. Undernehr, 307 Ark. 445, 821 S.W.2d 26 (1991).

16-56-107. Enforcement of security interest in livestock.

  1. No action to enforce a security interest in livestock shall be brought against a livestock auction market or selling agent who, in the ordinary course of business, sells the livestock for another person in a public auction, more than eighteen (18) months after the date of the sale.
  2. No action to enforce a security interest in livestock against a buyer in the ordinary course of business shall be brought more than eighteen (18) months after the livestock is sold to the buyer.

History. Acts 1985, No. 902, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-246, 37-247.

16-56-108. Recovery of statutory penalties.

All actions on penal statutes where the penalty, or any part thereof, goes to the state, or to any county or person suing for the same, shall be commenced within two (2) years after the offense has been committed or the cause of action has accrued.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 6954; Pope's Dig., § 8932; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-204.

Case Notes

Applicability.

An action to enforce a statutory liability which is not a penalty is governed by the three year limitation provided in § 16-56-105. Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Walsh, 68 Ark. 433, 59 S.W. 952 (1900).

This statute cannot be pleaded in bar of the remedial portion of a statute which is both remedial and penal. McDonald v. Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 183 S.W. 751 (1916).

This statute is not applicable to liability for assessment imposed by another state upon bank stockholders upon insolvency; the liability is contractual rather than in the nature of a penalty. Hospelhorn v. Burke, 196 Ark. 1028, 120 S.W.2d 705 (1938).

The environmental protection acts found at §§ 8-4-101 et seq., 8-6-201 et seq., and 8-7-201 et seq., are regulatory and protective rather than penal, and therefore the statute of limitations for penal actions does not apply. Arkansas ex rel. Bryant v. Dow Chem. Co., 981 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Ark. 1997).

Estate administrator's amended complaint for the wrongful conversion of timber, brought on behalf of the estate, was time-barred under § 16-56-105(4) and (6), the three-year statute of limitations for trespass and conversion, and this section, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to penal statutes where the penalty goes to the person suing, which included claims brought pursuant to § 18-60-102. It was also barred because the administrator failed to meet the bond requirement of § 28-42-103. Travis Lumber Co. v. Deichman, 2009 Ark. 299, 319 S.W.3d 239 (2009).

Disability.

In action for treble damages under § 18-60-102(a) and (b), the two year limitation of this section does not apply where plaintiff was under the age of majority at the time the cause of action arose and brought his action within the limitation of § 16-56-116(a). Callaway v. Perdue, 238 Ark. 652, 385 S.W.2d 4 (1964).

Pleading.

Actions for the recovery of a statutory penalty are governed by rules of practice in civil action; consequently the statute of limitations must be pleaded, otherwise it is waived as a defense. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 82 Ark. 309, 101 S.W. 748 (1907).

Statute Tolled.

In a taxpayer action against a sheriff, allegations and proof of fraud and concealment were sufficient to toll any statute of limitations which was applicable. Thomas v. Williford, 259 Ark. 354, 534 S.W.2d 2 (1976).

Time Expired.

In claim for treble damages the trial court did not err in precluding plaintiff from recovering treble damages because the two-year limitation period had expired. Kutait v. O'Roark, 305 Ark. 538, 809 S.W.2d 371 (1991).

Cited: St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. State, 59 Ark. 165, 26 S.W. 824 (1894); Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

16-56-109. Actions against sheriffs, coroners, and other officials.

  1. All actions against sheriffs and coroners upon any liability incurred by them by doing any act in their official capacity or by the omission of any official duty, except for escapes, shall be brought within two (2) years after the cause of action has accrued and not thereafter.
  2. All actions against sheriffs or other officers for the escape of any person imprisoned on civil process shall be commenced within one (1) year from the time of escape, and not thereafter.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, §§ 8, 9; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6952, 6953; Pope's Dig., §§ 8930, 8931; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-202, 37-203.

Case Notes

Deputies and Jailers.

Although deputy sheriffs and jailers are not referred to in this section, they are entitled to the benefit of the statute when sued on account of acts or omissions which took place in the course of their official duties. Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. Ark. 1973).

False Arrest.

Under this section an action against a sheriff for false arrest must be brought within two years. Gilpin v. Tack, 256 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Ark. 1966).

Federal Actions.

This section applied to an action brought in federal court against an Arkansas jailer for injuries sustained by a federal prisoner at the hands of other inmates while confined in an Arkansas jail. Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. Ark. 1973).

The running of the statute was not tolled by the confinement of a plaintiff outside state in a federal penitentiary when he was not so confined at the time his cause of action accrued in view of § 16-56-116 (a) and (b). Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. Ark. 1973).

Federal prisoner confined in state jail had to bring negligence claim against sheriff and jailer within time prescribed by this section. Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. Ark. 1973).

Pleading.

The plea of the statute of limitations cannot be raised by demurrer, unless the complaint shows not only that the time has elapsed so as to bar the action, but also the nonexistence of any grounds for the avoidance of the statute. State use of Glover v. McIlroy, 196 Ark. 63, 116 S.W.2d 601 (1938).

Statute Tolled.

In a taxpayer action against a sheriff, allegations and proof of fraud and concealment were sufficient to toll any statute of limitations which was applicable. Thomas v. Williford, 259 Ark. 354, 534 S.W.2d 2 (1976).

Unlawful Taking.

Action against sureties on bond of former sheriff commenced more than two years after date on which he was required to turn over to his successor property and money in his hands, to recover value of property which the sheriff had attached, was barred by limitations, though filed soon after determination of replevin suit against sheriff. State use of Glover v. McIlroy, 196 Ark. 63, 116 S.W.2d 601 (1938).

Cited: Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

16-56-110. Sheriffs', coroners', and constables' bonds.

  1. Actions on the official bonds of sheriffs and coroners shall be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall accrue, and not afterward.
  2. A certified copy of the bond shall be evidence in all suits brought on the bond.
  3. No suit shall be brought on any bond of a constable after the expiration of four (4) years from its date.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 29, § 14; Acts 1844, § 1, p. 24; C. & M. Dig., § 6957; Pope's Dig., § 8935; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-207, 37-208.

Case Notes

Actions Barred.

Suit filed by heirs on sheriff's bond was barred under this section where sheriff left office and filed his last settlement more than four years before suit. Elmore v. Bishop, 184 Ark. 243, 42 S.W.2d 399 (1931).

Action against sureties on bond of former sheriff commenced more than four years after date on which he was required to turn over to his successor property and money in his hands, to recover value of property which the sheriff had attached, was barred by limitations, though filed soon after determination of suit in replevin against sheriff. State use of Glover v. McIlroy, 196 Ark. 63, 116 S.W.2d 601 (1938).

Actions not Barred.

Where the county sheriff was receiving expense funds without required proof of expenses, the receipt constituted an illegal exaction and thus the county sheriff was correctly required to account and repay the sums received and the statute of limitations did not bar the action. Thomas v. Williford, 259 Ark. 354, 534 S.W.2d 2 (1976).

Pleading.

The plea of the statute of limitations cannot be raised by demurrer, unless the complaint shows not only that the time has elapsed so as to bar the action, but also the nonexistence of any grounds for the avoidance of the statute. State use of Glover v. McIlroy, 196 Ark. 63, 116 S.W.2d 601 (1938).

Statute Tolled.

In a taxpayer action against a sheriff, allegations and proof of fraud and concealment were sufficient to toll any statute of limitations which was applicable. Thomas v. Williford, 259 Ark. 354, 534 S.W.2d 2 (1976).

16-56-111. Notes and instruments in writing and other writings.

  1. Actions to enforce written obligations, duties, or rights, except those to which § 4-4-111 is applicable, shall be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action shall accrue.
  2. However, partial payment or written acknowledgment of default shall toll this statute of limitations.

History. Acts 1844, § 1, p. 24; 1889, No. 70, § 1, p. 87; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6955, 6956; Pope's Dig., §§ 8933, 8934; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-209, 37-210; Acts 1989, No. 644, § 1; 1991, No. 1048, § 1; 1997, No. 1164, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. As to abolition of distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments executed since the adoption of the Constitution of 1868 and provision that the statute of limitations in regard to sealed and unsealed instruments in force at that time should remain in force until altered, see Ark. Const., Schedule § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, A Statutory Primer: Revised Article 3 of the U.C.C. — Negotiable Instruments, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 65.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Contracts, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 611.

Note, Professional Malpractice — Limitation of Actions — Arkansas Extends the Occurrence Rule to Accountants and Recognizes a Tolling Provision in Attorney Malpractice Actions, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 115.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

Case Notes

Construction.

In a breach of contract action for alleged architectural defects, in which a written contract was involved, subsection (b) of this section was the applicable statute of limitations; the existence of § 16-56-112 did not extend the statute of limitations under subsection (b) or otherwise affect its applicability. Zufari v. Architecture Plus, 323 Ark. 411, 914 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

Applicability.

Holding that plaintiff suing on a note was a charitable institution and that statute of limitations did not apply to it was error. McCrite v. Hendrix College, 198 Ark. 1149, 133 S.W.2d 31 (1939).

The statute of limitations is inapplicable to a suit brought to enforce a trust. Sprigg v. Wilmans, 204 Ark. 863, 165 S.W.2d 69 (1942).

Actions by third persons based on written contracts which are made for their benefit are governed by the limitation of this section rather than § 16-56-105. H.B. Deal & Co. v. Bolding, 225 Ark. 579, 283 S.W.2d 855 (1955).

Although the trial court determined that the five-year statute of limitations applicable to written contracts applied, where the trial court based its finding of liability against the defendant completely upon the finding that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs as their attorney and thereby committed malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations as to the defendant was three years. Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 849 S.W.2d 513 (1993).

In an action involving fraud and a written instrument, the court looks to the gist of the action as alleged to determine which statute of limitations applies. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

Under the express terms of § 16-56-103(b), subsection (b) of this section does not apply to suits to enforce payment of any bills, notes, or evidences of any debt issued by any bank. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

In transferred employees' action under the Labor Management Relations Act, the state statute of limitations for breach of contract was not applicable; applying such would run counter to the policy of rapid final resolutions of labor disputes, and the employer did not actually repudiate the grievance process in the collective bargaining agreement. Arif v. AT & T Corp., 959 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Ark. 1997).

In a claim where it was unclear whether plaintiffs were complaining of the circumstances surrounding the execution of a 1993 agreement, or seeking to enforce a 1981 contract breached in 1996, summary judgment based on the running of the 3 year statute of limitations was improper. Ingram v. Chandler, 63 Ark. App. 1, 971 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Loan papers between debtors and bank constituted evidence of a written agreement between debtors and guarantor, and subsection (a) of this section provides that actions to enforce a written obligation must commence within five years after the cause of action accrues; thus, the trial court erred when it found that the guarantor was seeking contribution and that the cause of action was barred by a three-year statute of limitations. Hendrickson v. Carpenter, 88 Ark. App. 369, 199 S.W.3d 100 (2004).

Court erred in awarding judgment to plaintiff in his breach of contract action against defendant because plaintiff's earlier failure to comply with the service requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i) resulted in a failure to commence the action so as to effectuate the one-year savings provision provided in § 16-56-126; hence, the action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in subsection (a) of this section. Long v. Bonds, 89 Ark. App. 111, 200 S.W.3d 922 (Jan. 5, 2005).

Employee's ERISA claims for benefits under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a), (e)(1), and (f); penalties under § 1132(c)(1); and breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1105(a) and (b), were dismissed because (1) the three-year statute of limitations set forth in § 16-56-105(3) applied to the employee's claim for penalties, the employee requested the plan summary in December 2001 and again in January 2002 but waited until April 2005 to make further inquiries and another year to file a complaint, and the employee did not act with “due diligence,” to enforce her rights so she was not entitled to equitable tolling; (2) with regard to the employee's long-term disability (LTD) claim, the employee knew by December 2001 that her short-term (STD) claim had been denied, such denial served as notification to the employee that no more disability benefits would be approved, the employee should have known that LTD benefits were included and should have taken reasonable steps to enforce her claims, and the employer's failure to send the employee a plan summary did not excuse a four-year delay, so the three-year statute of limitation was not equitably tolled, and the employee's LTD claim was barred; (3) the employee's claim based on the employer's breach of fiduciary duty was also made too late because under the ERISA's statute of limitations, such claims had to be brought within three years under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1113(2); and (4) defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the employee's claim for STD benefits was construed as one for summary judgment and was granted because although the five-year limitations period set forth in this section applied to the claim, the statute of limitations was tolled because the amended claim for STD benefits related back to the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2), the employer offered an affidavit and documentation of its STD payments to the employee, and the employee did not respond to the employer's offer of proof. Gonser v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Finding against the relatives in an action stemming from the relatives' default on a promissory note and security agreement previously executed was proper because the appellate court agreed with the circuit court's interpretation of the provision in the agreement to mean that the final payment, due on January 30, 2004, was to be a balloon payment of any unpaid balance on the note. Accordingly, the term “principal balance” was to include everything that remained unpaid on the date the last balloon payment came due; therefore, the damage claim included everything that remained unpaid throughout the course of the note and the circuit court's finding that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations was proper. Housley v. Hensley, 100 Ark. App. 118, 265 S.W.3d 136 (2007).

In a nondischargeability action under 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(2)(A), where the debt to which the debtors' misrepresentations related arose from a breach of a limited liability company's operating agreement, the five year statute of limitations for breach of contract stated in this section applied, not the three year period for fraud. Lewis v. Spivey (In re Spivey), 440 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010).

Circuit court did not err by dismissing appellants' legal malpractice claims against their attorney, because they were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under this section. Although appellants attempted to categorize the claims differently, the “gist” of their claim was legal malpractice; therefore, the five-year statute of limitations set forth in this section did not apply. Richardson v. Madden, 2012 Ark. App. 120 (2012).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the owners of a trailer park because the gravamen of the tenant's claim was for assault and battery and/or negligence, not breach of contract, and the claim was therefore untimely where the tenant filed his complaint over four years after the incident, and no breach of contract was alleged that would bring the action under the five-year statute of limitations. The rental form, which was not specific to the tenant, contained no promise, specific or general, on the part of the owners to protect the tenant from harm. Moody v. Tarvin, 2016 Ark. App. 169, 486 S.W.3d 242 (2016).

Acceleration Clauses.

Where the debtor defaulted and creditor accelerated the debt, the creditor's cause of action on the debt evidenced by a note did not depend upon any further contingency or condition precedent, as the creditor's right to a deficiency judgment was simply part of a remedial process the creditor initiated by accelerating the debt and could not be treated as a separate cause of action; therefore, the statute of limitations began to run when the creditor accelerated the debt, causing the creditor's complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against the debtor to be barred when brought more than five years after the date the note was accelerated. Oaklawn Bank v. Alford, 40 Ark. App. 200, 845 S.W.2d 22 (1992).

Attorneys.

A malpractice suit alleging that the defendant attorneys breached their contract by failing to act with diligence as required by the contract is an action for negligence rather than for breach of contract, and the three year statute of limitations should apply. Sturgis v. Skokos, 335 Ark. 41, 977 S.W.2d 217 (1998).

When the client sued the attorney in connection with the execution of a prenuptial agreement, her complaint was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for legal-malpractice claims under § 16-56-105. There was no written contract to bring the action under the five-year statute of limitations set forth in this section. Pounders v. Reif, 2009 Ark. 581 (2009).

Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof was on the plaintiff suing on notes to establish that they were not barred by limitations which had been pleaded as a defense. Rose v. Rose, 184 Ark. 430, 42 S.W.2d 567 (1931).

Plaintiff suing on a note relying upon payments to remove the bar of the statute of limitations has burden to show that the payments were made. McNeill v. Rowland, 198 Ark. 1094, 132 S.W.2d 370 (1939).

If in action on promissory note the debtor pleads the statute of limitations as a bar to the action and plaintiff alleges that there has been a part payment on the note, then burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove date of part payment, and mere endorsement on back of note is not sufficient proof of making of part payment. Smith v. Grimsley, 215 Ark. 279, 220 S.W.2d 428 (1949).

Certificate of Deposit.

Under § 4-3-104(j), a certificate of deposit is a negotiable instrument, and an action to enforce such an instrument under Article 3 of the UCC would be subject to the six-year limitation period under § 4-3-118(e), not the five-year limitation period under this section. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

Child Support Agreements.

The period of time for which the mother may recover for the reasonable and definite amount she has expended for the support of the children is governed by the language of the original divorce decree and where, as in the present case, there was no provision in the original divorce decree for support, the obligation of the father would come within the three year statute for such definite amounts as she had expended for the support of the minor children. Wilder v. Garner, 235 Ark. 400, 360 S.W.2d 192 (1962).

Choice of Law.

Insured's claim against insurers was not time-barred, because under Arkansas Supreme Court precedent, Arkansas law applied and therefore a policy provision requiring suit to be filed before the statute of limitations expired was void under § 23-79-202. Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 863 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2017).

Civil Rights.

Although employee's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim involved a collective bargaining agreement between a union and the employer, the alleged discriminatory practices did not arise from any breach of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore this statute of limitations for actions on written contracts was inapplicable. Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977).

Where the plaintiff brought a civil rights complaint involving the termination of the plaintiff's written employment contract, § 16-56-105, governing liabilities created by statute, was the applicable statute of limitations, not this section which governs actions on written contracts. Wagh v. Dennis, 677 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1982).

Conditional Promise.

Statute does not run on a conditional promise until the contingency has happened. Perry v. Cunningham, 40 Ark. 185 (1882).

Corporations.

The appointment of a receiver will not stop the running of the statute against an insolvent corporation. Davis v. Scott, 129 Ark. 226, 195 S.W. 383 (1917).

A complete and present cause of action accrued when assets conveyed in a bill of sale were transferred by person executing bill of sale to a corporation and the stock distributed in violation of the bill of sale, and statute commenced to run from that time. Hunter v. Connelly, 247 Ark. 486, 446 S.W.2d 654 (1969).

Date of Accrual.

In a breach of contract action against architectural firm for alleged design defects, the relevant date for accrual of the cause of action for breach was the date the plans were rejected by the Health Department, since on that date the cause of action was complete, and plaintiff was entitled to sue for breach; when he chose not to do so but chose instead to allow defendant to attempt to rectify the problem, that did not alter the fact that a breach had occurred, and thus suit filed more than five years after the breach was untimely. Zufari v. Architecture Plus, 323 Ark. 411, 914 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

Court properly determined that employee's 2002 breach of contract action against employer was barred by the five-year statute of limitations; the action accrued at the point when employee could have first maintained his action, when the employer failed to apportion settlement funds to the Federal Railroad Retirement Board in 1990. Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 89 Ark. App. 223, 201 S.W.3d 439 (2005).

Insurance underwriter's breach of contract claim against its agent, arising from the agent's issuance of a general liability policy to an Alabama motel in violation of the parties' binding authority agreement, was time-barred under subsection (b) of this section because the underwriter filed its suit more than five years after the agent breached its contractual duty by issuing the policy. The underwriter's cause of action accrued when the contract was breached, not when it suffered injury arising from that breach, which occurred several years later, when lawsuits covered by the policy were filed against the insured motel and the agent refused to provide defense and indemnification in those suits. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Regions Ins., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

Subdivision lot owner's action for breach of restrictive covenants and a declaration that such covenants were unenforceable was barred by the applicable statute of limitations under this section, as the cause of action accrued when a golf club and a successor-in-interest to the developer of the subdivision sold the first lot that they deferred a monthly fee for, not with each deferred lot sold. Beckworth v. Diamante, 2010 Ark. App. 815, 379 S.W.3d 752 (2010).

Plaintiff's action was properly dismissed because his claims were clearly time-barred under this section and §§ 16-56-105, 4-88-115, and by failing to allege when and how he discovered defendant's alleged fraud, plaintiff failed to meet his burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), (f) of sufficiently pleading that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment saved his otherwise time-barred claims. Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2011).

Debts.

The statute does not begin to run against a note that may be declared due on default in interest until the end of its regular term, unless the payee exercises his option. Sherwood v. Wilkins, 65 Ark. 312, 45 S.W. 988 (1898).

The statute runs from the date of a new promise. Kelley v. Telle, 66 Ark. 464, 51 S.W. 633 (1899); Williams v. Young, 71 Ark. 164, 71 S.W. 669 (1903).

Cause of action accrues at maturity of note. Rock Island Plow Co. v. Masterston, 96 Ark. 446, 132 S.W. 216 (1910).

A right to enforce a mortgage lien acquired by the right of subrogation will not be barred where the debt has been kept alive by a new note executed by the debtor. Roark v. Matthews, 125 Ark. 378, 188 S.W. 841 (1916).

The statute of limitations begins to run against the creditor of an insolvent corporation whenever he has notice that the corporation is insolvent, and notice may be presumed when the insolvency becomes a matter of general notoriety. Davis v. Scott, 129 Ark. 226, 195 S.W. 383 (1917).

Demand paper is due immediately, and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the instrument. McCollum v. Neimeyer, 142 Ark. 471, 219 S.W. 746 (1920).

A cause of action on a note is not barred where an action was brought on it within five years from maturity where the action was dismissed and new action brought within a year on the same cause of action. Felker v. Boatmen's Bank, 146 Ark. 186, 225 S.W. 306 (1920).

Evidence held to sustain a finding that the defendant's consent to the crediting of the amount owed by the payee of a note to the defendant on the note which the defendant had executed did not constitute an acknowledgement of the debt sufficient to form a basis of a new promise, tolling the statute of limitations on the note. Sanders v. McClintock, 175 Ark. 633, 300 S.W. 408 (1927).

The cause of action on a promissory note does not accrue until the day following the date of its maturity. Shanks v. Clark, 175 Ark. 883, 300 S.W. 453 (1927).

Where a cause of action on a note is barred by limitations, a mortgage securing the note is likewise barred. Taylor v. Cheairs, 181 Ark. 4, 24 S.W.2d 852 (1930).

The right of action by a joint maker of a note who paid it for contribution is based on an implied obligation, and not governed by the limitation prescribed by this section. Hazel v. Sharum, 182 Ark. 557, 32 S.W.2d 315 (1930).

Where a debt is secured by a pledge, the running of the statute of limitations destroys the right of recovery on the debt, but it has no effect on the right of the pledgee to retain the property or enforce his claim against it, until the debt is paid. Hill v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 90 S.W.2d 490 (1936).

Plaintiffs took title free from lien of mortgages which had been kept alive by tax payments made by mortgagee. Polster v. Langley, 201 Ark. 396, 144 S.W.2d 1063 (1940).

Recital in notes that drawers and endorsers waived presentation for payment, protest and nonpayment, and granted to holder right to grant extensions without notifying them, was held not to apply to payee who subsequently endorsed the notes and who could only be bound for five years from due date of notes. Mayberry v. Penn, 201 Ark. 756, 146 S.W.2d 925 (1941).

When recovery is sought on an obligation payable in installments, this statute runs against each installment from the time it becomes due. Linke v. Kirk, 204 Ark. 393, 162 S.W.2d 39 (1942); Wilson v. Wilson, 231 Ark. 416, 329 S.W.2d 557 (1959).

Written contract for repurchase, executed by parties thereto for specific purpose of preventing foreclosure of deed of trust, including original debt as the consideration thereof, tolled the statute of limitations and made a new point for it to begin to run. Walker v. Mullins, 204 Ark. 939, 165 S.W.2d 607 (1942).

A note payable on demand is due immediately upon its execution, and the statute of limitations runs from that date, unless there is a subsequent unconditional promise to pay by the party from whom the debt is due, which is sufficient to toll the statute. McMahon v. O'Keefe, 213 Ark. 105, 209 S.W.2d 449 (1948).

Where the maker of a note payable on demand writes letters acknowledging the validity of the debt due and by inference promises to pay, the acts on the part of the debtor are sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. McMahon v. O'Keefe, 213 Ark. 105, 209 S.W.2d 449 (1948).

Where plaintiff filed suit on promissory note more than five years after due date and unauthorized payments were made on the note, the payments did not toll the statute, and action upon the note was therefore barred. Sutterfield v. Smith, 216 Ark. 41, 223 S.W.2d 1018 (1949).

Suit, by holders of unpaid installment bonds of drainage district, to collect bonds and interest was not barred where each annual report of district's receiver acknowledged the bonds and interest as obligations of the drainage district. Greer v. Blocker, 218 Ark. 259, 236 S.W.2d 68 (1951).

Three year limitation of § 16-56-105 applicable to oral contracts governed the transaction where borrower pledged a note for repayment of oral loan rather than the limitation of this section. Shelton v. Harris, 225 Ark. 855, 286 S.W.2d 20 (1956).

Where parties enter into a written stipulation as to the amount of indebtedness which is sworn to before a notary public, the instrument constitutes an account stated and starts the running of this section anew. Johnson v. Gammill, 231 Ark. 1, 328 S.W.2d 127 (1959).

In action to recover delinquent payments which is filed more than five years after the last payment was made, plaintiff can recover only those installments due and accruing within five years before the filing of petition. Wilson v. Wilson, 231 Ark. 416, 329 S.W.2d 557 (1959).

A suit on a note filed less than five years after the note was executed was within the limitation of this section. Wallace v. Hamilton, 238 Ark. 406, 382 S.W.2d 363 (1964).

An alleged oral extension agreement for which the record shows no semblance of valid consideration is not sufficient to toll the running of the statute. Holmes v. Thompson, 240 Ark. 818, 402 S.W.2d 400 (1966).

Creditor's action was not barred by the statute of limitations on default on balloon payment. Delta Oil Co. v. Catalani, 276 Ark. 66, 633 S.W.2d 1 (1982).

If a check, pledged as security was nonnegotiable, that fact alone would not discharge the liability of the drawer of the check who remained secondarily liable on the check until the statute of limitations ran or until its liability was otherwise discharged. Wildman Stores, Inc. v. Carlisle Distrib. Co., 15 Ark. App. 11, 688 S.W.2d 748 (1985).

When recovery is sought on an obligation payable in installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment from the time it becomes due; therefore, where the debtor made partial payments in each year since the execution of the note, with the most recent payment being made in 1985, the statute of limitations would not run for actions on the note until 1990, five years from the date of the last payment. In re Borum, 60 B.R. 516 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986).

When recovery is sought on an obligation payable in installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment from the time it becomes due; that is, from the time when an action might be brought to recover it. Bank of N.Y. v. University Partners, Ltd., 719 F. Supp. 1479 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Where a foreclosure suit was filed on March 13, 1991 regarding a promissory note that was signed on March 15, 1982, with the first payment due on March 15, 1983, and where no payments were made, plaintiffs were barred by law from recovering those payments that became due prior to March 13, 1986, due to the five-year statute of limitations. Karnes v. Marrow, 315 Ark. 37, 864 S.W.2d 848 (1993).

Breach of contract claim involving a loan that was secured by a property deed was not barred by the statute of limitations because the breach claim did not accrue until just a few months before the filing of the complaint, when the lenders refused further payments and claimed the payments were merely rent because they owned the property at issue. Smith v. Eisen, 97 Ark. App. 130, 245 S.W.3d 160 (2006).

Five-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied under this section, and the last payments on June 24, July 7, and July 10, 2004, were made within the 5-year period after the creditors filed the claims on November 28, 2007, and April 3, 2008, because the debtor's use of the cards represented an intent to perform a unilateral contract by repaying the amount charged; the issuance of the card to the debtor to be accepted by her in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth by the card member agreements or rejected by non-use was an offer; and the contract became binding when the debtor retained the card, made use of it, and thereby agreed to the terms of the written agreement. In re Pettingill, 403 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).

Bank's claim upon promissory note was not barred by the statute of limitations under this section as the note maker made a payment before the bar attached and created a new starting point for the limitations period. Valley v. Helena Nat'l Bank, 2010 Ark. App. 560 (2010).

Because appellee lender received insurance payments when the collateral for a promissory note was damaged in a fire, the trial court did not err in finding that the five-year statute of limitations for an action on the note was tolled under subsection (b) of this section by partial payments. Payton v. Coleman, 2012 Ark. App. 160 (2012).

In a creditor's breach of contract suit arising from cross-defaulted loan agreements, counterclaims asserting causes of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices were time-barred. Bank of Am., N.A. v. JB Hanna, LLC, 766 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2014).

—Acceleration Clauses.

Acceleration clause contained in note and mortgage for benefit of payee and enforceable at his option was held not to start the statute of limitations running upon failure to make payment of interest. Hodges v. Taft, 194 Ark. 259, 106 S.W.2d 605 (1937).

Statute of limitations began to run when default was made in payment of first note. Hodges v. Dilatush, 199 Ark. 967, 136 S.W.2d 1018 (1940).

Where an automatic acceleration clause occurs if an installment of interest is not paid within thirty days after due date, but there is no declaration that a default in the payment of an installment of the principal accelerates the maturity of the debt, the statute is a bar only to those installments over five years due, where there is no testimony as to a default in interest. Holmes v. Thompson, 240 Ark. 818, 402 S.W.2d 400 (1966).

—Assumption of Debts.

Whether an incoming partner becomes liable on an existing note of the old partnership depends on whether he assumed the indebtedness; in the absence of assumption he will not be bound by payments made by a member of the old firm nor precluded from pleading the statute of limitations against the note. Stephens v. Neely, 161 Ark. 114, 255 S.W. 562, 45 A.L.R. 1236 (1923).

The right of a husband to be subrogated to the lien of a mortgagee on his wife's land which he had discharged after her death is to use the mortgage just as the original holder thereof might have done, and the devolution of the cause of action does not interrupt the running of the statute. Ogden v. Watts, 186 Ark. 500, 54 S.W.2d 292 (1932).

Since the assumption of payment of the note by the different grantees in the deeds appearing in the plaintiff's chain of title was made within five years before the institution of the suit, the lien of the mortgage was kept alive, although the debt as against the original payor was barred by the statute of limitations. Webb v. Alexander, 195 Ark. 727, 113 S.W.2d 1095 (1938).

—Credit Card Debt.

Claim Nos. 7, 8, and 9 complied with the applicable Bankruptcy Rules and were presumed to be prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of each claim; the creditors were not required to attach the writings on which the debts were based to the proofs of claim. Underlying credit card debts were subject to the Arkansas five-year statute of limitations period. In re Richardson, 557 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2016).

—Endorsement of Payments.

Payments, endorsed on a note, which were admitted by the debtor to be correct or were impliedly assented to by him are sufficient to stop the running of the statute of limitations. McAbee v. Wiley, 92 Ark. 245, 122 S.W. 623 (1909).

The date of a payment on a note and not the endorsement or entry of it marks the time of the interruption of the statute unless a future date is agreed upon by the parties. Slagle v. Box, 124 Ark. 43, 186 S.W. 299 (1916).

The running of the statute of limitations is not estopped by endorsements of payments on a note not shown to have been made by the defendant. Kory v. East Ark. Lumber Co., 181 Ark. 478, 26 S.W.2d 896 (1930).

The presence or absence of endorsement of credits or other payments on the back of a note is not conclusive proof that payments tolling the statute were or were not made. Schaefer v. Baker, 181 Ark. 620, 27 S.W.2d 83 (1930).

It is the fact of payment on the note and not the endorsement thereon that tolls the statute. Reynolds v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 182 Ark. 861, 33 S.W.2d 403 (1930).

Payments need not be endorsed as credits on back of note to arrest the running of the statute of limitations; it is the fact of payment and not its endorsement that tolls the statute. McNeill v. Rowland, 198 Ark. 1094, 132 S.W.2d 370 (1939).

Where order of dismissal in 1938 was final determination of mortgage foreclosure suit filed in 1931 with notice of lis pendens and it reinstated the mortgage in full force and effect as though no suit had been filed, order was binding on judgment creditors of mortgagor who secured judgment after beginning of suit and precluded them from contending that subsequent foreclosure suit was barred by limitations for failure to make marginal endorsements of payment within five years. Mitchell v. Federal Land Bank, 206 Ark. 253, 174 S.W.2d 671 (1943), superseded by statute as stated in, Croft v. Croft, 8 Ark. App. 20, 648 S.W.2d 511 (1983).

—Multiple Debts.

Where one owed a note at a bank barred by the statute of limitations and thereafter made a deposit in the bank, it was held that the bank had the right to credit this deposit on the note but the right to so credit the deposit did not toll the statute of limitations. Desha Bank & Trust Co. v. Quilling, 118 Ark. 114, 176 S.W. 132 (1915).

A creditor may not arbitrarily apply payments made upon unmatured obligations where there are debts past due upon which the same may be applied; so payments by a debtor cannot be arbitrarily applied by the creditor to the payment of unearned interest to create a presumption that the statute of limitations was to run from that time. Gunther v. Cotner, 192 Ark. 498, 92 S.W.2d 865 (1936).

Holder of note could not apply payment for one debt to another debt so as to toll the statute of limitations. Piggott Nursery Co. v. Davis, 195 Ark. 738, 113 S.W.2d 1102 (1938); Higginbotham v. Ritter, 202 Ark. 412, 150 S.W.2d 620 (1941); Nelson v. Rutledge, 229 Ark. 464, 316 S.W.2d 346 (1958).

Where deed of trust was executed by defendant to secure a single indebtedness evidenced by three notes, payments which were an acknowledgment of the entire indebtedness should have first been credited to interest on entire indebtedness and not to any single note, and payment within five years kept the entire debt alive so that none of the notes were barred by this statute. Rich v. Hankins, 203 Ark. 1082, 160 S.W.2d 44 (1942).

—Payments.

If payment of a promissory note is demanded on the third day of grace, and refused, the statute runs from that day; otherwise not till the next day. Holland v. Clark, 32 Ark. 697 (1878).

County warrants are always receivable for taxes, regardless of the date of their issue. Daniel v. Askew, 36 Ark. 487 (1880); Howell v. Hogins, 37 Ark. 110 (1881); Whitthorne v. Jett, 39 Ark. 139 (1882); Lusk v. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238, 2 S.W. 847 (1887); Hill v. Logan County, 57 Ark. 400, 21 S.W. 1063 (1893).

The five year limitation may be pleaded in bar for a petition for mandamus to compel the payment of warrants. Crudup v. Ramsey, 54 Ark. 168, 15 S.W. 458 (1891).

Where more than five years elapsed between the last payment on a note and the date action thereon was commenced against the principal and sureties, the claim is barred as against the sureties. Polk v. Stephens, 118 Ark. 438, 176 S.W. 689 (1915).

Part payment of a debt by a joint and several debtor before the bar of the statute of limitations attaches binds the other joint debtors. Fendley v. Shults, 142 Ark. 180, 218 S.W. 197 (1920).

Payment of interest on a note within the statutory period stops the running of the statute of limitations. Conley v. Archillion, 146 Ark. 64, 225 S.W. 5 (1920).

Where a note sued on was barred by the statute of limitations at the time when the last payment thereon was made, the payment revived the deed and it was not necessary to pay in money where the satisfaction of demands of the maker against others was treated by all parties as payment of the amount endorsed on the note. Johnson v. Spangler, 176 Ark. 328, 2 S.W.2d 1089, 59 A.L.R. 899 (1928).

A sale of mortgaged chattels by the mortgagee and application of the proceeds on a mortgage note was in effect the foreclosure of the mortgage and not such voluntary payment as would toll the statute of limitations. Taylor v. White, 182 Ark. 433, 31 S.W.2d 745 (1930).

Where a mortgage executed by a wife was barred by the statute of limitations when the husband paid the note, the payment did not revive the lien nor was the lien acquired by subrogation. Ogden v. Watts, 186 Ark. 500, 54 S.W.2d 292 (1932).

Where, in an action on a promissory note, the only issue involved was whether payments had been made which tolled the statute of limitations, an instruction by the court in which the jury was told that the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, necessarily meant that the burden rested upon him to show that payments were made which prevented the note from being barred by the statute. Vittitow v. Lewis, 193 Ark. 318, 100 S.W.2d 89 (1936).

A payment by the trustee in bankruptcy to the creditor of a bankrupt will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations since the payment was not a voluntary payment. Bank of Searcy v. Kroh, 195 Ark. 785, 114 S.W.2d 26 (1938).

Maker's subsequent promise, in answer to request for payment of note, to pay $500 at a certain date and $100 a month thereafter, was evidence sufficient to toll statute of limitations. Cady v. Guess, 197 Ark. 611, 124 S.W.2d 213 (1939); Dunnington v. Taylor, 198 Ark. 770, 131 S.W.2d 627 (1939); Young v. Blocker, 201 Ark. 802, 146 S.W.2d 902 (1941); Hobson v. Priddy, 204 Ark. xviii, 165 S.W.2d 73 (1942).

Payments on a debt after the bar of the statute of limitations had attached, as between the parties, removes the bar and revives the debt. McNeill v. Rowland, 198 Ark. 1094, 132 S.W.2d 370 (1939).

Suits on notes upon which no payments have been made are barred in five years after maturity. Leverett v. Williamson, 199 Ark. 910, 136 S.W.2d 478 (1940).

To extend time for the filing of an action upon the indebtedness, the acknowledgement thereof must be an unconditional promise to pay or must be under such circumstances that an unconditional promise to pay may be inferred and it must be made by the party from whom the debt is due to one whom it is due or to his or her authorized agent. Root v. Thomas, 203 Ark. 1078, 160 S.W.2d 46 (1942).

Where part payment is accompanied by circumstances or declarations by the debtor showing it was not his intention to admit by the payment continued existence of the debt and his obligation to pay the balance, the law does not imply a promise. Buss v. Cooley, 205 Ark. 42, 167 S.W.2d 867 (1942).

Part payment of a debt by one joint and several debtors before action on note is barred by statute of limitations, is binding on the other debtors. Smith v. Grimsley, 215 Ark. 279, 220 S.W.2d 428 (1949).

Part payment by one joint and several debtor after action on the debt is barred by statute of limitations is not binding on the other debtors. Smith v. Grimsley, 215 Ark. 279, 220 S.W.2d 428 (1949).

If part payment is made on a promissory note, statute of limitations starts running from the date of the part payment. Smith v. Grimsley, 215 Ark. 279, 220 S.W.2d 428 (1949).

Bank, which advanced additional money on first mortgage loan after knowledge that agent of mortgagor had made an unrecorded payment within five year period on prior mortgage, was entitled to recover entire amount of loan, since prior mortgage was in effect a prior unrecorded mortgage. Tucker v. Atkinson, 219 Ark. 921, 245 S.W.2d 388 (1952).

Signer of mortgage notes was estopped to plead statute of limitations in suit by mortgagee to foreclose where payment was made on the obligation within five year period by virtue of apparent authority to make payment as agent. Tucker v. Atkinson, 219 Ark. 921, 245 S.W.2d 388 (1952).

Trustee of property was not a third party within meaning of § 18-49-101 (a)-(c), hence he was bound by payments made on mortgage. Tucker v. Atkinson, 219 Ark. 921, 245 S.W.2d 388 (1952).

Where evidence sustained finding that there had been payments of interest on notes then suit on notes and to foreclose vendor's lien would not be barred by five year statute of limitation. Affholter v. McCarley, 226 Ark. 735, 293 S.W.2d 698 (1956).

Part payment interrupts the running of this section. Johnson v. Gammill, 231 Ark. 1, 328 S.W.2d 127 (1959).

Where a mortgage was given to secure an initial loan and future advances and, at a time when there were several notes outstanding, the debtor wrote to the creditor offering to pay part but not all of the amount but not on his account identifying the notes he was offering to pay on, the letter was presumed to be an acknowledgement of the entire indebtedness and revived the statute as to the whole. McHenry v. Littleton, 237 Ark. 483, 374 S.W.2d 171 (1964).

The ledger crediting of the maker's credit balance on an open account with the holder of notes as payment on the notes, with the consent of the maker, stopped the running of the statute of limitations, notwithstanding failure of the holder of the notes and the mortgage securing them to endorse the payment on the margin of the recorded mortgage. Misenhimer v. Perkins Oil Co., 248 Ark. 434, 451 S.W.2d 864 (1970).

Decedent's Estate.

Running of statute is not suspended by death of maker of note until letters of administration are granted. Whipple v. Johnson, 66 Ark. 204, 49 S.W. 827 (1899); Salinger v. Black, 68 Ark. 449, 60 S.W. 229 (1900); A.R. Bowdre & Co. v. Pitts, 94 Ark. 613, 128 S.W. 57 (1910).

A suit on a contract to make a will accrues against the co-heirs on the promisor's death, and is governed by this statute as to limitations. Goff v. Beaty, 157 Ark. 212, 247 S.W. 787 (1923).

Conveyance of property in return for promise to care for person did not bar person from seeking accounting, and trial court correctly applied five-year, rather than three-year, statute of limitations to accounting since daughter's obligation arose from written deeds not oral or implied promise. Cluck v. Mack, 278 Ark. 506, 647 S.W.2d 442 (1983).

Ejectment.

In an ejectment matter, the statute of limitations for removal of a person from land, rather than the statute of limitations for cancellation of instruments, applies. Schwarz v. Colonial Mtg. Co., 326 Ark. 455, 931 S.W.2d 763 (1996).

Goods.

A shipper of freight may recover damages for delay in the transportation and delivery of freight in an action founded on the contract, and the five year statute applies to a claim founded on such a contract. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Cunningham Comm. Co., 127 Ark. 246, 192 S.W. 211 (1917).

Insurance.

An action on a policy of disability insurance for monthly disability benefits was held not barred by the five year statute of limitations though recovery was limited to the five years preceding the filing of the action. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Langston, 189 Ark. 1067, 76 S.W.2d 50 (1934); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 190 Ark. 941, 82 S.W.2d 250 (1935).

Where insured and beneficiary assigned life policy to secure indebtedness, beneficiary was not entitled, after insured's death, to maintain an action for the proceeds of the policy without paying the debt, even though the debt was barred by limitations. Hill v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 90 S.W.2d 490 (1936).

Suit instituted more than five years after injury to recover under disability clause of insurance policy was barred by limitations. Teague v. National Life Co., 204 Ark. 196, 161 S.W.2d 754 (1942).

Where tie-in line was not constructed under original contract for electrical construction on which the statute would have run but was constructed under separate agreement which was not yet barred, contractee's suit for indemnity against contractor on indemnity agreement on judgment recovered by employee for injuries sustained was not barred by this section. Kincade v. C & L Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 227 Ark. 321, 299 S.W.2d 67 (1957).

There was no evidence of record that insurance company attempted to fraudulently conceal, cover-up, or misrepresent to an estate the problem of determining the proper beneficiary of an insurance policy, so that fraud did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), rehearing denied, First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 312 Ark. 95, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908, 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993).

Insured's declaratory relief action to determine the availability of underinsured motorist benefits was an action to recover a claim arising under a policy of insurance and was governed by the five-year statute of limitation in this section; in addition, the running of the statute of limitation was triggered by the breach of the contract and not the underlying accident. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nash, 357 Ark. 581, 184 S.W.3d 425 (2004).

Insured's breach of contract suit, which was brought outside an accidental death and dismemberment policy's three-year time limit, was timely. Section 23-79-202 precluded the insurer from contractually shortening the limitations period to less than the five-year period for breach of contract actions under subsection (a) of this section. Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2012).

Installment payments.

When an obligation is made payable by installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment as it becomes due and unpaid. Riley v. Riley, 61 Ark. App. 74, 964 S.W.2d 400 (1998).

Lease.

Air conditioner installation, undertaken without written consent in violation of the terms of the lease, was completed by March 5, 2003, and the limitations period ended on March 5, 2008, which expired before this case began, and thus the trial court erred in finding that the action was not barred. Filat v. Rand, 2015 Ark. App. 316, 463 S.W.3d 301 (2015).

Medical Services.

Section 16-56-106, and not this section, covers all actions brought to recover charges for medical services. Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987).

Limitations period contained in § 16-56-106, and not that of this section, is applicable to a debt for hospital services. Thomas v. Service Fin. Corp., 293 Ark. 190, 736 S.W.2d 3 (1987).

Pleadings.

Amendment to more than five years after cause accrued, where the original complaint was filed within the five year period, was not the bringing of a new cause of action, and the cause of action was not barred. McGraw v. Miller, 184 Ark. 916, 44 S.W.2d 366 (1931).

If a party had such an interest in the note sued on as entitled it to maintain a suit for the use and benefit of another, the filing of its complaint would serve to toll the statute of limitations, and any pleading filed thereafter by way of amendment would relate back to the institution of the original action; but if it did not have such a cause of action, the amendment to the complaint offered by the second party was only an effort to substitute the party in interest for one who had no cause of action which cannot be permitted. Floyd Plant Food Co. v. Moore, 197 Ark. 259, 122 S.W.2d 463 (1938), superseded by statute as stated in, St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court of Craighead County, 348 Ark. 197, 73 S.W.3d 584 (Ark. 2002).

The defense of limitations may be raised by motion to dismiss. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

Property Settlement Agreement.

Former wife's claims in her motion for contempt that a former husband failed to comply with certain provisions in their property settlement agreement was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in this section that applied to written contracts as the settlement was an independent contract that did not merge with the divorce decree. The husband's mental health problems were not sufficient to make him insane for purposes of tolling the statute under § 16-56-116, and in any event, the wife, not the husband, was the one bringing the action. Wall v. Wall, 2011 Ark. App. 143 (2011).

Real Estate Interests.

An action for breach of a contract by the plaintiff's predecessor in title to open an alley between the lot conveyed and an adjacent lot before selling the latter which he sold three years prior to bringing suit was held not barred by the statute of limitations. Holthoff v. Joyce, 174 Ark. 248, 294 S.W. 1006 (1927).

Where mortgagee within five years from maturity date of note and institution of foreclosure suit had redeemed the land from tax sale and paid the taxes thereon, under the power so to do given in the mortgage, foreclosure suit was not barred by this statute. Dalton v. Polster, 200 Ark. 168, 138 S.W.2d 64 (1940).

Lien of attorney on land of estate made a part of the conveyance by the executrix could not be asserted after eight years. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

Where claimant did not file his affidavit with the real estate commission until more than five years after he signed the purchase agreements, his claim was not barred as the period of limitations for contracts runs from the point at which the cause of action accrues, rather than from the date of the agreement. Eckels v. Ark. Real Estate Comm'n, 30 Ark. App. 69, 783 S.W.2d 864 (1990).

Breach of warranty case against the sellers of real property was barred by the five-year statute of limitations because the cause of action accrued at the time of the sale, but not at the time of a court order quieting title in a portion of the property to several neighbors. The breach and constructive eviction occurred on the date of the deed. Riddle v. Udouj, 99 Ark. App. 10, 256 S.W.3d 556 (2007), aff'd, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

In a declaratory judgment action, even if the five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until there was notice that a first lease was being relied on, a complaint was time-barred due to a recordation of an assignment; the recording served as constructive notice from the time the instrument was filed for record, and the case was filed more than 5 years after an assignment was recorded. The circuit court did not err by treating the claim as raising contract enforcement issues and applying the relevant statutory period of limitations. McDougal v. Sabine River Land Co., 2015 Ark. App. 281, 461 S.W.3d 359 (2015).

—Abstractors.

The right of action against an abstractor for damages resulting from errors, defects, or omissions in an abstract of title prepared by him is not and cannot be based on the written certificate attached to the abstract because the written certificate is only evidence of the provisions of the preexisting oral or implied contract of employment. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

The right of action against an abstractor for damages resulting from errors, defects, or omissions in an abstract of title prepared by him accrues at the time of the delivery of the abstract. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

In action for dissolution of alleged partnership formed for the purpose of selling lots and on accounting for plaintiff's alleged interest in the property covering the lots, recovery could not be had where it was shown that suit was commenced after the five-year period. Booth v. Hayde, 228 Ark. 244, 307 S.W.2d 227 (1957).

—Deeds.

A deed, signed by grantor alone when accepted by the grantee, becomes the mutual contract of the parties and any promise of the grantee therein provided for is governed by the provision of the statute of limitations respecting written instruments. Parker v. Carter, 91 Ark. 162, 120 S.W. 836 (1909).

Where the grantee in a deed as consideration undertook to maintain the grantors during life, the contract was not barred by limitations where the grantee never repudiated the obligation. Federal Land Bank v. Miller, 184 Ark. 415, 42 S.W.2d 564 (1931).

Grantor's action for breach of covenant in deed was barred by limitation of this section where action was commenced more than five years after right of action occurred. Roemhild v. Jones, 283 F.2d 70 (8th Cir. 1960).

In suit to cancel deed, plaintiff could not invoke the aid of equity without first doing equity herself by recognizing the validity of the grantee's lien; therefore, she could not contend that his claims were barred by the five-year statute of limitations. Daniels v. Johnson, 234 Ark. 315, 351 S.W.2d 853 (1961).

An action for breach of warranty in a deed was not barred by the three year statute, as actions on writings under seal are not barred until five years after the cause of action accrues. Booth v. Mason, 241 Ark. 144, 406 S.W.2d 715 (1966).

In a case concerning a real estate transaction in which the deed was held in escrow until purchaser's six-month note came due, five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the note became due. Woods v. Wright, 254 Ark. 297, 493 S.W.2d 129 (1973).

—Property Settlement Agreement.

Where the property settlement agreement was an independent contract that was incorporated into the court decree, it did not merge into the decree and was, therefore, subject to the five-year statute of limitations under this section, and not the ten-year limitations period in § 16-56-114. Meadors v. Meadors, 58 Ark. App. 96, 946 S.W.2d 724 (1997).

Retirement Benefits.

This section applied to a claim in federal court for retirement benefits under federal statute. Bennett v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 1998).

Service Contracts.

Where the services in question were rendered upon a written contract to which the five-year statute of limitations applied, the plea of the statute was unavailing where the services were rendered within such period. Central Clay Drainage Dist. v. Hunter, 174 Ark. 293, 295 S.W. 19 (1927).

Waiver.

An agreement to waive the statute of limitations for all time, made at the inception of a contract, is void because it violates public policy. First Nat'l Bank v. Arkansas Dev. Fin. Auth., 44 Ark. App. 143, 870 S.W.2d 400 (1994).

Written Acknowledgement of Oral Contract.

Written security agreement was a sufficient acknowledgment of a valid existing debt for attorney's fees so as to start the statute of limitations running anew. However, the written acknowledgement did not transform the oral agreement for fees into a written one, and the three-year statute applicable to oral agreements under § 16-56-105 still applied, rather than the five-year statute for written agreements under this section, thereby barring an attorney's claim for fees. Still v. Perroni Law Firm, 2011 Ark. 447, 385 S.W.3d 182 (2011).

Written Instruments.

Where the various written communications between the parties contain all the terms of sale, the five-year limitation applies. Sims v. Miller, 151 Ark. 377, 236 S.W. 828 (1922).

Where the plaintiff entered into a written contract for the sale of merchandise, and certain of the defendants at the time of the execution of the contract joined therein for the purpose of becoming guarantors of the purchasers, a suit upon the agreement is upon a written contract to which the five-year statute of limitations applies, though an account of the purchases under the agreement is filed with the complaint. W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Pritchard, 151 Ark. 390, 236 S.W. 833 (1922).

A bill of lading is an instrument in writing, and the five-year statute applies to suit to recover on it. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 166 Ark. 226, 266 S.W. 82 (1924).

This section applies to a buyer's action for damages for breach of warranty arising from a written contract of sale. Louisville Silo & Tank Co. v. Thweatt, 174 Ark. 437, 295 S.W. 710 (1927).

An order for merchandise, given over the telephone but later confirmed in writing and accepted by the seller shipping the hose and rendering an invoice, was held a written contract within the five-year statute. City of Ft. Smith v. United States Rubber Co., 184 Ark. 588, 42 S.W.2d 1004 (1931).

The fact that oral proof was required to identify plaintiffs as third party beneficiaries under a written contract and to establish the amount due each under the provisions of the contract did not prevent the five-year limitation of this section rather than the three year limitation of § 16-56-105 from applying. H.B. Deal & Co. v. Bolding, 225 Ark. 579, 283 S.W.2d 855 (1955).

Suit on written support contract made in contemplation of divorce is a suit on a written instrument and is governed by the five-year statute of limitations. Altman v. Altman, 240 Ark. 370, 399 S.W.2d 501 (1966).

District court's verdict was reversed on appeal where the applicable statute of limitations began to run at the latest date the plaintiff lessor learned its land had suffered a remediable injury, though it did not yet know the extent of the injury; thus, the breach of contract claim was timely. Highland Indus. Park, Inc. v. BEI Def. Sys. Co., 357 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2004).

Trial court properly ruled that the handwritten agreement was a final, binding contract rather than a preliminary negotiation, and thus properly applied the five-year limitations period under this section rather than the three-year limitations period in § 16-56-105. Patel v. Patel, 2015 Ark. App. 726, 479 S.W.3d 580 (2015).

Five-year statute of limitations for contract claims applied to an investor's amended complaint against the investor's investment account manager, rather than the three-year statute of limitations for negligence claims, because the investor pleaded a breach of contract and a specific promise; the investor alleged there was a contract between the investor and the manager, that the manager specifically promised to process an account transaction in a timely manner, that the manager breached this specific promise, and that the investor suffered damages. Farris v. Conger, 2017 Ark. 83, 512 S.W.3d 631 (2017).

Cited: Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Gordy, 228 Ark. 643, 309 S.W.2d 330 (1958); Fuller v. Fuller, 240 Ark. 475, 400 S.W.2d 283 (1966); Carter v. Zachary, 243 Ark. 104, 418 S.W.2d 787 (1967); Federal Land Bank v. Wilson, 533 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986); Coast-to-Coast Stores, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 676 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Refco, Inc. v. Farm Prod. Ass'n, 844 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1988); O'Bryant v. Horn, 297 Ark. 617, 764 S.W.2d 445 (1989); Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1989); Ferguson v. Order of United Com. Travelers of Am., 307 Ark. 452, 821 S.W.2d 30 (1991); Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark. 771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994); Kinkead v. Estate of Kinkead, 51 Ark. App. 159, 912 S.W.2d 442 (1995); Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 326 Ark. 895, 935 S.W.2d 258 (1996); Federal Fin. Co. v. Noe, 335 Ark. 78, 983 S.W.2d 107 (1998); Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 344 Ark. 177, 40 S.W.3d 733 (2001); Wilkins v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 299 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2002).

16-56-112. Design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, repair, etc. — Actions for property damage, personal injury, or wrongful death.

  1. No action in contract, whether oral or written, sealed or unsealed, to recover damages caused by any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction or the construction and repair of any improvement to real property or for injury to real or personal property caused by such deficiency, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction or the construction or repair of the improvement more than five (5) years after substantial completion of the improvement.
    1. No action in tort or contract, whether oral or written, sealed or unsealed, to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death caused by any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction or the construction and repairing of any improvement to real property shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction or the construction and repair of the improvement more than four (4) years after substantial completion of the improvement.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this section, in the case of personal injury or an injury causing wrongful death, which injury occurred during the third year after the substantial completion, an action in tort or contract to recover damages for the injury or wrongful death may be brought within one (1) year after the date on which injury occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event shall such an action be brought more than five (5) years after the substantial completion of construction of such improvement.
  2. The foregoing limitations shall also apply to any action for damages caused by any deficiency in surveying, establishing, or making the boundaries of real property, the preparation of maps, or the performance of any other engineering or architectural work upon real property or improvements to real property.
  3. The limitations prescribed by this section shall not apply in the event of fraudulent concealment of the deficiency, nor shall the limitation be asserted by way of defense by any person in actual possession or control, as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in the improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death.
  4. If a person furnishes designs or plans which are not used within three (3) years from the date they are furnished, no action shall lie against that person for deficiency in the designs or plans.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any cause of action, nor shall the parties to any contract for construction extend the above prescribed limitations by agreement or otherwise.
  6. As used in this section, the term “person” shall mean an individual, corporation, trust, partnership, unincorporated organization, limited liability company, or any other business association or entity.
    1. It is the intent of the General Assembly and the purpose of this subsection to reinstate and to codify the accepted-work doctrine for publicly owned improvements to public property, which was repudiated by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Suneson v. Holloway Construction Co., 337 Ark. 571 (1999).
      1. A contractor who performs the construction or repair of any publicly owned improvement to public real property in substantial compliance with the designs or plans, after a practical acceptance of the completion of the improvement by the person representing the government entity in actual possession or control thereof as proprietor, owner, tenant, or otherwise, shall incur no further liability to third parties by reason of the condition of the work unless contracted otherwise by the parties.
      2. The contractor may be liable for an improvement that is a nuisance per se, or that contains a defect that could not reasonably be detected on inspection by the proprietor, or that was turned over by the contractor in a manner so negligently defective as to be eminently dangerous to third persons.

History. Acts 1967, No. 42, §§ 1-8; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-237 — 37-244; Acts 2001, No. 1119, §§ 1, 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1119, § 3, provided: “This act shall not apply to any case based upon facts which occurred prior to the effective date of this act.” The effective date of Acts 2001, No. 1119, is March 27, 2001.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment, in (g), inserted “trust,” “limited liability company” and “or entity”; and added (h).

Research References

ALR.

What constitutes “improvement to real property” for purposes of statute of repose or statute of limitations. 122 A.L.R.5th 1.

Ark. L. Notes.

Looney, When Third Means Fourth, Contract Includes Tort, and a Five-Year Statute of Limitation Actually Leaves Only Three Years or Less to File Suit: The Strange Saga of the Arkansas “Statute of Repose” in Construction Cases, 1993 Ark. L. Notes 87.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Paul, The Law of Construction Bonds in Arkansas: A Review, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 333.

Survey, Contracts, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 329.

Seventeenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law — Torts, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 453.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

Luke K. Burton, Note: Property Improvement Claims—A History and Recommendation for Arkansas's Lone True Statute of Repose, 35 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 415 (2013).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section does not grant special privileges or immunities in violation of Art. 2, § 18, of the Arkansas Constitution, as a vital distinction exists between owners or suppliers and those engaged in the professions and occupations of design and building. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901, 91 S. Ct. 868, 27 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1971).

This section is not a special law in violation of Art. 5, § 25, or Amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution because it is limited to those furnishing design or construction for improvements to real estate. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901, 91 S. Ct. 868, 27 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1971).

In General.

Subdivision (b)(1) of this section is a substantive statute. Brown v. Overhead Door Corp., 843 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

Construction.

The phrase “in contract” should be construed in the light of the legislative purpose and the language of the preamble to Act 1967, No. 42 to extend the coverage of this section to all actions which arise out of a construction contract where property damage has allegedly resulted from any deficiency in design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or the construction and repair of any improvement to real property. Okla Homer Smith Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc., 278 Ark. 467, 646 S.W.2d 696 (1983).

The legislature simply made a mistake when it used “third” instead of “fourth” in the phrase “occurred during the third year after the substantial completion” in subdivision (b)(2). Dooley v. Hot Springs Family YMCA, 301 Ark. 23, 781 S.W.2d 457 (1989).

There is no exception in subsection (a) for residential property, and the statute does not give the purchaser of residential property a reasonable length of time to bring suit. Rogers v. Mallory, 328 Ark. 116, 941 S.W.2d 421 (1997).

Because this section provided a statute of repose on actions to recover damages caused by a deficiency in the construction of an improvement to real property, and the instant case involved an alleged breach of an indemnity provision in a construction contract, the statute did not apply; if the legislature wants to expand the protection afforded by the statute of repose to include indemnity actions arising from construction work, it may wish to amend the statute. Ray & Sons Masonry Contrs., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 114 S.W.3d 189 (2003).

Because a statute of repose is not an affirmative defense, the failure to plead it as an affirmative defense is not a bar to raising the issue on appeal; thus, the court considered the issue on appeal as claimed by a subcontractor. Ray & Sons Masonry Contrs., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 114 S.W.3d 189 (2003).

Purpose.

The legislative purpose of this section was to enact a comprehensive statute of limitations protecting persons engaged in the construction industry from being subject to litigation arising from work performed many years prior to the initiation of the lawsuit. Okla Homer Smith Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc., 278 Ark. 467, 646 S.W.2d 696 (1983).

Applicability.

The manufacturers of mass produced fungible goods do not fall within the protection of subdivision (b)(1) of this section, particularly when the defendant manufacturer is not involved in the installation of the product and had nothing to do with the design of the improvement within which it is installed. Brown v. Overhead Door Corp., 843 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

In a breach of contract action for alleged architectural defects, in which a written contract was involved, § 16-56-111(b) was the applicable statute of limitations; the existence of this section did not extend the statute of limitations under § 16-56-111(b) or otherwise affect its applicability. Zufari v. Architecture Plus, 323 Ark. 411, 914 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of a construction company in a negligent construction case because a lawsuit was not filed until after the three-year period in § 16-56-105(3) had run; there was no evidence that the company had performed any repairs or that repairs were done on its behalf, and, even if repair work had been done on the company's behalf, the statute of limitations would have only been tolled during the period of repairs, which was not of sufficient length to render the claim timely. Without proof of the attempted repairs, the statute of repose in subsection (a) of this section did not come into play, and there was no tolling of the three-year statute of limitations. Marshall v. Turman Constr. Corp., 2012 Ark. App. 686 (2012).

Circuit court did not err by allowing a property owner's negligence case to go to the jury because it was not barred by the statute of repose. The claim was not one for personal injury or wrongful death; rather, the claim was solely based on property damage. Platinum Peaks, Inc. v. Bradford, 2015 Ark. App. 548, 473 S.W.3d 70 (2015).

Action Barred.

Plaintiff's action in contract was filed more than five years after substantial completion of subcontractor's work and was barred by this section. Okla Homer Smith Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc., 278 Ark. 467, 646 S.W.2d 696 (1983).

Suit for damage to shop brought more than five years after shopping center was built was barred by this section. Elliotte v. Johnson, 285 Ark. 383, 687 S.W.2d 523 (1985).

In directing the verdict, the trial court properly found no evidence of fraudulent concealment that would have tolled the statute of limitations found in subsection (a) of this section; the homeowner testified that, upon inspecting the house with a realtor prior to purchasing it in 1991, he noticed cracks along mortar joints and in the sheet rock caused by the expanding and contracting soil, and the fact that the homeowner discussed the problem with the builder in 1994 showed that he had sufficient knowledge to commence the running of the statute of limitations. Curry v. Thornsberry, 81 Ark. App. 112, 98 S.W.3d 477 (2003), aff'd, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Trial court properly directed a verdict for home builder because, although the home buyers offered some proof of the defective condition of the home, they offered no evidence to indicate that the builder engaged in some positive act of fraud to toll the statute of limitations; moreover, the buyers knew that the house had defects before they purchased it. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Where the residence was constructed in 1987, but appellant's suit was not filed until 1995, in the absence of fraudulent concealment of the alleged deficiencies in construction of their home, appellant's suit was barred as of 1992 by the statute of limitations found in subsection (a) of this section and the builder was properly granted a directed verdict. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Because subsection (f) of this section unambiguously prohibited the parties to a construction contract from extending, by agreement or otherwise, the five-year-limitations period set forth in subsection (a), the architect and designer were properly awarded partial summary judgment in an owner's breach of contract action. First Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Black, Corley, Owens & Hughes, P.A., 2011 Ark. App. 447 (2011).

Even though they relied on a written builder's warranty, the crux of homeowners' complaint was that they were damaged by the defective construction of their house. This fit squarely within this section, the statute of repose, and therefore their action brought more than five years after the home was completed was barred. Varadan v. Pagnozzi, 2012 Ark. App. 700 (2012).

Statute of repose barred a school district's breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence claims against a supplier of roofing materials used in construction of a school building; the building was substantially completed more than five years before the suit was filed, and the statute was not tolled while the supplier tried to repair the roof because there was no evidence that the supplier fraudulently concealed the roof's deficiencies. Star City Sch. Dist. v. ACI Bldg. Sys., LLC, 844 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2017).

Breach of Implied Warranty.

The five-year limit imposed by subsection (a) applies to claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability of a dwelling even where the alleged breach was not discovered until after the limitations period had run. Rogers v. Mallory, 328 Ark. 116, 941 S.W.2d 421 (1997).

There is an implied warranty of fitness and habitability in the sale of a new house which extends to the subsequent purchasers of the home. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Improvement to Real Property.

For action for damages resulting from breach of contract when equipment failed, the equipment constituted an improvement to real property although not bolted or otherwise attached to the building where it was interconnected with other parts of machinery and equipment of the plaintiff and therefore the limitation of this section governed. Cherokee Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Manly Jail Works, Inc., 257 Ark. 1041, 521 S.W.2d 528 (1975).

Subsection (a) clearly establishes a maximum five-year period within which an injured party can bring suit against a person who deficiently constructs or repairs an improvement to real property which commences after the substantial completion of the improvement, but, in bringing such a suit, the injured party must still bring the action within the statute of limitations for that type of cause of action. If the breach or injury occurs immediately after the completion of the improvement, the injured party must still comply with § 16-56-105(3) and bring his action within three years from when the breach occurs but not later than the five-year period provided in subsection (a). East Poinsett County Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Union Std. Ins. Co., 304 Ark. 32, 800 S.W.2d 415 (1990).

Retaining wall was an “improvement.” 65th Ctr., Inc. v. Copeland, 308 Ark. 456, 825 S.W.2d 574 (1992).

Cited: Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970); City of Hot Springs v. National Sur. Co., 258 Ark. 1009, 531 S.W.2d 8 (1975); Gay v. Rabon, 280 Ark. 5, 652 S.W.2d 836 (1983).

16-56-113. Bonds of executors and administrators.

Actions on the bonds of executors and administrators shall be commenced within eight (8) years after the cause of action shall accrue, and not afterward.

History. Acts 1844, § 1, p. 24; C. & M. Dig., § 6958; Pope's Dig., § 8936; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-211.

Case Notes

Accrual of Action.

The statute does not begin to run against a cause of action on an administrator's bond until there is a final judgment in the probate court and an order to pay creditors which is violated by the administrator. Hall v. Cole, 71 Ark. 601, 76 S.W. 1076 (1903).

Fraud.

Proceeding by collateral heirs, to set aside judgment secured by alleged sole heir against estate was barred where it was filed more than eight years after rendition of judgment, since alleged fraud in securing of judgment did not toll limitation period. Williams v. Purdy, 223 Ark. 275, 265 S.W.2d 534 (1954).

Cited: Hanf v. Whittington, 42 Ark. 491 (1883); Meyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 197 Ark. 418, 122 S.W.2d 586 (1938).

16-56-114. Judgments and decrees.

Actions on all judgments and decrees shall be commenced within ten (10) years after cause of action shall accrue, and not afterward.

History. Acts 1844, § 1, p. 24; C. & M. Dig., § 6959; Pope's Dig., § 8937; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-212.

Cross References. Executions on judgments in justice of the peace courts limited to five years, § 16-19-1002.

Ten years to bring scire facias to revive judgment, § 16-65-501.

Case Notes

In General.

The defense of the statute of limitations is a valid or meritorious one such as will support the vacation of a judgment. Berringer v. Stevens, 145 Ark. 293, 225 S.W. 14 (1920).

Judgment lien expires within three years after its rendition, unless revived, but judgment creditor may issue an execution on the judgment at any time within ten years after its rendition. Bird v. Kitchens, 215 Ark. 609, 221 S.W.2d 795 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 892, 70 S. Ct. 241 (1949).

This section does not provide for revival of the statute of limitations for actions on a judgment by a subsequent acknowledgment of debt. Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999).

Under § 16-65-501, the dealership owner's writ of scire facias to revive a ten-year-old judgment against the partner should have been granted because the owner's 1993 judgment had not been satisfied; the partner had twice tendered the cash and stock certificates but, despite his efforts, he had been unable to extinguish his judgment debt. Carder Buick-Olds Co. v. Wooten, 2009 Ark. App. 310, 308 S.W.3d 156 (2009).

Accrual of Action.

The cause of action accrues upon the rendition of the judgment, but the issuance of process or payment on a judgment will toll the statute and form a new period from which it will run. Koontz v. La Dow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 S.W. 686 (1918).

The date of payment on a judgment is the time from which a new period of life for ten years begins to run. Pepin v. Hoover, 205 Ark. 251, 168 S.W.2d 390 (1943).

A cause of action on a judgment accrues on the date the judgment is rendered. A. Karcher Candy Co. v. Hopkins, 211 Ark. 810, 202 S.W.2d 588 (1947).

Child Support.

This section does not apply to the recovery of delinquent child-support payments since the order for child-support is not a final decree. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957).

In actions for child-support arrearages, the limitation period found in § 9-14-236 applies, not the ten-year statute in this section. Cole v. Harris, 330 Ark. 420, 953 S.W.2d 586 (1997).

While § 9-14-234 provides that child support installments payable through the court registry become final judgments as they accrue, this section's general ten-year statute of limitations does not apply to actions to collect such arrearages; instead, the limitations period found at § 9-14-236(c) governs. Sanderson v. Harris, 330 Ark. 741, 957 S.W.2d 685 (1997).

Enforcement of a judgment for accrued child support arrearages was barred where the judgment was rendered in July, 1985, the only proven payment on the judgment was a garnishment in September, 1985, and no action was commenced within 10 years from that date. Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999).

Criminal Proceedings.

This statute has no relation to criminal proceedings. Stocks v. State, 171 Ark. 835, 286 S.W. 975 (1926).

Estate Administration.

Probate allowances are within this statute; while the statute does not operate to bar a judgment during the course of administration, it commences running when the administrator is discharged. Brown v. Hanauer, 48 Ark. 277, 3 S.W. 27 (1886), overruled in part, Price v. Price, 253 Ark. 1124, 491 S.W.2d 793 (1973).

Statute does not begin to run against claim against estate until administration has been closed. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

Even though a claim against an estate may be considered a judgment and the ten-year statute govern, where administratrix sold real property of estate to herself subject to lien for attorney's fee, there was a waiver of the claim against the estate in favor of the contractual lien in the deed and rights were barred by delay of eight years. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

Foreign Judgments.

Even though Arkansas provides a ten-year period for the enforcement of all judgments which also applies to judgments revived in this state, where a judgment was revived in Illinois under that state's 20-year statute of limitations, and registration and enforcement were then sought in Arkansas, this state would give full faith and credit to the validly revived Illinois judgment. Durham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Services/Child Support Enforcement Unit, 322 Ark. 789, 912 S.W.2d 412 (1995).

Trial court properly denied property owners' motion to quash judgment holder's motion to execute a Missouri judgment by forcing the sale of Arkansas real estate; the Arkansas statute of limitations applied because the Missouri statute of limitations, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516.350, was procedural in nature as it only worked to extinguish the judgment holders' remedy and the action was timely under the Arkansas statute. Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 139 S.W.3d 500 (2003).

Petition to revive a foreign judgment was not barred by the running of the statute of limitations under this section because the application was filed well within the 10 year period of a judgment that was registered in 2003; even if a judgment filed in 2001 was the appropriate judgment to begin the running of the limitations period, the application was still timely because it was filed exactly 10 years from the date the judgment. The day that the judgment was entered was not counted in computing the limitations period. Bird v. Shaffer, 2012 Ark. App. 464 (2012).

Justices of Peace.

This section applies to judgments of justices of the peace; the provision of § 16-19-1002 against issuing execution after five years does not prevent suits on the judgment nor bar recovery. Hicks v. Brown, 38 Ark. 469 (1881); Trammell v. Anderson, 52 Ark. 176, 12 S.W. 328 (1889).

Municipal Courts.

This section applies to judgments of municipal courts. A. Karcher Candy Co. v. Hopkins, 211 Ark. 810, 202 S.W.2d 588 (1947).

Property Settlement Agreement.

Where the property settlement agreement was an independent contract that was incorporated into the court decree, it did not merge into the decree and was, therefore, subject to the five-year statute of limitations in § 16-56-111, and not the ten-year limitations period under this section. Meadors v. Meadors, 58 Ark. App. 96, 946 S.W.2d 724 (1997).

Public Administrator.

Where final settlement as public administrator was approved by the probate court, a suit thereon filed seven years later was not barred by the ten year statute although the sheriff went out of office more than ten years before suit was filed. Elmore v. Bishop, 184 Ark. 243, 42 S.W.2d 399 (1931).

Since creditor could enforce his judgment with a remedy of a resulting trust, the district court erred in finding that his claim was time-barred by the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfers Act, § 4-59-201 et seq.; the allegations were sufficient to argue that a resulting trust was formed, and the creditor, who was entitled to step into the debtor's shoes, timely filed his claim within the 10 years for enforcing a judgment against the defendant, the trustee/title holder of real property held for the benefit of the debtor. Imperato v. McMinn, 406 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2005).

Suspension of Statute.

While a judgment is enjoined, a statute does not run, and intermediate executions and payments form new points for the running of the statute. Lindsay v. Merrill, 36 Ark. 545 (1880).

Process may be issued at any time before the enforcement of a judgment is barred, and a break in the running of the statute of limitations will constitute the commencement of a new period not only for an action to enforce the judgment but for the issuance of process. Koontz v. La Dow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 S.W. 686 (1918).

Worker's Compensation.

While a two-year statute of limitations applied to the filing of a claim for workers' compensation benefits, pursuant to § 11-9-702(a)(1), that limitations period did not apply to bar the employee's claim against the employer where the employee was not filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits, but instead was seeking to enforce an Illinois judgment he had already received based on an injury he sustained in Illnois while working for the employer; in that case, this section's 10-year limitations period for enforcement of judgments applied. Dodson v. Taylor, 346 Ark. 443, 57 S.W.3d 710 (2001).

Cited: A. Baldwin & Co. v. Williams, 74 Ark. 316, 86 S.W. 423 (1905); Martin v. H.T. Simon, Gregory & Co., 86 Ark. 280, 110 S.W. 1046 (1908); Koontz v. La Dow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 S.W. 686 (1918); Epperson v. Singleton, 247 Ark. 1006, 449 S.W.2d 203 (1970).

16-56-115. Limitation of actions not otherwise provided for.

All actions not included in §§ 16-56-104, 16-56-105, 16-56-108, and 16-56-109 shall be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action has accrued.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 6960; Pope's Dig., § 8938; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-213.

Case Notes

Accrual.

Subdivision lot owner's action for breach of restrictive covenants and a declaration that such covenants were unenforceable was barred by the applicable statute of limitations under this section, as the cause of action accrued when a golf club and a successor-in-interest to the developer of the subdivision sold the first lot that they deferred a monthly fee for, not with each deferred lot sold. Beckworth v. Diamante, 2010 Ark. App. 815, 379 S.W.3d 752 (2010).

Action Time-Barred.

It was generally known by 2003 that the club was actively deferring dues, and assuming that 2003 was the date for the tolling of the statute, the latest that suit could have been brought was in 2008; as the suit was brought in 2012, any action based on the club's deferment of dues was time-barred. Dye v. Diamante, 2017 Ark. 42, 510 S.W.3d 759 (2017).

Actions on Accounts.

An action to surcharge the account of a treasurer is barred in five years. Sims v. Craig, 171 Ark. 492, 286 S.W. 867 (1926).

Applicability.

This section's five-year statute of limitations is applicable to those child support payments due prior to the effective date of §§ 9-14-236 and 16-56-129 (repealed), and the new ten-year statute of limitations found in those sections is applicable to payments accruing after the effective date of those sections. Sullivan v. Edens, 304 Ark. 133, 801 S.W.2d 32 (1990), superseded by statute as stated in, Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Branch v. Carter, 54 Ark. App. 70, 923 S.W.2d 874 (1996).

Attorney's Lien.

Lien of attorney on land sold by estate could not be asserted after eight years. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

Breach of Warranties.

It is clear that physical encroachments may result in a constructive eviction, and likewise, if a person builds a fence or wall completely surrounding his or her home and in so doing encloses a portion of their neighbor's yard, the record owner has been dispossessed; such an encroachment need not completely foreclose the possibility of physical entry in order to result in constructive eviction. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

Trial court properly found that buyers' claim of breach of the warranties of title and quiet enjoyment were barred by the statute of limitations under this section; there were visible fences establishing the boundary and the neighbors were using the disputed property as their own on the date of the conveyance, and thus the buyers were constructively evicted and the warranties of title and quiet enjoyment were breached as of the date of the conveyance in 1996, and the limitations period had expired when the buyers filed their complaint in 2005. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

For statute of limitation purposes under this section regarding buyers' claim of breach of the warranties of title and quiet enjoyment, the question was whether the buyers were constructively evicted from the disputed property at some point before an order was entered in a prior, separate quiet title action; the court noted that a neighbors' letter could only have put the buyers on notice of a competing claim to the land and it could not have effected an eviction if the buyers were currently in possession of the property, and while the trial court's reasoning was flawed in this regard, the court could affirm if the trial court reached the correct decision, which it did, that the breach of warranty claim was time-barred. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

Five-year statute of limitations for breach of warranty of title under this section began to run at the time defendants cut off electricity to a life estate grantee's home located on the property, not at an earlier date when she was unable to use the entire 463 acres of the property. Jackson v. Smith, 2010 Ark. App. 681, 380 S.W.3d 443 (2010).

Change in limitations.

There is no constitutional impediment, except in title to property cases, to increasing the length of a limitation period and making the increase retroactive to cover claims already in existence; however, the General Assembly may not expand a limitation period so as to revive a claim already barred. Chunn v. D'Agostino, 312 Ark. 141, 847 S.W.2d 699 (1993).

Child Support.

Action to recover delinquent child support payments is governed by this section. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957); Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992).

A father's legal obligation to support his minor children can be enforced against the father unless barred by the five-year statute of limitations. Brown v. Brown, 233 Ark. 422, 345 S.W.2d 27 (1961).

Where mother brought action for support of illegitimate child against putative father, more than five years after the child's birth, it was error to grant the father summary judgment, since the child is the real party in interest and should thus not be barred by the mother's failure to bring the action. Dozier v. Veasley, 272 Ark. 210, 613 S.W.2d 93 (1981).

Section 9-14-236 applies retroactively to expand the statute of limitations for causes of action for delinquent child-support payments not barred on the date of the section's enactment. Branch v. Carter, 326 Ark. 748, 933 S.W.2d 806 (1996).

Civil Rights.

In an action brought by an Arkansas resident against Arkansas police officers for alleged deprivation of civil rights, either the Arkansas three-year statute of limitations for actions founded on contract or liability, which has been construed to cover liability created by statute, or the five-year general statute of limitations was applicable, and since the action was instituted within the statutory period of both statutes, it was timely. Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970)Questioned byKessel v. Schaff, 697 F. Supp. 1102 (D.N.D. 1987).

Contracts.

Five-year statute applies to action to recover funds paid under a void contract with an improvement district. Core v. McWilliams Co., 175 Ark. 112, 298 S.W. 879 (1927).

Landowners and taxpayers in an action to recover funds alleged to have been paid defendant on a void contract and converted to its own use were permitted to recover under this section. Core v. McWilliams Co., 175 Ark. 112, 298 S.W. 879 (1927).

Where alleged fraud in the sale of stock could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence at time stockholder executed written guarantee as additional security to deed of trust on lands of corporation, and this occurred more than five years prior to institution of action for fraud, action was barred by this statute. Kahn v. Hardy, 201 Ark. 252, 144 S.W.2d 725 (1940).

Action filed for breach of warranty a few days prior to date of deed was timely, the warranty being breached as of the date of conveyance. Wood v. Setliff, 229 Ark. 1007, 320 S.W.2d 655 (1959).

Where grantee sued grantor for breach of warranty, the property having been originally granted more than five years prior to commencement of suit, action would be barred by the statute of limitations. Wood v. Setliff, 229 Ark. 1007, 320 S.W.2d 655 (1959).

The statute of limitations regarding an action to recover real or personal property did not begin to run, where evidence sufficient to find that trustee held corpus of trust under new trust with remainderman's consent. McDermott v. McAdams, 268 Ark. 1031, 598 S.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1980).

Decedent's Estate.

An order of the probate court erroneously precluding an heir from participation in an estate is a conversion, and the statute of limitations of five years ran against the heir as soon as the distribution was made and was not arrested by reason of his nonresidence. Hill v. Wade, 155 Ark. 490, 244 S.W. 743 (1922).

Heirs whose names were omitted from a will have five years in which to bring a suit to recover their share of an estate. James v. Helmich, 186 Ark. 1053, 57 S.W.2d 829 (1933).

This section does not apply to suit to probate will. Hudson v. Hudson, 219 Ark. 211, 242 S.W.2d 154 (1951).

Proceeding by collateral heirs, who were nonresidents, to set aside judgment secured by alleged sole heir against estate was barred where it was filed 18 years after rendition of judgment, since alleged fraud in securing of judgment did not toll limitation period, as there were no positive acts of fraudulent concealment, and plaintiffs could have obtained information by checking records of estate. Williams v. Purdy, 223 Ark. 275, 265 S.W.2d 534 (1954).

Where landlord held landlord's lien and mortgages as security, the court held that none of the indebtedness of decedent to landlord was barred by the statute of limitations where the limitation had not run before decedent's death. Goins v. Sneed, 229 Ark. 550, 317 S.W.2d 269 (1958).

Pretermitted children had five years from the date of distribution under their father's will to bring an action against the devisee under the will for partition of the devised property. Negovanov v. Wensko, 248 Ark. 1109, 455 S.W.2d 929 (1970).

Heir to decedent father's estate who at time of probate was presumed dead was precluded by statute of limitations from attacking the determination of heirship. McBroom v. Clark, 252 Ark. 372, 480 S.W.2d 947 (1972).

There is no reason for a requirement that a petition for the determination of heirship be filed within five years or any other specified time after the death of the person whose heirs are to be ascertained. Bryant v. Lemmons, 269 Ark. 5, 598 S.W.2d 79 (1980).

Commitment of fraud in administration of estate tolled the statute of limitations. Walters v. Lewis, 276 Ark. 286, 634 S.W.2d 129 (1982).

Heirship Action.

In a case where heirship was being determined, the action was not barred by the limitations periods in § 18-61-101 and this section because the time period did not begin to run until a pecuniary consequence arose; there had been no demand for the trust property that would have triggered the limitations period. Moreover, the case was filed within the limitations period if it began to run when mineral leases were executed. Scroggin v. Scroggin, 103 Ark. App. 144, 286 S.W.3d 758 (2008).

Local Governments.

The statute of limitations can be pleaded by a county. Gaines v. Hot Springs County, 39 Ark. 262 (1882).

Statute does not apply to actions against board of education for interest belonging to county school fund. County Bd. of Educ. v. Morgan, 182 Ark. 1110, 34 S.W.2d 1063 (1931), overruled, Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989).

The three year, and not the five year, statute of limitations is applicable to suit against county treasurer. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Columbia County, 197 Ark. 1027, 126 S.W.2d 293 (1939).

In suit against county treasurer, statute of limitations commences to run from the date of the settlement. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Columbia County, 197 Ark. 1027, 126 S.W.2d 293 (1939).

In suit against county treasurer, for money paid out on void warrants and falsely credited in her account, the statute of limitations commences to run from the date of the settlement. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Columbia County, 197 Ark. 1027, 126 S.W.2d 293 (1939).

The municipality is a creature of the state; in this case warranty in municipal land transfer was breached as of the date of conveyance of the property. Wood v. Setliff, 229 Ark. 1007, 320 S.W.2d 655 (1959).

Tort.

A civil action for seduction sounds in tort and may be brought within five years. Darnell v. Lea, 162 Ark. 516, 258 S.W. 363 (1924).

The five year statute of limitations provided for in this section applies to an action for alienation of affections. Gibson v. Gibson, 240 Ark. 827, 402 S.W.2d 647 (1966). (Case was decided prior to the 1967 amendment of § 16-56-104.).

In suit for severe emotional distress upon the plaintiffs, the three-year statute of limitations under § 16-56-105 applied, and the five-year statute of limitations under this section did not apply; thus, suit filed four years after distress was inflicted was time-barred. Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981)Criticized byPoindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

Unfair Practices Act.

The Arkansas Unfair Practices Act contains no limitation period, which results in the application of the general catch-all five-year statute found in this section. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

Circuit court correctly applied the five-year statute of limitations to claims under the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, § 4-72-201 et seq., as neither § 16-56-105 nor this section applied; five-year statute applied because the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act contained no statute of limitations. Miller Brewing Co. v. Ed Roleson, Jr., Inc., 365 Ark. 38, 223 S.W.3d 806 (2006).

Cited: Breining v. Lippincott, 125 Ark. 77, 187 S.W. 915 (1916); England v. Hughes, 141 Ark. 235, 217 S.W. 13 (1919); Scroggin Farms Corp. v. McFadden, 165 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1948); Wheeler v. Wallingsford, 229 Ark. 576, 317 S.W.2d 153 (1958); Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959); Wilson v. Wilson, 231 Ark. 416, 329 S.W.2d 557 (1959); Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ark. 1960); Wilder v. Garner, 235 Ark. 400, 360 S.W.2d 192 (1962); Lane v. Graves, 525 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1975); Bankston v. Davis, 262 Ark. 635, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978); Russ v. Ratliff, 578 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1978); Winston v. Robinson, 270 Ark. 996, 606 S.W.2d 757 (1980); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 271 Ark. 404, 609 S.W.2d 84 (1980); Ragland v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 286 Ark. 33, 689 S.W.2d 349 (1985); Coast-to-Coast Stores, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 676 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Carroll County v. Eureka Springs School Dist. # 21, 292 Ark. 151, 729 S.W.2d 1 (1987); F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. House, 320 Ark. 423, 897 S.W.2d 565 (1995); Douglas v. First Student, Inc., 2011 Ark. 463, 385 S.W.3d 225 (2011).

16-56-116. Persons under disabilities at time of accrual of action.

  1. If any person entitled to bring any action under any law of this state is under twenty-one (21) years of age or insane at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, that person may bring the action within three (3) years next after attaining full age, or within three (3) years next after the disability is removed.
  2. No person shall avail himself or herself of any disability unless the disability existed at the time the right of action accrued.
  3. When two (2) or more disabilities are existing at the time the right of action or entry accrued, the limitation prescribed shall not attach until all the disabilities are removed.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, §§ 25, 27; Acts 1844, § 2, p. 24; 1899, No. 123, § 1, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6961, 6973, 6975; Pope's Dig., §§ 8939, 8951, 8953; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-224 — 37-226; Acts 1999, No. 18, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Subsection (a) of this section may be superseded as to infants by § 9-25-101, which provides that persons of the age of eighteen (18) years shall be considered to have reached the age of majority for all purposes except that of purchasing alcoholic beverages.

Cross References. Civil actions based on sexual abuse, § 16-56-130.

Research References

ALR.

Effect of appointment of legal representative for person under mental disability on running of state statute of limitations against such person. 111 A.L.R.5th 159.

Effect of appointment of legal representative for minor on running of state statute of limitations against minor. 1 A.L.R.6th 407.

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Developments: Charitable-Immunity Doctrine — Direct-Action Statute, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 199.

Case Notes

In General.

Where the statute begins to run during the life of the devisor, no disability in the devisee will stop it. Bozeman v. Browning, 31 Ark. 364 (1876).

The rule with respect to infants under this section is equally applicable to incompetents. Mason v. Sorrell, 260 Ark. 27, 551 S.W.2d 184 (1976).

Attorneys were not negligent in failing to timely refile client's medical malpractice claim within the one-year time period allowed for refiling a claim under this section, where the law concerning timely refiling of a complaint after taking a nonsuit had not been settled. Pugh v. Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997).

Where the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) failed to inform parents and their injured child about the BSA's insurance coverage and parents failed to include insurer in the suit before the statute of limitations ran, notice was imputed to the insurer; thus, under the circumstances, the second amended complaint related back to the filing of the original complaint and was not barred by the statute of limitations. Low v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005).

Applicability.

This section is not applicable to the betterment statute, which allows recovery of mesne profits for three years and contains no exception in favor of infants. Brown v. Nelms, 86 Ark. 368, 112 S.W. 373 (1908).

This section does not apply to the right under § 14-86-1503 to redeem land from tax sale. Gamble v. Phillips, 107 Ark. 561, 156 S.W. 177 (1913).

This section does not apply in an action for wrongful death. Anthony v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 108 Ark. 219, 157 S.W. 394 (1913).

The limitation of time fixed by a wrongful death statute is a limitation on the right of action and is an essential element of the right to sue; therefore, the general savings clause provision has no application to wrongful death actions. Sandusky v. First Elec. Coop., 266 Ark. 588, 587 S.W.2d 37 (1979).

This section applies only to action at common law and therefore does not operate to toll the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions, which always have been considered purely statutory. Crawford v. Martin Marietta Corp., 622 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1980).

This section applied to a suit for personal injuries brought by parents on behalf of their minor son, under a theory of breach of implied warranty of merchantability; that cause of action has its roots in the common law, even though it has been changed by the Uniform Commercial Code. Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1994).

A suit by a minor's guardian brought in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the decedent is not protected by the provisions of subsection (a). Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997), overruled in part, Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49 (2013).

The two-year statute of limitations and the tolling provision of § 16-114-203 supersede the three-year period that § 16-56-116 allows after a disability is removed for persons insane at the time the right of action accrued. Smith v. Diversicare Leasing Corp. of Am., 65 Ark. App. 138, 985 S.W.2d 749 (1999).

The repealer clause added to this section does not have the effect of repealing the specific savings statute enacted for minor children in § 16-114-203 of the Medical Malpractice Act. Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d 557 (2000).

Wrongful death action filed against healthcare providers by a decedent's parents was void ab initio where the decedent had no personal representative and the complaint failed to include as a plaintiff the decedent's half-brother; hence, this section did not apply to allow the parents to add the half-brother after the limitations period had run. Andrews v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 86 Ark. App. 161, 170 S.W.3d 303 (2004).

Accrual of Action.

Taking an appeal from a judgment confirming the settlement of a guardian is barred in one year and does not constitute the bringing of an action within this section. Nelson v. Cowling, 89 Ark. 334, 116 S.W. 890 (1909).

This statute did not bar action by ward against guardian for an accounting more than three years after attaining majority, where guardian had not been discharged. Young v. Young, 201 Ark. 984, 147 S.W.2d 736 (1941).

The running of the statute was not tolled by the fact that plaintiff was confined outside the state because he was not so confined when his cause of action accrued. Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. Ark. 1973).

Adoption.

The one-year statute of limitations in § 9-9-216(b)(1) provides a special procedure which cannot be annulled by ARCP 41(a) or this section, which allows an action dismissed without prejudice to be refiled within one year of the dismissal. In re Martindale, 327 Ark. 685, 940 S.W.2d 491 (1997).

Insanity.

Action by next friend to cancel deed executed seven years prior thereto was barred under evidence establishing that grantor for more than three years had not been incompetent to such an extent as to justify holding he did not have capacity to reason in respect to business matters and to appreciate their significance. Waggoner v. Atkins, 204 Ark. 264, 162 S.W.2d 55 (1942).

The right of an an insane person to redeem her property from tax sale is not lost by lapse of statutory time for redemption. Schuman v. Westbrook, 207 Ark. 495, 181 S.W.2d 470 (1944).

Where guardian of a mental incompetent sued to set aside a deed executed by the incompetent, guardian was not guilty of laches in view of the three year saving clause of this section. Zini v. First Nat'l Bank, 228 Ark. 325, 307 S.W.2d 874 (1957).

The statute of limitations on a personal injury action did not run against an incompetent even though a guardian of his estate had been appointed prior to accrual of the cause of action. Mason v. Sorrell, 260 Ark. 27, 551 S.W.2d 184 (1976).

When a person, by reason of the injury sustained, is incapable of managing his or her personal affairs, that individual may be regarded or classified as incompetent or “insane.” Phillips v. Sugrue, 800 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

Where it was alleged that defendant intentionally took improper sexual liberties with plaintiff and indecently fondled her against her will and without her consent, it appeared likely that plaintiff may have sustained a disability that brought her within the provisions of this statute, adequate to raise a genuine issue of fact as to plaintiff's incompetency at the time of the accrual of the cause of action and as to when, if at all, the disability was removed. Phillips v. Sugrue, 800 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

From an alleged victim's suit against his former scoutmaster and several others alleging damages resulting from sexual abuse he suffered 30 years before when he was 11 and 12 years old, judgment in favor of the scoutmaster was proper as repressed memory syndrome did not toll the statute of limitations under this section, and the alleged victim failed to show that the other parties fraudulently concealed facts, or even that they knew, about the scoutmaster's sexual abuse of the alleged victim. Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415 (2009).

Minority.

A female attains full age at 18 years. Brake v. Sides, 95 Ark. 74, 128 S.W. 572 (1910); Shapard v. Mixon, 122 Ark. 530, 184 S.W. 399 (1916) (decided prior to 1975 amendment of § 9-25-101).

Action for seduction of an infant may be brought within three years after her majority though an action for same cause had been brought and dismissed for want of prosecution during her infancy. Darnell v. Lea, 162 Ark. 516, 258 S.W. 363 (1924).

Infant wards who brought suit within three years after majority were not barred from relief under this section. Wasson v. Treece, 189 Ark. 728, 75 S.W.2d 71 (1934).

Decree determining validity of title based on tax sale was valid and binding where minor defendants affected by it took no steps to void it within three years after having reached their majority. Cannon v. Price, 202 Ark. 464, 150 S.W.2d 755 (1941).

In action by heirs for cancelation of deed and an accounting in which two heirs were alleged to be minors, plea of limitations set up by defendant in motion for judgment on pleadings could not be considered. Story v. Cheatham, 217 Ark. 193, 229 S.W.2d 121 (1950).

Where plaintiff was under age of majority at the time his cause of action for treble damages under § 18-60-102 arose, this section rather than § 16-56-108 is controlling. Callaway v. Perdue, 238 Ark. 652, 385 S.W.2d 4 (1964).

A minor and his mother could maintain tort actions against the estate of decedent after the expiration of the statute of nonclaim when there was in force a policy of liability insurance on decedent's vehicle which policy has been depleted through the use of a bill of interpleader in the federal district court. Johnson v. Poore, 266 Ark. 601, 587 S.W.2d 44 (1979).

Where a wrongful death action was not filed by the minor children of a man killed in a construction accident until 15 years after the accident, the statute of limitations for the wrongful death action was not tolled during the minority of the plaintiffs and thus the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Crawford v. Martin Marietta Corp., 622 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1980).

Section 4-86-102 which governs causes of action based on strict liability creates a new right that was not available at common law, but does not contain a specific period of limitation; such actions are governed by the general statute of limitations applicable to all products liability cases in § 16-116-103. Therefore, this section operates to extend the time for minors to file a products liability action brought on a strict liability theory. Harris v. Standardized San. Sys., 658 F. Supp. 438 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Probate section giving an illegitimate child 180 days to file a claim creates a new right, and the right is created for only 180 days. Boatman v. Dawkins, 294 Ark. 421, 743 S.W.2d 800 (1988).

Where child did not fall within either of the two exceptions for a minor's cause of action under § 16-114-203(c), the complaint brought on his behalf was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in § 16-114-203. Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d 557 (2000).

—Burden of Proof.

Burden is on plaintiff to prove bringing of suit within three years after attaining his majority. Yell v. Lane, 41 Ark. 53 (1883).

—Homesteads.

That the homestead of a minor will deteriorate in value and will be insufficient to satisfy the claims against the estate if the right to sell is postponed until the minor reaches his majority and that judgments against the estate will be barred by the statute of limitations before that time constitute no valid reason for the sale of land while a minor's right of homestead in it exists. Henry v. Dollin, 195 Ark. 607, 113 S.W.2d 97 (1938).

This statute was held not to affect rule that when one dies seized of a homestead leaving as heirs minor children they have two separate and distinct estates in the land, existing at the same time and incapable of merger. Kitchens v. Wheeler, 200 Ark. 671, 141 S.W.2d 34 (1940).

Statute of Limitations.

Because a general statute must yield when there is a specific statute involving the particular subject matter, in a minor child's medical malpractice action, the two-year statute of limitations in § 16-114-203 applied rather than the three-year statute of limitation in this section. Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d 557 (2000).

Tolling.

Dismissal of the patient's medical malpractice claim was appropriate, in part because her argument that § 16-56-116 allowed the tolling of the statute of limitations for those with disabilities was not presented to the circuit court. Thus, it could not be considered for the first time on appeal. Collins v. St. Vincent, 98 Ark. App. 190, 253 S.W.3d 26, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 902, 128 S. Ct. 233, 169 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2007).

Former wife's claims in her motion for contempt that a former husband failed to comply with certain provisions in their property settlement agreement was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in § 16-56-111 that applied to written contracts as the settlement was an independent contract that did not merge with the divorce decree. The husband's mental health problems were not sufficient to make him insane for purposes of tolling the statute under this section, and in any event, the wife, not the husband, was the one bringing the action. Wall v. Wall, 2011 Ark. App. 143 (2011).

Cited: Frakes v. Hunt, 266 Ark. 171, 583 S.W.2d 497 (1979); Eddleman v. Estate of Farmer, 294 Ark. 8, 740 S.W.2d 141 (1987); Linder v. Howard, 296 Ark. 414, 757 S.W.2d 549 (1988).

16-56-117. Death of person entitled to sue or of a party.

  1. If any person entitled to bring any action specified in this act dies before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement of the suit, and if the cause of action survives to his or her representatives, then his or her executors or administrators may commence the suit, after the expiration of such time and within one (1) year after his or her death, but not after that period.
    1. If any action has been commenced within the times respectively prescribed in the provisions of this act, and the defendant in the suit dies before judgment and the right of action survives against the representatives of the defendant, the plaintiff may commence a new action against the heirs, executors, or administrators of the defendant, as the case may require, within one (1) year after the defendant's death.
    2. If no executor or administrator is appointed within that time, within one (1) year after the letters testamentary or of administration have been granted.
    1. When an action commenced within the time prescribed by law abates by reason of the death of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's executor or administrator may commence a new action within one (1) year after the death of the plaintiff if the right of action survives to his or her representatives.
    2. If any action commenced by an executor or administrator abates by the death of the plaintiff, a new action may be commenced by the administrator of the same estate at any time within one (1) year after the abatement.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, §§ 19, 22, 23; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6968, 6970, 6971; Pope's Dig., §§ 8946, 8948, 8949; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-219 — 37-221.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-102.

Cross References. Revivor of actions, §§ 16-62-107, 16-62-108.

Case Notes

Defendant's Death.

When the statute commenced to run in creditor's lifetime, it did not stop upon his death until administration was granted on his estate. Brown v. Merrick & Fenno, 16 Ark. 612 (1855); Whipple v. Johnson, 66 Ark. 204, 49 S.W. 827 (1899); Salinger v. Black, 68 Ark. 449, 60 S.W. 229 (1900).

Plaintiff's Death.

Where after death of plaintiff, suit in state court was not revived under the provisions of § 16-62-108 and was dismissed, administrator of plaintiff could not bring a new action in federal court after one year had elapsed. Robison v. Jones, 261 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1958).

Circuit court properly dismissed an executor's lawsuit against the owners of a nursing home because the savings statute, § 16-56-126, did not apply to the facts of the case; the decedent passed away while her case was still pending, which abated the case, and it was nonsuited only after the case abated, and the executor had not timely moved for an order of substitution or commenced a new action within one year after decedent's death. Garrett v. Progressive Eldercare Servs. — Saline, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 201, 575 S.W.3d 426 (2019).

Cited: McGraw v. Miller, 184 Ark. 916, 44 S.W.2d 366 (1931); Williams v. Purdy, 223 Ark. 275, 265 S.W.2d 534 (1954).

16-56-118. Suspension of limitations — Persons in the armed forces.

  1. The statutes of limitations in this state are suspended so far as those statutes affect the claim or cause of action of a person in the armed forces of the United States during the existence of a state of war between the United States and any other nation, and for six (6) months thereafter.
  2. Any person in the armed forces of the United States during the existence of a state of war between the United States and any other nation may, at any time within one (1) year after the end of the state of war and six (6) months thereafter, maintain a suit for the collection of any debt or the recovery of any real or personal property to which the person may be entitled if the statute of limitations had not run against the action prior to the person's entry into the armed forces of the United States.

History. Acts 1943, No. 159, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-227, 37-228.

16-56-119. Commencement of suit stayed by injunction — Effect.

Whenever the commencement of any suit is stayed by an injunction of any court of equity, the time during which the injunction shall be in force shall not be deemed any portion of the time in this act limited for the commencement of the suit.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 24; C. & M. Dig., § 6972; Pope's Dig., § 8950; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-223.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-102.

16-56-120. Prevention of commencement of action by party.

If any person, by leaving the county, absconding, or concealing himself, or by any other improper act of his own, prevents the commencement of any action specified in this act, the action may be commenced within the times respectively limited after the commencement of the action shall have ceased to be so prevented.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 26; C. & M. Dig., § 6974; Pope's Dig., § 8952; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-229.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-102.

Case Notes

In General.

Under this section the inability of the plaintiff to sue in consequence of any act of the defendant mentioned in this section must exist at the time the cause of action accrues. Denton v. Brownlee, Homer & Co., 24 Ark. 556 (1867); Richardson v. Cogswell, 47 Ark. 170, 1 S.W. 51 (1886); Keith v. Hiner, 63 Ark. 244, 38 S.W. 13 (1896).

Absconding.

A foreign corporation which neglects to designate an agent upon whom process may be served is not an absconding debtor. Rachels v. Stecher Cooperage Works, 95 Ark. 6, 128 S.W. 348 (1910).

A guarantor of a note who left the state openly and with knowledge of the officers of a bank holding the note was not an absconding debtor. Smith v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 183 Ark. 235, 35 S.W.2d 347 (1931).

Evidence held to show debtor who left state was not an absconder within the meaning of this statute. Keck v. Pickens, 207 Ark. 757, 182 S.W.2d 873 (1944).

Burden of Proof.

Although this section allows for tolling of the statute of limitations when the defendant has concealed himself or by other improper action has prevented the commencement of a cause of action, where the plaintiff made nothing more than cursory allegations to this effect, and has shown nothing by way of proof that the defendant's misconduct prevented her from proceeding with her suit, the District Court properly dismissed her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Roberts v. Dillon, 15 F.3d 113 (8th Cir. 1994).

Cause of Action Concealed.

Fraud suspends the statute, but the suspension is arrested as soon as the fraud is discovered by the party having the right of action, or which could have been discovered by the party unless he negligently failed to do so; statute does not run against a trust until there is a disclaimer of the trust brought home to the beneficiary. McGaughey v. Brown, 46 Ark. 25 (1885); Woodard v. Jaggers, 48 Ark. 248, 2 S.W. 851 (1886); Wren v. Followell, 52 Ark. 76, 12 S.W. 155 (1889); French v. Watson, 52 Ark. 168, 12 S.W. 328 (1889); Jacoway v. Hall, 67 Ark. 340, 55 S.W. 12 (1900).

Where there has been a fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, the statute does not run until the discovery of the fraud. Conditt v. Holden, 92 Ark. 618, 123 S.W. 765 (1909).

Under this statute time will not run until the discovery of the fraud, or until, with reasonable diligence, it might have been discovered. City Nat'l Bank v. Sternberg, 195 Ark. 503, 114 S.W.2d 39 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 614, 59 S. Ct. 73 (1938).

Evidence was sufficient to justify holding that fraud in sale of bonds was concealed and that cause of action was not barred by statute of limitations. City Nat'l Bank v. Sternberg, 195 Ark. 503, 114 S.W.2d 39 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 614, 59 S. Ct. 73 (1938).

Evidence held to make a jury question of whether defendant had by any improper act of her own concealed from plaintiff his cause of action so as to preclude the running of the statute of limitations. Kurry v. Frost, 204 Ark. 386, 162 S.W.2d 48 (1942).

Improper Act.

Escaping from penitentiary was held an improper act. Reeder v. Cargill, 102 Ark. 518, 145 S.W. 223 (1912).

Cited: Scroggin Farms Corp. v. Howell, 216 Ark. 569, 226 S.W.2d 562 (1950).

16-56-121. Prevention of commencement of action — Foreign debtors absconding to this state.

If any debtor shall fraudulently abscond from any other state, territory, or district to this state without the knowledge of his, her, or their creditor, the creditor may commence suit against the absconding debtor within the times in this act, or any other acts of limitations, in force on December 14, 1844, prescribed for limiting the action, after the creditor may become apprised of the residence of the absconding debtor.

History. Acts 1844, § 4, p. 24; C. & M. Dig., § 6963; Pope's Dig., § 8941; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-231.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-101.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section is restricted, by its terms, to absconding debtors, and is not applicable to replevin. Payne v. Bruton, 10 Ark. 53 (1849). See also Smith v. Joyce, 10 Ark. 460 (1850).

Absconding Debtor.

A foreign corporation that fails to appoint an agent on whom process may be served is not an absconding debtor. Rachels v. Stecher Cooperage Works, 95 Ark. 6, 128 S.W. 348 (1910).

One who leaves the state openly and with the knowledge of his creditor is not an absconding debtor. Rock Island Plow Co. v. Masterston, 96 Ark. 446, 132 S.W. 216 (1910).

After Accrual.

Absconding of debtor after cause of action accrues does not stop the statutes. Richardson v. Cogswell, 47 Ark. 170, 1 S.W. 51 (1886).

16-56-122. Tolling statute — Verbal promise or acknowledgment insufficient.

No verbal promise or acknowledgment in any action founded on a simple contract shall be deemed sufficient evidence to take any case out of the operation of this act or to deprive the party of the benefits thereof.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 6965; Pope's Dig., § 8943; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-216.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-102.

Research References

ALR.

Insurer's waiver of defense of statute of limitations. 104 A.L.R.5th 331.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This statute is not applicable to a new original promise. Christian Women's Bd. v. Clark, 140 Ark. 262, 215 S.W. 631 (1919).

Consideration Required.

An oral waiver of the statute of limitations or a promise not to plead it does not fall within statute requiring written acknowledgment of outlawed debt, but the promise or conduct must be based upon some consideration. Dunnington v. Taylor, 198 Ark. 770, 131 S.W.2d 627 (1939).

Promise and Acknowledgments.

Like all other acknowledgments and promises having legal force and sanction, they must be made to the person to whom the debt is due, or to one authorized to act for him, and with the intent at the time to pay it. Ringo v. Brooks, 26 Ark. 540 (1871).

Under this section, it was held that to suspend the statute by promise or acknowledgment, the promise or acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged. Burnett v. Turner, 105 Ark. 290, 151 S.W. 249 (1912).

—Acknowledgments.

A written acknowledgment to revive a debt must be an unqualified and unconditional acknowledgment of the debt as a debt due at the time, or it must be an express promise to pay it, which presupposes such an acknowledgment. Alston v. State Bank, 9 Ark. 455 (1849); Brown v. State Bank, 10 Ark. 134, 1849 Ark. LEXIS 60 (1849); Beebe v. Block, 12 Ark. 595 (1852); Grant v. Ashley, 12 Ark. 762 (1852).

Written acknowledgment of a debt is a removal of the statute bar, and not a new contract. Harlan v. Bernie & Meyer, 22 Ark. 217 (1860); Ringo v. Brooks, 26 Ark. 540 (1871); Kelley v. Telle, 66 Ark. 464, 51 S.W. 633 (1899).

A written acknowledgment will not be sufficient to fix a new period for the statute of limitations to run from, if it embraces a qualification which rebuts the inference of an unconditional promise to pay. Eureka Springs Sch. Dist. v. Cromer, 52 Ark. 454, 12 S.W. 878 (1889).

It is not necessary that the intention to pay be expressed in the acknowledgment. Morris v. Carr, 77 Ark. 228, 91 S.W. 187 (1905).

—Promise.

A verbal promise does not revive a barred claim, nor does a written promise revive it, but gives a right of action coextensive with the new promise. Worthington v. De Bardlekin, 33 Ark. 651 (1878).

Where new promise is relied upon and it is conditional, the happening of the contingency provided for must be proved to sustain recovery. Opp v. Wack, 52 Ark. 288, 12 S.W. 565 (1889).

Action on oral guaranty of an open account is barred at end of three years after last item was furnished. Goldsmith v. First Nat'l Bank, 169 Ark. 1162, 278 S.W. 22 (1925).

An oral admission of the correctness of an open account and promised payment interrupts the running from the due date of each item of the three year statute of limitations as to items not yet barred but not as to items already barred by limitations. Boatner v. Gates Bros. Lumber Co., 224 Ark. 494, 275 S.W.2d 627, 51 A.L.R.2d 326 (1955).

Cited: Holmes v. Thompson, 240 Ark. 818, 402 S.W.2d 400 (1966); Hyde Wholesale Dry Goods Co. v. Edwards, 255 Ark. 211, 500 S.W.2d 85 (1973).

16-56-123. Tolling statute — Endorsement of payment on bond or sealed instrument insufficient.

No endorsement of any payment written upon any bond or any other sealed instrument by or on behalf of the party to whom the payment shall be made shall be deemed a sufficient proof of the payment so as to take the case out of the operation of this act.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 32; C. & M. Dig., § 6977; Pope's Dig., § 8955; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-217.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-102.

Case Notes

In General.

Endorsements are only memoranda or at most evidence, but endorsements of payments admitted by the debtor himself or assented to by him, even impliedly, will toll the statute. McAbee v. Wiley, 92 Ark. 245, 122 S.W. 623 (1909).

Partial Payments.

Partial payments endorsed on the record of a mortgage will continue the lien of the mortgage as against the rights of all third parties if made and endorsed before the debt is barred by the statute of limitations. Wadley v. Ward, 99 Ark. 212, 137 S.W. 808 (1911).

16-56-124. Tolling statute — Promise by joint contractor or executor.

When there are two (2) or more joint contractors or executors, no joint contractor or executor shall lose the benefit of this act by reason of any written acknowledgment or promise made and signed by any of the other joint contractors or executors. Nothing contained in this section shall be so construed as to alter, take away, or lessen the effect of any payment of any principal or interest made by any person whatever on any joint contract.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 15; C. & M. Dig., § 6966; Pope's Dig., § 8944; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-218.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-102.

Case Notes

Acknowledgment and Promise.

A new promise in writing by one joint debtor, after the bar has attached, does not take the debt out of the statute of limitations as to the other debtors. Biscoe v. Jenkins, 10 Ark. 108 (1849); Grant v. Ashley, 12 Ark. 762 (1852); Woody v. State Bank, 12 Ark. 780 (1852).

Under this section, a joint contractor is not bound by a written acknowledgment or promise made and signed by the other joint contractor so as to stop the statute of limitations. Meisner v. Pattee, 170 Ark. 217, 279 S.W. 787 (1926).

Part Payment.

Part payment by one joint debtor before the bar attaches will bind the other joint debtor. Payment by one is payment for all. Trustees Real Estate Bank v. Hartfield, 5 Ark. 551 (1844); Burr v. Williams, 20 Ark. 171 (1859).

Part payment of the debt before the bar attaches forms a new point from which the statute will begin to run. Trustees Real Estate Bank v. Hartfield, 5 Ark. 551 (1844); Biscoe v. Jenkins, 10 Ark. 108 (1849); Durritt v. Trammell, 11 Ark. 183 (1850); Hicks v. Lusk & Co., 19 Ark. 692 (1858); Burr v. Williams, 20 Ark. 171 (1859); Chase v. Carney, 60 Ark. 491, 31 S.W. 43 (1895); Everton v. Day, 66 Ark. 73, 48 S.W. 900 (1898); Less v. Arndt, 68 Ark. 399, 59 S.W. 763 (1900).

Part payment by one joint debtor after the bar attaches does not revive the debt against the other joint debtors. Biscoe v. Jenkins, 10 Ark. 108 (1849); Biscoe v. James, 10 Ark. 163 (1849); Mason v. Howell, 14 Ark. 199 (1853); Ruddell v. Folsom, 14 Ark. 213 (1853); Hicks v. Lusk & Co., 19 Ark. 692 (1858); Burr v. Williams, 20 Ark. 171 (1859).

Part payment will not remove the statute bar as to third persons not in privity with the debtor or creditor. Mayo & Jones v. Cartwright, 30 Ark. 407 (1875), overruled, Whittington v. Flint, 43 Ark. 504 (1884).

Part payment by administrator of unprobated mortgage debt does not suspend running of statute. Cox v. Phelps, 65 Ark. 1, 45 S.W. 990 (1897).

—Proof.

In order to prove part payment as against a co-obligor, it must be shown that the payment was made at a time when its legal effect would be to remove the statutory bar. The mere endorsement of a credit as of a date to effect this is not sufficient, but it must be shown that the endorsement of payment was in fact made within the time; where the endorsement is made by the obligors, or one of them, the proof of that fact will be sufficient evidence to permit the endorsement to be read as evidence of the date and fact of payment. Ruddell v. Folsom, 14 Ark. 213 (1853).

Where the fact of part payment is relied upon to stop the running of the statute, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove part payment. Simpson v. Brown-Desnoyers Shoe Co., 70 Ark. 598, 70 S.W. 305 (1902).

Voluntary Payment.

This section refers to a payment that is voluntary and the application of the proceeds arising from a foreclosure of a mortgage or the surrender of mortgaged property for foreclosure by a joint contractor does not stop the running of the statute of limitations as to the other contractor. Meisner v. Pattee, 170 Ark. 217, 279 S.W. 787 (1926).

16-56-125. Actions against tortfeasors whose identity is unknown.

  1. For the purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, any person, firm, or corporation may file a complaint stating his or her cause of action in the appropriate court of this state, whenever the identity of the tortfeasor is unknown.
    1. The name of the unknown tortfeasor shall be designated by the pseudo-name John Doe or, if there is more than one (1) tortfeasor, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, etc.
    2. Upon determining the identity of the tortfeasor, the complaint shall be amended by substituting the real name for the pseudo-name.
  2. It shall be necessary for the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney to file with the complaint an affidavit that the identity of the tortfeasor is unknown before this section shall apply.

History. Acts 1959, No. 140, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 37-234 — 37-236.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Although the mother amended her complaint to substitute a contractor for one of the John Doe defendants within the 90 days allotted by this section and claimed that the amended complaint was timely, the argument failed because the court would have to apply Arkansas' three-year statute of limitations, and it was Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations that governed the case. Hall v. Summit Contrs., Inc., 356 Ark. 609, 158 S.W.3d 185 (2004).

Circuit court erred in granting an estate's motion for summary judgment because, although the plaintiff was not aware of the defendant's death, she named the defendant's estate as a John Doe defendant, the statute of limitations was tolled where record demonstrated that the identity of the tortfeasor, the defendant's estate, was unknown to the plaintiff, and the requirements for relation back of an amendment were met. Berryhill v. Synatzske, 2014 Ark. 169, 432 S.W.3d 637 (2014).

Failure to Name Party.

Patient was aware that the nurse could, and should, have been specifically named as a defendant from the outset of the case where the patient knew of the nurse's existence and his name was on the operative report prepared on the day of the surgery; the failure to name the nurse in the original complaint was not a mere mistake of identity, and this section only allows a complaint to be filed against a John Doe defendant when the plaintiff cannot identify the tortfeasor. Stephens v. Petrino, 350 Ark. 268, 86 S.W.3d 836 (2002).

Cited: Harvill v. Community Methodist Hosp. Ass'n, 302 Ark. 39, 786 S.W.2d 577 (1990).

16-56-126. Commencement of new action or filing mandate after nonsuit or arrest or reversal of judgment.

    1. If any action is commenced within the time respectively prescribed in this act, in §§ 16-116-101 — 16-116-107, in §§ 16-114-201 — 16-114-209, or in any other act, and the plaintiff therein suffers a nonsuit, or after a verdict for him or her the judgment is arrested, or after judgment for him or her the judgment is reversed on appeal or writ of error, the plaintiff may commence a new action within one (1) year after the nonsuit suffered or judgment arrested or reversed.
      1. However, if after judgment for plaintiff the judgment is reversed on appeal or writ of error and the cause is remanded for another trial, the mandate shall be taken out and filed in the court from which the appeal is taken within one (1) year from rendition of the judgment of reversal.
      2. Otherwise, the cause shall be forever barred.
  1. If the cause of action survives to the plaintiff's heirs or to his or her executors or administrators, they may in like manner commence a new action or take out a mandate within the time allowed the plaintiff.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 21; Acts 1891, No. 159, § 3, p. 280; C. & M. Dig., § 6969; Pope's Dig., § 8947; Acts 1983, No. 145, § 1; 1985, No. 221, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-222.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-56-102.

Cross References. Time within which mandate of Supreme Court must be taken out and filed in inferior court, § 16-67-325.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Dorothy Vaughan Goodwin, Recent Developments: The Arkansas Savings Statute Applies If There Has Been a “Timely, Completed Attempt” to Serve the Defendant, Jones v. Douglas, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 639 (2016).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555.

Survey — Civil Procedure, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 135.

Case Notes

In General.

This section does not narrow the period of limitation in the case of a nonsuit but extends the period of limitations applicable to the cause of action. Love v. Cahn, 93 Ark. 215, 124 S.W. 259 (1909); Williford v. Williford, 102 Ark. 65, 143 S.W. 132 (1912).

This section did not create a new liability, but only qualified the statute of limitations applicable to actions where a nonsuit had been filed. Partin v. Wade, 172 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1949).

Where action is not barred by limitations second action may be brought more than one year after nonsuit. Eades v. Joslin, 219 Ark. 688, 244 S.W.2d 623 (1951).

This section authorizes the dismissal of an action without prejudice to the right to bring another action for the same cause. Campbell v. Coldstream Fisheries, Inc., 230 Ark. 284, 322 S.W.2d 79 (1959).

The dismissal of a cause of action without prejudice permits the bringing of a subsequent action for the same cause. Oliver v. Miller, 239 Ark. 1043, 396 S.W.2d 288 (1965).

Attorneys were not negligent in failing to timely refile client's medical malpractice claim within the one-year time period allowed for refiling a claim under this section, where the law concerning timely refiling of a complaint after taking a nonsuit had not been settled. Pugh v. Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997).

A plaintiff may only invoke this section, Arkansas's savings statute, if the plaintiff files the complaint before the period of limitations has expired and then completes timely service on the defendant against whom the subsequent action is brought. Haynes v. Wire, No. 4:12CV00123 JLH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88743 (E.D. Ark. June 27, 2012).

Construction.

Section 16-57-104(a), concerning transfer of jurisdiction to proper forum, is compatible with this section, Arkansas's savings statute. Linder v. Howard, 296 Ark. 414, 757 S.W.2d 549 (1988).

The extension provided in § 16-114-204 (repealed) was not intended to apply to this section. Pugh v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 317 Ark. 304, 877 S.W.2d 577 (1994).

Under Arkansas law, negligence, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and strict liability are each distinct causes of action, requiring different elements of proof; thus, the plaintiff's federal causes of action for breach of warranty, failure to warn, and strict liability were time-barred because they were not pleaded in the state products liability complaint and, therefore, were not tolled by operation of this section. Dillaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 23 F.3d 1376 (8th Cir. 1994).

Purpose.

It is not the purpose of the one year nonsuit statute, which tolled statute of limitations for one year, to shorten plaintiff's rights; plaintiff was not prohibited from bringing suit for damages and an injunction two years after the cause of action even though plaintiff had taken a nonsuit one year after the cause of action in a case involving same facts. Shelton v. Jack, 239 Ark. 875, 395 S.W.2d 9 (1965).

Applicability.

Subdivision (a)(1) of this section did not apply in customer's action against bank for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, constructive fraud, and fraudulent concealment where the 2002 dismissal of customer's action against its sales manager remained in effect for over one year; the bank was not made a party to any valid lawsuit until 2004. Technology Partners, Inc. v. Regions Bank, 97 Ark. App. 229, 245 S.W.3d 687 (2006).

Excessive force and deliberate indifference to excessive force claims asserted against two county deputy sheriffs in their individual capacities were time-barred because they were asserted more than three years after the incident giving rise to the claims occurred. This section did not apply to toll the statute of limitations with regard to the claims because in his prior 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 suit, which was non-suited, plaintiff did not specifically indicate that he was attempting to hold the sheriffs liable in their individual capacities and, therefore, they were deemed to have been sued in their official capacities only in that suit. Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 902, 128 S. Ct. 2932, 171 L. Ed. 2d 864 (2008).

Savings statute was applicable entitling the patient to refile his medical malpractice suit because his initial attempted service on the surgeon was proper; the return receipt was signed by the surgeon's secretary and the patient not only served the surgeon by certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted delivery, he further sent interrogatories certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted delivery and the secretary signed for those documents as the surgeon's agent. McCoy v. Montgomery, 370 Ark. 333, 259 S.W.3d 430 (2007).

Arkansas savings statute does not apply in workers' compensation cases. Single Source Transp. v. Kent, 99 Ark. App. 153, 258 S.W.3d 416 (2007).

While it could be considered that the employee suffered a nonsuit as required in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the statute did not apply because it also required that the employee's slander action against the partnership be commenced within the time respectively prescribed for slander claims, which was one year, as provided in § 16-56-104(3). The employee did not allege defamation against the partnership in either his discrimination complaint, his third-party complaint, or his amended complaint. Roeben v. BG Excelsior Ltd. P'ship, 2009 Ark. App. 646, 344 S.W.3d 93 (2009).

In a case arising out of a car accident, the savings statute did not apply after the statute of limitations had run because the injured parties were not lulled into thinking that service was not required when a driver filed a response before he was served; there was a denial of an assertion that an adjuster in the case requested waiting on service while a settlement was negotiated. Filing a response to a complaint before service was perfected did not lead to service becoming unnecessary. Cagle v. Terwilliger, 2015 Ark. App. 191, 458 S.W.3d 770 (2015).

When the plaintiff passes away while prosecuting the plaintiff's claims, the real party in interest must be substituted before a nonsuit in order to take advantage of the savings statute. Garrett v. Progressive Eldercare Servs. — Saline, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 201, 575 S.W.3d 426 (2019).

Circuit court properly dismissed an executor's lawsuit against the owners of a nursing home because the savings statute did not apply to the facts of the case; since the action abated by death before a nonsuit was taken, subsection (a) of this section was not applicable and thus subsection (b) did not apply. Subsection (b) of this section applies when the plaintiff first nonsuits the case and subsequently passes away. Garrett v. Progressive Eldercare Servs. — Saline, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 201, 575 S.W.3d 426 (2019).

Adoption.

The one-year statute of limitations in § 9-9-216(b)(1) provides a special procedure which cannot be annulled by ARCP 41(a) or this section, which allows an action dismissed without prejudice to be refiled within one year of the dismissal. In re Martindale, 327 Ark. 685, 940 S.W.2d 491 (1997).

Appeal.

From the decision that ARCP 41(a) permitted voluntary nonsuit without prejudice after notice of appeal was filed, it follows that this section allows the appeal to be refiled within one year. Sosebee v. County Line Sch. Dist., 320 Ark. 412, 897 S.W.2d 556 (1995).

Applicability.

Where no nonsuit has been suffered, nor arrest of judgment made, nor reversal had on appeal, this statute does not apply. Hill v. Pipkins, 72 Ark. 549, 81 S.W. 1216 (1904).

This statute does not narrow the period of limitation in which an action may be brought upon a claim which is not otherwise barred by the general statute of limitations applicable to the claim; it only applies to those causes of action which would otherwise be barred before the running of one year from the time of taking a nonsuit. Mitchell v. Federal Land Bank, 206 Ark. 253, 174 S.W.2d 671 (1943), superseded by statute as stated in, Croft v. Croft, 8 Ark. App. 20, 648 S.W.2d 511 (1983).

Where plaintiff filed diversity action in federal court within limitation period against defendant who was resident of another state at the time of the accident but action was dismissed without prejudice because defendant was resident of Arkansas at the time action was filed, plaintiff could refile in state court within one year even though limitation period had run. Coleman v. Young, 256 Ark. 759, 510 S.W.2d 877 (1974).

In applying § 16-56-105 to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the circuit court will recognize decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court regarding the applicability of this section to claims subject to the three-year limitation as it has in contexts other than civil rights litigation. Whittle v. Wiseman, 683 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1982).

This section does not apply to actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 since those actions are governed by a federal statute of limitations; however, the section would apply to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 which guarantees equal rights. Garrison v. International Paper Co., 714 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1983).

Limitation period for filing objections to discharge or complaints to determine dischargeability of debts of bankrupt is set by federal statutory law and this section is not applicable to permit a refiling of a complaint dismissed without prejudice by the bankruptcy court. Davis v. Lewis, 36 B.R. 88 (E.D. Ark. 1984).

The Arkansas savings statutes, § 4-2-725 and this section, apply to actions originally filed in a foreign state if the original action was commenced within the statute of limitations specified for similar causes of action under Arkansas law. LaBarge, Inc. v. Universal Circuits, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

This section is written in the conjunctive, meaning two conditions must be met in order to fall within its language; the original action must be timely, and the plaintiff must suffer a nonsuit in that action. Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 47 F.3d 311 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Wal-Mart Stores v. Follette, 516 U.S. 814, 116 S. Ct. 66 (1995).

The savings statute applies only to actions governed by a general statute of limitations and not to proceedings, such as election contests, in which the right to file is limited to a very short period. McCastlain v. Elmore, 340 Ark. 365, 10 S.W.3d 835 (2000).

The statute does not apply where the original statute of limitations had not yet expired. Elzea v. Perry, 340 Ark. 588, 12 S.W.3d 213 (2000).

Burden of Proof.

Plaintiff must prove bringing of action within one year after dismissal of former action. Watkins v. Martin, 69 Ark. 311, 65 S.W. 103 (1901).

Commencement of New Action.

Service of summons on second suit after dismissal of first suit saves second suit, though it was brought before first was dismissed. Sims v. Miller, 151 Ark. 377, 236 S.W. 828 (1922).

The issuance of a summons in a transitory action within one year after nonsuit was taken and delivery thereof to the sheriff of the county of the venue is not the commencement of a new action where in the meantime the defendant had changed his residence to another state. Cherry v. Falvey, 188 Ark. 827, 68 S.W.2d 98 (1934).

Suit was barred by three year limitation period of § 16-56-105, but filing of suit within three years of cause of action, with plaintiff taking a nonsuit after the three years and bringing another action under this section was not barred. Smithey v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 127 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Ark. 1955), aff'd, 237 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. Ark. 1956).

This section permitted the filing of a claim in a state court more than one year after a “nonsuit suffered” in federal court was affirmed, and rehearing denied, by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals but less than one year after certiorari was denied in the case by the U.S. Supreme Court. Lubin v. Crittenden Mem. Hosp., 288 Ark. 370, 705 S.W.2d 872 (1986).

Because the plaintiff failed to meet the service requirements contemplated or specifically provided for in ARCP 3 and 4(i), he also failed to commence the action so as to effectuate the one-year savings provision provided in this section. Green v. Wiggins, 304 Ark. 484, 803 S.W.2d 536 (1991).

Second complaint held timely. Brown v. Saint Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 308 Ark. 361, 823 S.W.2d 908 (1992).

Under ARCP 3, an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the clerk of the proper court, and the establishment of venue and the tolling of a statute of limitations is based on the date the complaint is filed; however, the commencement date is subject to the plaintiff completing service within 120 days from the date of filing of the complaint, unless the time for service has been extended by the court under ARCP 4(i). Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons, 315 Ark. 173, 866 S.W.2d 372 (1993).

This section allows a party to file a new complaint within one year of a nonsuit as long as the cause of action is the same in substance as the original complaint at the time the latter was nonsuited. Dillaha v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 23 F.3d 1376 (8th Cir. 1994).

Court erred in awarding judgment to plaintiff in his breach of contract action against defendant because plaintiff's earlier failure to comply with the service requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i) resulted in a failure to commence the action so as to effectuate the one-year savings provision provided in this section; hence, the action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in § 16-56-111(a)Long v. Bonds, 89 Ark. App. 111, 200 S.W.3d 922 (Jan. 5, 2005).

Easement owner's pro se petition to enjoin the landowner from interfering with her purported easement was properly dismissed where a new case number was not assigned to the petition after the initial case was nonsuited, as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 3. Burnham v. Price, 2018 Ark. App. 410, 558 S.W.3d 402 (2018).

Ark. R. Civ. P. 3(c), as amended in 2011, effectively overrules Tucker v. Sullivant, 2010 Ark. 170. Burnham v. Price, 2018 Ark. App. 410, 558 S.W.3d 402 (2018).

Complaint Amended.

Amended complaint on second suit was held sufficient as against demurrer where the amended complaint showed the bringing of the original suit in the same court, identified by date and docket number, the taking of a nonsuit at a specified date, and the commencement of a new action within the period set out in this section. Partin v. Wade, 172 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1949).

Where complaint in second action made same mistake in description and date as that contained in first action, the action was permitted even though plaintiff was permitted to amend complaint in second action by correcting description and date. Cummings v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Co., 202 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1953).

Following a voluntary nonsuit, the filing of an amended complaint satisfied the requirement of the savings statute, codified at subdivision (a)(1) of this section, that a new action be commenced within one year where the amended complaint was filed within the one-year period and timely service was completed as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 4. Tucker v. Sullivant, 2010 Ark. 170, 370 S.W.3d 812 (2010).

Dismissal with Prejudice.

Where suit was dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution, a subsequent suit for the same purpose is barred. Leach v. Cook, 211 Ark. 763, 202 S.W.2d 359 (1947).

Where suit was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute, no nonsuit was suffered, and this section did not apply, plaintiff's only remedy was to appeal the original decision. Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 47 F.3d 311 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Wal-Mart Stores v. Follette, 516 U.S. 814, 116 S. Ct. 66 (1995).

Court rejected parents' claim that dismissal of their amended medical malpractice claim against hospital and doctor for failure to comply with the service requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 should have been without prejudice; the parents' failure to comply with the service of process requirements resulted in a failure to commence their medical malpractice action and effectuate the one-year savings provision in this section. Posey v. St. Bernard's Healthcare, Inc., 365 Ark. 154, 226 S.W.3d 757 (2006).

Dismissing with prejudice a municipality's petition challenging annexation against a landowner bank, which had requested detachment under § 14-40-2002, was not error where the municipality had not completed any service at all on the bank, and as a result, the one-year savings provision in this section did not apply. City of Tontitown v. First Sec. Bank, 2017 Ark. App. 326, 525 S.W.3d 18 (2017).

This section did not apply given that appellant's attempt at service was not valid, and the circuit court's conclusion that the attempt was not made in good faith was not clearly erroneous. Thus, the circuit court's dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. Eliasnik v. Y&S Pine Bluff, LLC, 2018 Ark. App. 138, 546 S.W.3d 497 (2018).

Patient's attempt at service by certified mail was insufficient to allow him the benefit of this section, because proof of service was lacking and the patient had no reason to believe that service was complete. No green cards were returned for three of the defendant doctors and there was no proof that the person who signed a green card for the fourth defendant doctor was the doctor's agent. McCoy v. Robertson, 2018 Ark. App. 279, 550 S.W.3d 33 (2018).

Dismissal Without Prejudice.

Where earlier order was a dismissal without prejudice, it was error for the trial judge to grant summary judgment and preclude defendant's claim on the grounds of res judicata. Magness v. McEntire, 305 Ark. 503, 808 S.W.2d 783 (1991).

Because an accident victim filed his complaint during the limitations period and served it timely, albeit imperfectly, under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4, he was entitled to the one-year grace period provided by the saving statute, subdivision (a)(1) of this section, and therefore the case was properly dismissed without prejudice, allowing him to refile. McCoy v. Bodiford, 2010 Ark. App. 152 (2010).

Unbeknownst to plaintiffs, the addressee was not the registered agent for the company; the appellate court believed that the Arkansas Supreme Court would hold that plaintiffs completed service on the company and that their action had thus commenced for purposes of this section. The appellate court concluded that the action had commenced for purposes of this section and that, had the action remained in state court, the claims against the company would have been dismissed without prejudice; thus, at a minimum, the district court should have dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the company without prejudice. Barner v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 796 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2015).

Circuit court erred in dismissing buyers' action with prejudice because they were entitled to the benefit of this section since they made a timely, completed attempt to serve sellers; the summonses and complaints were mailed to the sellers at their last known address, and when the envelopes containing the complaints and summonses were returned to the buyers' attorney, they were marked with a postal service stamp that contained several options for delivery and were marked “refused.” Jones v. Douglas, 2016 Ark. 166, 489 S.W.3d 648 (2016).

Circuit court's decision to dismiss a complaint without prejudice, rather than with prejudice, was affirmed where an injured driver and her husband timely filed their complaint and served the driver who rear-ended the car behind them via warning order, but on appeal of the default judgment entered against that driver, the service was held imperfect under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 due to the insufficiency of the diligent-inquiry affidavit. Under case law, the injured driver and her husband, who filed their case during the limitations period and served it promptly but imperfectly, deserved the grace period provided by this section (the “savings” statute) to refile their case and serve it properly. Thomas v. Robinson, 2020 Ark. App. 103, 596 S.W.3d 531 (2020).

Entitlement to Privilege.

It was error to dismiss the second action for failure to pay costs in former action. Turrentine v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 96 Ark. 181, 131 S.W. 337 (1910).

A grantee being in privity of estate may bring a new action within the time specified. Dressler v. Carpenter, 107 Ark. 353, 155 S.W. 108 (1913).

The plaintiff brought an action and took a nonsuit, the cause being dismissed without prejudice. It was held that the plaintiff could bring a suit upon the same cause of action if he acted within the period of limitation. Forschler v. Cash, 128 Ark. 492, 194 S.W. 1029 (1917).

Successful plaintiff in justice court may take nonsuit on appeal to circuit court and bring another action. Biddle v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 160 Ark. 323, 254 S.W. 666 (1923).

After plaintiff takes nonsuit of crossaction for breach of warranty, he may sue defendent's estate for the breach within a year of such nonsuit. Fox v. Pinson, 182 Ark. 936, 34 S.W.2d 459, 74 A.L.R. 583 (1930).

Dismissal because of defect in complaint amounted to a nonsuit without prejudice and plaintiffs were entitled to bring a suit on the same cause of action within one year from the dismissal. Norm Co. v. Harris, 197 Ark. 124, 122 S.W.2d 532 (1938).

A new suit can be brought by a plaintiff who, from causes that are incident to the administration of the law, was compelled to abandon an action, regardless of whether it was by his own act or by the act of the court, if either would leave a cause of action undetermined. Cowan v. Patrick, 247 Ark. 886, 448 S.W.2d 336 (1969).

Where trial court erred in finding that proper service had been made on defendant and entered default judgment against defendant, it would be unfair to expect the plaintiff not to rely on this finding and believe that its action was timely commenced, and plaintiff should therefore not be barred by statute of limitations where default judgment was set aside five years later. Cole v. First Nat'l Bank, 304 Ark. 26, 800 S.W.2d 412 (1990).

Because this savings statute protected those who in good faith filed and timely served an action who would otherwise suffer a complete loss of relief on the merits due to a procedural defect, plaintiff's complaint was timely filed, and despite service being defective, the action was commenced for purposes of the savings statute. Rettig v. Ballard, 2009 Ark. 629, 362 S.W.3d 260 (2009).

Good Faith.

A medical malpractice action was timely under the savings statute where the plaintiff first commenced an action against the defendant in federal district court in Arizona, but that action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and less than a year later, she brought the same claim in federal district court in Arkansas; the plaintiff wanted her case to be heard and adjudicated in Arizona, and the fact that her selection of Arizona as a forum may have turned out to have been erroneous was not a sufficient basis for a conclusion that she did not act in good faith. Chandler v. Roy, 272 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2001).

Nonsuit.

To suffer a nonsuit it is not necessary that a suitor actually ask for and be granted a nonsuit in the trial court. Wheeler v. Wallingsford, 229 Ark. 576, 317 S.W.2d 153 (1958).

When a nonsuit is taken, the procedure which was adopted in that action has no bearing on a subsequent action. Campbell v. Coldstream Fisheries, Inc., 230 Ark. 284, 322 S.W.2d 79 (1959).

For the purposes of this section, a dismissal of a complaint on defendant's motion is the same as a nonsuit. Carton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 295 Ark. 126, 747 S.W.2d 93 (1988); West v. G.D. Searle & Co., 317 Ark. 525, 879 S.W.2d 412 (1994).

The day on which a nonsuit is taken should be excluded from computation. Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 Ark. 1, 759 S.W.2d 203 (1988).

This section could not save the wrongful-death claims of the children where the children were not parties to the first action that ended in a nonsuit. Murrell v. Springdale Mem. Hosp., 330 Ark. 121, 952 S.W.2d 153 (1997).

Where no nonsuit was effectively granted because no order granting the nonsuit was entered, the one-year savings statute was never activated. Blaylock v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 330 Ark. 620, 954 S.W.2d 939 (1997).

A nonsuit is not effective on the filing date; a court order is necessary to grant a nonsuit and the judgment or decree must be entered to be effective. Blaylock v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 330 Ark. 620, 954 S.W.2d 939 (1997).

The right to nonsuit prior to the submission of the case to the jury is absolute; a nonsuit has the effect of an absolute withdrawal of the claim and carries with it all the pleadings and all issues with respect to a plaintiff's claim. Tribco Mfg. Co. v. People's Bank of Imboden, 67 Ark. App. 268, 998 S.W.2d 756 (1999).

When buyer of property nonsuited his complaint against seller for breach of contract, the matter could not be subsequently litigated as it was barred by res judicata; claim should have been brought when foreclosure action was brought by seller. Pentz v. Romine, 75 Ark. App. 274, 57 S.W.3d 235 (2001).

Suit by the administrator of decedent's estate for wrongful death resulting from alleged medical malpractice was time-barred because it had not been filed within two years of the decedent's death as required by § 16-114-203; although the suit had been filed within one year of the date on which a previous suit against the same healthcare providers, filed by the decedent's heirs, had been non-suited, the estate had not been a party to the first action and could not, therefore, rely on the saving provision contained in this section to overcome the running of the statute of limitations. Tatus v. Hayes, 79 Ark. App. 371, 88 S.W.3d 864 (2002).

Dismissal of the patient's medical malpractice claim was appropriate because it was untimely under § 16-56-126(a)(1) since Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) stated that the one-year period began when the circuit court entered an order granting the non-suit; additionally, Ark. R. Civ. P. 58 did not require courts to notify parties of the entry of an order of judgment. The patient also offered no proof that the hospital's attorney defrauded her or intended to defraud her in any way when he told her that the signing date was the date from which the statute would run. Collins v. St. Vincent, 98 Ark. App. 190, 253 S.W.3d 26, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 902, 128 S. Ct. 233, 169 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2007).

Appellee's counterclaim for quiet title was not barred by subdivision (a)(1) of this section as a prior court did not treat appellee's affirmative defense of adverse possession as a counterclaim under § 18-61-101(a), and the nonsuit of the prior action did not affect the statute of limitations, which had not begun to run on the quiet title claim as appellee was still in possession of the property. Sutton v. Gardner, 2011 Ark. App. 737, 387 S.W.3d 185 (2011).

Savings statute did not give an estate administrator a year to file a wrongful death suit following the Workers' Compensation Commission's dismissal of a workers' compensation claim, as the Commission's decision was not a “nonsuit”; the Commission denied the claim on the merits. Frisby v. Milbank Mfg. Co., 688 F.3d 540 (8th Cir. 2012).

Motion to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction was denied where three unlitigated claims had been nonsuited, they were not re-filed within one year under this section, and the statute of limitations for the claims had expired; thus, the claims were no longer a bar to finality. Stodola v. Lynch, 2017 Ark. 181, 519 S.W.3d 677 (2017).

School district's appeal of a jury award in favor of a teacher on a breach of contract claim was dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order where the jury award did not resolve all of the claims, the teacher had taken a voluntary nonsuit of the two remaining claims, the claims had not been dismissed with prejudice, and the one-year time period for refiling the claims under this section had not expired. Prescott Sch. Dist. v. Steed, 2017 Ark. App. 533 (2017).

In an action brought by a commercial landlord against two tenants for unpaid rent and property damage, a final appealable order was lacking after a default judgment was granted against tenant #1, partial summary judgment was entered against tenant #2 on the unpaid rent claim, and the landlord took a voluntary nonsuit without prejudice of “all pending but unresolved” claims. The partial summary judgment on the unpaid rent claim was subject to reconsideration and even revision before the final resolution of the case and it could not be considered a “pending but unresolved” claim that was dismissed by the voluntary nonsuit; in addition, the landlord could refile its claim for property damage against tenant #2 after the voluntary nonsuit. A Time for You v. Park H Props., LLC, 2019 Ark. App. 282 (2019).

Pleading.

Allegations in previous case regarding court jurisdiction is of no consequence in a subsequent case, because before a court can assume jurisdiction there must be something in the present pleadings giving that court jurisdiction. Campbell v. Coldstream Fisheries, Inc., 230 Ark. 284, 322 S.W.2d 79 (1959).

Substitution.

In a claim brought against the suppliers of a pain pump, a dismissal was proper because a wife, as a patient's administratrix, did not seek substitution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 prior to a nonsuit of the case when it was pending in federal court. Therefore, the patient and his wife did not receive the benefit of this section. Wilson v. Lincare, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 329, 288 S.W.3d 708 (2008).

Suit Barred.

Evidence sufficient to bar second suit. Yates v. Phillips, 180 Ark. 709, 22 S.W.2d 559 (1929); Thompson v. Pulaski-Lonoke Drainage Dist., 192 Ark. 1178, 90 S.W.2d 237 (1936); Young v. Garrett, 212 Ark. 693, 208 S.W.2d 189 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814, 69 S. Ct. 31 (1948), rehearing denied, J. H. Allison & Co. v. NLRB, 335 U.S. 905, 69 S. Ct. 404, 93 L. Ed. 439 (1949); Casey v. Burdine, 214 Ark. 680, 217 S.W.2d 613 (1949); Wheeler v. Wallingsford, 229 Ark. 576, 317 S.W.2d 153 (1958); Taylor v. Goodwin, 237 Ark. 121, 371 S.W.2d 617 (1963); Nelson v. Wakefield, 282 Ark. 285, 668 S.W.2d 29 (1984).

Where plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action on March 4, 1994, two days short of the two-year statute of limitations under § 16-114-203(a), and had until July 2, 1994, to complete service of process pursuant to ARCP 4(1), requested another 120 days on June 23, 1994, and was granted a 30-day extension on July 28, 1994, and where plaintiff, after failing to obtain service, requested a nonsuit on August 18, 1994, which was granted on September 14, 1994, the claim refiled on August 11, 1995, had not invoked this section's one-year savings provision and was barred by the statute of limitations. Thomson v. Zufari, 325 Ark. 208, 924 S.W.2d 796 (1996).

When a decedent's heirs nonsuited their wrongful death claim, the claim could not be refiled after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, by the administratrix of the decedent's estate, even though she was one of the heirs who filed the wrongful death claim, as this section only allowed a claim to be refiled after nonsuit by the same parties who filed the original action. Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 76 Ark. App. 264, 64 S.W.3d 764 (2001).

Where a wrongful-death complaint was not in compliance with § 16-62-102 and the statute of limitations had run, barring heirs from commencing a wrongful-death action against a doctor, the wife of the deceased was also barred from pursuing a separate claim for loss of consortium, which was derivative to wrongful-death action. Sanderson v. McCollum, 82 Ark. App. 111, 112 S.W.3d 363 (2003).

Where heirs were not plaintiffs to their mother's first wrongful-death complaint, they could not benefit from the application of the savings statute where, at the time the heirs filed their wrongful-death suit, the two-year statute of limitations had already run, barring their claim; the heirs could not ratify the first suit filed by their mother so as to have come within the savings statute because that suit had been non-suited and, therefore, there was no valid cause of action for them to have ratified. Sanderson v. McCollum, 82 Ark. App. 111, 112 S.W.3d 363 (2003).

Circuit court's dismissal of the buyer's case for failure of service of valid process was upheld where, in order to invoke the protection of the savings statute, the buyer had to timely commence the original action; the buyer's fraud claim against the car dealership was therefore time barred and the savings statute did not apply. Smith v. Sidney Moncrief Pontiac, Buick, GMC Co., 353 Ark. 701, 120 S.W.3d 525 (2003).

Tolling Statute of Limitations.

Although an action is brought in a court without jurisdiction, yet its pendency will arrest the statute if a proper action is commenced within a year after the judgment in first suit is vacated. Little Rock, M.R. & T. Ry. v. Manees, 49 Ark. 248, 4 S.W. 778 (1887).

In order to suspend the statute of limitations the action must be properly commenced. Wilkins v. Worthen, 62 Ark. 401, 36 S.W. 21 (1896).

Where plaintiff filed a tort action against the defendant within two year period of limitations and took a nonsuit, plaintiff could maintain a second suit based on same cause of action where filed within one year of the nonsuit, though second action was filed more than two years after the occurrence of the tort. Partin v. Wade, 172 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1949).

When the court lacking subject matter jurisdiction has, by statute, authority to transfer the action to a court of competent jurisdiction, timely filing of the suit in the first court tolls the statute of limitations. Linder v. Howard, 296 Ark. 414, 757 S.W.2d 549 (1988).

To toll the limitations period and to invoke the saving statute, a plaintiff need only file his or her complaint within the statute of limitations and complete timely service on a defendant under ARCP 4; a court's later ruling which finds completed service invalid does not disinherit the plaintiff from the benefit of the saving statute. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons, 315 Ark. 173, 866 S.W.2d 372 (1993).

Where plaintiff filed a timely action against and completed service upon defendant in his prior lawsuit, the applicable limitations period was tolled, and he was thereby entitled to invoke this section when refiling his complaint. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons, 315 Ark. 173, 866 S.W.2d 372 (1993).

Trial court properly refused to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to delay the running of the one-year saving statute so that wrongful death plaintiffs' fifth amended complaint could be deemed timely where their attorney was not sufficiently diligent in the seven-week period he had to rename the defendant to merit the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Stracener v. Williams, 84 Ark. App. 208, 137 S.W.3d 428 (2003).

Trial court erred in granting state's motion to strike appellant's motion to dismiss a forfeiture action because, after voluntarily dismissing its first forfeiture complaint for failure to complete service of process, the state neglected to toll the limitations period to invoke the one-year savings statute because it did not file the forfeiture complaint within the 120-day period required by § 5-64-505(3). Mitchell v. State, 94 Ark. App. 304, 229 S.W.3d 583 (2006).

Circuit court properly dismissed a patient's negligent treatment case against a chiropractor without prejudice to being refiled where the patient had commenced his case under Ark. R. Civ. P. 3 by completing timely, but defective, service, and thus, he was entitled to the shelter of subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Clouse v. Tu, 101 Ark. App. 260, 274 S.W.3d 344 (2008).

Because the court denied class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 in an earlier filed case on the ground that the named plaintiffs were not typical of or adequate representatives for the class, it was not a reason equally applicable to any later suit, so American Pipe applied and the statute of limitations was tolled by the prior action. Under this section, the Arkansas's savings statute, the tolling gave plaintiffs one year after certification was denied in the prior action to commence a new action and receive the full protection of the prior action, and because plaintiffs filed the instant action within that year, they received the maximum benefit of the tolling, except that they could not recover from any further back than October 1, 2006, because prior to October 1, 2006, the employer was exempt from the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act as it was subject to the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Garner v. Butterball, LLC, No. 4:10CV01025 JLH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21859 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 22, 2012).

In a foreclosure case involving a construction loan, summary judgment was properly granted on the borrower's nonsuited counterclaims for negligence and interference with business expectancies, which were untimely under § 16-56-105 because they were filed more than three years after the lender refused further funding of the loan and were not saved by this section because they were filed more than two years after the voluntary nonsuit. Grand Valley Ridge, LLC v. Metro. Nat'l Bank, 2012 Ark. 121, 388 S.W.3d 24 (2012).

Cited: Robison v. Jones, 261 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1958); Credit Indus. Co. v. Blankinship, 230 Ark. 371, 323 S.W.2d 198 (1959); Vines v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 232 Ark. 173, 337 S.W.2d 722 (1960); Farm Serv. Coop. v. Goshen Farms, Inc., 267 Ark. 324, 590 S.W.2d 861 (1979); Weston v. Bachman, 682 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982); Blakemore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 789 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1986); Ware v. Gardner, 309 Ark. 148, 827 S.W.2d 657 (1992); Goldsby v. Fairley, 309 Ark. 380, 831 S.W.2d 142 (1992); Oxford v. Perry, 340 Ark. 577, 13 S.W.3d 567 (2000); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736 (8th. Cir. 2001); Nef v. Ag Servs. of Am., Inc., 79 Ark. App. 100, 86 S.W.3d 4 (2002); Wright v. City of Little Rock, 366 Ark. 96, 233 S.W.3d 644 (2006); Recinos v. Zelk, 369 Ark. 7, 250 S.W.3d 221 (2007); Barrows v. City of Fort Smith, 2010 Ark. 73, 360 S.W.3d 117 (2010).

16-56-127. Mutual open accounts — Accrual of cause of action.

In actions brought to recover any balance due upon a mutual open account current, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued from the time of the last item proved in the account.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 12; C. & M. Dig., § 6964; Pope's Dig., § 8942; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-215.

Case Notes

Action Barred.

Since an account with the improvement districts was in the nature of an account current and the suit was brought as soon as the shortage was discovered, the statute of limitations was without application. Murphy v. Marshall, 203 Ark. 986, 159 S.W.2d 741 (1942).

Action Not Limited.

In a suit on a mutual account, the plaintiff was not limited to recovery of items sold within three years prior to the action, and a charge limiting recovery to items purchased within three years before institution of the action was error. T. M. Dover Merchantile Co. v. Myers, 180 Ark. 576, 21 S.W.2d 972 (1929).

Mutual Open Account.

“Mutual open account” means something more than charges on one side and credits of payments on the other. There must be mutual credit founded on a subsisting debt on the other side, or an express or implied agreement for a setoff of mutual debts. McNeil v. Garland & Nash, 27 Ark. 343 (1871); McConnell v. Arkansas Coffin Co., 172 Ark. 87, 287 S.W. 1007 (1926).

Evidence sufficient to find mutual accounts. T. M. Dover Merchantile Co. v. Myers, 180 Ark. 576, 21 S.W.2d 972 (1929); Refco, Inc. v. Farm Prod. Ass'n, 844 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1988).

16-56-128. Guaranteed student loans.

There shall be no greater statute of limitations defense available to a borrower who has defaulted on a loan guaranteed by the Student Loan Guarantee Foundation of Arkansas than would be available had the borrower defaulted on an obligation to the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1987, No. 574, § 3.

Cross References. Administration of student loan provisions of federal laws, § 6-81-201.

16-56-129. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning arrearages and limitations on child support, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1184, § 30. The section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 525, § 1.

Acts 1989, No. 525, § 1, is also codified as § 9-14-236.

16-56-130. Civil actions based on sexual abuse.

  1. Notwithstanding any other statute of limitations or any other provision of law that can be construed to reduce the statutory period set forth in this section, any civil action based on sexual abuse which occurred when the injured person was a minor but is not discovered until after the injured person reaches the age of majority shall be brought within three (3) years from the time of discovery of the sexual abuse by the injured party.
    1. A claim based on an assertion of more than one (1) act of sexual abuse is not limited to the injured party's first discovery of the relationship between any one (1) of those acts and the injury or condition, but may be based on the injured party's discovery of the effect of the series of acts.
    2. It is not necessary for the injured party to establish which act in a series of acts of childhood sexual abuse caused the injury or condition that is the subject of the lawsuit.
  2. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Childhood sexual abuse” means sexual abuse which occurred when the injured person was a minor;
    2. “Minor” means a person of less than eighteen (18) years of age; and
    3. “Time of discovery” means when the injured party discovers the effect of the injury or condition attributable to the childhood sexual abuse.

History. Acts 1993, No. 370, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 370, § 2, provided:

“This act is applicable to all actions filed on or after the effective date of the act [August 13, 1993].”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.

Cross References. Persons under disabilities at time of accrual of action, § 16-56-116.

Subchapter 2 — Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitations Act

16-56-201 — 16-56-210. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning uniform conflicts of laws forms of action, was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 310, § 1. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-56-201. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-302.

16-56-202. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-303.

16-56-203. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-304.

16-56-204. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-305.

16-56-205. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-306.

16-56-206. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-307.

16-56-207. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-301.

16-56-208. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 8.

16-56-209. [Reserved.]

16-56-210. Acts 1985, No. 387, § 9.

Chapter 57 Forms Of Action

16-57-101 — 16-57-109. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This chapter, concerning forms of action, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 189. The chapter was derived from the following sources:

16-57-101. Civil Code, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 1033; Pope's Dig., § 1235; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-204.

16-57-102. Civil Code, § 13; C. & M. Dig., § 1047; Pope's Dig., § 1249; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-215.

16-57-103. Civil Code, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 1034; Pope's Dig., § 1236; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-205.

16-57-104. Civil Code, §§ 7-9; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1041, 1042, 1044; Pope's Dig., §§ 1243, 1244, 1246; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-208 — 27-210.

16-57-105. Civil Code, § 12; C. & M. Dig., § 1043; Pope's Dig., § 1245; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-211.

16-57-106. Civil Code, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 1045; Pope's Dig., § 1247; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-212.

16-57-107. Civil Code, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 1046; Pope's Dig., § 1248; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-213.

16-57-108. Civil Code, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 1048; Pope's Dig., § 1250; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-214.

16-57-109. Civil Code, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 1036; Pope's Dig., § 1238; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-207.

Chapter 58 Commencement Of Action — Process

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules for Inferior Courts [now District Courts] pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Cross References. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, §§ 16-4-10116-4-108.

Effective Dates. Acts 1842, § 36, p. 27: Jan. 1, 1843.

Acts 1846, § 5, p. 86: effective on passage.

Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1875, No. 77, § 53: effective on passage.

Acts 1877, No. 56, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 106, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1915, No. 290, § 24: June 1, 1915.

Acts 1931, No. 42, § 2: approved Feb. 18, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “In view of the fact that a large number of banks in the state are now in the process of liquidation and many actions will be commenced in the courts of this state in which the state bank commissioner will be a necessary party and delay will be occasioned by obtaining service of process on the state bank commissioner in person, an emergency is ascertained and declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1935, No. 70, § 3: became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 26, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas many motor buses, coaches and trucks are being operated upon the public highways of this state and by reason of their operation persons are being injured and their property damaged and in many instances there is now no agent of the owner or operator of such vehicles upon whom service of summons can be had in counties through which same are being operated, therefore an emergency exists on account of such injuries and damages to persons and property and no adequate provisions for service of summons existing, it is found that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after passage.”

Acts 1947, No. 347, § 6: Mar. 28, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas many nonresident persons, firms, partnerships and corporations are not now qualified under the Constitution and laws of this State to do business herein and by reason of operating business in and through the State of Arkansas injury and damage are being done to persons and property within said State; and whereas in cases of such injury and damage by such nonresident defendants those suffering damages thereby have no convenient method by which they may sue to enforce their rights, if any, in the State of Arkansas, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1960 (Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 2: Jan. 21, 1960. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared by the General Assembly that undue hardships are placed upon many victims of accidents involving nonresident motorists in that many of them are unable to make bond for costs when effecting service of process as plaintiffs in actions brought against such nonresidents, thereby preventing them from having their rights litigated in court. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in full force on and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 969, § 5: Mar. 31, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Arkansas Code 16-58-106(c) permits an order of attachment or order for delivery of property to be issued or executed on Sunday only under very limited circumstances; that this provision is unfair to judgment creditors in that failure to issue or execute such order on Sunday may result in the property being concealed or removed from the jurisdiction; that this act is designed to permit the issuance and execution of such orders on any day including Sunday without restrictions and should be given effect immediately to protect judgment creditors in the state. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

In personam jurisdiction over nonresident based on ownership, use, possession, or sale of real property. 4 A.L.R.4th 955.

In personam jurisdiction under long-arm statute of nonresident banking institution. 9 A.L.R.4th 661.

Validity of substituted service of process upon liability insurer of unavailable tortfeasor. 17 A.L.R.4th 918.

In personam jurisdiction, under long-arm statute, over nonresident attorney in legal malpractice action. 23 A.L.R.4th 1044.

In personam jurisdiction, under long-arm statute, over nonresident physician, dentist, or hospital in medical malpractice action. 25 A.L.R.4th 706.

Religious activities as doing or transaction of business under long-arm statutes or rules of court. 26 A.L.R.4th 1176.

Bringing action to trial or other activity sufficient to avoid dismissal under statute or court rule. 32 A.L.R.4th 840.

C.J.S. 72 C.J.S., Process, § 1 et seq.

16-58-101. Payment of fees prerequisite to entry of action or issuance of writ.

  1. No action shall be entered upon the docket of any court nor any original mesne or final process issued in the action, except in criminal cases and cases where the state is plaintiff, until the fees for entering the case upon the docket and for issuing the writ and the taxes thereon, if any, are paid, or bond and security to the approval of the clerk given therefore.
  2. No clerk shall be liable to an action for refusing to docket a cause or issue any writ unless the fee and tax thereon is first tendered or secured as provided in this section.

History. Acts 1875, No. 77, § 8, p. 167; C. & M. Dig. § 4574; Pope's Dig., § 5658; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-302.

Cross References. Circuit court clerks — Miscellaneous fees, § 21-6-402.

Case Notes

Failure to Pay Filing Fee.

Circuit court erred in entering an order dismissing with prejudice the prisoner's civil rights case as the prisoner's case was never filed because he never paid a filing fee to the circuit clerk; therefore, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction. Ward v. Hutchinson, 2018 Ark. 270, 555 S.W.3d 866 (2018).

Liability of Clerk.

The clerk was not liable to an action for refusing to docket a cause or issue any writ where the fees required by this section were not tendered, paid, or secured to the circuit court clerk by the plaintiff in spite of the demands made by the clerk to the plaintiff. McClellan v. Young, 232 Ark. 679, 339 S.W.2d 624 (1960).

16-58-102. Style of process issued by judge, justice, or other officer.

All writs and process issued by any judge, justice of the peace, or other officer authorized to issue the writ or process shall run in the name of the State of Arkansas and be signed by the officer issuing the writ or process.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 159, § 3; C. & M. Dig. § 1125; Pope's Dig., § 1341; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-305.

16-58-103. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning summons generally, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 20[21]. The section was derived from Civil Code, §§ 60, 61, 762; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1127, 1137, 1138; Pope's Dig., §§ 1343, 1353, 1354; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-310, 27-312, 27-313.

16-58-104. Alias or pluries writs.

When any writ or other process issued out of any court of this state is not executed, the clerk of the court shall issue an alias, pluries, or other proper process without an order of the court for that purpose on the application of the party suing out the writ or other process.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 159, § 8; C. & M. Dig., § 1126; Pope's Dig., § 1342; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-311.

Case Notes

Alias Writ.

First or outstanding writ does not have to be returned unexecuted before clerk is authorized to issue alias writ without court order. Carnes v. Strait, 223 Ark. 962, 270 S.W.2d 920 (1954)Questioned byDavis v. Colvin, 238 Ark. 968, 385 S.W.2d 944 (Ark. 1965).

16-58-105. Seal.

All writs shall be sealed with the judicial seal of the court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 159, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 1124; Pope's Dig., § 1340; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-304.

Cross References. Official seals, § 1-4-108.

16-58-106. Issuance and execution of process, writ, summons, etc., on Sunday or a holiday.

  1. It shall be no objection to any process, writ, summons, affidavit, or order for a provisional remedy that it was issued, made, or is dated on a holiday nor shall it be an objection to any bond given by or for any party to an action or taken by an officer in the course of the action that it was made or is dated on any such day.
  2. A summons or order for a provisional remedy may be issued on any holiday, except Sunday. It may be issued on Sunday if an affidavit of the plaintiff or some other person is made to the effect that, unless it is issued on that day, there is reasonable cause to believe that it cannot be executed.
  3. An order of attachment or for the delivery of property or a writ of execution may be issued or executed on any holiday, including Sunday.
    1. A summons, subpoena, notice, order of arrest, or order of injunction may be executed on any holiday except Sunday. It may be executed on Sunday if the officer having the process believes, or an affidavit of the plaintiff or some other person is made to the effect that the affiant believes, that the process cannot be executed after such holiday.
    2. The defendant shall have no privilege of exemption from the service of the process mentioned in subdivision (d)(1) of this section, except from an arrest by reason of his or her attendance at any muster, election, or order of survey or as a witness at any court or other place.

History. Civil Code, §§ 763-767; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1128-1132; Pope's Dig., §§ 1344-1348; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-314 — 27-318; Acts 1997, No. 969, § 1.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The legislature meant by this section that in order to permit the service of process on Sunday such service could not be had anywhere within the state after such Sunday. Waldron Mfg. Corp. v. Kincannon, 197 Ark. 804, 124 S.W.2d 968 (1939).

Service on Sundays.

As a general rule, service of summons on Sunday is void and of no effect except in special cases and cases of urgent necessity. Waldron Mfg. Corp. v. Kincannon, 197 Ark. 804, 124 S.W.2d 968 (1939).

An affidavit by plaintiff's attorney stating that service could not be had upon defendant after that day, which was Sunday, in the southern district of Logan County, was held insufficient under this statute, as it did not state that the service could not be had in any of the other counties of the state. Waldron Mfg. Corp. v. Kincannon, 197 Ark. 804, 124 S.W.2d 968 (1939).

16-58-107. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 was amended on February 1, 2001, by revising subsection (a) to permit service only by a person authorized by this rule to serve process and by revising subsection (c) to allow service of process by a sheriff or deputy unless the sheriff is a party to the action. The amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 were deemed by the Arkansas Supreme Court to supersede Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-58-107, 16-58-108, 16-58-109, 16-58-112, 16-58-113, 16-58-118, and 16-58-119.

Section 16-58-107 was derived from Civil Code, § 65 [65A]; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [65a], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 1143; Pope's Dig., § 1359; and A.S.A. 1947, § 27-322.

16-58-108. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 was amended on February 1, 2001, by revising subsection (a) to permit service only by a person authorized by this rule to serve process and by revising subsection (c) to allow service of process by a sheriff or deputy unless the sheriff is a party to the action. The amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 were deemed by the Arkansas Supreme Court to supersede Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-58-107, 16-58-108, 16-58-109, 16-58-112, 16-58-113, 16-58-118, and 16-58-119.

Section 16-58-108 was derived from Civil Code, § 769; C. & M. Dig., § 1134; Pope's Dig., § 1350; and A.S.A. 1947, § 27-327.

16-58-109. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 was amended on February 1, 2001, by revising subsection (a) to permit service only by a person authorized by this rule to serve process and by revising subsection (c) to allow service of process by a sheriff or deputy unless the sheriff is a party to the action. The amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 were deemed by the Arkansas Supreme Court to supersede Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-58-107, 16-58-108, 16-58-109, 16-58-112, 16-58-113, 16-58-118, and 16-58-119.

Section 16-58-109 was derived from Civil Code, § 807 and A.S.A. 1947, § 27-307.

16-58-110. Sheriff to attend clerk's office to receive process.

It shall be the duty of the sheriff or one (1) of his or her deputies to attend at the clerk's office daily, Sundays excepted, to receive any process that may be issued, and the clerk shall deliver to him or her any process remaining in his or her office.

History. Civil Code, § 65; C. & M. Dig., § 1142; Pope's Dig., § 1358; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-320.

Cross References. Sheriff to execute when directed to him, § 14-14-1301.

Case Notes

Cited: Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

16-58-111. Endorsement of day and hour of receipt on process.

The sheriff shall endorse upon every summons, order of arrest, or order for the delivery of property, or of attachment or injunction in his or her hands the day and hour it was received by him or her.

History. Civil Code, § 776; C. & M. Dig., § 9165; Pope's Dig., § 11827; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-329.

16-58-112. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 was amended on February 1, 2001, by revising subsection (a) to permit service only by a person authorized by this rule to serve process and by revising subsection (c) to allow service of process by a sheriff or deputy unless the sheriff is a party to the action. The amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 were deemed by the Arkansas Supreme Court to supersede Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-58-107, 16-58-108, 16-58-109, 16-58-112, 16-58-113, 16-58-118, and 16-58-119.

Section 16-58-112 was derived from Civil Code, § 768; C. & M. Dig., § 1133; Pope's Dig., § 1349; and A.S.A. 1947, § 27-321.

16-58-113. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 was amended on February 1, 2001, by revising subsection (a) to permit service only by a person authorized by this rule to serve process and by revising subsection (c) to allow service of process by a sheriff or deputy unless the sheriff is a party to the action. The amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 were deemed by the Arkansas Supreme Court to supersede Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-58-107, 16-58-108, 16-58-109, 16-58-112, 16-58-113, 16-58-118, and 16-58-119.

Section 16-58-113 was derived from Acts 1846, §§ 1-4, p. 86; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1462-1465; Pope's Dig., §§ 1763-1766; and A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-323 — 27-326.

16-58-114. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the payment of fee as prerequisite to service of process, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 269, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1875, No. 77, § 22, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., § 4591; Pope's Dig., § 5679; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-328.

16-58-115. Sheriff to note time of service.

When a sheriff serves a summons, he or she shall note on the copy of the summons delivered or offered to the defendant or left at the defendant's residence the time and date the summons was served.

History. Acts 1979, No. 364, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-322.1.

16-58-116. Acknowledgment of service.

Service may be acknowledged by the defendant by an endorsement upon the summons, signed and dated by him or her, and attested by a witness. The affidavit of the witness shall be proof of the service.

History. Civil Code, § 68; C. & M. Dig., § 1146; Pope's Dig., § 1362; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-331.

16-58-117. Return.

    1. Each sheriff, coroner, and constable, on the return made by him or her on any writ or other process, shall state at length the time when, the place where, and how the writ or process was served.
    2. Otherwise, the officer shall not be entitled to demand or receive any fee for the service or execution of the writ or other process.
    1. In all cases of the return of service upon a summons by an officer, the return must state the time of service and that a copy was delivered to, or offered and refused by, the defendant.
      1. If a return of service is defective in these respects, the officer may be fined by the court, not exceeding ten dollars ($10.00), and shall be liable to the action of any person aggrieved by the defect.
      2. However, the court may permit an amendment, according to the truth of the case.
  1. It shall not be a sufficient return of any process that the officer was kept off by force from executing it.

History. Acts 1842, § 25, p. 27; Civil Code, §§ 67, 779; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1145, 4625, 9168; Pope's Dig., §§ 1361, 5714, 11830; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-333 — 27-335.

Case Notes

In General.

When it appears from a return that no sufficient service has been had, the court acquires no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. Coffee v. Gates & Bro., 28 Ark. 43 (1872).

Other County.

The sheriff to whom the writ has been directed from another county is not required to bring it back in person to the office from which it issued, it being sufficient if he endorses a certificate of his proceeding under it and mails it back to the issuing officer. Bledsoe v. Pierce-Williams Co., 147 Ark. 51, 226 S.W. 532 (1921).

Valid Return.

Record made by official endorsement of return is the proper evidence of due service. Coffee v. Gates & Bro., 28 Ark. 43 (1872).

Two returns endorsed on the same day must be considered together; service found defective as the second return did not show that it was left at the usual place of abode with a person over 15 years of age. Pillow v. Sentelle & Co., 39 Ark. 61 (1882).

The return need not follow the exact language of the statute. Duval v. Johnson, 39 Ark. 182 (1882).

Any oral return on an execution made before the justice of the peace who issued the writ does not constitute a valid return. Jones v. Goodbar, 60 Ark. 182, 29 S.W. 462 (1895).

Return stating that a copy was left “with a member of his family over 15 years old at his usual place of abode” was sufficient without stating the name of the person with whom the copy was left. Box v. Equitable Sec. Co., 71 Ark. 286, 73 S.W. 100 (1903).

A sheriff's return may be contradicted by evidence accompanying it. Good Roads Machinery Co. v. Cox, 139 Ark. 29, 212 S.W. 87 (Ark. 1919).

Waiver of Defects.

An answer of a corporation, without preservation of defect in return of service, waived any defect in the return. O'Guinn Volkswagen, Inc. v. Lawson, 256 Ark. 23, 505 S.W.2d 213 (1974)Questioned byBailey v. Matthews, 279 Ark. 117, 649 S.W.2d 175 (1983).

Cited: Cairo & Fulton R.R. v. Trout, 32 Ark. 17 (1877).

16-58-118. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 was amended on February 1, 2001, by revising subsection (a) to permit service only by a person authorized by this rule to serve process and by revising subsection (c) to allow service of process by a sheriff or deputy unless the sheriff is a party to the action. The amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 were deemed by the Arkansas Supreme Court to supersede Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-58-107, 16-58-108, 16-58-109, 16-58-112, 16-58-113, 16-58-118, and 16-58-119.

Section 16-58-118 was derived from Acts 1939, No. 314, § 1; 1947, No. 347, § 1; and A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-610 and 27-612.

16-58-119. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 was amended on February 1, 2001, by revising subsection (a) to permit service only by a person authorized by this rule to serve process and by revising subsection (c) to allow service of process by a sheriff or deputy unless the sheriff is a party to the action. The amendments to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 were deemed by the Arkansas Supreme Court to supersede Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-58-107, 16-58-108, 16-58-109, 16-58-112, 16-58-113, 16-58-118, and 16-58-119.

Section 16-58-119 was derived from Civil Code, §§ 77, 78; Acts 1915, No. 290, § 3, p. 1081; 1917, No. 143, § 1, p. 776; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1157, 1158; Pope's Dig., §§ 1374, 1379; Acts 1961, No. 54, § 1; and A.S.A. 1947, § 27-339.

16-58-120. Method of service — Resident and nonresident defendants out of state — Secretary of State agent.

  1. Any cause of action arising out of acts done in this state by an individual in this state or by an agent or servant in this state of a foreign corporation may be sued upon in this state, although the defendant has left this state, by process served upon or mailed to the individual or corporation outside the state.
    1. Any resident or nonresident person who commits acts in this state sufficient to give an individual in this state a cause of action against the person committing the acts shall have deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as his or her agent for service of process on him or her in any suit arising out of the acts committed by said resident or nonresident.
      1. Service of the process shall be made by:
        1. Serving three (3) copies of the process on the Secretary of State;
        2. Notifying the Secretary of State that service is being effected pursuant to this subsection; and
        3. Paying the Secretary of State the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00).
      2. Such service shall be sufficient service upon the nonresident person or any resident person who has subsequently absented himself or herself physically from the state or upon the executor, administrator, or other legal representative of his or her estate, in case he or she has since died, if notice of the service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by certified mail by the plaintiff or his or her attorney to the defendant at his or her last known address or to the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate in case the person has died, and the defendant's return receipt or the return receipt of the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate of the deceased person is attached to the writ of process and entered and filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which such cases are brought.
    2. The court in which the action is pending may order some continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the act.
    3. The Secretary of State, upon receiving a copy of the service of summons, shall also forthwith mail a copy of the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, by first-class mail to the last and best known address of the named defendant in the suit, notifying him or her of the filing of the suit.
  2. A defendant so summoned shall have thirty (30) days in which to answer after service upon him or her.
  3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a corporation that has an agent for service of process registered with the Secretary of State.

History. Acts 1963, No. 119, §§ 1, 2; 1983, No. 167, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-339.1, 27-339.2; Acts 1997, No. 1213, § 1.

Research References

ALR.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.

Ark. L. Rev.

Legislative Notes — No. 119 — Personal Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 124.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Civil Procedure, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 131.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Family Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 200.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Family Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 159.

Case Notes

In General.

When an issue of jurisdiction arises under a broad long-arm statute such as this section, the plaintiff must first establish the validity of his substantive cause of action; the complaint must allege facts bringing the case within the long-arm statute and must state a prima facie cause of action and conclusory allegations do not suffice. Howard v. County Court, 278 Ark. 117, 644 S.W.2d 256 (1983).

In a divorce action, where service on the husband was attempted by sending the complaint and summons by certified mail to the husband's last known address, but the summons was returned unclaimed, the trial court erred in allowing service by warning order, without the filing of an affidavit that a diligent inquiry had been made into the husband's whereabouts as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(f), and the divorce decree that had been entered was void. Jackson v. Jackson, 81 Ark. App. 249, 100 S.W.3d 92 (2003).

Applicability.

This section is not limited to tort actions. Mallory v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 909, 521 S.W.2d 215 (1975).

The acquisition of personal jurisdiction under the “long-arm statute” is not restricted to tort actions but applies to all causes of action arising out of acts done within this state, including divorce, alimony, support, and property division. Knox v. Knox, 25 Ark. App. 107, 753 S.W.2d 290 (1988).

Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state trucking company was not dependent on § 16-4-101 where, at trial, the proof was not in dispute as to the situs of the collision; thus, Arkansas acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant under this section because the plaintiff's cause of action arose directly from an act committed in this state by the agent of the defendant. Watkins Motor Lines v. Hedrick, 316 Ark. 683, 873 S.W.2d 814 (1994).

The plain language of this section requires that the person upon whom service is sought must be one who has subsequently absented himself physically from this state. Dougherty v. Sullivan, 318 Ark. 608, 887 S.W.2d 305 (1994).

As appellant failed to personally serve appellee and thus did not attach a return receipt to the writ of process and file it in the clerk's office, it could not avail itself of the long-arm statute. Pulaski Choice, L.L.C. v. 2735 Villa Creek, L.P., 2010 Ark. App. 451, 376 S.W.3d 500 (2010).

Appellant could not avail itself of the long-arm statute as this section did not apply to in rem proceedings like appellant's quiet title action. Pulaski Choice, L.L.C. v. 2735 Villa Creek, L.P., 2010 Ark. App. 451, 376 S.W.3d 500 (2010).

Evidence.

Evidence insufficient for court to obtain jurisdiction. Hinson v. Culberson-Stowers Chevrolet, Inc., 244 Ark. 853, 427 S.W.2d 539 (1968); Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (1981); Howard v. County Court, 278 Ark. 117, 644 S.W.2d 256 (1983).

Evidence sufficient for court to obtain jurisdiction. Mallory v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 909, 521 S.W.2d 215 (1975); Bunker v. Bunker, 261 Ark. 851, 552 S.W.2d 641 (1977).

Reasonableness.

Whether the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of acts done within this state is reasonable depends on the “basic fairness” test of due process and on consideration of other factors. Knox v. Knox, 25 Ark. App. 107, 753 S.W.2d 290 (1988).

Whether the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of acts done in this state is reasonable depends upon the facts of each individual case, with the principle factors to be considered being the nature and quality of the acts, the extent of the relationship of the defendant to this state, and the degree of inconvenience which would result to the defendant by being forced to stand suit in this state. Jessie v. Jessie, 53 Ark. App. 188, 920 S.W.2d 874 (1996).

Service of Process.

In a case based on § 4-60-103, which permits recovery on checks written on accounts with insufficient funds, appellant's service through the Secretary of State did not effect proper service on an LLC, whose certificate of authority in Arkansas had been revoked, despite appellant's contention that service was properly effected based on this section; the complaint did not allege that any acts were done in Arkansas, appellant was not in Arkansas, and appellant did not send process to appellee's last known address. Eliasnik v. Y&S Pine Bluff, LLC, 2018 Ark. App. 138, 546 S.W.3d 497 (2018).

Cited: White v. Ray, 267 Ark. 83, 589 S.W.2d 28 (1979); Franklin v. Griffith, 282 Ark. 271, 668 S.W.2d 518 (1984); Young v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1988); Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996).

16-58-121. Method of service — Nonresident or absent owner, chauffeur, driver, or operator — Survival of action.

    1. The acceptance by a nonresident owner, chauffeur, driver, or operator, or by a resident owner, chauffeur, driver, or operator of any motor vehicle who subsequently absents himself or herself physically from the state, except such nonresident owners or operators, drivers, or chauffeurs as may have a designated agent within this state upon whom valid and binding service of process may be had under the laws of this state, of the rights and privileges conferred by the laws of the State of Arkansas to drive or operate or permit or cause to be operated or driven a motor vehicle upon the public highway, private property, and property owned or controlled by the United States Government within this state as evidenced by his or her or its operating or causing or permitting a motor vehicle to be operated or driven thereon or the operation by a nonresident owner, nonresident operator or chauffeur, or resident owner, operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, or the causing or permitting by the nonresident owner, nonresident operator or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself physically from the state, of a motor vehicle to be operated on the highway, private property, and property owned or controlled by the United States Government within the State of Arkansas shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by the nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur, or by the resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, whether the nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, is an individual, firm, or corporation, of the Secretary of the State of Arkansas or his or her successor in office to be the true and lawful attorney and agent of the nonresident owner, or nonresident operator, or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action or proceedings against him or her against any such person, firm, or corporation, or in the case of death of any such person, against any administrator, executor, or other legal representative of his estate, growing out of any accident or collision in which the nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, or any agent, servant, or employee of any such nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on a highway, private property, or property owned or controlled by the United States Government within this state, whether the nonresident operator or chauffeur or resident operator or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state is the owner of the motor vehicle or not.
    2. Such acceptance or operation shall be a signification of the agreement of any such person, firm, or corporation, that any such process against any such person, firm, or corporation, or against the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate of such person who may not have survived in such accident or collision, which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on such person, firm, or corporation personally.
    1. Service of the process shall be made by serving a copy of the process on the Secretary of State, notifying the Secretary of State that service is being effected pursuant to this subsection, and paying the Secretary of State the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00). Such service shall be sufficient service upon the nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur or upon the resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur who has subsequently absented himself or herself physically from the state, or upon the executor, administrator, or other legal representative of his or her estate in case he or she has not survived such accident or collision or has since died, if notice of the service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff or his or her attorney to the defendant at his or her last known address or to the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate in the case he or she has not survived the accident or collision or has since died, and notice of such service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff or his or her attorney to the defendant at his or her last known address, or to the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate of the deceased wrongdoer or tortfeasor, and the defendant's return receipt, or the return receipt of the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate of the deceased person, or the affidavit of the plaintiff or his or her attorney of compliance herewith are to be appended to the writ of process and entered and filed in the office of the clerk of the court wherein the cause is brought. The Secretary of State, upon receiving a copy of the service of summons shall also forthwith mail a copy of the summons together with a copy of the complaint by first class mail to the last and best known address of the named defendant in the suit, notifying him or her of the filing of the suit.
    2. The court in which the action is pending may order any continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action.
    1. Any cause of action arising out of the accident or collision against any person, in the case of the death of that person, shall survive against his or her administrator, executor, or other legal representative of his or her estate.
    2. Service of summons when obtained upon any such nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur; or resident owner, resident operator or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself physically from the state; or his or her executor, administrator, or other legal representative of his or her estate, as provided in this section for the service of process, shall be deemed sufficient service of summons and process to give to any of the courts of this state jurisdiction over the cause of action and over such nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur, or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, or the defendant, and shall warrant and authorize personal judgment against such nonresident owner, nonresident operator or chauffeur; resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state; executor, administrator, or other legal representative of his or her estate; or the defendant in the event that the plaintiff prevails in the action.

History. Acts 1955, No. 38, §§ 1-3; 1959, No. 307, § 23; 1960 (Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 1; 1963, No. 520, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-342.1 — 27-342.3; Acts 1997, No. 1213, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. As to penalty for violation of Acts 1959, No. 307, see § 27-50-305.

Research References

ALR.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

Ark. L. Rev.

Meaning of Term “Public Highway” in Nonresident Motorist Service Act, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 323.

Substituted Service on Resident Owners or Operators of Motor Vehicles, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 390.

Arkansas Nonresident Motorist Service Statute — Actual Notice Necessary, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 381.

Conflict of Laws — Arkansas 1959-64, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 135.

The Uniform Long-Arm Act in Arkansas: The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 627.

Conflict of Laws — Personal Jurisdiction and the Long-Arm Statute, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 106.

Civil Procedure — Arkansas' Non-Resident Motorist Statute — What Is Sufficient Compliance?, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 63.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1969-72, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former similar section held not unconstitutional upon contention it denies nonresident owners of motor vehicles equal protection of the law and due process. Highway Steel & Mfg. Co. v. Kincannon, 198 Ark. 134, 127 S.W.2d 816, appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 504, 60 S. Ct. 88, 84 L. Ed. 431 (1939); Alexander v. Bush, 199 Ark. 562, 134 S.W.2d 519 (1939)Questioned byForsgren v. Gillioz, 110 F. Supp. 647 (D. Ark. 1953) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Actual Notice.

Former similar section required actual notice of the pendency of the action before jurisdiction of the defendant was acquired. Alexander v. Bush, 199 Ark. 562, 134 S.W.2d 519 (1939)Questioned byForsgren v. Gillioz, 110 F. Supp. 647 (D. Ark. 1953) (decision under prior law).

Service under this section is complete, for purposes of determining prior jurisdiction as between state trial courts, at least when notice is actually received by the defendant or defendants, if not in fact complete prior to that time. Simmons v. Broomfield, 163 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Default judgment invalid where this section not properly complied with. Jenkins v. Hill, 240 Ark. 197, 398 S.W.2d 679 (1966); Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971).

Attorney/Client Relationship.

Where service was attempted on nonresident defendant under similar former section but copy of summons was sent to attorney who allegedly represented defendant, question of whether an attorney and client relationship existed between defendant and the attorney was a question of fact for the trial judge. Harris v. Starr, 226 Ark. 127, 288 S.W.2d 332 (1956) (decision under prior law).

Guardian Ad Litem.

This section is by its terms a personal service statute, therefore appellant's claim that judgment by default was improperly rendered on constructive service because no attorney ad litem was appointed to represent him, and that he had right to have action retried within two years after judgment had no merit. Agee v. Wildman, 240 Ark. 111, 398 S.W.2d 542 (1966).

Invalid Service.

Where the plaintiff did not demonstrate that sufficient inquiry was made in attempting to ascertain defendant's last known address and thereby deprived defendant of reasonably probable actual notice consistent with due process, the substitute service statute was not sufficiently complied with and default judgment was void. Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971).

Service found to be invalid but the summons itself was not void and an order of dismissal based on this ground was error since it would prevent the service of a properly issued summons by a duly authorized person. Merriott v. Whitsell, 251 Ark. 1031, 476 S.W.2d 230 (1972).

Constructive service obtained on motorist under this section was not valid, where there was no allegation that motorist was from outside the state or had absented himself from the state. Morphew v. Safeco Ins. Co., 256 Ark. 809, 510 S.W.2d 543 (1974).

Ownership.

Service on defendant was proper under this section where she signed a statement before the accident, referring to the pickup truck which she turned over to stepson motorist as “my Ford Truck,” when she conceded in her brief on appeal that an inference could be made that title was in her name at the time of the accident, and where the certificate of title reflected that 12 days after the accident she transferred title from her deceased husband's estate to herself. Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996).

Perfection of Service.

Where nonresident defendant filed a motion to quash summons for the reason that plaintiff did not mail copy of summons and complaint by registered mail, and plaintiff subsequently complied with the statute by mailing the copies by registered mail to the defendant, the motion to quash would be overruled, as service had been perfected. Fritchey v. Summar, 86 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (decision under prior law).

Trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant where service was perfected on the Secretary of State pursuant to this section, notwithstanding the fact that the record did not contain a return of service as proof that service was accomplished, since perfection of service was never contested by defendant. Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996).

Second Suit.

Where plaintiff failed to allege defendant was a nonresident and thereafter filed a second suit in which he alleged defendant was a nonresident and defendant filed a motion in the second suit to quash the return of summons, motion was properly overruled, as second suit superseded first as both suits were the same except for allegation that defendant was a nonresident. Webb v. Pope County Circuit Court, 214 Ark. 890, 218 S.W.2d 722 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Standing.

Defendant in action by minor who was injured by motorist who was allegedly encouraged to speed by defendant did not have standing to raise issue of whether the absentee motorist had been properly served under this section. Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 258 Ark. 9, 522 S.W.2d 383 (1975).

Sufficient Compliance.

Service on nonresident operator pursuant to this section is valid, hence part of summons referring to prior statute, which only authorized service against nonresident owner, will be treated as surplus. Hamlin v. Darr, 220 Ark. 841, 250 S.W.2d 532 (1952).

Service against nonresident motorist may be obtained under this section in proceeding by tortfeasor against whom judgment was obtained to obtain contribution from other joint tortfeasors. Burnett v. Agent, 227 Ark. 1050, 303 S.W.2d 575 (1957).

Survival of Action.

Statutory agency of Secretary of State for service of process was held not to expire upon the death of a nonresident motorist. Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Simmons v. Broomfield, 163 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Aufderhar v. American Employers Ins. Co., 331 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1964); Davis v. Schimmel, 252 Ark. 1201, 482 S.W.2d 785 (1972); Merriott v. Whitsell, 251 Ark. 1031, 476 S.W.2d 230 (1972); Stubbs v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Franklin v. Griffith, 282 Ark. 271, 668 S.W.2d 518 (1984).

16-58-122. Method of service — Owner or operator of motor buses or trucks.

  1. When the defendant is the owner or operator of any motor bus or buses, motor coach or coaches, or motor truck or trucks engaged in the business of carrying and transporting either passengers, freight, goods, wares, or merchandise over any of the highways of this state, the service of summons may be had upon an owner or operator by serving the summons upon:
    1. Any clerk or agent of the owner or operator selling tickets or transacting any business for the owner or operator; or
    2. Any driver or chauffeur of any bus, coach, or truck being operated or driven by the driver or chauffeur as a servant, agent, or employee of the owner or operator.
  2. Service had upon the agent or agents of an owner or operator or had upon a chauffeur or driver of any bus, coach, or truck being operated or driven by the driver or chauffeur as a servant, agent, or employee of the owner or operator shall be deemed and considered as good and valid service upon the owner or operator whether the owner or operator is a person, firm, or corporation.
  3. Nothing contained in this section shall be so construed as to repeal any provision of the law of this state as to venue or service of summons in effect on February 26, 1935, except where the law may be in direct conflict with the provisions of this section. It is the intention of this section to provide further and additional methods of obtaining service of summons as against the owners and operators of motor buses, coaches, and trucks, as set out in this section.

History. Acts 1935, No. 70, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 1377, 1378; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-343, 27-344.

Research References

ALR.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section affords due process and is not discriminatory. Yocum v. Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co., 191 Ark. 1126, 89 S.W.2d 919 (1936).

In General.

This section is a service statute only and it did not impair or take away any of the means of service already existing by law. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pipkin, 199 Ark. 339, 133 S.W.2d 851 (1939).

Purpose.

This section was intended to afford service rights only in those cases where adequate provisions for service had not been made by previous statutes. Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Toler, 197 Ark. 1097, 126 S.W.2d 618 (1939).

Applicability.

This section is not applicable to service to recover damages sustained by drinking beverage containing foreign substance, where beverage company had no agent or place of business in the county; it applies only to acts for damages to persons or their property occasioned by the negligent operation of motor buses, coaches or trucks. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Bacon, 193 Ark. 6, 97 S.W.2d 74 (1936); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. O'Neal, 193 Ark. 1143, 104 S.W.2d 808 (1937).

This statute was held to apply to action for injuries to passenger forcibly ejected from bus by its driver. Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Toler, 197 Ark. 1097, 126 S.W.2d 618 (1939).

This section was passed for the purpose of obtaining service on a tortfeasor where service could not have otherwise been obtained in this state on him, and, where other service is available this section has no application. Lindley v. Kincannon, 200 Ark. 772, 140 S.W.2d 1005 (1940).

This section applies to all operators of trucks and buses whether operating on fixed lines or not. Viking Freight Co. v. Keck, 202 Ark. 656, 153 S.W.2d 163 (1941).

Agent.

This section was held to authorize service of process upon driver of truck belonging to foreign corporation and used to deliver goods to corporation's customers in county where accident occurred. Yocum v. Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co., 191 Ark. 1126, 89 S.W.2d 919 (1936).

Service of process on the terminal manager of another bus company with whom the defendant bus company contracted for use of its terminal facilities and to sell tickets for it was invalid where the defendant bus company had a superintendent residing in the state and who was registered with the Arkansas Commerce Commission as its resident agent for service of process. Bullard v. Crown Coach Co., 248 Ark. 739, 453 S.W.2d 712 (1970).

Compliance with Statute.

Service of summons was unauthorized as compliance with section insufficient. Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Toler, 197 Ark. 1097, 126 S.W.2d 618 (1939); Bryant Truck Lines v. Nance, 199 Ark. 556, 134 S.W.2d 555 (1939).

In a suit based on alleged negligent operation of defendant's bus, service on agent who sold tickets and maintained a bus station for defendant was sufficient without resort to any of the provisions of this section. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pipkin, 199 Ark. 339, 133 S.W.2d 851 (1939).

Question of Fact.

Prohibition did not lie to prevent trial of suit against taxicab company upon service on taxi driver under the provisions of this section since whether a taxicab is such a conveyance as is referred to in this act may depend upon a question of fact, to be determined, in the first instance, by the trial court. Safeway Cab & Storage Co. v. Kincannon, 192 Ark. 1019, 96 S.W.2d 7 (1936), overruled in part, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672 (1937).

16-58-123. Method of service — Owner or officer of steamboat or watercraft.

When any action to recover judgment against the owners or officers of any steamboat, vessel, or other watercraft for any debt or liability created by them, or either of them, is commenced in any county in which the steamboat, vessel, or watercraft was found and, from any cause the summons or other process cannot be served in the action in the county where that action was commenced, a service in any other county in this state has the same effect as if made in the county where the action was brought.

History. Civil Code, § 76; C. & M. Dig., § 1156; Pope's Dig., § 1373; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-345.

Research References

ALR.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

Case Notes

Judgment.

A judgment against the owner of a steamboat upon service of process had in another county is void unless the record shows that the steamboat was found in the county in which the action was commenced. Ford v. Adams, 54 Ark. 137, 15 S.W. 186 (1891).

Cited: Ribelin v. Wilks, 135 Ark. 599, 205 S.W. 977 (1918).

16-58-124. Method of service — Corporations.

  1. When the defendant is a corporation created by the laws of this state, the service of the summons may be upon the president, mayor, or chairman of the board of trustees. In case of the absence of the above officers, then it may be served upon the cashier, treasurer, secretary, clerk, or agent of the corporation. In case of railroad corporations, it may be served upon any station agent or upon any person who has control of any of the business of that corporation, either as clerk, agent, or otherwise, who as agent or clerk has to report to the corporation who employs him or her. In cases of railroad corporations, a service of a copy of the summons upon the clerk or agent of any station in the county where the summons is issued shall be deemed and considered as a good and valid service.
  2. In the case of a foreign railroad corporation which files its articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State, process shall be served on the agent or agents of the corporation, or upon the agent or agents of the receiver or receivers of the corporation, in the same manner that process is authorized by law to be served on railroad corporations existing under laws of this state. Service upon the agent or agents of any receiver or receivers of any such foreign railroad corporation shall be deemed and considered as good and valid service upon the corporation and upon the receivers thereof.

History. Civil Code, § 69; Acts 1877, No. 56, § 1, p. 59; 1901, No. 106, § 1, p. 171; C. & M. Dig., § 1147; Pope's Dig., § 1363; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-346.

Research References

ALR.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.

Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of Garnishment: A Compendium of the Pertinent Cases and Statutes, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 39.

Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of Garnishemnt: Does a Corporate Garnishee Need a Lawyer to Answer the Writ?, 1997 Ark. L. Notes 95.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

A statute prescribing a mode of service of process on a railroad which is different from that provided for in its charter is not void as impairing the obligations of a contract. Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168, 24 L. Ed. 423 (1877).

Administrative Orders.

Service of an order of an administrative agency can be by mail; there is no requirement that such service comply with the law regarding service of summons. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd. v. F & F Concrete Prods., Inc., 297 Ark. 508, 763 S.W.2d 86 (1989).

Proper County.

A domestic corporation must be sued in the county where it has its principal place of business or where its chief officer resides and it can be sued in another county only when it has a branch office therein. Beal-Doyle Dry Goods Co. v. Odd Fellows Bldg. Co., 109 Ark. 77, 158 S.W. 955 (1913), overruled, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672 (1937).

Service of process in a transitory action against a domestic corporation issuing from a court of the county where the corporation has a branch office and served on the manager of the principal office in another county where the corporation had its principal place of business should have been quashed. Duncan Lumber Co. v. Blalock, 171 Ark. 397, 284 S.W. 15 (1926), overruled, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672 (1937); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672 (1937).

Summons served on domestic corporation in county in which it had no office and wherein its chief officer did not reside is invalid. Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Landers Chevrolet Co., 183 Ark. 669, 37 S.W.2d 873 (1931).

Proper Persons.

—Corporations Generally.

Service of summons on subordinate officer of a fraternal insurance order is invalid where the chief officer of the order is within the county at the time. Knights of Honor v. Epps, 123 Ark. 371, 185 S.W. 470 (1916).

Employee of drug store who was paid by power company to accept payment and receipt the bills of patrons of the power company in that locality was a proper person to receive service of process for the power company. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Hoover, 182 Ark. 1065, 34 S.W.2d 464 (1931)Limited byInternational Paper Co. v. Aud, 210 Ark. 425, 196 S.W.2d 578 (1946).

Service on grand master of incorporated lodge was void as he was not one of officers named in the section. Brick v. Sovereign Grand Lodge, 196 Ark. 372, 117 S.W.2d 1060 (1938).

Service of writ of process in garnishment proceedings was properly held invalid where return showed delivery of a copy to a vice-president who was not in control of the corporation's business and evidence failed to show that the president was unavailable. Nutrena Mills, Inc. v. Parsons Feed & Farm Supply, Inc., 234 Ark. 1058, 356 S.W.2d 421 (1962).

Where a writ of garnishment was issued on a bank and the sheriff contended that he served it on a vice-president of the bank but no notation was made on the return that the bank president was not available, the service was invalid. First Nat'l Bank v. H & M Lumber Co., 252 Ark. 175, 477 S.W.2d 850 (1972).

Where a deputy sheriff served a writ of garnishment on a corporation's office manager, who was neither a corporate officer nor the designated agent for process, despite the fact that the corporation's president was in the city on the service day, there was a clear failure to comply with the statutory service requirements of this section; accordingly, a default judgment against the corporation was properly set aside pursuant to ARCP Rule 55(c) and Rule 60 for lack of personal jurisdiction. Pounders v. Chicken Country, Inc., 3 Ark. App. 220, 624 S.W.2d 445 (1981).

Where absence of corporation's president was never shown, service of writ of garnishment on bookkeeper and secretary of corporation would not be proper under this section; under same circumstances, however, service on secretary of the corporation and the bookkeeper, who testified that she was “more or less in charge of the office” at the time of service, would be proper under ARCP 4(d)(5). Since these provisions conflict and this section does not fit into the exception described in ARCP 81(a), ARCP 4(d)(5) supersedes this section. May v. Bob Hankins Distrib. Co., 301 Ark. 494, 785 S.W.2d 23 (1990).

—Railroad Corporations.

Under § 16-55-116(d) and this section, a station agent is the proper person on whom to serve notices on railroads. St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Hale, 82 Ark. 175, 100 S.W. 1148 (1907).

A judgment at law against a railroad company against which there was a good defense will not be enjoined in equity if the default judgment was the result of inattention on the part of the station agent of the railroad company upon whom process was served. Cazort & McGehee Co. v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 100 Ark. 395, 140 S.W. 277 (1911).

Service of summons on the conductor of a train passing through the county is not sufficient. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Solomon & Weinberg, 161 Ark. 552, 256 S.W. 862 (1923).

A telegraph operator was agent of a defendant railroad although he was in the employment of another railroad which paid his salary and regularly received and delivered dispatches regarding movements of the defendant's trains and sold tickets for passage thereon. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Steele, 190 Ark. 662, 80 S.W.2d 623 (1935).

Return.

Return of process served upon an agent of a domestic corporation which does not recite that the president or other chief officer is absent from the county is insufficient. Arkansas Coal, Gas, Fire-Clay & Mfg. Co. v. Haley, 62 Ark. 144, 34 S.W. 545 (1896); Arkansas Constr. Co. v. Mullins, 69 Ark. 429, 64 S.W. 225 (1901).

An officer's return to a writ of garnishment stating that he delivered a copy thereof to the within named company by delivering to its manager a true and perfect copy is insufficient in failing to show whether the company was a domestic or foreign corporation or a partnership. Moreno-Burkham Constr. Co. v. Thorpe, 152 Ark. 550, 237 S.W. 427 (1922).

In an action against a bridge company, where the allegations fail to show whether it is a corporation or a partnership, a return of summons as duly served by handing a copy of it to the bridge company to a named agent in charge of its business in a certain city, was insufficient. Austin Bridge Co. v. Vaughan, 178 Ark. 995, 13 S.W.2d 13 (1929).

Return of process may be amended where the proper person was served although his position was misstated. O'Guinn Volkswagen, Inc. v. Lawson, 256 Ark. 23, 505 S.W.2d 213 (1974)Questioned byBailey v. Matthews, 279 Ark. 117, 649 S.W.2d 175 (1983).

16-58-125. Method of service — Corporate agent at branch office.

    1. Any and all foreign and domestic corporations which keep or maintain in any of the counties of this state a branch office or other place of business shall be subject to suits in any of the courts in any of the counties where the corporation keeps or maintains the office or place of business.
    2. Service of summons or other process of law from any of the courts held in the counties upon the agent, servant, or employee in charge of the office or place of business shall be deemed good and sufficient service upon the corporation and shall be sufficient to give jurisdiction to any of the courts of this state held in the counties where the service of summons or other process of law is had upon the agent, servant, or employee of the corporation.
  1. This section shall not be taken and held by the courts of this state as repealing any of the laws of this state in force on April 1, 1909, and governing and regulating the service of process or summons upon corporations of this state, but shall be by the courts of this state construed and held as cumulative and in aid of the laws of this state in force on April 1, 1909.

History. Acts 1909, No. 98, §§ 1, 2, p. 293; C. & M. Dig., § 1152; Pope's Dig., § 1369; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-347, 27-348.

Research References

ALR.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.

Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of Garnishment: A Compendium of the Pertinent Cases and Statutes, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 39.

Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of Garnishemnt: Does a Corporate Garnishee Need a Lawyer to Answer the Writ?, 1997 Ark. L. Notes 95.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section is construed to mean that such corporations as mentioned shall be subject to suits in any of the courts of any of the counties, if it keeps or maintains a place where a well-defined line of business is carried on with an agent in charge of that business. Harrison v. Swift & Co., 200 Ark. 285, 139 S.W.2d 4 (1940).

This section does not repeal any statute relating to service of process but nothing is said to limit its effect upon venue since providing venue in additional counties is certainly cumulative in effect and the section cannot be read to be cumulative only to statutes governing method of service. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Enfield, 261 Ark. 796, 551 S.W.2d 552 (1977).

Applicability.

Defendants contending that this statute, rather than § 16-60-108, is the applicable statute could not prevent a trial for want of jurisdiction where the jurisdiction depended on questions of fact. Millsap v. Williams, 236 Ark. 416, 366 S.W.2d 705 (1963).

Corporations.

Because the buyer failed to produce any facts to support its venue argument, and because this section and § 16-58-116 supported venue for the action in Cleburne County, the trial court correctly denied the buyer's motion to dismiss on the basis of venue. Ison Props., LLC v. Wood, 85 Ark. App. 443, 156 S.W.3d 742 (2004).

Insufficiency Not Apparent.

Where alleged lack of service on foreign corporation is not apparent upon the face of the records but arose upon presentation of evidence of certain factual conditions and legal effect of the facts, writ of prohibition to prevent trial was denied. Simms Oil Co. v. Jones, 192 Ark. 189, 91 S.W.2d 258 (1936).

Office and Business.

The words “branch office” and “other place of business” are not synonymous; branch office designates a place where business is transacted similar to that where the principal office is situated. Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Shackleford, 115 Ark. 272, 171 S.W. 99 (1914).

A foreign corporation need not own or rent the building in which it conducts its business to authorized service on the agent in charge. Ramey v. Baker, 182 Ark. 1043, 34 S.W.2d 461 (1931).

Service on domestic corporation in county in which it had no branch office or other place of business was invalid. Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Landers Chevrolet Co., 183 Ark. 669, 37 S.W.2d 873 (1931).

—Branch Office.

In an action against a foreign corporation, service of summons in a county where the company maintains a branch office is sufficient. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Senn, 184 Ark. 554, 43 S.W.2d 255 (1931).

Contract action could only be brought where corporation maintained branch. Mayner v. Utah Constr. Co., 108 F. Supp. 532 (W.D. Ark. 1952).

—Place of Business.

Establishment of place of business found. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Hoover, 182 Ark. 1065, 34 S.W.2d 464 (1931)Limited byInternational Paper Co. v. Aud, 210 Ark. 425, 196 S.W.2d 578 (1946); Cook v. Malvern Brick & Tile Co., 194 Ark. 759, 109 S.W.2d 451 (1937); Public Loan Corp. v. Stanberry, 224 Ark. 258, 272 S.W.2d 694 (1954); Brandon v. Memphis Publishing Co., 194 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Ark. 1961).

In action for injuries by passenger forcibly ejected from defendant's bus, filing of action in county other than the one where defendant maintained a place of business and service of summons on bus driver was unauthorized. Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Toler, 197 Ark. 1097, 126 S.W.2d 618 (1939).

Plaintiff did not secure jurisdiction of defendant corporation by service of process on the corporation in county where defendant had principal place of business, where suit was filed in county wherein defendant had no officers or place of business at all. Concrete, Inc. v. Arkhola Sand & Gravel Co., 228 Ark. 1016, 311 S.W.2d 770 (1958).

Other Laws.

This section was not affected by § 16-58-122(a) and (b). Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Toler, 197 Ark. 1097, 126 S.W.2d 618 (1939); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pipkin, 199 Ark. 339, 133 S.W.2d 851 (1939).

Rule 4 A.R.C.P. did not supersede this section. Sun Gas Liquids Co. v. Helena Nat'l Bank, 276 Ark. 173, 633 S.W.2d 38 (1982)Criticized byVenable v. Becker, 287 Ark. 236, 697 S.W.2d 903 (1985).

Proper County.

Where transitory action against domestic corporation was brought in county in which it maintained a branch, service should have been upon the agent in that county, and not on the general manager of the corporation in the county in which the corporation maintained its principal office. Duncan Lumber Co. v. Blalock, 171 Ark. 397, 284 S.W. 15 (1926), overruled, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672 (1937).

Service on agent in charge of branch office may be at any place he may be found in the county. Black Springs Lumber Co. v. Palmer, 192 Ark. 1032, 96 S.W.2d 469 (1936).

Where action against foreign corporation was brought in one county under this section, service of process on designated agent for service in another county was invalid. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672 (1937).

Proper Persons.

Person found to be agent upon whom process could be properly served. Terry Dairy Co. v. Parker, 144 Ark. 401, 223 S.W. 6 (1920); Riggs v. Clay County Burial Ass'n, 192 Ark. 994, 96 S.W.2d 4 (1936); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pipkin, 199 Ark. 339, 133 S.W.2d 851 (1939); Public Loan Corp. v. Stanberry, 224 Ark. 258, 272 S.W.2d 694 (1954); Arkansas Indep. Oil Marketers Ass'n v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 225 Ark. 620, 284 S.W.2d 127 (1955); Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Tolbert, 233 Ark. 249, 343 S.W.2d 784 (1961).

Person found not to be agent of the corporation upon whom process could be properly served within this statute where shipments were made f.o.b. and products handled became the property of the distributor. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672 (1937); International Paper Co. v. Aud, 210 Ark. 425, 196 S.W.2d 578 (1946).

The requirement that service be made upon the person in charge of the corporate office or business is mandatory. Morgan v. National Pizza Co., 285 Ark. 61, 684 S.W.2d 812 (1985).

An order setting aside the judgment against a garnishee was appealable to the Supreme Court only because the appeal involved the interpretation or construction of this section which establishes the requirements for services of process upon a corporate agent at a branch office. Morgan v. National Pizza Co., 285 Ark. 61, 684 S.W.2d 812 (1985).

Return.

Sheriff's return showing service on defendant's agent without allegation that defendant maintained an office or other place of business in the county and not showing that summons was served upon an agent in charge of an office or other place of business, was insufficient to show valid service in action. Sloan v. Peoples Loan & Inv. Co., 195 Ark. 1085, 115 S.W.2d 833 (1938).

Venue.

This section governs venue and clearly states that venue in an action against a domestic corporation can be laid in any county where the corporation maintains a branch office and that service of summons from any court held in the county upon the person in charge of the office is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Enfield, 261 Ark. 796, 551 S.W.2d 552 (1977).

Cited: Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Shackleford, 115 Ark. 272, 171 S.W. 99 (1914); Arkansas Valley Indus., Inc. v. Roberts, 244 Ark. 432, 425 S.W.2d 298 (1968); Cavette v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 260 Ark. 874, 545 S.W.2d 612 (1977); Porter Foods, Inc. v. Brown, 281 Ark. 148, 661 S.W.2d 388 (1983); Zolper v. AT&T Info. Sys., 289 Ark. 27, 709 S.W.2d 74 (1986).

16-58-126. Method of service — Corporations — Secretary of State.

Whenever process in any suit against a domestic corporation cannot be served in the county of the corporation's domicile upon any officer authorized to be served with process by the laws of the state and this fact is made to appear by the return of the sheriff of the county upon summons directed to the officer, the process may be served on the Secretary of State. He or she shall immediately send the process served on him or her to the corporation at its place of domicile by mail. The service shall be as valid as if served on an officer of the corporation authorized to be served with process. The service shall date from the time of service upon the Secretary of State.

History. Acts 1915, No. 290, § 22; C. & M. Dig., § 1148; Pope's Dig., § 1364; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-349.

Research References

ALR.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

16-58-127. Method of service — Foreign corporations.

Where the defendant is a foreign corporation having an agent in this state, the service may be upon the agent.

History. Civil Code, § 72; C. & M. Dig., § 1151; Pope's Dig., § 1368; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-350.

Research References

ALR.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

Case Notes

Agent.

Process against a foreign corporation may be served upon an agent of the corporation residing within the county of the venue where the agent was in control of the business of the corporation in the county, although the corporation had designated an agent residing elsewhere in the state upon whom process might be served. Lesser Cotton Co. v. Yates, 69 Ark. 396, 63 S.W. 997 (1901).

Whether the actions of an agent of a foreign corporation are sufficient to constitute him an agent for service is a question for the trial court. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. v. Surface Combustion Corp., 222 Ark. 591, 261 S.W.2d 769 (1953).

Person found to be agent upon whom process could be properly served. Public Loan Corp. v. Stanberry, 224 Ark. 258, 272 S.W.2d 694 (1954); Brandon v. Memphis Publishing Co., 194 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Ark. 1961); Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Tolbert, 233 Ark. 249, 343 S.W.2d 784 (1961); Bullard v. Crown Coach Co., 248 Ark. 739, 453 S.W.2d 712 (1970).

Where employee of foreign corporation is clothed with the power to hire and fire employees and pay their wages, to endorse checks made out to corporation that are received by him, and where the employee is supplied with living quarters and works no set hours but puts in as much time as he sees fit, the employee is an agent of foreign corporation upon whom service may be had under this section. Keith v. Cave Springs, 233 Ark. 363, 344 S.W.2d 591 (1961).

Debtor who had initiated an adversary proceeding to determine dischargeability of a student loan obligation was entitled to default and a default judgment because the debtor had complied with the service of process requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004 and Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(5) when the debtor served an amended summons and complaint on the creditor's designated agent. The debtor was not also required to service process on the creditor itself as well as the agent. Weston v. Ed Fin. Servs., LLC (In re Weston), 398 B.R. 325 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008).

Constructive Service.

A foreign corporation having designated an agent upon whom process might be served in actions against it could be proceeded against only by personal service on its agent or some other agent in the state acting for it and not by constructive service. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bounds, 198 Ark. 149, 127 S.W.2d 629 (1939).

Federal Courts.

This section did not confer jurisdiction on federal court over foreign corporation in claim which grew out of interstate transaction asserted by another foreign corporation against it. McAvoy v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 185 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Ark. 1960).

Out-of-State Injury.

An action for personal injuries to a nonresident received in another state is maintainable in this state against a foreign railroad operating a line in this state if based on service on an authorized agent in this state. Yockey v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 183 Ark. 601, 37 S.W.2d 694 (1931), overruled, Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

Cited: Zolper v. AT&T Info. Sys., 289 Ark. 27, 709 S.W.2d 74 (1986).

16-58-128. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the method of service on a bank, was repealed by Act 2005, No. 426, § 2. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 70; C. & M. Dig., § 1149; Acts 1931, No. 42, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 1365, 1366; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-351, 27-352.

16-58-129. Method of service — Insurance company.

Where the defendant is an incorporated insurance company and the action is in a county in which there is an agency of the company, the service may be upon the chief officer of the agency.

History. Civil Code, § 71; C. & M. Dig., § 1150; Pope's Dig., § 1367; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-353.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.

Case Notes

Agent.

Service of summons on a foreign insurance company's general agent for service was held to give jurisdiction to the court in another county wherein the company had a local agent. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Henry, 188 Ark. 262, 65 S.W.2d 32 (1933); Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Kincannon, 202 Ark. 1128, 155 S.W.2d 687 (1941).

16-58-130. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning constructive service warning orders, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 21[22]. The section was derived from Civil Code, §§ 79-83, 454; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [80], p. 219; 1915, No. 290, §§ 4, 5; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1159-1163, 6269; Pope's Dig., §§ 1380-1384, 8225; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-354 — 27-359; Acts 1991, No. 199, § 1.

16-58-131. [Superseded]

Publisher's Notes. This section has been deemed superseded by the Arkansas Supreme Court in light of its January 28, 1999 amendment of ARCP 5. For the text of the amendment, please consult the February issue of the Arkansas Court Rules Newsletter (LEXIS Law Publishing, 1999) or the Court Rules Volume.

Section 16-58-131 was derived from Acts 1963, No. 67, §§ 1-5; 1975, No. 304, § 1; and A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-360 — 27-364.

16-58-132. Refusal to accept process served by mail.

Where service of summons, process, or notice is provided for or permitted by registered or certified mail, under the laws of Arkansas, and the addressee refuses to accept delivery, and it is so stated in the return receipt of the United States Postal Service, the written return receipt, if returned and filed in the action, shall be deemed an actual and valid service of the summons, process, or notice.

History. Acts 1979, No. 446, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-365.

Case Notes

Savings Statute.

Circuit court erred in dismissing buyers' action with prejudice because they were entitled to the benefit of the savings statute, § 16-56-126, since they made a timely, completed attempt to serve sellers; the summonses and complaints were mailed to the sellers at their last known address, and when the envelopes containing the complaints and summonses were returned to the buyers' attorney, they were marked with a postal service stamp that contained several options for delivery and were marked “refused.” Jones v. Douglas, 2016 Ark. 166, 489 S.W.3d 648 (2016).

16-58-133. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated, in its per curiam of Dec. 21, 1987, that this section was superseded by ARCP 72.

16-58-134. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning time limit for service, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 22[23]. The section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 401, § 1.

Chapter 59 Lis Pendens

Effective Dates. Acts 1965 (2nd Ex. Sess), No. 5, § 2: Nov. 6, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Arkansas' present Lis Pendens Statute does not expressly authorize the county recorder of deeds to accept, file, record and index a lis pendens notice of an action pending in a United States District Court within this State, as permitted by an Act of Congress, 28 U.S.C. Section 1964; therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Cancellation prior to termination of underlying action, absent claim of delay. 49 A.L.R.4th 242.

Am. Jur. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Lis Pen., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Creditors' Provisional Remedies and Debtors' Due Process Rights: Statutory Liens in Arkansas, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 185.

C.J.S. 54 C.J.S., Lis Pen., § 1 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Bankruptcy — A Fraudulent Conveyance Action and a Lis Pendens May Create a Lien Which Survives a Bankruptcy Discharge, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 319.

16-59-101. Filing of notice required to constitute constructive notice of pending action.

To render the filing of any suit at law or in equity in either a state court or United States district court affecting the title or any lien on real estate or personal property constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of any such real estate or personal property, it shall be necessary for the plaintiff or any one (1) of the plaintiffs, if there is more than one (1) plaintiff, or his or her attorney or agent to file a notice of the pendency of the suit, for record with the recorder of deeds of the county in which the property to be affected by the constructive notice is situated.

History. Acts 1903, No. 65, § 1, p. 118; C. & M. Dig., § 6979; Pope's Dig., § 8959; Acts 1965 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 5, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-501.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The notice of lis pendens is for the purpose of preserving rights pending the litigation. Mitchell v. Federal Land Bank, 206 Ark. 253, 174 S.W.2d 671 (1943), superseded by statute as stated in, Croft v. Croft, 8 Ark. App. 20, 648 S.W.2d 511 (1983).

Applicability.

This section applies only to actions affecting titles and liens on real estate or personal property, not to actions seeking a money judgment. Tolley v. Wilson, 212 Ark. 163, 205 S.W.2d 177 (1947); Health Betterment Found. v. Thomas, 225 Ark. 529, 283 S.W.2d 863 (1955).

Appellants' mere filing of a notice of lis pendens was ineffective to create any vested rights that would preclude the assertion of a claim for reformation where the notice under the lis pendens statute did not have any application between the parties. The notice under the statute did not establish any lien, or have any application as between the parties, but gave effect to the rights ultimately established by a judgment in the case. Longing Family Revocable Trust v. Snowden, 2013 Ark. App. 81, 426 S.W.3d 488 (2013).

Acknowledgment.

As a lis pendens is not an instrument in writing for the conveyance of any real estate or by which any real estate may be affected in law or equity, acknowledgment of the lis pendens is not required under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-47-101. Benefit Bank v. Rogers, 2012 Ark. 419, 424 S.W.3d 812 (2012).

Actual Knowledge.

Where all the parties interested in a purchase of land have actual knowledge of the condition of the title, this section has no application. Zeigler v. Daniel, 128 Ark. 403, 194 S.W. 246 (1917).

Purchaser with actual notice is bound notwithstanding failure to give lis pendens notice. Drummond v. Batson, 162 Ark. 407, 258 S.W. 616 (1924).

One who purchases, having actual notice of the pendency of a suit to foreclose a mortgage, cannot avail himself of the failure to give the lis pendens notice required by the section. Shouse v. Scovill, 200 Ark. 441, 139 S.W.2d 240 (1940).

One who acquires from a party property in litigation in a court having jurisdiction, takes it subject to the rights of the parties and has the same rights as the grantee, and is conclusively bound by the results of the litigation. White River Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Fears, 213 Ark. 75, 209 S.W.2d 294 (1948).

Appeals.

Purchaser at a judicial sale based upon a decree which on appeal was declared void was entitled to recover value of improvements made while the appeal was pending. McDonald v. Rankin, 92 Ark. 173, 122 S.W. 88 (1909).

The purpose of a lis pendens is to put bona fide purchasers or mortgagees upon notice that the title to certain real or personal property is being litigated and litigation is obviously not completed until appellate review is had in cases where appeals are perfected; the statutory effect of a lis pendens follows the litigation to its conclusion. Ashworth v. Hankins, 241 Ark. 629, 408 S.W.2d 871 (1966).

Complaint for Money Judgment.

Only the filing of a lis pendens against the property can render the complaint a matter of record before it is reduced to judgment, but lis pendens cannot be filed for a complaint merely for a money judgment and not directly affecting the title to the real estate. Bank of Cave City v. Abstract & Title Co., 38 Ark. App. 65, 828 S.W.2d 852 (1992).

District court ordered the U.S. Government to remove a notice of lis pendens it filed against defendant's residence, pursuant to this section, after defendant was indicted on charges alleging that he conspired with another person to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1341. Although the indictment charging defendant with conspiracy to commit mail fraud included a forfeiture allegation in the amount of $1,811,490 and gave notice of the Government's intent to seek substitute property, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(p), in the event $1.8 million in cash could not be located with due diligence, the Government's notice of lis pendens was improper under this section because the Government was using defendant's residence as a substitute for a money judgment it was seeking, and this section did not apply to actions seeking money judgments. United States v. Jewell, 556 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Ark. 2008).

Conversion.

A lienholder may protect himself against an actionable conversion of property to which his lien attaches which has not occurred at the time he files his foreclosure suit by filing a notice of lis pendens, and if the property is thereafter converted by a stranger to the case that person would take subject to the outcome of the foreclosure litigation. Superior Iron Works & Supply Co. v. Saulsberry, 226 Ark. 1032, 295 S.W.2d 626 (1956).

Effect of Filing.

A general creditor who files an action to cancel a fraudulent conveyance of a debtor acquires a specific lien on the property conveyed, including lien on real property when notice of lis pendens is filed. Clark v. Bank of Bentonville, 308 Ark. 241, 824 S.W.2d 358 (1992).

Recording of the notice of lis pendens under this section was itself a “transfer” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.S. § 547, which transfer occurred when the notice was recorded; thus, the transfers by the filing of the lis pendens filings on two properties were effective when recorded, occurred within 90 days of the debtor's bankruptcy filing, and were avoided by the bankruptcy trustee. Rice v. First Ark. Valley Bank (In re May), 310 B.R. 405 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004).

Lis pendens filed under § 16-59-101 et seq. against defendant's residence, which was allegedly subject to forfeiture as substitute property in a criminal case against defendant, was not a seizure or a legal restraint of the property; 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(e) therefore did not prohibit the government from filing the lis pendens prior to conviction. United States v. Jewell, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (E.D. Ark. 2008).

Materials supplier that filed a materialman's lien on property after a bank had filed a foreclosure complaint and a lis pendens on the same property was subject to the lis pendens because the supplier did not obtain an interest in the property prior to the filing of the lis pendens. Nat'l Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Coleman, 373 Ark. 246, 283 S.W.3d 218 (2008).

As a husband voluntarily signed and his wife filed a lis pendens against real property before their divorce was final, litigation relating to the property was clearly pending at the time of the filing; therefore, a bank which later acquired a mortgage on the property was on notice that the property was being litigated in some fashion. Benefit Bank v. Rogers, 2012 Ark. 419, 424 S.W.3d 812 (2012).

Estoppel.

Where evidence established that a party accepted and treated as his own, land that had been awarded to another person in severalty in a partition suit, and when the party treated the tract of land as his own property, he thereby estopped himself from claiming an undivided interest in the entire tract from which the property had been subdivided in the partition suit. Crain v. Foster, 230 Ark. 190, 322 S.W.2d 443 (1959).

Failure to Record.

Failure of a bona fide purchaser to record his title before a list pendens notice was filed will not deprive him of his title or give the plaintiff any superior title. Oil Fields Corp. v. Dashko, 173 Ark. 533, 294 S.W. 25Certiorari or review denied by275 U.S. 548, 48 S. Ct. 85 (1927).

Judgment Creditors.

Where order of dismissal was final determination of mortgage foreclosure suit filed seven years earlier with notice of lis pendens, and it reinstated the mortgage in full force and effect as though no suit had been filed, the order was binding on judgment creditors of mortgagor who secured judgment after beginning of suit and precluded them from contending that subsequent foreclosure suit was barred by limitations for failure to make marginal endorsements of payment within five years. Mitchell v. Federal Land Bank, 206 Ark. 253, 174 S.W.2d 671 (1943), superseded by statute as stated in, Croft v. Croft, 8 Ark. App. 20, 648 S.W.2d 511 (1983).

Notice Void.

One who purchases land from one in possession thereof without notice, either actual or constructive, of the pendency of an action against the seller to recover the land is not concluded by a judgment rendered therein against the seller. Jennings v. Bouldin, 98 Ark. 105, 134 S.W. 948 (1911).

A suit affecting the title or any lien on the real estate is not lis pendens until a notice of the pendency of the action is filed in accordance with this section. Henry Wrape Co. v. Cox, 122 Ark. 445, 183 S.W. 955 (1916); Jones v. Ainell, 123 Ark. 532, 186 S.W. 65 (1916); Cramer v. Remmel, 132 Ark. 158, 200 S.W. 811 (1918).

Purchaser without actual knowledge of mortgage foreclosure suit instituted three days prior to purchase and without constructive notice because lis pendens notice had not been given, being a third party to the mortgage which was barred because no notation of any payment on the note was endorsed on the margin of its record, took title free from the mortgage lien even though he acquired title by quit-claim deed. Shouse v. Scovill, 200 Ark. 441, 139 S.W.2d 240 (1940).

A lis pendens notice became nugatory when the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint. Tolley v. Wilson, 212 Ark. 163, 205 S.W.2d 177 (1947).

The filing of the complaint is a condition precedent to filing the notice of lis pendens under this section and a prematurely filed notice of lis pendens is a nullity. Keith v. Bratton, 738 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1984).

Priorities.

As the divorce court did not unilaterally impose a lis pendens on real estate as security for a former husband's payment of spousal support to appellee, but both parties agreed to its being imposed, the lis pendens was valid and appellee's interest in the property was senior to that of a bank which later acquired a mortgage on that property. Benefit Bank v. Rogers, 2012 Ark. 419, 424 S.W.3d 812 (2012).

Purchase by Spouse.

Where land owned by a husband was sold for taxes and purchased by his wife from the assignee of the tax title, she was not affected by the pendency of a suit to recover the land from the husband since her title was in opposition to his. Boykin v. Jones, 67 Ark. 571, 57 S.W. 17 (1900) (decision under prior law).

Specific Performance.

A suit for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate is within the rule as to lis pendens and one who acquires an interest in the property pending the suit from a party thereto is bound by the result of the suit. Lightle v. Schmidt, 144 Ark. 304, 222 S.W. 46 (1920).

Tenants.

A tenant going into possession of land under a defendant in pending mortgage foreclosure proceedings, without actual notice of the proceedings and in the absence of constructive notice thereof, is entitled to hold the land under his rental contract. Jordan v. Hargis, 156 Ark. 408, 246 S.W. 476 (1923).

Transfer.

The recording of a lis pendens affects the possession and interests in debtor's property; accordingly, the recording of the notice of lis pendens is itself a “transfer” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 547, which transfer occurred when the notice was recorded. Dupwe v. Worthen Nat'l Bank (In re Rising Fast Rentals, Inc.), 162 B.R. 203 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).

Cited: Mitchell v. Federal Land Bank, 206 Ark. 253, 174 S.W.2d 671 (1943); Chevron Oil Co. v. Tlapek, 265 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Myers v. Muuss, 281 Ark. 188, 662 S.W.2d 805 (1984).

16-59-102. Contents of notice.

The notice of the pendency of the suit shall set forth the title of the cause and the general object thereof, together with a correct and full description of the property to be affected thereby, the names of the parties to the suit, and the style of the court where the suit is pending.

History. Acts 1903, No. 65, § 1, p. 118; C. & M. Dig., § 6979; Pope's Dig., § 8959; Acts 1965 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 5, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-501.

Case Notes

Cited: Benefit Bank v. Rogers, 2012 Ark. 419, 424 S.W.3d 812 (2012).

16-59-103. Duty of recorder of deeds.

It shall be the duty of the recorder of deeds to record the notice of the pending suit in either a state court or United States district court in a book kept for that purpose, upon the payment of the same fees as are provided by law for recording mortgages.

History. Acts 1903, No. 65, § 1, p. 118; C. & M. Dig., § 6979; Pope's Dig., § 8959; Acts 1965 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 5, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-501.

16-59-104. Index of notices.

The recorder of deeds shall immediately upon the filing of the notice of the pendency of the action enter in an index to be kept in his or her office such reference to these notices as will enable all persons interested to search his or her office to obtain a description of the property to be affected thereby and the names of the parties to the suit.

History. Acts 1903, No. 65, § 3, p. 118; C. & M. Dig., § 6981; Pope's Dig., § 8961; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-503.

16-59-105. Fees of recorder — Taxing as costs.

For the indexing and recording of the notice of the pendency of the suit, the recorder of deeds shall be entitled to the same fees as are provided by law for recording and indexing deeds. The sum thus paid to the recorder shall be taxed as part of the costs of executing the process by the sheriff or other officer.

History. Acts 1903, No. 65, § 6, p. 118; C. & M. Dig., § 6984; Pope's Dig., § 8964; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-504.

Cross References. Fees of recorder, § 21-6-306.

16-59-106. Accounts due state lien from commencement of action.

The amount of any account audited, adjusted, and found due the state, with the penalties and interest thereon, shall be a lien on all the real estate of the person charged with the amount of any such account from the time the suit shall be brought for the recovery thereof.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 18, § 35; C. & M. Dig., § 9302; Pope's Dig., § 11988; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-505.

16-59-107. Copy of notice as evidence.

A copy of the record, authenticated by the recorder of deeds, shall be evidence of the notice of the pendency of the suit and of the filing of the notice in all courts and places.

History. Acts 1903, No. 65, § 2, p. 118; C. & M. Dig., § 6980; Pope's Dig., § 8960; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-502.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Documentary Evidence — Arkansas, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 79.

Chapter 60 Venue

Cross References. Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 16-4-101 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, A Guide to Arkansas Venue, 1995 Ark. L. Notes 83.

Case Notes

In General.

Since statehood, the General Assembly has provided that the basic rule of venue is that a defendant must be sued in the county where he lives or is summoned. Quinney v. Pittman, 320 Ark. 177, 895 S.W.2d 538 (1995).

Nature of Claim.

Venue is controlled by the characterization of claim by statute rather than the characterization of a claim given by a plaintiff. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Saline County Circuit Court, 329 Ark. 357, 947 S.W.2d 12 (1997).

When two or more actions are pled that lie in different venues, venue is determined by the real character of the action and the principal right being asserted. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Saline County Circuit Court, 329 Ark. 357, 947 S.W.2d 12 (1997).

Residence.

The General Assembly was aware of the difference between the words “resides” and “domicile,” was aware of the fact that a person might have a residence in one county and his domicile in another, and deliberately chose to use the word “resides” in this chapter; “residency” means the place of actual abode, not a home which one expects to occupy at some future time. Quinney v. Pittman, 320 Ark. 177, 895 S.W.2d 538 (1995).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2015, No. 830, § 2. The former subchapter, concerning General Provisions, consisted of §§ 16-60-10116-60-119. The history notes to former §§ 16-60-101, 16-60-102, 16-60-103, 16-60-114, 16-60-115, and 16-60-119 have been added to corresponding sections in the revised subchapter. The remaining sections of the former subchapter were derived from the following sources:

16-60-104. Civil Code, § 92; C. & M. Dig., § 1171; Pope's Dig., § 1393; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-605.

16-60-105. Acts 1935, No. 74, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 1385; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-609.

16-60-106. Civil Code, § 93; C. & M. Dig., § 1172; Pope's Dig., § 1394; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-606.

16-60-107. Civil Code, § 94; C. & M. Dig., § 1173; Pope's Dig., § 1395; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-607.

16-60-108. Civil Code, § 95; C. & M. Dig., § 1174; Pope's Dig., § 1396; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-608.

16-60-109. Acts 1973, No. 142, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-619, 27-620.

16-60-110. Civil Code, § 91; C. & M. Dig., § 1170; Pope's Dig., § 1392; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-604; Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 56, § 1; 1997, No. 208, § 13.

16-60-111. Acts 1977, No. 401, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-621 — 27-623; Acts 2007, No. 549, § 1; 2009, No. 546, § 1.

16-60-112. Acts 1939, No. 314, § 1; 1947, No. 347, § 1; 1961, No. 137, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-610, 27-610.1, 27-612.

16-60-113. Acts 1941, No. 317, § 1; 1947, No. 182, § 1; 1977, No. 830, § 1; 1983, No. 642, § 1; 1985, No. 921, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-611.

16-60-116. Civil Code, §§ 96-100; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1176-1180; Pope's Dig., §§ 1398-1402; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-613 — 27-617.

16-60-117. Acts 1941, No. 21, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-618.

16-60-118. Acts 1997, No. 725, § 1.

Preambles. Acts 1935, No. 74, contained a preamble which read: “Whereas, large and numerous business enterprises of various kinds are being operated in the state of Arkansas by individuals, firms, copartnerships and association of persons and under the law as it now exists the venue for suits against them is fixed in the county of their residence or where such person or a member of the firm, copartnership or association may be found, and in many instances this works to the disadvantage of those who deal with such person, firm, copartnership or association by requiring the person so desiring to sue to go to the place of residence of such person, firm, copartnership or association and it is the purpose of this act to relieve against this situation …”

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1935, No. 74, § 3: approved Feb. 26, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that a large number of people in the State of Arkansas are affected by this act and that in many cases justice requires its immediate effectiveness and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after passage.”

Acts 1939, No. 314, § 3: approved Mar. 15, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It is found that the revenues of many counties are reduced by paying expenses of courts for the trial of actions brought from other counties to the damage of the taxpayers, and the dockets of the circuit courts in many counties congested and the time of such courts taken up by actions from other counties so that there is not sufficient time for the courts properly to try local cases, and an emergency is thereby created and is declared and this act shall be in force immediately from and after its passage.”

Acts 1941, No. 21, § 2: approved Feb. 3, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared to be a fact that the laws concerning service of process in Arkansas are in an uncertain state; furthermore, that there are complaints now pending in the courts of Arkansas, brought on meritorious causes of action, upon which it may be impossible to secure service of process, the actions being local in nature and service being now in some cases limited to the county in which such actions are brought. Therefore, this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage.”

Acts 1941, No. 317, § 3: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared that in many instances it is necessary for an injured party to bring more than one action in different counties in order to obtain relief and damages arising out of the same wrongful or negligent act; that such multiplicity of suits constitute an expense to many counties within the state and a crowding of their dockets, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, it shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1947, No. 182, § 3: Mar. 6, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and declared that in many instances litigants to actions for personal injury and property damage have a cause of action growing out of the same accident and that the jurisdiction for property damage is in one county and for personal injury in another county, and that as a result thereof an inconvenience and expense arises to the litigants and multiplicity of suits results therefrom, and because of these conditions and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1947, No. 347, § 6: Mar. 28, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas many nonresident persons, firms, partnerships and corporations are not now qualified under the Constitution and laws of this State to do business herein and by reason of operating business in and through the State of Arkansas injury and damage are being done to persons and property within said State; and whereas in cases of such injury and damage by such nonresident defendants those suffering damages thereby have no convenient method by which they may sue to enforce their rights, if any, in the State of Arkansas, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 921, § 3: Apr. 15, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is urgent need for enactment of legislation to enable citizens of the State of Arkansas to bring legal action in local courts in counties where citizens have been subjected to fraudulent conduct by telephone, mail or other means; that this Act is designed to permit citizens to bring actions for fraud in the county where the fraud occurred, has been initiated, has been consummated or has been communicated whether such fraud is common law fraud or other fraudulent conduct so designated as insurance, securities, consumer or other fraud under the laws of the State of Arkansas; and that this Act should be given effect as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 56, § 4: Nov. 16, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that a serious question exists regarding the venue requirements for actions brought against confined persons, particularly when that person is being confined in a facility not located within the county in which he resided or claimed his residence, and that this law is required to clear up that confusion. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2013, No. 1315, § 3: Apr. 18, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that school district litigation is a complex and costly endeavor; that a new venue statute would resolve many issues regarding where a lawsuit should be brought; and that this act is immediately necessary because future litigants are currently relying on venue statutes that would require litigation in an inconvenient forum. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 967, § 4: Apr. 5, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the people of the State of Arkansas will benefit from immediate access to the most efficient venues for prosecution of litigation in which the state is a party. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Contractual provision limiting place or court in which action may be brought. 31 A.L.R.4th 404.

Am. Jur. 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Conflict of Laws — Action for Injury to Extrastate Land, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

Grounds for Venue in Arkansas — A Survey, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 468.

C.J.S. 67A C.J.S., Parties, § 1 et seq.

92A C.J.S., Venue, § 1 et seq.

16-60-101. Venue in circuit courts — General rules and exceptions.

  1. A civil action other than a civil action mentioned in §§ 16-60-102 — 16-60-109, 16-106-101, and specific venue provisions codified in another title of the Arkansas Code shall be brought in any of the following counties:
    1. The county in which a substantial part of the event or omission giving rise to the cause of action occurred;
      1. The county in which an individual defendant resided at the time of the event or omission giving rise to the cause of action.
      2. If the defendant is an entity other than an individual, the civil action shall be brought in the county where the entity had its principal office in this state at the time of the event or omission giving rise to the cause of action; or
      1. The county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the event or omission giving rise to the cause of action.
      2. If the plaintiff is an entity other than an individual, the civil action shall be brought in the county where the plaintiff had its principal office in this state at the time of the event or omission giving rise to the cause of action.
    1. The residence of a properly joined named class representative may be considered in determining proper venue in a class action.
    2. The residence of a putative or actual member of a class other than a named representative shall not be considered in determining proper venue for a class action.
  2. In a civil action with multiple plaintiffs, venue shall be proper as to each named plaintiff joined in the civil action unless:
    1. The plaintiffs establish that they assert any right to relief against the defendant jointly, severally, or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence; and
    2. The existence of a substantial number of questions of law or material fact common to all the plaintiffs not only will arise in the civil action, but also that:
      1. The common questions of law or material fact will predominate over individual questions of law or material fact pertaining to each plaintiff;
      2. The civil action can be maintained more efficiently and economically for all parties than if prosecuted separately; and
      3. The interest of justice supports the joinder of the parties as plaintiffs in one (1) civil action.
    1. Unless venue objections are waived by the defendant or by unanimous agreement of multiple defendants, if venue is improper for any plaintiff joined in the civil action, then the claim of the plaintiff shall be severed and transferred to a court where venue is proper.
      1. If severance and transfer is mandated and venue is appropriate in more than one (1) court, a defendant sued alone or multiple defendants, by unanimous agreement, may select another court to which the civil action shall be transferred.
      2. If there are multiple defendants who are unable to agree on another court, the court in which the civil action was originally filed may transfer the action to another court.
  3. When venue is proper as to one (1) defendant, it is also proper as to any other defendant with respect to all causes of action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.

History. Acts 2015, No. 830, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-60-101 has been amended and renumbered as § 16-60-102.

Case Notes

Construction.

Because an insurer was the first party to file suit, and it chose to do so in the county in which it had its principal office, a circuit judge erred by applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens under § 16-4-101(D), effectively overruling the insurer's choice of venue. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Gadbury-Swift, 2010 Ark. 6, 362 S.W.3d 291 (2010) (decided under former § 16-55-213).

Improper Venue.

Where a writ of prohibition entered in the court's prior decision required the circuit court to dismiss the representative of the Arkansas consumers from the case, no basis existed for venue over the only remaining named plaintiff; venue was not proper because the remaining plaintiff was a resident of Texas. Centerpoint Energy, Inc. v. Miller County Circuit Court, 372 Ark. 343, 276 S.W.3d 231 (2008).

Dismissal for improper venue under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) of a complaint alleging fraud in the inducement of contract was not erroneous because forum-selection clauses designated Kansas as governing law and in both Arkansas and Kansas a party had to plead fraud in the inducement of a forum-selection clause itself to avoid its application Provence v. Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 2010 Ark. 27, 360 S.W.3d 725 (2010) (decision under prior law).

16-60-102. Local actions.

A civil action for the following causes shall be brought in the county in which the subject of the civil action, or some part of the civil action, is situated:

  1. The recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest in real property;
  2. The partition of real property;
  3. The sale of real property under a mortgage, lien, or other encumbrance or charge; and
  4. An injury to real property.

History. Civil Code, § 84; C. & M. Dig., § 1164; Pope's Dig., § 1386; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-601; Acts 2015, No. 830, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-60-101. Former § 16-60-102 has been amended and renumbered as § 16-60-103.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “Local actions” for “Actions brought where subject of action situated” in the section heading; substituted “civil action” for “action”; deleted “except as provided in § 16-60-116(d)” at the end of the introductory language; and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to all actions coming within its terms whether brought at law or in equity. Wilson v. Parkinson, 157 Ark. 69, 247 S.W. 774 (1923).

Character of Complaint.

Venue in county where land was located was proper for both compulsory counterclaim and permissive third-party complaint, since both claims involved the same cause of action as the original complaint and had common questions of law and fact. Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 280 Ark. 420, 658 S.W.2d 397 (1983).

—Local Actions.

If the purpose of a bill and the effect of a decree are to reach and operate upon the land itself, then it is regarded as a proceeding in rem and is a local action and must be brought in the county where the land is situated. Dowdle v. Byrd, 201 Ark. 775, 147 S.W.2d 343 (1941).

Where the object of the suit was to compel defendant to accept a conveyance of real estate and to pay therefor in accordance with his contract so to do, and if he refused to do so, having acquired the outstanding title of the mortgagee, to have a lien therefor decreed upon the land and the land condemned to satisfy the lien, the action is local under this section as it is to recover an interest in real estate. Dowdle v. Byrd, 201 Ark. 775, 147 S.W.2d 343 (1941).

In determining whether action brought is local, regardless of title of suit, the court will look to the effect of the decree, and if effect of decree is to affect an interest in land, the court will hold that the action must be filed in the county where the land is located. Drum v. McDaniel, 215 Ark. 690, 222 S.W.2d 59 (1949).

Where purpose of action, and effect of decree is to reach and operate upon the land itself, then action is a proceeding in rem and it must be brought in county where the land is situated. Drum v. McDaniel, 215 Ark. 690, 222 S.W.2d 59 (1949).

Encumbrances.

—Foreclosure.

A suit to foreclose a mortgage on a town lot was properly brought in the county in which the lot was situated. Harrison v. Bank of Fordyce, 178 Ark. 760, 12 S.W.2d 400 (1929).

Chancery court of county where mortgaged lands are partly situated is the proper tribunal in which to institute foreclosure suit. Wasson v. Dodge, 192 Ark. 728, 94 S.W.2d 720 (1936).

—Quiet Title.

An action to remove a cloud upon the title to land is a local action and should be brought in the county in which the land is situated. Fidelity Mtg. Co. v. Evans, 168 Ark. 459, 270 S.W. 624 (1925).

An action to have certain deeds voided and entries removed as clouds upon title was a quiet title action the venue of which was governed by this section even though a state commission was a party defendant. State ex rel. Ark. Publicity & Parks Comm'n v. Butt, 229 Ark. 433, 316 S.W.2d 204 (1958).

In suit to quiet title where county chancery court entered decree as to title of the disputed property and nothing in the record showed conclusively that some part of the land was not located in that county, Supreme Court would indulge the presumption that the trial court had jurisdiction. Black v. Clary, 235 Ark. 1001, 363 S.W.2d 528 (1963).

Injunction.

Jurisdiction to enjoin sale of land is transitory. Jones, McDowell & Co. v. Fletcher, 42 Ark. 422 (1883).

An action to enjoin commissioners of a road district from extending assessments against lands in another district is not a local action but is transitory. Arkansas-Louisiana Hwy. Imp. Dist. v. Douglas-Gould & Star City Rd. Imp. Dist., 138 Ark. 162, 210 S.W. 150 (1919).

A suit to restrain a threatened injury to real property is a local action. Drainage Dist. No. 7 v. Hutchins, 184 Ark. 521, 42 S.W.2d 996 (1931).

Chancery court had jurisdiction to enjoin city located within county to refrain from dumping sewage in creek to detriment of downstream landowners but would not have had jurisdiction to award damages for such action as to landowners located in another county so that consent decree enjoining the action would not preclude subsequent suit by out-of-county landowners in county where land lay alleging that pollution of stream amounted to a taking of owners' land by city and seeking damages for the same. Weathers v. City of Springdale, 239 Ark. 535, 390 S.W.2d 125 (1965).

Injury to Crops and Land.

A suit to restrain defendant from removing earth from plaintiff's land is an action for an injury to real property. Cox v. Railway Co., 55 Ark. 454, 18 S.W. 630 (1892).

An action for conversion of timber is not an action for injury to real property. Emerson v. Turner, 95 Ark. 597, 130 S.W. 538 (1910).

An action, the effect of which is to prevent defendants from interfering with plaintiff's mining business, is not an action for, nor to prevent, an injury to real property. Jones v. State, 170 Ark. 863, 281 S.W. 663, 1926 Ark. LEXIS 247 (1926).

An action by tenants for injury to land must be brought in the county where the land lies. Missouri P.R.R. v. Henry, 188 Ark. 530, 66 S.W.2d 636 (1934).

A contractor who injures another's land while engaged in constructing a state highway may be sued in the county where the injury was committed. Arkansas Hwy. Comm'n v. Holt, 190 Ark. 868, 81 S.W.2d 929 (1935).

Action of trespass must be filed in county where land is located, as it is a local action. Pruitt v. Sebastian County Coal & Mining Co., 215 Ark. 673, 222 S.W.2d 50 (1949).

In suit by plaintiffs to recover damage to crop filed in county where plaintiffs' land was located, service on defendant in another county was proper, since damage to crop was local in nature. Heeb v. Prysock, 219 Ark. 899, 245 S.W.2d 577 (1952).

Complaint to recover damages for injury to property of plaintiff by defendant contractor engaged in widening highway under a contract with state was a suit in tort instead of contract and it was properly filed in county where land was located. Southeast Constr. Co. v. Wood, 223 Ark. 325, 265 S.W.2d 720 (1954); Southeast Constr. Co. v. Wood, 223 Ark. 328, 265 S.W.2d 722 (1954).

An action for injury to realty is local in nature and must be brought in the county in which the land is situated and a building being moved is still realty where there is no intention to convert it into personal property, so that claim for damage to it in moving is properly venued in the county where the building was when moved. Bucton Constr. Co. v. Carlson, 225 Ark. 208, 280 S.W.2d 408 (1955).

In actions concerning real estate, venue lies in the county where the realty is located, so where a plaintiff alleges that buildings were damaged by a defendant corporation in moving of them and there was no intention to convert the buildings to personalty the venue of the action is governed by the situs of the buildings when moved and lies in the county where they were located. Bucton Constr. Co. v. Carlson, 225 Ark. 208, 280 S.W.2d 408 (1955).

An action to enjoin a trespass on real property must be considered local in character. Miracle v. Jacoby, 192 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Ark. 1961).

Interest in Lands.

A suit to recover title to mortgages sold to the defendant was for the recovery of an interest in land and the venue was properly laid in the county wherein the mortgaged lands were situated. National Equity Life Ins. Co. v. Seamster, 188 Ark. 170, 65 S.W.2d 31 (1933).

Jurisdiction.

Circuit court of county in which real estate levied upon was located had jurisdiction of action to determine validity of distress warrant. Crawford v. Carson, 35 Ark. 565 (1880).

The circuit court of county is without jurisdiction to try an action in ejectment to lands in another county in the absence of an order of a change of venue. King v. Harris, 134 Ark. 337, 203 S.W. 847 (1918).

In action to replevy check deposited in escrow pursuant to contract to purchase interest in realty located out-of-state, where vendor intervened seeking specific performance, insofar as relief prayed for would not affect title to the land, but could be obtained through personal obedience of the parties, court had jurisdiction. Bell v. Wadley, 206 Ark. 569, 177 S.W.2d 403 (1944).

—Consent to Jurisdiction.

Consent cannot give jurisdiction of a suit in another county. Jacks v. Moore, 33 Ark. 31 (1878).

Parties to an action of trespass cannot by consent confer jurisdiction of the subject matter, if land is not located in the county where suit is filed. Pruitt v. Sebastian County Coal & Mining Co., 215 Ark. 673, 222 S.W.2d 50 (1949).

—Incidental Jurisdiction.

A judgment for defendant in an action in one county for damages to personal property alleged to have been caused by the negligence and destruction of building in another county barred a subsequent action in the latter county between the same parties for damages for the destruction of the building. Dunaway v. Russell, 173 Ark. 898, 294 S.W. 1 (1927).

County court in which foreclosure suit was properly instituted has jurisdiction to try every question, both legal and equitable, that may arise in the case, including construction of will of testator domiciled in another county to determine whether mortgagor had title to land sought to be foreclosed. Wasson v. Dodge, 192 Ark. 728, 94 S.W.2d 720 (1936).

Where county court rightfully acquired jurisdiction over necessary parties and subject matter in foreclosure proceeding, no other court of equal dignity or one having concurrent jurisdiction had any right to interfere. Wasson v. Dodge, 192 Ark. 728, 94 S.W.2d 720 (1936).

Where decree foreclosing mortgage lien was rendered in the one district of a county, service had on defendant in another district of that county was held to support deficiency judgment, since court having jurisdiction to foreclose the mortgage had the incidental jurisdiction to render a personal judgment for the debt it secured. Husband v. Crockett, 195 Ark. 1031, 115 S.W.2d 882 (1938).

When lands located in two counties were both subject to a single note and mortgage and when the mortgage holder had previously obtained a decree of foreclosure in one county for the land within that county, the holder could not then institute a separate action in the second county for the remaining land since the court in the first action, having assumed jurisdiction for one purpose, retained it for all purposes with the power to grant all of the legal and equitable relief to which the parties were entitled. Steelman v. Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n, 285 Ark. 217, 685 S.W.2d 800 (1985).

—Multiple Jurisdictions.

When the county of the venue is divided into two judicial districts, it may be brought in either. Jones v. State, 170 Ark. 863, 281 S.W. 663, 1926 Ark. LEXIS 247 (1926).

Where all the parties to an action to quiet title are interested in all the lands by reason of claiming under a common title, the court of the county in which the greater portion of the land is situated had jurisdiction though a small portion of it was situated in another county. Bowen v. Frank, 179 Ark. 1004, 18 S.W.2d 1037 (1929).

In an action to determine the ownership of land formed by accretion where all of the land actually in controversy lay in one county but in their complaint plaintiffs asked for the determination of adjoining land in another county and, though defendants conceded this land to be plaintiffs' the section applies, hence the action could be brought in either county. Adkisson v. Starr, 222 Ark. 331, 260 S.W.2d 956 (1953).

Although the land over which the land owners established a prescriptive easement was in Perry County, venue was proper in Conway County because a transitory claim, the request for an injunction prohibiting the servient property owners from interfering with the land owners' use of the gate in Conway County, was included in the complaint; thus, the trial court's refusal to dismiss on the basis of venue was correct. River Bar Farms, L.L.C. v. Moore, 83 Ark. App. 130, 118 S.W.3d 145 (2003).

Leases.

Since an oil and gas lease conveys an interest and an easement in the land, action to enforce a lien upon lease must be brought in county where land is. Clark v. Dennis, 172 Ark. 1096, 291 S.W. 807 (1927).

Suit to cancel a five-year lease of land on ground that lessor had forfeited or abandoned his rights therein is a transitory action, the lease being personal property, and should have been brought in the county where lessees resided or in some county where personal service could be obtained upon them. Jones v. Brinkman, 200 Ark. 583, 139 S.W.2d 686 (1940).

An action for the recovery of damages to real property based on the breach of a written lease agreement is transitory. Ferrill v. Collins, 222 Ark. 840, 262 S.W.2d 885 (1953).

Action seeking a declaratory judgment interpreting acreage under a lease agreement between landlord and tenant did not involve recovery of an interest in real property and should have been brought in the county of defendant's residence. Doyle v. Williams, 251 Ark. 797, 475 S.W.2d 170 (1972).

Where a lessee brought an action to quiet title against the landowners and a subsequent lessee, the complaint was local in nature and the plaintiff properly filed the action in the county where the land was located. Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 280 Ark. 420, 658 S.W.2d 397 (1983).

Partition of Land.

Where the estate of a deceased person has been wound up, an action for partition of the land among the heirs should be brought in the county where the land or some part of it is situated and not in the county where the deceased's representatives qualified. Cowling v. Nelson, 76 Ark. 146, 88 S.W. 913 (1905).

Recovery of Lands.

A suit to cancel a fraudulent deed of land and revest title in plaintiff is an action for the recovery of real property. McLaughlin v. McCrory, 55 Ark. 442, 18 S.W. 762 (1892).

An action to recover certain lands, conveyed away, and to declare and enforce judgment liens against the same, is local and not transitory and must be brought in the county where the lands are situated. Harris v. Smith, 133 Ark. 250, 202 S.W. 244 (1918).

A suit in effect to compel the reconveyance of land sold under execution is a local action maintainable only where land is situated. Arkansas Mineral Prods. Co. v. Creel, 181 Ark. 722, 27 S.W.2d 1003 (1930).

Specific Performance.

The general rule is that where in a suit for specific performance of a contract involving land plaintiff seeks only in personam relief against defendant and does not seek a decree which by virtue of in rem statutes will act on the title to the land itself, the action is considered to be in personam and transitory, and statutes like this section are inapplicable; thus, under this general rule such an action may be maintained in any jurisdiction where service on defendant can be obtained. Cobb v. National Lead Co., 215 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Ark. 1963).

Courts of one state can render an in personam decree compelling specific performance of a contract relating to lands located in another state, and this rule would seem to apply a fortiori to suits for specific performance brought in one subdivision of a state with respect to property located in another subdivision where in personam relief only is sought. Cobb v. National Lead Co., 215 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Ark. 1963).

Writ of Prohibition.

In a case in which respondents filed a lawsuit in White County, Arkansas, against the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (AGFC), seeking an injunction enjoining the AGFC from leasing, conveying, encumbering, or otherwise transferring mineral rights to certain land, a writ of prohibition that was sought by the AGFC was not appropriate. Former § 16-60-101 (see now this section) and former § 16-60-103 (see now § 16-60-104) provided the circuit court with the authority to conclude that venue was proper in White County. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Mills, 371 Ark. 317, 265 S.W.3d 760 (2007).

Natural-gas compressor station operator was not entitled to a writ of prohibition barring property owners' suit from proceeding in the Faulkner County Circuit Court after that court denied the operator's motion to dismiss or transfer due to improper venue because the operator failed to demonstrate that Faulkner County was wholly without jurisdiction on the issue of venue (operator's principal place of business was located in Faulkner County) (case arose before the 2015 amendments to the venue statutes). DeSoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Ramsey, 2016 Ark. 22, 480 S.W.3d 144 (2016).

16-60-103. Actions brought where cause of action arose.

A civil action for the following causes shall be brought in the county where the cause, or some part of the cause, arose:

  1. A civil action for the recovery of a fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed by a statute, except that when the violation of the statute for which the claim is made was committed on a watercourse or road that is the boundary of two (2) counties, the civil action may be brought in either county;
  2. A civil action against a public officer for an act done by him or her in virtue or under color of his or her office, or for a neglect of official duty; and
  3. A civil action upon the official bond of a public officer, except as provided in § 16-106-101.

History. Civil Code, § 85; C. & M. Dig., § 1165; Pope's Dig., § 1387; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-602; Acts 2015, No. 830, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-60-102. Former § 16-60-103 has been amended and renumbered as § 16-60-104.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “civil action” for “action” throughout the section; substituted “violation of the statute” for “offense” in (1); deleted “and 16-106-104” at the end of (3); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section refers to an action for the benefit of the public and not to private actions against a wrongdoer. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Miller, 103 Ark. 151, 146 S.W. 485 (1912).

Section 16-106-101(d) fixes the venue in actions against state officers, and is not changed by this section which fixes the venue in actions against other public officers except state officers, on the ground of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” as § 16-106-101(d) refers to actions against state officers, and this section refers to actions against public officers. Downey v. Toler, 214 Ark. 334, 216 S.W.2d 60 (1948).

Subdivision (1) applies only to penal actions instituted by the state for the benefit of the public and not to private actions against a wrongdoer violating § 4-75-201 et seq.Concrete, Inc. v. Arkhola Sand & Gravel Co., 228 Ark. 1016, 311 S.W.2d 770 (1958).

Action against Public Officer.

A suit against a sheriff, his deputies, and bondsmen for killing plaintiff's husband must be brought in the county where the cause of action arose. Edwards v. Jackson, 176 Ark. 107, 2 S.W.2d 44 (1928).

Alleged cause of action against county clerk for unlawfully issuing a marriage license in that county was improperly brought in another county. Ragan v. Cox, 208 Ark. 809, 187 S.W.2d 874, 1945 Ark. LEXIS 499 (1945).

An action against a town marshal, who was also a deputy sheriff, for damages for an alleged unjustifiable assault in the course of making an arrest is within the province of this section. Moncus v. Raines, 210 Ark. 30, 194 S.W.2d 1 (1946).

A court reporter is not a public officer and this section does not govern the jurisdiction of cause brought against him for an act done under color of office, or for neglect of official duty. Wirges v. Arrington, 239 Ark. 1047, 396 S.W.2d 292 (1965).

Action on Official Bond.

An action on a bond of a county treasurer could be maintained only in the county of which he was treasurer. State v. American Sur. Co., 187 Ark. 673, 62 S.W.2d 13 (1933).

Official Act.

The official act complained of must be official conduct resulting in or causing the injury. Williams v. Priddy, 188 Ark. 137, 64 S.W.2d 553 (1933).

16-60-104. Actions that shall be brought in Pulaski County.

The following civil actions shall be brought in Pulaski County:

    1. A civil action on behalf of the state, or which may be brought in the name of the state, or in which the state has or claims an interest, except as provided in § 16-106-101.
    2. However, if a civil action could otherwise be brought in another county or counties under the venue laws of this state, including without limitation this subchapter, then the civil action may be brought either in Pulaski County or the other county or counties;
    1. A civil action brought by a state board, state commissioner, or state officer in his or her official capacity, or on behalf of the state, except as provided in § 16-106-101.
    2. However, if a civil action could otherwise be brought in another county or counties under the venue laws of this state, including without limitation this subchapter, then the civil action may be brought either in Pulaski County or the other county or counties;
    1. A civil action against the state or a civil action against a state board, state commissioner, or state officer because of his or her or the state board's official acts.
    2. However, if a civil action could otherwise be brought in another county or counties under the venue laws of this state, including without limitation this subchapter, then the civil action may be brought either in Pulaski County or the other county or counties;
  1. A civil action brought against an organization that regulates extracurricular interscholastic activities in grades seven through twelve (7-12) in both public and private schools if the organization's main administrative office is located in Pulaski County; and
  2. Other civil actions required by law to be brought in Pulaski County.

History. Civil Code, § 90; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [90], p. 219; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-603; Acts 2001, No. 806, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 190; 2011, No. 600, § 1; 2015, No. 830, § 2; 2017, No. 967, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2001, No. 806, became law without the Governor's signature.

This section was formerly codified as § 16-60-103.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment inserted “except that if … county or counties; and” in (3).

The 2003 amendment, in (4), inserted “other,” substituted “required” for “now authorized” and deleted “the separate Court of Chancery of” preceding “Pulaski.”

The 2011 amendment added present (4) and redesignated former (4) as (5).

The 2015 amendment substituted “civil action” for “action” in the introductory language and in (2), (3), and (5); substituted “Pulaski County” for “the county in which the seat of government is situated” in the introductory language; redesignated former (3) as (3)(A) and (B); in (3)(B), substituted “However” for “except that” and “including without limitation” for “as provided in”; and made stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendment added (1)(B) and (2)(B); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Actions Against Administrative Agency.

In a case in which respondents filed a lawsuit in White County, Arkansas, against the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (AGFC), seeking an injunction enjoining the AGFC from leasing, conveying, encumbering, or otherwise transferring mineral rights to certain land, a writ of prohibition that was sought by the AGFC was not appropriate. Former § 16-60-101 (see now § 16-60-102) and former § 16-60-103 (see now this section) provided the circuit court with the authority to conclude that venue was proper in White County. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Mills, 371 Ark. 317, 265 S.W.3d 760 (2007).

Trial court erred in dismissing the property owners' action challenging the construction of a gas-well pad and access road for lack of venue where the owners had named the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission as a defendant and asserted a constitutional due process claim, and thus the county in which the action was filed was an appropriate venue. Phifer v. Seeco, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 211 (2014).

Actions Against State, Etc.

This section relates only to venue and not jurisdiction so that an action for a mandatory injunction to compel state commission to issue license to petitioner was maintainable in another county where improper venue was waived. Arkansas State Racing Comm'n v. Southland Racing Corp., 226 Ark. 995, 295 S.W.2d 617 (1956), superseded by statute as stated in, Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Lindsey, 292 Ark. 314, 730 S.W.2d 474 (1987).

Action for mandatory injunction was a common law cause of action wherein venue by statute was in Pulaski County until waived by defendant's entering his appearance by filing demurrer. Arkansas State Racing Comm'n v. Southland Racing Corp., 226 Ark. 995, 295 S.W.2d 617 (1956), superseded by statute as stated in, Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Lindsey, 292 Ark. 314, 730 S.W.2d 474 (1987).

Actions by State, Etc.

A foreign corporation authorized to do business in Arkansas is not recognized as having a local or county residence, and a suit brought in the name of the state against the corporation must be brought at the seat of government, which is in Pulaski County. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Roberts, 246 Ark. 864, 440 S.W.2d 208 (1969).

Other Legislation.

This section does not restrict the venue of a habeas corpus action which by § 16-112-102(a) is made coextensive with the state. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Lipe, 257 Ark. 1015, 521 S.W.2d 526 (1975).

16-60-105. Actions for medical injury.

A civil action for medical injury brought under § 16-114-201 et seq. against a medical care provider, as defined in § 16-114-201, shall be filed in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.

History. Acts 2015, No. 830, § 2.

Case Notes

Construction.

Statutory provision concerning venue in civil actions for medical injury was constitutional under Ark. Const. Art. 4, § 2 and did not conflict with the rules of civil procedure because venue is a matter within the province of the General Assembly. Clark v. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2010 Ark. 115, 362 S.W.3d 311 (2010) (decided under former § 16-55-213).

Improper Venue.

Dismissal of a medical malpractice claim against out-of-county service providers for lack of proper venue, under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), was proper where the patient received treatment from providers in two different counties and, under former similar provision, each provider had to be sued in the county where the services were provided. Clark v. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2010 Ark. 115, 362 S.W.3d 311 (2010) (decided under former § 16-55-213).

16-60-106. Actions on debt, account, or note against certain public entities.

A civil action on a debt, account, or note, or for goods or services against a city of the first class, a city of the second class, an incorporated town, a public facilities board, or a county shall be brought in the county in which the city, town, public facilities board, or county lies.

History. Acts 2015, No. 830, § 2.

16-60-107. Contract actions by resident subcontractor, supplier, or materialman against nonresident prime contractor or subcontractor — Affidavit of contractor.

  1. A civil action in contract by a resident subcontractor, supplier, or materialman against a prime contractor or subcontractor who is a nonresident of this state or who is a foreign corporation may be brought in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action arose.
  2. When a judgment is recovered in a civil action in contract against a nonresident prime contractor or subcontractor, the prevailing party is entitled to an attorney's fee in the amount to which he or she is entitled by contract or, if an amount is not fixed, a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by the attorney on behalf of the prevailing party.
  3. The prevailing party in a civil action in contract is also entitled to recover costs and fees paid, as well as interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) on the balance due from the date the prime contractor received his or her final payment.
    1. A foreign corporation providing services in this state shall furnish, before receiving payment for its services, or in the case of installment payment, before receiving the last installment, a sworn affidavit to the person or entity employing the foreign corporation stating that all subcontractors have been paid in full.
    2. A person signing a sworn affidavit under subdivision (d)(1) of this section when in fact all subcontractors have not been paid in full upon conviction is guilty of a Class D felony.

History. Acts 1981, No. 922, §§ 1-4; 1983, No. 38, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-624 — 27-627; Acts 2015, No. 830, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-60-114.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “A civil action in contract” for “Contract actions” in (a); substituted “civil action in contract” for “action” in (b); in (d)(2), substituted “a sworn affidavit under subdivision (d)(1) of this section” for “such a sworn affidavit” and “upon conviction is guilty” for “shall be deemed guilty”; and made stylistic changes.

16-60-108. Action by insured or beneficiary against surety on contractor's performance bond.

A civil action brought in this state by or in behalf of an insured or beneficiary against a domestic or foreign surety on a contractor's payment or performance bond may be brought in the county:

  1. In which the loss occurred;
  2. Of the insured's residence at the time of loss; or
  3. Of the beneficiary's residence at the time of loss.

History. 1983, No. 39, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-628; Acts 2005, No. 2258, § 1; 2015, No. 830, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-60-115.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “payment or” for “payment of” in the introductory paragraph.

The 2015 amendment substituted “civil action” for “action.”

Cross References. Actions on bonds generally, § 16-107-101.

Case Notes

Improper Venue.

Subcontractor's suit against general contractor's surety, brought in Arkansas despite a forum selection clause in the subcontract naming Florida as the exclusive venue, was properly dismissed for improper venue under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1972), and neither public policy nor inconvenience warranted a different result on appeal. This section, which was permissive, trumped the general venue provision of the Arkansas Insurance Code fixing venue for any action against any type of insurer and did not constitute the kind of “strong public policy” sufficient to invalidate a forum selection clause under Bremen . Servewell Plumbing, LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co., 439 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2006).

16-60-109. Actions against a public school district.

A civil action, other than a civil action described in § 16-60-104 or a civil action for personal injury or death, against a public school district, a public school district board of directors, or a public school district's officer, agent, servant, or employee acting within the course and scope of his or her agency or employment shall be brought in the county or in the judicial district of the county in which the public school district is situated or has its principal office.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1315, § 2; 2015, No. 830, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-60-119.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “civil action” for “action” twice and substituted “§ 16-60-104 or a civil action for personal injury or death” for “§ 16-60-103 or § 16-60-112.”

16-60-110 — 16-60-119. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. As to repeal of these sections, see note at beginning of subchapter.

Subchapter 2 — Change of Venue

Cross References. Disqualification of judges, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 20.

Justices of the peace, § 16-19-406.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 38, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1909, No. 192, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1909, No. 249, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 2017, No. 967, § 4: Apr. 5, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the people of the State of Arkansas will benefit from immediate access to the most efficient venues for prosecution of litigation in which the state is a party. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Change of venue justified by fact that large number of inhabitants of local jurisdiction have interest adverse to party to action. 10 A.L.R.4th 1046.

Venue change in action for malicious prosecution. 12 A.L.R.4th 1278.

Am. Jur. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Contrib., § 39 et seq.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, § 50 et seq.

C.J.S. 92A C.J.S., Venue, § 145 et seq.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The sections set forth in this subchapter govern all proceedings for change in venue in civil cases. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Heirs of Ring, 247 Ark. 170, 444 S.W.2d 705 (1969).

16-60-201. Motion — Notice.

    1. Any party to a civil action to be tried by a jury may obtain an order for a change of venue therein by motion upon a petition stating that he or she verily believes that he or she cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the action in the county in which the action is pending, on account of the undue influence of his or her adversary, or of the undue prejudice against the petitioner or his or her cause of action or defense in the county.
    2. The petition shall be signed by the party and verified as pleadings are required to be verified and shall be supported by the affidavits of at least two (2) credible persons to the effect that the affiants believe the statements of the petition are true.
    3. When a corporation files the petition, the petition shall be supported by the affidavits of two (2) credible persons, neither of whom is directly or indirectly connected with the corporation in any capacity whatever, and neither of whom has been promised, nor shall receive, within twelve (12) months next preceding the signing of the petition, any benefit or favor from the corporation different from those received by every other citizen of the state or which every citizen is entitled to receive as a matter of right.
  1. The motion shall be made before, and the order granted by, the judge of the circuit court of the county in which the action is pending in open court or in vacation. If the motion is made at any time or place except in open court, at the calling of the case, it shall be upon reasonable notice in writing to the adverse party or his or her attorney.
  2. The party may make his or her petition and the affidavit supporting the petition apply to one (1) county in addition to the one in which the action is pending.
  3. A change of venue shall not be granted in an action under § 16-60-104(1) or § 16-60-104(2).
    1. A defendant in a civil action under § 16-60-104(3) may obtain an order for a change of venue by motion requesting a transfer to one (1) of the following counties:
      1. Pulaski County;
      2. Any county in which one (1) of the plaintiffs, or in the case of a certified class action, any member of the class, resides, conducts business, or maintains a principal place of business; or
      3. If no plaintiff is a resident of Arkansas, any county in the state of Arkansas.
    2. The venue of the civil action shall be changed upon a showing that the proposed transferee county is a proper venue as set forth in this subsection.

History. Acts 1875, No. 38, §§ 1, 2, p. 114; 1909, No. 192, § 1, p. 570; C. & M. Dig., §§ 10339, 10340; Pope's Dig., §§ 14340, 14341; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-701, 27-702; Acts 2017, No. 967, § 2.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (d) and (e); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Abuse of Discretion.

The action of the trial court in refusing to grant a change of venue will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Van Camp v. State, 125 Ark. 532, 189 S.W. 173, 1916 Ark. LEXIS 202 (1916).

A trial court has the discretion to refuse a petition for a change of venue where the plaintiff alleges that he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in the county, but does not allege any fact upon which his opinion was based. Pierce v. Sicard, 176 Ark. 511, 3 S.W.2d 337 (1928).

Denial of a change of venue in suit was not an abuse of discretion, though two-thirds of the county were interested. Desha v. Independence County Bridge Dist., 176 Ark. 253, 3 S.W.2d 969 (1928).

Fact that absence of affidavit in support of motion was not objected to at trial did not prevent Supreme Court from considering such absence in determining whether trial court abused its discretion in denying motion. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Leavell, 246 Ark. 1049, 441 S.W.2d 99 (1969).

Refusal to grant motion for change of venue based on other than statutory grounds was not an abuse of discretion of trial court. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Heirs of Ring, 247 Ark. 170, 444 S.W.2d 705 (1969).

Although defendant filed a verified motion for a change of venue, where motion was not supported by additional affidavits as required by this section there was not an abuse of discretion when the trial court refused the motion, even though other party failed to object to the sufficiency of the motion. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Geeslin, 247 Ark. 537, 446 S.W.2d 245 (1969).

Appeal.

A case on appeal may be changed by complying with this section. Hurley v. Bevens, 57 Ark. 547, 22 S.W. 172 (1893).

Joinder.

All defendants must join in asking for a change of venue. Klein v. German Nat'l Bank, 69 Ark. 140, 61 S.W. 572 (1901).

Place of Transfer.

Venue of civil action may be changed to county outside the circuit. Palatin Ins. Co. v. Evans, 63 Ark. 241, 37 S.W. 1046 (1896).

Support of Petition.

On an application for a change of venue, in order for an affiant to qualify as a credible person, he must be cognizant of the prejudice existing throughout the entire county and it is not sufficient for him to show a knowledge of the popular sentiment in three or four localities of the county. Hedden v. State, 179 Ark. 1079, 20 S.W.2d 119 (1929).

No matter how credible one affiant may be, a petition for change of venue supported by the affidavit of only one person is properly overruled for noncompliance with this section requiring the affidavit of two credible persons. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Duff, 246 Ark. 922, 440 S.W.2d 563 (1969).

The requirements of this section that a motion for change of venue be supported by two affidavits cannot be waived. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Leavell, 246 Ark. 1049, 441 S.W.2d 99 (1969).

Where State Highway Commission failed to follow the mandatory procedure set out in this section in petitioning for change of venue in eminent domain case, motion for change of venue was properly denied. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Coffman, 247 Ark. 302, 445 S.W.2d 92 (1969).

16-60-202. No change made unless found necessary.

Except as provided under § 16-60-201(e), the venue of civil actions shall not be changed unless the court or judge to whom the application for change of venue is made finds that the change of venue is necessary to obtain a fair and impartial trial of the cause.

History. Acts 1909, No. 249, § 1, p. 751; C. & M. Dig., § 10341; Pope's Dig., § 14342; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-704; Acts 2017, No. 967, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added “Except as provided under § 16-60-201(e)”.

Case Notes

Abuse of Discretion.

The granting or denial of a change of venue lies largely in the discretion of a trial judge, and the Supreme Court will not reverse the trial court's denial of a change of venue unless there has been an abuse of its discretion. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Duff, 246 Ark. 922, 440 S.W.2d 563 (1969).

Refusal to grant motion for change of venue based on other than statutory grounds was not an abuse of discretion of trial court. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Heirs of Ring, 247 Ark. 170, 444 S.W.2d 705 (1969).

Paternity.

Change of venue in paternity suit falls under this section. Scott v. State, 173 Ark. 625, 292 S.W. 979 (1927).

Cited: Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Heirs of Ring, 247 Ark. 170, 444 S.W.2d 705 (1969).

16-60-203. Objection to petition — Order.

Upon presenting the petition, which may be resisted, and upon notice to the judge, the judge may make an order for the change of venue in the action, if in his or her judgment it is necessary for a fair and impartial trial, to a county to which there is no valid objection and which he or she concludes is most convenient to the parties and their witnesses.

History. Acts 1875, No. 38, § 3, p. 114; 1899, No. 116, § 1, p. 189; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-703.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

Exercise of discretion of trial court will not be interfered with. Louisiana & N.W. Ry. v. Smith, 74 Ark. 172, 85 S.W. 242 (1905).

16-60-204. Procedure when order granted — Transmission of papers — Fees.

  1. When the order for change of venue is obtained out of term time, the party obtaining the order shall cause the petition, notice, affidavit, and order to be delivered to the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, who shall file the order with the papers in the case.
    1. In all cases where an order for a change of venue is granted, the clerk shall make and file with the papers a certified copy of all the orders in the case and, upon the payment of the transmission fees provided for in this section, shall transmit the papers in the case to the clerk of the court to which the venue is changed by any safe and convenient mode which he or she may select.
    2. The clerk shall be responsible for the transmission of the papers, for which he or she shall receive ten cents (10¢) per mile to and from the clerk's office, to be paid by the party obtaining the order, and to be taxed in the costs.
    1. If the above-mentioned fee is not paid or arranged with the clerk within fifteen (15) days from the granting of the order, the order shall be null and void.
    2. The judge granting the order may extend the time of making such payment, which shall be stated in the order.
    3. The adverse party, if he or she chooses, may make such payment.

History. Acts 1875, No. 38, §§ 4, 5, p. 114; C. & M. Dig., §§ 10342, 10343; Pope's Dig., §§ 14343, 14344; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-705, 27-706.

Case Notes

Order.

An order varying from the petition as to the grounds for the change of venue is amendable. Hurley v. Bevens, 57 Ark. 547, 22 S.W. 172 (1893).

Prepayment.

A court to which the venue is changed acquires jurisdiction upon the filing of the transcript when the clerk waived the prepayment of his fees. Fritz Bros. v. Wells, 83 Ark. 124, 103 S.W. 168 (1907).

Presumption.

On appeal, where the record shows that an order for a change of venue was made and that thereafter the parties voluntarily submitted to trial in the court in which the action was brought, it will be presumed the order became inoperative under this section. Duncan v. Tufts, 52 Ark. 404, 12 S.W. 873 (1889).

16-60-205. Number of changes limited.

Only one (1) order for a change of venue shall be granted to the same party in the same action.

History. Acts 1875, No. 38, § 5, p. 114; C. & M. Dig., § 10343; Pope's Dig., § 14344; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-706.

16-60-206. Time for trial after change.

In all cases of change of venue, the action shall stand for trial in the court to which the change is made at the first term of the court which commences more than ten (10) days from the filing of the papers of the case in the office of the clerk of such court.

History. Acts 1875, No. 38, § 6, p. 114; C. & M. Dig., § 10344; Pope's Dig., § 14345; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-707.

16-60-207. Domestic relations.

The venue of domestic relations cases in this state may be transferred between judicial districts in which either party resides, when agreed to by the parties to the action and the judges involved.

History. Acts 1975, No. 371, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-708; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 191.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “judicial districts” for “chancery circuits” and “judges” for “chancellors of the circuits.”

Chapter 61 Parties

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this subchapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Cross References. Parties to actions, ARCP 17.

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 32, § 2: effective on passage.

Research References

ALR.

Standing of civic or property owners' association to challenge zoning board decision (as aggrieved party). 8 A.L.R.4th 1087.

Descendability or inheritability of right to contest will. 11 A.L.R.4th 907.

Standing of foster parent to seek termination of rights of foster child's natural parents. 21 A.L.R.4th 535.

Right of insurer to intervene in action by insured against uninsured motorist. 35 A.L.R.4th 757.

Right of insurer to intervene in workers' compensation proceeding. 38 A.L.R.4th 355.

Assignability of claim for legal malpractice. 40 A.L.R.4th 684.

No-fault insurer as defendant where insured automobile owner or operator is not liable for economic losses under no-fault insurance law. 40 A.L.R.4th 858.

Am. Jur. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parties, § 1 et seq.

16-61-101. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the designation of parties, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 23[24]. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 1032; Pope's Dig., § 1234; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-203.

16-61-102. Married persons.

  1. If a husband and wife are sued together, the wife may defend:
    1. For her own right; and
    2. If the husband neglects to defend, for his right also.
  2. Where a husband, being a father, has deserted his family, the wife, being a mother, may prosecute or defend in his name any action which he might have prosecuted or defended and shall have the same powers and rights therein as he might have had.

History. Civil Code, §§ 43, 44; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1108, 1109; Pope's Dig., §§ 1324, 1325; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-821, 27-822.

Case Notes

Recovery of Land.

Wife could sue for recovery of land in name of absent husband where evidence showed that husband abandoned wife and children. Edge v. Buschow Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 903, 239 S.W.2d 597 (1951).

Removal.

The right of a married woman to sue for personal injuries in her own name is not lost by the defendant's removal of the cause of action to a federal court. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Humble, 181 U.S. 57, 21 S. Ct. 526, 45 L. Ed. 747 (1901).

Torts.

The husband is responsible for the wife's torts committed during coverture. Such torts may be committed under the following circumstances: (1) where the husband is absent and had no knowledge of the intended act; (2) where the husband is absent but the tort is done under his direction; (3) where the husband was present, but the wife acted on her own volition; and (4) where the tort is committed in the company of the husband and by his command or encouragement. In the first three cases they are jointly liable and the wife must be joined as she is in reality the offending party. In the last situation the husband alone is the offending party. Kosminsky v. Goldberg, 44 Ark. 401 (1884).

Witnesses.

In an action by a husband and wife to recover damages for personal injuries to each of them, although neither is a competent witness for or against the other, either is competent to testify in his or her own behalf. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Amos, 54 Ark. 159, 15 S.W. 362 (1891).

16-61-103 — 16-61-106. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning actions against infants and insane persons, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 24[25]–27[28]. The sections were derived from:

16-61-103. Civil Code, §§ 46, 47; C. & M. Dig. §§ 1111, 1112; Pope's Dig., §§ 1327, 1328; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-823, 27-824.

16-61-104. Civil Code, §§ 48, 50; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [50], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1113, 1115; Pope's Dig., §§ 1329, 1331; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-825, 27-827.

16-61-105. Civil Code, §§ 51, 52; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1116, 1117; Pope's Dig., §§ 1332, 1333; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-828, 27-829.

16-61-106. Civil Code, §§ 53, 54; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1118, 1119; Pope's Dig., §§ 1334, 1335; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-830, 27-831.

16-61-107. Insanity during pendency of action — Guardian joined.

Where a party is judicially found to be of unsound mind during the pendency of an action, the fact being stated on the record:

  1. If he or she is the plaintiff, his or her guardian may be joined with him or her in the action as such;
  2. If he or she is the defendant, the plaintiff may, upon ten (10) days' notice thereof to his or her guardian, have an order making the guardian a defendant also.

History. Civil Code, § 55; C. & M. Dig., § 1120; Pope's Dig., § 1336; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-832.

Case Notes

Proper Party.

Because plaintiff individual was not the proper party to pursue the tort claims against defendants due to her incompetency, and she did not move to substitute the proper party after being put on notice of the need for substitution, the district court did not err in dismissing the claims. Kuelbs v. Hill, 615 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1287, 131 S. Ct. 1679, 179 L. Ed. 2d 616 (2011).

16-61-108. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning guardian ad litem appointments and disqualification of certain parties and attorneys for infants or insane persons, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 28[29]. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 49; C. & M. Dig., § 1114; Pope's Dig., § 1330; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-826.

16-61-109. Fees of guardian or attorney appointed to defend infant, insane person, or prisoner — Costs.

A guardian or attorney appointed on the application of the plaintiff to defend for an infant, person of unsound mind, or prisoner shall be allowed a reasonable fee for his or her services, to be paid by the plaintiff and taxed in the costs.

History. Civil Code, § 57; C. & M. Dig., § 1122; Pope's Dig., § 1338; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-834.

Case Notes

In General.

Finding against appellants in an action concerning property transfers was proper where it was determined that the circuit court was exercising its equitable power when it ordered that fees be taxed as costs against them. Middleton v. Lockhart, 364 Ark. 32, 216 S.W.3d 98 (2005).

Cited: Middleton v. Lockhart, 344 Ark. 572, 43 S.W.3d 113 (2001).

16-61-110. Foreign executors, administrators, and guardians.

Administrators, executors, and guardians appointed in any of the states, territories, or districts of the United States, under the laws thereof, may sue in any of the courts of this state, in their representative capacity, to the same and like effect as if the administrators, executors, and guardians had been qualified under the laws of this state. However, the administrators, executors, or guardians shall be required, before they shall institute a suit or proceeding, to execute the same bond as is required of other nonresidents by the laws of this state.

History. Acts 1843, § 1, p. 105; C. & M. Dig., § 1093; Pope's Dig., § 1309; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-805.

Case Notes

Applicability.

A foreign administratrix may sue in this state. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cleere, 76 Ark. 377, 88 S.W. 995 (1905).

This section does not mention curators. Kindrick v. Capps, 196 Ark. 1169, 121 S.W.2d 515 (1938).

Ancillary Letters.

A foreign administrator had recovered a judgment in an action brought by him in his representative capacity in the jurisdiction of his appointment. It was held that he may sue upon the judgment in his own name without taking out ancillary letters. McCraw v. Simpson, 208 Ark. 471, 187 S.W.2d 536 (1945).

Appointment.

Son, a foreign administrator of his mother's estate, was subject to the requirements for domiciliary personal representatives found in §§ 28-48-101 through 28-48-109, pursuant to this section. Because the son had not been appointed administrator of his mother's estate in any state at the time he filed his original complaint for trespass and conversion of timber, he did not have standing to sue; because the complaint was a nullity, a second complaint could not relate back under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Travis Lumber Co. v. Deichman, 2009 Ark. 299, 319 S.W.3d 239 (2009).

Jurisdiction.

A domiciliary administratrix of a deceased's out-of-state estate voluntarily entered her appearance in an interpleader proceeding in Arkansas claiming a fund involved in an action in a federal court in the other state. It was held that the Arkansas chancery court had jurisdiction. McCraw v. Simpson, 208 Ark. 471, 187 S.W.2d 536 (1945).

Substitution.

An administrator appointed at the deceased's domicile in another state cannot sue for a debt due his intestate in this state after the appointment of an administrator here. Gibson v. Ponder, 40 Ark. 195 (1882).

Where a suit is brought by an infant by her foreign guardian, it was not error to permit her to substitute a resident as her next friend. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Haist, 71 Ark. 258, 72 S.W. 893 (1903), overruled, Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992).

Cited: Tipler v. Crafton, 202 Ark. 351, 150 S.W.2d 625 (1941); Redditt v. Hale, 184 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1950).

16-61-111. Joint and several obligors.

  1. Joint obligations shall be construed to have the same effect as joint and several obligations, and may be sued on, and recoveries had thereon in like manner.
  2. Persons severally liable upon the same contract, including parties to bills of exchange, promissory notes placed upon the footing of bills of exchange, common orders and checks, and sureties on the same or separate instruments, may all, or any of them, or the representatives of those persons who may have died, be included in the same action, at the plaintiff's option.
    1. Where two (2) or more persons are jointly bound by contract, the action thereon may be brought against all or any of them, at the plaintiff's option.
    2. Where any of the persons so bound are dead, the action may be brought against any or all of the survivors, with the representatives of all or any of the decedents, or against the latter, or any of them.
    3. Where all the persons so bound are dead, the action may be brought against the representatives of all or of any of them.
    4. An action or judgment against any one (1) or more of several persons jointly bound shall not be a bar to proceedings against the other.
  3. No creditor on any joint, or joint and several, obligation shall have more than one (1) satisfaction and costs in one (1) suit.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 82, §§ 3, 5; Civil Code, §§ 34, 35; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1099, 1100, 6229, 6231; Pope's Dig., §§ 1282, 1284, 1315, 1316; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-810 — 27-813.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Matthews, Procedural Considerations in Bringing Suit Against a General Partnership in Arkansas, 1989 Ark. L. Notes 57.

Case Notes

Costs.

Where separate suits are brought against two parties liable on a joint contract and judgment for costs recovered against one of them which is satisfied, the costs of the other suit should be charged against the plaintiff; but where there has been no satisfaction of the first judgment, the plaintiff should have judgment for costs against the other promissor. Kissire v. Plunkett-Jarrell Grocer Co., 103 Ark. 473, 145 S.W. 567 (1912).

Effect.

Where a bill is signed by a firm and by firm members individually, one is liable for the full amount of the note although no service is had upon the other. Lamew v. Wilson-Ward Co., 106 Ark. 340, 153 S.W. 261 (1913).

Fact that judgment was had against principal only on retaining bond did not prevent a subsequent judgment from being rendered against the surety. Craig v. Collier, 155 Ark. 538, 244 S.W. 717 (1922).

The owners of less than the entire reversion could sue to enforce the forfeiture of an oil and gas lease for breach of an implied covenant to develop since in this state the covenants of the lessee are divisible in that each assignee must develop his portion. Alphin v. Gulf Ref. Co., 39 F. Supp. 570 (W.D. Ark. 1941).

Accommodation maker is not entitled to judgment against comakers in suit on note by payee against all makers until he has paid judgment obtained by payee. Haley v. Brewer, 220 Ark. 511, 248 S.W.2d 890 (1952).

Where defendant signed certain promissory notes both as officer of corporation and in his own name, he could not show by parol evidence that he was not to be bound by such notes. Larcon Co. v. Wallingsford, 136 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Ark. 1955), aff'd, 237 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. Ark. 1956).

Liability.

In a suit on a joint and several contract, the plaintiff may sue all or any of the co-contractors. Deloach v. Dixon, 1840 U.S. App. LEXIS 448 (C.C.D. Ark. 1840); Johnson v. Byrd, 13 F. Cas. 735 (C.C.D. Ark. 1841).

Payee of a note may sue one or more of the payors at his election. Bradford, Rainwater & Co. v. Toney, 30 Ark. 763 (1875).

The surviving maker of a promissory note, who is the administrator of his deceased coobligor, may be sued on the note in both his individual and representative capacity, at the same time. W.J. Little Grocer Co. v. Johnson, 50 Ark. 62, 6 S.W. 231 (1887).

Survival.

Joint obligations are taken as joint and several, and survive. Maledon v. Leflore, 62 Ark. 387, 35 S.W. 1102 (1896).

Where statute provided that officer depositing public funds should be liable therefor together with the sureties on his official bond and the bank and its stockholders a recovery could be had against all of them or against any of them. Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 135 S.W. 896 (1911).

Where person purchased certain goods from plaintiff and the defendants agreed to pay whatever balance shown to be due to the plaintiff, it was held that the plaintiff, could sue both the person and the defendants in the same action. Fluhart v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 126 Ark. 307, 190 S.W. 118 (1916).

Both the drawer and acceptor of a draft are severally liable to the payee, and he may pursue both either jointly or severally, though only one satisfaction may be had. Ohio Galvanizing & Mfg. Co. v. Nichol, 170 Ark. 16, 279 S.W. 377 (1926).

Where suit is brought against contractors and sureties on a construction bond, the fact that case was dismissed as to sureties for want of jurisdiction did not require dismissal as to contractors, who were liable in any event where they bought material and failed to pay for it. Hot Springs Concrete Co. v. Rosamond, 178 Ark. 194, 10 S.W.2d 12 (1928).

In a joint action against an insolvent county depository and its nonresident surety, there was no separable controversy entitling the surety to a removal. Consolidated Indem. & Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Craighead County, 184 Ark. 581, 43 S.W.2d 240 (1931).

It was not improper to join insolvent bank and its surety in suit on depository bond. Consolidated Indem. & Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Craighead County, 184 Ark. 581, 43 S.W.2d 240 (1931).

A defendant cannot bring in another party defendant unless he files a cross complaint against the party and states facts showing that the cause of action against the third party affects the subject of the original action. Meyers Store Co. v. Armstrong, 187 Ark. 636, 61 S.W.2d 440 (1933).

In a lessee's suit for breach of lease in which the evidence was conflicting as to whether one lessor authorized a material alteration of the lease, purporting to be the agent of all the lessors, an instruction that the lessors were not liable unless all the lessors authorized the alteration was erroneous. Darling Shops, Inc. v. Brack, 95 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1938).

Note executed by partnership is the joint obligation of the partners and holder had the right to sue either the surviving partner or the administratrix of the estate of the deceased partner or both. Nakdimen v. Bruton, 196 Ark. 1179, 112 S.W.2d 974 (1938).

Surviving partner sued as maker of partnership note had the right, by appropriate pleadings, to have the comaker, or his administratrix, made a party defendant, but he could not compel the plaintiff to sue the other party or to have process issued bringing the administratrix into the suit. Nakdimen v. Bruton, 196 Ark. 1179, 112 S.W.2d 974 (1938).

Accommodation maker is not entitled to judgment against comakers in suit on note by payee against all makers until he has paid judgment obtained by payee. Haley v. Brewer, 220 Ark. 511, 248 S.W.2d 890 (1952).

Subsection (b) relates to the parties which may be joined in an action and does not relate to venue which must still be obtained by proper service under venue statutes. Barr v. Cockrill, 224 Ark. 570, 275 S.W.2d 6 (1955).

Where defendant signed certain promissory notes both as officer of corporation and in his own name, he could not show by parol evidence that he was not to be bound by the notes. Larcon Co. v. Wallingsford, 136 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Ark. 1955), aff'd, 237 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. Ark. 1956).

16-61-112. Assignments.

  1. When the assignment is not authorized by statute, the assignor must be a party as plaintiff or defendant.
  2. Where the right of the plaintiff is transferred or assigned during the pendency of the action, it may be continued in his or her name, or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer or assignment is made to be substituted in the action, proper orders being made as to security for the costs.

History. Civil Code, §§ 26, 27; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [26], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1090, 1091; Pope's Dig., §§ 1306, 1307; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-802, 27-803.

Case Notes

In General.

It is only when the assignment of a thing in action is not authorized by statute that the assignor is required to be made a party. Collier v. Trice, 79 Ark. 414, 96 S.W. 174 (1906).

Administrative Actions.

While assignor would have been a necessary party in a suit for damages in circuit court, the assignee's action involved a complaint before the Real Estate Commission, which is governed by the rules of the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act. Eckels v. Ark. Real Estate Comm'n, 30 Ark. App. 69, 783 S.W.2d 864 (1990).

Bills of Lading.

While bills of lading with the words “nonnegotiable” printed across their face are not negotiable in the sense of the law merchant, they represent the property shipped; when assigned and delivered with intent to pass the title to the property, it is not necessary for the assignee, in a suit based upon them, to join his assignor as plaintiff. Dewberry-Hargett Co. v. Arkansas State Bank, 164 Ark. 223, 261 S.W. 301 (1924).

In an action by carrier against the shipper of goods under a through bill of lading to recover freight charges, refusal to grant the shipper's request to make the initial carrier a party in order that he might offset a claim for damages against the amount plaintiff paid the initial carrier for freight charges was not error, where, though the bill of lading was assignable, it was not assigned to plaintiff. Price v. New York, C. & S. L. R. Co., 175 Ark. 688, 300 S.W. 373 (1927).

Bonds.

Assignee of claim growing out of breach of supersedeas bond may sue in his own name. Love v. Cahn, 93 Ark. 215, 124 S.W. 259 (1909).

Control of Action.

The assignee has the right to control the action. Boqua v. Marshall, 88 Ark. 373, 114 S.W. 714 (1908).

Insurance.

Insured in automobile damage policy was necessary party to suit against person causing damage, brought by insurer which alleged its subrogation to insured's rights by assignment. American Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 165 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Coker, 218 Ark. 653, 238 S.W.2d 491 (1951).

Judgments.

The assignee of a judgment is entitled to defend an appeal therefrom by the other party, as against the claim to the right by the assignor's administratrix. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Hunnicutt, 181 Ark. 694, 27 S.W.2d 93 (1930).

Negotiable Instruments.

Real owner of note may sue in his own name though he holds by delivery merely. Webster v. Carter, 99 Ark. 458, 138 S.W. 1006 (1911).

Where a bank made collections for another bank and sent drafts therefor which were not paid because the collecting bank went into the hands of the state bank commissioner, the other bank may maintain an action against the bank commissioner to have its claim allowed as a preferred claim. Rainwater v. Federal Reserve Bank, 172 Ark. 631, 290 S.W. 69 (1927).

Where person had become assignee of a note sued on, he was the real party in interest and on motion should have been substituted as sole plaintiff. Higginbotham v. Ritter, 200 Ark. 376, 139 S.W.2d 27 (1940).

Nonnegotiable Bill.

Where person assigned nonnegotiable bill to plaintiff, without endorsement, it was held that the plaintiff could maintain an action against the maker of the bill without making the assignor a party plaintiff. Morgan v. Center, 133 Ark. 247, 202 S.W. 235 (1918).

Open Account.

An open account is not assignable, and a party to whom it is transferred cannot sue upon it alone, but must join his assignor as a party. Goode v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 Ark. 451, 13 S.W.2d 6 (1928).

Out-of-State Laws.

The assignment of claims against a corporation for the purpose of collection merely, if valid in the state where made, will entitle the assignee to bring an action thereon in his own name in this state. Lanigan v. North, 69 Ark. 62, 63 S.W. 62 (1901).

Pendency of Action.

Fact that plaintiff's title and interest in note sued on has been transferred since commencement of action is no defense at law to the action. Ivey v. Drake, 36 Ark. 228 (1880).

Where the right of a party to suit to share in fund in litigation defended upon verbal contract, the assignment of his interest to another authorized the latter to control the litigation. Boqua v. Marshall, 88 Ark. 373, 114 S.W. 714 (1908).

Where right of plaintiff in action is transferred during the pendency of the action, the assignee is not a necessary party and suit may be continued in name of assignor. Tribue v. Broaddus, 106 Ark. 418, 153 S.W. 611 (1913).

Advancement by the manager to an abstract company of the price of making an abstract of title for the defendant constituted an assignment of the company's right of action to the manager and the action may be continued in the name of the company. Benson v. Arkansas Abstract Co., 123 Ark. 620, 185 S.W. 1089 (1916).

Where plaintiffs in a suit to quiet their title to certain lands sold the lands, it is proper to make their grantees parties plaintiff. Hurst v. Munson, 152 Ark. 313, 238 S.W. 42 (1922).

The assignee of county warrants issued for the construction of a bridge may appeal from an order of the county court cancelling the warrants and refusing to reissue the same. Woodruff County v. Road Improv. Dist., 159 Ark. 374, 252 S.W. 930 (1923).

Assignment by defendant contractor of his contract to surety company during pendency of action entitles plaintiffs to proceed against assignees. Southern Sur. Co. v. Phillips, 181 Ark. 14, 24 S.W.2d 870 (1930).

An assignment can be made during the pendency of an action on a note. Higginbotham v. Ritter, 200 Ark. 376, 139 S.W.2d 27 (1940).

Statute of Limitations.

In the action by the assignee of a cause of action not made assignable by statute, the assignor is a necessary party plaintiff, and where no offer is made to make him a party until the statute of limitation has expired, the action is barred. Temple Cotton Oil Co. v. Davis, 167 Ark. 448, 268 S.W. 38 (1925).

Sureties.

Surety of contractor who completes contract may sue thereon. Chapman & Dewey Land Co. v. Wilson, 91 Ark. 30, 120 S.W. 391 (1909).

Tort Claims.

Tort claims are not made assignable by statute, and an assignee maintaining action on such claims must join his assignors. Young v. Garrett, 149 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1945).

Cited: Perryman v. Hackler, 323 Ark. 500, 916 S.W.2d 105 (1996).

16-61-113 — 16-61-115. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning interpleader, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 29[30]–31[32]. The sections were derived from:

16-61-113. Civil Code, § 37; C. & M. Dig., § 1102; Pope's Dig., § 1318; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-815.

16-61-114. Civil Code, § 38; Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 32, § 1, p. 36; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1103, 1104; Pope's Dig., §§ 1319, 1320; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-817, 27-818.

16-61-115. Civil Code, §§ 39, 40; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1105, 1106; Pope's Dig., §§ 1321, 1322; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-819, 27-820.

Subchapter 2 — Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act

A.C.R.C. Notes. The amendments to this subchapter by Acts 2013, No. 1116, were not official amendments to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. As a result, this subchapter substantially deviates from the official version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.

Publisher's Notes. Although this act was revised in 1955, Arkansas has retained the 1939 version.

For Comments regarding the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, see Commentaries Volume B.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 8: Aug. 16, 2013. Effective date clause provided: “This act is remedial in nature and applies to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.”

Research References

ALR.

Release of, or covenant not to sue, one primarily liable for tort, but expressly reserving rights against one secondarily liable, as bar to recovery against latter. 24 A.L.R.4th 547.

Contribution from joint tortfeasor who is spouse or otherwise in close familial relationship to injured party. 25 A.L.R.4th 1120.

Ark. L. Rev.

Workmen's Compensation — Contribution and Indemnity — Employer's Liability to Third Party Tortfeasor, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 512.

Comparative Negligence, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 357.

Panel on Settlement Procedures, 11 Ark. L. Rev. 54.

Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A “Before and After” Survey, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 89.

Family Torts in Automobile Cases, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 299.

Conflict of Laws — Effect of Judgment on Liability of Joint-Tortfeasors, 14 Ark. L. Rev. 343.

Arkansas Model Jury Instructions: Introductory and Closing Instructions, Use of General Verdict and Interrogatories, Negligence, Proximate Cause, Owners and Occupiers of Land, Common Carriers, Railroads, and Comparative Negligence, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 66.

Note, Mary Carter in Arkansas: Settlements, Secret Agreements, and Some Serious Problems, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 570.

Woods, Some Observations on Contributions and Indemnity, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 44.

Note, McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde: Arkansas's Wake-Up Call in Accounting for Settlements in Multi-Defendant Litigation?, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1027.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Bradley, Civil Procedure, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 107.

Case Notes

In General.

Arkansas was the first state to adopt the optional version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, thus early opting for proportionate assessment of fault between joint tortfeasors. Elk Corp. of Ark. v. Builders Transport, Inc., 862 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1988).

Construction.

Interpretation given this subchapter by the National Conference of Commissioners on uniform state laws is not necessarily binding on the Supreme Court, but it should be adopted unless erroneous or contrary to the settled policy of the state as declared in the opinions of the Supreme Court. Shultz v. Young, 205 Ark. 533, 169 S.W.2d 648 (1943)Criticized byWoodward v. Blythe, 249 Ark. 793, 462 S.W.2d 205 (Ark. 1971).

Purpose.

One of the primary purposes of this subchapter is to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962).

Applicability.

This subchapter applies to joint tortfeasors who are also joint adventurers. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 246 Ark. 1269, 441 S.W.2d 787 (1969).

This subchapter is inapplicable where there has been a judgement and satisfaction based on a purely derivative theory. Barnett v. Isabell, 282 Ark. 88, 666 S.W.2d 393 (1984).

Discretion of Court.

Invoking of remedy afforded by this act is discretionary with the trial court. Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962).

Individual Liability.

Individual liability of joint tortfeasors to the injured party is unaffected by this subchapter. One defendant may proceed against others liable to the injured party for his pro rata share, but this does not affect the right of the injured party to recover from the joint tortfeasors individually or collectively. Dunaway v. Troutt, 232 Ark. 615, 339 S.W.2d 613 (1960), overruled, United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Murphy, 331 Ark. 364, 961 S.W.2d 752 (Ark. 1998)Questioned byMissouri Pac. R.R. v. Arkansas Sheriff's Boys' Ranch, 280 Ark. 53, 655 S.W.2d 389 (1983), overruled in part, Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Padgett, 241 Ark. 353, 407 S.W.2d 728 (Ark. 1966)Questioned byBreeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. Ark. 1967).

Service of Process.

In suit under this law, service on nonresident motorist could be obtained under the provisions of § 16-58-121(a). Burnett v. Agent, 227 Ark. 1050, 303 S.W.2d 575 (1957).

Workers' Compensation.

Where an action involves both this subchapter and the Workers' Compensation Act, it is in the interest of public policy and in keeping with the intent of the General Assembly to give the compensation act priority as an exclusive remedy. Therefore, in matters involving worker's compensation benefits the employer shall be immune from third party tortfeasors claim. W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Cited: McKennon v. Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 244 S.W.2d 138 (1951); Citizens Coach Co. v. Wright, 228 Ark. 1143, 313 S.W.2d 94 (1958); Industrial Farm Home Gas Co. v. McDonald, 234 Ark. 744, 355 S.W.2d 174 (1962); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Shwayder Bros., 238 Ark. 768, 384 S.W.2d 473 (1964); Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 240 Ark. 280, 399 S.W.2d 258 (1966); Morison v. GMC, 428 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1970); International Harvester Co. v. Burks Motors, Inc., 252 Ark. 816, 481 S.W.2d 351 (1972); Welter v. Curry, 260 Ark. 287, 539 S.W.2d 264 (1976); Dulin v. Circle F Indus., Inc., 558 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1977); Martin v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Harvey v. Eastman Kodak Co., 271 Ark. 783, 610 S.W.2d 582 (1981); Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Champlin & Wells, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Champlin & Wells, Inc., 775 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. Ark. 1985); Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995).

16-61-201. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Joint tortfeasor” means two (2) or more persons or entities who may have joint liability or several liability in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them; and
  2. “Several liability” means that each person or entity is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1001; Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the rights afforded to joint tortfeasors by this act apply with equal force after the modification of joint and several liability as provided in § 16-55-201, and that none of the rights granted to join tortfeasors by this act, including allocation of fault and credits for settlements entered into by other joint tortfeasors, shall be denied to joint tortfeasors.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section and the section heading.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 8: Aug. 16, 2013. Effective date clause provided: “This act is remedial in nature and applies to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Notes, Tort Law — General Release Forms — The Free Ride for Joint Tortfeasors Is Over, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 791.

Case Notes

Appeal.

Where only one of two joint tortfeasors appealed from a judgment against them and obtained a reversal, the jury on the second trial was not limited in its judgment against the tortfeasor to the amount of the judgment in the first trial against the tortfeasor who did not appeal, but plaintiff's first satisfaction must be credited to any subsequent satisfaction he seeks. Woodward v. Blythe, 249 Ark. 793, 462 S.W.2d 205 (Ark. 1971).

Common Liability.

It is not necessary that the parties act in concert in order to be liable as joint tortfeasors. Applegate v. Riggall, 229 Ark. 773, 318 S.W.2d 596 (1958).

In view of this section it is clear that before there can be any contribution it must appear that at least originally the person seeking contribution and the person from whom contribution is sought must have been under a common legal liability to the injured party. Cox v. Maddux, 255 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Ark. 1966), rev'd, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967).

Defendant's argument was flawed where action was for breach of contract since subchapter applies only to persons liable for torts, and defendant did not show that person seeking contribution and person from whom contribution was sought were under a common legal liability to injured party. Roberts & Co. v. Sergio, 22 Ark. App. 58, 733 S.W.2d 420 (1987).

Even if the parties' tortious acts are temporally separate, if they caused the same injury or loss, the parties are jointly liable. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ernst & Young v. Reves, 502 U.S. 1092, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992), aff'd, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).

To the extent that the holding in St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton, 2013 Ark. 38, 425 S.W.3d 761, conflicts with the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., it has been effectively overruled by Acts 2013, No. 1116. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

Discovery.

It was error to grant at this point in the case defendant subcontractor's motion to compel discovery of the confidential settlement agreement between plaintiff and defendant general contractor that resulted from mediation, when the subcontractor sought contribution and apportionment of fault, because (1) any right of contribution does not arise until one joint tortfeasor pays more than the tortfeasor's share of liability, and no damages had been awarded yet, and (2) it was error to find the general contractor and subcontractor were joint tortfeasors before any evidence was presented. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, however, the Civil Justice Reform Act, § 16-55-201 et seq., did not eliminate contribution among “joint tortfeasors”. Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 2020 Ark. App. 140, 597 S.W.3d 114 (2020).

Joint Tortfeasors.

Arkansas law permits a plaintiff to seek contribution from defendant as a “joint tortfeasor”, and plaintiff's contribution action was not defeated merely because the tort liability shared by the two insurers arose by virtue of principles of vicarious liability. Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1999).

Summary judgment was improperly granted in a contribution case arising from the distribution of an estate and a trust as a beneficiary could have been a joint tortfeasor based on an allegation of civil conspiracy. Heinemann v. Hallum, 365 Ark. 600, 232 S.W.3d 420 (2006).

In a second trial, the judge was correct in refusing to credit $60,000 paid by an insurance company in the first trial because the other defendant, an insurance brokerage acting as the agent for the company, and the company were not joint tortfeasors; the jury only found the agent liable for deceit and the appellate court could not tell whether the damages awarded against the insurance company and the damages awarded against the agent compensated the policy purchaser for the “same injury to person or property.” Aon Risk Servs. v. Mickles, 96 Ark. App. 369, 242 S.W.3d 286 (2006).

Hospital did not have a right of contribution under the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) because the hospital and the rehabilitation center were not joint tortfeasors under the UCATA, as there was only several liability following the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton, 2013 Ark. 38, 425 S.W.3d 761 (2013), superseded by statute as stated in, J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

In employee's products liability action against the manufacturer of the product that injured him while he was working, the circuit court properly precluded the manufacturer's attempt to allocate fault to the nonparty employer in its amended answer; because the employer was clothed with immunity from liability in tort under the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers' compensation statutes, the employer could not have joint or several “liability” in tort and therefore did not meet the definition of “joint tortfeasor” in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., or fall within the confines of that act. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56, 595 S.W.3d 9 (2020).

Judgment-Proof Defendant.

The law does not presume that full recovery can be defeated because one or more of the defendants may be execution proof. Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935 (1948).

Principal-Agent Relationship.

While indemnity is commonly granted where liability has been imposed on a person not because of any fault on his part but solely because of his relationship to the one at fault, this doctrine did not apply to a railroad's indemnity claim against a truck driver since there was no employer-employee or other agency type relationship between the railroad and the driver on which to base imputation of liability. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Star City Gravel Co., 592 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1979).

Proper Joint Tortfeasors.

If purchaser of chemical distributes it by plane over its crop, and crop of plaintiff is damaged, and plaintiff files suit against the purchaser of the chemical for damages, nonresident chemical corporation who sold it was a proper joint defendant as use of chemical was inherently dangerous to other crops. Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).

Where husband while driving wife's car to work collided with unlighted trailer of defendants which was being pulled by a tractor, relative to the damage done to wife's car, husband and defendants were joint tortfeasors. Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854, 350 S.W.2d 169 (1961).

Where court concluded that the accounting firm and all of the settling defendants were joint tortfeasors, it was correct to credit the verdict against the firm with the settlement proceeds. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Ernst & Young v. Reves, 502 U.S. 1092, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992), aff'd, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).

Retroactive Applicability.

Section 16-61-201 et seq., as amended by Acts 2013, No. 1116, did not apply retroactively to a medical malpractice action because Act 1116 created new, substantive rights, so Act 1116 could not constitutionally be retroactively applied. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Acts 2013, No. 1116 could not constitutionally be applied retroactively because, inter alia, Act 1116 created a new, substantive right to allocation of fault by adding the term “several liability,” which meant each person or entity was liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Time for Determination of Liability.

The question of the joint or common liability of the joint tortfeasors is determined as of the time the cause of action accrues and not at the time when the right to recover contribution is asserted, but where the jury, by its verdict, obviously found that defendant was neither jointly nor severally liable for the injury to the plaintiff, there simply was no way under the statutory definition that the defendant could be considered as a joint tortfeasor. Scalf v. Payne, 266 Ark. 231, 583 S.W.2d 51 (1979).

Cited: Arhart v. Micro Switch Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1986); Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Cole, 329 Ark. 209, 947 S.W.2d 362 (1997); Hurst v. Dixon, 357 Ark. 439, 182 S.W.3d 102 (2004).

16-61-202. Right of contribution — Accrual — Pro rata share.

  1. The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors.
  2. A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he or she has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his or her pro rata share of the common liability.
  3. The right of contribution is not limited to money damages but also includes the right to an allocation of fault as among all joint tortfeasors and the rights provided for in § 16-61-204.
  4. A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 2; 1949, No. 35, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1002; Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the rights afforded to joint tortfeasors by this act apply with equal force after the modification of joint and several liability as provided in § 16-55-201, and that none of the rights granted to join tortfeasors by this act, including allocation of fault and credits for settlements entered into by other joint tortfeasors, shall be denied to joint tortfeasors.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment redesignated former (1) through (3) as (a), (b), and (d); substituted “of the common liability” for “thereof” in (b); inserted (c); and deleted former (4).

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 8: Aug. 16, 2013. Effective date clause provided: “This act is remedial in nature and applies to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Punitive Damages in Ark. — Expanded? Restricted?, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 25.

Ark. L. Rev.

Acts 1949 General Assembly — Act 35 Amendment of Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 371.

Samuel T. Waddell, Comment: Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 485 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Roberts and Deere, Torts, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 207.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where, in an action for damages for personal injuries against joint tortfeasors the court was unable to determine from the jury's verdict that the verdict was based on any disproportionate fault on part of two defendants this section could not be applied to save or clarify the situation. Shearman Concrete Pipe Co. v. Wooldridge, 218 Ark. 16, 234 S.W.2d 382 (1950).

Hospital did not have a right of contribution under the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) because the hospital and the rehabilitation center were not joint tortfeasors under the UCATA, as there was only several liability following the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton, 2013 Ark. 38, 425 S.W.3d 761 (2013), superseded by statute as stated in, J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

Cause of Action.

A cause of action for contribution arises with the underlying tort, and not upon payment of common liability. Union Pac. R.R. v. Mullen, 966 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1992).

Entitlement to Contribution.

In action where wife recovered against defendants for damage to her car and husband recovered for personal injuries, defendants, upon discharging judgment obtained against them by wife, will be entitled to file motion for judgment for contribution from husband. Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854, 350 S.W.2d 169 (1961).

Joint tortfeasor was required to contribute to the interest paid on judgment by other tortfeasor where no interest on payment between the date of payment and the date of the money judgment was allowed and where no more than the legal rate of interest was paid. International Harvester Co. v. Burks Motors, Inc., 252 Ark. 816, 481 S.W.2d 351 (1972).

Defendant was not entitled to contribution from plaintiff father who was not liable to injured children and who was not thereby a joint tortfeasor with defendant. Welter v. Curry, 260 Ark. 287, 539 S.W.2d 264 (1976).

The adoption of comparative fault did not prevent a joint tortfeasor whose fault had been determined to be in the amount of 50 percent or more from having contribution from his fellow tortfeasor who was less negligent. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Star City Gravel Co., 452 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1979).

A claim for contribution among tortfeasors is a derivative or conditional action in that the contribution-claimant, e.g., the third-party plaintiff (defendant), is not entitled to a money judgment against the party from whom contribution is sought, e.g., the third-party defendant, until the third-party plaintiff has paid more than his pro rata share of their common liability. Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995).

—Apportionment.

When the evidence is sufficient, the jury is permitted to appraise the conduct of each defendant and to undertake, as fairly as practicable, to fix the responsibility of each. Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935 (1948).

Where apportionment of damages required payment of shares solely for the purpose of determining rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors, each tortfeasor remaining severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury as at common law, determination of apportioned judgments by jury would not be disturbed. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 240 Ark. 280, 399 S.W.2d 258 (1966).

In a wrongful death action against two or more joint tortfeasors, plaintiff was not required to prove the precise injury to the decedent caused by the negligence of each tortfeasor. Woodward v. Blythe, 249 Ark. 793, 462 S.W.2d 205 (Ark. 1971).

Jury found that one defendant was partially responsible for plaintiff's damages and second defendant was also responsible; this meant that first defendant was entitled to contribution from the second defendant to the extent of his liability. Burks Motors, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 250 Ark. 29, 466 S.W.2d 907 (1971).

Defendant against whom a joint and several judgments had been entered was not entitled to a judgment against codefendant until it had paid more than its pro rata share. Burks Motors, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 250 Ark. 641, 466 S.W.2d 943 (1971); Shelton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 281 Ark. 100, 662 S.W.2d 473 (1983).

Since the defendant did not ask the trial court to apportion the damages according to relative degrees of fault, as allowed by subdivision (4), and the jury made no factual findings which would support such apportionment, the defendant was only entitled to contribution from the codefendant for any amounts which it paid above one half of the judgment. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 774 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1985).

Immune Employer.

In employee's products liability action against the manufacturer of the product that injured him while he was working, the circuit court properly precluded the manufacturer's attempt to allocate fault to the nonparty employer in its amended answer; because the employer was clothed with immunity from liability in tort under the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers' compensation statutes, § 11-9-105, the employer could not have joint or several “liability” in tort and therefore did not meet the definition of “joint tortfeasor” in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., or fall within the confines of that act. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56, 595 S.W.3d 9 (2020).

The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., does not allow for the apportionment of fault to an immune nonparty employer. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56, 595 S.W.3d 9 (2020).

The language of § 16-55-201 is clear; it speaks in terms of the allocation of fault among the “defendants” to the action but is silent as to the allocation of nonparty fault. Instead, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., addresses the allocation of nonparty fault. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56, 595 S.W.3d 9 (2020).

Indemnity.

Suit by utility to recover from contractor amount of damages it was required to pay for injuries sustained by employee of contractor under agreement by contractor to hold utility harmless from suits for personal injuries was not a suit for contribution of joint tortfeasor but a suit under indemnity agreement. Bruno v. Bruno, 221 Ark. 759, 256 S.W.2d 341 (1953).

Contribution and indemnity are mutually exclusive remedies because the former distributes the loss among tortfeasors while the latter shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has been compelled to pay it to the shoulders of another who should bear it instead. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Star City Gravel Co., 452 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1979).

Joint Tortfeasors.

It was error to grant at this point in the case defendant subcontractor's motion to compel discovery of the confidential settlement agreement between plaintiff and defendant general contractor that resulted from mediation, when the subcontractor sought contribution and apportionment of fault, because (1) any right of contribution does not arise until one joint tortfeasor pays more than the tortfeasor's share of liability, and no damages had been awarded yet, and (2) it was error to find the general contractor and subcontractor were joint tortfeasors before any evidence was presented. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, however, the Civil Justice Reform Act, § 16-55-201 et seq., did not eliminate contribution among “joint tortfeasors”. Wynne-Ark., Inc. v. Richard Baughn Constr., 2020 Ark. App. 140, 597 S.W.3d 114 (2020).

Limitation of Actions.

In suit by injured person to recover damages from defendant, the latter was not prevented from filing third party complaint for contribution from joint tortfeasor notwithstanding right of plaintiff in suit against the third party defendant was barred by statute of limitations. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

A cause of action for contribution accrues when one joint tortfeasor pays more than his or her pro rata share of common liability; thus, the three-year statute of limitations under § 16-56-105 had not yet expired due to the fact that a settlement had just been entered where an executor and his wife agreed to pay more of their fair share in a trust dispute. Heinemann v. Hallum, 365 Ark. 600, 232 S.W.3d 420 (2006).

When homeowners sued a general contractor, who sought contribution and indemnity from subcontractors, the general contractor's claims were not time-barred because, under subsection (b) of this section, the statute of limitations did not begin until a joint tortfeasor paid more than his or her share of liability. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

Retroactivity.

This subchapter is not retroactive and it appears to have been settled prior to its enactment that contribution among joint tortfeasors did not exist. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 210 Ark. 575, 196 S.W.2d 919 (1946).

Section 16-61-201 et seq., as amended by Acts 2013, No. 1116, did not apply retroactively to a medical malpractice action because Act 1116 added a new provision in subsection (c) of this section providing that the right to contribution is not limited to money damages but also includes the right to allocation of fault as among all joint tortfeasors and the rights provided for in § 16-61-204. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Settlements.

Joint tortfeasor was not entitled to judgment of contribution against other tortfeasor, as each tortfeasor settled his liability separately from the other. Lacewell v. Griffin, 214 Ark. 909, 219 S.W.2d 227, 8 A.L.R.2d 189 (1949).

Where the settlement of a judgment by a tortfeasor provided that the payment was in full for all claims accruing to the injured person but did not mention joint tortfeasors, settlement did not release the joint tortfeasor of liability and the tortfeasor was not entitled to contribution from the joint tortfeasor. Allbright Bros., Contractors ex rel. Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).

In an action for damages arising out of train-truck collision at railroad crossing, the fact that an employee of railroad might have had cause of action against owner of truck for the injuries suffered and that the railroad's settlement with its employee was purely voluntary, would not in itself justify withdrawing this part of claim, which was made by the railroad against driver of truck on the basis of contribution between joint tortfeasors, from the consideration of the jury. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ellison, 250 Ark. 160, 465 S.W.2d 85 (1971).

When homeowners sued a general contractor, who sought contribution and indemnity from subcontractors, the general contractor's settlement with the homeowners did not moot the contractor's contribution and indemnity claims because the settlement extinguished the subcontractors' liability to the homeowners. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

Cited: Ward v. Walker, 206 Ark. 988, 178 S.W.2d 62 (1944); Citizens Coach Co. v. Wright, 228 Ark. 1143, 313 S.W.2d 94 (1958); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 6 V.I. 163 (3d Cir. 1968); Morison v. GMC, 428 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1970); W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982); Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982); Arhart v. Micro Switch Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1986); Stewman v. Mid-South Wood Prods. of Mena, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Cole, 329 Ark. 209, 947 S.W.2d 362 (1997); Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1999).

16-61-203. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the rights afforded to joint tortfeasors by this act apply with equal force after the modification of joint and several liability as provided in § 16-55-201, and that none of the rights granted to join tortfeasors by this act, including allocation of fault and credits for settlements entered into by other joint tortfeasors, shall be denied to joint tortfeasors.”

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning judgment against one tortfeasor, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1941, No. 315, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1003.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 8: Aug. 16, 2013. Effective date clause provided: “This act is remedial in nature and applies to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.”

16-61-204. Release — Effect on injured person's claim and on right of contribution.

  1. A release by the injured person of one (1) joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other joint tortfeasors unless the release so provides.
  2. A release by the injured person of a joint tortfeasor does not relieve the released tortfeasor from liability to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor unless the release is given before the right of the other joint tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released joint tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable against all other joint tortfeasors.
  3. When the injured person releases a joint tortfeasor, the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other joint tortfeasors shall be reduced by the greatest of the following:
    1. The amount of the consideration paid for the release;
    2. The pro rata share of the released joint tortfeasor's responsibility for the injured person's damages; or
    3. Any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced.
  4. When the injured person releases a joint tortfeasor, the remaining defendants are entitled to a determination by the finder of fact of the released joint tortsfeasor's pro rata share of responsibility for the injured person's damages.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1004; Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the rights afforded to joint tortfeasors by this act apply with equal force after the modification of joint and several liability as provided in § 16-55-201, and that none of the rights granted to join tortfeasors by this act, including allocation of fault and credits for settlements entered into by other joint tortfeasors, shall be denied to joint tortfeasors.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section and added “and on right of contribution” to the section heading.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 8: Aug. 16, 2013. Effective date clause provided: “This act is remedial in nature and applies to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Samuel T. Waddell, Comment: Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 485 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Notes, Tort Law — General Release Forms — The Free Ride for Joint Tortfeasors Is Over, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 791.

Case Notes

Purpose.

It was the intention of the Arkansas Legislature in enacting this section to abrogate the common law rule that a release of one tortfeasor released all other tortfeasors jointly liable for the occurrence, thereby retaining the liability of joint tortfeasors. Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 299 Ark. 232, 773 S.W.2d 78, 6 A.L.R.5th 1188 (1989).

Agreements.

Injured patient and a hospital agreed that they would inform the jury about a nurse anesthetist's settlement with the patient and that the hospital would waive its right to a credit; in other words, they agreed that the jury would solely determine the hospital's liability and award monetary damages for harm caused by the hospital. An appellate court therefore refused to grant the patient's request that the jury assess the hospital's share alone and that the hospital pay its fair share of the damages. Villines v. N. Ark. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2011 Ark. App. 506, 385 S.W.3d 360 (2011).

Reduction in Damages.

In a vehicle rollover case, the manufacturer was not entitled to have the compensatory damage award reduced by 50 percent based on the fault of another driver, who had settled, because although the jury found the other driver was 50 percent at fault, the jury instructions asked the jury to find damages caused only by the vehicle manufacturer. Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 510, 431 S.W.3d 210 (2013).

Release.

Where the settlement of a judgment by a tortfeasor provided that the payment was in full for all claims accruing to the injured person but did not mention joint tortfeasors, settlement did not release the joint tortfeasor of liability and the tortfeasor was not entitled to contribution from the joint tortfeasor. Allbright Bros., Contractors ex rel. Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).

In an action against an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained in an accident, the passenger's release of driver and her liability insurer contained a clause releasing “all other persons, firms, or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable,” therefore barring the action, even though the parties did not intend to release the manufacturer and the manufacturer paid no consideration. Morison v. GMC, 428 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, Morison v. General Motors Corp., 400 U.S. 904, 91 S. Ct. 142 (1970).

Where plaintiff, who had brought a malpractice action, settled and dismissed the action for the consideration and executed a general release discharging her doctor and “all other persons, firms, corporations…,” that general release was sufficient to release joint tortfeasors who were not parties to the release since this section provides that other tortfeasors are discharged “if the release so provides.” Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982).

In a medical malpractice case, a release executed by a patient and a hospital was insufficient to release a doctor from liability under this section based on language in the release referencing the hospital's employees. Luu v. Still, 102 Ark. App. 11, 279 S.W.3d 481 (2008).

—Content or Form.

In order to satisfy the language of this section, a release must name or otherwise specifically identify the tortfeasors to be discharged. Broad boilerplate language is not sufficient. Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 299 Ark. 232, 773 S.W.2d 78, 6 A.L.R.5th 1188 (1989).

—Release Before Verdict.

Under this subchapter, joint tortfeasors are entitled to have the amount due plaintiff reduced by the amount paid by a joint tortfeasor, but if evidence as to the amount paid by one of the tortfeasors is introduced into evidence in trial against the other tortfeasor, the defendant cannot, after verdict, have the court reduce the amount of the verdict by the amount paid by the other defendant, as he has had the benefit of the amount paid by the other tortfeasor, when he introduced the amount of the settlement before the jury reached its verdict. Giem v. Williams, 215 Ark. 705, 222 S.W.2d 800 (1949).

Trial court properly refused to permit tortfeasor to introduce settlement agreement between second tortfeasor and injured party, even though it might have had some bearing on the plaintiff's credibility, as the evidence would have informed the jury that one of the defendants had admitted liability and would have been used for arguing that plaintiff had accepted the amount of settlement as fair compensation for his injuries. Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).

In this case the trial court refused the defendant permission to introduce evidence of one tortfeasor's settlement payment to plaintiff, but after verdict the trial court, under the theory that the law of joint tortfeasors applied, correctly credited the judgment with the payment, since the jury had no knowledge of the settlement, and therefore assessed the total damages of plaintiff. Woodard v. Holliday, 235 Ark. 744, 361 S.W.2d 744 (1962).

Where settlement was made during the course of trial by one or more joint tortfeasors, the trial court committed no error in advising the jury of the fact, but not the amount, of the settlement. Arhart v. Micro Switch Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1986).

Retroactivity.

It was held that enactment of this section would not be given a retroactive effect. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. McDaniel, 131 F.2d 89 (1942).

Section 16-61-201 et seq., as amended by Acts 2013, No. 1116, did not apply retroactively to a medical malpractice action because this section provided rights for joint tortfeasors against released tortfeasors and provided that when an injured person released a joint tortfeasor, the remaining defendants were entitled to a determination by the finder of fact of the released joint tortfeasor's pro rata share of responsibility for the injured person's damages, creating substantive rights that were absent from the previous version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq.English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Section 16-61-201 et seq., as amended by Acts 2013, No. 1116, did not apply retroactively to a medical malpractice action because Act 1116 added a new provision in § 16-61-202 providing that the right to contribution is not limited to money damages but also includes the right to allocation of fault as among all joint tortfeasors and the rights provided for in § 16-61-204. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Time for Determining Liability.

The question of the joint or common liability of joint tortfeasors is determined as of the time the cause of action accrues and not at the time when the right to recover contribution is asserted; but where the jury, by its verdict, obviously found that defendant was neither jointly nor severally liable for the injury to the plaintiff, there simply was no way under the statutory definition that the defendant could be considered as a joint tortfeasor. Scalf v. Payne, 266 Ark. 231, 583 S.W.2d 51 (1979).

Cited: Hill v. Southside Pub. Sch., 688 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Garver & Garver v. Little Rock San. Sewer Comm., 300 Ark. 620, 781 S.W.2d 24 (1989); Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).

16-61-205. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the rights afforded to joint tortfeasors by this act apply with equal force after the modification of joint and several liability as provided in § 16-55-201, and that none of the rights granted to join tortfeasors by this act, including allocation of fault and credits for settlements entered into by other joint tortfeasors, shall be denied to joint tortfeasors.”

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning releases and the effect on right of contribution was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 6. The section was derived from Acts 1941, No. 315, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1005.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 8: Aug. 16, 2013. Effective date clause provided: “This act is remedial in nature and applies to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.”

16-61-206. Indemnity.

This subchapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1006.

Case Notes

In General.

Due to this section, this subchapter did not bar plaintiff from full indemnity for defendant's breach of covenant. Anthony v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830, 84 S. Ct. 74 (1963).

Cited: Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982).

16-61-207. Third party practice — Amended complaints — Counterclaims and cross-complaints — Motion practice.

  1. Before answering, a defendant seeking contribution in a tort action may move ex parte or, after answering, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable as a joint tortfeasor to him or her to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him or her. If the motion is granted and the summons and complaint are served, the person so served, hereinafter called the third party defendant, shall make his or her defense to the complaint of the plaintiff and to the third party complaint in the same manner as defenses are made by an original defendant to an original complaint. The third party defendant may assert any defenses which the third party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff may amend his or her pleadings to assert against the third party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against the third party defendant had he or she been joined originally as a defendant. The third party defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff as well as of his or her own liability to the plaintiff and to the third party plaintiff. A third party defendant may proceed under this section against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable as a joint tortfeasor to him or her or to the third party plaintiff for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third party defendant.
  2. When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff he or she may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this section would entitle a defendant to do so.
  3. A pleader may either (a) state as a cross-claim against a coparty any claim that the coparty is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant; or (b) move for judgment for contribution against any other joint judgment debtor, where in a single action a judgment has been entered against joint tortfeasors one (1) of whom has discharged the judgment by payment or has paid more than his or her pro rata share thereof. If relief can be obtained as provided in this subsection no independent action shall be maintained to enforce the claim for contribution.
  4. The court may render such judgments, one (1) or more in number, as may be suitable under the provisions of this subchapter.
  5. [Repealed.]
  6. In the event plaintiff or defendant fails to serve third parties in such time and manner as may be required for third parties to be brought in and for service on the same to have matured on the day set for the original proceedings between the original parties, such failure shall not delay prosecution of proceedings between the original parties or impair the original defendant's right of contribution.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1007; Acts 1993, No. 759, § 1; 2013, No. 1116, §§ 1, 7, 8.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly that the rights afforded to joint tortfeasors by this act apply with equal force after the modification of joint and several liability as provided in § 16-55-201, and that none of the rights granted to join tortfeasors by this act, including allocation of fault and credits for settlements entered into by other joint tortfeasors, shall be denied to joint tortfeasors.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment repealed (5).

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1116, § 8: Aug. 16, 2013. Effective date clause provided: “This act is remedial in nature and applies to all causes of action accruing on or after March 25, 2003.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Panel on Comparative Negligence — Third Party Practice, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 88.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Issued Interim Report of Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases Regarding Possible Changes to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Because of the Invalidation of Civil Justice Reform Act, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 85.

Case Notes

Comparative Fault.

No Arkansas cases suggest that Arkansas follow the substantive comparative fault rule that a plaintiff's degree of fault should always be compared with the fault of other possible wrongdoers, even if plaintiff has asserted no claim against those wrong doers; indeed, given the plain language of § 16-64-122 — that the plaintiff's fault should be compared to that of the parties from whom the plaintiff “seeks to recover damages” — it is hard to imagine how the legislature's words could be construed to reach such a result. Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1996).

Complaint.

It would have been more accurate for decedent's administrator to entitle his pleading a cross-claim rather than a third party complaint, but since the difference is merely one of form and can have no effect upon the administrator's statutory right to seek contribution, it would not be prohibited. Northwest Motors, Inc. v. Creekmore, 229 Ark. 755, 318 S.W.2d 614 (1958); Little Rock Land Co. v. Raper, 245 Ark. 641, 433 S.W.2d 836 (1968).

When the third-party complaint alleges a direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff on the claim set out in the plaintiff's complaint, the third party shall make his defenses to the complaint and no amendment to the complaint is necessary or required, and the parties are at issue as to their rights respecting the claim without any amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff. Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980).

Entitlement to File.

The right of a defendant to seek contribution from a joint tortfeasor by making him a party to the suit is permissive and does not exclude the right of the defendant to seek contribution in a separate suit. Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956).

If a joint tortfeasor is not made a party to suit against a defendant the defendant does not have to seek contribution against such tortfeasor in that suit, but if the joint tortfeasor is also a party defendant, the defendant must seek contribution in that suit. Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956).

In action where wife recovered against defendants for damage to her car and husband recovered for personal injuries, defendants upon discharging judgment obtained against them by wife will be entitled to file motion for judgment for contribution from husband. Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854, 350 S.W.2d 169 (1961).

—Discretion of Court.

The trial court has a measure of discretion in allowing or disallowing a defendant to have a joint tortfeasor made a party to the suit for the purpose of seeking contribution. Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956).

Where in suit against one tortfeasor a second alleged tortfeasor was not a party to the suit although the suits were consolidated with two suits in which alleged joint tortfeasor was a party, trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to seek contribution where question was not brought to the attention of the trial court until the attorneys were making their opening statements in the cases. Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956).

Federal Rule.

This section specifically makes the adjudication of the third-party defendant's liability to the plaintiff binding upon the third-party defendant; thus the section is different from those patterned after Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which the plaintiff “may” amend his pleadings to assert a claim against the third-party defendant. Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980).

Limitation of Actions.

In suit by injured person to recover damages from defendant truck owner the latter was not prevented from filing third party complaint for contribution from joint tortfeasor notwithstanding right of plaintiff in suit against the third party defendant was barred by statute of limitations. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

Because the duty of the third-party defendant to defend against the allegations of the plaintiff, in the complaints against the defendants, existed at the time the third-party defendant was served with the pleadings, and because three years had not then elapsed after the plaintiff was injured, the cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations even though the plaintiff did not file complaint against third-party defendant until more than four years after injury. Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980).

Because the Arkansas legislature has amended this section to provide that a plaintiff “may” rather than “shall” bring claims he has against a third-party defendant, it is unclear whether Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980) is still good law in Arkansas, even with respect to a plaintiff's untimely claims against third-party defendants. Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1996).

Reversible Error.

Error in directing verdict for one defendant while returning verdict for the other defendant was reversible, since the defendant who had the verdict returned against him could have moved for judgment for contribution against the other defendant if jury had returned a verdict against him. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Stracener, 239 Ark. 1001, 395 S.W.2d 745 (1965).

Settlement.

If administratrix of decedent files a damage suit against contractor and subcontractor to recover damages for death of decedent due to negligence of defendants, and thereafter before trial dismisses case against the subcontractor on payment of a sum, the contractor under this subchapter has the right to still make the subcontractor a third party defendant. Giem v. Williams, 215 Ark. 705, 222 S.W.2d 800 (1949).

Third-Party Defendants.

Although this section requires a plaintiff, if he has a claim against third party defendant, to assert it, it does not require that the plaintiff have an existing claim against the third party defendant, in order for the principal defendant to bring the third party defendant into the case. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

A cause of action held to be stated against person as a third party defendant. Applegate v. Riggall, 229 Ark. 773, 318 S.W.2d 596 (1958).

Where the defendants, in filing counterclaim, sought recovery against plaintiff and a third party alleging that the sole proximate cause of collision was their joint and concurrent negligence and filed a motion to make the third party a defendant, it was within the sound discretion of the court to grant the motion. Talley v. Morphis, 232 Ark. 91, 334 S.W.2d 652 (1960).

In action against installer of seat belt for injuries received when belt broke during automobile collision defendant installer was, under allegation of plaintiff's third party complaint, entitled under this subchapter to join supplier of seat belts as a third party defendant. Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962).

The plaintiff in an action to enforce an uninsured motorist clause against his insurance company cannot be compelled under this section or § 23-89-405 to join as third party defendants the alleged tortfeasors, although the defendant insurance company may make the alleged tortfeasors defendants by cross-complaint. Home Ins. Co. v. Williams, 252 Ark. 1012, 482 S.W.2d 626 (1972).

Subsection (1) enables one or more of several joint tortfeasors sued by the injured person to add as third-party defendants any fellow joint tortfeasors whom they believe to have been also responsible for the tort complained of and to litigate against them in the injured person's action any claims for contribution; in this way, the interests of justice may be promoted by obviating the necessity of a separate action for contribution. Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995).

Under subdivision (1), the third-party plaintiff is not required to wait until he has paid the judgment to implead in the primary action other persons who are or may be jointly liable for the tort. Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995).

Cited: Sunday v. Burk, 172 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Colvin, 252 Ark. 306, 478 S.W.2d 755 (1972); Davis v. General Motors Corp., 257 Ark. 983, 521 S.W.2d 214 (1975); Jack Wood Constr. Co. v. Ford, 258 Ark. 47, 522 S.W.2d 408 (1975); Bill C. Harris Constr. Co. v. Powers, 262 Ark. 96, 554 S.W.2d 332, 14 A.L.R.4th 812 (1977).

16-61-208. Constitutionality.

If any provision of this subchapter, or the application thereof, to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the subchapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this subchapter are declared to be severable.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 8.

16-61-209. Uniformity of interpretation.

This subchapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1008.

Case Notes

Construction.

In an action against an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained in an accident, the passenger's release of driver and her liability insurer contained a clause releasing “all other persons, firms, or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable,” therefore barring the action, even though the parties did not intend to release the manufacturer and the manufacturer paid no consideration. Morison v. GMC, 428 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, Morison v. General Motors Corp., 400 U.S. 904, 91 S. Ct. 142 (1970).

16-61-210. Short title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.”

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1009.

Case Notes

Cited: Hill v. Southside Pub. Sch., 688 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

16-61-211. Repeal.

All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter are hereby repealed.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1009n.

16-61-212. Emergency clause.

Because the passage of this subchapter will invite parties litigant to pursue dilatory tactics in the courts of this state until its effective date in order that they may take advantage of its provisions, contrary to the public health, safety, and welfare, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this subchapter shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.

History. Acts 1941, No. 315, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1009n.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1941, No. 315, was signed by the Governor and took effect on March 26, 1941.

Chapter 62 Survival And Abatement Of Actions

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Effective Dates. Acts 1925, No. 109, § 2: approved Feb. 25, 1925. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, § 5, p. 102: effective on passage.

Acts 1981, No. 625, § 3: Mar. 23, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas announced in Sugg v. Continental Oil Co., 270 Ark. 882, 608 S.W.2d 1 (1980) that the nonsuit statute, Sec. 21 Revised Statutes, Chapter 91, same being Ark. Stat. 37-222 shall not apply in an action for wrongful death where a nonsuit is suffered more than three years after the death of the person allegedly to have been wrongfully killed, and this Act is needed in order to avoid unnecessary hardships in wrongful death actions and to avoid confusion to provide for the proper administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2001, No. 1581, § 3: Apr. 13, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that under current interpretation of present law certain persons who were financially dependent on a deceased person are, because of age, excluded from being the beneficiary of a wrongful death action; that the current interpretation is inequitable; that this act cures the inequity; and that this act should go into effect as soon as possible so that such persons hereafter will be included as beneficiaries of any wrongful death claim. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Inheritability or descendability of right to contest will. 11 A.L.R.4th 907.

Beneficiary's death: effect upon right of action under death statute. 13 A.L.R.4th 1060.

Punitive damages in tort action: claim as surviving death of tortfeasor or person wronged. 30 A.L.R.4th 707.

Effect of death of party to divorce proceeding pending appeal or time allowed for appeal. 33 A.L.R.4th 47.

Am. Jur. 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abat. & R., § 1 et seq.

61A Am. Jur. 2d, Plead., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Cox and Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court That Came in From the Code, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

C.J.S. 1 C.J.S., Abat. & R., § 1 et seq.

71 C.J.S., Plead., § 1 et seq.

16-62-101. Survival of actions — Wrongs to person or property.

    1. For wrongs done to the person or property of another, an action may be maintained against a wrongdoer, and the action may be brought by the person injured or, after his or her death, by his or her executor or administrator against the wrongdoer or, after the death of the wrongdoer, against the executor or administrator of the wrongdoer, in the same manner and with like effect in all respects as actions founded on contracts.
    2. Nothing in subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be so construed as to extend its provisions to actions of slander or libel.
  1. In addition to all other elements of damages provided by law, a decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's loss of life as an independent element of damages.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 4, §§ 59, 60; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1070, 1071; Pope's Dig., §§ 1273, 1274; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-901, 27-902; Acts 2001, No. 1516, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment redesignated former (a) and (b) as present (a)(1) and (a)(2) and made related changes; in (a)(1), substituted “a wrongdoer” for “the wrongdoers” and made gender neutral changes; and added present (b).

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Flaccus, A Grab Bag of Recent Arkansas Cases, 1999 Ark. L. Notes 25.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, The Law of Defamation: An Arkansas Primer, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 915.

Recent Development: Survival Actions — Defining “Loss of Life” Damages, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 441 (2004).

Note, The Measure of Life: Determining the Value of Lost Years After Durham v. Marberry, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 125.

T.W. Brown, Recent Developments: Claim for Invasion of Privacy Does Not Survive Decedent's Death, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 787 (2012).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Torts, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

J. Lyn Entrikin, The Right of Privacy in Arkansas: A Progressive State, 35 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 439 (2013).

Case Notes

Construction.

A wrongful-death action brought by a plaintiff in his individual capacity pursuant to § 16-62-102 involves neither the same action nor the same plaintiff as a survival action brought by the plaintiff in his representative capacity on behalf of the decedent's estate pursuant to this section. Murrell v. Springdale Mem. Hosp., 330 Ark. 121, 952 S.W.2d 153 (1997).

Because the phrase “loss of life damages” as used in subsection (b) was clear and unambiguous and since loss-of-life damages could only begin accruing at the point when life was lost, at death, there was no reason to believe the legislature intended to require the decedent to live for a period of time between injury and death in order to recover loss-of-life damages. Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481, 156 S.W.3d 242 (2004).

Decedent died when his vehicle hit the back of a farm tractor on a highway; on appeal, the administratrix of the decedent's estate raised the issue of whether the circuit court erred in ruling that the wrongful-death statute allowing recovery of loss-of-life damages did not apply retroactively. The language included in § 16-62-101(b) was added by Acts 2001, No. 1516; however, the Act added only a new remedy to an already existing right, the act was meant to be applied retroactively, and the ruling of the circuit court on this issue was also error. McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark. 318, 254 S.W.3d 729 (2007).

Acts 2001, No. 1516 is meant to be applied retroactively. McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark. 318, 254 S.W.3d 729 (2007).

Accounting.

Where an action was brought for the accounting against a corporate officer whose death occurred after service of notice but before any defensive pleading was filed, executrix could not maintain an action to prohibit the chancery court from proceeding with the original action. Rider v. Cunningham, 232 Ark. 407, 337 S.W.2d 868 (1960).

Administration of Estate.

Causes of action for the benefit of the estate of a person wrongfully killed and for the benefit of his widow and next of kin may be united in a suit brought by the decedent's administratrix. Southern Anthracite Coal Co. v. Hodge, 99 Ark. 302, 139 S.W. 292 (1911).

When the amount recovered by an administratrix for wrongful death is for the benefit of the estate and there is necessity for further probate proceedings, the judgment should be certified to the probate court, but if no necessity exists, it need not be certified to that court. Adams v. Shell, 182 Ark. 959, 33 S.W.2d 1107 (1930).

Any recovery by administratrix for compensation for injuries sustained by deceased as a result of defendant's negligence would be for the benefit of deceased's estate. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

Where following a collision, the plaintiff died of unrelated causes, leaving no heirs with standing to bring a lawsuit against the defendant for damages to vehicle since none of the heirs was injured by any action of the defendant. Daughhetee v. Shipley, 282 Ark. 596, 669 S.W.2d 886 (1984).

It was administrator's duty and right to pursue action, subject to the probate court's approval, and to choose counsel for that purpose. Cude v. Cude, 286 Ark. 383, 691 S.W.2d 866 (1985).

Adjustment company could not recover deceased's debt for medical services rendered to the deceased shortly before her death because the trial court made clear that the settlement made to the estate was intended for the beneficiaries under § 16-62-102. Mid-South Adjustment Co. v. Estate of Harris, 87 Ark. App. 139, 189 S.W.3d 518 (2004).

Wrongful death and survival action filed by decedent's mother on behalf of herself and decedent was neither brought by and in the name of an appointed personal representative of decedent nor were decedent's brother and biological father (both statutory beneficiaries under § 16-62-102(d)), joined as plaintiffs as required for a wrongful death action under § 16-62-102(b). Further, neither the mother nor anyone else had been appointed an administrator or executor as required for a survival action under this section; therefore, at the time the mother filed the action, she did not have standing to pursue the claims against defendants. Farrow v. Sammis, No. 3:07cv00097 SWW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90429 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 7, 2007).

Regarding a father's motion to intervene in a mother's wrongful death and survivor action for the sole purpose of seeking to stay the proceedings pending a determination from the probate court as to who would be named administrator of decedent son's estate, Ark. R. Civ. P. 17 had no application because the action was not filed in accordance with § 16-62-102(b) or this section and the original complaint thus was a nullity. When the original complaint was a nullity, Ark. R. Civ. P. 17 was inapplicable because the original complaint never existed and, therefore, there was no pleading to amend. Farrow v. Sammis, No. 3:07cv00097 SWW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90429 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 7, 2007).

Assignment of Tort Claim.

The survival provided by this section does not confer the power of assignment upon the holder of an unliquidated tort claim for personal injuries. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wright Oil Co., 248 Ark. 803, 454 S.W.2d 69 (1970).

Breach of Contract.

A decedent's personal representatives could bring a breach of contract action against an attorney who allegedly failed to draft the decedent's will in accord with the decedent's desires. McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 988 S.W.2d 9 (1999).

Civil Rights.

The Arkansas law of survival is not inconsistent with federal civil rights laws. Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1986).

The Arkansas survivorship statute does allow survival of a civil rights action. Oliver v. United States Army, 758 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Ark. 1990).

Arkansas survival statute was not applicable to abate an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq., claim for compensatory damages brought by a decedent's estate; federal common law did not incorporate state survivorship law in light of the ADA's broad remedial purpose and the need for a uniform federal rule. Guenther v. Griffin Constr. Co., Inc., 846 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2017).

Contributory Negligence of Distributee.

Where an infant was killed through the wrongful act of the defendant, his administrator was entitle to recover damages for his conscious suffering between the time of his injury and his death and it is no defense that the decedent's father who as the sole distributee of the estate was entitled to receive the same was guilty of negligence which contributed to his injury and death. Nashville Lumber Co. v. Busbee, 100 Ark. 76, 139 S.W. 301 (1911).

Corporations.

Where a corporation has a cause of action against another, the action does not survive but dies when the plaintiff corporation goes out of existence. Arkansas Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 110 Ark. 130, 161 S.W. 136 (1913).

Death of Party.

An action is not abated by the death of a party after the cause of action has been merged in a final judgment and while the judgment stands, even though the judgment is based on a cause of action which would not survive the death of a party before judgment. Brundrett v. Hargrove, 204 Ark. 258, 161 S.W.2d 762 (1942).

Under this section an action for violation of civil rights would survive upon the death of the defendant. Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 88 A.L.R.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1961).

At common law, all actions for tort died with the tortfeasor. That rule is still in effect in this state, except this section has removed that bar as to tortious injury to the person, and provides that such actions survive the death of the tortfeasor and may be brought against his estate or personal representative; however, it does not authorize such actions to be maintained against the heirs of a deceased person. Westridge v. Byrd, 37 Ark. App. 72, 823 S.W.2d 930 (1992).

In a patient's medical malpractice suit against her since-deceased surgeon and the hospital, the appellate court granted the patient's motion to appoint the surgeon's widow as the special administratrix of the surgeon's estate for purposes of defending the case, reviving the case, and substituting the special administratrix in the surgeon's stead because the patient's personal-injury claims survived the surgeon's death under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Section 16-62-106(a) gave the appellate court authority to appoint the widow, and the widow consented to stand in place of the surgeon. Taylor v. Landherr, 101 Ark. App. 279, 275 S.W.3d 656 (2008).

Subdivision (a)(1) of this section did not provide for the claim of invasion of privacy to survive the death of the decedent. Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, 423 S.W.3d 548 (2012).

Evidence.

Evidence that explosion and fire at service station resulting in fatal injuries to decedent could have been caused by negligence of defendants in designing of storeroom and equipment therein was sufficient for jury to have awarded damages for wrongful death. Marshall v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 459 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1972).

The jury was entitled to draw inferences from known physical phenomena incorporated in the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness and from the circumstantial evidence in the case. Marshall v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 459 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1972).

Circuit court erred in granting the directed-verdict motion of the church, insurer, and others, on the estate's claim for loss-of-life damages under subsection (b) of this section because there was substantial evidence from which a jury could have determined that the estate was entitled to loss-of-life damages. The testimony indicated that the decedent was a mother of four, as well as a grandmother; that she was close to her oldest daughter; that she had worked as a waitress; that she lived with a man for whom she had come to Arkansas; and that, at the time of the accident, the decedent was on her way to a family get-together. One Nat'l Bank v. Pope, 372 Ark. 208, 272 S.W.3d 98 (2008).

An estate seeking loss-of-life damages pursuant to subsection (b) of this section must present some evidence that the decedent valued his or her life, from which a jury could infer and derive that value and on which it could base an award of damages. Mere proof of life and then death is insufficient; that being said, it is not suggested that the evidence required be limited to direct evidence, as circumstantial evidence may certainly be used as well. One Nat'l Bank v. Pope, 372 Ark. 208, 272 S.W.3d 98 (2008).

Legal Malpractice.

A decedent's personal representatives could not bring a legal malpractice action against the attorney who drafted the decedent's will since there was no pre-death injury arising from the attorney's alleged malpractice. McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 988 S.W.2d 9 (1999).

Libel, Slander, etc.

An action for slander abates with the death of either party. Miller v. Nuckolls, 76 Ark. 485, 89 S.W. 88 (1905).

Action brought by doctor against pharmacist and pharmacy stating claims for libel, slander, malicious prosecution and intentional injury to plaintiff's medical practice, arising out of an unsuccessful criminal prosecution charging plaintiff with illegal distribution of scheduled drugs, did not survive plaintiff's death. Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1986).

Limitation of Actions.

Action may be brought within three years from date of killing under this section notwithstanding the limitation provided in wrongful death statute. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Robertson, 103 Ark. 361, 146 S.W. 482 (1912).

The right of action for the benefit of the estate of plaintiff's intestate for conscious pain and suffering before death is governed by the three year limitation fixed by § 16-56-105. Smith v. Missouri P. R. Co., 175 Ark. 626, 1 S.W.2d 48 (1927).

Where administrator's action against railroad for death of intestate was brought when an action for the benefit of the widow and next of kin was barred by limitations but action for the benefit of the estate was not, it must be presumed that suit was for the benefit of the estate. Sykes v. Jameson, 192 Ark. 631, 94 S.W.2d 718 (1936).

Where deceased was injured as a result of alleged negligence of railroad, his cause of action for injuries accrued on the date of injury; where deceased's action was barred by period of limitations, similar action by administratrix was also barred as she occupied the same position as deceased in regards to such action. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

Actions under this section are governed by general three year statute of limitations, § 16-56-105. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

When the action brought under this section is against a decedent's estate, it must be brought within the time limit for filing claims against the estate even though the plaintiff is looking not to the assets of the estate but to the decedent's liability insurer for payment of his judgment. Swan v. Estate of Monette ex rel. Monette, 265 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. Ark. 1968).

The three-year limitation on an action for injury resulting from taking a drug manufactured by the defendant began to run when it became apparent that the injury from the drug was permanent. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

Loss of Services.

A husband's loss of the services and companionship of his wife does not amount to wrongs done to his person or his property within the meaning of this section. White v. Maddux, 227 Ark. 163, 296 S.W.2d 679 (1956).

Marital Property.

Wife's claim, that settlement proceeds of a personal injury to her late husband were marital property, held without merit; the funds belonged to his estate, to be distributed pursuant to probate law. Ellis v. Ellis, 315 Ark. 475, 868 S.W.2d 83 (1994).

Medical Malpractice.

Survival claims involving death as a result of a medical injury are governed by the Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., and not by this chapter. Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 326 Ark. 140, 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996).

Because the doctor's failure to perform to the appropriate standard of care constituted medical malpractice and was a proximate cause of the death of the child, under the Arkansas Wrongful Death statute the child's parents were awarded damages sustained as a proximate result of his wrongful death; the parents were also entitled to damages under the Arkansas Survival Statute, § 16-62-101 et seq.McMullin v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Wrongful-death and survival action brought by the administratrix of the decedent's estate against the medical center was time-barred under § 16-114-203 as the order appointing the administratrix was not effective until it was filed almost two weeks after the complaint was filed; therefore, at the time the administratrix filed this cause of action against the medical center, she was not the administrator of the estate and did not have standing to pursue the claim against the medical center. As such, the complaint was a nullity. Hubbard v. Nat'l Healthcare of Pocahontas, Inc., 371 Ark. 444, 267 S.W.3d 573 (2007).

Multiple Actions.

Where deceased has died as a result of alleged negligence of defendant, both action for compensation of deceased's injuries and action for wrongful death of deceased should be brought by personal representative of deceased if there is one. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

Circuit court's order dismissing a wrongful death claim made pursuant to § 16-62-102(a) and (b), which failed to dispose of a survival claim made pursuant to this section, left the Arkansas Supreme Court without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the case in the absence of a final judgment. Myers v. McAdams, 366 Ark. 435, 236 S.W.3d 504 (2006).

Pain and Suffering.

Action for pain and suffering endured by son resulting from drug allegedly administered by adoptive father was held not a suit for wrongful death which would abate on death of wrongdoer, but one of injury resulting in pain and suffering, which survives. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245, 122 A.L.R. 1348 (1939).

Parties.

Actions for survivorship and actions for wrongful death are separate and distinct in nature. In a survival action, the administrator asserts the decedent's own cause of action, and only the administrator may bring this cause of action; the wrongful death statute, on the other hand, creates a cause of action in the survivors, and it may be brought by the administrator in their behalf, or by the heirs themselves if there is no administrator. First Com. Bank v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

Plaintiff lacked standing to sue when she filed the original complaint because she had not yet been appointed the administrator of decedent's estate (her mother's estate) and because she was not the sole heir; however, upon being appointed administrator six days later, she was deemed to be a new party when she filed the timely amended complaint. Hackelton v. Malloy, 364 Ark. 469, 221 S.W.3d 353 (2006).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a physician in a husband's wrongful-death/survival action because when the husband filed his original suit, no order had been entered appointing him as administrator, nor were all of the wife's heirs at law named as plaintiffs, as required by this section and § 16-62-102(b). Norton v. Luttrell, 99 Ark. App. 109, 257 S.W.3d 580 (2007).

In a claim brought against the suppliers of a pain pump, a dismissal was proper because a wife, as a patient's administratrix, did not seek substitution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 prior to a nonsuit of the case when it was pending in federal court. Therefore, the patient and his wife did not receive the benefit of § 16-56-126. Wilson v. Lincare, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 329, 288 S.W.3d 708 (2008).

Special administrator of a reopened probate case could file survival claims because the claims belonged to the decedent's estate and had to be filed by the personal representative of the estate or a special administrator. The trustee that had served as the estate's personal representative did not have to file the claims. Arman v. Chi St. Vincent Hot Springs, 2019 Ark. App. 187, 574 S.W.3d 731 (2019).

Venue.

Action against administrator for negligence of his intestate could be brought in any county where service could be had, and could not be brought in county in which administrator was appointed unless he was served therein. Baker v. Puckett, 182 Ark. 265, 31 S.W.2d 286 (1930).

Cited: Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Caple, 207 Ark. 52, 179 S.W.2d 151 (1944); Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 460 S.W.2d 61 (1970); Fields v. Huff, 510 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Daughhetee v. Shipley, 282 Ark. 596, 669 S.W.2d 886 (1984); Lowe v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 1089 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Baker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34 Ark. App. 59, 805 S.W.2d 665 (1991); McCoy v. Crumby, 353 Ark. 251, 106 S.W.3d 462 (2003); Rhuland v. Fahr, 356 Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d 2 (2004); Johnson v. Greene Acres Nursing Home Ass'n, 364 Ark. 306, 219 S.W.3d 138 (2005); Miller v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 98 Ark. App. 102, 250 S.W.3d 574 (2007); Lucas v. Wilson, 2011 Ark. App. 584, 385 S.W.3d 891 (2011).

16-62-102. Wrongful death actions — Survival.

    1. Whenever the death of a person or an unborn child as defined in § 5-1-102 is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default and the act, neglect, or default would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof if death had not ensued, then and in every such case, the person or company or corporation that would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person or the unborn child as defined in § 5-1-102 injured, and although the death may have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a felony.
    2. The cause of action created in this subsection shall survive the death of the person wrongfully causing the death of another and may be brought, maintained, or revived against the personal representatives of the person wrongfully causing the death of another.
    3. A person is not liable under this subsection when the death of the unborn child results from:
      1. A legal abortion, including an abortion performed to remove an ectopic pregnancy or other nonviable pregnancy where the embryo is not going to develop further;
      2. The fault of the pregnant woman carrying the unborn child;
      3. Assisted reproduction technology activity, procedure, or treatment;
      4. Actions occurring before transfer to the uterus of the woman of an embryo created through in vitro fertilization; or
      5. A woman or her healthcare provider using contraception approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration.
  1. Every action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person. If there is no personal representative, then the action shall be brought by the heirs at law of the deceased person.
    1. Every action authorized by this section shall be commenced within three (3) years after the death of the person alleged to have been wrongfully killed, except the action may be commenced against a person in the time period permitted to bring a murder charge under § 5-1-109(a) if the person was convicted of one (1) of the following offenses:
      1. Capital murder, § 5-10-101;
      2. Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102; or
      3. Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103.
    2. If a nonsuit is entered for an action authorized by this section, the action shall be brought within one (1) year from the date the nonsuit was entered without regard to the date of the death of the person alleged to have been wrongfully killed.
  2. The beneficiaries of the action created in this section are:
    1. The surviving spouse, children, father, mother, brothers, and sisters of the deceased person;
    2. Persons, regardless of age, standing in loco parentis to the deceased; and
    3. Persons, regardless of age, to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis at any time during the life of the deceased.
  3. No part of any recovery referred to in this section shall be subject to the debts of the deceased or become, in any way, a part of the assets of the estate of the deceased person.
    1. The jury or the court, in cases tried without a jury, may fix such damages as will be fair and just compensation for pecuniary injuries, including a spouse's loss of the services and companionship of a deceased spouse and any mental anguish resulting from the death to the surviving spouse and beneficiaries of the deceased.
    2. When mental anguish is claimed as a measure of damages under this section, mental anguish will include grief normally associated with the loss of a loved one.
  4. The judge of the court in which the claim or cause of action for wrongful death is tried or is submitted for approval of a compromise settlement, by judgment or order and upon the evidence presented during trial or in connection with any submission for approval of a compromise settlement, shall fix the share of each beneficiary, and distribution shall be made accordingly. However, in any action for wrongful death submitted to a jury, the jury shall make the apportionment at the request of any beneficiary or party.
  5. Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the right of circuit courts having jurisdiction to approve or authorize settlement of claims or causes of action for wrongful death, but the circuit courts shall consider the best interests of all the beneficiaries under this section and not merely the best interest of the widow and next of kin as now provided by § 28-49-104.
  6. It is not the responsibility of the personal representative of a deceased person to locate anyone in loco parentis who is not known to the personal representative to be in loco parentis to the deceased person.

History. Acts 1957, No. 255, §§ 1-5; 1981, No. 625, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-906 — 27-910; Acts 1993, No. 589, § 1; 2001, No. 1265, § 1; 2001, No. 1581, §§ 1, 2; 2013, No. 1032, § 2; 2013, No. 1426, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment by No. 1265 inserted “viable fetus” in (a)(1); added (a)(3); and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

The 2001 amendment by No. 1581 redesignated former (d) as present (d) through (d)(3) and made related changes; inserted “regardless of age” in (d)(2) and (d)(3); added “at any time during the life of the deceased” in (d)(3); and added (i).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1032 substituted “unborn child as defined in § 5-1-102” for “viable fetus” twice in (a)(1); and rewrote (a)(3).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1426 inserted “except the action … the following offenses” in (c)(1); inserted (c)(1)(A) through (c)(1)(C); and, in (c)(2), substituted “entered for an action authorized by this section” for “suffered,” deleted “of” following “from the date,” and inserted “was entered.”

Cross References. Right of action in case of death from injuries survives under workers' compensation laws, Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 32; Amend. 26.

Commencement or revival of actions, § 28-50-102.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Negligence — Wrongful Death — Statute of Limitation, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 424.

Torts — Wrongful Death — Death from Prenatal Injuries, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 203.

Arkansas Model Jury Instructions: Wrongful Death, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 73.

Comment, The Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 294.

Case Note, Simmons First National Bank v. Abbott: The Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute, etc., 40 Ark. L. Rev. 421.

Allowing Fetal Wrongful Death Actions in Arkansas: A Death Whose Time Has Come?, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 465.

Recent Developments, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 419.

Wrongful Death Damages Under the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act: Would a Change Make Cents?, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 577 (2001).

Note, The Measure of Life: Determining the Value of Lost Years After Durham v. Marberry, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 125.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 581.

Arkansas Law Survey, Saunders, Torts, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 259.

Arkansas Law Survey, Looney, Decedents' Estates, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 139.

Survey — Civil Procedure, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 137.

Survey — Torts, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 261.

Survey, Torts, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 409.

Legislative Survey, Miscellaneous, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 161.

Note, A Viable Fetus is Not a “Person” Under the Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 307.

Torts-Wrongful Death-The Birth of Fetal Rights Under Arkansas's Wrongful Death Statute: The Arkansas Supreme Court Recognizes a Fetus as a “Person.” Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001), 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 359.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Tort Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1085.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section does not violate Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 13. Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345 S.W.2d 610 (1961), overruled, Fountain v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968), overruled in part, Fountain v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968), superseded by statute as stated in, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tucker, 353 Ark. 730, 120 S.W.3d 61 (2003).

Construction.

An historical distinction has been built into the wrongful death legislation between the proceeding to determine the apportionment of the award and the proceeding to determine the liability and computation of damages recoverable from the tortfeasor, which distinction is preserved in the scheme of this section; the issue of fixing the amount of damages is dealt with in subsection (f) and the issue of fixing the shares of the statutory beneficiaries in that award is dealt with in subsection (g). Bell v. Estate of Bell, 318 Ark. 483, 885 S.W.2d 877 (1994).

If the defendant is deceased, the three-year limit on wrongful death actions provided by subdivision (c)(1) of this section may be shortened by § 28-50-101(a). Callaghan v. Coberly, 927 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Ark. 1996).

A wrongful-death action brought by a plaintiff in his individual capacity pursuant to this section involves neither the same action nor the same plaintiff as a survival action brought by the plaintiff in his representative capacity on behalf of the decedent's estate pursuant to § 16-62-101. Murrell v. Springdale Mem. Hosp., 330 Ark. 121, 952 S.W.2d 153 (1997).

Two-year limitations period of Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., conflicts with the three-year limitations period provided under subsection (c) of this section and is therefore controlling where death ensues from medical injuries. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).

Applicability.

Where the alleged cause of the decedent's death was a medical injury, the two-year statute of limitations provided by § 16-114-203, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in this section, is applicable. Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997), overruled in part, Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49 (2013).

Rejection of the husband's claim that he had a curtesy interest in a settlement award involving his deceased wife was appropriate because the wife never possessed a chose in action since there was no cause of action for wrongful death created in any individual beneficiary under this section, the wrongful-death statute. Bridges v. Shields, 2011 Ark. 448, 385 S.W.3d 176 (2011).

Admiralty.

The right of action given by former, similar section may be enforced in admiralty. Monongahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Schinnerer, 196 F. 375 (6th Cir. 1912) (decision under prior law).

Apportionment.

The factors set forth in subsection (f) of this section also guide the probate court's determination of the apportionment of the settlement proceeds under subsection (g), in those cases where the damages issue was not tried. Bell v. Estate of Bell, 318 Ark. 483, 885 S.W.2d 877 (1994).

The evidence supported the probate court's apportionment order, where the probate court's 50/50 apportionment of the remaining proceeds between appellant and the minors roughly approximated the apportionment of their economic losses (52% to appellant and 48% to the minors), and the court clearly considered both this evidence and the compensable elements enumerated in this section. Bell v. Estate of Bell, 318 Ark. 483, 885 S.W.2d 877 (1994).

In an action arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision which resulted in an award of damages apportioned by the jury among family members of the decedent, two awards were reversed where the recipients did not testify at trial and no other witnesses presented evidence of mental anguish on the part of either of them. New Prospect Drilling Co. v. First Com. Trust, 332 Ark. 466, 966 S.W.2d 233 (1998).

Under subsections (g) and (h), it was clear that the probate court had the authority to approve a wrongful death settlement and also to apportion and distribute the proceeds. Douglas v. Holbert, 335 Ark. 305, 983 S.W.2d 392 (1998), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Bates v. Arkansas, 526 U.S. 1064, 119 S. Ct. 1454, 143 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1999).

Attorneys' Fees.

A beneficiary's attorney is not entitled to fees on a portion of wrongful death proceeds attributable to the beneficiary, and a probate court has no jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees for services rendered to an individual beneficiary. Brewer v. Lacefield, 301 Ark. 358, 784 S.W.2d 156 (1990).

Beneficiaries.

An action for the benefit of the estate and one for the widow may be joined. Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 131 S.W. 969 (1910); Southern Anthracite Coal Co. v. Hodge, 99 Ark. 302, 139 S.W. 292 (1911) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The administrator may recover for the conscious suffering of a deceased infant, and it is no defense, that the father, being sole distributee, was guilty of contributory negligence. Nashville Lumber Co. v. Busbee, 100 Ark. 76, 139 S.W. 301 (1911) (decision under prior law).

The administrator of a deceased minor is entitled to recover all damages for a wrongful death, both for the benefit of his estate and the next of kin. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Godfrey, 178 Ark. 103, 10 S.W.2d 894 (1928)Questioned byWheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 240 Ark. 280, 399 S.W.2d 258 (1966) (decision under prior law).

Where widow received payment of judgment for her husband's death for the benefit of herself and next of kin, widow was entitled to only one-third of the amount received and she held the balance in trust for her children; the adult children being entitled to their share on demand. Moseley v. Beard, 203 Ark. 731, 158 S.W.2d 917 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Where grandparents stood in loco parentis to their nine-year-old grandson, an award for mental anguish because of the death of the grandson was not improper. Bockman v. Butler, 226 Ark. 159, 288 S.W.2d 597 (1956) (decision under prior law).

Any recovery in action by administratrix for wrongful death of deceased would be for the benefit of deceased's next of kin. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

Damages recovered do not become a part of the general assets of the estate and are not subject to debts of the estate but are recovered in trust for the beneficiaries named herein. Dukes v. Dukes, 233 Ark. 850, 349 S.W.2d 339 (1961).

A step-daughter was one to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis within the meaning of this section. Moon Distribs., Inc. v. White, 245 Ark. 627, 434 S.W.2d 56 (1968).

Section 9-9-215 specifically says that, in construing statutes, the court shall recognize that there is no legal relationship existing between an natural parent whose child has been adopted by another; the child of a natural father adopted by another, was not one of the beneficiaries which this section authorized to recover for the wrongful death of the decedent. Webb v. Harvell, 563 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. Ark. 1983).

Whether a decedent stood in the position of in loco parentis to a person is to be determined by the intent of the parties. Standridge v. Standridge, 304 Ark. 364, 803 S.W.2d 496 (1991).

The fact that step-son lived with his mother and decedent for a little over 15 months was not enough to establish that decedent had formed the intent to assume the duties and benefits of becoming step-son's father. Standridge v. Standridge, 304 Ark. 364, 803 S.W.2d 496 (1991).

A step-son was not one to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis within the meaning of this section where nothing in the record indicated that the deceased had formed the intent to assume the duties and benefits of becoming step-son's father. Standridge v. Standridge, 304 Ark. 364, 803 S.W.2d 496 (1991).

Where defendant's sole claim to the proceeds of wrongful death award was as decedent's surviving spouse, and where because of the invalidity of her marriage to decedent, she was not his surviving spouse, she thus could not share in the proceeds of the settlement. Standridge v. Standridge, 304 Ark. 364, 803 S.W.2d 496 (1991).

Under the Arkansas wrongful death statute, a corporation cannot recover for the loss of an employee's services because a decedent's employer is not an enumerated beneficiary. Lusby v. Union Pac. R.R., 4 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 1993).

Children who are not living at the time of the deceased person's death are not among the statutory beneficiaries, and neither are the deceased children's heirs at law, therefore, the definition of “children” as used in subsection (d) of this section does not include the descendants of those children of the deceased who predeceased the deceased. Babb v. Matlock, 340 Ark. 263, 9 S.W.3d 508 (2000).

Circuit court erred in denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration in a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a nursing home resident's beneficiaries because under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the wrongful-death beneficiaries were bound by the arbitration agreement executed by the nursing home resident. Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy, 2013 Ark. 463 (2013).

Trial court correctly determined that a decedent's stepchildren were not beneficiaries of a wrongful-death settlement as that term was defined in the statute; at no time did the decedent assume the role or responsibilities of a parent with regard to either stepchild and, as such, the relationship between the stepchildren and the decedent never rose to the level of in loco parentis. Zulpo v. Blann, 2013 Ark. App. 750 (2013).

It was unnecessary to determine whether the decedent's daughter was a beneficiary of the wrongful-death action because the jury absolved the doctor of negligence. Hartman v. Edwards, 2014 Ark. App. 480, 442 S.W.3d 13 (2014).

Collateral Source Rule.

Although the collateral source rule was held not applicable to a proceeding for distribution of settlement funds, it still applies in the context of a proceeding to determine the liability and damages recoverable from the wrongdoer. Bell v. Estate of Bell, 318 Ark. 483, 885 S.W.2d 877 (1994).

Where the amount of damages was reached by compromise agreement and was finalized prior to the commencement of the apportionment proceeding, subsection (f) did not apply. Bell v. Estate of Bell, 318 Ark. 483, 885 S.W.2d 877 (1994).

Complaint.

If the complaint fails to show that there is no administrator, the defect may be supplied by proof. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Hutchinson, 101 Ark. 424, 142 S.W. 527 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Dismissal of wrongful death action was proper where personal representatives of estate filed complaint pro se, which constituted the unauthorized practice of law rendering the complaint a nullity, and where the two-year statute of limitations had expired. Davenport v. Lee, 348 Ark. 148, 72 S.W.3d 85 (2002).

Widower failed to meet the requirements of subsection (b) of this section because he had not been appointed executor at the time he originally filed the complaint; therefore, he lacked standing to pursue the action, the original complaint was a nullity, and the subsequent appointment of the widower as executor did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. McKibben v. Mullis, 79 Ark. App. 382, 90 S.W.3d 442 (2002).

Although plaintiff lacked standing to sue when she filed the original complaint because she had not yet been appointed the administrator of decedent's estate and she was not the sole heir, upon being appointed administrator six days later, she was deemed to be a new party when she filed the timely amended complaint; the original complaint remained a document setting out allegations satisfying the fact-pleading requirements for a complaint set out in Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and the facts pled in the original complaint were adopted by reference under Ark. R. Civ. P. 10(c) into the amended complaint. Hackelton v. Malloy, 364 Ark. 469, 221 S.W.3d 353 (2006).

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend the complaint filed by plaintiff, the decedent's daughter, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), in a wrongful death action where the daughter, who at the time she filed the original complaint was not yet the personal representative of the estate and the heirs were not named as parties in the complaint, lacked standing to sue; the complaint amounted to a nullity and could not serve as the foundation for an amendment.Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2006).

Conflict of Laws.

The fact that the laws of distribution in this state and those of the state where the death occurred are different is no defense to an action brought in this state. Midland V. R. Co. v. Le Moyne, 104 Ark. 327, 148 S.W. 654 (1912) (decision under prior law).

District court erred in applying Arkansas law as a basis for dismissing plaintiff's suit seeking relief for the alleged impairment of its hospital lien by a decedent's estate that had settled a wrongful death claim without paying the decedent's medical bills, because Arkansas's interest did not outweigh concerns about forum shopping and maintenance of interstate order that favored the application of Tennessee law to plaintiff's lien impairment claim. Shelby Cnty. Health Care Corp. v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 836 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 473, 199 L. Ed. 2d 358 (U.S. 2017).

Damages.

The loss to minor children of the instruction and the physical, moral, and intellectual training by a parent is an element to be considered in estimating damages to children by reason of parents' wrongful death, and each child is entitled to recover the amount of pecuniary loss sustained by the child. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Prince, 101 Ark. 315, 142 S.W. 499 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Where the wrongful act of another deprives the husband of the services or companionship of his wife, he is entitled to compensation therefor. Graysonia-Nashville Lumber Co. v. Carroll, 102 Ark. 460, 144 S.W. 519 (1912) (decision under prior law).

The widow and children of one negligently killed are not entitled to damages for his pain and suffering but only to damages for the loss of his comfort and support. Hines v. Betts, 146 Ark. 555, 226 S.W. 165 (1920); Webb v. Waters, 154 Ark. 547, 243 S.W. 846 (1922) (preceding decisions under prior law).

In an action by a parent for the negligent killing of a child, the damages awarded must be founded on pecuniary loss, actual or expected, and mere injury to feelings cannot be considered. Interurban Ry. v. Trainer, 150 Ark. 19, 233 S.W. 816 (1921)Questioned byBeaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (decision under prior law).

Parents sought damages for the death of their adult son and it was held that contributions by the son to the father were admissible in evidence without proof of financial dependency. Washburn v. Douthit, 73 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1934) (decision under prior law).

Instruction authorizing recovery of damages by a parent for death of child in such sum as he would have contributed to his parents after reaching majority was held erroneous. Davis v. Gillin, 188 Ark. 523, 66 S.W.2d 1057 (1934) (decision under prior law).

In death action by administrator, instruction as to measure of damages should have distinguished between cause of action for the benefit of widow and next of kin for pecuniary loss to them and cause of action to the estate for damages suffered by the deceased prior to his death. Clift v. Jordan, 205 Ark. 245, 168 S.W.2d 403 (1943) (decision under prior law).

In action to recover for death of plaintiff's husband, instruction authorizing jury to include in their verdict, as an element of damages, loss of consortium and companionship amounted to an erroneous declaration as to measure of damages, but, when raised for first time in the motion for new trial, cannot be considered on appeal. Missouri P.R.R. v. Gilbert, 206 Ark. 683, 178 S.W.2d 73 (1944) (decision under prior law).

To prove loss of future earnings due to impairment of earning power of the deceased at the time of the accident and death, evidence as to prior earnings is not necessarily confined to the immediate time prior to the accident. Missouri P.R.R. v. Gilbert, 206 Ark. 683, 178 S.W.2d 73 (1944) (decision under prior law).

Recovery for benefit of children should be limited to the present worth of sums which would be contributed by the parent prior to their majority. Missouri P.R.R. v. Gilbert, 206 Ark. 683, 178 S.W.2d 73 (1944) (decision under prior law).

The pecuniary value of the loss of future earnings of the deceased is a factor to be considered in determining the loss of the financial aid to the widow and children. Missouri P.R.R. v. Gilbert, 206 Ark. 683, 178 S.W.2d 73 (1944) (decision under prior law).

Temporary employment, and the higher wages paid thereon, considered alone, would not be a proper test to furnish a fair and general measure of his earning capacity. Missouri P.R.R. v. Gilbert, 206 Ark. 683, 178 S.W.2d 73 (1944) (decision under prior law).

In estimating damage resulting from loss or impairment of earning capacity, the reasonable and dependable probabilities, looking through all that may happen and for all the year for which the computation is to be made, and viewed according to the general experiences and observations of life, are the elements which are to guide to a fair and acceptable result. Missouri P.R.R. v. Gilbert, 206 Ark. 683, 178 S.W.2d 73 (1944) (decision under prior law).

There is nothing in this section which limits a child's recovery for pecuniary loss, arising from the wrongful death of a parent, to the period of his minority. Strahan v. Webb, 231 Ark. 426, 330 S.W.2d 291 (1959).

Since the right to recover damages for pecuniary loss beyond the minority of the beneficiaries depends upon the circumstances, where it is clear that deceased would have contributed to the education of his two sons even after they had attained their majority, the sons are entitled to damages for pecuniary loss beyond their minority. Strahan v. Webb, 231 Ark. 426, 330 S.W.2d 291 (1959).

The term “pecuniary injuries” as used in this section is not limited to the present value of the financial support that a child would receive from his mother during his minority, but includes also compensation for the loss of parental love, care, supervision, and training. Bridges v. Stephens, 238 Ark. 801, 384 S.W.2d 490 (1964).

Award for the death of the mother of an illegitimate child dependent upon the mother not only for pecuniary support, but also for the loving care that a child ordinarily receives from both parents, found not excessive. Bridges v. Stephens, 238 Ark. 801, 384 S.W.2d 490 (1964).

This section does not limit the recovery of one to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis to damages for mental anguish to the exclusion of damages for pecuniary loss. Moon Distribs., Inc. v. White, 245 Ark. 627, 434 S.W.2d 56 (1968).

Since this section limits the class of beneficiaries who can recover compensatory damages for pecuniary loss to the surviving spouse and next of kin of the deceased, and the relationship of brother to the deceased was not analogous to next of kin; instruction that permitted jury to compensate brother for such pecuniary loss was error. Vickers v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 534 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1976).

Where the adult sons were financially independent, and the decedent had no legal obligation to support the adult sons, and where the sons had not truly demonstrated that they suffered greater than normal grief due to the loss of their father, the court correctly directed a verdict in favor of defendants. Dobson v. Bacon Transp. Co., 607 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1979).

Where the testimony of the surviving husband of a woman killed in an automobile accident concerning his mental anguish was sufficient in itself to support the amount which the probate court apportioned to him, the award for mental anguish was proper, even though the court awarded the husband one-third of the wrongful death action recovery and referred to a “curtesy amount” since the evidence showed that the court did not determine his share arbitrarily and without reference to the evidence. Dale v. Sutton, 273 Ark. 396, 620 S.W.2d 293 (1981).

Evidence sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. Brown v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 543 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1983).

The laws of this state do not preclude the allowance of punitive damages in a wrongful death action, at least where the award of punitive damages is simply an incident of the action for personal injuries that the decedent would have had if he had lived. Brown v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 703 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1983).

For discussion of amount of damages to be awarded for compensatory damages, pecuniary injuries, mental anguish, conscious pain and suffering, loss of services and loss of consortium to survivors of victims of an explosion, see Lowe v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 1089 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Finding in favor of the spouse that a pharmacist incorrectly filled the decedent's prescription resulting in his death was proper and an award of $125,000 to the decedent's daughter for mental anguish was acceptable because subdivision (f)(2) of this section included grief normally associated with the loss of a loved one. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tucker, 353 Ark. 730, 120 S.W.3d 61 (2003).

Jurisdiction.

The probate court does not have jurisdiction to resolve the paternity of a child in order to determine whether the child can share in the proceeds of a wrongful death settlement. Rager v. Turley, 342 Ark. 223, 27 S.W.3d 729 (2000).

Denial of doctor's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent circuit court from proceeding with a wrongful-death action was proper where the circuit court was not wholly without jurisdiction; furthermore, the court could not treat the petition as one for certiorari because the case simply did not present a situation where the remedy by appeal was inadequate. Conner v. Simes, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476 (2003).

—Mental Anguish.

Mental anguish, to warrant recovery of damages therefore, must be real and with cause and must have resulted proximately and naturally from conduct or event which gives rise to the right of recovery, and an award must be reasonable in light of all relevant factors disclosed by the evidence. Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959).

The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases decided under § 23-17-112(a) are applicable to mental anguish claims arising under this section. Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959).

Award to children was reasonable compensation for mental anguish suffered by them because of wrongful death of father. Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959).

It was the intention of the legislature to allow recovery for mental anguish under this section. Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345 S.W.2d 610 (1961), overruled, Fountain v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968), overruled in part, Fountain v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968), superseded by statute as stated in, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tucker, 353 Ark. 730, 120 S.W.3d 61 (2003).

In order to recover for mental anguish under this section, one must suffer more than normal grief. Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345 S.W.2d 610 (1961), overruled, Fountain v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968), overruled in part, Fountain v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968), superseded by statute as stated in, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tucker, 353 Ark. 730, 120 S.W.3d 61 (2003); Fountain v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968).

A verdict for mental anguish suffered by parents because of death of their daughter was not so grossly excessive as to shock conscience of court. Tiner v. Tiner, 238 Ark. 222, 379 S.W.2d 425 (1964).

Where the decedent was survived by his mother and several brothers and sisters, the brothers and sisters could recover for mental anguish caused by the wrongful death even though they were not heirs at law. Fountain v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968).

In wrongful death action, factors to be considered in evaluating mental anguish are the duration and intensity of the sorrow and grief, the attitude of the decedent toward the survivor, the attitude of the survivor toward the decedent, the duration and intimacy of the relationship, and ties of affection between decedent and survivor, and the violence and suddenness of the death. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Pennington, 261 Ark. 650, 553 S.W.2d 436 (1977).

Mental anguish in wrongful death actions will vary in every case according to the nervous temperament of the individual, his ability to withstand shock, sex, circumstances, and position in life. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Pennington, 261 Ark. 650, 553 S.W.2d 436 (1977).

Among the circumstances to be considered in determining the extent and compensability of mental anguish are the closeness of the relationship of the survivors with the deceased, the probable life expectancy of the deceased and survivors, the nature of the death, and the physical and mental impact on the survivors. Dugal v. Commercial Std. Ins. Co., 456 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. Ark. 1978).

Damages under this section may include compensation for mental anguish occasioned by a death, provided that the survivors suffer more than normal grief. Dugal v. Commercial Std. Ins. Co., 456 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. Ark. 1978).

The legislature vested the cause of action for damages for mental anguish in the personal representative, but with the recovery apportionable among the individual beneficiaries, so that all claims arising from a wrongful death can be asserted and settled in one suit and there was no reason to recognize a duplicate cause of action in the decedent's mother as an individual. Waldrip v. McGarity, 270 Ark. 305, 605 S.W.2d 5 (1980).

The award to each beneficiary for mental anguish for wrongful death is to be determined on an individual basis. Dale v. Sutton, 273 Ark. 396, 620 S.W.2d 293 (1981).

Evidence was sufficient in itself to support the amount which the probate court apportioned to him; award for mental anguish was proper, even though the court awarded the husband one-third of the wrongful death action recovery and referred to a “curtesy amount,” since the evidence showed that the court did not determine his share arbitrarily and without reference to the evidence. Dale v. Sutton, 273 Ark. 396, 620 S.W.2d 293 (1981).

The proximity of relationship between the deceased and the survivors is the most significant factor in determining whether recovery for mental anguish is allowable; distant relatives generally have no more than normal grief and will not be allowed to recover without establishing something more. Martin v. Rieger, 289 Ark. 292, 711 S.W.2d 776 (1986).

The suddenness and violent nature of the death is not sufficient, standing alone, to support an award of damages for mental anguish. Mental anguish must be real and with cause and be more than the normal grief occasioned by the loss of a loved one. Lowe v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 1089 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Factors utilized in evaluating awards for mental anguish in wrongful death cases are: (1) the duration and intimacy of their relationship and the ties of affection between the decedent and the survivor; (2) frequency of association and communication between an adult survivor and an adult decedent; (3) the attitude of the decedent toward the suvivor and of the survivor toward the decedent; (4) the duration and intensity of the sorrow; (5) maturity or immaturity of the survivor; (6) the violence or suddenness of the death; (7) sleeplessness or troubled sleep over an extended period; (8) obvious extreme or unusual nervous reaction to the death; (9) crying spells over an extended period of time; (10) adverse effect on survivor's work or school; (11) change of personality of the survivor; (12) loss of weight by survivor or other physical symptoms; and (13) age and life expectancy of the decedent. Lowe v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 1089 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

—Punitive Damages.

The estate and children of decedent could recover punitive damages in wrongful death action brought under this section since Arkansas courts have allowed punitive damages where the action is grounded in the wrongful death or survival statutes. Fields v. Huff, 510 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Ark. 1981).

Punitive damages are recoverable in wrongful death actions. The surviving beneficiaries of the decedent, killed as a result of willful and wanton tortious conduct, are entitled to recover those punitive damages the decedent would have recovered had he or she lived. Vickery v. Ballentine, 293 Ark. 54, 732 S.W.2d 160 (1987).

The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the injured party but to impose a monetary penalty on the defendant and to discourage others from similar behavior. That purpose is unquestionably the same whether the injured person lives or dies as a result of defendant's willful or wanton conduct. Vickery v. Ballentine, 293 Ark. 54, 732 S.W.2d 160 (1987).

Medical Malpractice.

The limitations period provided under § 16-114-203 conflicts with the limitations period provided under this section; pursuant to the Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., this section's statute of limitations, as an inconsistent provision of law, is superseded by § 16-114-203 where the two conflict. Hertlein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 323 Ark. 283, 914 S.W.2d 303 (1996).

Any medical injury, even one resulting in death, is governed by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, § 16-114-203, and not by this section. Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 326 Ark. 140, 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996).

By passing the Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., the Arkansas General Assembly did not repeal this section in cases where the death was caused by a medical injury. Meredith v. Buchman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 764 (W.D. Ark. 2000).

Wrongful-death and survival action brought by the administratrix of the decedent's estate against the medical center was time-barred under § 16-114-203 as the order appointing the administratrix was not effective until it was filed almost two weeks after the complaint was filed; therefore, at the time the administratrix filed this cause of action against the medical center, she was not the administrator of the estate and did not have standing to pursue the claim against the medical center. As such, the complaint was a nullity. Hubbard v. Nat'l Healthcare of Pocahontas, Inc., 371 Ark. 444, 267 S.W.3d 573 (2007).

Parties.

It is no defense that the widow has remarried since the killing. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cleere, 76 Ark. 377, 88 S.W. 995 (1905) (decision under prior law).

In an action for the killing of a child, the surviving father being the next of kin and the parent in whose behalf recovery may be had, it was error to instruct the jury that the mother might recover for the loss of the child's services. Hines v. Johnson, 145 Ark. 592, 224 S.W. 989 (1920) (decision under prior law).

Where a widow brought suit for the wrongful death of her husband in her name for the benefit of herself and their minor child and judgment was rendered for the widow and no question was raised in the trial court as to the proper parties plaintiff, it could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Reynolds v. Nutt, 217 Ark. 543, 230 S.W.2d 949 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Where wrongful death action was brought in the respective names of the parents of deceased minors when the parents were administrators of the respective estates of the sons, defendants were not prejudiced by the action of the court in denying their motion to dismiss the complaint and permitting the plaintiffs to amend their complaint by interlineation, substituting the proper parties plaintiff. J. Paul Smith Co. v. Tipton, 237 Ark. 486, 374 S.W.2d 176 (1964)Criticized byHarris v. Hercules, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Ark. 1971).

Actions for survivorship and actions for wrongful death are separate and distinct in nature. In a survival action, the administrator asserts the decedent's own cause of action, and only the administrator may bring this cause of action; the wrongful death statute, on the other hand, creates a cause of action in the survivors, and it may be brought by the administrator in their behalf, or by the heirs themselves if there is no administrator. First Com. Bank v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

In Arkansas, a wrongful-death action must be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person, and if there is no personal representative of the deceased person, then a wrongful-death action must be brought by all the heirs at law; an action brought by less than all the heirs of the deceased is a nullity. Sanderson v. McCollum, 82 Ark. App. 111, 112 S.W.3d 363 (2003).

Survival and wrongful death action was properly dismissed because subsection (b) of this section requires that the suit be filed by the personal representative or all of the heirs of the decedent, and the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that this language is clear and unambiguous; because the wrongful-death action is a creation of statute and exists only in the manner and form prescribed by statute, an action brought by less than all of the heirs of the deceased is a nullity. Estate of Mona L. Hernandez v. Clark, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 481 (June 23, 2004).

Term “heirs at law” as used in subsection (b) of this section means “beneficiaries” as used in subsection (d), and a motion to dismiss a wrongful death action was properly granted where two sisters were not named as parties; the doctrine of relation back under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15 did not help because the original complaint was a nullity. Brewer v. Poole, 362 Ark. 1, 207 S.W.3d 458, 2005 Ark. LEXIS 239 (2005).

Circuit court properly concluded that the next of kin's wrongful death complaint against the physicians and nurses did not comply with § 16-62-102 (Supp. 1999) where there was no personal representative and the decedent's three siblings had not been named as plaintiffs in the action. Rice v. Tanner, 363 Ark. 79, 210 S.W.3d 860 (2005).

Order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of a city, county, and others in a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 wrongful death action was affirmed as, when the original complaint was filed, the plaintiff, the decedent's daughter, was not yet the administratrix of the estate and the caption did not list the heirs individually, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) and Ark. R. Civ. P. 10(a); the complaint did not identify the heirs as parties and did not meet the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, thus, the daughter lacked standing to sue. Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2006).

Wrongful death and survival action filed by decedent's mother on behalf of herself and decedent was neither brought by and in the name of an appointed personal representative of decedent nor were decedent's brother and biological father (both statutory beneficiaries under subsection (d) of this section), joined as plaintiffs as required for a wrongful death action under subsection (b) of this section. Further, neither the mother nor anyone else had been appointed an administrator or executor as required for a survival action under § 16-62-101; therefore, at the time the mother filed the action, she did not have standing to pursue the claims against defendants. Farrow v. Sammis, No. 3:07cv00097 SWW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90429 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 7, 2007).

Regarding a father's motion to intervene in a mother's wrongful death and survivor action for the sole purpose of seeking to stay the proceedings pending a determination from the probate court as to who would be named administrator of decedent son's estate, Ark. R. Civ. P. 17 had no application because the action was not filed in accordance with subsection (b) of this section or § 16-62-101 and the original complaint thus was a nullity. When the original complaint was a nullity, Ark. R. Civ. P. 17 was inapplicable because the original complaint never existed and, therefore, there was no pleading to amend. Farrow v. Sammis, No. 3:07cv00097 SWW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90429 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 7, 2007).

Dismissal of a wrongful-death action against a doctor and a hospital was proper because the savings statute under § 16-62-102(b) did not apply since the case was improperly refiled by a mother and father as heirs at law when a personal representative had been appointed; the personal representative should have been substituted as the real party in interest prior to dismissal. Recinos v. Zelk, 369 Ark. 7, 250 S.W.3d 221 (2007).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a physician in a husband's wrongful-death/survival action because when the husband filed his original suit, no order had been entered appointing him as administrator, nor were all of the wife's heirs at law named as plaintiffs, as required by § 16-62-101 and subsection (b) of this section. Norton v. Luttrell, 99 Ark. App. 109, 257 S.W.3d 580 (2007).

Trial court did not err by granting the doctors' summary judgment because the medical malpractice action was not properly filed within the two-year statute of limitations of § 16-114-203(a). The trial court did not err in holding that the November 3, 2009 order of substitution of parties was ineffective and therefore the action was barred by the statute of limitations because: (1) the wrongful death complaint filed by the patient's daughter and husband in April 2009 was a nullity because four siblings of the patient were omitted as party plaintiffs as required by subsection (b) of this section and therefore it never existed; (2) the order of substitution of parties that substituted the daughter in her capacity of estate administrator as the party plaintiff did not allege any facts supporting the action and therefore did not constitute an amended complaint; (3) the order of substitution was entered on November 3, 2009, after the statute of limitations had expired as to each doctor in July 2009 and September 2009; and (4) the estate administrator could not establish the first element of the continuous-course-of-treatment doctrine because she could not establish that the doctors provided continuous treatment to the patient up to November 3, 2009. Mendez v. Glover, 2010 Ark. App. 808, 379 S.W.3d 92 (2010).

—Heirs.

The mother is not an heir entitled to sue, although the deceased contributed to her support in his lifetime. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Frost, 93 Ark. 183, 124 S.W. 748 (1909) (decision under prior law).

A boy whose parents were killed in a railroad crossing collision, leaving him the only heir and next of kin of both parents, may recover for the mother's death. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Oxford, 174 Ark. 966, 298 S.W. 207 (1927) (decision under prior law).

Failure to appoint a personal representative has no bearing in a wrongful death action as the “heirs at law” can sue in their own right. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Rowe, 256 Ark. 221, 506 S.W.2d 569 (1974).

The statute authorizing heirs to maintain suit on behalf of a decedent is this section, and it applies only to wrongful death situations. Daughhetee v. Shipley, 282 Ark. 596, 669 S.W.2d 886 (1984).

Where a wrongful death action is pursued by heirs at law, all heirs at law must be joined in the action; where there are multiple heirs at law, a single heir at law lacks standing under this section, thus depriving the circuit court of jurisdiction. Ramirez v. White County Circuit Court, 343 Ark. 372, 38 S.W.3d 298 (2001).

Since family did not name decedent's siblings as plaintiffs in a lawsuit against defendants for medical malpractice where probate had not been opened, the complaint was a nullity and summary judgment in favor of defendants was proper; siblings were not named as plaintiffs until after statute of limitations in § 16-114-203 expired. Rice v. Tanner, 363 Ark. 79, 210 S.W.3d 860 (2005).

— —In Loco Parentis.

Where there was no evidence that the two adult grandchildren, who suffered no disability, were relying on their mother's support at the time of her death, they were not beneficiaries under the wrongful-death statute and were not entitled to take as heirs at law of their mother, because she did not stand in loco parentis to them at the time of her death. Babb v. Matlock, 340 Ark. 263, 9 S.W.3d 508 (2000).

—Joinder.

Where there is no personal representative, the action may be brought by the widow and heirs, but if all parties do not join, the error is waived unless raised in trial court. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Watson, 97 Ark. 560, 134 S.W. 949 (1911)Questioned byBond v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 233 Ark. 32, 342 S.W.2d 473 (1961). See also Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Corman, 92 Ark. 102, 122 S.W. 116 (1909) (preceding decisions under prior law).

It was an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of a suit under former section that widow and heirs be joined. Thompson v. Southern Lumber Co., 113 Ark. 380, 168 S.W. 1068 (1914) (decision under prior law).

An administratrix suing for the wrongful death of a foreign bus company's ticket agent who was injured while helping to load a passenger's truck on one of the company's vehicles was entitled to maintain a joint action against the company, the bus driver, and the Arkansas citizens who allegedly caused the death. Harrelson v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 87 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1936) (decision under prior law).

—Personal Representatives.

The father cannot maintain the action where there is a personal representative. Saint Louis, M. & S.E.R.R. v. Garner, 76 Ark. 555, 89 S.W. 550 (1905) (decision under prior law).

A foreign administrator may maintain the action. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Graham, 83 Ark. 61, 102 S.W. 700 (1907); Midland V. R. Co. v. Le Moyne, 104 Ark. 327, 148 S.W. 654 (1912) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A wife's administrator may sue her husband for tort resulting in her death. Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916) (decision under prior law).

The administrator of a deceased employee may recover for his death against his employer for the benefit of everybody concerned, including the next of kin. Ashcraft v. Jerome Hardwood Lumber Co., 173 Ark. 135, 292 S.W. 386 (1927) (decision under prior law).

Deceased's mother as his administratrix could maintain an action for damages for his wrongful death. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Crick, 182 Ark. 312, 32 S.W.2d 815 (1930) (decision under prior law).

A death action based on the Employer's Liability Act, §§ 11-8-10111-8-108, for the benefit of the deceased employee's widow and heirs against a corporation not engaged in interstate commerce must be instituted by the personal representative of such employee and not by his widow and heirs. Dicken v. Missouri P. R. Co., 188 Ark. 1035, 69 S.W.2d 277 (1934) (decision under prior law).

When a personal representative is appointed, the personal representative is the only person who can maintain a suit for damages for wrongful death. Reed v. Blevins, 222 Ark. 202, 258 S.W.2d 564 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937, 74 S. Ct. 632 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Personal representative in bringing suit for wrongful death acts only as a trustee of conduit and may not go beyond that status. Dukes v. Dukes, 233 Ark. 850, 349 S.W.2d 339 (1961).

Where personal representative is appointed, personal representative is the only person who can maintain suit for wrongful death. Dukes v. Dukes, 233 Ark. 850, 349 S.W.2d 339 (1961); Dawson v. Gerritsen, 295 Ark. 206, 748 S.W.2d 33 (1988).

Where deceased has died as a result of alleged negligence of defendant, both action for compensation of deceased's injuries and action for wrongful death of deceased should be brought by personal representative of deceased if there is one. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

While the widow and daughter of deceased are beneficiaries of any wrongful death recovery, there is no case law or statute giving them standing as parties to the action. Therefore it was not they, but the administrator, whose duty and right it was to pursue the action, subject to the probate court's approval, and to choose counsel for that purpose. Cude v. Cude, 286 Ark. 383, 691 S.W.2d 866 (1985); Brewer v. Lacefield, 301 Ark. 358, 784 S.W.2d 156 (1990).

The personal representative, in bringing suit for wrongful death, acts only as a trustee of conduit, and any proceeds recovered are for the benefit of the beneficiaries and not for the estate. Brewer v. Lacefield, 301 Ark. 358, 784 S.W.2d 156 (1990).

Beneficiaries may prefer to have independent counsel to protect their interests in a wrongful death suit, but as long as the code provides that the personal representative is the party to bring the action, that party has the absolute right to choose counsel for that purpose. Should the personal representative or chosen council fail to provide adequate representation, application can be made to the probate court to either not approve or disallow the contracts entered into by the representative, and a representative can be removed pursuant to § 28-48-105 if the court finds him unsuitable. Brewer v. Lacefield, 301 Ark. 358, 784 S.W.2d 156 (1990).

Every wrongful death action shall be brought by the personal representative of the deceased person, if there is a personal representative. McGuire v. Smith, 58 Ark. App. 68, 946 S.W.2d 717 (1997).

A personal representative of the estate may file a wrongful death action on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries. Douglas v. Holbert, 335 Ark. 305, 983 S.W.2d 392 (1998), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Bates v. Arkansas, 526 U.S. 1064, 119 S. Ct. 1454, 143 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1999).

Dismissal of a wrongful death action filed in the name of the estate was proper where the action was required to have been brought by and in the name of the personal representative as personal representative; in addition, had an amendment been allowed to substitute the name of the personal representative, it would have constituted the commencement of a new action for which the period of limitations had expired pursuant to this section. Estate of Byrd v. Tiner, 81 Ark. App. 366, 101 S.W.3d 887 (2003).

—Special Administrator.

Because a special administrator was appointed in a reopened probate case, the special administrator was the duly appointed representative for the wrongful-death statutory beneficiaries and was the proper party plaintiff in the tort case. Arman v. Chi St. Vincent Hot Springs, 2019 Ark. App. 187, 574 S.W.3d 731 (2019).

Pecuniary Injuries.

The term “pecuniary injuries” in a wrongful death action refers to the present value of benefits, including money, goods and services which the deceased would have contributed to the claimed beneficiaries had she lived. Lowe v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 1089 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Prior Judgment.

Where in action for injuries resulting from automobile collision by one driver against the other driver's widow as administratrix of his estate, widow did not file a cross complaint but alleged contributory negligence, judgment against the estate was held to bar subsequent action by widow against plaintiff in the former suit and his employer to recover damages occasioned by loss of contributions made to her by her deceased husband, since the widow had the duty of litigating in the former suit all the questions which she raised in the suit later brought for her personal benefit. Morgan v. Rankin, 197 Ark. 119, 122 S.W.2d 555, 119 A.L.R. 1466 (1938) (decision under prior law).

Where a personal representative of the deceased recovered in a wrongful death action and later an unknown widow of the deceased appeared and filed another wrongful death action against the defendant, the first suit is res judicata and a bar to the latter. Reed v. Blevins, 222 Ark. 202, 258 S.W.2d 564 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937, 74 S. Ct. 632 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Trial court properly entered summary judgment for defendant railroad in decedent's estate's wrongful death lawsuit where the decedent's guardian had already sued the railroad and the case had been settled and the guardian had signed a release. Estate of Hull v. Union Pac. R.R., 355 Ark. 547, 141 S.W.3d 356 (2004).

Where the decedent wandered away from a nursing home and was never found, and where the guardian's negligence action concluded in a dismissal with prejudice, the guardian could not have brought another negligence and wrongful death lawsuit stemming from the same acts when the probate court declared the missing decedent was in fact dead. Brown v. Pine Bluff Nursing Home, 359 Ark. 471, 199 S.W.3d 45 (2004).

Property Damage.

The action authorized by former statute could not be used to recover damages for injuries to property. Pierce Oil Corp. v. Taylor, 147 Ark. 100, 227 S.W. 420 (1921) (decision under prior law).

Settlement Agreement.

A memorandum agreement purporting to settle all matters involved in the administration and distribution of decedent's estate did not preclude a wrongful death action filed on behalf of the statutory heirs. Skaggs v. Cullipher, 57 Ark. App. 50, 941 S.W.2d 443 (1997).

Statutory beneficiaries are not entitled to notice of a petition for approval of a wrongful death settlement. Douglas v. Holbert, 335 Ark. 305, 983 S.W.2d 392 (1998), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Bates v. Arkansas, 526 U.S. 1064, 119 S. Ct. 1454, 143 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1999).

Settlement proceeds do not become assets of the decedent's estate to be distributed pursuant to a will or the laws of intestate succession; instead, the proceeds of a wrongful death action are for the sole benefit of the statutory beneficiaries and may not be used to pay off debts of the estate. Douglas v. Holbert, 335 Ark. 305, 983 S.W.2d 392 (1998), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Bates v. Arkansas, 526 U.S. 1064, 119 S. Ct. 1454, 143 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1999).

Trial court's denial of the adjustment company's claim to proceeds from a settlement made to an estate was affirmed because it was clear that the settlement was intended as a recovery for the estate beneficiaries and the company was precluded under subsection (e) of this section from making a claim for the deceased's debt against those proceeds. Mid-South Adjustment Co. v. Estate of Harris, 87 Ark. App. 139, 189 S.W.3d 518 (2004).

Statute of Limitations.

Where administrator's action against railroad for death of intestate was brought when an action for the benefit of the widow and next of kin was barred by limitations but action for the benefit of the estate was not, it must be presumed that suit was for the benefit of the estate. Sykes v. Jameson, 192 Ark. 631, 94 S.W.2d 718 (1936) (decision under prior law).

Action against a corporation on theory it should be held liable for the payment of a judgment recovered against another corporation for employee's death, if a tort action, would be barred because not brought within two years after employee's death or within one year after non-suit was taken against the present defendant in the former action. Mannon v. R.A. Young & Sons Coal Co., 207 Ark. 98, 179 S.W.2d 457 (1944) (decision under prior law).

The filing of an action within two years is a condition precedent to maintaining an action and the failure to bring suit within two years cannot be waived. Wilson v. Missouri P. R. Co., 58 F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Ark. 1945) (decision under prior law).

The period of limitations contained in this section is a part of the substantive rights created by the section, and all actions brought under the section are controlled by the limitation. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

Where at time of deceased's death his cause of action for personal injuries is barred by statute of limitations, action by his personal representative for wrongful death is also barred as it is derivative in nature and arises only where original of deceased has been preserved. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

In a wrongful death action against the owner of the involved car on the theory of negligent entrustment, an amendment of the complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations which changed the allegation as to the identity of the driver of the car was not barred by the three-year limitation of this section as it was not the beginning of a new cause of action, but a continuation of the original. Soncini v. Rankin, 238 Ark. 595, 383 S.W.2d 500 (1964).

In an action for wrongful death where the complaint and summons were not delivered to the sheriff until the Monday following a Sunday upon which the last day for commencing a wrongful death action fell, the action was still timely because of the application of the Sunday rule. Vermeer Mfg. Co. v. Steel, 263 Ark. 323, 564 S.W.2d 518 (1978)Limited byTatro v. Langston, 328 Ark. 548, 944 S.W.2d 118 (Ark. 1997).

The limitation of time fixed by a wrongful death statute is a limitation on the right of action and is an essential element of the right to sue; therefore, the general savings clause provision has no application to wrongful death actions. Sandusky v. First Elec. Coop., 266 Ark. 588, 587 S.W.2d 37 (1979).

Statute of limitations for the wrongful death action was not tolled during the minority of the plaintiffs and thus action was barred by the three year statute of limitations. Crawford v. Martin Marietta Corp., 622 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1980).

This section does not preclude a party who has commenced a wrongful death action within three years of date of death, and who has suffered a nonsuit of that action, from recommencing it more than one year after date of nonsuit, but within three years from date of death. Legislative intent in creating the one-year-after-nonsuit provisions in this section was not to shorten limitations period in event of nonsuit. Burkett v. PPG Indus., Inc., 294 Ark. 50, 740 S.W.2d 621 (1987).

The wrongful death statute created a new and separate cause of action which could arise if death was caused by any wrongful act and which carries its own statute of limitations as part of that right. For this reason, the medical malpractice statute of limitations is irrelevant when a patient dies from his injuries before the two-year period has run. Brown v. Saint Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 308 Ark. 361, 823 S.W.2d 908 (1992).

Where wrongful-death complaint was not in compliance with this section, and the statute of limitations had run, barring heirs from commencing a wrongful-death action against a doctor, the wife of the deceased was also barred from pursuing a separate claim for loss of consortium, which was derivative to wrongful-death action. Sanderson v. McCollum, 82 Ark. App. 111, 112 S.W.3d 363 (2003).

Wrongful death action filed against healthcare providers by a decedent's parents was void ab initio where the decedent had no personal representative and the complaint failed to include as a plaintiff the decedent's half-brother; hence, under subsection (b) of this section, the parents could not add the half-brother after the limitations period had run. Andrews v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 86 Ark. App. 161, 170 S.W.3d 303 (2004).

Where an original wrongful death complaint was a nullity because it was brought by the decedent's heirs rather than the personal representative, as required by this section, a subsequent amended complaint filed by the administratrix, which attempted to bring the estate in as a party, was a new suit filed after the statute of limitations period and, therefore, could not relate back under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15 and was barred by statute of limitations. Rhuland v. Fahr, 356 Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d 2 (2004).

Motion to dismiss filed by an energy company should not have been granted because a claim was not time barred under § 16-62-102(c)(1) where it was filed within three years of death, but not within three years of an accident; there was no negligence claim filed by a decedent or on his behalf prior to the filing of a wrongful-death action. Miller v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 98 Ark. App. 102, 250 S.W.3d 574 (2007).

Under the savings statute, subdivision (c)(2) of this section, the administratrix had one year from the date of the nonsuit to refile her complaint against the medical center, and the administratrix did this by refiling her complaint on November 17, 2005; therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing the administratrix's complaint against it. Brown v. Nat'l Health Care of Pocahontas, Inc., 102 Ark. App. 148, 283 S.W.3d 224 (2008).

Filing of a workers' compensation claim did not toll the statute of limitations on a wrongful death suit; the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's primary jurisdiction to determine workers' compensation coverage did not prevent the tort action from being filed while the workers' compensation claim was pending. Frisby v. Milbank Mfg. Co., 688 F.3d 540 (8th Cir. 2012).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a personal representative's wrongful death complaint as being untimely filed because the original pro se complaint filed by plaintiff, a nonlawyer, as the personal representative of the estate constituted the unauthorized practice of law and was a nullity and could not be amended; by the time an attorney filed a complaint, more than three years had passed since the decedent's death, and the personal representative's claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Henson v. Cradduck, 2020 Ark. 24, 593 S.W.3d 10 (2020).

Summary Judgment.

Where the matter of a legal duty was the subject of a construction contract which was ambiguous as to the parties' intent, a question of fact was presented, precluding summary judgment in a wrongful death action. Elkins v. Arkla, Inc., 312 Ark. 280, 849 S.W.2d 489 (1993).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the owners of a pool in a wrongful death action arising from the drowning of a child; the owners did not engage in any willful or wanton conduct which contributed to the child's drowning because, even though only one adult who could swim was present in the area, a pool owner had repeatedly told the deceased child to wear a life jacket and had told the children to stay in the shallow end of the pool. Moses v. Bridgeman, 355 Ark. 460, 139 S.W.3d 503 (2003).

Survival Action.

For a death caused by the wrongful act of another, a cause of action survives if the deceased lived after the act constituting the cause of action, whether conscious or not. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Dawson, 68 Ark. 1, 56 S.W. 46 (1900) (decision under prior law).

The cause of action in favor of the husband for the negligent killing of his wife does not survive the husband. Billingsley v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 84 Ark. 617, 107 S.W. 173 (1907) (decision under prior law).

An action is not abated by the death of a party after the cause of action has been merged in a final judgment and while the judgment stands, even though the judgment is based on a cause of action which would not survive the death of a party before judgment. Brundrett v. Hargrove, 204 Ark. 258, 161 S.W.2d 762 (1942) (decision under prior law).

The survival and wrongful death causes are stated in separate sections, and the fact that this section is entitled “Wrongful death actions—Survival” does not indicate that the survival cause of action is contained in this section. First Com. Bank v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

Memorandum agreement purporting to settle all matters involved in the administration and distribution of decedent's estate settled and released an estate's survival cause of action. Skaggs v. Cullipher, 57 Ark. App. 50, 941 S.W.2d 443 (1997).

Circuit court's order dismissing a wrongful death claim which failed to dispose of a survival claim made pursuant to § 16-62-101 left the Arkansas Supreme Court without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the case in the absence of a final judgment. Myers v. McAdams, 366 Ark. 435, 236 S.W.3d 504 (2006).

Order appointing the administratrix on April 11, 2003, as special administratrix specifically stated that the term was for six months; thus, her term expired on October 11, 2003, before she filed complaints against all of the appellees except for the medical center; unless a person was the personal representative or executor of the estate at the time of filing, he had no standing to file a complaint on behalf of the estate and any complaint filed was a nullity, and because the administratrix's complaint was a nullity, her nonsuit on December 6, 2004, did not dismiss these complaints; it dismissed only the properly filed complaint against the medical center, and because the first complaints filed were nullities, the November 17, 2005 complaint was the first complaint filed by a properly appointed personal representative and no savings statute applied; thus, the administratrix's complaint against the medical personnel was barred by the statute of limitations. Brown v. Nat'l Health Care of Pocahontas, Inc., 102 Ark. App. 148, 283 S.W.3d 224 (2008).

Unborn Child.

This section will determine whether, or to what extent, there is a right to maintain an action, or to recover damages, for the death of an unborn child and the action, if any, is a tort action cognizable in circuit court; the wrongful death statute will not be interpreted in an ex parte probate proceeding. Carpenter v. Logan, 281 Ark. 184, 662 S.W.2d 808 (1984).

Under the parental immunity statute, a viable fetus born dead does not have a cause of action against a mother who negligently caused the death of the fetus, regardless of whether the fetus is a “person” under the wrongful death statute. Where the claim of the fetus against the mother for negligent injury is barred by the parental immunity doctrine, the derivative claims by the fetus and its siblings under the wrongful death statute are also barred. Carpenter ex rel. Carpenter v. Bishop, 290 Ark. 424, 720 S.W.2d 299 (1986).

“Person” does not include a viable fetus for the purpose of the wrongful death statute. Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995), overruled, Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001).

A viable fetus is a “person” within the meaning of this section. Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001).

Cited: De Long v. Green, 229 Ark. 100, 313 S.W.2d 370 (1958); Peugh v. Oliger, 233 Ark. 281, 345 S.W.2d 610 (1961); Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1965); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lovins, 248 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Ark. 1965); McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966); Matthews v. Travelers Indem. Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 247, 432 S.W.2d 485 (1968); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Rowe, 256 Ark. 221, 506 S.W.2d 569 (1974); Russ v. Ratliff, 578 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1978); Pickens-Bond Constr. Co. v. Case, 266 Ark. 323, 584 S.W.2d 21 (1979); Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1980); Webb v. Harvell, 563 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Martin v. Rieger, 289 Ark. 292, 711 S.W.2d 776 (1986); Dawson v. Gerritsen, 290 Ark. 499, 720 S.W.2d 714 (1986); Burrows v. Turner Mem'l Hosp., 762 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Ruffins v. ER Ark., P.A., 313 Ark. 175, 853 S.W.2d 877 (Ark. 1993); Pickens v. Black, 316 Ark. 499, 872 S.W.2d 405 (1994); Holmes v. McClendon, 349 Ark. 162, 76 S.W.3d 836 (2002); Estate of Hull v. Union Pac. R.R., 355 Ark. 547, 141 S.W.3d 356 (2004); Cockrum v. Fox, 359 Ark. 508, 199 S.W.3d 69 (2004); Johnson v. Greene Acres Nursing Home Ass'n, 364 Ark. 306, 219 S.W.3d 138 (2005); Lucas v. Wilson, 2011 Ark. App. 584, 385 S.W.3d 891 (2011).

16-62-103. Suits involving public officers.

No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against any public officer in this state in his or her official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his or her official duties shall abate by reason of his or her death or the expiration of his term of office or his or her retirement, resignation, or removal from office. In such event the court, on motion or supplemental petition filed at any time within twelve (12) months thereafter, showing the necessity for the survival thereof, to obtain a settlement of the question involved, may allow the action or other proceeding to be maintained by or against his or her successor in office. The court may make such order as shall be equitable for the payment of costs.

History. Acts 1925, No. 109, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 1253; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1021.

Case Notes

Delivery to Successor.

This section contemplates that the sheriff shall deliver over to his successor in office such goods and moneys as he may receive, and that any suit pending shall survive and may be revived against the successor to recover from him the same goods or property, or moneys, as were sought to be recovered in the beginning. State use of Glover v. McIlroy, 196 Ark. 63, 116 S.W.2d 601 (1938).

Sheriff's failure to deliver over to his successor property and money coming into his hands as such officer is a violation of this section and a breach of the obligation of the contract evidenced by his bond. State use of Glover v. McIlroy, 196 Ark. 63, 116 S.W.2d 601 (1938).

Timeliness.

Action against sureties on bond of former sheriff commenced more than four years after date on which he was required to turn over to his successor property and money in his hands, to recover value of property which the sheriff had attached, was barred by limitations, though filed soon after determination of suit in replevin against sheriff. State use of Glover v. McIlroy, 196 Ark. 63, 116 S.W.2d 601 (1938).

16-62-104 — 16-62-106. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning death of a party or expiration of powers, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 32[33]–34[35]. The sections were derived from:

16-62-104. Civil Code, §§ 549, 550; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1053, 1054; Pope's Dig., §§ 1256, 1257; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1001, 27-1002.

16-62-105. Civil Code, §§ 551-556; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1055-1060; Pope's Dig., §§ 1258-1263; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1003 — 27-1008.

16-62-106. Acts 1851, §§ 1, 2, 4, p. 102; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1050-1052; Pope's Dig., §§ 1252, 1254, 1255; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1009 — 27-1011.

16-62-107. Revivor of actions against personal representative of defendant.

  1. An order to revive an action against the personal representative of a defendant, or against him or her and the heirs or devisees of the defendant, may be made at any time after the appointment of the personal representative. Upon application, the court shall grant such reasonable continuance as may be necessary to enable the personal representative properly to prepare for trial.
    1. An order to revive an action against the personal representative of a decedent for the purpose of proving a claim against the estate of the decedent shall not be made after the time fixed by law for filing claims against the said estate.
    2. An order of revivor may, however, be made against the personal representative of a deceased defendant after the expiration of the time for filing claims against the estate in any case where the personal representative may be a necessary or proper party for the determination of rights of the estate in the subject matter of the action.
    3. No order of revivor against either the personal representative or the heirs or devisees of the decedent shall be made except with the consent of such personal representative, heirs, or devisees unless made within one (1) year from the time when it could first have been made, except as provided in § 16-62-108.

History. Civil Code, §§ 560, 561; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1064, 1065; Pope's Dig., §§ 1267, 1268; Acts 1963, No. 84, §§ 2, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1015, 27-1016.

Case Notes

In General.

The power to revive without consent ceases at the expiration of the time limited by this section. Cole v. Hall, 85 Ark. 144, 107 S.W. 175 (1907); Peay v. Pulaski County, 103 Ark. 601, 148 S.W. 491 (1912); Bank of Des Arc v. Moody, 110 Ark. 39, 161 S.W. 134 (1913).

This section is mandatory. Dupree v. Smith, 150 Ark. 80, 233 S.W. 812 (1921); Prager v. Wootton, 182 Ark. 37, 30 S.W.2d 845 (1930).

Applicability.

Subsection (a) refers to the final, not the conditional, order of revivor. McNutt v. State, 48 Ark. 30, 2 S.W. 254 (1886); State Fair Ass'n v. Townsend, 69 Ark. 215, 63 S.W. 65 (1901).

Subsection (b) applies to cases pending in the Supreme Court on appeal as well as to cases pending before judgment in circuit court. Temple v. Culp, 105 Ark. 222, 150 S.W. 867 (1912).

Intervention.

An heir of decedent, in filing his intervention, entered the litigation voluntarily as he found it and cannot later be heard to complain of the proceedings had prior to the time of intervention; in other words, where suit against the decedents abated at their deaths, the intervention by the heir of decedents had the effect of beginning a new action by him as alleged owner of the land. Bingham v. Zeno, 228 Ark. 1039, 312 S.W.2d 181 (1958).

Where defendant in suit to quiet title died and the deed under which defendant claimed title was a conveyance to defendant jointly as husband and wife, such defendant would have held such title as a tenancy by the entirety and, therefore, when defendant died any title he may have held expired and there was nothing to revive under the provisions of this section, but the whole claimed estate would be in his widow who was not a party to the action; and therefore, a petition to intervene by the widow of the plaintiff, although filed later than the time within which an action could be revived under this section, would be treated as a new action. Wilson v. Huggins, 228 Ark. 1115, 314 S.W.2d 694 (1958).

Order.

An order of revivor is not a final decree. Blum v. Pulaski County, 92 Ark. 101, 122 S.W. 109 (1909).

Parties.

A suit to cancel a trustee's deed will be dismissed when it was not revived against the heirs or devisees of the deceased grantee within the one year period although it was revived against the executor, since the heirs were necessary parties. Blake v. Thompson, 176 Ark. 840, 4 S.W.2d 514 (1928).

Timeliness.

Where a defendant died during the pendency of an appeal taken by the plaintiff, and the latter neglected to revive the suit against the administrator for more than 18 months after his appointment, and neither the administrator nor his heirs consented to the revivor, the appeal will be dismissed. State Fair Ass'n v. Townsend, 69 Ark. 215, 63 S.W. 65 (1901).

Where a suit to cancel a trustee's deed and for an accounting for rents was improperly revived against the executor of the grantee on the latter's death and the heirs were not made parties until five years later, the cause of action was barred. Blake v. Thompson, 176 Ark. 840, 4 S.W.2d 514 (1928).

16-62-108. Revivor of actions against plaintiff's representative or successor — Exception.

An order to revive an action in the names of the representatives or successor of a plaintiff may be made forthwith. However, an order to so revive the action shall not be made without the consent of the defendant after the expiration of one (1) year from the time when the order might first have been made. Where the defendant shall also have died, or his or her powers have ceased in the meantime, the order of revivor on both sides may be made within the period provided by this section or the period provided by § 16-62-107(b), whichever shall be longer.

History. Civil Code, § 562; C. & M. Dig., § 1066; Pope's Dig., § 1269; Acts 1963, No. 84, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1017.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1963, No. 84, § 5, provided:

“The provisions of this act shall apply in all cases where the death of a party or the cessation of his powers occurs after the effective date hereof.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

T.W. Brown, Recent Developments, The Arkansas “Revivor” Statute's One-Year Limitations Period Applies to Both the Substitution of a Personal Representative and the Substitution of the Actual Injured Party, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 347 (2013).

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies equally where there is no general administrator or executor as where there is one, because in such event the persons interested may have a revivor in the name of a special administrator. Anglin v. Cravens, 76 Ark. 122, 88 S.W. 833 (1905).

Construction With Other Laws.

This section is not superseded by Ark. R. Civ. P. 25, as the statute creates a special proceeding with a different procedure distinct from an ordinary civil action to which the court rules apply. Nix v. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr., 342 Ark. 650, 30 S.W.3d 746 (2000).

Intervention.

Where, in a suit to cancel a note and mortgage, one alleging purchase of same becomes a party, he is in effect an intervener, and, for purposes of a motion to revive the action, he is in effect a plaintiff. Gorham v. Hall, 172 Ark. 744, 290 S.W. 357 (1927).

Order.

An order of revivor may be made as soon as the court in which the action is pending convenes after the death of the plaintiff. Anglin v. Cravens, 76 Ark. 122, 88 S.W. 833 (1905).

Where, within one year after plaintiff's death, motion was made to revive case in name of executors and court ordered defendant to show cause why the cause should not be revived, and thereafter executors filed a substituted complaint and an amendment to their complaint, it was tantamount to an order of the court receiving the cause since until after the lapse of one year it was not necessary to require the defendants to show cause. Keffer v. Stuart, 127 Ark. 498, 193 S.W. 83 (1917).

Timeliness.

Order of revivor made within one year from first day the court in which the action was pending was in session following the death of plaintiff was held timely, and no notice to defendants was necessary. Heilig v. Haskins, 192 Ark. 311, 90 S.W.2d 986 (1936).

Where at the time of his death decedent had suit pending to have his rights determined in certain land and to have those rights enforced, failure of his heirs to have the suit revived within one year from the next session of court after his death barred any claim the heirs may have otherwise had in subsequent suit involving title to the property. Woolfolk v. Davis, 225 Ark. 722, 285 S.W.2d 321 (1955).

Where after death of plaintiff, suit in state court was not revived within the period prescribed by this section and state court action was dismissed, administrator of deceased plaintiff could not thereafter bring the same action in federal court. Robison v. Jones, 261 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1958).

One-year statute of limitations in this section was applicable to bar a suit brought by a special administrator of an estate when the administrator died during the litigation. Ark. R. Civ. P. 25 merely governed the procedure for substituting a party and did not operate to enlarge the time in which substitution could occur. Ausman v. Hiram Shaddox Geriatric Ctr., 2013 Ark. 66, 426 S.W.3d 379 (2013).

Circuit court properly dismissed an executor's lawsuit against the owners of a nursing home because the savings statute, § 16-56-126, did not apply to the facts of the case; the decedent passed away while her case was still pending, which abated the case, and it was nonsuited only after the case abated, and the executor had not timely moved for an order of substitution or commenced a new action within one year after decedent's death. Garrett v. Progressive Eldercare Servs. — Saline, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 201, 575 S.W.3d 426 (2019).

Waiver of Objection.

Although a substitute representative of an estate made no formal request for substitution as plaintiff within the one-year limitations period of this section, he defended motions to dismiss based on the original representative's disqualification and sought reconsideration of the dismissals; therefore, the defendants waived the issue of substitution. Taylor v. MCSA, LLC, 2013 Ark. 430, 430 S.W.3d 113 (2013).

Cited: Wilson v. Lincare, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 329, 288 S.W.3d 708 (2008).

16-62-109. Time for revivor — Effect of expiration.

When it appears to the court by affidavit that either party to an action has been dead, or, where he or she sues or is sued as a personal representative, that his or her powers have ceased for a period so long that the action cannot be revived in the names of his or her representatives or successor without the consent of both parties, it shall order the action to be stricken from the docket.

History. Civil Code, § 563; C. & M. Dig., § 1067; Pope's Dig., § 1270; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1018.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where the guardian of the wife's estate failed to timely obtain letters of administration within forty days of the wife's death, the guardian lost its authority to prosecute an action to contest her husband's will on her behalf when it failed to comply with § 28-65-323. The circuit court erred by deciding the case based on a failure to comply with § 16-62-109, which concerned time for revivor of a civil action and was inapplicable in this special proceeding. First Sec. Bank v. Estate of Leonard, 369 Ark. 213, 253 S.W.3d 434 (2007).

Dismissal.

Circuit court erred in striking and dismissing son's complaint as the circuit court order appointing son as special administrator for his deceased mother and ordering substitution of the parties pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 25 was sufficient to revive the mother's breach of contract and negligence action against the nursing home; the procedures in the reviver statute, §§ 16-62-101 to 16-62-111, were superseded by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1986 and no longer governed the procedure for obtaining an order of reviver and, thus, an order pursuant to the revivor statutes was unnecessary. Deaver v. Faucon Props., Inc., 367 Ark. 288, 239 S.W.3d 525 (2006).

One-year statute of limitations in § 16-62-108 was applicable to bar a suit brought by a special administrator of an estate when the administrator died during the litigation. Ark. R. Civ. P. 25 merely governed the procedure for substituting a party and did not operate to enlarge the time in which substitution could occur. Language in this section regarding a special administrator's powers ceasing for a period so long that the action cannot be revived further reinforced that the time limitation in § 16-62-108 applied, regardless of whether it was the injured party who died or a special administrator. Ausman v. Hiram Shaddox Geriatric Ctr., 2013 Ark. 66, 426 S.W.3d 379 (2013).

Waiver of Objection

Although a substitute representative of an estate made no formal request for substitution as plaintiff within the one-year limitations period of § 16-62-108, he defended motions to dismiss based on the original representative's disqualification and sought reconsideration of the dismissals; therefore, the defendants waived the issue of substitution. Taylor v. MCSA, LLC, 2013 Ark. 430, 430 S.W.3d 113 (2013).

Cited: Blum v. Pulaski County, 92 Ark. 101, 122 S.W. 109 (1909); Temple v. Culp, 105 Ark. 222, 150 S.W. 867 (1912); Dupree v. Smith, 150 Ark. 80, 233 S.W. 812 (1921); Robison v. Jones, 158 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

16-62-110. Failure of plaintiff's representatives to revive after notice — Motion to strike.

At any term of the court succeeding the death of the plaintiff, while the action remains on the docket, the defendant having given to the plaintiff's proper representatives, in whose names the action might be revived, ten (10) days' notice of the application therefor, may have an order to strike the action from the docket, and for costs against the estate of the plaintiff, unless the action is forthwith revived.

History. Civil Code, § 564; C. & M. Dig., § 1068; Pope's Dig., § 1271; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1019.

Case Notes

Cited: Keffer v. Stuart, 127 Ark. 498, 193 S.W. 83 (1917).

16-62-111. Trial not postponed by revivor.

When, by the provisions of § 16-62-110, an action stands revived, the trial thereof shall not be postponed by reason of the revivor, if the action would have stood for trial at the term the revivor is complete, had no death or cessation of powers taken place.

History. Civil Code, § 565; C. & M. Dig., § 1069; Pope's Dig., § 1272; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1020.

Chapter 63 Pleadings And Pretrial Proceedings

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules for Inferior Courts pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1949, No. 301, § 4: approved Mar. 19, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “This Act is necessary to insure orderly procedure in the circuit and chancery courts; and being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist; and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

16-63-101. Pretrial conferences.

  1. Actions taken at the conference, amendments allowed to the pleadings, rulings of the court, stipulations to be considered in evidence, and agreements made by the parties on any of the matters considered will be made a part of the record in the case.
  2. Objections may be made and exceptions saved at the time the order is made or when the action is called for trial unless the record entry is reached by agreement of all parties with full understanding of the subject matter agreed upon.
  3. For the purpose set out in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, if a pretrial conference is ordered by the court, it must be in the county where the cause is pending and after due and reasonable notice of the time and place is given to the litigants or their counsel.
  4. If the pretrial conference is conducted by agreement of the court and the litigants or their counsel, the pretrial conference may be held at any time and place in the judicial district which may be agreed upon.
  5. A defendant named in a complaint filed in any of the courts of this state who participates in a pretrial conference held pursuant to the provisions of this section or who avails himself or herself of any of the discovery procedures authorized under §§ 16-44-115 — 16-44-120 shall not thereby be deemed or held to have entered his or her general appearance in the cause, nor to have waived his or her right, otherwise existing, to object to the sufficiency of any process or the service thereof, or the jurisdiction of the court over his or her person, or to any defect in the venue as laid in the cause.

History. Acts 1949, No. 301, §§ 2, 3; 1957, No. 288, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2402, 27-2403, 28-361.

Case Notes

Cited: Reynolds v. Holmes, 232 Ark. 783, 340 S.W.2d 383 (1960).

16-63-102. Deposits in court.

    1. Whenever, in the exercise of its authority, a court has ordered the deposit or delivery of money or other thing and the order is disobeyed, the court, besides punishing the disobedience, may make an order requiring the sheriff to take the money or thing and deposit or deliver it in conformity with its directions.
      1. The court may direct the sheriff to keep safe any property delivered pursuant to the provisions of this section and may allow him or her the necessary expenses attending the property, to be paid by such party as the court shall direct, and taxed in the costs of the action.
      2. The court may confide to the sheriff money deposited or paid into court, which shall be kept by him or her under the same requirements and responsibilities of himself or herself and his or her sureties as are provided by this code in respect to money deposited in lieu of bail.
  1. A court sitting in a county in which, or in any county adjoining which, there is a bank or a branch of a bank, created by the laws of this state or the United States, transacting regular banking business, may order money paid into court to be deposited in that bank or branch to the credit of the court, in the action or proceeding in which the money was paid. Money so deposited shall be paid only upon the check of the clerk of the court annexed to its certified order for the payment and in favor of the person to whom the order directs the payment to be made.
  2. Money deposited or paid into the court in any action shall not be loaned out by the court unless it is with the consent of all the parties having an interest in or making claim to the money.

History. Civil Code, §§ 329-333; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1346-1350; Pope's Dig., §§ 1571-1575; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1602 — 27-1606.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section is the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in tables volume.

Case Notes

Liability of Clerk.

Unless the clerk is protected by an order of the court in depositing money which constitutes a fund in court in a bank, he does so at his peril, and will be responsible therefor on his official bond on failure of the bank. Martin v. Bogard, 176 Ark. 203, 2 S.W.2d 700 (1928).

Subchapter 2 — Pleadings

Cross References. Impeachment proceedings, pleadings, § 21-12-203.

Effective Dates. Acts 1855, § 13, p. 196: effective on passage.

Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1915, No. 290, § 24: June 1, 1915.

Acts 1935, No. 91, § 2: Mar. 2, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “The immediate operation of this act being necessary for the public peace, health, and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in full force immediately from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 204, § 2: Feb. 18, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that confusion now exists as to the discretion of the circuit and chancery courts of this State to allow assertion of counterclaim by way of amended pleadings and that an immediate clarification of the court's power is essential. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 286, § 5: Feb. 26, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that litigation of a frivolous nature by incarcerated persons is flooding the state court systems. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2011, No. 336, § 2: Mar. 18, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that complaints are often misconstrued with respect to the amount in controversy; that a plaintiff should be allowed to state with specificity the actual amount sought; that when a plaintiff pleads with particularity the amount in controversy the plaintiff should be bound by that pleading; and that this act is immediately necessary because the rules regarding pleading civil complaints should be implemented without undue delay due to current strain on judicial dockets. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-63-201, 16-63-202. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning pleadings, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § § 35[36], 36[37]. The sections were derived from:

16-63-201. Civil Code, § 105; C. & M. Dig., § 1183; Pope's Dig., § 1405; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1101.

16-63-202. Acts 1915, No. 290, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 1186; Pope's Dig., § 1408; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1104.

16-63-203. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning verification of pleadings, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 192. The section was derived from Civil Code §§ 136, 158, 159, 604, 792; Acts 1855, § 9, p. 196; 1873, No. 88, § 1 [792], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1216-1218, 1220, 1245, 1246, 9297; Acts 1935, No. 91, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 1439-1442, 1444, 1469, 1470, 11983; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1106 — 27-1112.

16-63-204, 16-63-205. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning answer by guardian of infant or insane person or by attorney for prisoner and counterclaim, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 37[38], 38[39]. The sections were derived from:

16-63-204. Civil Code, § 122; C. & M. Dig., § 1203; Pope's Dig., § 1425; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1122

16-63-205. Civil Code, § 118; C. & M. Dig., § 1196; Pope's Dig., § 1418; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1124

16-63-206. Setoffs.

  1. A setoff may be pleaded in any action for the recovery of money and may be a cause of action arising either upon contract or tort.
  2. In suits by executors or administrators, debts existing against their testators or intestates and owing to the defendant at the time of the death of the testator or intestate may be set off by the defendant in the same manner as if the action had been brought by and in the name of the deceased.
  3. Judgments, bills, bonds, notes, or other writings assigned to the defendant after suit has been commenced against him or her shall not be allowed to be set off against the demands of the plaintiff.
  4. When any plaintiff shall be indebted to a defendant in any bond, bill, note, contract, book account, or other liquidated demand and the defendant fails to set off the debt against the plaintiff's demand, the defendant shall be forever barred from recovering costs in any suit which he or she may thereafter institute upon any such bond, bill, note, contract, book account, or other liquidated demand.
  5. Where it appears that a new party is necessary to a final decision upon the setoff, the court shall permit the new party to be made, if it also appears that, owing to the insolvency or nonresidence of the plaintiff or other cause, the defendant will be in danger of losing his or her claim unless permitted to use it as a setoff.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 139, §§ 2, 3, 7; Civil Code, §§ 119, 120; Acts 1917, No. 267, § 2, p. 1441; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1197-1201; Pope's Dig., §§ 1419-1423; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1125 — 27-1129.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Seventeenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law — Civil Procedure, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 447.

Case Notes

Construction.

Subsection (a) has been liberally construed by the court so as to arrive at a true balance when mutual demands exist. Leonard v. Taylor, 183 Ark. 933, 39 S.W.2d 704 (1931).

Although §§ 16-56-102 and 16-65-603(a) permit judgments to be set off against each other, subsection (c) of this section prevents the setoff of judgments assigned to the defendant after suit has been commenced against him. Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637, 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

Sections 16-56-102 and 16-65-603(a) are provisions generally authorizing that a demand, right or course of action may be asserted by setoff and also permitting money judgments to be set off (having due regard to the legal and equitable rights of all persons interested in both judgments), while subsection (c) of this section is a specific provision governing the timeliness of setoffs, disallowing those judgments assigned to a defendant after the plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant; because these three provisions can be read in harmony, neither § 16-56-102 nor § 16-65-603(a) impliedly repeal subsection (c) of this section. Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637, 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

Applicability.

Subsection (d) had no application where the action was for goods furnished and the demand against plaintiff was in the nature of a claim for unliquidated damages. Milner v. Camden Lumber Co., 74 Ark. 224, 85 S.W. 234 (1905).

Subsection (b) has no application to person who was not the owner or holder of note which he seeks to use as setoff at time of decedent's death. Watkins v. Parker, 97 Ark. 492, 134 S.W. 1187 (1911).

This section is broad enough to include both setoff and recoupment, which is available as a defense to defendant regardless of whether plaintiff has filed bankruptcy or been discharged in bankruptcy. Walker v. First Com. Bank, 317 Ark. 617, 880 S.W.2d 316 (1994), dismissed, 333 Ark. 100, 969 S.W.2d 146 (1998).

Action Against State.

The state is entitled to a setoff against a warrant issued for construction work under a valid highway contract though the warrant had passed to an innocent purchaser, and the refunding board could not allow the warrant until it was determined by the highway audit commission or by a competent court what amount was due the claimant. Refunding Bd. v. State Hwy. Audit Comm'n, 189 Ark. 144, 70 S.W.2d 1027 (1934).

Action for Recovery of Money.

The damages in a cause of action for brokers' commissions are not unliquidated and unavailing as a setoff when there is no controversy over the price to be paid for the services. Burton v. Blytheville Realty Co., 108 Ark. 411, 158 S.W. 131 (1913) (decision prior to 1917 amendment).

A cause of action arising either upon contract or tort may form the subject matter of a counterclaim in any action for the recovery of money and this may be done in any case where liability could be asserted in an original action brought against the plaintiff. Any suit which the defendant could maintain as an independent cause of action is by this act made a proper subject matter for a counterclaim. Coats v. Milner, 134 Ark. 311, 203 S.W. 701 (1918).

Landowners could not set off against drainage assessments past-due bonds and coupons on the ground that setoffs were allowed before the drainage statute was effective, since a proceeding to collect the assessments was not an action for the recovery of money. State ex rel. Murphy v. Cherry, 188 Ark. 664, 67 S.W.2d 1024 (1934).

Notwithstanding this section, an action for the establishment of child support is not an action for the recovery of money, and thus it was error for the court to grant obligor parent a setoff against a child support award for a debt she paid. Chaisson v. Ragsdale, 323 Ark. 373, 914 S.W.2d 739 (1996).

Banks.

A depository in an insolvent bank is not entitled to have his deposit set off against his paper that had not matured at the time of the bank's insolvency. Steelman v. Atchley, 98 Ark. 294, 135 S.W. 902 (1911).

Where, after the death of intestate, his administratrix deposited funds in a bank to which intestate was indebted at the time of his death, the bank was not entitled to set off the deposit against the intestate. Cleveland County Bank v. Doster, 176 Ark. 1163, 5 S.W.2d 334 (1928).

The law of setoff as between an insolvent bank and its creditors applies only to concurrent liabilities on the date of its insolvency. Stokes v. Home Life Ins. Co., 187 Ark. 972, 63 S.W.2d 657 (1933).

Conversion.

In a Chapter 7 case, creditor converted proceeds from the sale of a vacuum unit because creditor acted as a broker in finding a buyer and creditor breached its fiduciary duty by failing to turn over the proceeds to debtor; setoff was not available because it was prohibited by Arkansas law, the debts were not mutual, and setoff was prohibited on equitable grounds since it would have violated the automatic stay. Nat'l Hydro-Vac Indus. Servs., L.L.C. v. Fed. Signal Corp. (In re Nat'l Hydro-Vac Indus. Servs., L.L.C.), 314 B.R. 753 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004).

Evidence.

Where a defendant sought to set off a note endorsed to him after the suit was commenced, it may be shown by parol evidence that the note was assigned before the suit was commenced, since the endorsement related back to that time. Loftin v. King, 185 Ark. 421, 47 S.W.2d 578 (1932).

Instructions.

In an action for assault, it was proper to instruct that if the damages to which the defendant was entitled on a counterclaim for slander equaled or exceeded the amount of damages which the plaintiff was entitled to recover on account of the assault the jury should find for the defendant. Collier v. Thompson, 180 Ark. 695, 22 S.W.2d 562 (1929).

Judgment.

A judgment may be used as a setoff against another judgment or claim founded on contract. Milner v. Camden Lumber Co., 74 Ark. 224, 85 S.W. 234 (1905).

Open Accounts.

The assignee of an open account takes subject to all rights of setoff then held by the debtor against the assignor. Jones v. Model Laundry, 180 Ark. 616, 22 S.W.2d 19 (1929).

Property.

The seller of goods cannot, after their delivery to the buyer, retake possession of them after death of buyer, and then, when sued for their value by the buyer's administrator, set off debts due the seller. Henderson Co. v. Webster, 178 Ark. 553, 11 S.W.2d 463 (1929).

One sued by an executor for wrongful conversion of property of the estate may not set off claim that he may have against the estate. Ouchita Valley Refining Co. v. Webster, 178 Ark. 845, 12 S.W.2d 779 (1929).

Remand.

A decree remanding a case with directions in accordance with the opinion, holding that the lower court erred in directing appropriation of the proceeds of the landlord's sale of the crop to tenant's debt for prior years because there was no lien on the crop to secure the indebtedness, was held not to prevent either party from stating an account or pleading any claim they may have. Henry v. Irby, 175 Ark. 614, 1 S.W.2d 49 (1927).

Statute of Nonclaim.

Person who acquired note after decedent's death could not set off note if barred by statute of nonclaim. Watkins v. Parker, 97 Ark. 492, 134 S.W. 1187 (1911).

A setoff or recoupment may be made under this section whether barred by the nonclaim statute or the general statute of limitations. Hill v. Barnes, 208 Ark. 432, 186 S.W.2d 675 (1945).

Cited: Morris v. City of Fort Smith, 224 Ark. 722, 276 S.W.2d 36 (1955); Easley v. Inglis, 233 Ark. 589, 346 S.W.2d 206 (1961).

16-63-207. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning libel and slander, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 39[40]. The section was derived from Civil Code, §§ 143, 144; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1228, 1229; Pope's Dig., §§ 1452, 1453; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1148, 27-1149.

16-63-208. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. This section was held to be superseded by ARCP 8 in Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Kesterson, 288 Ark. 611, 708 S.W.2d 606 (1986); Griffin-Payne, Inc. v. Union Bank, 289 Ark. 182, 710 S.W.2d 201 (1986). Section 16-63-208 was derived from Civil Code, § 149; C. & M. Dig., § 1233; Pope's Dig., § 1457; Acts 1983, No. 391, § 1; and A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1142.

16-63-209, 16-63-210. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning instrument for payment of money only and actions for recovery of real property, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 40[41], 41[42]. The sections were derived from:

16-63-209. Civil Code, § 138; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [138], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 1222; Pope's Dig., § 1446; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1143.

16-63-210. Civil Code, § 145; C. & M. Dig., § 1230; Pope's Dig., § 1454; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1145.

16-63-211. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning filing of deeds, etc., with pleadings, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 148; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [148], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 1223; Pope's Dig., § 1447; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1144.

16-63-212 — 16-63-214. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning presumptions and matters of judicial notice, irrelevant or redundant matter, and variance between pleading and proof, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 42[43] — 44[45]. The sections were derived from:

16-63-212. Civil Code, § 137; C. & M. Dig., § 1221; Pope's Dig., § 1445; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1141.

16-63-213. Civil Code, § 140; C. & M. Dig., § 1225; Pope's Dig., § 1449; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1154.

16-63-214. Civil Code, §§ 150-152; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1234-1236; Pope's Dig., §§ 1458-1460; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1155 — 27-1157.

16-63-215. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning the court's authority with respect to pleadings, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 155; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1239-1242; Pope's Dig., §§ 1463-1466; Acts 1975, No. 204, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1160.

16-63-216, 16-63-217. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning constructive service and deposition, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 45[46], 46[47]. The sections were derived from:

16-63-216. Civil Code, § 444; C. & M. Dig., § 6260; Pope's Dig., § 8216; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1153.

16-63-217. Acts 1915, No. 290, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 1186; Pope's Dig., § 1408; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1104.

16-63-218. Original papers not removed.

No original pleading, motion, or deposition shall be permitted to be taken from the office of the clerk of the court unless by the order of the court or judge in each specific instance, but all original papers shall remain in the office subject to the inspection of all interested persons and their attorneys.

History. Acts 1915, No. 290, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 1186; Pope's Dig., § 1408; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1104.

Case Notes

Removal of Papers.

It is not error for an attorney to remove the papers for the purpose of mailing them to the chancellor. Gregory v. Rubel, 184 Ark. 55, 41 S.W.2d 771 (1931).

16-63-219. Fee for discovery of medical records.

A party in a civil action who seeks discovery of medical records from a physician or a hospital may be required by the court to pay the person from whom discovery is sought a reasonable fee for processing the records. The fee for processing the records shall not be limited to the expense of copying the records.

History. Acts 1987, No. 359, § 1.

16-63-220. Reply to action brought by prisoner.

      1. Any defendant may waive the right to reply to any action brought by an incarcerated person, defined for purposes of this section as a person who has been convicted of a crime and is incarcerated for that crime or is being held in custody for trial or sentencing, under Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other federal law or state law.
      2. Notwithstanding any other law or rule of procedure, such waiver shall not constitute an admission of the allegations contained in the complaint.
    1. No relief shall be granted to the plaintiff unless a reply has been filed.
  1. The court may require any defendant to reply to a complaint brought under this section if it finds that the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits.

History. Acts 1997, No. 286, § 1.

16-63-221. Complaint — Amount in controversy.

  1. A plaintiff who files a complaint in a circuit or district court praying for an award of damages may, but is not required to, state an amount in controversy for the purposes of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and determining if the amount sought is within the jurisdictional limits of the court.
  2. A declaration allowed by subsection (a) of this section is binding on the plaintiff with respect to the amount in controversy unless the plaintiff subsequently amends the complaint to pray for damages in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the court, at which time the amendment is governed by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Acts 2011, No. 336, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Joinder

16-63-301. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning misjoinder, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 47[48]. The section was derived from Civil Code, §§ 103, 104; C. & M. Dig. §§ 1078, 1079; Pope's Dig., §§ 1286, 1287; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1302, 27-1303.

16-63-302. Failure to join actions — Costs.

When any plaintiff brings in the same court several suits against the same defendant or defendants for causes of action that may be joined, the plaintiff shall recover only the costs of one (1) action. The costs of the other actions shall be adjudged against him or her unless sufficient reason appears to the court for bringing several actions.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 116, § 133; C. & M. Dig., § 1082; Pope's Dig., § 1290; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1306.

Subchapter 4 — Continuance or Dismissal

Cross References. Continuance in justice of peace courts, § 16-19-603.

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1887, No. 18, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1981, No. 312, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 5, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this Act is necessary to clarify the authority granted by the legislative branch of government to the judicial branch of government, and that this Act is in keeping with the separation of powers provision of Section 2 of Article 4 of the Arkansas Constitution, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 1354, § 51: Apr. 14, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act affects the method of selection of alternate members of the Legislative Council and Legislative Joint Auditing Committee and that this act is immediately necessary for proper continuity and efficiency in State government. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Continuance conditioned on applicants' payment of costs incurred by other party. 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.

C.J.S. 17 C.J.S., Continuances, § 1 et seq.

16-63-401. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning continuance after amendment, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 48[49]. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 157; C. & M. Dig., § 1244; Pope's Dig., § 1468; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1402.

16-63-402. Continuance for absence of evidence or witness.

  1. A motion to postpone a trial on account of the absence of evidence shall, if required by the opposite party, be made only upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained and that due diligence has been used to obtain it. If the motion is for an absent witness, the affidavit must show what facts the affiant believes the witness will prove and not merely show the effect of the facts in evidence, that the affiant believes them to be true, and that the witness is not absent by the consent, connivance, or procurement of the party asking the postponement.
  2. If thereupon the adverse party will admit that on trial the absent witness, if present, would testify to the statement contained in the application for a continuance, then the trial shall not be postponed for that cause. However, the opposite party may controvert the statement so set forth in the motion for continuance by evidence.

History. Civil Code, § 340; Acts 1879, No. 26, § 1, p. 26; 1887, No. 18, § 1, p. 19; C. & M. Dig., § 1270; Pope's Dig., § 1494; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1403.

Case Notes

Absent Witness.

Affidavit and motion insufficient to warrant continuance for absent witness. Richie v. State, 85 Ark. 413, 108 S.W. 511, 1908 Ark. LEXIS 545 (1908); Nix v. State, 124 Ark. 599, 187 S.W. 308 (1916); State ex rel. Greene County Bar Ass'n v. Huddleston, 173 Ark. 686, 293 S.W. 353 (1927); Estes v. State, 180 Ark. 656, 22 S.W.2d 172 (1929); Weaver v. State, 185 Ark. 147, 46 S.W.2d 37 (1932); Meyers v. State, 185 Ark. 892, 50 S.W.2d 234 (1932); Huddleston v. State, 186 Ark. 1197, 53 S.W.2d 1 (1933); Lynch v. State, 188 Ark. 831, 67 S.W.2d 1011 (1934); Shank v. State, 189 Ark. 243, 72 S.W.2d 519 (1934); Cathey v. State, 194 Ark. 1074, 110 S.W.2d 17 (1937); Carter v. State, 196 Ark. 746, 119 S.W.2d 913 (1938); Morgan v. Austin, 206 Ark. 235, 174 S.W.2d 562 (1943); Bryant v. State, 208 Ark. 192, 185 S.W.2d 280, 1945 Ark. LEXIS 390 (1945).

A motion which shows that the affiant has not been able to communicate with the witness and therefore did not know what she would testify is insufficient. State Life Ins. Co. v. Ford, 101 Ark. 513, 142 S.W. 863 (1912).

Where defendant moved for continuance in order to procure depositions or attendance of absent witnesses, the acts of diligence used in procuring the testimony should have been set forth in the motion. Lee v. State, 145 Ark. 75, 223 S.W. 373 (1920).

Motion for continuance on account of absence of witness beyond jurisdiction of court should show how attendance of witness could be had at next term of court. Freeman v. State, 150 Ark. 387, 234 S.W. 267 (1921).

A motion for continuance based on the absence of some particular witness must, to be sufficient, state that the witness is not absent by the consent, connivance, or procurement of the moving party. Davis v. State, 155 Ark. 245, 244 S.W. 750 (1922)Questioned byAllison v. State, 204 Ark. 609, 164 S.W.2d 442 (1942).

Because defendant had not located a witness to testify by time of trial and was basically requesting an open-ended continuance to search for some unnamed witness which he might not be able to afford, and because defendant waited until after the trial was in progress to move for a continuance and then filed no affidavit to establish the materiality of the anticipated evidence, trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. Hill v. State, 321 Ark. 354, 902 S.W.2d 229 (1995).

—Admission by Adverse Party.

It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse a continuance for an absent witness where the adverse party admitted that the witness, if present, would testify as stated in the application for continuance. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Copeland, 184 Ark. 648, 43 S.W.2d 65 (1931); Ozan Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward, 188 Ark. 557, 66 S.W.2d 1074 (1934).

This section held not applicable where plaintiffs admitted that witness, if present, would testify to statement contained in motion for continuance made by one defendant, but other defendants objected to statement and upon its introduction stated in open court they did not believe the witness would so testify. Clift v. Jordan, 205 Ark. 245, 168 S.W.2d 403 (1943).

In action to recover value of crop, refusal to grant plaintiff's motion for continuance was held not to show abuse of wide discretion resting in trial judge. Morgan v. Austin, 206 Ark. 235, 174 S.W.2d 562 (1943).

—Affidavits.

Statement of facts which are expected to be proved by absent witness cannot be contradicted by counter affidavits or other testimony for purpose of defeating a motion for continuance. Lane v. State, 67 Ark. 290, 54 S.W. 870 (1899).

A motion for continuance because of the absence of a certain witness was properly overruled where it was not accompanied by the required affidavit. Smith v. State, 181 Ark. 592, 26 S.W.2d 899, 1930 Ark. LEXIS 170 (1930); Brooks v. State, 308 Ark. 660, 827 S.W.2d 119 (1992); Dansby v. State, 319 Ark. 506, 893 S.W.2d 331 (1995).

In order to obtain a continuance because of the absence of a witness, it is necessary that the movant support his motion by an affidavit stating what facts affiant believes the witness will prove and not merely the effect of the facts in evidence. Venable v. State, 260 Ark. 201, 538 S.W.2d 286 (1976).

Where no affidavit accompanied defendant's motion for a continuance due to an absent witness, the motion was properly denied. King v. State, 314 Ark. 205, 862 S.W.2d 229 (1993); Marshall v. State, 316 Ark. 753, 875 S.W.2d 814 (1994).

This section requires the presence of an affidavit in order to justify a continuance due to a missing witness. Cloird v. State, 314 Ark. 296, 862 S.W.2d 211 (1993).

The courts have required that the movant for a continuance show by affidavit the likelihood of procuring the absent witnesses. Landreth v. State, 331 Ark. 12, 960 S.W.2d 434 (1998).

In an attempted capital murder case, the court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a continuance where, by omitting the affidavit, defendant failed to show his diligence in attempting to locate the two missing witnesses; further, without the expected testimony of the missing witnesses and those witnesses that he had not yet hired, defendant could not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. Clark v. State, 358 Ark. 469, 192 S.W.3d 248 (2004).

Appellate Review.

A trial court's denial of motion for a continuance will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion, and the defendant has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. State, 316 Ark. 753, 875 S.W.2d 814 (1994).

Criminal Cases.

This section is void insofar as it will deny a person accused of a crime the use of process to bring witnesses before the court in criminal prosecutions. Graham v. State, 50 Ark. 161, 6 S.W. 721 (1887).

In criminal cases, continuances rest within the sound discretion of the court, and an abuse of that discretion must be shown. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934).

An accused is entitled to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses and this means the right to a delay until witnesses may be had at the trial, when they are within the jurisdiction of the court, in all cases wherein the authority and power of the court has been properly invoked. Carter v. State, 196 Ark. 746, 119 S.W.2d 913 (1938).

Specific method provided by this section must be followed substantially by one who would invoke the power and authority of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses. Carter v. State, 196 Ark. 746, 119 S.W.2d 913 (1938).

A person is not entitled to an indefinite continuance simply because a potential witness cannot be located; the elements of the diligence of the defense and the cooperation, or lack of it, on the part of the state are highly relevant in such cases, as is the likelihood of the movant ever procuring the witness. Doles v. State, 280 Ark. 299, 657 S.W.2d 538 (1983).

In murder prosecution, defendant was not entitled to indefinite continuance nor to have state admit veracity of hearsay statement of unavailable witness, where the state had tried and failed to locate the witness and there was no basis for believing that she would ever be located. Doles v. State, 280 Ark. 299, 657 S.W.2d 538 (1983).

Where a party has missing witnesses or other absence of evidence, and moves for a continuance pursuant to ARCrP 27.3, the filing of an affidavit by the movant is required under subsection (a) of this section. Wilson v. State, 320 Ark. 142, 895 S.W.2d 524 (1995).

Where state objected to continuance at trial, and defendant filed no affidavits in support of his motion, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for continuance. Griffin v. State, 322 Ark. 206, 909 S.W.2d 625 (1995); Travis v. State, 328 Ark. 442, 944 S.W.2d 96 (1997).

Trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion in granting the State of Arkansas a continuance when the alleged rape victim did not appear at defendant’s trial because the State then had time to secure the only witness who could have provided evidence sufficient to convict defendant. Had the continuance not been granted, the charge against defendant likely would have otherwise been dropped. Hudson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 253 (2014).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's request for a continuance in a prosecution for residential burglary and theft. The State learned of the second crowbar found at a material witness's residence the Friday before filing its motion on Monday, the State had scheduled that witness's deposition and asked only for a two-day continuance, and defendant asserted below only the issue of the State's diligence and failed to prove he was prejudiced by the continuance; even without the witness's testimony, the link between the crowbar, defendant, and the victims' home was established. Andruszczak v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 183, 518 S.W.3d 114 (2017).

Discretion.

The granting or refusing of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Robbins, 70 Ark. 364, 67 S.W. 758 (1902); Missouri P.R.R. v. Berry, 191 Ark. 1165, 83 S.W.2d 531 (1936).

No abuse of court's discretion found in denying motion for continuance. Brickey v. State, 148 Ark. 595, 231 S.W. 549 (1921); Leach v. State, 229 Ark. 802, 318 S.W.2d 617 (1958).

The granting of a continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial court which will not be reversed unless the action is plainly erroneous or is a clear abuse of discretion. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. McGill Bros. Rice Mill, 185 Ark. 108, 46 S.W.2d 651 (1932); Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, 370 S.W.2d 613 (1963); Andrews v. Lauener, 229 Ark. 894, 318 S.W.2d 805 (1958); Wallace v. Hamilton, 238 Ark. 406, 382 S.W.2d 363 (1964); Thacker v. State, 253 Ark. 864, 489 S.W.2d 500 (1973); Conway v. State, 256 Ark. 131, 505 S.W.2d 758 (1974); Derrick v. State, 259 Ark. 316, 532 S.W.2d 431 (1976); Kelley v. State, 261 Ark. 31, 545 S.W.2d 919 (1977); Johnson v. State, 287 Ark. 426, 700 S.W.2d 786, 1985 Ark. LEXIS 2300 (1985).

The denial of a continuance when the motion is not in substantial compliance with this section is not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Cloird v. State, 314 Ark. 296, 862 S.W.2d 211 (1993); Wilson v. State, 320 Ark. 142, 895 S.W.2d 524 (1995).

The factors to consider in exercising discretion over a continuance motion are the diligence of the movant, the probable effect of the testimony at trial, the likelihood of procuring the attendance of the witness in the event of a postponement, and the filing of an affidavit, stating not only what facts the witness would prove, but also that the appellant believes them to be true. Cloird v. State, 314 Ark. 296, 862 S.W.2d 211 (1993).

The burden is on the appellant to establish prejudice and abuse of discretion in the denial of a continuance. Cloird v. State, 314 Ark. 296, 862 S.W.2d 211 (1993).

On review, the alleged failure of defendant to file an affidavit regarding the testimony of a witness defendant sought to have testify at his trial was not addressed because the prosecutor did not object before the trial court that defendant failed to file the requisite affidavit; however, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance because defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from the denial. Stenhouse v. State, 362 Ark. 480, 209 S.W.3d 352 (2005).

Evidence.

On motion for continuance, testimony may be heard for purpose of showing a want of diligence in procuring testimony of absent witness, or want of good faith in making application, or an improbability that proposed testimony can be obtained. Lane v. State, 67 Ark. 290, 54 S.W. 870 (1899).

A continuance cannot be granted on an affidavit of counsel as to what his client told him. Morgan v. Austin, 206 Ark. 235, 174 S.W.2d 562 (1943).

Because the jury had before it ample evidence that the victim previously made claims of sexual abuse that no one believed, defendant was not prejudiced during his trial for sexual assault by the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, to provide an investigator who could testify as to the victim's inconsistencies and untruths. Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 341, 288 S.W.3d 226 (2008).

Factors to Be Considered.

Besides compliance with the statutory requirement of an affidavit, the court should consider several other factors in determining whether a continuance should be granted. Among these are the diligence of the movant in obtaining witnesses, the probable effect of the testimony at trial, and the likelihood of procuring the attendance of the witness in the event of a postponement. David v. State, 295 Ark. 131, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988).

In exercising its discretion concerning a request for a continuance to obtain the presence of a witness, the trial court should consider the following factors: (1) the diligence of the movant, (2) the probable effect of the testimony at trial, (3) the likelihood of procuring the attendance of the witness in the event of a postponement, and (4) the filing of an affidavit, stating not only what facts the witness would prove, but also that the movant believes them to be true. Butler v. State, 303 Ark. 380, 797 S.W.2d 435 (1990).

Continuance denied even though psychiatric report had not been filed in strict compliance with former § 5-2-305(d) (see now §§ 5-2-327, 5-2-328) where defendant failed to show any prejudice. Turner v. State, 326 Ark. 115, 931 S.W.2d 86 (1996).

Grounds.

This section does not require that a motion for continuance be reduced to writing and supported by affidavits, unless the opposite party demands it; but, if a motion on the grounds of surprise is overruled, the party complaining should set forth the facts constituting the surprise. Venable v. State, 177 Ark. 91, 5 S.W.2d 716 (1928).

Before the appellants would be entitled to a continuance because of the filing of a cross-complaint, it would be necessary for them to show that they had been misled to their prejudice and in what respect they had been misled. Williams v. Bullington, 195 Ark. 253, 111 S.W.2d 507 (1937).

Noncompliance.

Procedure required by this section held not followed. Malone v. State, 292 Ark. 243, 729 S.W.2d 167 (1987); Johnson v. State, 305 Ark. 580, 810 S.W.2d 44 (1991).

The denial of a motion which is not in substantial compliance with the statute is not an abuse of discretion. Butler v. State, 303 Ark. 380, 797 S.W.2d 435 (1990).

As the state did not object to a continuance, appellant's failure to submit an affidavit is not fatal under this section. Rankin v. State, 57 Ark. App. 125, 942 S.W.2d 867 (1997).

Objection.

A party not objecting to a ruling granting a continuance is estopped from objecting on appeal to the form of the motion. Drown v. White River Levee Dist., 181 Ark. 629, 27 S.W.2d 793 (1930).

Subsection (a) mandates an affidavit to justify a continuance due to a missing witness when the state objects to the continuance. Wilson v. State, 320 Ark. 142, 895 S.W.2d 524 (1995).

Reviewability.

Revocation of defendant's suspended imposition of sentence was appropriate because he never argued to the trial court that the state had not filed an affidavit in accordance with subsection (a) of this section. In the absence of an objection at trial, any argument concerning the failure to submit such an affidavit would not be addressed on appeal. Dotson v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 731 (2011).

Time for Filing.

A motion for a continuance by a defendant should not be made before filing answer. Winter v. Bandel, 30 Ark. 362 (1875).

Court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a continuance to procure expert testimony where defendant waited until two days before the trial when he had had five months in which to obtain an expert. Cherry v. State, 347 Ark. 606, 66 S.W.3d 605 (2002).

Cited: Copeland v. State, 226 Ark. 198, 289 S.W.2d 524 (1956); Worley v. State, 259 Ark. 433, 533 S.W.2d 502 (1976); Jones v. State, 20 Ark. App. 1, 722 S.W.2d 871 (1987); Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996).

16-63-403. No continuance until costs paid.

No order of continuance takes effect until the plaintiff or, if the continuance has been granted upon the motion of the defendant, the defendant has made or secured the payment of all costs of the action, due for the term in which the continuance is granted.

History. Civil Code, § 775; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [775], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 1272; Pope's Dig., § 1496; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1404.

16-63-404. Dismissal in vacation.

The plaintiff or his or her attorney may dismiss any suit, except actions of replevin, pending in any of the courts of this state, in vacation, in the office of the clerk on the payment of all costs that may have accrued therein.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 116, § 134; C. & M. Dig., § 1262; Pope's Dig., § 1486; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1406.

Case Notes

Appealability.

Since motion to dismiss with prejudice filed by the plaintiff did not constitute a cross-complaint, reviewing court affirmed the order of the chancellor who concluded that there was no appealable order of the court. Lewis v. Brown, 232 Ark. 983, 341 S.W.2d 772 (1961).

Consent Decree.

Consent decree purporting to dismiss action but also including matters of importance in addition to the direction of dismissal of the action cannot be entered in vacation. Parker v. Frierson, 124 Ark. 238, 187 S.W. 162 (1916).

Foreign Corporation.

A foreign corporation which had not complied with the laws of this state brought an action against the appellee. It was held that the corporation could dismiss its action in vacation and then after complying with the state laws bring another action upon the same grounds. J.R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Horne, 133 Ark. 570, 203 S.W. 24 (1918).

Judgment or Decree.

This section does not provide for the dismissal of a judgment or decree in vacation. Shuman v. Irby, 201 Ark. 907, 147 S.W.2d 358 (1941).

Where court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties entered a decree awarding maintenance to wife and children, an attempted dismissal by the wife in vacation was ineffectual in depriving the court of jurisdiction of husband's motion to modify the decree. Shuman v. Irby, 201 Ark. 907, 147 S.W.2d 358 (1941).

Nonsuit.

A nonsuit taken before a clerk in vacation, on payment of costs, is authorized by the statute. State Bank v. Gray, 12 Ark. 760 (1852); Lyons v. Green, 68 Ark. 205, 56 S.W. 1075 (1900); Glenn v. Porter, 68 Ark. 320, 57 S.W. 1109 (1900).

Since prior to the submission of a cause to the court, a party had the absolute right to nonsuit his partition plea, by filing and subsequently nonsuiting his partition plea, plaintiff did not waive his right nor was he estopped to raise the homestead exemption under § 18-60-401. Pascall v. Smith, 267 Ark. 66, 588 S.W.2d 700 (1979).

Replevin.

Dismissal of replevin action in vacation by notation on record following delivery of property to plaintiff on failure of defendant to file bond was without legal authority; hence trial court erred in refusing to reinstate replevin action. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Mackay, 221 Ark. 226, 252 S.W.2d 819 (1952).

Right to Dismiss.

The plaintiff may dismiss at any time when the court is not in session. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Ingram, 118 Ark. 377, 176 S.W. 692 (1915).

The right to dismiss an action rests only with the plaintiff and a plaintiff is one who has and asserts a cause of action against another. Walton v. Rucker, 193 Ark. 40, 97 S.W.2d 442 (1936).

Plaintiff has the right to dismiss any suit he has brought by application either to the court or to the clerk in vacation. Norton v. Hutchins, 196 Ark. 856, 120 S.W.2d 358 (1938).

A plaintiff has the right to dismiss his complaint but he has no right to dismiss a defendant's cross-complaint. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 226 Ark. 192, 289 S.W.2d 190 (1956).

The plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss his case at any time before final submission to the court. Lewis v. Brown, 232 Ark. 983, 341 S.W.2d 772 (1961).

Court properly dismissed action. Lewis v. Brown, 232 Ark. 983, 341 S.W.2d 772 (1961).

Before any defense pleadings were filed the petitioner for habeas corpus proceedings had the right to dismiss his petition under this section. Austin v. Austin, 241 Ark. 634, 409 S.W.2d 833 (1966).

Substantial Compliance.

Action of plaintiff's counsel to dismiss pending action and payment of all the costs was held to amount to a dismissal of the action as authorized by this section. Missouri P.R.R. v. Haigler, 203 Ark. 804, 158 S.W.2d 703 (1942).

16-63-405. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning proceedings on setoff or counterclaim where plaintiff's action is dismissed, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 403; C.& M. Dig., § 6236; Pope's Dig., § 8192; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1407.

16-63-406. Stay of proceedings in which party or attorney is a member or an employee of the General Assembly.

    1. Any and all proceedings in suits pending in any of the courts of this state in which any attorney for either party to any suit is the Lieutenant Governor or a member of the Senate or the House of Representatives, or is a clerk or sergeant at arms or a doorkeeper of either branch of the General Assembly, and any and all proceedings and suits pending in any of the courts of this state in which the Lieutenant Governor or any member of the General Assembly or clerk or sergeant at arms or doorkeeper of either branch of the General Assembly is a party, shall be stayed for not less than fifteen (15) days preceding the convening of the General Assembly and for thirty (30) days after its adjournment, sine die, unless otherwise requested by any interested member of the General Assembly or interested officer or employee of the General Assembly.
    2. The motion for a continuance need not be reduced to writing.
    3. It is not necessary that notice be afforded to opposing counsel that a continuance is sought.
  1. Any and all proceedings and suits pending in any of the courts in this state in which any attorney for either party to any suit is a member of the Legislative Council, the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee, or any interim committee of the General Assembly shall be stayed or reset if scheduled if the proceeding or hearing has been scheduled on the day immediately prior to, the day immediately after, or the day upon which the Legislative Council, Legislative Joint Auditing Committee, or any interim committee is meeting if the attorney is a member, or an alternate member attending in the place of a regular member, of the committee which is meeting and the attorney requests the continuance of the court no less than three (3) days before the proceeding is to commence.
  2. The term “adjournment sine die” as used in this section shall mean the adjournment without the establishment of a day certain for reconvening.
  3. The provisions of this section shall be applicable in the case of special or extraordinary sessions of the General Assembly, as well as regular sessions.

History. Acts 1981, No. 312, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1401.1; Acts 1997, No. 1354, § 35.

Cross References. Administrative hearings, § 25-15-103.

Case Notes

Continuance Granted.

Court granted attorney's motion for an extension of time of 45 days after the legislature adjourns in which to file an appellate brief. Wilson v. Neal, 327 Ark. 783, 939 S.W.2d 312 (1997).

16-63-407. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning striking causes of action, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 49[50]. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 102; C. & M. Dig., § 1077; Pope's Dig., § 1285; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1408.

Subchapter 5 — Citizen Participation in Government Act

16-63-501. Title.

This subchapter shall be known as and may be cited as the “Citizen Participation in Government Act”.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1843, § 1.

Research References

ALR.

Application of Anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) Statutes to Real Estate Development, Land Use, and Zoning Disputes. 64 A.L.R.6th 365.

Application of Anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) Statutes to Invasion of Privacy Claim. 85 A.L.R.6th 475.

16-63-502. Legislative findings.

The General Assembly finds and declares that:

  1. It is in the public interest to encourage participation by the citizens of the State of Arkansas in matters of public significance through the exercise of their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and the right to petition government for a redress of grievances;
  2. The valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and the right to petition government for a redress of grievances should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process;
  3. The threat of a civil action for damages in the form of a strategic lawsuit against political participation and the possibility of considerable legal costs can act as a deterrent to citizens who wish to report information to federal, state, or local agencies; and
  4. Strategic lawsuits against political participation can effectively punish concerned citizens for exercising the constitutional right to speak and petition the government for a redress of grievances.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1843, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Have I Been SLAPPed? Arkansas's Attempt to Curb Abusive Litigation: The Citizen Participation in Government Act, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 507.

16-63-503. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “An act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of grievances under the United States Constitution or the Arkansas Constitution in connection with an issue of public interest or concern” includes, but is not limited to, any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made:
    1. Before or to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or other proceeding authorized by a state, regional, county, or municipal government; or
    2. In connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or other body authorized by a state, regional, county, or municipal government; and
    1. “Privileged communication” means a communication made:
      1. In, to, or about an issue of public concern related to any legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or other proceeding authorized by a state, regional, county, or municipal government;
      2. In the proper discharge of an official duty; and
      3. By a fair and true report of any legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or other proceeding authorized by a state, regional, county, or municipal government, or anything said in the course of the proceeding.
    2. “Privileged communication” also includes:
      1. All expressions of opinion or criticisms in regard to any legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or other proceeding authorized by a state, regional, county, or municipal government; and
      2. All criticisms of the official acts of any and all public officers.
    3. “Privileged communication” does not include a statement or report made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1843, § 1.

16-63-504. Immunity from suit.

Any person making a privileged communication or performing an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of grievances under the United States Constitution or the Arkansas Constitution in connection with an issue of public interest or concern shall be immune from civil liability, unless a statement or report was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1843, § 1.

Research References

ALR.

Application of Anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) Statutes to Real Estate Development, Land Use, and Zoning Disputes. 64 A.L.R.6th 365.

Application of Anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) Statutes to Invasion of Privacy Claim. 85 A.L.R.6th 475.

16-63-505. Verification requirement.

For any claim asserted against a person or entity arising from possible privileged communication or an act by that person or entity that could reasonably be construed as an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of grievances under the United States Constitution or the Arkansas Constitution in connection with an issue of public interest or concern, the party asserting the claim and the party's attorney of record, if any, shall be required to file contemporaneously with the pleading containing the claim a written verification under oath certifying that:

  1. The party and his or her attorney of record, if any, have read the claim;
  2. To the best of the knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry of the party or his or her attorney, the claim is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
  3. The act forming the basis for the claim is not a privileged communication; and
  4. The claim is not asserted for any improper purpose such as to suppress the right of free speech or right to petition government of a person or entity, to harass, or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1843, § 1.

16-63-506. Failure to properly verify.

  1. If a claim governed by § 16-63-505 is not verified as required by § 16-63-505, the claim shall be stricken unless it is verified within ten (10) days after the omission is called to the attention of the party asserting the claim or his or her attorney of record.
    1. If a claim is verified in violation of § 16-63-505, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the persons who signed the verification, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include dismissal of the claim and an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
    2. Other compensatory damages may be recovered only upon the demonstration that the claim was commenced or continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or maliciously inhibiting a person or entity from making a privileged communication or performing an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of grievances under the United States Constitution or the Arkansas Constitution in connection with an issue of public interest or concern.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1843, § 1.

16-63-507. Procedure.

    1. All discovery and any pending hearings or motions in an action for a claim governed by § 16-63-505 shall be stayed upon the filing of a motion to dismiss or a motion to strike under § 16-63-506.
    2. A hearing on a motion filed under § 16-63-506 shall be conducted not more than thirty (30) days after service unless emergency matters before the court require a later hearing.
  1. The court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery or other hearings or motions be conducted notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1843, § 1.

16-63-508. Other recovery not precluded.

Nothing in this subchapter shall affect or preclude the right of any party to any recovery otherwise authorized by common law, statute, or rule.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1843, § 1.

Chapter 64 Trial And Verdict

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rules for Inferior Courts pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 92, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 125, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1915, No. 290, § 24: June 1, 1915.

Acts 1945, No. 196, § 3: approved Mar. 6, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “It is found that there is some confusion at present in the procedure necessary to properly present stipulations of fact and other papers filed in a cause of action in order to obtain a review by the appellate courts on the merits of the controversy and unless such procedure is immediately clarified there is imminent danger of litigants losing substantial rights on account of technical objections to the preparation and presentation of the record in the trial of the cause. An emergency is therefore declared and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 460, § 6: approved Mar. 28, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “It has been ascertained and declared that in tort cases where the defendant has either failed to answer or has answered and failed to appear and defend, and in such cases, it is necessary for the court to empanel a jury to try the sole issue of damages. This requirement has caused great delay in the trial of lawsuits, and in addition, has increased the expense unnecessarily, so that there is immediate need for legislation to eliminate the unnecessary expense. It is, therefore, ascertained that an emergency exists and this Act being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 139, § 9: approved Feb. 23, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It is found that there is great confusion at present in the procedure necessary to properly preserve and present evidence on appeal from the chancery courts, and that such procedure is now governed by special acts applicable to the several chancery districts within the State which are wholly dissimilar, making it necessary to follow a separate procedure in each of the respective chancery districts in order to obtain a review by the appellate court on the merits of the controversy, and unless such procedure is immediately clarified and made uniform there is imminent danger of litigants losing substantial rights on account of technical objections to the preparation and presentation of the record in the trial of the cause. An emergency is, therefore, declared and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1979, No. 664, § 5: Mar. 30, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Second General Assembly that there is an immediate need to provide qualified interpreters for deaf persons at administrative, civil and criminal proceedings and that this Act is immediately necessary to accomplish the same. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 469, § 7: Mar. 12, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an immediate need to protect the confidentiality of privileged communications between qualified interpreters for deaf and hearing-impaired persons occurring at administrative, civil and criminal proceedings and that this act is immediately necessary. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Disqualification, for bias, of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Manner or extent of examination of witnesses by trial judge. 6 A.L.R.4th 951.

Authority of state court to order jury trial in civil case where jury has been waived or not demanded by parties. 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Stipulation or waiver in state civil case, to accept verdict by number or proportion of jurors less than that constitutionally permitted. 15 A.L.R.4th 213.

Attorneys: communication with jurors after trial. 19 A.L.R.4th 1209.

Waiver or loss of right to disqualify judge by participation in proceedings. 24 A.L.R.4th 870; 27 A.L.R.4th 597.

Disqualification of judge because of assault or threat against him by party or person associated with party. 25 A.L.R.4th 923.

Impeachment of verdict by juror's evidence that he was coerced or intimidated by fellow juror. 39 A.L.R.4th 800.

Inconsistency of verdicts on separate theories of negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability. 41 A.L.R.4th 9.

Am. Jur. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 88 C.J.S., Trial, § 1 et seq.

Case Notes

Cited: Melton v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co, 99 Ark. 433, 139 S.W. 289 (1911); Rolfe v. Spybuck Drainage Dist. No. 1, 101 Ark. 29, 140 S.W. 988 (1911).

16-64-101 — 16-64-104. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning issues related to trial by court or jury, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, §§ 50[51] — 53[54]. The sections were derived from:

16-64-101. Civil Code, § 336; C. & M. Dig., § 1263; Pope's Dig., § 1487; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1701.

16-64-102. Civil Code, §§ 334, 335; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [334, 335], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1264, 1265; Pope's Dig., §§ 1488, 1489; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1702, 27-1703.

16-64-103. Civil Code, § 337; C. & M. Dig., § 1266; Pope's Dig., § 1490; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1704.

16-64-104. Civil Code, § 377; C. & M. Dig., § 1310; Pope's Dig., § 1535; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1745.

16-64-105. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. This section was held to be superseded by ARCP 49 in In re Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedures, 279 Ark. 470, 651 S.W.2d 63 (1983). The section was derived from Acts 1949, No. 460, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1743.1 — 27-1743.3.

16-64-106 — 16-64-108. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the time period for trial for actions at law and in equity, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 193. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-64-106. Civil Code, § 394; Acts 1915, No. 290, §§ 10, 11; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1286, 1287; Pope's Dig., §§ 1510, 1511; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1717, 27-1718.

16-64-107. Civil Code, § 396; Acts 1915, No. 290, § 13; C. & M. Dig., § 1289; Pope's Dig., § 1514; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1720.

16-64-108. Civil Code, § 398; C. & M. Dig., § 1291; Pope's Dig., § 1516; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1722.

16-64-109. [Superseded.]

  1. Where an order for a provisional remedy has been made by a judge or justice in an action within the jurisdiction of his or her respective court and the order has been served or levied, the trial of the action or disposition of the order may take place at any time after five (5) days' notice to the defendant, without waiting for the regular term of the judge's or justice's court. The notice may be given by the officer at the time of serving the summons or levying the order.
  2. If the justice before whom the trial should be regularly had is sick, absent, or unable to act, the officer may return the case for trial before the most convenient magistrate.
  3. If it is made to appear satisfactorily to the judge or justice, by affidavit or other proof, that the defendant has left the county of his or her residence and is within the state, the judge or justice shall immediately enter on his or her docket an order requiring the defendant to appear within fifteen (15) days thereafter for the trial of the order and answer to the plaintiff's complaint, or that judgment will be entered against him or her, and his or her property sold to satisfy the judgment. The order shall be served by posting copies of it in four (4) conspicuous places in the county, one (1) of which shall be at the county seat.

History. Civil Code, § 825; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [825], p. 219; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1723.

16-64-110. Order of trial.

When the jury has been sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order unless the court, for special reasons, otherwise directs:

  1. The plaintiff must briefly state his or her claim and the evidence by which he or she expects to sustain it;
  2. The defendant must then briefly state his or her defense and the evidence he or she expects to offer in support of it;
    1. The party on whom rests the burden of proof in the whole action must first produce his or her evidence;
    2. The adverse party will then produce his or her evidence;
  3. The parties will then be confined to rebutting evidence unless the court, for good reasons, in furtherance of justice, permits them to offer evidence in their original case;
  4. When the evidence is concluded, either party may request instructions to the jury on points of law, which shall be given or refused by the court, and the instructions shall be reduced to writing if either party requires it; and
  5. The parties may then submit or argue the case to the jury. In the argument the party having the burden of proof shall have the opening and conclusion, and if, upon the demand of his or her adversary, he or she refuses to open and fully state the grounds upon which he or she claims a verdict, he or she shall be refused the conclusion.

History. Civil Code, § 349; Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 92, § 1, p. 174; C. & M. Dig., § 1292; Pope's Dig., § 1517; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1727.

Cross References. Burden of proof, § 16-40-101.

Case Notes

In General.

These provision are mandatory, and it is error for the judge to fail to comply therewith. Anderson v. State, 34 Ark. 257, 1879 Ark. LEXIS 34 (1879); National Lumber Co. v. Snell, 47 Ark. 407, 1 S.W. 708 (1886).

There was error where the trial court required the party who did not have the burden of proof to present its case first. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Post, 330 Ark. 369, 955 S.W.2d 496 (1997).

Discretion of Court.

There was no abuse of discretion when the circuit court allowed the defendant to recall the plaintiff, in personal injury action, for several additional questions on cross examination while the plaintiff was still putting on his case. Piercy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 311 Ark. 424, 844 S.W.2d 337 (1993), rehearing denied, 312 Ark. 434A (1993).

Instructions.

Where a party demands that instructions be in writing, it is error to make oral explanations of the charge; and unless it affirmatively appears that the error is harmless it is ground for reversal. Mazzia v. State, 51 Ark. 177, 10 S.W. 257 (1888); Excelsior Mfg. Co. v. Owens, 58 Ark. 556, 25 S.W. 868 (1894); Merrill v. City of Van Buren, 125 Ark. 248, 188 S.W. 537 (1916).

Instruction must not assume facts which are to be determined by the jury. Townsly-Myrick Dry Goods Co. v. Greenfield, 58 Ark. 625, 25 S.W. 282 (1894); McMurray v. Boyd, 58 Ark. 504, 25 S.W. 505 (1894).

Party cannot complain of instructions given at other's request if he asked one to same effect. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Dodd, 59 Ark. 317, 27 S.W. 227 (1894); Dunnington v. Frick Co., 60 Ark. 250, 30 S.W. 212 (1895); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Baker, 67 Ark. 531, 55 S.W. 941 (1900).

If a party wishes an instruction on a point not covered by court's charge, he should ask one covering it. White v. McCracken, 60 Ark. 613, 31 S.W. 882 (1895); Lackey v. State, 67 Ark. 416, 55 S.W. 213 (1900); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Wilson, 70 Ark. 136, 66 S.W. 661 (1902).

Instructions not based on evidence are misleading. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Denty, 63 Ark. 177, 37 S.W. 719 (1896); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Sweet, 63 Ark. 563, 40 S.W. 463 (1897).

Instructions should not confine jury's attention to one of two grounds for relief relied on. W.W. Johnson Co. v. Triplett, 66 Ark. 233, 50 S.W. 455 (1899).

Instructions should not submit undisputed facts but should assume them to be true. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Baker, 67 Ark. 531, 55 S.W. 941 (1900); Milwaukee Harvester Co. v. Tymich, 68 Ark. 225, 58 S.W. 252 (1900); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Tomlinson, 69 Ark. 489, 64 S.W. 347 (1901); McGee v. Smitherman, 69 Ark. 632, 65 S.W. 461 (1901); Burnett v. State, 72 Ark. 398, 81 S.W. 382 (1904).

Instructions should cover defendant's theory as well as plaintiff's. Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co. v. Trainer, 68 Ark. 106, 56 S.W. 789 (1900); Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co. v. Morrison, 69 Ark. 289, 62 S.W. 1045 (1901).

Abstract instructions should not be given. Inabnett v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 69 Ark. 130, 61 S.W. 570 (1901); Saint Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Townsend, 69 Ark. 380, 63 S.W. 994 (1901); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Wilson, 70 Ark. 136, 66 S.W. 661 (1902).

Written instructions being asked, an oral charge taken in shorthand is insufficient. Arnold v. State, 71 Ark. 367, 74 S.W. 513 (1903); Burnett v. State, 72 Ark. 398, 81 S.W. 382 (1904).

The requirements of the law are met when instructions given by the court are reduced to writing and subject to the inspection by counsel at some time before the end of the trial. Reed v. Rogers, 134 Ark. 528, 204 S.W. 973 (1918).

Directing counsel to read to the jury instructions given at their request, though not proper, was held not prejudicial where court stated that instructions given were the instructions of the court and that jury was bound to consider them as the law of the case. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Hunnicutt, 193 Ark. 1128, 104 S.W.2d 1070 (1937).

The trial court may for sufficient reasons give an instruction after the argument. Crain v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 206 Ark. 465, 176 S.W.2d 145 (1943).

—Timeliness.

Trial judge has discretion to require instructions to be settled before argument begins, and, as a means to this end, may require any special request for instructions to be made before opening of argument. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Mitchell, 115 Ark. 339, 171 S.W. 895 (1914).

In action for damages to a truck struck by a train at a crossing, giving instruction regarding duties of locomotive enginemen after the argument had been concluded was not error. Crain v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 206 Ark. 465, 176 S.W.2d 145 (1943).

Intervener.

One who intervenes in an attachment suit is entitled to open and close the argument by virtue of having the burden of proof, though the landlord answers that the alleged subtenancy was a scheme to defraud him. Jones v. Seymour, 95 Ark. 593, 130 S.W. 560 (1910).

Where the plaintiff and an intervener sought to recover in the same action upon a policy of life insurance, it was within the trial court's discretion to determine the order of the argument. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shane, 98 Ark. 132, 135 S.W. 836 (1911).

Statement of Claim.

It is duty of trial judge to see that counsel in his opening statement confines himself to a brief statement of his claim, or defense, and the evidence he expects to sustain it. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Murphy, 74 Ark. 256, 85 S.W. 428 (1905).

If court fails to restrain counsel within his legitimate scope and privilege, it is the right of opposing counsel to object to the argument. The objection should be definite and call for a ruling of the court thereon, and if court then fails to properly restrain and control argument within proper bounds, and instruct jury to disregard any improper remarks and admonish counsel, then an exception should be taken. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Murphy, 74 Ark. 256, 85 S.W. 428 (1905).

Under this section defendant's attorneys should have demanded that plaintiff's attorneys make a full and complete opening statement if defendant's attorneys desired to make the subsequent claim that new matter was injected in the closing argument. Reddell v. Norton, 225 Ark. 643, 285 S.W.2d 328 (1955).

Submission or Argument to Jury.

In condemnation proceedings, the land owner has the opening and concluding argument. Springfield & Memphis Ry. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258 (1884).

The right to open and close abides with the plaintiff so long as he has anything to prove to recover a verdict for more than nominal damages. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 57 Ark. 136, 20 S.W. 1083 (1893).

Burden of proof found to be on the plaintiff, entitling him to open and close the argument. Mansur &Tebbetts Implement Co. v. Davis, 61 Ark. 627, 33 S.W. 1074 (1896); Mine La Motte Lead & Smelting Co. v. Consolidated Anthracite Coal Co., 85 Ark. 123, 107 S.W. 174 (1907); Kilpatrick v. Rowan, 119 Ark. 175, 177 S.W. 893 (1915); Copeland v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 177 Ark. 1178, 9 S.W.2d 561 (1928).

The order of argument is to be determined by the pleadings. Beal & Doyle Dry Goods Co. v. Barton, 80 Ark. 326, 97 S.W. 58 (1906).

Burden of proof found to be on the defendant, entitling him to open and close the argument. Roberts v. Padgett, 82 Ark. 331, 101 S.W. 753 (1907); Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Howle, 131 Ark. 299, 198 S.W. 286 (1917); Kempner v. Stephens, 186 Ark. 877, 56 S.W.2d 580 (1933); Vern Barnett Constr. Co. v. J.A. Hadley Constr. Co., 254 Ark. 866, 496 S.W.2d 446 (1973).

This section, if not mandatory, certainly grants to trial courts power to control course of argument as to conform to orderly procedure, and unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, Supreme Court will not interfere. Dickinson v. McBride, 127 Ark. 555, 193 S.W. 89 (1917).

As a matter of right, the one on whom the burden rests shall have the right to close the argument as well as to open it, if in his opening statement he fully states grounds upon which he claims a verdict. Dickinson v. McBride, 127 Ark. 555, 193 S.W. 89 (1917).

Where after delivery of plaintiff's opening argument, defendant refused to give his argument, it was proper for court to then permit plaintiff to proceed with his closing argument, since defendant by such action could not deprive the plaintiff of his right to conclude the argument, and motion of defendant thereafter that he then be permitted to give his argument to jury was properly overruled. Dickinson v. McBride, 127 Ark. 555, 193 S.W. 89 (1917).

The right to open and close must ordinarily be asserted at the opening of the trial, before the other party introduces any evidence; where, at the beginning of the trial one of the parties acquiesces in, or permits without objection, the assumption by the other party of the burden of proof, it is not proper to permit the former to open and conclude the argument to the jury. Southern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Heggie, 206 Ark. 196, 174 S.W.2d 931 (1943).

The party having the burden of proof shall make the opening and closing argument, and where there is more than one party it is within the court's discretion to fix the order of argument. Schwam v. Reece, 213 Ark. 431, 210 S.W.2d 903 (1948).

The defendant has right to open and close arguments before jury when he has burden of proof. Johnson v. Stout, 218 Ark. 599, 238 S.W.2d 97 (1951).

The party holding the affirmative of the issues joined in the pleadings and who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side has the right to open and close the evidence in argument. In the argument, the party having the burden of proof shall have the opening and conclusion. Wyatt v. W.B. Smith Hatchery, Inc., 232 Ark. 611, 339 S.W.2d 323 (1960).

Trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant insurer's attorney the right to present a closing argument to the jury simply because the plaintiff waived his right to do so where the insurer bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses. American Livestock Ins. Co. v. Garrison, 28 Ark. App. 330, 774 S.W.2d 431 (1989).

Verdict.

Notwithstanding the weight of testimony was to the effect that defendant made no false representations to plaintiff, it was error to direct a verdict for the defendant if there was a conflict in the testimony upon that point. Hutchison v. Gorman, 71 Ark. 305, 73 S.W. 793 (1903).

A verdict should not be directed unless it can be said as a matter of law that no recovery can be had upon any reasonable view of the facts which the evidence tends to establish. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Neal, 71 Ark. 445, 78 S.W. 220 (1903).

Cited: Property Owners Imp. Dist. No. 247 v. Williford, 40 Ark. App. 172, 843 S.W.2d 862 (1992); City of Jacksonville v. Nixon, 2014 Ark. App. 485, 442 S.W.3d 906 (2014).

16-64-111, 16-64-112. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning interpreters for persons with communication problems and for the deaf, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 237, §§ 3, 4. The sections were derived from:

16-64-111. Acts 1973, No. 555, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-835; Acts 2001, No. 424, § 2.

16-64-112. Acts 1979, No. 664, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 5-715.1, 5-715.2; Acts 1991, No. 469, § 1.

16-64-113. Jury may view subject of litigation.

Whenever, in the opinion of the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of real property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body, under the charge of an officer, to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury is thus absent, no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial.

History. Civil Code, § 350; C. & M. Dig., § 1293; Pope's Dig., § 1518; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1731.

Case Notes

Condemnation.

In suits by lot owners to recover damages for condemnation of portions of their lots, it was within trial court's discretion to permit view of property even though one of the parties objected. Bridgman v. Baxter County, 202 Ark. 15, 148 S.W.2d 673 (1941).

Crops.

In a lawsuit involving crop damage, the jury was properly allowed to visit the fields where the damage occurred. McGraw v. Weeks, 326 Ark. 285, 930 S.W.2d 365 (1996).

Ejectment.

In suit for damages for wrongful ejection from street car, it was proper to permit jury to examine a car and the controller thereon. Dobbins v. Little Rock Ry. & Elec. Co., 79 Ark. 85, 95 S.W. 794 (1906).

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny the plaintiff a request that the jury view the land involved in an ejectment suit. Holimon v. Rice, 208 Ark. 279, 185 S.W.2d 927 (1945).

In a Body.

Where a juror alone visited the place of the accident, refusal to grant the defendant's request that the entire jury be conducted to the place of the accident was held error. Gus Blass Co. v. May, 189 Ark. 1115, 76 S.W.2d 92 (1934).

Instructions.

In an action to recover for work done in a building under agreement to perform work in a workmanlike manner, instructions, that on a view of the premises, the jury should not base their verdict on their examinations, and that the impression made upon their minds by the examination did not constitute a part of the evidence in the cause, were properly refused. Fitzgerald v. La Porte, 67 Ark. 263, 54 S.W. 342 (1899).

Personal Property.

In an action for injuries caused by the bursting of a saw, where the defendant acquiesced in the jury's viewing the machine, the conduct of the jury in having the saw taken apart was not error. Trumbull v. Martin, 137 Ark. 495, 208 S.W. 803 (1918)Criticized byWagnon v. Barker, 236 Ark. 55, 364 S.W.2d 314 (Ark. 1963).

Since the section refers to real property only, a request that the jury be permitted to inspect a locomotive similar to one on which plaintiff received the injury for which the action is brought was properly refused. Missour P. R. Co. v. Hendrix, 169 Ark. 825, 277 S.W. 337 (1925), cert. denied, Missouri P. R. Co. v. Hendrix, 270 U.S. 651, 46 S. Ct. 351 (1926).

Real Property.

While the exercise of the authority to allow a jury view rests in the judgment and discretion of the court and not the jury, where the court inquired of the jury whether they felt that they wanted to view the property and after receiving a negative reply denied the motion for a jury view, the ruling was proper. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Carder, 228 Ark. 8, 305 S.W.2d 330 (1957).

Request for View.

A request for view need not be made in the absence of the jury. Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 326 S.W.2d 889, 76 A.L.R.2d 751 (1959).

Permitting the request for view to be made in the presence of the jury was not prejudicial to the defendant where the court made it clear to the jury that it was the court refusing the view and not the defendant who was trying to hide something. Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 326 S.W.2d 889, 76 A.L.R.2d 751 (1959).

Scene of Accident.

In action for damages for personal injuries, where plaintiff was struck by moving train, it was no abuse of discretion for trial court to refuse to order jury to visit scene of accident, it being in another county and a very exact plat of ground in question having been introduced in evidence. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 127 Ark. 323, 192 S.W. 174 (1917).

Trial court was held not to have abused its discretion in overruling railroad company's motion for an order requiring jury to view crossing where accident occurred where company had introduced a photograph of crossing made a few days after fatal accident which was evidence of the physical facts existing at the crossing when deceased was killed. Missouri P.R.R. v. Foreman, 196 Ark. 636, 119 S.W.2d 747 (1938).

16-64-114. Jury instructions generally.

In the trial of all cases in courts of record wherein juries are employed, it shall be the duty of the presiding trial judge to deliver to the jury immediately prior to its retirement for deliberation a typewritten copy of the instructions which has been given to the jury orally, when counsel for all parties so request. This copy of instructions shall, at the time of the dismissal of the jury, be returned to the court by the foreman of the jury.

History. Acts 1957, No. 128, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1732.1.

Cross References. Charge to jury, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 23.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

It is within the court's discretion to send typewritten instructions to the jury room notwithstanding that all parties did not so request. Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 531 S.W.2d 945, 91 A.L.R.3d 325 (1976).

In a medical malpractice action the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing, over plaintiffs' objection, the jury to take typewritten instructions into the jury room, since neither party may veto the judge's determination. Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 531 S.W.2d 945, 91 A.L.R.3d 325 (1976).

The trial court may, within its discretion, give the instructions to the jury regardless whether they are requested. Waganer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 269 Ark. 976, 601 S.W.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1980).

A trial court need not give an instruction which needs explanation, modification, or qualification, nor is a trial judge required to give repetitious or redundant instructions. Newman v. Crawford Constr. Co., 303 Ark. 641, 799 S.W.2d 531 (1990).

Formal Deliberations.

Formal deliberations have begun where a jury has received its instructions and heard the arguments of counsel before retiring to the jury room. D.B.&J. Holden Farms, Ltd. P'ship v. Ark. State Highway Comm'n, 93 Ark. App. 202, 218 S.W.3d 355 (2005).

Model Instructions.

When jury instructions are requested which do not conform to the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions (AMI), they should be given only when the trial judge finds the AMI instructions do not contain an essential instruction or do not accurately state the law applicable to the case, and if the model instructions given to the jury cover the matters embraced in the requested instruction, it is not error to refuse such instruction. Newman v. Crawford Constr. Co., 303 Ark. 641, 799 S.W.2d 531 (1990).

Standards for Instructions.

Jury instructions should be based on the evidence in the case, and instructions stating only abstract legal propositions or submitting matters on which there is no evidence should not be given. Newman v. Crawford Constr. Co., 303 Ark. 641, 799 S.W.2d 531 (1990).

Undue Emphasis.

Evidence found that one part of the instruction was emphasized at the expense of another part and constituted error. Waganer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 269 Ark. 976, 601 S.W.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1980).

16-64-115. Jury instructions — Further instruction during deliberations.

After the jury has retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony or if they desire to be informed as to any point of law arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them into court, where the information required shall be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or their counsel.

History. Civil Code, § 353; C. & M. Dig., § 1296; Pope's Dig., § 1521; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1734.

Case Notes

Appellate Review.

Because defendant did not argue at trial that the trial court failed to comply with this section when it allowed the replaying of a victim's recorded testimony after the jury had begun deliberations, defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. King v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 309 (2018).

Deposition Testimony.

In a medical malpractice action, a trial court did not err in allowing videotape deposition testimony by plaintiff's treating physician to be replayed to the jury because no transcript of the deposition was available and the trial court complied with the requirements of this section by replaying the physician's entire testimony, including both direct and cross-examination, in open court with all parties present. Padilla v. Archer, 2011 Ark. App. 746, 387 S.W.3d 267 (2011).

Discretion of Court.

Allowing the jury to have access to something which has not been admitted into evidence will not necessarily, without more, constitute an abuse of discretion. Dickerson Constr. Co. v. Dozier, 266 Ark. 345, 584 S.W.2d 36 (1979).

This section prescribes the method of communicating the information required, not necessarily the information requested; thus, before additional information is given, the trial court must determine whether the information requested is required, and the trial court has broad discretion to decide what information should be given to the jury. National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

Mandatory Compliance.

Compliance with this section is mandatory. National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

No Violation Found.

Trial court did not err in denying an administratrix's motion for a new trial after a jury awarded judgment to a home health care company and its employees in an action for negligence because a bailiff did not violate the statute by answering a jury question; the bailiff's stated in an affidavit that after the bailiff informed the attorneys that the jury had a question, the jurors told the bailiff they had figured it out. Houchins v. Home Care Professionals of Ark., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 553, 423 S.W.3d 655 (2012).

Permission to Separate.

In a civil trial the jury may be permitted to separate either during the trial or after the case is submitted to them. Williams v. Williams, 112 Ark. 507, 166 S.W. 552 (1914).

Presumption of Prejudice.

Prejudice is presumed from a violation of this section unless the lack of prejudice is manifest. National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

Request for Clarification.

Where jury foreman went alone to the judge to request a clarification of a jury instruction and the judge in the presence of counsel for both sides told the foreman that no further instructions were required and neither party requested that the jury be brought in for further instructions or objected to the court's handling of the incident, the only violation of this section was in the foreman's requesting the instruction himself rather than sending the deputy to convey the request, and there was no prejudice. National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

Cited: Jones v. Parrish, 330 Ark. 521, 954 S.W.2d 934 (1997); Lowry v. State, 90 Ark. App. 333, 205 S.W.3d 830 (2005).

16-64-116. Conduct of jury after submission of case.

  1. When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they may decide in court or retire for deliberation.
    1. If the jury retires, they must be kept together in some convenient place, under the charge of an officer, until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged by the court, subject to the discretion of the court to permit them to separate temporarily at night and at their meals.
    2. The officer having them under his or her charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself or herself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, unless by order of the court, and he or she shall not, before their verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.

History. Civil Code, § 351; C. & M. Dig., § 1294; Pope's Dig., § 1519; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1732.

Case Notes

No Violation Found.

Trial court did not err in denying an administratrix's motion for a new trial after a jury awarded judgment to a home health care company and its employees in an action for negligence because a bailiff did not violate the statute by answering a jury question; the bailiff's stated in an affidavit that after the bailiff informed the attorneys that the jury had a question, the jurors told the bailiff they had figured it out. Houchins v. Home Care Professionals of Ark., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 553, 423 S.W.3d 655 (2012).

16-64-117. Separation of jury — Admonishment by court.

If the jury is permitted to separate, either during the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they may be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse with or allow themselves to be addressed by any other person on any subject of the trial and, during the trial, that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the cause is finally submitted to them.

History. Civil Code, § 352; C. & M. Dig., § 1295; Pope's Dig., § 1520; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1733.

16-64-118. Discharge of jury.

  1. The jury may be discharged by the court on account of the sickness of a juror, or other accident or calamity requiring their discharge, or by consent of both parties, or after they have been kept together until it satisfactorily appears that there is no probability of their agreeing.
  2. In all cases where the jury is discharged during the trial, or after the cause is submitted to them, it may be tried again immediately or at a future date, as the court may direct.

History. Civil Code, §§ 354, 355; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1297, 1298; Pope's Dig., §§ 1522, 1523; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1735, 27-1736.

Cross References. Verdict by agreement of nine jurors in civil cases, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 7; Amend. No. 16.

Case Notes

Authority of Court.

Authority conferred on trial court by this section is directive or permissive rather than mandatory and rests in the discretion of the court. Gregory v. Colvin, 235 Ark. 1007, 363 S.W.2d 539 (1963).

The legislature intended to give the trial court authority to direct when the cause would be tried again — immediately or at some future date — but did not give the court authority to direct whether or not the cause was to be retried, and trial court could not permanently deny a party the right to a retrial. Gregory v. Colvin, 235 Ark. 1007, 363 S.W.2d 539 (1963).

16-64-119. Verdict of jury — Polling jury.

  1. When the jury has agreed upon its verdict, they must be conducted into court, their names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman.
  2. When the verdict is announced either party may require the jury to be polled, which is done by the clerk or court asking each juror if it is his or her verdict. If any one answers in the negative, the jury must again be sent out for further deliberation.
  3. The verdict shall be written, signed by the foreman, and read by the court or clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict.
    1. If any juror disagrees, the jury must be sent out again.
    2. If no disagreement is expressed, and neither party requires the jury to be polled, the verdict is complete and the jury discharged from the case.

History. Civil Code, §§ 356, 357; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1299, 1300; Pope's Dig., §§ 1524, 1525; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1737, 27-1738.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas Model Jury Instructions: Introductory and Closing Instructions, Use of General Verdict and Interrogatories, Negligence, Proximate Cause, Owners and Occupiers of Land, Common Carriers, Railroads, and Comparative Negligence, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 66.

Michael Kiel Kaiser, Case Note: Blueford v. Arkansas: Why the United States Supreme Court's Construction of Arkansas's Criminal Transitional Jury Instructions Is Not Binding on Arkansas Courts, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1083 (2013).

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section pertains to civil trials and was inapplicable in this criminal case. Adams v. State, 2009 Ark. 375, 326 S.W.3d 764 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1021, 130 S. Ct. 1922, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010).

Objections.

Where the verdict was in writing, rendered in open court, received without objection, and duly recorded, appellant waived any objection to the requirement that the verdict forms be signed. Fisher v. Valco Farms, 328 Ark. 741, 945 S.W.2d 369 (1997).

Polling the Jury.

When, on a poll of the jury, a juror answered that he did not believe the verdict was right but agreed to it for the sake of harmony, it will not be said that he answered in the negative but that he answered in the affirmative and that the verdict was his own. Williams v. Williams, 112 Ark. 507, 166 S.W. 552 (1914).

Where in proceedings for assessment of damages for lands verdict was signed by the foreman only and record showed no request for a poll of the jury, presumption obtains that the verdict was unanimous and the signatures of the jurors were therefore not required. Montgomery County v. Cearley, 192 Ark. 868, 95 S.W.2d 554 (1936).

Court's refusal to allow defendant's counsel to poll the jury in order to inquire about the dollar amount it intended plaintiff to recover was proper since this section only permits polling the jury to ask each juror if the verdict is his verdict. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Mays, 273 Ark. 16, 616 S.W.2d 734 (1981).

A trial judge, before ruling on a motion to modify the verdict, should not have an ex parte conversation with some of the jurors about anything which caused them to assent to the verdict. To do so is error. Coran v. Keller, 295 Ark. 308, 748 S.W.2d 349 (1988).

When, after a driver admitted liability for a car crash, a jury awarded an allegedly injured party zero damages, the party did not waive an objection to the verdict by declining to poll the jury; declining to poll a jury does not bar an appeal under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59. Wallis v. Keller, 2015 Ark. App. 343, 464 S.W.3d 128 (2015).

—Failure to Request Poll.

Although there may have been a unanimous verdict which was not disclosed because of failure to poll the jury, a new trial was granted where an instruction was given pursuant to a void statute that agreement by nine jurors would substantiate a verdict. Davis v. H.A. Nelson & Son, 132 Ark. 436, 201 S.W. 511 (1918).

Where neither party required jury to be polled, verdict became final, and defendant could not complain that verdict was not unanimous. Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 74 S.W.2d 640 (1934).

There is a presumption that the verdict was unanimous and the signatures of the jurors were therefore not required. Montgomery County v. Cearley, 192 Ark. 868, 95 S.W.2d 554 (1936).

Verdict.

It is error to refuse to a jury permission to retire and reconsider their verdict where, on hearing it read by the clerk, they state to the court that it is not their verdict. Saxon v. Foster, 69 Ark. 626, 65 S.W. 425 (1901). See also Harris v. Graham & Bordley, 86 Ark. 570, 111 S.W. 984 (1908).

The requirement that the verdict be written and signed by the foreman may be waived where an unsigned verdict is rendered in open court and duly received without objection and thereafter recorded. Hodges v. Bayley, 102 Ark. 200, 143 S.W. 92 (1912).

Where two verdicts are written on the same paper and signed beneath by the foreman, there is sufficient compliance with the statute. Fox v. State, 156 Ark. 428, 246 S.W. 863 (1923).

Fact that a question mark appeared on the written verdict after the amount of damages was awarded did not invalidate the verdict, the jury having been asked by the court whether it was their verdict after it was read by the clerk and having replied in the affirmative. Price-Snapp-Jones Co. v. Brown, 184 Ark. 1143, 45 S.W.2d 517 (1932).

The verdict should reflect the true and correct and final conclusion of the jury and if before discharging the jury, it is made known to the court that the jury has misunderstood the instructions, it is no error to permit the jury to further consider their verdict, after the instructions have been explained. Clift v. Jordan, 207 Ark. 66, 178 S.W.2d 1009 (1944).

Trial court errs in making a substantive amendment to the verdict after the discharge of the jury. Coran v. Keller, 295 Ark. 308, 748 S.W.2d 349 (1988).

Neither statute nor long-standing precedent permitted the trial court to recall the jury after discharge and poll the individual jurors based on a claim that the jury misunderstood the instructions; nor did the law allow the jury to correct or amend its verdict once it was discharged from the case and had left the presence and control of the court. Spears v. Mills, 347 Ark. 932, 69 S.W.3d 407 (2002).

Verdict Forms.

District court did not abuse it's discretion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49, by using general verdict form instead of special verdict form submitted by defendant which alleged plaintiff's comparative fault. Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 128 F.3d 631 (8th Cir. 1997).

Cited: Womack v. Brickell, 232 Ark. 385, 337 S.W.2d 655 (1960); Martin v. Blackmon, 277 Ark. 190, 640 S.W.2d 435 (1982).

16-64-120. Recovery of damages.

Whenever damages are recoverable, the plaintiff may claim and recover any rate of damages to which he or she may be entitled for the cause of action established.

History. Civil Code, § 376; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1730.

Case Notes

Excessive Damages.

The court followed the rule that verdicts will be set aside for excessive damages only when not supported by proof or when they are so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice or an incorrect appreciation of the law. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cordell, 189 Ark. 1132, 76 S.W.2d 307 (1934).

16-64-121. Assessment of damages by jury.

When, by the verdict, either party is entitled to recover money of the adverse party, the jury in their verdict must assess the amount of recovery.

History. Civil Code, § 361; C. & M. Dig., § 1305; Pope's Dig., § 1530; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1742.

Case Notes

Judgment.

Ordinarily, the jury must assess the amount of the recovery, but where the parties apparently agreed to submit only the issue of liability to the jury, the judge could enter judgment for the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff. Winters v. Barr, 263 Ark. 618, 566 S.W.2d 745 (1978).

16-64-122. Comparative fault.

  1. In all actions for damages for personal injuries or wrongful death or injury to property in which recovery is predicated upon fault, liability shall be determined by comparing the fault chargeable to a claiming party with the fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages.
    1. If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is of a lesser degree than the fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is entitled to recover the amount of his or her damages after they have been diminished in proportion to the degree of his or her own fault.
    2. If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is equal to or greater in degree than any fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is not entitled to recover such damages.
  2. The word “fault” as used in this section includes any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party.
  3. In cases where the issue of comparative fault is submitted to the jury by an interrogatory, counsel for the parties shall be permitted to argue to the jury the effect of an answer to any interrogatory.

History. Acts 1975, No. 367, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1763 — 27-1765; Acts 1991, No. 663, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, The Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 364.

Note, Imputed Negligence Under the Arkansas Comparative Liability Statute, Exception: Stull, Adm'x v. Ragsdale, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 722.

Woods, Product Liability: Is Comparative Fault Winning the Day?, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 360.

Case Note, Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club: Assumption of Risk Rides Again, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 657.

Samuel T. Waddell, Comment: Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 485 (2013).

Cristen C. Handley, Comment: Back to the Basics: Restoring Fundamental Tort Principles by Abolishing the Professional-Rescuer's Doctrine, 68 Ark. L. Rev. 489 (2015).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Torts, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Note, Torts — Negligence — Contributory Negligence of One Parent Is Imputed to the Other to Diminish the Latter's Recovery for the Death of a Minor Child. Stull v. Ragsdale, 273 Ark. 277, 620 S.W.2d 264, 26 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981). 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 289.

Note, Conflict of Laws — Multistate Torts — Arkansas Relies on Choice-Influencing Considerations and the “Better Rule of Law,” 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 511.

Survey — Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 613.

Survey — Torts, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 261.

Survey — Civil Procedure, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 747.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Tort Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1085.

Sizing Up a Multi-Party Tortfeasor Suit in Arkansas: A Tale of Two Laws — How Fault Is, and Should Be, Distributed, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 251.

Case Notes

In General.

The court's refusal to ask the jurors whether they meant to allow no one to recover was based upon a correct understanding of the comparative negligence statute. Brown v. Keaton, 232 Ark. 12, 334 S.W.2d 676 (1960) (decision under prior law).

This section defines comparative fault, in essence, as the comparing of fault between a claiming party and the party against whom the claiming party seeks to recover. Rathbun v. Ward, 315 Ark. 264, 866 S.W.2d 403 (1993).

Construction.

While it is true that the right to contribution from a joint tortfeasor is dependent upon a finding of joint and several liability, subsection (d) does not allow the concepts and effects of contribution among joint tortfeasors to be argued to the jury; this section is clear in this respect and is not ambiguous. Rathbun v. Ward, 315 Ark. 264, 866 S.W.2d 403 (1993).

Subsection (d) is expressly limited to issues of comparative fault; if the legislature intended to allow counsel to argue issues of contribution and indemnity among joint tortfeasors, it would have so provided when it added subsection (d) to this section. Rathbun v. Ward, 315 Ark. 264, 866 S.W.2d 403 (1993).

Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), § 16-55-201 et seq., pertains to fault apportionment in a general way, and the Arkansas Comparative Fault Act under this section specifically defines fault and identifies whose fault can be apportioned. Because these two provisions address the same subject matter, it is reasonable to conclude that the general terms of the CJRA are intended to be subject to the specific terms of the Arkansas Comparative Fault Act. Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Purpose.

The purpose of the comparative negligence statute is to distribute the total damages among those who caused them. FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

Applicability.

Fault may be compared in all actions for damages for personal injuries or wrongful death or injury to property. Little Rock Elec. Contractors v. Okonite Co., 294 Ark. 399, 744 S.W.2d 381 (1988).

Malicious prosecution is an intentional tort and, therefore, comparative negligence does not apply. Kellerman v. Zeno, 64 Ark. App. 79, 983 S.W.2d 136 (1998).

This section did not apply to an action by a marmalade manufacturer against a jar manufacturer to recover for a business loss which occurred when it had to recall 6,000 cases of marmalade after a consumer complained that he cut his tongue on a sliver of glass in a jar of marmalade since the case did not involve an “injury to property” although the glass jars could have been said to be injured property, the real gist of the action was to recover the business loss from having to take the jars back, not merely to recover the cost of rendering the jars, as jars, nondefective. E.D. Smith & Sons v. Arkansas Glass Container Corp., 236 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2001).

Trial court should not have instructed the jury on comparative fault under this section in appellant's action for damages resulting from a car accident because appellee was required to yield the right of way under § 27-51-603 and appellant did not have a duty to anticipate his failure to yield. The fact that appellant allegedly admitted fault by stating that she was looking for a parking spot was irrelevant as she had no duty; rather it was appellee's duty to avoid the accident as he was backing out of a driveway onto the highway on which appellant was traveling. Bell v. Misenheimer, 102 Ark. App. 389, 285 S.W.3d 693 (2008), rev'd, 2009 Ark. 222, 308 S.W.3d 120 (2009).

Affirmative Defense.

Comparative fault is an affirmative defense. Skinner v. R.J. Griffin & Co., 313 Ark. 430, 855 S.W.2d 913 (1993).

Agency.

While indemnity is commonly granted where liability has been imposed on a person not because of any fault on his part but solely because of his relationship to the one at fault, this doctrine did not apply to a claim against a person since there was no employer-employee or other “agency-type” relationship on which to base imputation of liability. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Star City Gravel Co., 592 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1979).

Apportionment of Fault.

Where there is evidence of negligence on the part of both plaintiff and defendant, apportionment of fault under Arkansas' comparative fault statute becomes a matter solely within the province of the finder of fact. Lockett v. International Paper Co., 871 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1989).

The fact that one party admits negligence at trial does not preempt consideration of any negligence of another party when negligence is properly alleged and supported by evidence. Bryant v. Eifling, 301 Ark. 172, 782 S.W.2d 580 (1990).

The Arkansas comparative fault law is capable of recognizing and distributing fault between parties whose misconduct contributed to an actionable loss. FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

It was not error for the court to instruct the jury on comparative fault where there was evidence that plaintiff entered the yard despite the presence of “Beware of the Dog” signs, and that plaintiff's injuries could have been caused by her running from the dog, rather than from the dog's attack. Turner v. Stewart, 330 Ark. 134, 952 S.W.2d 156 (1997).

In an action by the owner of an officer building and a tenant against a security company arising from a fire in the building for negligence in failing to detect the fire and failing to timely contact the fire department, the owner was not entitled to recover on the basis that its negligence was less than the combined negligence of the tenant and the security company; it was improper to combine the fault of the tenant and the security company because the tenant was a co-plaintiff in the action, rather than a defendant. NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 343 Ark. 437, 36 S.W.3d 291 (2001).

Appellate court reversed a judgment that awarded no damages to a building owner even though the jury found that the owner was not liable and that a fire extinguisher company and plaintiff restaurant were each fifty percent (50%) liable for damages caused by the fire as, under this section, the owner's liability was to be compared to the company's liability. Yu v. Metro. Fire Extinguisher Co., 94 Ark. App. 317, 230 S.W.3d 299 (2006).

Section 16-55-202 should be interpreted as being compatible with subsection (a) of this section, which limits the apportionment of fault to an individual or entity from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, which includes individuals and entities that are subject to being brought into a suit pursuant to a cross or third party claim under Ark. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, but excludes nonparties who are otherwise immune from suit, including employers who are immune pursuant to § 11-9-105(a), the exclusive remedies provision of the Workers' Compensation Law, § 11-9-101 et seq.Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Assumption of Risk.

Where it is established in a products liability case that the injured person assumed the risk of injury, there can be no recovery. Dulin v. Circle F Indus., Inc., 558 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1977).

Because Arkansas is a comparative fault state, assumption of risk is not a complete bar to recovery but is simply a matter to be considered in deciding fault. Simmons v. Frazier, 277 Ark. 452, 642 S.W.2d 314 (1982).

In a products liability action, the jury found that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of the accident. W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Finding of assumption of risk did not bar the plaintiff's recovery for the manufacturer's alleged negligence, since the jury also apportioned a greater percent of the responsibility for the accident to the defendant. W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Where none of the forms of assumption of risk which survives the adoption of comparative fault in Arkansas is applicable to the facts of a case, an instruction on assumption of risk should not be given. Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1988).

On its face, this section purports to merge the defense of assumption of risk into the statutory comparative fault scheme; however, implied secondary reasonable assumption of risk and implied secondary unreasonable assumption of risk must no longer be a complete bar to recovery, but rather one element to be factored into the comparative fault analysis. Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1988).

The adoption of comparative fault represents a legislative judgment that a plaintiff should not be denied recovery for injuries caused by a defendant's negligence simply because the plaintiff was partially at fault, although less at fault than the defendant. Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1988).

A plaintiff's conduct which amounts to assumption of risk is not a complete bar to recovery, but rather is simply one element to be factored into the comparative fault analysis. Lockett v. International Paper Co., 871 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1989).

There was evidence to support the giving of the assumption of risk instruction where plaintiff testified he was aware of all the specific risks that led to his injury. Bonds v. Snapper Power Equip. Co., 935 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991).

Instruction that referred to assumption of risk as a defense was harmless error because the other instructions made it clear that assumption of risk was an element of fault, not a complete bar to recovery. Bonds v. Snapper Power Equip. Co., 935 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991).

Because a jury must compare negligence pursuant to this section, the doctrine of assumption of the risk is no longer applicable in Arkansas as a separate theory. Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).

Causation.

Proximate cause is defined in terms of direct causation. Kubik v. Igleheart, 280 Ark. 310, 657 S.W.2d 545 (1983).

In tort suit against defendant who shot him, plaintiff's negligence would not present an issue for the jury, since the negligent act did not lead in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, to defendant's intentional act of firing the shotgun which caused the damages and, accordingly, instruction on comparative negligence was not warranted. Kubik v. Igleheart, 280 Ark. 310, 657 S.W.2d 545 (1983).

In a products liability case, the injured plaintiff could not recover from the defendant/manufacturer where the jury found no causal link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries. Bonds v. Snapper Power Equip. Co., 935 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991).

Under the express language of subsection (c) of this section, there must be a determination of “proximate cause” before any “fault” can be assessed against the claiming party. Skinner v. R.J. Griffin & Co., 313 Ark. 430, 855 S.W.2d 913 (1993); Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co., 318 Ark. 792, 888 S.W.2d 303 (1994).

Where the evidence at trial did not establish a causal connection between the failure to wear safety goggles and the damages to plaintiff's eye, the trial court erred in giving a comparative fault instruction. Skinner v. R.J. Griffin & Co., 313 Ark. 430, 855 S.W.2d 913 (1993).

In determining whether plaintiff's negligence is contributory, plaintiff's conduct is to be viewed as to whether it was a proximate cause of her damages. Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co., 318 Ark. 792, 888 S.W.2d 303 (1994).

Comparative Negligence.

It was proper to find that the total negligence causing the injury should be prorated between the plaintiff and defendant and 25% to driver of tractor-trailer. Ward Body Works, Inc. v. Smallwood, 227 Ark. 314, 298 S.W.2d 332 (1957) (decision under prior law).

In personal injury suit, verdicts for plaintiffs were proper. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Guthrie, 227 Ark. 566, 299 S.W.2d 829 (1957) (decision under prior law).

Where plaintiff's contributory negligence is less than that of the other party he is entitled to a verdict but his damages will be reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. Gibson v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 385 (W.D. Ark. 1958) (decision under prior law).

In personal injury action, plaintiff was entitled to recover where the jury found that he was 10% negligent, but his recovery was limited to 90% of his total damages. Chism v. Phelps, 228 Ark. 936, 311 S.W.2d 297 (1958) (decision under prior law).

Where pedestrian sued for injuries sustained when struck by automobile while walking across street, the pedestrian could obtain judgment for 20% of his total damages where the jury found him to be 80% negligent. Johnson v. Brewer, 228 Ark. 946, 311 S.W.2d 301 (1958) (decision under prior law).

Where the negligence of two parties is equal, neither can recover. Sunday v. Burk, 172 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark. 1959) (decision under prior law).

Where the evidence showed that the contributory negligence of both parties was equal the trial judge was correct in his conclusion that neither party could recover against the other. Easley v. Inglis, 233 Ark. 589, 346 S.W.2d 206 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Contributory negligence does not bar a plaintiff's recovery if it is of less degree than that of the defendant. Scoville v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 458 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1972) (decision under prior law).

Where two vehicles collided and both drivers were negligent, but negligence of one driver was less than that of the other, the first driver may recover as long as the damages are diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to him. Scoville v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 458 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1972).

The basic purpose of law that provided that contributory negligence was not a bar to recovery where negligence of person claiming damages was less than the person causing such damages was to distribute the total damages among those who caused them, and since the legislature intended to deny recovery to a plaintiff only when his negligence was at least 50% of the cause of the alleged injuries, where the plaintiff's negligence was less than 50% of all the codefendants' he was entitled to recover from each or all of them as joint tortfeasors even though the plaintiff's negligence equalled or exceeded that of a particular codefendant. Riddell v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 488 S.W.2d 34 (1973).

Where machine operator employee was experienced, had been cautioned on dangers and had violated operating instructions, there was evidence to support the verdict that his fault exceeded that of his employer. Smith v. Aaron, 256 Ark. 414, 508 S.W.2d 320 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Under the Arkansas comparative negligence statute in effect at the time of accident, a claimant could recover only if his negligence was of a lesser degree than the negligence of the defendant; and if a claimant was without fault, he could recover the full amount of any damages proximately caused by the United States and it made no difference that another claimant might have been more negligent than the United States. Deal v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. Ark. 1977) (decision under prior law).

The fault sought to be compared in comparative negligence claim must be a proximate cause of the damages sustained by a party. Kubik v. Igleheart, 280 Ark. 310, 657 S.W.2d 545 (1983).

In a personal injury suit brought by a hotel guest who fell when the toilet lid detached from the toilet assembly, there was no substantial evidence of the guest's negligence and the issue of comparative fault should not have been presented to the jury; thus, the trial court erred by denying a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of comparative negligence and by refusing to instruct the jury as to res ipsa loquitur. Marx v. Huron Little Rock, 88 Ark. App. 284, 198 S.W.3d 127 (2004).

In a negligence case, the trial court committed reversible error when it submitted the case on special interrogatories, without allowing counsel to argue the effect of the comparative-fault special interrogatory. Campbell v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 89 Ark. App. 91, 200 S.W.3d 473 (2004), rev'd, 363 Ark. 132, 211 S.W.3d 500 (2005).

In a wrongful death case brought by pedestrian's administratrix, the trial court did not err by denying plantiff's motion for directed verdict on defendant motorist's assertion of comparative fault; there was substantial evidence that the pedestrian was negligent. There was testimony that the driver never crossed the center line and had remained in the northbound lane at all times, and it was up to the jury to determine the weight and value to be given to the testimony of the witnesses. Belcher v. Denton, 2016 Ark. App. 263, 492 S.W.3d 551 (2016).

Contribution among Tortfeasors.

The adoption of comparative fault did not prevent a joint tortfeasor, whose fault had been determined to be in the amount of 50 percent or more, from having contribution from his fellow tortfeasor who was less negligent. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Star City Gravel Co., 452 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1979).

Exemption.

Where state fair booklet and entry forms clearly stated that the fair association would not be responsible for loss or damage to property while it was on the fair grounds and the fair booklet also specifically informed entrants that if they desired to protect their property from fire loss, they should obtain insurance against that risk, a jury could conclude that, taken as a whole, the clauses exempted the fair association from liability for negligently caused fire damage to property. Frensley v. National Fire Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1988).

Fault.

Fault to be compared may consist of a party's breach of warranty. Little Rock Elec. Contractors v. Okonite Co., 294 Ark. 399, 744 S.W.2d 381 (1988).

Insurance.

In action for benefits of uninsured motorist clause in policy of auto insurance where claimant was found to have been guilty of contributory negligence less in degree than that of other driver, diminution of jury verdict was properly based upon total verdict rather than upon policy limit for uninsured motorist protection so as to constitute a recovery in excess of policy limit permitting a recovery of penalty and attorney's fees. Alexander v. Pilot Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 331 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (decision under prior law).

A subrogated insurer is barred from recovery if the insured would be barred from pursuing his cause of action because of his contributory negligence; accordingly, where the evidence showed that decedent's negligence exceeded the total negligence of all the defendants, the subrogated insurer cannot recover for the amounts paid to decedent's beneficiaries. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. Ark. 1981).

Jury.

Since there cannot be an unavoidable accident when one of the parties was negligent, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury relative to unavoidable accident, the collision in question certainly being caused by somebody's negligence and the jury finding both parties to be negligent. Sullivan v. Fanestiel, 229 Ark. 662, 317 S.W.2d 713 (1958) (decision under prior law).

It was the function of the jury to determine how the negligence of the plaintiff compared to the negligence of the defendant where there was a question of contributory negligence and assumption of risk involved. Rhoads v. Service Machine Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (decision under prior law).

The question of the comparative negligence of the parties was exclusively for the jury. Scoville v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 458 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1972) (decision under prior law).

Where the plaintiff claimed its dairy herd was injured as a result of faulty design of the defendant's silo and defendants responded with sufficient evidence of owner mismanagement at the dairy to warrant a fault comparison by the jury, the district court erred when it refused to instruct the jury to reduce plaintiff's award by the amount of its own negligence or other breach of duty. Circle J Dairy, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 790 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1986).

Where the interrogatory clearly instructed the jury to use 100% to represent the total negligence of the defendants, not the total negligence contributing to the injury, the jury was allowed to consider the plaintiff's blame. Circle J Dairy, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 790 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1986).

Where the plaintiff asked for $684,962 in damages and was awarded $500,000, or approximately 77% of the claim, jurors did not consider any fault on the plaintiff's part equal to or exceeding that attributable to defendants. Circle J Dairy, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 790 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1986).

A trial court is not obligated to give an instruction on assumption of risk when such theory of recovery is no longer applicable law in Arkansas. Ouachita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).

Submission of comparative fault special-interrogatory verdict forms to the jury by the circuit court during deliberations without allowing the victim the opportunity to argue to the jury the effects of answers to those interrogatories violated subsection (d) of this section; further, the error was not harmless, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 61, as the victim's inability to argue the effects of the jury's answers to the interrogatories was prejudicial. Campbell v. Entergy Arkansas, Inc., 363 Ark. 132, 211 S.W.3d 500 (2005).

Circuit court's error in resubmitting a negligence case on special interrogatory verdict forms without allowing the individual the opportunity to argue to the jury the effects of the answers to the interrogatories pursuant to § 16-64-122(d) was not harmless error where the jury apportioned each party fifty percent (50%) fault, even the slightest tipping of those percentages in favor of the individual would have resulted in a judgment against the owner of the electrical wire, the jury had been deadlocked at one point, six to six, only the minimum number of jurors needed for a verdict were in agreement, and the error was particularly injurious because the individual could not have known at closing arguments that special interrogatory forms would be used. Campbell v. Entergy Arkansas, Inc., 363 Ark. 132, 211 S.W.3d 500 (2005).

Trial court did not err in a product liability action in allowing evidence of a driver's alcohol consumption and instructing the jury on comparative fault under subsection (a) of this section; it was for the jury to decide whether the driver's fault, if any, served as a proximate cause of the truck catching on fire. Gartman v. Ford Motor Co., 2013 Ark. App. 665, 430 S.W.3d 218 (2013).

Jury Instructions.

Trial court properly instructed the jury on comparative fault as the broad language set forth in this section contradicted plaintiff's claim that fault should not be compared in enhanced-injury cases; under Arkansas law, comparative fault was applicable to all actions for personal injury or wrongful death. Bishop v. Tariq, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 445, 384 S.W.3d 659 (2011).

Malpractice.

The issue of a plaintiff's fault may be submitted to the jury in a legal malpractice action even when the plaintiff has not taken some specific action to interfere with the attorney's performance. Reliance Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Jennings, 189 F.3d 689 (8th Cir. 1999).

Mitigation.

The duty to mitigate damages is frequently viewed as a duty imposed by law to further a policy limitation on the amount of damages that may be collected by an injured party. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kerr, 804 F. Supp. 1091 (W.D. Ark. 1992)Criticized byResolution Trust Corp. v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 1995).

Multiple Defendants.

The plaintiff may recover from an individual defendant in a multiple defendant case even though the negligence of the individual defendant is less than that of the plaintiff. Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1996).

In a simple negligence case, the relative fault of the plaintiff is compared to the relative fault of the defendant and the plaintiff may recover damages only if his fault is less than the defendant's fault; in a case where there are multiple defendants, this section provides that a plaintiff is allowed to recover if his relative fault is less than the combined fault of all defendants. Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1996).

Pleading.

It may be possible to plead comparative negligence in mitigation of the tort of deceit. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 774 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1985).

As a consequence of failing to plead contributory negligence as an affirmative defense, defendant retailer did not have available the full benefit of a contributory negligence defense under subsection (b) of this section, but the failure did not make all evidence relating to plaintiff's conduct excludable under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403. Dupont v. Fred's Stores of Tenn., Inc., 652 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2011).

Professional Negligence.

This section can achieve its purpose in an accountant malpractice action, and its application will not improperly protect accountants from liability for the portion of harm caused by their professional negligence. FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

Review.

Apportionment of fault under this state's comparative fault statute is a matter within the province of the finder of fact, and thus subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1986).

In case where jury determined the plaintiffs were more at fault than the defendants, but still allowed recovery for plaintiffs, the evidence which was presented to the jury on the defendants' behalf was substantial and the trial court was correct in denying the motion for new trial. Hodges v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 305 Ark. 466, 808 S.W.2d 775 (1991).

Scope.

No Arkansas cases suggest that Arkansas follow the substantive comparative fault rule that a plaintiff's degree of fault should always be compared with the fault of other possible wrongdoers, even if plaintiff has asserted no claim against those wrong doers; indeed, given the plain language of this section — that the plaintiff's fault should be compared to that of the parties from whom the plaintiff “seeks to recover damages” — it is hard to imagine how the legislature's words could be construed to reach such a result. Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1996).

Seat Belts.

The nonuse of a seat belt may constitute a proximate cause of injury if some or all of the damage sustained by the nonuser would not have occurred had the seat belt been worn. Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1989).

Failure to wear an available seat belt may, in the absence of a statute requiring use, nevertheless constitute negligence under the general common-law standard of ordinary care. Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1989).

A jury may assess a percentage of fault against plaintiff if defendants can demonstrate the degree to which her injuries would have been reduced by use of a seat belt. Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1989).

Nonuse of seat belts may be admissible as evidence of comparative fault if such nonuse is a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries, which the defendant has the burden of proving. Baker v. Morrison, 309 Ark. 457, 829 S.W.2d 421 (1992).

Where there was no evidence that their nonuse of seat belts caused their injuries, the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion in limine to exclude evidence concerning their failure to wear seat belts, and the case was remanded for new trial where the erroneously admitted evidence may have led the jury to attribute more fault to plaintiffs than should have been attributed to them. Baker v. Morrison, 309 Ark. 457, 829 S.W.2d 421 (1992).

Cited: Strange v. Stovall, 261 Ark. 53, 546 S.W.2d 421 (1977); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977); Davis v. Cox, 268 Ark. 78, 593 S.W.2d 180 (1980); Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980); Legate v. Passmore, 268 Ark. 1161, 599 S.W.2d 151 (Ct. App. 1980); Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1147 (W.D. Ark. 1982); W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982); Smith v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 716 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1983); Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 724 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1983); Bankston v. Pulaski County School Dist., 281 Ark. 476, 665 S.W.2d 859 (1984); Scogin v. Century Fitness, Inc., 780 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1985); Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 662 F. Supp. 569 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Dawson v. Fulton, 294 Ark. 624, 745 S.W.2d 617 (1988); Elk Corp. of Ark. v. Builders Transport, Inc., 862 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1988); Garver & Garver v. Little Rock San. Sewer Comm., 300 Ark. 620, 781 S.W.2d 24 (1989); E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of Army, 874 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1989); Chaney v. Falling Creek Metal Prods., Inc., 906 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1990); Robertson v. Union Pac. R.R., 954 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1992).

16-64-123. Excessiveness of damages generally.

The verdict of any jury rendered in any action for the recovery of damages where the measure thereof is indeterminate or uncertain shall not be held to be excessive or be set aside as excessive, except for some erroneous instruction or, upon evidence, aside from the amount of the damages assessed, that it was rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice.

History. Acts 1901, No. 125, § 1, p. 196; C. & M. Dig., § 1313; Pope's Dig., § 1538; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1903.

Research References

ALR.

Liability of cigarette manufacturers for punitive damages. 108 A.L.R.5th 343.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The court held this section to be void insofar as it curtailed the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Whether this section is void insofar as it affects the jurisdiction of the circuit court was not decided. St. Louis & N. A. R. Co. v. Mathis, 76 Ark. 184, 91 S.W. 763 (1905).

In General.

This section is not the basic authority for reduction of a jury verdict by a trial court and it only purports to limit the basic and inherent power of the court in certain cases. Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).

Applicability.

Where losing party did not waive all errors and where the winning party did not remit the excess, this section does not apply. Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).

Factors Considered.

The standard of review for whether damages are so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court or demonstrate that the jury was motivated by passion or prejudice involves consideration of such elements as past and future medical expenses, permanent injury, loss of earning capacity, scars resulting in disfigurement, and pain, suffering, and mental anguish. Gipson v. Garrison, 308 Ark. 344, 824 S.W.2d 829 (1992).

Grounds for Reduction.

A belief by a trial court that damages are excessive is not, standing alone, a sufficient ground for ordering a reduction. Morrison v. Lowe, 274 Ark. 358, 625 S.W.2d 452 (1981).

Record sufficient to find that award of actual and punitive damages was excessive, but that underlying liability determinations were not tainted; therefore remittitur was appropriate. Dees v. Allied Fid. Ins. Co., 655 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Ark. 1985).

Power of Court.

This section, which provides that in cases where damages are not susceptible of definite measurement a remittitur shall be ordered only where the judgment is rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice, is not the basic authority for the reduction of a jury verdict, since remittitur is within the inherent power of a court. Morrison v. Lowe, 274 Ark. 358, 625 S.W.2d 452 (1981).

Reduction improper.

Punitive damages award of $350,000 against husband for assaulting his wife did not shock the court's conscience or demonstrate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Cater v. Cater, 311 Ark. 627, 846 S.W.2d 173 (1993).

Cited: Jamison v. Spivey, 197 Ark. 698, 125 S.W.2d 453 (1939); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Noles, 201 Ark. 1088, 148 S.W.2d 650 (1941); Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).

16-64-124. Remittitur.

The circuit judge presiding at the trial, if he or she deems the verdict excessive, may, on motion for a new trial filed by the losing party, indicate the amount of the excess. Thereupon, if the losing party offers to file and enter of record a release of all errors that may have accrued at the trial if the prevailing party will remit the amount so deemed excessive and the prevailing party refuses to remit the amount so deemed excessive, the verdict shall be set aside.

History. Acts 1901, No. 125, § 1, p. 196; C. & M. Dig., § 1313; Pope's Dig., § 1538; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1903.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The court held this section to be void insofar as it curtailed the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Whether this section is void insofar as it affects the jurisdiction of the circuit court was not decided. St. Louis & N. A. R. Co. v. Mathis, 76 Ark. 184, 91 S.W. 763 (1905).

Applicability.

Where losing party did not waive all errors and where the winning party did not remit the excess, this section does not apply. Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).

In a conversion action, the ratio between the punitive-damages award of $250,000 before the trial court's remittitur was not “grossly excessive” where the compensatory damages award of $35,000 established an approximate 7:1 ratio, which was well within the acceptable range when reviewing that particular factor under recent United States Supreme Court rulings; on cross-appeal the trial court was ordered to reinstate, upon remand, the original punitive-damages award of $250,000. Hudson v. Cook, 82 Ark. App. 246, 105 S.W.3d 821 (2003).

Excessive after Remittitur.

Where, from all the evidence, the amount awarded by the jury appears excessive and the trial court so found; and where, after the plaintiff had entered a remittitur, the judgment was still grossly excessive and there was no satisfactory evidence from which the Supreme Court could determine what sum should be awarded, the cause should be remanded for a new trial. Jamison v. Spivey, 197 Ark. 698, 125 S.W.2d 453 (1939).

Grounds for Reduction.

Record sufficient to find that award of actual and punitive damages was excessive, but that underlying liability determinations were not tainted; therefore remittitur was appropriate. Dees v. Allied Fid. Ins. Co., 655 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Ark. 1985).

Motion for Reduction.

Motion for reduction of jury award is held to be in the nature of a request for a remittitur under this section and not a motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, and its granting is not inconsistent with granting a new trial. Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).

Power of Court.

Court's action in reducing verdict without requiring filing of release provided by this section was not error, court having inherent power to reduce verdicts to conform to established facts. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Noles, 201 Ark. 1088, 148 S.W.2d 650 (1941).

Refusal to Order.

The trial court did not err in refusing to order a remittitur of damages for mental anguish and loss of consortium where there was no showing that the verdict was influenced by passion, and the verdict, while high, was not so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court. Martin v. Rieger, 289 Ark. 292, 711 S.W.2d 776 (1986).

Scope.

This section is not the basic authority for reduction of a jury verdict by a trial court and it only purports to limit the basic and inherent power of the court in certain cases. Dorey v. McCoy, 246 Ark. 1244, 442 S.W.2d 202 (1969).

This section, which provides that in cases where damages are not susceptible of definite measurement a remittitur shall be ordered only where the judgment is rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice, is not the basic authority for the reduction of a jury verdict, since remittitur is within the inherent power of a court. Morrison v. Lowe, 274 Ark. 358, 625 S.W.2d 452 (1981).

Cited: Morrison v. Lowe, 274 Ark. 358, 625 S.W.2d 452 (1981).

16-64-125. Method of serving judgment on defendant constructively summoned.

The service of the copy of the judgment, if in this state, shall be made and proved in the same manner as the service of a summons and, if out of this state, in the manner prescribed in § 16-58-119 [superseded], as to the service of a copy of the complaint and summons and proof thereof.

History. Civil Code, § 452; C. & M. Dig., § 6267; Pope's Dig., § 8223; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1909.

16-64-126. Title of bona fide purchasers of property unaffected by new trial.

The title of purchasers in good faith to any property sold under an attachment or judgment shall not be affected by the new trial permitted by ARCP, Rule 59, except the title of property obtained by the plaintiff and not bought of him in good faith by others.

History. Civil Code, § 453; C. & M. Dig., § 6268; Pope's Dig., § 8224; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1910.

16-64-127 — 16-64-129. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning transcripts and the record on appeal in equity cases, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 194. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-64-127. Acts 1915, No. 290, § 19; C. & M. Dig., § 1269; Pope's Dig., § 1493; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-1728.

16-64-128. Acts 1945, No. 196, § 1; 1951, No. 139, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1754 — 27-1756.

16-64-129. Acts 1951, No. 139, §§ 3-7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-1757 — 27-1761.

16-64-130. Punitive damage — Contract involving financial institutions.

  1. For the purposes of this section, the term “financial institutions” means banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions located within the State of Arkansas and which are insured by an agency of the federal government.
  2. This section shall be applicable in civil actions in which a claim is asserted against a financial institution, whether by complaint, counterclaim, third party complaint, or other pleading. If a claim asserted against a financial institution is determined by the court to be a breach of contract claim arising out of a loan of money or other extension of credit by the financial institution to the person asserting the claim, then punitive damages shall not be awarded to the person asserting the claim unless it is found that the person asserting the claim suffered personal injury or physical damage to property as a result of the financial institution's alleged action or inaction.

History. Acts 1991, No. 532, § 1.

Case Notes

Punitive damages not allowed.

Where a bank had provided recourse financing to a car dealer for 20 years, during that time had executed contracts establishing the terms for such financing, and within months of executing one such contract notified the dealer that it would not honor the same, the claim involved the issuance of credit; therefore, under this section, the dealer was not entitled to punitive damages in his breach of contract action against the bank. Bank of Am., N.A. v. C.D. Smith Motor Co., 353 Ark. 228, 106 S.W.3d 425 (2003).

16-64-131. New business rule — Damages.

  1. In a case involving a recognized tort or breach of contract, there is no absolute denial of damages for lost profits to a newly established business.
  2. A newly established business is subject to the same standard of proof for lost profits as any other business regardless of how long the newly established business has operated.

History. Acts 2017, No. 1103, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2017, No. 1103, § 1, provided: “Legislative findings.

The General Assembly finds that:

“(1) Courts in this state and others may have perceived Arkansas as a ‘new business rule’ state concerning the exclusion of lost profit damages for a newly established business;

“(2) Damages have been recoverable in this state if they can be established with a reasonable degree of certainty; and

“(3) The question of damages, both as to measure or amount, is a question of fact, and thus Arkansas has not applied a rigid ‘new business rule’ to bar the award of future lost profits in tort or breach of contract cases.”

Acts 2017, No. 1103, § 2, provided: “Legislative intent.

The General Assembly intends to:

“(1) Annul the application of the ‘new business rule’ on any action for damages consisting of lost profits; and

“(2) Prohibit the recognition of the ‘new business rule’ in a court in this state.”

Chapter 65 Judgments Generally

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Executions may issue on judgments, § 16-66-101.

Limitations on actions on judgment, § 16-56-114.

Effective Dates. Acts 1859, No. 147, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1868, No. 9, § 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1891, No. 56, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 92, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1945, No. 55, § 3: Feb. 16, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “Because of the confusion and uncertainty existing in the various counties throughout the State under the present laws relative to the legal fees entitled to be charged by the Circuit and Chancery Clerks and Recorders in this State for the services they render, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1963, No. 124, § 2: Feb. 28, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the fee presently provided for recorders for recording, indexing and cross-indexing instruments of writing is not adequate to compensate such recorders and in fact is working a severe hardship on the recorders in the various counties and that this act is immediately necessary to correct the situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 333, § 6: Mar. 1, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the establishment of uniform advance fees to be charged for causes of action by the clerks in the various circuit and chancery courts of this State is necessary to provide for the efficient operation of said offices and to minimize the necessity of maintaining separate accounts for various fees; that the fees charged by county recorders are not now adequate to reimburse the county for the service of recording instruments, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to promote the efficient administration of justice in this State and to enable counties to recover reasonable fees for services rendered by recorders. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 782, § 3: Apr. 3, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the rate of interest on judgments should be assessed in accordance with the amendment to Article XIX, Section 13 of the Constitution of Arkansas which became effective December 2, 1982. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Running of interest on judgment where both parties appeal. 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.

State statute or rule allowing interest or changing rate of interest on judgments or verdicts. 41 A.L.R.4th 694.

“One Satisfaction Rule” as Ground for Summary Judgment, 20 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2018).

Am. Jur. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgm., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 49 C.J.S., Judgm., § 1 et seq.

16-65-101, 16-65-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning the definition of a judgment, and rendering judgments in a single action against several defendants, were repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1275, § 1. They were derived from the following sources:

16-65-101. Civil Code, § 399; C. & M. Dig., § 6233; Pope's Dig., § 8189; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-101.

16-65-102. Civil Code, §§ 401, 404; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6235, 6237; Pope's Dig., §§ 8191, 8193; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-103, 29-104. For present law, see ARCP 54.

16-65-103. Computation of amount of judgment.

In all judgments or decrees rendered by any court of justice for any debt, damages, or costs, and on all executions issued thereon, the amount shall be computed, as near as may be, in dollars and cents, rejecting smaller fractions. No judgment or other proceeding shall be considered erroneous for such an omission.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 100, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 7351; Pope's Dig., § 9390; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-115.

Case Notes

In General.

An entry containing a statement that one of the defendants should have paid the plaintiff a certain amount each month but no statement of the amount due plaintiff was not a judgment within the meaning of this section, but only findings of fact upon which the judgment should be based. Thomas v. McElroy, 243 Ark. 465, 420 S.W.2d 530 (1967).

Costs.

In a condemnation action, costs awarded were to be treated as a judgment and the trust was entitled to postjudgment interest. City of Bryant v. Boone Trust, 2018 Ark. App. 547, 564 S.W.3d 550 (2018).

Final Judgment.

In a case alleging breach of contract that arose from a termination of employment, a July 2013 order lacked finality because it did not calculate an amount that a former employee was entitled to in dollars and cents; the fact that the court found that the former employee was entitled to lost wages of $45,000 less the amount she earned while employed by the county clerk did not cure a defect in a January 2013 order. Helena-West Helena Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Shields, 2014 Ark. App. 519 (2014).

Multiple Parties.

Judgment in a vehicle rollover case was not final as required by Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 2(a)(1), because it merely set forth the jury's findings that both the vehicle manufacturer and the other driver were responsible and the total amount of damages, rather than a specific dollar amount owed by the manufacturer pursuant to this section. Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 88 (2013).

Cited: McWhorter v. McWhorter, 2009 Ark. 458, 344 S.W.3d 64 (2009); Daniel v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. 206, 520 S.W.3d 258 (2017).

16-65-104. Computation of special damages.

  1. Where special damages are given by statute and it appears, by the verdict of the jury, or other decision of the action, that the special damages are due and recoverable by one of the parties against the other, the court shall render judgment for that party.
  2. If, in ascertaining the amount of the special damages, it is necessary to assess the value of any property or amount of any debt or claim, the court may hear the proof and assess the value or amount, or have the assessment made by a jury.

History. Civil Code, § 421; C. & M. Dig., § 6275; Pope's Dig., § 8231; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-114.

Case Notes

Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict.

In an action in which special statutory damages are recoverable in addition to wages due, a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict for wages due must be made before judgment is entered on the verdict. Chaney v. Missouri P.R.R., 167 Ark. 172, 267 S.W. 564 (1925).

16-65-105. Excess of setoff over claim.

  1. If a setoff established at the trial exceeds the plaintiff's claim so established, judgment for the defendant must be given for the excess.
  2. If it appears that the defendant is entitled to any other affirmative relief, judgment shall be given therefor.

History. Civil Code, § 419; C. & M. Dig., § 6274; Pope's Dig., § 8230; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-112.

Case Notes

Cited: Auten v. United States Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125, 19 S. Ct. 628, 43 L. Ed. 920 (1899).

16-65-106. Reservation of infant's right to show cause against judgment.

It shall not be necessary to reserve, in a judgment or order, the right of an infant to show cause against the judgment or order after his or her attaining full age. However, in any case in which, but for this section, such a reservation would have been proper, the infant, within twelve (12) months after arriving at the age of eighteen (18) years, may show cause against the order or judgment.

History. Civil Code, § 423; C. & M. Dig., § 6277; Pope's Dig., § 8233; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-117.

Case Notes

Decree Absolute.

A decree does not become absolute till the expiration of the time to show cause. Rankin v. Schofield, 81 Ark. 440, 98 S.W. 674 (1905).

Ejectment.

Where, in a suit for ejectment, in which an infant is not deprived of his interest in land, the rule that an infant may sue to show cause and set aside the judgment when he attains his majority does not apply. Paragould Trust Co. v. Perrin, 103 Ark. 67, 145 S.W. 886 (1912).

Land Interests.

A decree against an infant, divesting his title to land if regularly obtained, is not void but voidable for cause. Blanton v. Rose, 70 Ark. 415, 68 S.W. 674 (1902).

Where a decree divests a minor of an interest in lands, he has a right to show cause against the decree within 12 months after arriving at full age. Purcell v. Gann, 113 Ark. 332, 168 S.W. 1102 (1914).

Where a conveyance by a father to his infant children was set aside as a fraud upon his creditors, the infants, having an interest in the land which they could divest only by conveyance, are entitled to show cause against the decree within 12 months after arriving at the age of majority. Berringer v. Stevens, 145 Ark. 293, 225 S.W. 14 (1920).

In suit to foreclose a trust deed by curator of minors where default decree was rendered for cross-complainant claiming title as purchaser at tax sale, demurrer to minors' motion or complaint to set aside the decree was improperly sustained since proceeding was not a collateral attack on the decree and minors had right to petition for vacation of erroneous judgment. Arkansas Trust Co. v. Sims, 198 Ark. 1143, 133 S.W.2d 854 (1939).

Liens.

This section has no application to decrees of foreclosure under liens placed upon the lands of an infant by his ancestor. Estes v. Lucky, 133 Ark. 97, 201 S.W. 815 (1918); Shaw v. Polk, 152 Ark. 18, 237 S.W. 703 (1922).

Limitations.

A suit to set aside a judgment against an infant must be brought within 12 months after the infant attains majority, if not within that period the action is barred the same as an action of an adult. Ready v. Ozan Inv. Co., 190 Ark. 506, 79 S.W.2d 433 (1935).

Partnership.

In an action to wind up a partnership, a decree providing for the service of summons upon a minor and appointment of a guardian and attorney ad litem for the minor is binding on her to the same extent as if she were an adult heir. James v. Wade, 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13 (1940).

Plaintiffs.

The sections authorizing a minor to show cause against a judgment or decree after coming of age affords no relief to an infant plaintiff. Glasscock v. Glasscock, 98 Ark. 151, 135 S.W. 835 (1911).

This section refers to judgments against infant defendants and an infant plaintiff cannot, upon attaining his majority, have a judgment in his favor set aside because of its inadequacy. Walker v. Killoren Elec. Co., 243 Ark. 752, 421 S.W.2d 893 (1967).

Procedure.

Before a party can take advantage of this section, errors in the judgment must be shown. Martin v. Gwynn, 90 Ark. 44, 117 S.W. 754 (1909).

Right of Review.

The right of review of a judgment against a minor exists only where by the former practice it was proper to reserve in the decree his right to show cause. Paragould Trust Co. v. Perrin, 103 Ark. 67, 145 S.W. 886 (1912).

Cited: Jones v. Pond & Decker Mfg. Co., 79 Ark. 194, 96 S.W. 756 (1906); Brake v. Sides, 95 Ark. 74, 128 S.W. 572 (1910).

16-65-107. Recital of notice.

In all cases where it appears from a recital in the records of any court that actual or constructive notice was given, it shall be evidence of that fact.

History. Acts 1859, No. 147, § 2, p. 172; C. & M. Dig., § 6239; Pope's Dig., § 8195; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-108.

Case Notes

False Return.

An officer's false return of service of process does not preclude one from showing in proper proceeding that no service was had, and thus be relieved from burden of judgment or decree based on a false return of service. Husband v. Crockett, 195 Ark. 1031, 115 S.W.2d 882 (1938).

Notice.

A decree is not subject to collateral attack by infant defendant where the record is otherwise silent as to service of process. Huggins v. Dabbs, 57 Ark. 628, 22 S.W. 563 (1893).

Whether a domestic judgment when collaterally attacked, is void for want of notice, is a matter for the court to determine from an inspection of the record. McDonald v. Ft. Smith & W. R. Co., 105 Ark. 5, 150 S.W. 135 (1912).

A record which contradicts the finding of service in a decree stultifies itself and the decree is overcome. Union Inv. Co. v. Hunt, 187 Ark. 357, 59 S.W.2d 1039 (1933).

—Constructive Notice.

The recital in the record, that constructive notice to a nonresident defendant in chancery has been given by publication, is sufficient. Coons v. Throckmorton, 25 Ark. 60 (1867).

A decree in a proceeding by constructive service which recites that notice was given as required by statute, without specifying how notice was given, is valid as against collateral attack. McLain v. Duncan, 57 Ark. 49, 20 S.W. 597 (1892).

Presumption.

Where minor heirs-at-law endeavored to have a foreclosure decree vacated after attaining majority because of defective service on them as infants, the court held that there existed a presumption of service from a recital in the decree of foreclosure that could not be attacked collaterally. Boyd v. Roane, 49 Ark. 397, 5 S.W. 704 (1887).

The statutory presumption in favor of the recital in a record of service of process is not overcome by the fact that the record contains a copy of the summons without any return of service endorsed thereon. White v. Smith, 63 Ark. 513, 39 S.W. 555 (1897).

Where a decree recited that the defendants “were duly served with summons as required by law,” it will be presumed that defendants were duly summoned. Love v. Kaufman, 72 Ark. 265, 80 S.W. 884 (1904).

Recitals.

The recital in a judgment of the county court barring county warrants which had been called in for examination and reissue, that due notice of the order calling in the warrants had been given, is conclusive evidence of that fact. Newton v. Askew, 53 Ark. 476, 14 S.W. 670 (1890).

On a direct attack, recitals in a judgment that defendants, though served with summons, failed to appear were prima facie evidence of the fact stated and must be taken as true unless there is testimony to contradict them or tending to show to the contrary. First Nat'l Bank v. Dalsheimer, 157 Ark. 464, 248 S.W. 575 (1923).

In an action to set aside a default foreclosure decree, the evidence was held insufficient to prove want of service as against recitals of the decree showing service. Davis v. Ferguson, 164 Ark. 340, 261 S.W. 905 (1924).

A recital in the record of a court imparts absolute verity, and parties thereto are estopped from denying its truth. Recital of service is prima facie evidence of the fact. Fidelity Mtg. Co. v. Evans, 168 Ark. 459, 270 S.W. 624 (1925).

The evidence was held to make a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense to authorize a judgment obtained without service to be set aside on direct attack. First Nat'l Bank v. Turner, 169 Ark. 393, 275 S.W. 703 (1925).

Recitals in a judgment showing legal service are conclusive in the absence of fraud. Kindrick v. Capps, 196 Ark. 1169, 121 S.W.2d 515 (1938).

16-65-108. Judgments, orders, sentences, and decrees without notice void.

All judgments, orders, sentences, and decrees made, rendered, or pronounced by any of the courts of the state against anyone without notice, actual or constructive, and all proceedings had under judgments, orders, sentences, or decrees shall be absolutely null and void.

History. Acts 1859, No. 147, § 1, p. 172; C. & M. Dig., § 6238; Pope's Dig., § 8194; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-107.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Comment, Service of Process — Default Judgment, etc., 40 Ark. L. Rev. 381.

Case Notes

In General.

Judgment without notice to parties is void. Townsly-Myrick Dry Goods Co. v. Fuller, 58 Ark. 181, 24 S.W. 108 (1893); Grinstead v. Wilson, 69 Ark. 587, 65 S.W. 108 (1901).

Applicability.

This section was not applicable to order of chancery court restraining parties from entering property. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Hammock, 201 Ark. 927, 148 S.W.2d 324 (1941).

Sureties, having made themselves parties to the suit by entering into the appeal bond, are not entitled to notice before decree against them. Whetstone v. Atlas Drilling & Prod. Co., 241 Ark. 487, 409 S.W.2d 322 (1966).

This section is not applicable to an order to the Workers' Compensation Commission. Dura Craft Boats, Inc. v. Daugherty, 247 Ark. 125, 444 S.W.2d 562 (1969).

Intervention.

Although the State of Arkansas was indeed a party to the litigation, the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission and the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission were not parties to the litigation and, therefore, the chancery court erred by assuming jurisdiction over the commissions and a judgment ordering them to monitor the level of a lake was void. Taylor v. Zanone Props., 342 Ark. 465, 30 S.W.3d 74 (2000).

Issue Raised.

Where complaint based on a foreclosure to land stated that no notice of the land sale had been given, the court held the issue of the lack of notice was raised by the pleadings. Beck v. Rhoads, 235 Ark. 619, 361 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1962).

Judgment Void.

Any judgment rendered in vacation is invalid. Biffle v. Jackson, 71 Ark. 226, 72 S.W. 566 (1903).

An overdue tax sale based on a judgment rendered by a special judge at an adjourned term of the court held on a day when the regular judge was holding the regular term of court in another county in the same circuit is a nullity. Caldwell v. Barrett, 71 Ark. 310, 74 S.W. 748 (1903).

Where in order to have rights in certain lands determined court confirmed title in one of defendants without the defendant having filed a cross-complaint and without notice to the other defendants and without any sort of pleadings which would authorize the decree, the judgment was void on the face of the record and not res judicata. Woolfolk v. Davis, 225 Ark. 722, 285 S.W.2d 321 (1955).

Under this section the defendant does not seek a trial, but asks that the judgment be declared void. White v. Ray, 267 Ark. 83, 589 S.W.2d 28 (1979).

In cases where judgments are void, no proof of a meritorious defense is necessary to set aside judgment. Cole v. First Nat'l Bank, 304 Ark. 26, 800 S.W.2d 412 (1990).

The doctrine res judicata or election of remedies do not apply when the out-of-state judgment on the issues in controversy has been declared void. Sides v. Kirchoff, 316 Ark. 680, 874 S.W.2d 373 (1994).

Although the State of Arkansas was indeed a party to the litigation, the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission and the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission were not parties to the litigation and, therefore, the chancery court erred by assuming jurisdiction over the commissions and a judgment ordering them to monitor the level of a lake was void. Taylor v. Zanone Props., 342 Ark. 465, 30 S.W.3d 74 (2000).

Judgment debtors were properly granted summary judgment in the judgment creditor's foreclosure action because the judgment was not revived in accord with the statute governing the issuance of a writ for scire facias as a writ had not been served on the debtors as required by the statute; thus, the order of revivor was void. Rose v. Harbor East, Inc., 2013 Ark. 496, 430 S.W.3d 773 (2013).

Notice.

A judgment of a court of general jurisdiction rendered without service of summons without the statutory written notice cannot be assailed if the defendant in the judgment had actual notice. Renfroe v. Parmelee, 143 Ark. 547, 220 S.W. 816 (1920).

Court may cause notice to be given when necessary to serve the purpose of justice, but plaintiff, having invoked the jurisdiction of the court, must take notice of the regular or adjourned sessions thereof. Berry v. Sims, 195 Ark. 326, 112 S.W.2d 25 (1938).

Where the uncontradicted testimony was to the effect that appellants had no notice of any kind, that the foreclosure suit would be or was, in fact, filed in this case, then the foreclosure decree, together with the deeds based thereon, would be subject to collateral attack. Beck v. Rhoads, 235 Ark. 619, 361 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1962).

An order dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice, entered without notice while the court was not in session, was void and was properly set aside without the filing of a verified complaint therefor by the plaintiff. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Steel, 245 Ark. 284, 431 S.W.2d 854 (1968).

Where the plaintiff did not demonstrate that sufficient inquiry was made in attempting to ascertain appellant's last known address and thereby deprive him of “reasonably probable” actual notice consistent with due process and the substitute service statute § 16-58-121 (a) and (b) was not sufficiently complied with, the default judgment was void. Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971).

On motion to set aside default judgment on ground of defective service of process where service was invalid, judgment was void ab initio. Edmonson v. Farris, 263 Ark. 505, 565 S.W.2d 617 (1978).

This section has to do with a judgment entered without any notice whatever, not merely without formal notice. White v. Ray, 267 Ark. 83, 589 S.W.2d 28 (1979).

A summons notice to be valid must be reasonably calculated to make the defendant aware of his duty to take action or risk entry of a default judgment; judgments by default rendered without valid service of notice are judgments rendered without jurisdiction and are therefore void. Tucker v. Johnson, 275 Ark. 61, 628 S.W.2d 281 (1982), overruled, Southern Transit Co. v. Collums, 333 Ark. 170, 966 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1998). But see Southern Transit Co. v. Collums, 333 Ark. 170, 966 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1998).

—Constructive Service.

A judgment enforcing an attachment on land based on constructive service will not be quashed on certiorari because sheriff's return was defective if the judgment defendant had an adequate remedy at law allowing parties against whom judgment is rendered on constructive service two years in which to come into court and move to have case retried. Gates v. Hayes, 69 Ark. 518, 64 S.W. 271 (1901).

A judgment based on constructive service by publication is void where a warning order was not made upon the complaint. Beidler v. Beidler, 71 Ark. 318, 74 S.W. 13 (1903).

A decree of divorce based upon constructive service by publication without actual service is void where her name was given in the complaint, warning order, and decree was erroneous. Grober v. Clements, 71 Ark. 565, 76 S.W. 555 (1903).

Where a resident defendant is served with constructive service, the proceedings are null and void. Barksdale v. Barksdale, 170 Ark. 228, 279 S.W. 789 (1926).

—Presumption.

Where infant heirs and their guardian ad litem were served with process in a suit to foreclose mortgage, and no attempt was made to vacate decree until all party defendants had attained 21 years, then all joined in action to vacate judgment on grounds that process had been defective, it was held that the presumption of service was conclusive from the record and could not be contradicted by evidence. Boyd v. Roane, 49 Ark. 397, 5 S.W. 704 (1887).

A presumption of regularity attends a judgment of a superior court of general jurisdiction which can be controverted only by showing that there was no notice and that a meritorious defense existed which could have been asserted notwithstanding this section. Soverigan Camp, W. W. v. Wilson, 136 Ark. 546, 207 S.W. 45 (1918).

Pleadings.

When a motion alleges that the judgment is void, and the challenge is based on this section, the movant who had no notice of the suit against him need not allege a meritorious defense to have the judgment set aside. Green v. Yarbrough, 299 Ark. 175, 771 S.W.2d 760 (1989).

Service of Process.

Because service of process was insufficient to give notice, the default judgment was void ab initio. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997).

Supersession.

The reporter's notes to A.R.C.P., Rule 71, suggest that this section is superseded, but if this section is superseded by Rule 71 it is only to the extent necessary “for enforcing obedience” to orders of the court, and is expressly not superseded with respect to judgments by default. Tucker v. Johnson, 275 Ark. 61, 628 S.W.2d 281 (1982), overruled, Southern Transit Co. v. Collums, 333 Ark. 170, 966 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1998). But see Southern Transit Co. v. Collums, 333 Ark. 170, 966 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1998).

Writ of Garnishment.

Where a writ of garnishment served as summons in an action but failed to notify the garnishee that failure to answer could result in judgment against him, proper notice was not given which was a fatal defect in the writ. DeSoto, Inc. v. Crow, 257 Ark. 882, 520 S.W.2d 307 (1975).

Cited: Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971); Davis v. Schimmel, 252 Ark. 1201, 482 S.W.2d 785 (1972); Edmonson v. Farris, 263 Ark. 505, 565 S.W.2d 617 (1978); Southern Paper Box Co. v. Houston, 15 Ark. App. 176, 690 S.W.2d 745 (1985).

16-65-109. Entry of judgment.

  1. When a trial by a jury has been had, judgment must be entered by the clerk in conformity with the verdict, unless it is special or the court orders the case to be reserved for future argument or consideration.
  2. When the verdict is special, where there has been a special finding upon particular questions of fact or where the court has ordered the case to be reserved, the court shall order what judgment shall be entered.

History. Civil Code, §§ 416, 417; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6271, 6272; Pope's Dig., §§ 8227, 8228; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-109, 29-110.

Case Notes

In General.

Judgment will be entered in conformity to the verdict unless (1) the verdict is special and the court reserves the case for further consideration or (2) a party is entitled to judgment upon the pleadings notwithstanding the verdict. Powers v. Wood Parts Corp., 184 Ark. 1032, 44 S.W.2d 324 (1931).

Interest.

The court has no power to add interest to the verdict of a jury in rendering verdicts. Hallum v. Dickinson, 47 Ark. 120, 14 S.W. 477 (1886).

Inclusion of interest in judgment in eminent domain proceeding does not violate this section requiring judgment to conform to verdict, since an eminent domain proceeding while in the nature of a suit for damages is actually an action to determine value of land taken. Ark. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Stupenti, 222 Ark. 9, 257 S.W.2d 37 (1953).

Time of Entry.

Where a decree entered upon the record of the chancery court purports to have been rendered on a day when the court was in session, though it was entered upon the record after the entry of an order adjourning the court for the term, it will be presumed that the decree was rendered in term time and not in vacation. Fiddyment v. Bateman, 97 Ark. 76, 133 S.W. 192 (1910).

Cited: Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Sharp, 194 Ark. 405, 108 S.W.2d 579 (1937); Henderson v. Skerczak, 247 Ark. 446, 446 S.W.2d 243 (1969).

16-65-110. Judgments by default.

  1. Judgments by default rendered by the circuit courts may be recorded in a separate book for that purpose.
  2. The orders showing the rendition of these judgments by default shall be signed by the circuit judge.

History. Civil Code, § 424; C. & M. Dig., § 2229; Pope's Dig., § 2857; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-122.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Setting Aside Default Judgments in Arkansas, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 971.

16-65-111. Death of party.

  1. If, after a verdict is rendered in any action, either party dies before judgment is actually entered thereon, the court may at any time during the term at which the verdict was rendered enter final judgment in the names of the original parties.
  2. Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to authorize the entry of the judgment against any party who may have died before a verdict was actually rendered against him or her, notwithstanding he or she may have died on the first day or any other day of the term at which the verdict may have been rendered. Such a verdict shall be void.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 1, §§ 11, 12; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1306, 1307; Pope's Dig., §§ 1531, 1532; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-105, 29-106.

Case Notes

Nunc Pro Tunc Order.

Where a cause has been submitted in the Supreme Court, if either party dies before final judgment, the judgment may be rendered in the names of the original parties as of a day previous to the death; or, if the death of either party is suggested and proved, a nunc pro tunc order may be made to extend back to a day between the submission and death. Pool v. Loomis, 5 Ark. (5 Pike) 110 (1843).

16-65-112. Entry of judgment upon order book.

The judgment must be entered upon the order book and must specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the action.

History. Civil Code, § 422; C. & M. Dig., § 6276; Pope's Dig., § 8232; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-116.

Case Notes

Allowance to Widow.

Where allowance to administratrix, as deceased's widow, out of decedent's personalty, was made without minor child whose interests were affected and for whom no defense was made, being a party to the proceeding, minor had 12 months after coming of age in which to move to have the order vacated. Moudy v. Bradley, 200 Ark. 630, 140 S.W.2d 113 (1940).

Court Memorandum.

In action for divorce where a memorandum of the court sets out that certain realty is held by the parties as an estate by the entirety, but does not set forth whether it will be continued as such and does not set visitation rights of the husband, the memorandum does not clearly specify the relief granted as required by this section and therefore is not a decree. O'Dell v. O'Dell, 247 Ark. 635, 447 S.W.2d 330 (1969).

Duty of Clerk.

It is the duty of the clerk to make a record of what the court orders and adjudges. Stanton v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 194 Ark. 135, 106 S.W.2d 584 (1937).

Cited: McConnell v. Bourland, 175 Ark. 253, 299 S.W. 44 (1927); Poe v. Walker, 183 Ark. 659, 37 S.W.2d 866 (1931).

16-65-113. Entry into judgment book — Index.

  1. The clerk must keep among the records of the court a book to be called the judgment book.
  2. The entry in the judgment book must show the names of the plaintiff and defendant and, if more than one (1), then of the first-named of each in the pleadings with the words “and others”, the term at which the judgment was entered, and a reference to the order book and page at which the judgment is to be found, with a space left for the entry of the satisfaction of the judgment.
    1. The clerk shall immediately after the rendition of any judgment or decree enter it in the judgment book, in which shall be alphabetically cross-indexed all the judgments of the court, according to the surnames of the plaintiff and defendant. If there is more than one (1) plaintiff or defendant, then the names of all plaintiffs and defendants shall be so indexed and cross-indexed.
    2. It shall be so arranged that all the judgments in the case of plaintiffs whose surnames commence with the same letter and all of each term shall immediately succeed each other.
  3. If a clerk scans judgments so that they appear in full on an internet-based system or other similar electronic system and are searchable by name and case number, the requirements of this subchapter no longer apply.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, § 31; Civil Code, § 424; Acts 1909, No. 17, § 1, p. 26; C. & M. Dig., § 6282; Pope's Dig., § 8238; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-118, 29-120, 29-121; Acts 2009, No. 1209, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that subsection (b) of this section was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (d).

16-65-114. Interest on judgments.

    1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, a judgment entered by a court shall bear post-judgment interest and, if appropriate under the facts of the case, prejudgment interest:
      1. In an action on a contract at the rate provided by the contract or at a rate equal to the Federal Reserve primary credit rate in effect on the date on which the judgment is entered plus two percent (2%), whichever is greater; and
      2. In any other action at a rate equal to the Federal Reserve primary credit rate in effect on the date on which the judgment is entered plus two percent (2%).
    2. Interest on a judgment shall not exceed the maximum rate permitted under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 89.
  1. A judgment rendered or to be rendered against a county in the state on a county warrant or other evidence of county indebtedness shall not bear interest.

History. Acts 1868, No. 9, § 2, p. 32; 1893, No. 78, § 1, p. 145; C. & M. Dig., § 7360; Pope's Dig., § 9399; Acts 1975, No. 474, § 1; 1985, No. 782, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-124; Acts 2009, No. 633, § 15; 2013, No. 1140, § 1; 2019, No. 995, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. In reference to the term “passage of this act,” Acts 1985, No. 782, § 3, provided that the act would take effect from and after its passage. The act was signed by the Governor on April 3, 1985.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “a circuit court” for “any court or magistrate” in (a); inserted (b) and redesignated the subsequent subsection accordingly; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2013 amendment rewrote and redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1); inserted (a)(2); deleted (b) and redesignated former (c) as present (b); and in present (b), substituted “a county warrant” for “county warrants,” and deleted “any” and “after the passage of this act” at the end.

The 2019 amendment, in the introductory language of (a)(1), deleted “interest on” preceding “a judgment”, inserted “post-judgment”, and added “and, if appropriate under the facts of the case, prejudgment interest”; substituted “at a rate equal to the Federal Reserve primary credit rate in effect on the date on which the judgment is entered plus two percent (2%)” for “ten percent (10%) per annum” in (a)(1)(A); and made a similar change in (a)(1)(B).

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Matthews, Interest Rate Provisions and the Negotiability of Commercial Paper, 1986 Ark. L. Notes 37.

Brill, A Primer on Judgment and Pre-Judgment Interest in Arkansas, 1989 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Ark. L. Rev.

Insurance — Insurer's Undertaking in Liability Policy for Interest on Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 14 Ark. L. Rev. 112.

Note, Compound Pre-Judgment Interest as an Element of Just Compensation: Wilson v. City of Fayetteville, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 937.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw: Tort Law, 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 759.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not violative of Ark. Const., Art. 2, §§ 8, 17. Read v. Mississippi County, 69 Ark. 365, 63 S.W. 807 (1901), aff'd, 188 U.S. 739, 23 S. Ct. 849, 47 L. Ed. 677 (1903).

This section does not violate the contract clause nor the due process clause of the federal Constitution.Missouri & Ark. Lumber & Mining Co. v. Greenwood Dist., 249 U.S. 170, 39 S. Ct. 202, 63 L. Ed. 538 (1919).

In General.

As a general rule, judgments bear interest. Taylor v. Corning Bank & Trust Co., 185 Ark. 691, 48 S.W.2d 1102 (1932).

All judgments should bear interest except those expressly excluded. Shofner v. Jones, 201 Ark. 540, 145 S.W.2d 350 (1940).

Ark. Const., Art. 19, § 13 has nothing to do with interest on a judgment amount. Gavin v. Gavin, 319 Ark. 270, 890 S.W.2d 592 (1995), overruled in part, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Sauer, 358 Ark. 89, 186 S.W.3d 229 (2004).

In a home sale breach of contract action, reversal and remand for a damages trial mooted the issue as to whether the sellers were entitled to postjudgment interest pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Heflin v. Brackelsberg, 2010 Ark. App. 261, 374 S.W.3d 755 (2010).

Construction.

The language of this section providing for an interest award of 10 percent on a judgment is mandatory barring discretionary reduction by the trial court. Rest Hills Memorial Park, Inc. v. Clayton Chapel Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 233, 6 Ark. App. 180, 639 S.W.2d 519 (1982).

Based on a review of the history and plain language of subsection (a) if this section and the emergency clause of Acts 1985, No. 782, § 3, the legislature intended the interest rate limitation in Ark. Const. art. 19, § 13 to apply to limit judgments in all cases, and Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp v. Carlton , 319 Ark. 555, 892 S.W.2d 496 (1995) and Gavin v. Gavin , 319 Ark. 270, 890 S.W.2d 592 (1995) are overruled to the extent they conflict with the rule; therefore, a 10 percent post-judgment interest award in a tort case was erroneous because it exceeded the 8.25 interest rate allowed in the particular case under Ark. Const. art. 19, § 13. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Sauer, 358 Ark. 89, 186 S.W.3d 229 (2004).

Under this section, postjudgment interest on attorney's fees does not accrue until the date the trial court quantifies the amount of attorney's fees in dollars and cents. Daniel v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. 206, 520 S.W.3d 258 (2017).

Purpose.

The purpose of interest on judgments is to compensate the judgment creditor for the fact that he had not had the use of a certain sum of money that has been adjudged to be his. Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979).

Costs.

In a condemnation action, costs awarded were to be treated as a judgment and the trust was entitled to postjudgment interest. City of Bryant v. Boone Trust, 2018 Ark. App. 547, 564 S.W.3d 550 (2018).

Discretion of Court.

In action for personal injuries where trial judge was unaware of his discretion in fixing rate of interest on judgment between ten percent and six percent and set the amount at six percent because he understood legal rate to be six percent in absence of contract for higher rate, the judgment on appeal was modified to provide an interest rate of ten percent. Dunn v. Brimer, 259 Ark. 855, 537 S.W.2d 164, 79 A.L.R.3d 958 (1976).

Where evidence in a condemnation action, showed that the trial judge did not actually exercise his discretion to override the mandatory language of this section providing for an interest award of 10 percent on any judgment, the land owners were entitled to an interest award of 6 percent from the date of the order of entry to the time of judgment, and at a rate of 10 percent from the date of the trial court's judgment until satisfaction. Rest Hills Memorial Park, Inc. v. Clayton Chapel Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 233, 6 Ark. App. 180, 639 S.W.2d 519 (1982).

Chancellor erred by simply imposing a rate of six percent instead of the rate prescribed by subsection (a) of this section. Chambers v. Manning, 315 Ark. 369, 868 S.W.2d 64 (1993).

Entire Amount.

Where judgment is rendered for the principal of a debt and interest, the entire judgment, including interest, will thereafter bear interest. Soudan Planting Co. v. Stevenson, 100 Ark. 384, 140 S.W. 271 (1911).

Entire Judgment.

In an action against a tort defendant's insurer, the judgment creditor of the tort judgment was entitled to interest on the entire judgment, even though it exceeded the policy limits. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 236 Ark. 268, 365 S.W.2d 454 (1963); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 238 Ark. 159, 379 S.W.2d 8 (1964).

Where execution on judgment against tortfeasor was returned unsatisfied and the judgment creditor then obtained judgment for a lesser amount against the defendant's insurer, he was entitled in addition thereto to interest on the original judgment. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 238 Ark. 159, 379 S.W.2d 8 (1964).

Final Judgment.

The probate court did not err in refusing to award interest pursuant to an order entered in 1987 finding that appellants were entitled to a sum from an estate, where the 1987 order was entered by agreement, and the order made it clear that the “judgment” was not due and owing, but was subject to a determination “at some later date” that sufficient funds existed, “then and only then will the judgment be paid”; this order by its own terms was not a final determination of an amount payable from the estate. Estate of Otto v. Estate of Fair, 316 Ark. 674, 875 S.W.2d 487 (1994).

Miscellaneous Awards.

With regard to awards made in condemnation proceedings by the state highway commission, § 27-67-316 is the more specific provision and controls over this section. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Scott, 264 Ark. 397, 571 S.W.2d 607 (1978).

Where the Public Service Commission ordered the telephone company to pay interest at the rate of ten percent per annum upon refunds that it ordered, the commission did not abuse its discretion in view of this section allowing interest at the rate of ten percent per annum on judgments in favor of creditors, unless the court rendering the judgment, in its discretion, reduces the rate. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 267 Ark. 550, 593 S.W.2d 434 (1980).

In action by taxpayers against city challenging ordinance levying privilege tax against waterworks commission, award of post-judgment interest was correct; since judgments against municipalities are not excluded in this section, the judgment entered would bear interest until paid at the rate of ten percent per annum. City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982), cert. denied, Cash v. Little Rock, 462 U.S. 1111, 103 S. Ct. 2464, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1341 (1983), overruled in part, T&T Chem. v. Priest, 351 Ark. 537, 95 S.W.3d 750 (2003).

Post-judgment interest was properly ordered to accrue not only on the jury award but also on the court's prejudgment interest award since the purpose of awarding interest would be frustrated if party were not compensated for the loss of use of all of his money, both before and after judgment. Hopper v. Denham, 281 Ark. 84, 661 S.W.2d 379 (1983).

Post-judgment award of interest at a rate of ten percent was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court where court considered economic conditions and the prevailing rate of interest in conformity with the purpose of awarding post-judgment interest, which is to compensate the judgment creditor for the loss of the use of money adjudged to be his. Hopper v. Denham, 281 Ark. 84, 661 S.W.2d 379 (1983).

Post-judgment interest rate of 6.25 percent on non-contract damages imposed by a trial court was proper as the 10 percent post-judgment interest that the prevailing party sought was not awardable if it exceeded the amount allowed by the Arkansas Constitution. Superior Fed. Bank v. Mackey, 84 Ark. App. 1, 129 S.W.3d 324 (2003).

Multiple Defendants.

Where the injured party plaintiff got a judgment in another state against the insured, which was unsatisfied, and plaintiff got another judgment in Arkansas against the insurer, the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the foreign judgment until it is reduced to an Arkansas judgment and interest on the Arkansas judgment from the date of its entry to the date of the trial as a matter of law. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 236 Ark. 268, 365 S.W.2d 454 (1963).

Period of Interest.

Where judgment was rendered for plaintiff on its claim and for a lesser amount for defendant on its counterclaim, reversed on appeal from the counterclaim judgment and, on retrial, again rendered for the original amounts, plaintiff was entitled to interest only on the difference between the two judgments from the date of the original judgment. Ralston Purina Co. v. Parsons Feed & Farm Supply, Inc., 416 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1969).

Interest on a judgment ran until the amount of the judgment was paid either into court or directly to the parties entitled to receive payment. Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979).

In a suit by subcontractors to recover from the general contractor for its alleged breach of two contracts, the subcontractors were entitled to 6 percent interest from the date of the filing of their complaints, even though they did not recover the sums sought, and to 10 percent interest following judgment. Advance Constr. Co. v. Dunn, 263 Ark. 232, 563 S.W.2d 888 (1978).

Both prejudgment and postjudgment interest should have been awarded upon a jury determination of damages. TB of Blytheville, Inc. v. Little Rock Sign & Emblem, Inc., 328 Ark. 688, 946 S.W.2d 930 (1997).

Judgment interest was calculated from the entry of the original judgment in which damages were found payable from a construction company to a homeowner, not from the date of entry of recalculated damages following an appeal. Glover v. Woodhaven Homes, Inc., 346 Ark. 397, 57 S.W.3d 211 (2001).

When a judgment has been appealed, and the appellate decision does not result in an actual reversal of the judgment, interest begins accruing from the date of the original judgment; thus, in an action for personal injuries resulting from an auto accident, where the trial court erred in severing an under-insured motorist carrier without requiring it to be bound by the verdict in the original trial, but neither the judgment in favor of the carrier's policy holder nor the award of damages were reversed, it was proper to award postjudgment interest from the date of judgment in the original trial. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brinker, 350 Ark. 15, 84 S.W.3d 846 (2002).

Because the action involved a controversy over what the subcontractor did correctly and did not do correctly and the damages were hotly contested, the court refused to award prejudgment interest. Ray & Sons Masonry Contrs., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 114 S.W.3d 189 (2003).

Probate Court Order.

Probate court's order of allowance of a claim against an estate was a judgment, and claimant is entitled to interest from date of allowance, though payment was delayed because there was no satisfactory market for assets of the estate. Shofner v. Jones, 201 Ark. 540, 145 S.W.2d 350 (1940).

Rate.

Where statutory rate of interest was increased to 10 percent before trial to recover amounts due under a contract, a 10 percent interest would apply to the judgment obtained by the contractor, even though the statutory rate of interest on judgments was only 6 percent when the contracts were made. Love v. H.F. Constr. Co., 261 Ark. 831, 552 S.W.2d 15 (1977).

Although the judgment debtor's appeal and consequent delay in satisfying the debt was not unreasonable, debtor knew interest would run, and the judgment creditor was deprived of its money during that time, interest at the rate of 10 percent is applicable. Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979).

Judgment providing for interest per annum on the judgment lower than the statutory rate was invalid. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Carlton, 319 Ark. 555, 892 S.W.2d 496 (1995), overruled in part on other grounds, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Sauer, 358 Ark. 89, 186 S.W.3d 229 (2004).

Where judgment was rendered in favor of a car dealer in its action against a bank arising from the breach of a contract for recourse financing under subsection (a) of this section, the trial court erred by awarding post-judgment interest at a rate of six and one-quarter percent because there was no evidence in the record of what the Federal Reserve Discount Rate, which under Ark. Const. art. 19, § 13, was the baseline for determining whether the interest rate was unconstitutionally excessive, was at the time the contract was signed; hence, the judgment was reversed as to the interest rate and the case was remanded for determination of the proper interest rate based on the Federal Reserve Discount Rate at the time the contract at issue was executed. Bank of Am., N.A. v. C.D. Smith Motor Co., 353 Ark. 228, 106 S.W.3d 425 (2003).

Cited: International Harvester Co. v. Burks Motors, Inc., 252 Ark. 816, 481 S.W.2d 351 (1972); Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978); Box v. Dudeck, 265 Ark. 165, 578 S.W.2d 567 (1979); Edwards v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 683 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1982); Crittenden County v. Williford, 283 Ark. 289, 675 S.W.2d 631 (1984); Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984); Watson v. Miears, 612 F. Supp. 1235 (W.D. Ark. 1984); City of Jacksonville v. Venhaus, 302 Ark. 204, 788 S.W.2d 478 (1990); Bank of Bearden v. Simpson, 305 Ark. 326, 808 S.W.2d 341 (1991); DC Xpress, L.L.C. v. Briggs, 2009 Ark. App. 651, 343 S.W.3d 603 (2009).

16-65-115. Passage of title by decree.

  1. In all cases where the court may decree the conveyance of real estate or the delivery of personal property, it may by decree pass the title of the property, without any act to be done on the part of the defendant, when it shall be proper, and may issue a writ of possession, if necessary, to put the party in possession of the real or personal property or may proceed by attachment or sequestration.
  2. When an unconditional decree is made for a conveyance, release, or acquittance and the party required to execute the conveyance, release, or acquittance shall not comply therewith, the decree shall be considered and taken to have the same operation and effect and be as available as if the conveyance, release, or acquittance had been executed conformably to the decree.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, §§ 123, 124; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6297, 6298; Pope's Dig., §§ 8253, 8254; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-126, 29-127.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Bills to Remove Cloud on Title and Quieting Title, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 83.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

In action relating to interest in realty located in another state, where vendor intervened seeking specific performance, insofar as relief prayed for would not affect title to the land, but could be obtained through personal obedience of the parties, court had jurisdiction even though land was in another state. Bell v. Wadley, 206 Ark. 569, 177 S.W.2d 403 (1944).

Where proceeding in state court by plaintiff to establish validity of deed was dismissed by plaintiff, a cross-complaint asserted by defendant in state court proceeding for specific performance based on contingency which never happened did not invoke jurisdiction of state court over property involved, since cross-complaint expired by its own terms, hence federal district court had jurisdiction of subsequent action by plaintiff to establish validity of same deed. Holt v. Werbe, 198 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1952).

Quiet Title Action.

In quiet title proceedings where title was based on partition decree, failure to show that deeds were executed was not fatal because rights of innocent purchasers were not in issue and title would vest through the partition decree, the deed being only evidence of title and not essential under the provisions of this section and §§ 16-65-115(a) and 16-65-116(a). Person v. Johnson, 218 Ark. 117, 235 S.W.2d 876 (1950).

Cited: Lawyer v. Carpenter, 80 Ark. 411, 97 S.W. 662 (1906); Dowdle v. Byrd, 201 Ark. 775, 147 S.W.2d 343 (1941).

16-65-116. Recordation of decree of conveyance required.

  1. In all cases where a circuit court shall decree a conveyance of real estate or that real estate pass, the party in whose favor the decree is made shall cause a copy thereof to be recorded in the recorder's office of the county in which the lands to be conveyed lie, within one (1) year after the making of the decree. If the decree is not recorded within that time, it shall be void as to all subsequent purchasers without notice.
  2. The term “real estate”, as used in this act, shall be construed to include all estates and interest in lands and tenements, whether legal or equitable, liable to be sold under execution.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, §§ 33, 34; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6283, 6284; Pope's Dig., §§ 8239, 8240; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-128, 29-129.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 84 codified as §§ 16-65-113, 16-65-116, 16-65-50116-65-505, 16-65-601, 16-65-602, 16-66-411.

Case Notes

Homestead.

Divorced wife who remarried her husband and again obtained a divorce was held to have acquired no interest in the homestead superior to the rights of mortgagee to whom husband executed mortgage, subsequent to first divorce, after wife had abandoned the right to occupy the homestead given to her by the divorce decree. Wilkerson v. Hoover, 192 Ark. 337, 91 S.W.2d 274 (1936).

16-65-117. Judgment as lien on land.

      1. A judgment in the Supreme Court or circuit courts of this state, and in the United States district courts or United States bankruptcy courts within this state, shall be a lien on the real estate owned by the defendant in the county in which the judgment was rendered from the date of its rendition only if the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment maintains a permanent office within the county, at which office permanent records of the judgments of the court are continuously kept and maintained, and the judgment has been filed with the circuit clerk. A judgment in the district courts of this state shall not be a lien on the real estate owned by the defendant in the county in which the judgment was rendered until the judgment has been filed and indexed in the judgment records of the circuit clerk in the county in which the judgment was rendered.
      2. As to any person who does not have actual notice of the rendition of the judgment, the judgment shall be a lien from the date the judgment is recorded and indexed by the court clerk in a manner that provides reasonable notice to the public.
      1. If a judgment is rendered by one (1) of the courts in a county where the clerk of the court does not maintain a permanent office at which permanent records of the judgments of the court are continuously kept and maintained, the judgment shall not be a lien on the land of the defendant in that county until a certified copy of the judgment is filed in the office of the circuit clerk of that county.
      2. As to any person who does not have actual notice of the rendition of the judgment, the judgment shall be a lien from the date the judgment is recorded and indexed by the court clerk in a manner that provides reasonable notice to the public.
    1. No such judgment shall be a lien on the land of the defendant in any other county until a certified copy of the judgment is filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the land lies.
    2. As to any person who does not have actual notice of the rendition of the judgment, the judgment shall be a lien from the date the judgment is recorded and indexed by the court clerk in a manner that provides reasonable notice to the public.
    1. The clerk, on the filing in his office of a certified copy of a judgment of any of the courts mentioned in subsection (a) of this section, and upon the payment of three dollars ($3.00), shall immediately proceed to docket and index the judgment in the same manner as though rendered in the court of his or her own county. From that time, the judgment shall be a lien on the defendant's lands in that county.
    2. It shall be the duty of the court clerk to index each judgment immediately upon filing it in the permanent records of the judgments of the court. For purposes of this section, the term “judgments” shall include any order, decree, or judgment which contains a provision for payment of money for the support and care of any child or children through the registry of the court.
      1. The liens authorized by this section shall:
        1. Continue in force for ten (10) years from the date of the judgment; and
        2. Be revived only under § 16-65-501.
      2. An act or circumstance that may toll or renew the limitations period provided by § 16-56-114 for the underlying judgment shall not revive or extend the duration of a lien authorized by this section.
    1. Except as provided in § 16-65-501, a transcript of the judgment of revivor, when filed in other counties, shall have the same and like effect as a judgment of revivor has in the county in which it is rendered.

History. Acts 1891, No. 56, §§ 1, 2, p. 92; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6299, 6300; Pope's Dig., §§ 8255, 8256; Acts 1945, No. 55, § 2; 1959, No. 182, § 1; 1963, No. 124, § 1; 1977, No. 333, § 3; 1985, No. 228, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1720, 29-130, 29-131; Acts 1987, No. 356, § 1; 1989, No. 931, § 1; 1993, No. 1179, § 1; 1995, No. 475, § 1; 2011, No. 227, § 2.; 2015, No. 1113, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1977, No. 333, § 4, codified as § 21-6-101, provides that the appropriate fee prescribed by that section shall be in lieu of the fee prescribed by this section.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 228, § 3, provided that the provisions of the act would be applicable only to the liens of judgments rendered or revived on or after June 28, 1985.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment subdivided (d); inserted “under § 16-65-501” in (d)(1); and inserted “Except as provided in § 16-65-501” in (d)(2).

The 2015 amendment redesignated (d)(1) as (d)(1)(A); in (d)(1)(A), inserted designations (i) and (ii) and substituted “Be revived only under” for “may be revived under”; and added (d)(1)(B).

Cross References. Child support, § 9-14-101 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence and Circo, An Exchange of Collegial Memoranda on the Attachment of a Judgment Lien to Real Property Subject to a Buy-Sell Agreement, 2006 Arkansas L. Notes 93.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Family Law, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 577.

Survey — Debtor-Creditor, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 573.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section should be read together and regarded as a statute creating a lien and declaring its terms. Lion Oil & Refining Co. v. Rex Oil Co., 195 Ark. 1021, 115 S.W.2d 556 (1938).

Applicability.

This section does not apply to land of grantor in a deed placed in escrow before judgment. Snow Bros. Hdwe. Co. v. Ellis, 180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162 (1929).

Chancery Court.

Money decree in chancery court became a lien upon defendant's real property in the county on the date of rendition. In re Van Meter, 135 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Ark. 1955).

Complaint.

A complaint does not constitute a lien on land until it is reduced to judgment. Bank of Cave City v. Abstract & Title Co., 38 Ark. App. 65, 828 S.W.2d 852 (1992).

Conveyances.

A judgment is not a lien on land which judgment debtor has conveyed to defraud creditors. Doster v. Manistee Nat'l Bank, 67 Ark. 325, 55 S.W. 137 (1900).

A lien may be fixed by levy of an execution on lands which have been fraudulently conveyed by a debtor, prior to the rendition of the judgment against him. Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Harris, 113 Ark. 100, 167 S.W. 706 (1914).

Where evidence showed that deed from mother to daughter was executed four days after recording of certified copy of judgment against the mother and was executed for purpose of defrauding creditors, the deed could not defeat right of purchaser of land involved at sheriff's sale to obtain possession thereof. Board v. Van Houten, 229 Ark. 168, 313 S.W.2d 843 (1958).

Equitable Estate.

The equitable estate of a judgment-defendant is bound by the lien of the judgment. Cohn v. Hoffman, 50 Ark. 108, 6 S.W. 511 (1887).

Execution.

Mere delay to sue out an execution during the time prescribed by law for the continuance of the judgment-lien would not, of itself, be sufficient to displace the lien; nor would the issuance and return of an execution without action, by order of the plaintiff, discharge the lien, or postpone it, in favor of a subsequent judgment-lien. Shall v. Biscoe, 18 Ark. (5 Barber) 142 (1856).

Where commissioner of revenues obtained judgment on certificate of indebtedness for gasoline taxes but did not procure a writ of scire facias or execution to collect or preserve its judgment, the right of the state to claim a lien was barred after three years (now ten years), since lien is not excepted from the three-year (now ten-year) limitation provided for liens of judgments. Lion Oil & Refining Co. v. Rex Oil Co., 195 Ark. 1021, 115 S.W.2d 556 (1938).

Judgment lien expires within three years after its rendition, unless revived, but judgment creditor may issue an execution on the judgment at any time within ten years after its rendition. Bird v. Kitchens, 215 Ark. 609, 221 S.W.2d 795 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 892, 70 S. Ct. 241 (1949) (decision prior to 1985 amendment).

A writ of execution or garnishment after a judgment in the circuit or chancery court is issuable only from the court in which the judgment was rendered. McGehee Bank v. Charles W. Greeson & Sons, 223 Ark. 18, 263 S.W.2d 901 (1954).

Homestead.

A homestead of a judgment-defendant is not subject to liens except for certain exceptions to the rule. Davis v. Day, 56 Ark. 156, 19 S.W. 502 (1892).

A debtor may fix his homestead upon any land he may own regardless of his debts and the rights of his creditors if it is done before any lien attaches to the land. Sears v. Setser, 111 Ark. 11, 162 S.W. 1083 (1914).

In a bankruptcy proceeding, where the existence of a lien on a homestead had the detrimental effect of clouding title, thereby preventing a fresh start, the debtors would be allowed to avoid the lien. In re Kellar, 204 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996).

Through 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(a)(1), the bankruptcy provided Chapter 12 debtors in possession with judgment lien rights under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, but the property was subject to an Ark. Const. Art. 9, § 3, homestead to which such a lien could not attach, thus, avoidance of creditor bank's mortgage was not available under § 544(a)(1). Caine v. First State Bank of Crossett (In re Caine), 462 B.R. 688 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2011), aff'd, No. 1:12-CV-1012, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43360 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2014).

Husband and Wife.

Where land was deeded to third party by husband merely as conduit in the title or trustee in conveyance back to husband and wife and the third party was never a bona fide or beneficial owner of the property, judgment against the third party was not a valid lien against the land. West v. Smith, 225 Ark. 365, 282 S.W.2d 597 (1955).

Bank could not pay off amount of deed of trust and claim title, since the interest of the wife in the land, where deed of trust signed only by husband, could not be foreclosed, rather, the excess amount must be accounted for to the court according to equity. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Colvin, 264 Ark. 582, 572 S.W.2d 836 (1978).

Inasmuch as a creditor's judgment against a husband became a lien against his interest in land acquired after the entry of the judgment, when the husband conveyed his interest to his wife, her two estates in the land did not merge to defeat the creditor's intervening equity; she, therefore, received his estate in the land subject to the judgment lien. Automotive Supply, Inc. v. Powell, 269 Ark. 255, 599 S.W.2d 735 (1980).

Judgments.

Lien of judgment was not suspended by stay of judgment. Beloate v. New England Sec. Co., 128 Ark. 215, 193 S.W. 795 (1917).

Filing of foreign judgment in office of circuit court of Arkansas county was merely a notice to defendants and prospective grantees that plaintiff had obtained judgment against the defendants and was in the process of enforcing it; however, judgment lien was not acquired by plaintiff against the defendants until default judgment, based on the foreign judgment, was entered by federal court. Bank of Sun Prairie v. Hovig, 218 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Ark. 1963).

A fine assessed the owner of real property constituted a judgment contemplated by this statute and was a lien on the land making the land subject to sale under execution to satisfy the fine. Hudmon v. Coonfield, 239 Ark. 1063, 396 S.W.2d 296 (1965).

Judgment debtor, which obtained a judgment against a debtor in Texas, and recorded its judgment in the real property records of an Arkansas county, had an enforceable judgment lien against the debtor's real property in that county. United States v. Neal, 255 F.R.D. 638 (W.D. Ark. 2008), aff'd, 391 Fed. Appx. 569 (8th Cir. 2010).

Directed verdict was appropriate, because the judgment debtors did not own the property, and as a matter of law, the company's judgment lien did not attach to the property that was now owned by the current owner; there was no evidence that the judgment debtors owned the property. Buckeye Ret. Co., LLC v. Walter, 2012 Ark. App. 257, 404 S.W.3d 173 (2012).

Circuit court erred in granting a declaratory judgment in favor of a judgment debtor's widow because the foreign judgment that the judgment creditors registered against the debtor was finalized before he died, and thus, the judgment acted as a lien against the debtor's, and now the widow's, real property. Harris v. Temple, 2013 Ark. App. 605 (2013).

Justice of Peace.

A judgment of a justice of the peace must be filed with the circuit clerk of that county before it is filed in another county. Winkler v. Baxter, 114 Ark. 422, 170 S.W. 94 (1914).

Leases.

A judgment is a lien on a reversion in real estate. A judgment becomes a lien on after-acquired lands. Trustees R.E. Bank v. Watson & Hubbard, 13 Ark. (8 English) 74 (1852)Criticized byTrapnall v. Richardson, Waterman & Co., 13 Ark. 543, 58 Am. Dec. 338 (Ark. 1853).

This section does not apply to leaseholds. Munson v. Wade, 174 Ark. 880, 298 S.W. 25 (1927).

A lien does not attach to land but only to the interest that the debtor has in land and any diminution in his interest will diminish his lien, or should interest cease entirely, the lien is extinguished. Snow Bros. Hdwe. Co. v. Ellis, 180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162 (1929).

Lessee of recorded oil and gas lease providing that no change of ownership would bind lessee until furnished with written transfer or assignment was not liable for royalty payments made to judgment debtor prior to time he was notified of judgment. Standard Oil Co. v. Craig, 202 Ark. 168, 150 S.W.2d 744 (1941).

Neither the probate court order granting a lien upon the real estate nor the order reviving the lien were construed to do more than recognize that the judgment constituted a lien on the real estate of the owner. Price v. Price, 253 Ark. 1124, 491 S.W.2d 793 (1973).

—Priority.

A judgment lien on land has priority over a mortgage of later date. Trapnall v. Richardson, Waterman & Co., 13 Ark. 543, 58 Am. Dec. 338 (Ark. 1853).

Where a lien antedates a recorded mortgage, the lien is superior to that of a subsequently dated mortgage. Pindall v. Trevor & Colgate, 30 Ark. 249 (1875); Hawkins v. Files, 51 Ark. 417, 11 S.W. 681 (1888).

A lien of a judgment is subject to all valid liens on the property, whether recorded or not. Apperson & Co. v. Burgett, 33 Ark. 328 (1878).

A creditor who first obtains a judgment against his debtor acquires a superior lien on his lands against another creditor who procured a general attachment. Goodard-Peck Grocery Co. v. Adler-Goldman Comm'n Co., 67 Ark. 359, 55 S.W. 136 (1900).

Where judgment creditors caused writs of execution to issue to give their lien priority over mortgage, the court held that liens were junior and inferior to mortgage. First Nat. Bank v. Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co., 188 Ark. 642, 67 S.W.2d 599 (1934).

Prior recorded mortgage has priority over a judgment recorded subsequently, even though mortgagee knew that there was an unrecorded judgment against the mortgagor. Fears v. Futrell, 216 Ark. 122, 224 S.W.2d 362 (1949).

Where plaintiff loans money to a judgment debtor, and takes a mortgage as security, which mortgage is recorded, and thereafter the plaintiff loans the judgment debtor an additional amount, and note states that it is secured by the same property covered by the prior recorded mortgage, and thereafter the judgment is recorded, the note is an equitable mortgage, and takes priority over the recorded judgment. Fears v. Futrell, 216 Ark. 122, 224 S.W.2d 362 (1949).

Certificate of assessment for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes acquired status of judgment when filed in circuit court in accordance with § 11-10-718 and constituted a lien of debtor's realty which was superior to federal government's lien for taxes under F. C. A., tit. 26, § 3670 where state's lien was first in point of time and there was no allegation of insolvency to bring into play the federal priority statute (F. C. A., tit. 31, § 191). Commercial Credit Corp. v. Schwartz, 130 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Ark. 1955).

A first mortgage lost its priority over a junior lien when the holder of the first mortgage chose not to foreclose, but instead chose to take a “warranty deed in lieu of foreclosure,” and then resold a substantial part of the same real estate to a stranger to the title without taking any action against the holder of the junior lien, resulting in a merger extinguishing the first mortgage debt, and leaving the intervening lien outstanding. Construction Mach. v. Roberts, 307 Ark. 252, 819 S.W.2d 268 (1991).

Partnership.

The interest which a partner holds in a partnership is directly proportioned to the amount he is subject to in a judgment lien on the partnership. Jones, McDowell & Co. v. Fletcher, 42 Ark. 422 (1883).

Recordation of Deed.

A judgment rendered was not prior and paramount to a deed recorded on the same date but executed previously when there was no conspiracy to defraud, and the bona fide purchaser paid a fair price for the land. Tolley v. Wilson, 212 Ark. 163, 205 S.W.2d 177 (1947).

Revival of Judgment.

A scire facias writ was properly issued by the trial court for the revival of a judgment where the ten-year limitation period on the effectiveness of the judgment had not yet run, even though the original judgment lien of 3 years had expired. Burton v. Bank of Tuckerman, 276 Ark. 538, 637 S.W.2d 577 (1982) (decision under prior law).

Tax Sale.

A judgment recovered after judgment-debtor has permitted lands to be sold for taxes and before period allowed by law for redemption from the tax sale has expired is a lien on the interest therein. McNeill v. Carter, 57 Ark. 579, 22 S.W. 94 (1893).

One who purchases the land from the debtor subsequent to the rendition of the judgment takes subject to those liens and does not acquire any new title or right to priority over the judgment lien by redemption from the tax sale. McNeill v. Carter, 57 Ark. 579, 22 S.W. 94 (1893).

Time Limit.

The time limit provided in this section is not a statute of limitation; it is a period of duration. The expiration of a statute of limitation extinguishes a right to enforce a remedy, but it does not extinguish the substantive right itself; the expiration of the statute of duration, however, extinguishes the substantive right itself. Refco, Inc. v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 295 Ark. 32, 746 S.W.2d 375 (1988).

—Revival.

Under this section, a lien expires unless it is revived under § 16-65-501. Lien expired pursuant to this section where the judgment creditor did not comply with § 16-65-501, and the mere fact that it was made a party to a lawsuit during the existence of the lien did not in itself prevent the subsequent expiration of the lien. Refco, Inc. v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 295 Ark. 32, 746 S.W.2d 375 (1988).

Cited: Ford v. Harrison, 69 Ark. 205, 62 S.W. 59 (1901); Pepin v. Hoover, 205 Ark. 251, 168 S.W.2d 390 (1943); Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981); Speer v. Speer, 298 Ark. 294, 766 S.W.2d 927 (1989); In re Inmon, 208 B.R. 455 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996); In re Bookout, 231 B.R. 306 (E.D. Ark. 1999); Smith v. Credit Serv. Co., 339 Ark. 41, 2 S.W.3d 69 (1999); Canady v. Petit Jean State Bank, 2015 Ark. App. 313, 463 S.W.3d 328 (2015).

16-65-118. Liens of officers and attorneys.

  1. When any judgment is recovered in a court of record by or in favor of any party, all officers who in pursuance of law and attorneys who upon contract expressed or implied have rendered service for or in behalf of the party in the action or proceedings in or upon which the judgment was rendered, shall severally have liens upon and an interest in the judgment, as follows:
    1. Each officer to the amount to which he or she is entitled by law as costs, fees, allowances, or otherwise for services rendered to or on behalf of the party; and
    2. Each attorney to the amount to which he or she is entitled by contract or, if no amount is fixed, a reasonable compensation for his or her services rendered as set forth above for or on behalf of the party.
    1. Any property sold upon, in pursuance of, or to satisfy the judgment and purchased, directly or indirectly, by or on behalf of the party in whose favor the judgment was rendered, his or her heir, personal representative, or assignee, shall be deemed to be held in trust for any person holding a lien to the amount of his or her lien until the lien is discharged.
    2. When the judgment is for the recovery of real or personal property, the lien shall amount to an interest in the property to the extent of the lien.

History. Civil Code, § 426; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6304-6306; Pope's Dig., §§ 8260-8262; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-132.

Cross References. Lien of attorney, § 16-22-304.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to professional services which have produced a judgment or something tangible and does not apply to services which protect an existing title or right to property. Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324, 19 S.W. 966 (1892).

Attorney's Liens.

Where an attorney has recovered a judgment for his client and taken steps to perfect his lien for his services, he acquires an interest in the judgment of which he cannot be deprived after the judgment has become final. Osborne v. Waters, 92 Ark. 388, 123 S.W. 374 (1909).

At common law an attorney has a lien upon his client's evidence of indebtedness in his hands but not upon the debt itself and hence a complaint in equity seeking to fix a lien on the proceeds of the client's insurance policy did not state any facts which would confer a lien where it did not allege that the policy or other evidence, if any, was in the possession of the attorney. Cosby v. Hurst, 149 Ark. 11, 231 S.W. 194 (1921).

Attorneys employed to conduct a lawsuit had a lien on the judgment or funds recovered for their services. Lake v. Wilson, 183 Ark. 180, 35 S.W.2d 597 (1931).

Where decedent's mother was held to be sole beneficiary of his estate subject to dower right and statutory allowances of decedent's widow, it was sufficient to establish an attorney's lien on the mother's recovery pursuant to a contingent fee agreement. Camp v. Park, 226 Ark. 1026, 295 S.W.2d 613 (1956).

While a client may dispose of his cause of action as he sees fit, if there are any proceeds from the litigation derived by settlement or final judgment the attorney has a lien thereon of which he cannot be deprived by the parties. Camp v. Park, 226 Ark. 1026, 295 S.W.2d 613 (1956).

When an attorney recovers judgment for his client of the nature prescribed by statute and takes steps to perfect his lien he acquires an interest in the judgment of which he cannot be deprived after the judgment becomes final. Camp v. Park, 226 Ark. 1026, 295 S.W.2d 613 (1956).

Equitable or Charging Lien.

Requisites for an equitable or charging lien of an attorney are an agreement the intent of which is to give or charge or pledge property as security for an obligation and sufficient description of the property to be given or charged. Camp v. Park, 226 Ark. 1026, 295 S.W.2d 613 (1956).

Where an agreement contains no express provision for a lien to secure a debt thereunder it must appear that the contracting party asserting the lien looked to the fund itself for payment and did not rely on the personal responsibility of the owner of the claim of which the fund was the result. Camp v. Park, 226 Ark. 1026, 295 S.W.2d 613 (1956).

Judgment for State.

An attorney has no lien on a judgment recovered in favor of the state. Compton v. State, 38 Ark. 601 (1882).

Justices of the Peace.

Justices of the peace have jurisdiction to enforce attorney's lien. Adamson v. Kay, 100 Ark. 248, 140 S.W. 13 (1911).

Real Property Liens.

If a judgment is for recovery of property, the attorney's lien gives him an interest in it which court of equity will enforce. Porter, Taylor & Co. v. Hanson, 36 Ark. 591 (1880); Lane v. Hallum, 38 Ark. 385 (1882).

Where an attorney's services lifted a cloud on title, he has no lien on property for those services. Hershy v. Du Val, 47 Ark. 86, 14 S.W. 469 (1885).

Where, under a decision of the trial court, a client's land was taken possession of by his adversary, but upon appeal the decision was reversed whereupon the possession was surrendered to the client, this constituted a recovery which entitled the attorney to a lien on the land. Greenlee v. Rowland, 85 Ark. 101, 107 S.W. 193 (1908).

While an attorney has no lien for services for merely defending a suit, services rendered in canceling a conveyance for fraud and recovering the land are such services as to entitle the attorney to a lien. Baxter County Bank v. Davis, 137 Ark. 459, 208 S.W. 797 (1919).

Set-Off.

Where one, holding judgment against another, moves to have it set off against a judgment against himself in the other's favor, his right thereto will not be defeated by a lien of the other's attorney subsequently filed on the latter judgment. Park v. Hutchinson, 80 Ark. 183, 96 S.W. 751 (1906).

Settlement.

Where an attorney in a suit causes property to be attached, the lien of the attachment inures to his benefit, and cannot be defeated by any settlement between the parties. Gist v. Hanly, 33 Ark. 233 (1878). See also Hall v. Huff, 114 Ark. 206, 169 S.W. 792 (1914); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Blaylock, 117 Ark. 504, 175 S.W. 1170 (1915).

16-65-119. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning reversal, modification, or vacation of judgments, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 195. The section was derived from Civil Code, §§ 566-568; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6285-6287; Pope's Dig., §§ 8241-8243; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-501 — 29-503.

16-65-120. Sale or transfer of judgment or cause of action — Filing and noting by clerk.

  1. The sale of a judgment or any part thereof of any court of record within this state or the sale of any cause of action or interest therein after suit has been filed thereon, shall be evidenced by a written transfer which, when acknowledged in the manner and form required by law for the acknowledgment of deeds, may be filed with the papers of the suit. When thus filed by the clerk, it shall be his or her duty to make a minute of the transfer on the margin of the record of the court where the judgment of the court is recorded or, if judgment is not rendered when the transfer is filed, the clerk shall make a minute of the transfer on the docket of the court where suit is entered, giving briefly the substance thereof, for which services he or she shall be entitled to a fee of twenty-five cents (25¢), to be paid by the party applying therefor.
  2. When the transfer is duly acknowledged, filed, and noted as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the transfer shall be full notice and valid and binding upon all persons subsequently dealing with reference to the cause of action or judgment, whether they have actual knowledge of the transfer or not.
  3. This section shall apply to any and all judgments, suits, claims, and causes of action, whether assignable or not.

History. Acts 1899, No. 92, § 1, p. 154; C. & M. Dig., § 6303; Pope's Dig., § 8259; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-123; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 196.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “in law and equity” following “whether assignable” in (c).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Altered or Absent Evidence: The Tort of Spoliation: Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 43 Ark. L. Rev. 453.

Case Notes

Acknowledgment and Recording.

Even though bank failed to have assignment to it acknowledged and recorded as provided in this section, bank's security interest was protected against the subsequent lien of the Internal Revenue Service. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Hempstead County Sand & Gravel, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1985).

Claims Against Counties.

Sale of claim against county does not come under this section. Shelton v. Landers, 167 Ark. 638, 270 S.W. 522 (1925).

Although the assignment of a suit pending against a county did not comply with this section, it was nevertheless valid between the parties and a subsequent garnisher takes subject to the assignment. McKim v. Highway Iron Prods. Co., 181 Ark. 1121, 29 S.W.2d 682 (1930).

Filing of Assignment.

The assignment should be filed in the lower court. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Hambright, 87 Ark. 242, 112 S.W. 876 (1908).

Notice.

Actual notice of assignment is binding, though transfer is not filed. Kansas City, F.S. & M.R. Co. v. Joslin, 74 Ark. 551, 86 S.W. 435 (1905).

Other Legislation.

This section, which relates specifically to the sale and assignment of judgments and causes of action, was not impliedly repealed by enactment of § 4-9-102, and was the applicable law; therefore, a cause of action assigned to bank as collateral for loan prior to filing of federal tax liens by federal government against assignor took precedence over tax liens that arose out of unsecured obligation. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Hempstead County Sand & Gravel, Inc., 767 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1985).

Cited: Elardo v. Taylor, 291 Ark. 503, 726 S.W.2d 1 (1987).

16-65-121. Judgments, etc., effective from date rendered.

All judgments, orders, and decrees rendered in open court by any court of record in the State of Arkansas are effective as to all parties of record from the date rendered and not from the date of entry of record.

History. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 98, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Civil Procedure, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 603.

Case Notes

In General.

A letter from the judge, or an announcement in open court, until reduced to an order and properly entered by the clerk, does not create or terminate legal or equitable rights that exist under the law. In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

Ark. R. Civ. P. Rule 58, rather than this section, controlled the effective date of a divorce decree, and the rule effectively supercedes the statute. Price v. Price, 341 Ark. 311, 16 S.W.3d 248 (2000).

Construction.

The parties need not take actions to preserve appeal rights or other procedures permitted under the rules of procedure from the date of a ruling in open court; to construe this section in this manner would create not only a direct conflict with ARCP 58, but also procedural chaos. In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

Even where a decision has been rendered in open court, this section would not alter the legal fact that a final judgment had not been “entered.” In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

“Entry” of a document is distinct from “dated” or “filed”: the term “dated” refers to the date the judge signs the order; a document is “filed” on the date the clerk file-stamps it; and a document is “entered” when it is actually recorded on the docket sheet or book by the clerk. In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

The language “effective as to all parties of record” implies, at least, a directive that the parties to the action must act in accord with the directives issued to them, in open court, by the presiding judge, and the parties are clearly on notice of the directives, just as if the order had been “entered” by the clerk; thus, it is logical that the individuals or entity parties, having been told the decision by the decision-maker, be required to behave, outside the courtroom, in a manner consistent with that ruling. In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

The ambiguous term “rendered” provides fruitful argument to litigants who wish to avoid the effect, whatever it may be, of this section. In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

With respect to judgment and commitment orders, they are effective upon entry of record in accordance with Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2, and as this section directly conflicts with the rules of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2, and Arkansas caselaw, it is superseded; thus, a trial court was well within its authority to modify a sentence pronounced in open court prior to entry of judgment as long as it complied with other pertinent criminal rules. Bradford v. State, 351 Ark. 394, 94 S.W.3d 904 (2003).

Trial court had the authority to modify a sentence pronounced in open court prior to the entry of judgment because the oral order was not effective until set forth in writing and filed of record; although defendant claimed a denial of the right to be present at all proceedings pursuant to § 5-4-310, defendant was present for all portions of the proceedings, and while this section had provided that a judgment rendered in open court was effective from that date, this section has been superceded. Hankins v. State, 84 Ark. App. 370, 141 S.W.3d 905 (2004).

Court did not err in finding that appellees timely revived the 1999 decree where they filed their writ of scire facias on May 13, 2009, within ten years from May 25, 1999, the effective date of the decree, because the Arkansas Supreme Court had previously found Ark. R. Civ. P. 58 effectively superseded this section, and there was no reason not to extend this finding, which involved this more generally applicable section, to § 16-65-501. Middleton v. Lockhart, 2012 Ark. 131, 388 S.W.3d 451 (2012).

Applicability.

The application of this section is limited, as its language suggests; it does not affect, legally or equitably, any persons other than the parties to the litigation. In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

Open Court.

The term “open court” refers to the proceedings and acts taken by parties and the court in the courtroom and on the record. In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

A letter signed by the judge on his letterhead, delivered to the parties through the United States mail does not constitute “open court.” In re Bunt, 165 B.R. 894 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

16-65-122. Records to contain judgment debtors' social security number — Exceptions.

The records of all personal judgments rendered in circuit court shall contain the social security number of the judgment debtor unless otherwise prohibited under federal law or the social security number is unavailable.

History. Acts 1993, No. 267, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1993, No. 267, § 1, as originally enacted, amended § 16-20-304.

Cross References. Record and index of court proceedings, § 16-20-304.

Subchapter 2 — Judgment on Motion

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 388, § 3: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “There being no present adequate procedural remedy for appellees against appellants and their sureties in cases wherein supersedeas or appeal bonds are given but the appeals are not perfected, it is hereby declared that an emergency exists and that, this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Research References

C.J.S. 49 C.J.S., Judgm., § 243 et seq.

Case Notes

Federal Rules.

This subchapter is an adoption of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ashley v. Eisele, 247 Ark. 281, 445 S.W.2d 76 (1969).

16-65-201. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning obtaining judgments on motion, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 197. The section was derived from Civil Code, §§ 478-483; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6250-6254; Pope's Dig., §§ 8206-8210; Acts 1941, No. 388, § 1; 1961, No. 30, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-201— 29-206.

16-65-202. Judgments against officers or securities on defaults.

    1. Judgment shall be rendered summarily against the persons and their securities and for the defaults stated in subsections (b)-(d) of this section.
    2. The motion may be made by the party aggrieved or his or her legal representatives against the person in default and his or her securities upon his or her official bond.
    3. Judgment shall be rendered against such of the parties, whether principal or surety, as may have received notice of the intended motion.
  1. Judgments shall be rendered for the plaintiffs in the following cases against the sheriff, coroner, or constable receiving or executing the writ:
    1. For willully failing to return an execution, the amount of the judgment on which it was issued, including all the costs and ten percent (10%) thereon;
    2. On demand of the plaintiff or his or her agent or attorney for willfully failing to pay over money collected upon an execution, judgment for the amount so collected, and ten percent (10%) per month damages from the time such demand was made;
      1. Judgment for the amount of the execution, interest, costs, and ten percent (10%) damages for willfully failing to make the money on an execution which by due diligence could have been made.
      2. However, the sheriff or other officer shall have the same defenses that now exist by law with regard to property, the title to which is contested;
    3. For willfully making a false return upon an execution, judgment for the amount of the execution, interest, and costs, and ten percent (10%) damages thereon;
    4. For willfully failing to endorse on an execution the true date of its delivery to him or her, judgment for twenty percent (20%) on the amount of the execution, and the officer shall also be responsible for any injury or loss which may arise from the omission;
      1. For willfully failing to execute a summons, attachment, or other mesne process which, by due diligence, could have been executed, judgment for a sum not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) to be ascertained by a jury.
      2. This remedy shall not preclude the party injured from a resort to other legal means of redress; and
    5. Judgment in favor of the party or officer, as the case may be, for the amount for which he or she is liable, and ten percent (10%) per month thereon from the time the money should have been paid, until paid, for willfully failing to pay on demand to the party or officer entitled to receive the same all money received by him or her in his or her official capacity, and which it is by law his or her duty to pay over, whether it is for fines, forfeitures, costs, or other indebtedness.
  2. In the manner prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, judgment shall be rendered in favor of the defendant against the officers and their securities named in that subsection on the notice therein specified:
    1. For willfully failing to pay over on demand any excess of money which may remain upon a sale by execution, after the satisfaction thereof, and the costs, judgment for the amount of such excess and five percent (5%) per month after demand;
    2. For willfully failing to return an execution, wholly or partially satisfied, twenty-five percent (25%) on the amount paid; and
    3. For willfully failing to pay over on demand money paid or collected on an execution, the whole or any part of which is enjoined in circuit court or the judgment on which the execution issued has been reversed or set aside in any manner or the execution superseded or quashed, judgment for the amount and five percent (5%) per month on the amount from the time the execution was returnable.
  3. Judgment shall be rendered against the clerk and his or her sureties, in the manner prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, upon the notice prescribed and shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff:
    1. Twenty-five percent (25%) on the amount of the debt for willfully failing to issue an execution upon a forfeited delivery bond within five (5) days after the return thereof to his or her office by the proper officer;
    2. Twenty-five percent (25%) on the amount of the judgment for willfully failing to issue execution upon any judgment, order, or decree in his or her office on request of the party interested, or his or her agent or attorney; and
      1. Judgment for a sum not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), to be ascertained by a jury, for willfully failing to issue an attachment, summons, or other mesne process, which the party applying may be entitled to have issued.
      2. This remedy is not to preclude the party injured from a resort to other legal means of redress.

History. Acts 1857, §§ 1-3, p. 141; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6255-6258; Pope's Dig., §§ 8211-8214; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-207 — 29-210; Acts 2003, No. 1151, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, throughout this section, inserted “willfully” preceding “failing” and made stylistic and gender neutral changes.

Cross References. Return of execution, § 16-66-416.

Case Notes

Constables.

It is no defense to an action against a constable for failure to return an execution that the execution was prematurely issued within ten days after the rendition of the judgment, or that it commanded the sheriff to collect interest on the judgment at an incorrect rate. Jones v. Goodbar, 60 Ark. 182, 29 S.W. 462 (1895).

Where a constable has neglected to levy an attachment whereby plaintiff suffers damage, the plaintiff must elect whether he will sue the constable on his common-law liability or under this section. Abbott v. Norman, 134 Ark. 535, 204 S.W. 303 (1918).

Sheriffs.

Where sheriff has paid over money collected on judgment to “attorney of record” as permitted by § 21-6-307, he cannot be held liable under subdivision (b)(2) for failure to pay money over to plaintiff. Williams v. State, 65 Ark. 159, 46 S.W. 186 (1898).

Where a sheriff seized property by virtue of legal process in a replevin case, he became privy to the suit and can exempt himself from liability for subsequent loss of the property only by showing that he made disposition of it as the law directs or that its loss was not on account of his negligence and he cannot question the right and title of the plaintiff who recovered in that action. Hearn v. Ayres, 77 Ark. 497, 92 S.W. 768 (1906).

Subsection (b) is mandatory and fact that during the time sheriff held the execution the judgment was set aside as to some of the debtors did not excuse him from making the return within the proper time nor exempt him from liability therefor. J.B. Pearson Flour & Feed Co. v. Pittman, 192 Ark. 1062, 95 S.W.2d 1143 (1936).

Where a judgment was entered in the circuit court of one county and an execution upon that judgment was issued to the sheriff of another county, a motion for summary judgment against the sheriff for failure to levy the execution was properly filed against the sheriff in the county in which the judgment was obtained. Atkinson v. Means, 252 Ark. 8, 477 S.W.2d 178 (1972).

A sheriff sued by a plaintiff in execution under this section can defend against a failure of duty by showing that his omission in performing the duty was due to the conduct or instructions of the judgment plaintiff or his attorney of record; accordingly, where the record showed that the judgment plaintiffs and their attorney had substantially contributed to any omission by the sheriff by causing the power of the execution to be exhausted by accepting payments on the judgment, they were not entitled to recover against him. 555, Inc. v. Barlow, 3 Ark. App. 139, 623 S.W.2d 843 (1981).

—Failure to Return.

If a sheriff fails to return an execution, which he has accepted without a demand for his fees, on or before the return day, he is liable to the plaintiff for the amount of the judgment, with costs and ten per cent thereon, and the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment therefor. Herr & Co. v. Atkinson, 40 Ark. 377 (1883). But see Atkinson v. Hulse, 30 Ark. 760 (1875).

It is no defense to an officer in a failure to return action that the defendant is insolvent; nor that he was prevented from filing it by reason of the absence of the clerk, without further showing that the office remained closed during the life of the execution and he returned it as soon thereafter as possible. Atkinson v. Heer & Co., 44 Ark. 174 (1884).

It does not excuse the sheriff that there may be irregularities in the execution in an action for failure to return. Hawkins v. Taylor, 56 Ark. 45, 19 S.W. 105 (1892).

Where an execution was returned by the sheriff after the return day and subsequently the judgment on which it was issued was satisfied, the execution plaintiff cannot maintain an action against the sheriff for failure to return the execution within the prescribed time, as the acceptance of payment waived any cause of action growing out of the failure. Powell v. Massey-Herndon Shoe Co., 69 Ark. 79, 62 S.W. 66 (1901).

Where the execution was directed to the sheriff of a county other than the one where issued and failed to show from what court it was issued and the sheriff returned it to the court in his own county, it was error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury that, if the failure to make the return to the proper clerk was due to a mistake of existing facts on the part of the sheriff as to which clerk issued the execution and that mistake was not the result of the sheriff's own carelessness or negligence, they should find for the sheriff. Hamilton v. Pan American Southern Corp., 238 Ark. 38, 378 S.W.2d 652 (1964).

Where a judgment was entered in the circuit court of one county and an execution upon that judgment was issued to the sheriff of another county, a motion for summary judgment against the sheriff for failure to levy the execution was properly filed against the sheriff in the county in which the judgment was obtained. Atkinson v. Means, 252 Ark. 8, 477 S.W.2d 178 (1972).

Sheriff's failure to return execution within the required time may be excusable, in action against him by judgment creditor, where failure was due at least in part to judgment creditor. Southern Credit Corp. v. Atkinson, 255 Ark. 615, 502 S.W.2d 497 (1973).

The automatic stay provision of the U.S. bankruptcy code does not relieve the sheriff of the statutory duty to file a return within 60 days. Lindsey Family Trust v. Cauthron, 20 Ark. App. 149, 725 S.W.2d 581 (1987).

Summary judgment granted for sheriff where the judgment creditor's attorney mailed the original writ to the sheriff and he mailed it back to the attorney asking attorney to make a specific listing of property, but the plaintiff's attorney never advised the sheriff of any specific property and kept the writ past the deadline for filing with the clerk; a judgment creditor cannot benefit from any direct or indirect act that contributes to the officer's omission to perform his duty. Vinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995).

Cited: Sutter v. King, 310 Ark. 681, 839 S.W.2d 218 (1992).

Subchapter 3 — Judgment by Confession

Cross References. Justice of the peace courts, confession of judgment, § 16-19-706.

Research References

Am. Jur. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgm., § 228 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Joyce, Due Process and the Cognovit Clause, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 745.

C.J.S. 49 C.J.S., Judgm., § 138 et seq.

16-65-301. Appearance and confession.

Any person indebted or against whom a cause of action exists may personally appear in a court of competent jurisdiction, and with assent of the creditor or person having the cause of action, confess judgment therefor; whereupon, judgment shall be entered accordingly.

History. Civil Code, § 413; C. & M. Dig., § 6245; Pope's Dig., § 8201; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-301.

Case Notes

Appearance.

This section, requiring personal appearance in court, covers all modes of taking judgment by confession, and former practice of taking the judgment before clerk in vacation is improper. Hare v. Hall, 41 Ark. 372 (1883).

Where the entry of a judgment by confession in the docket of a justice of the peace does not show except by inference that the defendant personally appeared in the justice court as provided by law, and it is shown by parol testimony that he did not in fact appear, the judgment will be held void. Smith v. Finley, 52 Ark. 373, 12 S.W. 782 (1889).

A judgment by confession in vacation is void. Blass v. Lee, 55 Ark. 329, 18 S.W. 186 (1892).

Confession by Attorneys.

Where defendants each signed an instrument acknowledging indebtedness to plaintiff, authorizing a certain attorney to enter appearances, and consenting to the rendering of a judgment against them, judgment reciting “defendants each confess judgment herein by their written agreements duly filed herein” shows a judgment by consent and is valid upon collateral attack. Houpt v. Bohl, 71 Ark. 330, 75 S.W. 470 (1903).

16-65-302. Requisites of judgment.

The debt or cause of action shall be briefly stated in the judgment by confession or in a writing to be filed as pleadings in other actions.

History. Civil Code, § 414; C. & M. Dig., § 6246; Pope's Dig., § 8202; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-302.

16-65-303. Enforcement.

A judgment by confession shall authorize the same proceedings for its enforcement as judgments rendered in actions regularly brought and prosecuted.

History. Civil Code, § 415; C. & M. Dig., § 6247; Pope's Dig., § 8203; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-303.

16-65-304. Release of errors.

The confession shall operate as a release of errors.

History. Civil Code, § 415; C. & M. Dig., § 6247; Pope's Dig., § 8203; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-303.

Case Notes

Estoppel.

A party confessing judgment before a justice of the peace is estopped by his voluntary act from questioning its correctness and cannot appeal therefrom. Cave v. T.J. Smith & Son, 101 Ark. 348, 142 S.W. 508 (1912).

Multiple Parties.

After insurer's confession of judgment, it was dismissed from case in regard to its claim against insured, but the confessed judgment did not dismiss insurer from its rights of subrogation against the third-party tort-feasor; while insurer was estopped from denying the correctness of the confessed judgment, the judgment clearly did not preclude it from pursuing other claims to which it was entitled and to which no confession of judgment had been made in an action involving multiple parties. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Riverside Marine Remanufacturing, Inc., 278 Ark. 585, 647 S.W.2d 462 (1983).

Subchapter 4 — Default Judgment

Cross References. Allowed by justice of the peaces, §§ 16-19-70216-19-704.

Effective Dates. Acts 1923, No. 661, § 2: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Mar. 23, 1923.

Research References

Am. Jur. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgm., § 265 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Setting Aside Default Judgments in Arkansas, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 971.

C.J.S. 49 C.J.S., Judgm., § 195 et seq.

16-65-401. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning default by failure to file a defense, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Acts 1955, No. 351, § 3; 1971, No. 174, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-410.

16-65-402, 16-65-403. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning default judgments as to uncontroverted claims and in cases of constructive service, were repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1275, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-65-402. Civil Code, § 412; C. & M. Dig., § 6249; Pope's Dig., § 8205; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-403.

16-65-403. Civil Code, §§ 445-449; Acts 1891, No. 54, § 1, p. 91; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6261-6265; Acts 1923, No. 661, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 8217-8221; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-404 — 29-408. For present law, see ARCP 55.

Subchapter 5 — Survival and Revival

Effective Dates. Acts 1891, No. 110, § 2: effective one year from date of passage.

Research References

Am. Jur. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgm., § 415 et seq.

C.J.S. 50 C.J.S., Judgm., § 636 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Property, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 599.

16-65-501. Scire facias.

  1. The plaintiff or his or her legal representatives at any time before the expiration of the lien of a judgment may sue out a scire facias to revive the judgment.
  2. The scire facias shall be served on the defendant or his or her legal representatives, terre-tenants, or other person occupying the land, and may be directed to and served in any county in this state.
    1. If the defendant cannot be found, the court shall make an order briefly setting forth the nature of the case and requiring all persons interested to appear on a date set by the court and show cause why the judgment or decree should not be revived and lien continued.
    2. A copy of the order shall be put up for four (4) weeks at the courthouse door of the county in which the judgment or decree may have been rendered.
  3. If upon service or publication of the scire facias, as required in subsection (c) of this section, the defendant or any other person interested does not appear and show cause why such judgment or decree shall not be revived, the judgment shall be revived and the lien continued for another period of ten (10) years and so on from time to time as often as may be necessary.
  4. If a scire facias is sued out before the termination of the lien of any judgment or decree, the lien of the judgment revived shall have relation to the day on which the scire facias issued.
  5. No scire facias to revive a judgment shall be issued except within ten (10) years from the date of the rendition of the judgment, or if the judgment shall have been previously revived, then within ten (10) years from the order of revivor.
    1. Unless before the expiration of a judgment the notice under subdivision (g)(2) of this section is recorded in the real property records of a county other than the county in which an action under this section is filed:
      1. A scire facias to revive the judgment is not effective in the county other than the county in which an action under this section is filed; and
        1. A recorded judgment lien may not be revived against real property in the county other than the county in which an action under this section is filed.
        2. This subdivision (g)(1)(B) does not prevent a judgment creditor from registering a judgment or recording a judgment lien in a new county after a judgment is obtained or revived.
    2. The notice shall include with respect to the action:
      1. The names of the judgment debtors and judgment creditors;
      2. The name of the court and case number in which the judgment was rendered;
      3. The name of the county in which the petition for a writ of scire facias was filed;
      4. The date on which the petition was filed; and
      5. A statement that the filing party intends to maintain its judgment lien against any property of the judgment debtor located in the county in which the notice is filed.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, §§ 6-11; Acts 1891, No. 110, § 1, p. 192; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6316-6322; Pope's Dig., §§ 8271-8277; Acts 1983, No. 718, §§ 1, 2; 1985, No. 228, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-601—29-607; Acts 2011, No. 227, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 228, § 3, provided that the provisions of the act would be applicable only to the liens of judgments rendered or revived on or after June 28, 1985.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted the last sentence in (e); and added (g).

Cross References. Alimony or support payments, lien, §§ 9-14-230, 9-14-231.

Case Notes

In General.

Scire facias is in the nature of a writ of summons. Alexander v. Steel, 13 Ark. (8 English) 392 (1853).

The writ of scire facias occupies the place of both declaration and writ of summons. Trapnall & Trapnall v. Terry & Steele, 27 Ark. 70 (1871).

A scire facias is both a complaint and summons, and should run in the name of all of the plaintiffs, if living, and against all of the defendants, if living. Calhoun v. Adams, 43 Ark. 238 (1884).

The statutory process is not the only way in which judgments can be revived; a circuit court also has jurisdiction to extend a judgment because a judgment may be revived by bringing an ordinary civil action thereon. Agribank v. Holland, 71 Ark. App. 159, 27 S.W.3d 462 (2000).

Purpose.

Purpose of reviving judgment by means of scire facias is to preserve lien acquired by prior judgment. Hinton v. Willard, 215 Ark. 204, 220 S.W.2d 423 (1949).

Heirs.

The proceeding must be against the executor or administrator, not against the heir. Powell v. Macon, 40 Ark. 541 (1883).

Where the plaintiff is dead and his estate fully settled and the administration closed, his heirs are the owners of the judgment, and, being the real parties in interest, can sue out scire facias to revive judgment in their names. Crane v. Crane, 51 Ark. 287, 11 S.W. 1 (1888).

Not Granted.

Writ of scire facias was not granted under this section because there was no foreclosure judgment from 2003 to revive; no judgment of foreclosure was entered, an order did not put the court's directive of sale into execution, and a trial judge still had to appoint a commissioner and set a date, time, and location for the sale. Bly v. Collister, 2014 Ark. App. 476 (2014).

Original Judgment.

Errors and irregularities in the original judgment cannot be set up in defense of a scire facias to revive. Calhoun v. Adams, 43 Ark. 238 (1884).

Probate Court.

The provisions for reviving judgments have no application to the judgments of the probate court. Rose v. Thompson, 36 Ark. 254, 1880 Ark. LEXIS 90 (1880), overruled in part, Price v. Price, 253 Ark. 1124, 491 S.W.2d 793 (1973).

Res Judicata.

If defendant in scire facias action fails to set up counterclaim for credits due him on the judgment, he cannot later set up counterclaim for alleged credits in action brought by judgment creditor to set aside certain deeds to real estate executed by judgment debtor to other parties. Hinton v. Willard, 215 Ark. 204, 220 S.W.2d 423 (1949).

Failure of defendant in second revival of judgment by scire facias to appear and contest revival on the ground that first revival had been obtained without service of a writ of scire facias barred subsequent attack on validity of second revival proceeding in suit by plaintiff involving garnishment of stock owned by defendant. Lewis v. Bank of Kensett, 220 Ark. 273, 247 S.W.2d 354 (1952).

Revival.

Scire facias issued by clerk started process of reviving judgment; from that date, rights, if any, were fixed and interested parties were on notice from that date. Bohnsack v. Beck, 294 Ark. 19, 740 S.W.2d 611 (1987).

Under § 16-65-117, a lien expires unless it is revived under this section. Lien expired pursuant to § 16-65-117 where the judgment creditor did not comply with this section, and the mere fact that it was made a party to a lawsuit during the existence of the lien did not in itself prevent the subsequent expiration of the lien. Refco, Inc. v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 295 Ark. 32, 746 S.W.2d 375 (1988).

Even though Arkansas provides a ten-year period for the enforcement of all judgments and that this period also applies to judgments revived in this state, where a judgment was revived in Illinois under that state's 20-year statute of limitations, and registration and enforcement were then sought in Arkansas, this state would give full faith and credit to the validly revived Illinois judgment. Durham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Services/Child Support Enforcement Unit, 322 Ark. 789, 912 S.W.2d 412 (1995).

This section does not provide for revival of a judgment by a subsequent acknowledgment of debt. Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999).

Under this section, the dealership owner's writ of scire facias to revive a ten-year-old judgment against the partner should have been granted because the owner's 1993 judgment had not been satisfied; the partner had twice tendered the cash and stock certificates but, despite his efforts, he had been unable to extinguish his judgment debt. Carder Buick-Olds Co. v. Wooten, 2009 Ark. App. 310, 308 S.W.3d 156 (2009).

Court did not err in finding that appellees timely revived the 1999 decree where they filed their writ of scire facias on May 13, 2009, within ten years from May 25, 1999, the effective date of the decree, because the Arkansas Supreme Court had previously found Ark. R. Civ. P. 58 effectively superseded § 16-65-121, and there was no reason not to extend this finding, which involved the more generally applicable § 16-65-121, to this section. Middleton v. Lockhart, 2012 Ark. 131, 388 S.W.3d 451 (2012).

Court did not err in concluding that the 1999 decree could be revived by a writ of scire facias under this section, because the 1999 decree was entitled to the same footing as a judgment, and chancery courts had the statutory power to issue writs of execution to enforce their decrees. Middleton v. Lockhart, 2012 Ark. 131, 388 S.W.3d 451 (2012).

Second Judgment.

In a scire facias to revive a judgment, it is error to render a new judgment for the debt or damages. Hanly v. Adams, 15 Ark. (2 Barber) 232 (1854).

In scire facias proceeding upon a judgment of a justice of the peace which has been filed with circuit clerk as provided by law, it is not error to allow an amendment to the justice's judgment. Crane v. Crane, 51 Ark. 287, 11 S.W. 1 (1888).

Service of Process.

Constructive service on a nonresident in the mode provided by this and the following section is sufficient. Waldstein v. Williams, 101 Ark. 404, 142 S.W. 834 (1912).

Personal service is not required. Bohnsack v. Beck, 294 Ark. 19, 740 S.W.2d 611 (1987).

Judgment debtors were properly granted summary judgment in the judgment creditor's foreclosure action because the judgment was not revived in accord with the statute governing the issuance of a writ for scire facias as a writ had not been served on the debtors as required by the statute; thus, the order of revivor was void. Rose v. Harbor East, Inc., 2013 Ark. 496, 430 S.W.3d 773 (2013).

Judgment creditor's complaint to foreclose on a judgment lien was dismissed because (1) no writ of scire facias to revive the judgment lien was served on the judgment debtor, now deceased, as required by this section, before orders reviving the judgment were entered, so the orders were void ab initio, and (2) more than 10 years had elapsed since the judgment lien was validly revived, so the lien had expired and the complaint had no basis. Horne v. Cuthbert, 2015 Ark. App. 592, 473 S.W.3d 559 (2015).

Several Defendants.

A scire facias to revive and continue the lien of a judgment must be issued against all the defendants jointly, if all are living; and a judgment in favor of one defendant on the plea of nul tiel record enures to the benefit of and discharges the others. Bolinger v. Fowler, 14 Ark. (1 Barber) 27 (1853).

Timeliness.

In a scire facias to revive a judgment, it is error to render a new judgment for the debt or damages; also, to adjudge that it be revived from the date of the issuance of the writ, where the lien has expired before the suing out of the scire facias. Hanly v. Adams, 15 Ark. (2 Barber) 232 (1854).

Where a scire facias is sued out before the termination of the lien of a judgment but the judgment reviving the lien was not entered until after the period of three (now ten) years had expired since the judgment was rendered, the judgment of revival relates back to the issuance of the scire facias. Waldstein v. Williams, 101 Ark. 404, 142 S.W. 834 (1912).

The date of payment on a judgment is the time from which a new period of life for ten years begins to run. Pepin v. Hoover, 205 Ark. 251, 168 S.W.2d 390 (1943).

In suit by judgment debtor to set aside revival of judgment on ground that order of revivor was entered more than ten years after original judgment, although suit to revive judgment had been started prior to end of ten year period, the judgment cannot be set aside, as statute of limitations is governed by issuance of writ, and not by entry of order of revivor. General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Cox, 215 Ark. 860, 223 S.W.2d 775 (1949).

A scire facias writ was properly issued by the trial court for the revival of a judgment where the ten-year limitation period on the effectiveness of the judgment had not yet run, even though the original judgment lien had expired. Burton v. Bank of Tuckerman, 276 Ark. 538, 637 S.W.2d 577 (1982).

No time limit is placed on service of writ of scire facias; ARCP 4(i) is not intended to govern writs under this section. Bohnsack v. Beck, 294 Ark. 19, 740 S.W.2d 611 (1987).

No scire facias to revive a judgment for accrued child support arrearages could be filed more than 10 years after the date of the judgment. Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999).

Cited: Waldstein v. Williams, 101 Ark. 404, 142 S.W. 834 (1912); Epperson v. Singleton, 247 Ark. 1006, 449 S.W.2d 203 (1970); United States v. Plant, 56 F.R.D. 613 (W.D. Ark. 1972); Burton v. Bank of Tuckerman, 276 Ark. 538, 637 S.W.2d 577 (1982); Ewing v. Cargill, Inc., 324 Ark. 217, 919 S.W.2d 507 (1996).

16-65-502. Survival or revival of judgment upon death of a party.

    1. If one (1) or more plaintiffs in a judgment or decree dies before the judgment or decree is satisfied or carried into effect, the judgment or decree, if for money or concerning personal property, shall survive to the executors or administrators of the deceased party and, if concerning real estate, to his or her heirs or devisees.
    2. In each of the preceding cases, execution may be sued out in the name of the surviving plaintiff for the benefit of himself or herself and legal representatives of the deceased party, or the judgment or decree may be revived in the name of the legal representatives and the surviving plaintiff and execution may be sued out jointly.
    1. When there are several defendants in a judgment or decree and some of them die before the judgment or decree is satisfied or carried into effect, the judgment or decree, if for money or concerning personal property, shall survive against the executor or administrator of the deceased party and, if concerning real estate, against his or her heirs or devisees.
    2. In each of the cases mentioned in subdivision (b)(1) of this section, execution may be issued in the name of the surviving plaintiff for the benefit of himself or herself and the legal representatives of any deceased plaintiff or in the name of the surviving plaintiff and the representatives of any deceased plaintiff against any surviving defendant.
  1. The term “real estate”, as used in this act, shall be construed to include all estates and interest in lands and tenements, whether legal or equitable, liable to be sold under execution.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, §§ 12-15, 34; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6284, 6308, 6309, 6311, 6312; Pope's Dig., §§ 8240, 8263, 8264, 8266, 8267; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-129, 29-608 — 29-611.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 84 codified as §§ 16-65-113, 16-65-116, 16-65-50116-65-505, 16-65-601, 16-65-602, 16-66-411.

Case Notes

In General.

The death of a judgment-defendant does not defeat the action against him as the plaintiff may proceed against the judgment-defendant's representative. Finn v. Crabtree, 12 Ark. (7 English) 597 (1852).

Child Support.

Administrator of mother's estate had standing to sue to cover the arrears the father owed in child support, insurance premiums, and medical expenses at the time of her death, even though the father had custody of the children at the time of the suit. Darr v. Bankston, 327 Ark. 723, 940 S.W.2d 481 (1997).

Revivor.

Trustee, original party with mortgagee to action to foreclose deed of trust, who was appointed administrator of mortgagee's estate, was entitled, without revivor of the action, to enforce decree authorizing sale of property which had become final during mortgagee's lifetime. Hayes v. Whyte, 193 Ark. 918, 103 S.W.2d 628 (1937).

Cited: Price v. Hemingway, 179 Ark. 846, 18 S.W.2d 351 (1929).

16-65-503. Revival against administrators in succession.

If any executor or administrator who is a plaintiff or defendant in any judgment or decree dies, resigns, or is dismissed before the judgment or decree is satisfied or carried into effect, the judgment or decree may be revived by or against the administrator in succession in the manner provided for in this subchapter.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 6315; Pope's Dig., § 8270; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-615.

16-65-504. Revival of judgment against personal representatives, heirs, and devisees of deceased defendant.

  1. A judgment may be revived against the personal representatives, heirs, and devisees, or any of them, of a deceased defendant by an action in circuit court without verification of the complaint.
  2. A judgment or decree may be revived against the representatives of any deceased defendant by scire facias in the name of:
    1. The name of the surviving plaintiff; and
    2. Those plaintiffs who are deceased.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, § 16; Civil Code, § 442; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6310, 6313; Pope's Dig., §§ 8265, 8268; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-612, 29-613; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 198.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “in circuit court” for “prosecuted by proceedings at law” in (a).

16-65-505. Executions issued against defendant and deceased defendants' representatives.

Executions may be issued against the surviving defendant and the representatives of the deceased defendants or such of them as are jointly made parties.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, § 17; C. & M. Dig., § 6314; Pope's Dig., § 8269; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-614.

Subchapter 6 — Satisfaction

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 1184, § 5: Apr. 16, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to prevent unnecessary loss Arkansas Code 16-65-604, concerning prior judgements which may be enjoined when there may be a setoff, should be revised. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgm., § 1004 et seq.

C.J.S. 50 C.J.S., Judgm., § 656 et seq.

16-65-601. Entry of disposition of judgment in judgment book.

When satisfaction of a judgment or decree shall be acknowledged or entered by order of court, when satisfaction shall be made by execution, or when the judgment or decree shall be reversed or set aside, the clerk shall enter in the margin of the judgment book, opposite the judgment or decree, a memorandum of the disposition thereof, the date, and the book and page in which the evidence of the disposition is entered on record.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, § 28; C. & M. Dig., § 6280; Pope's Dig., § 8236; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-701.

Case Notes

Joint Debtors.

Entry on record of satisfaction of a judgment in full as to one of two joint judgment debtors satisfies the judgment as to both, though the entry recited that the judgment is not satisfied as to the other debtor. Biggs v. Davis, 184 Ark. 834, 43 S.W.2d 724 (1931).

16-65-602. Entry of satisfaction.

  1. Whenever the whole judgment shall appear to be satisfied by the return of an execution, it shall be the duty of the clerk to enter in the judgment book, in the space left for that purpose, “satisfied by execution”.
    1. Whenever a judgment is satisfied otherwise than upon an execution, it shall be the duty of the party or his or her attorney within sixty (60) days thereafter to enter satisfaction in the judgment book, which shall be sufficiently done by writing the words “satisfied in full”, with the date of the entry and the signature of the party making it.
    2. The court may on motion and notice compel an entry of satisfaction to be made.
      1. Satisfaction of a judgment or decree may be entered by the plaintiff in person, by his or her attorney of record, or by an agent duly authorized in writing for that purpose under the hand of the plaintiff.
      2. When the entry of satisfaction is made by an agent, his or her authority shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which the judgment or decree may be.
    3. If the person receiving satisfaction for any judgment or decree neglects or fails to enter satisfaction within the time prescribed in subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the person shall forfeit and pay to the person against whom the judgment or decree may have been entered any sum not exceeding one hundred fifty dollars ($150) nor less than five dollars ($5.00), to be recovered in an action founded on this act.
    1. If the person receiving satisfaction of any judgment or decree neglects or refuses to acknowledge the satisfaction of the judgment or decree within the time prescribed by subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the party interested may, on notice given to the adverse party or his or her attorney, apply to the court to have satisfaction entered.
    2. If the court is satisfied that the plaintiff or his or her agent or attorney has received full satisfaction of the judgment or decree, an order shall be made directing the clerk to enter satisfaction on the judgment or decree, which shall have the same effect as if it had been acknowledged by the party.
    3. The costs attending the application shall be recovered of the party so refusing, by execution, as in other cases.
  2. Satisfaction entered in accordance with the provisions of this section shall forever discharge and release the judgment or decree.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, §§ 19-21, 23-26; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6325-6332; Pope's Dig., §§ 8280-8287; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 29-702 — 29-708.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 84 codified as §§ 16-65-113, 16-65-116, 16-65-50116-65-505, 16-65-601, 16-65-602, 16-66-411.

Case Notes

In General.

While § 16-65-603 makes no provision for satisfaction of judgment, the authority not expressly given by § 16-65-603 is provided in this section. Roberts v. Feltman, 55 Ark. App. 142, 932 S.W.2d 781 (1996).

Attorney's Fees.

Attorney's fees are not “costs” within the meaning of subsection (c) of this section. Roberts v. Feltman, 55 Ark. App. 142, 932 S.W.2d 781 (1996).

Improper Entry.

Satisfaction, though improper, is a bar, so that orders issued in a foreclosure proceeding, subsequent to the entry of satisfaction, are void on their face and subject to collateral attack. Fields v. Jarnagin, 210 Ark. 1054, 199 S.W.2d 961 (1947).

Joint Debtors.

A release by the owners of a judgment of one of the three debtors jointly bound by it in consideration of the payment of a less sum than was due therefor will not operate to release the other two debtors where the instrument of release expressed on its face an intention not to release them. Hadley v. Bryan, 70 Ark. 197, 66 S.W. 921 (1902).

Satisfaction Set Aside.

Where a plaintiff purchases at his own execution sale property supposed to belong to the defendant and satisfies his judgment against the latter pro tanto, he will be entitled to have the satisfaction set aside upon being compelled subsequently to account to a third person as the owner of the property. De Loach Mill Mfg. Co. v. Little Rock Mill & Elevator Co., 65 Ark. 467, 47 S.W. 118 (1898).

Where a member of a partnership sold assets without consent of his partner in consideration of satisfaction of a decree in favor of the vendee, the sale was rescinded and the satisfaction set aside. Rutherford v. McDonnell, 66 Ark. 448, 51 S.W. 1060 (1899).

Subsequent Term.

An order dismissing a cause as having been settled, made after the expiration of the term at which the judgment was rendered, was held not to vacate the judgment nor to constitute a proceeding under this section authorizing the court to direct the clerk to enter satisfaction of the judgment on the record. Davis v. Oaks, 187 Ark. 501, 60 S.W.2d 922 (1933).

16-65-603. Judgments set off against each other.

  1. Judgments for the recovery of money may be set off against each other, having due regard to the legal and equitable rights of all persons interested in both judgments.
  2. The setoff may be ordered upon motion after reasonable notice to the adverse party, where both judgments are in the same court, or in an action for equitable relief in the court in which the judgment sought to be annulled by the setoff was rendered.

History. Civil Code, § 409; C. & M. Dig., § 6323; Pope's Dig., § 8278; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-709; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 199.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “for equitable relief” for “by equitable proceedings” in (b).

Cross References. Mutual judgments rendered before different justices of the peace set off, § 16-19-801.

Case Notes

Construction.

Although § 16-56-102 and subsection (a) of this section permit judgments to be set off against each other, § 16-63-206(c) prevents the setoff of judgments assigned to the defendant after suit has been commenced against him. Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637, 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

Section 16-56-102 and subsection (a) of this section are provisions generally authorizing that a demand, right or course of action may be asserted by setoff and also permitting money judgments to be set off (having due regard to the legal and equitable rights of all persons interested in both judgments), while § 16-63-206(c) is a specific provision governing the timeliness of setoffs, disallowing those judgments assigned to a defendant after the plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant; because these three provisions can be read in harmony, neither § 16-56-102 nor subsection (a) of this section impliedly repeal § 16-63-206(c). Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637, 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994).

While this section makes no provision for satisfaction of judgment, the authority not expressly given by this section is provided in § 16-65-602. Roberts v. Feltman, 55 Ark. App. 142, 932 S.W.2d 781 (1996).

Applicability.

This section has no application to probate judgments and it is doubtful whether it applies to foreign judgments. Weast v. Wickersham, 136 Ark. 541, 195 S.W. 685 (1917).

Father had no right to set off the judgment owed to the state of Missouri against the child-support arrearages owed to him by the mother; where the father would have had no set-off defense against the mother, he could not now assert the defense against the assignee, state of Missouri, and the fact that the mother later became delinquent on her child-support obligation to the father did not affect the State of Missouri's right to collection on its judgment. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Watkins, 83 Ark. App. 174, 119 S.W.3d 74 (2003).

Attorneys' Liens.

Where one holding judgment against another moves to have it set off against a judgment against himself in the other's favor, his right thereto will not be defeated by a lien of the other's attorney subsequently filed on the latter judgment. Park v. Hutchinson, 80 Ark. 183, 96 S.W. 751 (1906).

A lien for attorney's fees in various suits without showing the amount recoverable in the particular suit cannot prevail against the right of the judgment debtor to set off a judgment rendered for him against the client. Rachels v. Russell, 154 Ark. 418, 242 S.W. 809 (1922).

Contracts.

A judgment may not only be set off against another judgment but may be used as a set-off against any claim founded on a contract. Milner v. Camden Lumber Co., 74 Ark. 224, 85 S.W. 234 (1905).

Employer and Employee.

Court found that employer made himself liable for judgment against his employee and that the set-off or judgment was not allowable. Matthews v. Blanks, 68 Ark. 497, 60 S.W. 239 (1900).

Exemptions.

Where defendant, against whom judgment was obtained, purchased another judgment which had been rendered against plaintiff, defendant could not set off one judgment against the other where plaintiff scheduled his exemptions and his whole personal property, including his judgment against defendant, did not exceed the amount allowed as exempt property. Atkinson & Co. v. Pittman, 47 Ark. 464, 2 S.W. 114 (1886).

When a judgment creditor procured the sale of his debtor's exempt property, the creditor cannot in an action for damages for the sale thereof, set off against the debtor's judgment, his judgment against the debtor since that would destroy the exemption. Ray v. Gregory, 120 Ark. 50, 178 S.W. 405 (1915).

Multiple Parties.

Where both the judgment against defendant and defendant's successful cross-claim against co-defendant occurred in the same court and the chancellor complied with this section, the defendant was entitled to a setoff of his judgment for reimbursement and contribution against co-defendant. Roberts v. Feltman, 55 Ark. App. 142, 932 S.W.2d 781 (1996).

Same Transactions.

Where the plaintiff and defendant obtained judgments against each other growing out of the same transaction, defendant had no right to claim his right of action against plaintiff as exempt from the plaintiff's claim against him; the two causes of action having grown out of the same transaction, the one extinguishes the other pro tanto. Harry v. Williams, 122 Ark. 148, 182 S.W. 546 (1916).

16-65-604. Collection of judgment enjoined during pendency of action which may be usable as setoff.

During the pendency of an action, or while any claim, contract, or other obligation remains unsatisfied or unfulfilled which could be used as a setoff against a prior judgment in favor of the defendants or parties or any of them, the court shall enjoin and stay collection and enforcement of the prior judgment in favor of the defendants or parties upon such terms and conditions as the court deems necessary to prevent loss by insolvency, nonresidence, or otherwise.

History. Civil Code, § 410; C. & M. Dig., § 6324; Pope's Dig., § 8279; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-710; Acts 1993, No. 1184, § 1.

Chapter 66 Execution Of Judgments

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Constitutional Law — Writ of Execution Statutes Held Unconstitutional — Has the Due Process Notice Requirement Left Creditors Out in the Cold? Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990)13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 293.

Survey, Debtor/Creditor Relations, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 361.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1991, No. 389, § 5: Mar. 7, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the ability of a judgment creditor to enlist the aid of local officials to execute against property of judgment debtors is essential to assure that judgments can be satisfied in a peaceful and orderly manner; that since the ruling of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Duhon v. Gravette, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990), no constitutional statutory procedure exists in this State, and has not existed for a period of several months prior to the enactment of this legislation that permits the satisfaction of judgments through execution against property and that this act is immediately necessary to help assure the health, safety and welfare of judgment creditors and judgment debtors. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Exec., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 33 C.J.S., Exec., § 1 et seq.

16-66-101. Execution issued on final judgment order.

An execution may issue on any final judgment order of a court of record, in personam, for a liquidated sum of money and for interest and costs, or for costs alone.

History. Civil Code, § 672; C. & M. Dig., § 4253; Pope's Dig., § 5265; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-101.

Cross References. Enforcement of execution by state, § 16-106-107.

Execution after affirmance on appeal, § 16-67-326.

Execution for costs, § 16-68-410.

Case Notes

Issuance.

Execution may issue on judgment though not directed by the judgment itself. Morgan v. Scott-Mayer Comm'n Co., 185 Ark. 637, 48 S.W.2d 838 (1932).

Joint Execution.

A joint execution upon two separate judgments is void and is not amendable by the elimination of one of the judgments. Bigham v. Dover, 86 Ark. 323, 110 S.W. 217 (1908).

Judgment in Abeyance.

The court rendering the judgment had no power, in the absence of a stay or supersedeas pending appeal, to withhold execution beyond period fixed by former statute governing time of execution. Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978).

It was error for the trial court to order judgment held in abeyance so long as the husband paid small amount per month on the wife's judgment against him; therefore, case was remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of what amount should be paid to justify withholding contempt. Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978).

Jurisdiction.

Defendant's contacts, past and present, with state held sufficient to sustain the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction in garnishment proceeding. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Crockett Motor Sales, Inc., 293 Ark. 502, 739 S.W.2d 157 (1987).

Sheriff's Deed.

Sheriff's deed issued to wife on an execution based on arrearage of husband on support was not valid where there was no judgment in favor of wife for arrearage. Frazier v. Hanes, 220 Ark. 765, 249 S.W.2d 842 (1952).

Cited: Tiner v. Tiner, 2012 Ark. App. 483, 422 S.W.3d 178 (2012).

16-66-102. Execution on registered judgment from another county.

The circuit court of any county in this state in which a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in another county of this state has been registered in accordance with the provisions of § 16-65-117(a)-(c) shall have power to issue writs of execution upon any such judgment.

History. Acts 1967, No. 202, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-103.1.

Case Notes

Construction.

The phrase “writs of execution” is not some generic designation of all forms of execution and, instead, is a reference to one specific form of collecting on a judgment. Moory v. Quadras, Inc., 333 Ark. 624, 970 S.W.2d 275 (1998).

Applicability.

This section does not apply to issuance of a writ of garnishment based solely on a registered judgment rendered from a court in another county. Moory v. Quadras, Inc., 333 Ark. 624, 970 S.W.2d 275 (1998).

16-66-103. Execution may issue until collection barred.

An execution may be issued upon a judgment at any time until the collection of it is barred by the statute of limitations, although no execution may have been previously issued within a year and a day.

History. Civil Code, § 436; C. & M. Dig., § 4259; Pope's Dig., § 5271; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-103.

Cross References. Limitation of action on judgment, § 16-56-114.

Case Notes

Judgment Liens.

Judgment creditor may issue an execution on the judgment at any time within ten years after its rendition. Bird v. Kitchens, 215 Ark. 609, 221 S.W.2d 795 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 892, 70 S. Ct. 241 (1949).

Justices of the Peace.

Executions cannot issue on judgments of justices of the peace after five years. Trammell v. Anderson, 52 Ark. 176, 12 S.W. 328 (1889).

Running of Statute.

Process may be issued at any time before the enforcement of a judgment is barred and a break in the running of the statute of limitations will constitute the commencement of a new period not only for an action to enforce the judgment but for the issuance of process. Koontz v. La Dow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 S.W. 686 (1918).

The date of payment on a judgment is the time from which a new period of life begins to run. Pepin v. Hoover, 205 Ark. 251, 168 S.W.2d 390 (1943).

16-66-104. Procedure in issuing writs of execution.

  1. Form — In General. The form of a writ of execution may be in substance as follows:
  2. Form — Variances. The form of the writ of execution in subsection (a) of this section may be varied to suit each particular case.
  3. Notice to Defendant. Upon application for a writ of execution by a qualified judgment creditor, the clerk of the court shall attach to the writ set forth in subsection (a) of this section the following notice:
  4. Service and Return of Notice to Defendant — Mailing of Copies.
    1. The notice to defendant together with a copy of the writ of execution shall be served on the judgment debtor by:
      1. An officer authorized to serve process simultaneously with seizure or levy of property; or
      2. The judgment creditor in the same manner as service of writs or summons before the day the officer authorized to serve process seizes or levies on property of the judgment debtor.
    2. If the judgment creditor mails the writ of execution and the notice to defendant, as provided in subdivision (d)(1)(B) of this section, the mail shall be sent to the last known address of the judgment debtor. However, if the writ and notice are refused, unclaimed, or cannot be delivered by the post office, or if the residence address of the judgment debtor is not discoverable after diligent search, then the writ of execution and the notice to defendant shall be sent first-class mail to the judgment debtor at his or her last known residence address and, if known, his or her last place of employment.
  5. Mailing of Annual Notice. The judgment creditor shall not be required to serve another notice to defendant on the judgment debtor, by mail or otherwise, for future writs of execution on the same debt within one (1) year of the original writ of execution. If further writs of execution on the same debt are filed thereafter, then the notice shall be required to be served by the judgment creditor annually.
  6. Certificate of Service Statement. The circuit clerk shall include as a part of the writ of execution a certification statement of the service required in subsection (d) of this section on the judgment debtor. The judgment creditor, or the authorized officer serving the writ, must complete the certificate of service statement by listing the name and address of the judgment debtor and the date of mailing. The statement must be signed by the judgment creditor or his or her attorney.
  7. Hearing. Upon filing a claim of exempt property, a prompt hearing shall be held to determine the validity of the claimed exemptions. Provided, no hearing shall be required and a writ of supersedeas shall issue as to the claimed exemption or exemptions if the judgment creditor files a statement in writing that the judgment debtor's claim of exemption is not contested.
  8. Time to Claim Exemption. Upon receipt of a writ of execution and notice to defendant, the judgment debtor shall have twenty (20) days from such receipt to file a petition to claim any of the exemptions provided by law.

“In the Court of County, Arkansas (name) Plaintiff v. No. (number) (name) Defendant WRIT OF EXECUTION The State of Arkansas: To the Sheriff of (name) County, Greeting: A judgment was entered in this cause on (month/day) (year) in favor of (name) , the (plaintiff/defendant) and against (name) , the (plaintiff/defendant) for the principal sum of $ (amount) , costs and disbursements in the sum of $ (amount) , and interest on the judgment at the rate of (APR) percent per annum, until paid; and $ (nothing or amount paid) has been paid and credited on the judgment to the date of this writ, leaving unpaid thereon the total sum of $ (amount) , including costs and interest accrued to the date hereof, and interest will accrue after the date of this writ at the rate of $ (daily interest) per day; all as shown by the docket and files of this cause. You are commanded to take into your possession from (name) , the judgment debtor, the following described property: (description of specific property) . If said property is not to be found, then you shall take into your possession monetary amounts in the sum of $ (amount) , which is the equivalent of the value of said property. You are finally commanded to fully perform this writ, to recover said property or sums, to make return of this writ within the statutory period required by law, and to serve the Notice attached to this writ. In Witness Whereof, I have set my hand and official seal this (day) day of (month) , (year) (Title) (Seal)”

Click to view form.

“NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF YOUR RIGHT TO CLAIM CERTAIN PROPERTIES AS BEING EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION. The writ of execution delivered to you with this Notice means that certain properties belonging to you have been executed upon in order to pay a court judgment against you. HOWEVER, YOU MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP YOUR PROPERTY FROM BEING TAKEN, OR TO SUBSTITUTE THE PROPERTY THAT IS TAKEN, SO READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. State and federal laws say that certain property may not be taken to pay certain types of court judgments. This money or property is said to be ‘exempt’ from execution. You have the right to petition the court within twenty (20) days to claim an exemption. If your claim of an exemption is contested, the court shall promptly hold a hearing after your claim has been filed. YOU MUST IMMEDIATELY SERVE A COPY OF YOUR CLAIM UPON THE PARTY SEEKING EXECUTION.”

Click to view form.

History. Civil Code, § 673; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4254, 4255; Pope's Dig., §§ 5266, 5267; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-106, 30-107; Acts 1991, No. 389, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

Case Notes

Amendment.

An execution may be amended. Blanks v. Rector, 24 Ark. (11 Barber) 496 (1866); Bridewell v. Mooney, 25 Ark. 524 (1869).

An execution without a seal is amendable and, when amended by affixing the seal, relates back to its issuance. Hall v. Lackmond, 50 Ark. 113, 6 S.W. 510 (1887).

Harmless Error.

The words “and company” after the defendant's name is a mere irregularity and does not avoid the execution; it is good as against the defendant. Hawkins v. Taylor, 56 Ark. 45, 19 S.W. 105 (1892).

Jurisdiction.

A writ of execution or garnishment after a judgment in the circuit or chancery court is issuable only from the court in which the judgment was rendered. McGehee Bank v. Charles W. Greeson & Sons, 223 Ark. 18, 263 S.W.2d 901 (1954).

Cited: 555, Inc. v. Barlow, 3 Ark. App. 139, 623 S.W.2d 843 (1981); Vinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995); Moory v. Quadras, Inc., 333 Ark. 624, 970 S.W.2d 275 (1998).

16-66-105. Debt, damages, and costs endorsed on execution.

Every clerk of the courts of record in this state shall endorse upon every execution issued by him or her the debt, damages, and costs to be recovered before delivery of the execution to the officer by whom it is to be executed.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 4267; Pope's Dig., § 5279; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-104.

Cross References. Fees of officers to be indorsed on execution, § 16-68-502.

Indorsement of costs on execution, § 16-68-501.

16-66-106. Joint execution when judgment against several.

On a judgment or decree against several, the execution must be joint.

History. Civil Code, § 674; C. & M. Dig., § 4257; Pope's Dig., § 5269; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-108.

16-66-107. Death of one or more plaintiffs.

  1. The death of one (1) or all the plaintiffs shall not prevent an execution being issued thereon. However, on such execution, the clerk shall endorse the death of such of them as are dead and, if all the plaintiffs are dead, the names of the personal representative or last survivor if the judgment passed to the personal representative, or the names of the survivor's heirs, if the judgment was for real property.
  2. Before making the endorsements set forth in subsection (a) of this section, an affidavit of the death shall be filed with the clerk by one (1) of the plaintiffs, or personal representatives or heirs, or their attorney, and that the persons named as such are the personal representatives or heirs. In the case of personal representatives, they shall also file with the clerk a certificate of their qualification in the proper court in this state.
  3. The sheriff, in acting upon an execution endorsed as provided in subsection (a) of this section, shall proceed as if the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or the personal representative or heirs, were the only plaintiffs in the execution and shall take sale, stay, and forthcoming bonds accordingly.
  4. The defendant may move the court to quash an execution on the ground that the personal representative or heirs of a deceased plaintiff are not properly stated in the endorsement on the execution and, during the vacation of the court, may obtain an injunction, upon its being made to appear that the persons named are not entitled to the judgment on which the execution was issued.

History. Civil Code, §§ 437-439, 441; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4262-4264, 4266; Pope's Dig., §§ 5274-5276, 5278; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-109 — 30-112.

16-66-108. Death of part of defendants.

The death of part only of the defendants shall not prevent execution being issued which, however, shall operate alone on the survivors and their property.

History. Civil Code, § 440; C. & M. Dig., § 4265; Pope's Dig., § 5277; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-113.

16-66-109. Executions directed to any county without court order.

Executions issued upon any judgment, order, or decree rendered in any court of record may be directed to and executed in any county in this state without first procuring an order of the court for that purpose.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 4256; Pope's Dig., § 5268; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-114.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

A writ of execution or garnishment after a judgment in the circuit or chancery court is issuable only from the court in which the judgment was rendered. McGehee Bank v. Charles W. Greeson & Sons, 223 Ark. 18, 263 S.W.2d 901 (1954).

16-66-110. Endorsement of sheriff.

Every sheriff or other officer to whom any execution may be delivered shall endorse thereon the hour, day of the month, and year when it came to his or her hands.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 25; C. & M. Dig., § 4269; Pope's Dig., § 5281; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-115.

16-66-111. Priority of writs.

If two (2) or more writs of execution come to the hands of the sheriff or another officer to whom execution may be delivered on the same day, the writ of execution which he or she first received shall have priority over the others and shall be executed accordingly.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 25; C. & M. Dig., § 4269; Pope's Dig., § 5281; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-115.

16-66-112. Time execution attaches as lien.

An execution shall be a lien on the property in any goods or chattels, or the rights or shares in any stock, or on any real estate, to which the lien of the judgment, order, or decree extends or has been determined, from the time the writ shall be delivered to the officer in the proper county to be executed.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 24; C. & M. Dig., § 4276; Pope's Dig., § 5288; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-116.

Case Notes

Bank Deposits.

Creditor's writ of execution did not create a lien in the debtor's bank deposits. In re Frazier, 136 B.R. 199 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1991).

Equity.

Money decree in chancery court became a lien upon defendant's real property in the county on the date of rendition but did not become a lien on defendant's personal property until execution was issued and the writ delivered to the officer in the proper county to be executed. In re Van Meter, 135 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Ark. 1955).

A money decree in and of itself does not establish a constructive trust or an equitable lien in absence of language in the decree to that effect. In re Van Meter, 135 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Ark. 1955).

Priorities.

A sale of lands under a junior attachment does not release the lien of a prior attachment, and the money arising from the sale is not to be applied in payment of the prior attachment. Hanauer & Co. v. Casey, 26 Ark. 352 (1870).

By making a prior levy of an execution on personal property, a constable secures a prior lien as against the sheriff subsequently levying upon the same property under execution. Miller v. Grady, 76 Ark. 270, 88 S.W. 963 (1905).

Where attorneys filed suit and summons was issued in action against defendants before judgment creditor obtained execution or garnishment of personal property and before writ was delivered to officer of proper county to be executed, attorneys' lien was superior to lien of judgment creditor. Consolidated Underwriters of S.C. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 136 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Ark. 1955).

A judgment which has ripened into a lien by virtue of this section is superior and paramount to an unrecorded mortgage. Charlesworth Pontiac Co. v. Walker, 238 Ark. 940, 385 S.W.2d 797 (1965).

Cited: Vinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995); In re Huffman, — B.R. —, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1845 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. June 20, 2002).

16-66-113. Alias execution.

  1. If an execution is issued and the plaintiff desires to take out another at his or her own proper costs, the clerk may issue the execution, though the previous execution has not been returned.
  2. If an execution is returned, in whole or in part, not satisfied, a new one may issue.

History. Civil Code, § 674; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4260, 4261; Pope's Dig., §§ 5272, 5273; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-117, 30-118.

Case Notes

Presumption.

One levy raises a presumption of sufficiency. Ford v. Bigger, 80 Ark. 300, 97 S.W. 65 (1906).

16-66-114. Execution against corporations — Attachment.

  1. The first process upon a judgment against any private corporation shall be a fieri facias, which the sheriff or other officer shall levy on the moneys, goods and chattels, and lands and tenements of the corporation, and upon which he or she shall proceed as in other cases.
  2. If the sheriff or other officer returns upon any writ of fieri facias that no goods and chattels and lands and tenements can be found whereon to levy or if the property taken is not sufficient to satisfy the judgment, interest, and costs, then upon the application of the plaintiff or his or her attorney, the circuit court shall issue a writ of attachment against the rights and credits of the corporation, reciting the judgment, execution, and return, which shall be directed to the sheriff of the proper county.
  3. The attachment shall be executed by summoning as garnishee any person having any moneys or effects belonging to the corporation and any debtor to the corporation who may be found within the county to appear before the circuit court at the return of the writ and answer touching any moneys or effects of the corporation in his or her hands or any debt he or she may owe to the corporation.
  4. From the time of making service, all moneys and effects due and owing, payable, or belonging to the corporation shall be bound until the judgment is satisfied. No payment made thereafter to the corporation or other disposition of any debts, moneys, or effects so attached shall be credited to the garnishee making the payment nor shall the stock owned by the person in the corporation be allowed as a setoff.
  5. Proceedings against garnishees under the provisions of this section shall be the same as against the garnishees summoned in the case of absent and absconding debtors. However, no judgment shall be rendered against a garnishee for any debt to become due at a future day until after the debt shall become due.
  6. For all moneys paid by any garnishee under the provisions of this section, he or she shall have credit against the corporation to whom it is due.
  7. If a sufficient sum is not made to satisfy the judgment and costs, other writs of attachment may be issued as provided in this section, from time to time, until the whole is satisfied.
  8. If any money remains in the hands of the officer after satisfying the judgment and all costs, he or she shall pay the money to the corporation or its order.
  9. Nothing in the provisions of this section shall be so construed as to authorize the sale of any real or personal property belonging to the state or to any county, city, town, borough, or other public or municipal corporation regularly incorporated according to law, by virtue of any execution.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 33, §§ 7-15; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4274, 4345-4352; Pope's Dig., §§ 5286, 5357-5364; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-801 — 30-809.

Case Notes

Drainage District.

The property of a drainage district is not included in this section. Keith v. Drainage Dist. of Poinsett County, 183 Ark. 786, 38 S.W.2d 755 (1931).

Jurisdiction.

Where the creditor was located in Arkansas, the nonresident debtor wage earner lived in another state, but the wage earner's employer was subject to suit in Arkansas, since it registered to do business and did business in this state, the trial court had jurisdiction of the garnishment action against the employer. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Crockett Motor Sales, Inc., 293 Ark. 502, 739 S.W.2d 157 (1987).

Cited: Miller v. Alamo, 975 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1992); Turner v. Farnam, 82 Ark. App. 489, 120 S.W.3d 616 (2003).

16-66-115. Abstract of execution.

  1. The clerk shall keep a well-bound book in which he or she shall enter an abstract of all executions issued by him or her or out of his or her office, showing:
    1. The date of the execution;
    2. The names of the parties;
    3. The amount of debt;
    4. Damages;
    5. Costs;
    6. To what officer and county directed;
    7. The return, if any; and
    8. A reference to the book and page wherein the judgment, order, or decree whereon the execution issued is entered.
  2. Every clerk shall, moreover, keep a regular index in alphabetical order, to the abstract of executions, both by the names of the plaintiffs and of the defendants therein.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, §§ 11, 12; C. &. M. Dig., §§ 4267, 4268; Pope's Dig., §§ 5279, 5280; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-104, 30-105.

Case Notes

Cited: Vinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995).

16-66-116. Conveyances by commissioners.

  1. Real property may be conveyed by a commissioner appointed by the court when:
    1. By the judgment in an action, a party is ordered to convey that property to another; or
    2. That property has been sold under a judgment or order of the court and the purchase money paid.
  2. The deed of the commissioner shall so refer to the judgment, orders, and proceedings authorizing the conveyance that the judgment, orders, and proceedings may be readily found.
  3. It shall be necessary for the conveyance to be signed by the commissioner only, without affixing the names of the parties whose title is conveyed. However, the names of the parties whose title is conveyed shall be recited in the body of the conveyance.
  4. The conveyance shall be recorded in the office in which, by law, it should have been recorded had it been made by the parties whose title is conveyed by it.
    1. A conveyance made in pursuance of a judgment shall pass to the grantee the title of the parties ordered to convey the land.
    2. A conveyance made in pursuance of a sale ordered by the court shall pass to the grantee the title of all the parties to the action or proceeding.
  5. After a conveyance is ordered or adjudged, it shall not be necessary to revive the action if any of the parties shall die, but the conveyance in pursuance of the judgment or order shall be effectual to pass the title, notwithstanding the death of any of the parties.

History. Civil Code, §§ 428-435; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1507-1512; Pope's Dig., §§ 1816-1823; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-501 — 30-508; Acts 1989, No. 197, § 1.

Cross References. Quieting title, public sales, § 18-60-601 et seq.

Case Notes

Approval by Court.

Until confirmed, the sale is incomplete. Wells v. Rice, 34 Ark. 346 (1879); Purcell v. Gann, 113 Ark. 332, 168 S.W. 1102 (1914).

Conceding that conveyance executed and delivered without approval of court was ineffectual for conveying legal title, the purchaser nevertheless acquired an equitable title which can be asserted as a defense in a suit against him for the land. Saint Louis & Ark. Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Godwin, 85 Ark. 372, 108 S.W. 516 (1908).

An endorsement upon a commissioner's deed of its approval, signed by the chancellor, is evidence that he examined and approved the deed when sitting as a court. Jacks v. Kelley Trust Co., 90 Ark. 548, 120 S.W. 142 (1909).

Where the master's deed had not been judicially approved, a supplemental bill filed to effectuate a foreclosure presented a proper case for the exercise of equity jurisdiction. Ferguson v. Marble Sav. Bank, 105 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1939).

Death of Party.

This section has no application to a question of revivor after the death of the defendant in a foreclosure proceeding and before confirmation. De Yampert v. Manley, 127 Ark. 153, 191 S.W. 905 (1917).

Payment.

Payment to commissioner is all that is required. Graham v. W.W. Dickinson Hdwe. Co., 69 Ark. 119, 63 S.W. 58 (1901); Morgan v. Kendrick, 91 Ark. 394, 121 S.W. 278 (1909).

Recordation.

An unrecorded deed was good as between the parties and also against a subsequent purchaser of the land with notice. Millman Lumber Co. v. Bryant, 213 Ark. 277, 209 S.W.2d 878 (1948).

Title.

A decree in a personal action binds only the parties thereto and their privies and a sale thereunder passes only such title as the parties thereto had at the time of the decree of sale. Wilson & Beall v. Gaylord, 77 Ark. 477, 92 S.W. 26 (1906).

A commissioner's deed which by mistake recites that it conveys the interest of the defendants' ancestor, instead of the defendants themselves, is defective in form merely and should be reformed in chancery. Gates v. Gray, 85 Ark. 25, 106 S.W. 947 (1907).

Cited: Steelman v. Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n, 285 Ark. 217, 685 S.W.2d 800 (1985).

16-66-117. Bonds in executions and judicial sales.

  1. Every bond taken on the sale of property under an order or decree in equity or on the sale of property under execution, and every stay bond and forthcoming bond shall be signed by the principal and sureties and attested by the person taking the bond or someone in his or her presence.
  2. A bond so taken shall be returned to the proper officer with the report of the acts of the person taking it and, if taken under execution, the latter must be returned with the bond.
  3. All such bonds shall have the force and effect of a judgment on which an execution may issue. The execution shall be endorsed to the effect that no surety of any kind is to be taken.
  4. The officer taking any of the bonds described in subsection (a) of this section and his or her sureties, or their representatives, shall be jointly and severally liable to the person injured for any damages he or she may sustain by the officer's failing to discharge his or her duty in the taking of the bond.
    1. If one (1) of several obligors or obligees in a bond having the force and effect of a judgment dies before the judgment is satisfied, execution may issue on the bond in the name of the surviving obligees against the obligors or the survivor.
    2. When all the obligees in a bond as specified in subdivision (e)(1) of this section die, their personal representatives may, if the bond is not satisfied, sue out execution thereon after its maturity against the obligors, or their personal representatives if all the obligors are dead, or if only some of the obligors are dead, against the survivor and the personal representatives of the deceased.
  5. When a bond having the force of a judgment is quashed, a new execution may issue on the original judgment at the instance of the plaintiff in the same manner as if that bond had never been given.

History. Civil Code, §§ 685-689; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4304-4310; Pope's Dig., §§ 5316-5322; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-601 — 30-605.

Cross References. Actions on bonds, § 16-107-201 et seq.

Case Notes

Execution Sale.

A sale under execution on a bond is strictly a statutory proceeding and no authority is given in the section authorizing a court to confirm a sale of real estate made thereunder or to order the sheriff to make the sale and make a deed to the purchaser or to issue a writ of possession. Sumpter v. Hot Springs Sav. Trust & Guar. Co., 140 Ark. 91, 216 S.W. 311 (1919).

Release.

Sureties on a stay bond are released by the release of property levied on to the extent of the value of such property. White, Wilson, Drew Co. v. Ahrens, 156 Ark. 588, 247 S.W. 73 (1923).

16-66-118. Defaults of officers.

  1. Each officer to whom any execution is delivered shall be liable and bound to pay the whole amount of money specified in or endorsed on the execution and directed to be levied if he or she willfully:
    1. Neglects or refuses to execute or levy the execution according to law;
    2. Takes in execution any property, or if any property is delivered to him or her by any person against whom an execution may have been issued, and the officer neglects or refuses to make a sale of the property so delivered according to law;
    3. Does not return the execution on or before the return day specified therein;
    4. Makes a false return of the execution; or
    5. After having taken the defendant's body in execution, permits him or her to escape, and does not have his body according to the command of the writ.
  2. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court from which any execution may be issued to endorse on the execution the time when it was returned.
  3. If the officer, on the return of any execution or at the time the execution ought to be returned, does not have the money which he or she may have become liable to pay as prescribed in subsection (a) of this section and does not pay the money over according to the command of the writ, any person aggrieved thereby may have his or her action against the officer and his or her securities, upon his or her official bond.
  4. If any officer sells any property under any execution, whether he or she received payment therefor or not, or makes the money specified in or endorsed on any execution and directed to be levied, or any part thereof, and does not have the amount of such sales or the money so made before the court and does not pay over the same according to law, he or she shall be liable to pay the whole amount of the sale or money by him or her made to the person entitled thereto, with lawful interest thereon, and damages in addition at the rate of ten percent (10%) per month to be computed from the time when the execution is made returnable until the whole is paid, to be recovered in an action against the officer and his securities on his or her official bond.
    1. The party aggrieved may proceed against the officer by the motion before the court in which the writ is returnable in a summary manner, ten (10) days' previous notice of the intended motion being given, on which motion the court shall render judgment for the amount which ought to have been paid, with interest and damages as provided in subsection (d) of this section, and award execution thereon.
    2. The proceeding against any officer by motion in the manner prescribed in subdivision (e)(1) of this section shall not be construed to exempt the securities of the officer from liability.
    1. It shall be the duty of every officer to whom any execution may be directed, issued on any judgment recovered on motion according to the provisions of subsections (d) and (e) of this section, to execute the execution within fifteen (15) days after it shall be delivered to him or her.
    2. The officer shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities for every default therein as on other executions.
  5. If any sheriff or other officer to whom any execution may be legally directed refuses to receive the execution and execute it according to law, the officer shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office and shall also be liable to the party aggrieved for the amount of money specified in the execution, to be recovered against him or her and his or her securities on his or her official bond.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, §§ 62-67; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4360-4365; Pope's Dig., §§ 5372-5377; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-1001 — 30-1006; Acts 2013, No. 319, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Subdivision (a)(5) appears to contemplate an imprisonment for debt which would contravene Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 16.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added “willfully” at the end of the introductory language of (a).

Cross References. Actions on bonds, § 16-107-201 et seq.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

Case Notes

In General.

This section is highly penal. Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Lewis, 89 Ark. 488, 117 S.W. 558 (1909); Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Lewis, 97 Ark. 149, 133 S.W. 590 (1911); Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Davis, 186 Ark. 788, 56 S.W.2d 178 (1933).

While the language of the section is broad, it is sufficiently specific to cover executions issuing from any court created by the Constitution or by its authority. Lewis v. J.C. Pearson Co., 118 Ark. 271, 176 S.W. 160 (1915).

This section is highly penal and the person seeking to enforce the penalty must bring himself within both the letter and the spirit of the statute. G.F. Harvey Co. v. Huddleston, 125 Ark. 522, 189 S.W. 181 (1916).

This section is penal and is enforced only where the sheriff knew or by ordinary diligence could have ascertained that defendant had property subject to execution. McIlroy Banking Co. v. Mills, 178 Ark. 741, 11 S.W.2d 481 (1928).

Amendment of Execution.

An officer's liability is not increased by amending the execution. Jones v. Goodbar, 60 Ark. 182, 29 S.W. 462 (1895).

Death of Officer.

The action under this section is for breach of contract and survives, on the death of the officer, against his administrator and sureties. Wilson v. Young, 58 Ark. 593, 25 S.W. 870 (1894).

When a constable dies before the time expires for making the return the sureties are not liable for the penalty. Wm. R. Moore & Co. v. Rooks, 71 Ark. 562, 76 S.W. 548 (1903).

Defenses.

In proceedings by judgment creditor against sheriff for failure to return execution, it is neither a defense that the defendant in the execution was insolvent and the plaintiff not damaged, nor that the deputy sheriff endorsed a return upon the execution and finding the clerk absent when he went to file it, was later prevented from doing so because of official duties. Atkinson v. Heer & Co., 44 Ark. 174 (1884).

The irregularity of an execution is no excuse to a sheriff for failure to execute and return it, unless the irregularity be such as to render it void. Jett v. Shinn, 47 Ark. 373, 1 S.W. 693 (1886)Criticized byVinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995).

Irregularities in the execution are no defense to an action for a failure to return. Jones v. Goodbar, 60 Ark. 182, 29 S.W. 462 (1895).

A sheriff is not liable for a failure to return an execution in time, if he acted in obedience to instructions from the plaintiff's attorney. Bickham v. Kosminsky, 74 Ark. 413, 86 S.W. 292 (1905).

An officer can defend against a violation of this section when sued by the plaintiff in execution by showing that his omission to perform the duty was due to the conduct or instructions of the plaintiff or of his attorney of record. G.F. Harvey Co. v. Huddleston, 125 Ark. 522, 189 S.W. 181 (1916).

Summary judgment granted for sheriff where the judgment creditor's attorney mailed the original writ to the sheriff and he mailed it back to the attorney asking attorney to make a specific listing of property, but the plaintiff's attorney never advised the sheriff of any specific property and kept the writ past the deadline for filing with the clerk; a judgment creditor cannot benefit from any direct or indirect act that contributes to the officer's omission to perform his duty. Vinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995).

Failure to Levy.

In order for a plaintiff to recover from a constable for failure to make a levy upon the defendant's property pursuant to an execution issued, the plaintiff must prove that during the life of the writ of execution that his debtor was possessed of property liable to be seized under the writ and that the constable neglected to seize the property. Peery v. Mauldin, 120 Ark. 422, 179 S.W. 652 (1915).

Sheriff was not excused from executing on property because it was homestead; sheriff was under duty to execute on property, and he had no discretion in matter. Mandamus writ should have been issued to compel sheriff to levy execution. State v. Sheriff of Lafayette County, 292 Ark. 523, 731 S.W.2d 207 (1987).

Other Legislation.

Subsection (a) and (d) and subdivision (e)(1) were not repealed by the enactment of the Civil Code. Wilson v. Young, 58 Ark. 593, 25 S.W. 870 (1894).

Return.

An oral return is insufficient. Jones v. Goodbar, 60 Ark. 182, 29 S.W. 462 (1895).

Standing.

A judgment creditor, rather than a judgment debtor, has standing to sue a noncomplying sheriff under this section. Efurd v. Hackler, 335 Ark. 267, 983 S.W.2d 386 (1998).

Timeliness.

Evidence was held to support a judgment for sheriff sued for delay, though the clerk's execution docket showed the execution was not timely returned. State v. Warner, 185 Ark. 610, 48 S.W.2d 246 (1932).

Waiver.

Where an execution was returned by the sheriff after the return day and subsequently the judgment on which it was issued was satisfied, the execution plaintiff cannot maintain an action against the sheriff for failure to return the execution within the prescribed time, as the acceptance of payment waived any cause of action growing out of the failure. Powell v. Massey-Herndon Shoe Co., 69 Ark. 79, 62 S.W. 66 (1901).

Cited: Fort Smith Seed Co. v. Jones, 198 Ark. 1012, 132 S.W.2d 364 (1939); Saxon v. Purma, 256 Ark. 461, 508 S.W.2d 331 (1974); Miller v. Alamo, 975 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1992).

16-66-119. Immunity of law enforcement officers.

Any sheriff or other law enforcement officer acting reasonably, in good faith, and not in violation of clearly established law, and exercising due care while serving and executing writs of execution shall have immunity from suit and civil liability and shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts performed in the official performance of his or her duties.

History. Acts 1991, No. 424, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

Case Notes

Cited: Vinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995).

Subchapter 2 — Property Subject to Execution — Exemptions

Cross References. Exemptions from execution, Ark. Const., Art. 9.

Workers' compensation payments, exemption, § 11-9-110.

Effective Dates. Acts 1840, § 3, p. 9: effective on passage.

Acts 1855, § 13, p. 196: effective on passage.

Acts 1861, No. 196, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1871, No. 58, § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1873, No. 126, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 23, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1877, No. 53, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1887, No. 64, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1891, No. 3, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1909, No. 195, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1953, No. 164, § 4: Feb. 27, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that existing law pertaining to the garnishment of wages of laborers and mechanics is indefinite and confusing, causing hardship to both creditor and debtor, that there is urgent need for clarification of such laws, and that enactment of this bill will provide for more efficient administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1953, No. 205, § 3: Mar. 4, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas an injustice is worked on some creditors; this Act should become effective immediately. Therefore, this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health and welfare, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 663, § 9: Mar. 23, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that existing law relating to homestead does not in all circumstances provide for equal treatment between the sexes, that the constitutionality of such existing law has been drawn into question by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court, and that there is an urgent need to insure that the law provides equality in the rights and interests of a surviving spouse in the homestead of his or her deceased spouse, without reference to the sex of the surviving spouse. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 714, § 75: Mar. 25, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the existing law relating to such matters as homestead, dower, curtesy, statutory allowances payable from a decedent's estate, and the right of a surviving spouse to take against the will of a decedent, do not in all circumstances provide for equal treatment between the sexes, that the constitutionality of such existing law has been drawn into question by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court, and that there is an urgent need to insure that the law provides equality in the property rights and interests of married persons. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 282, § 4: Mar. 1, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Seventh General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that when land contiguous to a city is annexed certain landowners homestead rights are compromised by the annexation and that in fairness to the previously rural homestead owner, they should be allowed to retain their rural homestead status as long as the land on which the homestead is located remains rural in nature and is used for agricultural purposes. Therefore, in order to correct this inequity, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 345, § 6: Mar. 5, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “The courts of the United States, acting pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, as amended, have declared certain of the provisions of Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-66-218 (Section 2 of Act 419, Acts of Arkansas, 1981) dealing with personal property exemptions to be unconstitutional. The result of such decisions is that residents of Arkansas who must file bankruptcy proceedings may be limited to the sum of five hundred dollars ($500) in personal property as provided by the Constitution of Arkansas, even though there has not been any decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas as to a question arising under the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. Therefore, in order to give the citizens of the State of Arkansas an opportunity to enjoy the rights granted by the Federal Government, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Liquor license as subject to execution or attachment. 40 A.L.R.4th 927.

Am. Jur. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Exec., § 88 et seq.

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence, Common-law Exemptions, 2005 Arkansas L. Notes 65.

Ark. L. Rev.

Laurence, Enforcing a Money Judgment Against the Defendant's Stocks and Bonds: A Brief Foray into the Forbidding Realms of Article Eight and the Fourth Amendment, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 561.

Note, In re Holt: Personal Property Exemptions and the Forgotten Arkansas Constitution, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 759.

C.J.S. 33 C.J.S., Exec., § 18 et seq.

16-66-201. Property subject to execution.

The following described property shall be liable to be seized and sold under any execution upon any judgment, order, or decree of a court of record:

  1. All goods and chattels not exempted in this subchapter;
  2. All improvements on the public lands of the United States;
  3. The rights and shares in the stock of any bank, insurance company, or other incorporation;
  4. Any current gold or silver coin, which shall be returned as so much money collected, without exposing the current gold or silver coin to sale;
  5. Any bill or other evidence of debt issued by any moneyed corporation of this state or any other state, belonging to any person against whom an execution shall be issued, at the time the writ is delivered to the officer to be executed, or at any time thereafter;
  6. All real estate, whether patented or not, of which the defendant or any person for his or her use, was seized on the day of rendition of the judgment, order, or decree upon which the execution is issued, or at any time thereafter.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 23; C. & M. Dig., § 4270; Pope's Dig., § 5282; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-201; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 200.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (6), inserted “or her” and deleted “in law or equity” following “was seized.”

Case Notes

In General.

Real and personal property of the defendant under an execution upon any judgment may be sold to satisfy the execution. Keith v. Drainage Dist. of Poinsett County, 183 Ark. 786, 38 S.W.2d 755 (1931).

Bill of Debt.

A bill of debt is a promissory note or a corporate debenture, not a bank account, and is governed by § 4-3-101 et seq.In re Frazier, 136 B.R. 199 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1991).

Bond for Title.

A mortgagee has no interest subject to execution, but a vendee holding a bond for title has. Burr v. Robinson, 25 Ark. 277 (1868); Young v. Mitchell, 33 Ark. 222 (1878).

Interest of vendor who has given a bond for title is not subject to sale under execution. Strauss v. White, 66 Ark. 167, 51 S.W. 64 (1899). See Howes v. King, 127 Ark. 511, 192 S.W. 883 (1917).

Burden of Proof.

Prima facie, all of a debtor's property is subject to execution, and the burden is upon the party claiming it to show that it is exempt. Blythe v. Jett, 52 Ark. 547, 13 S.W. 137 (1889).

Death of Defendant.

If lands are levied on in the life of the debtor, they may be sold after his death. Barber v. Peay, 31 Ark. 392 (1876); Hare v. Hall, 41 Ark. 372 (1883).

Homestead.

When the estate was the homestead of a deceased wife and she left children, the purchaser takes subject to their use of it until each reaches the age of majority. Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9, 14 S.W. 925 (1890); Littell v. Jones, 56 Ark. 139, 19 S.W. 497 (1892).

Levy without Sale.

A levy without a sale is not a satisfaction of the judgment. Black v. Nettles, 25 Ark. 606 (1869).

Mortgages.

The right of a mortgagor to redeem his estate is liable to be taken upon execution by judgment creditors. State use of Ashley & Watkins v. Lawson, 6 Ark. (1 English) 269 (1845); Whitmore v. Tatum, 54 Ark. 457, 16 S.W. 198 (1891).

The estate of the mortgagee in land before foreclosure, or at least before entry, is not the subject of execution, though there has been a default, and the condition is forfeited. Trapnall's Adx. v. State Bank, 18 Ark. (5 Barber) 53 (1856); Harman v. May, 40 Ark. 146 (1882); Meadow v. Wise, 41 Ark. 285 (1883).

Mortgaged personal property is not subject to execution for the debt of the mortgagor. Jennings v. McIlroy, 42 Ark. 236 (1883); Buck v. Bransford, 58 Ark. 289, 24 S.W. 103 (1893).

Levy may be made on a mortgagor's interest in a land contract. Maxey v. Cooper, 94 Ark. 296, 126 S.W. 842 (1910).

Property not Subject to Execution.

Lands bought by wife cannot be levied on to pay her husband's debt. Allen v. Hightower, 21 Ark. (8 Barber) 316 (1860).

Execution cannot issue on a judgment against an executor as such. Hornor v. Hanks, 22 Ark. (9 Barber) 572 (1861).

The property of a charitable institution is not subject to seizure. Woman's Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n v. Fordyce, 79 Ark. 532, 86 S.W. 417 (1905).

A contingent remainder is not subject to sale under execution. Plumlee v. Bounds, 118 Ark. 274, 176 S.W. 140 (1915).

Growing and immature crops cannot be sold under execution issued by justice of the peace. First Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 159 Ark. 182, 251 S.W. 712 (1923).

Property Subject to Execution.

A husband's right of curtesy in his deceased wife's estate is subject to sale under execution. Stanley v. Bonham, 52 Ark. 354, 12 S.W. 706 (1889).

A levy may be made on property conveyed for the purpose of hindering creditors. A. Baldwin & Co. v. Williams, 74 Ark. 316, 86 S.W. 423 (1905).

Levy may be made on the interest of a vendee in a land contract. Evins v. Sandefur-Julian Co., 81 Ark. 70, 98 S.W. 677 (1906).

A partner's interest in partnership real estate may be sold under execution. Jones v. Fletcher, 132 Ark. 328, 200 S.W. 1034 (1918).

An execution may be levied on property conveyed to defraud creditors. Horn v. Horn, 232 Ark. 723, 339 S.W.2d 852 (1960).

Release.

A plaintiff may release an improper or excessive levy. Black v. Nettles, 25 Ark. 606 (1869).

16-66-202. Married women's property subject to execution.

Whenever a judgment has been recovered against a married woman, the judgment may be enforced by execution against her sole and separate estate or property to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were sole.

History. Acts 1873, No. 126, § 8, p. 382; C. & M. Dig., § 5586; Pope's Dig., § 7236; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-203.

Cross References. Married woman's property not subject to debts of husband, Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 7.

Case Notes

Judgment against Husband.

In suit against married woman to foreclose mortgage, it was error to render judgment against her husband. Hiner v. Whitlow, 66 Ark. 121, 49 S.W. 353 (1899)Questioned byFirst Nat'l Mtg. Co. v. Arkmo Lumber & Supply Co., 277 Ark. 298, 641 S.W.2d 31 (1982), overruled, Bailey v. Commerce Union Bank, 223 Ark. 686, 269 S.W.2d 314 (1954)Questioned byCrawford v. General Contract Corp., 174 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Ark. 1959).

16-66-203. Encumbered property.

  1. Any property, real, personal, or mixed, may be subjected to seizure under execution, garnishment, attachment, or other process, even though the property is subject to mortgage, deed of trust, vendor's lien, conditional sales contract, chattel mortgage, or other lien. Any officer authorized by law to execute process, may seize, levy upon, or otherwise take possession of any property, whether real, personal, or mixed, even though there may be a lien against the property, and he or she may sell the property as provided by law.
    1. Any prior lienholder or lienholders of any nature whatsoever shall be made a party or parties to the process, by the plaintiff or his or her attorney serving notice upon the lienholder or lienholders. This notice shall be served by any officer authorized to execute process. In the event the lienholder or lienholders are nonresidents of the State of Arkansas, then the plaintiff or his or her attorney shall give notice of the seizure of the property by registered mail to the lienholder or lienholders at their last known address. The return receipt of the lienholder or lienholders, or the affidavit of the plaintiff or his or her attorney, of the compliance with this subsection, shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court from which the writ of garnishment, attachment, or other process is issued.
    2. Any sale made under the provisions of this section shall be made subject to the lienholder's or lienholders' indebtedness.
  2. This section shall not be construed to deprive any person or persons of their homestead or personal exemptions as provided by law.

History. Acts 1953, No. 205, §§ 1, 2; 1959, No. 183, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-219, 30-220.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Rights of Junior Claimants to Encumbered Property, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 326.

Creditor's Rights — Attachment Revised, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 225.

Creditors' Provisional Remedies and Debtors' Due Process Rights: Attachment and Garnishment in Arkansas, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 607.

Nickles, A Localized Treatise On Secured Transactions — Part II: Creating Security Interests, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 559.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Cathey, The Real Estate Installment Sale Contract: Its Drafting, Use, Enforcement and Consequences, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 229.

Case Notes

Liens Against Seized Property.

Tax lien did not attach to sale proceeds of judgment debtor's goods where no money remained after the payment of the judgment and the cost of the sale. Miller v. Alamo, 975 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1992).

Property Subject to Seizure.

Where two brothers in a continuous equal partnership sign a joint note for a loan to buy stock and pledge the stock as security for the loan, although one brother claims to sign as an endorser to avoid subjecting the stock to a judgment which his wife has obtained against him, his share of the stock is still subject to collection of the judgment. Rice v. Rice, 125 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1954).

16-66-204. Leases subject to execution — Exception.

Every unexpired lease of lands shall be subject to execution and sale as real estate; but this lease shall not be subject to sale under any execution issued by a justice of the peace.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 73; C. & M. Dig., § 4271; Pope's Dig., § 5283; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-202.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 40.

Case Notes

Redemption.

Lease of land for farming purposes sold under execution may be redeemed as real estate so sold. Munson v. Wade, 174 Ark. 880, 298 S.W. 25 (1927).

16-66-205. Exemption — Property of state.

No property, whether real, personal, or mixed, or effects, credits, choses in action, assets of any description, securities or moneys belonging to the state, either legally or equitably, or the title of which may be in the state, shall be subject to judgment, decree, execution, or sequestration, or be seized on or sold by virtue of any order, judgment, decree, or process of any court whatever.

History. Acts 1855, § 8, p. 196; C. & M. Dig., § 4273; Pope's Dig., § 5285; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-204.

16-66-206. Exemption — Improvements on public land.

It is unlawful to levy upon and sell under any execution or decree any improvement, or right of preemption upon the public lands within this state, any law, usage, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. However, no other improvement on the public lands, as provided for above, shall be so exempt, except those on which the defendant may reside or cultivate at the time of issuing the execution.

History. Acts 1840, § 1, p. 9; C. & M. Dig., § 4272; Pope's Dig., § 5284; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-205.

16-66-207. Exemption — Family or public graveyards.

  1. The clerk and recorder of deeds of the proper county, when any description of the metes and bounds of a family graveyard or public burial place shall be filed in his or her office, shall make a record of the description in the record of deeds, which shall be sufficient to exempt the land or burial place, not only from taxation, but also from execution.
  2. Not more than five (5) acres shall be so exempted under this section.

History. Acts 1861, No. 196, §§ 1, 2, p. 373; C. & M. Dig., § 4275; Pope's Dig., § 5287; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-206, 30-206n.

16-66-208. Exemptions — Wages — Penalty.

    1. The wages of all laborers and mechanics not exceeding their wages for sixty (60) days shall be exempt from seizure by garnishment, or other legal process if the defendant in any case files with the court from which the process is issued a sworn statement that the sixty (60) days' wages claimed to be exempt is less than the amount exempt to him or her under the Constitution of the state, and that he or she does not own sufficient other personal property which, together with the sixty (60) days' wages, would exceed in amount the limits of the constitutional exemption.
    2. The party in whose favor the garnishment has been issued, and who asserts that a claim of exemption is invalid in whole or in part, by giving five (5) days' written notice to the person claiming the exemption, shall be entitled to a hearing before the court or judge issuing the garnishment upon the question of the validity of the claim of exemption. No supersedeas shall be issued for a period of five (5) days after the claim of exemption is made in order to provide time for the party in whose favor the garnishment has been issued to request such hearing. The notice required by this section shall be served by a person authorized to serve a summons under § 16-58-107, and shall be filed in the office of the judge or the clerk issuing the garnishment.
      1. If the claim of exemption is not valid, either in whole or in part, then the garnishment proceedings shall be stayed only as to such amount as the court may determine.
      2. If the claim of exemption is sustained, the wages of the person claiming such exemption shall not again be seized by garnishment or other legal process, for a period of sixty (60) days.
    1. The first twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per week of the net wages of all laborers and mechanics shall be absolutely exempt from garnishment or other legal process without the necessity of the laborer or mechanic filing a schedule of exemptions as provided in subsection (a) of this section.
    2. The term “net wages”, as used in this subsection, shall mean gross wages less the deductions actually withheld by the employer for Arkansas income tax, federal income tax, social security, group retirement, and group hospitalization insurance premiums and group life insurance premiums.
  1. Any officer violating the provisions of this section shall be subject to the fines and penalty mentioned in § 16-66-214.

History. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 23, § 1, p. 24; 1909, No. 195, § 1, p. 574; C. & M. Dig., § 5546; Pope's Dig., § 7185; Acts 1951, No. 301, § 3; 1953, No. 164, § 1; 1967, No. 65, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-207.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Garnishment of Wages, Exemptions, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 325.

Creditor's Rights — Attachment Revised, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 225.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Business Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 161.

Legislative Survey, Business Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 579.

Notes, Garnishment Procedures Must Provide For Notice to Postjudgment Debtor, etc., 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 517.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is constitutional. Birdsong v. Tuttle, 52 Ark. 91, 12 S.W. 158 (1889); Porter v. Navin, 52 Ark. 352, 12 S.W. 705 (1889).

This section was intended to limit the right of exemption to debts by contract as provided by Const., art. 9, § 1. Walker v. Walker, 148 Ark. 170, 229 S.W. 11 (1921).

Because the statutes pertaining to postjudgment garnishment, this section, §§ 16-66-211 and 16-110-401, do not require notice to the judgment debtor informing him of the garnishment, notice of possible state and federal exemptions, a prompt hearing to permit the judgment debtor to claim exemptions, an affidavit from the creditor stating that the writ would not cause the attachment of exempt funds, or the posting of a bond to compensate the judgment debtor for injury in case of wrongful garnishment, these sections do not contain sufficient procedural safeguards designed to prevent erroneous seizures to satisfy due process and are unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Applicability.

This section is limited to residents of the state. Birdsong v. Tuttle, 52 Ark. 91, 12 S.W. 158 (1889).

A garnishee sued in another state could not claim exemption in behalf of a debtor residing in this state, the privilege being personal and available only by following the statutory procedure. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Vanderberg, 91 Ark. 252, 120 S.W. 993 (1909).

A nonresident cannot claim the benefit of the exemption laws of this state. Person v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 113 Ark. 467, 169 S.W. 223 (1914).

Equity.

The remedy being at law for abuse of process, equity will not interfere to prevent the repeated issuance of garnishments. Baxley v. Laster, 82 Ark. 236, 101 S.W. 755 (1907).

Cited: Duraclean Co. v. Foltz, 240 Ark. 38, 397 S.W.2d 804 (1966); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Holt, 97 B.R. 997 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

16-66-209. Exemption — Proceeds of life, health, accident, and disability insurance — Definition.

  1. To the extent permitted by the Arkansas Constitution, all moneys paid or payable to any resident of this state under an insurance policy providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or disability benefits shall be exempt from liability or seizure under judicial process of any court and shall not be subjected to the payment of any debt by contract or otherwise by any writ, order, judgment, or decree of any court.
  2. As used in this section, “moneys” means a payment made under an insurance policy to compensate:
    1. The insured or beneficiary for a claim under the policy; or
    2. The owner, insured, or beneficiary for the cash surrender value of the policy.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the validity of any sale, assignment, mortgage, pledge, or hypothecation of a policy of insurance or the avails, proceeds, or benefits of a policy of insurance.

History. Acts 1933, No. 102, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7988; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-208; Acts 2009, No. 469, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was held unconstitutional in In re Hudspeth, 92 Bankr. 827 (1988), and In re Williams, 93 Bankr. 181 (1988).

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (b) and redesignated the remaining text accordingly; inserted “To the extent permitted by the Arkansas Constitution” in (a); and made related and minor stylistic changes.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Exemption Statutes for Proceeds of Personal Injury or Wrongful Death Lawsuits. 99 A.L.R.6th 481 (2014).

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence, On Worthen, Walker and Dicta: The Supreme Court Shoots the Breeze About Exemption Law, 1993 Ark. L. Notes 73.

Lawrence, What Holt Says and Why It's Wrong: An Essay on Sanders v. Putman, Putman v. Sanders and The Uneasy Condition of Arkansas Exemption Law, 1995 Ark. L. Notes 67.

Ark. L. Rev.

Westbrook, Retirement Plan Assets in an Arkansas Bankruptcy, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 253.

Laurence, In re Holt and the Re-making of Arkansas Exemption Law: Commentary After the Rout, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Business Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 579.

Survey — Bankruptcy, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 127.

Survey, Bankruptcy, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 311.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is constitutional except as to its retroactive application. It is unconstitutional as applied to a debt owing and reduced to judgment before its enactment. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 54 S. Ct. 816, 78 L. Ed. 1344, 93 A.L.R. 173 (1934).

Because of the unmistakable incompatibility with Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 2, this section is unconstitutional and cannot act to exempt property from inclusion in a debtor's estate pursuant to § 16-66-218(b)(7) and 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b)(2)(A). In re Hudspeth, 92 B.R. 827 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

This section violates Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 2, because, it exempts all insurance proceeds without limitation; the only way to cure the statute's invalidity would be to add a monetary limit consistent with the state constitution or to amend the constitution itself to revise the $500.00 ceiling. It is not the court's function to rewrite statutes to make them constitutional; therefore, the effect of the court's decision in the Hudspeth case is to render any exemption provided by § 16-66-209 unavailable to debtors in bankruptcy. In re Williams, 93 B.R. 181 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1988).

This section is unconstitutional as applied to debtors in bankruptcy because it is in direct conflict with the overriding $500 limitation imposed by Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 2. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Holt, 894 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1990).

In General.

This section exempts “all moneys,” not just death benefits. In re Duckett, 65 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986).

Cash Surrender Proceeds.

Where the life insurance policies contain no investment device or special dividend provision, the cash surrender proceeds of the debtor's policies are a mere incident of the debtor's life insurance policies, and thus are exempt in bankruptcy proceedings. In re Duckett, 65 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986); In re Weiler, 65 B.R. 564 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); In re Johnson, 66 B.R. 39 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986), aff'd, 85 B.R. 518 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

The cash surrender values of life insurance policies are exempt from the claims of creditors. Lee v. Johnson, 85 B.R. 518 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Dividends.

Accumulated dividends invested by insurance company in corporate stocks and payable to policyholder at certain times, but not payable to beneficiaries of life policy, were dividends paid to policyholder as an investor, not “as the insured or beneficiary designated under any insurance policy …” and dividends were not exempt from judicial seizure under this section. Cluck v. Mack, 253 Ark. 769, 489 S.W.2d 8 (1973).

Fraud.

The language of this section exempts all debts of whatever nature and in whatsoever manner incurred and is therefore applicable to obligation arising out of the fraudulent conduct of a beneficiary which may be made the basis for a recovery in a proper proceeding. Ponder v. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co., 194 Ark. 829, 109 S.W.2d 946 (1937).

Insurance Proceeds.

The bankruptcy exemption for insurance proceeds in this section and § 16-66-218 is limited by Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 2. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Holt, 97 B.R. 997 (W.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd, 894 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1990).

Secured Indebtedness.

This section does not deal with pledged property and does not exempt proceeds of life policy assigned to secure indebtedness from claim of judgment creditor of assignee. Hill v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 90 S.W.2d 490 (1936).

Time of Debt Origin.

This section does not impose any limitation as to the time of the origin of the debt and court cannot construe it as exempting from judicial process only debts of the beneficiary for which he was liable before and at the time the insurance policies matured by reason of insured's death. Ponder v. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co., 194 Ark. 829, 109 S.W.2d 946 (1937).

Veteran's Death Benefits.

Benefits for death of a service man who had not applied for the insurance, constituted insurance and are exempt from liability for seizure under judicial process for all debts of whatever nature and in whatsoever manner incurred. Cruce v. Arkansas State Hospital, 241 Ark. 680, 409 S.W.2d 342 (Ark. 1966).

16-66-210. Homestead Exemption Act.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Homestead Exemption Act of 1981”.
  2. The homestead of any resident of this state who is married or the head of a family shall not be subject to the lien of any judgment, or decree of any court, or to sale under execution or other process thereon, except such as may be rendered for the purchase money or for specific liens, laborers' or mechanics' liens for improving the homestead, or for taxes, or against executors, administrators, guardians, receivers, attorneys for moneys collected by them, and other trustees of an express trust for moneys due from them, in their fiduciary capacity.
    1. The homestead outside any city, town, or village, owned and occupied as a residence, shall consist of no more than one hundred sixty (160) acres of land, with the improvements thereon, to be selected by the owner. The homestead shall not exceed in value the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), but, in no event shall the homestead be reduced to less than eighty (80) acres, without regard to value.
    2. The homestead in any city, town, or village, owned and occupied as a residence, shall consist of not more than one (1) acre of land, with the improvements thereon, to be selected by the owner. The homestead shall not exceed the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in value, but in no event shall the homestead be reduced to less than one-quarter (¼) of an acre of land, without regard to value.
    3. Any homestead outside any city, town, or village, owned and occupied as a residence, which is annexed to or made part of an incorporated city or town within the State of Arkansas, shall retain its exemption under subdivision (c)(1) of this section as long as the land on which it is located remains rural in nature and has a significant agricultural use.
  3. The homestead provided for in this section shall inure to the benefit of the minor children, under the exemptions provided in this section, after the demise of the parents.

History. Acts 1981, No. 663, §§ 1-4, 6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-221 — 30-224, 30-226; Acts 1989, No. 282, § 1.

Cross References. Homestead exemption, Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 3.

Homestead rights of minor children, Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 10.

Rural homestead-acreage and value, Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 4.

Urban homestead-acreage and value, Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 5.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Establishment of the Homestead Exemption in Arkansas, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 37.

Mobile Homesteads, and in Particular the Exempt Status of Mobile Homes Located on Rented Lots: The Laws of Arkansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah Compared and the Principle of the Liberal Construction of Exemption Statutes Analyzed, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 221 (2004).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Property, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 607.

Survey, Property, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 659.

Case Notes

Construction.

Homestead laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the exemption. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Defendant's testimony that he was entitled to Second Amendment protection for his possession of a machine gun and a sawed off shotgun was properly withheld from the jury, where he was only a member of an unregulated militia; whether he was entitled to court-appointed counsel depended upon the homestead exemption under this section. United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1174, 129 S. Ct. 1369, 173 L. Ed. 2d 591 (2009).

Purpose.

The purpose behind the homestead exemption is the protection of families from execution of judgments upon their home. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Extent of Exemption.

Homestead exemption under subdivision (c)(1) of this section extended to only 80 of defendant's 120 acres of real property, and defendant and his wife could claim only a single homestead exemption. Defendant therefore had 40 acres of non-homestead property that could have been sold to pay legal fees, and reimbursement was required for legal services provided under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3006A. United States v. Fincher, 593 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2010).

Family.

In order to constitute a family, something more is required than a mere aggregation of individuals residing in the same house. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

The concept of “family” in the exemption imposes the requirement of a substantial relationship between the person who is obligated to provide the support and the person who as a dependent relies upon the support. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Head of a Family.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized certain factors that are critical in the determination as to whether a debtor qualifies as “head of a family.” These factors are: (1) the existence of an obligation upon the head of the house to support the others; (2) the existence of a corresponding state of dependence upon those being supported; and (3) the head of the family is one in authority where the status or relationship of the family exists. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Debtor was entitled to claim a homestead exemption under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(b)(2)(A) because she met the elements of head of household under Ark. Const. art. 9, § 3, and this section where (1) although she might not have been legally obligated to support her mother, debtor undertook the obligation, (2) her mother was partially dependent upon the debtor for basic financial needs, and (3) because of the mother's medical condition, the debtor had assumed the decision-making role with regards to household affairs. In re Warnock, 323 B.R. 249 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2005).

Where an unmarried bankruptcy debtor lived with his non-dependent sibling, the debtor nonetheless qualified as head of household for purposes of a homestead exemption since his dependent parent lived with him prior to the parent's death and there was no showing that the homestead was terminated; it was irrelevant that the parent was only partially dependent upon debtor, that debtor might not have been legally obligated to support the parent, and that the parent died prior to debtor's bankruptcy. In re Morris, 340 B.R. 78 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2006).

Because each debtor was an Arkansas resident, was head of a household, and had claimed the appropriate acreage, debtors were, for the purposes of the opinion, entitled to claim their respective eighty acres as exempt under Arkansas law. In re White, 450 B.R. 866 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).

Proof.

Where debtor failed to prove anything more than a minimal relationship, the fact that he and his father lived in the same house, debtor could not claim his interest in the property under the homestead exemption. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Cited: Powell v. First Nat'l Bank, 113 B.R. 512 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

16-66-211. Claiming exemptions — Schedule of property — Stay of execution — Levy on remainder of property — Appeal.

    1. Whenever any resident of this state, upon the issue against him or her for the collection of any debt by contract of any execution or other process, of any attachment except specific attachment against his or her property, desires to claim any of the exemptions provided for by law, he or she shall prepare a schedule, verified by affidavit, of all his or her property. This schedule shall include moneys, rights, credits, and choses in action held by himself or herself or others for him or her and specifying the particular property which he or she claims as exempt under the provisions of the Arkansas Constitution, Article 9.
    2. After giving five (5) days' notice in writing to the opposing party or his or her agent or attornery, the resident claiming the exemption shall file the schedule with the judge or clerk issuing the execution or other process or attachment.
    3. A hearing shall be ordered by the court or judge issuing the process if, within five (5) days after receiving the notice required to be given by the person claiming the exemption, the party in whose favor the process issued files a request for a hearing with the judge or clerk of the court.
    4. If after the hearing, either in open court or by the judge in vacation, the claim of exemption is determined to be valid, then supersedeas shall issue, staying any sale or further proceeding under the execution, process, or attachment against the property described in the schedule, and claimed as exempted, and by returning the property to the defendant.
    5. No alias execution shall be levied on property relieved from process by claim of exemption until one (1) year from the date of the filing of the schedule of exemptions.
    1. If the debtor has other property than that claimed in any former schedule, the officer shall levy upon that other property.
    2. If the debtor desires to claim further exemptions, he shall include all his property in any schedule therefor.
  1. If in any such schedule it appears that the debtor has more property in value than is exempt by law, he or she shall select his or her exemptions. The remainder of the property shall be subject to the levy of the execution, whether the property is included in any former schedule or not.
  2. An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from any order of judgment rendered by a justice of the peace upon the filing of the affidavit and upon executing the bond required in other cases of appeal.

History. Acts 1871, No. 58, § 1, p. 285; 1877, No. 53, § 1, p. 53; 1891, No. 3, § 1, p. 2; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5549-5551; Pope's Dig., §§ 7188-7190; Acts 1953, No. 164, § 2, p. 555; 1981, No. 714, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-209.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1991, No. 389, § 4, provided:

“All portions of Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated § 16-66-211 pertaining to claiming exemptions in actions involving Writs of Execution are hereby repealed to the extent that the provision is inconsistent with the provisions of this act. All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Laurence, An Odd Collection of Topics Relating to Creditors' Remedies Upon Which Various Federal Courts Have Recently Spoken — Rule 69, Rule 13, Federal Tax Liens and the Due Process Rights of Creditors, 37 Ark. L. Rev. 875.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Business Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 161.

Notes, Garnishment Procedures Must Provide For Notice to Postjudgment Debtor, etc., 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 517.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Because the statutes pertaining to postjudgment garnishment, this section, §§ 16-66-208 and 16-110-401, do not require notice to the judgment debtor informing him of the garnishment, notice of possible state and federal exemptions, a prompt hearing to permit the judgment debtor to claim exemptions, an affidavit from the creditor stating that the writ would not cause the attachment of exempt funds, or the posting of a bond to compensate the judgment debtor for injury in case of wrongful garnishment, these sections do not contain sufficient procedural safeguards designed to prevent erroneous seizures to satisfy due process and are unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Postjudgment exemption laws adequately provide for procedures and hearings by which a judgment debtor may exercise his or her rights to exemption claims or the return of levied property. It is the lack of a requirement of notice to the judgment debtor, however, that makes statutory provisions such as §§ 16-66-211 and 16-66-401 constitutionally deficient. Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990).

Service on garnishee was invalid due to the invalidity of this section on which it was based, and the constitutional deficiency was not supplied by actual notice to garnishee of items constitutionally required. Gravett v. Marks, 304 Ark. 549, 803 S.W.2d 551 (1991).

In General.

Exemption is not allowed unless claimed as provided. Scanlan v. Guiling, 63 Ark. 540, 39 S.W. 713 (1897).

The method provided by this section is exclusive of all others. Baxley v. Laster, 82 Ark. 236, 101 S.W. 755 (1907).

Every citizen of this state is entitled to exemptions, but in order to get his property exempt he must comply with the law. Griffin v. Puryear-Meyer Grocer Co., 202 Ark. 495, 151 S.W.2d 656 (1941).

To be allowable, exemptions must be claimed in manner provided. Jennings v. Tankersley Bros. Packing Co., 218 Ark. 776, 238 S.W.2d 625 (1951).

Contempt.

There was no err in holding appellants in contempt for failing to comply with this section, because the court was not dependent upon affidavits or verified petitions, appellants were served with a copy of the contempt petition, appellants were represented by counsel and had an opportunity to defend at the hearing on the petition for contempt; the court had ordered appellants to file their schedules of assets with the court clerk within forty-five days from the date of the judgments, and the court was not dependent upon affidavits or verified petitions since all the court had to do was examine the court clerk's files and see that the schedules had not been filed within forty-five days to establish a prima facie case of contempt. P. J. Transp., Inc. v. First Serv. Bank, 2012 Ark. App. 292 (2012).

Exemptions.

The articles claimed as exempt must be specified. Friedman v. Sullivan, 48 Ark. 213, 2 S.W. 785 (1886).

A debtor cannot claim his exemptions out of the proceeds of attached property when he has had an opportunity to schedule the specific property. Surratt v. Young, 55 Ark. 447, 18 S.W. 539 (1892).

Where Bulk Sales Law was not complied with, rights of seller's creditors could not be defeated on ground that seller was entitled to exemption when value of property sold, together with all other personal property owned by him, was less than his statutory exemption. Griffin v. Puryear-Meyer Grocer Co., 202 Ark. 495, 151 S.W.2d 656 (1941).

Hearing.

Dismissal of proceedings claiming certain property as exempt from seizure did not preclude a subsequent action to have exemptions set apart. Taylor v. Tomlinson, 65 Ark. 232, 45 S.W. 544 (1898).

Noncompliance.

A debtor who neglects to claim his exemptions as provided by this section waives his right to exemption. Andrews v. Briggs, 203 Ark. 714, 158 S.W.2d 269 (1942).

A judgment creditor was not prejudiced by a finding that the debtor's homestead was exempt from any levy under an earlier judgment even though the debtor failed to follow the proper procedures in claiming the exemption. Ross v. White, 15 Ark. App. 98, 689 S.W.2d 588 (1985).

Defendant's motion for the return of personal property that was seized in response to plaintiff's writ of execution and to claim statutory exemptions was denied because defendant had not filed with the court a schedule, verified by affidavit, setting forth all of his property as required by this section, which Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) made applicable to the proceeding, and as to defendant's claim of statutory exemptions under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(d), defendant failed to offer any evidence that he had filed for bankruptcy, and defendant had not followed the procedures set forth in 11 U.S.C.S. § 521 for filing a schedule of assets. Chanel, Inc. v. Adamson, No. 07-mc-00028, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 29, 2008).

Notice.

An appearance contesting the right to schedule is a waiver of the five days' notice. Garrett Bros. v. Wade, 46 Ark. 493 (1885); Brown v. Doneghey, 46 Ark. 497 (1885).

Notice to judgment debtor, to be constitutional, need not supply the judgment debtor with a “laundry list” of statutory or constitutional exemptions or inform him of all available exemptions. Such notice need only inform the debtor that postjudgment execution is being levied and that state and federal exemptions may be available with respect to the property subject to the levy. Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990).

Actual notice is insufficient where a notice statute is constitutionally insufficient. Gravett v. Marks, 304 Ark. 549, 803 S.W.2d 551 (1991).

Proof.

A judgment debtor who was allowed his rural exemption and who sought to enlarge his exemption had the burden of showing his right thereto. Hatcher v. Wasson, 191 Ark. 765, 87 S.W.2d 578 (1935).

A debtor claiming property to be exempt from execution is required to make a schedule of all his property, specifying the particular property claimed as exempt, and file the same with the officer after giving five days' notice in writing to the opposite party; if he would claim exemption for any of the property, he must bring himself and his property within the exceptions of some section by proper proof. Griffin v. Puryear-Meyer Grocer Co., 202 Ark. 495, 151 S.W.2d 656 (1941).

Once the debtor's right to the homestead exemption is at issue, the burden of proof is on the one claiming the exemption. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Schedule.

The schedule is amendable, on appeal in circuit court. May v. Hutson, 54 Ark. 226, 15 S.W. 606 (1891).

Schedule should be filed with justice when process from which property is claimed exempt is issued by him. Taylor v. Tomlinson, 65 Ark. 232, 45 S.W. 544 (1898).

An intentional failure to make a full disclosure of all personal property authorizes a disallowance of the claim. Farris v. Gross, 75 Ark. 391, 87 S.W. 633 (1905).

One who claims that his property is exempt from sale must file a written schedule with the justice of the peace who issued the execution before the sale, and mere notice that he intends to claim exemption does not satisfy the statute. Andrews v. Briggs, 203 Ark. 714, 158 S.W.2d 269 (1942).

Rule that one claiming exemption from sale must file written schedule with the justice who issued the execution prior to the sale is relaxed if unavoidable casualty intervenes. Andrews v. Briggs, 203 Ark. 714, 158 S.W.2d 269 (1942).

Defendant debtor is entitled to amend his schedule of exemption to show actual assets held by him. Williams v. Swann, 220 Ark. 906, 251 S.W.2d 111 (1952).

—Sufficiency of Schedule.

Schedule found sufficient. Huffman v. Thompson, 64 Ark. 196, 41 S.W. 428 (1897).

Schedule found insufficient. Cain v. Chennault, 195 Ark. 141, 110 S.W.2d 1063 (1937).

Supersedeas.

The debtor must see that supersedeas is issued, or he will have waived his right thereto; and if judgment is adverse, he must prosecute an appeal. Cason v. Bone, 43 Ark. 17 (1884); Chambers v. Perry, 47 Ark. 400, 1 S.W. 700 (1886).

A justice of the peace has no power to revoke a supersedeas. Cox v. Lee, 50 Ark. 456, 8 S.W. 400 (1887).

Cited: Duraclean Co. v. Foltz, 240 Ark. 38, 397 S.W.2d 804 (1966); Winkle v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 267 Ark. 101, 590 S.W.2d 852 (1979); Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

16-66-212. Right of homestead not lost by failure to schedule — Wife may claim.

  1. A debtor's right of homestead shall not be lost or forfeited by his or her omission to select and claim it as exempt before the sale thereof on execution, nor by his or her failure to file a description or schedule of the homestead in the recorder's or clerk's office.
  2. The debtor may select and claim his or her homestead after or before its sale on execution and may set up his or her right of homestead when suit is brought against him or her for possession.
  3. If a spouse neglects or refuses to make such claim, his or her spouse may intervene and set it up.
  4. If the debtor does not reside on his or her homestead and is the owner of more land than he or she is entitled to hold as a homestead, the debtor or his or her spouse, as the case may be, shall select the homestead before sale.

History. Acts 1887, No. 64, § 2, p. 90; C. & M. Dig., § 5543; Pope's Dig., § 7182; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-210.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Establishment of the Homestead Exemption in Arkansas, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 37.

Case Notes

In General.

This section does not change the nature of the homestead estate, only the right is not lost by a failure to file schedule. Snider v. Martin, 55 Ark. 139, 17 S.W. 712 (1891); Tillar v. Bass, 57 Ark. 179, 21 S.W. 34 (1893). See Brignardello v. Cooper, 116 Ark. 103, 172 S.W. 1030 (1915).

A right of homestead is not lost by failure to file a schedule claiming it before sale under execution or undue decree of chancery. Isbell v. Jones, 75 Ark. 591, 88 S.W. 593 (1905); Massengale v. Massengale, 186 Ark. 917, 56 S.W.2d 763 (1933).

The sale of a homestead can convey title free of a judgment lien in existence at the time of the sale, and it is well established that as to a homestead there are no creditors, once the property is occupied as a homestead nothing more need be done to give the debtor the right to claim the personal privilege against a judgment creditor's sale. Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hayes, 276 Ark. 582, 637 S.W.2d 592 (1982).

Burden of Proof.

The judgment debtor may wait until suit is brought before asserting homestead exemption; however, once putting the debtor's homestead right at issue, the burden of proof is on the one claiming the right to the exemption. Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hayes, 276 Ark. 582, 637 S.W.2d 592 (1982).

Children.

Widow's conduct with reference to homestead cannot affect rights of minor children. Russell v. Suddoth, 123 Ark. 200, 184 S.W. 842 (1916).

Levy.

Sheriff was not excused from executing on property because it was homestead. State v. Sheriff of Lafayette County, 292 Ark. 523, 731 S.W.2d 207 (1987).

Personal Right.

Subsequent purchasers and mortgagees cannot claim a judgment debtor's right to the homestead exemption in the property because it is a personal right which must be exercised by the party who seeks its benefits. Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hayes, 276 Ark. 582, 637 S.W.2d 592 (1982).

Suit for Possession.

The failure of a homestead claimant to assert his claim of exemption before it was sold under execution or to file a schedule thereof does not work a forfeiture of the homestead right which may be asserted when suit for possession is brought. Dean v. Cole, 141 Ark. 177, 216 S.W. 308 (1919).

Debtor may wait and set up homestead in land sold under execution until demand for possession. McKee v. Waters, 166 Ark. 301, 265 S.W. 947 (1924).

Following execution sale of property constituting a homestead, homestead right may be asserted when suit is brought for possession by the purchaser at the sale. White v. Turner, 203 Ark. 95, 155 S.W.2d 714 (1941).

Where debtor's homestead was purchased by judgment creditor who mortgaged it to a bank, foreclosure suit by the bank was held an attempt to sell a homestead in satisfaction of a judgment rendered upon a contract even though no claim of homestead was made until after the execution sale since claim may be asserted at any time when it is sought to dispossess the owner of the homestead. Bank v. White, 205 Ark. 852, 171 S.W.2d 55 (1943).

Waiver of Right.

The homestead right is still a privilege and may be waived by nonassertion, and a sale under execution is valid to all the world except to the husband and wife; as to them, the purchaser takes a defeasible title. Snider v. Martin, 55 Ark. 139, 17 S.W. 712 (1891); Jones v. Dillard, 70 Ark. 69, 66 S.W. 202 (1902).

Realty is exempt from sale under the homestead laws from creditors of either husband or wife and it does not matter that husband against whom creditor sought to collect judgment did not claim the homestead exemption. Campbell v. Geheb, 258 Ark. 225, 523 S.W.2d 185 (1975).

Wife's Claim.

Wife can claim homestead when husband neglects or refuses to do so. Hollis v. State, 59 Ark. 211, 27 S.W. 73 (1894).

The sale of a homestead by a husband and wife conveyed title free of a judgment lien which existed at the time of the sale against the husband debtor, even though the husband did not seek to exercise his right against execution. Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hayes, 276 Ark. 582, 637 S.W.2d 592 (1982).

Upon their divorce, husband and wife became tenants in common, each possessing an undivided, one-half interest in the property, and wife could not continue to assert husband's homestead interest after the divorce unless the right to do so was reserved in the divorce decree. Blackford v. Dickey, 302 Ark. 261, 789 S.W.2d 445 (1990).

Cited: Rowe v. Gose, 240 Ark. 722, 401 S.W.2d 745 (1966).

16-66-213. Appraisal of property claimed as exempt.

  1. Upon application to the justice or clerk by the plaintiff in whose favor such execution, process, or attachment shall have been issued, the justice or clerk, as the case may be, shall forthwith appoint three (3) disinterested appraisers, to be summoned and sworn by the officer levying the attachment, execution, or process.
    1. The appraisers shall proceed at once to appraise the property claimed as exempt.
    2. The appraisal signed by a majority of the appraisers shall be returned with the writ.
    1. If a majority of the appraisers decides that the full amount of the property described and claimed as exempted in the schedule is within the limit of valuation prescribed by the Constitution, then the officer levying the attachment or execution or enforcing other process, shall surrender the property to the defendant. The costs of the proceeding shall be paid by the plaintiff making application for the appraisal.
    2. If the decision shall be that the property described exceeds in value the amount exempted by the Constitution, then the justice or the clerk shall revoke the supersedeas so far as concerns such items of the property described as the appraisers may designate as in excess of the amount of exemption provided for by the Constitution, and the costs of the proceeding shall be paid by the defendant in the action.
  2. Either party shall have the right to appeal from the decision of the board of appraisers provided for in this section. If the board has been appointed by a justice of the peace, then the appeal shall be made to the circuit court of the county upon presentation of a duly certified transcript of the attachment, execution, or other process issued and of the decision of the appraisers. If the board has been appointed by the clerk of a court, then the appeal shall be made to the court by whose clerk the board was appointed.
  3. The appraisers shall each receive as compensation for their services the sum of three dollars ($3.00) per day for each day's service rendered, not to exceed two (2) days. This amount is to be taxed in the costs of the proceeding.

History. Acts 1871, No. 58, §§ 1, 2, 4, p. 285; 1877, No. 53, §§ 2-4, p. 53; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5552-5555, 5558; Pope's Dig., §§ 7191-7194, 7197; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-211 — 30-214, 30-216.

Case Notes

Construction.

Subdivision (c)(2) should be liberally construed. Pemberton v. Bank of E. Ark., 173 Ark. 949, 294 S.W. 64 (1927).

16-66-214. Effect of filing schedule — Sale stayed without bond — Penalty for sale of scheduled property.

  1. When the schedule provided for in § 16-66-211 has been filed as prescribed in that section, the provisions of Chapter VI, of Title XV of the Code of Civil Practice shall not be considered as applying to the case of the execution or other final process stayed.
    1. No indemnifying bond shall be received by the officer levying the execution or enforcing the final process.
    2. If any officer, under the pretext of having received an indemnifying bond, undertakes to sell the property described in the schedule, he or she shall be deemed guilty of gross misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in the county jail for a term of not less than one (1) month nor to exceed two (2) months and shall be fined in a sum not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). He or she shall furthermore be liable upon his official bond to the defendant in twice the amount of damages incurred by the defendant.

History. Acts 1871, No. 58, § 3, p. 285; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5556, 5557; Pope's Dig., §§ 7195, 7196; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-215.

Publisher's Notes. Chapter VI of Title XV of the Code of Civil Practice, referred to in this section, means §§ 723-741 of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

16-66-215. Evasion of exemption law in collection of debt — Penalty.

Whoever, whether principal, agent, or attorney, under the statutes of this state on the subject of the exemption of property from levy and sale on execution, or in attachment or garnishment, with intent to deprive any resident of this state of his or her rights, sends or causes to be sent out of this state any claim for debt to be collected by proceeding in attachment, garnishment, or other mesne process when the creditor, debtor, person, and corporation owing for the earnings intended to be reached by such proceedings is each within the jurisdiction of the courts of this state shall be guilty of a violation and upon conviction shall be fined for each and every claim so sent out of this state in any sum not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00).

History. Acts 1909, No. 34, § 1, p. 77; C. & M. Dig., § 5547; Pope's Dig., § 7186; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-217; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 83.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “violation” for “misdemeanor.”

16-66-216. Assignment or transfer of debt — Penalty for evasion.

Whoever, either directly or indirectly, assigns or transfers any claims for debts against a citizen of this state for the purpose of having the claims for debts collected by proceedings in attachment, garnishment, or other process out of the wages or personal earnings of the debtor in courts outside of this state when the creditor, debtor, person, or corporation owing the money intended to be reached by the proceedings in attachment is each within the jurisdiction of the courts of this state shall be guilty of a violation and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00).

History. Acts 1909, No. 34, § 2, p. 77; C. & M. Dig., § 5548; Pope's Dig., § 7187; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-218; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 83.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “violation” for “misdemeanor.”

16-66-217. Election of bankruptcy exemptions.

Residents of this state having the right to claim exemptions in a bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522 shall have the right to elect either:

(i) The property exemptions provided by the Constitution and the laws of the State of Arkansas; or

(ii) The property exemptions provided by 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).

History. Acts 1991, No. 345, § 2.

Research References

ALR.

What Constitutes State or Local Law That is Applicable on Date of Filing of Bankruptcy Petition for Purposes of Applying 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) or Its Predecessor in Opt-Out States. 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 333.

Ark. L. Rev.

Mobile Homesteads, and in Particular the Exempt Status of Mobile Homes Located on Rented Lots: The Laws of Arkansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah Compared and the Principle of the Liberal Construction of Exemption Statutes Analyzed, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 221 (2004).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Business Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 579.

Arkansas Law Survey, Sowell, Bankruptcy, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 87.

Hardin, Conversion of Nonexempt Property to Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy in Arkansas, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 719.

Survey — Bankruptcy, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 127.

Survey, Bankruptcy, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 311.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

Case Notes

Exemptions Prior to Effect of Section.

A debtor may exempt any property that is exempt under federal, state, or local law on the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Therefore, the debtors were entitled to use the federal bankruptcy exemptions where they filed their petition prior to June 17, 1981, even though they filed modifications of that plan after that date. Hollytex Carpet Mills v. Tedford, 24 B.R. 197 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 691 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. Ark. 1982).

Federal Exemptions.

This section does not adopt the federal exemption table listed in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), but rather adheres to it. In re Criswell, 152 B.R. 264 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).

When enacting this section, the legislature intended to give the citizens of the State of Arkansas an opportunity to enjoy the rights granted by the federal government; the legislature did not adopt the federal exemptions, but merely provided bankruptcy debtors the opportunity to choose the federal exemptions. In re Criswell, 152 B.R. 264 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).

Judgment creditor's judicial lien could have been avoided by debtors under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f) where (1) pursuant to § 16-66-112, the creditor held a judicial lien on debtors' vehicle upon delivery of its writ of execution, (2) debtors claimed an exemption of $ 2,400 for the vehicle under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(d)(2), and (3) because debtors elected to exempt their vehicle under the bankruptcy code, which allowed an exemption of up to $2,775 for an automobile, the judicial lien held by the creditor on the vehicle impaired debtors' allowable exemption under § 522(b). In re Huffman, — B.R. —, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1845 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. June 20, 2002).

Homestead.

There was no dispute that the debtor possessed a homestead within the meaning of Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 3 when at the time he resided in the property he was the head of a household, an Arkansas resident, and made the dwelling “home.” In re Gerrald, 151 B.R. 217 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1993).

Once the right of homestead is acquired and the property remains occupied by the owner, the homestead is not lost by the death of a spouse, departure of dependent children from the home, or divorce of the parties; however, the presumption in favor of homestead can be overcome upon a clear showing of abandonment. In re Gerrald, 151 B.R. 217 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1993).

A temporary removal, even for a period of several years, does not constitute an abandonment. In re Gerrald, 151 B.R. 217 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1993).

Because separating the real property, which was the subject of the debtors' claim of a homestead exemption under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(b)(2), this section, and Ark. Const. Art. 9, § 5, into exempt and non-exempt parcels would be an unlawful subdivision, the bankruptcy court ordered a sale of the property and the allocation of the proceeds between the trustee and the debtors according to each parties' interest. In re Bradley, 282 B.R. 430 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002), aff'd, Williams v. Bradley (In re Bradley), 294 B.R. 64 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003).

Where the debtor elected bankruptcy exemptions under state law rather than 11 U.S.C.S. § 522, the court found that the debtor's claimed interest was abandoned by the debtor; the property was no longer impressed with homestead character sufficient to allow the debtor to claim a right to homestead exemption in the property pursuant to this section and § 16-66-218. In re Hunter, 295 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2003).

Retroactivity.

In enacting Acts 1991, No. 345, the general assembly did not intend the election of either state or federal exemptions to be given retroactive effect. In re Gardner, 139 B.R. 460 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991).

Cited: Gerrald v. Wright, 57 F.3d 652 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Kastl, No. 2:13-bk-70057, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3342 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Aug. 15, 2013).

16-66-218. Exemptions from execution under federal bankruptcy proceedings.

  1. The following property shall be exempt from execution under bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to Pub. L. No. 95-598:
    1. The unmarried debtor's aggregate interest, not exceeding eight hundred dollars ($800) in value, and the married debtor's aggregate interest, not exceeding one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250) in value, in real or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
    2. The debtor's interest, not to exceed one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200) in one (1) motor vehicle;
    3. The debtor's aggregate interest in the debtor's or the debtor's spouse's wedding bands, including diamonds mounted thereon not exceeding one-half (½) carat in weight;
    4. The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) in value in any implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor.
  2. The exemptions granted in subsection (a) of this section shall be in addition to the present exemptions granted by Arkansas law as listed below:
    1. The personal property of an unmarried person not the head of a family not exceeding a value of two hundred dollars ($200) in addition to such person's wearing apparel — Arkansas Constitution, Article 9, Section 1;
    2. The personal property of a married person or head of a family not exceeding a value of five hundred dollars ($500) in addition to such person's wearing apparel — Arkansas Constitution, Article 9, § 2;
    3. Rural homesteads not exceeding one hundred sixty (160) acres of land with improvements thereon, up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in value but in no event less than eighty (80) acres without regard to value — Arkansas Constitution, Article 9, § 4;
    4. The urban homestead not exceeding one (1) acre of land with improvements thereon, but not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in value, but in no event to be less than one-quarter (¼) of an acre of land without regard to value — Arkansas Constitution, Article 9, § 5;
    5. The rural or urban homestead of a widow or surviving dependent children including the rents and profits from such homestead — Arkansas Constitution, Article 9, § 6;
    6. Sixty (60) days' wages, not exceeding the limits imposed by the Arkansas Constitution, Article 9, §§ 1 and 2, but in no instance less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per week — § 16-66-208;
    7. Proceeds of life, health, accident, and disability insurance — § 16-66-209;
    8. Department of Arkansas State Police retirement benefits — §§ 24-6-202, 24-6-205, 24-6-223;
    9. Stipulated premium insurance benefits — § 23-71-112;
    10. Mutual assessment insurance benefits — § 23-72-114;
    11. Fraternal benefit society benefits — § 23-74-119 [repealed];
    12. Assets of delinquent insurer — § 23-68-120;
    13. Rights to unemployment benefits and benefits received but not mingled with other funds except for debts incurred for necessities furnished during the time of unemployment — §§ 11-10-107 — 11-10-110;
    14. Workers' compensation benefits — § 11-9-110;
    15. Public welfare assistance grants — § 20-76-430;
    16. All contributions made by a debtor to an individual retirement account, as that term is defined for federal income tax purposes and state income tax purposes, for a period exceeding one (1) year prior to the filing of a petition of bankruptcy. However, the maximum amount of individual retirement account contributions that may be claimed under this subdivision shall not exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) for an individual and twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) for a husband and wife combined; and
    17. All other benefits exempt by law but not specifically enumerated herein.

History. Acts 1981, No. 419, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-211; Acts 1987, No. 932, § 1; 1989, No. 821, § 5.

Publisher's Notes. Section 23-74-119, concerning fraternal benefit society benefits, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 881, effective January 1, 1990. For present law, see title 23, chapter 74, subchapter 4.

U.S. Code. Public Law 95-598 referred to in this section is codified primarily throughout Titles 11 and 28 of the United States Code.

Research References

ALR.

Jewelry and Clothing as Within Debtor's Exemptions under State Statutes. 44 A.L.R.6th 481.

Construction and Application of Exemption for Firearms under State Law. 46 A.L.R.6th 401.

Construction and Application of State Exemptions for Health Aids. 100 A.L.R.6th 251 (2014).

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence, Exemption Law and the Non-Bankrupt Judgment Debtor, 1986 Ark. L. Notes 19.

Flaccus, Baby Needs New Shoes: Child Support Collection and Bankruptcy, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 51.

Lawrence, What Holt Says and Why It's Wrong: An Essay on Sanders v. Putman, Putman v. Sanders and The Uneasy Condition of Arkansas Exemption Law, 1995 Ark. L. Notes 67.

Ark. L. Rev.

Laurence, In re Holt and the Re-making of Arkansas Exemption Law: Commentary After the Rout, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

Westbrook, Retirement Plan Assets in an Arkansas Bankruptcy, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 253.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Business Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 579.

Arkansas Law Survey, Sowell, Bankruptcy, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 87.

Hardin, Conversion of Nonexempt Property to Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy in Arkansas, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 719.

Survey — Bankruptcy, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 127.

Survey, Bankruptcy, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 311.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Because of the unmistakable incompatibility with Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 2, § 16-66-209 is unconstitutional and cannot act to exempt property from inclusion in a debtor's estate pursuant to subdivision (b)(7) of this section and 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)A). In re Hudspeth, 92 B.R. 827 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Subdivisions (a)(2)-(4) and (b)(16) violate the state constitution because they provide for exemptions which exceed the $500.00 limitation provided for by the Arkansas Constitution, therefore, the exemptions provided are unavailable to debtors in bankruptcy. In re Giller, 127 B.R. 215 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990).

Because subdivisions (a)(2) and (4) of this section provide for exemptions in excess of the amount set by the Arkansas Constitution, the statutory exemptions are unconstitutional. In re Kelley, 455 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).

Abandonment.

Evidence supported conclusion that debtors intended to abandon portion of homestead on which buildings were situated by devoting that area to manufacture of new and refurbished buses where debtors did not construct buildings for any family or domestic purpose, buildings were constructed to conduct a manufacturing business, and buildings were permanent in nature and intended for industrial purposes. In re Evans, 190 B.R. 1015 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995), aff'd without op., 108 F.3d 1381 (8th Cir. Ark. 1997).

Family.

In order to constitute a family, something more is required than a mere aggregation of individuals residing in the same house. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

The concept of “family” in the exemption imposes the requirement of a substantial relationship between the person who is obligated to provide the support and the person who as a dependent relies upon the support. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Head of a Family.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized certain factors that are critical in the determination as to whether a debtor qualifies as “head of a family.” These factors are: (1) the existence of an obligation upon the head of the house to support the others; (2) the existence of a corresponding state of dependence upon those being supported; and (3) the head of the family is one in authority where the status or relationship of the family exists. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Homestead Exemption.

Husband and wife who were joint petitioners in bankruptcy were entitled to only one homestead exemption. Stevens v. Pike County Bank, 829 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1987).

Where the homestead property was urban property and exceeded $2,500.00 in value, the one-acre exemption claimed by the debtor exceeded the exemption allowable under Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 5 and the debtor had to select which portion of the one-acre tract he desired to claim as exempt. In re Giller, 127 B.R. 215 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990).

Where the debtor elected bankruptcy exemptions under state law rather than 11 U.S.C.S. § 522, the court found that the debtor's claimed interest was abandoned by the debtor; the property was no longer impressed with homestead character sufficient to allow the debtor to claim a right to homestead exemption in the property pursuant to § 16-66-217 and this section. In re Hunter, 295 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2003).

Insurance Proceeds.

The bankruptcy exemption for insurance proceeds in this section and § 16-66-209 is limited by Ark. Const., Art. 9, § 2. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Holt, 97 B.R. 997 (W.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd, 894 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1990).

Where life insurance policies contain no investment device or special dividend provision, the cash surrender proceeds of the debtor's policies are a mere incident of the debtor's life insurance policies, and, thus are exempt from bankruptcy proceedings based upon § 16-66-209. In re Duckett, 65 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986); In re Weiler, 65 B.R. 564 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); In re Johnson, 66 B.R. 39 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986), aff'd, 85 B.R. 518 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Personal Property Exemption.

Bankruptcy court found that, where the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition as a single person and testified that he was not married when he filed his bankruptcy petition, the debtor was not entitled to the personal property exemption found in the Ark. Const. art. 9, § 2. In re Hunter, 295 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2003).

Proof.

Where debtor failed to prove anything more than a minimal relationship, the fact that he and his father lived in the same house, debtor could not claim his interest in the property under the homestead exemption. In re Pate, 95 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

Rural Property.

Lots located within a subdivision, which were not within an incorporated town, city or village, and the subdivision was not provided services commonly thought of as being provided in a city, town or village were considered rural property within the meaning of the Arkansas Constitution for exemption purposes. In re Weaver, 128 B.R. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1991).

Woodlands area, a landed property about and contiguous to debtors' dwelling, located in rural area was part of debtors' homestead. In re McCall, 195 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995).

Although woodlands were not used for agricultural purposes they were part of debtors' rural homestead where debtors treated woodlands lot as part of their rural homestead, it was assessed together with dwelling, and when obtaining a home improvement loan, they offered it as security. In re McCall, 195 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995).

Urban Property.

Facts supported finding that debtors' homestead was urban in nature where property was only six to eight feet from city limits and debtors' property enjoyed all modern conveniences that were enjoyed by residents of city. In re Evans, 190 B.R. 1015 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995), aff'd without op., 108 F.3d 1381 (8th Cir. Ark. 1997).

Rural/urban issue is not altogether controlled by the corporate limits, thus property located outside the corporate limits may be determined urban. In re Oldner, 191 B.R. 146 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995).

Facts supported a finding that property was urban in nature where property was located in a megalopolitan area that had developed on either side of interstate between two cities, it was not easy to discern when you left one municipal corporate limit and entered another one, and land uses ranged from single family residences to commercial and industrial uses. In re Oldner, 191 B.R. 146 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995).

Worker's Compensation Benefits.

Worker's compensation proceeds continue to be exempt from claims of creditors after the money has been paid the injured worker; any other interpretation would defeat the purpose of the exemption, denying the worker the use of his money. In re Covey, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6408, 36 B.R. 696 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984).

Worker's compensation benefits which were received by the debtor prior to the filing of his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and were segregated from other assets were exempt from payment to unsecured creditors. In re Covey, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6408, 36 B.R. 696 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984).

Cited: Hollytex Carpet Mills v. Tedford, 24 B.R. 197 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Holt, 894 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Lillard, 38 B.R. 433 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984); In re Bradley, 282 B.R. 430 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002).

16-66-219. Wedding rings exempt.

A person's wedding ring shall be exempt from attachment, execution, and seizure for satisfaction of debts.

History. Acts 1989, No. 428, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 428, § 3, provided that the exemptions provided for in this section shall be in addition to any other exemptions provided by law.

Acts 1989, No. 428, § 4, provided:

“The exemptions prescribed by this act do not apply to property that is, as of the effective date of this act, subject to a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding or to valid claims of a holder of a final judgment who has, by levy, garnishment, or other legal process, obtained rights superior to those that otherwise would be held by a trustee in bankruptcy if a bankruptcy petition were then pending against the debtor.”

Cross References. Attachment and garnishment generally, § 16-110-101 et seq.

16-66-220. Pension and profit-sharing plans.

    1. A person's right to the assets held in or to receive payments, whether vested or not, under a pension, profit-sharing, or similar plan or contract, including a retirement plan for self-employed individuals, or under an individual retirement account or an individual retirement annuity, including a simplified employee pension plan, is exempt from attachment, execution, and seizure for the satisfaction of debts unless the plan, contract, or account does not qualify under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
    2. A person's right to the assets held in or to receive payments, whether vested or not, under a government or church plan or contract is also exempt unless the plan or contract does not qualify under the definition of a government or church plan under the applicable provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
    1. Contributions to an individual retirement account that exceed the amounts deductible under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and any accrued earnings on such contributions are not exempt under this section unless otherwise exempt by law.
    2. However, the limitations of subdivision (b)(1) of this section do not apply to an individual retirement account established pursuant to and qualifying under § 408(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

History. Acts 1989, No. 428, § 2; 1999, No. 867, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 428, § 3, provided that the exemptions provided for in this section shall be in addition to any other exemptions provided by law.

Acts 1989, No. 428, § 4, provided:

“The exemptions prescribed by this act do not apply to property that is, as of the effective date of this act, subject to a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding or to valid claims of a holder of a final judgment who has, by levy, garnishment, or other legal process, obtained rights superior to those that otherwise would be held by a trustee in bankruptcy if a bankruptcy petition were then pending against the debtor.”

U.S. Code. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in this section, is codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

Section 408(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in (b)(2), is codified as 26 U.S.C. § 408(a).

Case Notes

Interpretation.

Subdivision (a)(1) of this section was not unconstitutional, because the IRA exemption was not an absolute exemption of all personal property, and as such, did not offend Ark. Const. Art. 9, § 2; as long as the exemption at issue was not an absolute exemption of all personal property, but instead related only to exempting certain funds from general garnishment statutes, then the exemption did not violate Ark. Const. Art. 9, § 2. Clinical Study Ctrs., Inc. v. Boellner, 2012 Ark. 266, 411 S.W.3d 695 (2012).

16-66-221. Schedule of property — Filing.

  1. Whenever any resident of this state has any final judgment order of a court of record entered against him or her, he or she shall prepare a schedule, verified by affidavit, of all his or her property, both real and personal, including moneys, bank accounts, rights, credits, and choses in action held by himself or herself or others for him or her and specify the particular property which he or she claims as exempt under the provisions of the law.
  2. The schedule shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the final judgment order was rendered within forty-five (45) days of entry of the final judgment order.
  3. All final judgment orders of a court of record in this state shall include a provision requiring the judgment debtor to comply with the requirements of this section. However, the absence of the provision from a final judgment shall not invalidate the judgment.

History. Acts 1991, No. 610, §§ 1, 2; 1993, No. 120, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

Case Notes

Application and Construction.

This section did not apply to the judgment debtors, because the debtors had not been residents of Arkansas for more than seven years, and subsection (c) merely required the court to include the asset-schedule provision in its order if a resident defendant was required to prepare such a schedule in accordance with subsection (a). Hauser v. Sims, 2012 Ark. App. 295, 423 S.W.3d 104 (2012).

Cited: D. Hawkins, Inc. v. Schumacher, 322 Ark. 437, 909 S.W.2d 640 (1995).

Subchapter 3 — Staying, Quashing, or Vacating Writ

Cross References. Stay of execution in justice of the peace courts, § 16-19-901 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1889, No. 66, § 4: effective on passage.

Research References

Am. Jur. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Exec., § 607 et seq.

C.J.S. 33 C.J.S., Exec., § 139 et seq.

16-66-301. Petition to judge, stay, quash, or set aside execution — Proceedings.

  1. If any person against whom any execution has been issued applies to the judge of the court out of which the execution or order of sale was issued, by petition verified by affidavit, setting forth good cause why the execution ought to be stayed, set aside, or quashed, reasonable notice of the intended application having been previously given to the adverse party or his or her agent or attorney of record, the judge shall, upon the application, hear the complaint.
    1. If it appears that the execution ought to be stayed, set aside, or quashed and the petitioner enters into a recognizance with sufficient security in such sum as may be reasonable to be taken and approved by the judge, conditioned that if the application is determined against the petitioner, he or she will pay the debt, damages, and costs, to be recovered by the execution or order of sale, surrender in execution his or her property liable to be seized, taken, and sold by the execution or order of sale, or that the sureties will do it for him or her, then the judge shall make an order for the stay of the execution or order of sale as aforesaid.
    2. However, all property real and personal bound by the execution or order of sale shall remain bound as if no such stay had been granted.
  2. On the presentation of a certified copy of the order to the officer having charge of the execution or order of sale, he or she shall immediately return the execution or order of sale without further action.
  3. The judge shall return the petition and proceedings thereon, duly certified, to the court out of which the execution was issued or the order of sale made returnable. The clerk of that court shall enter the petition and proceedings upon the docket, and the court shall hear and determine the petition and proceedings in a summary manner, according to right and justice, and may award a perpetual stay of or quash the execution or order of sale, or may order the execution or order of sale to be enforced.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, §§ 70-72; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4291-4293; Pope's Dig., §§ 5303-5305; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-311 — 30-313.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section did not apply where the court did not quash execution until after it had heard the testimony and set the judgment aside. Harris v. Starr, 226 Ark. 127, 288 S.W.2d 332 (1956).

The statutory procedure or method of staying or vacating writs of execution on judgements, while apparantly exclusive, does not preclude a person from seeking recovery for damages when, pursuant to a writ of execution, a sheriff intentionally or willfully takes property from persons who are in no way connected with the suit and judgment from which the execution ensued. Battle v. Harris, 298 Ark. 241, 766 S.W.2d 431 (1989).

Circuit court erred in staying the execution of a judgment until the judgment holder appeared to show cause for failing to attend his deposition because there was no order, definite or otherwise, that the judgment holder potentially could be found in contempt for willfully disobeying. Lone v. Koch, 2015 Ark. App. 373, 467 S.W.3d 152 (2015).

Bond.

Although the bond failed to mention that payment under the bond was in any way conditional, the bond was read to include the condition. Hemingway v. Glasper, 291 Ark. 172, 722 S.W.2d 866 (1987).

Defenses.

Execution on a judgment rendered without notice will not be quashed unless defendant has a defense to the cause of action. Flowers v. United States Guar. Co., 89 Ark. 506, 117 S.W. 547 (1909).

Before a party would be entitled to have an execution quashed on ground default judgment was obtained without service of process, it is necessary first to show a valid defense to the action. Davis v. Bank of Atkins, 205 Ark. 144, 167 S.W.2d 876 (1943)Questioned byBeck v. Rhoads, 235 Ark. 619, 361 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1962).

Noncompliance.

A judgment creditor was not prejudiced by a finding that the debtor's homestead was exempt from any levy under an earlier judgment even though the debtor failed to follow the proper procedures in claiming the exemption or in obtaining a stay of execution. Ross v. White, 15 Ark. App. 98, 689 S.W.2d 588 (1985).

In a case involving a writ of execution, a debtor failed to follow subsection (a) of this section because he did not file a petition verified by an affidavit to challenge the writ; however, despite a trial court's ruling that the debtor's response did not comply with the statute, the trial court considered most or all of the pled defenses. Looney v. Raby, 100 Ark. App. 326, 268 S.W.3d 345 (2007).

Void Judgment.

Executions on void judgment may be quashed. Metcalf v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry., 101 Ark. 193, 141 S.W. 1167 (1911).

Cited: Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990); Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

16-66-302. Stay not allowed in specified instances.

  1. No stay shall be allowed upon:
    1. A judgment or decree against any collecting officer, attorney at law, or agent for a delinquency or default in executing or fulfilling the duties of his or her office or place, or failing to pay over money collected by him or her in such capacity, or against a principal by his or her surety, or of a debt due by obligation having the force of a judgment, or of a judgment or decree for specific property, or for the property or its value; or
    2. A judgment or decree enforcing a lien in favor of a vendor or mortgagee; or
    3. A judgment for personal injury or injuries resulting in death caused by neglect or default of another.
  2. In the cases mentioned in this section in which a stay is not allowed, the execution shall be so endorsed by the clerk.

History. Civil Code, § 679; Acts 1909, No. 202, § 1, p. 590; C. & M. Dig., § 4297; Pope's Dig., § 5309; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-304.

Case Notes

Bodily Harm.

A stay may not be had in an action for bodily harm not resulting in death, or in action for injuries resulting in death. Fernwood Mining Co. v. Pluna, 138 Ark. 459, 213 S.W. 397 (1919).

Guardian and Ward.

A judgment against a guardian in favor of his ward may be stayed. Parker v. Wilson, 99 Ark. 344, 137 S.W. 926 (1911).

16-66-303. Stay of execution — Bonds.

  1. The defendants, except in cases otherwise provided for in this subchapter, when there is no execution thereon in the hands of a collecting officer, may stay any judgment or decree for money for six (6) months by giving, before the clerk of the court entering up the judgment or decree, an obligation with good surety, to be approved by the officer, in substance as follows:
  2. At any time before a sale of property under the execution, any execution on a judgment or decree which could be stayed before the execution issued may, be stayed for six (6) months by the defendant's giving to the officer acting under the execution an obligation payable to the plaintiff with good security for the amount thereof including interest, cost, and half of the commissions up to that time. The obligation may be in substance as follows:

“This day the defendant, A. B. together with C. D., his or her surety, came before me, a clerk of the circuit court, and undertook that they would satisfy and pay E. F. his or her judgment, including interest (if any) and cost, amounting to dollars, rendered in his or her favor against A. B. by this court, within six (6) months, with legal interest on the whole amount thereof from this date.”

“We, A. B., principal, and E. F., surety, do bind ourselves six (6) months after the date hereof to pay C. D., the plaintiff in execution, the sum of $ dollars, to bear interest from this date, being the amount of an execution which issued from the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court Clerk on the day of , 20 in favor of the said C. D. for the sum of $ debt (or damages); $ interest; $ cost of suit; and $ sheriff's half commission, amounting in the whole to the sum of $ aforesaid, against the said A. B., and we, the said A. B. and E. F., surety, have stayed the same.

Witness our hands this day of , 20

History. Civil Code, §§ 676, 677; Acts 1889, No. 66, §§ 1, 2, p. 82; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4294, 4295; Pope's Dig., §§ 5306, 5307; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-301, 30-302.

Case Notes

Exclusive Method.

This section and 16-66-301 provide the exclusive method of obtaining stay of judgment. Taylor v. O'Kane, 185 Ark. 782, 49 S.W.2d 400 (1932).

Guardian and Ward.

A stay may be allowed upon a judgment in favor of a ward against his guardian for money collected by the guardian as such and not paid to the ward. Parker v. Wilson, 99 Ark. 344, 137 S.W. 926 (1911).

Judgment Liens.

The filing of a stay bond does not affect a judgment lien on lands unless it extends beyond the period of limitations in which event the judgment creditor will be given a reasonable time in which to levy an execution after the expiration of the stay bond. Beloate v. New England Sec. Co., 128 Ark. 215, 193 S.W. 795 (1917).

Review of Decree.

Prohibition was not proper remedy of property owner to prevent enforcement of chancery court decree ordering conveyance of real property, but rather the proper procedure was to obtain a temporary stay under this section until Supreme Court could decide appeal on the merits. Helmerich v. Benton County Chancery Court, 233 Ark. 795, 348 S.W.2d 878 (1961).

Sureties.

Sureties on a supersedeas bond of defendants appealing from a judgment for the plaintiff, having made themselves parties to the suit by signing a supersedeas bond, are defendants within this section. Morse Bros. Lumber Co. v. F. Burkart Mfg. Co., 155 Ark. 350, 244 S.W. 350 (1922).

16-66-304. Sale of personal property suspended upon giving bond.

  1. The sale of personal property upon which an execution is levied shall be suspended at the instance of any person, other than the defendant in the execution, claiming the property, who shall execute with one (1) or more sureties a bond to the plaintiff in the execution, sufficient for double the property's value to the effect that if it is adjudged that the property or any part of it is subject to the execution, he or she will pay to the plaintiff the value of the property so subject and ten percent (10%) thereon, not exceeding the amount due on the execution and ten percent (10%) thereon.
  2. For the purpose of taking the bond mentioned in subsection (a) of this section, the officer shall select three (3) disinterested householders and administer to them an oath to make a fair appraisal of each article of the property, whose appraisal in writing shall be recited in the bond.
  3. The bond, with the appraisal annexed thereto, shall be returned to the circuit court of the county in which the levy was made.
    1. The party to whom the bond is executed may move the court to which it is returned for a judgment thereon against all or any of the obligors, or their representatives, having given to them ten (10) days' notice of the motion.
    2. The court shall direct a jury to be impaneled and may cause such issues to be tried as it may prescribe. It may direct which party shall be considered plaintiff in the issue.
    3. If the property, or any part of it, is found subject to the execution, judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff therein for the value of the property so subject and ten percent (10%) thereon, not exceeding the amount due on the execution and ten percent (10%) thereon.
    4. An execution may be issued upon the judgment forthwith, on which the same endorsement shall be made as on the execution, in virtue of which the property had been seized.
  4. Upon the trial of the motion, either party may object that the property was not fairly appraised. Thereupon, the jury trying the facts shall hear evidence respecting and find the value of the property.
  5. The giving of the bond, mentioned in subsection (a) of this section, shall not discharge the levy of the execution upon the property claimed. But the officer may leave it subject to the lien of the levy with the person in whose possession it was found pending the proceeding on the bond, and may, in the meantime, proceed with the execution against any other property of the defendant.

History. Civil Code, §§ 727-732; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4311-4316; Pope's Dig., §§ 5323-5328; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-305 — 30-310.

Case Notes

Attachment.

This section applies as well to property about to be sold under a special execution in attachment, as to that levied on a special execution. State v. Spikes, 33 Ark. 801 (1878).

Burden of Proof.

In a contest between an execution plaintiff and an interpleader as to the ownership of property seized under execution, the court may direct that the latter assume the burden of proof. Norton v. Elk Horn Bank, 55 Ark. 59, 17 S.W. 362 (1891).

Under this section, the placing of the burden of proof is to be determined by the trial court according to circumstances; where the levy is made on property located in a public place based merely on the assertion of the judgment creditor that it is the property of the judgment debtor, the creditor could properly be required to carry the burden of proving his assertion. Velder v. Crown Exploration Co., 10 Ark. App. 273, 663 S.W.2d 205 (1984).

Where the property in issue was in the possession of debtor at the time of the levy, it was not improper to place the burden on intervenor who claimed ownership of the property even where not aided by prima facie evidence. Velder v. Crown Exploration Co., 10 Ark. App. 273, 663 S.W.2d 205 (1984).

Ownership.

The evidence was held to sustain a finding that property levied upon as that of an execution defendant belonged to him and not his wife who intervened claiming it. Winter v. Fly & Hobson Co., 170 Ark. 186, 279 S.W. 369 (1926).

Cited: Velder v. Crown Exploration Co., 10 Ark. App. 273, 663 S.W.2d 205 (1984).

16-66-305. Waiver of right of stay.

An agreement to waive the right of stay, or any other legal agreement in relation to any judgment or decree, entered on the record among the orders of court, shall be specifically enforced. In such case, the proper endorsement shall be entered upon the execution by the clerk or justice.

History. Civil Code, § 678; C. & M. Dig., § 4296; Pope's Dig., § 5308; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-303.

Subchapter 4 — Levy and Sale

Cross References. Sales of personal property made by order of court, § 18-49-104.

Sale under execution from a justice's court, § 16-19-1001 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1868, No. 37, § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1955, No. 162, § 4: approved Mar. 8, 1955. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby determined as a matter of fact that presently existing procedures for compelling discovery of assets by judgment debtors are inadequate in many cases to make effective the judgments of the courts, and that such inadequacy impairs the public peace, health and safety. An emergency is therefore hereby declared, and this act shall take effect from and after its passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sale. 5 A.L.R.4th 794.

Right of purchaser at execution sale, upon failure of title, to reimbursement or restitution from judgment creditor. 33 A.L.R.4th 1206.

Am. Jur. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Exec., § 221 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Laurence, Enforcing a Money Judgment Against the Defendant's Stocks and Bonds: A Brief Foray into the Forbidding Realms of Article Eight and theFourth Amendment, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 561.

C.J.S. 33 C.J.S., Exec., § 88-122 and § 196 et seq.

16-66-401. Selection of property to be sold — Levy.

The person against whom any execution may be issued may select what property, real or personal, shall be sold to satisfy the execution. If he or she gives to the officer a list of the property selected, sufficient to satisfy the execution, the officer shall levy upon that property and no other, if it is in his or her opinion sufficient to satisfy the execution and, if not, then upon such additional property as may be sufficient to satisfy the execution.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 28; C. & M. Dig., § 4277; Pope's Dig., § 5289; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-401.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Postjudgment exemption laws adequately provide for procedures and hearings by which a judgment debtor may exercise his or her rights to exemption claims or the return of levied property. It is the lack of a requirement of notice to the judgment debtor, however, that makes statutory provisions such as §§ 16-66-211 and 16-66-401 constitutionally deficient. Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990).

Duty of Officer.

It is the duty of the officer in making a levy under execution to levy the execution upon property of the defendant within his jurisdiction sufficient to satisfy the execution and all proper fees and costs. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Andrews, 102 Ark. 175, 143 S.W. 1084 (1912).

Effect of Stay or Vacation of Writ.

The statutory procedure or method of staying or vacating writs of execution on judgments, § 16-66-301 et seq., while apparently exclusive, does not preclude a person from seeking recovery for damages when, pursuant to a writ of execution, a sheriff intentionally or willfully takes property from persons who are in no way connected with the suit and judgment from which the execution ensued. Battle v. Harris, 298 Ark. 241, 766 S.W.2d 431 (1989).

Notice and Opportunity to Select Property.

Where a judgment debtor's property was sold under execution without notice to the judgment debtor or the opportunity to select property on which levy should be made, the court properly canceled the execution deed on the ground that it was inequitable for the sale to stand. Wade v. Deniston, 180 Ark. 326, 21 S.W.2d 424 (1929).

Notice to judgment debtor, to be constitutional, need not supply the judgment debtor with a “laundry list” of statutory or constitutional exemptions or inform him of all available exemptions. Such notice need only inform the debtor that postjudgment execution is being levied and that state and federal exemptions may be available with respect to the property subject to the levy. Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990).

Waiver of Right.

Where the judgment debtor refuses to either pay or supersede the judgment pending appeal and refuses to select property for sale, his rights under this section are not infringed by the deputy marshal's sale of his land. United States v. Weir, 235 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Ark. 1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. Ark. 1964).

Cited: Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990); In re Bookout, 231 B.R. 306 (E.D. Ark. 1999).

16-66-402. Levy on real estate — Certificate of levy filed with recorder — Levy as notice to purchaser or mortgagee.

  1. It shall be the duty of the sheriff, United States Marshal, or other officer levying upon any real estate under and by virtue of any writ of attachment, execution, or other process to file with the recorder of deeds of the county in which the real estate is situated a certificate of the levy or seizure, together with a correct and full description of the real estate levied upon or seized by him or her. It shall be the duty of the recorder of deeds to index and record the certificate of the levy or seizure in the same manner as provided for notice of lis pendens.
  2. In all cases in which lands are seized or levied upon, which are lying and situated in a county other than that in which the judgment is a lien under the provisions of the laws of this state, the levy or seizure of real estate shall not be notice to a purchaser or mortgagee of any real estate until the filing of the notice as provided by subsection (a) of this section. However, if the notice is filed within twenty-four (24) hours of the levy or seizure, it shall be notice from the time the levy or seizure was made, but if not filed within twenty-four (24) hours after the levy or seizure, it shall only be notice from the time the notice was filed.

History. Acts 1903, No. 65, §§ 4, 5; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6982, 6983; Pope's Dig., §§ 8962, 8963; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-404, 30-405.

Case Notes

Lis Pendens.

The purchaser of land upon which a writ of attachment has been levied under the lis pendens statute is not an innocent purchaser for value. Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Harris, 113 Ark. 100, 167 S.W. 706 (1914).

Common-law and equity rule of lis pendens has been abrogated by the statute, and since its enactment an action affecting title is not lis pendens until notice has been filed in compliance with the statute. Wilkins v. Jernigan, 195 Ark. 546, 113 S.W.2d 108 (1938).

Judgment debtor, which obtained a judgment against a debtor in Texas, and recorded its judgment in the real property records of an Arkansas county, had an enforceable judgment lien against the debtor's real property in that county. United States v. Neal, 255 F.R.D. 638 (W.D. Ark. 2008), aff'd, 391 Fed. Appx. 569 (8th Cir. 2010).

16-66-403. Levy on joint or partnership property — Assertion of claim.

  1. Whenever a sheriff or other officer levies an execution upon property or effects held jointly or in partnership by the debtor in the execution with others, to satisfy the separate debt of the debtor, the sheriff or other officer shall not proceed to make sale thereof, except as provided in this section if the person or persons, or any of them, holding a joint or partnership interest with the debtor, asserts a claim thereto, and, in writing, notifies the officer of the existence of the claim.
  2. Where any such levy is made, the officer shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the other joint owners or partners, if they are residing in his or her county, or to the agent, if any, of any joint owners or partners who are absent or nonresidents. If the joint owners or partners thereafter, for the space of fifteen (15) days, fail to give the officers notice of their claim, the officer shall then proceed to advertise and sell the property so levied upon.
  3. When a claim is asserted by the joint owners or partners to the property levied upon, the officer shall not, by virtue of his or her levy, deprive the joint owners or partners of the possession of the property levied upon, except for the purpose of making an inventory thereof and having the property appraised.
  4. The officer shall proceed to have the property levied upon appraised as provided in § 16-66-304(b). He or she shall return the inventory and appraisal, with the execution to the officer from which it issued. In his or her return, he or she shall state all the facts connected with the levy by him or her and the claims, if any, set up by the joint owner or owners.
  5. The execution creditor shall have a lien upon the property levied upon, such as is given by law to executions in the hands of the officer, and which shall continue until the levy is disposed of.
  6. Upon the execution's being filed by the officer that he or she had levied the execution upon the property, in which the debtor was joint owner or partner and that the property was claimed by the other joint owners or partners, the execution creditor may proceed to subject to the satisfaction of his or her execution the interest of his or her debtor so levied upon.
    1. If the creditor, at the commencement of his or her action or afterward, files an affidavit that he or she verily believes that the property levied upon will be removed from the county, sold, or otherwise disposed of with intent fraudulently to defeat his or her lien, the court, or judge thereof in vacation, or, if within the jurisdiction of a magistrate, then a justice of the peace, may make an order directing the officer to possess himself or herself of the property so levied upon, unless a bond with approved security is executed to the plaintiff in the execution, binding the obligors in the bond to have the same forthcoming, in obedience to any order or judgment of the court in the action.
    2. The bond shall be taken by the officer and returned by him or her to the court in which the action is pending.

History. Civil Code, §§ 742-748; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4280-4286; Pope's Dig., §§ 5292-5298; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-701 — 30-707; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 201.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “a” for “an equitable or other” in (a); deleted “by equitable proceedings” following “creditor may proceed” in (f); added the subsection designations in (g); and made gender neutral changes throughout.

Case Notes

Chancery Jurisdiction.

Where sheriff reported that he had found certain property, but others claimed to own it by reason of a mortgage, judgment creditor had a right to proceed in chancery court. Raley v. Mitchell, 196 Ark. 504, 118 S.W.2d 674 (1938).

Partners' Interests.

Where the interest of a partner in the firm assets has been levied on under execution, and his copartner has given the officer notice of his claim therein, the officer cannot sell the interest until it has been ascertained and set apart by equitable proceedings. Summers v. Heard, 66 Ark. 550, 50 S.W. 78, 51 S.W. 1057 (1899).

The interest of a partner in firm property so far as his individual creditors are concerned is his share after paying the debts of the firm, including any debt he may owe to the firm. Lewis v. Buford, 93 Ark. 57, 124 S.W. 244 (1909).

Time of Attachment.

The lien attaches at the time of the seizure. Harris v. Phillips, 49 Ark. 58, 4 S.W. 196 (1886); Jones v. Fletcher, 132 Ark. 328, 200 S.W. 1034 (1918).

16-66-404. Levy on shares or stock in corporations — Statement of shares and encumbrances.

  1. Whenever an officer, having an execution or writ of attachment in his or her hands, levies on shares or stock in corporations, he or she shall make the levy or seizure by leaving a true copy of the writ with the president, secretary, cashier, or other officer, with the certificate of the officer making the levy, that he or she levies upon and takes such rights or shares to satisfy the execution.
  2. When an execution shall be issued against any shares or stock in any bank, insurance company, or other corporation, it shall be the duty of the cashier, secretary, or chief clerk thereof, upon the request of the officer having the execution, to furnish him or her with a certificate under his or her hand, stating the number of rights or shares the defendant holds in the bank, company, or corporation, with the encumbrances thereon.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 26; Acts 1891, No. 21, §§ 1, 2; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4278, 4279; Pope's Dig., §§ 5290, 5291; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-402, 30-403.

Case Notes

Garnishment.

When a plaintiff in execution wishes to reach stock owned by the defendant in a corporation, he should follow the provisions of this section and the bringing of garnishment proceedings against the corporation is improper. Farmers State Bank v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 127 Ark. 278, 192 S.W. 230 (1917).

Garnishment will not reach shares of stock in a garnishee corporation belonging to a judgment debtor. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. W.O. Perkins & Son, 185 Ark. 830, 49 S.W.2d 606 (1932).

Notice.

A delivery by a sheriff of a notice to the proper officer of a corporation, after the order of attachment had been filed in the clerk's office, was a delivery after the sheriff's power to act under the writ had ceased to exist and consequently there was not attachment of the shares. Deutschman v. Byrne, 64 Ark. 111, 40 S.W. 780 (1897).

In order to attach shares under this section, it is necessary to deliver to one of the officers or agents named therein a notice in writing or certificate specifying the same; otherwise the court is without authority to condemn any stock to be sold to satisfy debt or judgment. H.B. Claflin Co. v. Bretzfelder, 69 Ark. 271, 62 S.W. 905 (1901).

16-66-405. Indemnifying bonds.

    1. If an officer who levies, or is required to levy, an execution upon personal property, doubts whether it is subject to execution, he or she may give to the plaintiff therein, or his or her agent or attorney, notice that an indemnifying bond is required.
    2. Bond may, thereupon, be given by or for the plaintiff, with one (1) or more sufficient sureties to be approved by the officer, to the effect that the obligors therein will indemnify him or her against the damage he may sustain in consequence of the seizure or sale of the property, will pay to any claimant thereof the damages he or she may sustain in consequence of the seizure or sale, and will warrant to any purchaser of the property such estate or interest therein as is sold.
    3. Thereupon, the officer shall proceed to subject the property to the execution and shall return the indemnifying bond to the circuit court of the county from which the execution issued.
  1. If the bond mentioned in subsection (a) of this section is not given, the officer or she may refuse to levy the execution or, if it had been levied, and the bond is not given in a reasonable time after it is required by the officer, he or she may restore the property to the person from whose possession it was taken, and the levy shall stand discharged.
    1. The claimant or purchaser of any property, for the seizure or sale of which an indemnifying bond has been taken and returned by the officer, shall be barred of any action against the officer levying upon the property if the surety was good when it was taken.
    2. The claimant or purchaser may maintain an action upon the bond and recover such damages as he or she may be entitled to.
  2. When property for the sale of which the officer is indemnified sells for more than enough to satisfy the execution under which it was taken, the surplus shall be paid into the court to which the indemnifying bond is directed to be returned. That court may order such disposition or payment of the money to be made temporarily or absolutely as may be proper in respect to the rights of the parties interested.
  3. No officer shall require any agent of the State of Arkansas, or any political subdivision thereof, to post an indemnifying bond prior to an execution on personal property.

History. Civil Code, §§ 723-726; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4287-4290; Pope's Dig., §§ 5299-5302; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-408 — 30-411; Acts 1995, No. 1183, § 1.

Case Notes

In General.

In order to compel sheriff to levy on personal property, an indemnifying bond must be furnished. Keith v. Drainage Dist. of Poinsett County, 183 Ark. 786, 38 S.W.2d 755 (1931).

Doubt.

The doubt as to whether the property is subject to sale must not be an arbitrary one. Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Lewis, 89 Ark. 488, 117 S.W. 558 (1909).

A sheriff may not demand an indemnifying bond in all cases before levying an execution, except when, acting in good faith, he doubts that property is subject to execution which appears to be so. Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Davis, 186 Ark. 788, 56 S.W.2d 178 (1933).

Real Property.

This section confers no authority with respect to real property. Smith v. Spradlin, 136 Ark. 204, 206 S.W. 327 (1918).

Cited: Williams v. Brooks, 3 Ark. App. 130, 623 S.W.2d 216 (1981).

16-66-406. Forthcoming bond by owner — Default.

    1. The owner of personal estate taken in execution may give to the officer levying on the personal estate an obligation, with good surety, to have the property forthcoming at the time and place of sale, specifying in the obligation each article of property and its value.
    2. The obligation may be in substance as follows:
    3. Upon the giving of the obligation, the officer shall return the possession of the property, so taken in execution, to the defendant, to remain with him or her, at his or her own risk and expense, until the time specified for its delivery.
    1. If the defendant fails to pay or stay the amount of the execution and fails to deliver so much of the property specified in the forthcoming obligation or other property in its place, as is sufficient to satisfy the execution and all costs and commissions, the officer shall return the execution and bond to the office from which the execution was issued and endorse on the execution the levy, the giving of the bond, and the particular property which is not forthcoming, and the other facts.
    2. The surety on the bond shall be liable only for the value of the property specified in the bond, which is not forthcoming, with interest thereon, from the date of the bond, and accruing costs.
    3. If the property specified in the forthcoming bond is not of value sufficient to satisfy the execution and all costs and commissions, the proper officer may issue another execution and credit the execution with the value of the property specified in the bond.
  1. An officer taking a forthcoming bond, who shall fail to return the bond to the proper officer for twenty (20) days, after the failure to comply on the part of the defendant shall, with his or her sureties, be liable to the plaintiff for the amount of the execution, costs, and commission, and twenty percent (20%) thereon, to be recovered by action against any one (1) or more of them or their representatives.

“We, A. B., principal, and C. D., surety, do bind ourselves that the property mentioned in the following schedule and valuation, to wit: valued at $ (naming each article and its value), shall be forthcoming at , on the day of next, at the hour of twelve o'clock in the day.

“Witness our hands, this day of , 20

History. Civil Code, §§ 680-682; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4298-4303; Pope's Dig., §§ 5310-5315; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-412 — 30-414.

16-66-407. Expiration of term, death, etc., of officer after levy.

  1. Where an officer has levied upon any goods and chattels, real estate, or other effects, by virtue of any execution, and the term of service of the officer expires and is terminated before or after the sale thereof, and before the purchaser has obtained a deed therefor, the officer shall nevertheless have power to do and perform all things in relation to the execution, and the sale of the property, and in making and acknowledging a deed to the purchaser, to all intents and purposes, as if his or her term of service had not expired. The officer and his or her securities shall be subject to the same penalties, actions, proceedings, and judgments for neglect, misconduct, or failure therein, as if he or she had still continued in office.
  2. When any officer dies or is removed from office, or is otherwise disqualified from acting, after having taken in execution any goods and chattels, real estate, shares, or other effects, and before sale thereof, the sheriff or coroner then in office shall proceed thereon, and do and perform all things remaining to be done and performed in relation to the execution, and the sale of the property, and in making and executing deeds and conveyances therefor, in the same manner and with the same effect as the officer so deceased, removed from office, or disqualified could have done.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, §§ 59, 60; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4357, 4358; Pope's Dig., §§ 5369, 5370; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-415, 30-416.

Case Notes

Duties Unfinished.

It is only when his duties remain unfinished that execution should issue to former sheriff. State ex rel. Cotton v. Atkinson, 53 Ark. 98, 13 S.W. 415 (1890).

16-66-408. Notice of sale of real and personal property — Advertisement.

  1. The time and place of sale of real property upon execution, by virtue of a judgment, or order of sale, must be advertised for at least twenty (20) days, next before the day of sale by posting printed advertisements at the courthouse door and five (5) other public places in the county in which the sale is to be made, one (1) of which is to be upon the premises to be sold, and by publishing the advertisement in a weekly newspaper, if there is one, in the county for at least two insertions before the day of sale.
    1. The time and place of sale of personal property shall be advertised by posting written or printed notices at three (3) of the most public places in the vicinity of the place of sale.
    2. No goods and chattels or other personal effects, seized and taken by virtue of any execution, shall be sold until the officer making the sale shall have given at least ten (10) days' notice of the time and place of sale and the property to be sold.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 36; Civil Code, § 690; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4321, 4323; Pope's Dig., §§ 5335, 5353; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-417, 30-418.

Case Notes

Deeds.

A complaint by a judgment creditor who purchased land at his own execution sale seeking to have the sheriff's deed reformed will be dismissed where such deed fails to show on its face that printed advertisements of the sale were posted and there was no other evidence that notice was given. Russell v. Williamson, 67 Ark. 80, 53 S.W. 561 (1899).

Equity.

Where there has been no fair competition, equity will annul the sale. Bennett v. Hutson, 33 Ark. 762 (1878).

When a judgment creditor, who has purchased at execution sale in satisfaction of the judgment, finds the sale was irregular, he may go into chancery and have the sale set aside and a resale ordered. Catchings v. Harcrow, 49 Ark. 20, 3 S.W. 884 (1886).

A mere irregularity in the conduct of a sale under an execution in an action at law will not be a ground for relief in equity as the law court had supervisory jurisdiction over its own process. Walker v. Files, 94 Ark. 453, 127 S.W. 739 (1910).

Fraudulent Sales.

The practice of selling lands under execution that have been fraudulently conveyed should not be encouraged. Apperson & Co. v. Burgett, 33 Ark. 328 (1878); Youngblood v. Cunningham, 38 Ark. 571 (1882).

Evidence sufficient to find that sale was fraudulent and thus void. Jennings v. Carter, 53 Ark. 242, 13 S.W. 800 (1890).

Judicial Sales.

Sales under execution are not judicial sales. Hershy v. Latham, 42 Ark. 305 (1883); Webster v. Daniel, 47 Ark. 131, 14 S.W. 550 (1886); Farnsworth v. Hoover, 66 Ark. 367, 50 S.W. 865 (1899).

The chancery court lacked jurisdiction to act to set aside its order of confirmation of the commissioner's report of a judicialsale because it did not set aside the order within ninety days of the date of its entry as required by ARCP 60. Strong v. Morgan, 58 Ark. App. 272, 950 S.W.2d 466 (1997).

Liens.

A lien acquired by levy is superior to prior unrecorded mortgage, though it be recorded before the sale under execution. Hawkins v. Files, 51 Ark. 417, 11 S.W. 681 (1888).

Purchaser.

The want of an advertisement will not avoid a sale against an innocent purchaser. Newton v. State Bank, 22 Ark. (9 Barber) 19 (1860); Youngblood v. Cunningham, 38 Ark. 571 (1882).

A mistake in the advertisement will not avoid the sale as against an innocent purchaser. Files v. Harbison, 29 Ark. 307 (1874).

When the plaintiff buys, he is not an innocent purchaser. Hill, Fontaine & Co. v. Coolidge, 33 Ark. 621 (1878); Williams v. McIlroy, 34 Ark. 85 (1879).

Errors and irregularities which do not render the execution a nullity will not invalidate a sale to an innocent purchaser. Huffman v. Gaines, 47 Ark. 226, 1 S.W. 100 (1886).

Mere irregularities in the process will not avoid a sale to a purchaser who is not proved to be at fault. Stotts v. Brookfield, 55 Ark. 307, 18 S.W. 179 (1892).

Sale Held Invalid.

The fact that the sheriff failed to meet this section's notice requirements, combined with the fact that the attorney for the executing plaintiff had his grandson purchase the seized vehicle, indicated that the sale was collusive, and therefore invalid. Garrett v. Walker, 172 B.R. 29 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

Sale after Return Day.

A sale after the return day is void. Hightower v. Handlin & Venneys, 27 Ark. 20 (1871).

Sale Price.

Mere inadequacy of price will not invalidate the sale. Newton v. State Bank, 22 Ark. (9 Barber) 19 (1860); Pindall v. Trevor & Colgate, 30 Ark. 249 (1875).

When the execution is for much more than is due on the judgment, the sale is void. Hightower v. Handlin & Venneys, 27 Ark. 20 (1871).

Waiver of Irregularities.

One who induces another to purchase his land under execution cannot afterward allege irregularities in the sale. Turner v. Watkins, 31 Ark. 429 (1876); Youngblood v. Cunningham, 38 Ark. 571 (1882).

A debtor may waive irregularities in the sale, and does so when he accepts and returns a surplus therefrom, after knowledge of the irregularities. Huffman v. Gaines, 47 Ark. 226, 1 S.W. 100 (1886).

16-66-409. Time and method of sale.

  1. All property taken in execution by any officer shall be exposed to sale on the day for which it was advertised, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., publicly, by auction, for ready money, and the highest bidder shall be the purchaser.
    1. The sale of real estate is not required to be made upon a court day, but it may be made at any other time, after being duly advertised.
    2. The sale is to be made at the courthouse door unless, at the request of the defendant who owns the land, the officer shall appoint the sale upon the premises.
    3. Where there has been one (1) failure to sell for want of bidders, the officer may appoint the sale at the courthouse door, or on the premises, as he or she shall deem most likely to secure a fair sale.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 48; Civil Code, § 690; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4317, 4324, 4325; Pope's Dig., §§ 4329, 4336, 4337; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-419, 30-420.

Case Notes

In General.

This section is directory. Feild v. Dortch, 34 Ark. 399 (1879); Reynolds v. Tenant, 51 Ark. 84, 9 S.W. 857 (1888); Taylor v. Georgia State Sav. Ass'n, 141 Ark. 425, 218 S.W. 180 (1920).

Applicability.

This section does not apply to sales by commissioners under chancery orders. Knight v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 186 Ark. 150, 52 S.W.2d 977 (1932).

Restoration of Property.

Purchaser at own execution sale may restore property upon reversal of judgment. McCracken v. Paul, 65 Ark. 553, 47 S.W. 854 (1898).

Sale Held Invalid.

The fact that the sheriff failed to meet this section's requirements, combined with the fact that the attorney for the executing plaintiff had his grandson purchase the seized vehicle, indicated that the sale was collusive, and therefore invalid. Garrett v. Walker, 172 B.R. 29 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

Sale on Credit.

All sales made by order of court must be on a credit. Welch v. Hicks, 27 Ark. 292 (1871).

Sale Price.

A sale for an excessive amount is void. Downs v. Dennis, 83 Ark. 71, 102 S.W. 699 (1907).

16-66-410. Sale of real estate — Division into tracts.

  1. In all sales of real estate, under execution, when the tract or tracts to be sold contain more than forty (40) acres, the real estate shall be divided as the owner or owners may direct into lots containing not more than forty (40) nor less than twenty (20) acres. The officer whose duty it may be to sell the property shall begin at one (1) corner of the real estate, to be designated in the notice published by him advertising the sale, and proceed to sell in the tracts of not more than forty (40) nor less than twenty (20) acres each, of contiguous territory, until the whole of the tract or tracts is disposed of unless the execution is sooner satisfied.
  2. In all sales of school lands, those sales shall commence at the northeast corner and shall be made in tracts of not more than forty (40) acres each, so long as there shall be as much as forty (40) acres remaining to be sold.
  3. In all cases where the corner at which the sale is to commence has not been designated in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, the officer whose duty it may be to sell the tract or tracts of land shall commence at the northeast corner as required in subsection (b) of this section.
  4. The provisions of this section shall not extend to lands sold for taxes.

History. Acts 1868, No. 37, §§ 1-3, 5, p. 122; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4326, 4327; Pope's Dig., §§ 5338, 5339; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-421, 30-422, 30-422n., 30-423.

Case Notes

Waiver.

The failure of the judgment debtor to either designate the property to be sold or to request that his farm be divided into lots for sale waived his rights under this section. United States v. Weir, 235 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Ark. 1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. Ark. 1964).

16-66-411. Sale of lands subject to prior liens.

  1. A sale of lands under a junior judgment shall pass the title of the defendant, subject to the lien of all prior judgments and decrees then in force.
  2. The money arising from the sale of lands under a junior judgment shall be applied to the payment of the judgment under which it may have been made.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 84, §§ 4, 5; C. & M. Dig., §§ 6301, 6302; Pope's Dig., §§ 8257, 8258; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-424, 30-425.

Case Notes

Prior Attachment.

A sale of lands under a junior attachment does not release the lien of a prior attachment, and the money arising from such sale is not to be applied in payment of prior attachment. Hanauer & Co. v. Casey, 26 Ark. 352 (1870).

Priority of Lien.

Judgment creditor who first files a suit in equity to uncover property fraudulently conveyed acquires the first lien. Doster v. Manistee Nat'l Bank, 67 Ark. 325, 55 S.W. 137 (1900).

16-66-412. Sale of corporate stock — Certificates of purchase.

  1. Shares or stock levied upon or seized shall be sold by the officer in the same manner as other personal property is sold under the writ by virtue of which the levy is made. The officer making the sale shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a certificate, which certificate may be in the following form:
  2. Upon presentation of the certificate to the president, secretary, cashier, or other principal officer of the corporation, who has charge of the stock books of the corporation, it shall be the duty of such officer to issue to the holder of the certificate a certificate of stock for the number of shares thus levied on and sold and transfer it on the stock books of the corporation, in the same manner as if transferred by the owner in person. When so transferred, the stock of the person whose interest has been sold by the officer under the writ of execution or attachment shall be deemed cancelled and wholly void.

“I (name of the officer and his office) hereby certify, that I have this day of sold to (name of purchaser) shares of the Capital Stock of the (name of the corporation) in conformity with the laws of the state, which said shares were by me seized on the day of , under and by virtue of a certain writ of (describe the writ) and issued and delivered to me out of the Court, on the day of , in favor of (name of plaintiff) against (name of defendant) for the sum and price of $ , which was the highest and best bid therefor.

Witness my hand this day of

History. Acts 1891, No. 21, §§ 2, 3; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4343, 4344; Pope's Dig., §§ 5355, 5356; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-436, 30-437.

16-66-413. Sale on credit.

    1. In all cases where the right to stay the execution exists and is not exercised, sales under the execution shall be on a credit of three (3) months, upon the purchaser's giving bond and good security to the plaintiff in the execution for the payment of the sale money, bearing interest from date.
    2. The bond may be in substance as follows:
    1. When property sold on credit sells for more than will satisfy the execution, costs, and commission, the officer making the sale shall take a bond payable to the defendant, the owner of the property, for the excess, similar in every other respect to that directed in subsection (a) of this section to be taken to the plaintiff, and to have the same force and effect, and on which the same proceedings may be had.
    2. If the property is sold for cash in hand, any excess over satisfying the execution, charges, and commissions shall be paid over by the officer to the defendant whose property is sold.

“A. B., principal, and C. D., surety, do bind ourselves to pay E. F., within three months from the date hereof, the sum of $ , with interest thereon from this date, being the purchase money (here set out the several articles of property so purchased, with the price of each), which was this day sold by G. H., sheriff (or constable, as the case may be) of County, in satisfaction of an execution which issued from the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court Clerk, (or K. L., a justice of the peace) on the day of , in favor of the said E. F., against M. O., for the sum of $ debt or damages, with interest and costs.

“Given under our hands, this day of , 20

History. Civil Code, §§ 683, 684; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4318, 4319; Pope's Dig., §§ 5330, 5331; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-426, 30-427.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to sales made by constables on executions issued by a justice of the peace since it is superseded by §§ 16-19-1004, 16-19-1008 and 16-19-1009 with respect to such sales.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section has no application to criminal proceedings. Hall v. Doyle, 35 Ark. 445 (1880).

Decree.

Decree ordering real property sold, without stating that it is to be on credit, is erroneous. Fry v. Street, 37 Ark. 39 (1881).

Interest.

Interest at the rate of six percent only can be charged on the deferred payment, but the sale is not voided where the selling officer undertook to charge eight percent interest where the purchaser did not base his refusal to complete the sale on that ground. Fulbright v. Morton, 131 Ark. 492, 199 S.W. 542 (1917).

Cited: Miller v. Alamo, 975 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1992).

16-66-414. Default of bidder.

  1. If any person refuses to pay the amount bid for any property struck off to him or her, the officer making the sale may again sell the property to the highest bidder. If any loss is occasioned, the officer may recover the loss by motion before any court or justice of the peace, if the amount of the loss does not exceed his or her jurisdiction.
  2. The court or justice shall proceed in a summary manner and give judgment and award execution therefor forthwith.
  3. The same proceedings may be had against any subsequent purchaser who refuses to pay. The officer may forever thereafter refuse the bid of the person refusing to pay for property purchased by him or her.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, §§ 49, 50; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4320, 4321; Pope's Dig., §§ 5332, 5333; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-428, 30-429.

Case Notes

Other Laws.

This section does not supersede the common-law remedy which the selling officer had of maintaining an action against the purchaser for the full amount of his bid. Fulbright v. Morton, 131 Ark. 492, 199 S.W. 542 (1917).

This section is cumulative, not exclusive. Maxwell v. Mitchell, 185 Ark. 248, 46 S.W.2d 794 (1932).

16-66-415. Officers not to bid at sale.

No officer to whom any execution may be directed, any of his or her deputies, or any person for them shall purchase any goods and chattels, real estate, or other effects at any sale made by virtue of any such execution. All purchases so made shall be void.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 51; C. & M. Dig., § 4322; Pope's Dig., § 5334; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-430.

16-66-416. Return of execution.

  1. All executions shall be returnable within ninety (90) days from their date.
    1. If an execution is satisfied, the officer may return thereon in substance, “satisfied”, unless it is by the sale of the property, then that fact must be stated.
    2. If satisfied in part, he or she must state what part and why the residue is not made.
    3. If levied and no sale has been had, for the want of bidders, or no property has been found, he or she must state that fact.

History. Civil Code, § 673; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4353-4356; Pope's Dig., §§ 5365-5368; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-431 — 30-434; Acts 2013, No. 319, § 2.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “within ninety (90) days” for “in sixty (60) days” in (a).

Case Notes

In General.

A return on a writ of execution is the short official statement of the officer, indorsed thereon or attached thereto, of what he has done in obedience to the mandate of the writ or of the reason why he has done nothing. The return of execution consists of the two acts of writing out the statements on the writ or on an attached paper and the filing; the mere writing out of the statement is not sufficient without filing it, and vice versa, the mere filing of the writ with no statement is not a return. Lindsey Family Trust v. Cauthron, 20 Ark. App. 149, 725 S.W.2d 581 (1987).

Endorsement.

This section requires within 60 days the endorsement upon the writ of what the officer has done and filing of it with the clerk who issued it. Smith v. Drake, 174 Ark. 715, 297 S.W. 817 (1927).

Upon a motion for summary judgment for failure to return an execution within 60 days as required by law, his endorsement in writing of service of the writ of execution not filed until after expiration of 60 days was held not a return within the 60-day period. Smith v. Drake, 174 Ark. 715, 297 S.W. 817 (1927).

Failure to Make Timely Return.

This section is mandatory and the fact that while an execution was in the sheriff's hands the judgment was set aside did not excuse the sheriff from making return within the statutory time. J.B. Pearson Flour & Feed Co. v. Pittman, 192 Ark. 1062, 95 S.W.2d 1143 (1936).

Sheriff's failure to return execution within the required time may be excusable, in action against him by judgment creditor, where failure was due at least in part to judgment creditor. Southern Credit Corp. v. Atkinson, 255 Ark. 615, 502 S.W.2d 497 (1973).

The automatic stay provision of the U.S. bankruptcy code does not relieve the sheriff of the statutory duty to file a return within 60 days. This section requires a return be filed within 60 days, even where the return merely states that the sheriff did not act against the debtor because the debtor has filed in bankruptcy court. Lindsey Family Trust v. Cauthron, 20 Ark. App. 149, 725 S.W.2d 581 (1987).

Return Day.

Although execution was made returnable more than 60 days from date, if sale was made within 60-day period, the sale is not void and the execution merely voidable. Youngblood v. Cunningham, 38 Ark. 571 (1882).

Executions may be returned before the return day. Reeves v. Sherwood, 45 Ark. 520 (1885); Hawkins v. Taylor, 56 Ark. 45, 19 S.W. 105 (1892).

This section does not impose a requirement that personal property be sold before the return day. 555, Inc. v. Barlow, 3 Ark. App. 139, 623 S.W.2d 843 (1981).

Service.

When sheriff retuned execution unserved whether for lack of indemnity bond or other good reason, the power of the execution was exhausted and it was functus officio. Pate v. Griffin, 225 Ark. 1032, 287 S.W.2d 453 (1956).

Cited: Hamilton v. Pan American Southern Corp., 238 Ark. 38, 378 S.W.2d 652 (1964); Searcy v. Cooper, 239 Ark. 280, 388 S.W.2d 918 (1965); Vinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995).

16-66-417. Executions from court with similar jurisdiction to justice of the peace — Land exempt — Procedure when returned unsatisfied.

  1. Land shall not be levied on or sold under execution from a justice of the peace's court or any court of similar jurisdiction.
  2. When an execution on a judgment of a court of similar jurisdiction to the justice of the peace courts has been returned by a constable or other officer, either as to the whole or a part thereof, in substance, “no property found to satisfy the same”, the plaintiff may obtain from the justice a certified copy of the judgment and execution and return and file the same in the circuit clerk's office of the county in which the judgment was rendered, which copies shall be copied by the clerk in a book kept for that purpose. Thereupon, the clerk shall issue writs of execution on the judgment for the amount due thereon and the costs, including the costs of the copies by the justice and copying by the clerk, which shall be levied and proceeded on as executions on judgments of the circuit court.

History. Civil Code, §§ 826, 827; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-406, 30-407.

Publisher's Notes. This section may be affected by §§ 16-19-1004 and 16-19-1011(a).

16-66-418. Discovery in aid of execution — Equitable proceedings — Attachment.

    1. After an execution of fieri facias directed to the county in which the judgment was rendered or to the county of the defendant's residence is returned by the proper officer, either as to the whole or part thereof, in substance, no property found to satisfy the execution, the plaintiff in the execution may institute an action in the court from which the execution issued, or in the court of any county in which the defendant resides or is summoned, for the discovery of any money, chose in action, equitable or legal interest, and all other property to which the defendant is entitled, and for subjecting the money, chose in action, equitable or legal interest, and all other property to which the defendant is entitled to the satisfaction of the judgment.
    2. In such actions, persons indebted to the defendant in the execution or holding the money or property in which he has an interest, or holding the evidences or securities for the same, may be also made defendants.
  1. The answers of each defendant shall be verified by his or her own oath and not by that of an agent or attorney, and the court shall enforce full and explicit discoveries in the answers by attachment.
  2. In the actions mentioned in the preceding subsections, the plaintiff may have an attachment against the property of the defendant in the execution, similar to the general attachments provided for in Chapter III of Title VIII of the code, without either the affidavit or bond therein required.
  3. A lien shall be created upon the property of the defendant, the levy of the attachment, or service of the summons with the object of the action endorsed thereon, on the person holding or controlling his property.
  4. The court shall enforce the surrender of the money, or security therefor, or of any other property of the defendant in the execution which may be discovered in the action. For this purpose, the court may commit to jail any defendant or garnishee failing or refusing to make such surrender, until it shall be done, or the court is satisfied that it is out of his or her power to do so.

History. Civil Code, §§ 473-477; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4366, 4368-4371; Pope's Dig., §§ 5378, 5380-5383; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-901 — 30-905; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 202.

Publisher's Notes. Chapter III of Title VIII of the code, referred to in this section, means §§ 216-291 of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in tables volume.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “by equitable proceedings” following “may institute an action” in (a)(1).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Discovery Procedure in Aid of Judgment, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 390.

Killenbeck, And Then They Did …? Abusing Equity in the Name of Justice, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

Discovery — Amount of Adversary's Insurance, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 456.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Departs from Uniform Trust Code, Holds Non-Spendthrift Trusts for Mandatory Lifetime Distributions Cannot Be Attached by the Beneficiary's Creditors, and Equitable Liens on Future Trust Distributions Are Not Available to Creditors Unless the Funds Are Permanently Unreachable Through Any Other Legal Process, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 509 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Lynn Foster, Arkansas’s Trust Code and Trust Planning: A Ten-Year Perspective, 38 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 301 (2016).

Case Notes

Construction.

“Defendant” designated in language, “or in the court of any county in which the defendant resides, or is summoned,” has reference to judgment debtor defendant. Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Arnold, 218 Ark. 436, 236 S.W.2d 718 (1951).

Chose in Action.

A “chose in action,” as used in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, means, literally, a thing in action, and is the right of bringing an action, or a right to recover a debt or money, or a right of proceeding in a court of law to procure the payment of a sum of money, or a right to recover a personal chattel or a sum of money by action; a chose in action is property, and to deny someone the same violates U.S. Const. Amend. 14. Agribank, FCB v. Cupples, 850 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Ark. 1993).

If there is legal authority in this state to attach a writ of execution to property in general, then that right must also extend to cover choses in action. Agribank, FCB v. Cupples, 850 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Ark. 1993).

Complaints.

Complaint was held to state a cause of action under this section. Morgan Utils., Inc. v. Perry County, 183 Ark. 542, 37 S.W.2d 74 (1931).

Jurisdiction.

Chancery court had jurisdiction of creditor's suit based on a foreign judgment against nonresident debtor statutorily served in other state, since judgment at law on the foreign judgment in the state could not be obtained. Miller v. Maryland Cas. Co., 207 Ark. 312, 180 S.W.2d 581 (1944).

Discovery proceeding was not within jurisdiction of chancery court. Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Arnold, 218 Ark. 436, 236 S.W.2d 718 (1951).

Order issued by circuit court in action which required an equitable proceeding under this section was reversed and remanded for transfer to chancery court. Cummings v. Fingers, 296 Ark. 276, 753 S.W.2d 865 (1988).

Judgment creditor's claim under this section was improper where the debtors' future distributions in trusts would become reachable when they became due, and thus, there was another legal process that could be utilized. J.B. Hunt, LLC v. Thornton, 2014 Ark. 62, 432 S.W.3d 8 (2014).

Liens.

While a judgment creditor may establish a lien upon the property of an apparently insolvent debtor in the hands of a third party by instituting equitable proceedings to subject the property to the payment of his claim, neither this nor the subsequent sections can give the judgment creditor a prior lien on the property over an existing lien in favor of a third person not made a party to the suit. N.M. Uri & Co. v. McCroskey, 135 Ark. 537, 205 S.W. 976 (1918).

Parties.

Proceedings for discovery against third party must be in connection with proceedings against judgment debtor who is indispensable party to suit. Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Arnold, 218 Ark. 436, 236 S.W.2d 718 (1951).

When suit is instituted against judgment debtor in proper forum for discovery of his property, third persons indebted to him or holding property in which he has interest may be made parties defendant. Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Arnold, 218 Ark. 436, 236 S.W.2d 718 (1951).

Payment.

Order of court that debtor pay into court a certain sum of money or be in contempt of court was erroneous when made without allegation or proof that debtor had that amount of money in his possession. Leonard v. State, 170 Ark. 41, 278 S.W. 654 (1926).

Public Corporation.

Since a county cannot in person make that required oath and is prohibited from doing so by an agent or attorney, it follows that either the answer must be received without oath, or the public corporation was not intended to be liable to the process of garnishment. Boone County v. Keck, 31 Ark. 387 (1876).

Substantial Compliance.

This section was held substantially complied with where sheriff who served execution reported that debtor had no property to satisfy the execution since all his personal property was mortgaged. Raley v. Mitchell, 196 Ark. 504, 118 S.W.2d 674 (1938).

Suit for Attachment and Conversion.

Suit by judgment creditor for attachment of property and for conversion, was proceeding for discovery. Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Arnold, 218 Ark. 436, 236 S.W.2d 718 (1951).

Cited: Robinson v. Citizens' Bank of Pettigrew, 135 Ark. 308, 204 S.W. 615 (1918); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979).

16-66-419. Discovery in aid of execution — Deposition.

  1. In any action in the circuit courts of this state, in which judgment has been rendered against one (1) or more of the parties therein, a party in whose favor the judgment was rendered or his or her successor in interest when that interest appears of record may, in aid of the judgment or in aid of execution issued thereon, examine any person, including other parties to the action, in the manner provided for taking of depositions for discovery purposes in § 16-44-116 and §§ 16-44-118 — 16-44-120.
  2. The remedies and proceedings provided in this section shall be cumulative and shall be available in addition to all others now provided by law.
  3. This section, being remedial in nature, shall apply to any case in which there is of record a judgment upon which execution may issue, without regard to the date the judgment was entered or the date the action was initiated.

History. Acts 1955, No. 162, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-906 — 30-908.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that subsection (a) of this section was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Laurence, An Odd Collection of Topics Relating to Creditors' Remedies Upon Which Various Federal Courts Have Recently Spoken — Rule 69, Rule 13, Federal Tax Liens and the Due Process Rights of Creditors, 37 Ark. L. Rev. 875.

16-66-420. Bill of sale — Delivery of property.

When the purchaser of any goods and chattels pays the purchase money, the officer selling the goods and chattels shall deliver to him or her the property and, if desired, shall execute an instrument in writing at the expense of the purchaser, testifying to the sale and payment of the purchase money, and conveying to the purchaser all the right, title, and interest which the debtor had in and to the property sold on the day the execution was delivered.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 52; C. & M. Dig., § 4342; Pope's Dig., § 5354; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-435.

Case Notes

Contents of Safe.

One purchasing a safe under execution is not entitled to its contents. Ray v. Light, 34 Ark. 421 (1879).

Contest of Sale.

Anyone in possession may contest the validity of the sale. Kennedy & Co. v. Clayton, 29 Ark. 270 (1874).

Goods Present at Sale.

A sale of goods not present at the sale is void. Kennedy & Co. v. Clayton, 29 Ark. 270 (1874).

Livestock.

A sale of cattle running at large is void. Rowan v. Refeld, 31 Ark. 648 (1877).

Sale Held Invalid.

Where the only notice of sale was the sheriff orally advising debtor that a sale would be held in ten days time, and title was never transferred, the sale was ineffective and the debtor retained an equitable interest in the vehicle. Garrett v. Walker, 172 B.R. 29 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).

16-66-421. Instrument of conveyance.

  1. The officer who shall sell any real estate or lease of lands for more than three (3) years shall make the purchaser a deed, to be paid for by the purchaser, reciting the names of the parties to the execution, the date when issued, the date of the judgment, order, or decree, and other particulars as recited in the execution and a description of the time, place, and manner of sale. This recital shall be received in evidence of the facts therein stated.
    1. Every officer executing any deed for land, tenements, and hereditaments sold under execution shall acknowledge the deed before the circuit court of the county in which the estate is situated. If the officer dies, leaves the state, resigns, or is removed from office before making the acknowledgment, the deed may be proved before the court as other deeds.
    2. The clerk of the court shall endorse upon the deed a certificate of the acknowledgment or proof, under the seal of the court, and shall make an entry in the minutes of the court of the acknowledgment, with the names of the parties to the suit and a description of the property conveyed by the deed.
  2. Every deed, so executed, acknowledged, or proved shall be recorded as other conveyances of land. Thereafter the deed or a copy thereof or of the record certified by the recorder shall be received in any court in this state without further proof of the execution thereof.
  3. If any officer executes a deed for land, tenements, or hereditaments sold under execution or by virtue of the order, sentence, or decree of any court and the deed is not acknowledged in open court, as provided by law, the deed or deeds of conveyance may be acknowledged or proven before any officer authorized by the laws of this state to take the acknowledgment or proof of deeds of conveyance and recorded as other deeds. The acknowledgment and recordation of the deed shall be as valid as if the deed were acknowledged in open court.
  4. When any officer dies, is removed from office, or is disqualified, after the sale of any property and before executing a conveyance therefor, the purchaser may petition the court out of which the execution issued, stating the facts. If he or she satisfies the court that the purchase money has been paid, the court shall order the sheriff then in office to execute and acknowledge a deed to the purchaser, reciting the facts. The deed shall be executed accordingly and shall have the same effect to all intents and purposes as if made by the officer so deceased, removed from office, or disqualified.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, §§ 54, 56-58, 61; Acts 1855, § 1, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4334, 4336-4339, 4359; Pope's Dig., §§ 5346, 5348-5351, 5371; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 30-446 — 30-451.

Publisher's Notes. Subsection (a) may be affected by § 16-66-501.

Case Notes

Deed Void on Face.

A deed void on its face cannot be reformed. Landon v. Morris, 75 Ark. 6, 86 S.W. 672 (1905).

Evidence of Sale.

A deed to land duly executed and acknowledged by the sheriff and recorded is evidence that the sale was regularly made, without proof that the sale was confirmed by the court. Winfrey v. People's Sav. Bank, 176 Ark. 941, 5 S.W.2d 360 (1928).

Timeliness of Objection.

The objection that there is no entry in the minutes of the court of the acknowledgment cannot be raised after 35 years. Williams v. Bennett, 75 Ark. 312, 88 S.W. 600 (1905).

16-66-422. Execution of instrument conveying improvements on public land.

The officer who sells any improvement on the public lands of the United States shall, at the expense of the purchaser, execute an instrument in writing reciting the sale, the payment of the purchase money, describing the improvements, and conveying to the purchaser all the right, title, interest, and claim that the debtor had in the improvement at the time execution was levied thereon.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, § 55; C. & M. Dig., § 4335; Pope's Dig., § 5347; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-438.

Subchapter 5 — Redemption

Research References

ALR.

Effect of taking appeal, or staying execution, on right to redeem from execution or judicial sale. 44 A.L.R.4th 1229.

Am. Jur. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Exec., § 522 et seq.

C.J.S. 33 C.J.S., Exec., § 253 et seq.

16-66-501. Certificate of sale given purchaser by sheriff — Return of duplicate.

The sheriff shall give the purchaser of any real property, sold upon execution a certificate of sale in which the property sold shall be described and the price for which it is sold stated. The certificate shall be evidence of the purchase at the price stated, and the officer shall return a duplicate thereof with the execution. No conveyance shall be made to the purchaser nor the possession delivered to him or her until the time for redeeming has expired. If the property is redeemed by the defendant as provided in this subchapter, the sale and certificate of purchase shall be null and void.

History. Civil Code, § 693; C. & M. Dig., § 4328; Pope's Dig., § 5340; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-439.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section has no application to a sale under decree of the chancery court though the suit was originally an attachment at law. Gray v. Bank of Hartford, 137 Ark. 232, 208 S.W. 302 (1918), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 608, 39 S. Ct. 290 (1919).

16-66-502. Time of redemption of real estate.

When any real estate or any interest therein is sold under execution, the real estate or interest therein may be redeemed by the debtor from the purchaser or his or her vendees, or the personal representatives of either, within twelve (12) months thereafter.

History. Civil Code, § 691; C. & M. Dig., § 4329; Pope's Dig., § 5341; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-440.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section should be liberally construed. Rose v. Loughborough, 182 Ark. 782, 32 S.W.2d 1066 (1930).

Applicability.

This section applies to redemptions where land was sold under judgment sustaining attachment. Beard v. Wilson, 52 Ark. 290, 12 S.W. 567 (1889).

Delivery of Purchase Money.

When a stranger to the suit becomes the purchaser at an execution sale of real estate the sheriff is required to deliver the purchase money to the execution creditor when it is received and is not permitted to wait until the time for redemption of the judgment debtor has expired. Fort Smith Seed Co. v. Jones, 198 Ark. 1012, 132 S.W.2d 364 (1939).

Grantees.

Grantees of a judgment debtor are entitled to redeem. Arkansas Nat'l Bank v. Price, 179 Ark. 259, 15 S.W.2d 396 (1929).

Leases.

A leasehold for farming purposes is not within the meaning of this statute. Munson v. Wade, 174 Ark. 880, 298 S.W. 25 (1927).

Property of Several Defendants.

Execution creditor is not permitted to have property of various defendants sold in bulk and thus embarrass a judgment debtor in exercising his right to redeem his land. Vaughan v. Screeton, 183 Ark. 816, 39 S.W.2d 299 (1931).

Purchaser under Junior Lien.

The purchaser at the execution sale under a junior lien may redeem the land from the purchaser at the execution sale under the senior lien. Dalton v. Brown, 130 Ark. 200, 197 S.W. 32 (1917).

Cited: United States v. Weir, 235 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Ark. 1963).

16-66-503. Manner of making redemption.

The debtor may at any time within twelve (12) months pay to the clerk of the court from which the execution issued the purchase money with fifteen percent (15%) per annum and all lawful charges and take his or her receipt therefor. The money shall be held by the clerk for the use of the purchaser. The clerk shall be responsible upon his official bond therefor. The clerk shall endorse upon the execution book that the redemption has been made.

History. Civil Code, § 692; C. & M. Dig., § 4330; Pope's Dig., § 5342; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-441.

Case Notes

Credit for Surplus.

Where an execution debtor seeks to redeem his homestead from a sale under an execution to which it is subject, he is not entitled to a credit on the purchase money for the surplus applied to pay off another execution to which the homestead was not subject. Simpson v. Biffle, 63 Ark. 289, 38 S.W. 345 (1896).

Equity.

This section is not applicable to a sale in chancery. Gray v. Bank of Hartford, 137 Ark. 232, 208 S.W. 302 (1918), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 608, 39 S. Ct. 290 (1919).

An injunction will not lie to prevent redemption. Arkansas Nat'l Bank v. Price, 179 Ark. 259, 15 S.W.2d 396 (1929).

Cited: Kelly v. Weir, 243 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Ark. 1965).

16-66-504. Right of judgment creditor to redeem — Entry of redemption upon execution book.

  1. At any time before the expiration of twelve (12) months from the sale of any land under the provisions of this subchapter which has not been redeemed, any judgment creditor may redeem the land in the manner set forth in subsection (b) of this section.
    1. The judgment creditor shall:
      1. Sue out an execution upon his or her judgment and place the execution in the hands of the proper officer;
      2. Pay to the officer the amount for which the premises were sold, and fifteen percent (15%) per annum thereon from the date of the sale, and all charges thereon for the use of the purchaser; and
      3. Offer to credit his or her execution with a sum at least equal to ten percent (10%) of the amount for which the land sold, which offer shall be regarded as his or her bid.
    2. All of which shall be endorsed upon the execution, and a statement thereof filed with the execution upon which the land was sold. Whereupon, the clerk shall endorse in the proper place upon the execution book that the creditor has bid for the redemption of the property, which shall be dated, and may be in substance as follows:

“A. B., a judgment creditor, bids … dollars, for the redemption of the property sold on this execution.”

History. Civil Code, § 694; C. & M. Dig., § 4331; Pope's Dig., § 5343; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-442.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Rights of Junior Claimants to Encumbered Property, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 326.

Case Notes

Payment to Sheriff.

Payment should be made to the sheriff, and not to the clerk. Edgewood Distilling Co. v. Rugg, 98 Ark. 589, 136 S.W. 977 (1911).

16-66-505. Redemption from judgment creditor by purchaser.

  1. Unless the purchaser, within thirty (30) days from the filing of the statement and the making of the endorsement mentioned in § 16-66-504, pays to the officer the amount so bid by the judgment creditor, the endorsement shall operate as a redemption of the property by the judgment creditor and he or she shall succeed to all the rights and liabilities of the purchaser.
  2. If the purchaser pays within the time allowed the amount so bid by the judgment creditor to the officer, it shall bar the redemption. The right of redemption of the judgment creditor as against the purchaser or anyone redeeming from him or her shall be forever foreclosed.
    1. If the purchaser fails to pay over to the officer the amount of the bid as provided in this section, the officer shall pay over to the purchaser the amount so paid by the judgment creditor and credit the execution of the judgment creditor with the amount so bid by him or her, after deducting costs and commissions, and shall execute to the judgment creditor a certificate of sale, in which shall be included as the price paid the amount paid to the purchaser and the amount of the bid of the judgment creditor.
    2. The judgment creditor shall for all purposes of this subchapter be regarded as the purchaser of the property at the price mentioned in the certificate of sale executed to him or her.
  3. Any other judgment creditor may in the same manner redeem from the judgment creditor or each succeeding judgment creditor who may redeem under the provisions of this section.
  4. No redemption shall be allowed after twelve (12) months from the day of the original sale.

History. Civil Code, § 695; C. & M. Dig., § 4332; Pope's Dig., § 5344; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-443.

16-66-506. Priority of right of redemption.

If any purchaser pays the amount bid by the judgment creditor, the officer shall pay that amount to the judgment creditor, together with the amount paid by the judgment creditor to the officer. The right of redemption shall be in the order of priority of judgment, but if any judgment creditor for thirty (30) days after a sale or redemption upon a judgment prior to his or hers fails to pay off prior bids and fails to bid for the redemption of the property, as provided in this subchapter, he or she shall be deemed to have waived his or her priority, as against others who have complied with the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Civil Code, § 696; C. & M. Dig., § 4333; Pope's Dig., § 5345; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-444.

Case Notes

Payment to Sheriff.

The payment under this section is to be made to the sheriff and not to the clerk. Edgewood Distilling Co. v. Rugg, 98 Ark. 589, 136 S.W. 977 (1911).

16-66-507. Conveyance by sheriff — Right to possession.

  1. After the time for redemption has expired, the sheriff or his or her successor shall convey by deed the property sold under the provisions of this subchapter to the person entitled thereto.
  2. Upon the conveyance, the grantee, if possession is not delivered within ten (10) days, may proceed by forcible detainer to be put in possession thereof.

History. Civil Code, § 697; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4334, 4340, 4841; Pope's Dig., §§ 5346, 5352, 6038; A.S.A. 1947, § 30-445.

Case Notes

Ejectment.

This section does not provide an exclusive remedy so as to prevent an action in ejectment. Austin v. Huie, 181 Ark. 412, 26 S.W.2d 87 (1930).

Equity.

This section is not binding as to procedure upon a court of equity. Gray v. Bank of Hartford, 137 Ark. 232, 208 S.W. 302 (1918), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 608, 39 S. Ct. 290 (1919).

Subchapter 6 — Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this subchapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Rules for Inferior Courts pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Former subchapter 6, concerning the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 501, § 9. The former subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-66-601. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-801.

16-66-602. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-802.

16-66-603. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-803.

16-66-604. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-804.

16-66-605. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-805.

16-66-606. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-806.

16-66-607. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-807.

16-66-608. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-808.

16-66-609. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-809.

16-66-610. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-810.

16-66-611. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-811.

16-66-612. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-812.

16-66-613. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-813.

16-66-614. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-814.

16-66-615. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-815.

16-66-616. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-816.

16-66-617. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-817.

16-66-618. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-818.

16-66-619. Acts 1949, No. 34, § 19; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-818n.

For Comments regarding the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, see Commentaries Volume B.

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 10: Mar. 13, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the version of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act adopted as Act 34 of 1949 is inadequate and out of date and it should be replaced by the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act recommended in 1964. Therefore, an emergency is hereby delcared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 74, § 6: Nov. 16, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act is in immediate need of technical corrections; that this Act makes such technical corrections; and that this Act should go into effect immediately in order that the correct law become effective as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Validity, construction, and application of Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. 31 A.L.R.4th 706.

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, Procedural Notes from All Over, 1989 Ark. L. Notes 65.

Ark. L. Rev.

Acts 1949 General Assembly — Act 34, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 402.

Constitutional Law — Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 660.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former subchapter was constitutional and applicable to a judgment or decree awarding child support to be paid in regular periodic installments and the propriety of enforcement of that decree in the state where it was registered. Holley v. Holley, 264 Ark. 35, 568 S.W.2d 487 (1978) (decision under prior law).

Purpose.

The primary purpose of former subchapter was to provide a summary judgment procedure in which a party in whose favor a judgment had been rendered may enforce that judgment promptly in any jurisdiction where the judgment debtor could be found, thereby enabling the judgment creditor to obtain relief in an expeditious manner. Dolin v. Dolin, 9 Ark. App. 329, 659 S.W.2d 954 (1983) (decision under prior law).

This subchapter provides a summary procedure in which a party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered may enforce that judgment promptly in any jurisdiction where the judgment debtor can be found, thereby enabling the judgment creditor to obtain relief in an expeditious manner. Chemical Methods Leasco, Inc. v. Ellison, 46 Ark. App. 288, 879 S.W.2d 467 (1994).

Applicability.

Former subchapter was applicable to a judgment or decree awarding child support to be paid in regular periodic installments and the propriety of enforcement of that decree in the state where it was registered. Holley v. Holley, 264 Ark. 35, 568 S.W.2d 487 (1978) (decision under prior law).

This subchapter requires only that the foreign judgment be regular on its face and duly authenticated to be subject to registration. Chemical Methods Leasco, Inc. v. Ellison, 46 Ark. App. 288, 879 S.W.2d 467 (1994).

Child Support.

Foreign child-support judgments and accompanying writs of garnishment were recognized and enforced by Arkansas courts under former subchapter and the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, § 9-14-301 et seq. (repealed). Walsh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 836 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1988) (decision under prior law).

Collateral Attack.

Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, a foreign judgment is a conclusive on collateral attack, except for defenses of fraud in the procurement or want of jurisdiction in the rendering court, as a domestic judgment would be. Strick Lease, Inc. v. Juels, 30 Ark. App. 15, 780 S.W.2d 594 (1989).

Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, a foreign judgment is as conclusive on collateral attack as a domestic judgment would be, except for the defenses of fraud in the procurement or want of jurisdiction in the rendering court. May v. May, 57 Ark. App. 215, 944 S.W.2d 550 (1997).

Form of Judgment.

This subchapter requires only that the foreign judgment be regular on its face and duly authenticated to be subject to registration. Strick Lease, Inc. v. Juels, 30 Ark. App. 15, 780 S.W.2d 594 (1989).

Jurisdiction.

Foreign judgments are presumed valid, and an answer asserting lack of jurisdiction is not evidence of the fact; the burden of proving it is on the one attacking the foreign judgment. Strick Lease, Inc. v. Juels, 30 Ark. App. 15, 780 S.W.2d 594 (1989).

16-66-601. Definition.

In this subchapter, “foreign judgment” means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.

History. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

Recent Developments, Child Support Decrees — Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act Mathews v. Mathews, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 803.

Case Notes

In General.

Where the circuit court amended a Washington state order to reflect the lower amount of money owed by the employer, as garnishee, to the insurer, the employer's motion was a direct attack on the Washington state default judgment. Nationwide Ins. Enter. v. Ibanez, 368 Ark. 432, 246 S.W.3d 883 (2007).

Applicability.

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § 16-66-601 et seq., was enacted before Ark. Const. Amend. 80 and § 16-11-301, and Ark. R. Civ. P. 44 therefore supersedes it with respect to how foreign judgments must be filed with an Arkansas court. Agility Fin. Credit Union v. Largent, 2018 Ark. App. 358, 552 S.W.3d 471 (2018).

Authentication.

Petition to revive a foreign judgment was properly granted because it was authenticated under Ark. R. Civ. P. 44 where it was signed by a clerk for a United States Bankruptcy Court; the Arkansas Supreme Court's rule-making authority over procedural matters was exclusive. It was argued that the proper authentication process was not followed when a certified copy of the judgment was attached to an application. Bird v. Shaffer, 2012 Ark. App. 464 (2012).

Cited: Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

16-66-602. Filing and status of foreign judgments.

A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or the statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any court of this state having jurisdiction of such an action. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of a court in this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.

History. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 2; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 74, § 1.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The primary purpose of this section is to provide a summary judgment procedure in which a party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered may enforce that judgment promptly in any jurisdiction where the judgment debtor can be found, thereby enabling the judgment creditor to obtain relief in an expeditious manner. McDermott v. Great Plains Equip. Leasing Corp., 40 Ark. App. 8, 839 S.W.2d 547 (1992); Chemical Methods Leasco, Inc. v. Ellison, 46 Ark. App. 288, 879 S.W.2d 467 (1994).

This subchapter requires only that the foreign judgment be regular on its face and duly authenticated to be subject to registration. Chemical Methods Leasco, Inc. v. Ellison, 46 Ark. App. 288, 879 S.W.2d 467 (1994).

Applicability.

Circuit court did not err in concluding that the creditor's foreign judgment did not serve as a lien on real estate owned by the judgment debtor where the creditor had not registered the judgment as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 44. Although the foreign judgment was accompanied with a certificate of authenticity, the judgment itself was not attested or certified to be a true copy of the original document as required by the court rule. Agility Fin. Credit Union v. Largent, 2018 Ark. App. 358, 552 S.W.3d 471 (2018).

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § 16-66-601 et seq., was enacted before Ark. Const. Amend. 80 and § 16-11-301, and Ark. R. Civ. P. 44 therefore supersedes it with respect to how foreign judgments must be filed with an Arkansas court. Agility Fin. Credit Union v. Largent, 2018 Ark. App. 358, 552 S.W.3d 471 (2018).

Application.

Petition to revive a foreign judgment was properly granted because it was authenticated under Ark. R. Civ. P. 44 where it was signed by a clerk for a United States Bankruptcy Court; the Arkansas Supreme Court's rule-making authority over procedural matters was exclusive. It was argued that the proper authentication process was not followed when a certified copy of the judgment was attached to an application. Bird v. Shaffer, 2012 Ark. App. 464 (2012).

Collateral Defenses.

Defenses which are raised for a purpose other than to impeach, modify or overturn a judgment, i.e., which are collateral, may not be raised in the registration proceeding. Purser v. Corpus Christi State Nat'l Bank, 256 Ark. 452, 508 S.W.2d 549 (1974), and, Purser v. Corpus Christi State Nat'l Bank, 258 Ark. 54, 522 S.W.2d 187 (1975) (decision to prior law).

Entitlement to Registration.

Where an out-of-state decree was regular on its face and recited all requisite jurisdictional facts, the decree was properly authenticated and entitled to registration; it could thereafter be attacked only on grounds of fraud in the procurement of it or want of jurisdiction. Dolin v. Dolin, 9 Ark. App. 329, 659 S.W.2d 954 (1983) (decision under prior law).

It was proper to deny a horse owner's motion to dismiss a company's application for registration of a default judgment obtained by the company in Delaware court against the horse owner, who was an Arkansas resident, as the Delaware court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the horse owner. The evidence supported the conclusion that the horse owner was in fact transacting business in Delaware, the horse owner utilized the company's transportation services to move his horses to and from the Delaware Park Racetrack, and it was clear that the horse owner had at least one employee in Delaware helping him conduct business within the state; moreover, foreign judgments are presumed valid. Hessee v. Simoff Horse Transp., LLC, 2020 Ark. App. 229 (2020).

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § 16-66-601 et seq., requires only that the foreign judgment be regular on its face and duly authenticated to be subject to registration; the foreign judgment is conclusive, except for the defenses of fraud in the procurement or want of jurisdiction in the rendering court, and in this case, the Arkansas circuit court must have implicitly found that the Delaware court had jurisdiction because that was the only way the registration of the foreign judgment could be proper. Although concise, the circuit court's ruling contained the only finding needed -- that the company complied with the laws of Delaware in obtaining its judgment. Hessee v. Simoff Horse Transp., LLC, 2020 Ark. App. 229 (2020).

There was no impediment to to entry of a default judgment obtained by a company in Delaware court against a horse owner, who was an Arkansas resident, because service of process was accomplished in the manner necessary to permit the entry of a default judgment under Delaware law, the Delaware default judgment was founded on Delaware law regarding personal jurisdiction, and the Delaware court expressly ruled that the horse owner had received proper service of process. While Arkansas law does not provide for service by first class mail when the certified letter is returned “unclaimed”, Delaware law does. Hessee v. Simoff Horse Transp., LLC, 2020 Ark. App. 229 (2020).

Failure to Register.

Where foreign court issued a judgment in favor of the judgment debtor on its counterclaim against the creditor, but the debtor did not ask the court to register the judgment in its favor, the trial court will not be reversed for failure to award relief for which no request was made. Monark Boat Co. v. Fischer, 292 Ark. 544, 732 S.W.2d 123 (1987) (decision under prior law).

Future Payments.

While some jurisdictions do not favor registration of a foreign decree requiring future payments, such as alimony or child support, this state favors that view; otherwise, parties could never, as a practical matter, enforce judgments and decrees if one party left the state of orginal jurisdiction. Nehring v. Taylor, 266 Ark. 253, 583 S.W.2d 56 (1979) (decision under prior law).

Hearing.

No hearing was mandated on a horse owner's motion to dismiss a company's application for registration of a foreign default judgment against him, as the law of Delaware allowed a Delaware court to award damages based on affidavits, the record on appeal contained no request for a hearing and thus the horse owner waived any right he might have had for a hearing, there was no indication that the Arkansas court failed to consider the horse owner's written response, and the Delaware court had before it sufficient evidence to determine the amount of damages. Hessee v. Simoff Horse Transp., LLC, 2020 Ark. App. 229 (2020).

Proper Registration Accepted.

Once a decree or judgment is accepted as proper for registration, then it becomes in effect an Arkansas judgment, and will remain on the judgment books to be enforced by Arkansas in the future. Nehring v. Taylor, 266 Ark. 253, 583 S.W.2d 56 (1979) (decision under prior law).

Judgment debtor, which obtained a judgment against a debtor in Texas, and recorded its judgment in the real property records of an Arkansas county, had an enforceable judgment lien against the debtor's real property in that county. United States v. Neal, 255 F.R.D. 638 (W.D. Ark. 2008), aff'd, 391 Fed. Appx. 569 (8th Cir. 2010).

Trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of garnishment upon an employer because a company that was awarded a judgment against an employee properly registered the valid Florida judgment in the trial court. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. D.A.N. Joint Venture III L.P., 374 Ark. 489, 288 S.W.3d 627 (2008).

Circuit court erred in granting a declaratory judgment in favor of a judgment debtor's widow because the foreign judgment that the judgment creditors registered against the debtor was finalized before he died, and thus, the judgment acted as a lien against the debtor's, and now the widow's, real property. Harris v. Temple, 2013 Ark. App. 605 (2013).

Protection From Collateral Attack.

Foreign judgments, regardless of whether entered by default, are protected against collateral attack by the full faith and credit clause of U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, unless the defenses of fraud in the procurement or want of jurisdiction in the rendering court can be established. Butler Fence Co. v. Acme Fence & Iron Co., 42 Ark. App. 30, 852 S.W.2d 826 (1993).

Registration Improper.

The trial court erred in permitting the registration of the lessor's foreign judgment where the other state's long-arm statute was not strictly complied with, and the lessee was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the other state. Bi-State Energy, Inc. v. Tidewater Compression, Inc., 19 Ark. App. 148, 718 S.W.2d 117 (1986) (decision under prior law).

Relitigation Prohibited.

Former statute did not permit the relitigation of any issue finally determined in the foreign court, for those matters are foreclosed. Dolin v. Dolin, 9 Ark. App. 329, 659 S.W.2d 954 (1983) (decision under prior law).

Res Judicata.

The decision of the foreign court that it had jurisdiction of the judgment debtor was binding on it, and while it could have appealed that decision, it could not attack it in a collateral proceeding because of the doctrine of res judicata. Monark Boat Co. v. Fischer, 292 Ark. 544, 732 S.W.2d 123 (1987) (decision under prior law).

Where the plaintiff contested personal jurisdiction in a Texas court and did not appeal that determination, the Texas court's finding that it had personal jurisdiction is res judicata and is not subject to collateral attack. May v. May, 57 Ark. App. 215, 944 S.W.2d 550 (1997).

Summary Judgment.

Trial court's premature ruling on motion for summary judgment where same jurisdictional question had been resolved in foreign court was not prejudicial to defendant in judgment registration proceeding. Purser v. Corpus Christi State Nat'l Bank, 258 Ark. 54, 522 S.W.2d 187 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Amant v. Callahan, 341 Ark. 857, 20 S.W.3d 896 (2000).

16-66-603. Notice of filing.

  1. At the time of the filing of the foreign judgment, the judgment creditor or his or her lawyer shall make and file with the clerk of court an affidavit setting forth the name and last known post office address of the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor.
  2. Promptly upon the filing of the foreign judgment and the affidavit, the clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice shall include the name and post office address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in this state. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has been filed.
  3. No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign judgment filed hereunder shall issue until ten (10) days after the date the judgment is filed.

History. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 3.

16-66-604. Stay.

  1. If the judgment debtor shows the court that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in which it was rendered.
  2. If the judgment debtor shows the court any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of a court of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring the same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state.

History. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 4; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 74, § 2.

16-66-605. Fees.

Any person filing a foreign judgment shall pay to the clerk of court the same filing fee that would be paid for the filing of a civil action. Fees for docketing, transcription, or other enforcement proceedings shall be as provided in other civil proceedings in the courts of this state.

History. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 5; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 74, § 3.

16-66-606. Optional procedure.

The right of a judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding under this subchapter remains unimpaired.

History. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 6.

16-66-607. Uniformity of interpretation.

This subchapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

History. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 7.

16-66-608. Short title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act”.

History. Acts 1989, No. 501, § 8.

16-66-609, 16-16-610. [Reserved.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 9 of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act is a repeal provision; Section 10 concerns the effective date.

Acts 1989, No. 501, § 10, makes the act effective March 13, 1989.

16-66-611 — 16-66-619. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. As to repeal of these sections, see note at beginning of subchapter.

Chapter 67 Appeal

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rules for Inferior Courts pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Research References

ALR.

Appealability of state court's order granting or denying motion to disqualify attorney. 5 A.L.R.4th 1251.

Running of interest on judgment where both parties appeal. 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.

Effect of death of party to divorce proceeding pending appeal or time allowed for appeal. 33 A.L.R.4th 47.

Am. Jur. 4 Am. Jur. 2d, A & E, § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

C.J.S. 4 C.J.S., A & E, § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-67-101. Time for filing notice of appeal.

Time for filing a notice of appeal shall commence upon the filing and entry of record of the judgment, order, or decree pursuant to Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

History. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 98, § 2.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Civil Procedure, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 603.

Subchapter 2 — Appeal to Circuit Court

Cross References. Allowances, appeals, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 51.

Contests for public offices, appeals, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 52.

Writs of certiorari, issuance by circuit court, § 16-13-205.

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 30: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 27, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1965, No. 382, § 3: Mar. 19, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that it is desirable that the final orders and judgments of county courts should be conclusive unless questioned by appeal filed promptly after such final orders and judgments are entered, and that it is in the public interest that the period for filing appeals from all final orders and judgments of county courts be standardized and limited to thirty (30) days. It is, therefore, declared that an emergency exists, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Case Notes

Cited: Garland County Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Ennis, 227 Ark. 880, 302 S.W.2d 76 (1957); Parker v. Rowan, 239 Ark. 929, 395 S.W.2d 338 (1965); Skinner v. Mayfield, 246 Ark. 741, 439 S.W.2d 651 (1969); Greig v. Crawford County, 256 Ark. 202, 506 S.W.2d 523 (1974); Horton v. McConnell, 256 Ark. 84, 506 S.W.2d 540 (1974); Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

16-67-201. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. This section was superseded by Inferior Court Rule 9 [now District Court Rule 9] with respect to appeals from a county court order involving a property assessment adjustment. See Pike Ave. Dev. Co. v. Pulaski County, 343 Ark. 338, 37 S.W.3d 177 (2001). The section was derived from Acts 1883, No. 27, § 1, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 2287; Pope's Dig., § 2913; Acts 1965, No. 382, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2001.

16-67-202 — 16-67-208. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning appeal to circuit court, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 54[55]. The sections were derived from:

16-67-202. Acts 1883, No. 27, § 2, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 2288; Pope's Dig., § 2914; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2002.

16-67-203. Acts 1883, No. 27, § 3, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 2289; Pope's Dig., § 2915; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2003.

16-67-204. Acts 1883, No. 27, § 5, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 2291; Pope's Dig., § 2917; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2005

16-67-205. Acts 1883, No. 27, § 4, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 2290; Pope's Dig., § 2916; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2004.

16-67-206. Chapters of Digest 1869, § 5, p. 109; C. & M. Dig., § 2236; Pope's Dig., § 2864; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2007.

16-67-207. Acts 1883, No. 27, § 6, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 2292; Pope's Dig., § 2918; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2006.

16-67-208. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 28, p. 53; C. & M. Dig., § 2293; Pope's Dig., § 2919; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2008.

16-67-209. Interest allowed on allowances wrongfully obtained.

In cases of allowances made against counties, the circuit court shall render judgment in favor of the counties against the appellees for the amount, with interest, of all such allowances wrongfully obtained by them.

History. Acts 1883, No. 27, § 6, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 2292; Pope's Dig., § 2918; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2006.

Subchapter 3 — Appeal to Supreme Court

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1[890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1891, No. 159, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 60, § 3: effective 60 days after passage.

Acts 1907, No. 137, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1913, No. 62, § 2: approved Feb. 18, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1915, No. 62, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 112, § 3: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Mar. 9, 1929.

Acts 1937, No. 355, § 2: approved Mar. 25, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “It is found that this act is necessary for the protection of litigants and for the speedy administration of justice, and for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; an emergency is therefore declared and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 213, § 3: approved Mar. 1, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being for the proper regulation of appeals to the Supreme Court of Arkansas in cases of unavoidable casualty, and being a part of and germane to the Arkansas law of Civil Procedure in the perfection of appeals to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, and being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1963, No. 123, § 5: July 1, 1963.

Acts 1963, No. 547, § 4: Mar. 29, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that great inequalities and discriminations are imposed upon an appellant taking steps to secure judicial review of an order granting a new trial, and that there is an urgent need for an equalization of the rights of parties in judicial proceedings, and that an enactment of this bill will provide for more efficient judicial administration. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the service of public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

The Work of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 241.

A New Judicial System for Arkansas, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

Case Notes

Cited: Peek Planting Co. v. W.H. Kennedy & Sons, 257 Ark. 669, 519 S.W.2d 49 (1975).

16-67-301. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 203. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 117, § 41; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2156.

16-67-302. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning rules for conduct of appeals, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 55[56]. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 883; Acts 1913, No. 62, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2171; Pope's Dig., § 2777; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2142.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Judicial Regulation of Procedure, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 146.

Case Notes

Authority of Court.

Where it is manifest that a cause has been fully developed, and that if the court had properly instructed the jury the plaintiff would have recovered a verdict, the Supreme Court, on reversing the case, has authority to enter judgment for the plaintiff. Jackson v. Carter, 169 Ark. 1154, 278 S.W. 32 (1925).

Costs.

Where appellant failed to set out the instructions of the circuit court in his abstract and brief required by rules of the Supreme Court, no costs for the abstract and brief will be taxed in case of reversal. Baker v. Allen, 66 Ark. 271, 50 S.W. 511 (1899); Brinkley Car Works & Mfg. Co. v. Cooper, 70 Ark. 331, 67 S.W. 752 (1901).

Mandates.

It was not error to refuse a continuance to the defendant where the plaintiff gave notice of the filing of the mandate to the defendant's attorney one week before the commencement of the term, if no prejudice was shown to have resulted to the defendant. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Sweet, 60 Ark. 550, 31 S.W. 571 (1895).

Where, after the reversal of a conviction by the Supreme Court, it was made to appear that an agreement had been made for an immediate mandate to issue, if the accused felt that he would be aggrieved by the early issuance of a mandate, he should have applied to the Supreme Court for a recall since he could not raise the question in the circuit court. Morton v. State, 208 Ark. 492, 187 S.W.2d 335 (1945).

On appeal from an order awarding a writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court will issue an immediate mandate when it appears that good cause has been shown for the action. Cobb v. Burress, 213 Ark. 177, 209 S.W.2d 694 (1948).

16-67-303. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning appealable judgments, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Arkansas Rules for Inferior Courts [now District Courts]. The section was derived from Civil Code § 15; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [15], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 2129; Pope's Dig., § 2735; Acts 1963, No. 547, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2101.

16-67-304. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning appeals from interlocutory orders in certain proceedings, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Arkansas Rules for Inferior Courts [now District Courts], and the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Acts 1937, No. 355, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 7507, 11194; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2102.

16-67-305, 16-67-306. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning survival of right of review and style of parties, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 55[56]. The sections were derived from:

16-67-305. Rev. Stat., ch. 117, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 2143; Pope's Dig., § 2749; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2109.

16-67-306. Civil Code, § 860; C. & M. Dig., § 2133; Pope's Dig., § 2739; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2108.

16-67-307. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning the method of obtaining review, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Arkansas Rules for Inferior Courts [now District Courts]. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 859; C. & M. Dig., § 2130; Pope's Dig., § 2736; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2103.

16-67-308, 16-67-309. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning writs of error, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 55[56]. The sections were derived from:

16-67-308. Rev. Stat., ch. 117, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2132; Pope's Dig., § 2738; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2105.

16-67-309. Civil Code, § 867; Acts 1899, No. 60, § 1, p. 111; 1915, No. 62, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2140; Pope's Dig., § 2746; Acts 1951, No. 213, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2106.

16-67-310 — 16-67-312. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that these sections, concerning appeals were deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Arkansas Rules for Inferior Courts [now District Courts]. The sections were derived from the following sources:16-67-310. Acts 1953, No. 555, §§ 2, 3; 1957, No. 194, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2106.1, 27-2106.2.16-67-311. Acts 1963, No. 123, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2106.3 — 27-2106.6.16-67-312. Acts 1953, No. 555, § 2; 1957, No. 194, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2106.1.

16-67-313 — 16-67-332. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1148, contained two sections designated as “SECTION 2”.

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning issues related to court of appeals, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 55[56]. The sections were derived from:

16-67-313. Civil Code, § 866; C. & M. Dig., § 2139; Pope's Dig., § 2745; Acts 1953, No. 555, §§ 4, 6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2107 — 27-2107.2.

16-67-314. Civil Code, § 863; C. & M. Dig., § 2136; Pope's Dig., § 2742; Acts 1953, No. 148, § 1; 1953, No. 555, §§ 14, 20; 1971, No. 206, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2127.1, 27-2127.8, 27-2128, 27-2129.2.

16-67-315. Civil Code, § 867; C. & M. Dig., § 2140; Pope's Dig., § 2746; Acts 1951, No. 213, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2106.

16-67-316. Acts 1953, No. 555, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2130.1.

16-67-317. Civil Code, § 876; Acts 1907, No. 137, § 1, p. 329; C. & M. Dig., § 2164; Pope's Dig., § 2770; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2135.

16-67-318. Civil Code, § 877; C. & M. Dig., § 2165; Pope's Dig., § 2771; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2136.

16-67-319. Civil Code, § 879; C. & M. Dig., § 2167; Pope's Dig., § 2773; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2138.

16-67-320. Civil Code, §§ 880, 881; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2168, 2169; Pope's Dig., §§ 2774, 2775; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2139, 27-2140.

16-67-321. Civil Code, § 882; C. & M. Dig., § 2170; Pope's Dig., § 2776; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2141.

16-67-322. Rev. Stat., ch. 117, §§ 29, 30; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2153, 2154; Pope's Dig., §§ 2759, 2760; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2131, 27-2132.

16-67-323. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 2182; Pope's Dig., § 2791; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2143.

16-67-324. Civil Code, § 883; Acts 1913, No. 62, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2171; Pope's Dig., § 2777; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2142.

16-67-325. Civil Code, § 16; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1[16], p. 219; 1891, No. 159, § 2, p. 280; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2176-2178, 2183; Acts 1929, No. 112, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 2785-2787, 2792; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2144 — 27-2147; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 204.

16-67-326. Civil Code, §§ 884, 887; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1[884], p. 213; 1891, No. 159, § 1, p. 280; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2172, 2175; Pope's Dig., §§ 2781, 2784; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2148, 27-2149.

16-67-327. Civil Code, § 884; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1[884], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., § 1271; Pope's Dig., § 1495; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2151.

16-67-328. Rev. Stat., ch. 117, § 37; C. & M. Dig., § 2180; Pope's Dig., § 2789; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2152.

16-67-329. Rev. Stat., ch. 117, § 42; C. & M. Dig., § 2181; Pope's Dig., § 2790; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2153.

16-67-330. Civil Code, § 886; C. & M. Dig., § 2174; Pope's Dig., § 2783; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2154.

16-67-331. Civil Code, § 885; C. & M. Dig., § 2173; Pope's Dig., § 2782; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2155.

16-67-332. Civil Code, § 883; Acts 1913, No. 62, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2171; Pope's Dig., § 2777; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2142.

Chapter 68 Costs And Bonds

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rules for Inferior Courts [now District Courts] pursuant to the Supersession Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in its order of December 18, 1978.

Research References

ALR.

Continuance of civil case as conditioned upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses incurred by other party. 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.

Allocation of defense costs between primary and excess insurance carriers. 19 A.L.R.4th 107.

Recovery of damages resulting from wrongful issuance of injunction as limited to amount of bond. 30 A.L.R.4th 273.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved]

Subchapter 2 — Bonds Generally

Cross References. Bail generally, § 16-84-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1857, § 2, p. 135: effective on passage.

Acts 1873, No. 126, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1949, No. 151, § 2: approved Feb. 23, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there is constantly being filed suits against the State Treasurer and Auditor involving moneys available for turn back to cities, counties, etc., which, when once in court ‘tie-up’ funds which under our existing laws should be distributed at specified times and in specified amounts; and

“Whereas, these funds must be set aside until such times as the courts rule on said suits; and

“Whereas, it is found that because of these many suits there is often moneys set aside pending litigation which should be turned back to the various local agencies and because of said suits the county judges, city officials and others are being deprived of the use of these moneys for lengthy periods of time;

“Therefore, this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act shall take effect from and after passage.”

16-68-201. Surety bond required in suits against Treasurer of State or Auditor of State.

In any suit brought against the Treasurer of State and Auditor of State prohibiting them from disbursing certain moneys due cities, counties, improvement districts, etc., the plaintiff or his or her attorneys shall be required to file surety bond with the Auditor of State in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the moneys involved in the suits, and the bond shall remain in force until final disposition of the suits.

History. Acts 1949, No. 151, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2207.

16-68-202. Married women — Authority to execute bonds — Liability.

In case it shall be necessary in the prosecution or defense of any action brought by or against a married woman to enter into any bond or undertaking, the bond or undertaking may be executed by the married woman with the same effect in all respects as if she were sole. If the bond or undertaking becomes broken or forfeited, the bond or undertaking may be enforced against her separate property.

History. Acts 1873, No. 126, § 9, p. 382; C. & M. Dig., § 5587; Pope's Dig., § 7237; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2206.

16-68-203. Sureties.

  1. The surety in every bond provided for by this code must be a resident of this state and worth double the sum to be secured beyond the amount of his or her debts and have property in this state liable to execution equal to the sum to be secured. Where there are two (2) or more sureties in the same bond they must, in the aggregate, have the qualifications prescribed in this subsection.
  2. No attorney, clerk, sheriff, or other person concerned in the execution of any process, shall become bail in any civil case.
    1. The ministerial officer whose duty it is to take a surety in any bond provided for by this code shall have the right to require the person offered as surety to make affidavit of his or her qualification, which affidavit may be made before the officer. However, any person interested may contest the sufficiency of the surety upon the making of the affidavit.
    2. If it is made to appear that the surety is not sufficient, then an officer who in good faith complies with this subsection shall be exempt from any liability to which he or she might otherwise be subject for taking insufficient surety.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 116, § 23; Civil Code, §§ 786, 787; C. & M. Dig., §§ 798-800; Pope's Dig., §§ 954-956; Acts 1963, No. 487, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2203 — 27-2205; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 205.

Publisher's Notes. This section may be affected by Ark. Const. Amend. 4.

The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in tables volume.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “solicitor, or counsellor at law or in equity” following “No attorney” in (b).

Cross References. Sureties on official bond, Ark. Const. Art. 19, § 21, Amend. No. 4.

Surety companies, § 23-63-1001 et seq.

16-68-204. Bonds not void for want of form.

The bond of no executor or executrix, administrator or administratrix or guardian, nor any prosecution, appeal, nonresident, or attachment bond, nor any other statutory bonds of any party, plaintiff, or defendant in any court of justice in this state, nor any recognizance in any criminal cause in this state, shall be declared null and void for the want of form if the intent of the bond can be plainly deduced from the body of the bond or recognizance.

History. Acts 1857, § 1, p. 135; C. & M. Dig., § 801; Pope's Dig., § 957; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2201.

16-68-205. New bond to replace defective bond.

When any bond provided for by this code is adjudged to be defective, a new and sufficient one may be executed in such reasonable time as the court may fix, with the same effect as if originally executed.

History. Civil Code, § 785; C. & M. Dig., § 797; Pope's Dig., § 953; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2202.

Publisher's Notes. The code referred to in this section means the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Case Notes

Amendment.

A bond for appeal to the circuit court in proper form though not signed by the sureties was subject to amendment. Fairview School Dist. v. Mammoth Spring School Dist., 189 Ark. 74, 70 S.W.2d 502 (1934).

Subchapter 3 — Bonds for Costs

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Costs, § 37 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Costs, § 125 et seq.

16-68-301. Persons required to give bond for costs — Deposit in lieu of bond — Dismissal of action for noncompliance.

  1. Before commencing an action, a plaintiff who is a nonresident of this state or a corporation other than a bank created by the laws of this state shall file in the clerk's office a bond, with sufficient surety and to be approved by the clerk, for the payment of all costs which may accrue in the action in the court in which it is brought or in any other court to which it may be carried, either to the defendant or to the officers of the courts.
  2. Instead of filing a bond, the plaintiff may deposit with the clerk of the court a sum of money sufficient to pay all costs that have accrued or will probably accrue in the action, subject to the sum's being increased at any time the court may deem necessary and by its order required.
  3. An action in which a bond for costs is required by subsection (a) of this section and has not been given shall be dismissed on the motion of the defendant at any time before the judgment, unless the bond is filed in a reasonable time to be allowed by the court after the motion is made therefor, securing all past and future costs. The action shall not be dismissed or abated if a bond for costs is given in such time as the court may allow.

History. Civil Code, §§ 698, 699; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1844, 1845; Pope's Dig., §§ 2363, 2364; Acts 1941, No. 344, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2301, 27-2302.

Case Notes

In General.

Bond not in statutory form is a good common-law bond. Munzesheimer v. Byrne, 56 Ark. 116, 19 S.W. 320 (1892).

A bond may be required to secure costs of appeal. Chambers v. Ogle, 114 Ark. 237, 169 S.W. 795 (1914).

Cash Deposit.

There is substantial compliance with this section when plaintiff at the time of commencing an action makes a cash deposit sufficient to cover the costs then accrued. Harral v. Helton, 230 Ark. 913, 327 S.W.2d 549 (1959).

Deposit Insufficient.

Where the deposit is insufficient the trial court may require plaintiff to increase it, but the trial court's failure to do so is not sufficient ground for dismissing the cause of action. Harral v. Helton, 230 Ark. 913, 327 S.W.2d 549 (1959).

Failure to Give Bond.

Suit against nonresident corporation will not be dismissed for failure to give bond on appeal if none was asked below. Adair v. Quincy Stove Mfg. Co., 119 Ark. 263, 177 S.W. 909 (1915).

In an action on a note against the appellant by the appellee, the appellant may, at any time before judgment, require the appellee to give a bond for costs or have the suit dismissed, but the appellant's failure to give a bond is unavailing on appeal when the record fails to show the appellee asked for a dismissal, because of the failure to give bond. Adair v. Quincy Stove Mfg. Co., 119 Ark. 263, 177 S.W. 909 (1915).

Failure of chancery court to require nonresident to make bond in habeas corpus proceeding to regain custody of her children even if it constituted error was harmless where the nonresident prevailed both in lower court and on appeal. Fulks v. Walker, 225 Ark. 390, 283 S.W.2d 347 (1955).

Failure to file the proper cost bond at the proper time is a matter of abatement and does not go to the merits of the case. Harral v. Helton, 230 Ark. 913, 327 S.W.2d 549 (1959).

Nonresident.

This section does not apply to nonresident who sues as administratrix and who has given bond as administratrix in this state. Warren & O.V.R.R. v. Waldrop, 93 Ark. 127, 123 S.W. 792 (1909).

A nonresident intervenor seeking to set aside the sale of property held under execution of judgment is for all practical purposes a plaintiff and must give the bond required by this section. Charlesworth Pontiac Co. v. Walker, 238 Ark. 940, 385 S.W.2d 797 (1965).

A nonresident intervenor, who gave no bond, in seeking to set aside a sale held under execution of judgment was for all practical purposes a plaintiff and the cause should have been dismissed. Charlesworth Pontiac Co. v. Walker, 238 Ark. 940, 385 S.W.2d 797 (1965).

Surety.

Under cost bond of nonresident plaintiff given under and in the language of this section, the surety continues liable for costs accruing after death of plaintiff and revivor of the action in the name of his special administrator appointed under § 16-62-106; the latter being relieved from liability for costs by § 16-62-106(d). United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 135 Ark. 1, 204 S.W. 416 (1918).

Timeliness of Objection.

Motion by plaintiff to dismiss petition of intervener for failure to file bond, which was filed after judgment in favor of plaintiff, was filed too late. Mothershead v. Douglas, 219 Ark. 457, 243 S.W.2d 761 (1951).

Cited: Levi Strauss & Co. v. Crockett Motor Sales, Inc., 293 Ark. 502, 739 S.W.2d 157 (1987).

16-68-302. Bond required if plaintiff becomes a nonresident.

If the plaintiff in an action, after its institution, becomes a nonresident of this state, he or she shall give security for costs, in the manner and under the restrictions provided for in § 16-68-301.

History. Civil Code, § 700; C. & M. Dig., § 1846; Pope's Dig., § 2365; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2303.

Case Notes

Administration of Estates.

This section had no application to an administratrix appointed in this state. Warren & O.V.R.R. v. Waldrop, 93 Ark. 127, 123 S.W. 792 (1909).

Intervenors.

In suit, court was not authorized to require intervenors to deposit moneys into court to cover portion of costs and expenses of court-appointed master. State ex rel. Purcell v. Nelson, 246 Ark. 210, 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969).

16-68-303. Bond required of guardian, next friend, or assignee.

A guardian or next friend suing for an infant or person of unsound mind, and every plaintiff suing as an assignee, except an endorsee of a bill of exchange or a promissory note placed on the footing of a bill of exchange, when insolvent, may be required to give security for costs. On the failure to give security for costs within a reasonable time after it is directed by the court, upon the motion of the defendant, his or her action shall be dismissed.

History. Civil Code, § 701; C. & M. Dig., § 1847; Pope's Dig., § 2366; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2305.

Case Notes

Assignee.

An administrator is not an assignee within this section. Tucker v. West, 31 Ark. 643 (1877).

16-68-304. State not required to give security for costs.

The state shall not be required or ruled to give security for costs in any case whatever, in any court.

History. Acts 1855, § 7, p. 196; C. & M. Dig., § 9296; Pope's Dig., § 11982; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2307.

Cross References. Appeal from writ of mandamus or prohibition, § 16-115-109.

Case Notes

Costs.

Master's fees and expenses are costs within the meaning of this section. State ex rel. Purcell v. Nelson, 246 Ark. 210, 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969).

Counties.

In action by the state for the use and benefit of a county against foreign corporation to recover statutory penalty for doing business in the state without qualifying under statutes, denial of corporation's motion to quash attachment of truck on ground that the state failed to make affidavit and execute bond was held not error, since the state is not required to give bond or security for costs in any case nor is it required to verify its pleadings. Vaccinol Prods. Corp. v. State ex rel. Phillips County, 203 Ark. 302, 156 S.W.2d 250 (1941).

Cited: Wimberly v. State, 90 Ark. 514, 119 S.W. 668 (1909); McCastlain v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 243 Ark. 506, 420 S.W.2d 893 (1967).

16-68-305. Requirement of additional security.

In an action in which a bond for costs has been given, the defendant, at any time before judgment and after reasonable notice to the plaintiff, may move the court for additional security on the part of the plaintiff. If, on the motion, the court is satisfied that the surety in the plaintiff's bond has removed from the state, or is not sufficient for the amount of the bond, it may dismiss the action, unless, in a reasonable time to be fixed by the court, sufficient security is given by the plaintiff.

History. Civil Code, § 702; C. & M. Dig., § 1848; Pope's Dig., § 2367; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2306.

16-68-306. Liability of attorney when bond not given.

When process is issued in an action by the direction of an attorney for a plaintiff who is required by § 16-68-301 to give security for costs, but who has failed to do so, the attorney shall be liable as surety for the costs of the action until a bond is given. The attorney's liability may be enforced by orders of court and by proceedings as for contempt if they are not obeyed.

History. Civil Code, § 703; C. & M. Dig., § 1849; Pope's Dig., § 2368; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2304.

Case Notes

Signature.

Attorneys may sign cost bond. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Miller, 117 Ark. 396, 175 S.W. 1164 (1915).

Cited: Fulks v. Walker, 225 Ark. 390, 283 S.W.2d 347 (1955).

Subchapter 4 — Costs Generally

Cross References. Additional costs taxed for justice building, § 19-5-1052.

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 126, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 28: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the language of certain court cost statutes lacks uniformity; that such lack of uniformity is detrimental to the proper collection of such court costs; and that such language should be standardized to promote the proper collection of such costs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Costs, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Costs, § 1 et seq.

16-68-401. Actions of trespass.

In all actions of trespass, if any damages are found for the plaintiff upon the trial of the issue or inquiry of damages, he or she shall recover his or her costs.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, § 20; C. & M. Dig., § 1836; Pope's Dig., § 2355; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2309.

16-68-402. Recovery below court's jurisdiction.

In all actions other than trespass which may be prosecuted in any court, the subject matter of which shall be cognizable before the court, but the damages recovered shall be below the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff shall recover his costs.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, § 20; C. & M. Dig., § 1836; Pope's Dig., § 2355; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2309.

16-68-403. Tender of full payment by defendant — Costs.

In all actions where tender is made and full payment offered, by discount or otherwise, in such specie as the party by contract or agreement ought to take, and the party to whom the tender is made refuses it and afterwards sues for the debt or goods so tendered, the plaintiff shall not recover costs in the suit, but the defendant shall recover costs in the same manner as if the judgment had been rendered in his or her favor on the merits of the case.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, § 29; C. & M. Dig., § 1843; Pope's Dig., § 2362; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2311.

Case Notes

Tender.

The effect of a tender is to save costs; but, in order to be availing, it must be followed up and the money brought into court. Hamlett v. Tallman & Graves, 30 Ark. 505 (1875).

16-68-404. Costs when action unsuccessful against part of several defendants.

When several persons are made defendants to any action of trespass, assault and battery, false imprisonment, detinue, replevin, trover, or ejectment, and one (1) or more of them is acquitted, every person so acquitted shall recover his or her costs in the same manner as if the verdict of acquittal had been in favor of all the defendants, unless it is certified by the court that there was reasonable cause for making the person a defendant to the action.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 1837; Pope's Dig., § 2356; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2313.

16-68-405. Suits for use of another — Liability to plaintiff for costs.

When a suit is commenced in the name of one person to the use of another, the person for whose use the action is brought shall be liable for the payment of all costs which the plaintiff may be adjudged to pay, and execution may be issued therefor.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, § 27; C. & M. Dig., § 1838; Pope's Dig., § 2357; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2317.

Case Notes

Mortgage Foreclosure.

This section is not applicable to suit to foreclose mortgage, though alleged to be a community suit. First Nat'l Bank v. Scranton Coal Co., 178 Ark. 643, 12 S.W.2d 6 (1928).

16-68-406. Action in name of married woman — Liability for costs.

In an action brought or defended by any married woman, in her name, neither her husband nor his property shall be liable for the costs thereof, or the recovery therein. In an action brought by her for an injury to her person, character, or property, if judgment passes against her for costs, the court in which the action is pending shall have jurisdiction to enforce payment of the judgment out of her separate estate or property.

History. Acts 1873, No. 126, § 6, p. 382; C. & M. Dig., § 5584; Pope's Dig., § 7234; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2318.

16-68-407. Judgment against security, attorney, or usee on motion.

In all cases where there is security for costs or where the attorney is liable for costs or where the action is brought to the use of another, in which the plaintiff is adjudged to pay the costs, judgment may be rendered against the security, attorney, or person for whose use the action was brought on motion of the party entitled to the costs, notice of the motion having first been given to the security, attorney, or other person.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, § 33; C. & M. Dig., § 1841; Pope's Dig., § 2360; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2327.

16-68-408. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning costs on appeal, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 206. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 34, §§ 21, 22, 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1856-1858; Pope's Dig., §§ 2375-2377; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2314 — 27-2316.

16-68-409. Taxation of costs — No charge for service not performed.

    1. The clerk shall tax and subscribe all bills of costs arising in any cause or proceedings instituted or adjudged in the court of which he or she is clerk, corresponding to the fees which shall, for the time being, be allowed by law.
    2. The clerk shall in no case allow any item or charge, unless the service for which it was made was actually performed in the cause.
  1. Any person aggrieved by the taxation of any bill of costs may upon application have the bill of costs retaxed by the court in which the action or proceeding was had, and in the retaxation, all errors shall be corrected by the court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, §§ 28, 30; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1859, 1860; Pope's Dig., §§ 2378, 2379; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2319, 27-2320; Acts 1991, No. 904, § 19.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 904, § 22, provided:

“It is hereby found that the passage of many court cost bills over several legislative sessions has caused confusion in the collection of such costs and that reasonable people can interpret the varying language of such court costs statutes differently. This legislation is necessary to standardize the language of such court cost statutes to provide that such costs are collected in a uniform manner statewide.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 23, provided:

“This act is hereby declared to be remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed to effect its purpose.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 24, provided:

“Nothing herein shall prohibit courts from assessing reasonable probation fees.”

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

It is within the power of the circuit court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to disallow to the plaintiff any costs which he has caused unreasonably and unnecessarily to be accumulated; and the judgment of the court below, in the exercise of the discretion, should not be overruled by this court, except in cases of manifest error and abuse of power. Meadows v. Rogers, 17 Ark. 361 (1856); Davies v. Robinson, 65 Ark. 218, 65 Ark. 219, 45 S.W. 471 (1898).

Motion to Retax.

Actions by deputy sheriff to recover costs in prior suit cannot be treated as motion to retax costs in the prior suit. Hudgins v. Beavers, 69 Ark. 577, 65 S.W. 99 (1901).

Reasonable Time.

Motion to retax costs filed after appellate court had affirmed the judgment, was held filed within a reasonable time and properly entertained since the motion questioned items of costs definitely fixed by law. Lewis v. D.F. Jones Constr. Co., 194 Ark. 602, 108 S.W.2d 1093 (1937).

Cited: Troutt v. Langston, 283 Ark. 220, 675 S.W.2d 625 (1984); McKinney v. City of El Dorado, 308 Ark. 284, 824 S.W.2d 826 (1992).

16-68-410. Execution for costs.

  1. In all cases where costs are given by this act, the party to whom the costs are adjudged may have execution therefor.
  2. In all cases where either party is adjudged to pay costs before final judgment, the party in whose favor the costs are adjudged may have execution therefor immediately, as upon final judgment.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, §§ 31, 32; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1839, 1840; Pope's Dig., §§ 2358, 2359; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2325, 27-2326.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 34, codified as §§ 16-68-40116-68-405, 16-68-407, and 16-68-40916-68-410.

Cross References. Execution may issue for recovery of costs, § 16-66-101.

Failure to take out mandate after decision on appeal, execution for costs, § 16-67-325.

Subchapter 5 — Fees and Fee Bills

Effective Dates. Acts 1842, § 36, p. 27: Jan. 1, 1843.

Acts 1843, § 3, p. 68: effective on passage.

Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Research References

Am. Jur. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Costs, § 52 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Costs, § 184 et seq.

16-68-501. Advance payment of fees — Recovery as costs — Unpaid fees — Endorsement on execution.

If any party to a suit pays any fees allowed by this act before final judgment and the judgment is thereafter rendered in his or her favor and costs adjudged to him or her, the amount so paid shall be taxed and endorsed on the execution and levied and collected by virtue thereof for the benefit of the party. All fees which have not been paid shall be endorsed on the execution and collected by virtue thereof for the benefit of the person rendering the service, or the fee may be collected on fee bills according to § 16-68-503, but only the costs of the prevailing party shall be so taxed on the execution.

History. Acts 1842, § 31, p. 27; C. & M. Dig., § 4628; Pope's Dig., § 5717; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2321.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1842, p. 27 codified as §§ 16-58-117, 16-68-50116-68-503, 16-68-505, 21-6-10221-6-105.

Case Notes

Cited: Buchanan v. Parham, 95 Ark. 81, 128 S.W. 563 (1910).

16-68-502. Fees of officers endorsed on execution — Fee book.

  1. The clerks of the several courts shall endorse on every execution which they shall issue the fees due to each officer and any other person.
  2. The clerks, at the time of issuing an execution or fee bill or of recovering any fees due to them by any party or other person, shall enter in a book, to be kept for that purpose, the several items for which they have charged, using words of full length.
  3. Every clerk shall deliver to any party or person to whom any fees are due, on demand, a full and complete copy of the entry made in the book, without any compensation for the copy.
  4. When any suit is instituted against any clerk or officer for having asked or taken illegal fees, the book referred to in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, and the entries therein, may be given in evidence on the trial.

History. Acts 1842, §§ 32-34, p. 27; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4629-4631; Pope's Dig., §§ 5718-5720; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2322 — 27-2324.

16-68-503. Fee bills of officers and witnesses.

  1. All officers and witnesses entitled to fees by the law for services rendered in any suit, matter, or controversy pending in any court of record may make out fee bills for the services at the end of each term of the court wherein the suit, matter, or controversy is pending, charging the party at whose instance the services were rendered.
  2. The fee bill shall be examined by the clerk of the court in which the services were rendered. If found correct, the clerk shall certify the fee bill and deliver the fee bill to the sheriff of the proper county to be collected by him or her.

History. Acts 1842, §§ 27, 28, p. 27; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4618, 4619; Pope's Dig., §§ 5707, 5709; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-2328, 27-2329.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section must be strictly construed. The fee bill must show, upon its face, that the party claiming the fees is one of the classes of persons specified in the act; otherwise it is void, and may be superseded. Ex parte Ashley, 3 Ark. 63 (1840); Ex parte Badgett, 6 Ark. 280 (1845); Ex parte Lawson, 11 Ark. 323 (1850).

Cited: Buckley v. Williams, 84 Ark. 187, 105 S.W. 95 (1907); Edwards v. Thayer, 122 Ark. 579, 184 S.W. 64 (1916).

16-68-504. Collection of fee bill.

When any fee bill shall come to the hands of any sheriff or other officer to be collected, and the person against whom the fee bill is issued refuses or fails to pay the amount of the fee bill within twenty (20) days after the fee bill shall be presented, the sheriff or other officer may and shall levy the fee bill and the amount claimed thereon on the goods and chattels of the person or persons and expose the goods and chattels for sale within sixty (60) days from the date of the levy. The sheriff or other officer shall give ten (10) days' notice of the time and place of the sale by means of at least four (4) advertisements put up in four (4) of the public places in his or her county. It is unlawful for the person or persons against whom the fee bill is issued, to delay the payment of the fee bill in any manner whatever.

History. Acts 1843, § 1, p. 68; C. & M. Dig., § 4620; Pope's Dig., § 5708; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2330.

Case Notes

Sale of Land.

Land cannot be sold under a fee bill not based on a judgment or order of a court. Minton v. Bennight, 83 Ark. 101, 103 S.W. 168 (1907).

16-68-505. Failure of sheriff to collect — Judgment against sheriff.

If any sheriff neglects or refuses to levy and collect the fees and pay over the money, when collected, to the person entitled thereto, the court shall upon motion enter up judgment for the amount of the fee bill against him or her and cause execution to issue thereon.

History. Acts 1842, § 30, p. 27; C. & M. Dig., § 4621; Pope's Dig., § 5710; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2331.

16-68-506. Pro rata division of fees when entire costs not collected.

In case the clerk, or, if the costs in any action are collected on execution by the sheriff, then the sheriff, is unable to collect the entire amount of costs due, the clerk or sheriff shall not first retain from the amount the fees due himself or herself, but shall account for and pay the costs collected pro rata to all officers and persons entitled to any portion of the costs so collected.

History. Civil Code, § 775; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1[775], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 4627; Pope's Dig., § 5716; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2332.

16-68-507. Suits by state — Payment of officer's fees.

Whenever any civil suit is or has been prosecuted by the state and for the state's own benefit, the clerks, sheriffs, and other officers shall be entitled to the same fees as in other civil cases between private persons. Whenever the state becomes liable to pay any such costs, it shall be the duty of the Auditor of State upon presentation of the certificate of the Attorney General that the costs have accrued and that the state is liable therefor and the amount claimed is just, to draw his or her warrant on the Treasurer of State for the amount so certified to be due, which shall be paid by the Treasurer of State.

History. Acts 1850, § 3, p. 45; C. & M. Dig., § 1842; Pope's Dig., § 2361; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2333.

16-68-508. Suits by state — Payment of costs and fees in frivolous civil actions.

  1. The defendant in any civil action brought in any court of this state by any state agency, board, or commission shall be entitled to recover from the state entity the court costs, witness fees, and reasonable attorneys' fees if the court determines that the action was brought without reasonable basis or was frivolous.
  2. The recovery of court costs, witness fees, and attorney' fees shall be limited to an aggregate total of ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
  3. The court costs, witness fees, and attorneys' fees shall be paid from maintenance and operation funds of the state agency, board, or commission.
  4. This section shall apply to all civil actions commenced after June 28, 1985.

History. Acts 1985, No. 148, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2334.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Procedure, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555.

Subchapter 6 — Incarcerated Persons

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-68-601. Amount of fees and costs.

  1. If an incarcerated person, defined for purposes of this subchapter as a person who has been convicted of a crime and is imprisoned for that crime or is being held in custody for trial or sentencing, files a civil action, the court shall order the incarcerated person to pay, as a partial payment of any court filing fees and court costs required by law, a first-time payment of twenty percent (20%) of the preceding six (6) months' income from the incarcerated person's inmate account as administered by the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction.
  2. The Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction shall withdraw these moneys maintained in the account for payment of the filing fees and court costs and shall forward these moneys collected at such times as the moneys exceed ten dollars ($10.00) to the appropriate court clerk or clerks until the actual court fees are paid in full.

History. Acts 1997, No. 340, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 856.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 323, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent. The General Assembly, in Act 549 of 1993, established the Arkansas Department of Community Punishment and delineated its purposes. Confusion in the public's perception, with regard to the purposes of the department, exists and will persist because of the inconsistency between the name of the department and its established purposes. The purpose of this act is to provide the department with a name that more accurately describes its role as an agency that is intended to fulfill the legislatively established purposes of supervision, treatment, rehabilitation, and restoration of adult offenders as useful law-abiding citizens within the community and to provide its supervisory board with a name consistent with the department's name change.”

Acts 2001, No. 323, § 2, provided:

“The ‘Department of Community Punishment’, as established in Arkansas Code 12-27-125, shall hereafter be known as the ‘Department of Community Correction’.”

Acts 2001, No. 323, § 5, provided:

“(a) The Arkansas Code Revision Commission shall make appropriate name changes in the Arkansas Code to implement this act.

“(b) The Arkansas Code Revision Commission is not required to codify this act.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (a) and (b).

Case Notes

Appeal.

Order that denied an inmate's indigent status and required partial filing fees did not state if the inmate had a colorable cause of action and was not file-marked, as required by the court rules. Until an order denying the inmate's indigent status was filed in the circuit court, there was no effective order from which the inmate could appeal the circuit court's decision. Dunahue v. Dennis, 2016 Ark. 285 (2016).

Court below has a duty to file-mark an inmate's petition and to enter an order to create a proper record. Dunahue v. Dennis, 2016 Ark. 285 (2016).

Supreme Court appointed a special master to ascertain the practice of handling these types of inmate matters in Lincoln County, what specifically occurred in this case, the current status of the inmate's petition in Lincoln County, whether subsequent orders and prior pleadings were marked filed on dates different than when presented by the inmate and entered by the court, and whether the inmate's pleading, while moot, could be capable of repetition in the future under the practices in Lincoln County. Dunahue v. Dennis, 2016 Ark. 285 (2016).

16-68-602. Additional payment.

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent an incarcerated person from authorizing payment beyond that required by this subchapter.

History. Acts 1997, No. 340, § 2.

16-68-603. Indigency.

Nothing in this subchapter should be construed to prohibit an incarcerated person from filing his or her civil action or proceeding if the incarcerated person is found to be indigent pursuant to the Arkansas indigency statutes.

History. Acts 1997, No. 340, § 3.

Case Notes

Notice of Appeal.

Court clerk should have filed a movant's notice of appeal on the day the notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief was filed, whether or not the movant was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. The motion to file a belated appeal was allowed because, but for this clerical error, the notice of appeal was timely filed. White v. State, 373 Ark. 415, 284 S.W.3d 64 (2008).

16-68-604. Affidavit of inability to pay.

  1. Any court of the State of Arkansas may authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit, action, or proceeding, without payment of fees and costs, by an incarcerated person who makes an affidavit that he or she is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
      1. This affidavit shall contain complete information as to the incarcerated person's:
        1. Identity;
        2. Nature and amount of income;
        3. Spouse's income, if available to the incarcerated person;
        4. Property owned;
        5. Cash or checking accounts;
        6. Dependents;
        7. Debts; and
        8. Monthly expenses.
      2. The incarcerated person, if applicable, shall also state the amount of money deposited in his or her inmate account for the past six (6) months.
    1. The affidavit shall contain the following statements: “I, , am unable to pay the filing fees and court costs described herein. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true and correct.”
  2. The Attorney General or other counsel for the defendant shall be authorized to receive information from the prison or jail verifying the financial information given by the incarcerated person.

History. Acts 1997, No. 340, § 4.

Case Notes

Notice of Appeal.

Court clerk should have filed a movant's notice of appeal on the day the notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief was filed, whether or not the movant was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. The motion to file a belated appeal was allowed because, but for this clerical error, the notice of appeal was timely filed. White v. State, 373 Ark. 415, 284 S.W.3d 64 (2008).

16-68-605. Merit of claims.

A court in which an affidavit of inability to pay has been filed may dismiss the action in whole or in part on a finding that:

  1. The allegation of poverty is false; or
  2. The action or a portion of the action lacks a justiciable issue as defined by § 16-22-309.

History. Acts 1997, No. 340, § 5.

16-68-606. Fees upon commencement or dismissal.

  1. If the court authorizes the commencement of the action and the court concludes, based on information contained in the affidavit or other information available to the court, that such person is able to pay part of the fees, costs, or security otherwise required, then the court shall order a partial payment to be made as a condition of the commencement or further prosecution of the action, provided that any such payment is not less than required under § 16-68-601. Furthermore, if the court dismisses the action for the reason that it lacks a justiciable issue, then the court may order the incarcerated person to pay reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to § 16-22-309.
  2. Furthermore, if the court dismisses the action for the reason that it lacks a justiciable issue, then the court may order the incarcerated person to pay reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to § 16-22-309.

History. Acts 1997, No. 340, § 6.

16-68-607. Multiple lawsuits — Definition.

    1. As used in this section, “civil action or proceeding” includes without limitation a legal action filed in federal or state court.
    2. “Civil action or proceeding” does not include:
      1. A petition for writ of habeas corpus;
      2. A petition for writ of error coram nobis; or
      3. A petition for relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  1. Unless the incarcerated person is under imminent danger of serious physical injury, an incarcerated person may not bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under the Arkansas indigency statutes if, on three (3) or more prior occasions while incarcerated or detained in any facility, the incarcerated person brought an action that was determined by a court to:
    1. Be frivolous or malicious; or
    2. Fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

History. Acts 1997, No. 340, § 7; 2017, No. 1110, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote this section.

Case Notes

In General.

Trial court correctly found that the dismissal of the inmate's civil rights complaint against prison officials would constitute a “strike” for purposes of this section, as the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fegans v. Norris, 351 Ark. 200, 89 S.W.3d 919 (2002).

Application.

Petitioner failed to show that the circuit court erred when it determined his habeas petition was a civil action that constituted one strike for purposes of this section, because § 16-106-202 had no application to this section, and this section did apply, when the circuit court correctly found that the petition for writ of habeas corpus failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the petition did constitute a strike for purposes of that section. McArty v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 257, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 920, 133 S. Ct. 371, 184 L. Ed. 2d 219 (2012).

It was improper to revoke an inmate's in forma pauperis status because the circuit court erred in counting as strikes cases the inmate filed in federal district court. Hill v. Gallagher, 2016 Ark. 198, 491 S.W.3d 458 (2016).

This section does not apply to dismissals in federal court; application of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases is limited to Arkansas courts, and this section is contained within that code. Hill v. Gallagher, 2016 Ark. 198, 491 S.W.3d 458 (2016).

Legislature's clear and definite meaning was that this section was only to be applied in what were, in fact, civil actions (applying version of section before the 2017 amendment). Hill v. State, 2017 Ark. 196, 520 S.W.3d 664 (2017).

Given that this section was only to be applied in what were, in fact, civil actions, a trial court erred in imposing two strikes on appellant where the strikes were based on his petition seeking to compel the prosecuting attorney to direct the state crime lab to turn over information from his criminal case, and thus, were part of his criminal case (applying version of section before the 2017 amendment). Hill v. State, 2017 Ark. 196, 520 S.W.3d 664 (2017).

Circuit court erred in imposing a strike pursuant to former version of § 16-68-607 (amended 2017) based on the denial of his § 16-90-111 petition as the statutory language in effect at the time did not confer authority on the circuit court to impose a strike in a criminal case. Lukach v. State, 2018 Ark. 208, 548 S.W.3d 810 (2018) (applying version of section before the 2017 amendment).

Because the Director of the Department of Correction did not demonstrate that the inmate's action was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, no strike for the appeal was warranted. Morgan v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 189, 575 S.W.3d 108 (2019).

Chapters 69-79 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 6. Criminal Procedure Generally

Publisher's Notes. Section 1 of the Preliminary Provisions of the 1869 Code of Practice in Criminal Cases, which is codified throughout this subtitle, provided that the provisions of the code would regulate proceedings in all prosecutions and penal actions in all the courts of the state and be known as the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases.

Section 214 of the 1869 code, as amended, provided that the repeal of laws inconsistent with the 1869 code did not revive any previous law or affect any existing right or proceeding already taken, except as provided by that code.

Section 410 of the 1869 code provided that the provisions of that code did not apply to the form of indictment, or pleadings in prosecutions or penal actions pending when that code took effect.

Effective Dates. Section 411 of the Criminal Code read: “This act, known as the ‘Code of Practice in Criminal Cases,’ shall so far go into effect, from and after its passage, that all proceedings in pursuance of its provisions shall be valid, but no proceeding before the first day of January, 1869, shall be rendered invalid by said Code; but on the first day of January, 1869, this Code shall take effect for all purposes, after which all proceedings shall be in accordance herewith.” Approved July 22, 1868.

Chapter 80 General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1077, §§ 1 and 2, provided:

“SECTION 1. Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Commission created.

“(a) There is created the Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Commission.

“(b) The commission shall consist of the following members:

“(1) The Governor or the Governor's designee;

“(2) A member of the House Judiciary Committee selected by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

“(3) A member of the Senate Judiciary Committee selected by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate;

“(4) The Attorney General or the Attorney General's designee;

“(5) The Director of the Arkansas Sentencing Commission;

“(6) A public defender appointed by the Public Defender Commission;

“(7) The Prosecutor Coordinator or the coordinator's designee;

“(8) A practicing attorney selected by the President of the Arkansas Bar Association;

“(9) A circuit judge selected by the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court;

“(10) A Judge of the Arkansas Court of Appeals selected by the Chief Judge of the Arkansas Court of Appeals;

“(11) A Supreme Court Justice selected by the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court;

“(12) The Director of the Department of Correction or the director's designee;

“(13) A sheriff selected by the Arkansas Sheriff's Association;

“(14) The Director of the Department of Arkansas State Police or the director's designee;

“(15) The Director of the Department of Community Punishment or the director's designee;

“(16) A professor from the University of Arkansas School of Law selected by the dean of the law school;

“(17) A professor from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William N. Bowen School of Law, selected by the dean of the law school;

“(18) The Executive Director of the Arkansas Code Revision Commission or the director's designee; and

“(19) The Director of the Bureau of Legislative Research or the director's designee.

“(c)(1) The Attorney General or the Attorney General's designee shall call the first meeting within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this act and shall serve as chair at the first meeting.

“(2) At the first meeting, the members of the commission shall elect from its membership a chair and other officers as needed for the transaction of its business.

“(3)(A) The commission shall conduct its meetings in Pulaski County.

“(B) Meetings shall be held at least once every three (3) months, but may occur more often at the call of the chair.

“(d) If any vacancy occurs on the commission, the vacancy shall be filled by the same process as the original appointment.

“(e) The commission shall establish rules and procedures for the conduct of its business.

“(f) Members of the commission shall serve without compensation, but may receive expense reimbursement according to § 25-16-902.

“(g) A majority of the members of the commission shall constitute a quorum for transacting any business of the commission.

“(h) The Attorney General shall provide staff for the commission.

“13-4-405. Duties of the commission.

“The commission shall:

“(1) Review all criminal laws and procedure of this state and propose any needed changes or corrections to be made by law or court rules;

“(2) Prepare draft legislation concerning the needed changes or corrections to the Arkansas Criminal Code and the criminal statutes of Arkansas;

“(3) Provide a copy of the draft legislation and any recommended changes to the court rules to the House and Senate Committee on Judiciary no later than October 1, 2004; and

“(4) Recommend to the Arkansas Supreme Court no later than October 1, 2004 any needed changes in court rules.

“SECTION 2. The commission expires July 1, 2005.”

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective January 1, 1976.

Effective Dates. Acts 1985, No. 569, § 3: Mar. 26, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there has been a tremendous increase in the number of offenses perpetrated against children in this State, that children of very tender years have increasing difficulty remembering past events necessary for a criminal prosecution the longer the length of time between the event and the trial, and that offenses against children are especially serious as to require, as nearly as possible, immediate removal of the offender from society. Therefore, this Act is necessary to shorten the time between the occurrence of the criminal offense and the trial and punishment of the perpetrator. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 14: Mar. 20, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, more than one hundred persons in Arkansas are entitled to relief under those decisions; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to make those persons eligible for parole in order to be in compliance with Montgomery v. Louisiana. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

16-80-101. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning method of prosecution, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 550. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 85; Crim. Code, §§ 6-8; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2854-2856, 3036; Pope's Dig., §§ 3670-3672, 3860; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-101 — 43-104.

16-80-102. Precedence given to criminal trials when victim under age of 14.

Notwithstanding any rule of court to the contrary and in furtherance of the purposes of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 27.1, all courts of this state having jurisdiction of criminal offenses, except for extraordinary circumstances, shall give precedence to the trials of criminal offenses over other matters before the court, civil or criminal, when the alleged victim is a person under the age of fourteen (14) years.

History. Acts 1985, No. 569, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 22-159.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 569, § 1, is also codified as § 16-10-130.

Case Notes

Cited: Thompson v. Erwin, 310 Ark. 533, 838 S.W.2d 353 (1992).

16-80-103. Disposition of stolen property.

  1. All property obtained by theft, robbery, or burglary shall be restored to the owner, and no sale, whether in good faith on the part of the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his or her right to the property.
  2. Any person losing property or any valuable thing by theft, robbery, or burglary may maintain his or her action not only against the felon but against any person whatsoever in whose hands or possession the property or valuable thing may be found.
  3. When property alleged to have been stolen comes into the possession of any sheriff, constable, law enforcement officer, or other person authorized to perform the duties of the officer, he or she shall hold the property subject to the order of the officer authorized pursuant to this section to direct the disposition thereof.
  4. Upon receiving satisfactory evidence of the ownership of the property, the judge or magistrate who shall take the examination of the person accused of stealing the property may order the property to be delivered to the owner, on his or her paying the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the preservation of the property, to be certified by the judge or magistrate, which order shall entitle the owner to demand and receive the property.
  5. If stolen property comes into the hands of a judge or magistrate, upon satisfactory proof of the ownership thereof, it shall be delivered to the owner, on the payment of the necessary expenses incurred in the preservation thereof, to be certified by the judge or magistrate.
  6. If the property stolen has not been delivered to the owner thereof, the court before which a conviction shall be had for stealing the property, on proof of the ownership, may order the property to be restored to the owner, on payment of the expenses incurred in the preservation thereof.
  7. If stolen property shall not be claimed by the owner within six (6) months from the time any person may have been convicted for stealing the property, the judge or magistrate authorized by the preceding provisions to order a restoration may order the property to be sold. The proceeds of the sale, after payment of the expenses of the preservation and sale of the property, shall be paid into the county treasury for the use of the county.
    1. If the thing stolen is a living animal or property of a perishable nature, the judge or magistrate authorized to order a restitution may order a sale thereof, and the proceeds shall be applied in the same manner as otherwise directed in this section with respect to stolen property.
    2. In all cases of sale as specified in subdivision (h)(1) of this section a particular description of the property shall be made out in writing and filed with the judge or magistrate making the order of sale so that the owner may be enabled to identify the property if he or she shall claim the proceeds within the time allowed for making his or her claim.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 44, div. 4, art. 6, §§ 3, 4; ch. 45, §§ 228-234; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1084, 1085, 10240a, 10240b, 3359-3365; Pope's Dig., §§ 1292, 1293, 1295, 1296, 4207-4213; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2901 — 43-2909; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 265.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “or her” and “or she” throughout the section; substituted “theft” for “larceny” in (a) and (b); inserted “law enforcement officer” in (c); inserted “judge or” preceding “magistrate” twice in (d); in (e), substituted “judge or” for “justice of the peace or other” preceding the first occurrence of “magistrate” and inserted “judge or” preceding the last occurrence of “magistrate”; and substituted “judge” for “court” in (g) and (h).

Cross References. Disposition of seized things, ARCrP 15.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

John Norwood, The Splendid Mystery of the Lost Lottery Ticket, 2013 Ark. L. Notes 1217.

Case Notes

Insurance.

Insured and his assignee under automobile policy could not recover against insurer for collision of stolen car, as purchaser of stolen car does not have sole and unconditional ownership. Southern Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Motor Fin. Co., 215 Ark. 601, 222 S.W.2d 981 (1949).

Title.

Title to stolen property remains in its rightful owner. Superior Iron Works & Supply Co. v. McMillan, 235 Ark. 207, 357 S.W.2d 524 (1962).

The common law rule that title to stolen property remains in its rightful owner is now embodied in subsection (a). Routh Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Wins, 312 Ark. 123, 847 S.W.2d 707 (1993).

Sections 27-50-1101 — 27-50-1103 and 27-50-1201 — 27-50-1210 have not implicitly amended the common law rule now embodied in this section since the acts are not so inconsistent that they cannot stand together; subsection (a) can be given effect where an automobile is stolen from the owner, and can be given effect when the vehicle is abandoned by the owner. Routh Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Wins, 312 Ark. 123, 847 S.W.2d 707 (1993).

16-80-104. Comprehensive mental health evaluation for a minor convicted of capital murder or murder in the first degree.

  1. If a comprehensive mental health evaluation is not performed at the request of the minor convicted of capital murder, § 5-10-101, or murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, before his or her trial or before he or she is sentenced, the circuit court shall ensure that a comprehensive mental health evaluation is conducted on the minor by an adolescent mental health professional licensed in the state before the minor's entry into the Division of Correction for a sentence of life imprisonment.
  2. A comprehensive mental health evaluation ordered under this section shall include without limitation the following information concerning the minor:
    1. Family interviews;
    2. Prenatal history;
    3. Developmental history;
    4. Medical history;
    5. History of treatment for substance use;
    6. Social history; and
    7. A psychological evaluation.
  3. A comprehensive mental health evaluation conducted under this section:
    1. Is not admissible into evidence at a trial or sentencing over the objections of the minor; and
    2. Shall be included in any documentation or inmate file kept by the Division of Correction or, if the minor is eventually supervised on parole, the Division of Community Correction.

History. Acts 2017, No. 539, § 8; 2019, No. 910, §§ 857, 858.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2017, No. 539, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017’.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 2, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a)(1) The General Assembly acknowledges and recognizes that minors are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences must be taken into account when minors are sentenced for adult crimes.

“(2) As the United States Supreme Court quoted in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), ‘only a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior,’ and ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,’ including ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’.

“(3) Minors are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers, and they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.

“(4) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized through its cases in Miller, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes’.

“(5) Youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.

“(b) In the wake of these United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging juvenile brain and behavioral development science, several states, including Texas, Utah, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Alaska, West Virginia, Colorado, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachussets, and the District of Columbia, have eliminated the sentence of life without parole for minors.

“(c) It is the intent of the General Assembly to eliminate life without parole as a sentencing option for minors and to create more age-appropriate sentencing standards in compliance with the United States Constitution for minors who commit serious crimes.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a) and (c)(2); and substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (c)(2).

Chapter 81 Citation and Arrest

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective January 1, 1976.

Acts 2015, No. 1179, § 3, added “Citation and” to the chapter heading.

Research References

Am. Jur. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest, § 3 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

C.J.S. 6A C.J.S., Arrest, § 4 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Criminal Procedure, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 349.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Interpreters for arrested deaf persons, §§ 16-64-112, 16-89-105.

Effective Dates. Acts 1874, No. 2, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 49, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 32, § 3: Feb. 19, 1988. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that properly certified law enforcement officers of the U. S. Forest Service and the National Park Service are not now included in the list of federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to arrest persons who violate Arkansas laws; that these federal officers should have that authority and in order to protect the public welfare should be granted that authority as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 268, § 6: Feb. 28, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that since the recent court decision in Bates v. Bates, this state has lacked adequate remedies for dealing with domestic violence and abuse; that the problem of domestic violence and abuse in our society is so complex that proper judicial remedies for victims and potential victims transcend the traditional jurisdictions of circuit and municipal court; that every potential remedy should be made available to members of households who have been subjected to abuse or are likely to be subjected to abuse such as to authorize warrantless arrests for domestic abuse. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 2005, No. 26, § 2: Feb. 1, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that crime is a threat to the safety to the citizens of the State of Arkansas; that additional certified law enforcement officers can reduce the threat of crime; and that this act is immediately necessary because it will avoid delay in increasing the number of law enforcement officers that can arrest offenders of the laws of the State of Arkansas. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2005, No. 272, § 2: Feb. 24, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is currently no statute that authorizes certified law enforcement officers from border cities to assist Arkansas law enforcement officers, and a statute is needed for the more efficient enforcement of Arkansas law. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Sufficiency of showing of reasonable belief of danger to officers or others excusing compliance with ‘knock and announce’ requirement — state criminal cases. 17 A.L.R.4th 301.

Lawfulness of warrantless search of purse or wallet of person arrested or suspected of crime. 29 A.L.R.4th 771.

Arrest without warrant by identified police officer outside of jurisdiction, when not in fresh pursuit. 34 A.L.R.4th 328.

Liability for false arrest or imprisonment under warrant as affected by mistake as to identity of person arrested. 39 A.L.R.4th 705.

Validity of arrest made in reliance upon uncorrected or outdated warrant list or similar police records. 45 A.L.R.4th 550.

Ark. L. Rev.

Torts — Unprivileged Arrest as a Basis for False Imprisonment Action, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 485.

The Obstruction of Justice by Interference with a Law Enforcement Officer's Performance of Duty, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 46.

Criminal law — Arrest — Presence of Officer as Prerequisite to Arrest for Misdemeanor, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 210.

The Federal Standard: The New State Law of Search and Seizure? 19 Ark. L. Rev. 329.

Search of the Person Incident to a Lawful Arrest, 28 Ark L. Rev. 79.

Arrest, Citation and Summons — The Supreme Court Takes a Giant Step Forward, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 137.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Arrest without a warrant — a man's home is his castle, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 95.

16-81-101. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning persons subject to arrest, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 551. The section was derived from Crim. Code, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 2853; Pope's Dig., § 3669; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-401.

16-81-102. Persons not subject to arrest.

    1. The members of the Senate and House of Representatives and the clerks, sergeants-at-arms, and doorkeepers of each branch of the General Assembly shall be privileged from arrest during the session of the General Assembly and for fifteen (15) days before the commencement and after the termination of each session.
    2. If any person shall arrest any of the persons named in this subsection during the time they are privileged therefrom, the person shall forfeit and pay the sum of one hundred dollars ($100), with costs, to be recovered by action in the name and for the use of the injured party.
  1. All persons qualified to vote for representatives in the General Assembly shall be privileged from arrest during their attendance at any election and while on their way going to and returning from the election.
  2. No person shall be arrested while doing militia duty under the order of his commanding officer or while going to or returning from the place of duty or parade.
  3. No person shall be arrested in the Senate chamber or House of Representatives during their sitting, or in any court of justice during the sitting of the court.
  4. Nothing contained in this section shall be so construed as to extend to cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace or to privilege any person named from being served at any time or place specified in this section with a summons or notice to appear.
  5. If any person is arrested contrary to the provisions of this section, the person shall be discharged on a writ of habeas corpus by any court or officer having authority to issue the writ at the cost of the party procuring the arrest.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 10, §§ 1, 3-6, 8, 9; C. & M. Dig., §§ 429, 431-434, 436, 437; Pope's Dig., §§ 466, 468-471, 473, 474; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-301 — 43-307.

Cross References. Certain actions, witnesses privileged from arrest, § 16-43-102.

Criminal prosecutions, witnesses from without the state privileged from arrest, § 16-43-404.

Electors, except for treason, felony, and breach of the peace, privileged from arrest, Ark. Const., Art. 3, § 4.

Exemption of members of General Assembly from arrest, Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 15.

Prisioner from other state immune from arrest or process while being transported or held as witness, § 16-43-308.

Privilege of volunteer and militia forces from arrest, Ark. Const., Art. 11, § 3.

Case Notes

Legislators.

A member of the legislature, while in attendance at a session of the General Assembly, can be served with a summons to appear after the adjournment of the legislature. Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. Munn, 151 Ark. 629, 238 S.W. 40 (1922).

Waiver of Exemption.

The right of a militiaman to be exempt from arrest may be waived by him. Reed v. State, 103 Ark. 391, 147 S.W. 76, 1912 Ark. LEXIS 202 (1912).

Cited: Jones v. Adkins, 176 Ark. 167, 2 S.W.2d 9 (1928).

16-81-103. Power of judge or magistrate to summon, examine, and issue warrant for arrest.

When a judge or magistrate is satisfied that a felony has been committed, he or she shall have power to summon before him or her any persons he or she may think proper and examine them on oath concerning it to enable him or her to ascertain the offender and to issue a warrant for his or her arrest.

History. Crim. Code, § 29; C. & M. Dig., § 2900; Pope's Dig., § 3716; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-410; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 266.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “judge or” and made gender neutral changes.

16-81-104. Warrant of arrest generally.

      1. A warrant of arrest may be issued by any circuit court judge, district court judge, or magistrate.
      2. A warrant of arrest may be executed by any law enforcement officer.
    1. It is the duty of a circuit court judge, district court judge, or magistrate to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with the commission of an offense when, from his or her personal knowledge or from information given him or her on oath, the circuit court judge, district court judge, or magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the charge.
      1. The prosecuting attorney may, whenever he or she believes any person has committed an offense in any county in the district for which he or she is elected, file before any circuit court judge, district court judge, or magistrate within the county in which he or she believes the offense has been committed a written information, under oath, charging the person with the commission of the offense.
      2. Upon a filing described in subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, the circuit court judge, district court judge, or magistrate may issue his or her warrant for the arrest of the person and have the person brought before him or her according to law.
  1. A warrant of arrest, in general terms, shall name or describe the offense charged to have been committed and the county in which it was committed. The warrant shall command the officer to whom it is directed to arrest the person named therein as the offender and bring him or her before some judge or magistrate of the county in which the offense was committed, to be dealt with according to law. It may be substantially in the following form, varying the terms to suit the case:

“The State of Arkansas.

To any law enforcement officer of the State of Arkansas:

It appearing that there are reasonable grounds for believing that A. B. has committed the offense of larceny in the County of Pulaski, you are therefor commanded, forthwith, to arrest A. B., and bring him before some judge or magistrate of Pulaski County, to be dealt with according to law.

Given under my hand the day of , 20

C.D.

Judge or Magistrate,

Summon as witnesses E. F. and J. K.”

History. Crim. Code, §§ 23, 24, 28; Acts 1883, No. 49, § 2, p. 72; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2894, 2895, 2899, 8320; Pope's Dig., §§ 3710, 3711, 3715, 10897; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-406 — 43-409; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 266; 2019, No. 608, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. “This code,” referred to in this section, means the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote (a)(1); inserted “judge or” in (a)(2) and (b); substituted “circuit, district, or city judge or magistrate” for “justice of the peace” in (a)(3); in the sample warrant form, substituted “law enforcement officer” for “Sheriff, Constable, Coroner, Jailer, Marshal, or Policeman” and “Judge or Magistrate” for “Justice of the Peace for Pulaski County” and made gender neutral changes.

The 2019 amendment, in (a)(1)(A), inserted “court” twice and deleted “or city judge” preceding “or magistrate; in (a)(2), substituted “circuit court judge, district court judge” for “judge” twice and substituted “an offense” for “public offense”; rewrote (a)(3); and made stylistic changes.

Cross References. Basis for issuance, ARCrP 7.1.

Form of warrant, ARCrP 7.2.

Research References

ALR.

Propriety of Warrant Under Federal Law Based Upon Network Investigative Technique (NIT), 29 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2018).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Although this section prescribes a procedure for the issuance of warrants that includes the presentation of the information to a neutral and detached magistrate, it appears to require the magistrate to issue the warrant upon such presentation. If this reading is correct, this section would impermissibly vest power to make probable-cause determinations in the hands of the prosecutor. Fairchild v. Lockhart, 675 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Ark. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. Ark. 1988).

Purpose.

The only purpose of an affidavit and arrest warrant is to have an accused arrested and brought before the justice, or other officer issuing the warrant, so that the accused may be dealt with according to law. Gomez v. State, 305 Ark. 496, 809 S.W.2d 809 (1991), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Ark. LEXIS 471 (July 10, 1995).

Affidavit.

Where the affidavit served its purpose, it was not necessary to consider whether the affidavit was defective for failing to state the date the alleged offense took place. Gomez v. State, 305 Ark. 496, 809 S.W.2d 809 (1991), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Ark. LEXIS 471 (July 10, 1995).

Approval by Judge.

The appearance of the traffic judge's initials on the corner of a warrant of arrest would not cause court to take judicial notice that judge must have approved the issuance of the warrant by the clerk. Webb v. State, 269 Ark. 415, 601 S.W.2d 848 (1980).

Defects.

A warrant commanding an officer to arrest on a charge of felony without designating the species of felony is not void and the officer cannot legally refuse to arrest the accused and will be liable to indictment if he permits him to escape by negligence. Martin v. State, 32 Ark. 124 (1877).

A defective warrant is immaterial after arrest. Cox v. City of Jonesboro, 112 Ark. 96, 164 S.W. 767 (1914); Dudney v. State, 136 Ark. 453, 206 S.W. 898 (1918).

An illegal arrest is not grounds for dismissal of criminal charges. State v. Fore, 46 Ark. App. 27, 876 S.W.2d 278 (1994).

Description of Offense.

Description of offense may be in general terms. Tucker v. State, 86 Ark. 436, 111 S.W. 275, 1908 Ark. LEXIS 431 (1908); Lismore v. State, 94 Ark. 207, 126 S.W. 853 (1910); State v. Brown, 131 Ark. 127, 198 S.W. 877 (1917).

Disqualification of Counsel.

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying defendant's lawyer under Ark. R. Prof. Conduct 1.12 because the lawyer's participation in issuing the arrest warrant and presiding over the plea and arraignment hearing when he was a judge was substantial under Ark. R. Prof. Conduct 1.0 as both qualified as matters of clear and weighty importance. To issue the arrest warrant when he was a judge, the lawyer had been required to weigh the merits to determine that the affidavit in support demonstrated reasonable grounds that defendant had committed the offense in question. Floyd v. State, 2016 Ark. 264, 495 S.W.3d 82 (2016).

Issuance by Clerk.

Arrest warrant for contempt of court which was issued by court clerk without authorization of judge and without accompanying affidavit or proof that an information was issued and which was not executed for over two years after its issuance was invalid as being both defective and “stale.” Webb v. State, 269 Ark. 415, 601 S.W.2d 848 (1980).

Judicial Immunity Upheld.

Because Arkansas law authorizes municipal judges to issue arrest warrants, where municipal judge issued warrant to enforce a circuit court judgment, judge acted, at most, in excess of jurisdiction and not in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 1994).

Offense Against United States.

Justice of the peace may issue a warrant for and bind over one charged with perjury against the laws of the United States. McIntosh v. Bullard, Earnhart & Magness, 95 Ark. 227, 129 S.W. 85 (1910).

Cited: Pursley v. State, 302 Ark. 471, 791 S.W.2d 359 (1990).

16-81-105. Execution of summons and service of process.

Any law enforcement officer to whom any criminal summons or warrant of arrest is directed may serve or execute it in any county in the state.

History. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 19, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3865; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-411; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 248.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “law enforcement” for “peace.”

Case Notes

Construction.

There are only four instances where the General Assembly has delegated the authority for law enforcement officers to make an arrest outside of their jurisdictions: (1) “fresh pursuit” (§ 16-81-301); (2) when the police officer has a warrant for arrest (§ 16-81-105); (3) when a local law enforcement agency requests an outside officer to come into the local jurisdiction and the outside officer is from an agency that has a written policy regulating its officers when they act outside their jurisdiction (§ 16-81-106(b)(3) and (4)); and (4) when a county sheriff requests that a peace officer from a contiguous county come into that sheriff's county and investigate and make arrests for violations of drug laws (§ 5-64-705). Henderson v. State, 329 Ark. 526, 953 S.W.2d 26 (1997).

Territorial Jurisdiction.

The traditional concept of territorial jurisdiction for peace officers is a sound one since a local community is best served by the requirement that local officers familiar with local neighborhoods make arrests in the community. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990).

Although an Arkansas deputy did not have authority under this section to arrest an arrestee pursuant to an Arkansas arrest warrant at the arrestee's parents' home, which was located in Oklahoma, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity as to the arrestee's Fourth Amendment claim because it was objectively reasonable for the deputy to have believed that the arrest was taking place in Arkansas. A 911 call from the home was identified as originating from an Arkansas area code and an Arkansas address, the home's mailbox was located in Arkansas, and the arrest warrant stated that the arrestee resided at the home's address in Arkansas. Engleman v. Murray, 546 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2008).

Warrantless Arrest.

Where the defendant was incarcerated and charged with robbery and the evidence was of such a substantial nature that the county officers had reasonable grounds or probable cause for the arrest and detention of defendant on the robbery charge, the warrantless arrest by the officer outside his county was a lawful arrest and restraint. Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 549, 534 S.W.2d 760, 1976 Ark. LEXIS 2104 (1976).

Where two officers from one county were accompanied by a police officer of the county in which the arrest was made, at the time of the arrest, no warrant was needed. Logan v. State, 264 Ark. 920, 576 S.W.2d 203 (1979).

Cited: Davis v. Dahmm, 763 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Brown v. State, 38 Ark. App. 18, 827 S.W.2d 174 (1992).

16-81-106. Authority to arrest — Definition.

  1. An arrest may be made by a certified law enforcement officer or by a private person.
  2. A certified law enforcement officer may make an arrest:
    1. In obedience to a warrant of arrest delivered to him or her; and
      1. Without a warrant, where a public offense is committed in his or her presence or where he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony.
      2. In addition to any other warrantless arrest authority granted by law or court rule, a certified law enforcement officer may arrest a person for a misdemeanor without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed battery upon another person, the officer finds evidence of bodily harm, and the officer reasonably believes that there is danger of violence unless the person alleged to have committed the battery is arrested without delay.
    1. A certified law enforcement officer who is outside his or her jurisdiction may arrest without warrant a person who commits an offense within the officer's presence or view if the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor.
      1. A certified law enforcement officer making an arrest under subdivision (c)(1) of this section shall notify the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the arrest was made as soon as practicable after making the arrest.
      2. The law enforcement agency shall then take custody of the person committing the offense and take the person before a judge or magistrate.
    2. Statewide arrest powers for a certified law enforcement officer will be in effect only when the certified law enforcement officer is working:
      1. Outside his or her jurisdiction at the request of or with the permission of the municipal or county law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the locale where the certified law enforcement officer is assisting or working by request; or
        1. As part of a child abduction response team.
        2. As used in subdivision (c)(3)(B)(i) of this section, “child abduction response team” means a multiagency or multi-jurisdictional composite of community professionals who are trained and equipped to respond in the search and recovery of an abducted or endangered child.
    3. Any law enforcement agency exercising statewide arrest powers under this section must have a written policy on file regulating the actions of its employees relevant to law enforcement activities outside its jurisdiction.
  3. A private person may make an arrest where he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony.
  4. A magistrate or any judge may orally order a certified law enforcement officer or private person to arrest anyone committing a public offense in the magistrate's or judge's presence, which order shall authorize the arrest.
  5. For purposes of this section, the term “certified law enforcement officer” includes a full-time wildlife officer of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission so long as the officer shall not exercise his or her authority to the extent that any federal funds would be jeopardized.
    1. The following persons employed as full-time law enforcement officers by the federal, state, county, or municipal government who are empowered to effect an arrest with or without warrant for violations of the United States Code and who are authorized to carry firearms in the performance of their duties shall be empowered to act as officers for the arrest of offenders against the laws of this state and shall enjoy the same immunity, if any, to the same extent and under the same circumstances as certified state law enforcement officers:
      1. Federal Bureau of Investigation special agents;
      2. United States Secret Service special agents;
      3. United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services special agents, investigators, and patrol officers;
      4. United States Marshals Service deputies;
      5. United States Drug Enforcement Administration special agents;
      6. United States Postal Service postal inspectors and special agents;
      7. United States Customs and Border Protection special agents, inspectors, and patrol officers;
      8. United States General Services Administration special agents;
      9. United States Department of Agriculture special agents;
      10. United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives special agents;
      11. Internal Revenue Service special agents and inspectors;
      12. Certified law enforcement officers of the United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service;
      13. Members of federal, state, county, municipal, and prosecuting attorneys' drug task forces;
      14. Certified law enforcement officers of the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service; and
      15. United States Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration special agents.
    2. If an agency described in subdivision (g)(1) of this section changes its name, the law enforcement officers described in subdivision (g)(1) of this section that are employed by the agency remain empowered to act as officers for the arrest of offenders against the laws of this state and retain the same immunity, if any, to the same extent and under the same circumstances as certified state law enforcement officers.
  6. Pursuant to Article 2.124 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, any certified law enforcement officer of the State of Arkansas or law enforcement officer specified in subsection (g) of this section shall be authorized to act as a law enforcement officer in the State of Texas with the same power, duties, and immunities of a peace officer of the State of Texas who is acting in the discharge of an official duty:
    1. During a time in which:
        1. The law enforcement officer from the State of Arkansas is transporting an inmate or criminal defendant from a county in Arkansas that is on the border of Texas to a hospital or other medical facility in a county in Texas that is on the border between the two (2) states.
        2. Transportation to such a facility shall be for purposes including, but not limited to, evidentiary testing of that inmate or defendant as is authorized pursuant to laws of the State of Arkansas or for medical treatment; or
      1. The law enforcement officer from the State of Arkansas is returning the inmate or defendant from the hospital or facility in Texas to an adjoining county in Arkansas; and
    2. To the extent necessary to:
      1. Maintain custody of the inmate or defendant while transporting the inmate or defendant; or
      2. Retain custody of the inmate or defendant if the inmate or defendant escapes while being transported.
        1. A certified law enforcement officer trained pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the State of Arkansas and the United States Department of Justice or the United States Department of Homeland Security is authorized to make an arrest in order to enforce federal immigration laws.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 32-35; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2903-2906; Pope's Dig., §§ 3719-3722; Acts 1983, No. 848, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-402 — 43-405; Acts 1987, No. 496, § 1; 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 32, § 1; 1989, No. 715, § 1; 1989, No. 846, § 1; 1993, No. 362, § 1; 1993, No. 436, § 1; 1995, No. 719, § 1; 2005, No. 26, § 1; 2005, No. 907, § 4; 2005, No. 1994, § 267; 2009, No. 158, § 1; 2013, No. 423, § 1; 2017, No. 946, § 1; 2019, No. 913, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The title of Acts 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 32, purports to amend § 16-81-106 by allowing National Park Service officers and employees to arrest persons. Section 1 of the act grants arrest powers to officers of the Department of Interior, National Park Service. The emergency clause, however, states that, in addition to the National Park Service, law enforcement officers of the U.S. Forest Service should be given arrest powers. The U.S. Forest Service is under the Department of Agriculture.

This section, as amended by Acts 1989, No. 715, was repealed by identical Acts 1993, Nos. 362 and 436, § 2.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment by No. 26 inserted “and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service” in (g)(12); and added (g)(14).

The 2005 amendment by No. 907 added (i).

The 2005 amendment by No. 1994 inserted “or her” and “or she” throughout this section; and inserted “judge or” in (c)(2)(B).

The 2009 amendment substituted “making” for “make” in (c)(2)(A).

The 2013 amendment redesignated the introductory language of former (g) as the introductory language of (g)(1); redesignated former (g)(1) through (g)(14) as (g)(1)(A) through (g)(1)(N); added (g)(1)(O) and (g)(2).

The 2017 amendment substituted “Postal Service postal inspectors and special agents” for “Postal Inspection Service postal inspectors” in (g)(1)(F).

The 2019 amendment, added the (c)(3)(A) designation; added (c)(3)(B); and made stylistic changes.

U.S. Code. Federal immigration laws are generally found in title 8 of the U.S. Code.

Cross References. Failure to meet qualifications for law enforcement officers, § 12-9-108.

Research References

ALR.

Power of Private Citizen to Institute Criminal Proceedings Without Authorization or Approval by Prosecuting Attorney. 90 A.L.R.6th 385.

Ark. L. Rev.

Killenbeck, Nothing That We Can Do? Or, Much Ado About Nothing? Some Thoughts on Bates v. Bates, Equity, and Domestic Abuse in Arkansas, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 747.

Killenbeck, And Then They Did …? Abusing Equity in the Name of Justice, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Ben Honaker, Note: We've Got Ourselves in a Pickle: The Supreme Court of Arkansas's Recent Expansion of Fourth Amendment Rights May Have Unintended Consequences, Pickle v. State, 2015 Ark. 286, 39 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 299 (2017).

Case Notes

Construction.

Where Acts 1989, No. 846 covered the entire subject matter of Acts 1989, No. 715, the General Assembly intended No. 846 as a substitute for No. 715, which repealed No. 715 amending this section by extending to wild life officers the same powers as other law enforcement officers. Uilkie v. State, 309 Ark. 48, 827 S.W.2d 131 (1992).

There are only four instances where the General Assembly has delegated the authority for law enforcement officers to make an arrest outside of their jurisdictions: (1) “fresh pursuit” (§ 16-81-301); (2) when the police officer has a warrant for arrest (§ 16-81-105); (3) when a local law enforcement agency requests an outside officer to come into the local jurisdiction and the outside officer is from an agency that has a written policy regulating its officers when they act outside their jurisdiction (§ 16-81-106(3) and (4)); and (4) when a county sheriff requests that a peace officer from a contiguous county come into that sheriff's county and investigate and make arrests for violations of drug laws (§ 5-64-705). Henderson v. State, 329 Ark. 526, 953 S.W.2d 26 (1997).

Authority to Detain.

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1 provides that a law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing a felony or misdemeanor involving danger or forcible injury to persons or damage to the identification of the person, or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct. King v. State, 42 Ark. App. 97, 854 S.W.2d 362 (1993).

Certification.

This section and § 12-9-108 are repugnant in that this section provides that only certified law enforcement officers have the authority to make arrests, while § 12-9-108 provides that it does not matter whether officers are certified in order to make a valid arrest; however, that limited difference did not repeal the authority of law enforcement officers to make arrests, and a law officer who is vested with the authority to make arrests can issue citations. McDaniel v. State, 309 Ark. 20, 826 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Illegal Arrest.

An illegal arrest is not grounds for dismissal of criminal charges. State v. Fore, 46 Ark. App. 27, 876 S.W.2d 278 (1994).

Outside Jurisdiction.

A local police officer, acting without a warrant outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction under which he holds office, is without official power to apprehend an offender unless he is authorized to do so by statute, and evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful detention or illegal arrest is subject to the exclusionary rule and should be suppressed. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990).

Where officer went to the location reported to him and observed truck being driven in a hazardous manner, stopped the truck, observed that defendant was drunk, and arrested him, the misdemeanor was committed in the officer's presence within the meaning of (c). Menard v. Carlisle, 309 Ark. 522, 834 S.W.2d 632 (Ark. 1992).

Where police officer initially noticed defendant's erratic driving while both the officer and the defendant were within the city limits, but where the officer waited for an additional period of observation before stopping and arresting the defendant rather than taking a chance of having the case dismissed, the officer had the authority to either stop, or to stop and arrest, the defendant before he left the officer's jurisdiction, and the officer was within the bounds of his authority when he followed defendant outside his jurisdiction and subsequently made the stop and arrest. King v. State, 42 Ark. App. 97, 854 S.W.2d 362 (1993).

Police officer from another jurisdiction had authority to arrest defendant as the latter was seen leaving a the scene of an attempted robbery because the local jurisdiction had asked the officer to assist and the foreign jurisdiction had a written policy on how to render assistance outside the foreign officer's jurisdiction. Martinez v. State, 352 Ark. 135, 98 S.W.3d 827 (2003).

Motion under the Fourth Amendment to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop was properly denied; even if Arkansas law did not give the officer authority to stop defendant's truck in a neighboring city, the officer had probable cause to stop defendant for a minor traffic violation and thus there was no Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Castleman, 795 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 912, 193 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2016).

Statewide Power.

Fact that city resolution authorizing officers to go into unincorporated parts of county did not provide for statewide arrest authority did not constitute noncompliance with this section since section does not require that the local government must make its officers travel statewide; there is no language in this section that would prohibit limiting the officer's official travel to a particular area of the state. Menard v. Carlisle, 309 Ark. 522, 834 S.W.2d 632 (Ark. 1992).

Territorial Jurisdiction.

The traditional concept of territorial jurisdiction for peace officers is a sound one since a local community is best served by the requirement that local officers familiar with local neighborhoods make arrests in the community. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990).

Cited: Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990).

16-81-107. Procedures of arrest.

  1. An arrest is made by placing the person of the defendant in restraint or by his or her submitting to the custody of the person making the arrest.
  2. No unnecessary force or violence shall be used in making the arrest.
  3. To make an arrest, a law enforcement officer may break open the door of a house in which the defendant may be after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.
  4. A law enforcement officer making an arrest may summon orally as many persons as he or she deems necessary to aid him or her in making the arrest, and all persons failing without reasonable excuse to obey the summons shall be guilty of Class C misdemeanors.
  5. The person making the arrest shall:
    1. Inform the person about to be arrested of the intention to arrest him or her and the offense for which he or she is to be arrested; and
    2. If acting under a warrant of arrest, give information of the warrant and show the warrant if required.
  6. The law enforcement officer making an arrest in obedience to a warrant shall proceed with the defendant as directed by the warrant.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 36-40, 42; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2907-2912; Pope's Dig., §§ 3723-3728; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-412 — 43-414, 43-415 — 43-417; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 412.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “a law enforcement” for “an” in (c) and (d); inserted “or her” in (d) and twice in (e); in (d), inserted “Class C” and deleted “and punished by fine and imprisonment, or either” at the end; inserted “or she” in (e); and inserted “law enforcement” in (f).

Cross References. Procedures on Arrest, ARCrP 4.4.

Refusing to assist law enforcement officer, § 5-54-109.

Resistance to authority, § 12-11-104.

Research References

ALR.

Power of Private Citizen to Institute Criminal Proceedings Without Authorization or Approval by Prosecuting Attorney. 90 A.L.R.6th 385.

Case Notes

Purpose.

This section is designed for the protection of the citizen, who may not be deprived of the liberty and taken into custody without being advised of the reasons for that action. Minton v. State, 198 Ark. 875, 131 S.W.2d 948 (1939).

Applicability.

This section has no application when the offense is committed in the presence of the officer, and the offender knows the officer has seen him commit the offense. Minton v. State, 198 Ark. 875, 131 S.W.2d 948 (1939).

Where the trouble resulted from defendant's resistance to and interference with an officer in the discharge of his duty, this statute has no application if the offense is committed in the presence of the officer and the officer would have no duty to inform defendant of the reason for his arrest. Bookout v. Hanshaw, 235 Ark. 924, 363 S.W.2d 125 (1962).

Duty to Inform.

The attempt of an officer to arrest one without informing him that he held a warrant and of his intention to arrest him does not justify the latter in killing the officer where he knew that he had the warrant and that his purpose was to arrest him. Appleton v. State, 61 Ark. 590, 33 S.W. 1066 (1896).

Where there was evidence that defendant charged with murder killed deceased while attempting to arrest him for offense committed in his presence, instruction advising jury that “person making the arrest shall inform the person about to be arrested of the intent to arrest him, the offense charged against him for which he is to be arrested” was reversible error. Minton v. State, 198 Ark. 875, 131 S.W.2d 948 (1939).

Where defendant had testified that he presumed that the arresting officer was in fact an officer of the law, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that the officer making the arrest must inform person of the officer's intention to arrest him and the offense for which he is being arrested, in view of fact that defendant's objection to the court's failure to give the instruction was based solely on the ground that the officer's official capacity was not made known to defendant. Dillard v. State, 260 Ark. 743, 543 S.W.2d 925 (Ark. 1976).

Failure to Aid Officer.

It is a good defense to a prosecution for failure to obey summons to aid an officer in making an arrest that defendant was sick and therefore unable to do so. Greenwood v. Smothers, 103 Ark. 158, 146 S.W. 109 (1912); Allen v. State, 117 Ark. 432, 174 S.W. 1179 (1915).

Manner of Making Arrest.

The word “arrest” did not have to be used to constitute a lawful arrest, rather it was the actual restrain or consent to restraint which constituted the arrest. McDonald v. State, 253 Ark. 812, 491 S.W.2d 36 (1973).

Although ARCrP 4.4 requires that the officer inform the arrested person that he is under arrest, formal words are not essential to an arrest. Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9, 642 S.W.2d 887, 1982 Ark. LEXIS 1606 (1982).

The officers were not required to make an arrest when they first had probable cause to do so. Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9, 642 S.W.2d 887, 1982 Ark. LEXIS 1606 (1982).

Use of Force.

Evidence insufficient to allow officer to plead self-defense. Johnson v. State, 100 Ark. 139, 139 S.W. 1117 (1911).

Evidence sufficient to show that force used was necessary because plaintiffs were resisting arrest. Pritchard v. Downie, 216 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Ark. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964).

Cited: Martin v. State, 114 Ark. 230, 169 S.W. 776 (1914); Pritchard v. Downie, 216 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Ark. 1963); Akins v. State, 253 Ark. 273, 485 S.W.2d 535 (1972); Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 93 S. Ct. 2199, 37 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1973); United States v. Price, 441 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Logan v. State, 264 Ark. 920, 576 S.W.2d 203 (1979); Ginter v. Stallcup, 641 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Ark. 1986); Pursley v. State, 302 Ark. 471, 791 S.W.2d 359 (1990).

16-81-108. Arrest on certain private property permitted.

State and local police are authorized to enter upon the parking areas of private business establishments and to discover, investigate, and effect the arrest of persons thereon violating any state or local law to the same extent as if the person or persons were upon the public streets or highways.

History. Acts 1969, No. 107, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-414.1.

Case Notes

Violation of Traffic Laws.

Inasmuch as a shopping center parking lot was not a highway, a defendant, whose car collided with another vehicle as defendant was pulling out of a parking space, could not be charged with the violation of failure to yield right-of-way. Hartson v. City of Pine Bluff, 270 Ark. 748, 606 S.W.2d 149 (1980).

16-81-109. Bail.

    1. When any sheriff or other law enforcement officer makes an arrest, he or she is authorized to take and to approve bail in the manner provided by law wherever he or she makes the arrest.
    2. If the offense charged is a misdemeanor, the person arrested may immediately give bail for appearing on a day to be named in the bail bond before the judge or magistrate who issued the warrant or before the court having jurisdiction to try the offense. The sheriff or other officer making the arrest may be authorized by the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to take the bail by an endorsement made on the warrant to that effect.
    1. If the defendant gives bail for his or her appearance before the judge or magistrate for an examination of the charge, as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the sheriff or officer taking the bail shall fix the day of the defendant's appearance.
    2. A deviation from the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall not, however, render the bail bond invalid.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 25-27; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [25]; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2896-2898; Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 19, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., §§ 3712-3714, 3865; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-411, 43-418 — 43-420; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 268.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (a)(1), inserted “sheriff or other law enforcement” and “or she”; inserted “judge or” in (a)(2) and (b)(1); substituted “judge or magistrate” for “justice” in (a)(2); and, in (b)(1), inserted “or her” and “sheriff or” and deleted “which shall not exceed five (5) days from the day of arrest, unless the arrest is made in a different county from that in which the offense was committed, in which case there may be one (1) day added for every twenty (20) miles of distance from the place of arrest to the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed” from the end.

Cross References. Bail generally, § 16-84-101 et seq.

Imprisonment for debt, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 16.

Case Notes

Affidavits.

Affidavits to hold to bail must be strictly construed. Robinson v. Holt, 20 F. Cas. 1016 (C.C.D. Ark. 1840).

Bail Bond in Replevin.

In the case of a bail bond in replevin, recovery could not be had against the sureties, in view of this section, until a capias ad satisfaciendum issued with a return thereon of non est inventus. Daniels v. Wagner, 156 Ark. 198, 245 S.W. 487 (1922).

16-81-110. Return on the warrant.

    1. The sheriff or officer who has executed a warrant of arrest shall make a written return on the warrant of the time and manner of executing it and deliver the warrant to the judge or magistrate before whom the defendant is brought.
    2. If bail is given as provided in § 16-81-109(a)(2), the officer shall deliver the warrant and bail bond to the judge or magistrate before whom, or to the clerk of the court in which, the defendant is bound by the bail bond to appear.
  1. If the arrest is made in a different county from that in which the offense is charged to have been committed and bail is given, the sheriff or officer may transmit the warrant and bail bond by mail to the person to whom by subsection (a) of this section he or she is required to deliver them.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 30, 31; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2901, 2902; Pope's Dig., §§ 3717, 3718; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-421, 43-422; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 268.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “sheriff or” and “judge or” throughout this section; and inserted “or she” in (b).

Cross References. Return of warrant and summons, execution after return, ARCrP 7.3.

16-81-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transportation of prisoners, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 552. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 237-239; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3366-3368; Pope's Dig., §§ 4214-4216; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-423 — 43-425.

16-81-112. Escape of prisoner.

  1. If the defendant escapes or is rescued after an arrest, the person in whose custody he or she was may immediately pursue and recapture him or her in any part of the state.
    1. If any person charged with or convicted of a felony within this state breaks prison, escapes, flees from justice, or absconds or secrets himself or herself, it shall be lawful for the Governor, if he or she deems it necessary, to offer a reward not to exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for apprehending and delivering the person into the custody of an officer as the governor may direct.
    2. Any person apprehending and delivering the escapee to the proper officer and producing to the Governor the receipt of the officer for the body of the escapee shall be entitled to the reward offered by the Governor, and the Governor shall certify the amount of the reward to the Auditor of State, who shall issue his or her warrant on the State Treasury for the reward, to be paid out of any money appropriated for the contingent expenses of the executive department.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 67, §§ 27, 28; Crim. Code, § 41; Acts 1874, No. 2, § 1, p. 39; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2916, 4897, 4898; Pope's Dig., §§ 3732, 6108, 6109; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-426 — 43-428; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 489.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (b)(1), deleted “treason, murder, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, larceny, perjury, counterfeiting, or any other” following “convicted of” and substituted “one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)” for “one thousand dollars.”

Case Notes

Cited: Blevins v. State, 31 Ark. 53 (1876).

16-81-113. Warrantless arrest for domestic abuse — Definitions.

      1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed acts which constitute a crime under the laws of this state and which constitute domestic abuse as defined in subdivision (b)(1) of this section against a family or household member, the officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102, even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.
      2. The arrest of the person shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer when evidence indicates that domestic abuse has occurred in addition to a violation of the Arkansas Criminal Code, § 5-1-101 et seq.
      1. When a law enforcement officer receives conflicting accounts of an act of domestic abuse involving family or household members, the law enforcement officer shall evaluate each account separately to determine if one (1) party to the act of domestic abuse was the predominant aggressor.
        1. When determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor, a law enforcement officer shall consider the following factors based upon his or her observation:
          1. Statements from parties to the act of domestic abuse and other witnesses;
          2. The extent of personal injuries received by parties to the act of domestic abuse;
          3. Evidence that a party to the act of domestic abuse acted in self-defense; or
          4. Prior complaints of domestic abuse if the history of prior complaints of domestic abuse can be reasonably ascertained by the law enforcement officer.
        2. A law enforcement officer may consider any other relevant factors when determining if one (1) party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor.
      1. When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person that is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a felony under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer shall arrest the person who was the predominant aggressor with or without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102, even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.
        1. When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the arrest with or without a warrant of the person who was the predominant aggressor shall be considered the preferred action by the law enforcement officer if there is reason to believe that there is an imminent threat of further injury to any party to the act of domestic abuse and the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed the act of domestic abuse within the preceding four (4) hours or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102, even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.
        2. When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person who is a party to an act of domestic abuse is the predominant aggressor and the act of domestic abuse would constitute a misdemeanor under the laws of this state, the law enforcement officer may arrest the person without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed those acts within the preceding four (4) hours, or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102, even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the law enforcement officer.
    1. Any law enforcement officer acting in good faith and exercising due care in making an arrest for domestic abuse shall have immunity from civil liability.
  1. As used in this section:
      1. “Dating relationship” means a romantic or intimate social relationship between two (2) individuals which shall be determined by examining the following factors:
        1. The length of the relationship;
        2. The type of the relationship; and
        3. The frequency of interaction between the two (2) individuals involved in the relationship.
      2. “Dating relationship” shall not include a casual relationship or ordinary fraternization in a business or social context between two (2) individuals;
    1. “Domestic abuse” means:
      1. Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members; or
      2. Any sexual conduct between family or household members, whether minors or adults, which constitutes a crime under the laws of this state; and
    2. “Family or household member” means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons related by blood within the fourth degree of consanguinity, any child residing in the household, persons who have resided or cohabited together presently or in the past, persons who have or have had a child in common, and persons who have been in a dating relationship together presently or in the past.
    1. Any person arrested under the provisions of this section shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay.
    2. The judicial officer shall conduct a pretrial release inquiry of the person.
  2. The inquiry should take the form of an assessment of factors relevant to the release decision such as:
    1. The person's employment status, history, and financial condition;
    2. The nature and extent of his or her family relationships;
    3. His or her past and present residence;
    4. His or her character and reputation;
    5. Persons who agree to assist him or her in attending court at the proper times;
    6. The nature of the charge and any mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear on the likelihood of conviction and the possible penalty;
    7. The person's prior criminal record, if any, and if he or she previously has been released pending trial, whether he or she appears as required;
    8. Any facts indicating the possibility of violations of law if the person is released without restrictions; and
    9. Any other facts tending to indicate that the person has strong ties to the community and is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court.
  3. The judicial officer may impose one (1) or more of the following conditions of release:
    1. Placing the person under the care of a qualified person or organization agreeing to supervise the person and assist him or her in appearing in court;
    2. Imposing reasonable restrictions on the activities, movements, associations, and residences of the person; and
    3. Imposing any other reasonable restrictions to ensure the appearance of the person at future judicial hearings.

History. Acts 1991, No. 268, §§ 1, 2; 1999, No. 1550, § 1; 2001, No. 1421, § 1; 2001, No. 1678, § 3; 2005, No. 1875, § 3; 2007, No. 204, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment by No. 1421, in (a)(1), substituted “in subdivision (b)(1) of this section” for “herein,” inserted “or within the preceding twelve (12) hours for cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102(14)” and made minor punctuation changes.

The 2001 amendment by No. 1678, in (b)(2), substituted “any child residing in the household” for “and,” added “and persons who have or have had a child in common” and made minor grammatical and gender neutral changes throughout.

The 2005 amendment inserted “and persons who are presently or in the past have been in a dating relationship together” in (b)(2); and added (b)(3) and made related changes.

Cross References. First degree assault on family or household member, § 5-26-307.

Domestic abuse definitions, § 9-15-103.

Petition form for protection orders, § 9-15-203.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Family Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 799.

16-81-114. Warrantless arrest for gas theft.

  1. Any person who pumps fuel into a vehicle or container, which fuel is the property of a retail business entity that engages in the sale of fuel, and then leaves the premises with the fuel and without paying for the fuel shall be subject to arrest during the four (4) hours following the event, notwithstanding the lack of a warrant for the arrest.
  2. Provided, however, the person arrested shall be released within twenty-four (24) hours of the arrest unless a warrant for the arrest of the person is issued according to law.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1515, § 1.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section, which allows a warrantless arrest for gas theft, is not an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. State v. Lester, 343 Ark. 662, 38 S.W.3d 313 (2001).

Construction With Other Laws.

This section, which allows a warrantless arrest for gas theft, is not superseded by Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.1. State v. Lester, 343 Ark. 662, 38 S.W.3d 313 (2001).

16-81-115. Certified law enforcement officers from adjoining states.

  1. A certified law enforcement officer from an adjoining state who is in Arkansas shall have the authorization to act as described in subsection (b) of this section if the officer is:
    1. Regularly assigned to duty in a municipality that is within one (1) mile of an Arkansas border;
    2. On duty in his or her regularly assigned municipality at the time he or she enters the city limits of the Arkansas municipality; and
    3. Within the city limits of the Arkansas municipality that adjoins the municipality to which the officer is regularly assigned.
  2. If the governing body of an Arkansas municipality authorizes it, a certified law enforcement officer who meets the requirements of subsection (a) of this section:
    1. Has the same powers, duties, and immunities as a certified law enforcement officer of Arkansas who is acting in the discharge of an official duty; and
    2. May enforce Arkansas law and the ordinances of an Arkansas municipality.

History. Acts 2005, No. 272, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

16-81-116. Warrantless arrest for violation of interference with emergency communication in the first degree, § 5-60-124, or interference with emergency communication in the second degree, § 5-60-125.

If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a person has violated § 5-60-124 or § 5-60-125, the officer may arrest the person without a warrant even if the incident did not take place in the presence of the officer if the officer has probable cause to believe the person has violated the section within the preceding:

  1. Four (4) hours; or
  2. Twelve (12) hours in cases involving physical injury as defined in § 5-1-102.

History. Acts 2009, No. 1456, § 1.

16-81-117. Interpreters for deaf persons who are arrested.

  1. If a person who is deaf is arrested for a criminal offense and taken into custody, the arresting law enforcement officer and his or her superiors shall procure a qualified interpreter in order to properly interrogate the deaf person and to interpret the person's statement.
  2. If a qualified interpreter is not present when a deaf person makes a statement while in custody for an arrest, the statement is not admissible in court.

History. Acts 2013, No. 237, § 5.

16-81-118. Citation and arrest by a school resource officer — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “school resource officer” means a school resource officer as described under § 6-10-128.
  2. A school resource officer may issue a citation to a person to appear in the local district court having jurisdiction over the place where a violation of state law occurred even if the school resource officer is outside of his or her jurisdiction if:
    1. The school resource officer is accompanying students on a school-sanctioned event that takes the students outside the county in which the school is located;
    2. The violation of state law is in conjunction with criminal activity that directly involves the students, school employees, or other persons participating in, observing, or assisting the school-sanctioned event; and
    3. The person who is the recipient of the citation is a student, school employee, or other person participating in, observing, or assisting the school-sanctioned event.
  3. The school resource officer shall use a citation book that substantially complies with the citation requirements under § 16-10-205.
    1. A citation issued under this section is not valid unless the school resource officer provides at a minimum:
      1. The address and phone number of the district court having jurisdiction;
      2. The date and time when the recipient of the citation is to appear in the district court;
      3. A cite to the specific state law that was alleged to have been violated;
      4. The printed name and date of birth of the person receiving the citation; and
        1. An opportunity for the person receiving the citation to sign the citation.
        2. If the person who is to receive the citation refuses to sign the citation, the school resource officer is required to arrest the person and deliver him or her to the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction immediately.
    2. The school resource officer shall file a copy of the citation issued under this section at least fifteen (15) days before the court date listed on the citation.
    3. The school resource officer shall provide a person receiving a citation under this section a full and complete copy of the citation.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1179, § 4.

Subchapter 2 — Stop and Search

Cross References. Search and Seizure, § 16-82-201 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 10: Apr. 9, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the crime rate in Arkansas is rising at a rapid rate; that the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies has been drastically curtailed by recent court decisions; that in many instances, the crime rate could be reduced and the criminal apprehended before he commits additional crime if the enforcement officer had authority to stop and search suspects and; that in order to remedy this situation, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Lawfulness of warrantless search of purse or wallet of person arrested or suspected of crime. 29 A.L.R.4th 771.

Am. Jur. 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Search, § 35 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Search of the Person Incident to a Lawful Arrest, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 79.

C.J.S. 79 C.J.S., Search, § 63 et seq.

16-81-201, 16-81-202. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning limitations on statutory construction and definitions, were repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 499. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-81-201. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-434.

16-81-202. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-433.

16-81-203. Grounds to reasonably suspect.

The following are among the factors to be considered in determining if the officer has grounds to reasonably suspect:

  1. The demeanor of the suspect;
  2. The gait and manner of the suspect;
  3. Any knowledge the officer may have of the suspect's background or character;
  4. Whether the suspect is carrying anything, and what he or she is carrying;
  5. The manner in which the suspect is dressed, including bulges in clothing, when considered in light of all of the other factors;
  6. The time of the day or night the suspect is observed;
  7. Any overheard conversation of the suspect;
  8. The particular streets and areas involved;
  9. Any information received from third persons, whether they are known or unknown;
  10. Whether the suspect is consorting with others whose conduct is reasonably suspect;
  11. The suspect's proximity to known criminal conduct;
  12. The incidence of crime in the immediate neighborhood;
  13. The suspect's apparent effort to conceal an article; and
  14. The apparent effort of the suspect to avoid identification or confrontation by a law enforcement officer.

History. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-435; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 249.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “a law enforcement officer” for “the police” in (14).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

J.H. Berry, Arkansas Open Carry: Understanding Law Enforcement’s Legal Capability Under a Difficult Statute, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 139 (2017).

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law, Criminal Law, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 700.

Case Notes

In General.

This section is merely illustrative, and not exhaustive, of the types of factors that may be considered in forming reasonable suspicion. Summers v. State, 90 Ark. App. 25, 203 S.W.3d 638 (2005).

Informant's Information.

Defendant's drug convictions were improper where the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him based only on an informant's information that defendant had just bought a “large quantity” of matches; the initial stop and the subsequent search of defendant's home were illegal seizures and, thus, inadmissible. Summers v. State, 90 Ark. App. 25, 203 S.W.3d 638 (2005).

Motion to suppress evidence was improperly granted because, where police had known an informant to give reliable information in the past, and accurate information was received from the informant about defendant and his vehicle, officers had specific, particularized, and articulable reasons for thinking that defendant was involved in criminal activity, which justified a stop under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1. Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the vehicle, any pretext on the part of the officers was irrelevant; moreover, the officers did not need any additional reasonable suspicion to justify a canine sniff, which was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Harris, 372 Ark. 492, 277 S.W.3d 568 (2008).

Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant based on a reliable confidential informant's information that he was going to deliver methamphetamine at a specified convenience store and defendant's arrival at the store, followed by the informant's call to defendant that he was at the wrong store and defendant's then leaving the first store and driving toward the other store. Owens v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 763, 387 S.W.3d 250 (2011).

Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and investigate drug-related criminal activity because a reliable known informant provided information about a delivery of methamphetamine. The fact that defendant arrived in a black car rather than a white car of the same make as described did not undermine reasonable suspicion. James v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 118, 390 S.W.3d 95 (2012).

Plain View.

Although this section would not justify a warrantless search where officer had no reason to believe defendant was armed and probably dangerous, the plain view exception to the warrant requirement rendered the warrantless search lawful. Phillips v. State, 53 Ark. App. 36, 918 S.W.2d 721, 1996 Ark. App. LEXIS 166 (1996).

Reasonable Suspicion.

Circuit court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress marijuana and contraband found on his person where the police officers had been called to a motel to investigate drug use on the premises, and the smell of raw and burnt marijuana emanating from defendant's person was sufficient to give the officers reasonable suspicion to stop him and determine if he was involved in the drug use. Spraglin v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 166 (2015).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress because under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's continued detention was not unlawful; the officer testified that he knew defendant, that he had received information from a reliable informant that defendant had drugs in the vehicle, and that defendant's demeanor continued to make him nervous, and defendant's fiancée stated to the officer that defendant placed a plastic bag under his seat after he had entered her vehicle. Rainey v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 427, 528 S.W.3d 288 (2017).

Consensual police-citizen encounter transformed into a seizure because a reasonable person in defendant's position would not believe he was free to leave based on the officers' 10-minute search for another individual who fled the scene, and an officer's request for permission to search for that individual in defendant's residence; however, the police had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant based on such factors as the prior reports of trespassing where defendant was parked, a black pouch containing plastic baggies in plain sight between the front seats of the truck, a determination that defendant had prior methamphetamine convictions, and the fact that the co-occupant fled the scene, and the 20-minute length of the detention was not unreasonable under these circumstances. Dye v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 545, 564 S.W.3d 299 (2018).

Reasonableness.

Evidence sufficient to justify police officer arresting defendant for intoxication. Holmes v. State, 262 Ark. 683, 561 S.W.2d 56 (1978).

Officer had adequate reason to stop vehicle. McDaniel v. State, 20 Ark. App. 201, 726 S.W.2d 688Certiorari or review denied by484 U.S. 838, 108 S. Ct. 121 (1987).

In determining whether an encounter with defendant was unconstitutional under Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court considered the factors listed in this section and determined that the officer did not have grounds to reasonably suspect defendant enough to warrant the detention and search. Jennings v. State, 69 Ark. App. 50, 10 S.W.3d 105 (2000).

Police officers were justified in stopping and searching defendant where defendant and another man were in a high crime area known for drug activity, they stood in a lot beside a vacant house and engaged in a hand-to-hand exchange, when they saw the police officers they separated and walked away, defendant was nervous, and the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient that defendant was engaged in illegal activity. Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003).

Defendant's nervous demeanor and the fact that he shifted his bag away from the drug dog were objective reasons for police officers to stop him and request his identification under Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2, even though they did not know at that point who defendant was. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 197 S.W.3d 468 (2004), cert. denied, Jackson v. Arkansas, 544 U.S. 1039, 125 S. Ct. 2266 (2005).

Motion to suppress evidence was properly denied, even though the trial court erred by finding that no seizure occurred when defendant was detained outside of a restaurant to wait on a canine sniff of his vehicle, because the officers had specific, particularized, and articulable reasons for suspecting defendant of involvement in the sale of methamphetamine based on the fact that he was following a known associate, who was driving a rental car, and they parked next to each other at the restaurant. Dowty v. State, 363 Ark. 1, 210 S.W.3d 850 (2005).

Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant for a canine sniff after a traffic stop where the officer based the further detention on a one-way rental, a rental in another person's name, nervousness, and the presence of air freshener. Lilley v. State, 362 Ark. 436, 208 S.W.3d 785 (2005).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a detention and a canine sniff of defendant's truck because an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant under subdivisions (1), (3), (6) and (9) of this section; after stopping defendant for driving a vehicle with a broken tail light, the officer noted that defendant refused to make eye contact, exhibited increased nervousness, and was known to have had prior drug problems. Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 167, 392 S.W.3d 897 (2012).

“Reasonably Suspect.”

A reasonable suspicion has been defined as a suspicion based upon facts or circumstances that give rise to more than a bare, imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion. Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997).

There was no indication that defendant was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a felony or a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, and the only factor present from this section, supporting a determination that the officer had grounds to “reasonably suspect”, was the fact that the neighborhood was a known drug area. Jennings v. State, 69 Ark. App. 50, 10 S.W.3d 105 (2000).

Officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant where the only factors tending to lead to reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 were the time of day and the incidence of crime in the neighborhood, and where the officers failed to observe any criminal activity or observe a suspicious transaction; officers did not have reasonable suspicion as defined by Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.1, and they were not investigating a particular crime as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2. Davis v. State, 77 Ark. App. 310, 74 S.W.3d 671 (2002), rev'd, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003).

Where police were patrolling a trailer park known for drug trafficking at 2:00 a.m., and defendant appeared from between two trailers and attempted to evade police, there was a reasonable suspicion that something illegal was afoot to justify a stop; moreover, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine which fell to the ground when defendant pulled his hand from his pocket. Jefferson v. State, 349 Ark. 236, 76 S.W.3d 850 (Ark. 2002).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress because an officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying a weapon and, therefore, a frisk of defendant was not an illegal search; the officer testified that defendant's shrugged shoulders, no eye contact, and tightening up indicated to the officer that defendant was lying about not having any weapons or anything illegal. Gilbert v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 857, 379 S.W.3d 774 (2010).

Circuit court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered in a search of her truck after she was stopped for a traffic violation was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Factors that combined to give a state trooper a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity were: (1) one month earlier he had stopped the same truck and arrested defendant's passenger for drunk driving and possession of marijuana; (2) during a criminal history check, the trooper discovered defendant had been previously arrested; (3) the trooper had information from a local police department that defendant was suspected of drug dealing; (4) defendant was nervous; and (5) it was late at night. Menne v. State, 2012 Ark. 37, 386 S.W.3d 451 (2012).

In an aggravated robbery case, suppression of evidence was not warranted because there was a reasonable suspicion for stopping a vehicle; an officer spotted a car near the robbery that was seen at another robbery a few days earlier, and the owner of the car had been arrested previously for having a gun. Davis v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 658, 430 S.W.3d 190 (2013).

In a drug case, a motion to suppress should have been granted because a canine sniff was conducted on a vehicle without reasonable suspicion for a continued detention after a traffic stop. Defendant picked up a package that had a strong odor of dryer sheets, the package contained a California return address and was addressed to someone besides defendant, a package with the same return address had been previously intercepted by the post office, neither of the names on the package were associated with the respective street addresses, and defendant did not sign for the package with his own name. However, these facts did not give rise to anything more than bare suspicion. MacKintrush v. State, 2016 Ark. 14, 479 S.W.3d 14 (2016).

Cited: Stewart v. State, 332 Ark. 138, 964 S.W.2d 793 (1998); Hill v. State, 81 Ark. App. 178, 100 S.W.3d 84 (2003).

16-81-204 — 16-81-209. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning stopping and detaining, were repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 500. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-81-204. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-429.

16-81-205. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-430.

16-81-206. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-431.

16-81-207. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-435.

16-81-208. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-436.

16-81-209. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-432.

Subchapter 3 — Uniform Act on Intrastate Fresh Pursuit

Research References

ALR.

Arrest without warrant by identified police officer outside of jurisdiction, when not in fresh pursuit. 34 A.L.R.4th 328.

Publisher's Notes. For Comments regarding the Intrastate Fresh Pursuit Act, see Commentaries Volume B.

16-81-301. Authority of law enforcement officers.

Any law enforcement officer of this state in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed to have committed a felony in this state or has committed or attempted to commit any criminal offense in this state in the presence of the officer, or for whom the officer holds a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense, shall have the authority to arrest and hold in custody such person anywhere in this state.

History. Acts 1941, No. 19, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-501; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 250.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “law enforcement” for “peace.”

Case Notes

Construction.

There are only four instances where the General Assembly has delegated the authority for law enforcement officers to make an arrest outside of their jurisdictions: (1) “fresh pursuit” (§ 16-81-301); (2) when the police officer has a warrant for arrest (§ 16-81-105); (3) when a local law enforcement agency requests an outside officer to come into the local jurisdiction and the outside officer is from an agency that has a written policy regulating its officers when they act outside their jurisdiction (§ 16-81-106(3) and (4)); and (4) when a county sheriff requests that a peace officer from a contiguous county come into that sheriff's county and investigate and make arrests for violations of drug laws (§ 5-64-705). Henderson v. State, 329 Ark. 526, 953 S.W.2d 26 (1997).

This section does not conflict with § 16-19-301. Reed v. State, 330 Ark. 645, 957 S.W.2d 174, 1997 Ark. LEXIS 685 (1997).

Authority to Detain.

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1 provides that a law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing a felony or misdemeanor involving danger or forcible injury to persons or damage to the identification of the person, or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct. King v. State, 42 Ark. App. 97, 854 S.W.2d 362 (1993).

Constables.

Although a constable's general powers and duties are established by § 16-19-301, a constable's authority to engage in the fresh pursuit of criminal suspects, whether suspected of committing felonies or misdemeanors, is derived from this section. Reed v. State, 330 Ark. 645, 957 S.W.2d 174, 1997 Ark. LEXIS 685 (1997).

A constable is a “peace officer” within the meaning of this section. Reed v. State, 330 Ark. 645, 957 S.W.2d 174, 1997 Ark. LEXIS 685 (1997).

Fresh Pursuit.

Where campus patrolman had witnessed traffic offenses and could form a reasonable belief that the defendant was intoxicated, such firsthand information and fact that he began pursuit within his jurisdiction, demonstrated that the patrolman was well within the bounds of his authority when he pursued the defendant for four blocks in the course of fresh pursuit and made the arrest outside the patrolman's jurisdiction. Smith v. City of Little Rock, 305 Ark. 168, 806 S.W.2d 371 (1991).

Because police was within his territorial jurisdiction when he first observed defendant driving in a dangerous manner, and began his pursuit of defendant from this point, the subsequent arrest was authorized under the “fresh pursuit” doctrine. Brown v. State, 38 Ark. App. 18, 827 S.W.2d 174 (1992).

Outside Jurisdiction.

A local police officer, acting without a warrant outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction under which he holds office, is without official power to apprehend an offender unless he is authorized to do so by statute, and evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful detention or illegal arrest is subject to the exclusionary rule and should be suppressed. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990).

Where police officer initially noticed defendant's erratic driving while both the officer and the defendant were within the city limits, but where the officer waited for an additional period of observation before stopping and arresting the defendant rather than taking a chance of having the case dismissed, the officer had the authority to either stop, or to stop and arrest, the defendant before he left the officer's jurisdiction, and the officer was within the bounds of his authority when he followed defendant outside his jurisdiction and subsequently made the stop and arrest. King v. State, 42 Ark. App. 97, 854 S.W.2d 362 (1993).

Territorial Jurisdiction.

The traditional concept of territorial jurisdiction for peace officers is a sound one since a local community is best served by the requirement that local officers familiar with local neighborhoods make arrests in the community. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990).

Warrantless Arrest.

Where county officers had reasonable grounds or probable cause for the arrest and detention of defendant, warrantless arrest by the officer outside his county was lawful arrest and restraint. Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 549, 534 S.W.2d 760, 1976 Ark. LEXIS 2104 (1976).

Cited: Davis v. Dahmm, 763 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Ark. 1991).

16-81-302. Disposition of prisoner.

If such an arrest is made in obedience to a warrant, the disposition of the prisoner shall be as in other cases of arrest under a warrant; if the arrest is without a warrant, the prisoner shall without unnecessary delay be taken before a judge or magistrate of the county wherein such an arrest was made.

History. Acts 1941, No. 19, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-502; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 269.

Amendments. The 2005 substituted “judge or” for “municipal court or a justice of the peace or other” and deleted “and such court shall admit each person to bail, if the offense is bailable, by taking security by way of recognizance for the appearance of the prisoner before the court having jurisdiction of such criminal offense” from the end.

Case Notes

Presentment Before Magistrate.

Since the arrest was legal without regard to fresh pursuit, there was no requirement that the defendant be taken before a local magistrate under this subchapter. Logan v. State, 264 Ark. 920, 576 S.W.2d 203 (1979).

16-81-303. Definition.

    1. The term “fresh pursuit” as used in this subchapter shall include:
      1. Fresh pursuit as defined by the common law; and
      2. The pursuit of a person:
        1. Who has committed a felony or is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony in this state;
        2. Who has committed or attempted to commit any criminal offense in this state in the presence of the arresting law enforcement officer referred to in § 16-81-301; or
        3. For whom the officer holds a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense.
    2. It shall also include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony in this state, though no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for so believing.
  1. Fresh pursuit as used in this subchapter shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.

History. Acts 1941, No. 19, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-503; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 251.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “law enforcement” in (a)(1)(B)(ii).

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Where campus patrolman had witnessed traffic offenses and could form a reasonable belief that the defendant was intoxicated, such firsthand information and fact that he began pursuit within his jurisdiction, demonstrated that the patrolman was well within the bounds of his authority when he pursued the defendant for four blocks in the course of fresh pursuit and made the arrest outside the patrolman's jurisdiction. Smith v. City of Little Rock, 305 Ark. 168, 806 S.W.2d 371 (1991).

Misdemeanors.

The definition of fresh pursuit is broad enough to embrace misdemeanors. Smith v. City of Little Rock, 305 Ark. 168, 806 S.W.2d 371 (1991).

Warrantless Arrest.

Evidence sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest by police based upon exigent circumstances, or upon the “fresh pursuit” exception as defined by this section. Thorne v. State, 274 Ark. 102, 622 S.W.2d 178 (1981), cert. denied, Thorne v. Arkansas, 455 U.S. 1024, 102 S. Ct. 1726 (1982).

16-81-304. Construction of act.

Section 16-81-301 shall not make unlawful an arrest which would otherwise be lawful.

History. Acts 1941, No. 19, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-504.

16-81-305. Title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Uniform Act on Intrastate Fresh Pursuit.”

History. Acts 1941, No. 19, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-505.

Subchapter 4 — Uniform Act on Interstate Fresh Pursuit

Research References

ALR.

Arrest without warrant by identified police officer outside of jurisdiction, when not in fresh pursuit. 34 A.L.R.4th 328.

Ark. L. Rev.

Uniform Act on Interstate Fresh Pursuit, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 364.

16-81-401. Title.

This subchapter may be called the “Uniform Act on Interstate Fresh Pursuit.”

History. Acts 1951, No. 211, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-511.

16-81-402. Purpose.

The purpose of this subchapter is to prevent criminals from utilizing state lines to handicap our police in their apprehension.

History. Acts 1951, No. 211, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-512.

16-81-403. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter the terms:

  1. “Fresh pursuit” shall include fresh pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony or an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony or an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence. It shall also include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony or an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence, though no felony nor an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony or an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used in this subchapter shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay;
  2. “State” shall include the District of Columbia.

History. Acts 1951, No. 211, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-513; Acts 2017, No. 400, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment inserted “or an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence” and “nor an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence” wherever the phrases occur in (1).

16-81-404. Member of duly organized peace unit of other state — Authority to arrest and hold.

Any member of a duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of another state of the United States who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within this state in such fresh pursuit, of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony or an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence in such other state shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody as has any member of any duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of this state to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony or an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence in this state.

History. Acts 1951, No. 211, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-514; Acts 2017, No. 400, § 2.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment twice inserted “or an offense of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence”.

16-81-405. Member of duly organized peace unit of other state — Procedures upon arrest.

If an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of § 16-81-404, he shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the county in which the arrest was made, who shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the Governor of this state or admit him to bail for such purpose. If the magistrate determines that the arrest was unlawful, he shall discharge the person arrested.

History. Acts 1951, No. 211, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-515.

Case Notes

Damages.

Where, in a civil rights action, the plaintiffs claimed that their rights were violated when an Oklahoma district attorney falsely arrested them in this state and failed to take them before a magistrate prior to returning them to Oklahoma, the trial court correctly replaced the two $5,000 jury awards with nominal damages because the evidence was undisputed that the plaintiffs suffered no damages because of the technical violation of this section. Cole v. Williams, 798 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. Ark. 1986).

Cited: Cole v. Williams, 624 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Ark. 1985).

16-81-406. Construction.

Section 16-81-404 shall not be construed so as to make unlawful any arrest in this state which would otherwise be lawful.

History. Acts 1951, No. 211, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-516.

16-81-407. Certification of subchapter.

Upon the passage and approval by the Governor of this subchapter, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to certify a copy of this subchapter to the executive department of each of the states of the United States.

History. Acts 1951, No. 211, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-517.

Chapter 82 Search and Seizure

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective January 1, 1976.

Cross References. Stop and Search, § 16-81-201 et seq.

Unreasonable searches and seizures, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 15.

Research References

ALR.

Search and seizure authorized over telephone. 38 A.L.R.4th 1145.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 614, § 8: Mar. 16, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that a person with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) antigen or antibodies who acts irresponsibly with respect to sexual contact or with respect to transfer of blood or blood products constitutes a deadly threat to the public and health and welfare of the people of the state of Arkansas; that the incidence of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is increasing at an alarming rate and that Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) results in enormous social, health and economic costs, ultimately causing premature death of all those infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 438, § 7: Mar. 10, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that a person with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) antigen or antibodies, or Hepatitis who acts irresponsibly with respect to contact with officials performing their official duties constitutes a deadly threat to the public and health and welfare of the people of the State of Arkansas; that the incidence of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), or Hepatitis is increasing at an alarming rate and that these diseases result in enormous social, health and economic costs, ultimately causing premature death of many persons afflicted with these diseases. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-82-101. Testing for human immunodeficiency virus — Sexual offenses.

  1. A person with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) or who tests positive for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) antigen or antibodies is infectious to others through the exchange of body fluids during sexual intercourse and through the parenteral transfer of blood or blood products and under these circumstances is a danger to the public.
    1. Any person arrested and charged with violating §§ 5-14-103, 5-14-110, 5-14-124 — 5-14-127, 5-26-202, and 5-70-102 may be required by the court having jurisdiction of the criminal prosecution, upon a finding of reasonable cause to believe that the person committed the offense and subject to constitutional limitations, to be tested for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any antibody to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) unless the court determines that testing the defendant would be inappropriate and documents the reasons for that determination in the court record.
    2. The test shall be confidentially administered by a licensed physician, the Division of Health of the Department of Health and Human Services, or a local health department.
    1. If the victim or person with whom the defendant engaged in sexual penetration during the course of the crime consents, the court shall provide the person or agency administering the test with the name, address, and telephone number of the victim or person with whom the defendant engaged in sexual penetration during the course of the crime.
    2. After the defendant is tested as to the presence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or an antibody to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) the person or agency administering the test shall immediately provide the test results to the victim or person with whom the defendant engaged in sexual penetration during the course of the crime, and shall refer the victim or other person for appropriate counseling.
    1. It shall be mandatory that upon request of the victim, and conviction of the defendant, a court of competent jurisdiction shall order the convicted person to submit to testing to detect in the defendant the presence of the etiologic agent for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).
    2. For purposes of this subsection:
      1. The term “convicted” includes adjudicated under juvenile proceedings; and
      2. The term “sexual offense” shall mean those offenses enumerated in subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
    3. The testing of a person convicted of a sexual offense as enumerated in subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be conducted by the division upon an order of a circuit court.
    4. The results of any tests performed pursuant to this subsection shall immediately be released to the victim and to the defendant; otherwise, the results of any tests performed shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure as public information under the Freedom of Information Act, § 25-19-101 et seq.
    5. Any victim of a sexual offense as enumerated in subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall, upon request of the victim, receive:
      1. Appropriate counseling;
      2. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing; and
      3. Referral or delivery for appropriate health care and support services.

History. Acts 1989, No. 614, §§ 1, 5; 1993, No. 616, § 1; 2003, No. 1390, § 6.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989, No. 614, § 1, is also codified as §§ 5-14-123(a) and 20-15-904(a).

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (b)(1), deleted “§ 5-14-109, §§ 5-14-1205-14-122” and inserted “5-14-110, 5-14-1245-14-127, 5-26-202.”

Cross References. Sexual offenses generally, § 5-14-101 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Criminal Liability for Attempting to Inflict the AIDS Virus: Possibilities in Arkansas' Future, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 505.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Criminal Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 617.

Legislative Survey, Civil Liberties, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 73.

16-82-102. Testing for human immunodeficiency virus — Assault and battery.

  1. A person with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), or who tests positive for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) antigens or antibodies or hepatitis, is infectious to law enforcement officers, fire fighters, and emergency medical technicians through the exchange of body fluids during the course of their duties and through the possible transfer of blood or blood products and under these circumstances is a danger to the public.
    1. Any person arrested and charged with violating any section of § 5-13-101 et seq. by committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, fire fighter, or emergency medical technician may be required by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a finding of reasonable cause to believe that the person committed the offense and subject to constitutional limitations, to be tested for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), any antibody to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), or hepatitis unless the court determines that testing the defendant would be inappropriate and documents the reasons for that determination in the court record.
    2. The test shall be confidentially administered by a licensed physician, the Division of Health of the Department of Health and Human Services, or a local health department.
    1. If the law enforcement officer, fire fighter, or emergency medical technician victim with whom the defendant engaged in contact consents, the court shall provide the person or agency administering the test with the name, address, and telephone number of the victim.
    2. After the defendant is tested as to the presence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), an antibody to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), or hepatitis, the person or agency administering the test shall immediately provide the test results to the victim with whom the defendant engaged in contact and shall refer the victim or other person for appropriate counseling.

History. Acts 1993, No. 438, §§ 1-3.

Cross References. Assault and battery generally, §§ 5-13-201 et seq.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Liberties, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 73.

Subchapter 2 — Warrants

16-82-201. Issuance of search warrants upon oral testimony.

  1. General Rule. If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit, any judicial officer of this state may issue a warrant based upon sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means.
  2. Application.
    1. The person who is requesting the warrant shall prepare a document, in a form approved by the Arkansas Judicial Council, to be known as a duplicate original warrant and shall read such duplicate original warrant verbatim to the judicial officer.
    2. The judicial officer shall enter verbatim what is so read to such magistrate on a document to be known as an original warrant.
    3. The judicial officer may direct that the warrant be modified.
  3. Issuance.
    1. If the judicial officer is satisfied that the circumstances are such as to make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit and that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, the judicial officer shall order the issuance of a warrant by directing the person requesting the warrant to sign the judicial officer's name on the duplicate original warrant.
    2. The judicial officer shall immediately sign the original warrant and enter on the face of the original warrant the exact time when the warrant was ordered to be issued.
    3. The finding of probable cause for a warrant upon oral testimony may be based on the same kind of evidence as is sufficient for a warrant upon affidavit.
  4. Recording and Certification of Testimony.
    1. When a caller informs the judicial officer that the purpose of the call is to request a warrant, the judicial officer shall immediately place under oath each person whose testimony forms a basis for the application and each person applying for that warrant.
      1. If a voice recording device is available, the judicial officer shall record by means of the device all of the call after the caller informs the judicial officer that the purpose of the call is to request a warrant.
      2. Otherwise, a stenographic or longhand verbatim record shall be made immediately.
      3. If a voice recording device is used or a stenographic record made, the judicial officer shall have the record transcribed, shall certify the accuracy of the transcription, and shall file a copy of the original record and the transcription with the court.
      4. If a longhand verbatim record is made, the judicial officer shall file a signed copy with the court.
  5. Contents. The contents of a warrant upon oral testimony shall be the same as the contents of a warrant upon affidavit.
  6. Additional Rule of Execution. The person who executes the warrant shall enter the exact time of execution on the face of the duplicate original warrant.
  7. Motion to Suppress Precluded. Absent a finding of bad faith, evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant issued under this section is not subject to a motion to suppress on the ground that the circumstances were not such as to make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 15; C. & M. Dig., § 2890; Pope's Dig., § 3706; Acts 1971, No. 123, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-201, 43-205; Acts 1993, No. 961, § 2; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 439.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted former (a) through (e); and redesignated former (e)(1) through (e)(7) as present (a) through (g).

Cross References. Permissible objects of seizure, ARCrP 10.2.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds Execution of Search Warrants by Officers Outside of Their Territorial Jurisdiction Without Interagency Agreement or Local Cooperation Is Not Per Se Unreasonable Under Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1145 (2013).

Case Notes

Purpose.

There is no irreconcilable conflict between the procedural rule, ARCrp 13.1(b), and the substantive statute, subsection (a) of this section; the purpose of subsection (a), providing that warrants could issue “only” upon affidavit sworn to before a magistrate, was not to restrict the issuance of search warrants to affidavits, but to insure that the information presented to magistrates and upon which they relied, was sworn to and recorded to facilitate subsequent review. Costner v. State, 318 Ark. 806, 887 S.W.2d 533 (1994).

Authority of Officers.

It was not per se unreasonable for Sherwood officers to execute the search warrant, as the statute gave officers authorities to issue a warrant directed to any person in the state, and the warrant was properly issued by a judge in the Sherwood District Court, plus a warrant could be executed by any officer, and nothing indicated the officers purposefully avoided notifying other law enforcement agencies, and the court could not say that the execution of the warrant was per se unreasonable such that it warranted suppression. State v. Robinson, 2013 Ark. 425, 430 S.W.3d 105 (2013).

Compliance.

Burden was on the state to show compliance with this section if it wished to rely on affidavit and search warrant. Russ v. Camden, 256 Ark. 214, 506 S.W.2d 529 (1974).

Where affidavit for search warrant named the police informant, but did not state how the informant was acquainted with the affiant, so that there were no particular facts presented as to the informant's reliability, search warrant did not comply with this section or ARCrP 13.1 and search violated Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 15 and U.S. Const., Amend. 4 and 14. State v. Prue, 272 Ark. 221, 614 S.W.2d 221, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863, 102 S. Ct. 322, 70 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1981). But see Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983).

Grounds for Issuance.

Evidence in affidavit insufficient to support issuance of warrant. Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204 (1974); Patterson v. Lockhart, 513 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1975); Byars v. State, 259 Ark. 158, 533 S.W.2d 175 (1976).

Evidence furnished sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. Blankenship v. State, 258 Ark. 535, 527 S.W.2d 636 (1975); Maxwell v. State, 259 Ark. 86, 531 S.W.2d 468 (1976); Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993), appeal dismissed, 316 Ark. 249, 871 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1994).

There was no violation of defendants' Fourth Amendment rights when officers drove up the driveway to their house looking for a probationer in the area, discovered marijuana growing in plain view, and then obtained a search warrant as a result; further, under subsection (a) of this section, the argument that the warrant was issued by a magistrate in a separate county was of no merit. Lancaster v. State, 81 Ark. App. 427, 105 S.W.3d 365 (2003).

Jurisdiction.

Since subsection (a) expressly provides that a search warrant may be issued by any judicial officer, judicial officers are not limited to issuing search warrants only in the counties in which they were elected or appointed. Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993), appeal dismissed, 316 Ark. 249, 871 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1994).

City detective testified that, on the date of the search, he contacted the county sheriff's office and asked if they would send a couple of deputies to assist, and also contacted the city police department and obtained the search warrant, and the city detective was also the officer in charge of the pre-raid briefing, thus, the fact that the warrant was executed in the county's jurisdictional area did not require suppression of the evidence. State v. Fountain, 350 Ark. 437, 88 S.W.3d 411 (2002).

Osceola District Court judge had jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for a residence in the Chickasawba District. Wagner v. State, 2010 Ark. 389, 368 S.W.3d 914 (2010).

Malicious Prosecution.

The procuring and issuance of a search warrant, maliciously and without probable cause, will support an action for damages for malicious prosecution. Hardin v. Hight, 106 Ark. 190, 153 S.W. 99 (1913).

Oral Testimony.

This section eliminates from consideration any oral testimony unless it is reduced to writing and accompanied by affidavit. Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204 (1974).

Cited: Durham v. State, 251 Ark. 164, 471 S.W.2d 527 (1971); Morris v. State, 252 Ark. 487, 479 S.W.2d 860 (1972); Powell v. State, 260 Ark. 381, 540 S.W.2d 1 (1976).

16-82-202. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning execution of warrants, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 501. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 16-18; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2891-2893; Pope's Dig., §§ 3707-3709; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-202 — 43-204.

Subchapter 3 — Body Cavity Searches

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 452, § 5: Feb. 17, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly hereby finds that law enforcement officers are hampered in conducting constitutional body cavity searches pursuant to search warrants because hospitals refuse to admit persons for such searches and medical personnel will not perform such searches without written consent from the person to be searched. Remedial measures must be taken to protect hospitals and medical personnel from civil liability for participating in body cavity searches when the ends of justice require them. Therefore, this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its approval.”

16-82-301. Refusal and consent.

No person may refuse to be subjected to a search of his or her body cavities pursuant to Rule 12.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, and written consent from the person searched shall not be necessary.

History. Acts 1977, No. 452, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3404.

16-82-302. Performance by public personnel.

Whenever feasible, employees of public institutions and public medical personnel will perform any searches pursuant to Rule 12.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.

History. Acts 1977, No. 452, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3403.

16-82-303. Immunity from civil liability.

  1. Any physician or licensed nurse who, pursuant to Rule 12.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, when authorized by a search warrant and requested by a law enforcement officer, performs a search of the body cavity of any person is immune from civil liability of any kind arising from the search except for negligence.
  2. Any hospital or clinic where a search pursuant to Rule 12.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, authorized by a search warrant, is performed is immune from civil liability of any kind arising from the search except for negligence.

History. Acts 1977, No. 452, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-3401, 43-3402.

Chapter 83 Coroner's Inquest

16-83-101 — 16-83-114. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. Sections 16-83-10116-83-106 and §§ 16-83-10816-83-114 were repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1301, § 3. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-83-101. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 19, 20; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1586, 1587; Pope's Dig., §§ 1910, 1911; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-311, 42-312.

16-83-102. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, § 9; Acts 1893, No. 147, § 1, p. 260; C. & M. Dig., § 1576; Pope's Dig., § 1900; A.S.A. 1947, § 42-301.

16-83-103. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 10, 11, 34; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1577, 1578, 1601; Pope's Dig., §§ 1901, 1902, 1925; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-302, 42-303, 42-326.

16-83-104. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 12-16; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1579-1583; Pope's Dig., §§ 1903-1907; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-304 — 42-308.

16-83-105. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 17, 18; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1584, 1585; Pope's Dig., §§ 1908, 1909; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-309, 42-310.

16-83-106. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 21-26; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1588-1593; Pope's Dig., §§ 1912-1917; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-313 — 42-318.

16-83-108. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 29-32; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1596-1599; Pope's Dig., §§ 1920-1923; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-321 — 42-324.

16-83-109. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, § 33; C. & M. Dig., § 1600; Pope's Dig., § 1924; A.S.A. 1947, § 42-325.

16-83-110. Acts 1877, No. 59, § 1, p. 62; 1889, No. 59, § 1, p. 74; C. & M. Dig., § 1605; Pope's Dig., § 1929; A.S.A. 1947, § 42-330.

16-83-111. Acts 1965, No. 160, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-331, 42-332.

16-83-112. Acts 1979, No. 498, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 42-333.

16-83-113. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 35, 36; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1602, 1603; Pope's Dig., §§ 1926, 1927; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-327, 42-328.

16-83-114. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, § 37; C. & M. Dig., § 1604; Pope's Dig., § 1928; A.S.A. 1947, § 42-329.

Section 16-83-107 was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 417, § 7. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 27, 28; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1594, 1595; Pope's Dig., §§ 1918, 1919; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 42-319, 42-320.

Chapter 84 Bail Generally

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in §§ 16-84-20116-84-206 and subchapter 1 of this chapter may not apply to § 16-84-207 which was enacted subsequently.

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective January 1, 1976.

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 8: Mar. 8, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present laws on the regulation of the bail bond business and bail generally are confusing and have been applied in an inconsistent manner; that there is an urgent need for the revision of laws pertaining to bail and that this Act is immediately necessary to eliminate deficiencies found in the present law. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Liability of surety on bail bond taken without authority. 27 A.L.R.4th 246.

Duration of surety's liability on pretrial bond. 32 A.L.R.4th 504.

Effect on liability of bail bond surety of state's delay in obtaining indictment or bringing defendant to trial. 32 A.L.R.4th 600.

Effect on surety's liability under bail bond of principal's incarceration in other jurisdiction. 33 A.L.R.4th 663.

Effect on surety's liability under bail bond of principal's subsequent incarceration in same jurisdiction. 35 A.L.R.4th 1192.

Am. Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bail & R., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

C.J.S. 8 C.J.S., Bail, § 29 et seq.

Case Notes

Cited: Skelton v. City of Atkins, 317 Ark. 28, 875 S.W.2d 504 (1994).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. Former subchapter 1, concerning general provisions, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 417, § 7. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-84-101. Crim. Code, §§ 67, 68; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2943, 2944; Pope's Dig., §§ 3759, 3760; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-701, 43-702.

16-84-102. Crim. Code, §§ 72-75; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2945-2948; Pope's Dig., §§ 3761-3764; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-703 — 43-706.

16-84-103. Rev. Stat., ch. 116, § 23; C. & M. Dig., § 800; Pope's Dig., § 956; Acts 1963, No. 487, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2204.

16-84-104. Crim. Code, § 77; C. & M. Dig., § 2949; Pope's Dig., § 3765; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-707.

16-84-105. Acts 1857, § 1, p. 135; C. & M. Dig., § 801; Pope's Dig., § 957; A.S.A. 1947, § 27-2201.

16-84-106. Crim. Code, § 80; C. & M. Dig., § 2953; Pope's Dig., § 3769; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-708.

16-84-107. Crim. Code, § 70; C. & M. Dig., § 2957; Pope's Dig., § 3773; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-709.

16-84-108. Crim. Code, § 69; C. & M. Dig., § 2956; Pope's Dig., § 3772; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-710.

16-84-109. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 236; C. & M. Dig., § 2954; Pope's Dig., § 3770; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-711.

16-84-110. Crim. Code, § 76; C. & M. Dig., § 2955; Pope's Dig., § 3771; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-712.

16-84-111. Crim. Code, §§ 78, 79; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [79], p. 255; 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 9, § 1, p. 10; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2950-2952; Pope's Dig., §§ 3766-3768; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-713 — 43-715.

16-84-112. Crim. Code, §§ 81-83; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2961-2963; Pope's Dig., §§ 3777-3779; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-716 — 43-718.

16-84-113. Crim. Code, §§ 84-87; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2964-2967; Pope's Dig., §§ 3780-3783; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-719 — 43-722.

16-84-114. Crim. Code, §§ 96, 97; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2975, 2976; Pope's Dig., §§ 3791, 3792; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-730, 43-731.

16-84-115. Acts 1959, No. 268, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-732.

Cross References. Bail upon arrest, § 16-81-109.

Excessive bail not required, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 9.

Habeas corpus to obtain bail, § 16-112-103.

Traffic offenses, bail by depositing operator's license, § 27-50-606.

16-84-101. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Admission to bail” means an order from a competent court or magistrate that the defendant be discharged from actual custody on bail and fixing the amount of the bail;
  2. “Direct supervision” means the person is in the physical presence of and acting pursuant to instructions from an Arkansas-licensed bail bond agent;
  3. “Professional bail bondsman” means an individual licensed as a professional bail bondsman by the Professional Bail Bond Company and Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board pursuant to § 17-19-201 et seq.;
  4. “Professional bail bond company” means a person holding a professional bail bond company license issued by the Professional Bail Bond Company and Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board pursuant to § 17-19-201 et seq.;
  5. “Surety” means the person who becomes the surety for the appearance of the defendant in court; and
    1. “Taking of bail” or “take bail” means the acceptance by a person authorized to take bail of the undertaking of a sufficient surety for the appearance of the defendant according to the terms of the undertaking, or that the surety will pay to the court the sum specified.
    2. “Taking of bail” or “take bail” shall not include the fixing of the amount of bail and no person other than a competent court or magistrate shall fix the amount of bail.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1997, No. 973, § 1; 2001, No. 1387, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. “This code,” referred to in this section, means the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment inserted (2).

Case Notes

Endorsement of Bail-Bond.

The endorsement upon a bail-bond of the approval of the officer taking it is not essential to its validity. Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517 (1880).

Cited: Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971); Holt Bonding Co. v. Nichols, 988 F. Supp. 1232 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

16-84-102. Persons authorized to take bail.

  1. The following may take bail:
    1. A judge, magistrate, or clerk of the court;
    2. A sheriff or deputy sheriff with respect to any person committed to the common jail of the county;
    3. Any law enforcement officer designated by a municipal police department with respect to any person committed to a municipal jail; and
    4. A law enforcement officer making an arrest as authorized under § 16-81-109.
  2. A constable shall not take bail.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 2005, No. 1994, § 270.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “judge, magistrate or” for “competent court” and “court” for “court, or magistrate”; and, in (a)(3), substituted “law enforcement” for “police” and added “and” at the end.

Case Notes

Discretion.

Taking of bail by a sheriff is a discretionary act and mandamus will not lie to compel its performance. United Bonding Co. ex rel. Richmond v. Johnson, 293 Ark. 467, 739 S.W.2d 147 (1987).

Sheriff's refusal to accept bonds from a particular bonding company amounted to a suspension of the bonding company's authority to issue bonds, which was equivalent to an impermissible suspension of the company's license. Holt Bonding Co. v. Nichols, 988 F. Supp. 1232 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

Exemption Laws.

A bail-bond is a debt by contract, and the exemption laws apply to a judgment and execution on it. State v. Williford, 36 Ark. 155 (1880).

Cited: Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971).

16-84-103. Qualification of surety.

  1. The surety shall be:
    1. A professional bail bondsman acting through a professional bail bond company; or
    2. A resident of the state, owner of visible property, over and above that exempt from execution, to the value of the sum in which bail is required, and shall be worth that amount after the payment of the surety's debts and liabilities.
        1. The person or persons offered as surety shall be examined on oath in regard to qualifications as surety, and any officer authorized to take bail is authorized to administer the oath, reduce the statements on oath to writing, and require the person or persons offered as surety to sign the statement.
        2. Other proof may also be taken in regard to the sufficiency of the surety.
      1. Prior to submission to the court or magistrate, the statement shall also be signed by the sheriff or chief of police in the jurisdiction where the defendant is charged.
    1. Proof that the surety is a licensed professional bail bondsman shall be deemed sufficient proof of the sufficiency of the surety, and the surety shall be accepted by all courts in this state or by any individual authorized to take bail under the provisions of § 16-84-102.
  2. No person shall be taken as surety unless the court or magistrate is satisfied, from proof and examination on oath, of the sufficiency of the person according to the requisitions of subsection (b) of this section.
  3. Where more than one (1) person is offered as surety, they shall be deemed sufficient if, in the aggregate, they possess the qualifications required.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1997, No. 973, § 2; 2003, No. 1648, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “shall” for “may” in (b)(2); and made minor stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Cited: Holt Bonding Co. v. Nichols, 988 F. Supp. 1232 (W.D. Ark. 1997).

16-84-104. Additional security.

There shall be no rules, regulations, or requirements enacted by any judge, magistrate, sheriff, or other officer of the court, requiring any professional bail bondsman or professional bail bond company to post any sum of security in addition to that required by the Professional Bail Bond Company and Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board pursuant to § 17-19-205 as a requirement for acceptance or writing bail bonds.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1997, No. 973, § 3.

Case Notes

Cited: Suit v. State, 212 Ark. 584, 207 S.W.2d 315 (1947); Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971); Liberty Bonding Co. v. State, 270 Ark. 434, 604 S.W.2d 956 (1980).

16-84-105. Responsibility of officer taking bail.

  1. The officer who takes bail shall be officially responsible for the sufficiency of the surety if taken other than through a professional bail bondsman.
  2. If the surety is not a professional bail bondsman, and the defendant has not yet appeared before a judicial officer pursuant to Rule 9 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer shall file a statement with the court describing the property of the surety upon which the sufficiency of the surety is based. The description of the property shall include the value of the property. The statement shall also be signed by the sheriff or chief of police in the jurisdiction where the defendant is charged.
  3. The officer who takes bail shall give a prenumbered written receipt for the collateral. The receipt shall give in detail a full account of the collateral received.
  4. An officer who takes bail shall not be liable for any bond ordered by a judicial officer under Rule 9.2(b)(i) or (ii) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1995, No. 470, § 1.

16-84-106. Attorneys and officers not to be sureties.

No attorney, solicitor, or counselor at law or in equity, clerk, sheriff, chief of police, law enforcement officer, or other person concerned in the execution of any process, shall become a personal guarantor or surety in any criminal proceeding.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1997, No. 1046, § 1.

Case Notes

Joint Bond.

A bail-bond is not joint because it is the the joint bond of two or more for the same sum that was required by each of them. Humphries v. State, 33 Ark. 713 (1878).

Loss and Renewal of Indictment.

Where the indictment is lost or destroyed, and new indictment is found against the defendant for the same offense, his bail for appearance to the first indictment will be liable for the penalty of the bond, if he fails to appear and answer the second indictment. Price v. State, 42 Ark. 178, 1883 Ark. LEXIS 79 (1883).

Recitals of Bond.

Sureties on a bail-bond are bound by recitals of bond. Harris v. State, 60 Ark. 209, 29 S.W. 640 (1895).

Venue.

When a change of venue is granted on the application of the defendant, who is at large on bail and he is ordered into the custody of the sheriff of the county to which venue is changed, the right of the bail is impaired and his liability is at an end. State v. Jones, 29 Ark. 127 (1874).

Sureties on bail-bond are estopped to deny venue. Harris v. State, 60 Ark. 209, 29 S.W. 640 (1895).

The surety on a bail-bond is not exonerated by an order made on the application of the defendant changing the venue of the action where it is ordered that he stand upon his bail. Beasly v. State, 53 Ark. 67, 13 S.W. 733 (1890).

16-84-107. Form of bond.

  1. The undertaking of the surety, other than by a professional bail bondsman, shall be substantially as follows:
  2. If the surety is a professional bail bondsman, the undertaking of the surety shall be in a form prescribed by the rules of the Professional Bail Bond Company and Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board.

“A.B., being in custody, charged with the offense of (naming or briefly describing it), and being admitted to bail in the sum of dollars, we C.D., of (stating his place of residence), and E.F., of (stating his place of residence), hereby undertake that the above named A.B. shall appear in the court on the day of its term to answer said charge, and shall at all times render himself or herself amenable to the orders and process of said court in prosecution of said charge, and, if convicted, shall render himself in execution thereof; or if he fail to perform either of these conditions, that we will pay to the appropriate court the sum of dollars.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1997, No. 973, § 4; 2019, No. 315, § 1301.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (b).

Case Notes

Cited: Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971).

16-84-108. Bonds not void for want of form.

No prosecution, appeal, nonresident, or attachment bond, nor any other statutory bonds of any party, plaintiff, or defendant in any court of justice, in this state, nor any recognizance in any criminal cause in this state, shall be declared null and void for the want of form if the intent of the bond can be plainly deduced from the body of the bond or recognizance.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5.

Cross References. Defendant on bail for felony indictment, § 16-89-106.

Case Notes

Cancelation of Bail.

Trial court did not abuse discretion in ordering that defendant, who was on bail, be taken into custody during the trial when it was brought to the court's attention that he had indicated that he might attempt to fix or tamper with the petit jury. Reaves v. State, 229 Ark. 453, 316 S.W.2d 824 (1958), cert. denied, Reaves v. Arkansas, 359 U.S. 944, 79 S. Ct. 723 (1959).

Cited: Suit v. State, 212 Ark. 584, 207 S.W.2d 315 (1947).

16-84-109. Irregularity of bail bond or recognizance.

  1. No bail bond or recognizance shall be deemed to be invalid by:
    1. Reason of any variance between its stipulations and the provisions of this chapter;
    2. The failure of the judge or magistrate or officer to transmit or deliver the bail bond or recognizance at the times provided in this subchapter; or
    3. Any other irregularity so that it is made to appear that the defendant was:
      1. Legally in custody;
        1. Charged with the public offense; and
        2. Discharged from the offense by reason of the giving of the bond or recognizance; and
      2. Can be ascertained from the bond or recognizance, that the surety undertook that the defendant should appear before a judge or magistrate for the trial of the offense.
    1. If no day is fixed for the appearance, or an impossible day, or a day in vacation, the bond or recognizance, if for his or her appearance before a judge or magistrate, shall be considered as binding the defendant so to appear and surrender himself or herself into custody for an examination of the charge in twenty (20) days from the time of his or her giving the bond or recognizance.
    2. The bond or recognizance, if for his or her appearance for trial in court, shall be considered as binding the defendant to appear and surrender himself or herself into custody on the first day of the next term of the court which shall commence more than ten (10) days after the giving of the bond or recognizance.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 2005, No. 1994, § 271.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “judge or” twice in (a) and in (b); inserted “or she” in (a); and inserted “or her” and “or herself” throughout (b).

16-84-110. Bail before conviction.

Before conviction, the defendant may be admitted to bail for his or her appearance:

  1. Before a judge or magistrate for an examination of the charge, where the offense charged is a misdemeanor;
  2. In the court to which he or she is sent for trial;
  3. To answer an indictment which has been found against him or her; or
  4. In a criminal action.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 2005, No. 1994, § 271.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “or her” in the introductory language and in (3); inserted “judge or” in (1); inserted “or she” in (2); and substituted “criminal” for “penal” in (4).

Case Notes

Evidence.

On application for bail in a criminal case, the court will give the prisoner the benefit of any reasonable doubts that may arise in considering the testimony. Ex parte Bird & Bailey, 24 Ark. 275 (1866).

Review.

The Supreme Court has power to review, on certiorari, the decision of a circuit judge refusing bail. Ex parte Harbour, 39 Ark. 126 (1882).

16-84-111. Bail during trial.

  1. During the trial of an indictment for a misdemeanor, the defendant may remain on bail.
  2. However, for a felony when a defendant is upon bail, he or she may remain upon bail or be kept in actual custody as the court may direct. If the defendant remains on bail, any surety's liability shall be exonerated unless the surety has agreed to remain as the surety until final judgment is rendered.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5.

Cross References. Taking of bail, § 16-81-109.

Case Notes

Construction With Other Laws.

The is no conflict between § 16-84-111(b) and Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 9.2(e). Bobby Cox Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 71 Ark. App. 119, 36 S.W.3d 752 (2000).

Discretion.

Taking of bail by a sheriff is a discretionary act and mandamus will not lie to compel its performance. United Bonding Co. ex rel. Richmond v. Johnson, 293 Ark. 467, 739 S.W.2d 147 (1987).

16-84-112. Entering of recognizance on court minutes.

All recognizances required or authorized to be taken in any criminal proceeding, in open court, by any court of record shall be entered on the minutes of the court, and the substance thereof shall be read to the person recognized.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where bondsmen permitted their principal to leave the state to avoid trial and failed to appear at a hearing upon a show-cause order but later found their principal and returned him to custody, this section was not applicable. Craig v. State, 257 Ark. 112, 514 S.W.2d 383 (1974).

Cause to Surrender.

When a bondsman has reasonable cause to believe that a defendant has committed a felony while released on bond, he has cause to surrender the defendant. Johnson v. Hicks, 288 Ark. 158, 702 S.W.2d 797 (1986).

Substantial Compliance.

Although surrender was made to a person without authority, the surety was relieved from responsibility where the surrender seemed regular, according to law and in good faith, and without collusion for the escape of the prisoner. Carter v. State, 43 Ark. 132 (1884).

Substantial compliance with this section is all that is necessary to release the bail so that a surrender of the principal by the bail releases the latter although a receipt from the sheriff is not taken and the surrender was made without a certified copy of the bond. Hester v. State, 145 Ark. 347, 224 S.W. 618 (1920).

Surrender Without Cause.

The bondsman may surrender the defendant without cause pursuant to this section only if the consideration for making the bond is returned to the defendant. Troutt v. Langston, 283 Ark. 220, 675 S.W.2d 625 (1984).

If surrender is without cause, the contract for bond implies that the bondsman must return the premium; however, if the surrender is with cause, there is no implied contract to return the fee. Johnson v. Hicks, 288 Ark. 158, 702 S.W.2d 797 (1986).

Cited: Flynn v. Greene County, 12 Ark. App. 386, 676 S.W.2d 766 (1984); United Bonding Co. ex rel. Richmond v. Johnson, 293 Ark. 467, 739 S.W.2d 147 (1987).

16-84-113. Application for bail.

  1. If the defendant is committed to jail and the application for bail is made to a judge or magistrate during vacation, it must be by written petition signed by the defendant or his or her counsel briefly stating the offense for which he or she is committed and naming the persons offered as surety.
  2. In all other cases, the application may be made orally to the judge or magistrate.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 2005, No. 1994, § 272.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (a), substituted “judge or magistrate” for “magistrate, or judge of the circuit court” and inserted “or her” and “or she”; and substituted “judge” for “court” in (b).

Case Notes

Garnishment.

Money deposited under this section in lieu of bail is not deemed to belong to the defendant and cannot be subject to garnishment for the debts of the criminal defendant. Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Skelton, 287 Ark. 378, 700 S.W.2d 44 (1985).

Interveners.

Where one arrested for unlawfully selling mortgaged cattle deposited the proceeds of the sale in lieu of bail, the mortgagee could intervene and claim the money. Imperial Valley Sav. Bank v. Huff, 126 Ark. 281, 190 S.W. 116 (1916).

Cited: Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971).

16-84-114. Surrender of defendant.

    1. At any time before the forfeiture of their bond, the surety may surrender the defendant or the defendant may surrender himself or herself to the jailer of the county in which the offense was committed.
    2. However, the surrender must be accompanied by a certified copy of the bail bond to be delivered to the jailer, who must detain the defendant in custody thereon as upon a commitment and give a written acknowledgment of the surrender.
    3. The surety shall thereupon be exonerated.
    1. For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the surety may obtain from the officer having in his or her custody the bail bond or recognizance a certified copy thereof, and thereupon at any place in the state may arrest the defendant.
    2. No person other than an Arkansas-licensed bail bond agent, an Arkansas-licensed private investigator, a certified law enforcement officer, or a person acting under the direct supervision of an Arkansas-licensed bail bond agent shall be authorized to apprehend, detain, or arrest a defendant on a bail bond, wherever issued, unless that person is licensed as a bail bond agent by the state where the bail bond was written.
    3. No person shall represent himself or herself to be a bail enforcement agent, bounty hunter, or similar title in this state.
    4. Any bail bond agent attempting to apprehend a defendant shall notify the local law enforcement agency or agencies of his or her presence and provide the local law enforcement agency or agencies with the defendant's name, charges, and suspected location.
    5. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
  1. The surety may arrest the defendant without the certified copy.
  2. If the surety has good cause for surrendering the defendant and has complied with the provisions of this section in surrendering the defendant, there shall be no requirement that the surety return part or all of the premium paid for the bail bond.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1995, No. 593, § 1; 1999, No. 1445, § 1; 2001, No. 1387, § 2.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment, in (b)(2), inserted “Arkansas-licensed bail bond agent, an,” deleted “or” following “investigator,” and substituted “bail bond agent” for “private investigator or certified law enforcement officer.”

Case Notes

Forfeiture.

A forfeiture becomes effective when announced; thus where defendant surrendered before the entry of judgment, but after forfeiture was announced, the bonding company was not entitled to complete exoneration. A-1 Bonding v. State, 64 Ark. App. 135, 984 S.W.2d 29 (1998).

License Revocation.

Circuit court did not err in affirming the revocation of a bail bond agent's license by the Arkansas Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board for violating §§ 17-19-101 et seq., because there was substantial evidence before the Board from which it could conclude that the agent had knowledge of and authorized a nonlicensed individual's actions; the agent instructed the individual, who was hired by the owner of a bonding company to perform office work, to “catch” or apprehend someone in violation of subdivision (b)(2) of this section, and the agent expressly testified that the individual acted pursuant to his direction. Hester v. Ark. Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd., 2011 Ark. App. 389, 383 S.W.3d 925 (2011).

Cited: Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971).

16-84-115. Deposit of money in lieu of bail.

Notwithstanding any rule of criminal procedure to the contrary:

    1. Whenever the defendant is admitted to bail in a specified sum, he or she may deposit the sum with the proper city or county official in the city or county in which the trial is directed to be had and take from the official a receipt of the deposit, upon delivering which to the officer in whose custody he or she is, he or she shall be discharged.
    2. After bail has been taken, a deposit may in like manner be made of the sum mentioned in the bail bond, which shall exonerate the surety.
  1. Where money is deposited, the proper city or county official shall hold and pay the money according to the orders of the court having jurisdiction to try the offense, and he or she and his or her sureties shall be liable for the money on their official bond.
  2. Upon judgment being rendered against a defendant for fine and costs, the court rendering judgment may order any money deposited agreeably to this section to be applied to the payment thereof. This subdivision (a)(3) shall not apply to a bail bond of a bail bondsman.
  3. The mayor shall designate the city official or officials who may accept a deposit of money in lieu of bail, and the county judge shall designate the county official or officials authorized to accept a deposit of money in lieu of bail.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1991, No. 720, § 1.

Case Notes

Construed with § 17-19-101 et seq.

This section gives courts the power to regulate the business of bondsmen, while § 17-19-101 et seq. merely states that the Insurance Department has the authority to administer § 17-19-101 et seq. and issue rules and regulations to that end. The Insurance Department must have the authority to effect the purpose of § 17-19-101 et seq., and the courts must have the authority to regulate their own business; thus, this section and § 17-19-101 et seq. are reconcilable in that regard. However, this section and § 17-19-101 are in conflict insofar as this section allows judges to fix the maximum amount of fees, while § 17-19-101 et seq. fixes the maximum amount. Section 17-19-101 et seq. controls and amends this section by implication in that respect; otherwise, the two acts are not in conflict and, therefore, there is no repeal of this section by implication. Miller v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 284 Ark. 55, 679 S.W.2d 187 (1984).

Effect of Amendments.

Prior to 1989, subdivision (3) of this section was codified as § 16-84-113(c) and did not contain the provision that the subdivision did not apply to bail bondsmen. Story v. State, 326 Ark. 86, 929 S.W.2d 709 (1996).

Fines.

This section authorized the court to order the money deposited by the defendant to be applied to his unpaid fine where the defendant failed to prove that the money was deposited by a bail bondsman. Story v. State, 326 Ark. 86, 929 S.W.2d 709 (1996).

Cited: Parrott v. State, 246 Ark. 672, 439 S.W.2d 924 (1969); Thomas v. State, 260 Ark. 512, 542 S.W.2d 284 (1976); Miller v. Lofton, 279 Ark. 461, 652 S.W.2d 627 (1983); Skelton v. City of Atkins, 317 Ark. 28, 875 S.W.2d 504 (1994).

16-84-116. Recommitment after bail or deposit of money.

  1. The court in which a prosecution for a public offense is pending may, by an order, direct the defendant to be arrested and committed to jail until legally discharged, after he or she has given bail, or deposited money in lieu thereof, in the following cases:
    1. When by having failed to appear, a forfeiture of bail or of the money deposited has been incurred;
    2. When the court is satisfied that his or her surety, or either of them, is dead, or insufficient, or has moved from the state;
    3. Upon an indictment's being found for an offense not bailable.
  2. Upon the order being made, the clerk shall issue process for the arrest and recommitment of the defendant. If the order is made on account of either of the cases mentioned in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as upon his or her first commitment, in a sum to be fixed by the court and named in the process for his or her arrest.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5.

Subchapter 2 — Forfeiture

Publisher's Notes. Former subchapter 2, concerning forfeiture, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 417, § 7. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-84-201. Crim. Code, §§ 88, 89; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2968, 2969; Pope's Dig., §§ 3784, 3785; Acts 1971, No. 109, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-723 — 43-724.

16-84-202. Crim. Code, § 90; C. & M. Dig., § 2970; Pope's Dig., § 3786; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-725.

16-84-203. Crim. Code, §§ 91, 92; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2971, 2972; Pope's Dig., §§ 3787, 3788; Acts 1953, No. 390, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-726, 43-727.

16-84-204. Crim. Code, § 93; C. & M. Dig., § 2973; Pope's Dig., § 3789; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-728.

16-84-205. Crim. Code, § 94; C. & M. Dig., § 2974; Pope's Dig., § 3790; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-729.

16-84-206. Acts 1963, No. 497, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-733.

Research References

Am. Jur. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bail & R., § 144 et seq.

Case Notes

Forfeiture Not a Fine.

Under state law, forfeiture of a bail bond is not synonymous with a fine in its ordinary sense. Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. Ark. 1972).

Cited: Phillips v. State, 100 Ark. 515, 140 S.W. 734, 1911 Ark. LEXIS 395 (1911); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961).

16-84-201. Action on bond in district courts.

      1. If the defendant fails to appear for trial or judgment, or at any other time when his or her presence in district court may be lawfully required, or to surrender himself or herself in execution of the judgment, the district court may direct the fact to be entered on the minutes and shall promptly issue an order requiring the surety to appear, on a date set by the district court not more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the date notice is sent by certified mail to the surety company at the address shown on the bond, whether or not it is received by the surety, to show cause why the sum specified in the bail bond or the money deposited in lieu of bail should not be forfeited.
      2. The one-hundred-twenty-day period in which the defendant must be surrendered or apprehended under subdivision (c)(2) of this section begins to run from the date notice is sent by certified mail to the surety company at the address shown on the bond, whether or not it is received by the surety.
    1. The order shall also require the officer who was responsible for taking of bail to appear unless:
      1. The surety is a bail bondsman; or
      2. The officer accepted cash in the amount of bail.
  1. The appropriate law enforcement agencies shall make every reasonable effort to apprehend the defendant.
    1. If the defendant is surrendered or arrested, or good cause is shown for his or her failure to appear before judgment is entered against the surety, the district court shall exonerate a reasonable amount of the surety's liability under the bail bond.
    2. However, if the surety causes the apprehension of the defendant or the defendant is apprehended within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date notice is sent by certified mail to the surety company at the address shown on the bond, whether or not it is received by the surety, a judgment or forfeiture of bond may not be entered against the surety, except as provided in subsection (e) of this section.
  2. If after one hundred twenty (120) days from the date notice is sent by certified mail to the surety company at the address shown on the bond, whether or not it is received by the surety, the defendant has not surrendered or been arrested, the bail bond or money deposited in lieu of bail may be forfeited without further notice or hearing.
  3. If the defendant is located in another state and the location is known within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date notice is sent by certified mail to the surety company at the address shown on the bond, whether or not it is received by the surety, the appropriate law enforcement officers shall cause the arrest of the defendant and the surety shall be liable for the cost of returning the defendant to the district court in an amount not to exceed the face value of the bail bond.
    1. In determining the extent of liability of the surety on a bond forfeiture, the court, without further notice or hearing, may take into consideration the expenses incurred by the surety in attempting to locate the defendant and may allow the surety credit for the expenses incurred.
    2. To be considered by the court, information concerning expenses incurred in attempting to locate the defendant should be submitted to the court by the surety no later than the one-hundred-twentieth day from the date notice is sent by certified mail to the surety company at the address shown on the bond, whether or not it is received by the surety.
  4. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a district court may suspend a bail bond company's or agent's ability to issue bail bonds in its court if the bail bond company or agent fails to comply with an order of the district court or fails to pay forfeited bonds in accordance with a district court's order.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1991, No. 991, § 1; 1993, No. 841, § 1; 1995, No. 1106, § 1; 1999, No. 567, § 5; 2003, No. 752, § 2; 2003, No. 1572, § 1; 2009, No. 633, § 16.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment by No. 752, throughout the section, inserted “district” preceding “court” and made gender neutral changes.

The 2003 amendment by No. 1572, in (d), deleted “prior to judgment against the surety” following “arrested” and added “without further notice or hearing”; in (e), deleted “before judgment is entered against the surety” from the beginning, inserted “within one hundred twenty … to appear” and made stylistic changes; redesignated former (f) as present (f)(1) and inserted “without further notice or hearing” following “the court”; and added (f)(2).

The 2009 amendment inserted “from the date notice is sent by certified mail to the surety company at the address shown on the bond, whether or not it is received by the surety” in (d), and substituted the same language for “after the issuance of the order” in (a)(1)(A), for “of receipt of written notification to the surety of the defendant's failure to appear” in (c)(2), and for “after the date of receipt of written notification to the surety of the defendant's failure to appear” in (e) and (f)(2); added (g); and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References. Jurisdiction of present courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 19(B).

Case Notes

Burden of Proof.

Where a bonding company contends that the statutory notice required under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section was defective because it was not sent to the address shown on the bond, the bonding company has the burden to show that the circuit court administrator sent the notice to the wrong address based on the bail bond. Bonding v. State, 340 Ark. 641, 13 S.W.3d 147 (Ark. 2000).

Where bondsman filed a motion to set aside a bond-forfeiture orderl more than 98 days after the forfeiture, the trial court lacked jurisdiction at the subsequent hearing to act on the motion to set aside the judgment because the 90 period provided for under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a) had elapsed and the bondsman had not met his burden of proof under this section to show cause to the trial court as to why the bond should not be forfeited. Arvis Harper Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 91 Ark. App. 95, 208 S.W.3d 809 (2005).

Credit for Expenses.

The trial court correctly complied with subdivision (c)(1) where the defendant was surrendered after the forfeiture but prior to entry of the judgment, and the trial court credited the appellant bonding company with $15,000 against the $75,000 forfeited bond as a setoff for funds expended in apprehending the defendant. A-1 Bonding v. State, 64 Ark. App. 135, 984 S.W.2d 29 (1998).

Effect of Amendments.

Until 1989, the trial court had discretion to remit the whole or a part of the amount specified in the bond agreement if the defendant was surrendered or arrested prior to entry of the forfeiture judgment against the surety; in 1989, however, the General Assembly amended subsection (c) to require the trial court to exonerate a reasonable amount of the surety's liability under the bail bond if, prior to entry of the judgment against the surety, the defendant was surrendered, arrested or good cause was shown for his nonappearance; in 1991, the General Assembly again amended subsection (c) to add a new second sentence to provide that, after the defendant's nonappearance, if the surety caused the apprehension of the defendant or the defendant was apprehended within 120 days from the date of his failure to appear, no judgment or forfeiture of the bond could be entered against the surety, except as provided in subsection (e); finally, in 1993, the General Assembly revised the second sentence of subsection (c) to provide that if the surety caused the apprehension of the defendant or the defendant was apprehended within 120 days from the date of receipt of written notification to the surety of the defendant's failure to appear, no judgment or forfeiture of bond could be entered against the surety, except as provided in subsection (e). AAA Bail Bond Co. v. State, 319 Ark. 327, 891 S.W.2d 362 (1995).

Failure to Appear.

When defendant fails to appear at the trial and the court enters that fact upon its record the bond is forfeited. Craig v. State, 257 Ark. 112, 514 S.W.2d 383 (1974); Heritage Ins. Co. v. White County, 279 Ark. 94, 649 S.W.2d 170 (1983).

Defendants forfeited bond by failing to appear for trial and trial court was not required to set aside the bond forfeiture and to conduct show-cause hearing in the forfeiture because, according to the specific language of this section, it is the surety, or bail bondsman who undertakes the obligation and who is entitled to the order setting the show-cause hearing, not the defendants. Miranda v. State, 304 Ark. 567, 803 S.W.2d 910 (1991).

Bond forfeited where bonding company was notified of the date of the defendant's scheduled appearance, but did not advise the defendant, who did not appear; the bond company thus failed to produce the defendant or to submit evidence to the court that part of the bond amount should be remitted. M & M Bonding Co. v. State, 59 Ark. App. 228, 955 S.W.2d 521, 1997 Ark. App. LEXIS 860 (1997).

Court did not err in upholding a bond forfeiture after a person who was arrested for public intoxication did not appear in court; subsection (b) of this section does not provide that the failure of a law enforcement agency to make every reasonable effort to apprehend a person necessarily constitutes good cause for the person's failure to appear. Hot Springs Bail Bond v. State, 90 Ark. App. 370, 206 S.W.3d 306 (2005).

Forfeiture Upheld.

Forfeiture of the bond for violation of probation and unpaid fines upheld where the surety failed to show that it exercised the effort required to return or attempt to effect the return of the defendant to custody. AAA Bail Bond Co. v. State, 55 Ark. App. 35, 929 S.W.2d 723 (1996).

Notice to Surety.

Notice to the surety, before forfeiture, is not required. Heritage Ins. Co. v. White County, 279 Ark. 94, 649 S.W.2d 170 (1983).

Substantial compliance with the notice requirement in subsection (c) is not sufficient in view of this section's clear and express requirement that written notification of defendant's nonappearance be given to commence the 120-day period. AAA Bail Bond Co. v. State, 319 Ark. 327, 891 S.W.2d 362 (1995).

Where the record failed to reflect notice to the surety within the time limits specified in this section, and forfeiture was entered before a show cause order was issued, reversible error resulted from the State's noncompliance with the terms of this section. Holt Bonding Co. v. State, 328 Ark. 178, 942 S.W.2d 834, 1997 Ark. LEXIS 233 (1997).

When the trial court performed the operative act of entering the failure of a defendant to appear into the minutes or docket, it became mandatory for notice to be promptly given to the appellant surety; notice given almost 18 months later did not constitute prompt notice. Bob Cole Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 65 Ark. App. 1, 984 S.W.2d 78 (1999).

The trial court failed to give the form of notice required by this section where the summons issued by the trial court was directed to the surety's street address rather than the post-office box address stated on the bond. Bob Cole Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 65 Ark. App. 5, 984 S.W.2d 83 (1999).

The trial court erred in ruling that the service requirements contained in the statute were fulfilled where the record did not show whether the notice was sent to the address listed on the bond and did not reflect that the notice was sent by certified mail. Bob Cole Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 68 Ark. App. 13, 2 S.W.3d 94 (1999), rev'd, 340 Ark. 641, 13 S.W.3d 147 (Ark. 2000).

No judgment of forfeiture could be entered since the 120-day period never began to run as notice to the surety was defective, and the defendant was apprehended. Bob Cole Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 68 Ark. App. 13, 2 S.W.3d 94 (1999), rev'd, 340 Ark. 641, 13 S.W.3d 147 (Ark. 2000).

Once the trial court made a docket entry noting defendant's failure to appear, it was mandatory pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section to promptly notify surety of the failure to appear, and failure to do so required reversal of bond forfeiture. Holt Bonding Co. v. State, 77 Ark. App. 198, 72 S.W.3d 537, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 240 (2002).

Where there was a six-month lapse between defendant's failure to appear and the issuance of the show-cause order, the trial court's failure to give timely notice to the bonding company prevented bond forfeiture. Spencer Bonding Servs. v. State, 89 Ark. App. 72, 200 S.W.3d 457 (2004).

Recovery of Bail.

Where defendant admitted that he forfeited his bail and he failed to provide any proof that his bail should not have been forfeited because he was in prison at the time of the forfeiture, he could not recover the bail which he had forfeited. Flynn v. Greene County, 12 Ark. App. 386, 676 S.W.2d 766 (1984).

Show-Cause Order.

A show-cause order does not abrogate a statutory forfeiture under this section, but merely affords the bondsmen an opportunity to be heard with respect to a total or partial remission of the forfeiture under § 16-84-205. Craig v. State, 257 Ark. 112, 514 S.W.2d 383 (1974).

Cited: General Casualty Co. v. State, 229 Ark. 485, 316 S.W.2d 704 (1958); Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); McCrosky v. State, 235 Ark. 629, 361 S.W.2d 266 (1962); Flynn v. Greene County, 12 Ark. App. 386, 676 S.W.2d 766 (1984); J & J Bonding, Inc. v. State, 330 Ark. 599, 955 S.W.2d 516 (1997); Holt Bonding Co. v. State, 77 Ark. App. 198, 72 S.W.3d 537, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 240 (2002); Holt Bonding Co. v. State, 353 Ark. 136, 114 S.W.3d 179, 2003 Ark. LEXIS 250 (2003).

16-84-202. Disposition of deposit.

  1. Where money is deposited in lieu of bail with a city official, after the forfeiture and final judgment of the court, the city official shall make settlement with the city treasurer who shall deposit the funds to the credit of the city general fund.
  2. Where money is deposited in lieu of bail with a county official, after the forfeiture and final adjournment of the court, the county official shall make settlement with the county treasurer who shall deposit the funds to the credit of the county general fund.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 1991, No. 720, § 2.

16-84-203. Certain absences excused.

  1. No forfeiture of any appearance or bail bond shall be rendered in any case where a sworn statement of a licensed court-appointed physician is furnished the court showing that the principal in the bond is prevented from attending by some physical or mental disability or where a sworn affidavit of the jailer, warden, or other responsible officer of a jail or correctional facility in which the principal is being detained shall be furnished to the court, or a sworn affidavit of any officer in charge is furnished to the court showing that the principal in the bond is prevented from attending due to the fact that he or she is being detained by a force claiming to act under the authority of the federal government that neither the state nor the surety could control.
  2. The appearance or bail bond shall remain in full force and effect until the principal is physically or mentally able to appear or until a detainer against the principal is filed with the detaining authority.

History. Acts 1989, No. 417, § 5; 2005, No. 1994, § 283.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (a), substituted “correctional facility” for “penitentiary” and inserted “or she.”

Case Notes

Applicability.

The summons required by this section is intended to inform those who post bail for others that unless they produce the defendant within 20 days, they will be liable for the defendant's bail; this section does not apply to defendants who post their own bail. Flynn v. Greene County, 12 Ark. App. 386, 676 S.W.2d 766 (1984).

Basis of Action.

In a proceeding against the sureties on a forfeited bail-bond, the bail-bond itself is the basis of the action and must, in connection with the order of forfeiture, present a complete cause of action. Phillips v. State, 100 Ark. 515, 140 S.W. 734, 1911 Ark. LEXIS 395 (1911).

Timeliness.

Proceedings ordering final judgment against surety in the amount of a bail-bond were not prematurely instituted, although brought in the same term of the court as the original order of forfeiture was entered, since the proceedings were instituted after the adjournment of the session of court at which the original order of forfeiture was entered. Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961).

Cited: Central Cas. Co. v. State, 233 Ark. 832, 349 S.W.2d 135 (1961); Miranda v. State, 304 Ark. 567, 803 S.W.2d 910 (1991).

16-84-204 — 16-84-206. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. As to repeal of these sections, see Publisher's Notes at beginning of subchapter.

16-84-207. Action on bail bond in circuit courts.

  1. If a bail bond is granted by a judicial officer, it shall be conditioned on the defendant's appearing for trial, surrendering in execution of the judgment, or appearing at any other time when his or her presence in circuit court may be lawfully required under Rule 9.5 or Rule 9.6 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other rule.
    1. If the defendant fails to appear at any time when the defendant's presence is required under subsection (a) of this section, the circuit court shall enter this fact by written order or docket entry, adjudge the bail bond of the defendant or the money deposited in lieu thereof to be forfeited, and issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant.
    2. The circuit clerk shall:
      1. Notify the sheriff and each surety on the bail bond that the defendant should be surrendered to the sheriff as required by the terms of the bail bond; and
      2. Immediately issue a summons on each surety on the bail bond requiring the surety to personally appear on the date and time stated in the summons to show cause why judgment should not be rendered for the sum specified in the bail bond on account of the forfeiture.
      1. If the defendant is apprehended and brought before the circuit court within seventy-five (75) days of the date notification is sent under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, then no judgment of forfeiture may be entered against the surety.
      2. The surety shall be liable for the cost of returning the defendant to the circuit court in an amount not to exceed the face amount of the bond.
      1. If the defendant is apprehended and brought before the circuit court after the seventy-five-day period under subdivision (c)(1) of this section, the circuit court may exonerate the amount of the surety's liability under the bail bond as the circuit court determines in its discretion and, if the surety does not object, enter judgment accordingly against the surety.
      2. In determining the extent of liability of the surety on the bond, the circuit court may take into consideration the actions taken and the expenses incurred by the surety to locate the defendant, the expenses incurred by law enforcement officers to locate and return the defendant, and any other factors the circuit court finds relevant.
    1. The appropriate law enforcement agencies shall make every reasonable effort to apprehend the defendant.
    1. If the surety does not consent to the entry of judgment in the amount determined under subsection (c) of this section, or if the defendant has not surrendered or been brought into custody, then at the time of the show cause hearing unless continued to a subsequent time, the circuit court shall determine the surety's liability and enter judgment on the forfeited bond.
    2. The circuit court may exercise its discretion in determining the amount of the judgment and may consider the factors listed in subsection (c) of this section.
    1. No pleading on the part of the state shall be required in order to enforce a bond under this section.
    2. The summons required under subsection (b) of this section shall be made returnable and shall be executed as in civil actions, and the action shall be docketed and shall proceed as an ordinary civil action.
    3. The summons shall be directed to and served on the surety in the manner provided in Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the surety's appearance pursuant to the summons shall be in person and not by filing an answer or other pleading.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a circuit court may suspend a bail bond company's or agent's ability to issue bail bonds in its court if the bail bond company or agent fails to comply with an order of the circuit court or fails to pay forfeited bonds in accordance with a circuit court's order.

History. Acts 2003, No. 752, § 1; 2003, No. 1472, § 1; 2009, No. 290, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in §§ 16-84-20116-84-206 and subchapter 1 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment, in (e)(3), substituted “shall” for “may,” deleted “an agent of” preceding “the surety,” and inserted “in the manner provided in Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Case Notes

Appeal.

Appellate court did not have jurisdiction to review an order of bail-bond forfeiture where the bond company did not file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the forfeiture order, the motion filed pursuant to this section to set aside the forfeiture order did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal, and thus, the appeal was not timely. Beth's Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 660 (2015).

Forfeiture of Bond.

Trial court properly exercised jurisdiction and ordered forfeiture of a bond where there was no requirement in subdivision (e)(2) of this section that the state file a separate civil action; in fact, subdivision (e)(1) stated that no pleading on the state's part was required to enforce a bond. First Ark. Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 102 Ark. App. 282, 284 S.W.3d 115 (2008).

Trial court properly forfeited a bond posted by a surety upon a defendant's failure to appear; while the surety was served with an order to appear at a show-cause hearing 39 days after the defendant failed to appear, this section provided only that a summons be immediately issued, and the surety waived any objection to service of process or the alleged failure to adhere to the statutory requirements by failing to raise an objection to the timeliness of service or the trial court's jurisdiction when it first appeared before the trial court. Affordable Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 44 (2015).

Bail bondsman's argument that the trial court had not followed this section was rejected where the statute did not require immediate issuance of an arrest warrant. Beth's Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 183, 486 S.W.3d 822 (2016).

Circuit court properly ordered defendant's bail bond forfeited; while the State conceded that it did not flag defendant's passport, the court's order did not require the State to notify the U.S. State Department of the seizure of defendant's passport, the surety did not show that an act of God, the State, or of a public enemy, or actual duress prevented defendant's appearance in circuit court, and the fact that defendant acquired a new passport and fled the country was a voluntary act on his part and not the result of any action or inaction by the State. Kathy's Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 586 (2016).

Issuance of Summons.

Trial court erred in ruling that a bond company had forfeited a bond when a summons was not immediately issued for a show cause hearing, as required by subdivision (b)(2)(B) of this section. First Ark. Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 373 Ark. 470, 284 S.W.3d 484 (2008).

Service of Summons.

Circuit court properly ordered an appearance bond forfeited for defendant's failure to appear at trial because the summons was served immediately, as required by statute, in that the bonding company was timely served the with the summons the day after the trial. Although defendant failed to appear at the first court appearance, it was defendant's subsequent failure to appear at trial that triggered the application of the forfeiture statute. Affordable Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 657, 449 S.W.3d 321 (2014).

Strict Compliance Required.

Because strict compliance with subdivision (b)(2)(B) of this rule was not had because summons was not issued “immediately” as required, a circuit court's judgment of forfeiture against a bail bond company was reversed, and the matter was remanded. First Ark. Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 373 Ark. 470, 284 S.W.3d 484 (2008).

Because a circuit court's forfeiture of a bond failed to strictly comply with this section, a forfeiture judgment against a bail bond company was reversed for the reasons set forth in a prior opinion of the court in a similar case, and the matter was remanded for an order consistent with the court's opinion. First Ark. Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 373 Ark. 468, 284 S.W.3d 483 (2008).

Chapter 85 Pretrial Proceedings

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective January 1, 1976.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1937, No. 306, § 4: effective on passage.

16-85-101. Right to attorney, physician, and phone calls.

  1. While confined and awaiting trial in any prison or jail in this state, no prisoner shall be denied the right to:
    1. Consult an attorney of the prisoner's own choosing;
    2. Call a physician of the prisoner's own choosing if in need of one; or
    3. Place free telephone calls to a bondsperson if the calls are local calls.
  2. Any officer or other person having charge or supervision of any prisoner in the state who refuses to permit the prisoner to consult an attorney of the prisoner's own choosing, call a physician of the prisoner's own choosing, or place free telephone calls to a bondsperson if the calls are local shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.

History. Acts 1937, No. 306, §§ 2, 3; Pope's Dig., §§ 3043, 3044; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-417.1, 43-417.2; Acts 2001, No. 1682, § 1; 2003, No. 1648, § 2; 2005, No. 1994, § 236.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1)-(3) and made related changes; added “While confined … awaiting trial, no” in (a); rewrote present (a)(3); inserted “or to place free … local calls” in (b); and made minor stylistic and gender neutral changes throughout.

The 2003 amendment inserted “or jail” in (a).

The 2005 amendment, in (b), inserted “Class B” and deleted “and shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) and may be confined to prison for not more than ninety (90) days” from the end.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Britta Palmer Stamps, Comment: The Wait for Counsel, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 1055 (2014).

Case Notes

No Right to Attorney.

Defendant could not be characterized as a prisoner confined to prison awaiting trial by virtue of his driving while intoxicated arrest; he further did not have the right to counsel before taking the breathalyzer test. Hudgens v. State, 324 Ark. 169, 919 S.W.2d 939 (1996).

Request for Physical Examination.

Defendant's application that he be permitted to have his person examined by a competent physician and to have a photograph taken for the purpose of showing cruel treatment by officer in order to obtain confession was improperly denied, and, since examination could not be made following appeal, defendant should have been permitted to show that he requested the examination. Morton v. State, 207 Ark. 704, 182 S.W.2d 675 (1944).

16-85-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning corporal or physical punishment, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 526. The section was derived from Acts 1937, No. 306, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 3044; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-417.2.

Subchapter 2 — Preliminary Examination

16-85-201 — 16-85-212. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 502. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-85-201. Crim. Code, §§ 43-45; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2913-2915; Pope's Dig., §§ 3729-3731; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-601 — 43-603.

16-85-202. Crim. Code, § 46; C. & M. Dig., § 2917; Pope's Dig., § 3733; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-604.

16-85-203. Crim. Code, § 47; C. & M. Dig., § 2918; Pope's Dig., § 3734; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-605.

16-85-204. Crim. Code, § 56; C. & M. Dig., § 2928; Pope's Dig., § 3744; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-615.

16-85-205. Crim. Code, §§ 48, 54, 55, 57; Acts 1915, No. 240, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2919-2921, 2929, 2930; Pope's Dig., §§ 3735-3737, 3745, 3746; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-606 — 43-608, 43-616, 43-617.

16-85-206. Crim. Code, §§ 49-53, 65; Acts 1877, No. 8, § 1, p. 6; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2922-2927; Pope's Dig., §§ 3738-3743; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-609 — 43-614.

16-85-207. Crim. Code, §§ 58-60, 66; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [66], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2931-2934, 2937; Pope's Dig., §§ 3747-3750, 3754; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-618 — 43-622.

16-85-208. Crim. Code, §§ 62, 64; Acts 1875, No. 77, § 34, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2935, 2936, 4601; Pope's Dig., §§ 3751, 3752, 5690; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-623 — 43-625.

16-85-209. Crim. Code, § 63; C. & M. Dig., § 2939; Pope's Dig., § 3755; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-631.

16-85-210. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, §§ 1, 2, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3753; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-626, 43-627.

16-85-211. Acts 1907, No. 379, §§ 1-3, p. 958; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2940-2942; Pope's Dig., §§ 3756-3758; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-628 — 43-630.

16-85-212. Acts 1993, No. 961, § 3.

Subchapter 3 — Information and Bill of Particulars

Effective Dates. Acts 1937, No. 160, § 7: approved Mar. 1, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “It is found to be a fact that the less frequent meetings of the grand jury necessitates vesting authority in the prosecuting attorney to subpoena witnesses in order to properly prepare criminal cases. Therefore, this Act being necessary for the public health, peace and safety, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act shall become effective immediately upon its passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Finding or return of indictment, or filing of information, as tolling limitation period. 18 A.L.R.4th 1202.

Speedy trial statute: application to dismissal or other termination of prior indictment or information and bringing of new indictment or information. 39 A.L.R.4th 899.

Limitations on state prosecuting attorney's discretion to initiate prosecution by indictment or information. 44 A.L.R.4th 401.

Am. Jur. 41 Am Jur. 2d, Indict., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 42 C.J.S., Indict., § 1 et seq.

16-85-301. Bill of particulars.

  1. The bill of particulars required by law in criminal cases shall state the action relied upon by the state in sufficient detail as required by an indictment prior to March 1, 1937, that is, with sufficient certainty to apprise the defendant of the specific crime with which charged, in order to enable him or her to prepare his or her defense.
  2. A supplemental bill of particulars may be required upon order of the trial court if the bill of particulars filed by the prosecuting attorney is not sufficiently definite to apprise the defendant of the specific crime with which he or she is charged.
  3. When a bill of particulars is filed with the clerk, a copy of it shall be furnished to the defendant upon his or her request.

History. Acts 1937, No. 160, §§ 4, 5; Pope's Dig., §§ 3796, 3797; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-804, 43-805.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The purpose of a bill of particulars is to acquaint the defense with sufficient information so that a defense can be prepared. Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 996, 363 S.W.2d 923 (1963); Limber v. State, 264 Ark. 479, 572 S.W.2d 402 (1978); David v. State, 295 Ark. 131, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988); Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996), cert. denied, Nance v. Arkansas, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S. Ct. 134, 136 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1996).

Discovery.

Defendant in a criminal proceeding may not use a motion denominated as a motion for a bill of particulars as a discovery vehicle. Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 996, 363 S.W.2d 923 (1963).

In the absence of prejudice, there is no error in failing to supply a bill of particulars when complete discovery has been granted. Limber v. State, 264 Ark. 479, 572 S.W.2d 402 (1978).

Discretion of Court.

The trial court, using discretion, can grant or deny the request for a bill of particulars. Burnett v. State, 287 Ark. 158, 697 S.W.2d 95 (1985), overruled in part, Midgett v. State, 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987).

Noncompliance.

Where the prosecutor failed to comply properly with defendant's discovery motion requesting names of all state witnesses and also improperly withheld the details of the alleged crime which should have been set out in the state's bill of particulars, defendant's conviction was reversed. Masingill v. State, 7 Ark. App. 90, 644 S.W.2d 614 (1983).

Sufficiency.

Indictment or information held to be sufficiently specific that bill of particulars not required. Perkins v. State, 217 Ark. 252, 230 S.W.2d 1 (1950); Willis v. State, 221 Ark. 162, 252 S.W.2d 618 (1952); Silas v. State, 232 Ark. 248, 337 S.W.2d 644 (1960), cert. denied, Silas v. Arkansas, 365 U.S. 821, 81 S. Ct. 705 (1961); Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996), cert. denied, Nance v. Arkansas, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S. Ct. 134, 136 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1996).

Information in conjunction with bill held sufficient. Lee v. State, 229 Ark. 354, 315 S.W.2d 916 (1958), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 359 U.S. 930, 79 S. Ct. 616 (1959).

Defendant was not entitled to a bill of particulars, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; a bill of particulars as to the precise time offenses were committed was not necessary because time was not material to allegations of rape and sexual assault in the second degree. Wallis v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 238, 374 S.W.3d 737 (2010).

Supplemental Bill.

If, in prosecution on charge of obtaining money under false pretenses, the defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars which was not definite and full, the defendant had the right to require the filing of a supplemental bill of particulars. Mortensen v. State, 214 Ark. 528, 217 S.W.2d 325 (Ark. 1949).

The defense may request that the state provide more details of the crime in a bill of particulars, and if defendant is not satisfied, he can seek a supplemental bill of particulars. David v. State, 295 Ark. 131, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988).

Cited: Haller v. State, 217 Ark. 646, 232 S.W.2d 829 (1950); Ragsdale v. State, 222 Ark. 499, 262 S.W.2d 91 (1953); Powell v. State, 251 Ark. 46, 471 S.W.2d 333 (1971); Caton v. State, 252 Ark. 420, 479 S.W.2d 537 (1972); Flaherty v. State, 255 Ark. 187, 500 S.W.2d 87 (1973).

16-85-302. Information.

Whenever a defendant has been held to answer at a preliminary examination to await the action of the grand jury or has been held for the circuit court, the prosecuting attorney may proceed to file information in the circuit court and to trial of the case, provided the prosecuting attorney, with the consent of the circuit court, may nolle prosequi any indictment or information pending in the court.

History. Acts 1937, No. 160, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 3798; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-806.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Malone, The Availability of a First Appearance and Preliminary Hearing, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 41.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Information by prosecuting attorney was not in violation of the due process clause of U.S. Constitution.Deatherage v. State, 194 Ark. 513, 108 S.W.2d 904 (1937).

Alternative Methods.

Prosecution for an offense may be by information or grand jury indictment. Smith v. State, 194 Ark. 1041, 110 S.W.2d 24 (1937); Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S. Ct. 641, 93 L. Ed. 1081 (1949); Ellingburg v. State, 254 Ark. 199, 492 S.W.2d 904 (1973).

Nolle Prosequi.

The trial court has no power to enter a nolle prosequi over the objection of the prosecuting attorney and neither the trial court nor the appellate court may compel a nolle prosequi, though they may suggest it. Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977).

The trial judge is vested with discretion as to the entry of a nolle prosequi of charges pending before him. Noland v. State, 265 Ark. 764, 580 S.W.2d 953 (1979).

Oath.

Neither the constitution nor the statutes require that an information be under oath. Bazzell v. State, 222 Ark. 473, 261 S.W.2d 541 (1953).

Sufficiency.

Although an information is drawn in the language of a particular section of the statute and that section does not apply, if by reasonable construction the language of the information charges an offense against the laws of the state under any other provision of the statutes, the proceedings should not be nullified. Baker v. State, 200 Ark. 688, 140 S.W.2d 1008 (1940).

This section does not require that an information be accompanied by an affidavit. Jacobs v. State, 317 Ark. 454, 878 S.W.2d 734 (1994); Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996), cert. denied, Nance v. Arkansas, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S. Ct. 134, 136 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1996).

Time of Filing.

An information may be filed before preliminary examination of the accused. Payne v. State, 226 Ark. 910, 295 S.W.2d 312 (1956), rev'd, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S. Ct. 844, 2 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1958).

Cited: Keating v. State, 255 Ark. 638, 501 S.W.2d 607 (1973); Dyas v. State, 260 Ark. 303, 539 S.W.2d 251 (1976); Ginter v. Stallcup, 641 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Ark. 1986); Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1989).

Subchapter 4 — Indictment Generally

Cross References. Decision in impeachment trial brought in senate no bar to indictment, § 21-12-208.

Punishment for contempt no bar to indictment, § 16-10-108.

Effective Dates. Acts 1881, No. 58, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 11, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1921, No. 230, § 2: Mar. 4, 1921. Emergency declared.

Research References

ALR.

Validity of indictment as affected by substitution or addition of grand jurors after commencement of investigation. 2 A.L.R.4th 980.

Finding or return of indictment, or filing of information, as tolling limitation period. 18 A.L.R.4th 1202.

Failure to swear or irregularity in swearing witnesses appearing before grand jury as ground for dismissal of indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 154.

Unauthorized persons: presence during state grand jury proceedings as affecting indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 397.

Speedy trial statute: application to dismissal or other termination of prior indictment or information and bringing of new indictment or information. 39 A.L.R.4th 899.

Limitations on state prosecuting attorney's discretion to initiate prosecution by indictment or information. 44 A.L.R.4th 401.

Am. Jur. 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indict., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 42 C.J.S., Indict., § 1 et seq.

16-85-401. Definition.

As used in this code, unless the context otherwise requires, an “indictment” is an accusation in writing, found and presented by a grand jury to the court in which they are impaneled, charging a person with the commission of a public offense.

History. Crim. Code, § 117; C. & M. Dig., § 3007; Pope's Dig., § 3829; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1001.

Publisher's Notes. “This code,” referred to in this section, means the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Case Notes

Cited: Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948).

16-85-402. Finding of indictment by jurors.

  1. The concurrence of twelve (12) grand jurors is required to find an indictment.
  2. When so found, it must be endorsed “a true bill” and the endorsement signed by the foreman.
  3. When an indictment is found, the names of all witnesses who were examined must be written at the foot of or on the indictment.
  4. The indictment must:
    1. Be presented by the foreman of the grand jury to the court; and
      1. Be filed with the clerk; and
      2. Remain in his or her office as a public record.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 118-120; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3008-3011; Pope's Dig., §§ 3830-3833; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1002 — 43-1005.

Case Notes

Construction.

Subsection (c) is merely directory. State v. Agnew, 52 Ark. 275, 12 S.W. 563 (1889); Cole v. State, 156 Ark. 9, 245 S.W. 303 (1922); McGuffin v. State, 156 Ark. 392, 246 S.W. 478 (1923); Wood v. State, 157 Ark. 503, 248 S.W. 568 (1923); Thomas v. State, 161 Ark. 644, 257 S.W. 376, 1924 Ark. LEXIS 132 (1924); Taylor v. State, 186 Ark. 162, 52 S.W.2d 961 (1932); Baker v. State, 215 Ark. 851, 223 S.W.2d 809 (1949); Steel v. State, 246 Ark. 75, 436 S.W.2d 800 (1969).

Endorsement.

Objection to omission of foreman's endorsement will be waived unless objection is made before pleading. State v. Agnew, 52 Ark. 275, 12 S.W. 563 (1889).

An endorsement leaving the date blank is sufficient to show a return by the grand jury. Shinn v. State, 93 Ark. 290, 124 S.W. 263 (1910).

Indictment was not defective because the foreman endorsed his name above the words “a true bill.” Withem v. State, 175 Ark. 453, 299 S.W. 739 (1927). See also Taylor v. State, 169 Ark. 589, 276 S.W. 577 (1925).

Names of Witnesses.

Omission to endorse on an indictment the names of witnesses examined before the jury is not ground for setting aside the indictment. State v. Brandon, 28 Ark. 410 (1873); State v. Johnson, 33 Ark. 174 (1878); Baker v. State, 215 Ark. 851, 223 S.W.2d 809 (1949).

Number of Jurors.

The testimony of the grand jurors who presented an indictment is not admissible to show that only 11 of their number voted in favor of finding a true bill. Nash v. State, 73 Ark. 399, 84 S.W. 497 (1904); Nash v. State, 79 Ark. 120, 95 S.W. 147 (1906).

It will be presumed that the indictment was found by the requisite number. Cook v. State, 109 Ark. 384, 160 S.W. 223 (1913).

When an indictment is properly returned into court, it will be presumed that it was duly found with the concurrence of the requisite number of the grand jury. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. State, 99 Ark. 1, 136 S.W. 938 (1911); Cook v. State, 109 Ark. 384, 160 S.W. 223 (1913).

Presentment and Filing.

The record must show that the indictment was brought into court. The endorsement of the clerk upon the indictment, “filed in open court,” is not sufficient. McKenzie v. State, 24 Ark. 636 (1867); Holcomb v. State, 31 Ark. 427 (1876); Chandler v. State, 38 Ark. 197 (1881); West v. State, 71 Ark. 144, 71 S.W. 483 (1903); Shinn v. State, 93 Ark. 290, 124 S.W. 263 (1910).

The indictment must be presented by the foreman in the presence of the grand jury. Robinson v. State, 33 Ark. 180 (1878).

It is sufficient for the clerk to describe the indictment by number when the party indicted is not in custody. Fitzpatrick v. State, 37 Ark. 238 (1881).

In felony cases, a nunc pro tunc order cannot be made in the defendant's absence. Felker v. State, 54 Ark. 489, 16 S.W. 663 (1891).

The objection that an indictment failed to show that it was filed in open court in the presence of the grand jury can only be reached by a motion to quash the indictment. Berry v. State, 155 Ark. 29, 243 S.W. 858 (1922).

Record.

The omission in the record may be supplied by a nunc pro tunc entry. State v. Gowen, 12 Ark. 62 (1851); Green v. State, 19 Ark. 178, 1857 Ark. LEXIS 22 (1857); James v. State, 41 Ark. 451, 1883 Ark. LEXIS 198 (1883).

Cited: Steel v. State, 246 Ark. 75, 436 S.W.2d 800 (1969); Lomax v. State, 248 Ark. 534, 452 S.W.2d 646 (1970).

16-85-403. Contents.

    1. The language of the indictment must be certain as to the title of the prosecution, the name of the court in which the indictment is presented, and the name of the parties.
    2. Upon request of the defendant, the state shall file a bill of particulars setting out the act or acts upon which it relies for conviction.
  1. An indictment may be substantially in the following form:
  2. The indictment must be direct and certain as regards:
    1. The party charged;
    2. The offense or offenses charged;
    3. The county in which the offense or offenses were committed; and
    4. The particular circumstances of the offense or offenses charged where they are necessary to constitute a complete offense or offenses.

“The State of Arkansas, vs. John Doe. In the Pulaski Circuit Court. The grand jury of Pulaski County, in the name and by the authority of the State of Arkansas, accuse John Doe of the crime of murder in the first degree (or other crime, as the case may be), committed as follows: The said John Doe, on January 1, 1936, in Pulaski County, did murder Richard Roe, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas.”

Click to view form.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 121-123; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3012, 3028, 3029; Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, §§ 22, 23, Acts 1937, p 1384; Pope's Dig., §§ 3834, 3851, 3852; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1006 — 43-1008; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 317.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1); deleted former (a)(1) and (a)(2) and redesignated former (a)(3) as present (a)(2); and inserted “or offenses” in (c)(2), (3) and (4).

Cross References. Style of indictments, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 49.

Case Notes

In General.

For cases discussing this section as it existed prior to the 1936 amendment, which rewrote the section, see Brittin v. State, 10 Ark. 299 (1850); Moffatt v. State, 11 Ark. 169 (1850); State v. Adams, 16 Ark. 497 (1855); Lemon v. State, 19 Ark. 171 (1857); Guest v. State, 19 Ark. 405 (1858); State v. Collins, 19 Ark. 587 (1858); Roberts v. State, 21 Ark. 183 (1860); Thompson v. State, 26 Ark. 323 (1870); Edwards v. State, 27 Ark. 493 (1872); Barton v. State, 29 Ark. 68 (1874); Dixon v. State, 29 Ark. 165, 1874 Ark. LEXIS 22 (1874); McPherson v. State, 29 Ark. 225 (1874); Lacefield v. State, 34 Ark. 275 (1879), overruled, Hobbs v. State, 86 Ark. 360, 111 S.W. 264 (1908)Questioned byLee v. State, 73 Ark. 148, 83 S.W. 916 (Ark. 1904); Johnson v. State, 36 Ark. 242, 1880 Ark. LEXIS 88 (1880); State v. Graham, 38 Ark. 519 (1882); State v. Springer, 43 Ark. 91 (1884); Shotwell v. State, 43 Ark. 345 (1884); Farmer v. State, 45 Ark. 95 (1885); Glass v. State, 45 Ark. 173 (1885); Reed v. State, 45 Ark. 333 (1885); State v. Frederick, 45 Ark. 347 (1885); Fortenbury v. State, 47 Ark. 188, 1 S.W. 58 (1886); State v. Withrow, 47 Ark. 551, 2 S.W. 184 (1886); State v. Kansas City, Springfield & Memphis R.R., 54 Ark. 546, 16 S.W. 567 (1891); Cleary v. State, 56 Ark. 124, 19 S.W. 313 (1892); La Rue v. State, 64 Ark. 144, 41 S.W. 53 (1897)Limited byBishop v. State, 73 Ark. 568, 84 S.W. 707 (Ark. 1905); Adams v. State, 64 Ark. 188, 41 S.W. 423 (1897); State v. Crawford, 64 Ark. 194, 41 S.W. 425 (1897); Keoun v. State, 64 Ark. 231, 41 S.W. 808 (1897); State v. Boyce, 65 Ark. 82, 44 S.W. 1043 (1898); Inman v. State, 65 Ark. 508, 47 S.W. 558 (1898); Boarman v. State, 66 Ark. 65, 48 S.W. 899 (1898); Houston v. State, 66 Ark. 120, 49 S.W. 351 (1899); Hampton v. State, 67 Ark. 266, 54 S.W. 746 (1899); State v. Mullins, 67 Ark. 422, 55 S.W. 211 (1900); State v. Williams, 68 Ark. 241, 57 S.W. 792 (1900); Saint Louis & S.F. Ry. v. State, 68 Ark. 251, 57 S.W. 796 (1900); Keeton v. State, 70 Ark. 163, 66 S.W. 645 (1902); State v. Culbreath, 71 Ark. 80, 71 S.W. 254 (1902); Green v. State, 71 Ark. 150, 71 S.W. 665, 1903 Ark. LEXIS 7 (1903); Carroll v. State, 71 Ark. 403, 75 S.W. 471 (1903); Halliburton v. State, 71 Ark. 474, 75 S.W. 929 (1903); State v. Ring, 77 Ark. 139, 91 S.W. 11 (1905); Richardson v. State, 77 Ark. 321, 91 S.W. 758 (1905); Sherrill v. State, 84 Ark. 470, 106 S.W. 967 (1907); Larimore v. State, 84 Ark. 606, 107 S.W. 165 (1907); Franklin v. State, 85 Ark. 534, 109 S.W. 298 (1908); Henderson v. State, 91 Ark. 224, 120 S.W. 966 (1909); Williams v. State, 93 Ark. 81, 123 S.W. 780 (1909); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. State, 90 Ark. 609, 128 S.W. 1199 (1909); Harding v. State, 94 Ark. 65, 126 S.W. 90 (1910); State v. Lester, 94 Ark. 242, 126 S.W. 846 (1910); Pearce v. State, 97 Ark. 5, 132 S.W. 986 (1910); Parker v. State, 98 Ark. 575, 137 S.W. 253 (1911); Petty v. State, 102 Ark. 170, 143 S.W. 1067 (1912); Fox v. State, 102 Ark. 393, 144 S.W. 516 (1912); Ray v. State, 102 Ark. 594, 145 S.W. 881 (1912); Kreider v. State, 103 Ark. 438, 147 S.W. 449 (1912); Wolfe v. State, 107 Ark. 33, 153 S.W. 1102 (1913); Halley v. State, 108 Ark. 224, 158 S.W. 121 (1913); Hughes v. State, 109 Ark. 403, 160 S.W. 209 (1913); Holland v. State, 111 Ark. 214, 163 S.W. 781 (1914); State v. Bunch, 119 Ark. 219, 177 S.W. 932 (1915); State v. Haller, 119 Ark. 503, 177 S.W. 1138 (1915); State v. Seawood, 123 Ark. 565, 186 S.W. 72 (1916); McNeil v. State, 125 Ark. 47, 187 S.W. 1060 (1916); State v. Bond, 151 Ark. 203, 235 S.W. 801 (1921); State v. Mason, 155 Ark. 189, 244 S.W. 6 (1922); Dooms v. State, 164 Ark. 50, 260 S.W. 708 (1924); Spears v. State, 173 Ark. 1071, 294 S.W. 66 (1927); Harrell v. State, 177 Ark. 505, 7 S.W.2d 23 (1928); Calhoun v. State, 180 Ark. 397, 21 S.W.2d 606 (1929); Bramlett v. State, 184 Ark. 808, 43 S.W.2d 364 (1931); Green v. State, 185 Ark. 1098, 51 S.W.2d 511 (1932); Kansas C. S. R. Co. v. State, 194 Ark. 80, 106 S.W.2d 163 (1937); Tucker v. State, 194 Ark. 528, 108 S.W.2d 890, 1937 Ark. LEXIS 375 (1937).

The requirements for informations and indictments are set out in this section and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 49. Archer v. Benton County Circuit Court, 316 Ark. 477, 872 S.W.2d 397 (1994).

Bill of Particulars.

Denial of request for bill of particulars was held not error where information filed set out in detail the acts upon which the state relied for a conviction and contained all requirements of former statute to make a good indictment had it been returned by a grand jury. Brockelhurst v. State, 195 Ark. 67, 111 S.W.2d 527 (1937).

Allegations of information or indictment held sufficient in the absence of motion for a bill of particulars. Craig v. State, 195 Ark. 925, 114 S.W.2d 1073 (1938); Jackson v. State, 226 Ark. 731, 293 S.W.2d 699 (1956).

If defendant desires details more specific than those set out in the information, he can file a motion for a bill of particulars. Smith v. State, 231 Ark. 235, 330 S.W.2d 58 (1959); Parker v. State, 265 Ark. 315, 578 S.W.2d 206 (1979); David v. State, 295 Ark. 131, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988).

In a trial on an indictment for murder, it was not necessary for the defendant to request a bill of particulars in order to be entitled to an instruction on the degrees of homicide where the state elected from the start to charge him with premeditated murder rather than murder in the commission of a felony. Bosnick v. State, 248 Ark. 846, 454 S.W.2d 311 (1970).

Where request for a bill of particulars was specifically made by defendants it was prejudicial error to fail to furnish them with a bill of particulars. Bliss v. State, 282 Ark. 315, 668 S.W.2d 936 (1984).

The prosecuting attorney did not commit reversible error by failing to file a bill of particulars stating what act the state would rely upon at trial to prove the crime, where the information set out in detail the act upon which the state would rely for a conviction and contained all of the necessary requirements and the defendant failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the state's technical failure to file a formal answer to the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars. Speer v. State, 18 Ark. App. 1, 708 S.W.2d 94 (1986).

Trial court has some discretion under this section in granting motions for a bill of particulars. Cope v. State, 292 Ark. 391, 730 S.W.2d 242 (1987).

County.

Erroneous allegation of county wherein offense was committed where accused was tried in county in which the testimony showed the offense was committed was not prejudicial. Meador v. State, 201 Ark. 1083, 148 S.W.2d 653 (1941).

Criminal Intent.

In a prosecution for murder, it is not necessary to allege and prove “premeditation” where the indictment charges that the crime was committed while attempting robbery. Noble v. State, 195 Ark. 453, 112 S.W.2d 631 (1938).

Allegations in bribery indictment were sufficient as in accord with the statute, though no allegation was made that city attorney received the bribes with that intent that bribes would influence his decisions. Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S. Ct. 641, 93 L. Ed. 1081 (1949).

Form.

Subsection (b) of this section is applicable to charging any crime other than that of murder. Baker v. State, 199 Ark. 1005, 137 S.W.2d 938Certiorari or review denied by311 U.S. 666, 61 S. Ct. 25 (1940).

Form of information charging first degree murder held sufficient. Thompson v. State, 205 Ark. 1040, 172 S.W.2d 234 (1943)Questioned byRussell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966).

In a trial for murder on an indictment in the form prescribed in this section, in which the state elected to charge the defendant with premeditated murder rather than murder in the commission of a felony, it was error to refuse an instruction on the degrees of homicide. Bosnick v. State, 248 Ark. 846, 454 S.W.2d 311 (1970).

Indictment clearly appraised defendant of the crime charged and amendment of the indictment to add certain words was simply a matter of form, which did nothing to change the nature of the crime otherwise charged. Owen v. State, 263 Ark. 493, 565 S.W.2d 607 (1978).

Offense Charged.

Although an information is drawn in the language of a particular section of the statute and that section is not applicable, if, by reasonable construction, the language of the information charges an offense against the laws of the state under another provision of the statutes, the proceeding should not be nullified. Baker v. State, 200 Ark. 688, 140 S.W.2d 1008 (1940).

Where defendant tried for first degree murder was found guilty of second degree murder, he was in no position to complain that the information charged elements that would not support first degree murder but only second degree murder. Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971).

It was not necessary for the information to include a statement of the act constituting the offense where the only crime charged was assault with the intent to kill. Ridgeway v. State, 251 Ark. 157, 472 S.W.2d 108 (1971).

Accused may be convicted of lesser offense, under proper instructions when charged with the greater offense, but he cannot be convicted of a felony when only charged with a misdemeanor. Scoggins v. State, 258 Ark. 749, 528 S.W.2d 641 (1975).

Indictment for conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses need not include statement of acts constituting offense. Owen v. State, 263 Ark. 493, 565 S.W.2d 607 (1978).

This section does not require that the penalty of the alleged offense be included in the information. Workman v. State, 267 Ark. 103, 589 S.W.2d 20 (1979).

It is only necessary that the indictment name the offense and the party to be charged; the state is not required to include a statement of the act or acts constituting the offense, unless the offense cannot be charged without doing so. David v. State, 295 Ark. 131, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988).

Sufficiency.

Information or indictment held sufficient. Johnson v. State, 199 Ark. 196, 133 S.W.2d 15 (1939); Robbins v. State, 219 Ark. 376, 242 S.W.2d 640 (1951); Castle v. State, 229 Ark. 478, 316 S.W.2d 701 (1958); Smith v. State, 231 Ark. 235, 330 S.W.2d 58 (1959); England v. State, 234 Ark. 421, 352 S.W.2d 582 (1962); Snider v. State, 242 Ark. 728, 415 S.W.2d 53 (Ark. 1967); Estes v. State, 246 Ark. 1145, 442 S.W.2d 221 (1969); Houpt v. State, 249 Ark. 485, 459 S.W.2d 565 (Ark. 1970); Williford v. State, 252 Ark. 397, 479 S.W.2d 244 (1972); Henderson v. State, 255 Ark. 870, 503 S.W.2d 889 (1974); Haynie v. State, 257 Ark. 542, 518 S.W.2d 492 (1975); Fortner v. State, 258 Ark. 591, 528 S.W.2d 378 (1975); Beard v. State, 269 Ark. 16, 598 S.W.2d 72 (1980); Browning v. State, 274 Ark. 13, 621 S.W.2d 688 (1981); Drew v. State, 8 Ark. App. 120, 648 S.W.2d 836 (1983).

State did not need to track the language of § 5-13-211 in order to charge defendant because merely citing the statute was sufficient; the state did not need to amend the information because it correctly cited the statute that defendant was charged with violating, and the additional language in the information was in the nature of explanatory text that was superfluous and did not make it fatally defective such as to warrant reversal. Barnes v. State, 94 Ark. App. 321, 230 S.W.3d 311 (2006).

Title.

The word “title” as used in this section, relates to the authority under which the proceeding is brought and not to ownership of property alleged to have been stolen. Mitchell v. State, 205 Ark. 596, 169 S.W.2d 867 (1943).

Cited: Budd v. State, 198 Ark. 869, 131 S.W.2d 933 (1939); Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W.2d 304 (1943); Haller v. State, 217 Ark. 646, 232 S.W.2d 829 (1950); Nail v. State, 225 Ark. 495, 283 S.W.2d 683 (1955); Castle v. State, 229 Ark. 478, 316 S.W.2d 701 (1958); Estes v. State, 246 Ark. 1145, 442 S.W.2d 221 (1969); Powell v. State, 251 Ark. 46, 471 S.W.2d 333 (1971); Caton v. State, 252 Ark. 420, 479 S.W.2d 537 (1972); Flaherty v. State, 255 Ark. 187, 500 S.W.2d 87 (1973); Baugh v. State, 256 Ark. 64, 505 S.W.2d 519 (1974); Owen v. State, 263 Ark. 493, 565 S.W.2d 607 (1978); Limber v. State, 264 Ark. 479, 572 S.W.2d 402 (1978); Parker v. State, 265 Ark. 315, 578 S.W.2d 206 (1979); Jones v. State, 275 Ark. 12, 627 S.W.2d 6 (1982); Richard v. State, 286 Ark. 410, 691 S.W.2d 872 (1985); Hagen v. State, 315 Ark. 20, 864 S.W.2d 856 (1993).

16-85-404. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, and its exceptions, concerning the rule that only one offense is chargeable in an indictment, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 503. The section was derived from Crim. Code, §§ 125, 126; Acts 1901, No. 11, § 1, p. 22; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3015, 3016; Acts 1921, No. 230, § 1; Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 20, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., §§ 3837, 3838; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1009, 43-1010.

16-85-405. Sufficiency and errors.

    1. The indictment is sufficient if it can be understood from the indictment:
      1. That it was found by a grand jury of a county, impaneled in a court having authority to receive the indictment;
      2. That the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court and at some time prior to the time of finding the indictment; and
      3. That the act or omission charged as the offense is stated with such a degree of certainty so as to satisfy due process of law.
    2. No indictment is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected, by reason of any defect which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.
  1. An error as to the name of the defendant shall not vitiate the indictment or proceedings on the indictment, and if the defendant's true name is discovered at any time before execution of the indictment, an entry shall be made on the docket of the court of the defendant's true name, referring to the fact of the defendant's being indicted by the name mentioned in the indictment, and the subsequent proceedings shall be in the defendant's true name.
  2. The statement in the indictment as to the time at which the offense was committed is not material except as a statement that it was committed before the time of finding the indictment, except where the time is a material ingredient in the offense.
  3. The words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in an indictment, but other words conveying the same meaning may be used.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 124, 127-137; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3013, 3014, 3017-3026; Pope's Dig., §§ 3835, 3836, 3839-3848; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1011 — 43-1022; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 318.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote this section.

Case Notes

Defendant's Name.

The doctrine of idem sonans held not to apply. Woods v. State, 123 Ark. 111, 184 S.W. 409 (1916).

One indicted under one name and tried and convicted under another cannot afterward raise the objection that a correction was made before conviction. Martin v. State, 161 Ark. 177, 255 S.W. 1094 (1923); Daniels v. State, 186 Ark. 255, 53 S.W.2d 231 (1932).

The minor misspelling of the victim's name in the information did not constitute a fatal defect as the rights of the defendant were not prejudiced. Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991).

Injured Persons.

Error as to name of victim held immaterial. State v. Seely, 30 Ark. 162 (1875); Bennett v. State, 84 Ark. 97, 104 S.W. 928 (1907); Andrews v. State, 100 Ark. 184, 139 S.W. 1134 (1911); Sutton v. State, 163 Ark. 468, 260 S.W. 403 (1924).

It is not necessary in an indictment for larceny or embezzlement to name those composing the partnership whose money has been stolen or embezzled. Ivey v. State, 109 Ark. 446, 160 S.W. 208 (1913); Hughes v. State, 109 Ark. 403, 160 S.W. 209 (1913).

—Ownership of Property.

Where two or more counts are used to charge the ownership of property in different persons so as to meet the contingencies of the evidence as to ownership, the prosecuting attorney should state that fact to the court on the demurrer and make it appear of record that only one offense was intended. State v. Jourdan, 32 Ark. 203 (1877).

Erroneous or incomplete allegation of ownership not material or prejudicial. Tucker v. State, 194 Ark. 528, 108 S.W.2d 890, 1937 Ark. LEXIS 375 (1937); Eason v. State, 198 Ark. 885, 132 S.W.2d 5 (1939); Johnson v. State, 199 Ark. 196, 133 S.W.2d 15 (1939); Tate v. State, 204 Ark. 470, 163 S.W.2d 150 (1942).

Evidence sufficient to show information was not demurrable on ground of being vague, indefinite and uncertain. Smith v. State, 199 Ark. 900, 136 S.W.2d 673 (1940).

An erroneous allegation of ownership of property does not affect any substantial right of the defendant charged if the offense is described with such certainty as to identify the act so there can be no doubt about the particular offense charged. Boyette v. State, 265 Ark. 707, 580 S.W.2d 473 (1979).

Instruments.

Where an indictment for forgery of a lost instrument sets out its substance, without alleging that the defendant destroyed it, it is error to charge the jury that a misdescription of the instrument is immaterial. Bench v. State, 63 Ark. 488, 39 S.W. 360 (1897).

As a general rule, an indictment for forgery of a bank check should set forth the instrument according to its tenor and should purport to do so, and it will not suffice to set it forth accurately in fact if it does not set forth its tenor; but if the instrument is lost or destroyed, or is in the possession of the accused or is otherwise inaccessible to the pleader, the substance will suffice. Crossland v. State, 77 Ark. 537, 92 S.W. 776 (1906)Questioned byHawthorn v. State, 206 Ark. 1009, 178 S.W.2d 490 (Ark. 1944).

An indictment for forgery of a certain writing which alleges that the writing “is in substance as follows,” and the writing is thereupon set out so minutely and in detail as to exclude the idea that the substance alone is merely set out, will be taken as if the writing was set out according to its tenor. Evans v. State, 94 Ark. 400, 127 S.W. 743 (1910).

Jurisdiction and Venue.

The venue must be proved on the trial, though not alleged in the indictment. Thetstone v. State, 32 Ark. 179 (1877).

Where the name of the county appears in the caption, and is referred to in the body of the indictment, it is sufficient. State v. Hunn, 34 Ark. 321 (1879); Hughes v. State, 154 Ark. 621, 243 S.W. 70 (1922).

Evidence held sufficient to prove jurisdiction and venue. Hampton v. State, 67 Ark. 266, 54 S.W. 746 (1899); Meador v. State, 201 Ark. 1083, 148 S.W.2d 653 (1941); Ward v. State, 203 Ark. 1024, 160 S.W.2d 864, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 196 (1942); Wise v. State, 204 Ark. 743, 164 S.W.2d 897 (1942); Trotter v. State, 206 Ark. 690, 177 S.W.2d 173 (1944).

Where an indictment alleged that the crime was committed in a certain county but failed to allege in which of the two districts of the county it was committed, it will be considered that it was committed in the district in which the grand jury was impaneled. Cegars v. State, 150 Ark. 648, 235 S.W. 36 (1921).

Whether the crime was committed in the alleged county was a jury question. Heath v. State, 207 Ark. 425, 181 S.W.2d 231 (1944).

Charging the location at which an offense occurred is necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the court; therefore, it is sufficient if the court having jurisdiction of the offense alleged can be determined from the information. Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 732 S.W.2d 817 (1987).

Particular Language.

As to omission and use of certain descriptive words, see: Holt v. State, 47 Ark. 196, 1 S.W. 61, 1886 Ark. LEXIS 3 (1886); Kansas C. S. R. Co. v. State, 194 Ark. 80, 106 S.W.2d 163 (1937); Davis v. State, 196 Ark. 721, 119 S.W.2d 527 (1938); Atha v. State, 217 Ark. 599, 232 S.W.2d 452 (1950)Questioned byFrancis v. Benton, 240 Ark. 779, 402 S.W.2d 110 (Ark. 1966).

It is enough if the information sufficiently informs the defendant of the charge or charges so that a defense can be prepared. Dean v. State, 293 Ark. 75, 732 S.W.2d 855 (1987).

Information alleging that defendant had three prior “arrests” rather than three prior “convictions” held sufficient where evidence showed that defendant did in fact have three prior convictions. Johnson v. State, 55 Ark. App. 117, 932 S.W.2d 347 (1996).

Perjury.

Indictment for perjury held insufficient. Harp v. State, 59 Ark. 113, 26 S.W. 714 (1894).

An indictment for perjury will be sufficient if it alleges that the perjured testimony was material but does not specify how it was material. Loudermilk v. State, 110 Ark. 549, 162 S.W. 569 (1913).

In an indictment charging the defendant with perjury, it is not sufficient merely to aver that the oath or affidavit was false; it is essential that it appear what the truth is, but that requirement is met if the allegation that a certain statement is false necessarily implies that the converse is true and necessarily implies what the converse is. Loudermilk v. State, 110 Ark. 549, 162 S.W. 569 (1913); Atkinson v. State, 133 Ark. 341, 202 S.W. 709 (1916).

Several assignments of perjury may be embraced in one count and all the several particulars in which the accused swore falsely may be embraced in one count, and proof of falsity of any one or more of the assignments will justify a conviction. Atkinson v. State, 133 Ark. 341, 202 S.W. 709 (1916).

An indictment for perjury in procuring a marriage license alleging that it was material that an affadivit be made to secure the license need not set out the facts making it material. Cox v. State, 164 Ark. 126, 261 S.W. 303 (1924).

An indictment for perjury need not refer to the statute pursuant to which the oath was administered. Cox v. State, 164 Ark. 126, 261 S.W. 303 (1924).

In indictments, for perjury, the falsity of the testimony or statement for which the defendant is indicted may be shown to be material either by direct averment or by allegation from which the materiality appears. Cockrum v. State, 186 Ark. 14, 52 S.W.2d 642 (1932).

Indictment for perjury held sufficient. Cockrum v. State, 186 Ark. 14, 52 S.W.2d 642 (1932); Cluck v. State, 192 Ark. 1036, 96 S.W.2d 489 (1936).

Plaintiff's Name.

The State was permitted on the day before trial to amend the information to change the name of one of the victims where the change did not prejudice the presenting of a defense. Lovett v. State, 330 Ark. 33, 952 S.W.2d 644 (1997).

Presumptions and Judicial Notice.

Chastity of a female is presumed and need not be alleged in a prosecution for seduction. Willhite v. State, 84 Ark. 67, 104 S.W. 531 (1907).

The Supreme Court will take judicial notice of cattle dipping rules promulgated by the board of control of agricultural experiment station and they need not be alleged in the indictment or proved. Palmer v. State, 137 Ark. 160, 208 S.W. 436 (1919).

Supreme Court takes judicial notice that Oklahoma is a dry state and it is not necessary to state that fact in the information in a prosecution for unlawful transportation of whiskey. Jones v. State, 198 Ark. 354, 129 S.W.2d 249 (1939).

Statutory Language.

An indictment for a statutory offense must state all of the circumstances that constitute the offense, no case being brought by construction within the statute unless it is completely within its words; however, the precise words of the statute need not be used, but words of equivalent import, or more extensive signification, which necessarily include the words of the statute, may be substituted. Wood v. State, 47 Ark. 488, 1 S.W. 709 (1886).

An indictment which states a statutory offense with such a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment upon conviction according to the rights of the case, and which states the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, is sufficient even though the facts alleged to constitute the offense are not couched in the precise language of the statute creating the offense. Wood v. State, 47 Ark. 488, 1 S.W. 709 (1886); State v. Bond, 151 Ark. 203, 235 S.W. 801 (1921).

Although an information is drawn in the language of a particular section of the statute and such section is not applicable, if, by reasonable construction, the language of the information charges an offense against the laws of the state under any other provision of the statutes, the proceeding should not be nullified. Baker v. State, 200 Ark. 688, 140 S.W.2d 1008 (1940).

Sufficiency.

Indictment or information held sufficient. Beard v. State, 79 Ark. 293, 95 S.W. 995, 97 S.W. 667 (1906), dismissed, 207 U.S. 601, 207 U.S. 602, 28 S. Ct. 258 (1907); State v. Peyton, 93 Ark. 406, 125 S.W. 416 (1910); Pearce v. State, 97 Ark. 5, 132 S.W. 986 (1910); Gurley v. State, 179 Ark. 1149, 20 S.W.2d 886 (1929); Green v. State, 185 Ark. 1098, 51 S.W.2d 511 (1932); Slinkard v. State, 193 Ark. 765, 103 S.W.2d 50 (1937); Brockelhurst v. State, 195 Ark. 67, 111 S.W.2d 527 (1937); Craig v. State, 195 Ark. 925, 114 S.W.2d 1073 (1938); Budd v. State, 198 Ark. 869, 131 S.W.2d 933 (1939); Johnson v. State, 199 Ark. 196, 133 S.W.2d 15 (1939); Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S. Ct. 641, 93 L. Ed. 1081 (1949); Underdown v. State, 220 Ark. 834, 250 S.W.2d 131 (1952); Jackson v. State, 226 Ark. 731, 293 S.W.2d 699 (1956); Castle v. State, 229 Ark. 478, 316 S.W.2d 701 (1958); England v. State, 234 Ark. 421, 352 S.W.2d 582 (1962); Edwards v. State, 244 Ark. 1145, 429 S.W.2d 92 (1968); Houpt v. State, 249 Ark. 485, 459 S.W.2d 565 (Ark. 1970); Ridgeway v. State, 251 Ark. 157, 472 S.W.2d 108 (1971); Williford v. State, 252 Ark. 397, 479 S.W.2d 244 (1972); Henderson v. State, 255 Ark. 870, 503 S.W.2d 889 (1974); Haynie v. State, 257 Ark. 542, 518 S.W.2d 492 (1975); Fortner v. State, 258 Ark. 591, 528 S.W.2d 378 (1975); Owen v. State, 263 Ark. 493, 565 S.W.2d 607 (1978); Beard v. State, 269 Ark. 16, 598 S.W.2d 72 (1980); Browning v. State, 274 Ark. 13, 621 S.W.2d 688 (1981); Van Daley v. State, 20 Ark. App. 127, 725 S.W.2d 574 (1987).

In formal charges of offenses committed, it is sufficient if the state of facts set out charges a specific offense, and no charge will be deemed insufficient which does not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of defendant on the merits. Kansas C. S. R. Co. v. State, 194 Ark. 80, 106 S.W.2d 163 (1937).

Indictment or information held insufficient to support conviction. Robbins v. State, 219 Ark. 376, 242 S.W.2d 640 (1951).

Indictment or information is sufficient if it puts the accused on notice as to the nature of the charge. Underdown v. State, 220 Ark. 834, 250 S.W.2d 131 (1952).

Time.

The dismissal of an indictment because of a discrepancy as to the day of the offense amounted to an acquittal after the jury was impaneled, as under this section the indictment was good. Lee v. State, 26 Ark. 260 (1870).

Indictment is sufficient even though it charges crime committed on future or impossible date. Conrand v. State, 65 Ark. 559, 47 S.W. 628 (1898); Hunter v. State, 93 Ark. 275, 124 S.W. 1028 (1910).

Indictment sufficient which left date of offense blank. Grayson v. State, 92 Ark. 413, 123 S.W. 388 (1909); Threadgill v. State, 99 Ark. 126, 137 S.W. 814 (1911).

Time held not be a material ingredient of the offense. Venable v. State, 177 Ark. 91, 5 S.W.2d 716 (1928); Buchanan v. State, 214 Ark. 835, 218 S.W.2d 700 (1948); Haller v. State, 217 Ark. 646, 232 S.W.2d 829 (1950); Payne v. State, 224 Ark. 309, 272 S.W.2d 829 (1954).

Amendment to change date of offense held proper. Scoggins v. State, 258 Ark. 749, 528 S.W.2d 641 (1975); Robinson v. State, 11 Ark. App. 18, 665 S.W.2d 890 (1984).

Where the state was allowed to amend the information to allege that the crime occurred between November 1, 1983, and January 15, 1984, rather than on or about January 15, 1984, no prejudice resulted from the court's action because the particular time was not an ingredient of the offense. Huffman v. State, 288 Ark. 321, 704 S.W.2d 627 (1986).

In prosecution for sexual abuse in the first degree, the court was correct in permitting the jury to hear the testimony of both the prosecutrix that the incident took place on December 15 and the witness who testified as to events occurring on December 8, the conflict as to the date going only to the weight of the evidence. West v. State, 290 Ark. 329, 719 S.W.2d 684 (1986), rehearing denied, 290 Ark. 340A, 290 Ark. 329, 722 S.W.2d 284 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Ridling v. State, 348 Ark. 213, 72 S.W.3d 466 (2002), superseded by statute as stated in, Taylor v. State, 355 Ark. 267, 138 S.W.3d 684 (2003), superseded by statute as stated in, Dykes v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 215 (Mar. 21, 2007).

A bill of particulars as to the precise time the offense was committed need not be granted unless the time is material to the allegation. Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 732 S.W.2d 817 (1987).

Victim's inability to fix definite date of rape does not defeat the charge, and any discrepancies in the testimony concerning the date of the offense were for the jury to resolve. Yates v. State, 301 Ark. 424, 785 S.W.2d 199 (1990).

Where the information alleged the offenses occurred in June or July, and the victim, a child, testified the incidents did not occur after the end of May, the time a crime is alleged to have occurred is not of critical significance unless the date is material to the offense, particularly with sexual crimes against children and infants. Fry v. State, 309 Ark. 316, 829 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1992).

Where the particular time was not an ingredient of the offense, amendment of the information just before trial as to the time of the offense was permissible. Harris v. State, 320 Ark. 677, 899 S.W.2d 459 (1995).

Generally speaking, the time a crime is alleged to have occurred is not of critical significance unless the date is material to the offense. Wilson v. State, 320 Ark. 707, 898 S.W.2d 469 (1995).

Exact dates of the sexual acts committed by defendant against the victim were immaterial to the offenses because the proof clearly showed that defendant had sexual intercourse with the victim while she was under the age of 14 and defendant's defense was that he did not commit the crimes. Martin v. State, 354 Ark. 289, 119 S.W.3d 504 (2003).

In a case involving second-degree sexual assault and attempted rape, defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by an amendment to an information that changed the time of the alleged offenses because the exact dates of the offenses were immaterial where the victim testified that defendant attempted to rape her and had sexual contact with her while she was under the age of 14; moreover, the lack of dates was not prejudicial where defendant contended that the sexual acts alleged by the victim never occurred. Bean v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 107, 432 S.W.3d 87 (2014).

Variance.

Inconsistency between charge and proof held immaterial. Rawlings v. State, 117 Ark. 539, 174 S.W. 150 (1915); Cluck v. State, 192 Ark. 1036, 96 S.W.2d 489 (1936); Warren v. State, 250 Ark. 247, 464 S.W.2d 564 (1971); Hall v. State, 276 Ark. 245, 634 S.W.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied, Hall v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 1109, 103 S. Ct. 738 (1983).

Variance between allegation and proof held fatal. Von Tonglin v. State, 200 Ark. 1142, 143 S.W.2d 185 (1940).

Amendment to information or indictment held permissible where there was no material variation or prejudice. Collins v. State, 200 Ark. 1027, 143 S.W.2d 1 (1940); Miller v. State, 250 Ark. 199, 464 S.W.2d 594, 1971 Ark. LEXIS 1241 (1971).

Notwithstanding variance in the wording of an information and the proof introduced at trial, reversal is not warranted unless the variance prejudiced substantial rights of the accused. Tackett v. State, 298 Ark. 20, 766 S.W.2d 410 (1989), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002).

Cited: Scoggins v. State, 32 Ark. 205 (1877); Buell v. State, 45 Ark. 336 (1885); Leak v. State, 61 Ark. 599, 33 S.W. 1067 (1896); Bledsoe v. State, 64 Ark. 474, 42 S.W. 899 (1897); Ward v. State, 70 Ark. 204, 66 S.W. 926, 1902 Ark. LEXIS 38 (1902); James v. State, 110 Ark. 170, 160 S.W. 1090 (1913); Oakes v. State, 135 Ark. 221, 205 S.W. 305 (1918); Bender v. State, 202 Ark. 606, 151 S.W.2d 668 (1941); Haller v. State, 217 Ark. 646, 232 S.W.2d 829 (1950); Willis v. State, 221 Ark. 162, 252 S.W.2d 618 (1952); Ragsdale v. State, 222 Ark. 499, 262 S.W.2d 91 (1953); Smith v. State, 231 Ark. 235, 330 S.W.2d 58 (1959); Estes v. State, 246 Ark. 1145, 442 S.W.2d 221 (1969); Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971); Powell v. State, 251 Ark. 46, 471 S.W.2d 333 (1971); Wilson v. State, 263 Ark. 764, 569 S.W.2d 87 (1978); Drew v. State, 8 Ark. App. 120, 648 S.W.2d 836 (1983); Richard v. State, 286 Ark. 410, 691 S.W.2d 872 (1985); Speer v. State, 18 Ark. App. 1, 708 S.W.2d 94 (1986); Dunlap v. State, 303 Ark. 222, 795 S.W.2d 920 (1990).

16-85-406. Construction of words.

The words used in an indictment must be construed according to their usual acceptance in common language, except words and phrases defined by law, which are to be construed according to their legal meaning.

History. Crim. Code, § 138; C. & M. Dig., § 3027; Pope's Dig., § 3849; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1023.

Case Notes

Public Highway.

Although a certain city street is not on a state-numbered highway, it is a “public highway” according to the usual acceptation in common language, and therefore an indictment which used the term “public highway” did not prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. Atha v. State, 217 Ark. 599, 232 S.W.2d 452 (1950)Questioned byFrancis v. Benton, 240 Ark. 779, 402 S.W.2d 110 (Ark. 1966).

16-85-407. Amendment of indictment and filing of bill of particulars.

  1. The prosecuting attorney or other attorney representing the state, with leave of the court, may amend an indictment as to matters of form or may file a bill of particulars.
  2. However, no indictment shall be amended nor bill of particulars filed so as to change the nature of the crime charged or the degree of the crime charged.
  3. All amendments and bills of particulars shall be noted of record.

History. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 24, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3853; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1024.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure — Amendment of Indictments and Informations, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 62.

Case Notes

In General.

Amendment of an indictment, or by implication an information, may be made with leave of court unless the amendment changes the nature of the crime charged or the degree of the crime charged; that holds true even after the jury has been sworn unless the amendment creates an unfair surprise. Neely v. State, 317 Ark. 312, 877 S.W.2d 589 (1994).

Construction.

This section, though limiting amendments to matters of form, must be read in connection with § 16-85-403. Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W.2d 304 (1943).

Alternative Charges.

The rule permitting alternative charges for the same offense, § 16-85-404(a), is not in conflict with subsection (b) of this section, which prohibits an amendment to an indictment which changes the nature or degree of the crime charged. Rucker v. State, 320 Ark. 643, 899 S.W.2d 447 (1995).

Change in Nature or Degree.

Amendment held not to change the nature or degree of the crime charged. Collins v. State, 200 Ark. 1027, 143 S.W.2d 1 (1940); Ingle v. State, 211 Ark. 39, 198 S.W.2d 996 (1947); Lee v. State, 229 Ark. 354, 315 S.W.2d 916 (1958), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 359 U.S. 930, 79 S. Ct. 616 (1959); Castle v. State, 229 Ark. 478, 316 S.W.2d 701 (1958); Silas v. State, 232 Ark. 248, 337 S.W.2d 644 (1960), cert. denied, Silas v. Arkansas, 365 U.S. 821, 81 S. Ct. 705 (1961); Washington v. State, 248 Ark. 318, 451 S.W.2d 449, 1970 Ark. LEXIS 1218 (1970); Murray v. State, 249 Ark. 887, 462 S.W.2d 438 (1971); Ridgeway v. State, 251 Ark. 157, 472 S.W.2d 108 (1971); Albright v. State, 253 Ark. 671, 488 S.W.2d 11 (1972); Finch v. State, 262 Ark. 313, 556 S.W.2d 434 (1977); Owen v. State, 263 Ark. 493, 565 S.W.2d 607 (1978); Prokos v. State, 266 Ark. 50, 582 S.W.2d 36 (1979); Workman v. State, 267 Ark. 103, 589 S.W.2d 20 (1979); Jones v. State, 275 Ark. 12, 627 S.W.2d 6 (1982); Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455 (8th Cir. 1983); State v. Brown, 283 Ark. 304, 675 S.W.2d 822 (1984); Lincoln v. State, 287 Ark. 16, 696 S.W.2d 316 (1985).

Amendment reducing charge held proper. Silas v. State, 232 Ark. 248, 337 S.W.2d 644 (1960), cert. denied, Silas v. Arkansas, 365 U.S. 821, 81 S. Ct. 705 (1961).

This section should not be construed to permit a defendant to complain of a change that is wholly to his advantage; therefore the trial court was not in error in allowing the state to reduce an original charge of capital murder to the lesser offense of first-degree murder. Huckaby v. State, 262 Ark. 413, 557 S.W.2d 875 (1977).

Amendment held to change the nature or degree of the crime charged. Harmon v. State, 277 Ark. 265, 641 S.W.2d 21 (1982), overruled in part, White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).

Amendment of an information which upgraded the offense was proper where the amendment did not change the nature or degree of the offense but authorized a more severe penalty and, although the prosecutor did not amend the information until the day of trial, defendant did not claim surprise, ask the trial judge for a continuance or tender proof of prejudice on appeal. Wilson v. State, 286 Ark. 430, 692 S.W.2d 620 (1985).

Where the only effect of the amendment to the information was to split the original single count of capital murder into two counts, under the new statutory definition of that offense, the amendment was a matter of form that did not change the nature of the offense charged. Mitchell v. State, 306 Ark. 464, 816 S.W.2d 566 (1991).

Defendant rightly invoked subsection (b) of this section on the basis that the degree of the offenses was changed when the two counts were amended from attempted rape to rape, but no prejudice resulted from the amendment. Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306, 849 S.W.2d 473 (1993).

Denial of a continuance to a defendant did not violate due process; although the information was amended the day before trial from a charge of rape of someone less than 14 years old by forcible compulsion to rape by forcible compulsion in violation of § 5-14-103(a)(1), the nature of the crime charged did not change, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413 (2012).

Trial court did not erroneously allow an information charging rape by forcible compulsion and terroristic threatening to be amended on the first day of trial to add physical helplessness as an alternative means of committing rape because the amendment addressed only the manner by which the rape was committed and did not change the nature or degree of the rape charge, and defendant could not show that the amendment resulted in prejudice through unfair surprise because he failed to move for a continuance and failed to claim surprise after he was put on notice that the State planned to amend the information. Harris v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 651 (2012).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Trial court's decision to deny appellant's motion for postconviction relief was not clearly erroneous because with regard to counsel's decision not to move to quash the second amended information or for a continuance, appellant failed to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective; appellant did not show how the addition of the second charge of aggravated robbery impeded his ability to prepare his defense. Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 166, 460 S.W.3d 781 (2015).

No Effect on Jurisdiction.

Defendant was properly convicted of rape despite his claim that he was charged with first-degree sexual assault, and the information against him was not amended. This section related to matters of notice and prejudice and provided a criminal defendant with protection against being prejudiced through surprise; thus, it was procedural in nature, not jurisdictional, and a violation of the statute did not divest the trial court of its authority to convict and sentence a defendant. VanOven v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 46, 380 S.W.3d 507 (2011).

Prejudice or Surprise.

Defendant held not to have been surprised or prejudiced by amendment. Albright v. State, 253 Ark. 671, 488 S.W.2d 11 (1972); Workman v. State, 267 Ark. 103, 589 S.W.2d 20 (1979); Crafton v. State, 274 Ark. 319, 624 S.W.2d 440 (1981); Horne v. State, 12 Ark. App. 301, 677 S.W.2d 856 (1984).

Defendant held prejudiced by amendment. Prokos v. State, 266 Ark. 50, 582 S.W.2d 36 (1979).

Trial court did not err in permitting the prosecutor to nolle prosse a first-degree murder charge and then file a new information charging defendant with capital felony murder where there was no surprise or prejudice to defendant and such procedure did not conflict with this section. Abernathy v. State, 278 Ark. 250, 644 S.W.2d 590 (1983).

Amendments to an information are permitted under this section if the amendment does not change the nature or degree of the crime charged, and if the accused is not surprised by the amendment. Lincoln v. State, 287 Ark. 16, 696 S.W.2d 316 (1985).

Where defendant knew of the state's plan to amend three days prior to trial, and he did not move for a continuance, there was no prejudice in the trial court's allowance of the amendment. Mitchell v. State, 306 Ark. 464, 816 S.W.2d 566 (1991).

As a result of the state's filing of a sufficiently specific amended information, in itself a bill of particulars, defendant demonstrated no prejudice. Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996), cert. denied, Nance v. Arkansas, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S. Ct. 134, 136 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1996).

Amended information by the State was proper where defendant was not surprised, made no motion for a continuance, and no prejudice was shown; as such, there was no need for reversal under this section. Hoover v. State, 353 Ark. 424, 108 S.W.3d 618 (2003).

There was no violation of this section when an information in a capital murder trial was amended a few days before trial to include a premeditation and deliberation element because defendant was not surprised by such; her own admissions showed that she acted in a premeditated and deliberative manner when she shot her husband as he slept, she had wanted to leave for a long time, and she fled with some of his belongings. Therefore, there was nothing wrong with including the premeditation and deliberation elements in the jury instructions. Terry v. State, 371 Ark. 50, 263 S.W.3d 528 (2007).

Defendant was properly convicted of attempted residential burglary and first-degree criminal mischief; while defendant's counsel did object to the timing of an amendment to the information changing the charge from criminal trespass to criminal mischief, he never articulated how the late filing of the amendment would prejudice defendant where the defense at trial was that he did not commit the crimes alleged and was elsewhere at the time of their commission. Moore v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 58 (2015).

Validity of Amendment.

Particular amendments held proper. Brewer v. State, 195 Ark. 477, 112 S.W.2d 976 (1938); Johnson v. State, 197 Ark. 1016, 126 S.W.2d 289 (1939); Bennett v. State, 201 Ark. 237, 144 S.W.2d 476 (1940); Tate v. State, 204 Ark. 470, 163 S.W.2d 150 (1942); Melton v. State, 212 Ark. 968, 209 S.W.2d 99 (1948); Cooley v. State, 213 Ark. 503, 211 S.W.2d 114 (1948).

Defect in information held cured by amendment. Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W.2d 304 (1943).

Information amended by deleting certain words. Massey v. State, 207 Ark. 675, 182 S.W.2d 671 (1944).

Court allowed prosecutor to insert name of defendant in charging clause where the body of the information showed who was accused by the information. Williams v. State, 215 Ark. 757, 223 S.W.2d 190, 1949 Ark. LEXIS 820 (1949).

Amendment held invalid. Hardwick v. State, 220 Ark. 464, 248 S.W.2d 377 (1952).

Amending the information to read “serious physical injury” rather than “personal injury” to conform to the 1993 amendment of § 5-54-125(c)(3) after prosecution had presented its case-in-chief changed neither the degree nor the nature of the offense charged, and thus no error occurred. Witherspoon v. State, 319 Ark. 313, 891 S.W.2d 371 (1995).

Pretrial amendment of an information that charged capital murder on the basis of felony murder to add, as an alternative, the charge of capital murder on the basis of premeditated and deliberated purpose, did not change the nature of the crime charged in violation of subsection (b), nor did the amendment adding an allegation of habitual offender change the nature or degree of the crime. Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996), cert. denied, Nance v. Arkansas, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S. Ct. 134, 136 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1996).

There is no requirement that an amendment to an information be made in writing. Johnson v. State, 55 Ark. App. 117, 932 S.W.2d 347 (1996).

Even though a prosecutor was not allowed to amend a felony information under § 16-85-407 in a theft of property case to show the value of a vehicle stolen since that changed the class of the crime, there was no reversible error because the sentence imposed was less than the maximum for either the amended or the original charge. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced. Ward v. State, 97 Ark. App. 294, 248 S.W.3d 489 (2007).

Circuit court did not err when it allowed the state to amend a felony information to include a habitual-offender allegation on the morning of defendant's trial for possession of a firearm by a felon, because the amendment did not change the nature or degree of the crime, but simply authorized a more severe punishment. Glaze v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 283, 378 S.W.3d 897 (2011), vacated, 2011 Ark. 464, 385 S.W.3d 203 (2011).

State's amendment of an information did not violate this section because the amendment did not constitute a severance of offenses under Ark. R. Crim. P. 22.1(c), and the evidence would have been introduced in any case as part of the events leading up to the shooting whether it was included in the charging instrument or not; the only offense charged in the case was first-degree battery under § 5-13-201(a)(3), and the amendment did not change the nature or degree of the crime but merely clarified the manner in which the offense was committed. Reed v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 352, 383 S.W.3d 881 (2011).

Trial court committed no error in allowing the state to orally amend the information to include the contra pacem clauses as required by Ark. Const. Art. 7, § 49 because the amendment conformed to the requirements of this section; the amendment adding the contra pacem clauses did not change the nature or degree of the crimes charged, nor did it compromise defendant's ability to make a defense, the amendment resulted in no prejudice, and defendant did not claim surprise or request a continuance after the amendment was granted. Walker v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 61, 389 S.W.3d 10 (2012).

Cited: Crabtree v. State, 238 Ark. 358, 381 S.W.2d 729 (1964); Henderson v. State, 255 Ark. 870, 503 S.W.2d 889 (1974); Dolphus v. State, 256 Ark. 248, 506 S.W.2d 538 (1974); Richard v. State, 286 Ark. 410, 691 S.W.2d 872 (1985); Allen v. State, 296 Ark. 33, 751 S.W.2d 347 (1988); Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458, 757 S.W.2d 937 (1988); Smith v. State, 300 Ark. 330, 778 S.W.2d 947 (1989); Sossamon v. State, 31 Ark. App. 131, 789 S.W.2d 738 (1990); Martin v. State, 316 Ark. 715, 875 S.W.2d 81 (1994); Kelch v. Erwin, 333 Ark. 567, 970 S.W.2d 255 (1998); Hoyle v. State, 2011 Ark. 321, 388 S.W.3d 901 (2011); Martinez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 182, 432 S.W.3d 689 (2014).

16-85-408. Public inspection and disclosure.

  1. When a grand jury indictment for any offense known to the laws of this state shall be found against any person not in actual confinement or held by recognizance to answer to the indictment, the indictment shall not be open to the inspection of any person except the judge and clerk of the court and the prosecuting attorney until the defendant has been arrested.
    1. No judge, clerk, prosecuting attorney, or other officer of any court shall disclose the fact of any indictment's being found until the defendant has been arrested or recognized to answer the indictment.
    2. Any judge, clerk, or other officer violating the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be guilty of a violation and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  2. The provisions of this section shall not extend to any officer making the disclosure by the issuing or in the execution of any process on the indictment or in any other manner when it shall become necessary in the discharge of any official duty.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 86-89; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2819, 3031-3033; Pope's Dig., §§ 3537, 3855-3857; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1025 — 43-1028; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 84.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “When a grand jury” for “When an” in (a); and substituted “violation” for “misdemeanor” in (b)(2).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Watkins, Access to Public Records under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 741.

Case Notes

Presumption.

It is presumed that an offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court in which the charge is filed, unless the evidence affirmatively shows otherwise. Baggett v. State, 15 Ark. App. 113, 690 S.W.2d 362 (1985).

Record Entry.

When an indicted party is not in custody, it is sufficient for the record entry of the finding of the indictment to describe it by number. Fitzpatrick v. State, 37 Ark. 238 (1881).

Venue.

In prosecution for interference with custody where defendant presented his motion to transfer case on basis of lack of venue from one county to another prematurely at the close of the state's evidence, the state was not required to put on proof that the interference with custody charge was committed in first county, as the information stated that the crime was committed therein and venue was presumed proper unless there was affirmative evidence to the contrary, and as the record reflected that there was no such evidence at that stage in the proceedings the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to transfer, for while admittedly defendant may have put on some proof following his motion to transfer to the effect that he did not consider committing the crime until he returned to second county and that he fled from that county with the child, independent review of the record revealed that defendant did not at any subsequent time during the course of the trial renew his motion to transfer. Baggett v. State, 15 Ark. App. 113, 690 S.W.2d 362 (1985).

Cited: Humphries v. State, 33 Ark. 713 (1878).

16-85-409. Recording.

  1. It shall be the duty of the clerks of the circuit courts of this state, whenever an arrest has been made of any person against whom an indictment has been found by the grand jury, properly returned, to record the indictment, with the entries thereon, in a book to be kept by him or her for that purpose.
  2. In all cases where an indictment may be lost or destroyed, or where the indictment cannot be found, a copy of the record thereof, as provided in subsection (a) of this section, duly certified by the clerk under his or her hand and the seal of the court, shall be taken and used for all purposes in any of the courts of this state the same as the original indictment.

History. Acts 1881, No. 58, §§ 1, 2, p. 106; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3034, 3035; Pope's Dig., §§ 3858, 3859; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1029, 43-1030.

Case Notes

Fee.

The clerk is not entitled to charge a county for recording an indictment. Hempstead County v. Harkness, 73 Ark. 600, 84 S.W. 799 (1905).

Presumption.

It is legally presumed from the fact that the clerk recorded an indictment that it was found by the grand jury and returned into court; and in cases of the loss or destruction of the orginal, the defendant may be tried and convicted on a copy from the record. Miller v. State, 40 Ark. 488, 1883 Ark. LEXIS 32 (1883).

16-85-410. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning second indictments, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 504. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 90; C. & M. Dig., § 3037; Pope's Dig., § 3861; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1031.

Subchapter 5 — Grand Jury Proceedings

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 28, § 20: effective 60 days after passage.

Acts 1883, No. 49, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1889, No. 62, § 4: June 1, 1889.

Acts 1933, No. 29, § 3: approved Feb. 14, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, grand juries, prosecuting attorneys and judges of the circuit courts of this State are in many instances being handicapped and delayed in the discharge of their duties because of the want of any provision for expeditious and adequate recording and reporting of the proceedings of grand juries, and such delays result in additional and unnecessary expense to the State and counties, and it is desirable that said condition be immediately remedied; now therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall take effect and be in force immediately from and after its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 254, § 3: approved Mar. 8, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, it is necessary to amend and improve judicial procedure and criminal law in connection with the privilege of editors, reporters, writers and radio stations and to clarify the same and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1983, No. 176, § 3: Feb. 15, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly hereby finds that there is presently no method by which the State of Arkansas can secure the attendance of witnesses before the grand jury when there is a probability the witness will absent himself therefrom. For the efficient and fair administration of justice, a system similar to the federal law on securing testimony of material witnesses, 18 U.S.C. Section 3149, is highly desirable. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Validity of indictment as affected by substitution or addition of grand jurors after commencement of investigation. 2 A.L.R.4th 980.

Finding or return of indictment, or filing of information, as tolling limitation period. 18 A.L.R.4th 1202.

Failure to swear or irregularity in swearing witnesses appearing before grand jury as ground for dismissal of indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 154.

Presence of unauthorized persons during state grand jury proceedings as affecting indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 397.

Individual's right to present complaint or evidence of criminal offense to grand jury. 24 A.L.R.4th 316.

Am. Jur. 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand J., § 32 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 377.

Witness Privileges, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 93.

Evidence — Informer's Privilege Before a Grand Jury, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 128.

Privileges, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 200.

Gingerich, The Arkansas Grand Jury, etc., 40 Ark. L. Rev. 55.

C.J.S. 38 C.J.S., Grand J., § 37 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note: An Equitable Treatment of Unauthorized Prosecutorial Promises of Immunity, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 389.

Watkins, The Journalist's Privilege in Arkansas, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 473.

Case Notes

Unconstitutional Exclusion.

Members of classes of citizens unconstitutionally excluded from selection as grand jurors could, as representatives of such excluded classes, bring an action to establish the unconstitutionality of such selection and enjoin the functioning of such grand jury, even though there was no reason to believe that such person would be the subject of any grand jury action. Jewell v. Stebbins, 288 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Ark. 1968).

16-85-501. Appointment of foreman and clerk.

  1. The court shall appoint one of the number of every grand jury as foreman.
  2. Every grand jury may appoint one of the members to be clerk, to preserve and keep minutes of their proceedings and of the evidence given before them.
    1. However, the presiding judge of the circuit court, at his or her discretion, may require the official court reporter in counties where provision is not otherwise made for a reporter to report the proceedings of the grand jury, to attend all or any sessions of the grand jury of the court, and to make reports of the proceedings of the grand jury at such sessions or such part of the proceedings as the judge of the court may direct, and to furnish to the prosecuting attorney, as promptly as practicable, transcribed, typewritten copies of all or such part of the proceedings so reported as the judge or the prosecuting attorney may request.
    2. Court reporters attending sessions of the grand jury shall be subject to the same penalties as are prescribed by law for any person divulging, except as authorized by law, any part of the proceedings of the grand jury.
    3. The official reporters of circuit courts are required to perform the duties imposed upon them in accordance with the provisions of this subsection, in addition to their other duties, and without additional compensation.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 62; Crim. Code, § 406; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [406], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2978, 2980; Acts 1933, No. 29, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 3800, 3802; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-903, 43-905.

16-85-502. Minutes.

The minutes of the proceedings and evidence shall be delivered to the prosecuting attorney when directed by the grand jury.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 62; C. & M. Dig., § 2981; Pope's Dig., § 3803; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-906.

Case Notes

Inspection.

Refusal to permit counsel for defendant to inspect minutes of grand jury was not error. Arnold v. State, 179 Ark. 1066, 20 S.W.2d 189 (1929).

16-85-503. Scope of inquiry.

  1. The grand jury must inquire:
    1. Into the case of every person imprisoned in the county jail or detention facility or on bail who has not been charged by indictment or information within sixty (60) days of arrest;
    2. Into the condition and management of the public prisons of the county; and
    3. Into the willful and corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every description in the county.
  2. The grand jury may inquire into all public offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the court in which they are impaneled and to indict such persons as they find guilty thereof.
  3. If a member of the grand jury knows or has reason to believe that a public offense has been committed within the jurisdiction of the court, he or she must disclose the knowledge or belief to his or her fellow jurors, who must thereupon investigate the offense.
  4. Grand jurors are entitled to free access, at all reasonable times, to public prisons and to the examination, without charge, of all public records in the county.
  5. It is the duty of every grand jury at each term of the circuit court to make careful examination of the condition of the accounts of the collecting officers of the county and any matters relating to the general school fund.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 99, 104-106; Acts 1871, No. 28, § 18, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2982-2986; Pope's Dig., §§ 3804-3808; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-907 — 43-911; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 319.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “detention facility or on bail who has not been charged by indictment or information within sixty (60) days of arrest” for “on bail to answer a criminal charge in that court who is not indicted” in (a)(1); substituted “may” for “has power, and it is their duty to” in (b); inserted “or she” and “or her” in (c); and deleted “dockets of justices of the peace” following “county” in (e).

Cross References. Duty to visit and examine condition of jail, § 12-41-508.

Case Notes

Prosecuting Attorney.

The prosecuting attorney has the same powers as those conferred by this section upon the grand jury. Gill v. State ex rel. Mobley, 242 Ark. 797, 416 S.W.2d 269 (1967).

Report.

Reception or rejection of grand jury's report criticizing former county judge held to be within the circuit court's discretion. Ex parte Cook, 199 Ark. 1187, 137 S.W.2d 248 (1940).

Report of grand jury should be expunged from record where it accused petitioners of conduct warranting their indictment for slander, where grand jury did indict for slander. Ex parte Faulkner, 221 Ark. 37, 251 S.W.2d 822 (1952).

16-85-504. Witnesses — Subpoena.

  1. The clerk, on the request of the foreman of the grand jury or of the prosecuting attorney, shall issue subpoenas for witnesses to appear before the grand jury. Upon the witnesses failing to attend in obedience thereto, the court shall proceed to coerce their attendance and may punish their disobedience by fine and imprisonment, as in the case of witnesses failing to attend on the trial.
  2. The clerk of the circuit court of every county in this state shall, on the request of the prosecuting attorney of the district in which the county is situated, issue, in vacation of the circuit court of the county, subpoenas for any witness to appear before the grand jury of the county to be impaneled at the next term of the circuit court in the county. The clerk shall deliver the subpoenas to the sheriff of the county, who shall serve them before the convening of the court. Any witness refusing to obey any subpoena so issued and served upon him or her shall be guilty of contempt of court.

History. Crim. Code, § 112; Acts 1883, No. 49, § 1, p. 72; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2990, 3116, 8319; Pope's Dig., §§ 3812, 3950, 10896; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-912, 43-913.

16-85-505. Witnesses — Oath.

The foreman of the grand jury shall have power to administer the oath to the witnesses appearing before the grand jury.

History. Crim. Code, § 101; C. & M. Dig., § 2987; Pope's Dig., § 3809; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-914.

Case Notes

Form.

No particular form of oath has been prescribed. State v. Green, 24 Ark. 591 (1867).

16-85-506. Witnesses — Joint offenders.

In all cases where two (2) or more persons are jointly or otherwise concerned in the commission of any criminal offense, either of the persons may be sworn as a witness in relation to the criminal offense, but the testimony given by the witness in no instance shall be used against him or her in any criminal prosecution for the same offense.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 67; C. & M. Dig., § 3122; Pope's Dig., § 3956; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-915; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 294.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “criminal offense” for “crime or misdemeanor.”

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not violative of the bill of rights as one compelled to give testimony is protected from self-accusation and his common-law and constitutional privileges are secured to him. State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853); Cossart v. State, 14 Ark. 538 (1854).

Applicability.

This statute had no application in determining admissibility of accused's statement at the coroner's inquest, where accused was not jointly charged with any other person and she was not called as a witness against any other person. Dunham v. State, 207 Ark. 472, 181 S.W.2d 242 (1944).

This section applies only to proceedings before a grand jury and has no application to proceedings before the petit jury. Rhea v. State, 226 Ark. 581, 291 S.W.2d 505 (1956).

This section only provides use immunity for an accomplice who actually testifies before a grand jury and does not apply where a written statement has been given to a prosecuting attorney. Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977).

Different Offenses.

The protection extended by this section applies only to the same offense; consequently, a person cannot be compelled to testify if his testimony will incriminate him for an offense other than the one charged in the case under consideration. State v. Bach Liquor Co., 67 Ark. 163, 55 S.W. 854 (1899).

An election clerk under indictment for making a false certificate cannot be compelled to testify against election judges under indictment for making a false count, the two offenses being different, so that the clerk is not within the protection of this section. Bates v. State, 164 Ark. 240, 261 S.W. 315 (1924).

Self-Incrimination.

This section prohibits the testimony of a person taken before an examining court from being used against him on a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Marshall v. State, 84 Ark. 88, 104 S.W. 934 (1907).

A voluntary confession by one of two participants in a bank robbery under an oath administered by the prosecuting attorney is admissible in a prosecution of the confessor alone, as not violating this section or self-incrimination under the constitution, where the confessor is warned that he need not confess and that it will be used against him. Rowe v. State, 224 Ark. 671, 275 S.W.2d 887 (1955).

Cited: Ex parte Butt, 78 Ark. 262, 93 S.W. 992 (1906); Decker v. State, 185 Ark. 1085, 51 S.W.2d 521 (1932); Bratton v. State, 213 Ark. 537, 211 S.W.2d 428 (1948); Horner v. State, 255 Ark. 426, 501 S.W.2d 217 (1973).

16-85-507. Witnesses — Refusal to testify.

When a witness, under examination, refuses to testify or to answer a question put to him or her by the grand jury, the foreman shall proceed with the witness into the presence of the court, and there distinctly state the refusal of the witness. If the judge, upon hearing the witness, shall decide that the witness is bound to testify or answer the question propounded, the judge shall inquire of the witness if he persists in his refusal. If the witness does persist in his refusal, the court shall proceed with him as in cases of similar refusal in open court.

History. Crim. Code, § 113; C. & M. Dig., § 2991; Pope's Dig., § 3813; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-916.

Cross References. Investigations of elections, self-incrimination not ground for refusing testimony, Ark. Const., Art. 3, § 9.

Person not compelled to be witness against self, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 8.

16-85-508. Witnesses — Securing testimony of material witnesses.

  1. If there is a reasonable belief that a material witness in any grand jury investigation may absent himself or herself from the jurisdiction or otherwise avoid service of a subpoena, a judicial officer, as defined in Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 1.6(c), shall impose conditions of release pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 9.1-9.5.
  2. A warrant of arrest may be issued by the judicial officer on the affidavit or testimony of a prosecuting attorney to secure the presence of the witness at the hearing to provide for his or her release. Other witnesses may be called and examined.
  3. No material witness shall be detained because of his or her inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of the witness for the proceeding can be adequately secured by deposition and further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to law.
  4. When the material witness has given his or her testimony, he or she shall be released immediately.

History. Acts 1983, No. 176, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-916.1.

16-85-509. Witnesses — Compensation.

  1. It shall be the duty of the foreman of each grand jury in this state to keep an abstract showing the name of each person subpoenaed and appearing as a witness before the grand jury, the number of days attended, and the amount due the person as a witness. The abstract shall be verified by affidavit as provided in this section and may be in the following form:
    1. The foreman of the grand jury shall issue a certificate to each of the witnesses showing the number of days attended and the amount due the witness, in conformity to the abstract.
    2. The certificate shall be attested by the clerk of the grand jury.
  2. Upon the presentation of the certificate to the clerk of the county court, the county court, upon examination and approval of the certificate, shall make an order allowing the certificate. After the order has been made, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the county court to draw his or her warrant in favor of the holder of the certificate for the amount adjudged to be due thereon and to file the certificate in his or her office.

“ABSTRACT OF WITNESSES Name No. Certifi- No. Amount cate Days Mileage Due STATE OF ARKANSAS, County of I, , foreman of the Grand Jury, do solemnly swear that the above and foregoing is a true and correct abstract of the name of each witness who appeared and was in attendance before the Grand Jury, the number of days attended, and the amount due the same at the term of the Circuit Court, 20 . Foreman of Grand Jury Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 20 . Clerk.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1889, No. 62, §§ 1, 2, p. 77; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3001-3003; Pope's Dig., §§ 3823-3825; Acts 1961, No. 454, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-924 — 43-926.

16-85-510. Disclosure of media sources.

Before any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper, periodical, radio station, television station, or internet news source, or publisher of any newspaper, periodical, or internet news source, or manager or owner of any radio station shall be required to disclose to any grand jury or to any other authority the source of information used as the basis for any article he or she may have written, published, or broadcast, it must be shown that the article was written, published, or broadcast in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare.

History. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 15, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3828; Acts 1949, No. 254, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-917; Acts 2011, No. 799, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “media” for “newspaper, periodical, or radio station” in the section heading; and inserted “television station, or Internet news source” and “or Internet news source.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.

Ark. L. Rev.

Act 1949 General Assembly — Act 254 Newspaperman's Privilege Extended to Radio Broadcasters, 3 Ark L. Rev. 374.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Owen, Survey of Arkansas Law: Civil Procedure, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 177.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

The Ben J. Altheimer Symposium: A Reporter's Privilege: Legal Fact or Fiction: Article: The Reporter's Privilege in Arkansas: An Overview with Commentary, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1.

Case Notes

Construction.

The use of the words “to any other authority” in this section clearly indicates that the privilege is applicable to civil proceedings and not restricted to criminal proceedings. Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).

Federal Subpoena.

Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 6, and this section would not shield a television network from a federal grand jury subpoena to turn over video footage and the transcript of an interview with a witness who refused to testify before the grand jury; state law privileges are inapplicable in such a situation. In re Grand Jury Subpoena ABC, 947 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Ark. 1996).

Waiver.

Where a newspaper reporter disclosed, to both her boss and a deputy prosecuting attorney, the name of a supposed anonymous confidential source, which name proved incorrect, with instructions that the name be kept strictly confidential, the privilege provided by this section was not waived. Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).

Cited: United States v. Hively, 202 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Ark. 2002).

16-85-511. Evidence.

The grand jury is not bound to hear evidence for the defendant, but it is their duty to weigh all the evidence before them. If they believe that other evidence will explain away the charge, they should order the evidence to be produced.

History. Crim. Code, § 102; C. & M. Dig., § 2988; Pope's Dig., § 3810; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-918; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 320.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted the former first sentence, which read; “The grand jury can receive none but legal evidence,” substituted “The grand jury is” for “They are,” and deleted “within their reach” following “other evidence.”

Case Notes

Construction.

This section is merely directory. McDonald v. State, 155 Ark. 142, 244 S.W. 20 (1922).

Sufficiency of Indictment.

An indictment will not be quashed on the ground that the evidence introduced before the grand jury is insufficient to sustain it. State v. Fox, 122 Ark. 197, 182 S.W. 906 (1916).

Testimony of Grand Juror.

The testimony of a grand juror is secondary and hearsay and therefore incompetent. McElroy v. State, 106 Ark. 131, 152 S.W. 1019 (1913).

Cited: Simpson v. Langston, 281 Ark. 458, 664 S.W.2d 872 (1984).

16-85-512. Persons permitted to be present.

No persons except the prosecuting attorney, the court reporter, and the witnesses under examination are permitted to be present while the grand jury is examining a charge, and no person whatever shall be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting on a charge.

History. Crim. Code, § 108; C. & M. Dig., § 2996; Pope's Dig., § 3818; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-919; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 273.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “court reporter” following “prosecuting attorney.”

Cross References. Right to interpreter, § 16-89-104.

Case Notes

Presence During Deliberation.

A motion to quash an indictment on the grounds that the prosecuting attorney was present and exercised undue influence and forced the jury to return the indictment was properly overruled where the allegation was not sustained by the evidence presented. Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733, cert. denied, Haraway v. Arkansas, 317 U.S. 648, 63 S. Ct. 42 (1942).

Presence During Examination.

An indictment will not be quashed on account of a stranger being in the grand jury room during the taking of testimony. Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. 516, 36 S.W. 947 (1896); Richards v. State, 108 Ark. 87, 157 S.W. 141 (1913); Tiner v. State, 109 Ark. 138, 158 S.W. 1087 (1913).

Presence in the grand jury room during accused's testimony of the police officer in charge of the investigation and his participation in the questioning of accused made it necessary to quash the indictment, even though the accused had said that he had no objection to the officer's presence, since there was no proof that accused knew or was informed of his rights. Moseley v. State, 256 Ark. 716, 510 S.W.2d 298 (1974).

Cited: Bennett v. State, 161 Ark. 496, 257 S.W. 372 (1923); Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 516 S.W.2d 895 (1974); Simpson v. Langston, 281 Ark. 458, 664 S.W.2d 872 (1984).

16-85-513. Indictment.

  1. The grand jury should find an indictment when all the evidence before them, taken together, would, in their judgment, if unexplained, warrant a conviction by the trial jury.
  2. All the papers and other matters of evidence relating to the arrest and examination of the charges against persons committed or on bail which have been returned to court by magistrates shall be laid before the grand jury. If, upon investigation, they refuse to find an indictment, they shall write upon some one of the papers “dismissed”, with the signature of the foreman. Thereupon, the court shall discharge the defendant from custody if he or she is in jail, or the court shall exonerate the bail if bail has been given, unless the court should be of the opinion that the charge should again be submitted to another grand jury. In that case, the defendant may be continued in custody or on bail until the next term of the court.
  3. The dismissal of the charge does not prevent its being again submitted to a grand jury as often as the court may direct, but without such direction, it cannot again be submitted.
  4. Unless an indictment is found at the term of the court next after the first submission of the charge to the grand jury, the defendant shall be discharged from custody or exonerated from bail unless, for cause shown, the court shall otherwise direct.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 103, 114-116; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2989, 2997-2999; Pope's Dig., §§ 3811, 3819-3821; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-920 — 43-923.

Case Notes

In General.

This section refers to the resubmission of causes by the court and does not prevent a grand jury after a criminal charge has been dismissed from subsequently returning an indictment against the defendant. Marshall v. State, 84 Ark. 88, 104 S.W. 934 (1907).

Dismissal.

The finding of an indictment for forgery will not be a dismissal of a charge of obtaining money under false pretense. Bingaman v. State, 181 Ark. 94, 24 S.W.2d 969 (1930).

Information.

The acts of the grand jury with respect to the finding of an indictment are not binding upon the prosecuting attorney with respect to his filing an information, and an information may be filed although the grand jury has investigated the case and refused or failed to find an indictment; this section does not prevent an accusation by information after the grand jury has investigated the charge. Orsini v. State, 286 Ark. 283, 691 S.W.2d 175 (1985).

16-85-514. Disclosure of information.

  1. Every member of the grand jury must keep secret whatever the member or any other grand juror may have said, or in what manner he or she or any grand juror may have voted on a matter before them.
    1. No grand juror shall disclose any evidence given before the grand jury except when lawfully required to testify as a witness in relation to the evidence, nor shall he or she disclose the fact of any indictment having been found against any person not in actual confinement until the defendant has been arrested.
    2. Any grand juror violating the provisions of this subsection shall be guilty of a violation and upon conviction shall be fined any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).
    1. A member of the grand jury, however, may be required by a court to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury for the purpose of ascertaining its consistency with the testimony given by the witness on trial, for the purpose of proceeding against the witness for perjury in his or her testimony, or upon the trial of a prosecution of the witness for perjury.
    2. It shall be the duty of the foreman of the grand jury to communicate to the prosecuting attorney, when requested, the substance of the testimony before them.
  2. A grand juror cannot be questioned for anything he or she may say or any vote he or she may give relative to a matter legally before the grand jury, except for a perjury he or she may have committed in making accusation or giving testimony before his or her fellow jurors.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 75, 76; Crim. Code, §§ 109-111; C. &. M. Dig., §§ 2820, 2992-2994; Pope's Dig., §§ 3538, 3814-3816; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-927 — 43-931; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 471.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “or she” and “or her” throughout this section; substituted “the member” for “he himself” in (a); and, in (b)(2), substituted “violation” for “misdemeanor” and “one thousand dollars ($1,000)” for “one hundred dollars ($100).”

Case Notes

Evidence.

In an action for a malicious prosecution, it was not error to refuse to permit the plaintiff to prove by members of the grand jury what testimony was given by the defendants before the grand jury in the alleged malicious prosecution. Scott v. Pennington, 151 Ark. 26, 235 S.W. 375 (1921).

Members of the grand jury were proper parties to maintain action based upon their investigation of facts upon which the complaint was based and they had a legal right to use this information, for even if they did obtain some of their information as jurors, there is no rule or law to prevent them from using it in an action to protect the public interest. Goodwin v. State, 235 Ark. 457, 360 S.W.2d 490 (1962).

Vote.

An indictment cannot be impeached by the testimony of a grand juror that only eleven of their number voted for it. Nash v. State, 73 Ark. 399, 84 S.W. 497 (1904); Nash v. State, 79 Ark. 120, 95 S.W. 147 (1906).

In a habeas corpus proceeding seeking release on the ground that petitioner was not indicted for burglary but only for robbery, the grand jurors' testimony that they did not vote to indict on both charges was incompetent. Whitted v. State, 188 Ark. 11, 63 S.W.2d 283 (1933).

Cited: Whitted v. State, 188 Ark. 11, 63 S.W.2d 283 (1933); Davis v. Circuit Court, 244 Ark. 142, 424 S.W.2d 149 (1968); Simpson v. Langston, 281 Ark. 458, 664 S.W.2d 872 (1984).

16-85-515. Advice of court or prosecuting attorney.

The grand jury may, at all reasonable times, ask the advice of the court or the prosecuting attorney.

History. Crim. Code, § 107; C. & M. Dig., § 2995; Pope's Dig., § 3817; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-932.

Case Notes

Secret Charge.

An indictment will not be quashed because the judge entered the grand jury room and charged the grand jury secretly. Yelvington v. State, 169 Ark. 359, 275 S.W. 701 (1925).

16-85-516. Indictment of grand juror.

Any grand juror may be indicted by the grand jury of which he or she is a member, but when any complaint shall be lodged against a grand juror, the foreman shall inform the prosecuting attorney of the charge. If, on examination, there are grounds for proceedings against the juror, the foreman shall inform the court of these grounds, and the court shall discharge the juror and cause another to be summoned, if necessary.

History. Crim. Code, § 407; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [407], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 3000; Pope's Dig., § 3822; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-933.

16-85-517. Special grand jury.

  1. At any time a grand jury is not in session, the court, in its discretion, by order entered of record, may impanel a special grand jury.
  2. When impaneled, the special grand jury shall have all the powers and proceed in all respects as provided by law for the conduct of regular grand juries.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 71, 72; C. & M. Dig., § 3004; Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 33, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3826; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-934.

Case Notes

Indictment by Regular Jury Quashed.

A special grand jury may be called and may return an indictment against defendant where one has been quashed which had been returned by the regular panel for the term. Sutton v. State, 163 Ark. 562, 260 S.W. 409 (1924); Nichols v. State, 187 Ark. 999, 63 S.W.2d 655 (1933).

Power of Circuit Court.

The circuit court acting under its inherent constitutional right has the power to direct the sheriff to summon a special grand jury and, when assembled, impanel a special grand jury. Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S. Ct. 641, 93 L. Ed. 1081 (1949).

Presumption.

Where a special grand jury has been summoned after the discharge of the regular grand jury, it is not necessary for the court to specify the reason for summoning the same in its order and the Supreme Court will presume that the condition existed authorizing such order. Davis v. State, 118 Ark. 31, 175 S.W. 1168 (1915).

Selection.

This section does not exempt courts from all legislative control in the matter of selecting special grand juries for such selection still must be made according to the governing statutes. Streett v. Roberts, 258 Ark. 839, 529 S.W.2d 343 (1975).

Cited: Breysacher v. State, 123 Ark. 101, 184 S.W. 433 (1916).

16-85-518. Experts — Expenses.

Grand juries may employ experts and other professionals to assist in the grand jury investigations if, prior to the employment, the quorum court and county judge approve the employment. In that case, all expenses resulting from the employment shall be paid by the county.

History. Acts 1987, No. 318, § 1.

Subchapter 6 — Process on Indictment

Cross References. Arrest, citation, summons, and pretrial release generally, ARCrP 4.1 et seq.

Research References

Am. Jur. 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indict., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 42 C.J.S., Indict., § 1 et seq.

16-85-601. Definition.

As used in this code, unless the context otherwise requires, the “process on an indictment” consists of the writs for arresting or summoning the defendant to appear and answer the indictment.

History. Crim. Code, § 139; C. & M. Dig., § 3039; Pope's Dig., § 3864; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1101.

Publisher's Notes. “This code,” referred to in this section, means the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

16-85-602. Order of court upon indictment.

Upon an indictment's being found, if the defendant is not in custody or on bail the court shall forthwith make an order for process to be issued on the indictment, designating whether it shall be for arresting or summoning the defendant.

History. Crim. Code, § 141; C. & M. Dig., § 3041; Pope's Dig., § 3867; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1103; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 321.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted “and, if it is for arresting the defendant and the offense charged is bailable, the sum in which he may be admitted to bail shall be fixed” from the end of this section.

Case Notes

Construction.

This statute is directory merely. State ex rel. Nixon v. Grace, 98 Ark. 505, 136 S.W. 670 (1911).

Applicability.

This section does not apply when the prosecution is by information. Beckwith v. State, 238 Ark. 196, 379 S.W.2d 19 (1964).

16-85-603. Arrest — Issuance.

  1. The process of arrest shall be issued by the clerk upon the order of the court and may be reissued from time to time by order of the prosecuting attorney.
  2. The process of arrest on an indictment shall be a bench warrant.
  3. A bench warrant may be substantially in the following form:

“Circuit Court — State of Arkansas. To any Law Enforcement Officer of the State: You are hereby commanded forthwith to arrest A. B., and bring him or her as provided by law before the Circuit Court, to answer an indictment found in that court against him or her for felony, (or misdemeanor, as the case may be) or, if the court be adjourned for the term, that you deliver him or her as provided by law to the custody of the jailer of ( ) County. Given under my hand and seal of said court this day of , 20 . C.D., Clerk, . C. C.”

Click to view form.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 140, 142, 143; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3040, 3042; Pope's Dig., §§ 3866, 3868; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1102, 43-1104, 43-1105; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 252.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (c), substituted “Law Enforcement Officer of” for “Sheriff, Coroner, Jailer, Constable, Marshal, or Policeman in” and inserted “or her” three times.

Case Notes

Bench Warrant.

The ordinary bench warrant is directed to any sheriff, coroner, jailer, constable, marshal or policeman in the state. Winkler v. State, 32 Ark. 539 (1877).

It is not a defense that the state failed to show that the court made an order for issuance of a bench warrant, as it is not proper that the order be entered of record and thereby open to public inspection. Humphries v. State, 33 Ark. 713 (1878).

Time of Trial.

A defendant, if arrested on a bench warrant, may be tried at the same term at which he is indicted. Shipley v. State, 50 Ark. 49, 6 S.W. 226 (1887).

16-85-604. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning arrest and bail, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, No. 498. The section was derived from Crim. Code, §§ 144-146; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3043-3045; Pope's Dig., §§ 3869-3871; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1106 — 43-1108.

16-85-605. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the summons, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 505. The section was derived from Crim. Code, §§ 147-149; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3046-3048; Pope's Dig., §§ 3872-3874; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1109 — 43-1111.

16-85-606. Issuance of bench warrant discretionary.

  1. The court may, at its discretion, order a bench warrant to be issued on any indictment.
  2. However, where the punishment is limited to a fine of one hundred dollars ($100) or less, a bench warrant shall not be issued unless the court is satisfied that there is reason to believe the defendant will escape punishment if a bench warrant is not issued.

History. Crim. Code, § 150; C. & M. Dig., § 3049; Pope's Dig., § 3875; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1112.

Subchapter 7 — Arraignment and Pleading Generally

Cross References. Arrest, citation, summons, and pretrial release generally, ARCrP 4.1 et seq.

Plea discussions and plea agreements, ARCrP 25.1 et seq.

Rights of accused, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10.

Right to interpreter, § 16-89-104.

Effective Dates. Acts 1891, No. 59, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1897, No. 22, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1965, No. 92, § 5: Feb. 18, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly that prosecutions by this State, or its governmental subdivisions, or persons for offenses against this State, or a governmental subdivision thereof, committed in the same course of conduct which resulted in the commission of an offense of the same character by the person against the United States, or against another State or Territory thereof, of which such person has been formerly acquitted or convicted, on the merits, subject such persons to needless and unjust harassment and are contrary to the spirit of constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy; that there is urgent need to prevent such injustices; and that enactment of this bill will provide the needed remedy. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding right to and incidents of jury trial. 3 A.L.R.4th 601.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding plea bargaining. 8 A.L.R.4th 660.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding guilty plea. 10 A.L.R.4th 8.

Judge's participation in negotiations as rendering guilty plea involuntary. 10 A.L.R.4th 689.

Right of prosecutor to withdraw from plea bargain prior to entry of plea. 16 A.L.R.4th 1089.

Stipulation allegedly amounting to guilty plea in state criminal trial. 17 A.L.R.4th 61.

Sufficiency of court's statement, before accepting plea of guilty, as to waiver of right to jury trial being a consequence of such plea. 23 A.L.R.4th 251.

Delay in arraignment as affecting admissibility of confession or other statement made by defendant. 28 A.L.R.4th 1121.

Power or duty of state court, which has accepted guilty plea, to set aside such plea on its own initiative prior to sentencing or entry of judgment. 31 A.L.R.4th 504.

Am. Jur. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 433 et seq.

C.J.S. 22 C.J.S., Crim. L., § 406 et seq.

Case Notes

Error in Procedure.

This subchapter provides simple and proper procedures to bring the defendant to the bar of justice, to ascertain his defense, and put the case at issue and should be followed; but the Supreme Court will not reverse a conviction unless the error has been prejudicial. Hobbs v. State, 86 Ark. 360, 111 S.W. 264 (1908).

Presence of Defendant.

Though the record must affirmatively show the presence of the defendant in each substantive step of the trial, where the language of the record is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in the strongest sense to which it is susceptible in favor of the court's judgment. Duncan v. State, 110 Ark. 523, 162 S.W. 573 (1913).

Waiver.

If the accused voluntarily pleads to indictment without being formally arraigned, and the court accepts the plea, there is an implied waiver of his right to hear the indictment read. Ransom v. State, 49 Ark. 176, 4 S.W. 658 (1887).

Where no prejudice appears upon the record, a conviction of a felony will not be set aside because the accused was tried without arraignment or plea, if the cause was treated as at issue upon a plea of not guilty. Hayden v. State, 55 Ark. 342, 18 S.W. 239 (1892).

Where defendant announced through his counsel that he was ready for trial, he waived his statutory right to be formally arraigned and to have the indictment read to him. Hill v. State, 251 Ark. 370, 472 S.W.2d 722 (1971).

16-85-701. Definition.

As used in this code, unless the context otherwise requires, an arraignment is the reading of the indictment to the defendant and the asking of him or her if he or she pleads guilty or not guilty to the indictment.

History. Crim. Code, § 155; C. & M. Dig., § 3050; Pope's Dig., § 3876; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1201; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 274.

Publisher's Notes. “This code,” referred to in this section, means the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted “by the clerk” following “indictment” and inserted “or her” and “or she.”

Case Notes

Cited: Davidson v. State, 108 Ark. 191, 158 S.W. 1103 (1913); Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965); Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996).

16-85-702. Arraignment for felonies and misdemeanors — Exception.

The arraignment shall only be made in indictments for felonies and misdemeanors and may be dispensed with by the court, with the defendant's consent.

History. Crim. Code, § 156; C. & M. Dig., § 3054; Pope's Dig., § 3880; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1202; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 295.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “felonies and misdemeanors” for “felony.”

Cross References. Prompt first appearance, ARCrP 8.1.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Malone, The Availability of a First Appearance and Preliminary Hearing, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 41.

Case Notes

Misdemeanor.

In a trial of a misdemeanor in the circuit court on appeal from a justice of the peace, it was unnecessary to arraign the defendant since arraignment is only necessary when the accused is tried on indictment. Mayfield v. State, 160 Ark. 474, 254 S.W. 841 (1923).

Cited: Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965); Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996).

16-85-703 — 16-85-705. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning prearraignment and arraignment, were repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 506. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-85-703. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 112; C. & M. Dig., § 3051; Pope's Dig., § 3877; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1203.

16-85-704. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 110, 111; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3052, 3053; Pope's Dig., §§ 3878, 3879; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1204, 43-1205.

16-85-705. Crim. Code, § 158; C. & M. Dig., § 3056; Pope's Dig., § 3882; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1206.

16-85-706. Motion to set aside indictment.

  1. The motion to set aside the indictment can only be made on the following grounds:
    1. A substantial error in the summoning or formation of the grand jury;
    2. That some person other than the grand jurors was present before the grand jury when they finally acted upon the indictment; and
    3. That the indictment was not found and presented as required by this code.
  2. If the motion is sustained, the court shall make an order that the case be submitted to another grand jury to be assembled at that or the next term of the court.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 159-162; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3057-3060; Pope's Dig., §§ 3883-3886; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1207—43-1210; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 322.

Publisher's Notes. “This code,” referred to in this section, means the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added “and” at the end of (a)(2); deleted “The defendant, if in custody, shall be remanded to jail, or if he is on bail, the bail shall be liable for the defendant's appearance to answer a new indictment, if one is found” at the end of (b); and deleted former (c) and (d).

Case Notes

Deficiency in Indictment or Information.

Where an indictment or information may be deficient, that deficiency can be corrected by supplying the defendant with a bill of particulars, or other facts detailing the elements of the charge; the defendant may be sufficiently informed of the charges through supporting affidavits. Meny v. State, 314 Ark. 158, 861 S.W.2d 303 (1993).

Grounds.

It is no defense that former prosecuting attorney agreed to dismiss prosecution. Dillard v. State, 65 Ark. 404, 46 S.W. 533 (1898).

An indictment will not be quashed on the ground that the evidence introduced before the grand jury was insufficient to sustain it. State v. Fox, 122 Ark. 197, 182 S.W. 906 (1916); Murphy v. State, 171 Ark. 620, 286 S.W. 871, 48 A.L.R. 1189 (1926).

It is not proper to quash an indictment because of the character or quantum of evidence before the grand jury. McDonald v. State, 155 Ark. 142, 244 S.W. 20 (1922).

An indictment will not be quashed because the judge entered the jury room and charged the grand jury secretly. Yelvington v. State, 169 Ark. 498, 276 S.W. 353 (1925).

Motion to quash indictment on ground that it is not direct and certain as to the offense charged, that it is repugnant in the description of the offense, that it is duplex, that it is based on a statute originating a crime unknown to the common law, that it is not in the language of the statute or fully descriptive of the offense charged in the statute, was properly overruled, since those grounds could not be raised by motion to quash. Matz v. State, 196 Ark. 97, 116 S.W.2d 604 (1938).

—Formation of Jury.

It is irregular for the court to designate by name particular persons among the bystanders to complete the grand jury; but such irregularity would not invalidate all the proceedings of the grand jury, and is not sufficient ground for setting aside the indictment. Runnels v. State, 28 Ark. 121 (1872).

—Presentment.

The objection that the record does not show that the indictment was returned into court by the grand jury cannot be raised on appeal for the first time. Shinn v. State, 93 Ark. 290, 124 S.W. 263 (1910).

Reindictment.

Where an indictment presented by the regular grand jury had been set aside after the grand jury had been discharged, it was not an abuse of discretion to cause a special grand jury at the same term to be summoned to consider the charge against the defendant. Sutton v. State, 163 Ark. 562, 260 S.W. 409 (1924).

Time for Objection.

The proper time to object to the sufficiency of an indictment or information is prior to trial. Meny v. State, 314 Ark. 158, 861 S.W.2d 303 (1993); Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421, 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997).

An objection to the form or sufficiency of an information must be made prior to trial. Ingram v. State, 48 Ark. App. 105, 891 S.W.2d 805 (1995).

Waiver.

When the grand jury has been impaneled and the indictment returned by them into court, irregularities in summoning or impaneling them and questions as to the qualifications of the jurors are waived by a plea of not guilty to the indictment. Shropshire v. State, 12 Ark. 190 (1851); Fenalty v. State, 12 Ark. 630 (1852); Brown v. State, 13 Ark. 96 (1852); Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 720 (1853); Straughan v. State, 16 Ark. 37 (1855); Dixon v. State, 29 Ark. 165, 1874 Ark. LEXIS 22 (1874); Miller v. State, 40 Ark. 488, 1883 Ark. LEXIS 32 (1883); Wright v. State, 42 Ark. 94 (1883).

Cited: Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948); Prince v. State, 304 Ark. 692, 805 S.W.2d 46 (1991); Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996).

16-85-707, 16-85-708. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning demurrer or plea generally, were repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 507. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-85-707. Crim. Code, §§ 163, 164, 179, 180; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3064, 3065, 3080, 3081; Pope's Dig., §§ 3890, 3891, 3906, 3907; Acts 1953, No. 141, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1211, 43-1212, 43-1228, 43-1229.

16-85-708. Crim. Code, §§ 165-171; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3066-3072; Pope's Dig., §§ 3892-3898; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1213 — 43-1219.

16-85-709. Pleas generally.

There are but three (3) kinds of pleas to an indictment or information:

  1. A plea of guilty;
  2. A plea of nolo contendere; or
  3. A plea of not guilty.

History. Crim. Code, § 172; C. & M. Dig., § 3074; Pope's Dig., § 3900; Acts 1953, No. 141, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1220; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 323.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “three (3)” for “four (4)” in the introductory language; and deleted former (4).

Research References

ALR.

Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client Regarding Guilty Pleas — Probation, Parole, or Pardon Possibilities. 31 A.L.R.6th 49.

Ark. L. Rev.

Plea of Nolo Contendere in a Criminal Action, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 337.

Case Notes

Order of Trying Pleas.

Where defendant pleads former acquittal, and not guilty, the plea of former acquittal should be first tried. Lee v. State, 26 Ark. 260 (1870).

Cited: Ex parte Hornsby, 228 Ark. 975, 311 S.W.2d 529 (1958).

16-85-710, 16-85-711. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning pleas of guilty and not guilty, were repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 508. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-85-710. Crim. Code, §§ 173, 174; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3075, 3076; Pope's Dig., §§ 3901, 3902; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1221 — 43-1222.

16-85-711. Crim. Code, § 175; C. & M. Dig., § 3077; Pope's Dig., § 3903; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1223.

16-85-712. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning pleas of former acquittal or conviction, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 509. The section was derived from Crim. Code, §§ 176-178; Acts 1891, No. 59, § 3, p. 96; 1897, No. 22, § 2, p. 29; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2883, 3073, 3078, 3079, 3311; Pope's Dig., §§ 3699, 3899, 3904, 3905, 4159; Acts 1965, No. 92, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1224 — 43-1227.

16-85-713. Leave of court to enter nolle prosequi.

No prosecuting attorney shall enter a nolle prosequi on any indictment or in any other way discontinue or abandon the indictment without the leave of the court in which the indictment is pending and without being first entered on the docket.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 109; C. & M. Dig., § 3061; Pope's Dig., § 3887; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1230; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 275.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted “minutes” preceding “docket.”

Case Notes

Agreement to Dismiss.

It is no defense that a former prosecuting attorney agreed to dismiss prosecution. Dillard v. State, 65 Ark. 404, 46 S.W. 533 (1898).

Discretion of Court.

The trial judge is vested with discretion as to the entry of a nolle prosequi of charges pending before him. Noland v. State, 265 Ark. 764, 580 S.W.2d 953 (1979).

Written Order Filed of Record.

This section does not speak to when a nolle prosequi becomes effective. Under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2, the nolle prosequi did not become effective until a written order was filed. Therefore, defendant’s speedy trial right was not tolled under Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(f) for the nolle prosequi until the written order was entered. Zimmerman v. Circuit Court of Miller Cty., 2018 Ark. 264, 555 S.W.3d 406 (2018).

Cited: Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977).

16-85-714. No contact orders — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Court” means a judge or judicial officer; and
    2. “No contact order” means an order issued by a court to a defendant at or after his or her first appearance on charges as described under Rule 8.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure that prohibits the defendant from contacting directly or indirectly a person in any manner or from being within a certain distance of the person's home or place of employment.
    1. A court may issue a no contact order under this section in addition to any other condition of release from custody that is imposed by the court if it appears that there exists a danger that a defendant will commit a serious crime, seek to intimidate a witness, or otherwise unlawfully interfere with the orderly administration of justice.
    2. The no contact order issued under this section shall be in effect until it is modified or terminated by the court.
    3. A no contact order issued under this section may contain, without limitation, the following:
      1. The reasons the court issued the no contact order in specific terms and description in reasonable detail of the purpose of the order;
        1. A prohibition against the defendant's approaching or communicating with a particular person or class of persons, either through a third party or by telephone, electronic communication, or in writing.
        2. A no contact order issued under this section shall not be deemed to prohibit any lawful or ethical activity of defendant's counsel;
      2. A prohibition against the defendant's going to certain described geographical areas or premises, including an imposition of a restriction that the defendant stay at least one thousand five hundred feet (1,500') from a person's location;
      3. A prohibition against the defendant's possessing a dangerous weapon or engaging in certain described activities, including the ingestion of alcohol or certain drugs; and
      4. A requirement that the defendant report regularly to and remain under the supervision of an officer of the court.
    4. When a no contact order is issued under this section, the court shall inform the defendant of the penalties for failure to comply with the conditions or terms of the order.
    5. All terms of a no contact order issued under this section shall be reduced to writing, and a copy shall be given to the defendant.
      1. If a defendant violates a no contact order issued under this section, the court shall issue a warrant directing that the defendant be arrested and immediately taken before any court having jurisdiction.
      2. The court shall then have authority to detain the defendant for a period of time not to exceed twenty-four (24) hours, unless the violation occurs on a Friday or a holiday, in which case the time period shall be forty-eight (48) hours, during which time the prosecuting attorney shall file a petition to revoke the defendant's appearance bond or modify the conditions of the defendant's release, alleging the following:
        1. That the defendant has knowingly violated the terms of a no contact order issued under this section;
        2. That relevant information has become known to the prosecuting attorney warranting the modification of or revocation of the defendant's appearance bond; and
        3. That a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant violated the terms of a no contact order issued under this section and that it was impracticable to secure an arrest warrant at the time of arrest.
        1. The defendant shall be entitled to a hearing on the petition to modify or revoke the defendant's appearance bond within forty-eight (48) hours of the defendant's appearance before the court, unless the violation occurs on a Friday or a holiday, in which case the hearing shall be within seventy-two (72) hours.
        2. If after a hearing the court finds that the defendant knowingly violated the terms of a no contact order issued under this section, the court may impose different or additional conditions of release or revoke his or her appearance bond.
    1. A court may set the duration of a no contact order issued under this section for an additional period of time after the adjudication of the offense for which the defendant was originally charged if it determines the additional period of time is necessary to protect the safety of a person, persons residing with the person, or members of the person's immediate family.
    2. The duration or extension of the no contact order shall not be for more than one (1) year from the date of issuance or, if the original charge is adjudicated with a finding of the defendant's guilt, from the date of sentencing.
  2. Upon conviction, violation of a no contact order issued under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

History. Acts 2011, No. 589, § 1; 2019, No. 1037, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted (a)(1); redesignated former provisions of (a) as (a)(2); in (a)(2), substituted “his or her first appearance on charges as described under Rule 8.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure” for “arraignment on charges”; and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Trial court properly denied defendant's petition to set aside a 10-year no-contact order because this section, which limits the duration of protective orders, did not apply as it was not in effect when the no-contact order was issued. Defendant presented no convincing argument or compelling authority, other than his bare assertion, that the no-contact order, surviving beyond the adjudication on the criminal offense, would be considered a sentence and an illegal one. Hardin v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 593, 473 S.W.3d 563 (2015).

Chapter 86 Insanity Defense

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1971, No. 433, § 1, provided that it was the specific intent of the codification of the mental health laws contained in the act to only affect those laws pertaining to mental health.

Acts 1971, No. 433, § 1 provided:

“It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the laws relating to the State Hospital, mental health, and mentally ill persons have been enacted piecemeal over a period of many years and that a great number of these laws are duplicating, conflicting, outmoded, and in urgent need of clarification and codification. It is the purpose and intent of the General Assembly in enacting this Act to clarify, update, and codify the various laws of the State relating to the State Hospital, mental health, and mentally ill persons.”

Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 10, § 1, provided:

“It is the specific intent of the codification of the mental health laws contained in this Act to only effect those laws pertaining to mental health. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to repeal or modify the provisions of Act 411 of 1955. No other laws shall be affected in any manner, nor shall the inclusion of such laws within this code in any way repeal or affect those laws as they otherwise apply.”

Cross References. Arrest and detention of insane persons before commitment, § 20-47-104.

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 10, § 4: Mar. 29, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the various mental health laws have been enacted over a period of one hundred years and are not properly organized so that they can be easily found; that many of these laws are antiquated and archaic and are in great need of updating in order to be useful; that the mental health laws need to be placed in a comprehensive code for easy reference by those persons interested in and who use these laws; and that only by the immediate passage of this Act can this be achieved. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Bifurcated trial: necessity or propriety on issue of insanity defense. 1 A.L.R.4th 884.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding incompetency, insanity, and related issues. 2 A.L.R.4th 27, 17 A.L.R.4th 575; 17 A.L.R.4th 575.

Conditions imposed when releasing person committed to institution as consequence of acquittal of crime on ground of insanity. 2 A.L.R.4th 934.

Right of accused in criminal prosecution to presence of counsel at court-appointed or approved psychiatric examination. 3 A.L.R.4th 910.

Mental abnormality of accused as affecting voluntariness of confession. 8 A.L.R.4th 16.

Criminal responsibility test. 9 A.L.R.4th 526.

Venue in bribery cases where crime is committed partly in one county and partly in another. 11 A.L.R.4th 704.

In personam or territorial jurisdiction of state court in connection with obscenity prosecution of author, actor, photographer, publisher, distributor, or other party whose acts were performed outside the state. 16 A.L.R.4th 1318.

Competency to stand trial of criminal defendant diagnosed as “mentally retarded”. 23 A.L.R.4th 493.

Jurisdiction of state court to try criminal defendant brought within jurisdiction illegally or as result of fraud or mistake. 25 A.L.R.4th 157.

Automatism or unconsciousness as defense to criminal charge. 27 A.L.R.4th 1067.

Competency to stand trial of criminal defendant diagnosed as “schizophrenic”. 33 A.L.R.4th 1062.

Computer analysis of defendant's mental state. 37 A.L.R.4th 510.

Forum state's jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in action based on obscene or threatening telephone call from out of state. 37 A.L.R.4th 852.

Am. Jur. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 46 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Law — Mental Disease as a Defense, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 59.

Financial Responsibility for an Accused Committed to the State Hospital for Observation, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 403.

Criminal Law — Insanity — Burden of Proof, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 398.

Criminal Law — Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examination When Issue of Insanity Is Not Raised by the Accused, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 493.

Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Defendant in Arkansas, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 19.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

Criminal Procedure — Pate v. Robinson Applied in Arkansas, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 162.

Recent Developments: Criminal Law: Placing Burden of Proof on Defendant to Show Issue of Insanity Found Constitutional, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 433.

C.J.S. 22 C.J.S., Crim. L., § 56 et seq.

Case Notes

Construction.

Former similar law was mandatory, but before a defendant could invoke the mandate he was to bring himself within its provisions. Whittington v. State, 197 Ark. 571, 124 S.W.2d 8 (1939) (decision under prior law).

Expert Psychiatrists.

With respect to the question of a defendant's sanity at the time an offense was committed and competency to stand trial, the statutorily provided review by a state hospital is sufficient; the defendant is not entitled to funds to hire his own expert psychiatrists. Sanders v. State, 308 Ark. 178, 824 S.W.2d 353 (1992).

Illiteracy.

Illiteracy did not mean insanity and did not constitute a defense to crime or render a confession of guilt inadmissible in evidence against accused. Mitchell v. State, 206 Ark. 149, 174 S.W.2d 241 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Pleading.

Plea of insanity at time of trial was not barred by pleading insanity at the time of the commission of the crime. Ince v. State, 77 Ark. 418, 88 S.W. 818 (1905); Johnson v. State, 97 Ark. 131, 133 S.W. 596 (1911) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Presence of Defendant.

Where defendant was not present for the hearing on his pretrial motion for a continuance and for his commitment to the Arkansas State Hospital for a mental examination, defendant's absence was not prejudicial, since defendant's trial counsel testified at the ARCrP 37 hearing that nothing during the trial surprised him and that he did not know of anything else he could have done in preparation for the trial even if the continuance had been granted. Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458, 757 S.W.2d 937 (1988).

Venue.

The accused on sanity hearing was entitled to a change of venue as in other cases. Howard v. State, 58 Ark. 229, 24 S.W. 8, 1893 Ark. LEXIS 33 (1893), overruled in part, Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426, 46 A.L.R.4th 461 (1984); State v. Helm, 69 Ark. 167, 61 S.W. 915 (1901); Dewein v. State, 120 Ark. 302, 179 S.W. 346 (1915); Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S.W. 186 (1915) (preceding decisions under prior law).

16-86-101. Plea of insanity not to prevent timely trial.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a trial of a defendant after an order for observation and examination has been entered.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1308; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment deleted “at at adjourned day or special term of court prior to the next regular term of court” following “defendant” and substituted “has” for “shall have.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section merely permitted a trial prior to the next regular term, in order to minimize motions for observation by defendants as a dilatory move; it did not require one. Campbell v. State, 265 Ark. 77, 576 S.W.2d 938 (1979).

Cited: Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

16-86-102. Examination and observation generally.

    1. Whenever a prosecution for any crime has been instituted in the circuit court by indictment or information, the court, subject to the provisions of §§ 5-2-304 and 5-2-311, shall immediately suspend all further proceedings in the prosecution if:
      1. The defendant files notice that he or she intends to rely upon the defense of mental disease or defect; or
      2. There is reason to believe that mental disease or defect of the defendant will or has become an issue in the case;
      3. The defendant files notice that he or she will put in issue his or her fitness to proceed; or
      4. There is reason to doubt his or her fitness to proceed.
    2. If a trial jury has been impaneled, the court may retain the jury or declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.
    3. A discharge of the jury shall not be a bar to future prosecution.
    1. Upon the issuance of an order for the examination and observation of the defendant, the court shall direct the circuit clerk to notify the prosecuting attorney and the counsel for the defendant of the issuance of the order.
      1. The action of the court in ordering that the defendant undergo examination and observation shall not preclude the state or the defendant from calling expert witnesses to testify at the trial.
      2. The expert witness shall have free access to the defendant for the purpose of observation and examination when the defendant is in the custody of local, county, or state law enforcement or state mental health facilities.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 7; 1973, No. 95, § 1; 1983, No. 191, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1301; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 2.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

Cross References. Access to defendant by examiners of his choice, § 5-2-306.

Case Notes

Purpose.

Purpose of former similar section was to have the accused, whose sanity was questioned, examined in advance of his trial by competent, impartial and disinterested physicians, who would make a report upon the sanity of the accused, subject to the right of either the prosecution or defense to have the physicians who prepared the report summoned as witnesses at the trial for examination and cross-examination. Jones v. State, 204 Ark. 61, 161 S.W.2d 173, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 14 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Appeal.

The Supreme Court could not, on appeal, direct an inquiry into defendant's sanity. O'Neal v. State, 111 Ark. 42, 163 S.W. 793 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Commitment to Hospital.

Confinement in jail rather than commitment to state hospital was not ground for reversal of conviction so long as the accused, pleading insanity, was given a prompt and impartial examination by a competent psychiatrist. Chitwood v. State, 210 Ark. 367, 196 S.W.2d 241 (1946) (decision under prior law).

This section does not require a defendant to be sent to the hospital until after a plea of insanity. Kozal v. State, 264 Ark. 587, 573 S.W.2d 323 (1978).

Denial of Examination.

Defendant's conviction was required to be set aside where the state trial court arbitrarily denied defendant's attempts to avail himself of the established state procedures whereby a mental examination at the state hospital could be obtained. Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

Where the record did not indicate that the trial court was ever apprised of the results of the asserted incomplete psychiatric examination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing a continuance for psychiatric examination. Derrick v. State, 259 Ark. 316, 532 S.W.2d 431 (1976).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to direct defendant to undergo further psychiatric observation, where defendant had been psychologically evaluated in compliance with this section. Clark v. State, 260 Ark. 479, 541 S.W.2d 683 (1976).

Where the defendant was examined at both the state hospital and a regional mental health facility, the court did not err in refusing to retain a private psychiatrist for the defendant at state expense. White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).

Discretion of Court.

Overruling motion to set aside judgment entered on plea of guilty and allowing defendant to enter a plea of insanity and ordering him taken to state penitentiary to serve sentence, following report of examination made by State Hospital pursuant to judge's order, was not abuse of discretion. Gunter v. State, 202 Ark. 551, 151 S.W.2d 85 (1941) (decision under prior law).

The court did not have discretion to deny defendant's motion for examination and a denial was erroneous. Lambert v. State, 213 Ark. 567, 211 S.W.2d 431 (1948) (decision under prior law).

While in certain instances the trial court could commit a defendant to the state hospital for mental examination, it had no authority to appoint a commission to make an examination. Green v. State, 222 Ark. 308, 259 S.W.2d 142 (1953) (decision under prior law).

Where necessary for the administration of justice if issue of insanity was raised after trial had commenced, court had discretion to declare a mistrial and commit a defendant to the State Hospital for observation. Cody v. State, 237 Ark. 15, 371 S.W.2d 143 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Jury Question.

Court did not deprive defendant of due process by failing to give him a preliminary hearing as to competency to stand trial, but where the court was aware that defendant was claiming mental incompetency to stand trial, it was error not to submit the issue to the jury. Bumgarner v. Lockhart, 361 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Ark. 1973).

Cited: Murphy v. State, 255 Ark. 861, 504 S.W.2d 748 (1974); Rodgers v. State, 261 Ark. 293, 547 S.W.2d 419 (1977); Andrews v. State, 265 Ark. 390, 578 S.W.2d 585 (1979); Ark. State Hosp. v. Cleburne County, 271 Ark. 94, 607 S.W.2d 61 (1980); Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1980); Arkansas State Hosp. v. Goslee, 274 Ark. 168, 623 S.W.2d 513 (1981); Dunn v. State, 291 Ark. 131, 722 S.W.2d 595 (1987); Randleman v. State, 310 Ark. 411, 837 S.W.2d 449 (1992).

16-86-103. Examination and observation.

  1. If the court orders the defendant to undergo examination and observation, the examination and observation of the defendant shall be made by:
    1. A licensed psychiatrist who:
      1. Has successfully completed or is currently participating in a post-residency fellowship in forensic psychiatry accredited by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., or has successfully completed a forensic certification course approved by the Department of Human Services; and
      2. Is currently approved by the department to administer forensic examinations; or
    2. A licensed psychologist who:
      1. Has successfully completed or is currently participating in a formal postdoctoral fellowship training program in forensic psychology or has successfully completed a forensic certification course approved by the department; and
      2. Is currently approved by the department to administer forensic examinations.
    1. Upon completion of the examination at a local mental health clinic or center, the court may commit the defendant to the Arkansas State Hospital for further examination and observation if the court determines in its sole discretion that the further examination and observation is warranted.
    2. The psychiatrist or the psychologist who examined and observed the defendant shall make a written report to the court and shall indicate:
      1. A description of the nature of the examination;
      2. A substantiated diagnosis in the terminology of the American Psychiatric Association's current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders;
      3. An opinion on whether the defendant, as a consequence of mental disease or defect, lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or her and to assist effectively in his or her own defense;
      4. A description of any evidence that the defendant is feigning signs and symptoms of mental disease or defect;
        1. When directed by the court, an opinion as to the extent, if any, to which the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was impaired at the time of the conduct alleged.
        2. This opinion shall also include a description of the reasoning used by the examiner to support the examiner's opinion;
      5. When directed by the court, an opinion as to the capacity of the defendant to have the culpable mental state that is required to establish an element of the offense charged;
      6. The signs and symptoms of mental disease or defect that led to the opinion on the presence of mental disease or defect; and
      7. The evidence that supports the opinion of the examiner on the capacity of the defendant to:
        1. Understand the proceedings against him or her; and
        2. Assist in his or her own defense.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 7; 1973, No. 95, § 1; 1983, No. 191, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1301; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 3; 2013, No. 981, § 4; 2015, No. 1152, § 7.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

The 2013 amendment substituted “either” for “or is currently participating in” in (a)(1)(A); in (a)(1)(A)(ii), substituted “A” for “Has successfully completed a” and deleted “Health and” before “Human Services”; substituted “department” for “Department of Human Services” throughout (a); and rewrote (a)(2).

The 2015 amendment redesignated (a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) as (a)(1)(A); and, in (a)(2), deleted “has” at the end of the introductory language and added “Has” at the beginning of (a)(2)(A).

Case Notes

Evidence.

Doctor's testimony and reports held to be competent evidence. Poole v. State, 212 Ark. 746, 207 S.W.2d 725 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Dunn v. State, 291 Ark. 131, 722 S.W.2d 595 (1987).

16-86-104. Admission to State Hospital — Report.

  1. If the Director of the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services determines that a defendant should be admitted to the Arkansas State Hospital for examination and observation, the defendant shall be committed to the Arkansas State Hospital for a period not exceeding one (1) month or until a time as the Director of the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services believes is necessary for the examination and observation of the defendant.
  2. The qualified psychiatrist or qualified psychologist who is designated to examine and observe the mental condition of the defendant shall prepare a written report indicating separately the defendant's mental condition during the period of the examination and the defendant's probable mental condition at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.
  3. The report shall be certified by the Director of the Arkansas State Hospital or a designee under his or her seal or by an affidavit duly subscribed and sworn to by him or her before a notary public who shall affix the notary public's certificate and seal to it.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 7; 1973, No. 95, § 1; 1983, No. 191, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1301; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 4; 2013, No. 980, § 6; 2017, No. 913, § 41.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

The 2013 amendment substituted “Behavioral” for “Mental” in (a).

The 2017 amendment, in (a), substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” following “If the Director of the” and “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” preceding “believes”.

Case Notes

Length of Commitment.

Words “not exceeding” held to be words of limitation beyond which the court could not go in one instance, and the hospital authorities in other. Brockelhurst v. State, 195 Ark. 67, 111 S.W.2d 527 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Hospital had no power or legal right to demand custody for an indefinite time, to be determined by it, of a prisoner examined under former statute and determined by the hospital to be insane, and the court could not, prior to the conclusion of the criminal trial, be forced to deliver the prisoner to the hospital. Davis v. Britt, 243 Ark. 556, 420 S.W.2d 863 (1967) (decision under prior law).

Report.

Joint report of superintendent and physician, to which notarial seal was affixed by court's permission on day of trial, was in substantial compliance with former section. Brockelhurst v. State, 195 Ark. 67, 111 S.W.2d 527 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Where report by officials of state hospital on question of accused's sanity, though not sworn to nor certified as required by law, was offered in evidence by accused, he could not complain that it made no finding as to his probable mental condition at the time homicide was committed. Jones v. State, 204 Ark. 61, 161 S.W.2d 173, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 14 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Doctor's testimony and reports held to be competent evidence. Poole v. State, 212 Ark. 746, 207 S.W.2d 725 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Where doctor from state hospital, who examined defendant, signed the report and testified at the trial regarding the report, it was not mandatory for state to produce superintendent, who certified to the report, as a witness, in order to introduce the report in evidence. Gerlach v. State, 217 Ark. 102, 229 S.W.2d 37 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Dunn v. State, 291 Ark. 131, 722 S.W.2d 595 (1987).

16-86-105. Examination and observation — Costs.

    1. The cost of examination other than by examiners retained by the defendant shall be borne by the state.
    2. Room and board costs shall also be borne by the state so long as the Arkansas State Hospital has actual physical custody of the defendant for the evaluation, observation, or treatment of the defendant.
    1. However, whenever an evaluation of the defendant has been completed, the county from which the defendant is sent for evaluation, within two (2) working days, shall procure the defendant from the Arkansas State Hospital.
    2. Should the county fail to procure the defendant within this two-day period, the county shall bear all room and board costs on the third and subsequent days.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 7; 1973, No. 95, § 1; 1983, No. 191, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1301; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 5.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former similar section held constitutional as lawful delegation of authority to determine cost of keeping persons sent to State Hospital for mental examination. Campbell v. Ark. State Hosp., 228 Ark. 205, 306 S.W.2d 313 (1957) (decision under prior law).

Former similar section was not unconstitutional as depriving county judge of exclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to disbursement of money for county purposes, since the disbursement was an expense of enforcing state's criminal laws and not in the nature of a contribution toward state institution. Campbell v. Ark. State Hosp., 228 Ark. 205, 306 S.W.2d 313 (1957) (decision under prior law).

Liability for Treatment.

Husband was not liable for maintenance and treatment of wife at state hospital where wife, who was charged with first degree murder, had been committed to the hospital without husband having been permitted to have her treated in a private institution. Arkansas State Hosp. for Arkansas State Hosp. v. Kestle, 236 Ark. 5, 364 S.W.2d 804 (1963)Questioned byCruce v. Arkansas State Hospital, 241 Ark. 680, 409 S.W.2d 342 (Ark. 1966) (decision under prior law).

Defendant was not entitled to public funds for investigative, psychiatric, and other services when he did not plead insanity as a defense to the charge of first-degree murder. Blanton v. State, 249 Ark. 181, 458 S.W.2d 373 (1970), cert. denied, Blanton v. Arkansas, 401 U.S. 1003, 91 S. Ct. 1240 (1971).

The legislature, by enacting former § 5-2-305 (see now §§ 5-2-327, 5-2-328), sought to minimize costs to the county as a factor influencing the decision by a trial judge to commit a criminal defendant for a mental examination; it did not eliminate payments by the county of all cost factors. Mears v. Arkansas State Hosp., 265 Ark. 844, 581 S.W.2d 339 (1979).

Cited: Dunn v. State, 291 Ark. 131, 722 S.W.2d 595 (1987).

16-86-106. Testimony of mental health examiners.

      1. When a defendant has been examined, the qualified psychiatrist or qualified psychologist who prepared the examination report shall be summoned as a witness at the trial at the order of the trial judge or at the request of either party.
      2. If summoned, the psychiatrist or psychologist shall be examined by the court and may be examined by either party. A copy of the written report may be made part of the record at trial in every case in which the fact of sanity is an issue at the trial.
    1. A witness employed by the state shall be so summoned to appear as to require as little loss of time as possible from his or her other duties.
    1. The actual necessary expenses of a witness incurred in attending the trial shall be borne by the state. The claims of the witness for the expenses shall be examined and approved by the trial judge before they may be allowed by the state.
    2. A witness employed by the Arkansas State Hospital shall receive no fees for his or her service as a witness.
      1. If a witness is employed by a clinic or center on a part-time basis and is summoned to appear in court on a day he or she would normally be on duty, the clinic or center shall be reimbursed by the state at the same rate it pays for the employee's services.
      2. If the witness is summoned to appear on a day he or she is not on duty at the clinic or center, he or she shall be paid at the same rate he or she is paid by the clinic or center.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 8; 1983, No. 191, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1302; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The reference to “defendant” in subdivision (a)(1)(B) was restored to “psychiatrist or psychologist” to correct a codification error.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote (a); substituted “may be made part of the record at trial” for “hereby required shall be given in evidence” in (b); substituted “the state” for “either the state hospital or the centers or clinics” in (c); redesignated former (d)-(d)(2) as present (d)(1)-(d)(3); and substituted “State Hospital” for “state hospital” in present (d)(2).

Cross References. Expert witnesses, § 5-2-308.

Case Notes

Confrontation of Witnesses.

The records of the hospital not certified as required could not be used to prove that the defendant was sane since he was entitled to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witness against him. Smith v. State, 200 Ark. 1152, 143 S.W.2d 190, 1940 Ark. LEXIS 189 (1940) (decision under prior law).

When objection to the use of the report was made, process must have been issued for the physician who made it in order to comply with constitutional provision that defendant be confronted with witnesses against him. Jones v. State, 204 Ark. 61, 161 S.W.2d 173, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 14 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Permitting a physician from the state hospital to testify regarding the composition of the hospital staff and the procedural methods of the staff when such testimony was within the personal knowledge of the witness did not violate defendant's right to be confronted with witnesses against him as this character of testimony was not “against” the defendant. Downs v. State, 231 Ark. 466, 330 S.W.2d 281 (1959) (decision under prior law).

Permitting a physician from the state hospital to testify with reference to a report compiled by him and other members of the hospital staff did not violate defendant's right to be confronted with witnesses against him. Downs v. State, 231 Ark. 466, 330 S.W.2d 281 (1959) (decision under prior law).

Examiner's Report.

Written findings of doctor as to sanity of defendant were admissible, even though they added nothing to his testimony. Veatch v. State, 221 Ark. 44, 251 S.W.2d 1015 (1952) (decision under prior law).

The report of the examiners did not go to the merits of the case and never got before the jury, therefore, the doctors were not subject to cross-examination, but if the defendant was committed to the state hospital its doctors would be required to report and appear as witnesses as to the defendant's guilt. Turner v. State, 224 Ark. 505, 275 S.W.2d 24, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 431 (1955) (decision under prior law).

In murder trial, court did not err in permitting physician from state hospital to testify regarding hospital staff report which was compiled from findings of fourteen physicians at state hospital over objections that it was hearsay evidence and denied defendant opportunity to question the persons whose findings were included in the report. Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959) (decision under prior law).

Rebuttal.

Where defendant was sent to state hospital for examination as to sanity prior to trial, it was not error on trial to permit testimony of physicians who examined him as to his sanity, in rebuttal to testimony given by witnesses for defendant that he was highly nervous. Clements v. State, 213 Ark. 460, 210 S.W.2d 912 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

16-86-107. Request for examination upon defense of insanity for felony charge.

    1. Whenever a defendant has been held for trial and the defense of insanity is an issue in the matter, the defendant or some person for him or her shall file a motion or request for an order of examination in the office of the clerk of the circuit court.
    2. The clerk shall immediately give notice in writing of the filing of the motion or request to the prosecuting attorney or his or her deputy.
    3. The motion or request shall be immediately presented to the circuit judge.
  1. If the court has reason to believe that the defendant should be examined and observed by reason of the suggestion of the prosecuting attorney or other court official or those interested in the defendant, it may enter the order on its own motion.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1304; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 7.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1)-(3); in (a)(1), deleted “by a magistrate, informed against, or indicted on a felony charge” following “trial” and substituted “is an issue in the matter” for “is made an issue in his behalf”; deleted “who is authorized to act upon the request during vacation of the court or during any session in another county” following “judge” in present (a)(3); and deleted former (c).

Case Notes

Authority of Court.

While in certain instances the trial court could commit a defendant to the state hospital for mental examination, it had no authority to appoint commission to make such an examination. Green v. State, 222 Ark. 308, 259 S.W.2d 142 (1953) (decision under prior law).

Denial of Examination.

Where the record showed that two competent local physicians could not find enough indicia of insanity to warrant recommending that trial court transfer the appellant to a state hospital for examination, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to make available funds to employ a medical expert of the appellant's own choosing. Barber v. State, 248 Ark. 64, 450 S.W.2d 291, 1970 Ark. LEXIS 1174 (1970) (decision under prior law).

Defendant's conviction was required to be set aside where the state trial court arbitrarily denied defendant's attempts to avail himself of the established state procedures whereby a mental examination at the state hospital could be obtained. Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

Failure to Request.

There was no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in not ordering a defendant pleading insanity committed to the state hospital where the defendant neither filed a motion for commitment or requested the court to appoint two physicians to examine him and determine if there was probable cause to believe him insane. Townsend v. City of Helena, 244 Ark. 228, 424 S.W.2d 856, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 917, 89 S. Ct. 244, 21 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1968) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Wade v. Tomlinson, 284 Ark. 432, 682 S.W.2d 751 (1985).

16-86-108. Plea of insanity when period before trial short or insanity alleged after charge.

  1. Whenever a defendant shall be held for trial in circuit court and the defendant alleges that he or she has become insane after being legally charged, the defendant or some person for the defendant must notify the prosecutor and the court at the earliest practicable time.
    1. Failure to notify the prosecutor within a reasonable time before the trial date shall entitle the prosecutor to a continuance which for limitation purposes shall be deemed an excluded period granted on application of the defendant.
    2. Alternatively, in lieu of suspending all further proceedings in the case, the court may order the immediate examination of the defendant by a qualified psychiatrist or a qualified psychologist.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1305; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 8.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

Case Notes

Appeal or Writ of Error.

If trial court failed to order an inquiry upon suggestion of insanity at time of trial the error could be corrected by appeal or writ of error, but not by writ of error coram nobis. Jenkins v. State, 223 Ark. 245, 265 S.W.2d 512Certiorari or review denied by347 U.S. 956, 74 S. Ct. 683 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Authority of Court.

While in certain instances the trial court could commit a defendant to the state hospital for mental examination, it had no authority to appoint commission to make such an examination. Green v. State, 222 Ark. 308, 259 S.W.2d 142 (1953) (decision under prior law).

Denial of Motion.

Denial of a defendant's motion requesting commitment to the state hospital for examination did not deny him the right to assert and try to prove the defense of insanity. Turner v. State, 224 Ark. 505, 275 S.W.2d 24, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 431 (1955) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant filed a motion requesting commitment to the state hospital and the court appointed two examiners who found no insanity, court had no reason as a matter of law to believe the defendant was insane and could deny the motion. Turner v. State, 224 Ark. 505, 275 S.W.2d 24, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 431 (1955) (decision under prior law).

Testimony of Examiners.

Report of the examiners did not go to the merits of the case and never got before the jury, therefore, the doctors were not subject to cross-examination, but if the defendant was committed to the state hospital its doctors would be required to report and appear as witnesses as to the defendant's guilt. Turner v. State, 224 Ark. 505, 275 S.W.2d 24, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 431 (1955) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

16-86-109. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the order for the observation and examination of the defendant in a criminal case, was repealed by Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 9. The section was derived from Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1306.

16-86-110. Insufficient time to submit report to court.

When proper and timely request is made to the court for an order of examination and observation and there is not sufficient time to complete the examination and submit the report before scheduled proceedings in the case, the court may order examination and immediately continue the case until the examination is complete and the report of that examination is submitted to the court.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1307; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 10.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

Case Notes

Cited: Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

16-86-111. Allegation of insanity of convicted defendant.

  1. The procedure provided in this chapter shall also be followed, insofar as it is applicable, in any case in which the insanity of the convicted defendant is alleged as a ground for postponing or not carrying out execution of any sentence imposed as part of the judgment of conviction of the defendant.
  2. In such cases, a hearing shall be held in the manner provided by law, but the evidence provided for in this subchapter shall be given at the hearing.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1303; Acts 2001, No. 1551, § 11.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment substituted “provided in this subchapter” for “prescribed in §§ 16-86-10216-86-106” in (a); and substituted “this subchapter” for “§§ 16-86-10116-86-110 and 16-86-113” in (b).

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

When insanity is claimed as a ground for postponement of sentence, the trial court is empowered to exercise its discretion. O'Rourke v. State, 295 Ark. 57, 746 S.W.2d 52 (1988).

Prior Examination.

It was not error to refuse to delay sentencing of the defendant because of defendant's alleged mental condition where, prior to trial, defendant had been examined at the state hospital and found to be without psychosis. Murphy v. State, 248 Ark. 794, 454 S.W.2d 302 (1970) (decision under prior law) O'Rourke v. State, 295 Ark. 57, 746 S.W.2d 52 (1988).

Cited: Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

16-86-112. Escape of committed person.

  1. A person committed to the state hospital in compliance with this chapter who escapes from the hospital shall be returned to the jurisdiction of the committing court upon his or her apprehension.
  2. After the return of the person to the jurisdiction of the committing court, the court may recommit him or her to the Arkansas State Hospital for further examination or make such other orders as, in its discretion, may be deemed necessary to provide for the custody of the person.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, §§ 10, 11; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1310, 43-1311.

16-86-113. Authority of court in vacation.

The circuit judges in vacation may make any order pertaining to the commitment, examination, observation, or return from the Arkansas State Hospital, after examination, of any defendant that they might make during a regular term of court at which the defendant might be tried.

History. Acts 1971, No. 433, ch. 6, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1309.

Case Notes

Cited: Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

Chapter 87 Public Defenders

A.C.R.C. Notes. Uncodified Acts 1989, No. 442, §§ 2 and 3, were amended by Acts 1993, No. 281. Acts 1993, No. 281, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 20. Acts 1989, No. 442 was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 21, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 5.

References to “this chapter” in § 16-87-101 may not apply to subchapters 2 or 3 which were enacted subsequently.

Publisher's Notes. As to establishment of public defender systems in certain circuits, see Acts 1975, No. 242; Acts 1975, No. 279; Acts 1981, No. 318; Acts 1983, No. 576 [repealed]; Acts 1983, No. 607 [repealed]; Acts 1983, No. 682 [repealed]; Acts 1983, No. 919 [repealed]; Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 8; Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 21.

Cross References. Appointment of counsel, ARCrP 8.2.

Fund to pay defense costs for indigents, § 14-20-102.

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 692, § 3: Mar. 20, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined that there is an immediate need for public defenders to employ an investigator and that this act assists the counties in providing for an investigator. This act being necessary for the public peace, health, and welfare, an emergency is declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 996, § 12: Apr. 11, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly hereby finds and determines; that it is essential to the administration of justice in conformity with the constitutional guarantee and right to effective assistance of counsel that persons who are financially unable to employ counsel be provided same at public expense; that the present system of the court assigning attorneys to represent indigent defendants for little or no compensation has become a severe burden on the lawyers of each judicial district in the State of Arkansas; that many lawyers have not developed or maintained adequate expertise in the highly specialized field of criminal law to effectively represent indigent defendants pursuant to the present assigned counsel system; and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide a system for making effective assistance of counsel available to indigent defendants in each judicial district in order to assure the proper administration of justice, and to relieve attorneys of the undue burden and indigent defendants of the potential handicap, which each must bear under the present assigned counsel system. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist; and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 896, § 5: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law pertaining to the defense of indigent persons by public defenders is in need of strengthening; this Act makes the necessary changes in the public defender law; and that this Act should go into effect as soon as possible in order to protect the constitutional rights of indigent defendants. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 898, § 5: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an immediate necessity for funding coordination for the public defender office between counties of multi-county judicial districts and that this Act so provides. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 28: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the language of certain court cost statutes lacks uniformity; that such lack of uniformity is detrimental to the proper collection of such court costs; and that such language should be standardized to promote the proper collection of such costs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 914, § 6: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that public defenders should be appointed for two (2) year terms; that this Act so provides; and that this Act should go into effect immediately in order to provide for the appointments for two (2) year terms as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Maximum fees for attorney appointed to represent indigent, 3 A.L.R.4th 576.

Power of court to change counsel appointed for indigent, against objections of accused and original counsel. 3 A.L.R.4th 1227.

Public defender's immunity from liability for malpractice, 6 A.L.R.4th 774.

Continuances at instance of public defender or appointed counsel over defendant's objections as excuse for denial of speedy trial. 16 A.L.R.4th 1283.

State recoupment statutes permitting state to recover counsel fees expended for benefit of indigent criminal defendants. 39 A.L.R.4th 597.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Notes. Ferri v. Ackerman: Malpractice Liability of Appointed Counsel, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 746.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Constitutional Law — Indigent Defense — Arkansas Statutory Fee and Expense Limitations Unconstitutional. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991), 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 595.

Case Notes

Exclusion of Sixth District.

In all jurisdictions other than the Sixth Judicial District, the procedure for the selection and compensation of public defenders is governed by this chapter. Thorne v. State, 269 Ark. 556, 601 S.W.2d 886 (1980).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1999, No. 1564, § 10: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that there is an immediate necessity for additional funding to provide for the defense of indigent persons by public defenders that this Act so provides; and that this Act should go into effect as soon as possible in order to protect the constitutional rights of indigent defendants. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-87-101. Title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Public Defender Act”.

History. Acts 1975, No. 996, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3301.

16-87-102 — 16-87-113. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. Former §§ 16-87-10216-87-113, concerning public defenders, were repealed by Acts 1999, No. 1564, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-87-102. Acts 1975, No. 996, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3302.

16-87-103. Acts 1975, No. 996, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3303.

16-87-104. Acts 1975, No. 996, §§ 4, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-3304, 43-3305; Acts 1991, No. 914, § 2.

16-87-105. Acts 1975, No. 996, §§ 6, 7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-3306, 43-3307; Acts 1991, No. 914, § 1.

16-87-106. Acts 1975, No. 996, §§ 6, 7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-3306, 43-3307; Acts 1991, No. 896, § 1.

16-87-107. Acts 1975, No. 996, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3306; Acts 1991, No. 898, § 1.

16-87-108. Acts 1975, No. 996, §§ 8, 9; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-3308, 43-3309.

16-87-109. Acts 1975, No. 996, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3310.

16-87-110. Acts 1975, No. 996, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3310.

16-87-111. Acts 1989, No. 692, § 1; 1991, No. 904, §§ 10, 20; 1991, No. 992, § 1; 1995, No. 1256, § 20; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4.

16-87-112. Acts 1991, No. 925, § 1.

16-87-113. Acts 1995, No. 1289, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Arkansas Public Defender Commission

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in § 16-87-101 may not apply to this subchapter which was enacted subsequently.

Acts 2013, No. 1394, § 12, provided: “DUTIES OF DEPENDENCY-NEGLECT APPEALS ATTORNEY.

The Public Defender Commission shall utilize Dependency-Neglect Appeals Attorneys exclusively to write appeals in dependency-neglect cases.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.”

Acts 2014, No. 95, § 12, provided:

“DUTIES OF DEPENDENCY-NEGLECT APPEALS ATTORNEY. The Public Defender Commission shall utilize Dependency-Neglect Appeals Attorneys exclusively to write appeals in dependency-neglect cases.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 972, § 14, provided:

“DUTIES OF DEPENDENCY-NEGLECT APPEALS ATTORNEY. The Public Defender Commission shall utilize Dependency-Neglect Appeals Attorneys exclusively to write appeals in dependency-neglect cases.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 235, § 12, provided: “DUTIES OF DEPENDENCY-NEGLECT APPEALS ATTORNEY. The Public Defender Commission shall utilize Dependency-Neglect Appeals Attorneys exclusively to write appeals in dependency-neglect cases.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Acts 2017, No. 828, § 12, provided: “DUTIES OF DEPENDENCY-NEGLECT APPEALS ATTORNEY. The Public Defender Commission shall utilize Dependency-Neglect Appeals Attorneys exclusively to write appeals in dependency-neglect cases.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 21: July 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly that the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in State v. Post et al, Case No. 92-787, has created great uncertainty regarding the payment of the legal fees and expenses in connection with the legal representation of indigent persons charged with crimes punishable by imprisonment and that delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1993, would cause irreparable harm to the proper implementation of a statewide public defender program. Therefore, and emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1993.”

Acts 1997, No. 141, § 5: Feb. 13, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that in many rural areas there are not enough attorneys to serve as public defenders; that this lack of personnel needed to preserve our rights as guaranteed under the United States Constitution constitutes a great burden on the State's judicial system, which should be immediately corrected; and that this bill eliminates some of the restrictions on serving as public defender. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1997, No. 250, § 258: Feb. 24, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 1211 of 1995 established the procedure for all state boards and commissions to follow regarding reimbursement of expenses and stipends for board members; that this act amends various sections of the Arkansas Code which are in conflict with the Act 1211 of 1995; and that until this cleanup act becomes effective conflicting laws will exist. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governer [sic], it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36 and No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997 and April 11, 1997, respectively. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1999, No. 1564, § 10: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that there is an immediate necessity for additional funding to provide for the defense of indigent persons by public defenders that this Act so provides; and that this Act should go into effect as soon as possible in order to protect the constitutional rights of indigent defendants. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2011, No. 39, § 2: Feb. 16, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the proper funding of defense counsel for indigent persons is of manifest importance; that a recent decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court has cast doubt on how the expenses of privately retained defense attorneys are to be paid, if at all; and that this act is immediately necessary because there is a question how the Arkansas Public Defender Commission should deal with the issue of privately retained attorneys. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 871, § 24: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one (1) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2019 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the legislative session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2019 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2019”.

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Attorneys, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 61.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where appointments of private attorneys were made before July 1, 1993, this subchapter did not apply. State v. Crittenden County, 320 Ark. 356, 896 S.W.2d 881 (1995).

16-87-201. Definitions.

For the purpose of this subchapter:

  1. “Commission” means the Arkansas Public Defender Commission created by this subchapter;
  2. “Executive director” means the person appointed by the commission pursuant to this subchapter; and
  3. “Indigent person” means a person who, at the time his or her need is determined, is without sufficient funds or assets to employ an attorney or afford other necessary expenses incidental thereto.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 17.

Case Notes

Expenses of Defendant Represented by Retained Counsel.

Request for a writ of prohibition filed by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission (APDC) was denied because, pursuant to § 16-87-212, the circuit court clearly had jurisdiction to order APDC to make payments for expenses for an indigent defendant even though defendant was represented by retained counsel, not the APDC. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, Fourth Div., 2010 Ark. 224, 365 S.W.3d 193 (2010).

Cited: Jones v. State, 367 Ark. 476, 241 S.W.3d 268 (2006).

16-87-202. Arkansas Public Defender Commission — Fund created.

  1. There is hereby created the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.
    1. The commission shall be composed of seven (7) members appointed by the Governor for five-year terms.
    2. At least four (4) members of the commission shall be attorneys who are licensed to practice law in the State of Arkansas and experienced in the defense of persons accused of crimes.
    3. At least one (1) member of the commission shall be a county judge, and at least one (1) member shall be a trial judge who hears criminal cases.
    4. No more than two (2) members of the commission shall be residents of the same congressional district, and no two (2) members of the commission shall be residents of the same county.
    5. A commission member shall be eligible for reappointment and shall continue in office until a successor is appointed and qualified.
    6. The Governor shall designate one (1) commission member to serve as chair.
    1. The commission shall meet at least once each quarter upon the call of the chair.
    2. Commission members shall serve without compensation but may receive expense reimbursement in accordance with § 25-16-901 et seq.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 11; 1997, No. 250, § 117.

Publisher's Notes. Subsection (a), as originally enacted by Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 11, also provided that one (1) of the initial appointees shall serve a term of one (1) year, one (1) shall serve a term of two (2) years, one (1) shall serve a term of three (3) years, two (2) shall serve a term of four (4) years, and two (2) shall serve a full five (5) year term.

16-87-203. Powers and duties.

  1. The Arkansas Public Defender Commission shall have the following powers and duties:
    1. To establish policies and standards for the public defender system throughout the state, including standards for determining who qualifies as an indigent person;
    2. To establish policies and standards for the organization and operation of public defenders' offices throughout the state, including funding, compensation, staffing, and standards of experience for attorneys assigned to particular cases;
    3. To allocate personnel for each public defender's office throughout the state;
    4. To require annual reports regarding expenditures, caseloads, and status of cases from each public defender;
    5. To evaluate the performance of the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office, the Trial Public Defender Office, each public defender, and private attorneys assigned to represent indigent persons;
    6. To approve the reassignment of cases from one public defender to another public defender in an adjacent area for the purpose of avoiding conflicts or adjusting caseloads;
    7. To approve the purchase, rental, and sharing of office space, equipment, or personnel among public defenders in the event and to the extent such items have been provided through an appropriation of the General Assembly;
    8. To establish employee personnel policies for the commission and the public defenders;
    9. To accept and to authorize a public defender to accept moneys, gifts, grants, or services from any public or private source;
    10. To enter and authorize a public defender to enter into contracts with individuals, educational institutions, nonprofit associations, or state or federal agencies, including contracts for the provision of legal services related to the defense of indigent persons;
    11. To maintain for each judicial district a current list of private attorneys who are willing to accept court appointments and who meet any other qualifications established by the commission;
    12. To maintain a separate list of private attorneys who are willing to accept court appointments in capital cases and who meet any other qualifications established by the commission;
    13. To oversee the Juvenile Ombudsman Division of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission;
    14. To perform all other functions and duties as authorized by law; and
      1. To enter into a professional services agreement with a person who is serving as a public defender or employed as an attorney with a state agency when the employee has been appointed to provide defense representation services by a judge.
      2. The total of the professional services agreement and the employee's salary shall not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) above the maximum of the pay grade of the employee's position.
  2. The commission shall operate the trial public defender system in such a manner that the respective trial public defenders shall not be deemed to be part of the same office for purposes of appointment in conflict of interest situations and in such a manner that the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office shall not be deemed a part of the same office as any trial public defender for purposes of appointment in conflict of interest situations.
  3. The commission shall make an annual report to the Governor, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals regarding the efforts of the commission to implement this subchapter.
  4. [Repealed.]

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 11; 1997, No. 788, § 18; 1997, No. 1341, § 18; 1999, No. 1580, § 8; 2001, No. 1799, § 1; 2015, No. 1152, § 8; 2019, No. 871, § 21.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2016, No. 235, § 14, provided: “PROVIDING PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES AGREEMENT. The Public Defender Commission shall have the authority to enter into a professional services agreement with a person who is serving as a public defender or employed as an attorney with a state agency when the employee has been appointed to provide defense representation services by a judge. The total of the professional services contract and the attorney's salary cannot exceed twenty-five percent (25%) above the maximum of the pay grade of the employee's position.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Acts 2017, No. 828, § 14, provided: “PROVIDING PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES AGREEMENT. The Public Defender Commission shall have the authority to enter into a professional services agreement with a person who is serving as a public defender or employed as an attorney with a state agency when the employee has been appointed to provide defense representation services by a judge. The total of the professional services contract and the attorney's salary cannot exceed twenty-five percent (25%) above the maximum of the pay grade of the employee's position.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment added (a)(14).

The 2015 amendment repealed (d).

The 2019 amendment added (a)(15) and made stylistic changes.

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Case Notes

Cited: Hillard v. State, 321 Ark. 39, 900 S.W.2d 167 (1995).

16-87-204. Executive director.

    1. The commission shall appoint an executive director who shall be licensed to practice law in the State of Arkansas, licensed to practice law for at least four (4) years prior to the effective date of the appointment, and experienced in the practice of criminal law, including the defense of capital cases.
    2. The commission may remove the executive director only for just cause, which includes permanent physical or mental disability which seriously interferes with the performance of duties, willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of public defender, habitual intemperance, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
  1. The executive director shall have the following powers and duties:
    1. To supervise the operations of the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office, and the Trial Public Defender Office;
    2. To maintain records of the operation of the public defender system, including, but not limited to, the following:
      1. Detailed descriptions of the organization of each public defender's office;
      2. The caseload of each public defender's office, including cases assigned to private attorneys;
      3. Budgets and actual expenditures of the commission and each public defender's office;
      4. Reassignment of cases from one (1) public defender to another public defender in an adjacent area; and
      5. Assignment of cases to private attorneys;
    3. To present to the commission within ninety (90) days after the end of the fiscal year an annual report on the operation of the public defender system which shall include:
      1. An accounting of all funds received and disbursed;
      2. An evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the public defender system; and
      3. Recommendations for improvement;
    4. To prepare a budget for the operations of the commission;
    5. To allocate and disburse funds appropriated for the operations of the commission and the public defender system pursuant to guidelines established by the commission;
    6. To allocate public defender, investigator, and secretary positions to the office of the public defender in each county or judicial district, based upon a formula established by the commission;
    7. To establish procedures for evaluating the performance of public defenders and private attorneys participating in the public defender system, pursuant to policies and standards developed by the commission;
    8. To appear before and provide assistance to the General Assembly and other relevant bodies regarding matters related to the public defender system;
    9. To convene conferences and training seminars related to the public defender system;
    10. To compile and disseminate statutes, court opinions, and other information to public defenders and private attorneys participating in the public defender system;
    11. To maintain a brief bank for use in connection with appeals;
    12. To perform other duties related to the administration of the public defender system as the commission may direct; and
      1. To supervise the operation of the Juvenile Ombudsman Division of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission; and
      2. To maintain records of such operation, including, but not limited to:
        1. The preparation of a budget and record of actual expenditures;
        2. The assignment of cases and caseload of each ombudsman;
        3. An evaluation of the performance of each ombudsman; and
        4. A detailed description of the organization of each office of the division.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 12; 1997, No. 788, § 19; No. 1341, § 19; 1999, No. 1580, § 9.

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-87-205. Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office.

  1. There is hereby created the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office to represent indigent defendants when the death penalty is sought and the trial public defender's office is unable to represent the defendant for the reasons set forth in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section.
  2. The Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office shall operate under the supervision of the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.
    1. The Arkansas Public Defender Commission shall be appointed by the trial court in the following situation:
        1. In capital murder cases in which the death penalty is sought if a conflict of interest is determined by the court to exist between the trial public defender's office and the indigent person or if for any other reason the court determines that the trial public defender cannot or should not represent the indigent person.
        2. The representation may be in conjunction with appointed private attorneys.
        3. In capital murder cases, unless the prosecuting attorney informs the circuit court at the arraignment of the defendant that the death penalty will not be sought, it shall be presumed for purposes of this section that the death penalty will be sought.
          1. The executive director may assign the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office, a trial public defender from another area, a private attorney whose name appears on a list of attorneys maintained by the commission, or a combination of private and public defender attorneys to represent the indigent person.
          2. The executive director shall notify the trial court of the assignment and an order reflecting the assignment shall be entered.
      1. In noncapital cases, if a conflict of interest is determined by the court to exist between the trial public defender's office and the indigent person, or if for any other reason the court determines that the trial public defender cannot or should not represent the indigent person, then the court, if time permits shall contact the commission to determine if a public defender from an adjacent area is available for appointment.
        1. If time does not permit or if there is not a trial public defender from an adjacent area available, then the court may appoint a private attorney.
        2. The trial judge shall notify in writing the commission of the appointment, the type of case, and the reason for the appointment within twenty (20) days of the appointment.
  3. To the extent money is appropriated, the executive director of the commission may hire attorneys, investigators, research assistants, and other staff as necessary to properly represent indigent persons.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 7; 2001, No. 1799, § 2; 2003, No. 606, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

The 2003 amendment added the language beginning “to represent indigent defendants” in (a); inserted “trial” preceding “public” in (c)(2)(B)(i); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The clear intent in the General Assembly's creation of the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office was to allocate to the state, if at all possible, the burdensome costs of defending capital murder cases; the primary thrust of the legislation would be thwarted by placing the duty of payment after June 30, 1993, on a county because the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office was not operational at the time private attorneys were appointed. State v. Crittenden County, 320 Ark. 356, 896 S.W.2d 881 (1995).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Trial court properly found appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered because trial counsel's advice that he faced a death sentence was not erroneous as the death penalty remained a potential outcome of any trial; no evidence or testimony was introduced to establish that the death penalty had been waived, and the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim and her unborn child supported counsel's reasonable belief that appellant faced a potential death sentence. True v. State, 2017 Ark. 323, 532 S.W.3d 70 (2017).

16-87-206 — 16-87-210. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. Former §§ 16-87-20616-87-208, concerning trial public defender offices and personnel, were repealed by Acts 1999, No. 1564, § 2. Former §§ 16-87-209 and 16-87-210, concerning court appointed attorneys and attorneys' fees and expenses, were repealed by Acts 2001, No. 1799, §§ 3 and 4. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-87-206. Acts 1993, No. 1193, §§ 1, 2, 16.

16-87-207. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 3.

16-87-208. Acts 1993, No. 1193, §§ 4, 5; 1997, No. 141, § 1.

16-87-209. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 6; 1999, No. 1564, § 3.

16-87-210. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 8; 1997, No. 788, § 21; No. 1341, § 21.

16-87-211. Compensation.

  1. On an interim basis in complex cases or at the conclusion of each case, the appointed attorney shall submit his or her bill to the appointing court, which shall issue an order authorizing compensation.
    1. An application for compensation shall be submitted to the Arkansas Public Defender Commission accompanied by the affidavit of the appointed attorney detailing the hours spent on the case and the services rendered and whether compensation was received or has been applied for from any other source.
    2. The commission shall determine and set the compensation award based upon guidelines established by the commission.
  2. There shall be no maximum amount of compensation in capital cases.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 9; 1999, No. 1564, § 4; 2001, No. 1343, § 1; 2001, No. 1799, § 5.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment by Nos. 1343 and 1799, in (a), substituted “On an interim basis in complex cases or at the” for “At the” and “authorizing” for “for appropriate”; inserted “submitted to the Arkansas Public Defender Commission” in present (b)(1); added (b)(2) and made related changes; and deleted former (d) and (e).

16-87-212. Court fees and expenses.

    1. The Arkansas Public Defender Commission is authorized to pay for certain expenses regarding the defense of indigents.
      1. The expenses shall include, but shall not necessarily be limited to, fees for counsel appointed by the court, expert witnesses, temporary investigators, testing, and travel.
        1. Expenses shall not include attorney's fees for counsel privately retained for the benefit of an indigent defendant for that defendant's defense.
        2. The commission may authorize the payment of expenses of counsel privately retained for the benefit of an indigent defendant, provided counsel complies with the standards set by the commission under this subchapter governing counsel appointed by the court or employed or contracted by the commission.
      1. Whenever a judge orders an authorized payment in a case involving an indigent person, a copy of the order accompanied by a detailed explanation of services rendered, time spent, and expenses incurred shall be transmitted to the commission, and the commission shall set the amount of compensation.
      2. Orders as authorized throughout this chapter shall be paid by the commission provided sufficient funds are available.
    1. With the approval of the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, trial public defenders, appointed private attorneys, and the Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office are authorized to utilize the services of the State Crime Laboratory for pathology and biology, toxicology, criminalistics, raw drug analysis, latent fingerprint identification, questioned documents examination, firearms and toolmarks identification, and in other such areas as the trial judge may deem necessary and appropriate.
    2. If approved by the executive director, the laboratory shall provide the requested services.
  1. At the discretion of the commission, capital murder cases and all proceedings under the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 37.5, shall be paid entirely by the commission.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 10; 1997, No. 788, § 22; No. 1341, § 22; 2001, No. 1343, § 2; 2001, No. 1799, § 6; 2011, No. 39, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment by Nos. 1343 and 1799 substituted “an authorized payment … amount of compensation” for “the payment of funds for the aforementioned expenses, the judge shall transmit a copy of the order to the commission, which is authorized in its discretion to pay the funds” in (a)(3)(A); and added (a)(3)(B) and (C) and made related changes.

The 2011 amendment inserted (a)(2)(B); substituted “counsel appointed by the court” for “appointed counsel” in (a)(2)(A); and, in (b)(1), substituted “Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission” for “executive director” and deleted “hereby” following “Appellate Office are.”

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where appointments of private attorneys were made before July 1, 1993, this subchapter did not apply. State v. Crittenden County, 320 Ark. 356, 896 S.W.2d 881 (1995).

Expenses of Defendant Represented by Retained Counsel.

Request for a writ of prohibition filed by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission (APDC) was denied because, pursuant to this section, the circuit court clearly had jurisdiction to order APDC to make payments for expenses for an indigent defendant even though defendant was represented by retained counsel, not the APDC. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, Fourth Div., 2010 Ark. 224, 365 S.W.3d 193 (2010).

16-87-213. Certificate of indigency.

      1. Any person charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment who desires to be represented by an appointed attorney shall file with the court in which the person is charged a written certificate of indigency.
      2. The certificate of indigency shall be in a form approved by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission and shall be provided by the court in which the person is charged.
      3. The certificate of indigency shall be executed under oath by the person charged with the offense and shall state in bold print that a false statement is punishable as a Class D felony.
      4. Upon execution, the certificate of indigency shall be made a permanent part of the indigent person's records.
        1. The certificate of indigency also shall function as a legally binding contractual agreement in which the person charged agrees that in exchange for legal representation provided by the state, he or she shall pay the amount ordered by the court, both upon the initial appointment of an attorney under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section and for any amount ordered by the court after the case has concluded.
        2. The certificate of indigency shall contain a notice that reads, “Your state income tax refund, legal settlements or favorable verdicts, lottery winnings, or any moneys or property forfeited by the state shall be intercepted to satisfy this debt under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-217.”
      1. If the court in which the person is charged determines that the person qualifies for the appointment of an attorney by being indigent or partially indigent under standards set by the commission, the court, except as otherwise provided by this subchapter, shall appoint the trial public defender to represent the person before the court.
      2. The court shall not appoint an attorney prior to review of the submitted affidavit.
    1. At the time of appointment of an attorney, the court immediately shall assess a fee of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than four hundred dollars ($400) to be paid to the commission in order to defray the costs of the public defender system.
    2. The fee under subdivision (b)(1) of this section may be waived if the court finds such an assessment to be too burdensome.
    3. The fee under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be collected at the beginning of the proceeding and is separate from any additional attorney's fee that might be assessed by the court.
      1. The commission shall deposit the money collected under subdivision (b)(1) of this section into a separate account within the State Central Services Fund entitled “Public Defender User Fees” to which access shall only be available to the commission.
      2. The commission may carry over any funds remaining in the separate account under subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this section at the end of the fiscal year to the subsequent year.
  1. All fees under this subchapter shall be collected by the county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in the circuit courts and district courts of this state, and the collecting county or city official, agency, or department shall remit to the commission by the tenth day of each month all of the fees collected on forms provided by the commission.
  2. The appointing court may at any time review and redetermine whether or not a person is an indigent person who qualifies for the appointment of an attorney pursuant to this subchapter.
  3. This section does not bar a prosecution for perjury or other offenses based on misrepresentation of financial status.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 13; 1999, No. 1564, § 5; 2001, No. 1799, § 7; 2001, No. 1809, § 6; 2003, No. 1765, § 23; 2013, No. 961, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1394, § 9, provided: “FEE GENERATION AND SUPPORT — COURTS.

Unless specified otherwise in Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) and Arkansas Code 16-87-213 the monies collected by the courts under the authority of § 5-4-303(g) and 16-87-213 shall be deposited into the State Treasury to the credit of the State Central Services Fund.

“In the event that the law requires that the fees levied under § 5-4-303(g) be deposited into the State Administration of Justice Fund, the State Treasurer shall transfer the amount of the fees collected each month under the authority of Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.”

Acts 2014, No. 95, § 9, provided:

“FEE GENERATION AND SUPPORT — COURTS. Unless specified otherwise in Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) and Arkansas Code 16-87-213 the monies collected by the courts under the authority of § 5-4-303(g) and 16-87-213 shall be deposited into the State Treasury to the credit of the State Central Services Fund.

“In the event that the law requires that the fees levied under § 5-4-303(g) be deposited into the State Administration of Justice Fund, the State Treasurer shall transfer the amount of the fees collected each month under the authority of Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 972, § 11, provided:

“FEE GENERATION AND SUPPORT — COURTS. Unless specified otherwise in Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) and Arkansas Code 16-87-213 the monies collected by the courts under the authority of § 5-4-303(g) and 16-87-213 shall be deposited into the State Treasury to the credit of the State Central Services Fund.

“In the event that the law requires that the fees levied under § 5-4-303(g) be deposited into the State Administration of Justice Fund, the State Treasurer shall transfer the amount of the fees collected each month under the authority of Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 235, § 9, provided: “FEE GENERATION AND SUPPORT — COURTS. Unless specified otherwise in Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) and Arkansas Code 16-87-213 the monies collected by the courts under the authority of § 5-4-303(g) and 16-87-213 shall be deposited into the State Treasury to the credit of the State Central Services Fund.

“In the event that the law requires that the fees levied under § 5-4-303(g) be deposited into the State Administration of Justice Fund, the State Treasurer shall transfer the amount of the fees collected each month under the authority of Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Acts 2017, No. 828, § 9, provided: “FEE GENERATION AND SUPPORT — COURTS. Unless specified otherwise in Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) and Arkansas Code 16-87-213 the monies collected by the courts under the authority of § 5-4-303(g) and 16-87-213 shall be deposited into the State Treasury to the credit of the State Central Services Fund.

“In the event that the law requires that the fees levied under § 5-4-303(g) be deposited into the State Administration of Justice Fund, the State Treasurer shall transfer the amount of the fees collected each month under the authority of Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018.”

Acts 2018, No. 87, § 9, provided: “FEE GENERATION AND SUPPORT — COURTS. Unless specified otherwise in Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) and Arkansas Code 16-87-213 the monies collected by the courts under the authority of § 5-4-303(g) and 16-87-213 shall be deposited into the State Treasury to the credit of the State Central Services Fund.

“In the event that the law requires that the fees levied under § 5-4-303(g) be deposited into the State Administration of Justice Fund, the State Treasurer shall transfer the amount of the fees collected each month under the authority of Arkansas Code § 5-4-303(g) from the State Administration of Justice Fund to the State Central Services Fund.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment by Nos. 1799 and 1809, in (a)(2)(B)(ii), deleted “by the quorum court” following “entity designated” and “or, in the case of a municipal court, the municipal court clerk” at the end; inserted “100% of” in (a)(2)(B)(iii)(a); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2003 amendment rewrote (a)(2)(B).

The 2013 amendment rewrote this section.

16-87-214. Prohibited conduct.

  1. A trial public defender or a deputy trial public defender shall not:
    1. Receive any funds, services, or other thing of monetary value, directly or indirectly, for the representation of an indigent person pursuant to court appointment, except the compensation authorized by law; or
    2. Refer any person, indigent or otherwise, who contacts the trial public defender to any other attorney, except pursuant to guidelines established by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.
  2. This section does not bar a prosecution or other disciplinary action against a trial public defender or deputy trial public defender who commits a violation of the law or the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct.
  3. The commission and the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission shall not interfere with the discretion, judgment, or advocacy of a trial public defender, a deputy trial public defender, or an appointed private attorney in the representation of indigent persons, but nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude the commission or the executive director from refusing to approve an expenditure of public funds.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 14; 2015, No. 1152, § 9.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment, in (b), substituted “This section does not” for “Nothing in this section shall be construed to” and substituted “Arkansas” for “Supreme Court Model.”

Case Notes

Construction.

When considered with the relevant public-defender statutes, it is evident that the reference to appointed counsel in Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-6(c) is to attorneys not otherwise compensated for their representation. Rushing v. State, 340 Ark. 84, 8 S.W.3d 489 (2000) (decided under prior law), superseded by statute as stated in, Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 233, 60 S.W.3d 485 (2001), superseded by statute as stated in, Mills v. State, 347 Ark. 695, 66 S.W.3d 643 (2002), superseded by statute as stated in, Newman v. State, 350 Ark. 53, 84 S.W.3d 43 (2002).

Compensation of Public Defender.

The Regular Salary Procedures and Restrictions Act found in § 19-4-1601 et seq. prohibits the public defender from receiving compensation from the State in an amount greater than that established by the General Assembly as the maximum annual salary for the state-salaried public defender. Rushing v. State, 340 Ark. 84, 8 S.W.3d 489 (2000) (decided under prior law), superseded by statute as stated in, Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 233, 60 S.W.3d 485 (2001), superseded by statute as stated in, Mills v. State, 347 Ark. 695, 66 S.W.3d 643 (2002), superseded by statute as stated in, Newman v. State, 350 Ark. 53, 84 S.W.3d 43 (2002).

Cited: Emery v. State, 341 Ark. 193, 15 S.W.3d 672 (2000).

16-87-215. Trial Public Defender Office.

There is hereby created the Trial Public Defender Office within the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, to be composed as follows:

  1. The Trial Public Defender Office shall supervise the development and operations of each of the components of the Arkansas trial public defender system pursuant to the rules and standards for governing the system adopted by the commission;
    1. The Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission shall appoint a defense services administrator.
    2. The administrator shall be chosen solely on the basis of training, experience, and other qualifications.
    3. The administrator need not be licensed to practice law; and
  2. The administrator may hire support staff and other personnel as necessary to properly discharge the duties assigned to the office to the extent allowed and as funds are appropriated by the General Assembly.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 17; 1997, No. 1341, § 17; 2019, No. 315, § 1302.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “regulations” following “rules” in (1).

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-87-216. Juvenile Ombudsman Division — Definitions.

  1. For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
    1. “Best interests of the juvenile” includes those actions and courses of action which:
      1. Keep the juvenile safe from physical, mental, or sexual abuse while in state custody;
      2. Are considerate of the court's recommendations and adhere to the juvenile's treatment plan; and
      3. Work toward rehabilitating the juvenile;
    2. “Division” means the Division of Youth Services of the Department of Human Services;
    3. “Executive director” means the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission; and
    4. “Juvenile” means any juvenile who has been committed to the custody of the Division of Youth Services pursuant to a disposition order of the juvenile division of circuit court.
    1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to create a Juvenile Ombudsman Division of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission to provide for independent oversight of the Division of Youth Services' facilities and programs that are unlicensed or unaccredited.
    2. There shall be created within the Arkansas Public Defender Commission a juvenile ombudsman and assistant juvenile ombudsmen that shall be appointed by the executive director.
    3. The minimum qualifications for an ombudsman shall be as follows:
      1. A master's degree in:
        1. Social work;
        2. Psychology;
        3. Law; or
        4. A related field;
      2. A bachelor's degree in:
        1. Social work;
        2. Psychology; or
        3. A related field; or
      3. Four (4) years' direct experience in programs serving juvenile offenders and their families.
    4. No waiver of the minimum qualifications in subdivision (b)(3) of this section shall be permitted.
  2. The powers and duties of the ombudsman shall be as follows:
    1. The ombudsman shall be given online access to all tracking systems maintained by the Division of Youth Services, including but not limited to the:
      1. Incident report tracking system and the disposition of incidents reported therein;
      2. Parent helpline tracking system; and
      3. Juvenile tracking system;
    2. The ombudsman may attend scheduled meetings or reviews of juvenile intake, program progress, or aftercare planning;
    3. The ombudsman shall be given access to any meeting or document that would be accessible to the general public through the Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq.;
    4. The ombudsman shall be given reasonable prior notice of all major activities of the Audit and Compliance Section of the Division of Youth Services and shall be permitted to accompany the monitor or monitoring team of the Division of Youth Services on any monitoring visit or audit;
    5. The ombudsman shall be subject to the same compliance with all procedures, policies, and laws regarding the confidentiality of juveniles committed to the Division of Youth Services as required by Division of Youth Services employees;
    6. The ombudsman may initiate and maintain contact with any juvenile during the juvenile's custodial placement or while on aftercare status;
    7. The ombudsman shall be given access to the juveniles and to the juveniles' records and meetings of program progress and case planning at all the privately contracted facilities of the Division of Youth Services;
      1. To identify instances where necessary services are not being provided with respect to the safety, health, education, and rehabilitation of the juvenile as identified in a treatment plan.
      2. When a problem is identified, the ombudsman shall notify the Director of the Division of Youth Services or his or her designee, the juvenile court having jurisdiction, the juvenile's parents or guardian, and the juvenile's attorney or attorneys of the problem;
    8. To document a juvenile's questions, complaints, and concerns related to the juvenile's health, safety, education, and treatment and seek answers to those questions and address the complaints and concerns in an expedient manner;
    9. To request and review, as needed, all records on the history and treatment of the juvenile while in the custody of the Division of Youth Services or in aftercare, including related agency and court records;
    10. To make unannounced visits to the unlicensed or unaccredited facilities of the Division of Youth Services, whether state-run or privately operated, to assure the safety and well-being of the juveniles;
    11. Upon receipt of a complaint involving alleged child maltreatment, the ombudsman shall immediately report the alleged incident to the Child Abuse Hotline, the facility director, and the Director of the Division of Youth Services or his or her designee, who shall be responsible for ensuring the juvenile's safety;
      1. To prepare annual reports on the overall functioning of the division's ability to provide for the safety, health, education, and rehabilitation of juveniles committed to the Division of Youth Services.
      2. The report shall be submitted to:
        1. The Secretary of the Department of Human Services and the Director of the Division of Youth Services;
        2. The House Committee on Aging, Children and Youth, Legislative and Military Affairs;
        3. The Senate Interim Committee on Children and Youth;
        4. The judges of the juvenile divisions of circuit court; and
        5. The Governor;
    12. To prepare annual reports comparing the court's recommendations, the treatment plans of the Division of Youth Services, and the actual services provided; and
    13. The audit and compliance process of the Division of Youth Services to verify that each juvenile has unhampered access to a grievance process that addresses the juvenile's questions, complaints, and concerns in a timely manner in accordance with policy and procedure of the Division of Youth Services or applicable statute.
  3. The ombudsman shall have no authority to command or otherwise instruct any division employee or contracted agent of the Division of Youth Services regarding any aspect of programming or operations, nor may the ombudsman alter or countermand any instruction to, or participation by, juveniles that is consistent with the policy and procedure of the Division of Youth Services or otherwise part of the treatment plan, program, or operations associated with the agency.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1580, §§ 1-6; 2001, No. 1797, § 1; 2003, No. 1008, §§ 1, 2; 2019, No. 910, § 5159.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1396, § 10, provided: “TRANSFER OF FUNDS FOR THE JUVENILE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM. The Department of Human Services shall provide funding in an amount not to exceed $240,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2014 for the Juvenile Ombudsman Program described in ACA16-87-216. Upon request by the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State shall transfer an amount not to exceed $240,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2014 from an account designated by the Director of the Department of Human Services to the State Central Services Fund as a direct revenue to fund the Juvenile Ombudsman Program.”

Acts 2014, No. 57, § 10, provided: “TRANSFER OF FUNDS FOR THE JUVENILE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM. The Department of Human Services shall provide funding in an amount not to exceed $240,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2015 for the Juvenile Ombudsman Program described in ACA16-87-216. Upon request by the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, the Chief Fiscal officer of the State shall transfer an amount not to exceed $240,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2015 from an account designated by the Director of the Department of Human Services to the State Central Services Fund as a direct revenue to fund the Juvenile Ombudsman Program.”

Acts 2015, No. 980, § 9, provided: “TRANSFER OF FUNDS FOR THE JUVENILE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM. The Department of Human Services shall provide funding in an amount not to exceed $240,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2016 for the Juvenile Ombudsman Program described in ACA16-87-216. Upon request by the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, the Chief Fiscal officer of the State shall transfer an amount not to exceed $240,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2016 from an account designated by the Director of the Department of Human Services to the State Central Services Fund as a direct revenue to fund the Juvenile Ombudsman Program.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 90, § 9, provided: “TRANSFER OF FUNDS FOR THE JUVENILE OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM. The Department of Human Services shall provide funding in an amount not to exceed $240,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2017 for the Juvenile Ombudsman Program described in ACA16-87-216. Upon request by the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State shall transfer an amount not to exceed $240,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2017 from an account designated by the Director of the Department of Human Services to the State Central Services Fund as a direct revenue to fund the Juvenile Ombudsman Program.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1999, No. 1580, § 7, provided:

“(a) A comprehensive outside evaluation of the Juvenile Ombudsman Division shall be conducted by an independent organization with established expertise in this area in the last quarter of the fiscal year 2003 to determine the ability of the Division to carry out its purpose.

“(b) The independent organization shall be selected by the House Interim Committee on Children and Youth, Legislative and Military Affairs and the Senate Interim Committee on Children and Youth, and the organization shall present its report to the two (2) interim committees. The organization shall provide a copy to the Director of the Department of Human Services, the Director of the Division of Youth Services, and the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.

“(c) The evaluation shall be paid by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

The 2003 amendment added “that are unlicensed or unaccredited” in (b)(1); inserted “unlicensed or unaccredited” in (c)(11); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment in (c)(13)(B)(i), substituted “Secretary” for “Director”; and added “of the Department of Human Services” following “Division of Youth Services”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Juvenile Ombudsman, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 448.

16-87-217. Recovery of fees owed.

    1. The State of Arkansas and the county may file a civil action for recovery of money expended in the representation of a person who is determined by a court not to have been indigent at the time expenditures were made.
    2. Suit shall be brought within three (3) years after the date a certificate of indigency is filed.
    1. The State of Arkansas also shall recover any fees owed or money expended in the representation of a person who is determined by a court not to have been indigent at the time expenditures were made by attaching a lien to the person's legal settlements or favorable verdicts, lottery winnings, or any moneys or property forfeited by the state.
    2. To effectuate a lien under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, a public defender shall file a notice of the lien setting forth services rendered to the person and a claim for reasonable value of the services with the clerk of the circuit court not later than ten (10) days after the disposition of the case.
    3. The person named in the notice of the lien shall be served personally with a copy of the lien in court immediately at the end of the trial court proceedings.
    4. The circuit court shall determine whether all or any part of the lien shall be allowed.
  1. In the event that a circuit court, county court, or district court renders a judgment for recovery of money in a civil action as described in this section, the Arkansas Public Defender Commission may file a claim for a setoff of the judgment amount against the person's state income tax refund as a claimant agency authorized under § 26-36-301 et seq.
  2. This section does not prohibit the commission from filing a claim for a setoff against a person's state income tax refund as a claimant agency authorized under § 26-36-301 et seq. to recover the fee provided for under § 16-87-213(b) or a judgment provided in § 16-87-218.

History. Acts 2013, No. 961, § 2; 2015, No. 893, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 961, contained two sections designated as “Section 2”.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment added (d).

16-87-218. Schedule of costs for legal services — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Early disposition” means a disposition that occurs within sixty (60) days of the date of the person's arrest or before the state files a criminal information, whichever occurs sooner; and
    2. “Extended matter” means a case that involves legal proceedings that extend beyond a completed trial.
  2. At the time of final disposition of any charges pending against a defendant represented by a public defender, the public defender shall ask the court to enter a judgment against the defendant in favor of the State of Arkansas for legal services rendered by the public defender.
  3. The amount of judgment shall be based on the following nonbinding fee schedule:
    1. Capital murder, § 5-10-101, in which the death penalty was given, including any appeal and post-conviction remedy, twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500);
    2. Capital murder, § 5-10-101, in which the death penalty was not given, murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, or Class Y felony:
      1. For an early disposition, five hundred dollars ($500);
      2. For a negotiated plea or disposition before trial, two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500); or
      3. For a trial or an extended matter, seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500);
    3. Any other felony homicide, §§ 5-10-103 — 5-10-106, Class A felony, or Class B felony:
      1. For an early disposition, two hundred fifty dollars ($250);
      2. For a negotiated plea or disposition before trial, one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250); or
      3. For a trial or an extended matter, five thousand dollars ($5,000);
    4. A Class C felony, Class D felony, unclassified felony, or driving or boating while intoxicated, § 5-65-103, third offense:
      1. For an early disposition, one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125);
      2. For a negotiated plea or disposition before trial, six hundred twenty-five dollars ($625); or
      3. For a trial or an extended matter, two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500);
    5. Any other misdemeanor:
      1. For an early disposition, sixty-five dollars ($65.00);
      2. For a negotiated plea or disposition before trial, one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125); or
      3. For a trial or an extended matter, five hundred dollars ($500);
    6. Any juvenile matter:
      1. For an early disposition, sixty-five dollars ($65.00);
      2. For a negotiated plea or disposition before trial, one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125); or
      3. For a trial or an extended matter, five hundred dollars ($500); or
    7. Any post-conviction relief that is not a direct appeal of the conviction:
      1. For an early disposition, two hundred dollars ($200);
      2. For a negotiated plea or disposition before trial or hearing, four hundred dollars ($400); or
      3. For a trial or hearing or an extended matter, six hundred twenty-five dollars ($625).
  4. A court is not required to enter a judgment against a defendant under this section.

History. Acts 2013, No. 961, § 3; 2015, No. 299, § 23.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment inserted “or boating” in (c)(4).

Subchapter 3 — Funding

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in § 16-87-101 may not apply to this subchapter which was enacted subsequently.

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36 and No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Noted Mar. 11, 1997 and Apr. 11, 1997, respectively. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

16-87-301. Transition to state funding.

  1. It is the intent of the General Assembly in the transition to a state-funded public defender system to provide an appropriate and adequate level of legal representation to indigent persons in all areas of the state. It is recognized by the General Assembly that in many areas of the state, resources have not been available to support a public defender system at the necessary level. It is also recognized, however, that in other areas, a system has been developed which is appropriately and successfully serving indigent persons and the justice system. With the transition from local funding of the system to state funding of the system, it is not the intent of the General Assembly to adversely affect those systems which are working well or to put in place a system which is too inflexible to respond to local needs or restrictions.
  2. In its administration of the system, therefore, the Arkansas Public Defender Commission is charged with the authority and responsibility to establish and maintain a system of public defenders which equitably serves all areas of the state, provides quality representation, makes prudent use of state resources, and works with others in the justice system at the state and local level to provide an appropriate level of legal services to indigent persons in our state.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 23; 1997, No. 1341, § 23.

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Legislative intent of Acts 1997, No. 788, § 16-10-602.

16-87-302. Funding of public defenders.

  1. The Arkansas Public Defender Commission shall be responsible for the payment of the following:
    1. The salaries of public defenders;
    2. The salaries of secretaries and other support staff of the public defender's office;
    3. The payment of the costs of certain expenses, as authorized by § 16-87-212.
  2. Each county or counties within a judicial district shall be responsible for the payment of the following:
      1. The cost of facilities, equipment, supplies, and other office expenses necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office.
      2. Funding for these expenditures may be from:
        1. A county administration of justice fund;
        2. A county's general fund;
        3. A county's public defender fund;
        4. A county's indigent defense fund;
        5. A county's public defender investigator fund; or
        6. Any other fund authorized by law for that purpose.
      3. These expenditures shall comply with an itemized, line-item budget appropriated by the quorum court; and
    1. The compensation of additional personnel within the office of the public defender, when approved in advance by the quorum court.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 12; 1997, No. 1341, § 12; 2001, No. 1799, § 8; 2011, No. 1201, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. As amended in 2001, this section provided:

“(a) Effective July 1, 2001, The Arkansas Public Defender Commission shall be responsible for the payment of the following: (1) The salaries of public defenders; (2) The salaries of secretaries and other support staff of the public defender's office; (3) The payment of the costs of certain expenses, as authorized by § 16-87-212.

“(b) Effective July 1, 2001, Each county or counties within a judicial district shall be responsible for the payment of the following: (1) The cost of facilities, equipment, supplies, and other office expenses necessary to the effective and efficient operation of the public defender's office; and (2) The compensation of additional personnel within the office of the public defender, when approved in advance by the quorum court.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment substituted “July 1, 2001” for “January 1, 1998” in (a); substituted “July 1, 2001” for “January 1, 1998” in (b); inserted “necessary to the effective and efficient” in (b)(1); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendment added (b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C).

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-87-303. Selection and qualifications of public defenders.

  1. Each person selected as a public defender shall be:
    1. Licensed to practice law in the State of Arkansas; and
    2. Experienced in the defense of criminal cases.
    1. Any person interested in being considered for appointment as a public defender in a judicial district shall submit his or her name to the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.
      1. The commission shall evaluate and submit up to three (3) names to the judges within the judicial district.
      2. By majority vote, the judges will select one (1) of the candidates whose name was submitted by the commission as the public defender.
      3. If one (1) of the candidates submitted does not receive a majority vote from the judges, then the commission shall select the public defender.
    1. The public defender in each judicial district shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years and shall be removed by the commission before the expiration of his or her term only for just cause.
    2. Just cause for removal shall consist of permanent physical or mental disability seriously interfering with the performance of duties, willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform public defender duties, habitual intemperance, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
  2. The public defender shall be eligible for reappointment.
  3. Vacancies in the office shall be filled in the same manner as the initial appointment.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 13; 1997, No. 1341, § 13; 2001, No. 1799, § 9.

Publisher's Notes. As amended in 2001, subdivision (c)(1) provided:

“Beginning January 1, 1998, The public defender in each judicial district shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years and shall be removed by the commission before the expiration of his or her term only for just cause.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote (b)(2); made a minor stylistic change in (c)(1); and made gender neutral changes throughout this section.

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-87-304. Distribution and placement of public defender positions.

  1. There shall be created within the Arkansas Public Defender Commission a number of positions, including chief public defenders, public defenders, investigators, and secretaries.
    1. The commission shall allocate positions to each county or judicial district based on an appropriate formula adopted by the commission.
    2. In the distribution of positions, the commission shall be guided by:
      1. The current distribution and type of positions across the state;
      2. An evaluation of court case filings and dispositions, the number of judges, the size and population of the county or district, and other appropriate factors; and
      3. The desire to avoid the necessity of appointing outside public defenders or private counsel due to conflicts of interest.
    1. There shall be at least one (1) public defender position allocated to each judicial district.
      1. Where appropriate, a position or positions may be assigned to a single county.
      2. In counties where more than one (1) position is allocated, the commission may designate one (1) or more of the positions as chief public defender.
      1. When one (1) or more chief public defenders is assigned to a county or judicial district and the chief public defender shall have administrative authority over other public defenders within the county or district, the chief public defender may select the other public defenders subject to the approval of the commission.
      1. Public defender positions may be allocated on a full-time or part-time basis.
      2. When a public defender is employed on a part-time basis, he or she may engage in the general practice of law.
      3. No person who serves as a full-time public defender may engage in the private practice of law.
      4. No person shall serve as a part-time public defender who also serves as a part-time municipal court judge, city court judge, or deputy prosecuting attorney in any judicial district.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 14; 1997, No. 1341, § 14; 2001, No. 1799, § 10.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1997, Nos. 778, § 14, and 1341, § 14, also provided:

“(d)(1) The commission shall develop the initial allocation of public defender positions to all counties and judicial districts on or before August 1, 1997.

“(d)(2) The plan shall be reviewed by the House and Senate Interim Committees on Judiciary on or before October 1, 1997.”

Effective Dates. The provisions of this section are effective January 1, 1998, by its own terms.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote (c)(3)-(4).

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-87-305. Salaries of public defenders.

  1. The entry level salaries of public defenders and public defender staff positions shall be consistent with that established by the state pay plan for the appropriate grade of each position.
  2. The public defenders and public defender staff positions shall be subject to the Uniform Attendance and Leave Policy Act, § 21-4-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 15; 1997, No. 1341, § 15; 1999, No. 1488, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1999, No. 1488, § 1, provided, in part:

“Public defender attorneys and employees of public defender offices who were converted from county or grant-funded employment to state employment and were employed as of January 2, 1998, shall have their length of service with a county recognized for purposes of calculating accrual rates for sick leave and annual leave.”

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

16-87-306. Duties.

The public defender in each judicial district shall have the following duties:

    1. To defend indigents within the district as determined by the circuit, municipal, or juvenile courts in the district in all:
      1. Felony, misdemeanor, juvenile, guardianship, and mental health cases;
      2. Traffic cases punishable by incarceration; and
      3. Contempt proceedings punishable by incarceration.
    2. Except for juvenile representation in family in need of services cases, in no case may a public defender be appointed or the commission be responsible for payment where there is no risk of incarceration or loss of liberty; and
    1. In all capital cases where the death penalty is sought, two (2) attorneys shall be appointed, unless the prosecuting attorney informs the circuit court at the arraignment of the defendant that the death penalty will not be sought.
    2. The Capital, Conflicts, and Appellate Office of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission may be appointed, consistent with § 16-87-205.
    3. It should be presumed for purposes of this section that the death penalty will be sought.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 16; 1997, No. 1341, § 16; 2001, No. 1799, § 11.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment, in present (1)(A), deleted “city, police” following “circuit, municipal” and made minor stylistic changes; and added (1)(B).

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Case Notes

Attorney Fees.

Defendant counsel's petition for payment of attorney fees for his work on defendant's appeal, despite his employment as a full-time public defender, was denied because subsection (c) of this rule applies only to appointed counsel not otherwise paid and Arkansas Criminal Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 16, requires all counsel to represent defendants through their direct appeal unless relieved. Rushing v. State, 340 Ark. 84, 8 S.W.3d 489 (2000) (decided under prior law), superseded by statute as stated in, Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 233, 60 S.W.3d 485 (2001), superseded by statute as stated in, Mills v. State, 347 Ark. 695, 66 S.W.3d 643 (2002), superseded by statute as stated in, Newman v. State, 350 Ark. 53, 84 S.W.3d 43 (2002).

Postconviction Proceedings.

Ark. R. Crim. P. Rule 37 proceedings are civil in nature and, therefore, a trial court is without authority to require the Public Defender Commission to pay attorney's fees in such a proceeding. Arkansas Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Greene County Circuit Court, 343 Ark. 49, 32 S.W.3d 470 (2000).

Purpose.

The purpose of § 16-10-307 and this section is to provide representation for indigents in cases in which there is a potential for loss of liberty, but the provision of § 14-20-102 that grants authority for the trial court to appoint attorneys for minors in civil litigation to be paid by county funds, was not incorporated in the statutes establishing and defining the duties and responsibilities of the Commission. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Burnett, 340 Ark. 233, 12 S.W.3d 191 (2000).

16-87-307. Conflicts of interest.

  1. If a court determines that a conflict of interest exists between an indigent person and a public defender, the case shall be reassigned as follows:
    1. If there is within the county or judicial district another public defender, the appointment of whom would not create a conflict of interest, the judge shall appoint that public defender to defend the person;
    2. If there is no other public defender within the county or judicial district eligible to represent the person, the judge shall notify the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, which may appoint a public defender from an adjacent area; or
    3. A private attorney may be appointed by the judge who shall notify in writing the commission of the appointment, the type of case, and the reason for the appointment within twenty (20) days of the appointment.
  2. The commission shall continue to maintain a list of private attorneys based upon their qualifications for acceptance of appointment.
    1. A list for each judicial district shall be prepared, certified, and updated annually by the commission.
    2. A separate list of attorneys throughout the state qualified and willing to accept appointment as lead counsel in capital cases shall be prepared, certified, and updated annually by the commission.
    3. The commission shall create a second list of attorneys who may be appointed to assist the lead counsel.
    4. The commission shall create and maintain a list of attorneys who are qualified and willing to accept appointment as lead counsel in actions under Rule 37.5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.

History. Acts 1997, No. 788, § 20; 1997, No. 1341, § 20; 2001, No. 1799, § 12; 2003, No. 605, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote (a)(3); and added (b) and (c).

The 2003 amendment added (c)(4).

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, Nos. 788 and 1341, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, § 16-87-301.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Post-Conviction Hearings in Capital Cases, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 441.

Chapter 88 Jurisdiction And Venue

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Aircraft, commission of crimes governed by state law, § 27-116-301.

Fresh pursuit laws, § 16-81-301 et seq.

Lack of jurisdiction during trial, § 16-89-119.

Preambles. Acts 1909, No. 290, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, The criminal jurisdiction of the State of Arkansas only extends to and follows the meanders of the west bank of the Mississippi River, and,

“Whereas, There are numerous crimes committed on the Mississippi River over which Arkansas and her sister States on the east bank of said river have no criminal jurisdiction and it is almost impossible to bring criminals operating along either bank of said river to justice …”

Acts 1911, No. 81, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, The criminal jurisdiction of the State of Arkansas only extends to and follows the meanders of the west bank of the St. Francis River; and,

“Whereas, There are numerous crimes committed on the St. Francis River over which Arkansas and her sister state on the east bank of said river have no criminal jurisdiction and it is almost impossible to bring criminals operating along either bank of said river to justice …”

Effective Dates. Acts 1903, No. 168, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Research References

ALR.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding venue and recusation matters. 7 A.L.R.4th 942.

Am. Jur. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 336 et seq.

C.J.S. 22 C.J.S., Crim. L., § 107 et seq.

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, A Guide to Arkansas Venue, 1995 Ark. L. Notes 83.

16-88-101. Jurisdiction of courts for certain offenses generally.

  1. The jurisdiction of the various courts of this state for the trial of offenses shall be as follows:
    1. The Senate shall have exclusive jurisdiction of impeachment;
    2. The Supreme Court shall have general supervision and control over all inferior courts in criminal cases;
    3. The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the district court, for the trial of offenses defined as felonies by state law and shall have original jurisdiction concurrent with the district court for the trial of offenses defined as misdemeanors by state law; and
    4. The district court shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the circuit court, for the trial of violations of ordinances of any town, city, or county within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court and shall have original jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit court for the trial of offenses defined as misdemeanors and violations by state law and committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court.
  2. Where an indictment is found in the circuit court for an offense within its jurisdiction, the circuit court shall have jurisdiction of all the degrees of the offense and of all the offenses included in the one (1) charge, although some of those degrees or included offenses are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court.
  3. A district court may issue arrest warrants and search warrants and may perform other pretrial functions, as authorized by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, in the prosecution of a person for an offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 10, 11; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [10], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 2863; Pope's Dig., § 3679; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1405, 43-1406; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 207, 208; 2007, No. 663, § 53; 2009, No. 398, § 1; 2011, No. 1218, §§ 11, 12.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment by No. 1185, § 207, rewrote the section.

The 2003 amendment by No. 1185, § 208, rewrote (a).

The 2009 amendment substituted “any town, city, or county within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court” for “the city or county in which the district court is located” in (a)(4), and made a related change.

The 2011 amendment inserted “and violations” in (a)(4).

Case Notes

Municipal Courts.

Although municipal courts have countywide jurisdiction of misdemeanors, that jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the justices of the peace in all townships except the township in which the municipal court sits. Therefore, only in the township in which the municipal court sits is its jurisdiction exclusive of the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Credit v. State, 25 Ark. App. 309, 758 S.W.2d 10 (1988).

Police Courts.

The chancery court has no jurisdiction over police court's use of bail money; rather than appealing to the circuit court the police court's decision foreclosing on and attaching the disputed funds and applying them to defendant's fine, plaintiff improperly filed suit in chancery court attempting to countermand the police court's order by enjoining the city's use of plaintiff's funds. Skelton v. City of Atkins, 317 Ark. 28, 875 S.W.2d 504 (1994).

Search Warrants.

Osceola District Court judge had jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for a residence in the Chickasawba District. Wagner v. State, 2010 Ark. 389, 368 S.W.3d 914 (2010).

Cited: Taylor v. State, 354 Ark. 450, 125 S.W.3d 174 (2003).

16-88-102. Restraint of inferior courts.

The circuit court of any county or the judge thereof, exercising jurisdiction in vacation, may by writ of prohibition restrain all other inferior courts in the limits of the county from exceeding their criminal jurisdiction.

History. Crim. Code, § 22; Acts 1903, No. 168, § 1, p. 325; C. & M. Dig., § 2884; Pope's Dig., § 3700; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1425.

Cross References. Jurisdiction to hear mandamus and prohibition writs, § 16-115-102.

16-88-103. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning removal of cases in circuit court to city, magistrate's or police courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 209. The section was derived from the following sources: Crim. Code, §§ 12, 13; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2867, 2868; Pope's Dig., §§ 3683, 3684; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1410, 43-1411.

16-88-104. Presumption of jurisdiction.

It shall be presumed upon trial that the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, and the court may pronounce the proper judgment accordingly unless the evidence affirmatively shows otherwise.

History. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 26, Acts 1937, p. 1384; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1426; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 210.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “in the indictment” following “offense charged.”

Cross References. Burden of proof, § 5-1-111.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Use of Presumptions in Arkansas, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 128.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where informations affirmatively alleged that crimes occurred in one county, statutory presumption that the crime was committed within the court's jurisdiction was inapplicable when case was prosecuted in another county. Williams v. Turner, 255 Ark. 907, 503 S.W.2d 901 (1974).

Allegation.

Under this section it is unnecessary to allege the venue of the offense. Meador v. State, 201 Ark. 1083, 148 S.W.2d 653 (1941); Ward v. State, 203 Ark. 1024, 160 S.W.2d 864, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 196 (1942).

Evidence.

Evidence sufficient to establish venue. Pickens v. State, 198 Ark. 916, 132 S.W.2d 10 (1939); Ahart v. State, 200 Ark. 1082, 143 S.W.2d 23 (1940); Kasinger v. State, 234 Ark. 788, 354 S.W.2d 718 (1962).

Venue held proper where no affirmative evidence to the contrary was established. McGhee v. State, 214 Ark. 221, 215 S.W.2d 135 (1948); Stewart v. State, 214 Ark. 497, 216 S.W.2d 873 (1949); Milam v. State, 253 Ark. 651, 488 S.W.2d 16 (1972).

Proof.

Trial court did not err in refusing to give instructions requiring the state to prove the venue. Cecil v. State, 234 Ark. 129, 350 S.W.2d 614 (1961).

The state did not have to prove the crime was committed in the forum county. Johnson v. State, 254 Ark. 703, 495 S.W.2d 845 (1973).

The state was not required in its case-in-chief to prove that the trial was being held in the county in which the crime was committed. James v. State, 280 Ark. 359, 658 S.W.2d 382 (1983).

Pursuant to this section, a trial court had jurisdiction over defendant's trial for theft by receiving because the evidence demonstrated that, at the very least, the disposal of the stolen property occurred in Arkansas. Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 615 (2012).

Cited: Ahart v. State, 200 Ark. 1082, 143 S.W.2d 23 (1940); Wise v. State, 204 Ark. 743, 164 S.W.2d 897 (1942); Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972); Taylor v. State, 334 Ark. 339, 974 S.W.2d 454 (1998); Clark v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 496, 423 S.W.3d 122 (2012).

16-88-105. Territorial jurisdiction of certain courts generally.

  1. The jurisdiction of the Senate and Supreme Court embraces the whole state.
  2. The local jurisdiction of circuit courts shall be of offenses committed within the respective counties in which they are held.
  3. The local jurisdiction of district courts shall be of offenses committed within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts, as prescribed by the statutes creating or regulating them.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 14-16; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2864-2866; Pope's Dig., §§ 3680-3682; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1407 — 43-1409; Acts 2007, No. 663, § 54.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution, adopted by voter referendum and effective July 1, 2001, in § 19(B)(2), provided:

“District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005. City Courts shall continue in existence after the effective date of this Amendment unless such City Court is abolished by the governing body of the city or by appropriate action of the General Assembly. Immediately upon abolition of such City Court, the jurisdiction of the City Court shall vest in the nearest District Court in the county where the city is located.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Case Notes

In General.

The constitution and applicable statutes provide that a circuit judge may act in a criminal case only when he is within the geographical area of the judicial district in which the charge is filed. State v. Vaughan, 343 Ark. 293, 33 S.W.3d 512 (2000).

Circuit Court.

This section, § 16-13-210 and Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 13 provide that a circuit judge may act in a criminal case only when he is within the geographical area of the judicial district in which the charge is filed. Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993).

Defendant's territorial jurisdictional claim was dismissed where he presented no positive evidence that the offense occurred anywhere other than in the county of the circuit court in which it was filed. Cates v. State, 329 Ark. 585, 952 S.W.2d 135 (1997).

Circuit Court in Jefferson County had jurisdiction to enter a judgment convicting defendant of a rape that occurred in Arkansas County where the offense was a continuing episode that began with the kidnapping of the female victim by two men in Jefferson County and ended with the gang rape of the victim in Arkansas County by defendant and several accomplices; the fact that defendant was acquitted of the offense that occurred in Jefferson County did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. Cloird v. State, 352 Ark. 190, 99 S.W.3d 419 (2003).

Pursuant to State v. Osborn, 345 Ark. 196, 45 S.W.3d 373 (2001), and § 16-88-108(c), jurisdiction in defendant's case was proper in either Calhoun County or Dallas County; had defendant not committed the crimes of aggravated robbery and kidnapping in Calhoun County, he would not have been placed into custody in Dallas County, he could not have escaped from that custody, and the prosecution in Calhoun County would not have been delayed. Avery v. State, 93 Ark. App. 112, 217 S.W.3d 162 (2005).

Mayor's Courts.

Mayor's court has jurisdiction of offenses committed within the city limits, but has powers of process throughout the county. Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).

Proof.

Before the state is called upon to offer evidence on the question of jurisdiction, there must be positive evidence that the offense occurred outside the jurisdiction of the court. Richards v. State, 279 Ark. 219, 650 S.W.2d 566 (1983).

Although the murder instrument was found in a county other than where the crime was prosecuted and a police chief who investigated the crime testified it was his opinion that the victim had been killed in that other county, but he did not state his basis for that opinion, there was no positive evidence from which a juror could say where the crime occurred; therefore, the state did not have the burden to prove that the crime occurred in the county where it was prosecuted. Dix v. State, 290 Ark. 28, 715 S.W.2d 879 (1986).

Related Offenses.

Because the rape offenses charged in the second prosecution did not occur within the same jurisdiction and venue of the initial prosecution, the offenses were not “related offenses” under Ark. R. Crim. P. 21.3 and dismissal was not required; the requisite inquiry for purposes of Rule 21.3 was not whether the offenses were committed in Craighead County but whether the offenses were committed in the same separate judicial district of Craighead County. Schoolfield v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 575, 564 S.W.3d 558 (2018).

Venue.

Pursuant to subsection (c), where some of the acts requisite to the murder occurred within the county, venue was properly laid in the county. Patterson v. State, 306 Ark. 385, 815 S.W.2d 377 (1991).

Ark. R. Crim. P. 21.3 did not preclude a prosecution for second-degree sexual assault because it did not occur in the same jurisdiction and venue as other offenses; the sexual assault in Sebastian County did not arise from the same criminal episode as similar offenses charged in Crawford County, which allegedly occurred within a span of four years. Rape was not a continuing offense, § 16-88-108 did not apply because the charged offenses of sexual assault was alleged to have been committed entirely within Sebastian County, and the offenses were not related under Rule 21.3. Bean v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 643 (2012).

Cited: Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967); .

16-88-106. Mississippi River — Jurisdictional boundaries.

  1. The criminal jurisdiction of the State of Arkansas is extended as follows:
  2. The State of Arkansas and her sister states, Tennessee and Mississippi, have concurrent criminal jurisdiction over the parts of the territory lying opposite them and between the lines extending and parallel to their north and south boundaries.

Beginning at a point where the north boundary line of Arkansas intersects the west bank of the Mississippi River and extending east along a line in extension of and parallel to the said north boundary of Arkansas to the east bank of the said Mississippi River; thence south along the bank, and following the meandering thereof to a point where a line drawn east along and parallel to the south boundary of Arkansas would intersect the east bank of the Mississippi River, thence west along that line to a point where the south boundary line of Arkansas intersects the west bank of the Mississippi River.

History. Acts 1909, No. 290, §§ 1, 2, p. 888; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2860, 2861; Pope's Dig., §§ 3676, 3677; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1401, 43-1402.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1909, No. 290, § 3, provided that the act would be in force when either Tennessee or Mississippi passed a similar act governing the territory described. Similar acts were passed by Mississippi April 12, 1910 and by Tennessee May 17, 1915.

Case Notes

Concurrent Jurisdiction.

In murder prosecution, where victim's body was found floating in the middle of the Mississippi River between Arkansas and Tennessee, courts of both states had concurrent jurisdiction where the crime was committed on the river. Padgett v. State, 151 Ark. 290, 236 S.W. 603 (1922).

The concurrent jurisdiction which two states may have over the width of a river, the center of which forms the territorial boundaries of the states, is not to be construed as giving one state authority to punish violations of its fish laws occurring beyond its side of the river, if such act is duly authorized by the neighboring state. State v. Alexander, 222 Ark. 376, 259 S.W.2d 677 (1953).

Cited: Means v. State, 118 Ark. 362, 176 S.W. 309 (1915).

16-88-107. Francis River — Jurisdictional boundaries.

  1. The criminal jurisdiction of the State of Arkansas is extended as follows:
  2. The State of Arkansas and her sister state, Missouri, have concurrent criminal jurisdiction over the parts of the territory lying opposite them and between the lines extending and parallel to their north and south boundaries.

Beginning at a point where the north boundary line of Arkansas intersects the west meander line of the St. Francis River and running east on an extension of the north boundary line to the meander line on the east bank of the river; thence south with the meander line of the river to the point where the meander line intersects the south boundary line of the State of Missouri; thence west on an extension of the south line of Missouri to the meander line on the west bank of the river; thence north with the meander line of the river to the point of beginning.

History. Acts 1911, No. 81, §§ 1, 2; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2857, 2858; Pope's Dig., §§ 3673, 3674; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1403, 43-1404.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1911, No. 81, § 3, provided that the act would be in force when Missouri passed a similar act. A similar act was passed by Missouri March 30, 1911.

Case Notes

East of Main Channel.

Defendant properly charged in Arkansas for offense occurring east of middle of channel. Brown v. State, 109 Ark. 373, 159 S.W. 1132 (1913).

Islands.

Jurisdiction of the criminal courts of this state is not extended to islands which are situated on the Missouri side of the main channel. Goodman v. State, 153 Ark. 560, 240 S.W. 735 (1922).

16-88-108. Jurisdiction of counties — Offenses generally.

  1. When any offense may be committed on the boundary of two (2) counties or where the person committing the offense may be on one side and the injury is done on the other side of the boundary, the indictment may be found and the trial and conviction thereon had in either of the counties. If it is uncertain where the boundary is, the indictment may be found and a trial had in either county.
  2. Where a river is the boundary between two (2) counties, the criminal jurisdiction of each county shall embrace offenses committed on the river or any island thereof.
  3. Where the offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another or the acts or effects thereof requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two (2) or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either county.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 93; Crim. Code, §§ 17, 18; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2869, 2874, 2875; Pope's Dig., §§ 3685, 3690, 3691; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1412, 43-1413, 43-1414.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not violative of the Constitution as to crimes committed on the boundary line between two counties or when there is uncertainty as to the location of the boundary. State v. Rhoda, 23 Ark. 156 (1861); Jones v. State, 54 Ark. 371, 15 S.W. 1026, 1891 Ark. LEXIS 61 (1891).

Subsection (b) of this section is a valid exercise of legislative power. Contra Cox v. State, 68 Ark. 462, 60 S.W. 27 (1900)Questioned byBottom v. State, 155 Ark. 113, 244 S.W. 334 (Ark. 1922); Bottom v. State, 155 Ark. 113, 244 S.W. 334 (Ark. 1922).

Construction.

Subsection (c) of this section is to be liberally construed. Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972).

Purpose.

Subsection (c) of this section was remedial, intended to prevent miscarriages of justice by extending the lines of jurisdiction beyond the limits prescribed by the common law. Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972).

Burden of Proof.

Before the state is called upon to offer any evidence of jurisdiction, there must be positive evidence that the offense occurred outside the jurisdiction of the court. Nicholson v. State, 319 Ark. 566, 892 S.W.2d 507 (1995).

Conspiracy.

Proper venue for a conspiracy prosecution is any county where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is alleged to have occurred. Lee v. State, 27 Ark. App. 198, 770 S.W.2d 148 (1989), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 493 U.S. 847, 110 S. Ct. 142 (1989).

Crime on Boundary.

Instruction that, if an offense is committed upon the boundary of two counties or if it is uncertain where the boundary is, a conviction may be had in either county is erroneous where there is no proof that the offense was committed upon the boundary of the two counties or that there is uncertainty about the location of the boundary. Jones v. State, 54 Ark. 371, 15 S.W. 1026, 1891 Ark. LEXIS 61 (1891).

Crime committed on a boat fastened to the bank of a stream on the boundary line is within the jurisdiction of either county. Bottom v. State, 155 Ark. 113, 244 S.W. 334 (Ark. 1922).

Joinder of Charges.

Where the kidnapping occurred in Washington County, continued into Madison County, and culminated with a rape in Madison County, both counties had jurisdiction and venue over both the kidnapping and rape charges, as they arose from the same continuing course of conduct. Thus, ARCrP 21.3 required the judge to grant the defense motion to join the charges in one trial, and when joinder was denied, the latter conviction had to be reversed and the charge dismissed. Cozzaglio v. State, 289 Ark. 33, 709 S.W.2d 70 (1986).

Where defendant did not request joinder of separate charges relating to separate crimes committed in one continuous episode in different counties, joinder was not required. Wilson v. State, 298 Ark. 608, 770 S.W.2d 123 (1989).

Jurisdiction.

While defendant worked for the sheriff's department, she was authorized to use the department's credit card only for county purchases; her use of the card for personal purchases was sufficient to support her conviction for fraudulently using a credit card in violation of § 5-37-207(a)(4). Because it was undisputed that the purchases took place in Pulaski County, Arkansas, the Pulaski County Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the case in accordance with subsection (c) of this section. Baker v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 788 (2009).

Location of Property.

In prosecution for disposing of property subject to a lien, circuit court in county in which case was heard had jurisdiction under this section, it appearing that the property in question, cattle, was situated in that county, notwithstanding that the acts with reference to disposal of the cattle took place in another county. Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972).

Offenses in More Than One County.

Where the offense of kidnapping occurred in one county and culminated in the aggravated robbery of the victim in another county, the first county had jurisdiction to try the defendant for both kidnapping and robbery. Ellis v. State, 291 Ark. 72, 722 S.W.2d 575 (1987).

Where robbery plan was hatched in one county and the disguise and weapon were obtained there, and the murder and robbery occurred in a second county, but the body was returned to the first, jurisdiction was in either county, and venue was thus properly laid in the first county. Thrash v. State, 291 Ark. 575, 726 S.W.2d 283 (1987).

Defendant's double jeopardy argument rejected where defendant's convictions for incest in one county were not for the same offense committed in another county, and where the offenses in the former county were not based on the same conduct for which he was convicted in the latter county. Fletcher v. State, 53 Ark. App. 135, 920 S.W.2d 42 (1996).

The county in which a chase began had jurisdiction over a charge of fleeing, notwithstanding the defendant's contention that he was actually chasing the police while in that county and that he did not have an intent to flee until the chase moved to another county. Barr v. State, 336 Ark. 220, 984 S.W.2d 792 (1999).

Jurisdiction in a prosecution for Medicaid fraud was properly found to be in Pulaski County, notwithstanding that the defendant's dental practice was in Pine Bluff and that his billings occurred there, since his Medicaid billings were submitted to a state agency in Little Rock for payment and his claims were denied or authorized there. Blackwell v. State, 338 Ark. 671, 1 S.W.3d 399 (1999).

In a prosecution for hindering apprehension or prosecution, jurisdiction was proper either in the county in which the defendant volunteered false information to the police with regard to a murder under investigation or in the county in which the murder occurred and in which the investigation was ongoing. State v. Osborn, 345 Ark. 196, 45 S.W.3d 373 (2001).

Circuit Court in Jefferson County had jurisdiction to enter a judgment convicting defendant of a rape that occurred in Arkansas County where the offense was a continuing episode that began with the kidnapping of the female victim by two men in Jefferson County and ended with the gang rape of the victim in Arkansas County by defendant and several accomplices; the fact that defendant was acquitted of the offense that occurred in Jefferson County did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. Cloird v. State, 352 Ark. 190, 99 S.W.3d 419 (2003).

Pursuant to subsection (c) of thjis section, a trial court had jurisdiction over defendant's trial for theft by receiving because the evidence demonstrated that, at the very least, the disposal of the stolen property occurred in Arkansas. Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 615 (2012).

Ark. R. Crim. P. 21.3 did not preclude a prosecution for second-degree sexual assault because it did not occur in the same jurisdiction and venue as other offenses; the sexual assault in Sebastian County did not arise from the same criminal episode as similar offenses charged in Crawford County, which allegedly occurred within a span of four years. Rape was not a continuing offense, this section did not apply because the charged offenses of sexual assault was alleged to have been committed entirely within Sebastian County, and the offenses were not related under Rule 21.3. Bean v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 643 (2012).

Venue.

Pursuant to subsection (c), where some of the acts requisite to the murder occurred within the county, venue was properly laid in the county. Patterson v. State, 306 Ark. 385, 815 S.W.2d 377 (1991).

Cited: Williams v. Turner, 255 Ark. 907, 503 S.W.2d 901 (1974); Hickerson v. State, 282 Ark. 217, 667 S.W.2d 654 (1984); Shaw v. State, 299 Ark. 474, 773 S.W.2d 827 (1989); Pilcher v. State, 303 Ark. 335, 796 S.W.2d 845 (1990).

16-88-109. Jurisdiction of counties — Importing property into state.

  1. Where the offense consists of importing any property into the state, the jurisdiction shall be in any county into which the offender imports the property.
  2. Whenever two (2) or more counties have jurisdiction of the same offense by this section, the county in which the defendant is first arrested shall proceed to try the offense, to the exclusion of others.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 19, 21; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2876, 2878; Pope's Dig., §§ 3692, 3694; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1415, 43-1417.

Case Notes

Selection of Forum.

The state may elect in which county the offense may be prosecuted when jurisdiction is concurrent, and the right of selection of the forum continues until there is a final judgment; consequently, the effect of a second indictment in another county having jurisdiction in the same judicial district is to effect a relinquishment of the jurisdiction in the county where first indictment was returned. Bottom v. State, 155 Ark. 113, 244 S.W. 334 (Ark. 1922).

Cited: Ronning v. State, 295 Ark. 228, 748 S.W.2d 633 (1988).

16-88-110. Jurisdiction of counties — Kidnapping.

  1. Where the offense consists of kidnapping, seizing, or confining a person without lawful authority, the jurisdiction shall be in the county in which the kidnapping, seizing, or confining was committed, or in any county in which it was continued.
  2. Whenever two (2) or more counties have jurisdiction of the same offense by this section, the county in which the defendant is first arrested shall proceed to try the offense, to the exclusion of the others.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 20, 21; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2877, 2878; Pope's Dig., §§ 3693, 3694; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1416, 43-1417.

Case Notes

Multiple Crimes.

In a prosecution for capital murder where the victim was kidnapped in one county and murdered in another, venue was proper where the murder occurred. Fairchild v. State, 284 Ark. 289, 681 S.W.2d 380 (1984), cert. denied, Fairchild v. Arkansas, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S. Ct. 2346 (1985).

Circuit Court in Jefferson County had jurisdiction to enter a judgment convicting defendant of a rape that occurred in Arkansas County where the offense was a continuing episode that began with the kidnapping of the female victim by two men in Jefferson County and ended with the gang rape of the victim in Arkansas County by defendant and several accomplices; the fact that defendant was acquitted of the offense that occurred in Jefferson County did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. Cloird v. State, 352 Ark. 190, 99 S.W.3d 419 (2003).

Selection of Forum.

The state may elect in which county the offense may be prosecuted when jurisdiction is concurrent, and the right of selection of the forum continues until there is a final judgment; consequently, the effect of a second indictment in another county having jurisdiction in the same judicial district is to effect a relinquishment of the jurisdiction in the county where first indictment was returned. Bottom v. State, 155 Ark. 113, 244 S.W. 334 (Ark. 1922).

16-88-111. Jurisdiction of counties — Offense committed on boat or vessel.

When any offense may have been committed within this state on board any steamboat, flatboat, keelboat, or other vessel in the course of any voyage or trip, an indictment for the offense may be found and a trial and conviction on the offense had in any county through which or any part of which the boat or vessel passed in the course of the same voyage or trip, and with like effect as in the county in which the offense was committed.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 92; C. & M. Dig., § 2873; Pope's Dig., § 3689; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1418.

16-88-112. Jurisdiction of counties — Mortal wound.

If any wound or mortal injury is inflicted on any human being in this state, who shall die thereof in another state or country, whether the state or country is within the jurisdiction of the United States or not, an indictment may be found. A trial and conviction thereon may be had in the county in which the wound or mortal injury was given or inflicted in all respects as if the death had happened in the county.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 96; C. & M. Dig., § 2879; Pope's Dig., § 3695; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1419.

16-88-113. Jurisdiction of counties — Stolen property.

  1. When any person is liable to be prosecuted as the receiver of any personal property that may have been feloniously stolen, taken, or embezzled, he or she may be indicted, tried, and convicted in any county where he or she received or had the property, notwithstanding that the larceny may have been committed in another county.
  2. When property stolen in one county and brought into another has been taken by burglary or robbery, the offender may be indicted, tried, and convicted for the burglary or robbery in the county into which the stolen property was taken, in the same manner as if the burglary or robbery had been committed in that county.
    1. Every person who steals or obtains by robbery the property of another in any other state or country, whether or not the state or country is within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, and who brings the property within this state, may be indicted, tried, and punished for larceny in the same manner as if the property had been feloniously stolen or taken within this state. In any case, the larceny may be charged to have been committed in any country into or through which the stolen property may have been taken.
    2. Every person prosecuted under the provisions of this section may plead a former conviction or acquittal for the same offense in another state or country. If the plea is admitted or established, it shall be a bar to any other or further proceedings against the person for the same matter.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 91, 99, 255, 256; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2870, 2871, 2880-2882; Pope's Dig., §§ 3686, 3687, 3696-3698; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1420 — 43-1423.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section was not abrogated by Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10. State v. Johnson, 38 Ark. 568 (1882).

Purpose.

This section was intended to allow trial in any county where the accused either received the property at first or at any time afterwards had it. Smith v. State, 169 Ark. 913, 277 S.W. 530 (1925).

Felonious Intent.

In order to give the circuit court of a county in this state jurisdiction to try one for larceny of property stolen in another state, it must appear that the property was brought by him into this state, with a continuous felonious intent. State v. Johnson, 38 Ark. 568 (1882).

Proof.

It must be proved that defendant stole the property in another state and brought it into this state. Sullivan v. State, 109 Ark. 407, 160 S.W. 239 (1913).

Pursuant to subsection (A) of this section, a trial court had jurisdiction over defendant's trial for theft by receiving because the evidence demonstrated that, at the very least, the disposal of the stolen property occurred in Arkansas. Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 615 (2012).

Stolen Goods Received in Another State.

This section does not authorize the prosecution in this state of one who merely received stolen goods in another state and brought them into this state. Wilson v. State, 97 Ark. 412, 134 S.W. 623 (1911).

Cited: Elmore v. State, 45 Ark. 243 (1885); State v. Alexander, 118 Ark. 357, 176 S.W. 315 (1915); Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972).

16-88-114. Jurisdiction of counties — Accessories to felonies.

  1. An indictment against any accessory to any felony may be found in any county where the offense of the accessory may have been committed, notwithstanding the fact that the principal offense may have been committed in another county.
  2. The like proceedings shall be had therein, in all respects, as if the principal offense had been committed in the same county.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 97; C. & M. Dig., § 2872; Pope's Dig., § 3688; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1424.

Case Notes

Effects of Offense.

A crime committed by an accessory must be prosecuted in the county where the consequences of the act occurred. State v. Reeves, 246 Ark. 1187, 442 S.W.2d 229 (1969).

Instruction.

Instruction held erroneous in not limiting the defendant's acts to those committed in county of the venue. Green v. State, 190 Ark. 583, 79 S.W.2d 1006, 1935 Ark. LEXIS 86 (1935).

16-88-115. Katie's Law.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as “Katie's Law”.
  2. When any sexual offense, as defined by § 5-14-101 et seq., is committed against any person who at the time of the sexual offense was traveling within this state by private motor vehicle, common carrier, watercraft, or other mode of transportation and law enforcement is unable to determine the county in which the sexual offense was committed, the venue for prosecuting the person committing the sexual offense may be in any county of this state from, through, or to which the victim traveled.

History. Acts 2001, No. 582, §§ 1, 2.

Cross References. Sexual Offenses, § 5-14-101 et seq.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

16-88-116. Traffic citations issued within a town or city with a district court — Placement on docket.

All traffic citations issued within the boundaries of a town or city of this state which has a district court shall be placed on the docket of the district court of that town or city, unless the presiding judge of that court authorizes a transfer to another court exercising jurisdiction over the area in which the citation was issued.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1032, § 1; 2007, No. 663, § 55.

Cross References. Transition provisions, tenure of present justices and judges, and jurisdiction of present courts, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 19.

Effective Dates. Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Subchapter 2 — Change of Venue

Cross References. Change of venue, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10.

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 65, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 177, § 2: effective on passage.

Research References

Am. Jur. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 372 et seq.

C.J.S. 22 C.J.S., Crim. L., § 186 et seq.

16-88-201. Removal for prejudice.

Any criminal cause pending in any circuit court may be removed by the order of the court, or by the judge thereof in vacation, to the circuit court of another county whenever it shall appear, in the manner provided in this subchapter, that the minds of the inhabitants of the county in which the cause is pending are so prejudiced against the defendant that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in that county.

History. Crim. Code, § 414, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., § 3087; Pope's Dig., § 3917; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1501.

Case Notes

In General.

A change of venue should be granted only when it is clearly shown that a fair trial is not likely to be had in the county; the burden of proof is on the defendant in a motion to change the venue, and the decision of the trial court will be upheld unless it is shown that there was an abuse of discretion in denying the motion. Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986); Redding v. State, 22 Ark. App. 81, 733 S.W.2d 424 (1987), rev'd, 293 Ark. 411, 738 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987); Cash v. State, 301 Ark. 370, 784 S.W.2d 166 (1990); McArthur v. State, 309 Ark. 196, 830 S.W.2d 842 (1992).

Defendant did not have a right to a jury totally ignorant of the crime. Cash v. State, 301 Ark. 370, 784 S.W.2d 166 (1990).

Burden of Proof.

The burden is on the defendant to show an inability to obtain a fair trial. Meny v. State, 314 Ark. 158, 861 S.W.2d 303 (1993).

Motion for change of venue properly denied where defendant failed to meet his burden of proof that a fair trial was not likely to be had in the county. Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258, 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996).

Discretion of Court.

Unless the trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for a change of venue, it will be affirmed on appeal. Leggett v. State, 227 Ark. 393, 299 S.W.2d 59 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 942, 78 S. Ct. 1393, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1556 (1958); Perry v. State, 232 Ark. 959, 342 S.W.2d 95 (1961); Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300, 241 Ark. 663, 408 S.W.2d 905 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 682, 87 S. Ct. 1325, 18 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1967); Wood v. State, 248 Ark. 109, 450 S.W.2d 537 (1970); Foster v. State, 275 Ark. 427, 631 S.W.2d 7 (1982); Redding v. State, 22 Ark. App. 81, 733 S.W.2d 424 (1987), rev'd, 293 Ark. 411, 738 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987); Cash v. State, 301 Ark. 370, 784 S.W.2d 166 (1990).

A motion for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Stout v. State, 247 Ark. 948, 448 S.W.2d 636 (1970).

A change of venue lies within the discretion of the trial court and if the court determines that the appellant can receive a fair trial by an impartial jury, there is no prejudice regardless of the location of the trial. Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982).

Trial judge did not err in denying his motion for a change of venue. Richardson v. State, 292 Ark. 140, 728 S.W.2d 189 (1987).

Evidence of Prejudice.

Court was held not to have erred in denying change of venue where showing of prejudice was limited to four out of twelve townships in the county. Cheney v. State, 205 Ark. 1049, 172 S.W.2d 427 (1943).

In considering a motion for change of venue, it was proper procedure to receive oral testimony to support the position of either the defendant or the state. Wood v. State, 248 Ark. 109, 450 S.W.2d 537 (1970).

A change of venue should be granted only when it is clearly shown that a fair trial is likely not to be had in the county. Kirkendall v. State, 265 Ark. 853, 581 S.W.2d 341 (1979).

Evidence insufficient to show that the minds of the inhabitants of the county in which the cause was pending were so prejudiced against the defendant that a fair and impartial trial could not be had therein. Wright v. State, 267 Ark. 264, 590 S.W.2d 15 (1979); O'Rourke v. State, 295 Ark. 57, 746 S.W.2d 52 (1988).

Where in a prosecution for capital felony murder and other crimes, the trial judge specifically found that none of the defendant's witnesses showed that they were cognizant of prejudice existing throughout the whole county, but merely portions of the county, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a change of venue. Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284 (1982), cert. denied, Hill v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S. Ct. 180 (1982).

A movant in a change of venue proceeding must demonstrate that there is countywide prejudice against him before his motion for a change of venue will be granted. Foster v. State, 275 Ark. 427, 631 S.W.2d 7 (1982); Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986); Redding v. State, 22 Ark. App. 81, 733 S.W.2d 424 (1987), rev'd, 293 Ark. 411, 738 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987).

Where there was ample testimony by the defendant's witnesses at a change of venue hearing from which the trial judge could conclude that the witnesses had no personal knowledge of prejudice that existed throughout the county, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied the defendant's motion for a change of venue. Foster v. State, 275 Ark. 427, 631 S.W.2d 7 (1982).

There can be no error in the denial of a change of venue if an examination of the jury selection shows that an impartial jury was selected and that each juror stated that he could give the defendant a fair trial and follow the instructions of the court. Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986); Redding v. State, 22 Ark. App. 81, 733 S.W.2d 424 (1987), rev'd, 293 Ark. 411, 738 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987); O'Rourke v. State, 295 Ark. 57, 746 S.W.2d 52 (1988); McArthur v. State, 309 Ark. 196, 830 S.W.2d 842 (1992).

Where voir dire of jurors showed that some had heard of the case or read about it, but none of those selected said they could not give the defendant a fair trial and the record revealed that, in the six months before trial took place, there was no extraordinary media coverage or local gossip about the crime, defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury. Cash v. State, 301 Ark. 370, 784 S.W.2d 166 (1990).

The burden is on the defendant to show the general mindset of the populace and the concomitant impossibility of receiving a fair trial, and where defendant did not exercise all of his peremptory challenges of jurors chosen trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove the case. Morris v. State, 302 Ark. 532, 792 S.W.2d 288 (1990).

Witnesses on a change of venue motion must demonstrate countywide knowledge of prejudice or the county's state of mind. McArthur v. State, 309 Ark. 196, 830 S.W.2d 842 (1992).

Affidavits that cite little or nothing beyond an affiant's own convictions that a fair trial is not possible are insufficient. Noel v. State, 331 Ark. 79, 960 S.W.2d 439 (1998).

Insanity.

When the question of insanity is submitted to a jury on writ of error coram nobis, after conviction and sentence, the prisoner is entitled to a change of venue upon such issue, but the change of venue carries with it the whole case. Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517 (1880); Dewein v. State, 120 Ark. 302, 179 S.W. 346 (1915).

Where determination of sanity is the issue, widespread belief in minds of inhabitants of county that accused was the person who robbed and killed a certain man would not show a prejudice that would prevent a fair and impartial trial. Dewein v. State, 120 Ark. 302, 179 S.W. 346 (1915).

Knowledge of Case.

It is not necessary that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts surrounding the case, as long as they can set aside any impression they have formed and render a verdict solely on the evidence at trial. McArthur v. State, 309 Ark. 196, 830 S.W.2d 842 (1992).

Question of Fact.

Petitioner's anticipation of difficulties in obtaining a fair and impartial trial because of inflamed public sentiment is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court having jurisdiction to try the offense with which she is charged, and thus is not a ground for removal from the state court; if the constitutional rights of petitioner are being denied or invaded by the court, appellate jurisdiction can and will correct the wrong. Rand v. Arkansas, 191 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Ark. 1961); Davis v. Reed, 316 Ark. 575, 873 S.W.2d 524 (1994).

Removal Denied.

Defendant's change-of-venue motion alleging adverse pretrial publicity was properly denied in light of the testimony introduced at the hearing which showed less-than-pervasive publicity, the failure of defendant to demonstrate during voir dire that there were publicity-affected jurors, and the fact that he did not use all his peremptory challenges. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

Change-of-venue motion properly denied where an examination of the jury selection showed that an impartial jury was selected; all of the jurors pledged that they could decide the case based solely on the evidence. Noel v. State, 331 Ark. 79, 960 S.W.2d 439 (1998).

In a criminal prosecution for capital murder, defendant was not entitled to a change of venue on the basis of pretrial publicity where the jury members were questioned on the change-of-venue point and the circuit court properly concluded that the jurors were impartial. Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (2004).

Cited: Bussard v. State, 300 Ark. 174, 778 S.W.2d 213 (1989); Davis v. Reed, 316 Ark. 575, 873 S.W.2d 524 (1994); Taylor v. State, 334 Ark. 339, 974 S.W.2d 454 (1998).

16-88-202. Removal as to several defendants.

When there are several defendants in any indictment or criminal prosecution and the cause of the removal of the defendants exists only as to one (1) or more of them, the other defendants shall be tried and all proceedings had against them in the county in which the case is pending, in all respects as if no order of removal had been made as to any defendant.

History. Crim. Code, § 431, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., § 3107; Pope's Dig., § 3937; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1517.

16-88-203. One change of venue.

Only one (1) change of venue shall be granted in any criminal case or prosecution.

History. Crim. Code, § 433, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., § 3108; Pope's Dig., § 3938; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1518.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional on its face. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980).

Denial of Second Change.

Where an examination of the record in a murder prosecution revealed that each of the jurors stated they could give the appellant a fair trial and that they would be guided by the instructions of the trial court, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant the defendant's request for a second change of venue. Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982).

The trial court complied with Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 10, and this section when it acted upon the defendant's first request for a change of venue and transferred venue to another county; although the defendant labeled his second motion as a motion to withdraw the earlier request for a change of venue, it was actually nothing more than a request for a second change of venue and therefore, was discretionary with the trial judge. Dansby v. State, 338 Ark. 697, 1 S.W.3d 403 (1999).

Retrial.

On retrial for capital murder, the defendant was not entitled to a change of venue where he had previously been granted a change, notwithstanding that a federal court vacated the state judgment of conviction. Ford v. Wilson, 327 Ark. 243, 939 S.W.2d 258 (1997).

Cited: Perry v. State, 279 Ark. 213, 650 S.W.2d 240 (1983); Ronning v. State, 295 Ark. 228, 748 S.W.2d 633 (1988).

16-88-204. Application and issuance for order of removal.

    1. The application of the defendant for an order of removal shall be by petition setting forth the facts on account of which the removal is requested. The truth of the allegations in the petition shall be supported by the affidavits of two (2) credible persons who are qualified electors, actual residents of the county, and not related to the defendant in any way.
    2. Reasonable notice of the application shall be given to the prosecuting attorney.
    3. The court shall hear the application and, after considering the facts set forth in the petition and the affidavits accompanying it and any other affidavits or counter affidavits that may be filed and, after hearing any witnesses produced by either party, shall either grant or refuse the petition according to the truth of the facts alleged in it and established by the evidence.
  1. Every order for the removal of a criminal cause under the provisions of this subchapter shall state whether the order is made on the application of the party or on facts within the knowledge of the court or judge making the order, and shall specify the cause of removal, and designate the county to which the cause is to be removed.
  2. The order, if made in term time, shall be entered on the record of the proceedings of the court. If made by a judge in vacation, the order shall be in writing and be signed by the judge and shall be filed by the clerk with the petition, if any, as a part of the record.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 415, 417, 418, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 156; 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3088-3090; Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 27, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., §§ 3918-3920; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1502 — 43-1504.

Case Notes

In General.

A change of venue should be granted only when it is clearly shown that a fair trial is not likely to be had in the county; the burden of proof is on the defendant in a motion to change the venue, and the decision of the trial court will be upheld unless it is shown there was an abuse of discretion in denying the motion. Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986).

Affidavits.

Transfer may be allowed where public sentiment is so strong that affidavits cannot be obtained. Hildreth v. State, 214 Ark. 710, 217 S.W.2d 622 (1949).

The language requiring affidavits by two persons is mandatory, as evidenced by use of the word “shall.” Singleton v. State, 337 Ark. 503, 989 S.W.2d 533, 1999 Ark. LEXIS 226 (1999).

—Basis of Opinion.

A change on the ground of prejudice will be refused where the examination of the affiants discloses the fact that their information or means of knowledge is insufficient. Duckworth v. State, 80 Ark. 360, 97 S.W. 280 (1906); White v. State, 83 Ark. 36, 102 S.W. 715 (1907); Duckworth v. State, 86 Ark. 357, 111 S.W. 268 (1908); Williams v. State, 103 Ark. 70, 146 S.W. 471, 1912 Ark. LEXIS 152 (1912); Wolfe v. State, 107 Ark. 29, 153 S.W. 1100 (1913).

Affiants' opinions held based on insufficient information to warrant change of venue. Jordan v. State, 141 Ark. 504, 217 S.W. 788 (1920); Davis v. State, 155 Ark. 245, 244 S.W. 750 (1922)Questioned byAllison v. State, 204 Ark. 609, 164 S.W.2d 442 (1942); Mullen v. State, 193 Ark. 648, 102 S.W.2d 82 (1937); Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284 (1982), cert. denied, Hill v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S. Ct. 180 (1982); Foster v. State, 275 Ark. 427, 631 S.W.2d 7 (1982).

Affiants' opinions held based on sufficient information to warrant change of venue. Sisson v. State, 168 Ark. 783, 272 S.W. 674 (1925).

This section contemplates that the subscribing witnesses shall have fairly accurate information concerning the state of mind of the inhabitants of the entire county toward the defendant. Bailey v. State, 204 Ark. 376, 163 S.W.2d 141 (1942); Cheney v. State, 205 Ark. 1049, 172 S.W.2d 427 (1943); Fancher v. State, 205 Ark. 1085, 172 S.W.2d 680 (1943)Questioned byRobertson v. State, 212 Ark. 301, 206 S.W.2d 748 (1947).

—Credibility of Affiants.

The prosecuting attorney may introduce counter affidavits to show that the person making affidavit in support of the application is not a credible person. Curtis v. State, 36 Ark. 284 (1880).

Affiant may be examined orally in open court in order to ascertain his credibility. Jackson v. State, 54 Ark. 243, 15 S.W. 607 (1891); Spurgeon v. State, 160 Ark. 112, 254 S.W. 376 (1923).

Court could not determine that attesting witnesses were not credible witnesses on ground that it knew facts stated in affidavit were not true where it refused to call such witnesses for examination. Ward v. State, 68 Ark. 466, 60 S.W. 31, 1900 Ark. LEXIS 95 (1900).

While the credibility of the affiants may be investigated, the truth or falsity of their affidavits cannot be inquired into. Strong v. State, 85 Ark. 536, 109 S.W. 536 (1908)Questioned byRush v. State, 238 Ark. 149, 379 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1964); Kendrick v. State, 180 Ark. 1160, 24 S.W.2d 859 (1930).

Affiants held not to be credible persons. Brown v. State, 134 Ark. 597, 203 S.W. 1031, 1918 Ark. LEXIS 564 (1918).

It was the duty of the defendant to produce the affiants so that the state could test their credibility by oral examination to determine their means of knowledge concerning the facts about which they made affidavits. Spurgeon v. State, 160 Ark. 112, 254 S.W. 376 (1923).

Court was authorized to inquire, not only as to whether the affiants had sworn or were likely to swear falsely, but into their motives, intent and feelings and their opportunities and means of knowledge as to existing prejudice, in order that the court might determine whether they were credible persons within this section. Clark v. State, 169 Ark. 717, 276 S.W. 849 (1925).

Affiants held to be credible persons. Padgett v. State, 171 Ark. 556, 286 S.W. 819 (1926).

In passing upon applications for change of venue in criminal cases, the court's discretion is limited to passage upon the credibility of the affiants, and in doing so the court may orally examine the affiants as to their informations to determine whether they have sworn recklessly or falsely without sufficient information as to the state of mind of the inhabitants of the county. Kendrick v. State, 180 Ark. 1160, 24 S.W.2d 859 (1930).

One who swears recklessly or who is generally known to be wanting in reputation for truth and veracity is not credible. Fancher v. State, 205 Ark. 1085, 172 S.W.2d 680 (1943)Questioned byRobertson v. State, 212 Ark. 301, 206 S.W.2d 748 (1947).

Burden of Proof.

The burden is on the applicant for a change of venue to make credible proof to support his motion. Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 370 S.W.2d 113 (1963); DuBois v. State, 258 Ark. 459, 527 S.W.2d 595 (1975).

A movant in a change of venue proceeding must demonstrate that there is countywide prejudice against him before his motion for a change of venue will be granted. Foster v. State, 275 Ark. 427, 631 S.W.2d 7 (1982); Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986).

County with Two Districts.

Petition filed in one district of a county, asking for a change of venue from both districts of that county to a second county, should have been granted and it was error to merely change venue to the other district of the first county. Williams v. State, 160 Ark. 587, 255 S.W. 314 (1923).

Discretion of Court.

Denial of a motion for a change of venue is within the discretion of the trial judge and his order is conclusive on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Speer v. State, 130 Ark. 457, 198 S.W. 113 (1917); Adams v. State, 179 Ark. 1047, 20 S.W.2d 130 (1929); Meyer v. State, 218 Ark. 440, 236 S.W.2d 996 (1951); Foster v. State, 275 Ark. 427, 631 S.W.2d 7 (1982).

Court has broad discretion in determining credibility of affiants, and this discretion should not be disturbed except for compelling reasons. Ragsdale v. State, 132 Ark. 210, 200 S.W. 802 (1918); Mullen v. State, 193 Ark. 648, 102 S.W.2d 82 (1937); Bailey v. State, 204 Ark. 376, 163 S.W.2d 141 (1942).

Evidence.

Trial court cannot rely on its own knowledge of local condition in passing upon petition for change of venue due to hostile public sentiment, but it must hear evidence upon the same and make its decision upon the evidence submitted. Ward v. State, 68 Ark. 466, 60 S.W. 31, 1900 Ark. LEXIS 95 (1900); Hildreth v. State, 214 Ark. 710, 217 S.W.2d 622 (1949).

Where attorneys for defendant presented a petition to the trial court in which they asked for a change of venue due to hostile public opinion, swore on oath that affidavits could not be obtained from residents of the community due to fear of reprisal from the other residents of the community, and agreed to testify to this condition, trial court erred in refusing to consider petition and to listen to their evidence. Hildreth v. State, 214 Ark. 710, 217 S.W.2d 622 (1949).

—Sufficiency.

Evidence held insufficient to support change of venue. Meyer v. State, 218 Ark. 440, 236 S.W.2d 996 (1951); Leggett v. State, 227 Ark. 393, 299 S.W.2d 59 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 942, 78 S. Ct. 1393, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1556 (1958); Moore v. State, 227 Ark. 544, 299 S.W.2d 838 (1957), cert. denied, Moore v. Arkansas, 358 U.S. 946, 79 S. Ct. 356, 3 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1959); Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 370 S.W.2d 113 (1963); Trotter v. State, 237 Ark. 820, 377 S.W.2d 14 (1964), cert. denied, Trotter v. Arkansas, 379 U.S. 890, 85 S. Ct. 164 (1964); Bailey v. State, 238 Ark. 210, 381 S.W.2d 467 (1964); Stout v. State, 247 Ark. 948, 448 S.W.2d 636 (1970); Blanton v. State, 249 Ark. 181, 458 S.W.2d 373 (1970), cert. denied, Blanton v. Arkansas, 401 U.S. 1003, 91 S. Ct. 1240 (1971); Scott v. State, 249 Ark. 967, 463 S.W.2d 404 (1971); Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980).

Evidence sufficient to warrant change of venue. Rush v. State, 238 Ark. 149, 379 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1964).

A motion for change of venue is not supported by “credible persons” when the movants, affiants, or witnesses are unable to show in their testimony that they have general knowledge as to the state of mind of the inhabitants of the whole county or that they are cognizant of prejudice existing throughout the whole county. Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting the change of venue based on two affidavits, where the state was able to show by cross-examination to the satisfaction of the trial court that the affiants for the defendant were not credible because they did not possess knowledge of the state of mind of the inhabitants of the entire county, and all the jurors selected either had heard nothing regarding the case or said they could set aside anything they had heard and decide the case on the evidence. Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986).

There can be no error in the denial of a change of venue if an examination of the jury selection shows that an impartial jury was selected and that each juror stated that he could give the defendant a fair trial and follow the instructions of the court. Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986).

Although voir dire reflected that publicity concerning the case was considerable, the record of the voir dire did not reveal such hostility towards the defendant by jurors who served in his trial as to suggest a partiality that could not be laid aside. Swindler v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 911, 110 S. Ct. 1938 (1990).

Defendant's change-of-venue motion alleging adverse pretrial publicity was properly denied in light of the testimony introduced at the hearing which showed less-than-pervasive publicity, the failure of defendant to demonstrate during voir dire that there were publicity-affected jurors, and the fact that he did not use all his peremptory challenges. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

—Witnesses.

Court had a right to consider not only the counter affidavit, but to hear the witnesses offered. Bailey v. State, 204 Ark. 376, 163 S.W.2d 141 (1942).

Witnesses may be heard to assist the court in determining whether allegations contained in the affidavit are true. Fancher v. State, 205 Ark. 1085, 172 S.W.2d 680 (1943)Questioned byRobertson v. State, 212 Ark. 301, 206 S.W.2d 748 (1947).

Court may hear testimony on the question of credibility, but it should not permit witnesses to be called for the purpose of giving independent testimony that a fair trial may be had and that prejudice does not exit, nor may the court substitute its own information or beliefs for those of the affiant when such information is dehors the record. Fancher v. State, 205 Ark. 1085, 172 S.W.2d 680 (1943)Questioned byRobertson v. State, 212 Ark. 301, 206 S.W.2d 748 (1947).

Failure to produce any of the affiants or to assign any reason for such failure is proper ground for refusal of the petition. Morton v. State, 208 Ark. 492, 187 S.W.2d 335 (1945).

Where a petition for a change of venue is filed in a criminal case, and supporting affidavits accompany the petition, the court may summon and examine the affiants. Robertson v. State, 212 Ark. 301, 206 S.W.2d 748 (1947).

It is not necessary for state affiants to appear in court although trial court may require their presence. DuBois v. State, 258 Ark. 459, 527 S.W.2d 595 (1975).

Form.

An order changing the venue in a criminal cause need not set forth the ground thereof, the same appearing in the petition which is a part of the record. Dixon v. State, 29 Ark. 165, 1874 Ark. LEXIS 22 (1874).

Where venue was changed, defendant could not complain of want of jurisdiction of such court on ground that his affidavit for change of venue was not signed by clerk. Bittick v. State, 67 Ark. 131, 53 S.W. 571 (1899).

Error in reference to circuit court to which case was transferred was only a clerical error which could result in no prejudice to the defendant. Ragsdale v. State, 132 Ark. 210, 200 S.W. 802 (1918).

Ineffective Counsel.

Where petitioner asserted that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to follow statutory procedures when moving for a change of venue, but the motions were all decided on the merits, as if they had been properly submitted, the court did not find that the counsel's failure was an error so serious as to amount to constitutionally deficient performance. Swindler v. Lockhart, 693 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1989).

Motion to Annul Order.

Where defendant who had been granted a change of venue moved to annul the order, but furnished no supporting affidavits that the minds of the inhabitants of the county to which the change had been made were prejudiced, the motion was properly denied. Watson v. State, 177 Ark. 708, 7 S.W.2d 980, 59 A.L.R. 356 (1928).

Notice.

Court may not arbitrarily make a rule requiring three day's notice to the attorney for the state of the intention to ask for a change of venue. Maxey v. State, 76 Ark. 276, 88 S.W. 1009 (1905).

Presence of Defendant.

Defendant should be present when the order is made, but his absence is not reversible error. Polk v. State, 45 Ark. 165 (1885); Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S.W. 658 (1891).

Presumption.

Where local prejudice rendering impossible an impartial trial is made cause for change of venue, legal presumption is that defendant can get a fair and impartial trial in the county in which the offense was committed, and to overcome this presumption defendant must show clearly that this cannot be done, and before a court is justified in sustaining an application on account of the prejudice of the inhabitants of the county, it must affirmatively appear that there is such a feeling of prejudice prevailing in the community as will be reasonably certain to prevent a fair and impartial trial. Bailey v. State, 204 Ark. 376, 163 S.W.2d 141 (1942).

Sufficiency of Application.

Motion for a change of venue alleging that the minds of the inhabitants in the county in which the cause is pending are so prejudiced against the defendant that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had therein, verified by the defendant's affidavit, is a sufficient “petition” within the meaning of this section. Jackson v. State, 54 Ark. 243, 15 S.W. 607 (1891).

Motion for change of venue was properly overruled where it contained the supporting affidavit of only one person. Davis v. State, 170 Ark. 602, 280 S.W. 636 (1926); Gaines v. State, 208 Ark. 293, 186 S.W.2d 154 (1945).

Application for a change of venue was held properly denied where the supporting affidavit did not state that the affiants were not related to the defendant. Crow v. State, 190 Ark. 222, 79 S.W.2d 75 (1935).

Petition for change of venue not supported by affidavits of two qualified electors of the county is not sufficient, and more especially so when testimony permitted by lower court after overruling the petition did not support the petitioner's contention. Chitwood v. State, 210 Ark. 367, 196 S.W.2d 241 (1946).

Where no affidavits had been filed in support of petition, there was no evidence that the minds of the inhabitants of the county were so prejudiced against the defendant that a fair and impartial trial could not be had therein. Wright v. State, 267 Ark. 264, 590 S.W.2d 15 (1979).

Affidavits or sworn testimony must be offered to support a motion for a change of venue. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980).

Where the defendant failed to attach affidavits to his motion for a change of venue, there was no evidence that the jurors were prejudiced by the pretrial publicity, and the motion was properly denied. Stone v. State, 290 Ark. 204, 718 S.W.2d 102 (1986).

Waiver.

While it was error to overrule an application for a change of venue which complied with the statutory requirements, the error was waived by the defendant by subsequently entering a plea of guilty. Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191 (1933), cert. denied, Hudspeth v. Arkansas, 296 U.S. 642, 56 S. Ct. 178, 80 L. Ed. 456 (1935).

Cited: White v. State, 83 Ark. 36, 102 S.W. 715 (1907); Jordan v. State, 141 Ark. 504, 217 S.W. 788 (1920); Cain v. State, 183 Ark. 606, 37 S.W.2d 708 (1931); Cheney v. State, 205 Ark. 1049, 172 S.W.2d 427 (1943); Meyer v. State, 218 Ark. 440, 236 S.W.2d 996 (1951); Bussard v. State, 300 Ark. 174, 778 S.W.2d 213 (1989); Sanders v. State, 317 Ark. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 (1994).

16-88-205. Recognizance required for certain defendants.

  1. When the order is made, the defendant, if not in custody and the offense charge is bailable, shall enter into recognizance with sufficient security for his or her appearance to answer the charges in the court to which the cause is to be removed, on the first day of the next term thereof, and not depart the court without leave.
  2. The recognizance may be taken by the court or judge making the order of removal or by any officer authorized by law to let to bail after indictment is found.
  3. When the recognizance is taken out of the court in which the cause is pending, it shall be filed with the clerk of the court as a part of the record in the cause.
  4. No order for the removal of a cause shall be effectual in the case of any defendant not in confinement or custody unless a recognizance is entered into as directed in this subchapter or unless the order of the removal is delivered before any juror is sworn in the cause.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 419-421, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3091-3903; Pope's Dig., §§ 3921-3923; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1505 — 43-1507.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section is merely directory. Beasly v. State, 53 Ark. 67, 13 S.W. 733 (1890); Havis v. State, 62 Ark. 500, 37 S.W. 957 (1896); Minor v. State, 162 Ark. 136, 258 S.W. 121 (1924).

Cited: Perry v. State, 279 Ark. 213, 650 S.W.2d 240 (1983).

16-88-206. Order to remove the bodies of certain defendants.

  1. If the defendant is in actual custody, the court or judge granting the order of removal shall also make an order commanding the sheriff to remove the body of the defendant to the jail of the county into which the cause is to be removed and deliver the defendant to the keeper of the jail, together with the warrant or process by virtue of which he or she is imprisoned and held.
  2. The sheriff shall obey the order without unnecessary delay and shall endorse on the commitment process or order of the court by which the prisoner is held in his or her custody the reason of the change of custody. The sheriff shall deliver the warrant with the prisoner to the keeper of the jail of the proper county, who shall give the sheriff a receipt therefor, and take charge of and keep the prisoner in the same manner as if he or she had been originally committed to the jail.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 422, 423, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3094, 3095; Pope's Dig., §§ 3924, 3925; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1508, 43-1509.

16-88-207. Second removal of same cause prohibited.

In no case shall a second removal of the same cause be allowed.

History. Crim. Code, § 421, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., § 3093; Pope's Dig., § 3923; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1507.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not on its face unconstitutional. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980).

This section, which purports to limit a criminal defendant to one change of venue, is not unconstitutional on its face. As with Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 8, this section can, and must, be read as operative only within the bounds of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Swindler v. Lockhart, 693 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1989).

No Error.

Even if the trial judge erroneously believed that this section prevented absolutely a second change of venue, the court expressed a willingness to consider the constitutional implications of the statute if necessary to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial; and the trial court gave alternative reasoning for denying the change of venue and did not base his decision solely on the belief that he lacked the authority to grant the change. Even if there were error, there was no actual prejudice, since the seated jury was composed of those who either had virtually no knowledge of the case, or who had tentative opinions which could be set aside; accordingly, the appellate court found no manifest error in the decision of the trial court not to permit a second change of venue. Swindler v. Lockhart, 693 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1989).

Cited: Perry v. State, 279 Ark. 213, 650 S.W.2d 240 (1983); Swindler v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1989).

16-88-208. Notice of order of removal.

  1. When the order of removal is made in term time, it shall be deemed a notice to every person who has entered into recognizance to appear at the term.
  2. In all other cases, the notice shall be given in writing, signed by the prosecuting attorney or the clerk of the court, and be served on the person so recognized in the manner provided by law for serving other notices.

History. Crim. Code, § 428, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., § 3100; Pope's Dig., § 3930; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1514.

16-88-209. Transcript of records and proceedings.

  1. Whenever any order shall be made for the removal of any cause under the provisions of this subchapter, the clerk of the court in which the cause is pending shall make out a full transcript of the records and proceedings in the cause, including the order of removal, the petition therefor, if any, and the recognizance of the defendant and of all witnesses. The clerk shall immediately transmit the transcript, duly certified under the seal of the court, to the clerk of the court to which the removal of the cause is ordered.
  2. If the transcript shall not have been transmitted or shall not have been received on or before the first term of the court to which the cause is ordered removed, or if the transcript shall be lost or destroyed, the cause shall not, by reason thereof, abate or be discontinued, but the transcript, or another in lieu thereof, may be transmitted and filed as required by this subchapter at or before the next succeeding term of the court. Proceeding shall be had thereon as if no failure or loss had happened.
  3. On the receipt of the transcript by the clerk of the court to which any cause is removed, the clerk shall file the transcript as a record of his court, and the same proceedings shall be had in the cause in the court, and in the same manner in all respects, as if the cause had originated there.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 424-426, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3096-3098; Pope's Dig., §§ 3926-3928; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1510 — 43-1512.

Case Notes

Certification.

Transcript should be duly certified by the clerk under the seal of his court, and the omission of the seal cannot be corrected by the clerk's attaching his official seal to the certificate, by leave of the court, after trial and judgment. Hudley v. State, 36 Ark. 237 (1880)Questioned byBrown v. State, 262 Ark. 298, 556 S.W.2d 418 (1977).

No legal conviction can be had upon an uncertified transcript. Ball v. State, 48 Ark. 94, 2 S.W. 462 (1886).

Perfection by Certiorari.

Where, after change of venue and verdict against the prisoner, a motion in arrest of judgment is made on ground the transcript does not show all necessary steps in proceeding, the transcript may be perfected by certiorari. Green v. State, 19 Ark. 178, 1857 Ark. LEXIS 22 (1857); Binns v. State, 35 Ark. 118 (1879).

Signature of Clerk.

Presumption in favor of the regularity of a transcript on a change of venue which is properly certified over the seal of the court, with the clerk's name affixed, is not overcome by proof that the clerk's signature is not in his handwriting, as he may have adopted another's writing for his signature. Harwood v. State, 63 Ark. 130, 37 S.W. 304 (1896).

Transfer of Records.

Original indictment remains in the court where it is preferred. Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624 (1855).

Until the transcript is lodged in the court to which the venue is changed, such court has no jurisdiction to try the cause. Burris v. State, 38 Ark. 221 (1881)Questioned byWeaver v. State, 83 Ark. 119, 102 S.W. 713 (1907).

Defendant cannot complain because the original indictment and application for change of venue were transmitted instead of certified copies. Kelly v. State, 102 Ark. 651, 145 S.W. 556 (1912).

Cited: Davis v. Reed, 316 Ark. 575, 873 S.W.2d 524 (1994).

16-88-210. Attendance of defendant and witnesses required.

The defendant and all witnesses, and others who shall have entered into recognizance to attend the trial of any cause, having notice of the removal thereof, shall be bound to attend at the time and place of trial in the county to which the cause is so removed. A failure to do so shall be deemed a breach of the recognizance. Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, judgment of forfeiture shall be entered by the court as provided by law.

History. Crim. Code, § 427, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., § 3099; Pope's Dig., § 3929; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1513.

16-88-211. Entitlement to forfeiture of bail.

When any person shall be indicted in any county in this state and an order shall be made for a change of venue to any other county in this state, and the defendant has been admitted to bail and a forfeiture has been taken upon the bond and judgment rendered thereon by the court of the county in which the cause stands for trial, the judgment when collected shall be paid by the sheriff into the treasury of the county in which the indictment was found.

History. Acts 1899, No. 177, § 1, p. 314; C. & M. Dig., § 3105; Pope's Dig., § 3935; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1522.

Cross References. Bail generally, § 16-84-101 et seq.

16-88-212. Costs and expenses of removal.

The costs and expenses necessarily incurred in the removal of any cause under the provisions of this subchapter shall be adjusted and allowed by the court where the cause is tried and shall be taxed and collected as other costs in the cause.

History. Crim. Code, § 429, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., § 3101; Pope's Dig., § 3931; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1515.

16-88-213. Liability of initial county for costs of trial.

  1. Whenever a change of venue is taken in any cause from one county to another as provided by law, the county from which the change of venue is taken shall be liable for all costs for which counties are liable under existing laws, and the county to which the change of venue is taken and where the cause is tried shall not be liable for any cost.
    1. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court trying any cause, immediately after the trial of the cause, to make out a statement of all costs accrued in the cause and for which counties are liable under existing laws.
    2. The statement of costs, if correct, shall be so certified by the judge of the court trying the cause. The clerk shall thereupon transmit the statement to the county clerk of the county in which the case originated, and the costs shall be allowed and paid by the county to the party entitled to the costs.
    1. The court trying any cause or causes on change of venue shall also enter an order on the record of the court at the close of the term of the court allowing the county in which the cause or causes have been tried the amount of per diem of the trial jury engaged in the trial in any or all of the causes and sheriffs during the trials. It shall be the duty of the court in making the order to take into consideration parts of a day.
    2. A copy of the order certified by the court shall be certified to the county clerk of the county where the cause or causes originated, and it shall be allowed and paid to the county trying the cause or causes by the county where the cause or causes originated.

History. Acts 1893, No. 65, §§ 1-3, p. 100; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3102-3104; Pope's Dig., §§ 3932-3934; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1519 — 43-1521.

Case Notes

Extent of Liability.

County in which the case originated is liable for all of the current expenses incurred in another county, in the trial of the cause, as well as for the costs for which it was already liable. Hempstead County v. Royston, 58 Ark. 113, 23 S.W. 650 (1893).

Fines and Fees.

Where there is a change of venue, fines and fees belong to the county where the offense was committed and the indictment found, even though the trial is held in the county to which the cause is removed. Washington County v. Benton County, 43 Ark. 267 (1884); Russell v. Rowland, 47 Ark. 203, 1 S.W. 74 (1886).

Judge's Certificate.

Certificate of judge is not a judicial act, but the court has power to correct the certificate and retax the costs. Peay v. Searcy County, 104 Ark. 133, 148 S.W. 500 (1912).

16-88-214. Failure of clerk to perform duty.

If any clerk of the circuit court shall neglect or refuse to perform any duty in relation to the removal of a cause enjoined on him or her by the provisions of §§ 16-88-20116-88-210, 16-88-212, and 16-88-214, he or she shall forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), to be recovered by civil action in the name of the state.

History. Crim. Code, § 430, as added by Acts 1873, No. 98, § 1, p. 234; C. & M. Dig., § 3106; Pope's Dig., § 3936; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1516.

Chapter 89 Trial and Verdict

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective January 1, 1976.

Cross References. Right to interpreter, § 16-89-104.

Trial of criminal offenses where victim under age of 14, precedence, § 16-10-130.

Effective Dates. Acts 1877, No. 35, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 3, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1915, No. 240, § 3: approved Mar. 24, 1915. Emergency declared.

Acts 1965, No. 489, § 1: Mar. 20, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. —— (1964) declared that the procedure for admitting confessions into evidence, identical to that now followed in this State, to be unconstitutional, an emergency is declared to exist and it is necessary in the public peace, health and safety that this Act take effect immediately and it shall therefore be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 124, § 4: Feb. 19, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds it would expedite criminal procedure if the prosecuting attorney would be allowed to waive the death penalty. An emergency is therefore declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public health, welfare and safety, shall be effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 664, § 5: Mar. 30, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Second General Assembly that there is an immediate need to provide qualified interpreters for deaf persons at administrative, civil and criminal proceedings and that this Act is immediately necessary to accomplish the same. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 469, § 7: Mar. 12, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an immediate need to protect the confidentiality of privileged communications between qualified interpreters for deaf and hearing-impaired persons occurring at administrative, civil and criminal proceedings and that this act is immediately necessary. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding right to and incidents of jury trial. 3 A.L.R.4th 601.

Disqualification, for bias, of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Sanctions against defense in criminal case for failure to comply with discovery requirements. 9 A.L.R.4th 837.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Prior representation or activity as prosecuting attorney as disqualifying judge from sitting or acting in criminal case. 16 A.L.R.4th 550.

Prosecutor's reference in opening statement to matters not provable or which he does not attempt to prove as ground for relief. 16 A.L.R.4th 810.

Continuances at instance of state public defender or appointed counsel over defendant's objections as excuse for denial of speedy trial. 16 A.L.R.4th 1283.

Waiver of right to counsel by insistence upon speedy trial in state criminal case. 19 A.L.R.4th 1299.

Jury's discussion of parole law as ground for reversal or new trial. 21 A.L.R.4th 420.

Propriety and effect of jurors' discussion of evidence among themselves before final submission of criminal case. 21 A.L.R.4th 444.

Right of prosecution to discovery of case-related notes, statements, and reports. 23 A.L.R.4th 799.

Waiver or loss of right to disqualify judge by participation in proceedings. 24 A.L.R.4th 870; 27 A.L.R.4th 597.

Disqualification of judge because of assault or threat against him by party or person associated with party. 25 A.L.R.4th 923.

Exclusion of evidence in state criminal action for failure or prosecution to comply with discovery requirements as to physical or documentary evidence. 27 A.L.R.4th 105.

Right of accused in state court to have expert inspect, examine, or test physical evidence in possession of prosecution. 27 A.L.R.4th 1188.

Disruptive conduct of spectators in presence of jury during criminal trial as basis for reversal, new trial, or mistrial. 29 A.L.R.4th 659.

Emotional manifestations by victim or family of victim during criminal trial as ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial. 31 A.L.R.4th 229.

Propriety of juror's tests or experiments in jury room. 31 A.L.R.4th 566.

Prejudicial effect of jury's procurement or use of book during deliberations. 31 A.L.R.4th 623; 35 A.L.R.4th 626.

Instructions to jury respecting accused's absence from state criminal trial. 31 A.L.R.4th 676.

Failure to object to improper questions or comments as to defendant's pretrial silence or failure to testify as constituting waiver of right to complain. 32 A.L.R.4th 774.

Exclusion of evidence in state criminal action for failure of prosecution to comply with discovery requirements as to statements made by defendants or other nonexpert witnesses. 33 A.L.R.4th 301.

Communication between court officials or attendants and jurors in criminal trial as ground for mistrial or reversal — post-Parker cases. 35 A.L.R.4th 890.

Right of accused, in state criminal trial, to insist, over prosecutor's or court's objection, on trial by court without jury. 37 A.L.R.4th 304.

Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on appeal. 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.

Impeachment of verdict by juror's evidence that he was coerced or intimidated by fellow juror. 39 A.L.R.4th 800.

Multiple juries at joint trial of multiple defendants in state criminal prosecution. 41 A.L.R.4th 1189.

Postretirement out of court communication between jurors and trial judge as grounds for new trial or reversal in criminal case. 43 A.L.R.4th 410.

Propriety of Use of Multiple Juries at Joint Trial of Multiple Defendants in State Criminal Prosecution. 41 A.L.R.6th 295.

Am. Jur. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 30 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

C.J.S. 23 C.J.S., Crim. L., § 961 et seq.

16-89-101. Trial times and postponements.

    1. When any circuit court is duly convened for a regular term, the court shall remain open for all criminal proceedings until its next regular term and may be in session at any time the judge thereof may deem necessary. However, no session shall interfere with any other court to be held by the same judge.
    2. If the time has not been previously fixed by the court, or unless in such cases they are required by law to take notice, all interested parties shall receive notice of any proceeding affecting their rights and shall be given time to prepare to meet the proceeding.
    1. If the defendant is in custody or on bail when the indictment is found, the trial may take place at the same term of the court on a day to be fixed by the court.
    2. If not tried at the same term, all indictments, together with all other criminal prosecutions and penal actions, shall be docketed for the first day of the next term of the court unless a different day is fixed by the order of the court.
    3. All prosecutions shall stand for trial on the day to which they are docketed, where the defendant is in custody, on bail, or has been summoned three (3) days before the commencement of the term.
    1. When an indictment is called for trial, or at any time previous thereto, the court upon sufficient cause shown by either party may direct the trial to be postponed to another day in the same term or to another term.
    2. The provisions of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869, in regard to postponements of the trial of actions, shall apply to the postponement of prosecutions on behalf of a defendant.
  1. The prosecuting attorney shall not be required, in order to obtain a continuance of a criminal case, to make an affidavit to the causes for continuance. His official statement in writing shall be sufficient.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 159; Crim. Code, §§ 186-190; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3126-3131; Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 31, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., §§ 3961-3967; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1701 — 43-1707.

Publisher's Notes. For parallel references to the provisions of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869, see the parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Cross References. Plea of insanity not to prevent timely trial, § 16-86-101.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Continuances in Arkansas, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 449.

Speedy Trial: A Comparative Analysis Between the American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice and Arkansas Law, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 234.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Subdivision (c) (2) of this section is unconstitutional insofar as it makes § 16-63-402(b) applicable to criminal cases. Graham v. State, 50 Ark. 161, 6 S.W. 721 (1887).

Continuances.

Continuance will be refused when desired evidence is cumulative only. Sneed v. State, 47 Ark. 180, 1 S.W. 68 (1886); Maxey v. State, 66 Ark. 523, 52 S.W. 2 (1899); Carroll v. State, 71 Ark. 403, 75 S.W. 471 (1903); Gallaher v. State, 78 Ark. 299, 95 S.W. 463 (1906); Owen v. State, 86 Ark. 317, 111 S.W. 466 (1908); Johnson v. State, 89 Ark. 46, 115 S.W. 930 (1909); Godard v. State, 100 Ark. 149, 139 S.W. 1131 (1911); Hamer v. State, 104 Ark. 606, 150 S.W. 142 (1912); Williams v. State, 105 Ark. 698, 151 S.W. 1011, 1912 Ark. LEXIS 511 (1912); Benson v. State, 112 Ark. 442, 166 S.W. 549 (1914).

The expected evidence must be competent and material to the issue. Hamilton v. State, 62 Ark. 543, 36 S.W. 1054 (1896); Kitts v. State, 70 Ark. 521, 69 S.W. 545 (1902); Adcock v. State, 73 Ark. 625, 83 S.W. 318 (1904); Pratt v. State, 75 Ark. 350, 87 S.W. 651 (1905); Harper v. State, 79 Ark. 594, 96 S.W. 1003 (1906); Morphew v. State, 84 Ark. 487, 106 S.W. 480 (1907); Strong v. State, 85 Ark. 536, 109 S.W. 536 (1908)Questioned byRush v. State, 238 Ark. 149, 379 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1964); Clampett v. State, 91 Ark. 567, 121 S.W. 934 (1909); Peters v. State, 103 Ark. 119, 146 S.W. 491 (1912), overruled, West v. State, 290 Ark. 329, 719 S.W.2d 684 (1986).

Continuance held to be properly denied. Carroll v. State, 71 Ark. 403, 75 S.W. 471 (1903); Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W. 409 (1905); Rucker v. State, 77 Ark. 23, 90 S.W. 151 (1905); Hust v. State, 77 Ark. 146, 91 S.W. 8 (1905); Weatherford v. State, 78 Ark. 36, 93 S.W. 61 (1906); McFarland v. State, 83 Ark. 98, 103 S.W. 169 (1907); Renfroe v. State, 84 Ark. 16, 104 S.W. 542 (1907); Le Grand v. State, 88 Ark. 135, 113 S.W. 1028 (1908); Johnson v. State, 89 Ark. 46, 115 S.W. 930 (1909); McCarthy v. State, 90 Ark. 384, 119 S.W. 647 (1909); Clampett v. State, 91 Ark. 567, 121 S.W. 934 (1909); McRae v. State, 92 Ark. 19, 92 Ark. 28, 122 S.W. 479 (1909); Striplin v. State, 100 Ark. 132, 139 S.W. 1128 (1911); Walker v. State, 100 Ark. 180, 139 S.W. 1139 (1911); Hamer v. State, 104 Ark. 606, 150 S.W. 142 (1912); Bruder v. State, 110 Ark. 402, 161 S.W. 1067 (1913); Tolliver v. State, 113 Ark. 142, 167 S.W. 703 (1914); Quertermous v. State, 114 Ark. 452, 170 S.W. 225 (1914); Bryan v. State, 179 Ark. 216, 15 S.W.2d 312 (1929); Copeland v. State, 226 Ark. 198, 289 S.W.2d 524 (1956); Moore v. State, 229 Ark. 335, 315 S.W.2d 907 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946, 79 S. Ct. 356, 3 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1959); Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, 370 S.W.2d 613 (1963); Jackson v. State, 245 Ark. 331, 432 S.W.2d 876 (1968); Thacker v. State, 253 Ark. 864, 489 S.W.2d 500 (1973); Wolfs v. State, 255 Ark. 97, 498 S.W.2d 878 (1973); Conway v. State, 256 Ark. 131, 505 S.W.2d 758 (1974); Derrick v. State, 259 Ark. 316, 532 S.W.2d 431 (1976); Russell v. State, 262 Ark. 447, 559 S.W.2d 7 (1977).

Grounds for postponement frequently used, in addition to those provided in the civil procedure statutes, include physical or mental condition of defendant, objections to the jury, want of time for preparation, absence of counsel, and surprise at trial. Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, 370 S.W.2d 613 (1963).

—Absence of Counsel.

It was within the trial court's discretion to refuse a continuance because the defendant's counsel was absent from the state on account of the sickness of his wife. Jefferson v. State, 89 Ark. 129, 115 S.W. 1140 (1909).

An application for continuance in a criminal case upon the ground that the applicant was confined to jail and that on account of the sickness of his attorney he was unable to prepare his defense was properly denied when he failed to show wherein he was unable to prepare his defense. Walker v. State, 91 Ark. 497, 121 S.W. 925 (1909).

—Absence of Witnesses.

It was reversible error to refuse the defendant a continuance for an absent witness whose testimony was material to the defense, where the defendant used proper diligence to secure his attendance and it appeared that the witness was within the court's jurisdiction. McElroy v. State, 100 Ark. 301, 140 S.W. 8 (1911).

After court held that defendant was entitled to a continuance, it abused its discretion in overruling the defendant's motion for continuance where state agreed to admit that the absent witness would testify to the facts as set out in the motion, but did not agree to admit that such facts were true. Tiner v. State, 110 Ark. 251, 161 S.W. 195 (1913).

An accused is entitled to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses, and this means the right to a delay until witnesses may be had at the trial, when they are within the jurisdiction of the court, in all cases wherein the authority and power of the court has been properly invoked. Carter v. State, 196 Ark. 746, 119 S.W.2d 913 (1938).

In continuances in criminal cases where the state admits that absent witness would testify as claimed, the state must also admit the truthfulness of such statements of the absent witness. Copeland v. State, 226 Ark. 198, 289 S.W.2d 524 (1956).

Where evidence of absent witness is cumulative, the trial court may deny motion for continuance because of absence of the witness. Copeland v. State, 226 Ark. 198, 289 S.W.2d 524 (1956).

—Burden of Proof.

Burden was on defendant to introduce evidence to show prejudice resulted from court's denial of motion for continuance. Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, 370 S.W.2d 613 (1963).

—Discretion of Court.

The matter of continuance is addressed to the discretion of the trial court; its action will not be reversed in the absence of such a clear abuse of discretion as to amount to a denial of justice, and the burden of demonstrating abuse rests upon appellant. Thompson v. State, 26 Ark. 323 (1870); Jackson v. State, 54 Ark. 243, 15 S.W. 607 (1891); Price v. State, 57 Ark. 165, 20 S.W. 1091, 1893 Ark. LEXIS 57 (1893); Kilgore v. State, 99 Ark. 648, 137 S.W. 1092 (1911); White v. State, 105 Ark. 698, 152 S.W. 163 (1912); Sullivan v. State, 109 Ark. 407, 160 S.W. 239 (1913); Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, 370 S.W.2d 613 (1963); Russell v. State, 262 Ark. 447, 559 S.W.2d 7 (1977).

Abuse of discretion to grant or deny continuance is reversible error. Cannon v. State, 60 Ark. 564, 31 S.W. 150, 32 S.W. 128 (1895); Jones v. State, 99 Ark. 394, 138 S.W. 967 (1911); Davey v. State, 99 Ark. 547, 139 S.W. 629 (1911).

Granting or refusing a continuance will not authorize a reversal unless the trial court abuses its discretion. Moore v. State, 184 Ark. 682, 43 S.W.2d 228 (1931); Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, 370 S.W.2d 613 (1963).

—Motion.

Error cannot be assigned in the overruling of a motion for continuance on account of the absence of a witness if the motion fails to state where the witness resides or what is expected to be proved by him. Shinn v. State, 93 Ark. 290, 124 S.W. 263 (1910); Davis v. State, 95 Ark. 555, 129 S.W. 530 (1910).

An application for continuance on account of the absence of witnesses should specifically set forth the facts expected to be proved by the desired witnesses and not in general terms or by indefinite allegations. Davis v. State, 95 Ark. 555, 129 S.W. 530 (1910).

Motion for continuance in a criminal case because of absence of witness should state that the affiant believes that facts to which the witness would testify are true. Freeman v. State, 150 Ark. 387, 234 S.W. 267 (1921); Estes v. State, 180 Ark. 656, 22 S.W.2d 172 (1929).

The court may in its discretion grant an oral motion for continuance. Venable v. State, 177 Ark. 91, 5 S.W.2d 716 (1928).

In order to obtain a continuance because of the absence of a witness, it is necessary that the movant support his motion by affidavit stating what facts affiant believes the witness will prove, and not merely the effect of such facts in evidence. Venable v. State, 260 Ark. 201, 538 S.W.2d 286 (1976).

Continuous Session.

The proper procedure under this statute would be to take a recess and not adjourn the court. Thomas v. State, 196 Ark. 123, 116 S.W.2d 358, 1938 Ark. LEXIS 148 (1938).

Where circuit court recessed in one county without adjourning, it could hold a legal term in another county. Thomas v. State, 196 Ark. 123, 116 S.W.2d 358, 1938 Ark. LEXIS 148 (1938).

Subsection (a) applies to any circuit court. Thomas v. State, 196 Ark. 123, 116 S.W.2d 358, 1938 Ark. LEXIS 148 (1938).

If court had adjourned, and not to an adjourned day, in order to reconvene and be in session legally, the record of reconvening would have to show affirmatively a compliance with statutory provisions. Fultz v. State, 196 Ark. 1161, 121 S.W.2d 111 (1938).

In absence of adjourning order or expiration of term, it is presumed the court was in continuous session and statutes relating to posting of notice or reconvening of court have no application. Fultz v. State, 196 Ark. 1161, 121 S.W.2d 111 (1938).

Subsection (a) applies to the court, as distinguished from the judge, and where supplementary motion for new trial supported by affidavits and alleging incompetency of a juror was presented to trial judge in chambers in county other than that of trial, new matter was not properly in the record. Sims v. State, 203 Ark. 976, 159 S.W.2d 753 (1942).

After the judge of the court has convened court for the regular term, the judge then can adjourn and convene court to try criminal case as the judge “may deem necessary.” Bradley v. State, 213 Ark. 927, 213 S.W.2d 901 (1948).

Custody or Bail.

The object of subdivision (b) (1) is to give priority, over other defendants, to the trial of persons who are in custody or on bail when they are indicted. Shipley v. State, 50 Ark. 49, 6 S.W. 226 (1887).

Although a defendant is not in custody or on bond, when indictment is found against him, he may, if arrested on a bench warrant, be tried at the term he is indicted, unless good cause be shown for postponement. Shipley v. State, 50 Ark. 49, 6 S.W. 226 (1887).

A person incarcerated in a sister state at the time of his indictment in this state has the right to ask the state of Arkansas to extradite him for trial, but if the sister state refuses, subsection (b) (2) will not inure to his benefit, or if the sister state requires some kind of waiver which the prisoner does not accomplish, he cannot take advantage of subsection (b) (2); however, if the sister state does agree to the extradition upon conditions met, then Arkansas must extradite and try the prisoner with due diligence or he will be entitled to the benefit of subsection (b) (2). Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225 Ark. 459, 283 S.W.2d 162 (1955).

Trial Date.

Where a trial has been properly conducted in other respects, a judgment of conviction will not be reversed simply because the record fails to show that the court set a day for trial. Wallace v. State, 28 Ark. 531 (1873).

Putting defendant to trial on day following filing of information cannot be presumed to be error where there is no record in regard to arraignment or whether arraignment was waived or whether defendants objected to going to trial at the time, or desired time for preparation. Smith v. State, 194 Ark. 1041, 110 S.W.2d 24 (1937).

Cited: Price v. State, 57 Ark. 165, 20 S.W. 1091, 1893 Ark. LEXIS 57 (1893); Tiner v. State, 110 Ark. 251, 161 S.W. 195 (1913); State v. Harvey, 169 Ark. 1074, 277 S.W. 869 (Ark. 1925); Givens v. State, 243 Ark. 16, 418 S.W.2d 629 (1967); Roach v. State, 255 Ark. 773, 503 S.W.2d 467 (1973); Conway v. State, 256 Ark. 131, 505 S.W.2d 758 (1974); Worley v. State, 259 Ark. 433, 533 S.W.2d 502 (1976).

16-89-102. Severance.

  1. When two (2) or more defendants are jointly indicted for a misdemeanor, they may be tried jointly or separately in the discretion of the court.
  2. No trial on an indictment against two (2) or more defendants shall be delayed because some of the defendants have not been arrested. Those arrested or in custody shall be tried and the cause shall be continued as to those not arrested.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 101; Crim. Code, § 236; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3038, 3139; Pope's Dig., §§ 3862, 3975; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1801, 43-1803.

Cross References. Joinder of defendants, ARCrP 21.2.

Case Notes

Felon Codefendant.

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's motion for severance based upon the fact that his codefendant was a convicted felon brought from the penitentiary for the trial, in the absence of any evidence in the record that the jury knew of such codefendant's status as a felon. Booker v. State, 244 Ark. 745, 427 S.W.2d 177 (1968).

16-89-103. Presence of defendant.

    1. If the indictment is for a felony, the defendant must be present during the trial.
        1. If he or she escapes from custody after the trial has commenced or is present at the beginning of the trial and then causes himself or herself to be unable to appear at trial or if on bail shall absent himself or herself during the trial, the trial may either be stopped or progress to a verdict at the discretion of the court.
        2. This provision shall apply in all instances except where the death penalty is sought.
      1. However, judgment shall not be rendered until the presence of the defendant is obtained.
  1. If the indictment is for a misdemeanor, the trial may be had in the absence of the defendant.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 184, 185; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3136, 3137; Pope's Dig., §§ 3972, 3973; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2101, 43-2102; Acts 1997, No. 526, § 1.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Subsection (a) is constitutional. The guaranty of the Constitution does not include the right to abscond and then complain of one's own absence. Gore v. State, 52 Ark. 285, 12 S.W. 564 (1889).

Applicability.

The rule in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, that where a defendant is on bail and absents himself, the trial may proceed, applies once trial has commenced and does not apply to flight before trial. Reece v. State, 325 Ark. 465, 928 S.W.2d 334 (1996).

Felony.

It is not necessary for the defendant to show that he was prejudiced by any action in his absence; his mere absence during a substantive part of the proceedings, where he may have lost an advantage or been prejudiced, is sufficient to set aside the conviction. Bearden v. State, 44 Ark. 331 (1884).

When it is plain that the accused has lost no advantage because of his absence, there is no error. Mabry v. State, 50 Ark. 492, 8 S.W. 823 (1888).

Defendant or his counsel may waive defendant's right to be present. Davidson v. State, 108 Ark. 191, 158 S.W. 1103 (1913); Scruggs v. State, 131 Ark. 320, 198 S.W. 694 (1917); Boling v. State, 189 Ark. 705, 74 S.W.2d 968 (1934); Nelson v. State, 190 Ark. 1027, 82 S.W.2d 519, 1935 Ark. LEXIS 176 (1935).

The right to be present ends with the trial and the trial ends with the verdict of the jury. Baldwin v. State, 119 Ark. 518, 178 S.W. 409 (1915).

—Counsel.

Right of defendant to have counsel present when verdict is returned is not ground for reversal if the defendant could not have been prejudiced by his absence. Baker v. State, 58 Ark. 513, 25 S.W. 603 (1894).

—Presence Not Required.

For the clerk to place the names of the panel in a box preparatory to drawing the jury for the trial is not a substantive step within the rule requiring the presence of defendant. Bearden v. State, 44 Ark. 331 (1884).

An order for venire for a jury was a substantive step, but the present method of selecting jurors to compose the panel is not and defendant's presence is not required. Mabry v. State, 50 Ark. 492, 8 S.W. 823 (1888).

Recognizance of witnesses is not a substantive step requiring the presence of defendant. Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S.W. 658 (1891).

Granting defendant a change of venue in his absence is not error. Polk v. State, 45 Ark. 165 (1885); Bond v. State, 63 Ark. 504, 39 S.W. 554 (1897).

Verdict is amendable in defendant's absence. State v. McNamara, 60 Ark. 400, 30 S.W. 762 (1895).

—Presence Required.

The accused must have the privilege of being present in person and by counsel whenever any substantive step is taken in his case. Brown v. State, 24 Ark. 620, 1867 Ark. LEXIS 24 (1867); Whittaker v. State, 173 Ark. 1172, 294 S.W. 397 (1927).

To swear the witnesses and put them under the rule is a substantive step requiring defendant's presence. Bearden v. State, 44 Ark. 331 (1884).

Taking testimony while defendant is necessarily absent a few minutes by permission of court is prejudicial error. Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. 516, 36 S.W. 947 (1896).

It is error to reread instructions in felony case in defendant's absence. Kinnemer v. State, 66 Ark. 206, 49 S.W. 815 (1899).

It is error for the judge, accompanied by the counsel on both sides, to enter the jury room after the cause has been submitted and deliver to the jury additional instructions without affording the defendant, who was present in the court room, an opportunity to be present. Stroope v. State, 72 Ark. 379, 80 S.W. 749 (1904).

Alleged error in the admission of evidence was moot because the remedy of a reversal and remand was not available; defendant had died and his presence was required at trial. Dowdy v. State, 2015 Ark. 35 (2015).

—Record.

The record, on appeal, must affirmatively show presence of defendant when any substantive step taken. Brown v. State, 24 Ark. 620, 1867 Ark. LEXIS 24 (1867).

The failure of the record on appeal to show affirmatively that the defendant in a bailable felony was present when the verdict was rendered is not a ground for reversal, as it will be presumed either that the defendant was voluntarily absent on bail or that he was present when the verdict was rendered. Bond v. State, 63 Ark. 504, 39 S.W. 554 (1897).

—Voluntary Absence.

If the defendant is on bail and absents himself, the trial may proceed. Lee v. State, 56 Ark. 4, 19 S.W. 16 (1892); Darden v. State, 73 Ark. 315, 84 S.W. 507 (1904); Cox v. City of Jonesboro, 112 Ark. 96, 164 S.W. 767 (1914).

When defendant disappeared during trial proceedings, court did not err in continuing trial in his absence since case had been specifically set for trial and defendant had indicated his readiness to proceed prior to voluntarily absenting himself. Johnson v. State, 270 Ark. 247, 604 S.W.2d 927, 1980 Ark. LEXIS 1588 (1980), cert. denied, Johnson v. Arkansas, 450 U.S. 981, 101 S. Ct. 1517, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 1222 (1981).

Where defendant voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom by oversleeping, and a jury had been selected and sworn, and both sides had announced that they were ready for trial, the defendant's trial had commenced and was properly allowed to proceed without defendant present. Reece v. State, 325 Ark. 465, 928 S.W.2d 334 (1996).

Misdemeanor.

Court has discretion to refuse a trial for misdemeanor in the defendant's absence. Bridges v. State, 38 Ark. 510 (1882).

The state cannot demand a trial for misdemeanor in the absence of the defendant. Owen v. State, 38 Ark. 512 (1882); Cox v. City of Jonesboro, 112 Ark. 96, 164 S.W. 767 (1914). But see, Henderson v. Murfreesboro, 119 Ark. 603, 178 S.W. 912 (1915).

Attorney's consent to try his client for a misdemeanor in his absence will be presumed to be by authority of the client in absence of proof to the contrary. Martin v. State, 40 Ark. 364 (1883).

Court should not permit a defendant to be tried in his absence, even with his consent, where the punishment may be imprisonment; but if it does so, and there is a verdict for imprisonment as part of his punishment, he cannot, after consenting, complain of it. Martin v. State, 40 Ark. 364 (1883).

If the offense is punishable by fine only, and defendant voluntarily absents himself, the state may demand a trial. Henderson v. Murfreesboro, 119 Ark. 603, 178 S.W. 912 (1915).

Where defendant appeals from a judgment of a justice of the peace and fails to appear, the circuit court has authority to affirm the penalty imposed, and the refusal to vacate the order by the circuit court will not be disturbed unless there is shown an abuse of discretion by the circuit court. Jaynes v. State, 212 Ark. 410, 206 S.W.2d 7 (1947).

If a trial on misdemeanor charge may be had in the absence of an accused, a plea may likewise be accepted in his absence. Prine v. State, 267 Ark. 304, 590 S.W.2d 25 (1979).

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.3's language that allows the defendant's attorney to waive a jury trial is consistent with this section, which states that a defendant's presence is not required in misdemeanor cases. Bolt v. State, 314 Ark. 387, 862 S.W.2d 841 (1993).

Trial Not Required.

Subsection (b) of this section makes it permissible for a court to hold a trial for an accused misdemeanant in absentia; however, having a trial is not mandatory. Taylor v. State, 44 Ark. App. 106, 866 S.W.2d 849 (1993).

Although defendant's attorney appeared and requested that the trial be held, and defendant was absent, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion under subsection (b) of this section in declining to hold a trial, dismissing the appeal, and leaving the municipal court's judgment intact. Taylor v. State, 44 Ark. App. 106, 866 S.W.2d 849 (1993).

Circuit judge properly refused to hold the trial in defendant's absence, dismissed the appeal, and ordered that the municipal court sentence be put into execution because defendant failed to appear for trial. Court did not abuse its discretion in not holding the trial despite his absence. Whitmire v. State, 50 Ark. App. 34, 901 S.W.2d 20 (1995).

Cited: Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458, 757 S.W.2d 937 (1988); Cagle v. State, 47 Ark. App. 1, 882 S.W.2d 674 (1994); Clayton v. State, 321 Ark. 602, 906 S.W.2d 290 (1995).

16-89-104, 16-89-105. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning interpreters in criminal actions, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 237, §§ 6, 7. The sections were derived from:

16-89-104. Acts 1973, No. 555, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2101.1; Acts 2001, No. 424, § 3.

16-89-105. Acts 1979, No. 664, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 5-715.1, 5-715.2; Acts 1991, No. 469, § 2.

16-89-106. Defendant on bail for felony indictment.

During the trial of an indictment for felony, when the defendant is on bail, he or she may remain on bail or be committed to and remain in the custody of the proper officer, as the court may direct.

History. Crim. Code, § 228; C. & M. Dig., § 3138; Pope's Dig., § 3974; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2103.

Cross References. Bail during trial, § 16-84-111.

Case Notes

Custody.

There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court in ordering that defendant, who was on bail, be taken into custody during the trial when it was brought to the court's attention that he had indicated that he might attempt to fix or tamper with the petit jury. Reaves v. State, 229 Ark. 453, 316 S.W.2d 824 (1958), cert. denied, Reaves v. Arkansas, 359 U.S. 944, 79 S. Ct. 723 (1959).

16-89-107. Trial of issues of law or fact.

    1. Issues of law shall be tried by the court.
    2. An issue of law arises on a demurrer to the indictment.
    3. All questions of law arising during the trial shall be decided by the court, and the jury shall be bound to take the decisions of the court on points of law as the law of the case.
    1. Issues of fact shall be tried by a jury. However, the determination of fact concerning the admissibility of a confession shall be made by the court when the issue is raised by the defendant; the trial court shall hear the evidence concerning the admissibility and the voluntariness of the confession out of the presence of the jury, and it shall be the court's duty before admitting the confession into evidence to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession has been made voluntarily.
    2. An issue of fact arises upon a plea of not guilty or of former acquittal or conviction.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 181-183, 234; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3082-3085, 3178; Pope's Dig., §§ 3908-3911, 4014; Acts 1965, No. 489, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2104 — 43-2107, 43-2131.

Cross References. Right to trial by jury, Ark. Const., Art. 2, §§ 7, 10, Amend. No. 16.

Research References

ALR.

What Constitutes Accused's Consent to Court's Discharge of Jury or to Grant of Motion for Mistrial Which Will Constitute Waiver of Former Jeopardy Plea — Silence or Failure to Object or Protest. 103 A.L.R.6th 137 (2015).

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Arizona v. Fulminate: Should Arkansas Courts Apply Harmless Error Analysis to Coerced Confessions, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 1015.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is constitutional as to the degree of proof required for a finding that a confession was voluntarily made. Ballew v. Sarver, 320 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Ark. 1970).

Confessions.

Admission of confessions without determining voluntariness was reversible error. Chenowith v. State, 247 Ark. 472, 445 S.W.2d 889 (1969).

The procedure outlined in this section, which requires the trial court to determine the voluntariness of confessions by a preponderance of the evidence, and an independent review on appeal are sufficient to meet the test that voluntariness be “fairly determined.” Ballew v. State, 249 Ark. 480, 459 S.W.2d 577 (1970).

Although a hearing was conducted out of the presence of the jury, and the court determined the confession to be voluntary, under this section it was error for the court subsequently to limit cross-examination of the witness before the jury, excluding the circumstances bearing on the voluntariness of the confession. Kagebein v. State, 254 Ark. 904, 496 S.W.2d 435 (1973).

In ruling upon the suppression of a confession, each case must be determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. This totality is subdivided into two main components; first, the statement of the officer, and second, the vulnerability of the defendant. Holmes v. State, 268 Ark. 601, 594 S.W.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1980); State v. Graham, 277 Ark. 465, 642 S.W.2d 880 (1982).

Deficiency in a ruling as to the voluntariness of a statement does not in itself entitle the defendant to a new trial. The cause should be remanded to the trial court for an explicit determination of the issue of voluntariness, and a new trial should be ordered only if the trial judge finds the confession to have been involuntary. Harris v. State, 271 Ark. 568, 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980); Moore v. State, 309 Ark. 166, 828 S.W.2d 599 (1992).

The general policy of a sheriff's office as to whether a statement by a defendant must be written or oral is irrelevant to the determination of whether the defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily made. Hayes v. State, 274 Ark. 440, 625 S.W.2d 498 (1981).

The defendant waived any objections to the use of the statement made by him at the police station by placing it in evidence. Williams v. State, 288 Ark. 444, 705 S.W.2d 888 (1986).

A confession induced by a misleading promise of reward or threat of harm is not a voluntary statement. Taylor v. State, 288 Ark. 456, 706 S.W.2d 384 (1986).

The purpose of a hearing under this section is to prevent a jury from hearing a confession before the court determines whether it has been voluntarily given and not to restrict evidence after the court has made the determination of voluntariness. Rucker v. State, 320 Ark. 643, 899 S.W.2d 447 (1995).

—Appeal.

Where there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination, that determination will not be disturbed on appeal. Mullins v. State, 240 Ark. 608, 401 S.W.2d 9 (1966).

Where the defendant at the hearing on voluntariness before the court made no objection, the court on appeal will not consider objections made thereafter. DuBois v. State, 258 Ark. 459, 527 S.W.2d 595 (1975).

The Supreme Court makes an independent determination of voluntariness, but does not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Titus v. State, 268 Ark. 9, 593 S.W.2d 164 (1980); White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).

The Supreme Court reviews the entire record on the question of the voluntariness of an incriminating statement, but the court considers testimony offered after a hearing only when the point has been properly raised in the trial court. Titus v. State, 268 Ark. 9, 593 S.W.2d 164 (1980).

While an appellate court does not reverse the trial court's finding on the voluntariness of an in-custodial confession unless it is clearly erroneous, it does make an independent determination based on the totality of circumstances, with all doubts resolved in favor of individual rights and safeguards, to determine whether the holding of the trial court was erroneous. State v. Graham, 277 Ark. 465, 642 S.W.2d 880 (1982); Free v. State, 19 Ark. App. 84, 717 S.W.2d 215 (1986), rev'd, 293 Ark. 65, 732 S.W.2d 452 (Ark. 1987).

—Burden of Proof.

State has burden of proving the voluntariness of an in-custody confession by producing all the material witnesses or accounting for their absence. Smith v. State, 254 Ark. 538, 494 S.W.2d 489 (1973); Russey v. State, 257 Ark. 570, 519 S.W.2d 751 (1975); Earl v. State, 272 Ark. 5, 612 S.W.2d 98 (1981); Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9, 642 S.W.2d 887, 1982 Ark. LEXIS 1606 (1982).

State has burden of showing that the defendant's confession was made after a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to remain silent. Cagle v. State, 267 Ark. 1145, 594 S.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1980).

The burden to prove the confession's voluntariness in a hearing does not become the state's unless the defense challenges the voluntariness and moves to suppress. Benedetti v. State, 268 Ark. 571, 594 S.W.2d 61 (Ct. App. 1980).

The state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of an in-custodial confession. Any conflict in the testimony of different witnesses is for the trial court to resolve. State v. Graham, 277 Ark. 465, 642 S.W.2d 880 (1982).

There is a presumption that an in-custody confession is involuntary, and the burden is on the state to show the statement to have been voluntarily, freely, and understandably made, without fear or hope of reward. Free v. State, 19 Ark. App. 84, 717 S.W.2d 215 (1986), rev'd, 293 Ark. 65, 732 S.W.2d 452 (Ark. 1987).

Where defendant's suppression motion raised the issue of involuntariness of his statements to police and where detective was a material witness connected with those controverted statements, it became the state's burden to produce detective at a suppression hearing or to explain his absence. Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258, 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996).

—Factors Considered.

Factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the waiver of the right to remain silent include age, education, and intelligence of the accused, advice or lack of advice of constitutional rights, length of detention, repeated or prolonged questioning, and the use of mental or physical punishment. Hatley v. State, 289 Ark. 130, 709 S.W.2d 812 (1986); White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).

A low intelligence quotient will not in itself render a waiver of the right to remain silent involuntary where the evidence shows the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Hatley v. State, 289 Ark. 130, 709 S.W.2d 812 (1986).

—Hearing.

It was permissible for prosecution to use a statement made by defendant while in custody to test the credibility of her testimony at the trial even though no hearing to determine the voluntariness of the prior statement was held. Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971)Questioned byHendrickson v. State, 290 Ark. 319, 719 S.W.2d 420 (Ark. 1986).

Defendant was not deprived of his rights by a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession conducted in the presence of the jury where he made no objection to the procedure at the time. Hill v. State, 250 Ark. 812, 467 S.W.2d 179 (1971).

It was not necessary to submit the issue of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury in the absence of a defense request. The holding of a hearing in the judge's chambers on the admissibility of the confession was all that was required. Furlow v. State, 251 Ark. 757, 475 S.W.2d 524 (1972).

Defendant's statements to sheriff during his incarceration could be used by the prosecution to impeach defendant's testimony without the requirement of a hearing held outside the presence of jury to determine its voluntariness. Williams v. State, 258 Ark. 207, 523 S.W.2d 377 (1975).

Evidence showed statements were not a confession within this section, so no in camera hearing was needed to test their voluntariness. Workman v. State, 267 Ark. 103, 589 S.W.2d 20 (1979).

Issue of voluntariness of defendant's statements was sufficiently raised at trial in a manner that required a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the voluntariness of the statements. Bucy v. State, 271 Ark. 768, 610 S.W.2d 576 (1981).

Trial court's failure to hold a hearing requested to determine the voluntariness of defendant's confession did not entitle defendant to a new trial; and case was remanded to trial court with instructions to conduct hearing and rule on the issue of voluntariness of defendant's confession. Guinn v. State, 27 Ark. App. 260, 771 S.W.2d 290 (1989).

The filing of a motion to strike the defendant's statement, with a certificate of service to the prosecuting attorney, sufficiently raised the issue of the voluntariness of the defendant's in-custody statement to require the court to hear the evidence concerning the admissibility and voluntariness of the statement out of the presence of the jury. Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1, 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990).

—Issue Raised by Defendant.

The admissibility of defendant's custodial statements was clearly “raised by the defendant” by way of his pretrial motion to suppress; despite the State's contention that defendant abandoned his suppression effort by failing to object to the admissibility of the statements when they were introduced at trial, defendant's pretrial suppression motion was all that was required by this section to raise the issue to the trial court and trigger its obligation to hold a hearing. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

A defendant is not required to raise the question of the admissibility of his incriminating custodial statements more than once. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

—Submission to Jury.

Where trial judge and attorneys retired to judge's chambers and discussed question of whether confessions was voluntary and judge, after finding confession was voluntary, submitted question to jury, procedure followed did not amount to reversible error. Hall v. State, 242 Ark. 201, 412 S.W.2d 603 (1967).

It was reversible error for the court to submit the question of the voluntariness of defendant's question to the jury rather than to determine the matter outside the presence of the jury. Estep v. State, 244 Ark. 843, 427 S.W.2d 535 (1968).

It was proper for trial court, in prosecution for first-degree murder, to refuse to submit issue of the voluntariness of appellant's confession to the jury and, as provided for by this section, to make its own finding as to voluntariness of the confession. Walker v. State, 253 Ark. 676, 488 S.W.2d 40 (1972).

Judge's statement to jury as to voluntariness amounted to a comment on the weight of the evidence and it was error to refuse to declare a mistrial. Walker v. State, 253 Ark. 676, 488 S.W.2d 40 (1972).

—Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence sufficient to show confession was voluntary and properly admissible. Ballew v. Sarver, 320 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Gray v. State, 253 Ark. 261, 485 S.W.2d 537 (1972); Bell v. State, 258 Ark. 976, 530 S.W.2d 662 (1975); Hulsey v. State, 261 Ark. 449, 549 S.W.2d 73 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882, 58 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1978); Holmes v. State, 268 Ark. 601, 594 S.W.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1980); Cagle v. State, 267 Ark. 1145, 594 S.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1980); Anderson v. State, 267 Ark. 1169, 594 S.W.2d 54, 1980 Ark. App. LEXIS 1184 (Ct. App. 1980); Titus v. State, 268 Ark. 9, 593 S.W.2d 164 (1980); Harvey v. State, 272 Ark. 19, 611 S.W.2d 762 (1981); Spillers v. State, 272 Ark. 212, 613 S.W.2d 387 (1981); Jackson v. State, 273 Ark. 107, 617 S.W.2d 13 (1981); Hunes v. State, 274 Ark. 268, 623 S.W.2d 835 (1981), cert. denied, Hunes v. Arkansas, 513 U.S. 844, 115 S. Ct. 134 (1994); Davis v. State, 275 Ark. 264, 630 S.W.2d 1 (1982); Hallman v. State, 288 Ark. 448, 706 S.W.2d 381 (1986); Taylor v. State, 288 Ark. 456, 706 S.W.2d 384 (1986); Thomas v. State, 289 Ark. 72, 709 S.W.2d 83 (1986); Hatley v. State, 289 Ark. 130, 709 S.W.2d 812 (1986); Free v. State, 19 Ark. App. 84, 717 S.W.2d 215 (1986), rev'd, 293 Ark. 65, 732 S.W.2d 452 (Ark. 1987); White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Stone v. State, 290 Ark. 204, 718 S.W.2d 102 (1986); Kennedy v. State, 325 Ark. 3, 923 S.W.2d 274 (1996).

Evidence sufficient to show defendant's confession was not voluntarily made. Richardson v. State, 274 Ark. 473, 625 S.W.2d 504 (1981); State v. Graham, 277 Ark. 465, 642 S.W.2d 880 (1982).

—Voluntariness.

There is a difference between the concept of an involuntary statement and a statement made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of one's constitutional rights; depending on the argument presented by the defendant in his suppression motion, a trial court should determine in the hearing whether the statement is inadmissible on account of its involuntariness or the lack of an effective waiver, or perhaps both of these grounds. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

The language of subdivision (b)(1) appears to require the trial court to consider only whether a statement was “voluntary” when the admissibility of the statement has been raised by the defendant; however, the Supreme Court has clearly required the trial court, if the defendant has alleged that his statement is inadmissible due to the lack of a waiver, to consider in a suppression hearing whether the statement was made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

Jury Questions.

When the issue involves a mixed question of law and fact, the jury may be judge of both law and facts themselves and are not bound by the law as declared by the court. Robinson v. State, 33 Ark. 180 (1878); Sweeney v. State, 35 Ark. 585 (1880).

It is within the exclusive province of the jury to determine, under proper instructions of the court, when the evidence is sufficient to convict; the court is without right to point out what inference may be drawn from particular facts in proof. Spivey v. State, 133 Ark. 314, 198 S.W. 101 (1917).

Circuit court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a jury trial on her fine for violating a municipal speeding ordinance. Johnston v. City of Pine Bluff, 258 Ark. 346, 525 S.W.2d 76 (1975).

Issues of fact must be tried by a jury; judges are prohibited from charging juries with regard to matters of fact (Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 23). Foster v. Lockhart, 811 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Ark. 1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. Ark. 1993).

Determining credibility of witnesses is within a jury's domain. Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993).

State inmate's federal habeas claim that the Supreme Court of Arkansas erred in rejecting his postconviction jury instruction argument because the Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense included the right to have the credibility of a confession determined by the jury, and the jury had to be instructed on the issue was procedurally barred because it was not “fairly presented” to the appropriate state court, and further, the jury instruction claim lacked merit even if not procedurally barred because under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, voluntariness was decided by the court, not the jury. Rucker v. Norris, 563 F.3d 766 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 950, 130 S. Ct. 401, 175 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2009).

Questions of Law.

Pro se defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge was not preserved as he failed to make a motion for a directed verdict before a trial court. He did not request a jury nullification instruction, nor was he entitled to one as, under subdivision (a)(3) of this section, all questions of law were decided by the trial court. Bower v. State, 2010 Ark. 456 (2010).

Right to Jury Trial.

Defendant, who appealed his conviction for driving his car left of center to the circuit court, had no need to demand or move for a trial by jury, much less obtain a ruling on the issue and thus the trial court erred in not honoring his right to be tried by a jury. Elmore v. State, 305 Ark. 426, 809 S.W.2d 370 (1991), modified, 305 Ark. 426, 809 S.W.2d 370 (1991).

Cited: Murphy v. State, 248 Ark. 794, 454 S.W.2d 302 (1970); Murphy v. State, 255 Ark. 398, 500 S.W.2d 394 (1973); McConahay v. State, 257 Ark. 328, 516 S.W.2d 887 (1974); Woodard v. State, 261 Ark. 895, 553 S.W.2d 259 (1977); Selph v. State, 264 Ark. 197, 570 S.W.2d 256 (1978); Shiras v. Britt, 267 Ark. 97, 589 S.W.2d 18 (1979); Spillers v. Housewright, 692 F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1982); Hall v. State, 276 Ark. 245, 634 S.W.2d 115 (1982); Harrell v. City of Conway, 296 Ark. 247, 753 S.W.2d 542 (1988); Stevenson v. State, 25 Ark. App. 318, 759 S.W.2d 220 (1988); Davis v. State, 308 Ark. 481, 825 S.W.2d 584 (1992); Dillon v. State, 311 Ark. 529, 844 S.W.2d 944 (1993); Jones v. State, 314 Ark. 383, 862 S.W.2d 273 (1993); Noble v. State, 319 Ark. 407, 892 S.W.2d 477 (1995); State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 80, 913 S.W.2d 259 (1996); Matthews v. State, 327 Ark. 70, 938 S.W.2d 545 (1997); Young v. State, 370 Ark. 147, 257 S.W.3d 870 (2007).

16-89-108. Waivers of trial by jury and death penalty.

  1. In all criminal cases, except where a sentence of death may be imposed, trial by a jury may be waived by the defendant, provided the prosecuting attorney gives his or her assent to the waiver. The waiver and the assent thereto shall be made in open court and entered of record. In the event of waiver, the trial judge shall pass both upon the law and the facts.
  2. In all criminal cases where the punishment is death, the prosecuting attorney, with permission of the court, may waive the death penalty and in those cases punishment cannot be fixed at more than life imprisonment.
  3. In all criminal cases where the maximum punishment is death by electrocution and the defendant waives a trial by jury, the court must determine that the defendant's waiver is voluntary and is not made in response to any promise or threat and that the waiver is freely made without fear or compulsion.

History. Init. Meas. 1936, No. 3, § 28, Acts 1937, p. 1384; Pope's Dig., § 3912; Acts 1971, No. 124, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2108 — 43-2108.2.

Cross References. Assent by prosecutor, ARCrP 31.1.

Capitol felonies, ARCrP 31.4.

Personal request, ARCrP 31.2.

Waiver of death penalty, § 5-4-608.

Case Notes

Agreements.

There is no federal rule binding the state courts to use a 12-member jury in state criminal prosecutions, and an agreement to proceed with an 11-member jury in accordance with state law and court rules is not a violation of the constitutional right to trial by jury. Vinston v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1988).

Credibility of Witnesses.

Where the trial court sits as a jury, the court is sole judge of the credibility of witnesses. Maples v. State, 225 Ark. 785, 286 S.W.2d 15 (1956).

Death Penalty.

In no case where a death sentence may be imposed may a jury be waived. Carson v. State, 198 Ark. 112, 128 S.W.2d 373 (1939); Scarber v. State, 226 Ark. 503, 291 S.W.2d 241 (1956).

Evidence.

Evidence sufficient to show that defendant's right to trial by jury was not violated. Ford v. State, 222 Ark. 16, 257 S.W.2d 30 (1953); Moore v. State, 241 Ark. 335, 407 S.W.2d 744 (1966).

Knowing and Intelligent Waiver.

Presuming waiver of right to a jury trial from a silent record is impermissible; the record must demonstrate that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and understandingly waived his right to a jury trial, and anything less is not waiver. Williamson v. Lockhart, 636 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Where the defendant was never made aware, either by the trial court or his attorney, that the choice confronting him was to be tried by jury of his peers, or to have his guilt or innocence determined by the judge, the defendant was deprived of sufficient information to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial. Williamson v. Lockhart, 636 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Prosecutor's Consent.

The assent of the prosecuting attorney to defendant's waiver of a trial by jury was for the benefit of the state and not the defendant, and his failure to assent did not invalidate the waiver. Scates v. State, 244 Ark. 333, 424 S.W.2d 876 (1968).

Although the record failed to show the prosecuting attorney affirmatively gave his consent to defendant's waiver of a jury trial, such consent was presumed from his presence at the time the waiver was made and his failure to object. Scates v. State, 244 Ark. 333, 424 S.W.2d 876 (1968).

Where the prosecuting attorney did not give his assent to the waiver by defendants of their right to a jury trial, the court did not err in compelling trial by jury for possession of marijuana. Hooper v. State, 257 Ark. 103, 514 S.W.2d 394 (1974).

Requirement under subsection (a) of this section and Ark. R. Crim. P. 31.1, that a prosecutor approve defendant's request to plead guilty and waive a jury trial, did not violate defendant's due process rights because the sentencing scheme codified at §§ 16-90-80116-90-804 did not create a liberty interest in protecting from exposure to higher ranges of sentences. Whitlow v. State, 357 Ark. 290, 166 S.W.3d 45 (2004).

Punishment.

State's waiver of the death penalty did not preclude the jury from sentencing the accused to life imprisonment without parole. Butler v. State, 261 Ark. 369, 549 S.W.2d 65 (1977).

Cited: Johnston v. City of Pine Bluff, 258 Ark. 346, 525 S.W.2d 76 (1975).

16-89-109. Oath of jury members.

When a jury of twelve (12) qualified jurors shall have been duly impaneled, they shall be sworn substantially as follows:

“You, and each of you, do solemnly swear, that you will well and truly try the case of the State of Arkansas against A. B., and a true verdict render, unless discharged by the court or withdrawn by the parties.”

History. Crim. Code, § 219; C. & M. Dig., § 3170; Pope's Dig., § 4006; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2109.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The oath prescribed for the petit jury by this section is not in violation of the Constitution; it in effect requires the jury to try the case according to the law and the evidence. Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248 (1874).

Delay in Swearing.

Evidence insufficient to show that delay in swearing jury prejudiced defendant's rights to a jury trial, fair trial or due process. Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852, 100 S. Ct. 106 (1979); 444 U.S. 979, 100 S. Ct. 479, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Jeopardy.

When the jury is finally sworn to try the case, jeopardy has attached to the accused, and when, without the consent of the defendants, expressed or implied, the jury is discharged before the case is completed, then the constitutional right against double jeopardy may be invoked, except only in cases of “overruling necessity.” Jones v. State, 230 Ark. 18, 320 S.W.2d 645 (1959).

Mandatory Nature.

The jury in criminal cases must take this oath regardless of the grade of the crime; the general oath administered to the regular panel will not suffice. Chiles v. State, 45 Ark. 143 (1885); Tong v. State, 169 Ark. 708, 276 S.W. 1004 (1925).

Record.

Where the record fails to show that the trial jury, in a felony case, were sworn in that case, a judgment of conviction will be reversed. Lawson v. State, 25 Ark. 106 (1868); Barbour v. State, 37 Ark. 61 (1881).

Where the record shows that the jurors were sworn, but the form of oath administered is not set out in the entries, it will be presumed by the Supreme Court, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that the oath was administered to the jurors in proper form. Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 17 (1874); Lay v. State, 42 Ark. 105 (1883).

If the form of oath administered is entered of record, and appears not to be in substance and legal effect the oath prescribed by law, it will be error. Anderson v. State, 34 Ark. 257, 1879 Ark. LEXIS 34 (1879).

Fact that jury was sworn must be shown by record. Tong v. State, 169 Ark. 708, 276 S.W. 1004 (1925).

Nunc pro tunc order showing the fact in the judgment that the jury was sworn as provided by law, entered subsequently to the filing of original transcript in the Supreme Court, was proper. Harrison v. State, 200 Ark. 257, 138 S.W.2d 785 (1940).

Separate Swearing.

When the regular panel is exhausted, and the deficiency of jurors is supplied by talesmen, they may be sworn separately, as they are selected. Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 17 (1874).

Time to Object.

A defendant in a misdemeanor prosecution waives his right to object that the jurors were improperly sworn unless he objects before going to trial. Ruble v. State, 51 Ark. 126, 10 S.W. 23 (1888).

After verdict, it is too late to object that the jurors were not sworn in accordance with the statute. Meadors v. State, 130 Ark. 471, 197 S.W. 1153 (1917).

It is not error on a charge of manslaughter to be tried by a jury of eleven men, where appellant not only agreed in open court to a jury of eleven, but made no objections, saved no exceptions and did not assign this as error in his motion for a new trial. Ford v. State, 222 Ark. 16, 257 S.W.2d 30 (1953).

16-89-110. Opening statements.

  1. The prosecuting attorney may then:
    1. Read the indictment to the jury;
    2. State the defendant's plea to the indictment and the punishment prescribed by law for the offense; and
    3. Make a brief statement of the evidence on which the state relies.
  2. The defendant or his or her counsel may then make a brief statement of the defense and the evidence upon which the defendant relies.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 220, 221; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3171, 3172; Pope's Dig., §§ 4007, 4008; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2110, 43-2111.

Case Notes

Delaying Opening Statement.

Criminal defendant was only allowed the opportunity to delay his opening statement until the close of the state's evidence where he made such a request at the appropriate time, the trial court assented, the state failed to object, and the defendant expected to put on some evidence following the opening statement. Lamar v. State, 347 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.3d 294 (2002).

Failure to Require Statement.

The trial being before the court without a jury, and there being no request for an opening statement, it was within the court's discretion to proceed with the trial without opening statements, and failure of the court to require opening statements did not violate defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair trial. Richards v. State, 266 Ark. 733, 585 S.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1979).

Instructions.

In view of this section, reading the information to the jury as one of the instructions, where affidavit of prosecuting attorney was not read, was not error. Malone v. State, 202 Ark. 796, 152 S.W.2d 1019 (1941).

Prosecutor's Remarks.

So long as the statement as to what the prosecutor expects to prove is made in good faith and not of a nature calculated to create a prejudicial impression, the failure of the evidence to substantiate the opening statement will not justify the setting aside of a conviction. McFalls v. State, 66 Ark. 16, 48 S.W. 492 (1898); Sheptine v. State, 133 Ark. 239, 202 S.W. 225 (1918).

Prosecutor's remark in opening statement was not in error. Nelson v. State, 139 Ark. 13, 212 S.W. 93, 1919 Ark. LEXIS 187 (1919); Mills v. State, 188 Ark. 107, 64 S.W.2d 83 (1933).

It is bad practice to permit the state's attorney, in a murder case, to read the testimony taken at the coroner's inquest as part of his opening statement. Gehl v. State, 179 Ark. 206, 15 S.W.2d 396 (1929).

Prosecutor's remark in his opening statement resulted in pre-evidentiary coercion which may have forced the defendant to testify against her will. Clark v. State, 256 Ark. 658, 509 S.W.2d 812 (1974).

Reading of Indictment.

In view of this section, there was no error in permitting the deputy prosecutor to read indictment to jury in murder prosecution. Baxter v. State, 225 Ark. 239, 281 S.W.2d 931 (Ark. 1955).

Statement by Assistant.

The opening statement may be made by an attorney assisting the prosecution. Tiner v. State, 115 Ark. 494, 172 S.W. 1010 (1914).

Time of Statement.

Defendant cannot be required to make an opening statement, but he cannot require the state to offer its evidence and then make his opening statement. McDaniels v. State, 187 Ark. 1163, 63 S.W.2d 335 (1933).

It was reversible to refuse to permit defense counsel to make an opening statement at the close of the state's evidence after assenting, without objection from the state, to his reserving his statement until such time at the close of the state's opening statement. Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653, 460 S.W.2d 319 (1970)Limited byLamar v. State, 347 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.3d 294 (2002).

Cited: Jenkins v. State, 222 Ark. 511, 261 S.W.2d 784 (1953); Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653, 460 S.W.2d 319 (1970).

16-89-111. Evidence generally.

  1. The state shall first offer the evidence in support of an indictment or information.
  2. The defendant or his or her counsel shall then offer the defendant's evidence in support of his or her defense.
  3. The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court for good reason, in furtherance of justice, permits them to offer evidence upon their original cases.
  4. A confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, does not warrant a conviction unless:
    1. Accompanied with other proof that the offense was committed; or
    2. Supported by substantial independent evidence that would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the confession.
      1. A conviction or an adjudication of delinquency may not be had in any case of felony upon the testimony of an accomplice, including in the juvenile division of circuit court, unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant or the juvenile with the commission of the offense.
      2. The corroboration under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances of the offense.
    1. However, a conviction may be had in misdemeanor cases upon the testimony of an accomplice.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 222-224, 239, 240; Acts 1883, No. 3, § 1, p. 2; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3173-3175, 3181, 3182; Pope's Dig., §§ 4009-4011, 4017, 4018; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2112 — 43-2116; Acts 2001, No. 903, § 1; 2013, No. 983, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment made gender neutral changes in (b); substituted “cases” for “case” in (c); redesignated former (e)(1) as present (e)(1)(A)-(B); and, in (e)(1)(A), inserted “or an adjudication of delinquency,” “including in juvenile court” and “or the juvenile.”

The 2013 amendment added “or information” in (a); inserted the (d)(1) designation; added (d)(2); and rewrote (e)(1)(B).

Research References

ALR.

Criminal Defendant's Age or Height as Factor in Determination of Whether Circumstances of Witness's Identification of Defendant in Photographic Array Shown by Police to Witness Were Impermissibly Suggestive as Matter of Federal Constitutional Law. 102 A.L.R.6th 365 (2015).

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Corroboration of Confessions in the Theft by Receiving Context: Is Proof of Theft Enough?, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 805.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Evidence, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Arkansas Law Survey, Smith, Evidence, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 165.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The more stringent corroboration requirements in the case of accomplice testimony does not violate the equal protection clause as there is a legitimate rationale for greater safeguards when a defendant's conviction is based on the testimony of a third person rather than on his own words. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996).

Applicability.

Subsection (d) of this section does not require that a confession be corroborated by other evidence in order to sustain a conviction; subsection (d) deals only with the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, and not mere admissibility. McVay v. State, 312 Ark. 73, 847 S.W.2d 28 (1993).

Subsection (d) was inapplicable in a prosecution for driving on a suspended driver's license, notwithstanding the defendant's argument that the only evidence to support his conviction was his uncorroborated confession, as the defendant's admission to the arresting officer that his license had been suspended was only one element of the offense of driving with a suspended license; the criminal act of driving with a suspended license was established by the defendant's admission in conjunction with the officer's testimony that the defendant was the only person in the vehicle. White v. State, 73 Ark. App. 264, 42 S.W.3d 584 (2001).

Court properly admitted juvenile's statements at a probation revocation proceeding to her probation officer regarding taking drugs because § 9-27-321 protected juveniles from Miranda violations in a pre-adjudication context, not at a revocation hearing; in addition, the statement was properly admitted because the statement was offered to prove that defendant had violated the terms of her probation. K.N. v. State, 360 Ark. 579, 203 S.W.3d 103 (2005).

In a case in which a minor was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to a juvenile court's finding that he committed the criminal offense of misdemeanor theft by receiving, in violation of § 5-36-106(a), the minor unsuccessfully argued that a witness's testimony had to be corroborated. Since the minor had been charged with a misdemeanor, subdivision (e)(1) of this section did not apply. R.W. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 220 (2010).

Accomplice Testimony.

Where an accomplice's confession was cross-implicating, even though enough other evidence was available from accomplice for conviction, the court was ordered to sever the case for retrial. Kerr v. State, 256 Ark. 738, 512 S.W.2d 13 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110, 95 S. Ct. 783, 42 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1975).

Testimony of an accomplice is insufficient to justify conviction of a felony, even though the court and jury believe the testimony. The reason for this rule is that the instinct for survival renders the testimony of an accomplice less than completely credible. Foster v. State, 290 Ark. 495, 720 S.W.2d 712 (1986), rehearing denied, 290 Ark. 495, 290 Ark. 498A, 290 Ark. 498, 722 S.W.2d 869, cert. denied, Arkansas v. Foster, 107 S. Ct. 3213, 96 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1987).

An accomplice's testimony must be corroborated by other evidence. The corroboration must be sufficient standing alone to establish the commission of the offense and to connect the defendant with it; it may be circumstantial evidence as long as it is substantial. David v. State, 295 Ark. 131, 748 S.W.2d 117 (1988); Franklin v. State, 311 Ark. 601, 845 S.W.2d 525 (1993); Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict on his capital murder conviction because the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of the underlying felony, aggravated robbery, even after eliminating the testimony of one of defendant's accomplices. Evidence showed that: (1) defendant had the purpose of committing a theft with the use of physical force, as he and three other individuals went to a witness's house to acquire ammunition for their firearm; (2) the fourth individual testified that defendant and three men arrived at his trailer where defendant displayed a gun, and that he provided ammunition for the gun; (3) a second witness, one of the three men who accompanied defendant, testified that he heard two gunshots fired after the two other men left the victim's apartment after the struggle between defendant and the victim ensued; and (4) the chief medical examiner testified that the victim died from a gunshot wound. Gardner v. State, 362 Ark. 413, 208 S.W.3d 774 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony and to convict defendant of first degree murder and theft where, in addition to the testimony of defendant's wife, who was an accomplice, defendant's own statements to the police, his conduct before and after the crime, and statements of the victim's friends regarding her fear of defendant tended to connect him to the crimes; further, although there was no evidence that defendant ever drove victim's Cadillac or had the vehicle in his possession, the jury might have determined that defendant facilitated the theft by leaving the accomplice without a vehicle at the victim's house, and there was evidence that the theft of the Cadillac was part of the plan to murder the victim. MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for aggravated robbery and capital murder based on defendant's admission that she held the victim's hands down while he was beaten inside an apartment during an alleged robbery and the testimony of an accomplice waiting outside; the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated. Johnson v. State, 366 Ark. 8, 233 S.W.3d 123 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's kidnapping conviction where defendant's accomplice testified that defendant killed the victim, and an officer testified that defendant stated that the accomplice attacked the victim, knocked him down, taped him in a chair, and that the victim was “moaning” and “in a bad way” before he died; although there was a discrepancy as to which individual attacked the victim, both statements pointed to defendant's involvement in the victim's murder. Holsombach v. State, 368 Ark. 415, 246 S.W.3d 871 (2007).

Because three of the state's witnesses were not charged as accomplices, and defendant neither requested that the trial court declare them accomplices nor proffered an accomplice jury instruction for the record, his argument that they were accomplices and that, without their testimony, the state would not have been able to prove its case, was not preserved for appeal. Boldin v. State, 373 Ark. 295, 283 S.W.3d 565 (2008).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of capital murder were appropriate because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate an accomplice's testimony under former § 43-2116; after eliminating the accomplice's testimony, other testimony still independently established the crimes and tended to connect defendant with their commission. Defendant's former wife testified that he was not home on the night in question, that a shotgun was missing, and that defendant told the wife's daughter that she would not have to return to her father's home; the father was one of the victims. Wertz v. State, 374 Ark. 256, 287 S.W.3d 528 (2008).

Where defendant's friend testified that defendant tried to rob the victim in his truck and shot him when he resisted, defendant's fingerprints were found on the truck and the blood on the gun matched defendant's DNA. Even if the friend was deemed an accomplice, there was sufficient corroborating evidence for purposes of this section to support defendant's conviction for capital murder. Bush v. State, 374 Ark. 506, 288 S.W.3d 658 (2008).

Defendant's convictions for capital murder and kidnapping were appropriate because a witness' testimony alone was enough to corroborate an accomplice's testimony against defendant, pursuant to subdivisions (e)(1)(A) and (B) of this section. Evidence showed that bullets found near the victims' bodies were fired from a .22 caliber rifle and a .38 caliber revolver and according to another witness, an individual wanted to buy a .38 caliber revolver from defendant; essentially, when all of the evidence was viewed in a light most favorable to the state, it tended to connect defendant to the commission of the crimes. Gilcrease v. State, 2009 Ark. 298, 318 S.W.3d 70 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain drug and firearm convictions because the testimony of defendant's wife that defendant bought the cocaine and that they were both involved in a drug-dealing operation was corroborated by other evidence that tended to connect defendant with possession of the drugs. Defendant not only was a co-owner of the car but he was driving it when he was stopped by the police for speeding, defendant admitted to the police that he was in possession of the loaded handgun that was in plain view and easily accessible to him at the time of the stop. Layton v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 96, 302 S.W.3d 610 (2009).

There was insufficient evidence corroborating the testimony of an accomplice to adjudicate a defendant as a delinquent juvenile because there was no substantial evidence that tended to connect defendant with the commission of the crime: there was no conclusive proof that the crime took place during the time alleged, defendant's location during this time was approximately a quarter of a mile away; other evidence established an extremely narrow window of time in which defendant could have committed the crime; and substantial evidence was also lacking with regard to defendant's association with the accomplice who had confessed to the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation. Westbrook v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 723 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for commercial burglary, criminal mischief, and breaking and entering because the testimony of defendant's accomplice, who was defendant's son, was sufficiently corroborated, as required by subdivision (e)(1) of this section, by an officer's testimony as to the items he found in defendant's truck, matching the description of items stolen from a convenience store. The accomplice admitted that he and defendant entered the store by using a cable to pull open the front doors and that he and defendant used bolt cutters and a pry bar to break into gaming machines, and these items, along with packages of cigarettes stolen from the store, were found by police officers in defendant's truck. Dunlap v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 582 (2010).

Appellant's conviction for delivery of methamphetamine was affirmed because the jury was properly instructed that the witness's testimony must be corroborated and an officer and the witness both testified that the crime of delivery of methamphetamine occurred. Hall v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 717 (2010).

In a capital murder trial, a circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate an accomplice's testimony; even if the accomplice's testimony was eliminated, the testimony of a police officer and the victim's nephew was consistent with the accomplice's testimony of the events surrounding the murder, the testimony of several police officers established defendant was in possession of the murder weapon four days after the crime occurred, and the testimony of several law enforcement officials established defendant's flight from the vicinity of the crime, constituting corroboration of all the other evidence establishing defendant's guilt. Taylor v. State, 2011 Ark. 10, 370 S.W.3d 503 (2011).

In defendant's capital murder trial, the state provided sufficient evidence to corroborate the alleged accomplice's testimony pursuant to this section and, even if the accomplice's testimony was eliminated, the other evidence presented independently established the crime and tended to connect defendant with its commission. Taylor v. State, 2011 Ark. 10, 370 S.W.3d 503 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated residential burglary and aggravated robbery were appropriate because the state provided sufficient evidence to corroborate his accomplices' testimony; even eliminating the accomplice testimony, the remaining evidence presented independently established the crimes and tended to connect defendant with their commission, as required by subdivisions (e)(1)(A) and (B) of this section. In part, witnesses testified about defendant being with the accomplices on the day of the crimes and the state also presented a witness's testimony that defendant had sold him the three shotguns that were identified as being the ones stolen from the victim. Tucker v. State, 2011 Ark. 144, 381 S.W.3d 1 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict during a trial for first-degree murder as an accomplice because there was sufficient evidence under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section corroborating a codefendant's testimony that defendant hired the codefendant to murder his wife; two witnesses identified the murder weapon as a gun belonging to defendant. Camp v. State, 2011 Ark. 155, 381 S.W.3d 11 (2011).

Defendant's argument that he was convicted on the basis of the uncorroborated accomplice testimony of his wife contrary to subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section was not preserved for review. Defendant's wife was never found to be an accomplice, and defendant failed to request that accomplice instructions be submitted to the jury for consideration. Bryant v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 348, 384 S.W.3d 46 (2011).

Independent evidence corroborated defendant's passenger's testimony that drugs in a blue glove in her pants belonged to defendant, including a letter defendant wrote to the passenger from jail asking her to change her statement and to implicate someone else in the crime and the passenger's statements to officers that she had something concealed on her body. Owens v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 763, 387 S.W.3d 250 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for second-degree forgery was proper considering accomplice testimony along with the other evidence, under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section. Although the evidence was circumstantial given that it was the accomplice, rather than defendant, who cashed the forged check, circumstantial evidence could provide the basis to support the conviction. Benton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 71, 388 S.W.3d 488 (2012).

There was sufficient evidence tending to connect defendant to an aggravated robbery and thus to corroborate accomplice testimony because surveillance video established the commission of the crime and an officer testified that defendant matched the description of a robber in the video based on his height and that the officer confirmed the truth of identifying information from a non-accomplice. Smith v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 534, 423 S.W.3d 624 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for capital murder and aggravated robbery because a witness's testimony corroborated that defendant was an accomplice to the aggravated robbery, defendant knew there was a large amount of marijuana at the home, a gun was used during the robbery, and the victim's death occurred during the robbery under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Bradley v. State, 2013 Ark. 58, 426 S.W.3d 363 (2013).

Because no accomplice instruction was submitted to the jury, and because defendant never requested that the circuit court declare defendant's cousin to be an accomplice as a matter of law, accomplice status was never determined, and the appellate court was unable to reach the merits of defendant's argument that the State failed to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of his alleged accomplice. Rainey v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 254 (2015).

Defendant's accomplice-corroboration argument as to the misdemeanor theft-of-property conviction failed under subdivision (e)(2) of this section as the violation was a misdemeanor, and defendant candidly admitted that his accomplice's testimony supported the conviction. Lovelace v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 146, 516 S.W.3d 300 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony as to defendant's first-degree battery conviction where the vehicle from which defendant fled matched the description seen in a video, and the victim identified defendant as the man who shot him. Lovelace v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 146, 516 S.W.3d 300 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery either as a principal or as an accomplice because defendant's boyfriend told her they were going to pick up the victim and that he intended to beat him up and take anything that the victim had on him; despite knowing the boyfriend's purpose, defendant still agreed to drive him; substantial corroborating evidence connecting defendant to the crime included two interviews she gave to the police and her written statement, which were admitted at trial; and the victim's death made the offense an aggravated robbery regardless of her knowledge of whether a gun might be used. Vaughan v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 439, 555 S.W.3d 922 (2018).

While the State's case against defendant for capital felony murder/aggravated robbery was premised on circumstantial evidence, testimony clearly corroborated an accomplice's testimony against defendant and the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict even without the accomplice testimony; testimony from multiple witnesses demonstrated that three masked men entered a gas station convenience store, the man in red demanded money from the owner, shot him in the neck, and then turned his gun on an employee, shooting him in the face. Lawshea v. State, 2019 Ark. 68, 567 S.W.3d 853 (2019).

—Accomplice Defined.

One who with full knowledge that a crime has been committed conceals it from the magistrate or harbors and protects the criminal is an accomplice. Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117 (1880).

An accomplice is one who could himself be convicted of the crime charged against the defendant, either as principal or accessory. Simon v. State, 149 Ark. 609, 233 S.W. 917 (1921); Henderson v. State, 174 Ark. 835, 297 S.W. 836 (1927); McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948); Havens v. State, 217 Ark. 153, 228 S.W.2d 1003 (1950).

Receiver of stolen goods and thief from whom he received them are accomplices within the meaning of this section. Long v. State, 192 Ark. 1089, 97 S.W.2d 67 (1936).

Ordinarily the question of whether a witness is an accomplice is a mixed question of fact and law and must be submitted to the jury where the evidence is in dispute. Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S.W.2d 546 (1937); Clayton v. State, 247 Ark. 643, 447 S.W.2d 319 (1969); Shrader v. State, 13 Ark. App. 17, 678 S.W.2d 777 (1984); Woodward v. State, 16 Ark. App. 18, 696 S.W.2d 759 (1985).

One jointly indicted with defendant, if evidence tends to show his or her connection with the commission of the offense, even though such evidence be meager and unsatisfactory, is to be regarded as an accomplice. Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S.W.2d 546 (1937).

Where question as to whether or not one is an accomplice is submitted to jury, its finding on the subject is final, unless the testimony shows conclusively that the witness was an accomplice. Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S.W.2d 546 (1937); Shrader v. State, 13 Ark. App. 17, 678 S.W.2d 777 (1984).

Victim not an accomplice. Waterman v. State, 202 Ark. 934, 154 S.W.2d 813 (1941); Wise v. State, 204 Ark. 743, 164 S.W.2d 897 (1942); Havens v. State, 217 Ark. 153, 228 S.W.2d 1003 (1950).

Evidence sufficient to show that question of whether witness was an accomplice was waived by the defendant. Trotter v. State, 215 Ark. 121, 219 S.W.2d 636 (1949).

One who buys a controlled substance is not an accomplice of the person who sells or delivers it. Sweatt v. State, 251 Ark. 650, 473 S.W.2d 913 (1971); Long v. State, 260 Ark. 417, 542 S.W.2d 742 (1976); Brizendine v. State, 4 Ark. App. 19, 627 S.W.2d 26 (1982); Barnes v. State, 15 Ark. App. 153, 691 S.W.2d 178 (1985); Williams v. State, 290 Ark. 449, 720 S.W.2d 305, 1986 Ark. LEXIS 2215 (1986), aff'd, 292 Ark. 616, 732 S.W.2d 135 (1987).

Grant of immunity alone does not cause a witness to be an accomplice as a matter of law. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 287, 742 S.W.2d 884 (1988).

Failure to inform law enforcement officers of crime does not make one an accomplice as a matter of law. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 287, 742 S.W.2d 884 (1988).

Mere presence at scene of a crime does not make one an accomplice. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 287, 742 S.W.2d 884 (1988).

A buyer of illicit drugs is not an accomplice of the seller. Talley v. State, 312 Ark. 271, 849 S.W.2d 493 (1993).

The fact that a witness has been granted immunity is not a basis to rule that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. State v. Young, 315 Ark. 656, 869 S.W.2d 691 (1994).

Where witness lured murder victim to the murder site, but there was no evidence that witness had knowledge of the crime that was going to occur, the facts did not show conclusively that witness was an accomplice as a matter of law. King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996).

—Appeal.

Where an appeal by the state in a felony case presents only the question of the sufficiency of the corroborating testimony of the appellee's accomplice in the commission of the crime charged, it will be denied, since that is a question of fact and the Supreme Court's opinion could not serve as a precedent for the trial of other cases founded on a similar charge. State v. Massey, 194 Ark. 439, 107 S.W.2d 527 (1937).

State conceded at trial that the witness was an accomplice; therefore, Supreme Court could not question that fact on appeal. Du Bois v. State, 254 Ark. 543, 494 S.W.2d 700 (1973).

The appellate court reviews the sufficiency of corroborating evidence by the test of whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, which means whether the fact finder could have reached the verdict without resorting to speculation and conjecture; in such cases the court merely determines whether the circumstantial evidence tends to some degree to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime and does not look to see whether every other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt has been excluded. Roe v. State, 7 Ark. App. 263, 647 S.W.2d 483 (1983).

If an accused must be acquitted if the state's case is based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, then that determination on appeal prohibits retrial just as it does when acquittal occurs at the trial; the reason for reversal is not “error,” but insufficiency of the state's proof. Foster v. State, 290 Ark. 495, 290 Ark. 498A, 290 Ark. 498, 722 S.W.2d 869.

On appeal, the inquiry is, or should be, not whether the court views the corroborating evidence as sufficient, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the corroborating evidence was sufficient. In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the corroborating evidence was sufficient, the court need only consider testimony lending support to the jury verdict and may disregard any testimony that could have been rejected by the jury on the basis of credibility. Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987).

Where state court reverses a conviction because the prosecution fails to corroborate accomplice testimony as required by this section, such a reversal is one based on evidentiary insufficiency, and therefore, a second prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution.DuBois v. Lockhart, 859 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1988).

State supreme court would not overturn trial judge, sitting as fact finder, who found that a witness was not an accomplice; defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery, in part based on the witness' testimony, was affirmed. Gray v. State, 311 Ark. 209, 843 S.W.2d 315 (1992).

Despite not asking for a jury instruction that witness was an accomplice as a matter of law and it was necessary for the state to produce evidence connecting defendant to the crime, independent of witness' testimony, the issue of an erroneous denial of a directed verdict motion on insufficient corroborative evidence was preserved for appeal. Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996).

In an appeal from the trial court's grant of a directed verdict of not guilty in defendant's murder trial, the state sought to have the Supreme Court determine whether the corroborating evidence submitted was sufficient to connect defendant to the offense under the accomplice-corroboration statute, but any decision in response to that portion of the state's appeal would have required consideration of the application of the statute to the specific facts of the case, which the Supreme Court would not do in appeals by the state. State v. Fuson, 355 Ark. 652, 144 S.W.3d 250 (2004).

Defendant was entitled to have the jury decide whether a state's witness was an accomplice whose testimony had to be corroborated pursuant to subdivision (e)(1) of this section and, if so, whether sufficient corroboration was proved; because the witness's testimony raised a question as to his accomplice status and the trial court refused to give a correct instruction permitting the jury to decide the question, the trial court committed reversible error. Torrence v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 225 (2010).

—Burden of Proof.

A person must first be found to be an accomplice under § 5-2-403 for the requirement of corroborative evidence to come into play under subdivision (e)(1) of this section; it is the burden of the defendant to prove that a witness is an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated. Rockett v. State, 319 Ark. 335, 891 S.W.2d 366 (1995).

Testimony of accomplices must be corroborated, but evidence corroborating accomplice testimony need not be sufficient standing alone to sustain the conviction; however, it must tend to connect the defendant to a substantial degree with the commission of the crime independent of the accomplice's testimony. Tate v. State, 84 Ark. App. 184, 137 S.W.3d 404 (2003), rev'd, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004).

—Corroboration.

Corroboration of testimony may be supplied by proof of the acts, conduct, or declarations of the party informed against, either before or after the commission of the crime. Long v. State, 192 Ark. 1089, 97 S.W.2d 67 (1936). For cases discussing the use of tape recordings as corroborating evidence, see Miller v. State, 230 Ark. 168, 321 S.W.2d 199, 1959 Ark. LEXIS 591 (1959).

This section requiring corroboration for felony convictions does not apply to the revocation of a previous suspension of sentence and, thus, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient basis for the revocation of a suspension of sentence. Townsend v. State, 256 Ark. 570, 509 S.W.2d 311 (1974); Ellerson v. State, 261 Ark. 525, 549 S.W.2d 495 (1977).

Corroboration may be furnished by the acts, conduct, declarations or testimony of the accused; false statements to the police and flight by an accused may constitute corroborating evidence. On the other hand, an explanation by the accused of suspicious circumstances may be considered in determining whether the evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony is sufficient. Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983).

Admission of uncorroborated accomplice testimony in penalty phase of capital case did not violate this section prohibiting conviction on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 656 S.W.2d 684 (1983), cert. denied, Clines v. Arkansas, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1328, 79 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1984).

That the legislature chose 16 years as the age of accountability for purposes of the crime of incest does not mean that it also intended that when an unwilling victim of incest is 16 years old, then corroboration is required. The testimony of the 16-year old victim of incest did not require corroboration under this section where the intercourse was not with her consent, as evidenced by her running away following the incident and her refusal to stay at home. Camp v. State, 288 Ark. 269, 704 S.W.2d 617 (1986).

The requirement of corroboration is satisfied by proof that crime was committed by someone. Shells v. State, 22 Ark. App. 62, 733 S.W.2d 743 (1987).

Flight by an accused may constitute a corroborating circumstance. Jimenez v. State, 24 Ark. App. 76, 749 S.W.2d 331, 1988 Ark. App. LEXIS 203 (1988).

Corroboration is not needed as to every detail supplied by an accomplice. York v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1759 (1989).

The corroborating evidence must establish the commission of the crime and tend to connect the accused with the crime. York v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1759 (1989); McDonald v. State, 37 Ark. App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992).

There is no requirement that each element of the crime attested to by the accomplice be corroborated by independent testimony; rather, if an accomplice is corroborated as to some particular fact or facts, the jury is authorized to infer that he speaks the truth as to all. York v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1759 (1989).

The corroboration required by subdivision (e)(1) is directed toward proof of the criminal offense and not to venue or jurisdictional facts, for which corroboration is not required. Lee v. State, 27 Ark. App. 198, 770 S.W.2d 148 (1989), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 493 U.S. 847, 110 S. Ct. 142 (1989).

Corroborating evidence is evidence which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, but is something less than that evidence necessary to sustain a conviction. Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994).

Corroboration need not be so substantial in and of itself to sustain a conviction. Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996).

Corroborative evidence held sufficient to connect defendant to the crime. Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996).

Where defendant was on trial for misdemeanor theft, testimony of his brother, an accomplice, alone was sufficient to support a conviction. Gutherie v. State, 52 Ark. App. 145, 915 S.W.2d 739 (1996).

Testimony of accomplice to the victim's kidnapping prior to the murder was sufficiently corroborated to support defendant's conviction for first-degree murder. Peeler v. State, 326 Ark. 423, 932 S.W.2d 312 (1996).

Although the evidence independent of the accomplice's testimony was sufficient to establish that the crimes were committed and that the defendant was near the scene of the crime, such evidence was not sufficient corroborative evidence to satisfy the requirement of subdivision (e)(1). Pickett v. State, 55 Ark. App. 261, 935 S.W.2d 281 (1996).

Trial court erred in granting a new trial pursuant to ARCrP 37.1 where defendant counsel's inadvertent failure to request a jury instruction regarding accomplice corroboration would not have changed the result of the trial. State v. Slocum, 332 Ark. 207, 964 S.W.2d 388 (1998).

The accomplice-corroboration rule does not apply to juvenile proceedings. Munhall v. State, 337 Ark. 41, 986 S.W.2d 863 (1999).

The testimony of an accomplice was sufficiently corroborated in a murder prosecution where (1) the defendant admitted that he and the accomplice were with the victim shortly before the victim was killed, (2) other witnesses testified to inculpatory statements made by the defendant, and (3) there was some physical evidence that tied the defendant to the murder. Marta v. State, 336 Ark. 67, 983 S.W.2d 924 (1999).

Standing alone, the corroboration for a felony conviction based upon accomplice testimony must be sufficient to establish the commission of the offense and to connect the defendant with it. Henderson v. State, 337 Ark. 518, 990 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

The test for corroborating evidence is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Henderson v. State, 337 Ark. 518, 990 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

Circumstantial evidence qualifies as corroborating evidence, but it must be substantial, although not so substantial in and of itself to sustain a conviction. Henderson v. State, 337 Ark. 518, 990 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

In a prosecution for felony-murder, the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice where (1) the medical examiner testified that the victim died of a gunshot wound to the chest, (2) a witness testified that the defendant was involved in a conversation with his accomplices about robbing a dice game at the scene of the crime, (3) another witness identified the defendant from a photo-lineup as one of the men who approached the scene of the crime just before the victim was shot, and (4) another witness testified that three or four men approached the scene of the crime and one of them was facing the victim just before she heard the gunshot that killed him. Flowers v. State, 342 Ark. 45, 25 S.W.3d 422 (2000).

In a prosecution for aggravated robbery and theft of property, testimony of another witness corroborated the testimony of an accomplice by establishing the commission of the crime and by tending to connect the defendants with the crime's commission. Rose v. State, 72 Ark. App. 175, 35 S.W.3d 365 (2000).

Testimony of victim and defendant's confession to police sufficiently corroborated testimony of defendant's two accomplices that defendant had been a knowing and willing participant in the robbery of a mailman. Johnson v. State, 75 Ark. App. 81, 55 S.W.3d 298, 2001 Ark. App. LEXIS 639 (2001).

Murder of woman who allegedly gave defendant the AIDS virus was corroborated by evidence other than that provided by an accomplice to the murder where another witness saw defendant shove the murder victim into a car and defendant's nervous actions right after the murder. Martin v. State, 346 Ark. 198, 57 S.W.3d 136 (2001).

Testimony of a murder defendant's accomplice that defendant repeatedly asked him to kill the victim was adequately corroborated by defendant's testimony admitting these requests. Atkinson v. State, 347 Ark. 336, 64 S.W.3d 259 (2002).

Where witnesses identified the state's exhibit as being the gold handgun used during the robbery and chose defendant's photograph out of a photo lineup as looking like the robber, and identified defendant as looking like the robber in the courtroom, and where an accomplice testified the gun belonged to his sister, the accomplice's testimony that he drove defendant to the store and waited as defendant robbed the store was sufficiently corroborated and defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. Jones v. State, 349 Ark. 331, 78 S.W.3d 104, 2002 Ark. LEXIS 376 (2002).

Defendant was properly convicted as an accomplice in a murder of a 15-year-old girl the codefendant had allegedly impregnated where evidence other than the testimony of the codefendant connected defendant with the commission of the offense; evidence showed that defendant provided the murder weapon, that defendant helped the killer prepare for the murder by selecting a grave site to dispose of the body, and that defendant assisted the killer in planning so as to avoid evidence that could connect him to the murder. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872 (2002).

Testimony of the accomplice was admissible where other evidence independently established the accomplice's description of the double murder; the medical examiner's testimony that one victim died as a result of being stabbed, having his throat cut, and to a lesser extent, blunt force trauma, an officer's testimony that defendant was found with the other victim's car, and testimony that defendant's van contained substantial blood from the victims, were all in accordance with the accomplice's testimony of how they had disposed of the bodies. Baughman v. State, 353 Ark. 1, 110 S.W.3d 740 (2003).

Much of the testimony against defendant was provided by defendant's girlfriend, who helped defendant plan and carry out the murder, and there was substantial corroboration of the girlfriend's testimony in the form of physical evidence and the testimony of other witnesses, thus, there was no merit to defendant's claim that the trial court denied his motion for a directed-verdict. Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 124 S.W.3d 439 (2003).

Evidence that defendant was found in a residence containing drug paraphernalia and an odor associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine and that he attempted to avoid detection and arrest corroborated the testimony of the accomplices and tended to connect defendant with the commission of the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. Breshears v. State, 83 Ark. App. 159, 119 S.W.3d 61 (2003).

Co-defendant was properly convicted as an accomplice to the offenses of robbery and kidnapping where the victim testified that two people were present during the beating and a city marshal testified that he saw co-defendant at the scene of the crime; this evidence was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony provided by defendant. Millholland v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 220 (Mar. 24, 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery and to corroborate the accomplice's testimony where witnesses testified as to the role defendant played in the robbery and described his clothing and weapon, which were collected at the scene. Flowers v. State, 92 Ark. App. 29, 210 S.W.3d 907 (2005).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict as there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of the underlying felony, aggravated robbery, and capital murder, after eliminating the accomplice testimony; other corroborating evidence demonstrated that defendant had the purpose of committing theft with the use of physical force, was armed with a deadly weapon, and caused the death of the victim and, further, a doctor testified that the victim died from a gunshot wound. Gardner v. State, 364 Ark. 506, 221 S.W.3d 339 (2006).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict where defendant never requested that the circuit court declare co-defendant an accomplice as a matter of law, nor did defendant ask that the circuit court give a jury instruction on the question of whether co-defendant was an accomplice as a matter of fact; therefore, defendant's accomplice-corroboration challenge was barred and the accomplice-corroboration principles of subdivision (e)(1) of this section did not apply. Price v. State, 365 Ark. 25, 223 S.W.3d 817 (2006).

In a capital murder and kidnapping case, evidence was sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony, such as testimony of other witnesses that one of the victims had stolen marijuana plants from defendant, that defendant instructed others to say he was at home at the time of the murders, and that defendant approached his nephew and told him that if he ever said anything about the victims he would get hurt; however, the case was reversed because the trial court improperly allowed evidence concerning other bad acts and reputation. Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine where an accomplice testified that defendant was inside his residence “cleaning up a cook” and “bagging everything up”; that testimony was corroborated by an officer who stated that, when he entered the home, defendant was in close proximity to the manufacturing items that were seized from the residence. Fitting v. State, 94 Ark. App. 283, 229 S.W.3d 568 (2006).

Sufficient evidence corroborated the accomplice witness testimony as to the crimes at a pharmacy and a bank where defendant confessed to a man and a woman overheard him, a witness testified she overhead defendant and others talking about robbing a pharmacy before the break-in occurred, there was physical evidence of the damages to the varying properties, as well as the hammer, tire iron, and concrete chunks, and defendant's behavior after the crimes. Collins v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 551, 444 S.W.3d 889 (2014).

If the testimony of an accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the remaining corroborating evidence was sufficient to establish that the juvenile committed the offenses of breaking or entering and first-degree criminal mischief where it showed that the juvenile and the accomplice spent the night together, a yoga studio was vandalized on that same night, the juvenile and accomplice had been involved in a string of vandalism incidents, and the juvenile admitted that he was present at the yoga studio and watched the accomplice throw a rock through its door. M.J. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 242 (2015).

In a case where defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, there was sufficient evidence presented to corroborate the accomplice's testimony because defendant told a detective he was at the store on the date of the robbery; surveillance tapes showed defendant, co-defendant, and the accomplice in the store at the same time as the victim, leaving the store immediately after the victim, and leaving the parking lot right behind the victim; defendant's mother testified that the vehicle police were searching for in connection with the aggravated robberies belonged to defendant; and, at trial, the victim's sister identified defendant as the person who committed the aggravated robberies with co-defendant. Foster v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 63, 510 S.W.3d 782 (2017).

Evidence to corroborate a witness's testimony was not required because defendant failed to demonstrate that the witness was an accomplice; first, the witness testified that he was merely present in the vehicle and this testimony was unrefuted, second, the circuit court did not find him to be an accomplice at law, and finally, the appellate court had no knowledge of whether the jury decided if the witness was an accomplice. Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 331 (2019).

Even assuming the witness was an accomplice, there was independent evidence tending to connect defendant with attempted capital murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing, as his letters and call to the witness were consistent with testimony that defendant was the shooter, and the jury could have found that defendant's alleged actions in firing the assault rifle at the officer and telling the driver to go aided and encouraged the driver in fleeing from the officer. Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 331 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of capital murder with the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the victim's death because the accomplices' testimony was corroborated by defendant's statement to police, forensic evidence, and testimony from other witnesses; the medical examiner (ME) testified that the victim died from internal blood loss caused by multiple blunt force injuries; defendant instructed the accomplices to beat the victim with baseball bats; the ME found oil on the victim's inner thighs and in her vagina, which was consistent with chainsaw oil; and defendant told the accomplices to use chainsaw oil as a lubricant and to shove a baseball bat inside the victim's vagina. Chumley v. State, 2019 Ark. 383, 590 S.W.3d 154 (2019).

— —By Defendant.

A voluntary confession of a defendant, made to one who is not an accomplice, is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Knowles v. State, 113 Ark. 257, 168 S.W. 148 (1914); Porter v. State, 206 Ark. 758, 177 S.W.2d 408, 1944 Ark. LEXIS 540 (1944).

The testimony of the defendant alone may be sufficient corroboration of an accomplice. Ford v. State, 205 Ark. 706, 170 S.W.2d 671 (1943); York v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1759 (1989).

Corroborating acts of defendant properly considered by court and jury. McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948).

Defendant's acts and testimony held to corroborate accomplice testimony. Coston v. State, 10 Ark. App. 242, 663 S.W.2d 187 (1984); Walker v. State, 13 Ark. App. 124, 680 S.W.2d 915 (1984).

— —Circumstantial Evidence.

Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to corroborate an accomplice, although of itself it would not justify a verdict of guilty, where it is unequivocal and certain in character, of a material nature, and tends to connect the defendant with the crime. Roath v. State, 185 Ark. 1039, 50 S.W.2d 985 (1932); Mullen v. State, 193 Ark. 648, 102 S.W.2d 82 (1937).

Where circumstantial evidence is utilized to support accomplice testimony, all facts of the evidence can be considered to constitute a chain sufficient to present a question for the resolution by the jury as to the adequacy of the corroboration and the court will not look to see whether every other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt has been excluded. Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (Ark. 1982).

Where circumstantial evidence is utilized, all facets of the evidence may be considered to constitute a chain sufficient to present the question for the resolution by the fact finder as to the adequacy of the corroboration. Roe v. State, 7 Ark. App. 263, 647 S.W.2d 483 (1983); McDonald v. State, 37 Ark. App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992).

The corroborating evidence may be circumstantial, but it must be of a material nature and legitimately tend to connect the accused with the commission of the crime. Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983); Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994).

The connecting evidence may be circumstantial but it must be substantial. Jimenez v. State, 24 Ark. App. 76, 749 S.W.2d 331, 1988 Ark. App. LEXIS 203 (1988).

Evidence corroborating testimony of an accomplice must tend to connect accused with the crime and be independent of evidence given by the accomplice. Corroborating evidence may be circumstantial if it is substantial, but need not be so substantial as to support a conviction without the testimony of the accomplice. Lee v. State, 27 Ark. App. 198, 770 S.W.2d 148 (1989), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 493 U.S. 847, 110 S. Ct. 142 (1989).

Where defendant was in the room where drug manufacturing materials were found during execution of a search warrant, under subdivision (e)(1) of this section, such evidence and accomplice testimony against defendant was sufficient evidence support defendant's drug possession and manufacturing convictions. Tate v. State, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of theft of scrap metal under § 5-36-123 and first-degree criminal mischief under § 5-38-203 because defendant's girlfriend admitted that she and defendant were depicted in photos taken by a motion-activated camera, and while her testimony did not have to be corroborated as to the misdemeanors pursuant to subdivision (e)(2) of this section, circumstantial evidence independently established the crimes and tended to connect defendant to the commission of those crimes. The photos indicated that defendant and his girlfriend were near the wire prior to its being stolen, a signal maintainer testified that he did not leave unused wire on the ground when replacing the stolen wire, and there was testimony that the theft of the wire stopped after defendant was caught. Procella v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 515, 504 S.W.3d 686 (2016).

— —Juvenile Proceedings.

The accomplice-corroboration rule does not apply to juvenile proceedings. Swanner v. State, 73 Ark. App. 4, 37 S.W.3d 697 (2001).

—Corroboration Not Shown.

Insufficient evidence corroborated the accomplice witness testimony as to the arson because evidence of the physical damage to the bank and evidence recovered from the crime scene did not connect defendant to the crime. Collins v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 551, 444 S.W.3d 889 (2014).

Adjudication of delinquency on charges of theft by receiving was improper because the evidence was insufficient without resorting to prohibited suspicion and conjecture; after excluding an accomplice's testimony, being a passenger in a stolen vehicle was not enough to establish constructive possession. The only evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony was that of his sister, who testified that she knew appellant and the other passengers in the stolen car and that all of them, appellant included, had seen her vehicle before. D.F. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 656, 476 S.W.3d 189 (2015).

Corroboration of accomplice testimony was not sufficient; excluding the accomplice's testimony and the alleged statements of another accomplice, none of the testimony other than that of an officer established that a crime was committed; there was no testimony at trial describing defendant, and the officer's testimony, even if properly admitted, did not sufficiently establish either that an armed robbery was committed or that defendant was involved. Vann v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 601, 566 S.W.3d 170 (2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder because there was no evidence that the victim was the victim of an intended theft apart from the accomplice's testimony. The State showed only that defendant was with the accomplice and another alleged participant an hour before the victim died and that defendant was with another person in a crowd of gawkers at the location where the victim died. Clark v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 455, 588 S.W.3d 64 (2019).

—Question of Law.

Where the testimony of the witnesses showed conclusively that they were accomplices and took part in the conspiracy, the question of whether they were accomplices for purposes of this section is one of law for the trial judge to determine. Williams v. State, 328 Ark. 487, 944 S.W.2d 822 (1997).

—Sufficiency.

For cases discussing standards for determining sufficiency of corroboration, see: Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117 (1880); Ernest v. State, 120 Ark. 148, 179 S.W. 174 (1915); Brewer v. State, 137 Ark. 243, 208 S.W. 290 (1918); Hill v. State, 144 Ark. 642, 218 S.W. 197 (1920); Brown v. State, 143 Ark. 523, 222 S.W. 377, 1920 Ark. LEXIS 250 (1920); Strum v. State, 168 Ark. 1012, 272 S.W. 359 (1925); Powell v. State, 177 Ark. 938, 9 S.W.2d 583 (1928); Yates v. State, 182 Ark. 179, 31 S.W.2d 295 (1930); Fleeman v. State, 204 Ark. 772, 165 S.W.2d 62 (1942); Casteel v. State, 205 Ark. 82, 167 S.W.2d 634 (1943); Ford v. State, 205 Ark. 706, 170 S.W.2d 671 (1943); Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W.2d 304 (1943); Thompson v. State, 207 Ark. 680, 182 S.W.2d 386 (1944); Bright v. State, 212 Ark. 852, 208 S.W.2d 168 (1948); McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948); Froman v. State, 232 Ark. 697, 339 S.W.2d 601 (1960); Shipp v. State, 241 Ark. 120, 406 S.W.2d 361 (1966); Pitts v. State, 247 Ark. 434, 446 S.W.2d 222 (1969); Petron v. State, 252 Ark. 945, 481 S.W.2d 722 (1972); Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978), cert. denied, Gardner v. Arkansas, 440 U.S. 911, 99 S. Ct. 1224, 59 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1979); Bly v. State, 267 Ark. 613, 593 S.W.2d 450 (1980); Price v. State, 267 Ark. 1172, 599 S.W.2d 394, 1980 Ark. App. LEXIS 1342 (Ct. App. 1980); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark. App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693 (1981); Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (Ark. 1982); Walker v. State, 277 Ark. 137, 639 S.W.2d 742 (1982); Lear v. State, 278 Ark. 70, 643 S.W.2d 550 (1982); Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983); Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983); Orsini v. State, 281 Ark. 348, 665 S.W.2d 245 (1984), cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 469 U.S. 847, 105 S. Ct. 162, 83 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1984), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 523 U.S. 1099, 118 S. Ct. 1568, 140 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1998); Redmon v. State, 282 Ark. 353, 668 S.W.2d 541 (1984); Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984), cert. denied, Linell v. Arkansas, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 1778 (1985); Bennett v. State, 284 Ark. 87, 679 S.W.2d 202 (1984); Kennel v. State, 15 Ark. App. 45, 689 S.W.2d 5 (1985); Combs v. State, 286 Ark. 74, 690 S.W.2d 712 (1985); Stephens v. State, 15 Ark. App. 352, 693 S.W.2d 64 (1985); Lipsmeyer v. State, 16 Ark. App. 14, 695 S.W.2d 848 (1985); Woodward v. State, 16 Ark. App. 18, 696 S.W.2d 759 (1985); Evans v. State, 287 Ark. 136, 697 S.W.2d 879 (1985); Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990); Davis v. State, 310 Ark. 582, 839 S.W.2d 182 (1992), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 603 (Nov. 8, 2007); Hughey v. State, 310 Ark. 721, 840 S.W.2d 183 (1992); Henderson v. State, 337 Ark. 518, 990 S.W.2d 530 (1999).

Evidence held sufficient to corroborate testimony of accomplice. Chancellor v. State, 76 Ark. 215, 88 S.W. 880 (1905); Larimore v. State, 84 Ark. 606, 107 S.W. 165 (1907); Roberts v. State, 96 Ark. 58, 131 S.W. 60 (1910); Townsend v. State, 148 Ark. 573, 231 S.W. 1 (1921); Mullen v. State, 193 Ark. 648, 102 S.W.2d 82 (1937); Fleeman v. State, 204 Ark. 772, 165 S.W.2d 62 (1942); Webb v. State, 206 Ark. 640, 176 S.W.2d 915 (1944); Padgett v. State, 212 Ark. 716, 207 S.W.2d 719 (1948); Trotter v. State, 215 Ark. 121, 219 S.W.2d 636 (1949); Beasley v. State, 219 Ark. 452, 242 S.W.2d 961 (1951); Knight v. State, 228 Ark. 502, 308 S.W.2d 821 (1958); Lauderdale v. State, 233 Ark. 96, 343 S.W.2d 422 (1961); Nolen v. State, 239 Ark. 681, 393 S.W.2d 765 (1965); Clayton v. State, 247 Ark. 643, 447 S.W.2d 319 (1969); Henson v. State, 248 Ark. 992, 455 S.W.2d 101 (1970); Thacker v. State, 253 Ark. 864, 489 S.W.2d 500 (1973); King v. State, 254 Ark. 509, 494 S.W.2d 476 (1973); Jackson v. State, 256 Ark. 406, 507 S.W.2d 705 (1974); Anderson v. State, 256 Ark. 912, 511 S.W.2d 151, 1974 Ark. LEXIS 1564 (1974); Hubbard v. State, 258 Ark. 472, 527 S.W.2d 608 (1975); Dyas v. State, 260 Ark. 303, 539 S.W.2d 251 (1976); Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755 (1976), overruled in part, White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Coffey v. State, 261 Ark. 687, 550 S.W.2d 778 (1977); Burnett v. State, 262 Ark. 235, 556 S.W.2d 653 (1977), cert. denied, Burnett v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S. Ct. 1525, 55 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1978); Bly v. State, 267 Ark. 613, 593 S.W.2d 450 (1980); Smithey v. State, 269 Ark. 538, 602 S.W.2d 676 (1980); Gipson v. State, 271 Ark. 700, 610 S.W.2d 261 (1981); Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 810, 611 S.W.2d 179 (1981); Sargent v. State, 272 Ark. 366, 614 S.W.2d 507 (1981); Paladino v. State, 2 Ark. App. 234, 619 S.W.2d 693 (1981); Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (Ark. 1982); Walker v. State, 277 Ark. 137, 639 S.W.2d 742 (1982); Roe v. State, 7 Ark. App. 263, 647 S.W.2d 483 (1983); Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983); Rhodes v. State, 280 Ark. 156, 655 S.W.2d 421 (1983); Rayford v. State, 284 Ark. 519, 683 S.W.2d 911 (1985); Kennel v. State, 15 Ark. App. 45, 689 S.W.2d 5 (1985); Evans v. State, 287 Ark. 136, 697 S.W.2d 879 (1985); Johnson v. State, 289 Ark. 589, 715 S.W.2d 441 (1986); Thrash v. State, 291 Ark. 575, 726 S.W.2d 283 (1987); Stickley v. State, 294 Ark. 44, 740 S.W.2d 616 (Ark. 1987); Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987); Moore v. State, 296 Ark. 30, 751 S.W.2d 345 (1988); Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 12, 792 S.W.2d 863 (1990); Taylor v. State, 303 Ark. 586, 799 S.W.2d 519 (1990); McDonald v. State, 37 Ark. App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992); Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993); Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001).

Insufficient evidence of burglary and theft of property was presented to corroborate the testimony of an admitted accomplice. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

The amount of the corroborating evidence necessary is a question for the jury. Kennedy v. State, 115 Ark. 480, 171 S.W. 878 (1914); Powell v. State, 177 Ark. 938, 9 S.W.2d 583 (1928); Mankey v. State, 192 Ark. 901, 96 S.W.2d 463 (1936); Mullen v. State, 193 Ark. 648, 102 S.W.2d 82 (1937); Smith v. State, 199 Ark. 900, 136 S.W.2d 673 (1940); McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948); Knight v. State, 228 Ark. 502, 308 S.W.2d 821 (1958).

Evidence held insufficient to corroborate testimony of accomplice. London v. State, 204 Ark. 189, 161 S.W.2d 207 (1942); Bright v. State, 212 Ark. 852, 208 S.W.2d 168 (1948); Miller v. State, 230 Ark. 168, 321 S.W.2d 199, 1959 Ark. LEXIS 591 (1959); Paschal v. State, 245 Ark. 396, 432 S.W.2d 879, 1968 Ark. LEXIS 1214 (1968); Du Bois v. State, 254 Ark. 543, 494 S.W.2d 700 (1973); Cockrell v. State, 256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204 (1974); Dunn v. State, 256 Ark. 508, 508 S.W.2d 555 (1974); Prather v. State, 256 Ark. 581, 509 S.W.2d 309 (1974); Olles v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755 (1976), overruled in part, White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Pollard v. State, 264 Ark. 753, 574 S.W.2d 656 (1978); Pace v. State, 267 Ark. 610, 593 S.W.2d 20 (1980); Roleson v. State, 272 Ark. 346, 614 S.W.2d 656 (1981); Redmon v. State, 282 Ark. 353, 668 S.W.2d 541 (1984); Combs v. State, 286 Ark. 74, 690 S.W.2d 712 (1985); Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994).

The corroboration of an accomplice's testimony required by this section is sufficient if it shows independently that a crime occurred and the accused was connected with its commission. Johnson v. State, 289 Ark. 589, 715 S.W.2d 441 (1986); Foster v. State, 290 Ark. 495, 720 S.W.2d 712 (1986), rehearing denied, 290 Ark. 495, 290 Ark. 498A, 290 Ark. 498, 722 S.W.2d 869, cert. denied, Arkansas v. Foster, 107 S. Ct. 3213, 96 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1987).

The question of sufficiency of the corroborating evidence to justify submission of the question of a defendant's guilt, must, of necessity, be governed by the facts and circumstances of the particular case, having regard for the nature of the crime, the character of the accomplice's testimony, and the general requirements with respect to corroboration. Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987).

Admissible hearsay statements of child declarant alleging rape by his stepfather provided sufficient corroboration of stepfather's confession despite child's subsequent testimony denying the truthfulness of his original allegations. Johnson v. State, 298 Ark. 617, 770 S.W.2d 128 (1989).

The test for determining the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence is whether, if the accomplice's testimony were eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. However, the corroborating evidence does not have to be sufficient to convict defendant of capital felony murder independently of the accomplice's testimony. Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992).

The corroborating evidence need not be sufficient standing alone to sustain the conviction, but must, independent from that of the accomplice, tend to a substantial degree to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

The test is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were completely eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

Evidence that only raises a suspicion of guilt is insufficient to corroborate an accomplice's testimony. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

Corroboration must be evidence of a substantive nature since it must be directed toward proving the connection of the accused with the crime and not directed toward corroborating the accomplice's testimony. Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994).

Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

In a case involving the manufacture of a controlled substance, evidence held insufficient to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (e)(1) of this section where the evidence produced by the State, other than the testimony of the accomplice, did no more than place defendant in a location where marijuana was used and where the marijuana growing plot was discussed. Gordon v. State, 326 Ark. 90, 931 S.W.2d 91 (1996).

Evidence that defendant was present at a residence where a search warrant was executed and was found by police exiting a bedroom in which items used to manufacture methamphetamine were found and that the residence had the odor of a methamphetamine laboratory was not sufficient to support the co-defendant residence owner's testimony that defendant had been manufacturing methamphetamine at the residence; defendant's convictions of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were reversed as evidence was otherwise insufficient to support the convictions. Miles v. State, 76 Ark. App. 255, 64 S.W.3d 759 (2001), overruled, Tate v. State, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004).

Test for determining the sufficiency of corroborating evidence is whether, if accomplice testimony were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Tate v. State, 84 Ark. App. 184, 137 S.W.3d 404 (2003), rev'd, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004).

In an armed robbery and theft prosecution, testimony of the driver of the getaway car that directly linked defendant to the robbery, the corroborating testimony of a store employee that defendant took money from, and that of an officer that defendant fled from after the getaway car crashed, was sufficient to convict defendant under this section. Parker v. State, 355 Ark. 639, 144 S.W.3d 270 (2004).

—Not Shown.

The trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that two witnesses who had been given immunity were accomplices of defendant and that he could not, therefore, be convicted on the basis of their testimony alone. State v. Young, 315 Ark. 656, 869 S.W.2d 691 (1994).

Confessions.

Confession made before a justice of the peace while holding court is a judicial confession and is sufficient. Skaggs v. State, 88 Ark. 62, 113 S.W. 346 (1908).

A confession, unless made in open court, cannot be used in evidence against a person charged with a crime unless it is first shown that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. Claborn v. State, 115 Ark. 387, 171 S.W. 862 (1914).

Where sheriff and prosecuting attorney testified as to admissions made by the defendant, which testimony was brought into the record without objection, it was proper testimony for the jury to consider. Wadlington v. State, 216 Ark. 914, 227 S.W.2d 940 (1950).

Subsection (d) has no application to a proceeding for revocation of a suspended sentence, and defendant's virtual confession would afford sufficient basis for the judgment revoking his suspension. Selph v. State, 264 Ark. 197, 570 S.W.2d 256 (1978).

Defendant's statement to his mother was a “confession,” as that term is used in subsection (d) of this section. Bishop v. State, 294 Ark. 303, 742 S.W.2d 911 (1988), overruled in part, Matthews v. State, 2009 Ark. 321, 319 S.W.3d 266 (2009).

This section implies that a confession in open court is sufficient to sustain conviction. Davis v. State, 33 Ark. App. 198, 804 S.W.2d 373 (1991).

Pre-arrest statement by defendant charged with DWI that he was the driver of the vehicle was not a “confession” as that term is used in subsection (d), because defendant's statement contained no admission that defendant was intoxicated or that his blood alcohol level was in excess of the legal limit at the time of the accident; defendant's statement that he was the operator of the vehicle merely constituted an admission of one element of the offense of DWI, rather than a confession of the crime. Stephens v. State, 320 Ark. 426, 898 S.W.2d 435 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient for a conviction of arson where defendant stated that the victim's body was placed on a wood burning stove where investigator's stated the fire had started, defendant admitted that he had kicked the pipe off of the stove, and the value of the destroyed trailer and its contents was between $20,000 and $25,000. Johnson v. State, 358 Ark. 460, 193 S.W.3d 260 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient for conviction of first-degree murder where the victim was last seen in the company of defendant, defendant confessed to his fellow inmates that he killed the victim with his hands in a fight after an argument, defendant told his brother that he would like to kill the victim, the victim's body was placed on wood burning stove, defendant kicked the pipe off of the stove, and the victim's body was found charred. Johnson v. State, 358 Ark. 460, 193 S.W.3d 260 (2004).

Convictions for sexual assault were reversed because the state failed to carry its burden of proof where a defendant's confession to sexual assault of his stepdaughters was not made in open court and was not accompanied with other proof that the offenses were committed and where both victims denied abuse at trial. Goodsell v. State, 104 Ark. App. 183, 289 S.W.3d 534 (2008).

—In General.

The requirement of subsection (d) for other proof requires the State to prove (1) the existence of an injury or harm constituting a crime and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 55 S.W.3d 271 (2001), substituted opinion, 65 S.W.3d 389 (Ark. 2001).

—Additional Evidence.

The confession of the defendant, accompanied with the proof that the offense was actually committed by someone, will warrant his conviction. Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367 (1884); Smith v. State, 168 Ark. 253, 269 S.W. 995 (1925); Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733, cert. denied, Haraway v. Arkansas, 317 U.S. 648, 63 S. Ct. 42 (1942); Mouser v. State, 215 Ark. 131, 219 S.W.2d 611 (1949); Hargett v. State, 235 Ark. 189, 357 S.W.2d 533 (1962); Wallis v. State, 245 Ark. 1024, 436 S.W.2d 273, 1969 Ark. LEXIS 1396 (1969); Fitzhugh v. State, 293 Ark. 315, 737 S.W.2d 638 (1987); Grimes v. State, 295 Ark. 426, 748 S.W.2d 657 (1988).

Additional evidence held sufficient to show that the offense was committed. Finn v. State, 127 Ark. 204, 191 S.W. 899 (1917); Johnson v. State, 135 Ark. 377, 205 S.W. 646 (1918); Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733, cert. denied, Haraway v. Arkansas, 317 U.S. 648, 63 S. Ct. 42 (1942); Mouser v. State, 215 Ark. 131, 219 S.W.2d 611 (1949); Ezell v. State, 217 Ark. 94, 229 S.W.2d 32 (1950); Forester v. State, 224 Ark. 194, 272 S.W.2d 320 (1954); Moore v. State, 227 Ark. 544, 299 S.W.2d 838 (1957), cert. denied, Moore v. Arkansas, 358 U.S. 946, 79 S. Ct. 356, 3 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1959); Boone v. State, 230 Ark. 821, 327 S.W.2d 87 (1959); Stewart v. State, 237 Ark. 748, 375 S.W.2d 804 (1964), cert. denied, Stewart v. Arkansas, 379 U.S. 935, 85 S. Ct. 336 (1964), cert. denied, Stewart v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 946, 87 S. Ct. 983, 17 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1967); Paschal v. State, 243 Ark. 329, 420 S.W.2d 73 (1967); Mosley v. State, 246 Ark. 358, 438 S.W.2d 311 (1969); Nash v. State, 248 Ark. 323, 451 S.W.2d 869 (1970); Mosby v. State, 253 Ark. 904, 489 S.W.2d 799 (1973); Upton v. State, 257 Ark. 424, 516 S.W.2d 904 (1974); Neal v. State, 259 Ark. 27, 531 S.W.2d 17 (1975), vacated, Collins v. Arkansas, 429 U.S. 808, 97 S. Ct. 44, 97 S. Ct. 45 (1976), aff'd, 261 Ark. 336, 548 S.W.2d 135 (1977); Whitmore v. State, 263 Ark. 419, 565 S.W.2d 133 (1978); Jamison v. State, 272 Ark. 24, 611 S.W.2d 753 (1981); Derring v. State, 273 Ark. 347, 619 S.W.2d 644 (1981); Thomerson v. State, 274 Ark. 17, 621 S.W.2d 690 (1981); McQueen v. State, 283 Ark. 232, 675 S.W.2d 358 (1984); Jacobs v. State, 294 Ark. 551, 744 S.W.2d 728 (1988); Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990); Spears v. State, 321 Ark. 504, 905 S.W.2d 828 (1995).

Additional evidence held insufficient to show that the offense was committed. Hickerson v. State, 196 Ark. 497, 118 S.W.2d 671 (1938); Johnson v. State, 198 Ark. 871, 131 S.W.2d 934 (1939); Eaton v. State, 255 Ark. 45, 498 S.W.2d 648 (1973); Boden v. State, 270 Ark. 614, 605 S.W.2d 429 (1980); Bray v. State, 12 Ark. App. 53, 670 S.W.2d 822 (1984); Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (1986), overruled, Smith v. State, 292 Ark. 162, 729 S.W.2d 5 (1987); Thomas v. State, 295 Ark. 29, 746 S.W.2d 49 (1988).

The “other evidence” and the “circumstances” required in addition to a confession to warrant conviction must be of a substantial character which, independent of the confession, and considered without reference to what the accused is alleged to have said or written, would suffice to overcome the legal presumption that casualty was an accident, or that it resulted from natural events. Johnson v. State, 198 Ark. 871, 131 S.W.2d 934 (1939).

The test of the correctness of verdict is not whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, but whether there was evidence that such an offense was committed, so that, before the confession could be introduced against the defendant, there must be evidence that the crime was committed by someone. Charles v. State, 198 Ark. 1154, 133 S.W.2d 26 (1939); Bivens v. State, 242 Ark. 362, 413 S.W.2d 653 (1967); Sawyer v. State, 284 Ark. 26, 678 S.W.2d 367 (1984).

Corroborating evidence that offense was committed need not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Morgan v. State, 286 Ark. 264, 691 S.W.2d 164 (1985); Bryant v. State, 16 Ark. App. 45, 696 S.W.2d 773, 1985 Ark. App. LEXIS 2174 (1985).

Defendant's alleged statement merely constituted an admission of one element of the offense charged and not a confession; a statement amounts to a confession only if there is an admission of guilt as to the commission of a criminal act. Thus, the defendant's statement did not require corroboration in order to support the defendant's conviction. Snyder v. City of DeWitt, 15 Ark. App. 277, 692 S.W.2d 273 (1985).

To satisfy this section and corroborate the confession, the state only had to prove that the crime was committed by someone. Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (1986), overruled, Smith v. State, 292 Ark. 162, 729 S.W.2d 5 (1987); Grimes v. State, 295 Ark. 426, 748 S.W.2d 657 (1988); Rucker v. State, 320 Ark. 643, 899 S.W.2d 447 (1995).

In corroborating defendant's confession state did not have to connect defendant to the offense by independent evidence; there must only be “other proof” that the offense occurred, in other words, proof of the corpus delicti. Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990).

State must prove, independent of a defendant's confession, that two elements exist: (1) an injury or harm constituting the crime, and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990).

The primary reason the state must prove the corpus delicti in corroborating a defendant's confession is to insure that a person is not convicted of a crime that did not occur. Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990).

Where defendant confessed to police that he raped victim on two occassions and at trial there was no substantive proof of a second rape, it was error not to grant defendant's motion for acquittal as to one count of rape. Yates v. State, 301 Ark. 424, 785 S.W.2d 199 (1990).

In prosecution for rape of his stepdaughter, where defendant admitted to having oral intercourse with the child, corroboration requirement was met by testimony of defendant's wife as to what child had told her regarding the alleged incidents. Hinzman v. State, 53 Ark. App. 256, 922 S.W.2d 725 (1996).

Statement containing knowledge of crime not known by the general public accompanied by witness' overhearing a direct confession was sufficient to sustain conviction for capital murder. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S. Ct. 1853, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1997).

The testimony demonstrating that defendant did in fact steal the pastries provided ample corroborating evidence of his intent. Releford v. State, 59 Ark. App. 136, 954 S.W.2d 295 (1997).

In a prosecution for rape of a five year old, the defendant's confession was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence where the physician who examined the victim on the day after the incident testified that he found bruises over the lower part of the body, that the bruises were on the buttocks, thighs, and groin area, and that there was a bruise on the right labia majora of the vaginal area, which could be consistent with sexual abuse. Lewis v. State, 74 Ark. App. 61, 48 S.W.3d 535 (2001).

Under the corpus delicti rule, the state had to prove the existence of an injury or harm constituting a crime and that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity; the victim's body and the physical evidence found at the scene establish the crime of murder and were sufficient to satisfy the rule. Jenkins v. State, 348 Ark. 686, 75 S.W.3d 180 (2002).

Corpus Delicti Rule.

The corpus delicti rule requires the State to prove, independent of a confession, two elements: (1) an injury or harm constituting a crime; and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. Ferrell v. State, 325 Ark. 455, 929 S.W.2d 697 (1996).

Where defendant: 1) led police officers to a remote wooded area where the decomposed remains of the body of one victim were found, and while the body of the other victim was never found, defendant inquired of police if it had been found and pleaded with them to continue looking for it so the victim could have a proper burial; 2) asked officers if he could be charged with murder if they could not find any bodies; and 3) made other incriminating statements, there was strong circumstantial evidence of both the fact of the victims' deaths and defendant's responsibility for the deaths to prove corpus delicti. Ware v. State, 348 Ark. 181, 75 S.W.3d 165 (2002).

Because a defendant admitted to a battery in open court during a hearing on the state's petition to revoke defendant's suspended sentence, the rule of corpus delicti found in subsection (d) of this section did not apply. May v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 703 (2009).

Convictions for sexual assault were reversed because the state failed to carry its burden of proof where a defendant's confession to sexual assault of his stepdaughters was not made in open court and was not accompanied with other proof that the offenses were committed and where both victims denied abuse at trial. Goodsell v. State, 104 Ark. App. 183, 289 S.W.3d 534 (2008).

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of manslaughter in violation of § 5-10-104(a)(3) because the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate defendant's confession when the evidence showed that the victim died hours after defendant admittedly went to his apartment, that the victim's apartment was in a state of disarray, which could have been interpreted as circumstantial evidence of a struggle, that blood was found in an area not in the immediate vicinity of where the victim ultimately passed away, and that the medical examiner would have ruled the victim's death a homicide had he known that he had been punched in the head five times; the corpus delicti rule, subsection (d) of this section, does not require the state to corroborate that the defendant committed the crime charged. It merely requires a showing that the crime occurred. Freeman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 90 (2010).

When defendant was convicted of simultaneously possessing drugs and firearms, in violation of § 5-74-106(a)(1), defendant's statement to police that a gun found in defendant's wife's purse belonged to defendant was properly admitted, under subsection (d) of this section, because the statement was corroborated by circumstantial evidence that (1) defendant and defendant's wife were in defendant's car, in which defendant's wife's purse was found, together when police pulled up behind the car, and (2) defendant fled the scene after police tried to arrest defendant upon finding a marijuana cigarette in the car. Patton v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 453 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for capital murder, residential burglary, and theft of property because the state offered evidence to corroborate defendant's confession under subsection (d) of this section; the state presented evidence that the murder victim died at the hands of another, that a second victim's home was burglarized, and that guns were removed from the second victim's home. Meadows v. State, 2012 Ark. 57, 386 S.W.3d 470 (2012).

Defendant's confession that he started the first fire that burned the cabin down, along with the cabin owner's testimony that the electricity and propane were disconnected at the time of the fire and that defendant had repeatedly threatened to burn the cabin days before the fire, and defendant's admission to removing the crime-scene tape, setting the second fire, and having someone remove the scrap metal from the scene, was sufficient to support his conviction for arson. Molpus v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 452, 469 S.W.3d 374 (2015).

Evidence offered by the State, including testimony that the victims' door was kicked in, that the victims were robbed, and that the victims were shot, established that the alleged offenses of aggravated robbery, aggravated residential burglary, first-degree battery, second-degree battery, interference with emergency communication, and theft of property occurred, and combined with defendant's confession during a custodial interrogation, constituted substantial evidence to support the convictions. Williams v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 277, 550 S.W.3d 42 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for second-degree murder under the corpus delicti rule, subsection (d) of this section, because defendant's confession was sufficiently corroborated; defendant confessed to killing the victims with a hammer and then disposing of the murder weapon, the victims' bodies were recovered, and both of the victims died from blunt-force trauma to the head, which was not an accident according to a medical examiner who performed autopsies of the victims. Watts v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 218 (2020).

—Instructions.

An instruction in a criminal case that the jury might convict the defendant if they were satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, by his confession not made in open court that he was guilty of the crime charged, was erroneous. Hubbard v. State, 77 Ark. 126, 91 S.W. 11 (1905).

In a criminal prosecution, a confession not made in open court will not warrant a conviction unless there is other proof tending to show that the offense had been committed, and an instruction to that effect is essential when, from statements attributed to the defendant alone, a specific intent to commit crime might be inferred by the jury. Davis v. State, 115 Ark. 566, 173 S.W. 829 (1914).

Confrontation Rights.

—Incentives to Testify.

Evidence of guarantees of immunity or promises of leniency or other considerations given to a prospective witness are proper subjects of cross-examination, and the denial of that right may violate constitutional guarantees of confrontation. Sullivan v. State, 32 Ark. App. 124, 798 S.W.2d 110 (1990).

The fact that it might have been error to deny the right to cross-examine on evidence of guarantees of immunity or promises of leniency or other considerations given to a prospective witness does not necessarily mandate reversal. The denial of the right of cross-examination on such issues, like any other trial error, is subject to being found harmless under the circumstances of the particular case. Sullivan v. State, 32 Ark. App. 124, 798 S.W.2d 110 (1990).

Instructions.

Instructions on accomplice testimony held proper. Celender v. State, 86 Ark. 23, 109 S.W. 1024 (1908); Casteel v. State, 151 Ark. 69, 235 S.W. 386 (1921); Stout v. State, 164 Ark. 553, 262 S.W. 641 (1924); Barnhardt v. State, 169 Ark. 567, 275 S.W. 909 (1925); Bryan v. State, 179 Ark. 216, 15 S.W.2d 312 (1929); Bennett v. State, 201 Ark. 237, 144 S.W.2d 476 (1940); Pope v. State, 216 Ark. 314, 225 S.W.2d 8 (1949).

For discussion of defendant's responsibility to request instruction, see: Miller v. State, 155 Ark. 68, 243 S.W. 1063, 1922 Ark. LEXIS 121 (1922); Slinkard v. State, 193 Ark. 765, 103 S.W.2d 50 (1937); Morris v. State, 197 Ark. 778, 126 S.W.2d 93 (1939); Carnal v. State, 234 Ark. 1050, 356 S.W.2d 651 (1962), cert. denied, Carnal v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 876, 83 S. Ct. 146 (1962); Garrison v. State, 13 Ark. App. 245, 682 S.W.2d 772 (1985).

Instructions on accomplice testimony held improper. Cummins v. State, 163 Ark. 24, 258 S.W. 622 (1924); Sweatt v. State, 251 Ark. 650, 473 S.W.2d 913 (1971).

For cases discussing defendant's entitlement to particular instructions, see: Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S.W.2d 546 (1937); Boyd v. State, 215 Ark. 156, 219 S.W.2d 623 (1949)Questioned byIn re Briefing of Criminal Cases, 234 Ark. 826, 234 Ark. 846, 354 S.W.2d 740 (1962); McCabe v. State, 245 Ark. 769, 434 S.W.2d 277 (1968); Hilliard v. State, 259 Ark. 81, 531 S.W.2d 463 (1976); Norton v. State, 260 Ark. 412, 540 S.W.2d 588 (1976); Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W.2d 328 (1979).

Proper instructions given at close of trial erased any possible error or prejudice resulting from use of certain words during the trial. Knight v. State, 228 Ark. 502, 308 S.W.2d 821 (1958).

An instruction that may have left the question as to whether a witness was an accomplice to be decided by the jury was not reversible error. Rice v. State, 241 Ark. 570, 408 S.W.2d 902 (1966).

Where there is a fact question concerning whether parties were accomplices, it is proper for the court to instruct the jury that they are to determine whether a certain person was an accomplice rather than instructing them that such person was an accomplice. DuBois v. State, 258 Ark. 459, 527 S.W.2d 595 (1975).

Where the state presented ample evidence tending to connect the petitioner to the crime, the lack of an accomplice instruction did not prejudice the petitioner. O'Rourke v. State, 298 Ark. 144, 765 S.W.2d 916 (1989).

Where a defendant appealed his convictions on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, because no accomplice instruction was submitted to the jury and defendant never requested that the trial court hold the witnesses to be accomplices as a matter of law, accomplice status was never determined, and the appellate court was unable to reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency argument. Brooks v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 84 (2014).

Where a defendant appealed his convictions on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, given the evidence that the shooting may have been prompted by revenge, the familial relations of the witnesses to the defendant, and the conflicting explanations for the trip given by the witnesses, the trial court erred in refusing to give the proffered accomplice instruction. Brooks v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 84 (2014).

—Jury Question.

The sufficiency of the corroborating evidence will frequently be a question of fact, for the jury, rather than a question of law for the court. Where the circumstantial evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense is substantial, the question of its sufficiency, along with the testimony of the accomplice, becomes one for the jury. Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987).

Even though one circumstance or a combination of several circumstances might not be sufficient, all of the circumstances in evidence may constitute a chain sufficient to present a jury question as to their adequacy as corroboration of the accomplice. Maynard v. State, 21 Ark. App. 20, 727 S.W.2d 858 (1987).

—Misdemeanors.

The sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday is a misdemeanor, which may be proven by the uncorroborated testimony of one witness. Richardson v. State, 211 Ark. 1019, 204 S.W.2d 477 (1947).

Post-Conviction Relief.

In an appeal from a denial for post-conviction relief, the appellate court could consider not only the testimony from the ARCrP Rule 37 hearing, but also the testimony given and evidence received at trial and abstracted in defendant's brief because the entire trial transcript was admitted as an exhibit at the Rule 37 hearing. Vickers v. State, 320 Ark. 437, 898 S.W.2d 26 (1995).

Rebuttal or Reopening.

Witness may be allowed to restate his testimony after submission of the case. Bennifield v. State, 62 Ark. 365, 35 S.W. 790 (1896), overruled, Tallman v. State, 151 Ark. 108, 235 S.W. 389 (1921); Tallman v. State, 151 Ark. 108, 235 S.W. 389 (1921).

State may be permitted to introduce evidence after the defendant has rested. Walker v. State, 100 Ark. 180, 139 S.W. 1139 (1911); Polk v. State, 252 Ark. 320, 478 S.W.2d 738 (1972).

Trial court has discretion to allow the introduction of testimony in rebuttal which more properly should be introduced in chief. Bobo v. State, 179 Ark. 207, 14 S.W.2d 1115 (1929).

Rebuttal evidence held improper. Henson v. State, 239 Ark. 727, 393 S.W.2d 856 (1965).

Subsection (c) permits the court to allow the state to reopen its case and offer new evidence. Lacy v. State, 240 Ark. 84, 398 S.W.2d 508 (1966).

It is within the trial court's discretion to permit the state to present other witnesses after the state has rested, where the circumstances are such as not to prejudice the defendant through surprise or otherwise at a time when the disadvantage cannot be overcome. Wimberly v. State, 240 Ark. 345, 399 S.W.2d 274 (1966); Rochester v. State, 250 Ark. 758, 467 S.W.2d 182 (1971).

The court did not err in permitting the state to bolster its case in chief by use of rebuttal. Pointer v. State, 248 Ark. 710, 454 S.W.2d 91 (1970), cert. denied, Pointer v. Arkansas, 400 U.S. 959, 91 S. Ct. 359 (1970).

State properly allowed to introduce new evidence after resting case. Bland v. State, 251 Ark. 23, 470 S.W.2d 592 (1971); McClendon v. State, 254 Ark. 902, 496 S.W.2d 428 (1973).

Defendant's testimony can be impeached by rebuttal evidence. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980); Walls v. State, 280 Ark. 291, 658 S.W.2d 362 (1983).

It is generally in the sound discretion of the trial court to allow rebuttal testimony which might have been properly introduced in the state's case-in-chief. In prosecution of a homicide, the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the introduction of a witness' testimony concerning the homicide that properly belonged in the state's case-in-chief, where the prosecutors actually interviewed the witness before they had finished calling their witnesses. Sims v. State, 19 Ark. App. 45, 716 S.W.2d 774 (1986).

State's Evidence.

Refusal of the trial court to require state to offer proof in a murder prosecution before the defendant stated his case to the jury was not error. McDaniels v. State, 187 Ark. 1163, 63 S.W.2d 335 (1933).

Cited: Harshaw v. State, 94 Ark. 343, 127 S.W. 745 (1910); Iverson v. State, 99 Ark. 453, 138 S.W. 958 (1911); Greenwood v. State, 107 Ark. 568, 156 S.W. 427 (1913); Hall v. State, 125 Ark. 263, 188 S.W. 801 (1916); Tongs v. State, 130 Ark. 344, 197 S.W. 573 (1917); Griffin v. State, 172 Ark. 606, 289 S.W. 765 (1927); Robinson v. State, 177 Ark. 534, 7 S.W.2d 5 (1928); Bell v. State, 177 Ark. 1034, 9 S.W.2d 238 (1928); Cush v. State, 180 Ark. 448, 21 S.W.2d 616 (1929); Howell v. State, 220 Ark. 278, 247 S.W.2d 952 (1952); Smith v. State, 222 Ark. 650, 262 S.W.2d 272 (1953); Kasinger v. State, 234 Ark. 788, 354 S.W.2d 718 (1962); Pointer v. State, 248 Ark. 710, 454 S.W.2d 91 (1970); Moore v. State, 251 Ark. 436, 472 S.W.2d 940 (1971); Reynolds v. State, 254 Ark. 1007, 497 S.W.2d 275 (1973); Murphy v. State, 255 Ark. 90, 498 S.W.2d 884 (1973); Decker v. State, 255 Ark. 138, 499 S.W.2d 612 (1973); Ferguson v. State, 255 Ark. 917, 503 S.W.2d 907 (1974); Upton v. State, 257 Ark. 424, 516 S.W.2d 904 (1974); Sanders v. State, 259 Ark. 329, 532 S.W.2d 752 (1976); Pennington v. Housewright, 666 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1981); Gipson v. Lockhart, 692 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1982); Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982); Kellensworth v. State, 275 Ark. 252, 631 S.W.2d 1 (1982); Hunter v. State, 8 Ark. App. 283, 653 S.W.2d 159 (1983); Hill v. State, 285 Ark. 77, 685 S.W.2d 495 (1985); Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985); Birchett v. State, 289 Ark. 16, 708 S.W.2d 625 (1986); Parette v. State, 301 Ark. 607, 786 S.W.2d 817 (1990); Clements v. State, 303 Ark. 319, 796 S.W.2d 839 (1990); Leshe v. State, 304 Ark. 442, 803 S.W.2d 522 (1991); Andrews v. State, 305 Ark. 262, 807 S.W.2d 917 (1991); Smith v. State, 310 Ark. 247, 837 S.W.2d 279 (1992); Jackson v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1993); Franklin v. State, 318 Ark. 99, 884 S.W.2d 246 (1994); Campbell v. State, 319 Ark. 332, 891 S.W.2d 55 (1995); Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647, 910 S.W.2d 682 (1995); Martin v. Norris, 82 F.3d 211 (8th Cir. 1996); Tinsley v. State, 338 Ark. 342, 993 S.W.2d 898 (1999); Windsor v. State, 338 Ark. 649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999); Barnett v. State, 346 Ark. 11, 53 S.W.3d 527 (2001); United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579 (8th Cir. 2002); Joiner v. State, 2010 Ark. 309 (2010); Rainey v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 383, 439 S.W.3d 67 (2014); Hubbard v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 93, 513 S.W.3d 289 (2017).

16-89-112. Evidence — Proof of certain acts or facts.

  1. In trials for treason, no evidence shall be given of an overt act that is not expressly laid in the indictment, and no conviction shall be had unless one (1) or more overt acts are alleged therein.
  2. In trials of indictments for conspiracy, in cases where an overt act is required by law to consummate the offense, no conviction shall be had unless one (1) or more overt acts are expressly alleged in the indictment and proved on the trial. However, overt acts other than those alleged in the indictment may be given in evidence on the part of the prosecution.
    1. If the existence, constitution, or powers of any banking company shall become material or are in any manner drawn in question on the trial of any indictment or other proceeding in a criminal cause, it shall not be necessary to produce a certified copy of the charter or act of incorporation, but the existence, constitution, or powers may be proved by general reputation or by the printed statute book of the state by which the corporation was created.
    2. On the trial of any indictment for counterfeiting any bill or note of any bank in this state, or of the United States, or of any other state or territory of the United States, the prosecuting attorney shall not be required to produce, on the trial, an authenticated copy of the charter of the bank, but the charter may be established in the manner prescribed in subdivision (c)(1) of this section.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 161, 162, 164, 165; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3117-3120; Pope's Dig., §§ 3951-3954; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2012 — 43-2015.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to all cases involving allegations of criminal conspiracy. Guinn v. State, 23 Ark. App. 5, 740 S.W.2d 148 (1987).

Proof by Reputation.

In a prosecution for stealing the books of a banking corporation with intent to defraud, it is sufficient to prove that there was such a corporation de facto, which may be proved by general reputation. Mears v. State, 84 Ark. 136, 104 S.W. 1095 (1907).

Where the ownership of property alleged to have been stolen was charged to be in a certain railroad company, “a corporation,” it was only necessary for the state to prove the de facto existence of the corporation, and evidence of general reputation of corporate existence was sufficient. Pearrow v. State, 146 Ark. 182, 225 S.W. 311 (1920).

Proof Required.

Under this section, it is required that state both allege and prove specific overt act evidencing that conspiracy has been put in motion, and provided issue is properly raised, failure to both allege and prove such an act is fatal to a conviction. Guinn v. State, 23 Ark. App. 5, 740 S.W.2d 148 (1987).

—Insufficient Proof.

“Open file” policy did not meet requirements of this section, and such failure warranted new trial. Guinn v. State, 23 Ark. App. 5, 740 S.W.2d 148 (1987).

—Sufficient Proof.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Shamlin v. State, 23 Ark. App. 39, 743 S.W.2d 1 (1988), rehearing denied, 23 Ark. App. 39, 744 S.W.2d 405 (1988), cert. denied, Shamlin v. Arkansas, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S. Ct. 163 (1988).

Cited: Lee v. State, 27 Ark. App. 198, 770 S.W.2d 148 (1989).

16-89-113. Evidence — Acquittal upon certain insufficient evidence.

  1. In all cases where, by law, two (2) witnesses, or one (1) witness with corroborating circumstances are requisite to warrant a conviction, the court shall instruct the jury to render a verdict of acquittal if the requisition is not fulfilled, by which instruction they are bound.
    1. Where two (2) or more persons are included in the same indictment, and the court is of the opinion that the evidence in regard to a particular individual is not sufficient to put him or her on his or her defense, it must, on motion of either party desiring to use the defendant as a witness, order him or her to be discharged from the indictment and permit him or her to be examined by the party so moving.
    2. The order is an acquittal of the defendant and a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 233, 241; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3062, 3180; Pope's Dig., §§ 3888, 4016; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2117, 43-2118.

Case Notes

Discretion of Court.

Where two defendants are jointly charged, one moves to discharge the codefendant, and the codefendant pleads innocent, trial court must have wide discretion in considering the motion, and the court's ruling will not be overturned in absence of abuse of discretion. Ballew v. State, 246 Ark. 1191, 441 S.W.2d 453 (1969).

Motion for Directed Verdict.

Appellant's contention as to insufficiency of evidence for want of corroboration of his extrajudicial “confession” might properly have been raised by motion for a directed verdict and, while it has been held that the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of a jury will be reviewed even in the absence of a request for a directed verdict, the failure to make the motion is some indication that appellant's counsel probably felt at that time there was sufficient corroborating evidence to make a question for the jury. Bivens v. State, 242 Ark. 362, 413 S.W.2d 653 (1967).

Evidence insufficient to warrant a directed verdict or reduced charge. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980).

16-89-114. Documents — Production generally.

Upon motion of either party, the court by its order and process may compel the production of any written document or any other thing which may be necessary or proper to be produced or exhibited as evidence on trial and may punish a disobedience of its orders or process as in case of witnesses refusing to testify.

History. Crim. Code, § 153; C. & M. Dig., § 3111; Pope's Dig., § 3945; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2010.

Cross References. Prosecutor's obligation to disclose, ARCrP 17.1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' 1971 Criminal Discovery Act, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Case Notes

Admissibility.

It was proper for the court to compel defendant in a murder trial to file a private ballistics report on the weapons involved as the report was clearly admissible in evidence if introduced by the maker thereof. Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300, 241 Ark. 663, 408 S.W.2d 905 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 682, 87 S. Ct. 1325, 18 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1967).

Self-Incrimination.

Where report of defendant's ballistics expert was given to prosecuting attorney, but was not made part of record and expert did not testify, there was no violation of defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, since the statements in the report contained nothing as coming from the defendant and the report was not introduced into evidence. Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1969).

16-89-115. Documents — Production where in possession of state.

  1. In any criminal prosecution brought by the State of Arkansas, no statement or report in the possession of the state which was made by a state witness or prospective state witness, other than the defendant, to an agent of the state shall be subject to subpoena, discovery, or inspection until the witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
  2. After a witness called by the state has testified on direct examination, the court on motion of the defendant shall order the state to produce any statement, as defined in subsection (e) of this section, of the witness in the possession of the state which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of the statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his or her examination and use.
    1. If the state claims that any statement ordered to be produced under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the state to deliver the statement for the inspection of the court in camera.
    2. Upon the delivery, the court shall excise the portions of the statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness.
    3. With the material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of the statement to the defendant for his or her use.
    4. If, pursuant to the procedure, any portion of the statement is withheld from the defendant and the defendant objects to the withholding, and the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of the statement shall be preserved by the state and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge.
    5. Whenever any statement is delivered to a defendant pursuant to this section, the court, in its discretion and upon application of the defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the examination of the statement by the defendant and his or her preparation for its use in the trial.
  3. If the state elects not to comply with an order of the court under subsection (b) or (c) of this section to deliver to the defendant any statement, or portion thereof, as the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.
  4. The term “statement”, as used in this section in relation to any witness called by the state, means:
    1. A written statement made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him or her; or
    2. A stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by the witness to an agent of the state and recorded contemporaneously with the making of the oral statement.
  5. The provisions of this section shall be applicable to the district, city, and circuit courts of this state.

History. Acts 1971, No. 381, §§ 3, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2011.3, 43-2011.4; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 211; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 211, 212.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment by No. 1185, § 211, substituted “the district, city” for “municipal” in (f).

The 2003 amendment by No. 1185, § 212, substituted “the district, city” for “municipal, police” in (f).

Case Notes

Appeals.

Evidence insufficient to find that the trial court erred in not requiring the prosecutor to provide defendant with previous statements made by a police officer who testified for the state. Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 731 S.W.2d 756 (1987).

Violation of this section was harmless where, although the trial court erred in refusing to order the state to produce copies of the statements for defendant, the trial court allowed the defendant's counsel to examine the statements and gain the full knowledge of their contents; thus reversal was not required. Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987).

Evidence was sufficient to find that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the trial court ruled that the defendant's attorney could not use the prior inconsistent statements of the victims for impeachment, and thus convictions had to be reversed and remanded for violations of the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause of U.S. Const. Amend. 6. Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987).

Failure of law enforcement officer to maintain his handwritten notes of eyewitness statements regarding the incident did not warrant mistrial. Wood v. State, 20 Ark. App. 61, 724 S.W.2d 183 (1987).

Although a witness's statement relating to pretrial identification would be subject to inspection upon the defendant's motion after that witness had testified at trial under this section, where defendant made a pretrial motion to exclude the witness's testimony on the ground that he had not been informed through discovery that the witness had identified him in a lineup, the information requested by the defendant was not subject to discovery until after the witness testified; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to exclude the witness's in-court identification. Shuffield v. State, 23 Ark. App. 167, 745 S.W.2d 630 (1988).

In a sexual abuse/rape case involving a child victim who recanted the initial allegations and later reaffirmed them, the appellate court was unable to reach a decision on the issue of whether the circuit court erred by denying defendant's request for the prosecutor's notes from an interview with the child victim where the circuit court did not conduct an in camera hearing or place the notes under seal for appellate review; thus, the appellate court had to remand for further proceedings. Harper v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 163, 573 S.W.3d 596 (2019).

Harmless error.

Failure, if any, to comply with this section held harmless. Hill v. State, 331 Ark. 312, 962 S.W.2d 762, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 860, 119 S. Ct. 145, 142 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1998).

Prior Statement.

Where the prosecution was unable to produce a previous statement given to the prosecution by the prosecuting witness, it was error for the trial court to require defense attorney to proceed with his cross-examination of the witness without the statement, but such error was held harmless. Rush v. State, 252 Ark. 814, 481 S.W.2d 696 (1972).

In a case involving the over-possession of pseudoephedrine, the trial court did not err by failing to strike the testimony of a witness based on an alleged failure to provide defendant with her written statement to police because it was unclear from the record if a written statement ever existed; moreover, even if it did exist, defendant's objection after the state rested was untimely. Lytle v. State, 91 Ark. App. 243, 209 S.W.3d 421 (2005).

Prosecutor's Notes.

Circuit court was not required to order the State to disclose the prosecutor's notes to defendant under this section where the notes from the interview of the victim were not “substantially verbatim”, but contained opinions and observations of the victim's behavior and demeanor, and clearly did not encompass everything the victim said. Harper v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 4, 592 S.W.3d 708 (2020).

Time of Producing Statement.

Neither ARCrP 17.1(a) nor this section requires the prosecutor to produce written statements from a witness before the trial. Brown v. State, 315 Ark. 466, 869 S.W.2d 9, 1994 Ark. LEXIS 11 (1994).

Witnesses Not Called.

Where the witness was not called by the state there was no obligation to supply his statement, unless it contained information which negates the defendant's guilt. Snell v. State, 290 Ark. 503, 721 S.W.2d 628 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S. Ct. 202 (1987).

Work Product.

There simply is no “work product” exception for the production of witnesses' statements in subsections (b) and (e). Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987).

Among the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a statement is substantially verbatim (not precisely verbatim) are the extent to which it conforms to the language of the witness, the length of the written statement in comparison to the length of the interview, whether quotations may be out of context, and the lapse of time between the interview and the transcription, which need be only contemporaneously, not simultaneously made. Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987).

Cited: Snell v. Lockhart, 791 F. Supp. 1367 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

16-89-116. Documents — Discovery and inspection.

  1. Upon motion of a defendant, the court may order the prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant:
    1. Written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the state, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecuting attorney;
    2. Results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the state, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecuting attorney; and
    3. Recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury.
  2. Upon motion of a defendant, the court may order the prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings, or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the state, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of his or her defense and that the request is reasonable. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, this section does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal state documents made by state agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by state witnesses or prospective state witnesses, other than the defendant, to agents of the state except as provided in § 16-89-115(a)-(e).
  3. If the court grants relief sought by the defendant under subdivision (a)(2) or subsection (b) of this section, it may, upon motion of the state, condition its order by requiring that the defendant permit the state to inspect and copy or photograph scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which the defendant intends to produce at the trial and which are within his or her possession, custody, or control, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the state's case and that the request is reasonable. Except as to scientific or medical reports, this subsection does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant or his attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case or of statements made by the defendant or by state or defense witnesses, or by prospective state or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agents, or attorneys.
  4. An order of the court granting relief under this section shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the discovery and inspection permitted and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
    1. Upon a sufficient showing, the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate.
    2. Upon motion by the state, the court may permit the state to make the showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court in camera.
    3. If the court enters an order granting relief following a showing in camera the entire text of the state's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal by the defendant.
  5. A motion under this section may be made only within ten (10) days after arraignment or at such reasonable later time as the court may permit.
    1. The motion shall include all relief sought under this section.
    2. A subsequent motion may be made only upon a showing of cause why the motion would be in the interest of justice.
    1. If, subsequent to compliance with an order issued pursuant to this section, and prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional material previously requested or ordered which is subject to discovery or inspection under this section, he or she shall promptly notify the other party or his or her attorney or the court of the existence of the additional material.
    2. If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this section or with an order issued pursuant to this section, the court may order the party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
  6. The provisions of this section shall be applicable to the district, city, and circuit courts of this state.

History. Acts 1971, No. 381, §§ 2, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2011.2, 43-2011.4; Acts 2003, No. 1185, §§ 213, 214.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment by No. 1185, § 213, substituted “the district, city” for “municipal” in (h).

The 2003 amendment by No. 1185, § 214, substituted “the district, city” for “municipal, police” in (h).

16-89-117. Limitation of witness fees in misdemeanor trials.

In no trial of any misdemeanor in circuit court shall the fees of more than five (5) witnesses be taxed against any county or the state unless their materiality and importance are first affirmed and certified to, under oath, by the attorney at whose instance the additional witnesses are subpoenaed.

History. Acts 1915, No. 240, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 2920; Pope's Dig., § 3736; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-607.

16-89-118. Conduct of jury.

    1. In the discretion of the court, the jurors may be permitted to separate or be kept together in the charge of proper officers before the case is submitted to them. The officers must be sworn to keep the jury together during the adjournment of the court and to suffer no person to speak to or communicate with them on any subject connected with the trial, nor to do so themselves.
    2. Whether permitted to separate or kept in the charge of officers, the jury must be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to permit anyone to speak to or communicate with them on any subject connected with the trial and that all attempts to do so should be immediately reported by them to the court, and that they should not converse among themselves on any subject connected with the trial or form or express any opinion thereon until the cause is finally submitted to them. This admonition must be given or referred to by the court at each adjournment.
    1. When, in the opinion of the court, it is necessary that the jury should view the place in which the offense is charged to have been committed or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order the jury to be conducted in a body, in the custody of proper officers, to the place, which must be shown to them by the judge or by a person appointed by the court for that purpose.
    2. The officers must be sworn to suffer no person to speak or communicate with the jury on any subject connected with the trial, nor do so themselves, except for the mere showing of the place to be viewed, and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 235, 243, 244; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3176, 3177, 3187, 3188; Pope's Dig., §§ 4012, 4013, 4023, 4024; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2119 — 43-2122.

Case Notes

Admonition.

Where it is alleged that the jury has been exposed to improper influences, the state must show that such is not a fact, or that the exposure was of such a character that could not or did not influence them. Vaughan v. State, 57 Ark. 1, 20 S.W. 588 (1892); McFalls v. State, 66 Ark. 16, 48 S.W. 492 (1898); Payne v. State, 66 Ark. 545, 52 S.W. 276 (1899).

Failure of the court in the trial of a felony to admonish the jury before permitting them to separate is reversible error where it is not affirmatively shown that the jurors were exposed to no improper influence. Johnson v. State, 68 Ark. 401, 59 S.W. 34, 1900 Ark. LEXIS 75 (1900).

Admonition is sufficient, though addressed to the officer instead of the jury, where jurors were kept in the charge of that officer and had been properly admonished at other adjournments. Lee v. State, 78 Ark. 77, 93 S.W. 754 (1906).

Where jury was permitted to separate for five-minute recess after admonition, but before submission of case to them, no error was committed in absence of showing of undue influence during the recess or of abuse of the court's discretion. Scarber v. State, 226 Ark. 503, 291 S.W.2d 241 (1956).

In a criminal prosecution, if a separation of the jury is after an adjournment, the state has the burden of showing that no juror has been subjected to the opportunity for influence to be exerted on him; whereas, if the separation follows a recess, it is incumbent upon defendant to make a showing of such influence. Lancaster v. State, 226 Ark. 820, 294 S.W.2d 348 (1956).

Evidence sufficient to show substantial compliance with the statutory duty to admonish the jury against communications as to the subjects being tried. Payne v. State, 226 Ark. 910, 295 S.W.2d 312 (1956), rev'd, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S. Ct. 844, 2 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1958).

Objection to failure of a trial court to properly admonish the jurors against communications with others on any subject connected with the trial should be made at the time the objectionable instruction is given and not after the jurors have left the courtroom. Payne v. State, 226 Ark. 910, 295 S.W.2d 312 (1956), rev'd, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S. Ct. 844, 2 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1958).

Evidence insufficient to show that conduct of two jurors, in asking the trial judge a question during a recess, was a violation of subdivision (a)(2). Bryant v. State, 254 Ark. 447, 494 S.W.2d 126, 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1532 (1973).

Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to poll jurors about an article published in the local newspaper that morning because they had promised to follow the judge's admonishment not to read anything in the morning paper, watch anything on television, or listen to anything on the radio concerning the case. Defense counsel concurred that the court had properly instructed the jury under this section, and the judge announced that he took the jurors at their word and would not poll them. Fields v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 269 (2012).

Separation or Sequestration.

Separation held proper. Hamilton v. State, 62 Ark. 543, 36 S.W. 1054 (1896); Borland v. State, 158 Ark. 37, 249 S.W. 591 (1923); Baxter v. State, 225 Ark. 239, 281 S.W.2d 931 (Ark. 1955); Scarber v. State, 226 Ark. 503, 291 S.W.2d 241 (1956); Payne v. State, 226 Ark. 910, 295 S.W.2d 312 (1956), rev'd, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S. Ct. 844, 2 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1958); Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959).

Court may keep jury together until meeting of court in adjourned term. McVay v. State, 104 Ark. 629, 150 S.W. 125 (1912).

Perfect impartiality in the jury is the object of subsection (a). Capps v. State, 109 Ark. 193, 159 S.W. 193 (1913).

Denial of motion to sequester jurors held proper. Hutcherson v. State, 262 Ark. 535, 558 S.W.2d 156 (1977); Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 414, 652 S.W.2d 26, cert. denied, Henderson v. Arkansas, 464 U.S. 1012, 104 S. Ct. 536 (1983).

—Discretion of Court.

It is within the sound discretion of the court to permit the jury to separate, either before or after the cause is submitted to them; but such discretion should be exercised with utmost caution. Johnson v. State, 32 Ark. 309 (1877).

Court did not abuse its discretion in placing nine jurymen in the charge of state police officer until other jurymen might be chosen, if the court gave the requisite instructions as to deportment of the jury, even though state police officer was not a resident of the county where the trial was being held. Walker v. State, 215 Ark. 530, 221 S.W.2d 402, 1949 Ark. LEXIS 783 (1949).

Prior to submission of case to jury, it was within court's discretion, under this section, either to permit the jury to separate after proper admonition or to be kept together in charge of officer who was properly sworn. Scarber v. State, 226 Ark. 503, 291 S.W.2d 241 (1956); Smith v. State, 227 Ark. 332, 299 S.W.2d 52 (1957).

Decision of the trial judge to allow the jury a two-day recess was within the court's discretion where, after deliberating, the jury reported it had some difficulty with the verdict, and the trial judge needed to be outside the county for two days. Harkness v. State, 271 Ark. 424, 609 S.W.2d 35 (1980).

The decision of whether or not to sequester the jury is left to the discretion of the trial court and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of prejudice. Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 414, 652 S.W.2d 26, cert. denied, Henderson v. Arkansas, 464 U.S. 1012, 104 S. Ct. 536 (1983).

—Improper Influence.

Where the trial court orders the jury in criminal cases to be kept together and they are exposed to improper influences, the burden is upon the state to show that they were not prejudicially influenced; but where the court permits the jury to separate, the burden is upon the accused to show that the jurors were improperly influenced by the exposure. Maclin v. State, 44 Ark. 115 (1884); Reeves v. State, 84 Ark. 569, 106 S.W. 945 (1907); Armstrong v. State, 102 Ark. 356, 144 S.W. 195 (1912); Carlton v. State, 109 Ark. 516, 161 S.W. 145 (1913); Borland v. State, 158 Ark. 37, 249 S.W. 591 (1923); Wallace v. State, 180 Ark. 627, 22 S.W.2d 395 (1929); Bieard v. State, 189 Ark. 217, 72 S.W.2d 530 (1934); Newton v. State, 189 Ark. 789, 75 S.W.2d 376 (1934); Harkness v. State, 271 Ark. 424, 609 S.W.2d 35 (1980).

Evidence insufficient to show improper influence. Freels v. State, 130 Ark. 189, 196 S.W. 913 (1917).

—Objection.

An objection to the separation of the jurors must be made in the trial court to make it subject for consideration by Supreme Court. Lesieurs v. State, 170 Ark. 560, 280 S.W. 9 (1926).

In cases where the court's action in exercising its discretion as to the separation of the jury is properly brought forward in the motion for a new trial, the assignment cannot be considered on appeal, in absence of an objection in the trial court. Scarber v. State, 226 Ark. 503, 291 S.W.2d 241 (1956).

Evidence insufficient to sustain objection that the jury and officers were not properly sworn in accordance with this section. Scarber v. State, 226 Ark. 503, 291 S.W.2d 241 (1956).

Swearing Officers.

It is too late to object after verdict that the officer in charge of the jury was not sworn as directed by this section, where the defendant was present when the jury retired and did not request that the oath be administered nor object. Lee v. State, 56 Ark. 4, 19 S.W. 16 (1892); Atterberry v. State, 56 Ark. 515, 20 S.W. 411 (1892)Questioned byBaxter v. State, 225 Ark. 239, 281 S.W.2d 931 (Ark. 1955).

Where the officer in charge leaves the jury in charge of another officer not specifically sworn, the purity of the trial is thereby impeached. Sutherland v. State, 76 Ark. 487, 89 S.W. 462 (1905).

If the sheriff has previously been sworn with reference to taking charge of the jury in the case, he need not be sworn again under subdivision (b)(2). Whitley v. State, 114 Ark. 243, 169 S.W. 952 (1914).

Upon the jury being allowed to view the scene of the alleged crime, it is mandatory that the officers conducting the jury to the scene be sworn in accordance with subdivision (c)(2). Baxter v. State, 225 Ark. 239, 281 S.W.2d 931 (Ark. 1955).

It was error for the trial judge not to administer the mandatory oath to the persons he placed in charge of the sequestered jury where the defendant's attorney objected twice to the trial judge's failure to swear the officers. Foster v. State, 285 Ark. 363, 687 S.W.2d 829 (1985).

Even though the trial court did not fully comply with the mandates of this section when administering an oath to the officer conducting the jury view, the trial court's error did not require reversal where nothing in the record suggested that any officer or juror misconduct occurred during the jury's trip or that prejudice resulted. Jefferson v. State, 328 Ark. 23, 941 S.W.2d 404 (1997).

While a trial court's failure to give an officer the special oath required under this section might result in some misconduct or prejudicial error, such error does not encompass a fundamental or structural right such as the right to trial by jury. Jefferson v. State, 328 Ark. 23, 941 S.W.2d 404 (1997).

View of Crime Scene.

When a view of the locality where the crime is alleged to have been committed is ordered by the court, the defendant must be permitted to accompany the jury. Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328 (1875).

Defendant cannot complain if he could have gone with jury for view of crime scene, but does not avail himself of the opportunity. Owen v. State, 86 Ark. 317, 111 S.W. 466 (1908).

It was not error to admit photographs of the locus in quo which correctly reproduced the scene of the alleged crime and which may have had some probative value. Zinn v. State, 135 Ark. 342, 205 S.W. 704 (1918).

Court did not err in denying request that jury view scene of alleged crime. Hogan v. State, 224 Ark. 191, 272 S.W.2d 312 (1954); Orsini v. State, 281 Ark. 348, 665 S.W.2d 245 (1984), cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 469 U.S. 847, 105 S. Ct. 162, 83 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1984), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 523 U.S. 1099, 118 S. Ct. 1568, 140 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1998).

A request to view a place pertinent to a material fact is a matter within the trial court's discretion and that exercise of discretion is not a ground for reversal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Lee v. State, 229 Ark. 354, 315 S.W.2d 916 (1958), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 359 U.S. 930, 79 S. Ct. 616 (1959); Orsini v. State, 281 Ark. 348, 665 S.W.2d 245 (1984), cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 469 U.S. 847, 105 S. Ct. 162, 83 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1984), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 523 U.S. 1099, 118 S. Ct. 1568, 140 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1998).

Cited: Baxter v. State, 225 Ark. 239, 281 S.W.2d 931 (Ark. 1955); Scarber v. State, 226 Ark. 503, 291 S.W.2d 241 (1956); Anderson v. State, 278 Ark. 171, 644 S.W.2d 278 (1983).

16-89-119. Lack of jurisdiction.

  1. If, during the trial, it shall appear that the offense was committed out of the jurisdiction of the court, but within the jurisdiction of some other court of this state, the court shall stop the trial, discharge the jury, and take the proceedings in the case as directed in § 16-85-708.
  2. If it appears the offense was committed out of the state, the trial shall be stopped as in subsection (a) of this section and the defendant either discharged or ordered to be retained in custody for a reasonable time until the counsel for the state shall have an opportunity to inform the chief executive officer of the state in which the offense was committed of the facts and for that officer to require the delivery of the offender.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 229, 230; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3197, 3198; Pope's Dig., §§ 4033, 4034; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2123, 43-2124.

Cross References. Jurisdiction and venue, § 16-88-101 et seq.

Case Notes

Presumption.

Where defendant prematurely presented his motion to transfer case on basis of lack of venue from one county to another, state was not required to put on proof that charge was committed in first county, as the information stated that the crime was committed therein and venue was presumed proper unless there was affirmative evidence to the contrary. Baggett v. State, 15 Ark. App. 113, 690 S.W.2d 362 (1985).

16-89-120. Proof of higher offense.

  1. If, during the trial, the court shall be of the opinion that the facts proved constitute an offense of a higher nature than that charged in the indictment, it may direct the jury to be discharged and all proceedings to be suspended until the case can be resubmitted to a grand jury and may order the defendant to be committed or admit him or her to bail to answer any new indictment which may be found against him or her for the higher offense.
  2. If an indictment is not found for the higher offense before the next grand jury is discharged, the court must proceed to try the defendant on the original indictment.

History. Crim. Code, § 231; C. & M. Dig., § 3199; Pope's Dig., § 4035; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2125.

16-89-121. Facts charged do not constitute offense.

If, during the trial, the court is of the opinion that the facts charged in the indictment do not constitute an offense punishable by law, it shall order the jury to be discharged and the indictment to be quashed, and thereupon take the proceedings directed in § 16-89-113(b).

History. Crim. Code, § 232; C. & M. Dig., § 3200; Pope's Dig., § 4036; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2126.

16-89-122. Dismissal of indictment.

The prosecuting attorney, with the permission of the court, may at any time before the case is finally submitted to the jury dismiss the indictment as to all or a part of the defendants and the dismissal shall not bar a future prosecution for the same offense.

History. Crim. Code, § 242; C. & M. Dig., § 3063; Pope's Dig., § 3889; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2127.

Case Notes

Multiple Defendants.

Any one of the defendants may be placed on trial when the cases of those preceding him have been dismissed. Borland v. State, 158 Ark. 37, 249 S.W. 591 (1923).

Nolle Prosequi.

Dismissal of indictment by nolle prosequi is not a bar to future prosecution for same offense. Moore v. State, 170 Ark. 697, 280 S.W. 657 (1926); Halton v. State, 224 Ark. 28, 271 S.W.2d 616 (1954).

Dismissal, or nolle prosequi, was not a bar to a future prosecution for the same offense as the effect was to set aside or annul the indictment. Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 455, 65 S.W.3d 402 (2002), cert. denied, Jones v. Arkansas, 536 U.S. 909, 122 S. Ct. 2366 (2002).

Because a trial court's granting of the state's motion to nol-pros resulted in a final order of dismissal and the state could not perfect an interlocutory appeal after it had the case dismissed, the state's interlocutory appeal under Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 3(a) was dismissed. State v. C.W., 374 Ark. 116, 286 S.W.3d 118 (2008).

Denial of appellant's, an inmate's, petition for postconviction relief was proper because he failed to prove that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. In part, although the inmate might have successfully quashed the amended information, he was not prejudiced by any resulting error, because the prosecutor would have simply refiled the charges since the state's dismissal of a case by nolle prosequi did not bar a subsequent prosecution under this section; Moreover, trial counsel appeared to have made a well-reasoned tactical decision not to object to the amendment. Hoyle v. State, 2011 Ark. 321, 388 S.W.3d 901 (2011).

Cited: Austin v. State, 193 Ark. 833, 103 S.W.2d 56 (1937).

16-89-123. Order of final arguments.

  1. If the case is not submitted without argument, the party having the burden of proof shall have the opening and conclusion of the argument. If, upon the demand of the adverse party, the attorney prosecuting for the state or the attorney for the defense shall refuse to openly and fully state the grounds on which he or she claims a verdict, the party so refusing shall be refused the conclusion of the argument.
  2. If more than one (1) counsel on each side shall argue the case, they shall do so alternately.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 226, 227; Acts 1877, No. 35, § 1, p. 30; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3185, 3186; Pope's Dig., §§ 4021, 4022; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2132, 43-2133.

Case Notes

Attorney Assisting Prosecution.

The closing argument may be made by an attorney assisting the prosecution. Coon v. State, 109 Ark. 346, 160 S.W. 226 (1913).

The opening argument may be made by an attorney assisting the prosecution. Tiner v. State, 115 Ark. 494, 172 S.W. 1010 (1914).

Disclosure of Grounds.

If the attorney assisting the prosecution fails in his opening argument to state fully the grounds upon which he relies for a conviction, he will not be permitted to close. Burrow v. State, 109 Ark. 365, 159 S.W. 1123 (1913).

Failure of court to grant motion requiring prosecuting attorney to fully disclose the grounds upon which he would rely for conviction in his opening argument was harmless error, since the prosecution did, in fact, make adequate disclosure. Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971)Questioned byHendrickson v. State, 290 Ark. 319, 719 S.W.2d 420 (Ark. 1986).

Effect of Admission.

Defendant cannot, by admitting the homicide and setting up insanity as a defense, obtain right to open and close argument. Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S.W. 658 (1891).

Multiple Attorneys.

Trial court did not err in requiring state to open argument and then the two attorneys for the defense to make their arguments, with the state closing, since burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt remained with the state. Young v. State, 230 Ark. 737, 324 S.W.2d 524 (1959).

Time Limit.

Court may limit time of argument of counsel. Vaughan v. State, 58 Ark. 353, 24 S.W. 885 (1894).

Cited: American Livestock Ins. Co. v. Garrison, 28 Ark. App. 330, 774 S.W.2d 431 (1989); Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995).

16-89-124. Exceptions to decisions of the court.

  1. Upon the trial of criminal or penal prosecutions, either party may except to any decision of the court by which the substantial rights of the party are prejudiced, subject to the restrictions in subsection (b) of this section.
  2. The decisions of the court upon challenges to the panel and for cause shall not be subject to exception.
  3. The exception shall be shown upon the record by a bill of exceptions prepared, settled, and signed as provided in the Code of Practice in Civil Cases of 1869.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 276-278; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3226-3228; Pope's Dig., §§ 4066-4068; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2128 — 43-2130.

Publisher's Notes. A former provision of this section, that the decisions of the court upon motions to set aside indictments would not be subject to exception, was held unconstitutional in Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248 (1874).

Cross References. Exceptions and motion for new trial unnecessary to preserve an error for review on appeal, § 16-91-113, ARCrP 36.21.

Case Notes

Appeal Without Bill of Exceptions.

In the absence of a bill of exceptions, it will be presumed in the Supreme Court that the verdict was sustained by the evidence. Wigley v. State, 41 Ark. 225 (1883).

Where there is no bill of exceptions, the Supreme Court is limited to a review of errors apparent in the record. Williams v. State, 47 Ark. 230, 1 S.W. 149 (1886).

Contents of Bill of Exceptions.

Where an objection to the admissibility of testimony, or a motion to exclude it, is overruled, the objection or the motion and the ruling of the court and exceptions to the ruling must be shown in the bill of exceptions and the ruling of the court made a ground for new trial, or they will not be noticed in the Supreme Court. Walker v. State, 39 Ark. 221 (1882).

The facts upon which errors are assigned must be set forth in the bill of exceptions. Chiles v. State, 45 Ark. 143 (1885).

When defect of proof is relied upon, all the evidence must be set out in bill of exceptions; where instructions and rulings are complained of, only the substance. Ballentine v. State, 48 Ark. 45, 2 S.W. 340 (1886).

Cited: Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328 (1875); Gross v. Bishop, 273 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Ark. 1967).

16-89-125. Deliberation of jury.

  1. While the jury is absent, the court may adjourn from time to time as to other business, but it shall be deemed open for every purpose connected with the cause submitted to the jury until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged.
  2. When the evidence is concluded, the court shall, on motion of either party, instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. If the defense is the insanity of the defendant, the jury must be instructed to state that fact in their verdict if they acquit him or her on that ground.
  3. A suitable room must be provided for the use of the jury on their retirement for deliberation, with suitable furniture, fuel, lights, and stationery.
    1. After the cause is submitted to the jury, they must be kept together in the charge of the sheriff, in the room provided for them, except during their meals and periods for sleep, unless they are permitted to separate by order of the court.
    2. Suitable food and lodging must be provided by the sheriff and the expense paid by the county.
    3. Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them all papers which have been received as evidence in the cause.
  4. After the jury retires for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as to any part of the evidence or if they desire to be informed on a point of law, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into court, the information required must be given in the presence of or after notice to the counsel of the parties.
    1. If, after retirement, one of the jurors becomes so sick as to prevent the continuance of his or her duty, or other accident or cause occurs preventing the jury from being kept together or, after being kept together such a length of time as the court deems proper, they do not agree in a verdict and it satisfactorily appears that there is no probability they can agree, the court may discharge them.
    2. In all cases where a jury is discharged, either in the progress of a trial or after the cause is submitted to them, the cause may again be tried at the same or another term of the court.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 225, 245-251, 265; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3179, 3189-3195, 3215; Pope's Dig., §§ 4015, 4025-4031, 4051; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2134 — 43-2142.

Cross References. Additional instructions, ARCrP 33.4.

Charge to juries, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 23.

Delivery of instructions to jury, ARCrP 33.3.

Keeping during deliberation of notes taken by jurors during trial, ARCrP 33.2.

Research References

ALR.

Propriety of Audio or Video Playback of Testimony or Statement to Jury. 65 A.L.R.6th 537.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, The Deleterious Effects of Anderson and Flanagan on Section 16-89-125(e) of the Arkansas Code Annotated, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 551.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Derden, Survey of Arkansas Law: Criminal Procedure, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 203.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section is mandatory and should be strictly followed. Tarry v. State, 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W.2d 202 (1986); Huckabee v. State, 30 Ark. App. 82, 785 S.W.2d 223 (1990).

The provisions of this section requiring the judge to call the jury into open court to answer any questions the jury may have are mandatory; therefore, the judge could not answer the jury's questions by sending notes or a tape recording of the proceedings to the jury room. Rhodes v. State, 290 Ark. 60, 716 S.W.2d 758 (1986).

ARCrP 33.3 does not contravene or modify this section. Bennett v. State, 302 Ark. 179, 789 S.W.2d 436Certiorari or review denied by498 U.S. 851, 111 S. Ct. 144, 112 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1990).

Applicability.

Section held not applicable. Hopes v. State, 294 Ark. 319, 742 S.W.2d 561 (1988).

This section held not to apply where court, in camera and outside the presence of counsel and the other jurors, examined one juror who wanted to know whether he could impart what he had seen to the other jurors. Clayton v. State, 321 Ark. 602, 906 S.W.2d 290 (1995).

Adjournment.

Court may, after receiving verdict on Sunday, adjourn over to another day. Eyer v. State, 112 Ark. 37, 164 S.W. 756 (1914).

Discharge Before Verdict.

It is competent for the court, where the jury cannot agree, to discharge them and hold the accused for trial on the same indictment by another jury, as also, where a juror in the course of a trial becomes so ill, or the prisoner becomes so sick, or in like cases of impossibility to proceed, but beyond this the authority of the court does not extend. Lee v. State, 26 Ark. 260 (1870).

A discharge of a juror without defendant's consent after he has been put in jeopardy operates as an acquittal, except in cases of overruling necessity, as the death or illness of the judge or a juror, or inability of the jury to agree on a verdict. Whitmore v. State, 43 Ark. 271 (1884).

Consent of a defendant that the jury may separate is not consent that one may absent himself and necessitate the discharge of the jury, and such a discharge without defendant's consent will operate as an acquittal. State v. Ward, 48 Ark. 36, 2 S.W. 191 (1886).

It is in the discretion of the court to excuse a juror for ill health. Hamilton v. State, 62 Ark. 543, 36 S.W. 1054 (1896).

In a criminal prosecution, the court may discharge the jury when the jury fails to agree upon a verdict and it satisfactorily appears to the trial judge that there is no probability of a verdict being reached. Carmen v. State, 120 Ark. 172, 179 S.W. 183 (1915).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declared a mistrial after jury foreman reported deadlock. Beard v. State, 277 Ark. 35, 639 S.W.2d 52 (1982).

Evidence.

In a second-degree murder case, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing testimony from a second doctor that personality disorders were not mental diseases in the context of this statute because testimony about what constituted a mental disease had previously been accepted; the challenged testimony simply embraced the issue of mental disease from a medical point of view, and it did not mandate a legal conclusion. Moreover, because a first doctor opined that a personality disorder was a mental disease in her report, and the report was entered into evidence, her opinion, despite being written and not oral, was evidence properly subject to rebuttal. Hajek-McClure v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 690, 450 S.W.3d 259 (2014).

Exhibits.

The court did not impermissibly comment on the evidence when it sent all of the evidence to the jury for review following a request by the jury to see a single piece of evidence. Goff v. State, 341 Ark. 567, 19 S.W.3d 579 (2000).

In defendant's murder case, there was no violation of subsection (e) of this section where the circuit court allowed the deliberating jury to replay defendant's recorded statements outside the courtroom; giving the tapes in question to the jury did not create the possibility that evidence that was never introduced at trial might be introduced in the jury room. Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143, 243 S.W.3d 866 (2006).

Ex Parte Communications.

Although it was inappropriate for the trial court to engage in any type of ex parte communication with the jury, the trial court's actions did not result in prejudice to the defendant where (1) when the jury sent out a question, it was discussed with both attorneys, and on at least one occasion, the attorneys were present with the judge at the jury room door when the jury asked a question, and (2) the trial court presented the jury's questions to the court reporter so that the information could be transcribed on the record. Bledsoe v. State, 344 Ark. 86, 39 S.W.3d 760 (Ark. 2001).

Extraneous Information.

Trial court did not err in allowing the jury to have an atlas during deliberations because the trial court followed the procedures of subsection (e) and prejudice was not presumed, even if the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to have the extraneous information; the jury deliberated for some time after receiving the atlas and the court did not see how defendant might have suffered prejudice in this regard. Fisher v. State, 84 Ark. App. 318, 139 S.W.3d 815 (2004).

Instructions Generally.

For cases discussing instructions which must be in writing, see: Wallace v. State, 28 Ark. 531 (1873); Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248 (1874); Polk v. State, 36 Ark. 117 (1880); Fitzpatrick v. State, 37 Ark. 238 (1881); Mazzia v. State, 51 Ark. 177, 10 S.W. 257 (1888); Burnett v. State, 72 Ark. 398, 81 S.W. 382 (1904).

It is error to give inconsistent and conflicting instructions. Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S.W. 237 (1891); Selden v. State, 55 Ark. 393, 18 S.W. 459 (1892); Frazier v. State, 56 Ark. 242, 19 S.W. 838 (1892); Vaughan v. State, 58 Ark. 353, 24 S.W. 885 (1894); Jones v. State, 89 Ark. 213, 116 S.W. 230, 1909 Ark. LEXIS 77 (1909).

Instructions should be applicable to opposing theories of the parties, and should declare the law applicable to any of the facts which upon the evidence may be taken by either party. Vaughan v. State, 57 Ark. 1, 20 S.W. 588 (1892).

Court must not say how much weight should be given to any state of facts. Denmark v. State, 58 Ark. 576, 25 S.W. 867 (1894); Sons v. State, 116 Ark. 357, 172 S.W. 1029 (1915).

It is error to refuse to give a proper instruction as to reasonable doubt. Terrell v. State, 69 Ark. 449, 64 S.W. 223 (1901); Bruce v. State, 71 Ark. 475, 75 S.W. 1080 (1903), overruled, Horton v. Jackson, 87 Ark. 528, 113 S.W. 45 (Ark. 1908).

For cases discussing necessity for requesting instructions, see: Vasser v. State, 75 Ark. 373, 87 S.W. 635 (1905); Jackson v. State, 92 Ark. 71, 122 S.W. 101 (1909); Roy v. State, 102 Ark. 588, 145 S.W. 190 (1912); Carlton v. State, 109 Ark. 516, 161 S.W. 145 (1913); Tiner v. State, 115 Ark. 494, 172 S.W. 1010 (1914); Webb v. State, 154 Ark. 67, 242 S.W. 380 (1922); Judd v. State, 192 Ark. 1178, 96 S.W.2d 604 (1936); Roberts v. State, 254 Ark. 39, 491 S.W.2d 390 (1973); Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W.2d 328 (1979); Byers v. State, 267 Ark. 1097, 594 S.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1980); Schwindling v. State, 269 Ark. 388, 602 S.W.2d 639 (1980).

All the instructions are to be read and construed as a whole and are entitled to a reasonable interpretation. Arnott v. State, 109 Ark. 378, 159 S.W. 1105 (1913).

For cases discussing argumentative instructions, see: Moore v. State, 109 Ark. 475, 160 S.W. 206 (1913); Price v. State, 114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914).

Court should not single out specific features of a case and emphasize them in separate instructions, but should submit all the facts and circumstances together for the consideration of the jury. Price v. State, 114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914); but see Tillman v. State, 112 Ark. 236, 166 S.W. 582 (1914).

Abstract instructions should be refused. Beavers v. State, 54 Ark. 336, 15 S.W. 1024 (1891); Stevens v. State, 117 Ark. 64, 174 S.W. 219 (1915).

General instructions may be cured by specific ones. Zinn v. State, 135 Ark. 342, 205 S.W. 704 (1918).

Attorneys may read the instruction to the jury. Davis v. State, 155 Ark. 245, 244 S.W. 750 (1922)Questioned byAllison v. State, 204 Ark. 609, 164 S.W.2d 442 (1942).

Failure of court to instruct jury on presumption of innocence at the beginning of the trial did not constitute error, as instructions are to be made at the conclusion of the evidence. Ricketts v. State, 254 Ark. 409, 494 S.W.2d 462 (1973).

A trial judge does not have to give an instruction where there is no evidence to support the giving of that instruction. Blair v. State, 284 Ark. 330, 681 S.W.2d 374 (1984).

While the trial court may have erred in instructing the jury prematurely, the preliminary instructions occasioned defendant no prejudice and, though error, were harmless. Jones v. State, 318 Ark. 704, 889 S.W.2d 706 (1994).

—Insanity.

Failure of court to instruct jury that if they acquit defendant on the ground of insanity to state that fact in their verdict, was harmless, where the jury did not acquit him. Downs v. State, 231 Ark. 466, 330 S.W.2d 281 (1959).

The jury is not to be told the options available to the trial court when a defendant is found not guilty by mental defect or disease. Robertson v. State, 304 Ark. 332, 802 S.W.2d 920 (1991).

—Objections.

Objection to part of instruction must be specific, not general. Thomas v. State, 74 Ark. 431, 86 S.W. 404 (1905); Burnett v. State, 80 Ark. 225, 96 S.W. 1007 (1906); Jackson v. State, 94 Ark. 169, 126 S.W. 843 (1910); Cox v. State, 99 Ark. 90, 136 S.W. 989 (1911); Burgess v. State, 108 Ark. 508, 158 S.W. 774 (1913); Banks v. State, 133 Ark. 169, 202 S.W. 43 (1918).

A series of instructions which supplement each other and, taken as a whole state the law correctly, is not objectionable, though some of them, standing alone, are objectionable for stating the law incompletely. Satterwhite v. State, 82 Ark. 64, 100 S.W. 70 (1907).

Exceptions in gross to several instructions will not be considered if any of them are correct. Johnson v. State, 84 Ark. 95, 104 S.W. 929, 1907 Ark. LEXIS 157 (1907); Bruder v. State, 110 Ark. 402, 161 S.W. 1067 (1913).

Jury Disagreement or Confusion.

Trial court's discretion should extend to a determination of whether or not the jury has expressed sufficient disagreement or confusion over some aspect of the testimony, thereby warranting a repeat of some portion of it. McKinney v. State, 303 Ark. 257, 797 S.W.2d 415 (1990).

The question of whether a jury is in sufficient disagreement or confusion to merit the requested information should be examined on a case by case basis, and although the request should not be granted merely to refresh a juror's recollection, it is not necessary for a literal argument to arise between jurors before they can receive requested evidence. McKinney v. State, 303 Ark. 257, 797 S.W.2d 415 (1990).

Because at least one juror was in doubt about a certain part of the evidence, it was not prejudicial for the trial court, pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, to play a part of the defendant's testimony for the jury. Newman v. State, 353 Ark. 258, 106 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Although failure to comply with subsection (e) of this section, requiring the jury to return to court if there is a disagreement or question, gave rise to a presumption of prejudice, the notes exchanged between the court and jury were included in the record, and petitioner failed to show any prejudice from the procedure that was followed. Davis v. State, 2013 Ark. 118 (2013).

Keeping Jurors Together.

It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit the jury to separate, or keep them together, before or after the case is submitted to them. Johnson v. State, 32 Ark. 309 (1877); Armstrong v. State, 102 Ark. 356, 144 S.W. 195 (1912).

Permitting jury to occupy separate cabins was not error, where evidence showed jury did not communicate with outside persons and nothing occurred to influence them. Smith v. State, 194 Ark. 264, 106 S.W.2d 1019, 1937 Ark. LEXIS 335 (1937).

Although it may be preferable to sequester the jury, it is a matter upon which the trial court must decide; the burden of proof to show that defendant did not receive an impartial trial because of failure to sequester the jury is upon defendant. Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982), cert. denied, Ford v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 1022, 103 S. Ct. 389 (1982).

Noncompliance.

Noncompliance with this section gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, and the state has the burden of overcoming that presumption. Tarry v. State, 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W.2d 202 (1986); Huckabee v. State, 30 Ark. App. 82, 785 S.W.2d 223 (1990).

Where the judge went into the jury room, by agreement of counsel, to answer the jury's questions concerning the defendant's sentence and parole eligibility, the state did not meet its burden of showing what occurred; therefore, the trial judge's violation of this section must be deemed to have been prejudicial to the defendant and was reversible error. Tarry v. State, 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W.2d 202 (1986).

Where juror asked trial judge a question concerning testimony of one of the witnesses, after jury had begun deliberations, and judge answered, and record did not contain the conversation and attorneys were not given opportunity to object, there was no compliance with subsection (e). Huckabee v. State, 30 Ark. App. 82, 785 S.W.2d 223 (1990).

Where trial judge orally gave jury ten instructions before opening statements and gave two more at the end of the trial but refused to grant defendant's motion to repeat all of the instructions, action of trial judge in giving all but two of the oral instructions at the beginning of trial violated this section and was reversible error. Bennett v. State, 302 Ark. 179, 789 S.W.2d 436Certiorari or review denied by498 U.S. 851, 111 S. Ct. 144, 112 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1990).

Noncompliance with subsection (e) of this section gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, and the state has the burden of overcoming that presumption. Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882 (1993).

If the procedure mandated by this section is not followed by the trial court, the state bears the burden of proving that no prejudice resulted. Sanders v. State, 317 Ark. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 (1994), cert. denied, Sanders v. Arkansas, 513 U.S. 1162, 115 S. Ct. 1126 (1995).

Although a violation occurred when the trial court answered questions from the jury without summoning it into open court, the state overcame the presumption that prejudice arose from the violation where the record showed that the proposed answers to the jury's questions were reduced to writing with agreement of defendant's counsel, and defendant's counsel did not argue on appeal that there was anything improper about their substance; further, the questions and answers were made part of the record and the trial judge did not enter the jury room when the written answers were delivered to the jurors. Clark v. State, 94 Ark. App. 5, 223 S.W.3d 66 (2006).

No one objected to a trial court's failure to answer a jury question regarding the meaning of concurrent and consecutive by bringing the jury back out, but rather debated and acquiesced in the trial court's written response. No abuse of discretion was shown in the trial court's written answer, and any error was not prejudicial. Frost v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 163 (2010).

—Open Court.

The trial judge's court's error in failing to comply with subsection (e) by visiting the jury room alone deprived defendant of a fundamental right which required protection, and as such, did not require a contemporaneous objection to preserve the issue for appeal. Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (Ark. 1997).

The language in subsection (e) mandates that a jury which is in deliberation must be brought into open court before any information may be given to it, and noncompliance with this provision gives rise to a presumption of prejudice; if the judge instead visits the jury room, the State has the burden of rebutting that presumption. Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (Ark. 1997).

—Prejudice Not Found.

Where the record reflected what occurred when the jury sent a note to the judge and the judge's response, and where the court gave notice of the jury's note to defense counsel before the jury returned, who made no motions or objections to the court's response at that time, the court's communication with the jury was not prejudicial to defendant; a mistrial was not required. Houston v. State, 41 Ark. App. 67, 848 S.W.2d 430 (1993).

State rebutted the presumption of prejudice from the trial court's violation of subsection (e) by showing the court's communication with the jury was limited to answering the jury's question, using language agreed to by the parties. Atkinson v. State, 347 Ark. 336, 64 S.W.3d 259 (2002).

Trial court violated subsection (c) of this section by communicating with the jury other than in open court by responding in writing to a jury question, but the state rebutted the presumption of prejudice because the record reflected the substance of the court's communication with the jury, defendant never objected to that substance, and the court never had any contact with the jury during deliberations. Anderson v. State, 353 Ark. 384, 108 S.W.3d 592 (2003), cert. denied, Anderson v. Arkansas, 540 U.S. 1050, 124 S. Ct. 832 (2003), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 109 (Jan. 12, 2006), dismissed, Anderson v. Norris, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10114 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 8, 2008).

—Waiver.

Strict compliance with this section was waived, where the attorneys went with the judge to the jury room, everything that happened was reported in the record, and there was no possibility of prejudice. Tarry v. State, 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W.2d 202 (1986).

Where the record was silent as to what occurred during the replaying of a videotape, pursuant to a request under subsection (e) of this section, there was no waiver of the procedural requirements of subsection (e) by the defendant. Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882 (1993).

Papers.

The jury should not be permitted to take with them papers containing statements bearing on the case which were not read in evidence. Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248 (1874).

It is in the discretion of the court to determine whether the jury shall take the instructions with them when they retire. Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 17 (1874); Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328 (1875).

Evidence showed possession by jury of defendant's motion for continuance was improper but not reversible error, and it was not error, while that paper was in the possession of the jury, to refuse a request of the jury to permit them to take a testamentary letter allegedly written by defendant for purpose of comparing signatures on both papers. Phillips v. State, 62 Ark. 119, 34 S.W. 539, 1896 Ark. LEXIS 145 (1896).

The word “may” in subdivision (d)(3) indicates the statute was intended to be permissive and not mandatory, and, in the absence of any request by the appellant for the jury to receive the other exhibits which had been introduced in evidence, the trial court had the right to give the jury the one they requested to see, or the confession, after they had retired for deliberation. Nathan v. State, 235 Ark. 704, 361 S.W.2d 637 (1962).

Allowing the jury to have access to something which has not been admitted into evidence will not necessarily, without more, constitute an abuse of discretion. Dickerson Constr. Co. v. Dozier, 266 Ark. 345, 584 S.W.2d 36 (1979).

Sending a videotape to the jury after the jury requested a paper document did not violate subdivision (d)(3) of this section because subdivision (d)(3) did not limit exhibits that may be given to the jury during deliberations to papers and there was no danger of additional evidence being introduced by giving the exhibit during deliberations. Anderson v. State, 367 Ark. 536, 242 S.W.3d 229 (2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1133, 127 S. Ct. 2973, 168 L. Ed. 2d 707 (2007).

Defendant's capital-murder conviction was appropriate because there was no error in the circuit court's decision to allow the jury to take a medical examiner's report with them into the jury room during deliberations, per subdivision (d)(3) of this section. The report was introduced into evidence during the trial, while defendant was present and represented by counsel. Jackson v. State, 375 Ark. 321, 290 S.W.3d 574 (2009).

Request for Information.

There was no violation of this section as the information played back to the jury had already been admitted into evidence and defendant did not suffer any prejudice by replaying the evidence. Jackson v. State, 2009 Ark. 336, 321 S.W.3d 260 (2009).

Retrial.

Holding second trial at the same term of first trial was not error. Hudspeth v. State, 194 Ark. 576, 108 S.W.2d 1085 (1937).

Court was authorized to retry a defendant at same term of court where there was a mistrial due to disagreement. Wimberly v. State, 214 Ark. 930, 218 S.W.2d 730 (1949).

Where the evidence presented in a prosecution for theft of property was sufficient, as a matter of law, to support a conviction, but a mistrial was declared after the jury reported that it was hopelessly deadlocked, it would not constitute double jeopardy to permit a retrial for the theft of property. Beard v. State, 277 Ark. 35, 639 S.W.2d 52 (1982).

A defendant's double jeopardy rights are not violated if he is required to stand trial following a mistrial due to a hung jury. Bell v. State, 6 Ark. App. 388, 644 S.W.2d 601 (1982)Criticized byLincoln v. State, 12 Ark. App. 46, 670 S.W.2d 819 (1984).

Strict Compliance.

Requirement that subsection (e) be strictly followed focuses not on the express reason for the jury to request the information, but the procedure by which the request is presented. McKinney v. State, 303 Ark. 257, 797 S.W.2d 415 (1990).

Although subsection (e) of this section does not expressly require a defendant's presence during the representation of evidence or instruction of law, when the trial court did not comply strictly with the procedural requirements of subsection (e), the failure to have the defendant present was reversible error. Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882 (1993).

Strict compliance with the procedural requirements of subsection (e) of this section may be waived. Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882 (1993).

The procedure set forth in this section is mandatory and must be strictly followed; the provisions of subsection (e) of this section are mandatory, in part, to ensure that the jury is not misinformed regarding the law as a consequence of the trial court's explaining the law to only one member of the jury. Sanders v. State, 317 Ark. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 (1994), cert. denied, Sanders v. Arkansas, 513 U.S. 1162, 115 S. Ct. 1126 (1995).

There was compliance with this section in response to a note from the jury because the jury was returned to the courtroom and the communication with the jury was documented in the record. James v. State, 2010 Ark. 486, 372 S.W.3d 800 (2010), overruled in part, Kou Her v. State, 2015 Ark. 91, 457 S.W.3d 659 (2015).

Subsequent Instructions.

Subsection (e) is mandatory. Wacaster v. State, 172 Ark. 983, 291 S.W. 85 (1927); Durham v. State, 179 Ark. 507, 16 S.W.2d 991 (1929); Rollie v. State, 236 Ark. 853, 370 S.W.2d 188 (1963); Andrews v. State, 251 Ark. 279, 472 S.W.2d 86 (1971), superseded by statute as stated in, Hawkins v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Ark. App. LEXIS 123 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1997); Martin v. State, 254 Ark. 1065, 497 S.W.2d 268 (1973); Jackson v. State, 256 Ark. 406, 507 S.W.2d 705 (1974).

Where defendant agreed to judge's entering the jury room and giving the jury further instructions in violation of subsection (e), he waived his right to challenge the action unless it was prejudicial to his rights. Boone v. State, 230 Ark. 821, 327 S.W.2d 87 (1959).

Subsection (e) requires that the entire jury must be present before the court and counsel for the parties, or that notice be given to counsel, upon any proceeding affecting the rights of the defendant or the state. Rollie v. State, 236 Ark. 853, 370 S.W.2d 188 (1963).

Subsection (e) should be strictly construed. Andrews v. State, 251 Ark. 279, 472 S.W.2d 86 (1971), superseded by statute as stated in, Hawkins v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Ark. App. LEXIS 123 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1997); Martin v. State, 254 Ark. 1065, 497 S.W.2d 268 (1973); Jackson v. State, 256 Ark. 406, 507 S.W.2d 705 (1974).

Even though defendant did not raise the propriety of a state's appeal under Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 3(c), the appeal was dismissed where the state did not present a proper issue for appeal when it claimed that a trial court erred in granting a new trial because there was no issue that concerned the correct and uniform administration of justice where the trial court's ruling turned on whether a bailiff, in fact, answered a juror's question. State v. Short, 2009 Ark. 630, 361 S.W.3d 257 (2009).

—Bailiff.

Advice of bailiff to jury held prejudicial. Williams v. State, 264 Ark. 77, 568 S.W.2d 30 (1978).

Where the bailiff relayed a request from the jury in the jury room for further instructions, and the bailiff, accompanied by attorneys for both parties, returned to the jury room with the judge's response that no further advice could be given on the matter, and defendant did not show that the bailiff counseled the jury on a point of law or acted to prejudice the defendant's rights, the judge did violate subsection (e) by relaying communications to the jury through the bailiff, but in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the error was harmless. Wilson v. State, 272 Ark. 361, 614 S.W.2d 663 (1981).

Where the jury was given verdict forms for rape and attempted rape during the penalty phase and the bailiff counseled the jury foreman to sign both forms, the bailiff testified that the jury had already found defendant guilty of rape and had signed the rape verdict form when he spoke with the jury foreman; thus, the bailiff's instruction could not have infected the jury's deliberations and, in addition, the circuit court polled each jury member individually concerning the verdict. Accordingly, no prejudice arose from the bailiff's comments to the foreman. Garcia-Chicol v. State, 2020 Ark. 148, 597 S.W.3d 631 (2020).

—Presence of Defendant.

Error of judge's rereading the instructions in the absence of the defendant's counsel was waived where defense was informed of what the court did before the jury retired but offered no objection. Wawak v. State, 170 Ark. 329, 279 S.W. 997 (1926).

Where court gives additional instruction to foreman of jury, in absence of defendant and his attorney, error is not cured by testimony of jurors that they had already reached a verdict of guilty before the instruction was given. Wacaster v. State, 172 Ark. 983, 291 S.W. 85 (1927).

It was reversible error for the court to charge individual jurors as to the law of the case in the absence of the accused and his counsel and after the jury had been deliberating for a considerable period of time without reaching a verdict. Hopkins v. State, 174 Ark. 391, 295 S.W. 361 (1927).

Defendant's right to be present was not prejudiced when his counsel waived that right prior to entry by both counsels and judge into the jury room at the jury's request. Jackson v. State, 256 Ark. 406, 507 S.W.2d 705 (1974).

Trial court committed reversible error in declining to answer the jury's questions about specific testimony, since the jury's inquiry and the court's ruling on the request were made during the absence of defense counsel. Golf v. State, 261 Ark. 885, 552 S.W.2d 236 (1977).

Remand to settle the record, pursuant to Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 4(a) and Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 6(e), was required where due to the lack of a verbatim record, it was impossible to determine whether defendant and his counsel were present when the circuit court ordered the jury notes marked as court's exhibits and received the jury notes into evidence. Likewise, the appellate court was unable to determine compliance or noncompliance with subsection (e) of this section. Terry v. State, 2019 Ark. 342 (2019).

—Sentence.

It was not error for the jury to ask the court if they could recommend a suspended sentence. Pendleton v. State, 211 Ark. 1054, 204 S.W.2d 559 (1947).

Judge's response to question concerning sentence held to be prejudicial. Bell v. State, 223 Ark. 304, 265 S.W.2d 709 (1954).

Where the jury, after some deliberation, returned to open court with a finding of guilt, but with the sentencing portion of the verdict form blank, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when in the presence of the entire jury, the defendant, and counsel for both the state and the defendant, it gave the jury additional instructions regarding its duty to specify the exact penalty to be imposed. Pruitt v. State, 8 Ark. App. 350, 652 S.W.2d 51 (1983).

—Single Juror.

If jurors are permitted to separate and one of them communicates with the court and the court gives an instruction, the presumption is that it would be prejudicial, but this error may be waived either by the defendant or his attorney. Smith v. State, 194 Ark. 264, 106 S.W.2d 1019, 1937 Ark. LEXIS 335 (1937).

Permitting one of the jurors to separate from the other eleven and go into the court room to talk to the court held not prejudicial. Smith v. State, 194 Ark. 264, 106 S.W.2d 1019, 1937 Ark. LEXIS 335 (1937).

Permitting one of the jurors to separate from the other eleven and go into courtroom to talk to court held to be prejudicial. Rollie v. State, 236 Ark. 853, 370 S.W.2d 188 (1963); Andrews v. State, 251 Ark. 279, 472 S.W.2d 86 (1971), superseded by statute as stated in, Hawkins v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Ark. App. LEXIS 123 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1997).

Cited: Jones v. State, 54 Ark. 371, 15 S.W. 1026, 1891 Ark. LEXIS 61 (1891); Johnson v. State, 60 Ark. 45, 28 S.W. 792 (1894); Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 29 S.W. 894 (1894); State v. McNamara, 60 Ark. 400, 30 S.W. 762 (1895); Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S.W. 900 (1896); Davis v. State, 63 Ark. 470, 39 S.W. 356 (1897); Caldwell v. State, 69 Ark. 322, 63 S.W. 59 (1901); Rayburn v. State, 69 Ark. 177, 63 S.W. 356 (1901); Byrd v. State, 69 Ark. 537, 64 S.W. 270 (1901); Bennett v. State, 70 Ark. 43, 66 S.W. 198 (1901); Ward v. State, 70 Ark. 204, 66 S.W. 926, 1902 Ark. LEXIS 38 (1902); Ritter v. State, 70 Ark. 472, 69 S.W. 262 (1902); Puckett v. State, 71 Ark. 62, 70 S.W. 1041 (1902); Walton v. State, 71 Ark. 398, 75 S.W. 1 (1903); Lee v. State, 72 Ark. 436, 81 S.W. 385 (1904); Cox v. State, 72 Ark. 544, 81 S.W. 1056 (1904); Keaton v. State, 73 Ark. 265, 83 S.W. 911 (1904); Mitchell v. State, 73 Ark. 291, 83 S.W. 1050 (1904); Meisenheimer v. State, 73 Ark. 407, 84 S.W. 494 (1904); Humphrey v. State, 74 Ark. 554, 86 S.W. 431 (1905); Beene v. State, 79 Ark. 460, 96 S.W. 151 (1906); Mabry v. State, 80 Ark. 345, 97 S.W. 285 (1906); Bell v. State, 81 Ark. 16, 98 S.W. 705 (1906); Stewart v. State, 88 Ark. 602, 115 S.W. 374 (1909); Dale v. State, 90 Ark. 579, 120 S.W. 389 (1909); Bailey v. State, 92 Ark. 216, 122 S.W. 497 (1909); Bowman v. State, 93 Ark. 168, 129 S.W. 80 (1909); Bennett v. State, 95 Ark. 100, 128 S.W. 851 (1910); Martin v. State, 97 Ark. 212, 133 S.W. 598 (1911); Hathcock v. State, 99 Ark. 65, 137 S.W. 551 (1911); Paul v. State, 99 Ark. 558, 139 S.W. 287 (1911); Caughron v. State, 99 Ark. 462, 139 S.W. 315 (1911); Gilchrist v. State, 100 Ark. 330, 140 S.W. 260 (1911); Fox v. State, 102 Ark. 393, 144 S.W. 516 (1912); Reed v. State, 102 Ark. 525, 145 S.W. 206, 1912 Ark. LEXIS 92 (1912); Monk v. State, 105 Ark. 12, 150 S.W. 133 (1912); West v. State, 105 Ark. 175, 150 S.W. 695 (1912); Gaylord v. State, 108 Ark. 408, 157 S.W. 1156 (1913); Scott v. State, 109 Ark. 391, 159 S.W. 1095 (1913); Woodland v. State, 110 Ark. 15, 160 S.W. 875 (1913); Coulter v. State, 110 Ark. 209, 161 S.W. 186 (1913); Barker v. State, 135 Ark. 404, 205 S.W. 805 (1918); Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978); Cassell v. State, 273 Ark. 59, 616 S.W.2d 485 (1981); Love v. State, 281 Ark. 379, 664 S.W.2d 457 (1984); Howard v. State, 291 Ark. 633, 727 S.W.2d 830 (1987); Weaver v. State, 296 Ark. 152, 752 S.W.2d 750 (1988); National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990); Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993); National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990); Lowry v. State, 90 Ark. App. 333, 205 S.W.3d 830 (2005); Padilla v. Archer, 2011 Ark. App. 746, 387 S.W.3d 267 (2011).

16-89-126. Verdict generally.

  1. When the jury has agreed upon their verdict, they must be conducted into court by the officer having them in charge, their names called by the clerk, and, if they all appear, their foreman must declare their verdict.
  2. The jury may render either a general or a special verdict.
  3. A general verdict is either “guilty” or “not guilty”. If the verdict is guilty, the jury must affix the punishment if the amount thereof is not determined by law.
    1. A special verdict is the finding of the facts only, leaving the law arising on the facts to the judgment of the court, with an ascertainment of the punishment in the event that the court pronounces a judgment of conviction on the verdict.
    2. A special verdict must present the conclusions of fact as established by the evidence, and not the evidence of those facts. The facts must be presented so that the court has nothing to do but draw the conclusions of law upon them.
    3. The special verdict must be reduced to writing by the jury and read to them in the presence of the court. It shall not be received by the court unless it pronounces affirmatively on the facts necessary to enable the court to give judgment.
    1. Upon an indictment for an offense consisting of different degrees, the defendant may be found guilty of any degree not higher than that charged in the indictment and may be found guilty of any offense included in that charged in the indictment.
      1. The offenses named in each of the subdivisions of this section shall be deemed degrees of the same offense, in the meaning of subdivision (e)(1) of this section:
        1. All offenses of homicide;
        2. All injuries to the person by maiming, wounding, beating, and assaulting, whether malicious or from sudden passion, and whether attended or not with the intention to kill;
        3. All offenses of larceny;
        4. Arson and house-burning;
        5. Burglary and house-breaking; and
        6. An offense, and an attempt to commit the offense.
      2. Offenses punished capitally are of the highest degree, other felonies are of higher degree than misdemeanor, and those punished by imprisonment are of higher degree than those punished by fine alone.
      3. Where the punishment is the same in kind, the amount that may be inflicted fixes the degree.
    2. Where there is a reasonable doubt of the degree of the offense which the defendant has committed, he or she shall be convicted only of the lower degree.
    3. When the proof shows the defendant to be guilty of a higher degree of the offense than is charged in the indictment, the jury shall find him or her guilty of the degree charged in the indictment.
  4. Upon an indictment against several, if the jury cannot agree as to all, they may render a verdict as to those concerning whom they do agree, and the case as to the others may be tried by another jury.
  5. When there is a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt upon the testimony in the whole case, he or she is entitled to an acquittal.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 237, 238, 253-260, 262, 263; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3183, 3184, 3201-3203, 3207-3211, 3213, 3214; Pope's Dig., §§ 4019, 4020, 4037-4039, 4043-4047, 4049, 4050; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2143 — 43-2151, 43-2157 — 43-2159.

Cross References. Conduct constituting more than one offense, § 5-1-110.

Reasonable doubt, § 5-1-111.

Case Notes

Appeal.

Verdict will not be disturbed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it. Gilchrist v. State, 100 Ark. 330, 140 S.W. 260 (1911).

Even constitutional issues will not be considered when raised on appeal for the first time, and where defendant alleged that he was convicted of a greater offense than that with which he was charged, but had failed to object to the jury instructions or the form of the verdict during the trial, the issue was not preserved, and defendant suffered no real prejudice. Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 514, 798 S.W.2d 87 (1990).

Degrees of Offenses.

If the indictment charges an offense of different grades and the jury returns a general verdict of “guilty as charged” without finding the degree, it will be presumed that the jury found in favor of the higher grade of the offense charged. Curtis v. State, 26 Ark. 439 (1871).

In reaching verdict, a doubt as to the degree of the crime, upon the facts of the case, should be resolved in favor of the accused. Harris v. State, 36 Ark. 127 (1880); Price v. State, 114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914); Adams v. State, 160 Ark. 405, 254 S.W. 832 (1923); Arnold v. State, 179 Ark. 1066, 20 S.W.2d 189 (1929).

Defendant cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that charged. Robbins v. State, 219 Ark. 376, 242 S.W.2d 640 (1951); Switzer v. Golden, 224 Ark. 543, 274 S.W.2d 769 (1955).

—Lesser Included Offenses.

Upon an indictment for a felony, the accused may be convicted of a misdemeanor, where both offenses belong to the same generic class, where the commission of the higher may involve the commission of the lower offense, and where the indictment for the higher offense contains all the necessary substantive allegations to let in proof of the misdemeanor. Cameron v. State, 13 Ark. 712 (1853); Childs v. State, 15 Ark. 204 (1854); Sweeden v. State, 19 Ark. 205 (1857); Guest v. State, 19 Ark. 405 (1858); State v. Cryer, 20 Ark. 64 (1859); Bryant v. State, 41 Ark. 359, 1883 Ark. LEXIS 184 (1883).

The finding of a verdict of manslaughter upon an indictment for murder is equivalent to an acquittal of the charge of murder. McPherson v. State, 29 Ark. 225 (1874).

If a verdict of “guilty of manslaughter” is returned upon a murder indictment, it will be presumed that voluntary manslaughter was intended. Fagg v. State, 50 Ark. 506, 8 S.W. 829 (1888).

An indictment for rape will sustain a conviction for carnal abuse. Henson v. State, 76 Ark. 267, 88 S.W. 965 (1905).

An indictment for assault with intent to kill will not sustain a conviction for assault and battery. Jones v. State, 100 Ark. 195, 139 S.W. 1126 (1911).

An indictment for rape will sustain a conviction for an assault with intent to commit rape. Paxton v. State, 108 Ark. 316, 157 S.W. 396 (1913).

When one is indicted for murder in the first degree, he may be convicted of manslaughter. Harris v. State, 170 Ark. 1073, 282 S.W. 680 (1926).

When on trial for robbery, if defendant is convicted of assault with intent to rob, he is properly convicted. Hight v. State, 172 Ark. 240, 288 S.W. 384 (1926).

Manslaughter is one of the degrees of murder. Ellis v. State, 234 Ark. 1072, 356 S.W.2d 426 (1962).

—Subsequent Prosecution.

Conviction of a misdemeanor, where the penalty is only a fine, will not bar an indictment for a felony for the same offense. State v. Nichols, 38 Ark. 550 (1882).

An acquittal of the charge will bar prosecution for offenses which are essential ingredients of that charge. Fox v. State, 50 Ark. 528, 8 S.W. 836 (1888).

A person convicted of a misdemeanor which placed him in jeopardy of liberty may not be indicted for a felony for the same offense. State v. Smith, 53 Ark. 24, 13 S.W. 391 (1890).

The conviction of any degree of rape would bar successive prosecution for any other degree of rape. State v. Lamb, 251 Ark. 999, 476 S.W.2d 7 (1972).

Form and Presentment.

Where several are jointly indicted and tried together, the verdict and judgment against them should be several; that is, fix the fine or punishment to be paid or suffered by each. Straughan v. State, 16 Ark. 37 (1855).

It is not necessary that the verdict should be written upon the indictment, though it is usual to do so. Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568 (1855).

The verdict is of no validity until delivered by the jury in court, and the clerk cannot receive it in the recess of the court without the direction of the court or consent of parties. State v. Mills, 19 Ark. 476 (1858).

The verdict need not be in writing, but may be announced orally by the foreman of the jury and entered by the clerk upon the record, but if it is in writing and responsive to the issue, it is sufficient without the formula “in manner and form as charged in the indictment.” Dixon v. State, 29 Ark. 165, 1874 Ark. LEXIS 22 (1874).

Verdict on an indictment containing two counts is sufficient if it finds the defendant guilty of each offense and assesses his punishment therefor separately, without alleging that the defendant was guilty as charged in the indictment or as charged in either count. Lawrence v. State, 71 Ark. 82, 71 S.W. 263 (1902).

Verdict finding the accused guilty as charged in the indictment and fixing his “penalty” at one year in the penitentiary was not invalid, as the word “punishment” was evidently intended. Russell v. State, 97 Ark. 92, 133 S.W. 188 (1910).

The jury may amend its verdict as to form. Hamer v. State, 104 Ark. 606, 150 S.W. 142 (1912).

Verdict may be received on Sunday. Eyer v. State, 112 Ark. 37, 164 S.W. 756 (1914).

Verdict form which failed to show maximum and minimum punishments was proper inasmuch as there is no requirement that a form of verdict given a jury show the sentencing alternatives and it is the responsibility of the party desiring a particular form of verdict to prepare it and request the court to submit it. Rowland v. State, 263 Ark. 77, 562 S.W.2d 590 (1978).

There is no requirement that a verdict form be submitted to the jury by the trial judge, although it is the better practice to do so. Rowland v. State, 263 Ark. 77, 562 S.W.2d 590 (1978).

General Verdict.

A general verdict of guilty on an indictment containing several counts is good, if either of the counts are good and are sustained by evidence. Brown v. State, 10 Ark. 607, 1850 Ark. LEXIS 140 (1850); Howard v. State, 34 Ark. 433, 1879 Ark. LEXIS 64 (1879); Watkins v. State, 37 Ark. 370, 1881 Ark. LEXIS 106 (1881), overruled, Crook v. State, 59 Ark. 326, 27 S.W. 229 (Ark. 1894); Cooper v. State, 37 Ark. 412 (1881).

Where there are two counts substantially the same, a general verdict is a finding upon both counts and is sufficient. Levells v. State, 32 Ark. 585 (1877).

Where defendant was convicted under an indictment containing two counts, and a general verdict of guilty, without specifying the offense, was received without objection, he could not subsequently object to the form of the verdict if the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of either offense. Cargill v. State, 76 Ark. 550, 90 S.W. 618 (1905).

A general verdict is a conviction of everything well charged. Blackshare v. State, 94 Ark. 548, 128 S.W. 549 (1910).

Reasonable Doubt.

Subsection (g) applies to misdemeanors as well as to felonies. State v. King, 20 Ark. 166 (1859).

The rule that the guilt of the accused must be established to the exclusion of every other hypothesis only applies in cases depending upon circumstantial evidence. Cohen v. State, 32 Ark. 226 (1877).

Reconsideration.

Evidence sufficient to show there was not such absolute discharge of the jury as prevented the court from recalling it for the purpose of correcting the verdict. Levells v. State, 32 Ark. 585 (1877).

The court may refuse a verdict and direct the jury to reconsider, and when they do reconsider and alter the verdict, the second verdict is the verdict of the jury. McRae v. State, 49 Ark. 195, 4 S.W. 758 (1887).

Sentence Fixed by Jury.

Under subsection (c) of this section and § 5-4-103, the defendant was entitled to have a jury fix his sentence for his conviction of driving while intoxicated, and his proffered jury instruction to this effect should have been given. Tharp v. State, 294 Ark. 615, 745 S.W.2d 612 (1988).

Setting Aside.

The court may set aside a verdict of acquittal of an offense punishable by fine only. Fenix v. State, 90 Ark. 589, 120 S.W. 388 (1909).

Cited: Puckett v. State, 194 Ark. 449, 108 S.W.2d 468 (1937); Clayton v. State, 247 Ark. 643, 447 S.W.2d 319 (1969); Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971); Lowe v. State, 264 Ark. 205, 570 S.W.2d 253 (1978); Ashlock v. State, 64 Ark. App. 253, 983 S.W.2d 448 (1998); Basham v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 384 (2011).

16-89-127. Verdict — Misdemeanor included in felony.

When an offense is charged in an indictment to have been committed with peculiar circumstances as to time, place, person, property, value, motive, or intention, the offense, without the circumstances, or with part only, is included in the offense, although that charge may be a felony, and the offense, without the circumstances, a misdemeanor only.

History. Crim. Code, § 261; C. & M. Dig., § 3212; Pope's Dig., § 4048; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2155.

16-89-128. Polling of jury members.

Upon a verdict's being rendered, the jury may be polled at the instance of either party, which consists of the clerk or judge asking each juror if it is his or her verdict. If one (1) answers in the negative, the verdict cannot be received.

History. Crim. Code, § 264; C. & M. Dig., § 3216; Pope's Dig., § 4052; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2160.

Research References

ALR.

Interrogation or Poll of Jurors, During Criminal Trial, as to Whether They Were Exposed to Media Publicity Pertaining to Alleged Crime or Trial. 55 A.L.R.6th 157.

Case Notes

Construction.

This statute is mandatory. Wingfield v. State, 95 Ark. 71, 128 S.W. 562 (1910).

Authority of Court.

If there is any reason to doubt that all the jurors concur, it is competent for the court, of its own motion, to cause the jury to be polled. Harris v. State, 31 Ark. 196 (1876).

The court is not limited to receiving the answer “yes” or “no,” but is limited to ascertaining whether the verdict is the juror's verdict, without examining the juror as to how the verdict was arrived at, except as to whether it was arrived at by lot. Kindrix v. State, 138 Ark. 594, 212 S.W. 84 (1919).

Preservation for Review.

Defendant failed to effectively make an argument for application of an exception that would permit the court to address the issue regarding jury polling for the first time on appeal, plus the facts of this case did not present a situation of comparable seriousness as that presented in other case law; defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection at the conclusion of the jury poll when the trial judge inquired if there was any reason not to release the jury and impose the sentence. Adams v. State, 2009 Ark. 375, 326 S.W.3d 764 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1021, 130 S. Ct. 1922, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010).

Scope of Inquiry.

A jury can be polled pursuant to this section, but the inquiry should be limited to determining that the verdict is that of each juror and “whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror”; it would be highly unrealistic to think that jurors do not consider the possibility of parole in arriving at a sentence in a criminal case and the outward expression of that by a juror was not grounds for a new trial where any information jurors had about possibility of parole was independent knowledge which they had prior to trial. Ashby v. State, 271 Ark. 239, 607 S.W.2d 675 (1980).

When a juror casts doubt on whether the verdict rendered is his verdict, and the court questions the juror until the juror casts an unequivocal vote, the juror is voting in the courtroom rather than in the jury room; although there are some cases in which courts have been able successfully to question a juror in open court and remove confusion without being reversed, those are rare circumstances in which, for example, the confusion is caused by the inability of the juror to hear the question, or a juror is reluctant, based on religious scruples, to use the word “guilty”. Rhodes v. State, 290 Ark. 60, 716 S.W.2d 758 (1986).

Unanimous Verdict.

Where the guilty verdict is not unanimous because of a juror's response to being polled, the jurors must be returned to the jury room for further deliberation; otherwise, the trial judge runs the risk of conducting a proceeding which, albeit well meant, will have the palpable effect of coercion. Rhodes v. State, 290 Ark. 60, 716 S.W.2d 758 (1986).

If the question on the juror's mind is the ultimate one of whether the accused is guilty, then that juror is expressing a reasonable doubt, and the verdict is not unanimous; therefore, where, in a capital murder trial, the jurors were polled as to their guilty verdicts and one juror responded that his verdict was with a question, the defendant's conviction was reversed. Rhodes v. State, 290 Ark. 60, 716 S.W.2d 758 (1986).

Cited: Ward v. State, 20 Ark. App. 172, 726 S.W.2d 289 (1987); Adams v. State, 2013 Ark. 174, 427 S.W.3d 63 (2013); Garcia-Chicol v. State, 2020 Ark. 148, 597 S.W.3d 631 (2020).

16-89-129. Final adjournment.

A final adjournment of the court discharges a jury.

History. Crim. Code, § 252; C. & M. Dig., § 3196; Pope's Dig., § 4032; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2161.

16-89-130. New trial.

  1. A new trial is the reexamination of an issue of fact in the same court by another jury after a verdict has been given.
  2. The application for a new trial must be made at the same term at which the verdict is rendered, unless the judgment is postponed to another term, in which case it may be made at any time before judgment.
  3. The court in which a trial is had upon an issue of fact may grant a new trial when a verdict is rendered against the defendant by which his or her substantial rights have been prejudiced, upon his or her motion, in the following cases:
    1. Where the trial in the case of a felony was commenced and completed in his or her absence;
    2. Where the jury has received any evidence out of court other than that resulting from a view as provided in this code;
    3. Where the verdict has been decided by lot, or in any other manner than by a fair expression of opinion by the jurors;
    4. Where the court has misinstructed or refused to properly instruct the jury;
    5. Where the verdict is against law or evidence;
    6. Where the defendant has discovered important evidence in his or her favor since the verdict; and
    7. Where, from the misconduct of the jury or from any other cause, the court is of opinion that the defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial.
  4. The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict cannot be used or referred to in evidence or in argument.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 266-268, 270; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3217-3219, 3221; Pope's Dig., §§ 4057-4059, 4061; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2201 — 43-2203, 43-2205.

Publisher's Notes. This section may be affected by § 16-91-105 and ARCrP 36.22 as to the time for filing a motion for a new trial.

“This code,” referred to in this section, means the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases of 1869. See parallel reference tables in the tables volume.

Cross References. Effect of filing motion for new trial upon appeal, ARCrP 36.21.

Time for filing motion for new trial, motion in arrest of judgment, or any other application for relief, § 16-91-105, ARCrP 36.22.

Research References

ALR.

Nature and determination of prejudice caused by remarks or acts of state trial judge criticizing, rebuking, or punishing defense counsel in criminal case as requiring new trial or reversal — Individualized determinations. 104 A.L.R.5th 357.

DNA evidence as newly discovered evidence which will warrant grant of new trial or other postconviction relief in criminal case. 125 A.L.R.5th 497.

Ark. L. Rev.

New Trial in Arkansas on Basis of Newly Discovered Evidence, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 60.

Criminal Law — Should the Miranda Decision Apply to Retrials, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 122.

State v. Cherry: The Lone Juror Forces Arkansas to Confront Pre-Deliberative Juror Misconduct and Rule of Evidence 606(b), 54 Ark. L. Rev. 823.

Case Notes

Application.

A motion for new trial waives all exceptions not expressly embodied in it. Johnson v. State, 43 Ark. 391 (1884), overruled in part, Carpenter v. Dressler, 76 Ark. 400, 89 S.W. 89 (1905).

Where supplementary motion for new trial supported by affidavits and alleging incompetency of a juror was presented to trial judge in chamber in county other than that of trial, new matter was not properly in the record. Sims v. State, 203 Ark. 976, 159 S.W.2d 753 (1942).

Failure of the trial court to read or have read the motion for new trial which was submitted to the court, and also the supporting affidavits, could not deprive the accused of a new trial if he was entitled to it. Ferguson v. State, 95 Ark. 428, 129 S.W. 813 (1910).

—In General.

In a motion for new trial alleging jury misconduct and lack of a fair trial, ARCrP 36.22 and § 16-91-105 have set the time frame, 30 days from date of judgment, and have effectively superseded this section. Cigainero v. State, 310 Ark. 504, 838 S.W.2d 361 (1992).

—Timeliness.

An application for a new trial for newly discovered evidence cannot be made at a term subsequent to that at which the verdict was rendered and the judgment entered. Thomas v. State, 136 Ark. 290, 206 S.W. 435, 1918 Ark. LEXIS 321 (1918).

A motion for a new trial could be made at a term subsequent to that at which the verdict was rendered, where sentence was not pronounced until such subsequent term. Collatt v. State, 165 Ark. 136, 262 S.W. 990 (1924).

Motion held timely. Bodnar v. State, 176 Ark. 1048, 176 Ark. 1049, 5 S.W.2d 293 (1928); Gross v. State, 242 Ark. 142, 412 S.W.2d 279 (1967)Questioned byPenn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426, 46 A.L.R.4th 461 (1984); Higginbotham v. State, 251 Ark. 832, 475 S.W.2d 522 (1972).

Motion for new trial should be made and acted upon at the same term at which the judgment was rendered, and where after filing motion for new trial the cause was continued but the judgment was not set aside, the court had no jurisdiction to act on the motion at a subsequent term. Corning v. Thompson, 113 Ark. 237, 168 S.W. 128 (1914); State v. Neil, 189 Ark. 324, 71 S.W.2d 700 (1934).

Where defendant's motion for new trial alleging jury misconduct and lack of a fair trial was filed nearly 90 days after conviction was entered, it was not timely. Cigainero v. State, 310 Ark. 504, 838 S.W.2d 361 (1992).

Where petitioner's claim of juror misconduct was brought over a decade after his conviction, the argument was untimely; the matter could have been brought in a motion for new trial immediately after the verdict and conviction. Echols v. State, 360 Ark. 332, 201 S.W.3d 890 (2005).

Discretion of Court.

In a prosecution for first-degree assault and second-degree battery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for new trial which was based on defendant's claim that a witness who was subpoenaed by the state but not called to testify would have corroborated defendant's theory of self-defense, where a list of all witnesses to be subpoenaed by the state had been supplied to defense counsel by the prosecuting attorney one year prior to trial and where all the witnesses were present at the trial. Newberry v. State, 262 Ark. 334, 557 S.W.2d 864 (1977).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial where the evidence proffered by defendant was either cumulative or an attack on the credibility of the trial witnesses; such evidence is not grounds for a new trial. Orsini v. State, 281 Ark. 348, 665 S.W.2d 245 (1984), cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 469 U.S. 847, 105 S. Ct. 162, 83 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1984), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Orsini v. Arkansas, 523 U.S. 1099, 118 S. Ct. 1568, 140 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1998).

The decision whether to grant a new trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and his decision will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party. Vasquez v. State, 287 Ark. 468, 701 S.W.2d 357 (1985).

Effect.

Where a judgment has been rendered, the filing of a motion for a new trial and the continuing of the cause thereafter does not have the effect of setting aside the judgment. Corning v. Thompson, 113 Ark. 237, 168 S.W. 128 (1914).

Grounds.

Evidence insufficient to establish grounds for a new trial. Meadows v. State, 72 Ark. 155, 78 S.W. 761, 1904 Ark. LEXIS 94 (1904); Reed v. State, 102 Ark. 525, 145 S.W. 206, 1912 Ark. LEXIS 92 (1912); Hill v. State, 255 Ark. 720, 502 S.W.2d 649 (1973); Kirkendall v. State, 265 Ark. 853, 581 S.W.2d 341 (1979); Henderson v. State, 284 Ark. 493, 684 S.W.2d 231 (1985); Williams v. State, 17 Ark. App. 173, 705 S.W.2d 896, 1986 Ark. App. LEXIS 2089 (1986).

Denial of continuance would have been proper grounds for a motion for new trial had the defendant shown that he was prejudiced thereby. Finch v. State, 262 Ark. 313, 556 S.W.2d 434 (1977).

Evidence which only attacks the credibility of other testimony is not grounds for a new trial. Williams v. State, 289 Ark. 69, 709 S.W.2d 80 (1986).

Manslaughter defendant failed to show any prejudice from a man's contact with two jurors during her trial, when a man approached the two jurors as they were eating, acknowledged that they were jurors, and referred to defendant as a “pill head;” there was no evidence that the comment was shared with the other jurors or that the jury expressed any equivocation about its verdict. Dail v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 184 (2013).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's motion for new trial because a juror's familiarity with the victim and the juror's own personal knowledge and experiences when considering the evidence presented at trial did not qualify as “extraneous prejudicial information”, and defendant could not show prejudice where the jury sentenced him below the maximum sentence for rape after his sentencing hearing, during which the State played a videotape of defendant's statement to police in which he confessed to sexually assaulting and raping his niece multiple times when she was between the ages of three and six. Lacy v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 66 (2018).

—Instructions.

Instruction held not to provide grounds for new trial. Arnold v. State, 150 Ark. 27, 233 S.W. 818 (1921).

—Jury Misconduct.

Juror misconduct not grounds for new trial. Vowell v. State, 72 Ark. 158, 78 S.W. 762 (1904); Ary v. State, 104 Ark. 212, 148 S.W. 1032 (1912); Zinn v. State, 135 Ark. 342, 205 S.W. 704 (1918).

Juror misconduct held to require new trial. Myers v. State, 111 Ark. 399, 163 S.W. 1177 (1914).

The separation of a juror from his fellow jurors during trial of a felony case casts upon the state the burden of showing that no improper influence was brought to bear upon the juror during his absence; and if the state fails to show that he was not subject to improper influence during such separation, the defendant will be entitled to a new trial. Ferguson v. State, 95 Ark. 428, 129 S.W. 813 (1910).

Where letter from foreman suggested some jurors reached the verdict of a life sentence against their will, but there was no indication of misconduct or abuse by the other jurors toward the three jurors who did not initially agree, and the fact that the jurors disagreed initially did not, by itself, make their subsequent compromise decision involuntary, there was no basis under former § 43-2203(c)(3) for a new trial. Smith v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 1392 (8th Cir. 1991) (decision under prior law).

The court did not err in granting a new trial where it was faced with evidence that jurors had discussed the facts in the case, as well as the evidence, prior to deliberations and there was testimony that some jurors prematurely formed a conclusion about the defendant's guilt and then discussed those conclusions with other jurors. State v. Cherry, 341 Ark. 924, 20 S.W.3d 354 (2000).

Inmate's claims regarding a juror's alleged untruthfulness during voir dire as to his feelings about the death penalty were not cognizable in inmate's postconviction proceeding; his remedy for alleged juror misconduct was to directly attack a verdict by requesting a new trial.Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006).

—Newly Discovered Evidence.

A motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly overruled, although the applicant states that he did not know of this testimony at the time of the trial and could not by reasonable diligence have known it, if he fails to state the acts done which are denominated reasonable diligence and the facts and circumstances under which such newly discovered evidence came to his knowledge. Ward v. State, 85 Ark. 179, 107 S.W. 677, 1908 Ark. LEXIS 511 (1908).

Motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are addressed to the legal discretion of the judge and it is only in the case of apparent abuse of that discretion or of injustice that the appellate court will interfere. Ward v. State, 85 Ark. 179, 107 S.W. 677, 1908 Ark. LEXIS 511 (1908).

Evidence sufficient to require new trial on basis of newly discovered evidence. Shropshire v. State, 86 Ark. 481, 111 S.W. 470 (1908); State v. Scott, 289 Ark. 234, 710 S.W.2d 212 (1986).

Newly discovered evidence that goes only to impeach the credibility of a witness is not ground for a new trial. Smith v. State, 90 Ark. 435, 119 S.W. 655, 1909 Ark. LEXIS 485 (1909); Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582 (1914).

A motion for a new trial on account of newly discovered evidence should be corroborated by the affidavits of other persons than the accused and, if it can be done, by those of the newly discovered witnesses themselves. Rynes v. State, 99 Ark. 121, 137 S.W. 800 (1911).

In a motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence, the applicant should state the facts and circumstances under which the evidence came to his knowledge and why he had not discovered it sooner. Young v. State, 99 Ark. 407, 138 S.W. 475 (1911).

A new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly denied where such evidence is cumulative merely or where it is not shown why it was not discovered before the trial. Ary v. State, 104 Ark. 212, 148 S.W. 1032 (1912).

Evidence insufficient to require new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence. Hawthorne v. State, 135 Ark. 247, 204 S.W. 841 (1918); Hill v. State, 289 Ark. 387, 713 S.W.2d 233 (1986), cert. denied, Hill v. Arkansas, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S. Ct. 1331 (1987).

The discovery of important evidence after the verdict which was not discoverable earlier by the exercise of due diligence requires a new trial. McCullars v. State, 183 Ark. 376, 35 S.W.2d 1030 (1931).

Defendant who makes the mere statement in his motion for new trial that new evidence in his favor has been discovered subsequent to trial has failed to comply with this section. Taylor v. State, 230 Ark. 809, 327 S.W.2d 6 (1959).

Newly discovered evidence is one of the least favored grounds for a new trial. Vasquez v. State, 287 Ark. 468, 701 S.W.2d 357 (1985).

Critical to the inquiry into newly discovered evidence are the diligence of the defendant in discovering the testimony and the probable effect of the testimony at the trial; evidence which is merely cumulative or an attack on the credibility of the trial witnesses is not grounds for a new trial. Vasquez v. State, 287 Ark. 468, 701 S.W.2d 357 (1985).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial where the witness who purportedly recanted his testimony had testified at trial only because he was called as a defense witness, the trial testimony was consistent with what the witness had told the police at the scene of the investigation, and the trial court did not believe that the recantation was truthful. Payne v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 263, 520 S.W.3d 719 (2017).

—Surprise.

It was not error to refuse the state a new trial in a criminal case on the ground of surprise in that the witness upon whose testimony the indictment was found claimed his constitutional privilege of not incriminating himself, if the state's attorney failed to use due diligence to ascertain before the trial whether the witness would claim his privilege and to make application for time to obtain other witnesses. State v. Bach Liquor Co., 67 Ark. 163, 55 S.W. 854 (1899).

Where a party is surprised by testimony which he knows to be false, he should ask for a suspension of the trial to enable him to meet such evidence, and if he goes to trial, taking the chances of acquittal, he cannot ask for a new trial. Adams v. State, 100 Ark. 203, 139 S.W. 1116 (1911).

—Verdict by Lot.

A verdict reached by the jury through a compromise of their views is not a verdict by lot but is a fair expression of their views. Blaylack v. State, 236 Ark. 924, 370 S.W.2d 615 (1963).

A verdict by lot is defined as involving an element of chance. Ward v. State, 20 Ark. App. 172, 726 S.W.2d 289 (1987).

A majority vote as to sentencing is not the equivalent of voting by lot, and so a jury's less than unanimous decision on sentence does not constitute voting by lot. Ward v. State, 20 Ark. App. 172, 726 S.W.2d 289 (1987).

A verdict reached by the jury through a compromise of their views is not a verdict by lot but is a fair expression of their views. Davis v. State, 330 Ark. 501, 956 S.W.2d 163 (1997).

Pleading.

Though defendant's pro se motion was styled as a motion for a new trial, it could not be seriously contended that the motion was anything other than one for ARCP 37 (now ARCP 37.1) relief where the motion referred to ARCP 37 (now ARCP 37.1) as its authority and where all of its allegations concerned the collateral issue of ineffective counsel. Haynes v. State, 311 Ark. 651, 846 S.W.2d 179 (1993).

Previous Trial.

Where a defendant is tried and convicted of a criminal offense and a new trial is granted him on his own motion, he may be tried again for the same offense. Johnson v. State, 29 Ark. 31 (1874).

When a defendant is acquitted of a misdemeanor punishable by fine only, the circuit court may set aside the verdict, upon motion of the state, and again put the defendant upon trial. Taylor v. State, 36 Ark. 84 (1880).

It was no defense to an indictment that the defendant had been convicted under a former indictment for the same offense, when the conviction was afterwards set aside on motion of the defendant and a nolle prosequi entered by the prosecuting attorney, whereupon a new indictment was returned. Floyd v. State, 80 Ark. 94, 96 S.W. 125 (1906).

Trial judge's explanation to the jury concerning previous trial did not violate subsection (d). Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300, 408 S.W.2d 905 (1966), dismissed, 386 U.S. 682, 87 S. Ct. 1325, 18 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1967), dismissed, 386 U.S. 684, 87 S. Ct. 1325, 18 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1967).

Record.

Affidavits or other evidence adduced in support of a motion for a new trial become a part of the record only by being incorporated in the bill of exceptions. Quertermous v. State, 114 Ark. 452, 170 S.W. 225 (1914).

It is in the province of a motion for new trial to bring upon the record all irregularities that occurred at the trial. Werner v. State, 44 Ark. 122 (1884); Chiles v. State, 45 Ark. 143 (1885); Sanders v. State, 55 Ark. 365, 18 S.W. 376 (1892); Overton v. State, 57 Ark. 60, 20 S.W. 590 (1892).

Cited: Howard v. State, 58 Ark. 229, 24 S.W. 8, 1893 Ark. LEXIS 33 (1893); Youngblood v. State, 161 Ark. 144, 255 S.W. 572 (1923); Puterbaugh v. State, 217 Ark. 686, 232 S.W.2d 984 (1950); Karoley v. A.R. & T. Elecs., Inc., 235 Ark. 609, 363 S.W.2d 120 (1962); Gross v. State, 246 Ark. 909, 440 S.W.2d 543 (1969); Henderson v. Skerczak, 247 Ark. 446, 446 S.W.2d 243 (1969); Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106; Kozal v. State, 264 Ark. 587, 573 S.W.2d 323 (1978); Halfacre v. State, 265 Ark. 378, 578 S.W.2d 237 (1979); Chisum v. State, 274 Ark. 332, 625 S.W.2d 448 (1981) (decision under prior law) Boren v. State, 297 Ark. 220, 761 S.W.2d 885 (1988); Chism v. State, 312 Ark. 559, 853 S.W.2d 255 (1993); Cigainero v. State, 321 Ark. 533, 906 S.W.2d 282 (1995).

Chapter 90 Judgment and Sentence Generally

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective January 1, 1976.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Disposition of offenders, § 5-4-101 et seq.

Preambles. Acts. 1939, No. 117, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, in the transfer of inmates from the State Farm for Women to a portion of the property operated as a training school for girls by the provisions of Act 203 of the Acts of 1935, Sections 12946 and 12949 of Pope's Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, some doubt is raised as to the authority to commit such convicts and to discipline, parole and discharge them …”

Effective Dates. Acts 1859, No. 147, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1887, No. 148, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1897, No. 37, § 2: Jan. 1, 1898.

Acts 1907, No. 440, § 8: effective on passage.

Acts 1923, No. 76, § 4: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Feb. 9, 1923.

Acts 1923, No. 152, § 2: effective on passage. Emergency declared. Approved Feb. 21, 1923.

Acts 1939, No. 117, § 6: approved Feb. 22, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and declared by the General Assembly to be a fact that there should be a segregation of sexes in the penal Institutions of this State; that there is some question as to the rights and duties of trial courts in rendering judgments for the commitment of women to the Girls Industrial School, and that all doubt can and should be removed as to the authority and jurisdiction of the Board in charge of the Training School for Girls over women convicts, the fact being that their authority and jurisdiction is at the present time questionable. Therefore, it is found an emergency exists and this Act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1953, No. 267, § 2: approved Mar. 10, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas the laws of the State of Arkansas have heretofore been inadequate to suppress such crimes and misdemeanors, and it being thought that the confiscation of deadly weapons used in the commission of crimes will further tend to preserve the peace and quiet of the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall take effect and shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1971, No. 72, § 3: Feb. 9, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under the present law, females over eighteen (18) years of age who are found to be alcoholics may be committed by the circuit court to the Arkansas State Reformatory for Women; that this law is discriminatory against women since male alcoholics are not subject to commitment to the Arkansas State Penitentiary; that it is essential to the well being of citizens of this State that this inequity be corrected immediately, and that this Act is designed to correct such inequity, and should therefore be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 193, § 2: Mar. 2, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly that some confusion exists as to the authority of the courts of this state to adjudge sentences of conviction to run concurrent with a sentence of another court of the state, a court of a different state or a federal court, and the courts should be given proper discretion as to sentencing and punishment. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 195, § 3: Mar. 2, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Arkansas Department of Correction has been required to accept the commitment of women convicted of the misdemeanors of prostitution, habitual intoxication, drug using, contributory dependency and conducting a disorderly house; that State correctional institutions are not the proper institutions to receive women found guilty of these misdemeanors. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 333, § 15: Mar. 22, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, it is deemed that criminal appeals should, so far as is feasible, be consistent with the statutes governing civil appeals and,

“Whereas, injustice sometimes results from the use and application of the present statutes applicable to the appeal of criminal cases and,

“Whereas, some confusion exists as to the manner in which criminal appeals are perfected, this Act is necessary for the protection of a public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1973, No. 818, § 8: Apr. 16, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that some degree of confusion exists in the courts of this State concerning presentence and probation procedures available to courts in handling of persons convicted of crimes, and that the present status of the law concerning the suspension of sentences imposed upon such persons is not to the best interest of the public and the end of justice because the courts do not have sufficient guidelines and authority by which to employ their discretion in granting such suspension, nor do the counties have adequate presentence or probation officers to effectively carry out a rehabilitation program, and that this Act is immediately necessary to correct this situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of th public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Accused's right to sentencing by same judge who accepted guilty plea entered pursuant to plea bargain. 3 A.L.R.4th 1181.

Propriety of imposition of death sentence by state court following jury's recommendation of life imprisonment or lesser sentence. 8 A.L.R.4th 1028.

Power of court, during same term, to increase severity of sentence. 26 A.L.R.4th 905.

Power of court to increase severity of unlawful sentence. 28 A.L.R.4th 147.

Sentencing judge's consideration of defendant's perjury or lying in pleas or testimony in present trial. 34 A.L.R.4th 888.

Permissibility of sentence to a fine only, under statutory provision for imprisonment or imprisonment and fine. 35 A.L.R.4th 192.

Using single prior felony conviction as basis for offense of possessing weapon by convicted felon and to enhance sentence. 37 A.L.R.4th 1168.

Expert testimony as to appropriate punishment for convicted defendant. 47 A.L.R.4th 1069.

Am. Jur. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 706 et seq.

C.J.S. 24 C.J.S., Crim. Proc., § 2183 et seq.

16-90-101. Arrest of judgment.

  1. A motion in arrest of judgment is an application on the part of the defendant that no judgment be rendered upon a verdict against him or her or on a plea of guilty.
  2. The motion may be made at any time before judgment, or after judgment during the same term of the court.
  3. The only ground upon which a judgment shall be arrested is that the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a public offense within the jurisdiction of the court.
  4. The court may arrest the judgment without motion on observing the defect in the indictment named in subsection (c) of this section.
  5. If the court is of opinion from the evidence on the trial that the defendant is guilty of a public offense, he or she may be detained in custody or on bail in the manner and for the time prescribed in § 16-85-706(b). However, otherwise he or she shall be discharged on the arrest of judgment.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 271-275; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3222-3225; Pope's Dig., §§ 4062-4065; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2206 — 43-2210.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Section 16-85-706(b), referred to in subsection (e) of this section, was amended by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 322, to remove references to custody and bail. Before the 2005 amendment § 16-85-706(b) read: “If the motion is sustained, the court shall make an order that the case be submitted to another grand jury, to be assembled at that or the next term of the court. The defendant, if in custody, shall be remanded to jail, or if he is on bail, the bail shall be liable for the defendant’s appearance to answer a new indictment, if one is found.”

Publisher's Notes. This section may be affected by § 16-91-105 and Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3 as to the time for filing a motion in arrest of judgment.

Cross References. Time for filing motion for new trial, motion in arrest of judgment, or any other application for relief, § 16-91-105, Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3.

Case Notes

Construction.

Subsection (c) requires that every material fact necessary to constitute an offense be alleged in the indictment. Barton v. State, 29 Ark. 68 (1874); Younger v. State, 37 Ark. 116 (1881) (decisions prior to 1937 amendment of § 16-85-403).

Construction of Indictment.

Indictment will, if possible, be so construed as to sustain the verdict. Loudermilk v. State, 110 Ark. 549, 162 S.W. 569 (1913); Davis v. State, 131 Ark. 542, 199 S.W. 902 (1917).

Where the facts alleged in an indictment for robbery constituted a public offense, a motion in arrest of judgment was properly overruled. Williams v. State, 153 Ark. 289, 239 S.W. 1065 (1922).

Every material fact constituting an offense must be alleged but, in determining the question of whether a public offense is properly alleged, the language used will be construed in favor of the validity of the indictment unless such interpretation is contrary to the plain and usual meaning of the words in the indictment. Dover v. State, 165 Ark. 496, 265 S.W. 76 (1924).

Grounds for Motion.

Motion in arrest of judgment cannot raise questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence; its only province is to question the sufficiency of the indictment, or at the utmost only such errors as appear on the record. McCoy v. State, 46 Ark. 141 (1885); State v. Bledsoe, 47 Ark. 233, 1 S.W. 149 (1886).

Evidence insufficient to establish grounds for motion in arrest of judgment. Ince v. State, 77 Ark. 426, 93 S.W. 65 (1906); Shaw v. State, 194 Ark. 272, 108 S.W.2d 497 (1937); Haraway v. State, 202 Ark. 845, 153 S.W.2d 161 (1941).

The only ground upon which a judgment may be arrested is that facts stated in the indictment or information do not constitute a public offense within the jurisdiction of the court. Bowen v. State, 205 Ark. 380, 168 S.W.2d 836 (1943).

Sufficiency of Information.

If a defendant in a criminal case desires to question the sufficiency of the information, he must either file a demurrer to the information or file a motion in arrest of judgment; he cannot raise the question by appeal. England v. State, 234 Ark. 421, 352 S.W.2d 582 (1962).

Verdict.

Motion should be granted when accused is found guilty of an offense not charged or included in the charge made in the indictment. Jones v. State, 100 Ark. 195, 139 S.W. 1126 (1911).

Defendant convicted on a plea of nolo contendere to sexual misconduct was not entitled to an arrest of judgment; although former § 5-14-107, the statute defining sexual misconduct as a criminal offense, had been repealed before he entered his plea of nolo contendere, the statute was in effect at the time he committed the offense. Holt v. State, 85 Ark. App. 151, 147 S.W.3d 699 (2004).

Cited: Clark v. State, 271 Ark. 866, 611 S.W.2d 502 (1981).

16-90-102. Presentence officers.

  1. Every judicial district shall have the authority to appoint one (1) or more presentence officers to make such reports to a circuit court as it deems desirable as to the past conduct of any defendant that appears before the circuit court.
    1. The appointment of presentence officers shall be in writing and entered upon the records of the circuit court.
    2. The presentence officer shall have such jurisdiction within the judicial district as is stated in the order of the appointment.
    3. One (1) presentence officer may be appointed chief presentence officer for the judicial district.
    1. The presentence officers shall be paid from the counties composing the judicial district in equal monthly increments as approved by the quorum court of each county but not to exceed thirteen thousand five hundred dollars ($13,500) per year.
    2. Federal funds disbursed under the direction of the Arkansas Crime Commission [abolished] may be used to pay all or any portion of the salaries of the presentence officers.

History. Acts 1973, No. 818, § 3; 1975, No. 602, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2333.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 343, § 2, abolished the Arkansas Crime Commission which had been created under former § 12-7-101.

16-90-103. Sentences without notice void.

All sentences made, rendered, or pronounced by any of the courts of the state against anyone without actual or constructive notice, and all proceedings had under such sentences, shall be absolutely null and void.

History. Acts 1859, No. 147, § 1, p. 172; C. & M. Dig., § 6238; Pope's Dig., § 8194; A.S.A. 1947, § 29-107.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1859, No. 147, § 1, p. 172, is also codified as § 16-65-108.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Comment, Service of Process — Default Judgment, etc., 40 Ark. L. Rev. 381.

Case Notes

Invalid Notice.

Where a resident defendant is served with constructive service, the proceedings are null and void. Barksdale v. Barksdale, 170 Ark. 228, 279 S.W. 789 (1926).

Judge's attempt to reduce a one-year sentence following a contempt order to six months was null and void where the trial judge failed to notify either party before amending his original order. Linder v. Weaver, 364 Ark. 319, 219 S.W.3d 151 (2005).

Cited: Franz v. Lockhart, 700 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ark. 1988).

16-90-104. Commitment of women for felony.

Women who are convicted of or who plead guilty to the commission of felonies may be committed to the Department of Corrections by any court of criminal jurisdiction.

History. Acts 1939, No. 117, § 1; 1971, No. 72, § 1; 1971, No. 195, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 46-804; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 859.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Department of Corrections” for “Department of Correction”.

16-90-105. Verdict of guilty.

  1. Upon the return of a verdict of guilty, if tried by a jury, or the finding of guilt if tried by the circuit court without a jury, sentence may be announced.
  2. The judgment of the circuit court may be then and there entered for sentencing and the entry of the judgment may be postponed to a date certain then fixed by the circuit court not more than thirty (30) days thereafter, at which time probation reports may be submitted, matters of mitigation presented, or any other matter heard that the circuit court or the defendant might deem appropriate to consider before the pronouncement of sentence and entry of the formal judgment.
  3. If the defendant is ordered to be held without bond or for any reason whatever, the defendant may file a written demand for immediate sentencing, whereupon the trial judge shall cause formal sentence and judgment to be made of record.
  4. At the time sentence is announced and judgment entered, the trial judge must advise the defendant of his or her right to appeal and either fix or deny bond.
  5. In its discretion, the trial judge may order:
    1. The defendant released from custody on his or her own recognizance;
    2. Another bond fixed;
    3. The defendant to remain subject to the provisions of his or her bond if the defendant appeared at trial on bail bond; or
    4. The defendant to the custody of the county sheriff to be held without bond.

History. Acts 1971, No. 333, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2301.

Cross References. Authorized sentences generally, § 5-4-104.

Release pending appeal, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 6.

Right of appeal, § 16-91-101 et seq., Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 1.

Role of jury and court in sentencing, § 5-4-103.

Sentencing and entry of judgment, Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.2.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

DiPippa, Suspending Imposition and Execution of Criminal Sentences, Etc., 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 367.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Criminal Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 849.

Case Notes

In General.

A judgment of conviction and sentence is required to be entered in each case; such judgment is a final judgment and not an interlocutory order subject to change. Hunter v. State, 278 Ark. 428, 645 S.W.2d 954 (1983).

This section does not require the voiding of a judgment entered more than 30 days after a court's acceptance of a guilty plea. Ainsworth v. State, 367 Ark. 353, 240 S.W.3d 105 (2006).

Dual Judgments.

When a court grants unauthorized dual judgments of sentence and one is imposed and served, and the other is the suspension of a sentence, there is an election by operation of law and the sentencing court has elected to order the sentence actually imposed; the other is void. Hunter v. State, 278 Ark. 428, 645 S.W.2d 954 (1983).

Inconsistent Entries.

Where there is inconsistency between the docket entry and the certified copy of the judgment, the certified copy prevails. Hunter v. State, 278 Ark. 428, 645 S.W.2d 954 (1983).

Notice of Right to Appeal.

Evidence sufficient to show defendant was not prejudiced where, upon conviction, court remanded defendant to custody of the sheriff without expressly advising defendant of his right to appeal and without fixing or denying bond. Tate v. State, 258 Ark. 135, 524 S.W.2d 624 (1975).

Petitioner was never advised by the trial court of his right to appeal and was granted leave to appeal. Easter v. Lockhart, 773 F. Supp. 1226 (E.D. Ark. 1991).

Objections.

For cases discussing defendant's responsibility in particular circumstances to object or to comment before sentencing, see: Brickey v. State, 148 Ark. 595, 231 S.W. 549 (1921); Morrison v. State, 159 Ark. 323, 251 S.W. 873 (1923) (preceding decisions under prior law); Coleman v. State, 257 Ark. 538, 518 S.W.2d 487 (1975); Noland v. State, 265 Ark. 764, 580 S.W.2d 953 (1979); Cooper v. State, 278 Ark. 394, 645 S.W.2d 950 (1983).

Cited: Hammon v. State, 270 Ark. 307, 605 S.W.2d 6 (1980); Franz v. Lockhart, 700 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Harrison v. State, 303 Ark. 247, 796 S.W.2d 329 (1990); Loar v. State, 368 Ark. 171, 243 S.W.3d 923 (2006).

16-90-106. Informed defendant for felony required.

  1. Judgment shall not be rendered against a defendant in case of felony, except in his or her presence. If the defendant is in custody, he or she shall be brought into court by the proper officer, and if not in custody, a bench warrant similar to the bench warrant on indictments shall be issued for his or her arrest.
  2. When the defendant appears for judgment, he or she must be informed by the court of the nature of the indictment, his or her plea, and the verdict thereon, if any. He or she must be asked if he or she has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him or her.
  3. He or she may show for cause against the judgment any sufficient ground for a new trial or for arrest of judgment.
  4. The law in relation to the punishment, pains, and penalties of all persons when convicted, so far as relates to him or her, and the sentence, shall be read to each convict. The consequences shall be fully declared to him or her, so that the person so convicted and sentenced shall in no instance be deemed ignorant of the sentence pronounced on him or her.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 44, div. 3, art. 7, § 8; Crim. Code, §§ 280-282; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3234-3236, 3241; Pope's Dig., §§ 4074-4076, 4081; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2302 — 43-2305.

Cross References. Procedure when insanity an issue, § 16-86-101 et seq.

Right to interpreter, § 16-10-1101 et seq.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

William R. Simpson, Jr., Clint Miller & David Sudduth, Essay: The Invalidity of a Plea of Guilty to a Criminal Offense Made by Video Teleconferencing When the Defendant is Not Present in Open Court, 34 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 383 (2012).

Case Notes

Allocution.

Failure of the trial court to accord the right of allocution is error. Smith v. State, 257 Ark. 781, 520 S.W.2d 301 (1975); Tate v. State, 258 Ark. 135, 524 S.W.2d 624 (1975).

Where a question is addressed to the defendant which affords him an opportunity to express why sentencing should not be pronounced, it is unnecessary that the precise language of subsection (b) be used. Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 573 S.W.2d 622 (1978); White v. State, 266 Ark. 499, 585 S.W.2d 952 (1979).

Where the trial court afforded defendant more than ample opportunity to be heard, defendant was not denied his right to allocution. Rogers v. State, 265 Ark. 945, 582 S.W.2d 7 (1979).

Where the trial judge failed to ask defendants why judgment should not be pronounced, there was no prejudice to defendants. Heard v. State, 272 Ark. 140, 612 S.W.2d 312 (1981).

Defendants were not entitled to a bifurcated trial so they could present evidence of extenuating or mitigating circumstances at a separate sentencing proceeding where they did not choose to testify at the trial on the merits even though they were afforded the opportunity to address the court before sentencing. Izzard v. State, 10 Ark. App. 265, 663 S.W.2d 192 (1984).

Subsection (b) is satisfied if the court affords the defendant his right of allocution at the time judgment is pronounced. Neff v. State, 287 Ark. 88, 696 S.W.2d 736 (1985).

Where the right of allocution is completely ignored by the court, defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. Neff v. State, 287 Ark. 88, 696 S.W.2d 736 (1985).

Although the trial judge failed to formally pronounce the verdict of guilty as required by subsection (b), where the defendants were represented by counsel, made no objection, did not file a motion for a new trial, and had not suggested in their appellate brief any possibility of prejudice as a result of the omission, reversal was not warranted. Willis v. State, 299 Ark. 356, 772 S.W.2d 584 (1989).

The total failure to afford a convicted defendant the right to state any legal reason why judgment should not be pronounced is reversible error. Hill v. State, 331 Ark. 312, 962 S.W.2d 762, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 860, 119 S. Ct. 145, 142 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1998).

Where defendant was invited to speak during the sentencing proceeding, he suffered no prejudicial error as to allocution. Hill v. State, 331 Ark. 312, 962 S.W.2d 762, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 860, 119 S. Ct. 145, 142 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1998).

Defendant's argument that he was denied a meaningful opportunity for allocution was rejected where he did not object to the trial court's failure to ask him if he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him; also, defendant suffered no prejudice because he testified during the sentencing hearing. Gamet v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 206, 518 S.W.3d 130 (2017).

Appeal.

Failure of the court to advise defendant of his right to appeal conviction and to fix or deny bond on appeal at the time of sentencing held not to prejudice defendant. Tate v. State, 258 Ark. 135, 524 S.W.2d 624 (1975).

Constitutional Right.

Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal case, and the defendant has a constitutional right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome. Lowery v. State, 297 Ark. 47, 759 S.W.2d 545 (1988).

Effect of Sentence.

Where the record is silent, it is presumed that the circuit court complied with the provisions of subsection (d), and a failure to do so would be no cause of reversal. Brown v. State, 13 Ark. 96 (1852).

Evidence showed noncompliance with subsection (d). Culpepper v. State, 268 Ark. 263, 595 S.W.2d 220 (1980), superseded as stated in, Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986).

Where sentencing was not in conformity with subsection (d) but there was no objection by either party and no appeal from the sentence, the irregularities were waived. Cooper v. State, 278 Ark. 394, 645 S.W.2d 950 (1983).

Defendant is entitled to know the effect of his sentences. Hunter v. State, 278 Ark. 428, 645 S.W.2d 954 (1983).

Habeas Corpus.

Because petitioner failed to demonstrate that the sentence was illegal on its face or the trial court lacked jurisdiction, he could not prevail on his appeal of the order dismissing his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus; a violation of this section does not implicate the trial court's jurisdiction or render a sentence illegal. Johnson v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 230, 577 S.W.3d 710 (2019).

Resentencing.

The presence of the defendant is required at resentencing as well. Lowery v. State, 297 Ark. 47, 759 S.W.2d 545 (1988).

Showing Cause Against Judgment.

Subsection (c) prohibits examination of jurors, as to their deliberations, to establish grounds for a new trial, unless it can be shown that the verdict was by lot. Williams v. State, 264 Ark. 77, 568 S.W.2d 30 (1978).

Cited: Johnson v. State, 225 Ark. 719, 284 S.W.2d 627 (1955); Coleman v. State, 257 Ark. 538, 518 S.W.2d 487 (1975); Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856, 568 S.W.2d 3 (1978); Rogers v. Britton, 466 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Parks v. State, 11 Ark. App. 238, 669 S.W.2d 496 (1984); Standridge v. State, 290 Ark. 150, 717 S.W.2d 795 (1986); Franz v. Lockhart, 700 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Goff v. State, 341 Ark. 567, 19 S.W.3d 579 (2000).

16-90-107. Fixing of punishment generally.

  1. When a jury finds a verdict of guilty and fails to agree on the punishment to be inflicted, or does not declare the punishment in its verdict, or if it assesses a punishment not authorized by law, and in all cases of a judgment on confession, the court shall assess and declare the punishment and render judgment accordingly.
    1. Juries and courts shall have the power to assess the punishment of one convicted of a felony at a general sentence to the Department of Correction. The sentence shall not be less than the minimum nor greater than the maximum time provided by law.
    2. At any time after the expiration of the minimum time, upon the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Correction and it appearing that a prisoner has a good record as a convict, his or her sentence may be terminated by the Parole Board.
  2. If the jury in any case assesses a greater punishment, whether of fine or imprisonment, than the highest limit declared by law for the offense for which the jury convicts the defendant, the court shall disregard the excess and enter judgment and pronounce sentence according to the highest limit prescribed by law in the particular case.
  3. If the jury in any case assesses a punishment, whether of fine or imprisonment, below the limit prescribed by law for offenses of which the defendant is convicted, the court shall render judgment and pronounce sentence according to the lowest limit prescribed by law in such cases.
  4. The court shall have power in all cases of conviction to reduce the extent or duration of the punishment assessed by a jury so that the punishment is not in any case reduced below the limit prescribed by law in such cases if the conviction is proper and the punishment assessed is greater than ought to be inflicted under the circumstances of the case.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 176-179; Acts 1907, No. 440, § 2, p. 1174; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3204, 3230-3233; Pope's Dig., §§ 4040, 4070-4073; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2306 — 43-2310.

Cross References. Authorized sentences generally, § 5-4-104.

Cruel and unusual punishment not to be inflicted, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 9.

Role of jury and court in sentencing, § 5-4-103.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statute Including “Sexually Motivated Offenses” Within Definition of Sex Offense for Purposes of Sentencing or Classification of Defendant as Sex Offender. 30 A.L.R.6th 373.

Ark. L. Rev.

Constitutional Law — Permissibility of Increased Sentence on Retrial, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 117.

Disposition of Offenders: Under Arkansas' New Criminal Code, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 222.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Statutes permitting the court to fix the punishment under certain circumstances are not unconstitutional. Froman v. State, 232 Ark. 697, 339 S.W.2d 601 (1960).

In General.

Subsection (b) contemplates that sentence imposed shall be executed, unless the verdict is set aside. Holden v. State, 156 Ark. 521, 247 S.W. 768 (1923).

Applicability.

Subsection (d) of this section did not apply to defendant's case where the jury fixed his sentences at 20 years' imprisonment on a battery count and 10 years' imprisonment on a firearm count, recommended the terms be served consecutively, and its recommendation of an alternative sentence of probation was not binding on the court. McElroy v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 342, 553 S.W.3d 182 (2018).

Discretion of Court.

It is within the trial judge's discretion to set the punishment for a defendant anywhere within the statutory range of punishment provided for a particular crime. Noland v. State, 265 Ark. 764, 580 S.W.2d 953 (1979); Adams v. State, 25 Ark. App. 212, 755 S.W.2d 579 (1988).

Where, after the defendant entered a guilty plea to class C felony theft of property for which the maximum sentence is 10 years, a sentence of 6 years in prison with 2 years suspended on condition that defendant pay the sum of $135,000 at the rate of $200.00 per month, beginning 60 days after release from prison and continuing for 12 years, at which time a civil judgment would be entered for the outstanding balance, was not proper. Brimer v. State, 295 Ark. 20, 746 S.W.2d 370 (1988).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reduce his life sentence for the rape of his minor daughter as numerous witnesses testified to the alleged abuse of the victim, including the victim herself, and a nurse examiner testified to signs of extensive and ongoing sexual abuse; based on this evidence, the jury's verdict did not appear to be the result of passion or prejudice. McDonald v. State, 364 Ark. 491, 221 S.W.3d 349 (2006).

Excessive Verdict.

Where the jury imposes a fine in excess of that provided by law, the court should disregard the excess; on appeal, the judgment will be modified by striking out that portion assessing the excessive fine and affirmed. Russell v. State, 112 Ark. 282, 166 S.W. 540 (1914).

Instruction authorizing jury to fix punishment at both fine and imprisonment was held erroneous, but the error could be corrected by eliminating from judgment that part sentencing defendant to imprisonment. Craig v. State, 204 Ark. 798, 164 S.W.2d 1007 (1942).

Fixing by Court.

Court did not err in submitting to the jury a verdict form authorizing the jury to find defendant guilty without agreement of punishment, leaving the punishment to be fixed by the court, along with forms allowing the jury to find the defendant not guilty or guilty with punishment fixed by them. Downs v. State, 231 Ark. 466, 330 S.W.2d 281 (1959).

Court held authorized to fix punishment. Froman v. State, 232 Ark. 697, 339 S.W.2d 601 (1960); Norton v. State, 260 Ark. 412, 540 S.W.2d 588 (1976); Clinkscale v. State, 13 Ark. App. 149, 680 S.W.2d 728 (1984).

Jury should not be told initially that they can let the court impose the punishment, but rather, they should only be told after they report that they have reached a verdict of guilty but are unable to agree on the punishment to be imposed. Ward v. State, 236 Ark. 878, 370 S.W.2d 425 (1963). But see Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W.2d 304 (1943).

Instruction that sentencing could be left to court held proper. Knighten v. State, 210 Ark. 248, 195 S.W.2d 47 (1946); Keese v. State, 223 Ark. 261, 265 S.W.2d 542 (1954); Ward v. State, 236 Ark. 878, 370 S.W.2d 425 (1963).

Where the circumstances indicated that the jury had reached a verdict as to defendant's guilt, it was not error for the court, upon inquiry by the jury, to permit them to return for instruction by the court as to whether, if they were unable to agree upon punishment, they could let the court fix the punishment. Burford v. State, 242 Ark. 377, 413 S.W.2d 670 (1967).

Where the instruction was given as to the fixing of punishment by the trial court at a time prior to a finding of guilty by the jury, and the counsel made the timely objection, such instruction constituted reversible error. Weems v. State, 259 Ark. 532, 534 S.W.2d 753 (1976).

Trial court's sentencing held proper. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 227, 742 S.W.2d 877 (1988).

Instructing the jury prior to a finding of guilty by the jury that they can let the court impose the punishment if they reach a verdict of guilty but are unable to agree on the punishment to be imposed is reversible error. Jones v. State, 318 Ark. 704, 889 S.W.2d 706 (1994).

The court properly imposed sentence on the defendant where one juror became ill after the jury rendered a guilty verdict and could not continue. Ashlock v. State, 64 Ark. App. 253, 983 S.W.2d 448 (1998).

Where the verdict form submitted by the jury the second time was proper, the trial court erred in taking the case from the jury based on the fact that the jury had recommended a sentence of “zero” for the Class D felony. Slaughter v. State, 69 Ark. App. 65, 12 S.W.3d 240 (2000).

Where the jury convicted defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and recommended a sentence of 3 years' probation, the trial court was permitted to sentence defendant to 20 years' imprisonment rather than follow the jury's recommendation; the jury's recommendation of 3 years' probation was not authorized by former § 5-64-401(a)(1) (see now § 5-64-420), which required a minimum sentence of 20 years. Ewings v. State, 85 Ark. App. 411, 155 S.W.3d 715 (2004).

Use of the word “may” in § 5-4-702 does not mean that a jury has the discretion as to whether to impose an enhanced sentence where a crime of domestic violence was committed in the presence of a child; rather, it means the state had the option of seeking the enhancement. Thus, where no sentence was imposed by the jury, a trial court did not err by imposing one under this section. Sullivan v. State, 366 Ark. 183, 234 S.W.3d 285 (2006).

Jurisdiction.

Municipal court was not exercising its criminal jurisdiction when it found defendant guilty of criminal offenses and ordered him to pay restitution. Townsend v. State, 292 Ark. 157, 728 S.W.2d 516 (1987).

Modification of Sentence.

Subsection (c) held inapplicable. Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969).

Sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment pursuant to subsection (c). Graham v. State, 253 Ark. 462, 486 S.W.2d 678 (1972); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark. 574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Kuehn v. State, 253 Ark. 889, 489 S.W.2d 505 (1973).

Trial court was incorrect in holding subsection (c) applicable where the error in the classification of the crime by the trial court applied to both minimum and maximum penalties under the law and penalty was reduced to minimum prescribed by law. Estes v. State, 258 Ark. 597, 528 S.W.2d 138 (1975).

After defendant's valid sentence had been put into execution and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify, amend or revise it, either during or after the term at which it was pronounced. Rogers v. State, 265 Ark. 945, 582 S.W.2d 7 (1979).

Where there was no evidence that the jury's sentence was based on passion or prejudice, court refused to reduce it. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980).

Where jury assessed punishment below minimum limit prescribed by law, subsection (d) required the trial judge to pronounce a sentence according to the lowest limit prescribed by law. Caldwell v. State, 268 Ark. 713, 595 S.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1980).

Where the judge said nothing about balancing the fine and imprisonment elements of the sentence when he reduced the fine and illegally increased the sentence under § 5-4-103, the appellate court had no reason to reverse the fine portion of the sentence. Richards v. State, 309 Ark. 133, 827 S.W.2d 155 (1992).

Request for leniency of sentence under subsection (e) was not considered where defendant did not show that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his counsel requested consideration of the sentences received by the others who were involved in the crime of which he was convicted. Riggins v. State, 329 Ark. 171, 946 S.W.2d 691 (1997).

Trial court's power under subsection (e) of this section to reduce the punishment assessed by the jury is harmonious with, and complementary to, the jury's power to fix punishment found in §§ 5-4-103 and 16-97-101. Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's post-trial request for a sentence reduction pursuant to subsection (e) of this section because defendant's 20-year sentence for second-degree sexual assault, in violation of § 5-14-125, fell within the statutory range. Brown v. State, 2010 Ark. 420, 378 S.W.3d 66 (2010).

Motion to Reduce.

Denial of inmate's petition for postconviction relief was proper because he failed to prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In part, the inmate's argument that the jury's verdict imposing the maximum sentences to run consecutively was a result of passion and prejudice was not persuasive; considering the court's ability to sua sponte reduce the sentence, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that a motion to reduce the sentence under subsection (e) of this section would have been denied. Hoyle v. State, 2011 Ark. 321, 388 S.W.3d 901 (2011).

Parole.

Neither the trial court nor counsel should comment on parole because the jury would be inclined to impose excessive punishment in order to compensate for early release. Haynes v. State, 311 Ark. 651, 846 S.W.2d 179 (1993).

Cited: Martin v. State, 162 Ark. 282, 257 S.W. 752 (1924); McGee v. State, 215 Ark. 795, 223 S.W.2d 603 (1949); Newsom v. State, 232 Ark. 405, 337 S.W.2d 866 (1960); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968); Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 440 S.W.2d 244 (1969); Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 90 S. Ct. 1578, 26 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1970); Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977); Rogers v. Britton, 466 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Franz v. Lockhart, 700 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Walker v. State, 309 Ark. 23, 827 S.W.2d 637 (1992); Brown v. State, 82 Ark. App. 61, 110 S.W.3d 293 (2003); Barritt v. State, 372 Ark. 395, 277 S.W.3d 211 (2008); Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 243, 383 S.W.3d 325 (2011).

16-90-108. Fixing of punishment — Misdemeanor.

  1. Whenever any person shall be convicted of a misdemeanor and the punishment for the offense is a fine, the judgment shall direct that the defendant be imprisoned until the fine and costs are paid.
    1. The person so convicted shall be incarcerated for a period not to exceed one (1) day for each two dollars ($2.00) of the fine and costs.
    2. Where the laws of this state permit any fine so imposed to be discharged by a person through manual labor upon state, city, or municipal facilities, the fine shall be discharged at a rate not to exceed one (1) day of labor for each five dollars ($5.00) of the fine and cost.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict the authority of any court to suspend any sentence upon such conditions as the court may impose.

History. Acts 1969, No. 156, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2314.1.

Cross References. Authorized sentences generally, § 5-4-104.

Confinement for default, § 16-90-407.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The word “imprisonment,” as used in former similar section, meant imprisonment in the county jail and applied only to misdemeanors. Cheaney v. State, 36 Ark. 74 (1880); Burrell v. State, 203 Ark. 1124, 160 S.W.2d 218 (1942) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Indigency.

Requiring an indigent defendant to serve out fine increased the severity of the penalty so that due process of law required that he be offered counsel before trial. Winters v. Beck, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969) (decision under prior law).

Where an indigent defendant brought habeas corpus proceeding for release from jail when imprisoned for inability to pay fine, there were alternatives to the unconditional release of the prisoner, such as probation or suspended sentence to permit installment payments of the fine. Cherry v. Hall, 251 Ark. 305, 472 S.W.2d 225 (1971).

16-90-109. Fixing of punishment — Conviction of two or more offenses.

  1. If the defendant is convicted of two (2) or more offenses, the punishment of each of which is confinement, the judgment shall be so rendered that the punishment in one (1) case shall commence after the termination of it in the others.
  2. When any person is convicted of more than one (1) offense, regardless if all of the convictions are in the same court or if one (1) of the convictions is in a different court of the state, a court of another state, or a federal court, where the punishment for a conviction begins before the expiration of the sentence imposed on the other conviction, the sentencing court shall have the authority to direct that the sentence adjudged shall run concurrently with the other sentence if it shall be deemed best for society and the person convicted.

History. Crim. Code, § 283; C. & M. Dig., § 3239; Acts 1923, No. 152, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 4056; Acts 1971, No. 193, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2311, 43-2312.

Cross References. Multiple sentences, § 5-4-403.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Law — Multiple Punishment Resulting From a Single Course of Criminal Conduct, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 181.

Case Notes

Concurrent Sentences.

The authority and discretion granted by subsection (b) is vested in the trial court alone. Hayes v. State, 169 Ark. 883, 277 S.W. 36 (1925).

Unless the judgment specifically directs that one sentence shall commence upon the expiration of the other, the sentences will run concurrently. Williams v. State, 229 Ark. 42, 313 S.W.2d 242 (1958).

Findings of the jury, in fixing the punishment, that the sentences should be serve consecutively can only be considered advisory inasmuch as the question of whether sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently lies solely within the province of the court. Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357 S.W.2d 499 (1962).

Prior to the passage of § 16-93-601, a prisoner committed to serve two sentences was required to completely serve one of the sentences prior to the other before becoming eligible for parole. Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969).

It was not error to refuse to instruct the jury as to whether sentences on several counts would run concurrently or consecutively. Tucker v. State, 248 Ark. 979, 455 S.W.2d 888 (1970).

Consecutive Sentences.

If the judgment did not direct that the imprisonment in one case commence after the termination of it in the other, the terms of imprisonment ran concurrently, but the rule did not apply if the judgments were pronounced for fines only and the defendant was subsequently imprisoned for nonpayment of the fines. Ex parte Brady, 70 Ark. 376, 68 S.W. 34 (1902) (decision under prior law).

Courts may direct that the term of confinement shall begin at the expiration of a previous term. Hayes v. State, 169 Ark. 883, 277 S.W. 36 (1925).

Though the court had the power to correct clerical errors in its judgments, orders or decrees, the order could not be corrected to read that the sentence was to begin at the expiration of the sentence defendant was at present serving, it being construed that the commitment would run concurrently. Williams v. State, 229 Ark. 42, 313 S.W.2d 242 (1958).

Where a defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary for 21 years for robbery and 7 years for burglary, the terms to run consecutively, the 21 years for robbery should be served first. Rowe v. State, 243 Ark. 375, 419 S.W.2d 806 (1967).

Where the defendant was convicted and sentenced for two offenses in state court, but before he was confined was tried on a federal charge and imprisoned in a federal penitentiary, his state sentence started running on the date he was delivered to the state penitentiary to start serving his sentence. Young v. State, 252 Ark. 184, 477 S.W.2d 823 (1972).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sentences to run consecutively. Graham v. State, 254 Ark. 741, 495 S.W.2d 864 (1973); Shields v. State, 281 Ark. 420, 664 S.W.2d 866 (1984); Edwards v. State, 300 Ark. 4, 775 S.W.2d 900 (1989).

A trial court has the discretion to make maximum sentences run consecutively if it is in the best interests of society and the person convicted and his exercise of discretion will not be reversed unless it is shown that he abused that discretion. Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 537 S.W.2d 800 (1976); Blair v. State, 284 Ark. 330, 681 S.W.2d 374 (1984).

Under this section, the trial court clearly has authority to order that sentences be served consecutively. Love v. State, 324 Ark. 526, 922 S.W.2d 701 (1996).

Cited: Jackson v. State, 254 Ark. 246, 492 S.W.2d 897 (1973); Klimas v. State, 271 Ark. 508, 609 S.W.2d 46 (1980); Matthews v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1984); Harper v. State, 315 Ark. 195, 865 S.W.2d 647 (1993).

16-90-110. Fixing of punishment — Judgment of death.

Where judgment of death is pronounced, the day of the execution shall be fixed in the judgment. The day of execution shall not be in less than thirty (30) days after the judgment.

History. Crim. Code, § 285; C. & M. Dig., § 3238; Pope's Dig., § 4078; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2313.

Cross References. Automatic appeal and mandatory review in death sentence case; procedure on affirmance, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 10.

Capital murder trial and sentence, § 5-4-601 et seq.

16-90-111. Correction or reduction of sentence.

  1. Any circuit court, upon receipt of petition by the aggrieved party for relief and after the notice of the relief has been served on the prosecuting attorney, may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided in this section for the reduction of sentence.
    1. The circuit court may reduce a sentence within ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed or within sixty (60) days after receipt by the circuit court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal.
    2. The circuit court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as provided by law.

History. Acts 1983, No. 431, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2314; Acts 1987, No. 550, § 1; 1999, No. 578, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was declared superseded by Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c) in Harris v. State, 318 Ark. 599, 887 S.W.2d 514 (1994). However, in Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304, 5 S.W.3d 41 (1999), the Supreme Court cited Black's Law Dictionary 1220 (7th ed. 1999) and held that when dealing with a motion to modify a condition contained in a judgment of probation under subsection (b) of this section rather than a petition under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37 for postconviction relief following imprisonment, a trial court had the authority to modify an illegal condition of probation under subsection (a) of this section because the defendant was on probation and therefore by definition not in custody.

By per curiam order dated December 19, 1994, the Supreme Court provided:

“This court frequently acts on motions filed in the course of appeals of orders denying post-conviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 37, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 (Supp. 1991), statutes which govern the issuance of writs of habeas corpus and mandamus as well as legal remedies such as error coram nobis proceedings and others. As there is no provision in the prevailing rules of procedure for a motion for reconsideration to be filed after this court has denied a motion which stems from a post-conviction matter, such motions will no longer be filed.”

Case Notes

Applicability.

Petitioner's allegations of mere trial error were not within the purview of this section, and thus, petitioner's allegations that the sentences were imposed without proper hearings or forms were not cognizable. Lukach v. State, 2017 Ark. 128, 516 S.W.3d 711 (2017).

Appeal Dismissed.

Defendant's appeal of the denial of defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence was dismissed because the sentence defendant contested had been vacated and remanded to the trial court, which resentenced defendant, rendering the appeal moot. Glaze v. State, 2013 Ark. 141 (2013).

Defendant's appeal of the denial of defendant's petition to correct an illegal sentence was dismissed because defendant could not prevail, as, (1) to the extent defendant's claims were cognizable under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, defendant's request for relief was properly treated as a petition under Rule 37.1 and was subject to the time limitations contained in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c), which defendant did not satisfy after having pled guilty, and, (2) to the extent defendant's claims were not cognizable under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, the claims alleged no error required to support a claim of an illegal sentence, as defendant did not show defendant's sentences were outside the statutory range, and defendant's petition was not timely filed under this section. Davis v. State, 2013 Ark. 189 (2013).

Considered as a Petition for Postconviction Relief.

Where defendant requested relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under this section should have been considered by the trial court as a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1(a). Gonder v. State, 2011 Ark. 248, 382 S.W.3d 674 (2011).

Inmate's appeal of the denial of the inmate's petition to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to this section, was dismissed because (1) Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(b) provided that all postconviction relief grounds cognizable under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 had to be raised in a Rule 37.1 petition filed within 90 days of the date of judgment when a defendant pled guilty, even though this section permitted a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time, as the statute was superseded to the extent the statute conflicted with the Rule's time limits, (2) the petition was filed over six years after judgment was entered, (3) the time limits in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2 were jurisdictional, denying a trial court jurisdiction if the time limits were not met, and, on appeal, a reviewing court, and (4) the inmate's sentence was within the prescribed statutory ranges in §§ 5-4-501(b)(2)(A) and 5-4-401(b)(1). Redus v. State, 2013 Ark. 9 (2013).

Supreme Court did not have to defer to the trial court to make the determination that defendant's sentence was illegal because whether the judgment was facially illegal was a matter of law, and it was not a question of fact best resolved through the trial court's determination. Hallman v. State, 2018 Ark. 336, 561 S.W.3d 305 (2018).

Sentence Not Facially Illegal.

Juvenile did not demonstrate that his two consecutive life sentences were illegal under this section where he had been convicted of two Class Y felonies under § 5-4-401(a)(1), which were punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years nor more than 40 years, or life, and thus, the sentences were within the allowed statutory range. Bell v. State, 2015 Ark. 370 (2015), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 2485, 195 L. Ed. 2d 826 (2016).

Trial court did not err in denying relief under this section where allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficient evidence, and constitutional error could not establish that the sentence was illegal on its face. Leach v. State, 2017 Ark. 176, 518 S.W.3d 670 (2017).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying the prisoner relief under this section where his claim that the judge acted in excess of his authority was not a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. Lukach v. State, 2018 Ark. 208, 548 S.W.3d 810 (2018).

Because defendant expressly waived presentation of proof as to both charges and the enhancement, the circuit court's denial of his petition to correct an illegal sentence was not clearly erroneous; the circuit court had found that defendant entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to false imprisonment and manslaughter, pleaded to the manslaughter charge as a habitual offender, and waived the presentation of proof and evidence as to the charges to which he was eventually sentenced as well as the enhancement of the charges. Johnson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 68, 571 S.W.3d 519 (2019).

Sentence Valid.

District court did not impose an illegal sentence on defendant after revoking her probation where the sentence of 10-years' imprisonment and 10-years' suspended imposition of sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum under § 5-4-401(a)(3). Turman v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 383, 467 S.W.3d 181 (2015).

Untimely Petition.

Where appellant entered a guilty plea to multiple felony offenses and received an aggregate sentence of 720 months in prison, the trial court did not err by denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence because he did not file it within the 90-day time limit required by subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Purifoy v. State, 2013 Ark. 26 (2013).

Trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion seeking waiver of 70 percent requirement of former § 16-93-611 (repealed 2011, see now § 16-93-618(c)) because whether treated as an action under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 or former § 16-90-111(b) (amended 1999), it was not timely filed. Johnson v. State, 2014 Ark. 526, 452 S.W.3d 87 (2014).

Cited: State v. Wilmoth, 369 Ark. 346, 255 S.W.3d 419 (2007); Robertson v. State, 2010 Ark. 300, 367 S.W.3d 538 (2010); Douglas v. State, 2014 Ark. 488 (2014).

16-90-112. Fixing of punishment — Removal from certain offices — Exclusion of suffrage.

  1. Where judges of the probate division of circuit court, justices of the peace, county sheriffs, county coroners, county surveyors, jailers, county assessors, prosecuting attorneys, constables, city or police judges, clerks, and marshals shall be convicted upon an indictment for malfeasance or misfeasance in office, for willful neglect in the discharge of their official duties, or for any offense which by statute law or the Arkansas Constitution creates a forfeiture of their offices, the court shall render a judgment of removal from office in addition to the other penalties and punishment prescribed by law.
  2. Every person convicted of bribery or felony shall be excluded from every office of trust or profit and from the right of suffrage in this state.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 44, div. 4, art. 11, § 8; Crim. Code, § 287; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3246, 3247; Pope's Dig., §§ 4091, 4092; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2318, 43-2319.

Cross References. Convicted persons ineligible, Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 9.

Persons entitled to vote, Ark. Const., Art. 3, §§ 1-7, Amend. No. 8.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Official Misconduct under the Arkansas Criminal Code, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 160.

Wills, Constitutional Crisis: Can the Governor (or Other State Officeholder) Be Removed from Office in a Court Action after Being Convicted of a Felony?, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

Case Notes

Suspension Pending Trial.

Legislature is without power to authorize the circuit court to suspend from office a prosecuting attorney who is under indictment. Speer v. Wood, 128 Ark. 183, 193 S.W. 785 (1917).

Cited: Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 570, 781 S.W.2d 14 (1989).

16-90-113. Fixing of punishment — Judgment for costs.

  1. In judgments against the defendant, a judgment for costs shall be rendered in addition to the other punishment. This judgment shall be taxed by the clerk and shall be for the benefit of the officers rendering the service.
  2. In case of failure by the defendant to pay the costs, they shall be paid by the county where the conviction is had.

History. Crim. Code, § 286; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [286], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 3243; Pope's Dig., § 4083; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2316.

Case Notes

Correction of Error.

An omission from the judgment of a provision that defendant shall pay the costs may be cured by nunc pro tunc entry. Villines v. State, 105 Ark. 471, 151 S.W. 1023 (1912).

Misdemeanor Cases.

In case of misdemeanor, when the defendant is convicted, the county is not liable for the costs. Bradley County v. Bond, 37 Ark. 226 (1881).

Prosecuting Attorney's Fee.

Costs include the prosecuting attorney's fee. Phillips County v. Clayton, 29 Ark. 246 (1874).

County is not liable for the fees of the prosecuting attorney in cases of convictions for misdemeanors where the defendant has no property and the county has not contracted to work its convicts. Lonoke County v. Reed, 122 Ark. 111, 182 S.W. 563 (1916).

Prosecuting attorney's fee is not taxable until final judgment has been rendered. Huddleston v. Craighead County, 128 Ark. 287, 194 S.W. 17 (1917).

16-90-114. Postponement of sentence.

  1. In any case where the pronouncement of final judgment and sentence shall have been postponed, all costs shall be considered due and payable just as if the sentence and judgment had been pronounced.
  2. It is the intention of this section that the postponement, so far as liability for costs is concerned, shall be regarded as a conviction.

History. Acts 1923, No. 76, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 4055; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2325.

Cross References. Effect on appeal, § 5-4-305.

16-90-115. Suspension of sentence.

  1. All courts of record, district courts, and city courts in this state shall have the authority to suspend the imposition of sentences or the imposition of fines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before the courts unless specifically prohibited by law.
    1. At any time before a court has entered a judgment of conviction against a criminal defendant, the court may dismiss the case and, in that instance, any fine imposed against the defendant shall be considered a civil penalty.
    2. The court, however, shall assess and disburse the appropriate court costs pursuant to § 16-10-305 et seq.

History. Acts 1999, No. 463, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, §§ 215, 216.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-90-115, concerning suspension of sentence, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 788, § 32 and No. 1341, § 31. The section was derived from Acts 1985, No. 956, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2326.1 — 43-2326.3.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment by No. 1185, § 215 substituted “district courts, city courts, and police courts” for “municipal courts, city courts, corporation courts, mayor's courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, and courts of common pleas” in (a).

The 2003 amendment by No. 1185, § 216, substituted “and city courts” for “city courts, and police courts” in (a).

Case Notes

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

16-90-116. Taking of bond or note for misdemeanor fine and costs.

  1. Whenever any person is convicted of a misdemeanor by any court or justice of the peace and gives security for the fine and costs adjudged against him or her, the county sheriff or other officer taking the security shall forthwith file the bond or note so taken with the clerk of the court or justice of the peace rendering the judgment.
    1. The bond or note, when so filed, shall have the force and effect of a judgment. If the bond or note is not satisfied at maturity, the clerk of the court or the justice of the peace, as the case may be, shall issue an execution against the defendant and the securities. The execution so issued shall have the same force and effect as other executions in criminal cases.
    2. If the clerk of the court or justice of the peace shall fail or refuse to issue execution as provided in this subsection within sixty (60) days after maturity of the bond or note, he or she shall be liable to indictment for a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not less than the amount of the judgments.

History. Acts 1887, No. 148, § 1, p. 274; 1897, No. 37, § 1, p. 47; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3278, 7560; Pope's Dig., §§ 4126, 9634; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2317.

Case Notes

Default in Payment.

Where security is given under this section, and defendant released by virtue thereof, and default is made in the payment at maturity of the note and a nulla bona return made, the defendant cannot be retaken on the judgment. State v. Pigguese, 58 Ark. 132, 23 S.W. 792 (1893).

Installment Payment.

The authority of the sheriff to accept a note or bond for the payment of a fine and costs could have been utilized to provide an installment payment system for those whose payments were secured by solvent surety. Cherry v. Hall, 251 Ark. 305, 472 S.W.2d 225 (1971).

Right to Appeal.

A judgment defendant does not waive the right to appeal by executing a note and mortgage to the state to secure the payment of the judgment. Hubbard v. State, 71 Ark. 467, 75 S.W. 853 (1903).

16-90-117. Security to keep the peace or be of good behavior.

  1. The court before which any person may be convicted of any criminal offense not punishable by death shall have power, in addition to the sentence prescribed or authorized by law, to require the person to give security to keep the peace or be of good behavior, or both, for any term not exceeding three (3) years from the time he or she may be discharged from prison if imprisonment is a part of the punishment.
  2. If the person fails to give security as required in subsection (a) of this section, he or she shall be committed to prison, there to remain until the security is given.
  3. No recognizance given under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed to be broken unless the principal therein is convicted of some offense amounting in judgment of law to a breach of the recognizance.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 180-182; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3248, 3249; Pope's Dig., §§ 4093, 4094; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2320 — 43-2322.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Killenbeck, Nothing That We Can Do? Or, Much Ado About Nothing? Some Thoughts on Bates v. Bates, Equity, and Domestic Abuse in Arkansas, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 766.

16-90-118. Duty of court to report to Division of Correction.

  1. Whenever any person is sentenced to the Division of Correction, it shall be the duty of the court before which he or she has been convicted to cause to be made and transmitted to the agent of the division a short report of the circumstances attending the offense, particularly those which tended to aggravate or extenuate the offense.
  2. The agent shall file and preserve the report.

History. Acts 1838, § 11, p. 116; C. & M. Dig., § 3242; Pope's Dig., § 4082; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2323; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 860.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in the section heading and in (a); and substituted “division” for “department” in (a).

Case Notes

Commitment Before Sentence.

Neither judges nor courts have authority to order persons accused of crimes, before conviction, to the penitentiary for safe-keeping. Martin v. State, 162 Ark. 282, 257 S.W. 752 (1924).

16-90-119. Confiscation of deadly weapons.

  1. When any person is convicted of any homicide, burglary, robbery, assault with intent to kill, assault with a deadly weapon, battery, or any other felony involving a deadly weapon, the court in which the person is convicted may confiscate the deadly weapons involved in the offense and may by court order either:
    1. Transfer the weapons and the title to the weapons to an appropriate state or local law enforcement agency for use or sale by the law enforcement agency; or
    2. Order the weapons destroyed if the weapons are not suitable for use or sale by law enforcement agencies.
    1. The sale of weapons by a law enforcement agency under this section shall be at a public auction or by competitive bid.
    2. The sale shall be subject to a background check of the purchaser through the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Instant Criminal Background Check System.
    3. The sale shall not include illegal weapons.
    4. The proceeds of the auction shall be retained by the law enforcement agency.

History. Acts 1953, No. 267, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2327; Acts 1987, No. 712, § 1; 2005, No. 889, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted the present subdivision (a), (a)(1) and (a)(2) designations and made related changes; inserted “for use or sale by the law enforcement agency” in present (a)(1); in present (a)(2), inserted “or sale” and deleted “may” preceding “order”; and added (b).

U.S. Code. As to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Instant Criminal Background Check System, referred to in (b)(2), see Section 103 of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922nt.

Cross References. Disposition of contraband and seized property, § 5-5-101.

Forfeiture of weapons and ammunition, § 5-5-401 et seq.

16-90-120. Felony with firearm.

  1. Any person convicted of any offense that is classified by the laws of this state as a felony who employed any firearm of any character as a means of committing or escaping from the felony, in the discretion of the sentencing court, may be subjected to an additional period of confinement in the Division of Correction for a period not to exceed fifteen (15) years.
  2. The period of confinement, if any, imposed under this section shall be in addition to any fine or penalty provided by law as punishment for the felony itself. Any additional prison sentence imposed under the provisions of this section, if any, shall run consecutively and not concurrently with any period of confinement imposed for conviction of the felony itself.
  3. A separate appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from the imposition of the sentence, if any, provided for by this section, and any appeal shall be in the manner prescribed for appellate review of conviction of criminal offenses in general. However, the sole and only question to be decided upon the separate appeal shall be whether the evidence warrants a finding that the defendant actually employed a firearm in the commission of, or escape from commission of, the felony for which he or she stands convicted.
  4. Any reversal of a defendant's conviction for the commission of the felony shall automatically reverse the prison sentence which may be imposed under this section.
    1. For an offense committed on or after July 2, 2007, notwithstanding any law allowing the award of meritorious good time or any other law to the contrary, except as provided in subdivision (e)(1)(B)(ii) of this section, any person who is sentenced under subsection (a) of this section is not eligible for parole or community correction transfer until the person serves:
      1. Seventy percent (70%) of the term of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced under subsection (a) of this section if the underlying felony was any of the following:
        1. Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;
        2. Kidnapping that is a Class Y felony, § 5-11-102;
        3. Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;
        4. Rape, § 5-14-103;
        5. Causing a catastrophe, § 5-38-202(a);
        6. Trafficking methamphetamine, § 5-64-440(b)(1);
        7. Manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or former § 5-64-401; or
        8. Possession of drug paraphernalia with the purpose to manufacture methamphetamine, former § 5-64-403(c)(5);
        1. Except as provided in subdivision (e)(1)(B)(ii) of this section, seventy percent (70%) of the term of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced under subsection (a) of this section if the underlying felony was any of the following:
          1. Manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or former § 5-64-401;
          2. Possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, former § 5-64-403(c)(5); or
          3. Trafficking methamphetamine, § 5-64-440(b)(1).
        2. The person is eligible for parole or community correction transfer if the person serves at least fifty percent (50%) of the term of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced under subsection (a) of this section for the offenses listed in subdivision (e)(1)(B)(i) of this section with credit for the award of meritorious good time under § 12-29-201 unless the person is sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. The time served by any person under this subdivision (e)(1)(B)(ii) shall not be reduced to less than fifty percent (50%) of the person's original sentence under subsection (a) of this section; or
      2. Either one-third (1/3) or one-half (½) of the term of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced under subsection (a) of this section with credit for meritorious good time and depending on the seriousness determination made by the Arkansas Sentencing Commission if the underlying felony was any felony not listed in subdivision (e)(1)(A) or subdivision (e)(1)(B) of this section.
    2. The sentencing court may waive subdivision (e)(1) of this section if all of the following circumstances exist:
      1. The defendant was a juvenile when the offense was committed;
      2. The defendant was merely an accomplice to the offense; and
      3. The offense was committed on or after July 31, 2007.
  5. A person who commits the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia with the purpose to manufacture methamphetamine, § 5-64-443, after July 27, 2011, shall not be subject to the provisions of this section.

History. Acts 1969, No. 78, §§ 1-3; 1973, No. 61, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2336 — 43-2338; Acts 2007, No. 1047, § 5; 2011, No. 570, § 76; 2019, No. 910, § 861.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted (e)(1)(A)(vi) through (viii); rewrote (e)(1)(B)(i) (a) ; substituted “the former § 5-64-403(c)(5); or” for “§ 5-64-403(c)(5)” in (e)(1)(B)(i) (b) ; inserted (e)(1)(B)(i) (c) ; and added (f).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Notes, Shockley v. State: The Constitutionality of the Arkansas Habitual Offender Determination Procedure, 39 Ark. L. Rev. 553.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Use of the words “sentencing court” in this section was intended by the legislature to refer either to the judge or the jury, and the factual issue of the use of a firearm is to be determined by the jury unless a jury has been waived; therefore, the statute does not contravene the constitutional right to a trial by jury. Redding v. State, 254 Ark. 317, 493 S.W.2d 116 (1973).

There was no justification in the argument that this section is vague and indefinite where the argument was unsupported by citation of precedent and defendants did not more than give citations to court decisions which were alleged as illustrative of the confusion. Barnes v. State, 258 Ark. 565, 528 S.W.2d 370 (1975).

Legislature held justified in specifying an additional penalty for those felonies committed by means of firearms; thus, this section was not an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of law even though a similar enhanced punishment was not imposed for commission of homicide by other means. Rawls v. State, 260 Ark. 430, 541 S.W.2d 298 (1976).

Defendant, who was charged with first-degree murder and convicted by the jury of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, was sentenced to 10 years for the manslaughter conviction and his sentence enhanced by 15 years under this section. Even if appellant had preserved for review the argument that the firearm enhancement violated double jeopardy, the argument failed on the merits as the enhancement was not a substantive criminal offense, but a sentencing enhancement specifically intended to provide additional punishment for the use of a firearm during the commission of the underlying felony itself. Campbell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 340, 525 S.W.3d 465 (2017).

In General.

If a deadly weapon used by a felon is a firearm, the sentencing court has the discretion pursuant to the statute to impose a period of confinement not to exceed 15 years, which period would be in addition to any fine or penalty authorized as punishment for the felony itself. Hagar v. State, 341 Ark. 633, 19 S.W.3d 16 (2000).

Where appellant was convicted of two hotel robberies, the trial court properly convicted him of aggravated robbery, rape, two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being a habitual offender where the state alleged that appellant had prior felony convictions. Townsend v. State, 355 Ark. 248, 134 S.W.3d 545 (2003).

Plain language of the firearm-enhancement statute shows that the legislature intended for it to apply to any offense, in addition to any fine or penalty provided by law as punishment for the felony itself. McKeever v. State, 367 Ark. 374, 240 S.W.3d 583 (2006).

Additional Confinement.

Addition of extra sentence by the trial court under this section violated the defendant's constitutional rights in that no specific finding was ever made by the jury to the effect that he had committed the crime while armed with a pistol. Johnson v. State, 249 Ark. 208, 458 S.W.2d 409 (1970).

Additional confinement held improper. Cotton v. State, 256 Ark. 527, 508 S.W.2d 738 (1974).

Finding that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder and that her sentence should be lengthened by five years under this section did not constitute double jeopardy. Rawls v. State, 260 Ark. 430, 541 S.W.2d 298 (1976).

Firearm enhancements must always run after the basic sentences and cannot be affected by the concurrent running of the original sentences. Welch v. State, 269 Ark. 208, 599 S.W.2d 717, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996, 101 S. Ct. 535, 66 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1980).

Additional confinement held proper. Haynie v. State, 257 Ark. 542, 518 S.W.2d 492 (1975); Ferguson v. State, 257 Ark. 1036, 521 S.W.2d 546 (1975); Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Holloway v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 252 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 836, 106 S. Ct. 111, 88 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1985).

The trial court erred in enhancing the defendant's sentence because the court was not the “sentencing court” where the defendant was found guilty and sentenced by a jury. Watson v. State, 71 Ark. App. 52, 26 S.W.3d 588 (2000).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault in violation of § 5-13-204(a) and use of a firearm in commission of a felony did not subject defendant to double jeopardy as the conviction under this section was used to enhance defendant's sentence. Davis v. State, 93 Ark. App. 443, 220 S.W.3d 248 (2005).

In a case involving terroristic acts under § 5-13-310(a)(1) where three shots were fired into an automobile, because each terroristic act was a separate offense that could have been committed with or without a firearm, each crime was subject to a firearm enhancement under this section. McKeever v. State, 367 Ark. 374, 240 S.W.2d 583 (2006).

Amendment.

In a murder case, the trial court did not err in allowing the state to amend the information on the morning of trial to include a felony-firearm enhancement. Because the charge defendant was tried for was contained in the original information, the reviewing court failed to see how defendant was unfairly surprised or otherwise prejudiced by the amended information. Plessy v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 74, 388 S.W.3d 509 (2012).

Appeal.

Where the record revealed that no objection to the information charging the defendant with the use of the firearms in the commission of a felony or to the manner of the submission of the issue to the jury was made, such issues could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Haynie v. State, 257 Ark. 542, 518 S.W.2d 492 (1975).

Defendants' argument that the firearm-enhancement statute was a lesser-included offense of any crime for which use of a firearm was an element, thereby making their sentences for the underlying felonies and the firearm enhancements illegal, was unpreserved for review because it was not properly framed as a challenge to an illegal sentence; the argument was a double-jeopardy challenge, and it had already been directly addressed and rejected. Anderson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 300 (2017).

Construction with Other Laws.

Section 5-4-103 did not repeal this section; the statutes speak to two different issues and can be read in harmony. Watson v. State, 71 Ark. App. 52, 26 S.W.3d 588 (2000).

Upon conviction for aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft of property, defendant's enhanced sentence as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions was affirmed as there was no conflict between § 5-4-104(a) and subsections (a) and (b) of this section; § 5-4-104(a) refers only to the initial sentence and subsections (a) and (b) refer only to a sentence enhancement that could be added to the initial sentence. Williams v. State, 364 Ark. 203, 217 S.W.3d 817 (2005).

This section, the firearm enhancement statute, was not repealed by implication when the Arkansas Criminal Code became effective in 1976; former § 5-4-505 could be read in harmony with this section, and the general assembly's amendment of this section was inconsistent with the conclusion it had been repealed by implication. Sesley v. State, 2011 Ark. 104, 380 S.W.3d 390 (2011).

Two fifteen-year sentences imposed by the jury under the firearm enhancement statute were not illegal, because § 5-4-104 and this section could be read in a harmonious manner, and without statutory amendments, the appellate courts' interpretations of the statutes remained the law. Smith v. State, 2013 Ark. 364 (2013).

Evidence Sufficient.

In a carjacking case where defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and theft, and his sentence enhanced under this section, the evidence was not insufficient based on a lack of proof there was a gun because the victim testified that, after she did not immediately move away from her car as directed, the perpetrator raised his shirt to display the handle of a gun that was stuck in his waistband; a law-enforcement officer confirmed that the victim reported that the perpetrator had a semiautomatic weapon in his waistband; and the jury obviously found there to be credible evidence that a firearm was used by the perpetrator to effect the robbery and theft. Davis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 274, 493 S.W.3d 339 (2016).

Circuit court properly sentenced defendant for capital murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and terroristic act, and his sentence was properly enhanced for employing a firearm in the commission of a felony; although the jury did not complete the verdict form concerning utilizing a firearm in the commission of a felony, the findings of guilt sufficiently triggered the sentence enhancement. Martinez v. State, 2019 Ark. 85, 569 S.W.3d 333 (2019).

Firearm Enhancement Statute Not Repealed by Implication.

Fifteen years' imprisonment pursuant to a firearm enhancement was proper because this section was not repealed by implication when the Arkansas Criminal Code became effective; statutes were not in irreconcilable conflict, and the general assembly had validated this section's continued existence by amending it. Neely v. State, 2010 Ark. 452, 370 S.W.3d 820 (2010).

Where defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery and theft of property, his sentence was enhanced by seven years pursuant to this section for employing a firearm in the commission of a felony; the appellate court rejected the argument that the firearm enhancement was repealed on January 1, 1976, when the Arkansas Criminal Code took effect. The firearm enhancement did not violate the plain language of § 5-4-104(a), because § 5-4-104(a) and subsections (a) and (b) of this section can be read harmoniously to mean that subsections (a) and (b) are only a sentence enhancement, while the Arkansas Criminal Code provides the minimum sentences to be imposed for each specific offense. Williams v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 179 (2013).

Indictment.

Court's failure to separately indicate the period of confinement for the felony conviction and the term of confinement under this section did not constitute reversible error. Norton v. State, 260 Ark. 412, 540 S.W.2d 588 (1976).

Presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness did not arise when the State filed an amended information adding a firearm enhancement under this section after defendant's first trial for aggravated robbery and theft ended in a mistrial, because the deputy prosecutors provided an objective, on-the-record explanation with their testimony that they initially decided not to amend the information in the interest of judicial economy to avoid a continuance. After the first trial ended in a hung jury, the threat of delay was no longer a factor. Williams v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 179 (2013).

Instructions.

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's second-degree battery instruction because the offense charged was first-degree battery pursuant to § 5-13-201(a)(3), and the jury was not required to find that defendant employed a firearm in order to convict him of that offense, nor was the jury required to apply the firearm enhancement if it convicted defendant of first-degree battery; the firearm enhancement was not an element of the first-degree-battery offense but was an additional sentence authorized by statute if defendant was convicted of first-degree battery, and the jury determined that defendant employed a firearm during commission of that offense as prohibited by this section. Reed v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 352, 383 S.W.3d 881 (2011).

In a carjacking case where defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and theft, and his sentence enhanced under this section, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury to consider whether to enhance defendant's sentence based on the use of a firearm because there was evidence of the use of a firearm; the judge gave the jury the model jury instruction, which was a proper statement of the law; and defendant's challenge to the veracity of the victim's testimony that the perpetrator showed her the handle of a gun in an effort to have her move away from her car was a credibility determination for the jury, not the appellate court. Davis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 274, 493 S.W.3d 339 (2016).

Sentencing.

After defendant was convicted of three counts of committing a terroristic act, the trial court did not err in imposing multiple firearm enhancements because defendant committed three separate criminal offenses, and each offense was committed with a firearm. McKeever v. State, 367 Ark. 374, 240 S.W.3d 583 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for murder in the second degree, with a firearm enhancement, was proper because defendant acted knowingly to cause the victim's death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The issues involved credibility and it was presumed that a person intended the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts; defendant shot her husband in the wrist with a handgun, he bled to death as a result of the wound, and additional evidence indicated that the fatal wound was defensive in nature. Johnson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 153, 375 S.W.3d 12 (2010).

Defendant's sentence enhancement pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, which allowed discretionary enhancement for using a firearm as a means of committing a felony, was proper because defendant's accomplice liability for the underlying offense of murder, that was committed by use of a firearm, was sufficient for the statutory enhancement to apply. Mhoon v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 183 (2010).

Summary denial of an inmate's Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 postconviction relief petition was reversed because the order did not provide the requisite findings and conclusions, and the record did not clearly support affirmation; because no hearing was held, the trial court had an obligation to provide written findings that showed that the inmate was entitled to no relief. It was not conclusive from the petition or the record that relief was not warranted on the inmate's claims concerning illegal sentencing as there was no evidence that counsel agreed to allow the court to sentence on a gun enhancement charge. Davenport v. State, 2011 Ark. 105 (2011).

Where defendant was convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to 240 months for committing a terroristic act and 192 months for domestic battery, the enhancement of his sentence on both charges by 144 months pursuant to this section did not result in his sentence being enhanced twice for using a deadly weapon because the use of a firearm was not an element the prosecution had to prove to obtain his convictions. King v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 94 (2012).

Because defendant's sentence for felon-in-possession/using firearm to commit another felony under § 5-73-103(c)(1)(B) was not enhanced by the statute defining the crime, the trial court did not err by applying the enhancement in subsection (a) of this section for using a firearm to commit a felony. Stubblefield v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 734 (2013).

Firearm enhancement of defendant's conviction for possessing a defaced firearm under § 5-73-107 was not an illegal sentence, even though the underlying conviction necessarily involved the possession of a firearm. Hinton v. State, 2015 Ark. 479, 477 S.W.3d 517 (2015).

In the context of a sentencing enhancement under subsection (a) of this section, there was no merit in defendant's argument that he did not use a firearm to kill a victim based on the fact that he was convicted of the offense of first-degree murder, and the victim was killed by multiple gunshot wounds. Fowler v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 579, 474 S.W.3d 120 (2015).

Where defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and 29 counts of terroristic acts and the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt phase that defendant or an accomplice employed a firearm as a means of committing first-degree murder but in the sentencing phase sentenced defendant to firearm enhancements in connection with the counts for terroristic acts, the 29 one-year sentences imposed as firearm enhancements were reversed because the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant employed a firearm as a means of committing terroristic acts. Ellis v. State, 2019 Ark. 286, 585 S.W.3d 661 (2019).

Cited: Roach v. State, 255 Ark. 773, 503 S.W.2d 467 (1973); Lisenby v. State, 260 Ark. 585, 543 S.W.2d 30 (1976); Walters v. State, 267 Ark. 155, 621 S.W.2d 468 (1979); Witherspoon v. State, 319 Ark. 313, 891 S.W.2d 371 (1995); Polivka v. State, 2010 Ark. 152, 362 S.W.3d 918 (2010); Liggins v. State, 2016 Ark. 432, 505 S.W.3d 191 (2016).

16-90-121. Second or subsequent felony with firearm.

Any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a second or subsequent felony involving the use of a firearm shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of ten (10) years in the Division of Correction without eligibility of parole or community correction transfer but subject to reduction by meritorious good-time credit.

History. Acts 1981, No. 583, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2336.1; Acts 2001, No. 1783, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 862.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

Case Notes

In General.

If a defendant is found guilty of a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, including but not limited to a firearm, that defendant must be sentenced to serve a minimum of 10 years in the state prison; according to the plain language of the statute, the use of a deadly weapon need not be an element of the crime. Hagar v. State, 341 Ark. 633, 19 S.W.3d 16 (2000).

Cumulative Punishment.

If the general assembly specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the same conduct, the trial court may impose cumulative punishment in a single trial. Jernigan v. State, 38 Ark. App. 102, 828 S.W.2d 864 (1992).

When two punishment statutes exist, a court is not prevented from using the more stringent provision. Jernigan v. State, 38 Ark. App. 102, 828 S.W.2d 864 (1992).

Double Jeopardy.

Aggravated robbery is not already an “enhancement provision” applied to robbery and imposed for the use of a deadly weapon, so “enhancement” under this section for the same use of the same deadly weapon does not subject a defendant to “double jeopardy.” Crespo v. State, 30 Ark. App. 12, 780 S.W.2d 592 (1989).

Good Time Credits.

Because § 12-29-201, changing how meritorious good-time credit was applied, did not impliedly repeal the language in this section (the deadly-weapon enhancement statute applicable at the time of an inmate's sentence), the inmate's 30-year sentence for first-degree murder was subject to reduction by meritorious good-time credit at the conclusion of the first 10 years of the sentence. Hobbs v. Baird, 2011 Ark. 261 (2011).

Sentence Proper.

A defendant in a prosecution for manslaughter was properly sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment where the jury found that she used a “firearm” in the commission of the crime, notwithstanding the jury's recommendation that she be sentenced to five years's probation and a $5,000 fine. Hagar v. State, 341 Ark. 633, 19 S.W.3d 16 (2000).

Verdict Forms.

Trial court did not err in submitting modified verdict forms to the jury which allowed the jury the additional choice of whether the crime was committed with a deadly weapon. Wilson v. State, 282 Ark. 551, 669 S.W.2d 889 (1984).

16-90-122. Post-conviction release of nonviolent offenders.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any circuit judge may authorize the temporary release of an offender in the county sheriff's custody who has:
    1. Been found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a nonviolent felony offense in circuit court; and
    2. Been sentenced to a term of imprisonment and committed to the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction and is awaiting transfer to the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction.
  2. A circuit judge shall not authorize the temporary release of an offender under subsection (a) of this section if the offender has been found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a:
    1. Class Y felony offense listed in § 16-93-618; or
    2. Felony sex offense listed in the definition of “sex offense” in § 12-12-903.
    1. The circuit judge may authorize the release under the terms and conditions that he or she determines are necessary to protect the public and to ensure the offender's return to custody upon notice that bed space is available at the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction.
    2. The circuit judge may require a cash or professional bond to be posted in an amount suitable to ensure the offender's return to custody.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1261, § 1; 2007, No. 279, § 1; 2011, No. 570, § 77; 2019, No. 910, §§ 863, 864.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “§ 16-93-618” for “§ 16-93-611” in (b)(1).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout (a)(2) and in (c)(1).

Case Notes

Applicability.

Allowing defendant's release on a bed-space bond was erroneous because the release of offenders was only allowed if they were nonviolent in nature; defendant pled guilty to two counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, which was a crime of violence under § 5-74-103. State v. Britt, 368 Ark. 273, 244 S.W.3d 665 (2006).

Because defendant was not “in custody” at the time defendant violated the conditions of defendant's release on bond under subdivision (a)(2) of this section, the circuit court erred in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict on defendant's conviction for second-degree escape under § 5-54-111(a)(2). Magness v. State, 2012 Ark. 16, 386 S.W.3d 390 (2012).

16-90-123. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning sealing certain convictions, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 1152, § 10. The section was derived from Acts 2013, No. 1157, § 7.

For current law, see § 16-90-1412.

Subchapter 2 — Multiple Convictions

Effective Dates. Acts 1953, No. 228, § 6: Mar. 6, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that a number of persons who commit felonies have previously been convicted of felonies and are habitual criminals and that a need exists in this State to increase the punishment provided to habitual criminals and that the passage of this Act will provide for greater punishment of habitual criminals and reduce the number of persons committing more than one felony and reduce the number of crimes committed in this State. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Using single prior felony conviction as basis for offense of possessing weapon by convicted felon and to enhance sentence. 37 A.L.R.4th 1168.

Am. Jur. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 779 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Federal Habeas Corpus — Multiple Offenders and Exhaustion of Remedies, 17 Ark. L. Rev. 78.

Note, Helm v. Solem: Can a Prison Sentence Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 673.

C.J.S. 24 C.J.S., Crim. Proc., § 2436 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 189.

16-90-201. Punishment for second or subsequent convictions generally.

Any person convicted of an offense which is punishable by imprisonment in the Division of Correction who shall subsequently be convicted for another offense shall be punished as follows:

  1. If the second offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender could be punished by imprisonment for a term less than his or her natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one (1) year more than the minimum sentence provided by law for a first conviction of the offense for which the defendant is being tried, and not more than the maximum sentence provided by law for this offense, unless the maximum sentence is less than the minimum sentence plus one (1) year, in which case the longer term shall govern;
  2. If the third offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender could be punished by imprisonment for a term less than his or her natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than three (3) years more than the minimum sentence provided by law for a first conviction of the offense for which the defendant is being tried, and not more than the maximum sentence provided by law for the offense, unless the maximum sentence is less than the minimum sentence plus three (3) years, in which case the longer term shall govern; and
    1. If the fourth or subsequent offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender could be punished by imprisonment for a term less than his or her natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent offense for a determinate term not less than the maximum sentence provided by law for a first conviction of the offense for which the defendant is being tried, and not more than one and one-half (1½) times the maximum sentence provided by law for a first conviction.
    2. However, any person convicted of a fourth or subsequent offense shall be sentenced to imprisonment for no less than five (5) years.

History. Acts 1953, No. 228, § 1; 1967, No. 639, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2328; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 870.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court held this section was repealed by implication by § 5-4-501. See Glaze v. State , 2011 Ark. 464, 385 S.W.3d 203 (2011).

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in the introductory language.

Cross References. Sentencing for habitual offenders, § 5-4-501.

Research References

ALR.

Pardoned or expunged conviction as “prior offense” under state statute or regulation enhancing punishment for subsequent conviction. 97 A.L.R.5th 293.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Conley v. State: Mitigation Before Guilt, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 995.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Enhanced sentence held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Wilson v. State, 251 Ark. 900, 475 S.W.2d 543 (1972).

The habitual criminal act is not unconstitutional on the grounds of cruel or unusual punishment. Thompson v. State, 252 Ark. 1, 477 S.W.2d 469 (1972).

Construction.

The Habitual Criminal Act is not couched in language indicative of an intention that its invocation by prosecuting officers be discretionary any more than the statutes fixing punishment for the crimes themselves. Poe v. State, 251 Ark. 35, 470 S.W.2d 818 (1971).

This section is best referred to as a sentencing enhancement provision, thus, if conviction on the “current offense” falls, then conviction as an habitual offender enhancing the sentence must fall with it. Ellingburg v. Lockhart, 397 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Ark. 1975).

Legislature intended the word “conviction” as used in the statute to mean the establishment of guilt prior to and independently of judgment and sentence. Rogers v. State, 260 Ark. 232, 538 S.W.2d 300 (1976).

Circuit court erred in sentencing defendant under this section because the statute was repealed by implication with the enactment of § 5-4-501, and the effect of sentencing defendant under this section was prejudicial since there was the possibility that the jury would have returned a sentence less than the minimum set forth in this section; because sentencing had to be determined by the law in effect at the time of the commission of a crime, defendant was entitled to a jury instruction in accordance with the Criminal Code's habitual-offender statute, § 5-4-501. Glaze v. State, 2011 Ark. 464, 385 S.W.3d 203 (2011).

General Assembly clearly took up the subject matter of the enhanced sentencing of habitual offenders anew in the more current statute, § 5-4-501, and the conflict between this section and § 5-4-501 is irreconcilable, resulting in a repeal by implication of this section; a plain reading of § 5-4-501 and this section makes clear that § 5-4-501 is the more comprehensive statute, covering the same subject matter as this section as well as including additional provisions to provide for the sentencing of habitual offenders who are convicted of serious and violent felonies, and it is further evident that the two statutes cannot be read together harmoniously as the sentencing ranges prescribed by each statute conflict. Glaze v. State, 2011 Ark. 464, 385 S.W.3d 203 (2011).

Applicability.

Although the Habitual Criminal Act encompasses prior convictions in the federal courts and in other state courts, the statute is applicable only when both the prior and present convictions are felonies and does not convert a misdemeanor into a felony. McIlwain v. State, 226 Ark. 818, 294 S.W.2d 350 (1956).

Under the Habitual Criminal Act, prior convictions may be the basis for increasing the punishment for the offense on trial; however, in the absence of a conviction, the jury ought not to consider some other offense as a reason for increased punishment. Osborne v. State, 237 Ark. 5, 371 S.W.2d 518 (1963).

Burden of Proof.

State had the burden of establishing the number and validity of defendant's prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the Arkansas Habitual Criminal Act. Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1979).

Failure to Invoke Act.

Where prosecuting attorneys in one district failed to invoke the habitual criminal act, subsequent applications of the act were not denials of equal protection or due process. Poe v. State, 251 Ark. 35, 470 S.W.2d 818 (1971).

Prior Convictions.

Where accused charged with a second or subsequent offense confesses the fact of the prior conviction, it is unnecessary for the state to prove such fact. Jackson v. State, 226 Ark. 731, 293 S.W.2d 699 (1956).

Court's refusal to strike the habitual criminal charge was not error since it had a right and duty to give the state the opportunity to prove a former conviction. Clubb v. State, 230 Ark. 688, 326 S.W.2d 816 (1959).

It is error to use pardoned conviction to enhance defendant's sentence. Duncan v. State, 254 Ark. 449, 494 S.W.2d 127 (1973).

As to stipulation to prior convictions, see: Cox v. State, 257 Ark. 35, 513 S.W.2d 798 (1974); Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1979); Cox v. Hutto, 619 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1980).

An adjudication of juvenile delinquency results in the determination of a status and not conviction for a crime. Rogers v. State, 260 Ark. 232, 538 S.W.2d 300 (1976).

—Assistance of Counsel.

Allowing jury to consider, as evidence of prior convictions, two documents which did not reflect whether the appellant was represented by or had validly waived counsel was an error which required reduction of the sentence. McConahay v. State, 257 Ark. 328, 516 S.W.2d 887 (1974).

Defendant's contention that he was not afforded counsel at the time he entered guilty pleas in the state courts was insufficient to rebut the statement in the state records that each time defendant entered guilty pleas he appeared in person and with his counsel. Clem v. Lockhart, 525 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1975).

Evidence of a defendant's prior convictions for purposes of applying the habitual criminal act must establish that the defendant either received assistance from an attorney or validly waived counsel at the time of each prior conviction. Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1979).

—Evidence.

Evidence of prior convictions sufficient to convict defendant under this section. Flurry v. State, 248 Ark. 722, 453 S.W.2d 402 (1970); Meyers v. State, 252 Ark. 367, 479 S.W.2d 238 (1972); Clem v. State, 254 Ark. 580, 495 S.W.2d 517 (1973).

As to admissibility of certain prior convictions, see: Wilburn v. State, 253 Ark. 608, 487 S.W.2d 600 (1972); Thacker v. State, 253 Ark. 864, 489 S.W.2d 500 (1973); Klimas v. State, 259 Ark. 301, 534 S.W.2d 202 (1976).

Where an infirm document of a previous conviction is admitted as evidence in a proceeding under this section, the Arkansas Supreme Court will reduce the defendant's sentence. McConahay v. State, 257 Ark. 328, 516 S.W.2d 887 (1974).

Where it could not be determined what part inadmissible conviction played in the determination of defendant's sentence under the habitual criminal act, defendant's sentence, upon showing of three admissible convictions, was reduced to minimum terms. Rogers v. State, 260 Ark. 232, 538 S.W.2d 300 (1976).

A docket sheet may not be used to establish a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing under the habitual criminal statute. Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1979).

Procedure Generally.

As to submission of the issue of punishment to the jury, see: Miller v. State, 239 Ark. 836, 394 S.W.2d 601 (1965); Cummings v. State, 239 Ark. 1027, 396 S.W.2d 298 (1965); Ridgeway v. State, 251 Ark. 157, 472 S.W.2d 108 (1971); Backus v. State, 253 Ark. 60, 484 S.W.2d 515 (1972).

Error of the trial court in permitting the state to show prior convictions of an alleged habitual criminal in its trial of the current charge cannot be raised in post-conviction procedure after the case has been finally adjudicated and the appellate process completed. Rowe v. State, 243 Ark. 375, 419 S.W.2d 806 (1967).

—Indictment or Information.

Indictment or information held sufficient to allege prior convictions. Jackson v. State, 226 Ark. 731, 293 S.W.2d 699 (1956).

That part of the indictment or information charging a previous conviction should not be read to the jury during the trial of the principal offense charged. Miller v. State, 239 Ark. 836, 394 S.W.2d 601 (1965); Cummings v. State, 239 Ark. 1027, 396 S.W.2d 298 (1965); Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966).

Information which did not designate defendant's four previous convictions, but did state that the charges were filed under the habitual criminal statute, was not fatally defective; any lack of specificity was waived by defendant's voluntary plea of guilty. Wilson v. State, 251 Ark. 900, 475 S.W.2d 543 (1972).

—Pleading.

If the defendant pleads guilty to the previous conviction charge, the matter can be handled by the court in charging the jury in its instruction as to the minimum penalty. Miller v. State, 239 Ark. 836, 394 S.W.2d 601 (1965); Cummings v. State, 239 Ark. 1027, 396 S.W.2d 298 (1965).

Evidence was sufficient to show defendant's guilty plea was entered with sufficient understanding of its effect, even though defendant alleged that the effect of the habitual criminal statute was not explained to him. Wilson v. State, 251 Ark. 900, 475 S.W.2d 543 (1972).

While the applicability of the habitual criminal act is “charged” in the sense that the trial court is notified of it in the information filed against the accused, no plea is required. Atkins v. State, 287 Ark. 445, 701 S.W.2d 109 (1985).

Cited: Walker v. State, 240 Ark. 441, 399 S.W.2d 672 (1966); Bradshaw v. State, 250 Ark. 135, 464 S.W.2d 614 (1971); Brown v. State, 252 Ark. 846, 481 S.W.2d 366 (1972); Polk v. State, 252 Ark. 320, 478 S.W.2d 738 (1972); Ellingburg v. State, 254 Ark. 199, 492 S.W.2d 904 (1973); Cox v. State, 255 Ark. 204, 499 S.W.2d 630 (1973); Roach v. State, 255 Ark. 773, 503 S.W.2d 467 (1973); Bumgarner v. Lockhart, 361 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Moore v. State, 256 Ark. 385, 507 S.W.2d 711 (1974); Alexander v. State, 256 Ark. 700, 509 S.W.2d 816 (1974); Yarbrough v. State, 257 Ark. 732, 520 S.W.2d 227 (1975); Johnson v. State, 259 Ark. 220, 532 S.W.2d 1 (1976); Cary v. State, 259 Ark. 510, 534 S.W.2d 230 (1976); Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857, 545 S.W.2d 606 (1977); Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978); Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1979); Blackmon v. State, 272 Ark. 157, 612 S.W.2d 319 (1981); Christian v. Housewright, 721 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1983); Woods v. State, 302 Ark. 512, 790 S.W.2d 892 (1990).

16-90-202. Punishment for third conviction for certain offenses.

  1. When any person shall be convicted of murder, rape, carnal abuse, or kidnapping and it shall be shown that the person has been twice previously convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes in this state or any other state, upon the third conviction the person shall be deemed a habitual criminal and shall be sentenced to life imprisonment in the Division of Correction.
  2. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to abolish or otherwise affect punishment by death for crimes which are punishable by death.

History. Acts 1967, No. 212, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2328.1; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 871.

Publisher's Notes. This section may have been repealed by later legislation which enacted § 5-4-104(a). See Hodge v. State, 320 Ark. 31, 894 S.W.2d 927 (1995).

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a).

Case Notes

Supersession of Statute.

This section may have been repealed by § 5-4-104(a). Hodge v. State, 320 Ark. 31, 894 S.W.2d 927 (1995).

16-90-203. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the effect of a conviction in another state, was derived from Acts 1953, No. 228, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2329.

This section was held to be superseded by § 5-4-503 in McGirt v. State, 289 Ark. 7, 708 S.W.2d 620 (1986).

16-90-204. Evidence of former conviction.

The duly certified copy of the record of a former conviction and judgment of any court of record for imprisonment in the penitentiary against the person indicated or the certificate of the warden or other chief officer of any penitentiary of this state or any other state in the United States, of the United States Government, of any foreign country, or of the chief custodian of the records of the United States Department of Justice containing the name and the fingerprints of the person imprisoned as they appear in the records of his or her office shall be prima facie evidence, upon the trial of any person for a second and subsequent offense, of the conviction and judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary and may be used in evidence against the person.

History. Acts 1953, No. 228, § 3; 1961, No. 95, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2330.

Cross References. Proof of previous conviction, § 5-4-504.

Case Notes

Construction.

Since the habitual criminal act authorizing a more severe punishment for one who has been previously convicted is highly penal, it must be strictly construed. Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357 S.W.2d 499 (1962).

Applicability.

Although the habitual criminal act encompasses prior convictions in the federal courts and in other state courts, the statute is applicable only when both prior and present convictions are felonies, and it does not convert a misdemeanor into a felony. McIlwain v. State, 226 Ark. 818, 294 S.W.2d 350 (1956).

Presumption.

Where the court's seal of which the clerk is custodian is affixed to document showing previous convictions, it will be presumed that the person who signed the name of the clerk as deputy is a deputy clerk in absence of evidence to the contrary. Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975).

Proof.

Where an information charges a defendant is a habitual criminal, the introduction of evidence of other crimes is not error although the defendant is not convicted under the habitual criminal charge. Rowe v. State, 224 Ark. 671, 275 S.W.2d 887 (1955).

Pre-Gideon conviction would be suppressed in determination of habitual offender status only if defendant raised lack of counsel, confused identity or other constitutional infirmities from earlier conviction at trial on habitual offender status rather than waiting until appeal. Fike v. State, 255 Ark. 956, 504 S.W.2d 363 (1974), superseded by statute as stated in, Doby v. State, 290 Ark. 408, 720 S.W.2d 694 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986).

Nothing in this section prevents proof of prior convictions by other admissible evidence. Parker v. State, 258 Ark. 880, 529 S.W.2d 860 (1975).

Properly certified copies of certain documents are prima facie evidence of prior convictions, but other methods of proof of prior convictions are not excluded. Parker v. State, 258 Ark. 880, 529 S.W.2d 860 (1975); Cary v. State, 259 Ark. 510, 534 S.W.2d 230 (1976).

—Records.

It was not the intent of the legislature to permit introduction of certified copy records of United States Department of Justice where the prisoner's sentence was served in state prison; rather, this section requires the certificate of the chief officer of the state penitentiary wherein the accused served time. Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357 S.W.2d 499 (1962).

Where evidence of prior convictions within the state was introduced by introducing the official record of the prior offenses with the records and the defendant, both being identified by the court clerk, this method was more reliable than the usual certified copies and did not prejudice the defendant. Thompson v. State, 252 Ark. 1, 477 S.W.2d 469 (1972).

It was not reversible error for clerk to read portion of prior judgment. Woods v. State, 260 Ark. 882, 545 S.W.2d 912 (1977).

Where there was a clear indication on each of the docket sheets showing a prior driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction and where the defendant waived the right to counsel, the docket sheets satisfied the requirements of this section since each was a duly certified copy of the record of a prior conviction. Moore v. State, 315 Ark. 131, 864 S.W.2d 863 (1993).

—Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence held insufficient to establish prior convictions. Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357 S.W.2d 499 (1962); Richards v. State, 254 Ark. 760, 498 S.W.2d 1 (1973); McConahay v. State, 257 Ark. 328, 516 S.W.2d 887 (1974); Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975); Klimas v. State, 259 Ark. 301, 534 S.W.2d 202 (1976).

Evidence held sufficient to establish prior convictions. Henson v. State, 248 Ark. 992, 455 S.W.2d 101 (1970); Edens v. State, 258 Ark. 734, 528 S.W.2d 416 (1975); Parker v. State, 258 Ark. 880, 529 S.W.2d 860 (1975).

Cited: Atkins v. State, 287 Ark. 445, 701 S.W.2d 109 (1985).

16-90-205. Trial procedure for habitual criminals.

The following trial procedure shall be adhered to in cases involving habitual criminals:

  1. The jury shall first hear all of the evidence pertaining to the current charge against the defendant and shall retire to reach its verdict as to this charge based only upon the evidence. However, nothing in this subdivision (1) shall prohibit cross-examination of a defendant as to previous convictions when the defendant takes the stand in his or her own defense;
  2. If the defendant is found guilty, the same jury shall sit again and hear evidence of the defendant's prior conviction or convictions. However, the defendant shall have the right to deny the existence of any prior convictions and to offer evidence in support of this denial; and
  3. The jury shall again retire, and if it is found that one (1) or more prior convictions exist or if the defendant admits the previous conviction or convictions, then the prior conviction or convictions shall be considered in fixing the punishment for the current offense for which the defendant has been convicted in accordance with § 16-90-201.

History. Acts 1967, No. 639, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2330.1.

Cross References. Sentencing procedure, § 5-4-502.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Developments, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 257.

Note, Conley v. State: Mitigation Before Guilt, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 995.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section and § 5-4-502 both address the bifurcated procedure for trials involving habitual criminals; this title addresses judgment and sentencing generally, and Title 5 addresses disposition of offenders. Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 518, 868 S.W.2d 85 (1994).

Both this section and § 5-4-502 provide that evidence of prior convictions shall not be considered until after the defendant is found guilty. Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 518, 868 S.W.2d 85 (1994).

Although this section contains a provision which states “nothing in this subdivision shall prohibit cross-examination of a defendant as to previous convictions when the defendant takes the stand in his own defense,” § 5-4-502 does not contain a corresponding provision. Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 518, 868 S.W.2d 85 (1994).

Purpose.

Trial of an habitual offender is bifurcated only to protect the defendant by withholding proof of his earlier convictions until the jury has found him guilty, and the sole purpose of the second stage is to allow the jury to consider possible enhancement of the sentence, not its reduction. Heard v. State, 272 Ark. 140, 612 S.W.2d 312 (1981).

There is no indication in this section of a legislative intention to permit a habitual offender to introduce any evidence during the second state of the trial except proof to rebut the evidence of previous convictions. Heard v. State, 272 Ark. 140, 612 S.W.2d 312 (1981).

Bifurcation.

Only the issue of guilt or innocence upon the charge should have been considered by the jury upon its first retirement to the jury room. Ridgeway v. State, 251 Ark. 157, 472 S.W.2d 108 (1971).

Bifurcated procedure held proper. Rimes v. State, 251 Ark. 678, 474 S.W.2d 115 (1971); Ellingburg v. State, 254 Ark. 199, 492 S.W.2d 904 (1973); Woods v. State, 260 Ark. 882, 545 S.W.2d 912 (1977).

This section provides for a bifurcated trial and does not provide for waiver; the bifurcated procedure “shall” be adhered to in cases involving habitual criminals. Griffin v. State, 307 Ark. 537, 823 S.W.2d 446 (1992).

Instructions.

Instruction advising the jury as to the forms of verdict, both as to a finding of guilty or not guilty and concluding, “When your return either of those verdicts into court, then you may or may not have another verdict to consider,” was not necessary but was not to be interpreted as telling the jury that defendant had been previously convicted. Henson v. State, 248 Ark. 992, 455 S.W.2d 101 (1970).

Objection.

Introduction of evidence under the habitual criminal act was proper where appellant and his codefendant had been previously convicted at least once of a crime punishable by confinement in the state penitentiary and defendant merely made a general objection to introduction of certified copies of past convictions. Thacker v. State, 253 Ark. 864, 489 S.W.2d 500 (1973).

Proof of Prior Convictions.

Even though defendant was also charged as a habitual offender, there was no error in the court's allowing him to be cross-examined concerning prior conviction and even asked if he was a habitual criminal. Coleman v. State, 256 Ark. 665, 509 S.W.2d 824 (1974).

The state has the burden of proving any prior convictions. McConahay v. State, 257 Ark. 328, 516 S.W.2d 887 (1974); Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1979).

Docket sheet may not be used to establish a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing under the habitual criminal statute. Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1979).

For discussion of stipulation as to prior convictions, see: Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1979); Morrow v. State, 271 Ark. 806, 610 S.W.2d 878, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819, 102 S. Ct. 99, 70 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1981).

The introduction of a prior criminal conviction is not forbidden during the guilt/innocence phase of a bifurcated trial. Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 518, 868 S.W.2d 85 (1994).

—Assistance of Counsel.

Where prior conviction failed to show either that defendant was represented by counsel or that he had waived counsel, admission into evidence of this conviction was error, and state had option of retrying the case or accepting the minimum penalty. Wilburn v. State, 253 Ark. 608, 487 S.W.2d 600 (1972).

Evidence of a defendant's prior convictions for purposes of applying the Arkansas habitual criminal act must establish that the defendant either received assistance from an attorney or validly waived counsel at the time of each prior conviction. Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1979).

Where one of the defendant's three prior convictions was a felony conviction, which resulted from the defendant having two prior misdemeanor convictions for the same offense, and the record showed that the defendant was represented by an attorney at the felony conviction, the felony conviction could be used for charging the defendant as a habitual criminal, despite the bald assertion by the defendant's present counsel that the defendant did not have counsel at the hearings on the misdemeanor convictions. Porter v. State, 281 Ark. 277, 663 S.W.2d 723 (1984).

Sentencing.

In the sentencing phase, the state may only introduce evidence of prior convictions, and the accused may only introduce evidence to rebut the existence of those convictions. Conley v. State, 305 Ark. 422, 808 S.W.2d 745, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 876, 112 S. Ct. 218, 116 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1991).

Cited: Richards v. State, 254 Ark. 760, 498 S.W.2d 1 (1973); Tosh v. State, 278 Ark. 377, 646 S.W.2d 6 (1983); Christian v. Housewright, 721 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1983); Rush v. State, 324 Ark. 147, 919 S.W.2d 933 (1996).

Subchapter 3 — Restitution to Victims

Cross References. Restitution as criteria, condition for suspension or probation, §§ 5-4-301, 5-4-303.

Restitution, § 5-4-205.

Restitution from inmate's earnings in work programs, § 12-30-406.

Research References

ALR.

Statutes providing for compensation of crime victim. 20 A.L.R.4th 63.

Am. Jur. 21A Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 820.

C.J.S. 24 C.J.S., Crim. Proc., § 2483 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Case Notes

Duty of Court.

Under this subchapter, the court has an affirmative duty, as far as is practicable, to require the responsible offender to make restitution to his victim. Irvin v. State, 28 Ark. App. 6, 771 S.W.2d 26 (1989).

Notice.

Since passage of this subchapter, a criminal defendant is put on notice that he is also subject to the sanction of restitution in addition to imprisonment and a fine. Irvin v. State, 28 Ark. App. 6, 771 S.W.2d 26 (1989).

16-90-301. Legislative determination.

The General Assembly recognizes that many innocent persons suffer injury, death, property damage, and resultant financial hardship because of crimes committed in this state and that there is a genuine need in this state to establish a method whereby the responsible offender, as far as practicable, may be required to make restitution to his or her victim so as to make that victim whole with respect to the financial injury suffered.

History. Acts 1981, No. 704, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2350.

Research References

ALR.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act — Constitutional Issues. 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 239.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The express purpose of restitution is to make the victim whole with respect to the financial injury suffered. In re Sutherland, 161 B.R. 657 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).

Where defendant was convicted for failing to pay child support for six years, § 5-1-109(b)(2) did not limit the restitution order to three years because so limiting the restitution would have violated the policy of this section, which was to make victims whole. Hampton v. State, 357 Ark. 473, 183 S.W.3d 148 (2004).

Restitution Amount Improper.

Trial court's restitution order that included items on it for which defendant had not been charged was improper as the purpose of restitution was to make the victim whole with respect to the financial injury suffered as a result of the victim's crime and there was no proof that many of the items included were the result of this crime. Simmons v. State, 90 Ark. App. 273, 205 S.W.3d 194 (2005).

16-90-302. Subchapter amendatory and supplemental.

The provisions of this subchapter are amendatory and supplemental to Acts 1977, No. 482, as amended.

History. Acts 1981, No. 704, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2355.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1977, No. 482, is codified as §§ 5-4-301, 5-4-303, 12-30-401, 12-30-403, and 12-30-40512-30-407.

16-90-303 — 16-90-306. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning restitution, judgments, and determination of amount, were repealed by identical Acts 1993, Nos. 533 and 553, § 5. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-90-303. Acts 1981, No. 704, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2351.

16-90-304. Acts 1981, No. 704, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2352.

16-90-305. Acts 1981, No. 704, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2353.

16-90-306. Acts 1981, No. 704, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2354.

For current law, see § 5-4-205.

16-90-307. Restitution fund.

  1. The circuit judges of each judicial district may establish a restitution fund to be administered by the circuit judge, the prosecuting attorney, or probationary agency, whichever the circuit judge shall designate.
  2. The circuit judges shall provide rules and regulations for this restitution fund and shall supervise the restitution fund.
    1. The circuit judges may levy additional fines against criminal defendants and place the additional fine money in the restitution fund of the judicial district.
    2. The additional fines shall be in an amount not to exceed the amount of the criminal penalty fine provided by law for the offense.
    3. The additional fine money shall be remitted to the restitution fund, to be deposited into a depository other than the county treasurer or State Treasury.
  3. Application for restitution may be made by victims of crime by written petition to the circuit judge, and the application shall be ruled upon without hearing.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting any circuit judge from requiring any specific defendant to make direct restitution to specific victims.

History. Acts 1983, No. 807, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2356.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Because restitution directed against defendant was comprised of money that in reality constituted a fine, the trial judge's actions at the earlier revocation hearing amounted to executing defendant's sentence; the plea of guilty, coupled with a fine and probation, constituted a conviction, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to amend or modify that sentence at a later date. Clampet v. State, 352 Ark. 176, 99 S.W.3d 414 (2003).

16-90-308. Proceeds from sale of rights arising from criminal act.

    1. Any person referred to as the defendant in this section who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to any crime who contracts to benefit economically regarding the crime shall pay to the circuit court in which the charges for the crime were filed any money or thing of value contracted to be paid to the defendant or his or her spouse, heirs, assigns, and transferees.
    2. As used in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, “benefit economically” does not include reimbursement for travel or other expenses.
    3. The circuit court shall deposit the moneys into an escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any victim or his or her legal representative of crimes committed by the defendant.
    1. Payments from the escrow account shall be made to the defendant upon an order of the judge of the circuit court wherein the charges were filed upon a showing that the money or thing of value shall be used for the exclusive purpose of retaining legal representation for the defendant at any stage of the criminal proceedings arising out of the criminal charge or to pay for already rendered legal representation and that the defendant would otherwise be unable to or has been unable to afford adequate legal representation.
    2. As used in subdivision (b)(1) of this section, “legal representation” includes costs of expert witnesses and testing of evidence.
    1. Payments from the escrow account shall be used to satisfy any civil judgment rendered in favor of a victim or his or her legal representative which arose out of the circumstances upon which the defendant's conviction was based, but only if the victim brings a civil action to recover money against the defendant.
    2. If no victim or legal representative of a victim has filed suit within five (5) years from the filing of the charges, any money remaining shall be paid over to any state-supported victim reparation or assistance program.
    3. Upon the disposition of the criminal charges in favor of the defendant, money in the escrow account shall be paid over to the defendant.
  1. The circuit court in which the charges were filed shall publish a notice in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation in each county of the state one (1) time every year for four (4) years from the date the money is deposited with the circuit court, notifying any eligible victim or legal representative of an eligible victim that moneys are available to satisfy judgments pursuant to this section.

History. Acts 1985, No. 382, §§ 1-4; 1985, No. 401, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2357 — 43-2360; Acts 2013, No. 1426, § 2.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “benefit economically” for “reenact the crime by use of any book, motion picture, magazine article, radio or television presentation, live entertainment, or any live or recorded presentation, or from the expression of his or her thoughts, opinions, or emotions”, “in which” for “wherein”, and inserted “for the crime”; inserted (a)(2) and (b)(2); redesignated former (a)(2) as present (a)(3); and, in (b)(1), inserted “or to pay for already rendered legal representation”, “or has been unable to” and “legal”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 559.

16-90-309. Restitution for theft of public property.

  1. When any defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to theft or any other offense affecting property held by or belonging to the state or any political subdivision thereof, the court shall require the payment of restitution for the benefit of the state or the applicable political subdivision as part of the sentence.
  2. The court shall set the amount of restitution based on reliable and probative evidence. Any amounts received by the state or a political subdivision from the Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq., or other third party bonds as a result of the defendant's actions shall not reduce the amount of restitution required to be paid by the defendant.
  3. If payments are made by the Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program to reimburse the state or political subdivision for losses incurred as a result of the actions of the defendant, the Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program is entitled to receive priority to any restitution ordered and received by the court up to the amount paid by the Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program to the state or political subdivision.
  4. The Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program is subrogated to any right of the state or political subdivision to the extent of any proceeds paid by the Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program.
  5. If restitution is allowed to be made over a period of time, the court shall also require the payment of interest on the amount of outstanding restitution. Interest shall begin to accrue from the date the court-ordered restitution is filed with the court clerk. The court shall determine the rate of interest to be assessed.
  6. An order of restitution for the benefit of the state or any political subdivision pursuant to the provisions of this section and § 16-90-310 does not bar any civil remedy that may also be available under law.

History. Acts 1993, No. 193, §§ 1, 2, 4; 1993, No. 520, §§ 1, 2, 4.

Case Notes

Fidelity Bond Trust Fund.

Section 21-2-708, regarding the Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, under which the Arkansas Fidelity Bond Trust Fund was created, was recently amended to expressly provide that the Arkansas Fidelity Bond Trust Fund is a victim who is entitled to restitution. In re Sutherland, 161 B.R. 657 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).

The Arkansas Fidelity Bond Trust Fund, which reimbursed a school district for losses caused by an embezzling employee, was the entity entitled to collect the restitution ordered in the judgment of employee's conviction; the fact that the statutorily created bond company was required to reimburse the immediate victim does not obviate the economic loss to the state. In re Sutherland, 161 B.R. 657 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).

16-90-310. Theft of public property — Lien on defendant's property.

  1. When any defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to theft or any other offense affecting property held by or belonging to the state or any political subdivision thereof, the circuit court shall order a lien upon any and all property, refunds, or any other items in which the defendant may have a vested interest.
    1. The purpose of the lien is to secure the payment of any restitution, fines, court costs, or other payments that may be ordered by the circuit court.
      1. The lien shall have the same effect as any other civil judgment.
      2. The state or the applicable political subdivision may execute upon the judgment in any manner provided by law.
      3. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the state or any political subdivision may execute upon any funds held by a state public retirement system or any state agency or political subdivision in which the defendant may have a vested interest.
    2. The circuit court shall order that these liens be released upon satisfaction of all payments ordered by the circuit court.

History. Acts 1993, No. 193, § 3; 1993, No. 520, § 3.

16-90-311. Restitution for audit investigation costs.

  1. When any defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to theft or any other offense affecting property held by or belonging to the State of Arkansas or any political subdivision of the state, and Arkansas Legislative Audit has incurred costs in the investigation of the transactions, the court shall require as part of the sentence the payment of restitution for the audit investigation costs to be payable to Arkansas Legislative Audit.
    1. The court shall set the amount of restitution based on audit investigative costs records provided by Arkansas Legislative Audit.
    2. Any amounts received by the state or a political subdivision from the Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq., or other third-party bonds as a result of the defendant's actions shall not reduce the amount of restitution required to be paid by the defendant.

History. Acts 2005, No. 904, § 1.

Subchapter 4 — Execution of Sentence — Confinement

Effective Dates. Acts 1881, No. 81, § 16: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 78. § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1985, No. 827, § 3: Apr. 4, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is immediately necessary for the Department of Correction to conform to the guidelines established by the Interstate Corrections Compact to make more orderly the transporting of prisoners. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Am. Jur. 21A Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 838 et seq.

C.J.S. 24 C.J.S., Crim. Proc., § 2383 et seq.

16-90-401. Delivery of copy of judgment to county sheriff.

Where a judgment of confinement, either in the Division of Correction or county jail, is pronounced, a certified copy of the judgment must be furnished forthwith to the county sheriff, who shall thereupon execute it, and no other warrant or authority is necessary to its execution.

History. Crim. Code, § 288; C. & M. Dig., § 3253; Pope's Dig., § 4097; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2601; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 872.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction”.

16-90-402. Delivery of defendant and copy of judgment to proper officials.

    1. In executing a judgment of confinement, the county sheriff shall deliver the defendant with a certified standardized copy of the sentencing order to the Division of Correction, Division of Community Correction, or to another detention facility, as indicated in the sentencing order.
    2. If electronic filing of court records has been implemented by the circuit clerk in the county where the defendant's conviction occurred, the standardized copy of the sentencing order may be electronically transmitted by the circuit clerk to the Division of Correction, the Division of Community Correction, or to another detention facility, as indicated in the sentencing order.
  1. The standardized copy of the sentencing order shall be developed by representatives from the Division of Correction, the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, and the Prosecutor Coordinator's office.

History. Crim. Code, § 293; C. & M. Dig., § 3264; Pope's Dig., § 4109; Acts 1985, No. 975, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2602; Acts 2013, No. 1335, § 2; 2019, No. 910, § 873.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote (a)(1) and (b); and added (a)(2).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section.

Case Notes

Cited: Cooper v. State, 278 Ark. 394, 645 S.W.2d 950 (1983); Hunter v. State, 278 Ark. 428, 645 S.W.2d 954 (1983).

16-90-403. Power of county sheriff to prevent escape, etc.

In conveying the defendant to the Division of Correction, the county sheriff shall have all the powers of preventing an escape, of resisting an effort to rescue the defendant, of recapturing the defendant, and of summoning persons to his or her aid that the county sheriff would have in executing a warrant of arrest in his or her county.

History. Crim. Code, § 294; C. & M. Dig., § 3263; Pope's Dig., § 4108; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2603; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 874.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction”.

16-90-404. Written return of county sheriff.

The county sheriff shall make a written return of the execution of the judgment of imprisonment and file the return with the clerk of the court within ten (10) days after the execution of judgment.

History. Crim. Code, § 295; C. & M. Dig., § 3265; Pope's Dig., § 4110; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2604.

16-90-405. Filing of judgment with clerk.

  1. It shall be the duty of the justice of the peace or the clerk of the court rendering a judgment or sentence of conviction in misdemeanor cases when the defendant is committed to the county jail to file a copy of the judgment or sentence in the office of the clerk of the county court, together with a full itemized statement of the fine and costs adjudged, as well as a concise statement of the time the convict may be held to labor in discharge of the judgment or sentence.
  2. The clerk of the county court shall register the judgment or sentence in a book to be kept by him or her for that purpose.

History. Acts 1881, No. 81, § 15, p. 148; 1883, No. 78, § 4, p. 125; C. & M. Dig., § 2089; Pope's Dig., § 2691; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2605.

16-90-406. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2005, No. 884, § 1, provided:

“Legislative findings and determinations. The General Assembly of the State of Arkansas finds and determines that:

“(1) As provided in § 16-11-301, all statutes concerning pleading, practice, and procedure are superseded by rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80, § 3, or pursuant to the Supreme Court's constitutional, inherent, or statutory authority prior to the effective date of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 80;

“(2) In Administrative Order No. 8, Section III, the Supreme Court established a procedure for completion and delivery of judgment and commitment orders; and

“(3) The existing statutory procedure concerning delivery of a copy of a warrant of commitment or court order is superseded.”

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning a prisoner's entitlement to a copy of a warrant of commitment or court order, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 884, § 2. The section was derived from Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5100; Pope's Dig., § 6363; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2608.

16-90-407. Confinement in default of payment of fine.

  1. The defendant shall not be held in confinement under an execution for a fine for a longer period than at the rate of one (1) day for each two dollars ($2.00) of the fine. However, the confinement shall not discharge the fine, which thereafter can only be collected by proceeding against the defendant's property.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to judgments in city or police courts, which may be discharged by confinement in the city workhouse, according to the provisions of the special statutes regulating them.

History. Crim. Code, § 299; C. & M. Dig., § 3266; Pope's Dig., § 4111; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2606.

Publisher's Notes. Subsection (a) of this section may be affected by § 16-90-108.

Case Notes

Form of Judgment.

One imprisoned for failure to pay a fine is not entitled to discharge because the judgment imposing the fine failed to specify the extent of the imprisonment which should be imposed upon the defendant in the event of his failure to pay the fine. Ex parte Brady, 70 Ark. 376, 68 S.W. 34 (1902).

16-90-408. Grounds for removal of person in confinement.

A person committed to prison for any criminal offense who is in the custody of an officer shall not be removed from the prison or delivered to the custody of any other officer, except in the following cases:

  1. By writ of habeas corpus or some other legal writ or under the guidelines of the Interstate Corrections Compact, § 12-49-101 et seq.;
  2. When he or she may be delivered to an officer, to be removed to some common jail;
  3. In case of fire, infectious disease, or other great necessity; or
    1. When the prisoner is charged by affidavit with treason or felony committed in some other state or territory of the United States of America.
    2. In such a case, on the demand of the executive of that state or the governor of a territory of the United States from which the prisoner fled, the prisoner shall be sent in custody by order of any circuit court or may be bound by recognizance, with good security by the court to appear at the proper time and place and surrender himself or herself to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction of the offense if the court, upon consideration of the evidence, shall be of the opinion that he or she should be put upon trial.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1[388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3267½, 5118; Pope's Dig., §§ 4113, 6381; Acts 1985, No. 827, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2607.

Case Notes

Prisoner as Witness.

Circuit court may have a competent witness who is confined in jail brought before it by habeas corpus to testify in behalf of the defendant in a criminal case. Gibony v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 462 (1877).

16-90-409. Judgment — Abatement of nuisance, etc.

  1. A certified copy of the judgment delivered to the county sheriff shall authorize and require him or her to execute a judgment for the abatement or removal of a nuisance or for anything other than the payment of money by the defendant.
  2. The county sheriff shall make a return of his or her execution of the judgment and file the return with the clerk of the court within sixty (60) days after the copy is delivered to him or her.

History. Crim. Code, § 298; C. & M. Dig., § 3267; Pope's Dig., § 4112; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2609.

Case Notes

Gaming House.

Maintenance of a gaming house is a criminal offense and it cannot be abated by injunction as a public nuisance, the only remedy being under this section. State v. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117, 98 S.W. 685 (1906).

Subchapter 5 — Execution of Sentence — Death Penalty

Cross References. Capital murder trial and sentence, § 5-4-601 et seq.

Procedure upon affirmance of death penalty by Supreme Court, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 10.

Warrant for execution when death sentence affirmed, § 16-91-115.

Effective Dates. Acts 1887, No. 24, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1905, No. 295, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1993, No. 914, § 5: Apr. 7, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that present law does not utilize the physical capabilities of the Department of Correction and that carrying out the death penalty under these changes is necessary for the peace, health and safety of the state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Am. Jur. 21A Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 856 et seq.

C.J.S. 24 C.J.S., Crim. Proc., § 2324 et seq.

16-90-501. Delivery of copy of judgment and convict to Department of Correction.

  1. The clerk of the court in which is pronounced the sentence of death against any convict shall deliver a certified copy thereof to the Director of the Department of Correction as soon as may be after the sentence.
  2. When a judgment of death is pronounced upon any person upon conviction of a capital offense, the person shall be immediately conveyed to the Department of Correction by the county sheriff of the county in which the trial was held and shall be delivered to the keeper of the department or director and kept there awaiting execution.

History. Acts 1913, No. 55, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 3253; Pope's Dig., § 4098; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2610.

Case Notes

Termination of Court's Authority.

After sentence has been pronounced, the court has been adjourned and the prisoner transported to the penitentiary awaiting execution, the trial court is not authorized to inquire into prisoner's sanity. Howell v. Kincannon, 181 Ark. 58, 24 S.W.2d 953 (1930).

16-90-502. Conduct of execution — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Adult” means a person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older;
    2. “Close relative of the victim” means any of the following persons in relation to the victim for whose death a person is sentenced to death:
      1. The spouse of the victim at the time of the victim's death;
      2. A parent or stepparent of the victim;
      3. An adult sibling, adult child, or adult stepchild of the victim; or
      4. Any other adult relative with a close relationship to the victim; and
    3. “Surviving innocent victim” means any adult person innocently present during the commission of the capital offense committed by the person sentenced to death who sustains an injury, either physical or emotional, and that results in a separate conviction for a lesser offense that arises out of the same course of conduct.
  2. An execution for a sentence of death shall be conducted by the Director of the Department of Correction or some assistant or assistants designated by him or her.
  3. The sentence of death shall be carried out in the manner prescribed under § 5-4-617 in every case.
  4. Unless a suspension of execution is ordered, the director or the assistants appointed by him or her shall proceed at the time named in the sentence to cause the death of the person sentenced to death in the manner prescribed under § 5-4-617.
    1. An execution of a person convicted in this state of a capital offense and sentenced to death shall be private. However, the following persons shall be present:
      1. The director or an assistant designated by the director;
      2. The Department of Correction official in charge of medical services or his or her designee;
      3. No more than six (6) of the following persons related to a victim of the crime for which the person is being executed if he or she chooses to be present:
        1. A spouse;
        2. Any parent or stepparent;
        3. Any adult sibling or stepsibling; and
        4. Any adult child or stepchild;
      4. A number of citizens determined by the director, not fewer than six (6) nor more than twelve (12), whose presence is necessary to verify that the execution was conducted in the manner required by law;
      5. Counsel for the person being executed if he or she chooses to be present; and
      6. The spiritual adviser to the person being executed if he or she chooses to be present.
    2. The director may prohibit a person who otherwise would be eligible to witness or view an execution under this subsection if he or she determines the person to be a security risk.
    3. Other persons designated by the director may be present at the execution.
    4. The maximum number of close relatives of the victim either witnessing the execution as a person designated under subdivision (e)(1)(C) of this section or as a person viewing the execution through a closed-circuit audiovisual monitor under subdivision (e)(5) of this section shall not exceed eighteen (18).
      1. A closed-circuit audiovisual monitor dedicated to viewing a live broadcast of the execution shall be placed in a location chosen by the director for the benefit of any close relative of the victim or any surviving innocent victim who desires to view the execution and who is not witnessing the execution as allowed under subdivision (e)(1)(C) of this section.
      2. The number of viewers shall not exceed eighteen (18) per execution.
      3. An audio or video recording shall not be made of the execution.

History. Acts 1887, No. 24, §§ 1, 2, p. 29; 1901, No. 58, § 1, p. 105; 1905, No. 295, § 1, p. 723; 1913, No. 55, §§ 2, 4; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3254-3256; Pope's Dig., §§ 4099-4101; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2611 — 43-2615; Acts 1997, No. 263, § 1; 1999, No. 78, § 1; 2015, No. 99, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment rewrote the section.

Cross References. Death chamber provided for, § 12-28-102.

Research References

ALR.

Validity of rules and regulations concerning viewing of execution of death penalty. 107 A.L.R.5th 291.

Case Notes

Counsel.

This section does not require that only one attorney be permitted to witness a client's execution in the viewing area. Therefore, Arkansas law does not mandate a Department of Correction regulation to that effect. McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179 KGB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57836 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017), vacated, 854 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1275, 197 L. Ed. 2d 746 (2017).

Prison execution policies did not provide to death row prisoners a sufficient alternative means to effectuate their rights to counsel and access to the courts. In effect, the viewing policies—which would not allow for the lone attorney permitted in the viewing room to continue witnessing the execution should that attorney need to petition a court during the execution—rendered as mutually exclusive the prisoners' right to have counsel witness the execution and the prisoners' right to access the courts. McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179 KGB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57836 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017), vacated, 854 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1275, 197 L. Ed. 2d 746 (2017).

Jury Deliberation.

It is not up to the jury to decide how a defendant is to die or whether death by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment; nor is it a circumstance to be considered when the jury deliberates on mitigating circumstances. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057, 101 S. Ct. 630, 66 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1980).

Public Access.

Mere fact that this section requires that between six to twelve respectable citizens be present at an execution to verify that the execution was conducted in compliance with § 5-4-617 does not transform executions, which this section states are private, into a public proceeding comparable to a criminal trial. Because Arkansas does not have an enduring tradition of public executions, the mere fact that full public access to executions could play a significant role in the proper functioning of capital punishment and could better inform the public debate about execution by lethal injection is not a sufficient basis for reading a right of public access to executions into U.S. Const., Amend. I. Ark. Times, Inc. v. Norris, No. 5:07CV00195 SWW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3500 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008) (decided under former version of statute).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit challenging the Arkansas Department of Correction's (ADC) lethal injection procedures was dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): (1) in the suit, a newspaper publisher, a newspaper editor, and a journalists' society challenged the ADC's legal injection procedures, claiming that the procedures violated their U.S. Const., Amend. I rights because those procedures did not open up the entire execution process to public view; (2) this section made clear that executions were private, and not public, proceedings; (3) the U.S. Supreme Court had not recognized a First Amendment right of access to executions and had held that neither the public nor the media had a U.S. Const., Amends. I, XIV, right to access private areas of prisons; and (4) the fact that this section required the presence of witnesses to verify that executions were conducted in compliance with § 5-4-617 did not transform executions into public proceedings or render them comparable to criminal trials, in which full public access was constitutionally required. Ark. Times, Inc. v. Norris, No. 5:07CV00195 SWW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3500 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008) (decided under former version of statute).

Cited: Ferguson v. Martineau, 115 Ark. 317, 171 S.W. 472 (1914); Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S.W. 186 (1915); Murray v. State, 249 Ark. 887, 462 S.W.2d 438 (1971).

16-90-503. Certification of execution.

  1. The Director of the Division of Correction shall certify the fact of the execution of the condemned felon to the clerk of the court by which the sentence was pronounced, who shall file the certificate with the papers of the case and enter it upon the records of the case.
  2. If the office of director is abolished, the duties devolving on him or her shall be performed by any other person selected by any board or commission having charge of the Division of Correction.

History. Acts 1913, No. 55, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 3257; Pope's Dig., § 4102; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2616; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 875.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a) and (b).

16-90-504. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, prohibiting the publishing of criminal execution details, was repealed by identical Acts 1995, Nos. 206 and 289, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1913, No. 55, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 3260; Pope's Dig., § 4105; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2619.

16-90-505. Return of body.

Upon application of a relative of the person executed, the body after execution may be returned to his or her address and at his or her cost.

History. Acts 1913, No. 55, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 3261; Pope's Dig., § 4106; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2620.

16-90-506. Reprieve, new trial, etc.

    1. Should the condemned felon, while in the custody of the Director of the Division of Correction, be granted a reprieve by the Governor or obtain a writ of error from the Supreme Court or should the execution of the sentence be stayed by any competent judicial proceeding, notice of the reprieve or writ of error or stay of execution shall be served upon the Director of the Division of Correction, as well as upon the condemned felon, and he or she shall yield obedience to it.
    2. In any subsequent proceeding, the mandate of the court having regard to the condemned felon shall be served upon the Director of the Division of Correction as well as upon the felon.
    3. If the felon is resentenced by the court, the proceedings shall be as provided under the original sentence.
  1. If a new trial is granted to the condemned felon after he or she has been conveyed to the Division of Correction, he or she shall be conveyed back to the place of trial as the Director of the Division of Correction may direct.
  2. The only officers who shall have the power of suspending the execution of a judgment of death are:
    1. The Governor;
    2. In cases of insanity or pregnancy of the individual, the Director of the Division of Correction as provided in subsection (d) of this section; and
    3. In cases of appeals, the Clerk of the Supreme Court, as prescribed by law.
        1. (a) When an individual under sentence of death, whose execution date has been set by the Governor, believes that he or she is not competent to be executed, the individual or his or her attorney may inform the Director of the Division of Correction in writing and shall provide any supporting evidence he or she wishes to be considered.
        2. When the Director of the Division of Correction is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an individual under sentence of death is not competent, due to mental illness, to rationally understand the nature and reasons for that punishment, the Director of the Division of Correction shall notify the Deputy Director of the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services.
        3. The Director of the Division of Correction shall also notify the Governor of this action.
        4. The Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services shall cause an inquiry to be made into the mental condition of the individual within thirty (30) days of receipt of notification.
        5. The attorney of record of the individual shall also be notified of this action, and reasonable allowance will be made for an independent mental health evaluation to be made.
        6. A copy of the report of the evaluation by the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services shall be furnished to the Mental Health Services Section of the Division of Health Treatment Services of the Division of Correction, along with any recommendations for treatment of the individual.
        7. All responsibility for implementation of treatment remains with the Mental Health Services Section of the Division of Health Treatment Services of the Division of Correction.
        1. If, after an evidentiary hearing that comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, over which the Director of the Division of Correction shall preside, the individual is found competent by the Director of the Division of Correction to rationally understand the nature of and reason for the punishment, the Governor shall be so notified and shall order the execution to be carried out according to law.
        2. If the individual is found incompetent due to mental illness, the Governor shall order that appropriate mental health treatment be provided. The Director of the Division of Correction may order a reevaluation of the competency of the individual as circumstances may warrant.
    1. When the Director of the Division of Correction is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a female convict under sentence of death is pregnant, he or she shall suspend the execution until it appears that she is not pregnant or until she has delivered the child.

(b) The Director of the Division of Correction shall consider any evidence offered by the individual or his or her attorney in making a determination of competency under subdivision (d)(1)(A)(ii) of this section.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 290, 291; Acts 1913, No. 55, §§ 6, 7; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3250, 3251, 3258, 3259; Pope's Dig., §§ 4095, 4096, 4103, 4104; Acts 1959, No. 228, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2617, 43-2618, 43-2621, 43-2622; Acts 1993, No. 914, § 1; 2017, No. 913, § 42; 2019, No. 615, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” throughout (d)(1)(A); and redesignated (d)(1)(A) as (d)(1)(A)(i) through (d)(1)(A)(vi).

The 2019 amendment added (d)(1)(A)(i) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; inserted “rationally” in (d)(1)(A)(ii); and, in (d)(1)(B)(i), inserted “after an evidentiary hearing that comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, over which the Director of the Division of Correction shall preside”, inserted “by the Director of the Division of Correction”, and inserted “rationally”.

Cross References. Manner of applying for executive clemency, § 5-4-607.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic Drugs, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 361.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Where this section's requirements were followed, no due process violation occurred even if it was held to create a liberty interest. Rector v. Lockhart, 783 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd without op., 971 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1992).

This section does not contain the particularized substantive standards which significantly guide the decision makers, or the mandatory language that the decision makers are required to act in a certain way, necessary to create a liberty interest. Rector v. Lockhart, 783 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd without op., 971 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1992).

The procedural requirement for the protection of an insane person's right not to be executed under Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 9 and U.S. Const. Amend. 8, as set out in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S. Ct. 990, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1977), are met by subdivision (d)(1) of this section. Singleton v. Endell, 316 Ark. 133, 870 S.W.2d 742, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S. Ct. 419, 130 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1994), overruled in part, Ward v. Hutchinson, 2018 Ark. 313, 558 S.W.3d 856 (2018).

The earlier version of subdivision (d)(1) of this section was not unconstitutional; however, Acts 1993, No. 914, rewrote the subdivision to provide for, as additional safeguards, the notification of counsel for the inmate and “reasonable allowance” for “an independent mental health evaluation.” Singleton v. Endell, 316 Ark. 133, 870 S.W.2d 742, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S. Ct. 419, 130 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1994), overruled in part, Ward v. Hutchinson, 2018 Ark. 313, 558 S.W.3d 856 (2018).

Circuit court erred in dismissing the inmate's complaint because subdivision (d)(1) of this section was unconstitutional on its face and violated the due-process guarantees of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. Ward v. Hutchinson, 2018 Ark. 313, 558 S.W.3d 856 (2018) (decision under prior law).

Subdivision (d)(1) of this section is devoid of any procedure by which a death-row inmate has an opportunity to make an initial substantial threshold showing of insanity to trigger the hearing process; nor does the language of subdivision (d)(1) provide for an evidentiary hearing that comports with the fundamental principles of due process. Ward v. Hutchinson, 2018 Ark. 313, 558 S.W.3d 856 (2018) (decision under prior law).

Subdivision (d)(1) of this section is unconstitutional on its face and violates the due-process guarantees of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions; the Supreme Court overrules Singleton v. Endell, 316 Ark. 133, 870 S.W.2d 742 (1994), to the extent that it conflicts with this holding. Ward v. Hutchinson, 2018 Ark. 313, 558 S.W.3d 856 (2018) (decision under prior law).

Inmate had standing to bring an action challenging the constitutionality of subdivision (d)(1) of this section because he had a death sentence and thus a personal stake in the outcome of the case. Ward v. Hutchinson, 2018 Ark. 313, 558 S.W.3d 856 (2018) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court erred in dismissing defendant's complaint against the Director of the Department of Correction because subdivision (d)(1) of this section, which vested sole discretion in the director to determine whether a prisoner was competent to be executed, was unconstitutional on its face and violated the due-process guarantees of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions, for the reasons set forth in Ward v. Hutchinson, 2018 Ark. 313. Greene v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 316 (2018) (decision under prior law).

Construction.

Since subsection (a) constitutes legislative recognition of the inherent judicial power to suspend an execution after its date has been set, subsection (c) cannot be strictly construed as reserving this power to the Governor. Leggett v. State, 231 Ark. 13, 328 S.W.2d 252 (1959).

Due to the unique circumstance where a constitutional issue of first impression was pending before the county circuit court but no decision had yet been rendered, that preceding was deemed to be a “competent judicial proceeding” allowing the Arkansas Supreme Court to grant a stay two days before the scheduled date of the execution. Singleton v. Norris, 332 Ark. 196, 964 S.W.2d 366 (1998).

Applicability.

One convicted of less than a capital offense is not entitled to the benefit of this section. Kelley v. State, 157 Ark. 48, 247 S.W. 381 (1923).

Clemency.

Circumstances arising after the crime affect the matter of clemency and should properly be addressed to the Governor after the courts are done with the case. Rector v. Clinton, 308 Ark. 104, 823 S.W.2d 829 (1992).

Insanity.

After sentence has been pronounced, the court adjourned, and a prisoner transported to the penitentiary awaiting execution, the trial court is not authorized to inquire into his insanity arising after the judgment or to make any orders in regard thereto. Howell v. Kincannon, 181 Ark. 58, 24 S.W.2d 953 (1930).

Superintendent has discretion in calling for sanity determination. Howell v. Todhunter, 181 Ark. 250, 25 S.W.2d 21 (1930); Black v. State, 216 Ark. 805, 227 S.W.2d 629 (1950); Leggett v. Henslee, 230 Ark. 183, 321 S.W.2d 764, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 865, 80 S. Ct. 127, 4 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1959).

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus to compel warden of penitentiary to inquire into sanity of prisoner awaiting execution. Howell v. Todhunter, 181 Ark. 250, 25 S.W.2d 21 (1930).

Petition for habeas corpus alleging present insanity of petitioner was denied where the question could be determined as provided by this section. Mitchell v. State, 233 Ark. 578, 346 S.W.2d 201 (1961).

The Arkansas standard limiting executions of persons with mental deficiencies is no more stringent than that in Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986). Rector v. Clinton, 308 Ark. 104, 823 S.W.2d 829 (1992).

Jurisdiction.

The circuit court had no authority to stay the execution on the basis of the allegation of the prisoner's claim of current insanity; it lacked jurisdiction. Rector v. Clinton, 308 Ark. 104, 823 S.W.2d 829 (1992).

Director of the Department of Correction and the Department of Correction were entitled to certiorari relief because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction under this section to stay prisoners' executions. Kelley v. Griffen, 2015 Ark. 375, 472 S.W.3d 135 (2015).

Cited: Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991); Singleton v. Norris, 332 Ark. 668 (1998).

16-90-507. Failure to execute on appointed day.

  1. Whenever a judgment of death has not been executed on the day appointed therefor by the court from any cause whatever, the Governor shall fix the day of execution by a warrant under his or her hand and seal of the state.
  2. The warrant shall be obeyed by the Director of the Department of Correction and no one but the Governor may then suspend the execution.

History. Crim. Code, § 292; C. & M. Dig., § 3262; Pope's Dig., § 4107; Acts 1959, No. 228, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2623.

Case Notes

Construction.

Since § 16-90-506(a) constitutes legislative recognition of the inherent judicial power to suspend an execution after its date has been set, this section cannot be strictly construed as reserving this power to the Governor. Leggett v. State, 231 Ark. 13, 328 S.W.2d 252 (1959).

Subchapter 6 — Expungement of Record

16-90-601 — 16-90-603. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning minor felony offenders subsequently pardoned for offenses, petition by minor nonviolent felony offender to expunge record of conviction, and the procedure for the expungement of records for minor felony offenders, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 5. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-90-601. Acts 1977, No. 800, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2834; Acts 1995, No. 998, § 3.

16-90-602. Acts 1977, No. 637, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2831.

16-90-603. Acts 1977, No. 637, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2832; Acts 1995, No. 998, § 4.

For current law, see the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq., and § 16-93-301 et seq.

16-90-604. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the certificate of expungement for minor nonviolent felony offenders, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 998, § 5. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 637, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2833.

For current law, see the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq., and § 16-93-301 et seq.

16-90-605. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning Governor's pardon, court order, and exclusions, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 6. The section was derived from Acts 1991, No. 1224, § 1; 1995, No. 998, § 6.

For current law, see the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq., and § 16-93-301 et seq.

Subchapter 7 — Arkansas Crime Victims Reparations Act

Cross References. Civil relief for victims of crime, § 16-118-107.

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 22 provided: “Acts 1987, No. 817, §§ 20 and 21, which provide for the establishment of the Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund and for victim's reparations assessments, shall be effective in accordance with established law. The remaining sections of this Act shall be effective for criminally injurious conduct occurring on or after July 1, 1988.”

Acts 1991, No. 396, § 10: Mar. 7, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that certain provisions of previous enactments of the General Assembly providing for reparations to crime victims failed to provide sufficient assessments to adequately fund the Crime Victims Reparations Fund and that it is therefore necessary to increase the amounts assessed to compensate and assist victims of criminal acts who suffer personal injury or death. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 250, § 258: Feb. 24, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 1211 of 1995 established the procedure for all state boards and commissions to follow regarding reimbursement of expenses and stipends for board members; that this act amends various sections of the Arkansas Code which are in conflict with the Act 1211 of 1995; and that until this cleanup act becomes effective conflicting laws will exist. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governer, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1997, No. 818, § 6: Mar. 26, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that in order to compensate and assist victims of criminal acts who suffer personal injury or death, the Crime Victims Reparations Fund must be adequately funded and in order to maintain eligibility for certain federal monies presently available to the Crime Victims Reparations Fund and to make certain Arkansas residents who are injured or killed by acts of terrorism committed outside the United States are eligible to receive this help, this act is necessary. Therefore an emergeny is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1999, No. 1508, § 19: Apr. 15, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that this act makes various technical corrections in the Arkansas Code; that this act further clarifies the law to provide that the Arkansas Code Revision Commission may correct errors resulting from enactments of prior sessions; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to be applicable during the codification process of the enactments of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2011, No. 11, § 2: Feb. 7, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Attorney General has immediate staffing needs in other areas of the agency; and that this act is immediately necessary because it will allow the Attorney General the flexibility to assign existing staff to work in other areas of the agency in addition to their responsibilities for the Crime Victims Reparations program. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Criminal Procedure, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 567.

Case Notes

Cited: Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Dalton, 860 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 116 S. Ct. 1063, 134 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1996).

16-90-701. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Arkansas Crime Victims Reparations Act”.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 2.

16-90-702. Legislative intent.

It is the intent of the General Assembly to provide a method of compensating and assisting those persons within the state who are victims of criminal acts and who suffer personal injury or death. To this end, it is the further intent of the General Assembly to provide reparations, in the amount of expenses actually incurred as a direct result of the criminal acts of other persons up to a maximum amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). However, for those victims whose injuries are catastrophic and result in a total and permanent disability, the maximum amount shall not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 1; 1999, No. 1178, § 1.

16-90-703. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

    1. “Allowable expense” means charges incurred for needed products, services, and accommodations, including, but not limited to:
      1. Medical care;
      2. Rehabilitation;
      3. Rehabilitative occupational training;
      4. Crime scene cleanup; and
      5. Other remedial treatment and care.
    2. “Allowable expense” also includes a reasonable and necessary amount for expenses related to funeral, cremation, or burial;
  1. “Board” means the Crime Victims Reparations Board created by § 16-90-705;
    1. “Claimant” means any of the following persons applying for reparations under this subchapter:
      1. A victim;
      2. A dependent of a victim who has died because of criminally injurious conduct; or
      3. A person authorized to act on behalf of any of the persons enumerated in this subdivision (3)(A).
    2. “Claimant” shall not include a service provider;
  2. “Collateral source” means a source of benefits or advantages for economic loss which the claimant has received or which is readily available to the claimant from any one (1) or more of the following:
    1. The offender;
    2. The United States Government or any agency thereof in the form of benefits, such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid;
    3. A state or any of its political subdivisions;
    4. State-required temporary nonoccupational disability insurance;
    5. Workers' compensation;
    6. Wage continuation programs of any employer;
    7. Proceeds of a contract of insurance payable to the claimant for loss which the victim sustained because of the criminally injurious conduct; or
    8. A contract providing prepaid hospital and other healthcare services or benefits for disability;
      1. “Criminally injurious conduct” means an act which occurs or is attempted in this state that results in personal injury or death to a victim, which act is punishable by fine, imprisonment, or death.
      2. “Criminally injurious conduct” shall include acts of terrorism committed outside of the United States as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331 against any Arkansas resident.
      3. “Criminally injurious conduct” does not include acts arising out of the operation of motor vehicles, boats, or aircraft unless the acts were committed with the intent to inflict injury or death or unless the acts involve any of the following:
        1. Injury or death intentionally inflicted through the use of a motor vehicle, boat, or aircraft;
        2. A violation of the Omnibus DWI or BWI Act, § 5-65-101 et seq.; or
        3. A violation of § 27-53-101.
    1. For the purposes of this subchapter, a person shall be deemed to have committed criminally injurious conduct, notwithstanding that by reason of age, insanity, drunkenness, or other reason he or she was legally incapable of committing a crime;
  3. “Dependent” means a natural person wholly or partially dependent upon the victim for care or support and includes a child of the victim born after the death of the victim where the death occurred as a result of criminally injurious conduct;
  4. “Economic loss” means monetary detriment consisting of allowable expense and work loss, but shall not include noneconomic detriment;
  5. “Immediate family” means a person's spouse, children, parents or guardian, siblings, and grandparents, whether related by blood, adoption, or marriage;
  6. “Noneconomic detriment” means:
    1. Pain;
    2. Suffering;
    3. Inconvenience;
    4. Physical impairment; and
    5. Nonpecuniary damage;
  7. “Personal injury” means actual bodily harm, including pregnancy or mental anguish which is the direct result of a violent criminal act;
    1. “Victim” means a person who suffers personal injury or death as a result of criminally injurious conduct committed either within the State of Arkansas or against any Arkansas resident who suffers personal injury as the result of criminally injurious conduct which occurs in states presently not having crime victims reparations programs for which the victim is eligible, and further includes any Arkansas resident who is injured or killed by an act of terrorism committed outside of the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331.
    2. “Victim” shall also include a person who:
      1. Is the child, whether by blood, adoption, or marriage, of a victim as defined in subdivision (11)(A) of this section;
      2. Is an immediate family member of a deceased victim, a victim of sexual assault, or a child victim;
      3. Is not an immediate family member, but who resided at the time of the crime in the same permanent household as a deceased victim; or
      4. Discovered the body of a victim who died as the result of criminally injurious conduct; and
  8. “Work loss” means loss of income from work the victim or claimant would have performed if the victim had not been injured or died, reduced by any income from substitute work actually performed by the victim or claimant or by income the victim or claimant would have earned in available appropriate substitute work that he or she was capable of performing but unreasonably failed to undertake.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 3; 1991, No. 396, §§ 2, 3; 1997, No. 818, §§ 1, 2; 1997, No. 887, § 1; 1999, No. 1502, §§ 1, 2; 1999, No. 1508, §§ 5, 6, 7; 2001, No. 548, § 1; 2015, No. 299, § 24.

Publisher's Notes. The version of this section as amended by Acts 1997, No. 818, was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 1502, § 2 and No. 1508, § 7.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment inserted present (11)(B)(i).

The 2015 amendment substituted “‘Criminally injurious conduct’ does” for “This term shall” in (5)(A)(iii); and inserted “or BWI” in (5)(A)(iii) (b)

Case Notes

Cited: Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Dalton, 860 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 116 S. Ct. 1063, 134 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1996).

16-90-704. Penalty.

The filing of a false claim for reparations pursuant to this subchapter shall constitute a Class D felony.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 19.

Cross References. Fines and limitations on amount, § 5-4-201.

Sentence, § 5-4-401.

16-90-705. Crime Victims Reparations Board.

    1. There is created a Crime Victims Reparations Board consisting of five (5) members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve four-year staggered terms and until a successor is appointed and qualified.
    2. At least two (2) members of the board shall be persons admitted to practice law in this state.
    3. At least one (1) member of the board shall be:
      1. A victim of criminally injurious conduct;
      2. The next of kin of a homicide victim; or
      3. An individual experienced in providing victim assistance services.
    4. A vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as a regular appointment.
  1. Each year the board shall elect the chair from its membership.
    1. Members of the board shall receive no pay for their services, but each member may receive expense reimbursement in accordance with § 25-16-901 et seq.
    2. All reasonable and necessary expenses of the board shall be paid from the Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 4; 1995, No. 773, § 1; 1997, No. 250, § 118.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 4, provided, in part, that, of the first members appointed, two shall be appointed for a term of two years, two shall be appointed for a term of three years, and one shall be appointed for a term of four years.

16-90-706. Powers of board — Logistical support.

    1. The Crime Victims Reparations Board shall have:
      1. Power to award reparations for economic loss arising from criminally injurious conduct if satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the requirements for reparations have been met; and
      2. Authority to award the reparations to the claimant or directly to the provider of services.
    2. The board shall:
      1. Hear and determine all matters relating to claims for reparations, including having the power to reinvestigate or reopen claims without regard to statutes of limitation; and
        1. Have discretion to act in a panel of three (3) or more members.
        2. This panel may exercise the powers granted to the board.
    3. The board shall have the power to subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance, require the production of records and other evidence, administer oaths or affirmations, conduct hearings, and receive relevant evidence.
      1. The board shall be provided such office, support staff, and secretarial services as necessary by the Department of Public Safety.
      2. The support staff and secretarial services described in subdivision (a)(4)(A) of this section may also be assigned by the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety to engage in additional work in other areas that do not involve crime victims reparations.
  1. In addition to any other powers and duties specified elsewhere in this subchapter, the board may:
    1. Regulate its own procedure, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter;
    2. Adopt rules to implement the provisions of this subchapter;
    3. Define any term not defined in this subchapter;
    4. Prescribe forms necessary to carry out the purposes of this subchapter;
    5. Request access to any reports of investigations or other data necessary to assist the board in making a determination of eligibility for reparations under the provisions of this subchapter;
    6. Take judicial notice of general, technical, and scientific facts within its specialized knowledge; and
    7. Publicize the availability of reparations and information regarding the filing of claims for reparations.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, §§ 5, 6; 2011, No. 11, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1303; 2019, No. 910, § 5926.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added the (a)(4)(A) designation and (a)(4)(B).

The 2019 amendment by No. 315 deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (b)(2).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Department of Public Safety” for “office of the Attorney General” in (a)(4)(A); and, in (a)(4)(B), substituted “Secretary of the Department of Public Safety” for “Attorney General”, and deleted “legal” preceding “work”.

16-90-707. Annual report by board.

  1. The Crime Victims Reparations Board shall prepare and transmit annually a report of its activities to the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety.
  2. This report shall include the amount of reparations awarded and a statistical summary of claims and awards made and denied.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 18; 2019, No. 910, § 5927.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Secretary of the Department of Public Safety” for “Governor” in (a).

16-90-708. Application forms — Cooperation by applicant.

  1. Each law enforcement agency in the state shall keep application forms prepared and provided by the Crime Victims Reparations Board and make them available to any person upon request.
  2. The board may contact any law enforcement agency to determine if an applicant has cooperated with that law enforcement agency in the identification, apprehension, and conviction of the perpetrator of the crime.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 7.

16-90-709. Proceedings and record — Settlement of claims.

    1. Every party to the claim shall be afforded an opportunity to appear and be heard, to offer evidence and argument on any issues relevant to the claim, and to examine witnesses and offer evidence to reply to any matter of an evidentiary nature in the record relevant to the claim.
    2. A record of the proceedings of the hearing in a contested case shall be made and shall be transcribed upon request of any party, who shall pay transcription costs unless otherwise ordered by the Crime Victims Reparations Board.
  1. Without a hearing, the board may settle a claim by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, or default.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 9.

16-90-710. Waiver of physician-patient privilege — Examinations and reports.

  1. Any person filing a claim under the provisions of this subchapter shall be deemed to have waived any physician-patient privilege as to communications or records relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the claimant.
    1. If the mental, physical, or emotional condition of a claimant is material to a claim, upon good cause shown, the Crime Victims Reparations Board may order the claimant to submit to a mental or physical examination and may order an autopsy of a deceased victim.
    2. The order shall:
      1. Specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination or autopsy and the person by whom it is to be made; and
        1. Require the person to file a detailed written report of the examination or autopsy with the board.
        2. The report shall set out the findings of the person making the report, including results of all tests made, diagnoses, prognoses, and other conclusions and reports of earlier examinations of the same conditions.
  2. The board shall furnish to the victim a copy of any reports examined. If the victim is deceased, the board, on request, shall furnish a copy of the report to the claimant.
  3. The board may require the claimant to supply any additional medical or psychological reports available relating to the injury or death for which reparations are claimed.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 10.

16-90-711. Confidential information.

When submitted to the Crime Victims Reparations Board as part of an application, the following information shall be confidential:

  1. Documents submitted by a claimant which relate to medical treatment; and
  2. Law enforcement investigative reports, if confidential under any other law.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 11.

16-90-712. Conditions for reparations — Changes in awards.

  1. Reparations shall not be awarded:
    1. Unless the claim has been filed with the Crime Victims Reparations Board within one (1) year after the injury or death upon which the claim is based, unless the board finds good cause for the failure to file a timely claim;
    2. To a claimant who was the offender or an accomplice of the offender;
    3. To another person if the award would unjustly benefit the offender or accomplice;
    4. To a victim who is injured or killed while confined in state, county, or municipal jail, prison, or other correctional facility as a result of conviction of any crime;
    5. To any claimant who has been convicted of a felony involving criminally injurious conduct;
    6. Unless the criminally injurious conduct resulting in injury or death was reported to the proper authorities within seventy-two (72) hours after its occurrence, or the board finds there was good cause for the failure to report within that time; or
        1. If there are insufficient funds in the Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund.
        2. However, when sufficient funds become available, the awards which have not been paid shall be paid in chronological order with the oldest paid first, unless the board finds that compelling circumstances support a payment out of chronological order.
      1. Any award under this subchapter is specifically not a claim against the state if it cannot be paid due to a lack of funds in the fund.
  2. Reparations otherwise payable to a claimant shall be diminished to the extent:
    1. That the economic loss is recouped from collateral sources; or
    2. Of the degree of responsibility for the cause of the injury or death attributable to the victim, as determined by the board.
  3. Upon finding that the claimant or victim has not fully cooperated with appropriate law enforcement agencies, the board may deny, withdraw, or reduce an award of reparations.
    1. On its own motion or on request of the claimant, the board may reconsider a decision granting or denying an award or determining its amount.
    2. An order on reconsideration of an award shall not require a refund of amounts previously paid unless the award was obtained by fraud.
    3. Reconsideration does not affect the finality of a board decision for the purpose of judicial review.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 12; 1999, No. 1102, § 1.

16-90-713. Awards apart from prosecution.

  1. An award may be made whether or not any person is prosecuted or convicted.
  2. The Crime Victims Reparations Board may suspend the proceedings pending disposition of a criminal prosecution that has been commenced or is imminent but may make a tentative award under § 16-90-716.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 13.

16-90-714. Subrogation of state to claimant's rights.

  1. If reparations are awarded, the state shall be subrogated to all the rights of a claimant to receive or recover from a collateral source to the extent that reparations were awarded.
    1. In the event the claimant recovers reparations, other than under the provisions of this subchapter for injuries or death resulting from criminally injurious conduct, the claimant shall retain as trustee so much of the recovered funds as necessary to reimburse the Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund to the extent that reparations were awarded to the claimant from that fund.
    2. The funds retained in trust shall be promptly deposited into the fund.
    1. If a claimant brings an action to recover damages related to the criminally injurious conduct upon which reparations are claimed or awarded, the claimant shall give the Crime Victims Reparations Board written notice of the action.
    2. After receiving the notice, the board may join in the action as a party plaintiff to recover the reparations awarded.
  2. The board shall not require any claimant to seek or accept any collateral source contribution unless the claimant was receiving those benefits prior to the occurrence giving rise to the claim under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, §§ 8, 14.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Equity and the Restitutionary Remedies: Constructive Trust, Equitable Lien, and Subrogation, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 1.

16-90-715. Action by state against convicted person for recovery of reparations.

    1. Whenever any person is convicted of a crime and an order for the payment of reparations is or has been made under this subchapter for a personal injury or death resulting from the act or omission constituting the crime for which conviction was had, the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety may institute a civil action against the convicted person for the recovery of all or any part of the reparations paid.
      1. The suit shall be instituted in the circuit court having jurisdiction in the county in which the person resides or is found or in Pulaski County.
      2. The circuit court shall have jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment in the action.
      1. Any amount recovered under this subsection shall be credited to the Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund.
      2. If an amount greater than that paid pursuant to the order for payment of reparations is recovered and collected in the action, the Crime Victims Reparations Board shall pay the balance to the claimant.
  1. The board shall provide the secretary with such information, data, and reports as he or she may require to institute actions in accordance with this section.
  2. The secretary may request the assistance of the Attorney General in instituting a civil action against the convicted person for the recovery of all or any part of the reparations paid.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 15; 2019, No. 910, § 5928.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Secretary of the Department of Public Safety” for “Attorney General” in (a)(1); substituted “secretary” for “Attorney General” in (b); and added (c).

16-90-716. Limitation on reparations — Manner of payment.

    1. Reparations payable to a victim and to all other claimants sustaining economic loss because of injury to or death of that victim may not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
    2. However, for those victims whose injuries are catastrophic and result in a total and permanent disability, the maximum reparations amount shall not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).
    1. The Crime Victims Reparations Board may provide for the payment to a claimant in a lump sum or in installments.
    2. At the request of the claimant, the board may convert future economic loss other than allowable expense to a lump sum, but only upon a finding by the board of either of the following:
      1. That the award in a lump sum will promote the interests of the claimant; or
      2. That the present value of all future economic loss other than allowable expense does not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  1. If the board determines that the claimant will suffer financial hardship unless an advance award is made, an amount may be paid to the claimant and shall be deducted from the final award or shall be repaid and recoverable from the claimant to the extent that it exceeds the final award.
    1. An award payable in installments for future economic loss may be made only for a period as to which the board can reasonably determine future economic loss.
    2. An award payable in installments for future economic loss may be modified by the board upon its finding that a material and substantial change of circumstances has occurred.
  2. An award shall not be subject to execution, attachment, garnishment, or other process, except that an award for allowable expense shall not be exempt from a claim of a creditor to the extent that the creditor has provided products, services, or accommodations, the costs of which are included in the award.
  3. An assignment by the claimant to any future award under the provisions of this subchapter is unenforceable, except:
    1. An assignment of any award for work loss to assure payment of court-ordered alimony, maintenance, or child support; or
    2. An assignment of any award for allowable expense to the extent that the benefits are for the cost of products, services, or accommodations necessitated by the injury or death on which the claim is based and are provided or are to be provided by the assignee.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, §§ 16, 17; 1999, No. 1178, § 2.

16-90-717. Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund.

There is created in the State Treasury a revolving fund for the Crime Victims Reparations Board to be designated the “Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund”. The fund shall be a continuing fund, not subject to fiscal year limitations, and shall consist of all moneys received by the board from any source including moneys applied for and received from any state, federal, or private source. All interest earned as a result of investing moneys in the Crime Victims Reparations Revolving Fund shall be paid into the fund and not into the general revenues of this state. All moneys accruing to the credit of the fund are appropriated and may be budgeted and expended by the board for the purpose of implementing the provisions of this subchapter and the provisions of the sexual assault statutes, §§ 12-12-40112-12-404.

History. Acts 1987, No. 817, § 20; 1991, No. 396, § 4.

16-90-718. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning additional assessments and the disposition of moneys, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 817, § 21; 1991, No. 396, § 5; 1991, No. 904, §§ 11, 20.

16-90-719. Property damage — Reparations — Intent.

    1. Persons who have suffered damage to their primary residence and surrounding real property in an amount in excess of five hundred dollars ($500) as a result of a criminal act or who have had personal property stolen from their primary residence valued in excess of five hundred dollars ($500), and who do not have adequate available resources or any collateral source of reimbursement, such as insurance, to cover the costs of repairs to their property may file a claim with the Crime Victims Reparations Board in the manner and form as is presently required by the Crime Victims Reparations Board for crime victims.
    2. The Crime Victims Reparations Board shall have the power to provide labor for repairs and cleanup supplied by eligible offenders serving community correction and probationers in accordance with rules promulgated by the Board of Corrections.
    3. By this section, the Division of Community Correction is authorized and directed to promulgate necessary rules permitting the use of eligible inmates transferred to or sentenced directly to community correction and probationers to perform the repair and cleanup work contemplated by this section and consistent with guidelines established by the Crime Victims Reparations Board.
  1. Inmates who have been convicted of violent crimes or residential burglary, even if transferred to or sentenced directly to community correction, and probationers who have been convicted of violent crimes, residential burglary, or theft of property shall be ineligible to participate in this program, and the rules governing this program shall reflect this prohibition.
    1. The Crime Victims Reparations Board and the Board of Corrections with the cooperation and assistance of the Division of Community Correction, working in conjunction with each other, shall promulgate the necessary rules to establish a program whereby eligible inmates released to or sentenced directly to community correction and probationers may perform labor on the primary residence and surrounding real property of victims whose primary residence has suffered damage as a result of a criminal act or whose personal property has been stolen from their primary residence, and whose owner does not have adequate available resources or any collateral source of reimbursement such as insurance to cover the costs of repairs or replacement.
    2. The safety of the victim, the probationer, and the inmate is to be given first priority in promulgating the rules.
    1. Whenever a dollar amount of property damage or loss is referred to in subsections (a)-(c) of this section, the dollar amount shall refer to the fair market repair or replacement value.
    2. Further, no award shall be made under the provisions of this section for a loss based on the dollar amount of an insurance deductible which is five hundred dollars ($500) or less.
  2. It is the intent of this section to provide a method of reparations whereby victims whose primary residence is damaged or whose personal property is stolen from their primary residence as a result of criminal acts and who do not have adequate available resources or a collateral source of reimbursement such as insurance to cover the cost of repairs to their primary residence or replacement of the personal property may receive assistance in the form of inmate or probationer labor to make repairs to and clean up their primary residence and the surrounding real property.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1269, §§ 1-3; 2019, No. 315, §§ 1304, 1305.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (a)(2), (a)(3), (c)(1), and (c)(2); and substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (b).

16-90-720. Payment for heathcare service — Schedule established — Third-party vendor authorized.

  1. The Crime Victims Reparations Board shall award payment for a healthcare service under this subchapter in the same manner as the medical fee schedule established for workers' compensation claims under § 11-9-517.
    1. The board, a claimant, or a victim is not liable for healthcare service charges in excess of the medical fee schedule under subsection (a) of this section.
    2. A healthcare provider shall accept payment from the board as payment in full for healthcare service charges unless an investigation of the healthcare service charges by the board determines that there is a reasonable healthcare justification for a deviation from the medical fee schedule.
  2. The board may contract with a third-party vendor to process payment for healthcare services under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2017, No. 918, § 1.

Subchapter 8 — Sentencing Guidelines

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, Nos. 532 and 550, § 13: Mar. 16, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the sentencing policies and standards of the State of Arkansas are in need of immediate reform in order to better provide for a balanced correctional system and to better effectuate the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crimes and to make possible their return as useful members of the community and passage of this act is necessary to facilitate these reforms. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect, unless provided for otherwise herein, from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 59 and 60, § 5: Aug. 26, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law which indicates the records to be used in computing criminal history scores for purposes of sentencing need to be broadened to include records of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere, and probation and suspended sentences; that the broadening of the present law will enhance the criminal penalties for criminal activity and thereby offer greater protection to the citizens of this State from the rising crime rate. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 1170, § 13: Apr. 11, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that confusion exists regarding the status of ineligible offenders judicially transferred to Department of Community Punishment facilities; that there is an immediate need to clarify the law applicable to transferring ineligible offenders back to the Department of Correction; and that it is in the best interest of the courts which already have crowded documents to immediately reduce the reporting requirements for departure sentences. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 250, § 258: Feb. 24, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 1211 of 1995 established the procedure for all state boards and commissions to follow regarding reimbursement of expenses and stipends for board members; that this act amends various sections of the Arkansas Code which are in conflict with the Act 1211 of 1995; and that until this cleanup act becomes effective conflicting laws will exist. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governer, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2005, No. 186, § 3: July 1, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional; that the voluntary presumptive standards of the State of Arkansas may be challenged as unconstitutional; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to confirm that the sentencing guidelines, as originally enacted, are advisory. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2005.”

Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 99.

16-90-801. Statement of sentencing policy.

  1. Purposes of Sentencing. The primary purposes of sentencing a person convicted of a crime are:
    1. To punish an offender commensurate with the nature and extent of the harm caused by the offense, taking into account factors that may diminish or increase an offender's culpability;
    2. To protect the public by restraining offenders;
    3. To provide restitution or restoration to victims of crime to the extent possible and appropriate;
    4. To assist the offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen; and
    5. To deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law.
  2. Purpose of Sentencing Standards.
    1. Though voluntary, the purpose of establishing rational and consistent sentencing standards is to seek to ensure that sanctions imposed following conviction are proportional to the seriousness of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender's criminal history.
    2. The standards seek to ensure equitable sanctions which provide that offenders similar with respect to relevant sentencing criteria will receive similar sanctions and offenders substantially different with respect to relevant sentencing criteria will receive different sanctions.
    3. Sentencing criteria should be neutral with respect to race, gender, social, and economic status.
  3. Appropriate Use of Sentencing Sanctions.
    1. Rational and consistent sentencing policy requires a continuum of sanctions which increases in direct proportion to the seriousness of the offense and the extent of the offender's criminal history.
    2. Commitment to the Division of Correction is the most severe sanction and due to the finite capacity of the division's facilities, it should be reserved for those convicted of the most serious offenses, those who have longer criminal histories, and those who have repeatedly failed to comply with conditions imposed under less restrictive sanctions.
    3. Arkansas law provides for significant intermediate penal sanctions in the community which should be utilized when appropriate.
    4. Restrictions on an offender's liberty should only be as restrictive as necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing contained in this policy.

History. Acts 1993, No. 532, § 1; 1993, No. 550, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 876.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “division’s facilities” for “department’s facilities” in (c)(2).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Defendant's claim that the General Assembly improperly delegated both legislative and judicial power to the Arkansas Sentencing Commission in violation of Article 4 of the Arkansas Constitution was denied because defendant failed to demonstrate that the Sentencing Guidelines Act had a prejudicial impact on him. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Requirement that a prosecutor approve defendant's request to plead guilty and waive a jury trial did not violate defendant's due process rights because the sentencing scheme codified at §§ 16-90-80116-90-804 did not create a liberty interest in protecting from exposure to higher ranges of sentences. Whitlow v. State, 357 Ark. 290, 166 S.W.3d 45 (2004).

Resentencing.

Where original judgment was illegal and case was reversed and remanded for resentencing, trial court could consider all punishments which the court originally had available to it and could further take note of defendant's failure to comply with conditions of the first sentence. Meadows v. State, 324 Ark. 505, 922 S.W.2d 341 (1996).

Valid Purposes.

Defendant's contention that it was improper to penalize a defendant in such a way as to make a law enforcement or political statement held without merit since this section provides that a primary purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to deter criminal behavior and foster respect for the law. Love v. State, 324 Ark. 526, 922 S.W.2d 701 (1996).

Subdivision (a)(5) of this section permits juries to use a sentence to “send a message,” i.e., to deter other potential criminals. Muldrew v. State, 331 Ark. 519, 963 S.W.2d 580 (1998).

Cited: Barritt v. State, 372 Ark. 395, 277 S.W.3d 211 (2008).

16-90-802. The Arkansas Sentencing Commission.

  1. There is hereby created the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, the purpose of which is to evaluate the effect of sentencing laws, policies, and practices on the criminal justice system, to make appropriate and necessary revision to the sentencing standards, and to make recommendations to the General Assembly on proposed changes of sentencing laws, policies, and practices.
    1. The commission shall be composed of nine (9) voting members and two (2) advisory members.
      1. One (1) advisory member shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Senate Committee on Judiciary.
      2. One (1) advisory member shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the House Committee on Judiciary.
    2. The voting members of the commission shall be composed of:
      1. Three (3) circuit judges;
      2. Two (2) prosecuting attorneys;
      3. Two (2) public defenders or private attorneys whose practices consist primarily of criminal defense work; and
      4. Two (2) private citizen members.
      1. The Governor shall appoint the voting members of the commission.
      2. All voting members shall serve for a term of five (5) years, unless they resign or are removed. Members shall serve until their replacements are appointed. Vacancies occurring before the expiration of a term shall be filled in the manner provided for members first appointed.
    1. The Governor shall select a chair to serve at his or her will.
    2. Members of the commission may receive expense reimbursement and stipends in accordance with § 25-16-901 et seq.
  2. In furtherance of its purpose, the commission shall have the following powers and duties:
      1. The commission shall adopt an initial sentencing standards grid and an offense seriousness reference table based upon the statutory parameters and additional data and information gathered prior to January 1, 1994.
      2. The commission shall also set the percentage of time within parameters set by law to be served for offenses at each seriousness level prior to any type of transfer or release;
      1. The commission shall periodically review and may revise the voluntary sentencing standards.
      2. Any revision of the standards shall be in compliance with provisions applicable to rule making contained in the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq.
      3. Any revision of the standards shall become effective as provided by the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq.
        1. The revised standards will be in effect unless modified by the General Assembly at its next session or until revised again by the commission.
        2. Any revisions by the commission shall be within the statutory parameters set for the various crime classes;
    1. The commission may review and make recommendations for revision of the Community Punishment Act, § 16-93-1201 et seq., target group to the General Assembly such that nonviolent offenses and offenders are routinely handled in community correction programs;
      1. The commission shall be in charge of strategic planning for a balanced correctional plan for the state.
      2. The commission shall develop such a plan in conjunction with the Board of Corrections.
      3. The commission shall monitor compliance with sentencing standards, assess their impact on the correctional resources of the state with the assistance of the board, and determine if the standards further the adopted sentencing policy goals of the state;
    2. The commission may review the classifications of crimes and sentences and make recommendations for change when supported by information that change is advisable to further the adopted sentencing policy goals of the state;
      1. The commission shall develop a research and analysis system to determine the feasibility, impact on resources, and budget consequences of any proposed or existing legislation affecting sentence length.
      2. The commission shall prepare and submit to the General Assembly a report on any such legislation prior to its adoption;
        1. All courts having criminal jurisdiction of felony crimes shall provide to the commission in a timely manner all information deemed necessary by the commission.
        2. Such information shall be in the form determined necessary by the commission.
      1. The commission shall have the authority to collect from any state or local governmental entity information, data in electronic or in other usable form, reports, statistics, or such other material which relates to sentencing laws, policies, and practices, or impacts on correctional resources or is necessary to carry out the commission's functions.
      2. The commission may coordinate its data collection with the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Arkansas Crime Information Center, the various circuit clerks of the state, and the various state and local correctional agencies;
    3. Under its duties outlined in this section, the commission shall be a criminal justice agency, as defined in § 12-12-1001, as its powers and duties include:
      1. Determining transfer eligibility;
      2. Gathering, analyzing, and disseminating criminal history information as it relates to sentencing practices, dispositions, and release criteria; and
      3. Determining the appropriate use of correctional and rehabilitative resources of the state;
      1. Produce annual reports regarding compliance with sentencing guidelines, including the application of voluntary presumptive standards, § 16-90-803, and departures from the standards, § 16-90-804.
      2. The report shall include:
        1. Data collected from each county; and
        2. Both a county-by-county and statewide accounting of the results including without limitation:
          1. Sentences to the Division of Correction and Division of Community Correction; (b) The average sentence length for sentences by offense type and severity level according to the sentencing guidelines;
      3. The report filed each year after the initial report submitted under this section shall include data from prior years;
    4. Prepare and conduct annual continuing legal education seminars regarding the sentencing guidelines to be presented to judges, prosecuting attorneys and their deputies, and public defenders and their deputies, as so required; and
      1. The commission shall collaborate with the Administrative Office of the Courts to develop and implement an integrated sentencing commitment and departure form that shall include:
        1. Demographic information including the race and ethnicity of both the offender and the victim or victims;
        2. The placement decision;
        3. Sentence length;
        4. Any departure from the sentencing guidelines on placement and sentence length;
        5. The number of months above or below the presumptive sentence;
        6. Justification for the departure; and
        7. A signature space for the judge and the prosecuting attorney to sign off on the contents of the form.
      2. The commission shall begin using the new form on January 1, 2012.
        1. Forms are to be collected annually and sent to the Administrative Office of the Courts.
        2. Data from the forms shall be collected and submitted to the Chair of the House Committee on Judiciary and the Chair of the Senate Committee on Judiciary.
    1. The commission shall meet no less than quarterly.
      1. The commission shall submit to the Governor, the General Assembly, and the Arkansas Judicial Council, Inc. a biennial report three (3) months prior to the convening of the regular session.
      2. The report shall include a summary of the commission proceedings and recommendations for legislative and administrative action.
    1. The commission shall employ a director from candidates presented to it by the Chair of the Arkansas Sentencing Commission in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Corrections.
    2. The Director of the Arkansas Sentencing Commission shall have appropriate training and experience to assist the commission in the performance of its duties.
    3. The director shall be responsible for compiling the work of the commission and drafting suggested legislation incorporating the commission's findings for submission to the General Assembly.
    1. The secretary shall employ such other staff and shall contract for services as are necessary to assist the commission in the performance of its duties, and as funds permit.
    2. The secretary shall ensure that appropriate budgetary measures are taken to employ enough staff or contract for expert services and to purchase the technology needed to compile and process sentencing data from all judicial districts in a timely manner.

(c) The percentage of sentences that are an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines; and

(d) The average number of months above the recommended sentence for those sentences described in subdivision (d)(9)(B)(ii) (c) of this section.

History. Acts 1993, No. 532, § 4; 1993, No. 550, § 4; 1995, No. 1170, § 6; 1997, No. 250, § 119; 2001, No. 1288, § 14; 2009, No. 962, § 36; 2011, No. 570, §§ 78, 79; 2019, No. 910, §§ 865, 866.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted by Acts 1993, Nos. 532 and 550, § 4, the end of subdivision (d)(1)(A) read:

“the effective date of these standards, January 1, 1994.”

As enacted by Acts 1993, Nos. 532 and 550, § 4, subdivision (e)(1) began:

“The commission shall hold its initial meeting within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of this act and …”

Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Publisher's Notes. As enacted by Acts 1993, Nos. 532 and 550, § 4, subdivision (c)(1) also provided:

“The initial terms of the voting members of the Commission are to be staggered over five (5) years. Subsequently, appointment for a single member will be made in 1994, and two (2) members appointed in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote (b)(2).

The 2009 amendment substituted “regular session” for “next regularly scheduled legislative session” in (e)(2)(A).

The 2011 amendment added (d)(9) through (d)(11); and added the (g)(1) designation and (g)(2).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (d)(9)(B)(ii) (a) ; in (f)(1), substituted “a director” for “an executive director”, and added “in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Corrections”; substituted “Director of the Arkansas Sentencing Commission” for “Executive Director of the Arkansas Sentencing Commission” in (f)(2); substituted “director” for “executive director” in (f)(3); substituted “The secretary” for “Subject to the approval of the Chair of the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, the executive director” in (g)(1); and substituted “secretary” for “executive director” in (g)(2).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

16-90-803. Voluntary presumptive standards.

      1. When a person charged with a felony enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, enters a negotiated plea, or is found guilty in a trial before the judge, or when the trial judge is authorized to fix punishment following an adjudication of guilt by a jury pursuant to § 5-4-103, sentencing may follow the procedures provided in § 16-90-804.
      2. However, these sentencing procedures do not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
    1. The voluntary presumptive sentence for any offender who committed a felony on or after January 1, 1994, may be determined by locating the appropriate cell of the sentencing standards grid.
  1. The two (2) dimensions of the sentencing standards grid represent the primary determinants of a sentence, offense seriousness and offender history.
    1. Offense Seriousness. The offense seriousness level is determined by the offense of conviction or the offense of which the person was found guilty or to which the person pleaded guilty or nolo contendere.
      1. Felony offenses are divided into ten (10) levels of seriousness, ranging from low, seriousness level I, to high, seriousness level X.
      2. The typical cases for the offenses listed within each level of seriousness are deemed to be generally equivalent in seriousness.
      3. The most frequently occurring offenses within each seriousness level are listed on the vertical axis of the sentencing standards grid.
      4. The seriousness level for infrequently occurring offenses can be determined by consulting the offense seriousness reference table.
      5. The seriousness level for inchoate offenses is one (1) level below the level for substantive offenses.
    2. Offender History. An offender's criminal history score constitutes the horizontal axis of the sentencing standards grid.
      1. The offender's criminal history score shall be computed from the following:
        1. Prior felony records;
        2. Prior misdemeanor records;
        3. Prior juvenile records, under certain circumstances outlined below; and
        4. Custody status at the time of the offense.
      2. The term “records”, for the purpose of computing criminal history scores, shall include:
        1. Convictions;
        2. Findings of guilt;
        3. Acceptance of pleas of guilty or nolo contendere;
        4. Instances where the defendant has been placed on probation, suspended imposition of sentence, or suspended execution of sentence;
        5. Records which have been expunged after August 31, 1994; and
        6. Dismissals ordered after August 31, 1994, pursuant to the First Offender Act, § 16-93-301 et seq.
      3. The specific weights to be assigned to the various criteria are as follows:
        1. Weight is assigned to prior felony records according to seriousness level, as follows:
          1. Seriousness levels I, II, III, IV, and V = one-half (0.5) point; and
          2. Seriousness levels VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X = one (1) point;
        2. Weight is assigned only to Class A misdemeanors.
          1. Each Class A misdemeanor is worth one-quarter (0.25) point.
          2. No more than one (1) point may be accrued from misdemeanor records;
        3. Weight is assigned only to judicial adjudications of delinquency for offenses for which a juvenile could have been tried as an adult and which the trial court deem relevant to sentencing in the current proceeding.
          1. Each adjudication is worth one-quarter (0.25) point, except for offenses adjudicated as delinquent which if committed by an adult are worth one (1) point and would have constituted:
            1. Capital murder, § 5-10-101;
            2. Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;
            3. Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103;
            4. Kidnapping in the first degree, § 5-11-102;
            5. Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;
            6. Rape, § 5-14-103;
            7. Battery in the first degree, § 5-13-201; or
            8. Aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer or an employee of a correctional facility, § 5-13-211, if a Class Y felony.
            1. No more than one (1) point may be accrued from juvenile offenses unless one (1) of the offenses adjudicated as delinquent would have constituted, if committed by an adult:
      4. Kidnapping in the first degree, § 5-11-102;
      5. Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;
      6. Rape, § 5-14-103;
      7. Battery in the first degree, § 5-13-201; or
      8. Aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer or an employee of a correctional facility, § 5-13-211, if a Class Y felony.
  2. Felony offenses at seriousness levels I-V will not be counted if a period of fifteen (15) years has elapsed since the date of discharge from or expiration of the sentence to the date of the current offense; and

(A) Capital murder, § 5-10-101;

(B) Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;

(C) Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103;

(2) An offender may receive no more than two (2) points for juvenile offenses;

(iv) One (1) point is to be added to an offender's score if the offender is under any type of criminal justice restraint for a felony offense at the time that he or she committed the crime for which he or she is being sentenced. Such restraint includes pretrial bond, suspended imposition of sentence, probation, parole, postprison supervision, and release pending sentencing for a prior crime;

(v) (a) Juvenile offenses must have occurred within ten (10) years of the time of the offense for which an offender is being currently sentenced.

(b) Misdemeanor offenses must have occurred within ten (10) years of the time of the offense for which an offender is currently being sentenced.

(vi) When multiple sentences for a single course of conduct were imposed, only the offense at the highest seriousness level is considered.

(3)(A)(i) The offense of conviction determines the appropriate seriousness level on the vertical axis.

(ii) The offender's criminal history score determines the appropriate location on the horizontal axis.

(B) The voluntary presumptive fixed sentence for a felony conviction is found in the sentencing standards grid cell at the intersection of the column defined by the criminal history score and the row defined by the offense seriousness level.

(C) The statutory minimum or maximum ranges for a particular offense shall govern over a voluntary presumptive sentence if the voluntary presumptive sentence should fall below or above the statutory minimum or maximum ranges.

(4) This section shall not apply when a jury has recommended a sentence to the trial judge.

(5) Capital murder is excluded from the sentencing standards and is subject to the procedures in § 5-4-601 et seq.

(c) For all arrests or offenses occurring before July 1, 2005, that have not reached a final disposition as to judgment in the trial court, sentencing shall be in accordance with the law in effect at the time the offense occurred and not under the provisions of this section.

History. Acts 1993, No. 532, § 2; 1993, No. 550, § 2; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 59, § 1; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 60, § 1; 1995, No. 1170, § 7; 2001, No. 1179, § 1; 2005, No. 186, § 1; 2017, No. 367, §§ 12, 13; 2017, No. 423, §§ 13, 14.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment redesignated former (a)(1) as present (a)(1)(A); and added (a)(1)(B).

The 2005 amendment substituted “sentencing may” for “sentencing shall” in (a)(1)(A); deleted former (a)(2); redesignated former (a)(3) as present (a)(2); substituted “may be determined” for “is determined” in present (a)(2); and added (c).

The 2017 amendment by No. 367 added (b)(2)(C)(iii) (a)(8) and (b)(2)(C)(iii) (b)(1)(H)

The 2017 amendment by No. 423 inserted “voluntary” in (a)(2) and throughout (b)(3); substituted “who committed a felony” for “of a felony committed” in (a)(2); and, in (b)(3)(C), substituted “offense” for “crime” and “the statutory minimum or maximum” for “such”.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction and Application of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2A2.1(b)(1), 18 U.S.C., Providing Enhancement for Attempted Murder or Assault with Intent to Commit Murder Dependent Upon Nature or Degree of Injury. 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 385.

Construction and Application of “Official Victim” Sentencing Enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c) Concerning Law Enforcement Officers and Prison Officials. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 371.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(s) Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity — Fraud Offenses. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 445.

Downward Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 18 U.S.C. — Fraud Offenses. 33 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 477.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3, Concerning Mental and Emotional Conditions as Ground for Sentencing Departure. 34 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 457.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) Providing Sentencing Enhancement For Manager or Supervisor of Criminal Activity — Drug Offenses — Cocaine. 35 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 467.

Validity, Construction, and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8, Providing for Upward Sentence Departure for Extreme Conduct. 36 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 95.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, Providing Sentencing Guideline for Conspiracy Not Covered by Specific Offense Guideline. 37 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 449.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G., § 3B1.1(a), 18 U.S.C., Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity — Drug Offenses. 43 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 365.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section does not create presumptive sentencing standards that are violative under the due process and equal protection clauses, notwithstanding the contention that the statute creates two classes of defendants, one whose punishment is determined by a jury and one whose punishment is determined by the trial judge, and encourages defendants to waive their right to a jury trial, since a trial judge is not required to impose the presumptive sentence and has authority to depart from the presumptive sentence. Hutcherson v. State, 74 Ark. App. 72, 47 S.W.3d 267 (2001).

Construction.

Because this section, although enacted at a later date, contains no repealing clause and does not conflict with § 5-4-501, the state has the option of alleging specific habitual status in the information or simply charging the underlying offense. Mackey v. State, 56 Ark. App. 164, 939 S.W.2d 851, rev'd on other grounds, 329 Ark. 229, 947 S.W.2d 359 (1997).

Applicability.

The trial court did not err when it failed to sentence the defendant in a prosecution for manslaughter according to the sentencing guidelines promulgated in the statute where the jury's recommended sentence fell clearly within the statutory range for a Class C felony, such as manslaughter. Hagar v. State, 341 Ark. 633, 19 S.W.3d 16 (2000).

Defendant's sentence was not illegal on its face, even though she was given a sentence greater than the presumed one, because her sentence was authorized pursuant to the statute governing sentencing for habitual offenders, § 5-4-501; the statutory range for a habitual offender with four or more felony convictions convicted of a Class C felony was between three and 30 years and, since defendant's 20 year sentence fell squarely within this range, the trial court was authorized to impose it. Brown v. State, 85 Ark. App. 382, 155 S.W.3d 22 (2004).

Defendant was properly given non-presumptive sentences for his convictions for second-degree domestic battery and third-degree domestic battery because the trial court was authorized to depart from the presumptive sentence pursuant to its written findings as to the severity of the victim's injuries; further, the sentencing procedure did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because a jury did not find the facts on which his non-presumptive sentence was based, the sentence was still within the statutory range, and defendant waived his right to a jury trial and consented to judicial sentencing. Brock v. State, 90 Ark. App. 164, 204 S.W.3d 562 (2005).

Guilty Plea.

Issues such as the trial court's upward departure from the sentencing guidelines contained in this section and § 16-90-804 are not appealable after an Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) conditional guilty plea. Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997).

Offender History.

Because defendant's prior felony records were more than 15 years old, and his prior misdemeanor record was more than 10 years old, they did not count toward his criminal history under the presumptive standards, and his criminal-history score was 0, rather than 2. Hunter v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 256, 522 S.W.3d 793 (2017).

Cited: Cupit v. State, 324 Ark. 438, 920 S.W.2d 853 (1996).

16-90-804. Departures from the voluntary presumptive sentence range.

    1. At a bench trial, a court may depart from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 in reliance on one (1) or more aggravating factors by providing a justification in the record of:
      1. A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and
      2. A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803.
      1. The justification regarding an aggravating factor shall be entered into the sentencing order.
      2. The sentencing order shall also reflect whether the sentence is the result of an original charge or whether an original charge was nolle prosequi.
      1. When sentencing is done by the court following a trial before the court, either party or both parties may present evidence to justify a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803.
      2. The court may allow argument either during the sentencing phase of a trial or at a separate hearing on the matter of departing from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 if the court finds that argument would be helpful.
        1. When sentencing is done by the court following the entry of a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a negotiated plea of guilty, the court shall enter the sentence on the record.
        2. After the court enters the sentence on the record under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(i) of this section, the prosecuting attorney shall provide in writing the credible reasons for a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range, if a departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range is applicable.
      1. If both parties agree on a recommended sentence, the court may choose to accept or reject the agreement based upon the facts of the case and whether the facts support the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803 or a departure different from any recommendation.
        1. If there is an agreed departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803, the parties shall supply written reasons to the court to attach to the sentencing order and to report to the Arkansas Sentencing Commission.
        2. The written reasons required under subdivision (b)(2)(B)(i) of this section shall include:
          1. A listing of the charges and sentencing enhancements against the offender as they were set out in the first charging instrument as well as any additional charges or sentence enhancements subsequently added in the case, if any; and
          2. A thorough recitation of the facts underlying the departure from the presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803. (C) If the court rejects the agreement under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, the offender shall be allowed to withdraw his or her plea.
          3. The following is a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that may be considered as a reason or reasons for departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803:
            1. While falling short of a defense, the victim played an aggressive role in the incident or provoked or willingly participated in the incident;
            2. The offender played a minor or passive role in the commission of the current offense;
            3. Before detection, the offender compensated or made a good faith effort to compensate the victim for any damage or injury sustained by the victim;
            4. The current offense was principally accomplished by another person, and the offender manifested extreme caution or sincere concern for the safety or well-being of the victim;
            5. The offender or the offender's children suffered a continuing pattern of physical or sexual abuse by the victim of the current offense, and the current offense is a response to the physical or sexual abuse;
            6. The inclusion of multiple offenses in calculating the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of the purpose of this chapter;
            7. If the current offense is a sexual offense, before detection in the sexual offense, the offender has voluntarily admitted the nature and extent of the sexual offense and has sought and participated in professional treatment or counseling for the sexual offense;
            8. Upon motion of the state stating that the offender has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance to the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the circumstances listed below may be weighed as mitigating factors with respect to the offender's offense:
              1. The timeliness of the offender's assistance;
              2. The nature and extent of the offender's assistance; and
              3. The truthfulness, completeness, and demonstrable reliability of any information or testimony provided by the offender; and
              4. (i) The offender used his or her position of trust, confidence, or fiduciary responsibility to facilitate the commission of the current offense.
              5. The offender has been involved in other conduct similar to the current offense as evidenced by the findings of civil or administrative law proceedings or the imposition of professional sanctions;
            9. (A) Any other compelling reason.
          4. The following is a nonexclusive list of aggravating factors that may be considered as a reason or reasons for departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence range determined under § 16-90-803:
            1. The offender's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim exhibited by degrading, gratuitous, vicious, torturous, and demeaning physical or verbal abuse, unusual pain, or violence in excess of that necessary to accomplish the criminal purpose;
            2. The offender knew or should have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth, advanced age, disability, or ill health;
            3. The current offense was a major economic offense or series of offenses, as identified by a consideration of any of the following factors:
      2. The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time;
        1. The current offense involved at least three (3) separate transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with a purpose to sell or transfer the controlled substance;
        2. The current offense involved an attempted or actual sale or transfer of a controlled substance in an amount substantially larger than the statutory minimum that defines the current offense;
        3. The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time or involved a broad geographic area of disbursement;
        4. The circumstances of the current offense reveal the offender to have occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy;
        5. The offender used his or her position or status to facilitate the commission of the current offense, including without limitation positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships, such as a pharmacist, physician, or other medical professional; or
        6. The offender has received substantial income or resources from his or her involvement in trafficking a controlled substance;

(B) If any other compelling reason is used as a mitigating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was a downward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included.

(A) The current offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim;

(B) The current offense involved attempted or actual monetary loss substantially greater than typical for the offense;

(ii) The factor described under subdivision (d)(3)(D)(i) of this section does not apply if it constitutes an element of the current offense; or

(4)(A) The current offense was a major controlled substance offense, identified as an offense or series of offenses related to trafficking in controlled substances under circumstances more onerous than the usual controlled substance offense.

(B) The presence of two (2) or more of the following circumstances is an aggravating factor with respect to the current offense:

(5)(A) The current offense is a felony and the offender employed a firearm in the course of or in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony.

(B) The factor described under subdivision (d)(5)(A) of this section does not apply to an offender convicted of a felony, an element of which is:

(i) Employing or using, or threatening or attempting to employ or use, a deadly weapon;

(ii) Being armed with a deadly weapon;

(iii) Possessing a deadly weapon;

(iv) Furnishing a deadly weapon; or

(v) Carrying a deadly weapon;

(6) The current offense was a sexual offense and was part of a pattern of criminal behavior with the same or different victims under eighteen (18) years of age manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time;

(7) The inclusion of multiple offenses in calculating the voluntary presumptive sentence range under § 16-90-803 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter;

(8) The current offense was committed in a manner that exposed risk of injury to persons other than the victim or victims, including without limitation shooting a firearm into a crowd of people;

(9) The current offense was a violent or sexual offense committed in the victim's zone of privacy, including without limitation the victim's home or the curtilage of the victim's home;

(10) The offender attempted to cover or conceal the current offense by intimidation of witnesses, destruction or tampering with evidence, or purposely misleading authorities;

(11) The current offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody;

(12) If the current offense is related to a vehicular homicide, the offender did not have the minimum insurance required by law; and

(13)(A) Any other compelling reason.

(B) If any other compelling reason is used as an aggravating factor under this subsection, additional details regarding the negotiated plea, if applicable, and why the sentence was an upward departure from the voluntary presumptive sentence shall be included.

(e) This section shall not apply when a jury has recommended a sentence to the trial court.

History. Acts 1993, No. 532, § 3; 1993, No. 550, § 3; 1995, No. 1170, §§ 8, 9; 2005, No. 186, § 1; 2017, No. 423, § 15.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote (a); inserted “or she” in present (b)(1)(B); deleted former (c); redesignated former (d) and (e) as present (c) and (d); substituted “considered” for “used” in present (c); and added present (e).

The 2017 amendment substituted “voluntary presumptive sentencing range” for “standards” in the section heading; and rewrote the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Research References

ALR.

Downward departure under state sentencing guidelines based on extraordinary family circumstances. 106 A.L.R.5th 377.

Construction and Application of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2A2.1(b)(1), 18 U.S.C., Providing Enhancement for Attempted Murder or Assault with Intent to Commit Murder Dependent Upon Nature or Degree of Injury. 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 385.

Construction and Application of “Official Victim” Sentencing Enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c) Concerning Law Enforcement Officers and Prison Officials. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 371.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(s) Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity — Fraud Offenses. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 445.

Downward Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 18 U.S.C. — Fraud Offenses. 33 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 477.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3, Concerning Mental and Emotional Conditions as Ground for Sentencing Departure. 34 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 457.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) Providing Sentencing Enhancement For Manager or Supervisor of Criminal Activity — Drug Offenses — Cocaine. 35 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 467.

Validity, Construction, and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8, Providing for Upward Sentence Departure for Extreme Conduct. 36 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 95.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, Providing Sentencing Guideline for Conspiracy Not Covered by Specific Offense Guideline. 37 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 449.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G., § 3B1.1(a), 18 U.S.C., Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity — Drug Offenses. 43 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 365.

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Developments, Sentencing, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 697.

Note, Hurricane Blakely and the Calm After the Storm Found in Booker, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 449.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Criminal Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 849.

Case Notes

Construction.

Defendant was properly given non-presumptive sentences for his convictions for second degree domestic battery and third degree domestic battery because the trial court was authorized to depart from the presumptive sentence pursuant to its written findings as to the severity of the victim's injuries; further, the sentencing procedure did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because a jury did not find the facts on which his non-presumptive sentence was based, the sentence was still within the statutory range, and defendant waived his right to a jury trial and consented to judicial sentencing. Brock v. State, 90 Ark. App. 164, 204 S.W.3d 562 (2005).

This section clearly indicates that the list of departure factors is not exclusive; therefore, evidence of subsequent drug manufacturing was admissible in the sentencing phase of a drug trial because it was relevant for departure purposes. Crawford v. State, 362 Ark. 301, 208 S.W.3d 146 (2005).

Compliance.

The General Assembly did not intend that the trial court necessarily write out the reasons for departure from the sentencing grid in longhand but only that the reasons be written; thus, where they were in writing, and the trial court circled the numbers of those aggravating circumstances that compromised its justifications, this procedure was appropriate and did not constitute error. Woods v. State, 323 Ark. 605, 916 S.W.2d 728 (1996).

Factors for Departure.

While “committing additional felonies while on probation” is not on the list of aggravating factors provided by the statute, it is an appropriate reason when the sentence follows a probation revocation proceeding and the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant committed other felonies during his probation. Martin v. State, 337 Ark. 451, 989 S.W.2d 908 (1999).

Guilty Plea.

Issues such as the trial court's upward departure from the sentencing guidelines contained in this section and § 16-90-803 are not appealable after an Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) conditional guilty plea. Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997).

Statutory Minimum.

This section does not allow a judge to sentence a defendant to a fifty-four month sentence when the statutory minimum is ten years. Pickett v. State, 321 Ark. 224, 902 S.W.2d 208 (1995).

Upward Deviation Upheld.

Given the testimony against defendant, and because the presumptive sentencing standards are merely advisory, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by departing from the presumptive sentence of 20 years' imprisonment and imposing 70 years' imprisonment on the continuing criminal enterprise conviction. Hunter v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 256, 522 S.W.3d 793 (2017).

Cited: Cupit v. State, 324 Ark. 438, 920 S.W.2d 853 (1996); Ladwig v. State, 328 Ark. 241, 943 S.W.2d 571 (1997); Johnson v. State, 328 Ark. 526, 944 S.W.2d 115 (1997); Burton v. State, 367 Ark. 109, 238 S.W.3d 111 (2006); Bell v. State, 371 Ark. 375, 266 S.W.3d 696 (2007).

Subchapter 9 — Expungement and Sealing of Criminal Records

16-90-901 — 16-90-906. [Repealed].

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning definition, effects of expungement, release of sealed records, the procedure for sealing of records, uniform petition and order to seal records, and when no guilty verdict rendered, were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 7. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-90-901. Acts 1995, No. 998, § 7; 1999, No. 1407, § 3; 2003, No. 1390, § 7; 2003, No. 1753, § 1; 2011, No. 570, § 80.

16-90-902. Acts 1995, No. 998, § 7.

16-90-903. Acts 1995, No. 998, § 7.

16-90-904. Acts 1995, No. 998, § 7; 2009, No. 477, § 1; 2011, No. 626, § 3; 2013, No. 282, § 10.

16-90-905. Acts 1995, No. 998, § 7; 2003, No. 839, § 1.

16-90-906. Acts 1997, No. 738, § 1.

For current law, see the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.

16-90-907. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning eligibility to file a uniform petition to seal a misdemeanor offense or violation, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 1152, § 11. The section was derived from Acts 2013, No. 1301, § 1.

For current law, see the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.

Subchapter 10 — Local Crime Stoppers Programs

16-90-1001. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Board” means the Crime Victims Reparations Board created by § 16-90-705;
  2. “Crime stoppers organization” means a private, nonprofit organization that is operated on a local or statewide level, that accepts and expends donations for rewards to persons who report to the organization information about criminal activity, and that forwards the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency; and
  3. “Local crime stoppers program” means the acceptance and spending of donations by a private, nonprofit organization for rewards to persons who report information concerning criminal activity to the organization, if the organization:
    1. Operates less than statewide; and
    2. Forwards reported information to the appropriate law enforcement agency.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 1.

16-90-1002. Duties.

  1. The Crime Victims Reparations Board shall:
    1. Advise and assist in the creation of local crime stoppers programs;
    2. Foster the detection of crime and encourage persons to report information about criminal acts;
    3. Encourage news and other media to promote local crime stoppers programs and to inform the public of the functions of the board;
    4. Assist local crime stoppers programs in forwarding information about criminal acts to the appropriate law enforcement agencies;
    5. Help law enforcement agencies detect and combat crime by increasing the flow of information to and between law enforcement agencies; and
    6. Adopt necessary rules necessary to carry out its functions under this subchapter.
  2. The office of the Attorney General shall provide the board such office space, support staff, and secretarial services as may be necessary for the administration of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 2; 2019, No. 315, § 1306.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (a)(6).

16-90-1003. Certification of local programs.

    1. The Crime Victims Reparations Board shall, at the request of a judge, determine whether a local crime stoppers program is qualified to receive repayments of rewards.
    2. The board shall approve a local crime stoppers program to receive those repayments if, considering the organization, continuity, leadership, community support, and general conduct of the local crime stoppers program, the board determines that the repayments will be spent to further the crime prevention purposes of the local crime stoppers program.
  1. Each local crime stoppers program certified by the board to receive payments is subject to an annual audit by an independent accounting firm and must submit the audit to the board for review.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 6.

16-90-1004. Confidentiality of board records.

The Crime Victims Reparations Board records relating to reports of criminal acts are confidential.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 3.

16-90-1005. Privileged information.

  1. Evidence of a communication between a person submitting a report of a criminal act to the Crime Victims Reparations Board or a local crime stoppers program and the person who accepted the report on behalf of the board or local crime stoppers program is not admissible in court or an administrative proceeding.
  2. Records of the board or a local crime stoppers program concerning a report of criminal activity may not be compelled to be produced before a court or other tribunal except on the order of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 4.

16-90-1006. Misuse of information.

  1. A person who is a member or employee of the Crime Victims Reparations Board or who accepts the report of criminal activity on behalf of a local crime stoppers program commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly divulges to a person not employed by a law enforcement agency the content of a report of a criminal act or the identity of the person who made the report without the consent of the person who made the report.
  2. An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 5.

16-90-1007. Repayment of rewards.

  1. After a defendant has been convicted of a felony offense, the judge may order the defendant to repay all or part of a reward paid by a local crime stoppers program.
  2. In determining whether the defendant must repay the reward or part of the reward, the court shall consider:
    1. The ability of the defendant to make the payment and the financial hardship on the defendant to make the required payment; and
    2. The importance of the information to the prosecution of the defendant as provided by the arresting officer or the attorney for the state with due regard for the confidentiality of the local crime stoppers program's records.
    1. If a judge orders a defendant to repay a reward or part of a reward, the court shall assess this cost against the defendant in the same manner as other costs of prosecution are assessed against a defendant.
    2. The court may order the defendant to:
      1. Pay the entire amount required when sentence is pronounced;
      2. Pay the entire amount required at a later date specified by the court; or
      3. Pay specified portions of the required amount at designated intervals.
  3. If a judge orders a defendant to repay a reward or part of a reward, a statement of the amount of the payment or payments required to be made shall be included in the judgment.
  4. After receiving a payment from a person ordered to make the payment under this section, the circuit clerk shall:
    1. Make a record of the payment;
    2. Deduct a one-time five dollar ($5.00) processing fee from the reward repayment;
    3. Forward the payment to the designated local crime stoppers program; and
    4. Make a record of the payment's being forwarded.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 8.

16-90-1008. Payments from probationers.

  1. A court may not order a probationer to make any payments as a term and condition of probation, except for fines, court costs, restitution of the victim, payment to a local crime stoppers program under subsection (b) of this section, and other terms and conditions expressly authorized by statute.
    1. In addition to any other terms and conditions imposed under this section, the court may require the probationer as a condition of his or her probation to make one (1) payment in any amount not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00) to a local crime stoppers program and as certified by the Crime Victims Reparations Board.
    2. In imposing the condition, the court shall consider the ability of the probationer to make the payment and the effectiveness and fiscal responsibility of the local crime stoppers program.
    1. A local crime stoppers program that receives a payment from a probationer may not use the payment for any purpose other than the payment of a reward to a person who reports information concerning criminal activity.
    2. No later than January 15 of each year, a local crime stoppers program that receives or expends money under this section shall file a detailed report with the Adult Probation Office of the Department of Community Correction that accounts for all money received and expended under this section during the preceding calendar year.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 7.

16-90-1009. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning court costs and the Crime Stoppers Assistance Fund, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 21, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 5. The section was derived from Acts 1995, No. 1300, § 9.

Subchapter 11 — Rights of Victims of Crime

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 18: January 1, 1998.

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-90-1101. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Crime” means an act or omission committed by a person, whether or not competent or an adult, which is punishable by incarceration if committed by a competent adult;
  2. “Member of the victim's family” means the spouse, a child by birth or adoption, a stepchild, a parent, a stepparent, a sibling, or an individual designated by the victim or by a court in which the crime is being or could be prosecuted, but does not include an individual who is accountable for the crime or a crime arising from the same conduct, criminal episode, or plan;
  3. “Offense against a victim who is a minor” means:
    1. Kidnapping pursuant to § 5-11-102(a)(4) when the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim;
    2. False imprisonment in the first degree pursuant to § 5-11-103 when the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim;
    3. Permanent detention or restraint pursuant to § 5-11-106 when the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim;
    4. Any sex offense when the victim is a minor;
    5. An attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this subdivision (3);
    6. An adjudication of guilt for an offense of the law of another state, for a federal offense, or for a military offense, which is substantially equivalent to any of the offenses enumerated in this subdivision (3); or
    7. A violation of any former law of this state that is substantially equivalent to any of the offenses enumerated in this subdivision (3);
  4. “Person” means an individual, corporation, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, governmental entity, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal entity;
  5. “Representative of the victim” means a member of the victim's family or an individual designated by the victim or by a court in which the crime is being or could be prosecuted;
  6. “Sex offense” means:
    1. Rape, § 5-14-103;
    2. Sexual indecency with a child, § 5-14-110;
    3. Sexual assault in the first degree, § 5-14-124;
    4. Sexual assault in the second degree, § 5-14-125;
    5. Sexual assault in the third degree, § 5-14-126;
    6. Sexual assault in the fourth degree, § 5-14-127;
    7. Incest, § 5-26-202;
    8. Engaging children in sexually explicit conduct for use in visual or print medium, § 5-27-303;
    9. Transportation of minors for prohibited sexual conduct, § 5-27-305;
    10. Employing or consenting to use of a child in sexual performance, § 5-27-402;
    11. Producing, directing, or promoting a sexual performance by a child, § 5-27-403;
    12. Computer child pornography, § 5-27-603;
    13. Computer exploitation of a child in the first degree, § 5-27-605(a);
    14. Promoting prostitution in the first degree, § 5-70-104;
    15. Stalking, § 5-71-229;
    16. An attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this subdivision (6);
    17. An adjudication of guilt for an offense of the law of another state, for a federal offense, or for a military offense, which is substantially equivalent to any of the offenses enumerated in this subdivision (6);
    18. A violation of any former law of this state that is substantially equivalent to any of the offenses enumerated in this subdivision (6); or
    19. Sexual extortion, § 5-14-113;
  7. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
  8. “Victim” means a victim of a sex offense or an offense against a victim who is a minor and a victim of any violent crime, but does not include a person who is accountable for the crime or a crime arising from the same conduct, criminal episode, or plan and does not include a governmental entity; and
  9. “Violent crime” means any felony which resulted in physical injury to the victim, any felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, terroristic threatening in the first degree, § 5-13-301(a), and stalking, as defined in § 5-71-229.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 1; 2003, No. 1087, § 13; 2003, No. 1390, § 8; 2017, No. 664, § 8.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment by No. 1087 inserted present (6)(P) and (Q).

The 2003 amendment by No. 1390 rewrote (6).

The 2017 amendment added (6)(S).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, Computer Crimes, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 361.

16-90-1102. Compliance with subchapter.

Failure to comply with this subchapter does not create a claim for damages against a government employee, official, or entity.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 2.

16-90-1103. Presence at court proceedings.

  1. The victim or a representative of the victim may be present whenever the defendant has a right to be present during a court proceeding concerning the crime charged, other than a grand jury proceeding, unless the court determines that exclusion of the victim or the victim's representative is necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial or the confidentiality or fairness of a juvenile proceeding.
  2. If the victim is present, the court, at the victim's request, shall permit the presence of an individual to provide support to the victim, unless the court determines that exclusion of the individual is necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 4.

16-90-1104. Nondisclosure of information about victim.

  1. A court may not compel a victim or a member of the victim's family testifying in a criminal justice proceeding to disclose a residential address or place of employment on the record in open court unless the court finds that disclosure of the information is necessary.
  2. A law enforcement agency shall not disclose to the public information directly or indirectly identifying the victim of a sex offense except to the extent that disclosure is:
    1. Of the site of the sex offense;
    2. Required by law;
    3. Necessary for law enforcement purposes; or
    4. Permitted by the court for good cause.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 3.

16-90-1105. Limitations on employer.

An employer may not discharge or discipline a victim or a representative of the victim for:

  1. Participation at the prosecuting attorney's request in preparation for a criminal justice proceeding; or
  2. Attendance at a criminal justice proceeding if the attendance is reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the victim.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 6.

16-90-1106. Prompt return of property.

  1. Any person holding property of a victim shall take reasonable care of the property.
  2. The responsible official shall promptly return the property to the victim when it is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, unless it is contraband or subject to forfeiture.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 5.

16-90-1107. Information from law enforcement agencies.

    1. After initial contact between a victim or a victim's family and a law enforcement agency responsible for investigating a crime, the law enforcement agency shall promptly give the victim and, if applicable, the victim's family, a preprinted document to be known as “Laura's Card” that clearly states the following:
      1. An explanation of the victim's rights under this subchapter; and
      2. Information concerning the availability of:
        1. Assistance to victims, including medical, housing, counseling, financial, social, legal, and emergency services;
        2. Compensation for victims under the Arkansas Crime Victims Reparations Act, § 16-90-701 et seq., and the name, street address, and telephone number of the agency to contact;
        3. Protection of the victim, including protective court orders; and
        4. Access by the victim and the defendant to public records related to the case.
    2. The law enforcement officer who provides the Laura's Card to a victim is required to provide the law enforcement officer's badge number and contact information on the Laura's Card.
  1. As soon as practicable, the law enforcement agency shall give to the victim, as relevant, the following:
    1. Information as to the suspect's identity, unless inconsistent with law enforcement purposes;
    2. Information as to whether the suspect has been taken into custody, has escaped, or has been released, and any conditions imposed on the release when such information has been made known to the law enforcement agency;
    3. The file number of the case and the name, office address, and office telephone number of a law enforcement officer assigned to investigate the case; and
    4. The prosecuting attorney's name, office address, and office telephone number.
  2. As used in this section, “law enforcement agency” includes without limitation a college or university police department.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 7; 2015, No. 873, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment redesignated and rewrote former (a) as (a)(1); added present (a)(2); and added (c).

16-90-1108. Information concerning appeal or post-conviction remedies.

If the defendant appeals or pursues a post-conviction remedy, the Attorney General, as to cases handled by the Attorney General, shall promptly inform the victim of:

  1. That fact;
  2. The date, time, and place of any hearing; and
  3. The decision.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 8.

16-90-1109. Information concerning confinement or commitment.

    1. Upon request of the victim, the Division of Correction, the Arkansas State Hospital, a local or regional hospital, local or regional mental health facility, or any other facility to which the defendant is committed by the court shall:
      1. Promptly inform the victim, through the use of the victim notification system under § 12-12-1201 et seq. or other method of personal communication, of the estimated date of the defendant's release from confinement from a court-ordered commitment under § 5-2-301 et seq., if reasonably ascertainable;
      2. Inform the victim at least thirty (30) days before release of the defendant on furlough or to a work release, halfway house, or other community program, if applicable;
      3. Inform the victim as soon as possible but preferably at least thirty (30) days before release of the defendant from a local or regional hospital or local or regional mental health facility, if applicable; and
      4. Promptly inform the victim of the occurrence of any of the following events concerning the defendant:
        1. An escape from a correctional or mental health facility or community program;
        2. A recapture;
        3. A decision of the Governor to commute the sentence or to pardon;
        4. A release from confinement and any conditions attached to the release;
        5. A discharge or conditional release or modification of a previously ordered conditional release from a court-ordered commitment under § 5-2-315; or
        6. The defendant's death.
    2. The requirement to inform a victim by a local or regional hospital or a local or regional mental health facility under this subsection may be accomplished by notifying by telephone or other electronic means the Arkansas State Hospital of the change of status of the defendant, and the Arkansas State Hospital shall then notify the victim through the victim notification system under § 12-12-1201 et seq. or other method of personal communication.
    1. At least thirty (30) days before a Parole Board hearing concerning the defendant, if requested by the victim, the board shall inform the victim of the hearing and of the victim's right to submit to the board a victim impact statement and shall promptly inform the victim of any decision of the board.
      1. It is the responsibility of the victim or his or her next of kin to notify the board of any change in address or telephone number.
      2. It is the responsibility of the victim or his or her next of kin to notify the board after the date of commitment of any change in regard to the desire to be notified of any future parole hearings.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 9; 2017, No. 429, § 3; 2019, No. 910, § 867.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added “or commitment” in the section heading; and rewrote (a).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in the introductory language of (a)(1).

16-90-1110. General requirements for information.

    1. Unless otherwise provided by this subchapter, information required to be furnished to the victim or other person authorized to receive notice may be furnished either orally or in writing.
    2. It is the responsibility of the victim or other person authorized to receive notice to furnish to the proper authorities, and keep current, the victim's mailing address and phone number.
  1. The person responsible for furnishing information shall promptly inform the victim of significant changes in the information to be furnished.
    1. The person responsible for furnishing information may rely upon the most recent name, address, and telephone number furnished by the victim.
    2. The address and telephone number of the victim or the immediate family member shall be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq.
    3. It is the responsibility of the victim or his or her next of kin to notify the person responsible for providing notice under this subchapter regarding any change in the victim's name, address, or telephone number.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 10.

16-90-1111. Presentence report.

In preparing a presentence report, the person preparing the report shall make a reasonable effort to confer with the victim. If the victim is not available or declines to confer, the person preparing the report shall record that information in the report.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 11.

Cross References. Presentence investigation, § 5-4-102.

16-90-1112. Victim impact statement.

    1. Before imposing sentence, the court shall permit the victim to present a victim impact statement concerning the effects of the crime on the victim, the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the manner in which the crime was perpetrated.
    2. The victim may present the statement in writing before the sentencing proceeding or orally under oath at the sentencing proceeding.
    3. The defendant is required to physically remain in the courtroom during the presentation of any victim impact statement, unless the court determines that the defendant is behaving in a disruptive manner or in a manner that presents a threat to the safety of any person present in the courtroom.
  1. The court shall give copies of all written victim impact statements to the prosecuting attorney and the defendant.
  2. The sentencing court shall consider the victim impact statement along with other factors, but if the victim impact statement includes new material factual information upon which the court intends to rely, the court shall adjourn the sentencing proceeding or take other appropriate action to allow the defendant adequate opportunity to respond.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 12; 2019, No. 301, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (a)(3).

Research References

ALR.

Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence in Noncapital State Proceedings. 8 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2015).

16-90-1113. Consideration and release of a victim impact statement during an inmate's parole determination.

      1. Before determining whether to release the inmate on parole, the Parole Board shall permit the victim to present a written victim impact statement at a victim impact hearing concerning the effects of the crime on the victim, the circumstances surrounding the crime, the manner in which the crime was perpetrated, and the victim's opinion regarding whether the inmate should be released on parole.
      2. At the victim's option, the victim may present the statement verbally at a victim impact hearing conducted by one (1) or more members of the board.
    1. Under this section, a victim impact hearing may be conducted through video-conference technology if utilizing video-conference technology does not inhibit the victim's statement.
    1. Except in those circumstances listed under subdivision (b)(2) of this section, the board upon request shall give the inmate a copy of all impact statements written by the victim.
      1. An impact statement written by the victim of an offense requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq., or of an offense defined as a sex offense by § 16-90-1101, is privileged and shall not be disclosed, directly or indirectly, to any person other than a member of the board, its authorized agents, a court, or other person, not including the inmate, entitled under this section to receive the statement.
      2. However, the board or a court with jurisdiction may order the disclosure of an impact statement written by the victim and otherwise privileged under this subdivision (b)(2) to the affected inmate when the board or a court finds that the interests or welfare of the inmate outweighs the privacy and safety interests of the victim or to enhance the accuracy of the board's determination.
  1. In deciding whether to release an inmate on parole, the board shall consider among other factors:
    1. Victim impact statements presented under subsection (a) of this section; and
    2. Victim impact statements presented to the sentencing court under § 16-90-1112.
  2. The board may establish rules not otherwise addressed by this section governing the preparation, use, and disclosure of a victim impact statement.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 13; 2015, No. 608, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment rewrote the section heading and the section.

Cross References. Procedures, required recommendations, § 16-93-702.

16-90-1114. Derivative rights of member of victim's family.

  1. If a victim is a minor or is incapacitated, incompetent, or deceased, a member of the victim's family may exercise the rights of the victim under this subchapter.
  2. If more than one (1) member of the victim's family attempts to exercise those rights, the court may designate which of them may exercise those rights.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 14.

16-90-1115. Duty to provide information or notice.

None of the provisions of this subchapter or §§ 16-21-106 and 16-93-702(b) shall be deemed to relieve any person of the duty of providing information or notices required by any other law.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 15.

Subchapter 12 — Encouragement of Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Users

16-90-1201. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the expungement of records for felony offenses for possession of a controlled substance or counterfeit substance, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 8. The section was derived from Acts 2001, No. 1778, § 1; 2011, No. 570, §, 81.

For current law, see the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.

Subchapter 13 — Earned Discharge and Completion of Sentence

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 951, § 2: Apr. 2, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Department of Community Correction has changed the system for discharging probationers and the department discontinued the former system at the beginning of the year; that the new system is automated and is ready for implementation; and that this act is immediately necessary because in order for a seamless implementation the department would like to begin the new system at the same time the changes in this act become effective. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-90-1301. Scope.

This subchapter shall apply to all applicable felony sentences entered on or after July 27, 2011.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 82.

16-90-1302. Applicable felonies.

  1. The following felony offenses shall be eligible for earned discharge and completion of the sentence under this subchapter:
    1. All Class D felonies, Class C felonies, and Class B felonies, except:
      1. An offense for which sex offender registration is required under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.;
      2. A felony involving violence under § 5-4-501(d)(2);
      3. Kidnapping, § 5-11-102;
      4. Manslaughter, § 5-10-104; or
      5. Driving or boating while intoxicated, § 5-65-103; and
    2. All Class A felony controlled substance offenses, § 5-64-401 et seq.
  2. A Class Y felony shall not be eligible for earned early discharge and completion of sentence under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 82; 2015, No. 299, § 25.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment inserted “or boating” in (a)(1)(E).

16-90-1303. Procedure.

  1. If a person is incarcerated for an eligible felony, whether by an immediate commitment or after his or her probation is revoked, and after he or she is moved to community supervision through parole or transfer by the Parole Board, or if he or she is placed on probation, he or she is immediately eligible to begin earning daily credits that shall count toward reducing the number of days he or she is otherwise required to serve until he or she has completed the sentence.
    1. Credits equal to thirty (30) days per month for every month that the offender complies with court-ordered conditions and a set of predetermined criteria established by the Department of Community Correction in consultation with judges, prosecuting attorneys, and defense counsel shall accrue while the person is on parole or probation.
    2. The department shall calculate the number of days the person has remaining to serve on parole or probation before that person completes his or her sentence.
    3. The number of days shall be recalculated on a monthly basis to reflect the application of any credits earned under this subchapter.
      1. The department shall have sole discretion to forfeit any credits a person earns under this subchapter unless otherwise provided for in this section.
      2. The award or forfeiture of any credits earned under this subchapter is not subject to appeal or judicial review.
    1. A person convicted of another felony offense while on parole or probation may result in the forfeiture of any credits earned under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 82.

16-90-1304. Application.

  1. When a person has accumulated enough days, through a combination of served and earned time equal to the total number of days of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court, he or she shall be eligible for consideration of discharge of his or her sentence under this subchapter.
    1. No less than forty-five (45) days before the discharge date, the Department of Community Correction shall submit notice to:
      1. The prosecuting attorney; and
      2. The Parole Board.
    2. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of the earned discharge notice, the prosecuting attorney or the board may submit to the department in writing any reasonable objection to early discharge under this subchapter warranting the forfeiture of earned-discharge credit.
    3. If an objection under subdivision (b)(2) of this section is lodged, the department shall immediately suspend the discharge of the sentence.
    4. The parolee or probationer may file a petition for review in the sentencing court.
    5. A review shall be conducted in the sentencing court within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the petition.
      1. The sentencing court shall consider the objections against the person based solely on the information contained in the petition.
      2. The sentencing court shall determine, based on a preponderance of the evidence, whether the person should not be discharged from the sentence because, if the information contained in the petition had been known to the department, the department would have ordered the forfeiture of any of the discharge credit earned to that point or if insufficient evidence exists that would warrant the forfeiture of discharge credit.
      3. If the sentencing court finds sufficient evidence warranting a forfeiture of discharge credits, the department shall make the necessary forfeiture of earned discharge credit appropriate for the type of misconduct asserted in the objection.
        1. If the sentencing court does not find sufficient evidence exists that warrants forfeiture of discharge credits, the department shall discharge the person immediately if the date upon which the completion of the sentence occurred has passed.
        2. If the date for completion of the sentence has not occurred, the person shall return to the status held at the point the objection was filed.
  2. If the prosecuting attorney or the board does not file an objection, upon the filing of a petition in the sentencing court by the parolee or probationer stating that no objections have been filed, the court may discharge the person immediately if the date upon which the completion of the sentence has passed.
  3. An appeal may not be taken by either party from the sentencing court's findings or the department's decision for early discharge.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 82; 2013, No. 1335, § 3; 2015, No. 951, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “forty-five (45)” for “seven (7)” in (b)(1).

The 2015 amendment substituted “be eligible for consideration of discharge of” for “have attained completion of” in (a); in (b)(2), substituted “of receipt of the earned discharge notice” for “before the discharge date” and “submit to the department in writing” for “file a petition in the sentencing court stating”; in (b)(3), deleted “a petition stating” following “If” and “pending a review of the evidence contained in the objection by the sentencing court” at the end; inserted (b)(4); redesignated former (b)(4) as (b)(5) and (b)(5) as (b)(6); deleted “Upon the request of the prosecuting attorney or the Parole board” at the beginning of present (6)(A); inserted (c); and redesignated former (b)(6) as (d).

16-90-1305. Notice and effect.

  1. Notice of the discharge of the person's sentence under this section shall be sent to the clerk of the sentencing court.
  2. The clerk of the sentencing court shall send notice to the Arkansas Crime Information Center.
  3. A person who earns discharge and completion of his or her sentence under this subchapter is considered as having completed his or her sentence in full and is not subject to parole or probation revocation for those sentences.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 82.

Subchapter 14 — Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2019, No. 680, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a) It is the intent of the General Assembly to find an easier pathway for a person to seal his or her record of certain criminal offenses for which sealing is already an option.

“(b) It is further the intent of the General Assembly to notify the public that this act is the first step in a multi-step process to attempt to make the sealing of certain records of a person's criminal history that involve nonviolent and nonsexual offenses an automatic operation.

“(c) A study of the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq., will be undertaken in the interim to propose any recommended or necessary legislation for the 2021 Regular Session, as well as an overall study of the funding of the criminal justice system, where applicable”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 17. Effective on and after January 1, 2014.

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-90-1401. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013”.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

16-90-1402. Intent.

  1. The General Assembly recognizes that historically the laws of this state involving the procedure a person must follow to have his or her prior criminal history information sealed have been confusing, from the standpoint of both practicality and terminology.
  2. It is the intent of the General Assembly to provide in clear terms in what instances and, if applicable, how a person may attempt to have his or her criminal history information sealed.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

Case Notes

Cited: Haile v. Johnston, 2016 Ark. 52, 482 S.W.3d 323 (2016).

16-90-1403. Scope.

  1. This subchapter governs all proceedings involving the sealing of criminal records.
  2. Inconsistencies between this subchapter and any other sections within the Arkansas Code in existence January 1, 2014, are resolved in favor of this subchapter, except that this subchapter does not apply to:
    1. The Arkansas Drug Court Act, § 16-98-301 et seq.;
    2. Extended juvenile jurisdiction records under § 9-27-508, unless the records are considered adult criminal records under § 9-27-501 et seq.; and
    3. The sealing of juvenile records.
    1. A court may hear a proceeding under this subchapter only if a uniform petition is initially filed by the petitioner.
    2. A court may only use a uniform order if the court decides to seal a criminal record under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

16-90-1404. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Completion of a person's sentence” means that the person, after being found guilty:
    1. Paid his or her fine, court costs, or other monetary obligation as defined in § 16-13-701 in full, unless the obligation has been excused by the sentencing court;
    2. Served any time in county or regional jail, a Division of Community Correction facility, or a Division of Correction facility in full; and
    3. If applicable:
      1. Has been discharged from probation or parole;
      2. Completed any suspended sentence;
      3. Paid any court-ordered restitution;
      4. Completed any court-ordered community service;
      5. Paid any driver's license suspension reinstatement fees, if a driver's license suspension reinstatement fee was assessed as a result of the person's arrest, plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a finding of guilt for the offense;
      6. Completed all other driver's license reinstatement requirements, if a driver's license suspension was imposed as a result of the person's arrest, plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a finding of guilt for the offense; and
      7. Completed any vocational or technical education or training program that was required as a condition of the person's parole or probation;
  2. “Conviction”:
    1. Includes the following, after the final act of judgment:
      1. A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, unless entered pursuant to court-ordered probation described in subdivision (2)(B)(iv) of this section, by a person formally charged with an offense;
      2. A finding of guilt, unless entered pursuant to court-ordered probation described in subdivision (2)(B)(iv) of this section, by a judge or jury after a trial;
      3. A finding of guilt, unless entered pursuant to court-ordered probation described in subdivision (2)(B)(iv) of this section, after entry of a plea of nolo contendere;
      4. A sentence of supervised probation on a felony charge;
      5. A suspended imposition of sentence, as defined in § 16-93-1202, with a fine;
      6. A sentence under § 16-93-1201 et seq.;
      7. A suspended sentence that is revocable and can subject the person to incarceration or a fine, or both; or
      8. A finding of guilt of a person whose case proceeded under § 16-93-301 et seq., and who violated the terms and conditions of § 16-93-301 et seq.; and
    2. Does not include:
      1. An order nolle prosequi;
      2. A suspended imposition of sentence, as defined in § 16-93-1202, with no fine;
      3. An acquittal for any reason;
      4. An order that the defendant enter a diversionary program that requires him or her to accomplish certain court-ordered objectives but that does not result in a finding of guilt if the program is successfully completed;
      5. A court-ordered probationary period under:
        1. The former § 5-64-413; or
        2. Section 16-93-301 et seq.;
      6. The entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without the court's making a finding of guilt or entering a judgment of guilt with the consent of the defendant or the resultant dismissal and discharge of the defendant as prescribed by § 16-93-301 et seq.;
      7. The entry of a directed verdict by a court at trial; or
      8. The dismissal of a charge either with or without prejudice;
  3. “Court” means a sentencing district court or sentencing circuit court, unless otherwise specifically identified;
    1. “Seal” means to expunge, remove, sequester, and treat as confidential the record or records in question according to the procedures established by this subchapter.
    2. “Seal” does not include the physical destruction of a record of a conviction unless this subchapter requires the physical destruction of the record of a conviction;
  4. “Sentence” means the outcome formally entered by a court upon a person in criminal proceedings;
  5. “Sex offense” means:
    1. The same as defined in § 12-12-903; and
    2. A felony offense repealed by Acts 2001, No. 1738;
  6. “Uniform order” means a uniform order to seal a record described in § 16-90-1414; and
  7. “Uniform petition” means a uniform petition to seal a record described in § 16-90-1414.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9; 2015, No. 1198, § 7; 2019, No. 910, § 868.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1738, referred to in subdivision (6)(B) of this section, repealed the following felony offenses: carnal abuse in the first degree, former § 5-14-104, carnal abuse in the second degree, former § 5-14-105, carnal abuse in the third degree, former § 5-14-106, sexual abuse in the first degree, former § 5-14-108, violation of a minor in the first degree, former § 5-14-120, and violation of a minor in the second degree, former § 5-14-121.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “Paid” for “Has paid” in (1)(A); and added (1)(C)(vii).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” and “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (1)(B).

16-90-1405. Eligibility to file a uniform petition to seal a misdemeanor offense or violation.

  1. A person is eligible to file a uniform petition under this subchapter to seal his or her record of a misdemeanor or violation immediately after:
    1. The completion of his or her sentence for the misdemeanor or violation, including full payment of restitution;
    2. Full payment of court costs;
    3. Full payment of driver's license suspension reinstatement fees, if a driver's license suspension reinstatement fee was assessed as a result of the person's arrest or conviction for the misdemeanor or violation; and
    4. The completion of all other driver's license reinstatement requirements, if a driver's license suspension was imposed as a result of the person's arrest or conviction for the misdemeanor or violation.
  2. There is not a limit to the number of times a person may file a uniform petition to seal his or her record of a misdemeanor or violation, except that the person may not file:
    1. A new uniform petition to seal one (1) of the following criminal offenses until after a period of five (5) years has elapsed since the completion of the person's sentence for the conviction:
      1. Negligent homicide, § 5-10-105, if it was a Class A misdemeanor;
      2. Battery in the third degree, § 5-13-203;
      3. Indecent exposure, § 5-14-112;
      4. Public sexual indecency, § 5-14-111;
      5. Sexual assault in the fourth degree, § 5-14-127;
      6. Domestic battering in the third degree, § 5-26-305; or
      7. A misdemeanor violation of § 5-65-103;
    2. A new uniform petition to seal a criminal offense listed in subdivisions (b)(1)(A)-(G) of this section before one (1) year from the date of the order denying the previous uniform petition;
    3. A new uniform petition to seal a misdemeanor or violation before ninety (90) days from the date of an order denying a uniform petition to seal the misdemeanor or violation;
    4. A new uniform petition to seal a misdemeanor or violation under this section if an appeal of a previous denial of a uniform petition to seal a misdemeanor or violation for the same misdemeanor or violation is still pending; or
    5. A new uniform petition to seal a misdemeanor or violation under this section if:
      1. The person was a holder of a commercial driver license or commercial learner's permit at the time the misdemeanor or violation was committed; and
      2. The misdemeanor or violation was a traffic offense, other than a parking violation, vehicle weight violation, or vehicle defect violation, committed in any type of motor vehicle.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person is eligible to file a uniform petition to seal a misdemeanor or violation under this section even if his or her misdemeanor or violation occurred before January 1, 2014.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9; 2019, No. 680, § 1[2].

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2019, No. 680 contained two sections designated as Section 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “immediately” for “sixty (60) days” in the introductory language of (a); and substituted “a misdemeanor” for “any other misdemeanor” in (b)(3).

Case Notes

Retroactivity.

Because the legislature did not intend for the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq., to apply retroactively to appellant's felony conviction, the circuit court erred in concluding that he was required to wait five additional years after the completion of his probation before petitioning the court to expunge his record Bolin v. State, 2015 Ark. 149, 459 S.W.3d 788 (2015).

Supreme Court of Arkansas concludes that the legislature expressly designated that the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq., should be retroactive with regard to misdemeanors but chose to exclude that retroactivity with regard to felonies. Bolin v. State, 2015 Ark. 149, 459 S.W.3d 788 (2015).

16-90-1406. Felony convictions eligible for sealing.

  1. Unless prohibited under § 16-90-1408, a person may petition a court to seal a record of a conviction immediately after the completion of the person's sentence for:
    1. A nonviolent Class C felony or nonviolent Class D felony;
    2. An unclassified felony;
    3. An offense under § 5-64-401 et seq. that is a Class A felony or Class B felony;
    4. Solicitation to commit, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit the substantive offenses listed in subdivisions (a)(1)-(3) of this section; or
    5. A felony not involving violence committed while the person was less than eighteen (18) years of age.
  2. Unless prohibited under § 16-90-1408, a person may petition a court with jurisdiction to seal a record of a conviction under this section after five (5) years have elapsed since the completion of the person's sentence for a violent Class C felony or a violent Class D felony.
      1. The petitioner can have no more than one (1) previous felony conviction.
      2. For the sole purpose of calculating the number of previous felony convictions under this section, all felony offenses that were committed as part of the same criminal episode and for which the person was convicted are a single conviction.
    1. The fact that a prior felony conviction has been previously sealed shall not prevent its counting as a prior conviction for the purposes of this subsection.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9; 2019, No. 680, § 2[3].

A.C.R.C. Notes. Present subsection (b) of this section was added by Acts 2019, No. 680, § 2[3] without underlining.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2019, No. 680 contained two sections designated as Section 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “immediately after” for “after five (5) years has elapsed since” in the introductory language of (a); inserted “nonviolent” twice in (a)(1); inserted (b); and redesignated former (b) as (c).

16-90-1407. Special procedures for sealing a controlled substance possession conviction.

A person may petition the court to seal a record of a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, § 5-64-419, or counterfeit substance, § 5-64-441, upon the completion of the person's sentence if, prior to sentencing:

  1. An intake officer appointed by the court, where applicable, determines that the person has a drug addiction and recommends the person as a candidate for residential drug treatment;
  2. The court places the person on probation and includes as part of the terms and conditions of the probation that:
    1. The person successfully complete a drug treatment program approved by the court; and
    2. The person remain drug-free until successful completion of probation; and
  3. The person successfully completes the terms and conditions of the probation.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

16-90-1408. Felony convictions ineligible for sealing.

  1. A record of a conviction of any of the following offenses is not eligible to be sealed under this subchapter:
    1. A Class Y felony, Class A felony, or Class B felony, except as provided in § 16-90-1406;
    2. Manslaughter, § 5-10-104;
    3. An unclassified felony if the maximum sentence of imprisonment for the unclassified felony is more than ten (10) years;
    4. A felony sex offense;
    5. A felony involving violence under § 5-4-501(d)(2); and
    6. A felony for which a person served any portion of his or her sentence as an inmate in the Division of Correction.
    1. A felony traffic offense committed in any type of motor vehicle if the person was a holder of a commercial learner's permit or commercial driver license at the time the felony offense was committed is not eligible for sealing under this subchapter.
    2. As used in this subsection, “traffic offense” does not include a parking violation, vehicle weight violation, or vehicle defect violation.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9; 2019, No. 910, § 869.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a)(6).

16-90-1409. Sealing records of arrests.

  1. A person may petition a district court or circuit court to seal a record of a prior arrest if charges have not been filed by the prosecuting attorney within one (1) year of the date of the arrest.
  2. The petition shall be filed in the county in which the arrest was made.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

16-90-1410. Sealing records of nolle prosequi, dismissed cases, or cases when the disposition is an acquittal.

  1. A person may petition to seal the records of a case in which there was for any reason:
    1. Entry of an order nolle prosequi upon motion of the prosecuting attorney after one (1) year has passed since the date of the entry of the order nolle prosequi;
    2. Entry of an order of dismissal;
    3. An acquittal, unless that acquittal was for reason of mental disease or defect under § 5-2-301 et seq.; or
    4. A decision by the prosecuting attorney not to file charges.
  2. The petition shall be filed in the court in which the order nolle prosequi or order of dismissal was entered.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

16-90-1411. Sealing of records for a pardoned person — Pardons for youthful felony offenders.

    1. The Governor shall notify the court upon issuing a pardon, and the court shall issue an order sealing the record of a conviction of the person pardoned.
    2. The record of a conviction relating to the conviction of a person pardoned before July 15, 1991, shall be sealed upon the filing of a copy of the pardon with the court by the person.
    3. This section does not apply to a pardon issued for:
      1. Any offense in which the victim is a person under eighteen (18) years of age;
      2. A sex offense; or
      3. An offense resulting in death or serious physical injury.
  1. A person shall have his or her record of a conviction sealed by the court if the person:
    1. Committed a felony in this state while under sixteen (16) years of age;
    2. Was convicted and given a suspended sentence;
    3. Received a pardon for the conviction; and
    4. Has not been convicted of another criminal offense.
  2. This section does not prevent a person from requesting that his or her criminal record be sealed under § 16-90-1405 or § 16-90-1406.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

16-90-1412. Sealing certain convictions for victims of human trafficking — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “victim of human trafficking” means a person who has been subjected to trafficking of persons, § 5-18-103, or any former law of this state, law of another state, or federal law that is substantially similar.
    1. A person convicted of prostitution, § 5-70-102, may file a uniform petition to seal the conviction under this section if it was obtained as a result of the person’s having been a victim of human trafficking.
    2. A uniform petition under this section may be filed at any time and may be filed for a conviction imposed at any time.
  2. The court shall grant the uniform petition under this section if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
    1. The petitioner was convicted of prostitution, § 5-70-102; and
    2. The conviction was obtained as a result of the petitioner's having been a victim of human trafficking.
  3. If the uniform petition under this section is granted, the court shall:
    1. Issue a uniform order to seal the conviction; and
    2. With respect to the conviction for prostitution, § 5-70-102, redact the petitioner's name from all records and files related to the petitioner's:
      1. Arrest;
      2. Citation;
      3. Criminal investigation;
      4. Criminal charge;
      5. Adjudication of guilt;
      6. Criminal proceedings; and
      7. Probation for the offense.
    1. Official documentation by a federal, state, or local government agency verifying that at the time of the conviction for prostitution, § 5-70-102, the petitioner was a victim of human trafficking creates a presumption under this section that the person's prostitution conviction was obtained as a result of having been a victim of human trafficking.
    2. Documentation under this subsection is not required to grant a petition under this section.
    3. Documentation under this subsection may include without limitation:
      1. Certified records of federal or state court proceedings that demonstrate that the defendant was a victim of a trafficker charged with a trafficking offense under state law or the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq., as it existed on January 1, 2013; or
      2. Certified records of “approval notices” or “law enforcement certifications” generated from federal immigration proceedings available to victims of human trafficking.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1152, § 12.

16-90-1413. Procedure for sealing of records.

    1. A person who is eligible to have a record sealed under this subchapter may file a uniform petition in the circuit court or district court in the county where the offense was committed and in which the person was convicted for the offense he or she is now petitioning to have sealed.
    2. Except as provided in § 16-90-1405, if a person has previously petitioned the court for the sealing of a record and that petition was subsequently denied, the person may not file a uniform petition under this subchapter regarding that record until one (1) year has passed since the denial of the previous petition.
      1. A copy of the uniform petition shall be served upon the prosecuting attorney for the county in which the uniform petition is filed and the arresting agency, if the arresting agency is a named party, within three (3) days of the filing of the uniform petition.
      2. It is not necessary to make the arresting agency a party to the action.
      1. The prosecuting attorney may file a notice of opposition with the court for a petition seeking to seal a record of an eligible misdemeanor conviction or violation setting forth reasons for the opposition to the sealing within thirty (30) days after receipt of the uniform petition or after the uniform petition is filed, whichever is the later date.
        1. If notice of opposition is not filed, the court may grant the uniform petition.
        2. If notice of opposition is filed, the court shall set the matter for a hearing if the record for which the uniform petition was filed is eligible for sealing under this subchapter unless the prosecuting attorney consents to allow the court to decide the case solely on the pleadings.
      1. The prosecuting attorney may file a notice of opposition with the court for a petition seeking to seal a record of an eligible felony conviction setting forth reasons for the opposition to the sealing.
      2. A court may not sign a uniform order sealing an eligible felony conviction without a hearing.
    1. The court may not grant the uniform petition until thirty (30) days have passed since the uniform petition was served on the prosecuting attorney, although the court may deny the uniform petition at any time.
    2. If the court determines that the record shall be sealed under the standards of § 16-90-1415, the uniform order described in § 16-90-1414 shall be entered and filed with the circuit court clerk or district court clerk, as applicable.
    1. A court clerk with whom a uniform order is filed shall certify copies of the uniform order to the prosecuting attorney who filed the underlying charges, the arresting agency, the Arkansas Crime Information Center, and, if applicable, any district court where the person appeared before the transfer or appeal of the case to circuit court.
    2. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall only accept certified copies of the uniform orders filed in circuit court.
    1. The circuit court clerk, the district court clerk, and, if applicable, the district court clerk where the person appeared before the transfer or appeal of the case to circuit court shall:
      1. Remove all petitions, orders, docket sheets, receipts, and documents relating to the record;
      2. Place the records described in subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section in a file; and
      3. Sequester the records described in subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section in a separate and confidential holding area within the clerk's office.
      1. A docket sheet shall be prepared to replace the sealed docket sheet.
      2. The replacement docket sheet shall contain the docket number, a statement that the record has been sealed, and the date that the order to seal the record was issued.
    2. All indices to the file of the person with a sealed record shall be maintained in a manner to prevent general access to the identification of the person.
  1. The prosecuting attorney shall:
    1. Remove the entire case file and documents or other items related to the record;
    2. Place the records described in subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section in a file; and
    3. Sequester the records described in subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section in a confidential holding area within his or her office.
  2. The arresting agency shall:
    1. Remove its entire record file and documents or other items relating to the record, including any evidence still in the arresting agency's possession;
    2. Place the records described in subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section in a file; and
    3. Sequester the records described in subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section in a confidential holding area within the arresting agency.
  3. Upon notification of a uniform order, all circuit clerks, district clerks, arresting agencies, and other criminal justice agencies maintaining records in a computer-generated database shall either segregate the entire record, including receipts, into a separate file or ensure by other electronic means that the sealed record shall not be available for general access unless otherwise authorized by law.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9; 2015, No. 1152, §§ 13, 14; 2019, No. 57, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment, in (c)(2), inserted “court” following “with the circuit” and added “or district court clerk, as applicable”; substituted “A court clerk with whom a uniform order is filed” for “The circuit court clerk” in (d)(1); and inserted “the district court clerk” in (e)(1).

The 2019 amendment substituted “thirty (30) days” for “ninety (90) days” in (c)(1).

16-90-1414. Uniform petition and uniform order to seal records.

    1. The Arkansas Crime Information Center shall adopt and provide the following to be used by a petitioner and any circuit court or district court in this state:
      1. A uniform petition to seal records; and
      2. A uniform order to seal records.
    2. An order to seal records covered by this subchapter shall not be effective unless the uniform order is entered.
      1. The uniform petition shall include a statement verified under oath indicating whether the petitioner has felony charges pending in any state or federal court and the status of the pending felony charges as well as whether the person is required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.
      2. The uniform petition also shall include a statement that the information contained in the uniform petition is true and correct to the best of the petitioner's knowledge.
    3. The uniform order shall contain, at a minimum, the following data:
      1. The person's full name, race, gender, and date of birth;
      2. The person's full name at the time of arrest and adjudication of guilt, if applicable, if different from the person's current name;
      3. The offense for which the person was adjudicated guilty and the date of the disposition, if applicable;
      4. The identity of the court;
      5. The provision under this subchapter that provides for sealing of the record, if applicable;
      6. The specific records to be sealed;
      7. The arrest tracking number;
      8. The system identification (SID) number; and
      9. The Federal Bureau of Investigation number, if known.
    1. If a record for the charges of the offense does not exist at the center, a record shall be established before the uniform order becomes effective.
    2. When a record does exist in the center, the petitioner and the original arresting agency shall submit fingerprint cards on the petitioner under § 12-12-1006 and procedures established by the center.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

Case Notes

In General.

The legislature did not intend to mandate that all petitioners file a uniform petition for expungement before the circuit court may grant the requested relief; expungement may be granted based upon a petition that substantially complies with the requirements of the statute, so long as the order granting expungement contains the particular information listed in the statute. Fulmer v. State, 337 Ark. 177, 987 S.W.2d 700 (1999) (decision under former § 16-90-905).

16-90-1415. Burden of proof — Standard of review.

  1. For a uniform petition filed under § 16-90-1405, unless the circuit court or district court is presented with and finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that a misdemeanor or violation conviction should not be sealed under this subchapter, the circuit court or district court shall seal the misdemeanor or violation conviction for a person after the person files a uniform petition as described in this section.
    1. A uniform petition filed under § 16-90-1406 may be granted if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that doing so would further the interests of justice, considering the following factors:
      1. Whether the person appears likely to reoffend;
      2. The person's other criminal history;
      3. The existence of any pending charges or criminal investigations involving the person;
      4. Input from the victim of the offense for which the person was convicted, if applicable; and
      5. Any other information provided by the state that would cause a reasonable person to consider the person a further threat to society.
    2. The factors listed in subdivision (b)(1) of this section are not exclusive.
  2. A uniform petition filed under § 16-90-1407 may be granted if the court finds that doing so is in the best interest of the petitioner and the state.
  3. A uniform petition filed under § 16-90-1409 or § 16-90-1410 shall be granted unless the state shows by a preponderance of the evidence that doing so would:
    1. Place the public at risk; or
    2. Not further the interests of justice.
  4. A uniform petition filed under § 16-90-1411 shall be granted if the court finds that the requirements of § 16-90-1411 are met.
    1. An appeal of the grant or denial of the uniform petition to seal may be taken by either party.
    2. An appeal from the district court shall be taken to the circuit court, which shall review the case de novo.
    3. An appeal from the circuit court shall be taken as provided by Supreme Court rule, and the appellate court shall review the case using an abuse of discretion standard.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

16-90-1416. Release of sealed records.

  1. The custodian of a sealed record shall not disclose the existence of the sealed record or release the sealed record except when requested by:
    1. The person whose record was sealed or the person's attorney when authorized in writing by the person;
    2. A criminal justice agency, as defined in § 12-12-1001, and the request is accompanied by a statement that the request is being made in conjunction with:
      1. An application for employment with the criminal justice agency by the person whose record has been sealed; or
      2. A criminal background check under the Polygraph Examiners Licensing Act, § 17-39-101 et seq., or the Private Security Agency, Private Investigator, and School Security Licensing and Credentialing Act, § 17-40-101 et seq.;
    3. A court, upon a showing of:
      1. A subsequent adjudication of guilt of the person whose record has been sealed; or
      2. Another good reason shown to be in the interests of justice;
    4. A prosecuting attorney, and the request is accompanied by a statement that the request is being made for a criminal justice purpose;
    5. A state agency or board engaged in the licensing of healthcare professionals;
    6. The Arkansas Crime Information Center; or
    7. The Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training.
    1. As used in this section, “custodian” does not mean the Arkansas Crime Information Center.
    2. Access to data maintained by the center shall be governed by § 12-12-1001 et seq.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9; 2015, No. 393, § 2; 2017, No. 139, § 1; 2019, No. 151, § 11.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment inserted designation (a)(2)(A); and added (a)(2)(B).

The 2017 amendment inserted (a)(5) and redesignated former (a)(5) as (a)(6).

The 2019 amendment added (a)(7).

16-90-1417. Effect of sealing.

    1. A person whose record has been sealed under this subchapter shall have all privileges and rights restored, and the record that has been sealed shall not affect any of his or her civil rights or liberties unless otherwise specifically provided by law.
    2. A person who wants to reacquire the right to vote removed from him or her as the result of a felony conviction must follow the procedures in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 51, § 11.
    3. The effect of this subchapter does not reconfer the right to carry a firearm if that right was removed as the result of a felony conviction.
    1. Upon the entry of the uniform order, the person's underlying conduct shall be deemed as a matter of law never to have occurred, and the person may state that the underlying conduct did not occur and that a record of the person that was sealed does not exist.
    2. This subchapter does not prevent the use of the record of a prior conviction otherwise sealed under this subchapter for the following purposes:
      1. A criminal proceeding for any purpose not otherwise prohibited by law;
      2. Determination of offender status under the former § 5-64-413;
      3. Habitual offender status, § 5-4-501 et seq.;
      4. Impeachment upon cross-examination as dictated by the Arkansas Rules of Evidence;
      5. Healthcare professional licensure by a state agency or board;
      6. Any disclosure mandated by Rule 17, 18, or 19 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
      7. Determination of certification, eligibility for certification, or of the ability to act as a law enforcement officer, by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9; 2017, No. 139, § 2; 2019, No. 151, § 12.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment inserted “the record of” in the introductory language of (b)(2); in (b)(2)(A), substituted “A criminal” for “Any criminal”; inserted present (b)(2)(E); and redesignated former (b)(2)(E) as (b)(2)(F).

The 2019 amendment added (b)(2)(G).

Case Notes

In General.

Where defendant failed to prove that his 1994 conviction was expunged in accordance with former section, the trial court did not err in admitting the conviction into evidence in his current trial for sexual assault. Davidson v. State, 363 Ark. 86, 210 S.W.3d 887 (2005) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court did not err in affirming the decision of the Arkansas State Board of Education to deny an applicant's waiver request for a certified teacher's license pursuant to § 6-17-410(c) because given the plain meaning of § 6-17-410(d)(1)(A)(v), there was no abuse of discretion in the Board's decision that the phrase “expunged or pardoned conviction” related to both any sexual or physical abuse offense committed against a child and any offense in § 6-17-410(c); when construing § 6-17-410(c) just as it reads and giving meaning and effect to every word within the statute, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for all who have pled guilty or nolo contendere to a disqualifying offense to be prohibited from receiving a teaching license, regardless of whether the individual's record has since been expunged. Landers v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 2010 Ark. App. 312, 374 S.W.3d 795 (2010) (decision under prior law).

Attorney Discipline.

Circuit court's order to dismiss the attorney's conviction and to seal the record of the criminal proceeding was not binding on the Arkansas Supreme Court for purposes of the disciplinary proceeding against the attorney because the court could not be bound by an expungement order made pursuant to a legislative enactment when engaged in its constitutional mandate to regulate and discipline attorneys at law. Ligon v. Davis, 2012 Ark. 440, 424 S.W.3d 863 (2012) (decision under prior law).

Eligibility for Elective Office.

Based on the plain language of this section, as a matter of law, appellee's misdemeanor conviction never occurred and all of his privileges and rights were restored. Thus, appellee was eligible to run for and hold office. Haile v. Johnston, 2016 Ark. 52, 482 S.W.3d 323 (2016).

16-90-1418. Uniform petition and uniform order — Creation.

The Arkansas Crime Information Center shall develop and draft the form to be used for the uniform petition and uniform order under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9.

16-90-1419. Filing fee.

The circuit clerk or district court clerk shall not collect a fee for filing the uniform petition under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 9; 2019, No. 680, § 3[4].

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2019, No. 680 contained two sections designated as Section 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote the section.

Chapter 91 Appeal and Post-Conviction

Cross References. No reversal of acquittal barring prosecution, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 9.

Research References

ALR.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding appellate and postconviction remedies. 15 A.L.R.4th 582.

Consequences of prosecution's failure to file timely brief in appeal by accused. 27 A.L.R.4th 213.

Right of defendant to bail pending appeal from conviction. 28 A.L.R.4th 227.

Duration of surety's liability on posttrial bail bond. 32 A.L.R.4th 575.

Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on appeal. 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.

Am. Jur. 4 Am. Jur. 2d, App. & Err., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' 1971 Criminal Discovery Act, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

C.J.S. 24 C.J.S., Crim. Proc., § 2097 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — Appeal

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this subchapter may be superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure — Criminal.

Acts 1997, No. 925, enacted subchapter 2 and designated the existing provisions of this chapter as subchapter 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 1899, No. 158, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1927, No. 6, § 2: effective 90 days after passage and approval. Approved Jan. 31, 1927.

Acts 1971, No. 333, § 15: Mar. 22, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, it is deemed that criminal appeals should, so far as is feasible, be consistent with the statutes governing civil appeals and,

“Whereas, injustice sometimes results from the use and application of the present statutes applicable to the appeal of criminal cases and,

“Whereas, some confusion exists as to the manner in which criminal appeals are perfected, this Act is necessary for the protection of a public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 6: Mar. 4, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas meeting in the First Extraordinary Session of 1994 that dangerous criminals who have been convicted of first-degree murder and other Class Y felonies are eligible under current laws to be released on appeal bonds; that Act 31 of 1987 was intended to limit the number of dangerous criminals being released on appeal bonds, but, in reality, has failed to stop the practice of releasing these criminals; and that the law must, in more specific terms, be changed to further limit those criminals subject to release on bail pending their appeals. Therefore, in order to correct a situation which endangers the safety of the citizens of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-91-101. Right generally.

  1. Any person convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony by virtue of a trial in any circuit court of this state has the right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
  2. An appeal may be taken jointly by codefendants or by just one (1) defendant although he or she may have been jointly charged and convicted with another defendant. One (1) appeal may be taken where a defendant has been found guilty of one (1) or more charges contained in any one (1) felony information or indictment.

History. Acts 1971, No. 333, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2701; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 276.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “or she” in (b); and deleted former (c), which was declared to have been implied repealed by Acts 1993, No. 535, in Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994). Former subsection (c) read: “There shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”

Cross References. Right of appeal, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 1.

Case Notes

In General.

Acts 1993, No. 535, which is codified in part as § 16-97-101 et seq., provided in part that all laws in conflict with the act were repealed, thus repealing subsection (c) of this section. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

Purpose.

Legislature intended that appeal in criminal cases, so far as feasible, should be consistent with civil appeals. State v. Adkisson, 251 Ark. 119, 471 S.W.2d 332 (1971).

Appeal of Right.

The sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel extends not only to trial but also to appeal where the state allows a first appeal as a matter of right. Howard v. State, 291 Ark. 633, 727 S.W.2d 830 (1987).

Appealable Judgments.

Judgment refusing to discharge the accused on motion to dismiss on the ground of former jeopardy was appealable. Jones v. State, 230 Ark. 18, 320 S.W.2d 645 (1959) (decision under prior law).

In the absence of a final order of the trial court settling some issue against defendant, or finding him guilty of some offense, an appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court will not lie. Weston v. State, 265 Ark. 58, 576 S.W.2d 705, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965, 100 S. Ct. 453, 62 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1979).

Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3 does not provide for an appeal following a plea of nolo contendere where the appeal challenges the admissibility of evidence as distinguished from evidence illegally obtained. Pickett v. State, 301 Ark. 345, 783 S.W.2d 854 (1990).

Both former subsection (c) of this section and Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 1 provide that there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty; however, one exception is found in Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b), which provides a procedure for a defendant to seek review of an adverse determination of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

Because the plain language of Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 1(a) and subsection (a) of this section required a conviction before a defendant had a right of appeal, and because a disposition pursuant to Act 346 of 1975, better known as the Arkansas First Offender Act, §§ 16-93-30116-93-305, was not a conviction, defendant had no right to appeal. Lynn v. State, 2012 Ark. 6 (2012).

Appeal on Behalf of State.

Where an interlocutory order was entered under an indictment for felony, by which the jurisdiction of the court was rendered doubtful, it was proper that an appeal should be taken to the Arkansas Supreme Court on behalf of the state. State v. Flynn, 31 Ark. 35 (1876); State v. Robinson, 55 Ark. 439, 18 S.W. 541 (1892) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Criminal Contempt.

Because criminal contempt was a misdemeanor, defendant had the right to appeal under this section and Rule 1(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure—Criminal, and the mootness doctrine did not bar a direct appeal, despite the fact that he had already served his sentence. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

A defendant's right to a direct appeal from his criminal conviction continues after his service of confinement. Thus, Swindle v. State, 373 Ark. 519, 285 S.W.3d 200 (2008), was clearly wrong to the extent that it conflicted with the Supreme Court's present holding that the mootness doctrine did not bar defendant's direct appeal of his criminal contempt conviction. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 383, 503 S.W.3d 62 (2016).

Guilty Pleas.

Some exceptions to the rule in former subsection (c), that there is no right to appeal from a guilty plea, include the following: (1) Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) permits an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty following the denial of a motion to suppress; (2) an appeal on the issue of the application of jail-time credit appears to be permissible; (3) the denial of a post-judgment motion, filed after a guilty plea to correct an illegal sentence, is appealable; and (4) a defendant may also appeal after a guilty plea when a jury sets punishment under the bifurcated procedure established by § 16-97-101(6). Hampton v. State, 48 Ark. App. 93, 890 S.W.2d 279 (1995).

When the appeal by a defendant who pled guilty is from a decision which was neither a part of the guilty plea acceptance nor the sentencing procedure which was an integral part of the guilty plea acceptance, the appeal is allowed. Hodge v. State, 320 Ark. 31, 894 S.W.2d 927 (1995).

State Remedy.

In the trial of a civil rights complaint by a state prisoner against a state prison warden, federal district court correctly refused to hear the prisoner's state claim since that claim would have to be made by direct appeal of the conviction in the Arkansas courts. Manning v. Lockhart, 623 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1980).

Cited: Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977); Butler v. State, 264 Ark. 243, 570 S.W.2d 272 (1978); Bass v. State, 9 Ark. App. 211, 657 S.W.2d 218 (1983); Henagan v. State, 302 Ark. 599, 791 S.W.2d 371 (1990); State v. Sherman, 303 Ark. 284, 796 S.W.2d 339 (1990).

16-91-102. Applicability of statutes governing civil appeals.

Matters pertaining to several appeals, the docketing, designation, abbreviation, stipulation, preparation, and correction or modification of the record on appeal, as well as appeals where no stenographic record was made, shall be governed by those statutes which apply to civil cases on appeal to the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1971, No. 333, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2705.

Cross References. Criminal appeals generally, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 4.

16-91-103. Precedence.

Appeals in criminal cases shall take precedence over all other business of the Supreme Court and shall be placed first upon the docket for trial.

History. Crim. Code, § 349; C. & M. Dig., § 3431; Pope's Dig., § 4274; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2702.

Cross References. Precedence, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Speedy Trial: A Comparative Analysis Between the American Bar Association's Standards of Criminal Justice and Arkansas Law, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 234.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Granting of an appeal in criminal cases in accordance with the statutory procedure was a prerequisite to the court's consideration of the case. Byrd v. State, 250 Ark. 223, 464 S.W.2d 565 (1971).

Where defendant's appeal had not been docketed in the Arkansas Supreme Court, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear his motion for new trial even though notice of appeal had been filed. State v. Adkisson, 251 Ark. 119, 471 S.W.2d 332 (1971).

Running of Time.

The sixty-day period during which an appeal could be taken began at the time of judgment, not at the time motion for new trial was denied. Higginbotham v. State, 251 Ark. 832, 475 S.W.2d 522 (1972).

Cited: Holman v. State, 257 Ark. 239, 515 S.W.2d 638 (1974).

16-91-104. Death of defendant.

No appeals shall be taken after the defendant's death, and, upon his or her death, an appeal taken during his or her life shall abate and shall not be revived.

History. Crim. Code, § 333; C. & M. Dig., § 3392; Pope's Dig., § 4235; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2707.

Cross References. Death of defendant, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 1.

16-91-105. Time and method of taking appeal — Motion for new trial, etc.

    1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of the sentence and entry of judgment by the trial judge, the person desiring to appeal the judgment shall file with the trial court a notice of appeal identifying the parties taking the appeal and the judgment appealed.
    2. The notice of appeal shall include a certificate by the appealing party or his or her attorney that a transcript of the trial record has been ordered from the court reporter if, for the purposes of the appeal, a transcript is determined essential to resolve the issues on appeal.
    3. Notification of the filing of the notice of appeal shall be given to all other parties or their representatives involved in the cause by mailing a copy of the notice of appeal to the parties or their representatives, but failure to give the notification shall not affect the validity of the appeal.
    4. Failure of the appellant to take any further steps to secure the review of the appealed conviction shall not affect the validity of the appeal but shall be grounds only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.
    5. If an appeal has not been docketed in the Supreme Court, the parties, with the approval of the trial court, may dismiss the appeal by stipulation filed in that court, or that court may dismiss the appeal upon a motion and notice by the appellant.
    1. Prior to the time fixed to file a notice of appeal, a person convicted of either a felony or misdemeanor may file a motion for new trial, a motion in arrest of judgment, or any other application for relief.
    2. The pleadings should include a statement that the movant believes the action is meritorious and is not offered for the purpose of delay.
    3. Service of the motion shall be given to the representative of the prosecuting party.
    4. If requested or found to be necessary, the trial court shall promptly designate a date certain to take evidence and to hear and dispose of all matters that are presented.
    5. Upon the filing of any motion or other application for relief in the trial court, the time to file a notice of appeal shall not expire until thirty (30) days after the disposition of all motions or applications.

History. Acts 1971, No. 333, §§ 3, 9; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2703, 43-2704.

Cross References. Post-trial motions, Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3.

Time and method of appeal, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 2.

Case Notes

Applicability.

In a motion for new trial alleging jury misconduct and lack of a fair trial, Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.22 (now see Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3) and this section have set the time frame, 30 days from date of judgment, and have effectively superseded § 16-89-130. Cigainero v. State, 310 Ark. 504, 838 S.W.2d 361 (1992).

Amendment of Record.

Record of circuit court could be amended so as to make it speak the truth after appeal or writ of error. Freel v. State, 21 Ark. 212 (1860); Binns v. State, 35 Ark. 118 (1879); Sweeney v. State, 35 Ark. 585 (1880) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Motion for New Trial, Etc.

Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant's motion for continuance. Mitchell v. State, 258 Ark. 562, 528 S.W.2d 368 (1975).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant a new trial where no written motion for new trial on the basis alleged was served upon the prosecuting attorney. Newberry v. State, 262 Ark. 334, 557 S.W.2d 864 (1977).

Where the defendant claimed that he had never received the notice of trial mailed to him, he should have made a motion for relief to the trial court pursuant to this section, and failure to pursue his available remedy in that court meant that he was not entitled to relief on appeal. Bridger v. State, 264 Ark. 789, 575 S.W.2d 154, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916, 100 S. Ct. 231, 62 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1979).

Motion for new trial held untimely. Chisum v. State, 274 Ark. 332, 625 S.W.2d 448 (1981); Smith v. State, 301 Ark. 374, 784 S.W.2d 595 (1990); Cigainero v. State, 310 Ark. 504, 838 S.W.2d 361 (1992).

Timeliness.

Good reason shown for tardiness in filing the notice of appeal. Goodwin v. State, 261 Ark. 926, 552 S.W.2d 233 (1977).

The jurisdictional consequences of failing to timely file a motion for a new trial should mirror those which result from failing to timely file a notice of appeal since the limitations period of subdivision (b)(1) of this section and former Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.22 (now see Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3) is specifically defined by reference to that set forth in former Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.9(a) (now see Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 2); accordingly, compliance with the thirty-day filing period contemplated by subdivision (b)(1) and former Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.22 is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the state court's consideration of a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Perry v. Norris, 879 F. Supp. 1503 (E.D. Ark. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 1997).

Cited: Finch v. State, 262 Ark. 313, 556 S.W.2d 434 (1977); Selph v. State, 264 Ark. 197, 570 S.W.2d 256 (1978); Kozal v. State, 264 Ark. 587, 573 S.W.2d 323 (1978).

16-91-106. Record — Preliminary hearing.

  1. Prior to the time the complete record on appeal is settled and certified as provided by law, any appealing party may docket the appeal in order to make in the Supreme Court a motion for dismissal, a stay pending appeal, an application for or reduction of bail bond, an order to proceed in forma pauperis, or for any intermediate order.
  2. The clerk of the trial court, at the request of the appealing party, shall certify and transmit to the appellate court a copy of such portion of the record of proceedings as may be available or needed for that purpose.

History. Acts 1971, No. 333, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2711.

Cross References. Record for preliminary hearing in Supreme Court, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 4.

16-91-107. Record — Transcript — Original exhibits.

  1. It shall not be necessary to file with either the notice of appeal or the designation of contents of record any portion of the reporter's transcript of the evidence of proceedings.
  2. All exhibits in the trial of any criminal case shall be a part of the record on appeal unless specifically omitted by the appealing party.

History. Acts 1971, No. 333, §§ 5, 6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2709, 43-2710.

Cross References. Time for filing record, contents of record, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 4.

16-91-108. Costs — Bond — Judgment.

  1. There shall be no bond for costs as a requisite for the appeal of either a felony or misdemeanor conviction.
  2. On the affirmance of a judgment, where the appeal is taken by the defendant, and on the reversal of a judgment, where the appeal is taken by the state, a judgment for costs shall be rendered against the defendant.

History. Crim. Code, § 353; C. & M. Dig., § 3434; Pope's Dig., § 4277; Acts 1971, No. 333, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2708, 43-2739.

Cross References. No bond for costs, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 5.

Judgment for costs, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 13.

Case Notes

Cited: Jordan v. State, 102 Ark. 43, 143 S.W. 131 (1912).

16-91-109. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning bail generally, was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 31, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1899, No. 23, § 1, p. 24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2958, 3395; Pope's Dig., §§ 3774, 4238; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2714.

16-91-110. Bail bond.

  1. The bail bond provided for in this section shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which the conviction is had, and a copy thereof shall be attached to the bill of exceptions and shall be made a part of the transcript to be filed in the Supreme Court.
    1. Except those offenses provided for in subdivisions (b)(2) and (3) of this section, when a criminal defendant has been found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal offense and is sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment, and the criminal defendant has filed an appeal, the court shall not release the defendant on bail or otherwise pending appeal unless the court finds:
      1. By clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or that there is not a substantial risk that the defendant will commit a serious crime, intimidate witnesses, harass or take retaliatory action against any juror, or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice or pose a danger to the safety of any other person; and
      2. That the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and that it raises a substantial question of law or fact.
    2. When a criminal defendant has been found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal offense of capital murder, § 5-10-101, the court shall not release the defendant on bail or otherwise pending appeal or for any reason.
    3. When a criminal defendant has been found guilty, pleaded guilty, or pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal offense of murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, rape, § 5-14-103, aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103, aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer or an employee of a correctional facility, § 5-13-211, if a Class Y felony, or causing a catastrophe, § 5-38-202(a), or the criminal offense of kidnapping, § 5-11-102, or arson, § 5-38-301, when classified as Class Y felonies, manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the former § 5-64-401, and is sentenced to death or a term of imprisonment, the court shall not release the defendant on bail or otherwise pending appeal or for any reason.
    1. If the appeal is granted by the circuit court, the appeal bond shall be conditioned that the defendant surrender himself or herself in the Supreme Court upon the dismissal of the appeal or upon the rendition of final judgment upon the appeal.
      1. If the defendant fails to surrender himself or herself in the Supreme Court in compliance with the conditions of his or her bond, the Supreme Court shall direct that fact to be entered on its records and shall adjudge the bail bond of the defendant, or the money deposited in lieu thereof, to be forfeited.
      2. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall immediately make and forward to the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the defendant was tried a certified copy of the judgment of the Supreme Court.
    2. The circuit clerk shall file the copy and shall immediately issue a summons against the sureties on the bail bond requiring them to appear and show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the sum specified in the bail bond on account of the forfeiture thereof, which summons shall be made returnable and shall be executed as in civil actions, and the action shall be docketed and shall proceed as an ordinary civil action.
    3. The summons may be served in any county in the state, and the service of the summons on the defendant or defendants in any county in the state shall give the court complete jurisdiction of the defendant and the cause.
    4. No pleadings on the part of the state shall be required in such cases.
    1. If the court in which the case is tried refuses to grant an appeal and the appeal shall thereafter be granted by any justice or justices of the Supreme Court, the bond shall be conditioned that, upon the dismissal of the appeal or the rendition of the final judgment therein by the Supreme Court, the defendant shall surrender himself or herself in execution of the judgment.
    2. If the appeal is not granted by the court in which the defendant was convicted, the bail bond shall also be conditioned that, if the appeal is not granted by any justice or justices of the Supreme Court, the defendant shall, immediately upon the denial of an appeal, surrender himself or herself to the county sheriff of the county in which he or she was convicted in execution of the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

History. Acts 1899, No. 158, §§ 3, 4, p. 291; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2959, 2960, 3398-3402; Acts 1927, No. 6, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 3775, 3776, 4241 — 4245; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2715 — 43-2719; Acts 1987, No. 31, § 1; 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 1; 1997, No. 1135, § 1; 2011, No. 570, § 83; 2017, No. 367, § 14.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 2, provided:

“This act may be known and cited as the ‘Officer Henry Callenan Memorial Post-Conviction Appeal Bond Elimination Act’.”

The procedural provisions of this section were declared superseded by Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.5 through Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.8 (now see Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 6) in Casement v. State, 318 Ark. 225, 884 S.W.2d 593 (1994).

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the former § 5-64-401” for “or manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of § 5-64-401” in (b)(3).

The 2017 amendment inserted “aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer or an employee of a correctional facility, § 5-13-211, if a Class Y felony” in (b)(3).

Cross References. Bail on appeal, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 6.

Case Notes

Construction.

The language of subdivision (b)(3) of this section clearly indicates that it is the responsibility of the sentencing court in a first-degree murder or Class Y felony case to refuse release on bail or pending appeal; nothing is said concerning a situation where a party is already under an appeal bond for first-degree murder and is subsequently brought into another court on an unrelated charge. Foreman v. State, 317 Ark. 146, 875 S.W.2d 853 (1994).

Appellate Review.

The remedy of the writ of certiorari is appropriate to review bail bond proceedings. Casement v. State, 318 Ark. 225, 884 S.W.2d 593 (1994).

Because the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment convicting defendant of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture and possession of a controlled substance, defendant's issue of bail pending appeal became moot and the appellate court did not have to decide moot issues; the appropriate and meaningful action that defendant could have taken would have been to petition the appellate court for a writ of certiorari separately challenging the trial court's denial of an appeal bond. Walley v. State, 353 Ark. 586, 112 S.W.3d 349 (2003).

Denial of Bail.

Trial court's order denying bail pending appeal was upheld by appellate court where trial court concluded that appeal was intended only for purposes of delay and did not raise a substantial question of law or fact. Vineyard v. State, 29 Ark. App. 180, 782 S.W.2d 370 (1989).

Discretion of Court.

Where the circuit court set bond for defendant in the amount of $1,000,000, “cash only,” explicitly for the purpose of putting it out of reach, and where the court failed to consider the factors set forth in Ark. R. Crim. P. 9.2(c), it exceeded the bounds of its discretion in arbitrarily setting bail at such a level. Foreman v. State, 317 Ark. 146, 875 S.W.2d 853 (1994).

Effect of Amendments.

Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 1, amended this section by adding certain Class Y felonies to those offenses for which appeal bond is prohibited; otherwise, this section, which has been in place since 1987, was unchanged by the 1994 legislation. Casement v. State, 318 Ark. 225, 884 S.W.2d 593 (1994).

Factors Considered.

Both this section and former Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.5 (now see Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 6) require trial court to consider whether criminal defendant (1) will appear at the conclusion of appellate proceedings, and (2) the likelihood of conviction, before granting bond on appeal. Vineyard v. State, 29 Ark. App. 180, 782 S.W.2d 370 (1989).

Supersession of Section.

The post-conviction appeal bond provisions of this section are “procedural” and within the scope of former Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.5 through 36.8 (now see Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 6). Casement v. State, 318 Ark. 225, 884 S.W.2d 593 (1994).

The purpose of former Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.5 (now see Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 6) is to establish criteria requiring release pending appeal or fixing of bail only after a finding that disqualifying factors are not present; to the extent that the court rule conflicts with this section, the rule controls. Casement v. State, 318 Ark. 225, 884 S.W.2d 593 (1994).

16-91-111. Appeal after confinement.

  1. If a judgment of confinement in the Division of Correction has been executed before the certificate of appeal was delivered to the county sheriff whose duty it was to execute the judgment, the defendant shall remain in the division during the pendency of the appeal unless discharged by the expiration of his or her term of confinement or by pardon.
  2. Upon a reversal, if a new trial is ordered, the defendant shall be removed from the division to the county jail from which he or she was brought by the county sheriff of the county.

History. Crim. Code, § 334; C. & M. Dig., § 3418; Pope's Dig., § 4261; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2726; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 284; 2019, No. 910, § 877.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “Department of Correction” for “penitentiary” twice in (a) and once in (b).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a); and substituted “division” for “department” in (a) and (b).

Cross References. Appeal after confinement, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 7.

Case Notes

Commitment Before Supersedeas.

Petitioner who has been lodged in the penitentiary after the issuance of the supersedeas but before the supersedeas was served on the officer charged with the execution of the sentence is not entitled to be sent back to the county jail. Ex parte Lawrence, 71 Ark. 54, 70 S.W. 470 (1902); Dowell v. State, 191 Ark. 311, 86 S.W.2d 23 (1935).

Cited: Kimble v. State, 246 Ark. 407, 438 S.W.2d 705 (1969).

16-91-112. Appeal by state.

  1. Where an appeal on behalf of the state is desired, the prosecuting attorney shall pray the appeal during the term at which the decision is rendered, whereupon the clerk shall immediately make a transcript of the record and transmit it to the Attorney General or deliver the transcript to the prosecuting attorney, to be transmitted by him or her.
  2. If the Attorney General, on inspecting the record, is satisfied that error has been committed to the prejudice of the state, and upon which it is important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal laws that the Supreme Court should decide, he or she may, by lodging the transcript in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court within sixty (60) days after the decision, take the appeal.
  3. An appeal by the state from a decision of the circuit court shall not suspend the proceedings in the case.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 329, 337; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3410, 3416; Pope's Dig., §§ 4253, 4254, 4259; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2720, 43-2721.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1971, No. 333, § 13, provided that the act would not alter the manner in which the state or other prosecuting party could appeal in a criminal case.

Cross References. Appeal by state, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 3.

Case Notes

Purpose.

By this section a method is afforded the law officers of the state to take the opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court upon questions which they consider important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law. State v. Dulaney, 87 Ark. 17, 112 S.W. 158 (1908); State v. Taylor, 180 Ark. 588, 22 S.W.2d 34 (1929).

Appealable Decisions.

If the decision of the question presented will not serve to secure correct and uniform administration of the criminal law, the appeal will not be entertained. State v. Smith, 94 Ark. 368, 126 S.W. 1057 (1910).

This section does not contemplate an appeal in a case in which the only error alleged is that the court incorrectly decided that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant a submission of the issue to the jury. State v. Spear, 123 Ark. 449, 185 S.W. 788 (1916).

This section does not require appellate opinion upon correctness of trial court's conclusion where error complained of related to a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Massey, 194 Ark. 439, 107 S.W.2d 527 (1937).

Noncompliance.

Where it does not appear that the provisions of this section have been complied with, the case will be stricken from the docket of the Arkansas Supreme Court. State v. Cox, 29 Ark. 115 (1874).

The duty of charging an accused with a felony is reserved either to the grand jury or the prosecutor, and the trial judge encroached upon the prosecutor's constitutional duties and breached the separation of powers doctrine where he amended charge from a felony to a misdemeanor over the state's objection. State v. Brooks, 301 Ark. 257, 783 S.W.2d 368 (1990).

Scope of Review.

Where there is no motion for a new trial, only errors appearing on the face of the record will be considered on appeal by the state. State v. Wilhite, 211 Ark. 1065, 204 S.W.2d 562 (1947).

Timeliness.

Appeal held untimely. State v. Alexander, 259 Ark. 139, 531 S.W.2d 707 (1976).

Transcript.

There is no language in this section requiring Attorney General to endorse on transcript of record a direction to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. State v. Knight, 259 Ark. 107, 533 S.W.2d 488 (1976).

Cited: State v. Jacks, 243 Ark. 77, 418 S.W.2d 622 (1967); Doty v. Goodwin, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 233 (1969); State v. Reeves, 246 Ark. 1187, 442 S.W.2d 229 (1969); Cherry v. Hall, 251 Ark. 305, 472 S.W.2d 225 (1971); State v. Lamb, 251 Ark. 999, 476 S.W.2d 7 (1972); State v. Cosentino, 252 Ark. 68, 477 S.W.2d 460 (1972); State v. Stringfellow, 253 Ark. 390, 486 S.W.2d 65 (1972); State v. Gibbons, 255 Ark. 352, 500 S.W.2d 341 (1973); State v. Knight, 259 Ark. 107, 533 S.W.2d 488 (1976); Collins v. State, 271 Ark. 825, 611 S.W.2d 182 (1981); State v. Russell, 271 Ark. 817, 611 S.W.2d 518 (1981); State v. Lee, 277 Ark. 142, 639 S.W.2d 745 (1982); Boone v. State, 282 Ark. 274, 668 S.W.2d 17 (1984).

16-91-113. Matters to be considered — Preserving error — Action to be taken.

  1. The Supreme Court need only review those matters briefed and argued by the appellant, except that where either a sentence for life imprisonment or death has been imposed the Supreme Court shall review all errors prejudicial to the rights of the appellant.
    1. It shall not be necessary to file a motion for new trial to obtain review of any matter urged for review on appeal.
    2. If a motion for new trial is submitted to the trial court, on appeal, the appellant shall not be restricted to a consideration of matters assigned therein.
    3. Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the trial court are unnecessary; but for all purposes for which an exception has previously been necessary, it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he or she desires the court to take or his or her objections to the action of the court and his or her grounds therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him or her.
    1. A conviction shall be reversed and a new trial ordered where the Supreme Court finds that the conviction is contrary to the Arkansas Constitution or the laws of Arkansas, or for any reason determines that the appellant did not have a fair trial.
    2. Where appropriate, the Supreme Court shall reverse the conviction and order the appellant discharged.
    3. In all other cases, the conviction must be affirmed, but the sentence of the appellant may be reduced if it is deemed excessive.

History. Acts 1971, No. 333, §§ 8, 11, 12; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2725 — 43-2725.2.

Cross References. Actions to be taken on appeal, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 15.

Exceptions and motions for new trial unnecessary, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 8.

Exceptions to decision of court, § 16-89-124.

Matters to be considered on appeal, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 14.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Criminal Procedure-Specificity of Objection. 28 Ark. L. Rev. 406.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Criminal Procedure, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 193.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Subsection (b) applies to the state the same as to individuals and it does not conflict with or change the manner by which the state may appeal as set forth in § 16-91-112. State v. Knight, 259 Ark. 107, 533 S.W.2d 488 (1976).

Capital Murder.

Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld defendant's conviction for the capital murder of an 87-year-old woman who was found shot to death in her yard where defendant confessed to the crime and the record of the guilt phase was reviewed for any prejudicial error under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)), Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 10, and subsection (a) of this section, and none was found. Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (2004).

On direct appeal of a capital murder case, where the Arkansas Supreme Court had considered all adverse rulings objected to by defendant but not argued on appeal and found no error, the effectiveness of counsel in making a motion for suppression had implicitly been approved and could not be challenged in a later proceeding. State v. Fudge, 361 Ark. 412, 206 S.W.3d 850 (2005).

Duty of Parties.

Even in capital cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court requires a defendant to have taken some action at trial to protect himself against perceived prejudice and to point out those actions in the appeal; the State Attorney General, as appellee, has the duty of double-checking a defendant's work to make sure all rulings adverse to the defendant are abstracted and briefed. Gardner v. Norris, 949 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Ark. 1996).

Instructions.

The Arkansas rule that has been followed in misdemeanor and civil cases of requiring the instructions to be briefed when error is assigned for the giving or refusing of an instruction should now be followed in felony criminal cases. Ellis v. State, 267 Ark. 690, 590 S.W.2d 309 (Ct. App. 1979).

The court does not consider an assigned error concerning instructions absent an abstract of the instructions given and will assume the jury was properly instructed. Ellis v. State, 267 Ark. 690, 590 S.W.2d 309 (Ct. App. 1979).

Jurisdiction of Trial Court.

After defendant's valid sentence had been put into execution and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify, amend or revise it, either during or after the term at which it was pronounced. Rogers v. State, 265 Ark. 945, 582 S.W.2d 7 (1979).

Objections.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to interpret former Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.24 (see now Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 14) as absolving a party from making the appropriate contemporaneous objection at trial as a prerequisite to appellate review; indeed, the Court has flatly held that the Arkansas procedure requiring review of the record for error in life and death cases presupposes that an objection was made at trial. Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).

The Arkansas Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that its obligation to review the entire record in a capital case presupposes that an objection was made at trial; there is no requirement that the Arkansas court ever consider errors not raised by the appellant since it is the appellant's obligation to point out those errors at trial and on appeal. Gardner v. Norris, 949 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Ark. 1996).

While it is true that S. Ct. & Ct. App. Rule 4-3(h) (now (i)) requires the Arkansas Supreme Court to review the record for error in life and death cases, this review presupposes that an objection was made at trial; where defendant failed to make a specific motion under Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1 for directed verdict indicating the particular deficiencies in the state's proof, it is as if he failed to object at all, and that failure below precludes review of the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Webb v. State, 327 Ark. 51, 938 S.W.2d 806 (1997).

Preserving Error.

While formal exceptions need not be saved, objections must have been made to the proceedings in order to obtain review in the Arkansas Supreme Court. Alexander v. State, 103 Ark. 505, 147 S.W. 477 (1912); Morris v. State, 142 Ark. 297, 219 S.W. 10 (1920); Sullivan v. State, 161 Ark. 19, 257 S.W. 58 (1923); Howell v. State, 180 Ark. 241, 22 S.W.2d 47 (1929); Lewis v. State, 202 Ark. 6, 148 S.W.2d 668 (1941) (preceding decisions under prior law).

If a defendant fails to object to the competency of a witness at the trial, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. Williams v. State, 257 Ark. 8, 513 S.W.2d 793 (1974).

An appellant, in order to preserve a question for review on appeal, had to do nothing more than make known to the trial court what he sought in the way of a ruling. Gruzen v. State, 267 Ark. 380, 591 S.W.2d 342 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 852, 101 S. Ct. 144, 66 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1980).

Defense counsel was not required to ask that the witness' testimony be stricken since, under § 16-89-115, that remedy was available only when the state elected not to comply with an order of the court to deliver a statement to the defendant; nor was any further objection by defense counsel necessary. Blakemore v. State, 268 Ark. 145, 594 S.W.2d 231 (1980).

An appellant is barred from arguing a point not supported by an objection in the trial court, and the Arkansas Supreme Court overlooks a failure to object in the trial court only when the error is so great that the trial judge was under a duty to correct his own action immediately and when no objection or admonition could have undone the damage or erased the effect of his error from the minds of the jurors. Smith v. State, 268 Ark. 282, 595 S.W.2d 671 (1980).

When life is at stake, the Arkansas Supreme Court will make its own examination of the record and reject or accept, on their merits, all objections made at trial, whether or not argued on appeal, but it will not consider a matter in the absence of an objection. Fretwell v. State, 289 Ark. 91, 708 S.W.2d 630 (1986).

Appellate court will not consider an argument on appeal unless it is made below. White v. State, 298 Ark. 163, 765 S.W.2d 949 (1989); McDonald v. State, 37 Ark. App. 61, 824 S.W.2d 396 (1992).

Where the prosecuting attorney's comments during closing argument, indeed the expressions complained of, were so interlaced and interwoven that they constituted one theme that extended throughout the entire argument, defense counsel's motion for mistrial encompassed and preserved on appeal all the expressions at issue, not just the remarks prompting or preceding the objection. Miller v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1995).

Defendant's point of error that the trial court should have excused a juror for cause was not preserved for appellate review because defense counsel essentially agreed with the trial court's ruling and conceded that there were no grounds to excuse the juror for cause; thus, there was no reversible error reviewable under Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)) or subsection (a) of this section. Roberts v. State, 352 Ark. 489, 102 S.W.3d 482 (2003), overruled in part, Dimas-Martinez v. State, 2011 Ark. 515, 385 S.W.3d 238 (2011).

Reduction of Sentence.

Where the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the judgment, it was without authority to reduce defendant's sentence. Hurst v. State, 251 Ark. 40, 470 S.W.2d 815 (1971).

The Arkansas Supreme Court could not, under Ark. Const., Art. 4, § 2 and Ark. Const., Art. 6, § 18, reduce the sentence under former § 5-64-401(a)(1)(ii) as “excessive” where it was within statutory limits and showed no error in its passing. Abbott v. State, 256 Ark. 558, 508 S.W.2d 733 (1974).

The state Supreme Court has no authority to reduce a sentence that is not in excess of statutory limits. Hooper v. State, 257 Ark. 103, 514 S.W.2d 394 (1974).

Where three-year sentence originally proposed by judge was arrived at without consideration of defendant's indigency or the time he had spent in jail awaiting trial, the sentence was reduced to three years with credit for six months' pretrial incarceration. Walters v. State, 259 Ark. 447, 533 S.W.2d 517 (1976).

Where sentence was erroneously enhanced on basis of prior conviction, such error did not mandate a new trial since the Arkansas Supreme Court could reduce the sentence in lieu of reversing and remanding for a new trial. Ellis v. State, 270 Ark. 243, 603 S.W.2d 891 (1980).

Where the defendant was improperly sentenced and both parties agreed on what the sentence should have been, the appellate court correctly reduced the defendant's sentence to the minimum. Mincy v. State, 19 Ark. App. 80, 717 S.W.2d 213 (1986).

Court reduced the sentence for possession with intent to deliver cocaine from a term of sixty years to fifty years, the maximum term of years under § 5-4-501(a) in accordance with subsection (c)(3). Nichols v. State, 306 Ark. 417, 815 S.W.2d 382 (1991).

Relation to Federal Habeas Proceedings.

Fact that the Arkansas Supreme Court was required, pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)) and subsection (a) of this section, to review the entire record of defendant's criminal case for prejudicial error, after she was convicted of capital murder, did not undermine the district court's finding that she was precluded from obtaining federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with regard to claims that she had not raised in the state courts because those claims were procedurally defaulted: (1) the state Supreme Court's review obligation under Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)) was limited to issues that defendant actually raised in the trial or appellate courts; (2) the state Supreme Court could not be deemed to have reviewed the procedurally defaulted claims under App. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)) because defendant had not raised any of them in the state trial court or in her appellate briefs; and (3) the district court's procedural default holding was consistent with current U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which required the defendant to “fairly present” her federal claims to the state courts first, which required that she actually raise the claims in the state courts. Meadows v. Norris, No. 5:05CV00156 JMM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85428 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 9, 2007).

Reversible Error.

Evidence held insufficient to require reversal. Hobbs v. State, 86 Ark. 360, 111 S.W. 264 (1908) (decision under prior law); Brown v. State, 262 Ark. 298, 556 S.W.2d 418 (1977).

Evidence held sufficient to require reversal. Garner v. State, 97 Ark. 63, 132 S.W. 1010 (1910) (decision under prior law).

The fact that the court ended its opinion with word “reversed” and was silent as to whether case was remanded or dismissed was of no consequence as the court's intent was evident from the opinion. Upton v. State, 255 Ark. 1071, 502 S.W.2d 454 (1973).

As to excessive sentences, see: Tenpenny v. State, 256 Ark. 523, 508 S.W.2d 752 (1974); Hooper v. State, 257 Ark. 103, 514 S.W.2d 394 (1974).

Sentence of Life Imprisonment or Death.

In first-degree murder prosecution, failure to instruct the jury that it may fix the punishment at life imprisonment was considered by appellate court even though not assigned as error in the motion for new trial. Smith v. State, 205 Ark. 1075, 172 S.W.2d 248 (1943) (decision under prior law).

On appeals in capital cases the court will not only consider each assignment of error, but it will also have examined the transcript for each objection made in the trial court by the defendant. Rorie v. State, 215 Ark. 282, 220 S.W.2d 421 (1949) (decision under prior law).

In a capital case, the court reviewed every objection in the record. Moore v. State, 229 Ark. 335, 315 S.W.2d 907 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946, 79 S. Ct. 356, 3 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1959) (decision under prior law).

Where appellant had been sentenced to life imprisonment, the court was required to consider objections that the appellant had raised during the trial but did not argue on appeal in addition to each assignment of error. Smith v. State, 259 Ark. 703, 536 S.W.2d 289 (1976).

In a case where the sentence is life imprisonment without parole, the Arkansas Supreme Court must examine the record for prejudicial errors. Gruzen v. State, 267 Ark. 380, 591 S.W.2d 342 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 852, 101 S. Ct. 144, 66 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1980); Gruzen v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 1020, 103 S. Ct. 386, 74 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1982).

The Arkansas Supreme Court is required by this section to review all errors prejudicial to the rights of the defendant in a case where a death sentence is imposed; this obligation is implemented through court procedure as outlined in Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 14 and Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)). Gardner v. Norris, 949 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Ark. 1996).

The Arkansas Supreme Court has an affirmative duty to review the record in all death-penalty cases for prejudicial error. State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 5 S.W.3d 51 (1999).

When a defendant has received a sentence of life imprisonment, it will continue to be his responsibility to bring forward an appeal; however, when the death penalty has been imposed, the Arkansas Supreme Court is required to perform an automatic review of the record for egregious errors such as those that fall within the exception to the plain-error rule. State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 5 S.W.3d 51 (1999).

Appellate court needed the complete record designated by a defendant who was appealing his conviction and life sentence for capital murder in order to fulfill its duty under this section and Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)) to conduct an independent review of the record for prejudicial error; thus, the trial court personnel were ordered to provide the missing parts of the record within 30 days. Howell v. State, 350 Ark. 47, 84 S.W.3d 442 (2002).

Where defendant was sentenced to life in prison and the record on appeal did not contain a complete transcript of jury selection and voir dire or opening and closing statements, the reviewing court was unable to review all errors prejudicial to defendant as required under Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)). Romes v. State, 355 Ark. 497, 139 S.W.3d 519 (2003).

Because the record was not sufficient for the Supreme Court of Arkansas to conduct its review under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(i), reversal and remand for a new trial was required; for example, despite considerable reconstruction efforts, at least 14 bench conferences, written jury instructions, and two juror notes were omitted from the record, and there was no verbatim transcript of any dialogue between counsel and the court concerning jury instructions Thrower v. State, 2018 Ark. 256, 554 S.W.3d 825 (2018).

Standard of Review.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate court makes an independent examination based upon the totality of the circumstances and reverses only if the decision of the trial court was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Hayes v. State, 312 Ark. 349, 849 S.W.2d 501 (1993).

The applicable statutory provisions as well as prior decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court are crystal clear that the application of the reasonable doubt standard is required in appellate review of aggravating circumstances findings. Miller v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1995).

An automatic review of the entire record in all death-penalty cases is useful when evaluating whether a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal was proper under Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988); such a review would also enable the court to determine (1) whether any errors raised in the trial court are prejudicial to the defendant, in accordance with this section and Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h) (now (i)), (2) whether any plain errors covered by the exceptions outlined in Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980), have occurred, and (3) whether other fundamental safeguards were followed. State v. Smith, 340 Ark. 257, 12 S.W.3d 629 (2000).

It was the intent of the Arkansas Supreme Court that the counsel appointed pursuant to the court's decision in State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 5 S.W.3d 51 (1999), would not serve as a representative of a party but rather would assist the court in its review because, when that counsel represents one of the parties, a conflict of interest exists. State v. Robbins, 340 Ark. 255, 9 S.W.3d 500 (2000).

Cited: Robertson v. State, 256 Ark. 366, 507 S.W.2d 513 (1974); Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977); Hulsey v. State, 261 Ark. 449, 549 S.W.2d 73 (1977); Hobgood v. State, 262 Ark. 725, 562 S.W.2d 41 (1978); Butler v. State, 264 Ark. 243, 570 S.W.2d 272 (1978); Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 573 S.W.2d 622 (1978); Hallman v. State, 264 Ark. 900, 575 S.W.2d 688 (1979); Andrews v. State, 265 Ark. 390, 578 S.W.2d 585 (1979); McGuire v. State, 265 Ark. 621, 580 S.W.2d 198 (1979); Wiman v. State, 266 Ark. 380, 583 S.W.2d 67 (1979); Nicholas v. State, 268 Ark. 541, 595 S.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1980); Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 605 S.W.2d 430 (1980); Conley v. State, 272 Ark. 33, 612 S.W.2d 722 (1981); Curry v. State, 272 Ark. 291, 613 S.W.2d 829 (1981); Sargent v. State, 272 Ark. 336, 614 S.W.2d 503 (1981); Sumlin v. State, 273 Ark. 185, 617 S.W.2d 372 (1981); Derring v. State, 273 Ark. 347, 619 S.W.2d 644 (1981); Harris v. State, 273 Ark. 355, 620 S.W.2d 289 (1981); Thomerson v. State, 274 Ark. 17, 621 S.W.2d 690 (1981); Jones v. State, 275 Ark. 12, 627 S.W.2d 6 (1982); Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982); Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982); Lear v. State, 278 Ark. 70, 643 S.W.2d 550 (1982); Long v. State, 280 Ark. 327, 657 S.W.2d 551 (1983); Miller v. State, 280 Ark. 551, 660 S.W.2d 163 (1983); Spears v. State, 280 Ark. 577, 660 S.W.2d 913 (1983); Hickerson v. State, 282 Ark. 217, 667 S.W.2d 654 (1984); Pruett v. State, 282 Ark. 304, 669 S.W.2d 186; Reed v. State, 282 Ark. 492, 669 S.W.2d 192 (1984); Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984); McDaniel v. State, 283 Ark. 352, 676 S.W.2d 732 (1984); Ruiz v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1985); Penn v. State, 284 Ark. 234, 681 S.W.2d 307 (1984); Sherron v. State, 285 Ark. 8, 684 S.W.2d 247 (1985); Hoback v. State, 286 Ark. 153, 689 S.W.2d 569 (1985); Richard v. State, 286 Ark. 410, 691 S.W.2d 872 (1985); Sims v. State, 286 Ark. 476, 695 S.W.2d 376 (1985); Burnett v. State, 287 Ark. 158, 697 S.W.2d 95 (1985); Snell v. State, 287 Ark. 264, 698 S.W.2d 289 (1985); Orr v. State, 288 Ark. 118, 703 S.W.2d 438 (1986); Futch v. State, 288 Ark. 323, 705 S.W.2d 11 (1986); Williams v. State, 288 Ark. 444, 705 S.W.2d 888 (1986); Williams v. State, 289 Ark. 69, 709 S.W.2d 80 (1986); Baker v. State, 289 Ark. 430, 711 S.W.2d 816 (1986); Hughes v. State, 289 Ark. 522, 712 S.W.2d 308 (1986); Parker v. State, 290 Ark. 158, 717 S.W.2d 800 (1986); Watson v. State, 290 Ark. 484, 720 S.W.2d 310 (1986); Henderson v. State, 291 Ark. 138, 722 S.W.2d 842 (1987); McDougald v. State, 295 Ark. 276, 748 S.W.2d 340 (1988); Ford v. State, 297 Ark. 77, 759 S.W.2d 556 (1988); Neal v. State, 298 Ark. 565, 769 S.W.2d 414 (1989); Ruiz v. State, 299 Ark. 144, 772 S.W.2d 297 (1989); Rodriquez v. State, 299 Ark. 421, 773 S.W.2d 821 (1989); Burnett v. State, 302 Ark. 279, 790 S.W.2d 137 (1990); Pilcher v. State, 303 Ark. 335, 796 S.W.2d 845 (1990); Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524, 798 S.W.2d 94 (1990); Jackson v. State, 306 Ark. 70, 811 S.W.2d 299 (1991); Moore v. State, 317 Ark. 630, 882 S.W.2d 667 (1994); Byrum v. State, 318 Ark. 87, 884 S.W.2d 248 (1994); Garrison v. State, 319 Ark. 617, 893 S.W.2d 763 (1995); Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258, 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996); Isbell v. State, 326 Ark. 17, 931 S.W.2d 74 (1996); Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 942 S.W.2d 231 (1997); Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003); Lacy v. State, 2010 Ark. 388, 377 S.W.3d 227 (2010).

16-91-114. Acquittal as bar to prosecution.

A judgment in favor of the defendant which operates as a bar to a future prosecution of the offense shall not be reversed by the Supreme Court.

History. Crim. Code, § 331; C. & M. Dig., § 3412; Pope's Dig., § 4255; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2722.

Cross References. Acquittal barring prosecution, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 9.

Case Notes

Charge Punishable by Imprisonment.

Arkansas Supreme Court cannot reverse case where defendant was acquitted of charge punishable by imprisonment. State v. Binkley, 123 Ark. 240, 185 S.W. 279 (1916); State v. Boatright, 192 Ark. 1100, 96 S.W.2d 775 (1936).

Misdemeanors.

Where a defendant indicted for a misdemeanor punishable by fine only has been tried, acquitted and the judgment reversed and cause remanded, he may be tried again upon the same indictment. Jones v. State, 15 Ark. 261 (1854); State v. Czarnikow, 20 Ark. 160 (1859).

Cited: State v. Harvest, 26 Ark. App. 241, 762 S.W.2d 806 (1989).

16-91-115. Affirmance of death sentence.

When a judgment of death has been affirmed and the day of execution has passed, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall transmit to the Governor a certificate of the affirmance and of the judgment, to the end that a warrant for the execution of the judgment may be issued by the Governor.

History. Crim. Code, § 337; C. & M. Dig., § 3415; Pope's Dig., § 4258; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2724.

Case Notes

Cited: Leggett v. State, 231 Ark. 13, 328 S.W.2d 252 (1959).

16-91-116. Proceedings on reversal and new trial.

  1. Upon a mandate of reversal ordering a new trial being filed in the clerk's office of the circuit court in which the judgment of confinement in the Department of Correction was rendered and executed, the clerk shall deliver to the county sheriff a copy of the mandate and precept, authorizing and commanding the county sheriff to bring the defendant from the department to the county jail, which shall be obeyed by the county sheriff and Director of the Department of Correction.
  2. If the defendant is again convicted upon the new trial, the period of his or her former confinement in the department shall be deducted by the circuit court from the period of confinement fixed in the last verdict of conviction.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 335, 336; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3419, 3420; Pope's Dig., §§ 4262, 4263; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2727, 43-2728; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 285.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “Department of Correction” for “penitentiary” throughout this section; substituted “the sheriff” for “him” following “commanding” in (a); and inserted “or her” in (b).

Cross References. Deduction of confinement under prior conviction, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 12.

Proceedings on reversal, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 11.

Case Notes

Credit for Former Confinement.

Defendant was entitled to credit for time spent in penitentiary, but not for time spent in jail. Kimble v. State, 246 Ark. 407, 438 S.W.2d 705 (1969).

Provision of this section dealing with giving credit upon second conviction for time already served in penitentiary for same offense will be applied where the first conviction is set aside by circuit court. Kimble v. State, 246 Ark. 407, 438 S.W.2d 705 (1969).

Cited: Kimble v. State, 246 Ark. 407, 438 S.W.2d 705 (1969).

16-91-117. Supreme Court's decisions binding.

The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be obligatory on the circuit courts as being the correct expositions of the law.

History. Crim. Code, § 337; C. & M. Dig., § 3417; Pope's Dig., § 4260; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2729.

16-91-118. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning misdemeanors, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 510. The section was derived from Crim. Code, §§ 339, 342, 344; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3421, 3425-3427; Pope's Dig., §§ 4264, 4268-4270; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2730, 43-2733, 43-2735.

Subchapter 2 — Arkansas Effective Death Penalty Act of 1997

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 925, § 10: Mar. 31, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system for carrying out a sentence of death is hopelessly fraught with endless litigation in state and federal court which undermines the deterrent value of the death penalty and imposes a needless financial burden on the state's resources, while depriving death row inmates of the right to obtain speedy relief on any meritorious constitutional claims. It is further found that the provisions of the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 provide significant restrictions on the amount of time federal courts may take to review such cases if the states provide a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of competent counsel for all indigent capital defendants in state post-conviction proceedings. The most significant delay between sentencing and execution occurs while capital cases await decision in federal habeas corpus litigation. From 1990 through 1993, the average time that prisoners sentenced to death in this state awaited execution was ten years and two months for those prisoners who pursued federal habeas corpus litigation. However, if the states comply with the requirements of the Antiterrorism Act, the average time that prisoners will await execution in federal court will be reduced to less than three years in most cases. For that reason an emergency is declared to exist and this act is necessary to permit the state to take advantage of the provisions which will reduce the time for review in federal court by providing a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of competent counsel for all indigent capital defendants in state post-conviction proceedings. This act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-91-201. Access to files.

  1. In the case of a defendant who has been convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death, the defendant's prior trial counsel shall make available to the defendant's state post-conviction counsel the complete files of the defendant's trial counsel, and the defendant's prior counsel on direct appeal shall make available to the defendant's state post-conviction counsel the complete files of the defendant's appellate counsel.
  2. The defendant's post-conviction counsel may inspect and photocopy the files, but the defendant's prior trial and appellate counsel shall maintain custody of their respective files for at least five (5) years following completion of the direct review process in state court, except as to the material which is admitted into evidence in any trial proceedings.

History. Acts 1997, No. 925, § 5.

Publisher's Notes. By per curiam order dated June 23, 1997, the Supreme Court provided, in part:

“[Arkansas Criminal Rule of Procedure] Rule 37.5 shall supersede Sections 5 and 6 of Act 925 (Title 16, Chapter 91, Section 201 and Section 202) except for the last paragraph of subsection 5(c) (§ 16-91-202(c)), which provided for education programs by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, and all of subsection 5(f) (§ 16-91-202(f)), which provides for the funding of the fees and expenses awarded under the rule through the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.”

16-91-202. Capital cases.

        1. If a capital conviction and sentence are affirmed on direct appeal, the circuit court in which the conviction was obtained shall, within two (2) weeks after the affirmance, conduct a hearing and enter a written order appointing counsel to represent the petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding upon issuance of the mandate by the appellate court, should the petitioner desire to pursue such a post-conviction proceeding.
        2. Counsel's appointment shall remain effective through any appeal of the post-conviction proceeding in state court.
      1. Counsel shall be appointed only after a finding by the circuit court that the petitioner is indigent and that he or she either accepts the appointment of counsel or is unable to make a competent decision whether to accept or reject the appointment of counsel.
      2. The circuit court may decline to appoint counsel for the petitioner only upon a written finding that the petitioner rejects the appointment of counsel and understands the legal consequences of that decision or upon a finding that the petitioner is not indigent.
      1. The circuit court may not appoint an attorney as counsel under this subsection if the attorney represented the petitioner at trial or on direct appeal of the conviction under attack unless the petitioner and the attorney request appointment on the record.
      2. If counsel is the same attorney who represented the petitioner at trial or on direct appeal, the circuit court shall appoint a second counsel to assist in the preparation of the petition for post-conviction relief.
      3. If the petitioner elects to proceed pro se, the waiver of the assistance of counsel shall be made in open court on the record.
      1. Upon the filing of a post-conviction petition, the clerk of the circuit court in which the petition is filed shall immediately forward a copy of the petition to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the petition was filed, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.
        1. The filing of the petition does not automatically stay any sentence of death.
        2. Upon the entry of an order pursuant to this subsection, a stay of execution shall be granted upon application to the circuit court wherein the motion for appointment of counsel was filed.
    1. The stay granted pursuant to this subsection shall automatically expire if:
      1. The petitioner fails to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief; or
      2. The petitioner is denied relief in his or her post-conviction proceeding in circuit court in the manner set forth in subsection (h) of this section.
    1. The following standards are the exclusive criteria which counsel must satisfy in order to be appointed under subsection (a) of this section.
    2. At least one (1) of the attorneys appointed to represent the applicant:
      1. Shall have:
        1. Previously represented a death-sentenced inmate in state or federal post-conviction relief proceedings within the five (5) years immediately preceding the appointment for which he or she is under consideration; or
        2. Acted, within the five (5) years immediately preceding the appointment for which he or she is under consideration, as defense counsel in no fewer than three (3) state or federal post-conviction relief proceedings arising from felony convictions, at least two (2) of which involved violent crimes, including one (1) murder case;
      2. Shall have, within the five (5) years immediately preceding the appointment for which he or she is under consideration, conducted at least two (2) evidentiary hearings in state or federal post-conviction relief proceedings, which may include any proceeding which satisfies subdivision (c)(2)(A)(i) of this section or subdivision (c)(2)(A)(ii) of this section;
      3. Shall have been licensed to practice law for no fewer than five (5) years, and for at least three (3) of those five (5) years shall have been licensed to practice in Arkansas courts; and
      4. Shall have successfully completed, within the two (2) years immediately preceding the appointment for which he or she is under consideration, not less than six (6) hours of Arkansas Continuing Legal Education Board-approved continuing legal education or professional training primarily involving advocacy in the field of capital trial, capital appellate, or capital post-conviction litigation.
    3. Consistent with § 16-87-204(b)(9), the executive director shall offer annually, to any attorney wishing to attend, no fewer than two (2) in-state conferences or seminars at each of which no less than six (6) hours of board-approved credit, as described in this subsection, is available.
    1. Notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, appointments of counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings and in appeals therefrom shall be made from counsel who qualify for appointment under subsection (c) of this section or subsection (e) of this section.
    2. The presiding circuit judge may contact the Arkansas Public Defender Commission for a list of counsel who meet the criteria of subsection (c) of this section and may appoint counsel from that list.
    3. Neither the commission nor any of its components shall possess any supervisory authority over counsel appointed to represent a petitioner in capital post-conviction proceedings or in appeals therefrom.
    4. Nothing in this section shall preclude the circuit court from appointing an out-of-state attorney pro hac vice as co-counsel, provided that in-state counsel is appointed consistent with the provisions of this subchapter.
    5. Once counsel has been appointed, the presiding circuit judge shall enter a written order specifying the appointed counsel's qualifications which satisfy subsection (c) of this section.
    1. The circuit court may appoint counsel who does not satisfy all of the criteria of subsection (c) of this section only upon a written finding that the attorney is clearly competent and qualified because of his or her unique training, experience, or background to represent an indigent petitioner in a capital post-conviction proceeding.
      1. In all such cases, the attorney shall have been admitted to practice law for not less than five (5) years and shall have had no fewer than three (3) years' experience in the actual handling of capital murder prosecutions or capital murder post-conviction proceedings in Arkansas courts.
      2. In addition, such counsel shall have successfully completed, within the two (2) years immediately preceding the appointment for which he or she is under consideration, not less than six (6) hours of board-approved continuing legal education or professional training primarily involving advocacy in the field of capital trial, capital appellate, or capital post-conviction litigation.
    2. Prior to appointing such counsel, the circuit court shall conduct a hearing at which the attorney shall demonstrate that his or her experience or other qualifications meet the requirements of this subsection, and the circuit court shall make written findings specifying what unique training, experience, or background qualifies the attorney for appointment under this subsection.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the circuit court shall fix the compensation to be paid to attorneys appointed under this subchapter, as well as the fees and expenses to be paid for investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services authorized by the circuit court at such rates or amounts as the circuit court determines to be reasonably necessary.
    2. All compensation and reasonable expenses authorized by the circuit court pursuant to this subchapter shall be paid by the commission.
    1. Not later than fifty (50) days after the filing of the petition, the circuit judge shall convene a status conference to schedule a hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief if a hearing is deemed necessary.
    2. The hearing must be conducted within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the status conference, unless good cause is shown to justify a continuance.
    1. Within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the transcript from the post-conviction hearing, if a hearing was held, or, if the circuit judge requests post-trial briefs, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the post-trial briefs, the circuit judge shall make specific written findings of fact and shall expressly state the circuit judge's conclusions of law relating to each issue raised in the petition for post-conviction relief.
    2. In the event no hearing was held, the circuit judge shall, within one hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the petition for post-conviction relief, make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to each issue presented in the petition for post-conviction relief.
  1. The transcription of the testimony and record in capital post-conviction proceedings shall be completed within sixty (60) days of the conclusion of the post-conviction hearing and shall immediately be provided to the parties and the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1997, No. 925, § 5.

Publisher's Notes. By per curiam order dated June 23, 1997, the Supreme Court provided, in part:

“[Arkansas Criminal Rule of Procedure] Rule 37.5 shall supersede Sections 5 and 6 of Act 925 (Title 16, Chapter 91, Section 201 and Section 202) except for the last paragraph of subsection 5(c) (§ 16-91-202(c)), which provided for education programs by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission, and all of subsection 5(f) (§ 16-91-202(f)), which provides for the funding of the fees and expenses awarded under the rule through the Arkansas Public Defender Commission.”

Cross References. Special rule for persons under sentence of death, Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5.

Case Notes

Review.

Although petitioner's death case had been reviewed five times, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the circumstances of the case were unique, recalled the mandate, and reopened the case solely because of: (1) the alleged comparable verdict form deficiency in the Willett v. State case; (2) the federal district court's dismissal of the federal habeas corpus petition in order to give state courts the opportunity to explore the issue; and (3) the enhanced scrutiny required in death cases. Robbins v. State, 353 Ark. 556, 114 S.W.3d 217 (2003).

16-91-203. Applicability of subchapter.

This subchapter applies to all persons under sentence of death, including those whose cases were pending on direct review when this subchapter was passed, who file their initial applications for state post-conviction relief on or after March 31, 1997.

History. Acts 1997, No. 925, § 6.

16-91-204. Legislative intent.

It is the express intent of this subchapter to comply with the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, in an effort to obtain the benefits of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, concerning time limitations in which federal habeas corpus proceedings and appeals must be considered and decided, and for other purposes. Throughout this subchapter, references to “post-conviction” proceedings or petitions refer solely to those proceedings or petitions which are filed pursuant to the state rule or statute in which claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are cognizable, such as Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specific reference to Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure was avoided only because the General Assembly is aware that the form of relief provided for by Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure may, at some point in the future, be provided for by a different rule or statute. It is the intent of the General Assembly to ensure that this subchapter apply to Rule 37-type post-conviction proceedings, not to post-conviction proceedings in which claims of ineffective assistance are not cognizable. It is the intent of § 16-91-202(e) to allow the appointment of counsel in the very limited circumstance in which, because of unique training, experience, or background, an attorney is clearly competent and qualified to represent an indigent petitioner in a capital post-conviction proceeding, but otherwise does not meet all of the criteria of § 16-91-202(c). Section 16-91-202(e) was created for the specific purpose of permitting the appointment of experienced attorneys, including but not limited to, former prosecutors and judges who, because of the nature of their practice, are uniquely qualified to represent capital defendants but do not meet the specific defense-related requirements of § 16-91-202(c).

History. Acts 1997, No. 925, § 2.

U.S. Code. The habeas corpus reform provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, referred to in this section, are codified primarily at 28 U.S.C. § 2244, § 2253 et seq., and § 2261 et seq. The Act also amended Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22.

Case Notes

Denial of Investigator

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the inmate authorization to retain an investigator to probe into issues of jury bias and misconduct because the inmate failed to demonstrate the need for an investigator, as nothing required the inmate's counsel to rely exclusively on an investigator to investigate whether one of the jurors had failed to disclose information accurately during voir dire and the inmate admitted that he did not know if any misrepresentation occurred. Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007).

Scope of Review.

Were the Supreme Court of Arkansas to refuse to examine a claim that fundamental error is overlooked in a death case, where within the past eight years the Supreme Court of Arkansas has reversed a death sentence for an error in the jury verdict forms, in Willett v. State, the Court would not be fulfilling its obligation to complete a thorough state review under Arkansas rules and state law. Robbins v. State, 353 Ark. 556, 114 S.W.3d 217 (2003).

Cited: Lee v. State, 367 Ark. 84, 238 S.W.3d 52 (2006).

16-91-205. Severability.

  1. If any provision of this subchapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this subchapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this subchapter are declared to be severable.
  2. In the event that any provision of this subchapter is found to be an invalid encroachment upon the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court, that provision shall be deemed to be a resolution of the General Assembly recommending the adoption of the provision by court rule.

History. Acts 1997, No. 925, § 8.

16-91-206. Title.

This subchapter is known and may be cited as the “Arkansas Effective Death Penalty Act of 1997”.

History. Acts 1997, No. 925, § 1.

Chapter 92 Costs, Fees, Fines, Etc.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1741, § 1, provided:

“(a) In those counties with a population between forty thousand (40,000) and forty-one thousand (41,000) according to the 2000 federal decennial census, the circuit courts shall assess, at the time of sentencing, a mandatory fine of one hundred dollars ($100) for all felony violations of state law that shall be deposited into the county general fund of the county in which the court sits and appropriated by the local quorum court to provide and compensate circuit court bailiffs.

“(b) The compensation package of the bailiffs provided under subsection (a) of this section shall be determined by the local quorum court.”

Cross References. Fees generally, § 21-6-101 et seq.

Fines and costs, § 5-4-201 et seq.

Judgment for costs, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 13.

Effective Dates. Acts 1848, § 4, p. 41: effective on passage.

Acts 1875, No. 77, § 53: effective on passage.

Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 58, § 15: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 114, § 226: effective on passage.

Acts 1889, No. 4, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 231, § 2: Mar. 27, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “On account of the fact that there are many innocent holders of property whose title thereto might be insecure, and the Act being necessary to preserve the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and the Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 24, § 6: Feb. 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that expenses incurred by the counties of this State in conducting trials for persons charged with felonies are great in many instances, that the expenses incurred by counties in the trials of persons charged with escape from the Arkansas Department of Corrections are great, that all these expenses are a serious financial drain on the resources of the counties, that there is a need for immediate financial assistance to counties responsible for the expenses of these trials and that enactment of this legislation will provide immediate financial assistance to counties which will be responsible for these expenses. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 39, § 3: Jan. 25, 1980. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the 72nd General Assembly, meeting in Extraordinary Session, that by mistake, Act 24 of 1979 was not provided moneys with which to fulfill the State's commitments to counties on account of trial expenses and that without this assistance, certain counties would suffer severe financial hardships. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary to protect the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 21: July 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly that the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in State v. Post et al, Case No. 92-787, has created great uncertainty regarding the payment of the legal fees and expenses in connection with the legal representation of indigent persons charged with crimes punishable by imprisonment and that delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1993, would cause irreparable harm to the proper implementation of a statewide public defender program. Therefore, and emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1993.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Right of indigent criminal defendant to polygraph test at public expense. 11 A.L.R.4th 733.

Am. Jur. 21A Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 847 et seq.

C.J.S. 24 C.J.S., Crim. Proc., § 2059 et seq.

16-92-101. Costs and fees — Defendant's property bound from time of arrest.

  1. The property, both real and personal, of any person charged with a criminal offense shall be bound from the time of his or her arrest or the finding of an indictment against him or her, whichever shall first happen, for the payment of all fines and costs which he or she may be adjudged to pay. However, no such lien shall be enforced unless the county judge of the county in which the judgment is rendered on the criminal charge shall file, or cause to be filed, with the circuit clerk of the county in which the person may own property, and within six (6) months after the rendition of judgment against the person, a notice of lis pendens as provided for in §§ 16-59-101 — 16-59-105, 16-59-107, and 16-66-402 and shall cause suit to be instituted to enforce the lien within two (2) years after the date of the filing of the notice.
  2. The filing of a suit within the time prescribed for filing the notice shall be sufficient compliance with the requirements as to notice.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 202; C. & M. Dig., § 3270; Acts 1929, No. 231, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 4116; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2403.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Criminal Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 153.

Case Notes

Lien.

This section creates a lien in favor of the state upon the property of the accused, wheresoever it may be found within the limits of the state, which binds it not only in his hands, but of any person in possession, from the time of arrest or indictment found until the accused is discharged or the fines and costs adjudged against him are paid; but this section does not confiscate the property or divest defendant of the possession and use of it during the prosecution. Lawson v. Johnson & Ashley, 5 Ark. 168 (1843).

A homestead is not subject to a lien for costs. Hollis v. State, 59 Ark. 211, 27 S.W. 73 (1894).

This section creates a lien on all property of defendant from time of his arrest, and gathers within its sweep all property owned by him until the judgment subsequently rendered is paid. Western Tie & Timber Co. v. Campbell, 113 Ark. 570, 169 S.W. 253 (1914).

The imposition of the fine constituted a judgment which became a lien on all property of appellant owned or acquired at any time after his arrest. Cherry v. Hall, 251 Ark. 305, 472 S.W.2d 225 (1971).

Return of Money.

Money taken from defendant at the time of his arrest, except for a marked bill, should have been returned upon a signed receipt identifying the amount and kind of bills. Powell v. State, 260 Ark. 381, 540 S.W.2d 1 (1976).

Third Party Claimants.

Unappealed adjudication that county had a lien on automobile was a bar to equity suit for possession of the automobile instituted by third party claimant who had intervened in the adjudicated case. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. O'Dell, 193 Ark. 246, 98 S.W.2d 953 (1936).

16-92-102. Costs and fees — Execution.

  1. The clerk of the court, at the end of each term, shall issue executions for all fines imposed on indictments, in penal actions, or otherwise, and for the costs of conviction in criminal cases during the term, and remaining unpaid, which shall be executed in the same manner as executions in civil cases. The property of the defendant may be seized and sold, notwithstanding that he or she may be in custody for the same demand.
  2. In every case where a witness is summoned by a special subpoena to testify in a particular case in which an indictment may be found, it shall be the duty of the clerk to tax the attendance of the witness with the cost of the suit, to be collected from the defendant, in the event that judgment shall be rendered against him or her therefor, and to be paid into the county treasury.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 203; Acts 1857, § 2, p. 131; Crim. Code, § 296; C. & M. Dig., § 3271; Pope's Dig., § 4117; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2404.

Cross References. Collection after default, § 5-4-204.

Case Notes

Cited: Hudmon v. Coonfield, 239 Ark. 1063, 396 S.W.2d 296 (1965); Cherry v. Hall, 251 Ark. 305, 472 S.W.2d 225 (1971).

16-92-103. Costs and fees — Severed defendants.

Where two (2) or more defendants are joined in one (1) indictment and shall sever in the trial, the costs which shall have accrued before the severance shall be adjudged against such of the defendants as may have been convicted, and the costs thereafter accruing shall be apportioned and adjudged accordingly.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 198; C. & M. Dig., § 3269; Pope's Dig., § 4115; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2402.

16-92-104. Costs and fees — Capital cases.

The costs in all cases of conviction where the convict may be sentenced to suffer death, and all expenses attending the execution of the sentence, shall be adjudged and taxed by the court and paid out of the estate of the convict, and execution may be issued against the estate of the convict therefor.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, § 197; C. & M. Dig., § 3268; Pope's Dig., § 4114; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2401.

16-92-105. Costs and fees — Liability of county.

  1. Fees allowed in criminal cases shall be paid by the defendant, but if sufficient property belonging to the defendant cannot be found for that purpose, the fees shall be paid by the county where the conviction is had, except in cases of misdemeanors, when the county shall not be liable.
  2. In all criminal or penal cases pending under indictment in the circuit courts, if the defendant shall be acquitted or if nolle prosequi shall be entered by the prosecuting attorney, except in cases where the prosecutor shall be adjudged to pay the costs or, in cases of felony, if the defendant shall be convicted and shall not have the property to pay the costs, the costs shall be paid by the county.
  3. The county shall not be liable for costs when the defendant is convicted until execution shall have been issued against the property of the convict and returned unsatisfied for the want of property to satisfy the costs; unless the court in which the trial was held shall certify that, in the opinion of the court, the costs cannot be made out of the property of the defendant.
  4. Whenever the county shall be liable to pay the costs and expenses in criminal cases, the circuit court for the county in which the case was held shall adjust the costs and expenses and cause them to be certified to the county court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 45, §§ 205-207; Acts 1875, No. 77, § 5, p. 167; 1889, No. 4, § 1, p. 3; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3272-3275; Pope's Dig., §§ 4118-4120, 4123; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2405 — 43-2408.

Case Notes

Adjustment and Certification.

County court could not allow a claim for costs in a criminal case not certified by the circuit court trying the cause. Peay v. Searcy County, 104 Ark. 133, 148 S.W. 500 (1912).

While the county is liable for costs in an unsuccessful criminal prosecution, the sole remedy of one attempting to collect such costs is by the procedure of subsection (d). Powell v. State, 233 Ark. 438, 345 S.W.2d 8 (1961).

Allowance of Claims.

Certain claims were allowable out of current revenue, and not out of the revenue of previous years, and could still be paid out of that revenue in subsequent years if there was a sufficient surplus. Poinsett County v. Lady, 199 Ark. 657, 135 S.W.2d 665 (1940).

Bond.

The taking of a bond not in conformity with the statutory requirements does not acquit the officer of liability for fines and costs. Wilson v. White, 82 Ark. 407, 102 S.W. 201 (1907).

Cases of Felony.

The words “cases of felony” refer to cases where the indictment and trial is for a felony, including those cases where conviction is for a misdemeanor of the same generic class as the felony. Smith v. State, 105 Ark. 58, 150 S.W. 149 (1912).

Collection.

In felony cases, the clerk cannot demand fees in advance. Jordan v. State, 102 Ark. 43, 143 S.W. 131 (1912).

Sheriff was not entitled to credit on gross receipts of his office for fees earned by him in misdemeanor cases but not collected. Miller County v. Sewell, 192 Ark. 808, 94 S.W.2d 1042 (1936).

In misdemeanor cases, the county is not liable for justice's fees, and the justice of the peace could only recover his fee if the accused was convicted, which amounted to a violation of due process. Doty v. Goodwin, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 233 (1969).

The fact that a justice of the peace may have a pecuniary interest in the conviction of a defendant in a misdemeanor case does not prevent him exercising jurisdiction if he elects to serve without compensation upon either conviction or acquittal. Doty v. Goodwin, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 233 (1969).

Fines Imposed Prior to Incumbency.

It is the duty of a sheriff to collect all fines imposed during the incumbency of his predecessor in office and which have not been paid. Wilson v. Chaney, 117 Ark. 287, 174 S.W. 564 (1915).

Liability of Sheriff.

Where the sheriff has in his custody a prisoner against whom a fine has been adjudged, it is his duty to collect the fine and he is chargeable with and liable therefor. Wilson v. Chaney, 117 Ark. 287, 174 S.W. 564 (1915).

Method of Payment.

The authority of the sheriff to accept a note or bond for the payment of a fine and costs could have been utilized to provide an instalment payment system for those whose payments were secured by solvent surety. Cherry v. Hall, 251 Ark. 305, 472 S.W.2d 225 (1971).

Misdemeanors.

If one accused of a felony is tried and acquitted of the felony but convicted of a misdemeanor of the same generic class included in the indictment, the county is liable for costs if the accused has no property out of which a judgment for costs can be made. Boone County v. Mitchell, 64 Ark. 125, 40 S.W. 784 (1897); Smith v. State, 105 Ark. 58, 150 S.W. 149 (1912).

Cited: Hempstead County v. Harkness, 73 Ark. 600, 84 S.W. 799 (1905); Union County v. Warner Brown Hosp., 297 Ark. 460, 762 S.W.2d 798 (1989).

16-92-106. Costs and fees — Justices of the peace.

  1. In all cases of felony where complaint shall be made before any justice of the peace or other officer, and the party against whom the complaint shall be made shall, upon a hearing thereof, be discharged, committed to jail, or bound over for his or her appearance at the circuit court, the justice or other officer or person to whom any fees may be due shall make out a fee bill for his or her costs allowed by law which may have accrued in the case. He or she shall present to the county court an itemized account, duly sworn to, which shall be examined as provided in subsection (b) of this section and, if found correct, audited and allowed by the county court.
  2. It shall be the duty of the county court to carefully examine the fee bills, and it may, in its discretion, summon witnesses to enable it to ascertain the correctness and validity of the fee bills. If, upon examination and investigation, the county court shall be of the opinion that the fee bills are not authorized by law or are based upon frivolous, malicious, or unauthorized prosecutions improperly allowed by any magistrate, then the county court may reduce, modify, or wholly disallow the fee bills.

History. Acts 1875, No. 77, §§ 36, 37, p. 167; 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 58, § 13, p. 103; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4603, 4604; Pope's Dig., §§ 5692, 5693; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2412, 43-2413.

Case Notes

Mayor as Justice of Peace.

If the mayor sits as a justice of the peace, the fine goes to the county. Incorporated Town of Pocahontas v. State ex. rel. Randolph County, 114 Ark. 448, 170 S.W. 89 (1914).

Violations of Ordinances.

An incorporated town is entitled to fines collected in the mayor's court for violations of ordinances imposing penalties for acts which are also offenses against the state. Town of Hackett City v. State ex rel. Greenwood Dist., 56 Ark. 133, 19 S.W. 426 (1892); Incorporated Town of Pocahontas v. State ex. rel. Randolph County, 114 Ark. 448, 170 S.W. 89 (1914).

Verification of Fee Bills.

This section excludes the operation of the general law providing the method of verifying claims against counties. Saline County v. Kinkead, 84 Ark. 329, 105 S.W. 581 (1907).

Cited: Cobb v. Jackson County, 64 Ark. 162, 41 S.W. 322 (1897).

16-92-107. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning costs, fees and prosecuting attorney information before justice of the peace, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 217. The section was derived from Acts 1925, No. 116, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 10887; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2411.

16-92-108. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning fee caps for attorneys appointed to represent indigent persons, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 20. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 246, § 1; 1985, No. 1076, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2419. For current law, see § 14-20-102.

16-92-109. Costs and fees — Reimbursement to counties — Definition.

    1. As used in this section, “costs incurred by the county” means all costs incurred by the county in bringing to trial or trials any person or persons charged with a felony offense, with a crime committed in furtherance of, or in connection with, an escape from the Division of Correction, or with escape from the division.
    2. Costs shall include, but shall not be limited to, salaries and expenses, except normal salaries and expenses incurred by the prosecuting attorney in investigation and prosecution, by the county sheriff in investigation and custody, and by the public defender or court-appointed attorney or attorneys in investigation and defense, as well as all other costs, including the expenses involved in the trial itself.
    3. Expenses shall also include extraordinary expenses for such services as witness fees and expenses, court-appointed expert witnesses, reporter fees, costs of preparing transcripts, necessary courtroom security reasonably required to protect the court and participants, and other direct trial costs.
    4. Trial shall be deemed to include all pretrial hearings and post-conviction proceedings, if any.
  1. Whenever a trial is held in which a crime committed in furtherance of, or in connection with, an escape from the division is charged or whenever a trial is held for escape from the custody of the division, the county or counties responsible for the trial or trials of the person or persons charged may apply to the Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration for reimbursement of the total costs incurred by the county or counties in each case.
    1. The county responsible for the costs of the felony proceedings or trial on charges of escape or in connection with escape from the division, shall prepare a statement of all costs incurred in connection with the proceedings, which shall be certified by the presiding judge of the circuit court or courts.
    2. The statement of costs incurred by the county or counties shall be sent to the secretary together with the county's application for reimbursement.
    1. The secretary shall audit and examine all statements of costs incurred by the county received by him or her in accordance with this section and shall determine whether the costs included in the statements comply with the provisions of this section.
    2. The secretary shall cause the amount of such costs as he or she determines comply with this section to be paid to the county or counties from the Trial Expense Assistance Fund, which is established by this section on the books of the Treasurer of State, the secretary, and the Auditor of State, which shall consist of moneys transferred to the Trial Expense Assistance Fund, as costs are incurred, from the Miscellaneous Revolving Fund.
  2. The secretary may make disbursements from the Trial Expense Assistance Fund to pay court-awarded attorney's fees and costs to court-appointed attorneys for indigent defendants.

History. Acts 1979, No. 24, §§ 1-5; 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 39, § 1; 1985, No. 419, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2408.1 — 43-2408.5; Acts 1993, No. 793, § 1; 1993, No. 1193, § 20; 2019, No. 910, § 878.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section; substituted “Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration” for “Director of the Department of Finance and Administration” in (b); and substituted “secretary” for “director” throughout (c), (d), and (e).

Cross References. Miscellaneous Revolving Fund, § 19-5-1009.

Trial Expense Assistance Fund, § 19-5-1053.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Case Notes

Expenses.

Although no guidelines governing the payment of experts and investigative expenses are given by this section, the decision concerning the award of reasonable expenses rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Crittenden County, 320 Ark. 356, 896 S.W.2d 881 (1995).

16-92-110, 16-92-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning costs and fees generally and judicial district prosecuting attorneys for counties over 200,000 population, were repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The sections were derived from the following sources:

16-92-110. Acts 1951, No. 31, § 4; 1959, No. 487, § 1; 1969, No. 194, § 1; 1970 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 151, §§ 1, 2; 1981, No. 325, § 1; 1981, No. 434, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2414 — 43-2414.2; Acts 1991, No. 904, §§ 12, 20; 1993, No. 113, § 1; 1993, No. 325, § 1; 1993, No. 1234, § 1.

16-92-111. Acts 1985, No. 621, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2414n; Acts 1991, No. 904, §§ 13, 20.

16-92-112. Costs and fees — Liability of state.

  1. The costs in all state prosecutions for any offenses which may be committed in or in respect of the Division of Correction shall be paid out of the State Treasury.
  2. In the cases mentioned in subsection (a) of this section, it shall be the duty of the judge to cause to be made out an accurate bill of costs therein and to certify to its correctness; it shall be the duty of the Auditor of State to draw his or her warrant for the amount when an appropriation shall be made therefor.

History. Acts 1848, §§ 1-3, p. 41; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3276, 3277; Pope's Dig., §§ 4124, 4125; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2409, 43-2410; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 879.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a).

16-92-113. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning fines and disposition, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 134, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1883, No. 114, § 212, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., § 10183; Pope's Dig., § 13966; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2501.

16-92-114. Fines — Abstract.

  1. At the close of the term of each circuit court, the clerk of the circuit court shall furnish to the clerk of the county court an official abstract of all fines, penalties, and forfeitures adjudged against defendants during the term of the circuit court.
  2. The abstract shall contain the style of each case, the full name of the parties, and amount of each fine, and the penalty and forfeiture separately.

History. Acts 1883, No. 114, § 219, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., § 10190; Pope's Dig., § 13973; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2502.

16-92-115, 16-92-116. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning fines and duties of sheriffs and circuit clerks and additional court costs and disposition and use of funds, were repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1765, § 24, and Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The sections were derived from:

16-92-115: Acts 1883, No. 114, §§ 220, 222, 223, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., §§ 10191, 10193, 10194; Pope's Dig., §§ 13974, 13976, 13977; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2503 — 43-2505; Acts 1987, No. 129, §§ 1, 2.

16-92-116: Acts 1987, No. 185, §§ 1-4.

16-92-117. Enhancement of the rate of collection of fine revenue — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “fine” or “fines” means all monetary penalties imposed by the district courts of this state, which include fines payable to the county general fund, the city general fund, and other state agencies, court costs, probation fees, and public service work supervisory fees.
    1. The Supreme Court Committee on Automation shall prescribe, in cooperation with the Administrative Office of the Courts, Arkansas Legislative Audit, the Association of Arkansas Counties, and the Arkansas Municipal League, appropriate forms for the reporting and allocation of all fines and such other information relevant to the income received by the various state, county, and city entities from district courts.
    2. Each district court in this state, if requested, shall provide this information to the committee for the twelve-month period immediately preceding the installation of the computer hardware and software as required by contract for the district court automation system.
      1. The state agency or entity which receives fine revenue from a district court in which this system is installed may contract with the vendor or private contractor selected by the committee to pay a percentage of any increased fine revenue to the vendor or private contractor to be used for the maintenance and operation of the system.
      2. The percentage to be received by the vendor or private contractor shall be agreed upon in advance by the state agency or entity affected.
      1. The county quorum court or the governing body of the city in which a district court having the system installed is located, or both, may contract with the vendor or private contractor selected by the committee to pay a percentage of any increased fine revenue to the vendor or private contractor to be used for the maintenance and operation of the system.
      2. The percentage to be received by the vendor or private contractor shall be agreed upon in advance by the county quorum court or the governing body of the city in which the district court is located, or both.
        1. Each district court in which the system is installed shall submit a report to the state agency or entity affected, either the county quorum court or the governing body of the city in which the district court is located, or both, for each twelve-month period immediately following installation of the system.
        2. This report shall be compared to the fine revenue received for the twelve-month period immediately preceding installation of the system which shall be the base year.
      1. The dollar amount of increase in fine revenue in each of the twelve-month periods immediately following installation of the system shall be compared to the twelve-month period immediately preceding installation.
        1. The dollar amount of increase in fine revenue as determined in this section shall be the basis for determining the funds due the vendor or private contractor for each year that the system is in operation.
        2. This amount shall be determined within forty-five (45) days after the end of the twelve-month period.
      2. Within sixty (60) days after the twelve-month period, each district court in which the system is installed shall remit to the vendor or private contractor one-twelfth (1/12) of the amount as determined in this subdivision (c)(3) for the succeeding twelve (12) months.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1696, §§ 2, 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1696, § 1, provided:

“(a) It is found by the General Assembly that the current system of case management, accounting, data collection, and data exchange in our state judicial system will be enhanced by the installation of a uniform computer system in the state's district courts. It is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system is not sufficient to provide this needed system. Finally, it is determined that performance-based budgeting is in the state's best interest.

“(b) It is, therefore, the intent of this section to implement a performance-based budgeting option for the state, counties, and cities to utilize for those courts which choose to acquire the uniform computer system selected by the Supreme Court Committee on Automation for the state's district courts.”

16-92-118. Fines — Collection and deposit — Definition.

    1. Notwithstanding § 16-13-709, the quorum court of each county of this state may delegate the responsibility for the electronic collection of fines assessed in a circuit court of this state within that county to the Administrative Office of the Courts or the Information Network of Arkansas.
    2. Fines collected in each circuit court by the Administrative Office of the Courts or the Information Network of Arkansas shall be remitted by the fifth working day of the following month to the county official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in that circuit court to be disbursed to the appropriate county fund, state entity, or state agency as provided by law.
    1. Notwithstanding § 16-13-709, the governing body or, if applicable and by mutual agreement, each governing body of a political subdivision that contributes to the expenses of a district court or the governing body of the city in which a city court is located may designate the responsibility for the electronic collection of fines assessed in that district court or that city court to the Administrative Office of the Courts or the Information Network of Arkansas.
    2. Fines collected in each district court or each department of district court by the Administrative Office of the Courts or the Information Network of Arkansas shall be remitted by the fifth working day of the following month to the county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in that district court to be disbursed under § 16-17-707.
  1. Fines collected in each city court by the Administrative Office of the Courts or the Information Network of Arkansas shall be disbursed by the fifth working day of the following month to the city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in that city court to be disbursed to the general fund or other city fund, state agency, or state entity as provided by law.
    1. The Administrative Office of the Courts or the Information Network of Arkansas shall be allowed to charge a transaction fee for any electronic payment of a court-ordered fine by an approved credit card or debit card.
    2. The fee provided for in subdivision (d)(1) of this section collected by the Administrative Office of the Courts shall be deposited by the fifth day of each month into the Judicial Fine Collection Enhancement Fund established by § 16-13-712.
    1. This section does not prohibit the county or city official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in a circuit court, district court, or city court of this state from the electronic collection of fines. The quorum court of each county may establish a transaction fee to be charged by the county official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in a circuit court within that county for any electronic payment of a court-ordered fine by an approved credit card or debit card.
    2. The governing body or, if applicable and by mutual agreement, each governing body of a political subdivision that contributes to the expenses of a district court or the governing body of the city in which a city court is located, may establish a transaction fee to be charged by the city or county official, agency, or department designated under § 16-13-709 as primarily responsible for the collection of fines assessed in that district court or city court for any electronic payment of a court-ordered fine by an approved credit card or debit card.
    3. The fee provided for in subdivisions (e)(1) and (2) of this section collected by the designated county or city official, agency, or department shall be deposited by the tenth day of each month into the appropriate circuit court automation fund, district court automation fund, or city court automation fund established under § 16-13-704 to be used solely for the purposes stated in that section.
    1. The procedures established by this section apply to the assessment and collection of all monetary fines, however designated, imposed by circuit courts, district courts, or city courts for criminal convictions, traffic convictions, civil violations, and juvenile delinquency adjudications and shall be used to obtain prompt and full payment of all such fines.
    2. As used in this section, “fine” or “fines” means all monetary penalties imposed by the courts of this state, which include fines, court costs, restitution, probation fees, and public service work supervisory fees.

History. Acts 2009, No. 328, § 4; 2011, No. 1218, § 13.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2009, No. 328, §§ 1, 2, provided:

“SECTION 1. Pursuant to Arkansas Code § 16-10-101 and 16-10-102, the Arkansas Supreme Court, through the Administrative Office of the Courts, is responsible for the design, purchase, implementation, and operation of a comprehensive automated court management system for use by all district, circuit, and appellate courts in the State of Arkansas.

“In 2001, the Arkansas Supreme Court created the Arkansas Court Automation Project to carry out these responsibilities and appointed the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Automation to oversee the project. Since that time a comprehensive system has been bid and purchased, redesigned for maximum use in Arkansas courts, and implemented in a number of pilot courts in the state. The system is now completed and scheduled for distribution and use by all of the courts in the state.“The purpose of this Act is to provide a structure for the perpetual staffing and operation of the system so that the system is self-supporting and all funding is generated by and through use of the system and without any use of the general revenue funds of the State of Arkansas.” “SECTION 2. This Act is to be known as the ‘Court Technology Improvement Act of 2009.’”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “a transaction fee” for “an access fee not to exceed ten dollars ($10.00” in (d)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2); redesignated (e)(3) and (e)(4) as (e)(2) and (e)(3); and substituted “subdivisions (e)(1) and (2)” for “subdivisions (e)(2) and (3)” in (e)(3).

16-92-119. Training regarding fines dedicated for the Safe Harbor Fund for Sexually Exploited Children.

  1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall educate judges regarding the fines dedicated for the Safe Harbor Fund for Sexually Exploited Children under §§ 5-18-103(d), 5-70-102(d), and 5-70-103(d).
  2. The Prosecutor Coordinator's office shall educate prosecutors regarding the fines dedicated for the fund under §§ 5-18-103(d), 5-70-102(d), and 5-70-103(d).
  3. The Arkansas Circuit Clerks Association and the Arkansas District Court Clerks Association shall educate circuit and district court clerks regarding the fines dedicated for the fund under §§ 5-18-103(d), 5-70-102(d), and 5-70-103(d).

History. Acts 2015, No. 1138, § 4.

Chapter 93 Probation and Parole

Research References

ALR.

Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 5 A.L.R.4th 773.

Conditioning probation on defendant's serving part of period in jail or prison. 6 A.L.R.4th 446.

Injuries caused by negligently released individual. 6 A.L.R.4th 1155.

Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody. 12 A.L.R.4th 722.

Propriety, as condition of probation, of requiring that probationer refrain from consumption of alcoholic beverages. 19 A.L.R.4th 1251.

Halfway house, rehabilitation center, or other restrictive environment as condition. 24 A.L.R.4th 789.

Conditioning probation on defendant's not entering specified geographical area. 28 A.L.R.4th 725.

Right of convicted defendant to refuse probation. 28 A.L.R.4th 736.

Probation officer's liability for negligent supervision of probationer. 44 A.L.R.4th 638.

Am. Jur. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pard., § 72 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Disposition of Offenders: Under Arkansas' New Criminal Code, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 222.

C.J.S. 67A C.J.S., Pard., § 46 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

Chapter 93 is for the use of the Department of Correction in determining parole eligibility and the court has no authority to determine the manner in which the Board of Pardons and Parole exercises its prerogative. Jones v. State, 270 Ark. 328, 605 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 46: Mar. 1, 1968. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds that the penal system of the State of Arkansas is in need of immediate reform, in order better to effectuate the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crime and to make possible their return as useful members of the community, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to establish a Department of Correction to effectuate such rehabilitation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after March 1, 1968.”

Acts 1983, No. 887, § 4: Mar. 28, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Sections 1 and 2 of Act 70 of 1981 need immediate amending. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, safety, shall be in full force and effect after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2013, No. 282, § 17: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 48(a): Sept. 1, 2015. Effective date clause provided: “Sections 11, 12, 13, and 20 of this act are effective on and after September 1, 2015.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-93-101. Definitions.

As used in this act:

  1. “Case plan” means an individualized accountability and behavior change strategy for supervised individuals that:
    1. Targets and prioritizes the specific criminal risk factors of the offender based upon his or her assessment results;
    2. Matches the type and intensity of supervision and treatment conditions to the offender's level of risk, criminal risk factors, and individual characteristics, such as gender, culture, motivational stage, developmental stage, and learning style;
    3. Establishes a timetable for achieving specific behavioral goals, including a schedule for payment of victim restitution, child support, and other financial obligations; and
    4. Specifies positive and negative actions that will be taken in response to the supervised individual's behaviors;
  2. “Criminal risk factors” are characteristics and behaviors that affect a person's risk for committing crimes and may include without limitation the following risk and criminogenic need factors:
    1. Antisocial personality;
    2. Criminal thinking;
    3. Criminal associates;
    4. Dysfunctional family;
    5. Low levels of employment or education; and
    6. Substance abuse;
  3. “Detriment to the community” means a person who has:
    1. Demonstrated a pattern of behavior that indicates disregard for the safety and welfare of others;
    2. Exhibited violence or repeated violent tendencies;
    3. Has been convicted of a felony involving violence, as defined under § 5-4-501(d)(2); or
    4. During the three (3) calendar years before the person's parole hearing:
      1. Demonstrated a documented lack of respect for authority towards law enforcement or prison officials while in the custody of the Division of Correction, the Division of Community Correction, or a law enforcement agency; or
      2. Accrued multiple disciplinary violations while in the custody of the Division of Correction, the Division of Community Correction, or a law enforcement agency, including at least one (1) disciplinary violation involving violence or sexual assault while in the custody of the Division of Correction, the Division of Community Correction, or a law enforcement agency;
  4. “Evidence-based practices” means policies, procedures, programs, and practices proven by scientific research to reliably produce reductions in recidivism;
  5. “Intermediate sanctions” means a nonprison accountability measure imposed on an offender in response to a violation of supervision conditions. Such measures may include without limitation:
    1. The use of electronic supervision tools;
    2. Drug and alcohol testing or monitoring;
    3. Day or evening reporting;
    4. Restitution;
    5. Forfeiture of earned discharge credits;
    6. Rehabilitative interventions such as substance abuse and mental health treatment;
    7. Reporting requirements to probation or parole officers;
    8. Community service or community work project;
    9. Secure or unsecure residential treatment facilities; and
    10. Short-term, intermittent incarceration;
  6. “Jacket review” means the review of the file of a transfer-eligible inmate located at any correctional facility in the state by an individual staff member or team of staff members of the Division of Community Correction for purposes of preparing the inmate's application for parole consideration by the Parole Board;
  7. “Parole” means the release of the prisoner into the community by the board prior to the expiration of his or her term, subject to conditions imposed by the board and to the supervision of the Division of Community Correction. When a court or other authority has filed a warrant against the prisoner, the board may release him or her on parole to answer the warrant of the court or authority;
  8. “Probation” means a procedure under which a defendant, found guilty upon verdict or plea, is released by the court without imprisonment, subject to conditions imposed by the court and subject to the supervision of the Division of Community Correction, but only if the supervision is requested in writing by the court;
  9. “Recidivism” means the return to incarceration in a Division of Correction or Division of Community Correction community correctional facility other than a technical violator program within a three-year period;
  10. “Risk needs assessment review” means an examination of the results of a validated risk-needs assessment;
  11. “Serious conditions violation” means a violation of the conditions of a parolee's parole or probationer's probation that results from an arrest for a misdemeanor offense that does not involve:
    1. An act involving a violent misdemeanor that provides the prosecuting attorney with the option to revoke the probationer's probation or parolee's parole, or allow the Division of Community Correction to utilize the sanctions provided under this chapter;
    2. An offense for which a conviction would require the person to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.;
    3. A misdemeanor offense of harassment or stalking or that contains a threat of violence to a victim, or a threat of violence to a family member of the victim of the offense for which the defendant was placed on probation or parole;
    4. A misdemeanor offense of driving or boating while intoxicated, § 5-65-103, when the probationer or parolee is currently being supervised for a felony offense of § 5-65-103, § 5-10-104, or § 5-10-105, and the felony offense was alcohol-related or drug-related; or
    5. Except for an offense under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, § 5-64-101 et seq., a misdemeanor offense that is a lesser included offense or falls within the same chapter of the Arkansas Criminal Code of the offense for which the defendant was placed on probation or parole;
  12. “Technical conditions violation” means:
    1. A violation of the conditions of a parolee's parole or a probationer's probation that results from a noncriminal act or positive drug screen; or
    2. The parolee or probationer absenting himself or herself from supervision;
    1. “Treatment” means targeted interventions that focus on criminal risk factors in order to reduce the likelihood of criminal behavior.
    2. Treatment options may include without limitation:
      1. Community-based programs that are consistent with evidence-based practices;
      2. Cognitive behavioral programs;
      3. Inpatient and outpatient substance abuse and mental health programs; and
      4. Other available prevention and intervention programs that have been scientifically proven to reliably reduce recidivism; and
  13. “Validated risk-needs assessment” means a determination of a person's risk to reoffend and the needs that, when addressed, reduce the risk to reoffend through the use of an actuarial assessment tool that assesses the dynamic and static factors that drive criminal behavior.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 23; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2801; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 286; 2011, No. 570, § 84; 2015, No. 895, § 18; 2017, No. 423, § 16; 2019, No. 910, §§ 880-885.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (1), substituted “Department of Community Correction” for “Board of Pardons and Paroles” and added “and” at the end; and, in (2), substituted “Parole Board” for “Board of Pardons and Paroles” and “the supervision of the Department of Community Correction” for “its supervision” and inserted “or her” twice.

The 2011 amendment added (1) through (5); redesignated former (1) and (2) as (6) and (7); and added (8) through (11).

The 2015 amendment added the definition for “Detriment to the community”.

The 2017 amendment added the definitions for “Serious conditions violation” and “Technical conditions violation”.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, codified as §§ 12-27-10112-27-105, 12-27-10712-27-109, 12-27-112, 12-27-113, 12-27-115, 12-27-118, 12-27-120, 12-28-102, 12-29-101, 12-29-103, 12-29-104, 12-29-107, 12-29-112, 12-29-401, 12-30-301, 12-30-306, 12-30-401, 12-30-403, 12-30-40512-30-407, 16-93-101, 16-93-102, 16-93-20216-93-204, 16-93-601, 16-93-610, 16-93-701, 16-93-705.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

16-93-102. Applicability of act to certain persons.

The provisions of this act are extended to any person who as of March 1, 1968, may be on parole or eligible to be placed on parole under existing laws, with the same force and effect as if this act had been in operation at the time the person was placed on parole or became eligible to be placed thereon, as the case may be.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 33; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2812.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-93-101.

16-93-103. Authority of officers to make arrests and carry firearms.

  1. A probation officer appointed by a circuit court or district court, excluding a juvenile probation officer, and a parole and probation officer employed by the Division of Community Correction who is a currently certified law enforcement officer may execute, serve, and return all lawful warrants of arrest issued by the State of Arkansas or any political subdivision of the state and are otherwise authorized to make lawful arrests as is any law enforcement officer of the State of Arkansas.
  2. A parole and probation officer either employed by the division or another entity authorized to employ a parole and probation officer may carry a:
    1. Firearm during all hours in which he or she is actively engaged in the obligations and duties of the office to which he or she is appointed or employed, pursuant to selection and training requirements under §§ 12-9-104, 12-9-106, and 12-9-107; and
    2. Nonstate-issued firearm during all hours in which he or she is not actively pursuing the obligations and duties of the office to which he or she is appointed.
  3. A parole and probation officer employed by the division may also carry:
    1. A nonstate-issued firearm as a secondary weapon while actively engaged in the duties of the office to which he or she is appointed or employed; and
    2. A state-issued firearm during all hours in which he or she is not actively engaged in the duties of the office to which he or she is appointed or employed, except that a parole and probation officer may not carry a firearm issued by the division while the parole and probation officer is actively working at employment other than for the division.

History. Acts 1983, No. 617, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2332.1; Acts 1997, No. 283, § 1; 1999, No. 1456, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 218; 2005, No. 1994, § 324; 2017, No. 239, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (c); substituted “district” for “municipal” and “Department of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Punishment.”

The 2005 amendment substituted “employed” for “employed, pursuant to the restrictions in § 5-73-306” in (c).

The 2017 amendment, in (a), inserted “circuit court or district” following “appointed by”, and substituted “and a parole” for “whether a circuit court or district court, and any parole”, and “of the state and are” for “thereof and is”; and rewrote (b) and (c).

16-93-104. Supervision fee — Direct payment by offender — Failure to pay.

    1. Any offender on probation, parole, or transfer under supervision of the Division of Community Correction shall pay to the division a monthly fee of thirty-five dollars ($35.00).
    2. The Director of the Division of Community Correction or his or her designee shall deposit each payment received into the State Treasury as special revenues credited to the Community Correction Revolving Fund.
    3. Expenditures from the fund shall be used for continuation and expansion of community correction programs and supervision as established and approved by the Board of Corrections.
    1. When an offender on probation defaults in the payment of supervision fees or any installment thereof, the court may require the offender to show cause why he or she would not be imprisoned for nonpayment.
    2. The offender shall not be imprisoned if the offender is financially unable to make the payments and states so to the court in writing, under oath, and the court so finds.
    3. Unless the offender shows that his or her default was not attributable to a purposeful refusal to obey the sentence of the court or to a failure on his or her part to make a good faith effort to obtain the funds required for payment, the court may order the defendant imprisoned until the payments are made.
    4. If the court determines that the default in payment is not attributable to the causes specified in subdivision (b)(3) of this section, the court may enter an order allowing the offender additional time for payment, reducing the amount of each installment, or revoking the fees or the unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part.
    1. The offender on parole may be imprisoned for violation of parole if the offender is financially able to make the payments and if the payments are not made and the Parole Board so finds, subject to the limitations set out in this subsection.
    2. The offender shall not be imprisoned if the offender is financially unable to make the payments and states so under oath to the Parole Board in writing, and the Parole Board so finds.
  1. Court costs under § 16-10-305 shall be collected in full before any fees are collected under this section.

History. Acts 1981, No. 70, §§ 1, 2; 1983, No. 887, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2808.1, 43-2808.2; Acts 1997, No. 278, § 1; 2011, No. 570, § 85; 2013, No. 282, § 11; 2019, No. 249, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1307.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2019, No. 315, § 1307, amended the introductory language of subdivision (a)(2)(B)(ii) of this section to replace "regulations" with "rules". However, Acts 2019, No. 249, § 1, specifically repealed subdivision (a)(2)(B)(ii) of this section, and, pursuant to Acts 2019, No. 315, § 3204(c), was the later act.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “parole, or transfer” for “or parole”, inserted “monthly”, and substituted “of thirty-five dollars ($35.00)” for “as determined by the Board of Corrections”; subdivided (a)(2); substituted “Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) of each payment” for “the payments” in (a)(2)(A); inserted (a)(2)(B); and substituted “Community Correction Revolving Fund” for “fund” in (a)(3).

The 2013 amendment added (d).

The 2019 amendment by No. 249, deleted (a)(2)(B) and deleted the (a)(2)(A) designation; deleted “Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) of” preceding “each payment” in (a)(2); and inserted “and supervision" in (a)(3).

The 2019 amendment by No. 315 substituted “rules” for “regulations” in the introductory language of (a)(2)(B)(ii).

Cross References. As to conditions of suspended sentence or probation, see § 5-4-303.

Community Correction Revolving Fund, § 19-6-432.

16-93-105. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning withholding of a supervision fee by employers, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 278, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1983, No. 789, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2808.3, 43-2808.4.

16-93-106. Warrantless search by any law enforcement officer of probationer or parolee.

    1. A person who is placed on supervised probation or is released on parole under this chapter is required to agree to a waiver as a condition of his or her supervised probation or parole that allows any certified law enforcement officer or Division of Community Correction officer to conduct a warrantless search of his or her person, place of residence, or motor vehicle at any time, day or night, whenever requested by the certified law enforcement officer or division officer.
    2. A warrantless search that is based on a waiver required by this section shall be conducted in a reasonable manner but does not need to be based on an articulable suspicion that the person is committing or has committed a criminal offense.
    1. A person who will be placed on supervised probation or parole and is required to agree to the waiver required by this section shall acknowledge and sign the waiver.
    2. If the person fails to acknowledge and sign the waiver required by this section, he or she is ineligible to be placed on supervised probation or parole.
  1. As used in this section, “residence” includes a garage or outbuilding on the property of a residence.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 19; 2019, No. 136, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “department officer” for “Department of Community Correction officer” in (a)(1); and added (c).

16-93-107. Medicaid eligibility of parolee or probationer — Definition.

  1. The Division of Correction shall screen inmates nearing release from incarceration and the Division of Community Correction shall screen parolees and probationers under supervision for Medicaid eligibility.
  2. If an inmate nearing release from incarceration, parolee, or probationer receives medical services, including substance abuse and mental health treatment, that meet criteria for Medicaid coverage, the parole officer, probation officer, or Division of Correction official or Division of Community Correction official may apply for Medicaid coverage for the inmate nearing release from incarceration, parolee, or probationer under this section.
    1. The inmate nearing release from incarceration, parolee, or probationer may designate an authorized representative for the purposes of filing a Medicaid application and complying with Medicaid requirements for determining and maintaining eligibility.
    2. However, the parole officer, probation officer, or Division of Correction official or Division of Community Correction official shall be the authorized representative for purposes of establishing and maintaining Medicaid eligibility under this subsection if:
      1. The inmate nearing release from incarceration, parolee, or probationer does not designate an authorized representative within three (3) business days after request; or
      2. The authorized representative designated under subdivision (c)(1) of this section does not file a Medicaid application within three (3) business days after appointment and request.
  3. An authorized representative under this section:
    1. Shall have access to the information necessary to comply with Medicaid requirements; and
    2. May provide and receive information in connection with establishing and maintaining Medicaid eligibility, including confidential information.
    1. The parole officer, probation officer, or Division of Correction official or Division of Community Correction official or the designee of the parole officer, probation officer, or Division of Correction official or Division of Community Correction official may access information necessary to determine if a Medicaid application has been filed on behalf of the inmate nearing release from incarceration, parolee, or probationer.
    2. Access under subdivision (e)(1) of this section shall be to:
      1. Establish Medicaid eligibility;
      2. Provide healthcare services; or
      3. Pay for healthcare services.
  4. As used in this section, “Medicaid eligibility” means eligibility for any healthcare coverage offered by the Department of Human Services.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 20; 2019, No. 910, §§ 886-888.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section.

16-93-108. Mental health and substance abuse treatment.

A parolee or probationer who is enrolled in a Medicaid program shall be referred to mental health or substance abuse treatment, or both, when the referral is included as part of a court order, supervision plan, or treatment plan.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 21.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

16-93-109. Medicaid reimbursement for essential healthcare services.

Unless otherwise prohibited by law, the Department of Human Services shall cooperate with the Division of Correction and the Division of Community Correction to establish protocols for utilizing Medicaid to reimburse the Division of Correction, Division of Community Correction, Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services, Division of Youth Services of the Department of Human Services, a healthcare provider, or a third party for essential healthcare services, including mental health and substance abuse treatment.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 21; 2017, No. 913, § 43; 2019, No. 910, § 889.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services”.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section.

16-93-110. Contracting with Medicaid provider.

The Department of Correction and the Department of Community Correction each may contract with a provider in order to facilitate the enrollment of an inmate, a probationer, or a parolee in Medicaid.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 21.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

16-93-111. Parole or probation prohibitions for sex offenses.

A person required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq., who is under felony probation or released on parole shall have as a term and condition of his or her probation or parole a prohibition against recording a person under fourteen (14) years of age under § 5-14-137 if he or she is assessed as a Level 3 or Level 4 offender.

History. Acts 2019, No. 621, § 4.

Subchapter 2 — Parole Board

Effective Dates. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 46: Mar. 1, 1968. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds that the penal system of the State of Arkansas is in need of immediate reform, in order better to effectuate the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crime and to make possible their return as useful members of the community, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to establish a Department of Correction to effectuate such rehabilitation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after March 1, 1968.”

Acts 1983, No. 700, § 3: Mar. 23, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that, in many instances, an application for parole filed with the State Board of Pardons and Paroles by Arkansas inmates confined in prison systems of other states, or of the federal government, may be acted upon by the Board without requiring the State of Arkansas to pay the cost of transporting the eligible candidate for parole back to the State of Arkansas for a personal interview before the Parole Board; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to enable the Parole Board to act on applications for parole under such circumstances upon recommendation from the corresponding parole board or commission of such other state, or the federal government, thereby resulting in savings of funds vitally needed by the Arkansas Department of Correction for other essential services for inmates. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 5, § 8: Jan. 29, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the people of Arkansas are not receiving adequate notice of the granting of applications for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture; that applications for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture are not being acted upon within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the recommendation of the State Board of Parole and Community Rehabilitation; and that repeated applications by the same individuals for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture are delaying the processing of applications for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Identical Acts 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), Nos. 8 and 9, § 7: Mar. 4, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly that the correctional policies of the State of Arkansas are in need of immediate reform in order to better provide for a balanced correctional system and to better effectuate the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crimes and to make possible their return as useful members of the community and passage of this act is necessary to facilitate these reforms. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 195, § 9: July 1, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1995 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1995 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1995.”

Acts 1995, No. 285, § 5: Feb. 13, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Post Prison Transfer Board is presently composed of four part-time members and three full-time members; that the workload of the Board dictates that more full-time members are necessary; that this bill increases the number of full-time members to five; and that the change in the composition of the Board should occur as soon as possible in order for it to properly carry out its duties. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 381, § 5: Feb. 20, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the effective and efficient operation of the Post Prison Transfer Board that the full time membership of the board be increased from three to five and the part time membership be reduced to two; that this act is designed to make such urgent and necessary revision in the membership of the board and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 250, § 258: Feb. 24, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 1211 of 1995 established the procedure for all state boards and commissions to follow regarding reimbursement of expenses and stipends for board members; that this act amends various sections of the Arkansas Code which are in conflict with the Act 1211 of 1995; and that until this cleanup act becomes effective conflicting laws will exist. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governer, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1999, No. 979, § 6: Mar. 31, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that the Post Prison Transfer Board is now composed of five (5) full-time members and two (2) part-time members; that the work of the board demands the attention of six (6) full-time members; that this act would result in the Post Prison Transfer Board being composed of six (6) full-time members and one (1) part-time member; that the conversion of the one (1) part-time member to full-time member should occur as soon as possible; and that unless this emergency clause is adopted this act will not go into effect until ninety (90) days after adjournment of this regular session. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 7: Apr. 2, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the ‘Task Force to Study the Disparity in Sentencing for Persons Convicted of Non-violent Crimes’ has found that it appears that some Arkansas citizens do not receive equitable sentences under the law; that it is necessary to compile statistical sentencing information in order to determine if disparities exist; and that this act is immediately necessary to allow the compiling of the needed statistical information in the first quarter of 2003. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 697, § 7: July 1, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2007 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2007 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2007.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 1265, § 12: Apr. 8, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is an alarming lack of transparency in the corrections system regarding information about inmates who will soon be coming up for parole and released into society; that it is vital to public safety that the public know exactly what potential threats exist from inmates in the Department of Correction who will soon be introduced back into society; and that this act is immediately necessary because the sooner inmate, parolee, and probationer information is made available to the public, the sooner the public is able to evaluate who is and who is not a threat to society. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 1288, § 3: Apr. 8, 2015, retroactive to Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that SB472 of 2015 contains a number of changes to the criminal justice system, including changes to the Parole Board; that an error in the bill inadvertently deletes some of the requirements for a member of the board; and that this act is immediately necessary because it replaces the inadvertently deleted language. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-93-201. Creation — Members — Qualifications and training — Definition.

    1. There is created the Parole Board, to be composed of seven (7) members to be appointed from the state at large by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.
        1. A member of the board shall be a full-time official of this state and shall not have any other employment for the duration of his or her appointment to the board.
          1. A member of the board who is currently serving as of April 1, 2015, shall terminate any other employment that has not been approved as required by subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii)(b) of this section.
          2. A member may engage in employment that has a limited time commitment with approval from the Chair of the Parole Board.
        1. The Governor shall appoint one (1) member as the chair who shall be the chief executive, administrative, budgetary, and fiscal officer of the board and the chair shall serve at the will of the Governor.
        2. The chair shall have general supervisory duties over the members and staff of the board but may not remove a member of the board except as provided under subsection (e) of this section.
        3. The board may review and approve budget and personnel requests prior to submission for executive and legislative approval.
      1. The board shall elect from its membership a vice chair and a secretary who shall assume, in that order and with the consent of the Governor, the duties of the chair in the case of extended absence, vacancy, or other similar disability of the chair until the Governor designates a new chair of the board.
    2. Each member shall serve a seven-year term, except that the terms shall be staggered by the Governor so that the term of one (1) member expires each year.
      1. A member shall have at least a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university and the member should have no less than five (5) years' professional experience in one (1) or more of the following fields:
        1. Parole supervision;
        2. Probation supervision;
        3. Corrections;
        4. Criminal justice;
        5. Law;
        6. Law enforcement;
        7. Psychology;
        8. Psychiatry;
        9. Sociology;
        10. Social work; or
        11. Other related field.
      2. If the member does not have at least a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university, he or she shall have no less than seven (7) years' experience in a field listed in subdivision (a)(4)(A) of this section.
      1. A member appointed after July 1, 2011, whether or not he or she has served on the board previously, shall complete a comprehensive training course developed in compliance with guidelines from the National Institute of Corrections, the Association of Paroling Authorities International, Inc., or the American Probation and Parole Association.
      2. All members shall complete annual training developed in compliance with guidelines from the National Institute of Corrections, the Association of Paroling Authorities International, Inc., or the American Probation and Parole Association.
      3. Training components under this subdivision (a)(5) shall include an emphasis on the following subjects:
        1. Data-driven decision making;
          1. Evidence-based practice.
          2. As used in this section, “evidence-based practice” means practices proven through research to reduce recidivism;
        2. Stakeholder collaboration; and
        3. Recidivism reduction.
  1. If any vacancy occurs on the board prior to the expiration of a term, the Governor shall fill the vacancy for the remainder of the unexpired term, subject to confirmation by the Senate at its next regular session.
  2. The members of the board may receive expense reimbursement and stipends in accordance with § 25-16-901 et seq.
    1. Four (4) members of the board shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of holding an official meeting.
    2. However, the affirmative vote of at least five (5) of the members of the board is required for any action by the board.
    1. A member of the board may be removed by the Governor after the Governor has received notification from the chair that the member:
      1. Has been derelict in his or her duties as a member of the board; or
      2. No longer meets the eligibility requirements to serve as a member of the board.
    2. The member of the board who has been reported to the Governor under subdivision (e)(1) of this section shall receive written notice of the notification by the chair to the Governor and the member of the board shall be allowed an opportunity to respond within seven (7) days.

History. Acts 1989, No. 937, §§ 2, 3, 5; 1993, No. 530, § 1; 1993, No. 547, § 1; 1995, No. 285, § 1; 1995, No. 381, § 1; 1997, No. 250, § 120; 1999, No. 979, § 1; 2005, No. 1033, § 1; 2007, No. 697, § 3; 2011, No. 570, § 86; 2015, No. 895, § 22; 2015, No. 1288, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended by Acts 1995, Nos. 285 and 381, subsection (a) contained an additional subdivision which read as follows:

“(A) The terms of office of two (2) of the four (4) part-time members serving on January 1, 1995, shall expire on February 13, 1995.

“(B) The Governor shall designate the two (2) members whose terms shall expire and shall appoint two (2) full-time members to replace them.”

Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Acts 2015, No. 1288, § 2, provided: “Contingent effectiveness — Retroactiveness. Section 1 of this act is not effective unless SB472 of 2015 becomes an act. If SB472 of 2015 becomes an act, Section 1 of this act is effective retroactively to the effective date of the act which SB472 becomes.” [SB472 of 2015 is Acts 2015, No. 895, which was effective April 1, 2015.]

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 37, provided that all functions, powers, and duties with respect to pardons, paroles, and probation previously performed by the State Penitentiary Board, acting as the State Board of Pardons, Paroles, and Probation, would be transferred from that board to the Board of Pardons and Paroles; it further provided that all books, records, supplies, materials, furniture, furnishings, and other properties belonging to the State Office of Pardons, Paroles, and Probation would be retained in that office and would be the property, and under the custody, of the Department of Correction; finally, it provided that the appropriation of funds made for the Office of Pardons and Paroles by Acts 1967, No. 391, would be for the Department of Correction, to the extent of the unexpended and unencumbered balances therein as of March 1, 1968.

Acts 1969, No. 621, § 1, provided that the State Board of Pardons and Paroles created by Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50 would be abolished and that all powers, functions, and duties of the board would be transferred to, and vested in, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles created by the 1969 act.

Former § 16-93-201, concerning the members — powers and duties, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 937, § 8. The former section was derived from Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, §§ 25, 35, 36; 1969, No. 621, § 2; 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 1; 1985, No. 925, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2802.1, 43-2804, 43-2814, 43-2815.

Acts 1989, No. 937, § 1, provided:

“The State Board of Pardons and Paroles created by Act 621 of 1969, as amended, and the Commission on Community-Based Rehabilitation created by Act 378 of 1975, as amended, are hereby abolished and all powers, functions and duties of said Board and Commission are hereby transferred under a Type 2 transfer as set forth in Arkansas Code 25-2-105 to and vested in the State Board of Parole and Community Rehabilitation herein created.”

Acts 1989, No. 937, § 2, provided, in part, that the Governor shall designate the terms of the initial members in such manner that the term of one member shall expire on January 14 of each year beginning January 14, 1990, and that the initial term of the chairman shall begin on July 3, 1989, and expire on January 14, 1996, with successors appointed for terms of seven years. The operation of subsection (c) may be affected by the enactment of Acts 1995, No. 1211, codified as § 25-16-901 et seq.

Acts 1995, No. 285, § 5, provided:

“It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Post Prison Transfer Board is presently composed of four part time members and three full time members; that the workload of the Board dictates that more full time members are necessary; that this bill increases the number of full time members to five; and that the change in the composition of the Board should occur as soon as possible in order for it to properly carry out its duties. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 381, § 5, provided:

“It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the effective and efficient operation of the Post Prison Transfer Board that the full time membership of the Board be increased from three to five and the part time membership be reduced to two; that this act is designed to make such urgent and necessary revision in the membership of the Board and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1999, No. 979, § 2 provided:

“The Governor shall designate which of the two current part-time members of Post Prison Transfer Board is converted to a full-time member by this act.”

Acts 2015, No. 1288, § 1, specifically amended this section as amended by Acts 2015, No. 895.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “Parole Board” for “Post Prison Transfer Board” in (a)(1), (b) and (d).

The 2011 amendment added “Qualifications and training” in the section heading; and added (a)(4) and (a)(5).

The 2015 amendment by No. 895 rewrote (a)(2); in the introductory language of (a)(4)(A), substituted “shall have” for “must have” and inserted “or more”; redesignated and rewrote former (d) as (d)(1); and added (d)(2) and (e).

The 2015 amendment by No. 1288 replaced (a)(4)(A)(xi), (a)(4)(B), and (a)(5), which were inadvertently deleted from the amendment to this section by Acts 2015, No. 895.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

16-93-202. Seal — Records and reports.

  1. The Parole Board shall adopt an official seal of which the courts shall take judicial notice.
  2. The board shall keep a record of its acts and shall notify each institution and facility of its decisions relating to persons who have been confined therein.
    1. An annual report in writing shall be made by the board on or before February 1 of each year for the preceding year.
    2. The report shall be directed to the Governor and to the General Assembly and shall contain statistical and other data concerning its work, including research studies which it may make on parole or related functions.
    1. A presentence report, a preparole report, and a supervision history obtained in the discharge of official duty by any member or employee of the board shall be privileged and shall not be disclosed, directly or indirectly, to any person other than the board, a court, others entitled under this chapter to receive the information, or as required under § 16-93-213.
    2. However, the board or a court, at its discretion, may permit the inspection of the presentence report, preparole report, or supervision history by a person having a proper interest in the presentence report, preparole report, or supervision history if the interests or welfare of the person involved makes that action desirable or helpful.
      1. Upon written request, a member of the General Assembly or an employee of the House of Representatives, the Senate, or the Bureau of Legislative Research acting on the member's behalf may view all classification, disciplinary, demographic, and parole hearing records of a current or former inmate or parolee who is currently or was formerly granted parole by the board.
      2. A request made on behalf of a member of the General Assembly shall be made in good faith.
    1. A view of records under subdivision (e)(1) of this section by an employee may be performed only if the employee is assigned to one (1) or more of the following committees:
      1. Senate Committee on Judiciary;
      2. House Committee on Judiciary; or
      3. Charitable, Penal and Correctional Institutions Subcommittee of the Legislative Council.
    2. The board shall ensure that the employee authorized under subdivision (e)(2) of this section to view records is provided access to the records.
    3. A record requested to be viewed under subdivision (e)(1) of this section is privileged and confidential and shall not be shown to any person not authorized to have access to the record under this section and shall not be used for any political purpose, including without limitation political advertising, fundraising, or campaigning.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, §§ 26, 27; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2805, 43-2806; Acts 1993, No. 530, § 3; 1993, No. 547, § 3; 2015, No. 895, § 23; 2015, No. 1265, § 10.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Acts 2016, No. 54, § 4, provided: “REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

“(a) The Parole Board shall submit annually to the Joint Performance Review Committee, the Senate Committee on Judiciary, and the House Committee on Judiciary a copy of the board's rules and policies, including any Administrative Rules, Directives, Memoranda, and Operational Policies, as well as any document intended to supplement any rule or policy;

“(b) Emergency Preparedness Plans shall be excluded from the provisions in this section.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Amendments. The 2015 amendment by No. 895 added (e).

The 2015 amendment by No. 1265 added “or as required under § 16-93-213” in (d)(1); and rewrote (d)(2).

16-93-203. Cooperation from prison officials.

It shall be the duty of any correctional official to:

  1. Grant access at all reasonable times to any prisoner over whom the Parole Board has jurisdiction under this chapter to the members of the board or its properly accredited representatives;
  2. Provide the board and its representatives facilities for communicating with and observing the person; and
  3. Furnish the board with:
    1. The reports the board requires concerning the conduct and character of any prisoner in his or her custody; and
    2. Any facts the board deems pertinent in determining whether:
      1. The prisoner shall be transferred and under what conditions the prisoner shall be transferred; or
      2. The prisoner shall be paroled.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 30; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2809; Acts 1993, No. 530, § 4; 1993, No. 547, § 4.

16-93-204. Executive clemency.

      1. All applications for pardon, commutation of sentence, reprieve, respite, or remission of fine or forfeiture shall be signed by the applicant under oath.
      2. For purposes of § 5-53-102, the application shall be deemed an official proceeding.
    1. An applicant shall obtain and include with his or her application a certified copy of the applicant's judgment and commitment order or comparable document.
    2. Applications shall be referred to the Parole Board for investigation.
  1. The board shall thereupon investigate each case and shall submit to the Governor its recommendation, a report of the investigation, and all other information the board may have regarding the applicant.
    1. As part of the board's investigation, the Chair of the Parole Board or his or her designee shall have the power to issue oaths and subpoena witnesses to appear and testify and to bring before the board any relevant books, papers, records, or documents.
      1. The subpoena shall be directed to any county sheriff, county coroner, or constable of the county in which the designated witness resides or is found.
      2. The endorsed affidavit on the subpoena of any person shall be proof of the service of the subpoena.
      3. The subpoena shall be served and returned in the same manner as subpoenas in civil actions in the circuit courts are served and returned.
    1. Before the board shall consider an application for a pardon or recommend a commutation of sentence, the board shall solicit the written or oral recommendation of the committing court, the prosecuting attorney, and the county sheriff of the county from which the person was committed.
      1. Before considering an application for a pardon or recommending a commutation of sentence of a person who was convicted of capital murder, § 5-10-101, or a Class Y felony, Class A felony, or Class B felony, the board shall notify the victim of the crime or the victim's next of kin, if he or she files a request for notice with the prosecuting attorney.
      2. When the board provides notice under subdivision (d)(2)(A) of this section, the board shall solicit the written or oral recommendations of the victim or the victim's next of kin regarding the granting of a pardon or commutation of sentence.
    2. The board shall retain a copy of the recommendations in the board's file.
    3. The recommendations shall not be binding upon the board in advising the Governor whether to grant a pardon or commute a sentence but shall be maintained in the inmate's file.
      1. If a hearing will be held on the application, the board shall notify the victim or the victim's next of kin of the date, time, and place of the hearing.
      2. The notice shall be given when soliciting the recommendations of the victim of the crime or the victim's next of kin.
  2. At least thirty (30) days before submitting to the Governor a recommendation that an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture be granted, the board shall:
    1. Issue a public notice of its intention to make such a recommendation; and
    2. Send notice of its intention to the circuit judge who presided over the applicant's trial, the prosecuting attorney, and the county sheriff of the county in which the applicant was convicted and, if applicable, to the victim or the victim's next of kin if the victim or the victim's next of kin registered for notification with the prosecuting attorney under § 16-21-106(c).
  3. Whether the board recommends that an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture be granted or denied by the Governor, the board shall issue public notice of each recommendation.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 32; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2811; Acts 1991, No. 706, § 2; 1993, No. 530, § 5; 1993, No. 547, § 5; 2005, No. 1975, § 3.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1)(A) and (a)(3); added (a)(1)(B) and (a)(2); inserted “shall be signed by the applicant under oath” in present (a)(1)(A); inserted “Applications” in (a)(3); substituted “board” for “Post Prison Transfer Board” in (b); added present (c); redesignated former (c) as present (d); added (e) and (f); and made gender neutral changes.

Cross References. Manner of applying for executive clemency, § 5-4-607.

Victim notification system, § 12-12-1201 et seq.

Research References

ALR.

Judicial Investigation of Pardon by Governor. 101 A.L.R.6th 431 (2015).

Case Notes

In General.

While this section does require the board to solicit the nonbinding recommendations of the committing court, the prosecuting attorney, the sheriff in whose county trial was had, and the victim or the victim's next of kin, it imposes no standards, criteria, or factors which the board may or may not consider in making its recommendation; when a commutation statute does not impose standards constraining the discretion of the board as to when clemency must be granted, the statute does not create a constitutional right or entitlement sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause. Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 1994).

There is simply no requirement under this section to provide notice when the Arkansas Parole Board recommends against granting clemency. Lee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 978 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1623, 197 L. Ed. 2d 748 (2017).

Authority of Board.

The board's recommendation is not binding on the governor and nothing in the Arkansas Code restricts the discretion of either the board or the governor. Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 1994).

The Post Prison Transfer Board has no authority to grant clemency; its duty is to investigate an application for clemency and submit to the governor its recommendation regarding the application. Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 1994).

Because this section does not impose standards constraining the discretion of the board as to when clemency must be granted, the statute does not create a constitutional right or entitlement sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause. Perry v. Brownlee, 122 F.3d 20 (8th Cir. 1997).

Authority of Governor.

The Governor has absolute discretion in granting or denying executive clemency; however, the decision must be made after mandated statutory procedures have been completed. Perry v. Brownlee, 972 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Ark. 1997).

Factors Considered.

This section imposes no standards on what the board or the Governor may consider in making their decisions, and the Governor is not bound by the board's recommendation. Perry v. Morgan, 122 F.3d 18 (8th Cir. 1997); Perry v. Brownlee, 122 F.3d 20 (8th Cir. 1997).

Investigation.

Absent any statutory standards governing what criteria the board may consider, any question asked by a single board member in an effort to explore or draw out asserted reasons for clemency or to reach a decision concerning the application would be appropriate. Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 1994).

The fact that the prisoner seeking clemency acknowledges the legality of his sentence is a factor to which a clemency board may give such weight as it chooses. Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 1994).

Cited: Young v. State, 252 Ark. 184, 477 S.W.2d 823 (1972); Richley v. Gaines, 860 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Ark. 1994).

16-93-205. Parole of Arkansas inmates in out-of-state prisons.

  1. The Parole Board may request the appropriate board or commission having jurisdiction over parole or transfer matters in other states or the United States Parole Commission to make recommendations concerning whether Arkansas inmates confined in prison systems of the other states or in federal prisons should be granted parole or transfer when eligible under Arkansas law.
  2. The Parole Board may take action at its option on the application of an inmate for parole, using as its criteria the recommendations received from the appropriate board or commission of the other states or the United States Parole Commission in lieu of the personal appearance before the Parole Board of the inmate seeking parole or transfer.

History. Acts 1983, No. 700, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2809.1; Acts 1993, No. 530, § 6; 1993, No. 547, § 6.

16-93-206. Parole revocation review — Jurisdiction.

  1. The Parole Board shall serve as the revocation review board for any person subject to either parole or transfer from prison.
  2. Revocation proceedings for either parole or transfer shall follow all legal requirements applicable to parole and shall be subject to any additional policies and rules set by the board.

History. Acts 1993, No. 530, § 2; 1993, No. 547, § 2; 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 8, § 1; 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 9, § 1; 1999, No. 1035, § 1; 2003, No. 1390, § 9; 2007, No. 600, § 1; 2007, No. 866, § 1; 2011, No. 570, § 87; 2019, No. 315, § 1308.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2003 amendment rewrote (c)(1)(B).

The 2011 amendment substituted “Parole revocation review — Jurisdiction” for “Board procedures” in the section heading; deleted (a) through (f); redesignated (g)(1) as (a) and (g)(2) as (b); and deleted (h).

The 2019 amendment substituted “policies and rules” for “policies, rules, and regulations” in (b).

Cross References. Victim notification system, § 12-12-1201 et seq.

16-93-207. Applications for pardon, commutation of sentence, and remission of fines and forfeitures.

      1. At least thirty (30) days before granting an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture, the Governor shall file with the Secretary of State a notice of his or her intention to grant the application.
      2. The Governor shall also direct the Division of Correction to send notice of his or her intention to the judge, the prosecuting attorney, and the county sheriff of the county in which the applicant was convicted and, if applicable, to the victim or the victim's next of kin.
    1. The filing of the notice shall not preclude the Governor from later denying the application, but any pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture granted without filing the notice shall be null and void.
  1. If the Governor does not grant an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture within two hundred forty (240) days of the Governor's receipt of the recommendation of the Parole Board regarding the application, the application shall be deemed denied by the Governor, and any pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture granted after the two-hundred-forty-day period shall be null and void.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (c)(3) and subsection (d) of this section, if an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture is denied in writing by the Governor, the person filing the application shall not be eligible to file a new application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture related to the same offense for a period of four (4) years from the date of filing the application that was denied.
      2. Any person who made an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture that was denied on or after July 1, 2004, shall be eligible to file a new application four (4) years after the date of filing the application that was denied.
    1. If an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture is denied by the Governor pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the person filing the application may immediately file a new application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture related to the same offense.
      1. The board may waive the waiting period for filing a new application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture described in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section if:
        1. It has been at least twelve (12) months after the date of filing the application that was denied; and
        2. The board determines that the person whose application was denied has established that:
          1. New material evidence relating to the person's guilt or punishment has been discovered;
          2. The person's physical or mental health has substantially deteriorated; or
          3. Other meritorious circumstances justify a waiver of the waiting period.
        1. The board shall promulgate rules that shall establish policies and procedures for waiver of the waiting period.
        2. The board may make additions, amendments, changes, or alterations to the rules in accordance with the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(3) of this section, if an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture of a person sentenced to life imprisonment without parole is denied in writing by the Governor, the person filing the application shall not be eligible to file a new application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture related to the same offense for a period of:
      1. Six (6) years from the date of the denial; or
      2. Eight (8) years from the date of the denial if the applicant is serving a sentence of life without parole for capital murder, § 5-10-101.
    2. If an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture of a person sentenced to life imprisonment without parole is denied by the Governor pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the person filing the application may immediately file a new application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture related to the same offense.
      1. The board or the Governor may waive the waiting period for filing a new application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine or forfeiture described in subdivision (d)(1) of this section if:
        1. It has been at least twelve (12) months after the date of filing the application that was denied; and
        2. The board determines that the person whose application was denied has established that:
          1. New material evidence relating to the person's guilt or punishment has been discovered;
          2. The person's physical or mental health has substantially deteriorated; or
          3. Other meritorious circumstances justify a waiver of the waiting period.
        1. The board shall promulgate rules that shall establish policies and procedures for waiver of the waiting period.
        2. The board may make additions, amendments, changes, or alterations to the rules in accordance with the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq.
  2. If an application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine is granted, the Governor shall:
    1. Include in his or her written order the reasons for granting the application; and
    2. File with the Senate and the House of Representatives a copy of the order that includes:
      1. The applicant's name;
      2. The offense of which the applicant was convicted;
      3. The sentence imposed upon the applicant;
      4. The date that the sentence was imposed; and
      5. The effective date of the pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine.
    1. This section shall not apply to reprieves.
    2. Reprieves may be granted as presently provided by law.

History. Acts 1993, No. 5, §§ 1-4; 1995, No. 1195, § 1; 1999, No. 498, § 2; 2005, No. 1975, §§ 4, 5; 2005, No. 2097, § 2; 2007, No. 183, § 1; 2011, No. 1169, § 1; 2013, No. 131, §§ 1, 2; 2019, No. 910, § 890.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment by No. 1975, in (b), substituted “two hundred forty (240)” for “one hundred twenty (120)” and “two-hundred-forty-day” for “one-hundred-twenty-day”; inserted present (d); and redesignated former (d) as present (e).

The 2005 amendment by No. 2097 redesignated former (c)(1) as present (c)(1)(A); in (c)(1)(A), added “Except as provided in subdivision (c)(3) of this section” and substituted “filing the application that was denied” for “the denial”; added (c)(1)(B) and (c)(3); and made related changes.

The 2011 amendment inserted the (d)(1)(A) designation and (d)(1)(B).

The 2013 amendment substituted “Parole Board” for “Board of Corrections” in (c)(3)(B)(i), (c)(3)(B)(ii), (d)(3)(B)(i) and (d)(3)(B)(ii); and substituted “shall establish” for “will establish” in (c)(3)(B)(i) and (d)(3)(B)(i).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a)(1)(B).

16-93-208. Services and equipment.

The Division of Correction and the Division of Community Correction may provide services, furnishings, equipment, and office space to assist the Parole Board in fulfilling the purposes for which the board was created by law.

History. Acts 1995, No. 195, § 3; 2019, No. 910, § 891.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1995, No. 195, § 3, is also codified as § 12-27-136.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction”.

16-93-209. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning concealed handguns, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 320, § 3. The section was derived from Acts 1999, No. 1253, § 1.

16-93-210. Monthly performance report on parole applications and outcome — Reports concerning administrative directives filed with Legislative Council.

    1. The Parole Board shall submit a monthly report to the chairs of the House Committee on Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Judiciary, the Legislative Council, the Board of Corrections, and the Governor, showing the number of persons who make application for parole and those who are granted or denied parole during the previous month for each criminal offense classification.
    2. The report shall include a breakdown by race of all persons sentenced in each criminal offense classification.
    3. The report shall include the reason for each denial of parole, the results of the risk-needs assessment, and the course of action that accompanies each denial pursuant to § 16-93-615(a)(2)(B)(ii).
  1. The Parole Board shall cooperate with and upon request make presentations and provide various reports, to the extent the Parole Board's budget will allow, to the Legislative Council concerning Parole Board policy and criteria on discretionary offender programs and services.
  2. The Parole Board shall file a report with the Legislative Council on a quarterly basis containing all new and revised administrative directives issued in the previous quarter by:
    1. The Parole Board;
    2. The Chair of the Parole Board;
    3. The Administrative Services Manager of the Parole Board;
    4. The Administrator of the Parole Board; and
    5. Staff of the Parole Board.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1031, § 6; 2005, No. 1994, § 277; 2011, No. 570, § 88; 2015, No. 1152, § 15; 2015, No. 1258, § 15.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 1258, § 1, provided: “LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS. The General Assembly finds:

“(1) Amendment 92 to the Arkansas Constitution states in part: ‘The General Assembly may provide by law for the review by a legislative committee of administrative rules promulgated by a state agency before the administrative rules become effective; and that administrative rules promulgated by a state agency shall not become effective until reviewed and approved by the legislative committee charged by law with the review of administrative rules under subdivision (a)(1) of this section’;

“(2) As Amendment 92 does not define the term ‘state agency’, the General Assembly may establish a definition by law as part of its implementation of Amendment 92;

“(3) The General Assembly at this time wishes to exclude the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission, the State Highway Commission, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department, and institutions of higher education from the definition of ‘state agency’ applied to the implementation of Amendment 92; and

“(4) The General Assembly or the Legislative Council reserve the right to amend the definition of ‘state agency’ in the future to include one (1) or all of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission, the State Highway Commission, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department, and institutions of higher education.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted “and the Commission on Disparity in Sentencing“ following “Legislative Council” in (b).

The 2011 amendment substituted “Monthly performance report” for “Annual report” in the section heading; in (a)(1), substituted “October 1, 2011” for “July 31, 2003, and on July 31 of each year thereafter”, substituted “a monthly report” for “an annual report”, inserted “the Chairpersons of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees”, inserted “the Board of Corrections, the Governor”, and substituted “previous month” for “fiscal year”; and added (a)(3).

The 2015 amendment by No. 1152, in (a)(1), deleted “Beginning October 1, 2011” at the beginning, substituted “Judiciary” for “Judciary”, and deleted “and the Commission on Disparity in Sentencing” following “Governor”.

The 2015 amendment by No. 1258 added “Reports concerning administrative directives filed with Legislative Council” in the section heading; and added (c).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

16-93-211. Early release to transitional housing facilities — Definition.

    1. As used in this section, “transitional housing” means a program that provides housing for one (1) or more offenders who have been:
      1. Transferred or paroled from the Division of Correction by the Parole Board;
      2. Placed on probation by a circuit court or district court; or
      3. Administratively transferred from the Division of Correction to the Division of Community Correction for participation in a reentry program.
    2. An offender's home or the residence of an offender's family member shall not be considered a transitional housing facility for purposes of this section.
    1. To assist an offender who will be eligible for parole or transfer to successfully reintegrate into the community, the board is authorized to place the offender into approved transitional housing up to one (1) year prior to the offender's date of eligibility for parole or transfer.
    2. Subject to conditions of release and consistent with rules promulgated by the board, placement in a transitional housing facility must be preceded by:
      1. The provision of all applicable notices under § 16-93-615; and
      2. A hearing conducted by the board.
  1. The decision to place an offender in transitional housing and the establishment of conditions of release by the board must be based on a reasoned, rational plan developed in conjunction with an accepted risk-needs assessment tool such that each placement decision is based on:
    1. Established criteria; and
    2. A determination that there is a reasonable probability that an offender can be placed in a transitional housing facility without detriment to:
      1. The community; or
      2. The offender.
  2. Conditions of release imposed by the board must at a minimum include a curfew requiring an offender placed in transitional housing to present himself or herself at a scheduled time to be confined in the transitional housing facility.
  3. An offender placed in transitional housing by the board will be supervised by officers of the Division of Community Correction.
  4. An offender who without permission leaves the custody of the transitional housing facility in which he or she is placed may be subject to criminal prosecution for first degree escape, § 5-54-110, second degree escape, § 5-54-111, and third degree escape, § 5-54-112.
  5. Revocation of placement in transitional housing must follow the revocation proceedings established in § 16-93-705.

History. Acts 2005, No. 679, § 1; 2011, No. 570, § 89; 2015, No. 146, § 2; Acts 2019, No. 910, §§ 892-894.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “§ 16-93-615” for “§ 16-93-206” in (b)(2)(A).

The 2015 amendment added (a)(1)(C).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(C); and substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (a)(1)(C) and (e).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 377.

16-93-212. Rulemaking authority.

The Parole Board may adopt rules to implement, administer, and enforce this subchapter.

History. Acts 2015, No. 609, § 1.

16-93-213. Records to be posted on a website.

  1. To the extent permitted by federal law, the Parole Board shall post on the board's website the following information concerning an inmate who is being considered for parole no less than six (6) months before his or her transfer-eligibility or parole-eligibility date, or the date the board determines eligibility for parole or transfer if the inmate is past his or her transfer-eligibility or parole-eligibility date:
    1. The name of the inmate;
    2. The Division of Correction identification number of the inmate;
    3. A current photograph of the inmate;
    4. The projected hearing date of the inmate;
    5. The number of times, if any, probation or parole has been revoked from the inmate; and
    6. A link to information required to be posted about the inmate by the division under § 12-27-145.
  2. The information required to be posted on the board's website:
    1. Shall be consistently updated as required to be the most current information available to the board;
    2. Shall instruct a victim of a crime as defined by § 16-90-1101 or § 16-90-1114 on how to contact the board and provide information on the inmate; and
    3. May be removed when the inmate has been either granted or denied parole.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1265, § 11; 2019, No. 910, §§ 895, 896.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a)(2) and (a)(6).

Subchapter 3 — Probation and Suspended Imposition of Sentence

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Cross References. Suspension or probation, § 5-4-301 et seq.

Preambles. Acts 1975, No. 346, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, under present state law the circuit and municipal judges of this State are clothed with very little discretion and have limited alternatives in the disposition of cases involving first offenders; and

“Whereas, circuit and municipal judges throughout the state feel that existing law governing the disposition of cases involving first offenders is unduly harsh and restrictive; and

“Whereas, respected leaders in the field of judicial reform feel that the administration of justice, the preservation of law and order, and increased respect for the judicial system could best be served by providing diversionary procedures for the disposition of cases involving first offenders;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1975, No. 346, § 8: Mar. 10, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that present law applicable to the disposition of cases involving first offenders is unduly harsh and restrictive, and that the administration of justice, the preservation of law and order, and increased respect for the judicial system could best be served by providing diversionary procedures for the disposition of cases involving youthful offenders. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 581, § 3: Mar. 18, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 346 of 1975 was designed as a first offender probation law; that there is currently no method of determining whether an individual has received probation under the terms of such Act more than one time; that in order to limit Act 346 of 1975 to being used no more than one time by the same person, it is necessary to initiate statewide reporting by the sentencing courts; that the Arkansas Crime Information Center is best equipped to maintain such statewide records; and that this Act is immediately necessary to accomplish these purposes. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 1188, § 6: Apr. 8, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the physical and psychological health of our children is one of our most compelling interests. Furthermore, taking responsible measures to protect our children from persons who have sexually victimized them will significantly decrease the possibility of recurrences. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 17. Effective on and after January 1, 2014.

Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-93-301. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, “sealing” means the procedure and effect as defined in the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.

History. Acts 1975, No. 346, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1231; Acts 1995, No. 998, § 8; 2011, No. 570, § 90; 2013, No. 1460, § 10.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2013 amendment substituted “sealing” for “expungement” and “the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.” for “§ 16-90-901(a)”.

Case Notes

In General.

Police captain's obedience of the subpoena to furnish plaintiff's criminal record was legally reasonable where it clearly would have been a violation of law for him to refuse to honor the subpoena, and it was equally clear that judicial officials were entitled to examine the expunged records. Morton v. City of Little Rock, 934 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1991).

Cited: Morton v. City of Little Rock, 728 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Doe v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 357 Ark. 413, 182 S.W.3d 107 (2004).

16-93-302. Probation — First time offenders — Penalties.

    1. A person may not avail himself or herself of the provisions of this section and §§ 16-93-301 and 16-93-303 on more than one (1) occasion.
    2. Any person seeking to avail himself or herself of the benefits of this section and §§ 16-93-301 and 16-93-303 who falsely testifies, swears, or affirms to the court that he or she has not previously availed himself or herself of the benefits of this section and §§ 16-93-301 and 16-93-303 is guilty of a Class D felony.
    1. Any person charged under this section and §§ 16-93-301 and 16-93-303 with keeping the confidential records of first offenders, as provided in § 16-93-301, who divulges any information contained in the records to any person or agency other than a law enforcement officer or judicial officer is guilty of a violation and upon conviction is subject to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500).
    2. Each violation shall be considered a separate offense.

History. Acts 1975, No. 346, §§ 4, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1234, 43-1235; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 432; 2011, No. 570, § 90.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “or herself” in (a)(1) and twice in (a)(2); in (a)(2), inserted “or she” and substituted “guilty of a Class D felony” for “deemed guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, or by both the fine and imprisonment”; and substituted “violation” for “misdemeanor” in (b)(1).

The 2011 amendment added “Probation — First time offenders” in the section heading; substituted “A person may not” for “No person may” in (a)(1); and deleted “the provisions of” following “Any person charged under” in (b)(1).

Case Notes

Eligibility.

Although defendant had previously reaped the benefits of New Mexico's first-offender statute, under the plain language of this section and § 16-93-303, defendant had never before availed himself of Arkansas' benefits, nor had he been previously convicted of a felony; thus, defendant's first-offender status should not have been voided. Montoya v. State, 2010 Ark. 419 (2010).

16-93-303. Probation — First time offenders — Procedure.

        1. When an accused enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere prior to an adjudication of guilt, the circuit court or district court, in the case of a defendant who previously has not been convicted of a felony, without making a finding of guilt or entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant, may defer further proceedings and place the defendant on probation for a period of not less than one (1) year, under such terms and conditions as may be set by the circuit court or district court.
        2. A sentence of a fine not exceeding three thousand five hundred dollars ($3,500) or an assessment of court costs against a defendant does not negate the benefits provided by this section or cause the probation placed on the defendant under this section to constitute a conviction except under subsections (c)-(e) of this section.
      1. However, a person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to one (1) or more of the following offenses is not eligible for sealing of the record under this subchapter:
        1. An offense that requires the person to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.;
        2. Public sexual indecency, § 5-14-111;
        3. Indecent exposure, § 5-14-112;
        4. Bestiality, § 5-14-122;
        5. Exposing another person to the human immunodeficiency virus, § 5-14-123; or
        6. A serious felony involving violence or a felony involving violence as provided in § 5-4-501.
    1. Upon violation of a term or condition, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided.
    2. This subsection does not require or compel any court of this state to establish first offender procedures as provided in this section and §§ 16-93-301 and 16-93-302.
  1. Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions of probation or upon release by the court prior to the termination period thereof, the defendant shall be discharged without court adjudication of guilt, whereupon the court shall enter an appropriate order that shall effectively dismiss the case, discharge the defendant, and seal the record, if consistent with the procedures established in the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.
  2. During the period of probation described in subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i) of this section, a defendant is considered as not having a felony conviction except for:
    1. Application of any law prohibiting possession of a firearm by certain persons;
    2. A determination of habitual offender status;
    3. A determination of criminal history;
    4. A determination of criminal history scores;
    5. Sentencing; and
    6. A purpose of impeachment as a witness under Rule 609 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.
  3. After successful completion of probation placed on the defendant under this section, a defendant is considered as not having a felony conviction except for:
    1. A determination of habitual offender status;
    2. A determination of criminal history;
    3. A determination of criminal history scores;
    4. Sentencing; and
    5. A purpose of impeachment as a witness under Rule 609 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.
  4. The eligibility to possess a firearm of a person whose record has been sealed under this subchapter and the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq., is governed by § 5-73-103.
  5. A court as a condition of probation shall order the defendant to:
        1. Enroll in and complete a vocational, technical, educational, or similar program if the court finds that the defendant's lack of an employable or marketable skill contributes to the defendant's being unemployed.
        2. The court may order the person to pay tuition for any vocational, technical, educational, or similar program in installments after the completion of the education or training program.
      1. If the defendant is on probation at the end of the vocational, technical, educational, or similar program required under subdivision (f)(1)(A) of this section, he or she shall be required to work in suitable employment for the remainder of his or her probation or for three (3) years, whichever occurs earlier; or
    1. Work consistently in suitable employment for the entire duration of his or her probation or for three (3) years, whichever occurs earlier.

History. Acts 1975, No. 346, §§ 2, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-1232, 43-1233; Acts 1995, No. 998, § 9; 1999, No. 1407, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 219; 2003, No. 1753, § 2; 2007, No. 744, § 2; 2011, No. 570, § 90; 2011, No. 1233, § 1; 2013, No. 1460, § 11; 2015, No. 1198, § 8; 2017, No. 662, § 1; 2019, No. 385, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment by No. 570 inserted “court” following “judge of the circuit” in (a)(1)(A)(i); and inserted “or sealing” in (a)(1)(B).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1233 added (a)(1)(A)(iii).

The 2013 amendment substituted “sealing” for “expungement” in (a)(1)(A)(iii); rewrote (a)(1)(B) and (a)(3); in (b), substituted “seal” for “expunge” and “the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401” for “§ 16-90-901”; in (e), deleted “expunged and” following “been” and substituted “the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401” for “§ 16-90-901”.

The 2015 amendment added (f).

The 2017 amendment, in (a)(1)(A)(i), deleted “the judge of” preceding the first occurrence of “the circuit court” and inserted “circuit court or district” near the end; substituted “is not” for “shall not” in (a)(1)(A)(iii); redesignated former (a)(1)(B) as the present introductory language of (a)(1)(B); substituted “one (1) or more of the following offenses” for “a sexual offense as defined by § 5-14-101 et seq. and §§ 5-26-202, 5-27-602, 5-27-603, and 5-27-605” in the introductory language of (a)(1)(B); added (a)(1)(B)(i) through (a)(1)(B)(v); and made a stylistic change.

The 2019 amendment deleted (a)(1)(A)(iii); and added (a)(1)(B)(vi).

Research References

ALR.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches. 99 A.L.R.5th 557.

Validity of condition of probation, supervised release, or parole restricting computer use or internet access. 4 A.L.R.6th 1.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Subdivision (a)(1) of this section applies only to an accused who enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere prior to an adjudication of guilt; where defendant was adjudged guilty by a jury, the trial court correctly determined that he was not entitled to probation under this section. Baker v. State, 310 Ark. 485, 837 S.W.2d 471 (1992).

Where it was clear this section was not utilized in defendant's prior cases even though the conviction judgment made a passing reference to it, defendant's argument that two prior criminal cases were expunged under this section and could not be used for enhancement purposes was not supported by the record. Baxter v. State, 324 Ark. 440, 922 S.W.2d 682 (1996).

Supreme Court reversed defendant's sentence and remanded for new sentencing because she had entered a plea of not guilty and was adjudicated guilty by the court following a bench trial, and therefore she was ineligible for sentencing pursuant to Acts 1975, No. 346. State v. Webb, 373 Ark. 65, 281 S.W.3d 273 (2008).

Although defendant had previously reaped the benefits of New Mexico's first-offender statute, under the plain language of § 16-93-302 and this section, defendant had never before availed himself of Arkansas' benefits, nor had he been previously convicted of a felony; thus, defendant's first-offender status should not have been voided. Montoya v. State, 2010 Ark. 419 (2010).

If subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section applies, then the trial court lacks authority to impose any sentence under subdivision (a)(1)(A). Wilson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 116 (2019).

Adjudication of Guilt.

Where the judgment entered recited on its face that appellant was found guilty and sentenced under the First Offenders Act, appellant was sentenced illegally. Gage v. State, 307 Ark. 285, 819 S.W.2d 279 (1991).

Bail.

A deferred guilty plea to a felony may be taken into consideration in fixing the amount and conditions of bail, however, the defendant cannot be denied release on bail as a matter of law because of the plea. Duncan v. State, 308 Ark. 205, 823 S.W.2d 886 (1992).

Disposition Not a Conviction.

Because the plain language of Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 1(a) and § 16-91-101(a) required a conviction before a defendant had a right of appeal, and because a disposition pursuant to Acts 1975, No. 346, better known as the Arkansas First Offender Act, §§ 16-93-30116-93-305, was not a conviction, defendant had no right to appeal. Lynn v. State, 2012 Ark. 6 (2012).

Expungement, Sealing.

A trial court does not have the power to expunge a defendant's record when defendant was not sentenced under one of the statutes, such as subdivision (a)(1) of this section, former § 16-93-502, or former § 5-64-407, which specifically provide for expunging the record. Shelton v. State, 44 Ark. App. 156, 870 S.W.2d 398 (1994).

Defendant whose felony conviction was properly expunged under subsection (b) could not be subsequently prosecuted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 5-73-103 based on the expunged conviction. State v. Warren, 345 Ark. 508, 49 S.W.3d 103 (2001).

Appellate court affirmed the denial of an inmate's motion to vacate because, in reviewing the lengthy colloquy between the court and the inmate, it was evident that expungement was not part of the individual's plea agreement; moreover, there was no right to expungement under this section. Barnett v. State, 366 Ark. 427, 236 S.W.3d 491 (2006).

Trial court erred in denying defendant's petition to have defendant's criminal record expunged because at the time defendant committed the sexual offenses, this section did not prohibit expungement for sexual offenses where the victim was under 18. Acts 1999, No. 1407, which precluded expungement in those circumstances, was not effective until July 30, 1999, and the act did not indicate that it was to be retroactively applied. McBride v. State, 99 Ark. App. 201, 258 S.W.3d 782 (2007).

Trial court erred in erred in denying defendant's petition to seal his criminal record because when defendant was released early from his probation, the court was statutorily mandated to discharge defendant without an adjudication of guilt and expunge his record. Turley v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 427, 429 S.W.3d 293 (2013).

Although, at the time defendant was sentenced, expungement should have occurred automatically under former subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the circuit court did not err in denying his 2014 petition to seal and in finding that defendant was not entitled to expungement of his 1995 felony conviction as he did not fulfill the terms and conditions of his probation. While defendant was on probation, he was charged with several felony drug counts and admitted to having used marijuana. Because the circuit court did not err in not expunging defendant's 1995 felony conviction, defendant's 1995 conviction was a valid basis for the 2014 felon in possession of a firearm charge. Kimbrell v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 17, 480 S.W.3d 206 (2016).

Right to Jury Trial.

Defendant's right to a trial by jury was not violated by the circuit court's dismissal of his appeal because defendant voluntarily agreed to defer his criminal proceedings and be placed on probation for at least one year; if his probation was successful, he would be discharged without an adjudication of guilt, his case would be dismissed, and his record would be expunged; and if he violated his probation and was adjudicated guilty, he would be able to appeal at that time. Barner v. State, 2015 Ark. 247, 464 S.W.3d 450 (2015).

Violation of Probation.

Presence of marijuana in defendant's apartment was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could determine that defendant violated the terms of his probation. Harris v. State, 270 Ark. 634, 606 S.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1980); Gage v. State, 307 Ark. 285, 819 S.W.2d 279 (1991).

Cited: White v. State, 329 Ark. 487, 951 S.W.2d 556 (1997); White v. State, 330 Ark. 720, 957 S.W.2d 683 (1997); Harrell v. State, 331 Ark. 232, 962 S.W.2d 325 (1998); Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002).

16-93-304. Probation — First-time offenders — Arkansas Crime Information Center.

  1. All district court judges and circuit court judges shall immediately report to the Arkansas Crime Information Center, in the form prescribed by the center, all probations of criminal defendants under §§ 16-93-301 — 16-93-303.
  2. Prior to granting probation to a criminal defendant under §§ 16-93-301 — 16-93-303, the court shall query the center to determine whether the criminal defendant has previously been granted probation under the provisions of §§ 16-93-301 — 16-93-303.
  3. If the center determines that an individual has utilized §§ 16-93-301 — 16-93-303 more than one (1) time, the center shall notify the last sentencing judge of that fact.
  4. During the probationary period under this subchapter, the center shall report the case as pending and shall not record it as guilty until the circuit court or district court enters an adjudication of guilt.

History. Acts 1981, No. 581, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-1236; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 278; 2011, No. 570, § 90; 2013, No. 1460, § 12.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “district” for “municipal” in (a).

The 2011 amendment added “Probation — First-time offenders” to the section heading; and inserted “(1)” in (c).

The 2013 amendment added (d).

16-93-305. Probation — First time offenders — Sex offender may not reside with minor victim.

  1. Whenever an accused who enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere prior to an adjudication of guilt for any sexual offense defined in § 5-14-101 et seq. or incest as defined in § 5-26-202 for a sexual offense or incest perpetrated against a minor is eligible for probation under procedures defined in § 16-93-303 or any other provision of law, as a condition of granting probation the court shall prohibit the accused, upon release, from residing in a residence with any minor unless the court makes a specific finding that the accused poses no danger to the minors residing in the residence.
  2. Upon violation of this condition of probation, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided by law.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1188, § 1; 2011, No. 570, § 90.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added “Probation — First time offenders —” to the section heading.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Conditions of Probation or Supervised Release Prohibiting Contact with Minors or Frequenting Places Where Minors Congregate — State Cases. 4 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).

16-93-306. Probation generally — Supervision.

    1. The Director of the Division of Community Correction with the advice of the Board of Corrections shall establish written policies and procedures governing the supervision of probationers designed to enhance public safety and to assist the probationers in integrating into society.
      1. The supervision of probationers shall be based on evidence-based practices, including a validated risk-needs assessment.
      2. Decisions shall target the probationer's criminal risk factors with appropriate supervision and treatment.
    2. The Division of Community Correction shall assume supervisory responsibilities over a probationer when the circuit court pronounces the probationer's sentence in the courtroom or upon the entry of a sentencing order, whichever occurs first.
  1. A probation officer shall:
    1. Investigate all cases referred to him or her by the director, the sentencing judge, or the prosecuting attorney;
    2. Furnish to each probationer under his or her supervision a written statement of the conditions of probation and instruct the probationer that he or she is required to stay in compliance with the conditions of probation or risk revocation under § 16-93-308;
    3. Develop a case plan for each individual who is assessed as a moderate to high risk to reoffend based on the risk and needs assessment that targets the criminal risk factors identified in the assessment, is responsive to individual characteristics, and provides supervision of offenders according to that case plan;
    4. Stay informed of the probationer's conduct and condition through visitation, required reporting, or other methods, and report to the sentencing court of that information upon request;
    5. Use practicable and suitable methods that are consistent with evidence-based practices to aid and encourage a probationer to improve his or her conduct and condition and to reduce the risk of recidivism;
      1. Conduct a validated risk-needs assessment of the probationer, including without limitation criminal risk factors and specific individual needs.
      2. The actuarial assessment shall include an initial screening and, if necessary, a comprehensive assessment.
      3. The results of the risk-needs assessment shall assist in making decisions that are consistent with evidence-based practices on the type of supervision and services necessary to each parolee; and
    6. Receive annual training on evidence-based practices and criminal risk factors, as well as instruction on how to target these factors to reduce recidivism.
    1. The Division of Community Correction shall allocate resources, including the assignment of probation officers, to focus on moderate-risk and high-risk offenders as determined by the actuarial assessment provided in subdivision (b)(6) of this section.
    2. The Division of Community Correction shall require public and private treatment and service providers that receive state funds for the treatment of or service for probationers to use evidence-based programs and practices.
    1. The Division of Community Correction shall have the authority to sanction probationers administratively without utilizing the revocation process under § 16-93-307.
      1. The Division of Community Correction shall develop an intermediate sanctions procedure and grid to guide a probation officer in determining the appropriate response to a violation of conditions of supervision.
      2. Intermediate sanctions administered by the Division of Community Correction are required to conform to the sanctioning grid.
    2. Intermediate sanctions shall include without limitation:
      1. Day reporting;
      2. Community service;
      3. Increased substance abuse screening and or treatment;
      4. Increased monitoring, including electronic monitoring and home confinement; and
        1. Incarceration in a county jail for no more than seven (7) days or incarceration in a Division of Community Correction or Division of Correction facility for no more than one hundred eighty (180) days.
          1. Incarceration as an intermediate sanction shall not be used more than six (6) times with an individual probationer.
          2. A probationer shall accumulate no more than thirty (30) days' incarceration in a county jail or no more than three hundred sixty (360) days' incarceration in a Division of Community Correction or Division of Correction facility as an intermediate sanction before the probation officer recommends a violation of the person's probation under § 16-93-307.
          3. A probationer is subject to a period of incarceration of:
            1. Up to ninety (90) days in a Division of Community Correction or Division of Correction facility for a technical conditions violation; and
            2. Exactly one hundred eighty (180) days in a Division of Community Correction or Division of Correction facility for a serious conditions violation. (d) A probationer may not be incarcerated more than two (2) times as a probation sanction in a Division of Community Correction or Division of Correction facility. (4) The Division of Community Correction shall notify the prosecuting attorney in writing when a probationer has been incarcerated due to an administrative sanction under this subsection and shall include an explanation of the cause for incarceration as well as the result of the sanction, if applicable.
  2. Any time in custody for which the probationer is held before a period of incarceration under this section is administered shall not count as a period of incarceration ordered under subdivision (d)(3)(E)(ii)(a) of this section or toward the total accumulation of days of incarceration as set forth in subdivision (d)(3)(E)(ii)(b) of this section.
  3. A sanction under this section is not available to a person serving a suspended imposition of sentence.
  4. A period of incarceration under this section:
    1. May be reduced by the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction for good behavior and successful program completion; and
    2. Shall not be reduced under this section for more than fifty percent (50%) of the total time of incarceration ordered to be served.
      1. A probationer subject to an administrative probation sanction under subsection (d) of this section does not have the right to an attorney at the administrative probation sanction but may elect instead to have a probation sanction heard in circuit court as provided in this subchapter and in which he or she has the right to an attorney.
      2. This subsection does not prohibit a probationer from conferring with a privately retained attorney during the administrative probation sanction process.
      1. The Division of Community Correction shall inform the probationer who is subject to a probation sanction under this section in writing that he or she may elect to have the probation sanction heard in circuit court.
      2. If the probationer elects to have his or her probation sanction heard in circuit court, the Division of Community Correction shall notify the prosecuting attorney and cause a petition to hear the probation sanction to be filed in the circuit court within ten (10) days of the election.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90; 2017, No. 423, § 17; 2019, No. 248, § 2.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “is required to” for “must” in (b)(2); substituted “Department of Community Correction” for “department” in (c)(2), (d)(1), (d)(2)(A), and (d)(2)(B); added “or incarceration in a Department of Community Correction or Department of Correction facility for no more than one hundred eighty (180) days” in (d)(3)(E)(i); rewrote former (d)(3)(E)(ii) and redesignated it as (d)(3)(E)(ii) (a) and (b) ; and added (d)(3)(E)(ii) (c) and (d) , (d)(4), and (e) through (h).

The 2019 amendment added (a)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

Case Notes

Cited: Tomes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 267, 577 S.W.3d 21 (2019).

16-93-307. Probation generally — Revocation hearings.

    1. A defendant arrested for violation of suspension or probation is entitled to a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that he or she has violated a condition of suspension or probation.
    2. The preliminary hearing shall be conducted by a court having original jurisdiction to try a criminal matter as soon as practicable after arrest and reasonably near the place of the alleged violation or arrest.
    3. The defendant shall be given prior notice of the:
      1. Time and place of the preliminary hearing;
      2. Purpose of the preliminary hearing; and
      3. Condition of suspension or probation the defendant is alleged to have violated.
    4. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the defendant has the right to hear and controvert evidence against him or her and to offer evidence in his or her own behalf.
      1. If the court conducting the preliminary hearing finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant has violated a condition of suspension or probation, it may order the defendant to be detained or it may return the defendant to supervision and may consider imposing one (1) or more intermediate sanctions in the sanctioning grid pending further revocation proceedings before the court that originally suspended imposition of sentence on the defendant or placed him or her on probation.
        1. If the court conducting the preliminary hearing does not find reasonable cause, it shall order the defendant released from custody.
        2. However, a release under subdivision (a)(5)(B)(i) of this section does not bar the court that suspended imposition of sentence on the defendant or placed him or her on probation from holding a hearing on the alleged violation of suspension or probation or from ordering that the defendant appear before it.
    5. The court conducting the preliminary hearing shall prepare and furnish to the court that suspended imposition of sentence on the defendant or placed him or her on probation a summary of the preliminary hearing, including the responses of the defendant and the substance of the documents and evidence given in support of revocation.
    1. A suspension or probation shall not be revoked except after a revocation hearing.
    2. The revocation hearing shall be conducted by the court that suspended imposition of sentence on the defendant or placed him or her on probation within a reasonable period of time after the defendant's arrest, not to exceed sixty (60) days.
    3. The defendant shall be given prior written notice of the:
      1. Time and place of the revocation hearing;
      2. Purpose of the revocation hearing; and
      3. Condition of suspension or probation the defendant is alleged to have violated.
    4. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the defendant has the right to:
      1. Hear and controvert evidence against him or her;
      2. Offer evidence in his or her own defense; and
      3. Be represented by counsel.
    5. If suspension or probation is revoked, the court shall prepare and furnish to the defendant a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking suspension or probation.
  1. At a preliminary hearing pursuant to subsection (a) of this section or a revocation hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of this section:
    1. The defendant has the right to counsel and to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness unless the court specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation; and
    2. The court may permit the introduction of any relevant evidence of the alleged violation, including a letter, affidavit, and other documentary evidence, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence in a criminal trial.
  2. A preliminary hearing pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is not required if:
    1. The defendant waives the preliminary hearing;
    2. The revocation is based on the defendant's commission of an offense for which he or she has been tried and found guilty in an independent criminal proceeding; or
    3. The revocation hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is held promptly after the arrest and in the judicial district where the alleged violation occurred or where the defendant was arrested.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The purpose of the 60-day requirement in subsection (b) of this section is to assure that a defendant who has been arrested for violation of probation is not held in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing. Beasley v. Graves, 315 Ark. 663, 869 S.W.2d 20 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Applicability.

The 60-day limitation of subsection (b) of this section is not applicable to a case where there is nothing in the record that indicates defendant was arrested for violating the terms of his probation. Beasley v. Graves, 315 Ark. 663, 869 S.W.2d 20 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Circuit court did not err by not finding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that the probation revocation hearing had been outside the 60-day limitation set by this section because the 60-day limitation period did not apply, as defendant was released on bail pending the revocation hearing. Johnson v. State, 2014 Ark. 74 (2014).

Authority to Modify.

Trial court had the authority to modify a sentence pronounced in open court prior to the entry of judgment because the oral order was not effective until set forth in writing and filed of record; although defendant claimed a denial of the right to be present at all proceedings, he was present for all portions of the proceedings, and although § 16-65-121 had provided that a judgment rendered in open court was effective from that date, the statute has been superseded. Hankins v. State, 84 Ark. App. 370, 141 S.W.3d 905 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Trial court lacked authority, pursuant to former § 5-4-303(d)(2) (now § 16-93-309(a)(2)), to lengthen defendant’s probationary period where defendant had made progress in the drug-court program under the Drug Court Act, § 16-98-301 et seq., because the trial court did not hold a revocation hearing pursuant to this section. Cross v. State, 2009 Ark. 597, 357 S.W.3d 895 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Authority to Revoke.

Where, while the defendant was serving probation imposed by the court of one county, he was convicted of an unrelated felony by the court of a second county, the court of the second county was without authority to revoke his probation; instead, the defendant should have been returned to the first county for a revocation hearing. Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 716 S.W.2d 746 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

A conviction in violation of probation warrants revocation even though the conviction may have been appealed. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The court did not have the power to revoke defendant's suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the suspension period. Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Because defendant violated a condition of his probation by committing two misdemeanor offenses, and because any delay in the revocation hearing was excludable when continuances were granted at defendant's request, the trial court did not err in revoking defendant's probation. Pratt v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 185 (2011) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Burden on State.

In probation revocation proceeding, the burden was on the State to show that defendant had been apprised of the revocation hearing, and the nature thereof, and had been given an opportunity to contact his counsel if he so desired. Akins v. State, 4 Ark. App. 235, 628 S.W.2d 880 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

In a hearing to revoke, the burden is on the state to prove the violation of a condition by a preponderance of the evidence, and on appellate review, the trial court's findings are upheld unless they are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986); Tipton v. State, 47 Ark. App. 187, 887 S.W.2d 540 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Conversion of Fine into Sentence.

The equal protection rule that the state cannot impose a fine as a sentence and then automatically convert it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full was not violated where the defendant, with the assistance of counsel, tendered his own schedule of payment for restitution in exchange for a suspended sentence and then made sporadic payments in violation of the payment schedule. Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Due Process.

Where defendant received suspended sentences on four charges and a petition to revoke suspension of one sentence was dismissed on the basis of the 60-day limitation of this section, but motion to dismiss was denied respecting petitions on other three sentences and suspension was revoked with respect to one of them, defendant was not denied due process by court's refusal to dismiss such petitions. Gordon v. State, 269 Ark. 946, 601 S.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant was held not to be denied the due process right of confrontation of witnesses, since this section only entitles defendant to fundamental fairness, with an opportunity to be heard rather than a comprehensive hearing. Lockett v. State, 271 Ark. 860, 611 S.W.2d 500 (1981) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where the trial court merely concluded that it had previously heard enough evidence at trial for another offense to revoke defendant's probation, the defendant was denied the fundamental fairness of a hearing as is required under this section. Akins v. State, 4 Ark. App. 235, 628 S.W.2d 880 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The trial judge erred in revoking the defendant's suspended imposition of sentence in violation of his constitutional right to due process because defendant was not given notice of the basis for his revocation nor was he afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard on it. Robinson v. State, 14 Ark. App. 38, 684 S.W.2d 824 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where defendant's suspended sentences were revoked after a full trial and verdict of guilty on another charge, there was no question that he was afforded his due process rights before the revocation decision was made. Phillips v. State, 17 Ark. App. 86, 703 S.W.2d 471 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

In a case seeking the revocation of a suspended sentence, defendant failed to show that there was a due process violation because he was present at a hearing, was provided the opportunity to hear and controvert evidence against him at the hearing, was provided the opportunity to offer evidence in his own defense, and was represented by counsel. Moreover, defendant failed to show that there was any prejudice, which was required for a reversal. Gholson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 373, 308 S.W.3d 189 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Evidence.

Although the mere presence of marijuana in defendant's apartment would not have been sufficient to convict one charged with possession of a controlled substance, it was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could determine that defendant had violated the terms of his probation. Harris v. State, 270 Ark. 634, 606 S.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Fact that police officers act in good faith is sufficient at a revocation hearing to permit the introduction of evidence not admissible at a formal trial; the reason is to provide the trial judge with complete information bearing on the admissibility of revoking probation. Dabney v. State, 278 Ark. 375, 646 S.W.2d 4 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Relevant evidence which is not admissible at a criminal trial may be admissible at a revocation hearing. Fitzpatrick v. State, 7 Ark. App. 246, 647 S.W.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Evidence as to defendant's accomplice liability in liquor store robbery was sufficient to justify the revocation of his probation. Fitzpatrick v. State, 7 Ark. App. 246, 647 S.W.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statement of an accomplice concerning the details of the robbery committed by him and the probationer constituted relevant evidence in revocation hearing. Fitzpatrick v. State, 7 Ark. App. 246, 647 S.W.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The trial court's decision to revoke the defendant's suspended sentence, which had been conditioned on his making restitution, was not clearly against a preponderance of the evidence; the defendant's failure to make the ordered payments, in light of his standard of living, his purchase of a $17,000 car, and the fact that he did not search for a job outside his field could be construed as an inexcusable failure to comply with the conditions of his suspension. Hoffman v. State, 289 Ark. 184, 711 S.W.2d 151 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The rules of evidence are not applicable in sentence revocation proceedings. Tipton v. State, 47 Ark. App. 187, 887 S.W.2d 540 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (c)(2) of this section in admitting audio and video recordings of cocaine deliveries at defendant's suspended sentence revocation proceeding because defendant had invited the confidential informant into defendant's home for the purpose of conducting illegal business; it was not reasonable for defendant to believe that the person to whom defendant sold cocaine would not share the information with others. Sherman v. State, 2009 Ark. 275, 308 S.W.3d 614 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Applying subdivision (c)(2) of this section, a circuit court did not abuse its discretion in a probation revocation proceeding by taking judicial notice of its own case file in the same case. Gray v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 159 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Hearings.

A preliminary revocation hearing is not required to determine if defendant has violated a condition of suspension if defendant is arrested for committing another criminal offense. Brandon v. State, 300 Ark. 32, 776 S.W.2d 345 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Jurisdiction.

Subject matter jurisdiction is granted to a particular position and not to the individual who fills it; accordingly, the defendant who had his suspended sentences revoked was mistaken in his argument that the language that the revocation “hearing shall be conducted by the court that suspended imposition of sentence on defendant” in subsection (b) meant that only the judge who suspended his sentences could revoke them. Nation v. State, 283 Ark. 250, 674 S.W.2d 939 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where a defendant appealed the revocation of his probation, the trial court's failure to hold the revocation hearing within 60 days of his arrest did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Since he was in custody on a parole violation during the pendency of the probation revocation, he did not suffer any prejudice. Givan v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 701 (2013).

Where a defendant appealed the revocation of his probation by arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to hold the revocation hearing, the fact that he had been convicted in one division of a county circuit court did not mean that a court in another division of the same county circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hold the revocation hearing. Givan v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 701 (2013).

Where a defendant appealed the revocation of his probation, he unsuccessfully argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the State failed to file a petition for revocation or issue a warrant comporting with former § 5-4-309(f) (current version at § 16-93-308); however, subsection (f) was not applicable because defendant's probation was revoked by an order filed well within the probationary period. Givan v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 701 (2013).

Notice.

The allegations of the petition for revocation of a suspended sentence gave adequate notice of the claimed violation of suspension where it alleged that defendant had been charged with burglary and theft and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges violated the conditions of the suspended sentence. Ellerson v. State, 261 Ark. 525, 549 S.W.2d 495 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant held not to have received proper notice as required by this section. Akins v. State, 4 Ark. App. 235, 628 S.W.2d 880 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

There was no error in failure to give defendant written notice of the time and place of revocation hearing, in light of the fact that defendant did receive actual notice of the time and place of the hearing and did not ask for a continuance. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Motion to dismiss revocation petition was denied where state was not placed on notice before revocation hearing that 60-day statutory period would be raised. Summers v. State, 292 Ark. 237, 729 S.W.2d 147 (1987) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's request for continuance, and defendant was not prejudiced by the state's failure to provide written notice of the revocation hearing where defendant had actual notice of the hearing. Green v. State, 29 Ark. App. 69, 777 S.W.2d 225 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Trial court did not err by revoking probation on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree after the state had notified defendant that rape would be the basis for the revocation. Davis v. State, 308 Ark. 481, 825 S.W.2d 584 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where defendant demonstrated no prejudice resulting from his probation being revoked based on evidence that he delivered a counterfeit controlled substance, after acquittal on a charge of delivery of a controlled substance, defendant was not denied notice or an opportunity to be heard under this section. Phillips v. State, 40 Ark. App. 19, 840 S.W.2d 808 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The State has a right to be notified prior to the hearing that a defendant will raise a speedy-hearing objection, and defendant waived his objection by failing to move for dismissal of the petition prior to the hearing. Wilkerson v. State, 53 Ark. App. 52, 920 S.W.2d 15 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Notice Sufficient.

Petition, as a whole, sufficiently communicated the purpose of the petition and advised defendant of the potential punishments where it cited the general revocation statutes, which cited imprisonment as a potential punishment, the petition was titled as a petition to revoke, the State alleged that defendant had violated her probation terms by failing to pay and failing to report for community service, and defendant acknowledged that violating the conditions of probation could have resulted in up to 20 years in prison when she signed her plea agreement. Turman v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 383, 467 S.W.3d 181 (2015).

Defendant's argument that the petition for revocation failed for lack of personal service was rejected where it was undisputed that defendant and his counsel had actual notice of the time and place of the probation revocation hearing, a plain reading of this section indicated that it required only prior written notice, and defendant admitted that he had received notice. Brown v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 403, 500 S.W.3d 781 (2016).

Defendant's argument that the allegations in the revocation petition were too vague was rejected as the petition specifically alleged, inter alia, that defendant had committed battery and arson, possessed a knife, and failed to pay his fines or report to his probation officer. Brown v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 403, 500 S.W.3d 781 (2016).

Preliminary Hearing.

Where the defendant was charged with violating conditions of his suspension because he committed the offense of criminal attempt, the probable cause hearing on the criminal attempt charge served the same purpose as a preliminary hearing on the suspension revocation, and the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of a preliminary hearing pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Dunavin v. State, 18 Ark. App. 178, 712 S.W.2d 326 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where the defendant was charged with violating conditions of his suspension because he committed another criminal offense, the probable cause hearing on the new offense served the same purpose as a preliminary hearing on the suspension revocation and, therefore, the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of a preliminary hearing pursuant to subsection (a). Bonham v. State, 73 Ark. App. 320, 43 S.W.3d 753 (2001) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the revocation of his probation because defendant waived his right to have a preliminary hearing since he never requested a preliminary hearing but filed a motion to dismiss over a year after his arrest; defendant failed to show how the delay, which the circuit court determined was caused by his repeated requests for continuances, prejudiced him. Hart v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 434, 530 S.W.3d 366 (2017).

Right to Confront Witnesses.

Where the substance of accomplice's written statement concerning robbery was disclosed by other evidence at revocation hearing, particularly the testimony of the probationer himself, the probationer was not prejudiced by the accomplice's failure to testify in person even though the trial court made no specific finding of any cause for not allowing confrontation as is required under subdivision (c)(1). Fitzpatrick v. State, 7 Ark. App. 246, 647 S.W.2d 480 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

In a probation revocation proceeding the trial court must balance the probationer's right to confront witnesses against grounds asserted by the state for not requiring confrontation. The court should first assess the state's explanation of why confrontation is undesirable or impractical, and second, consider the reliability of the evidence which the state offers in place of live testimony. Goforth v. State, 27 Ark. App. 150, 767 S.W.2d 537 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Although the rules of evidence do not apply in revocation proceedings, this is not meant to deny a probationer his due process right to confront witnesses. Goforth v. State, 27 Ark. App. 150, 767 S.W.2d 537 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Although the rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, are not strictly applicable in revocation proceedings, the right to confront the witnesses is. Jones v. State, 31 Ark. App. 23, 786 S.W.2d 851 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Confrontation error in a suspended sentence revocation hearing was not harmless because the absent informant’s testimony was important, and the state’s case was not overwhelming to begin with. Once defendant invoked her confrontation rights, precedent required that the circuit court enforce those rights absent a specific finding of “good cause,” pursuant to subdivision (c)(1) of this section. Graham v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 162 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Any right to confrontation error in allowing fingerprint evidence in a suspended sentence revocation hearing without presenting the witness who took the fingerprints was harmless because there was live testimony from a homeowner who caught defendant in the act of a burglary and who identified him as the burglar. Reynolds v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 705 (2012).

While the trial court did not find good cause to deny defendant's statutory right to confront the owner of his alleged residence, the error was harmless because other testimony clearly demonstrated that defendant regularly spent a substantial amount of time at locations other than his registered address. Fountain v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 71 (2014).

Circuit court properly found that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation because, even assuming that the admission of a violation report prepared by defendant's probation officer violated the confrontation clause, the error was harmless where defendant failed to pay his fines, costs, and fees as required, he admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana, which was another violation of his probation, and the State only had to prove one violation. Harris v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 51 (2015).

By allowing two police officers to testify that a confidential informant had identified appellant as the person who had delivered a controlled substance when the informant did not testify at the revocation hearing, and by denying appellant's confrontation-clause objections without explaining the basis for its ruling, the circuit court violated the confrontation clause. The confrontation-clause error was not harmless. Brisher v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 488, 505 S.W.3d 223 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in admitting a police officer's hearsay testimony in a hearing regarding revocation of defendant's suspended sentence where the victim was not present at the hearing; the circuit court's statement that it was satisfied with the information given by the officer regarding the victim's injuries sufficed as a finding of reliability under subdivision (c)(1) of this section. Apodaca v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 63, 482 S.W.3d 358 (2016).

Even if the admission of out-of-court statements into evidence violated the Confrontation Clause under the United States Constitution, the error was harmless because the evidence regarding new charges filed against defendant was not necessary to prove the State's case for revocation based on the fact that defendant violated other conditions of his probation by testing positive for drugs and alcohol numerous times. Ryan v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 105, 484 S.W.3d 689 (2016)

Trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by allowing a police officer to testify in a probation revocation hearing about the reason defendant had been discharged from a treatment program where the State offered no explanation for why the director of the facility was not available to be confronted, and the trial court did not make a good-cause finding for not allowing confrontation. Nelson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 324, 551 S.W.3d 417 (2018).

Trial court's Sixth Amendment error in allowing a police officer to testify about defendant's discharge from a treatment program rather than confronting the director of the program was harmless where it found defendant and his explanation concerning his discharge incredible, and defendant admitted that his discharge from the treatment program violated the terms of his probation. Nelson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 324, 551 S.W.3d 417 (2018).

Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated at the hearing to revoke defendant's suspended sentence; although the jailer whom defendant was accused of having assaulted did not testify, a video of the attack was shown and defendant was allowed to confront and cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified at the hearing. Furthermore, no hearsay evidence was offered. Caldwell v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 588, 565 S.W.3d 539 (2018).

Right to Counsel.

In probation revocation proceedings, the right to counsel may be waived, but the waiver must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and defendant's waiver of his right to counsel when he initially pled guilty did not constitute an intelligent waiver to all further proceedings. Furr v. State, 285 Ark. 45, 685 S.W.2d 149 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The trial court's action in relieving the defendant's counsel at the revocation hearing without affording the defendant an opportunity to retain new counsel constituted reversible error, even though the defendant had not paid his counsel in full, and the defendant had had numerous opportunities to obtain counsel but had failed to do so. Suire v. State, 18 Ark. App. 166, 712 S.W.2d 317 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant's direct appeal of his judgment of conviction preserved his right to object to his lack of counsel during sentencing where he was never informed by the court he had a right to counsel for the sentencing phase, and he was not precluded from objecting to his lack of counsel at sentencing because of his failure to object at the trial level or because he also filed a new-trial motion. Smith v. State, 329 Ark. 238, 947 S.W.2d 373 (1997) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Because defendant failed to timely object to the admission of certain testimony, and because the circuit court was charged with resolving all questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence, pursuant to former §§ 5-4-309(d) and 5-4-310(c)(2) (now §§ 16-93-308(d) and 16-93-307(c)(2)), a preponderance of the evidence supported the revocation of defendant's probation. Ellis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 654 (2011).

Where the State filed a petition to revoke defendant's probation for residential burglary alleging he violated the conditions of his probation by failing to pay fines, costs, and fees, failing to report to his probation officer, and providing a false address to his probation officer, the trial court conducted his hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of this section; a county employee testified that he did not pay his fines, costs, and fees, and defendant's probation officer testified that he failed to report and did not live at the address he provided. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's decision revoking probation. Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 2 (2013).

Where defendant appealed the revocation of his probation, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that he was aware of the conditions of his probation. Defendant did not assert that he, in fact, was unaware that criminal possession of cocaine was a violation of his probationary terms or that he was required by those terms to pay fines and report to his probation officer. Givan v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 701 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support a decision to revoke defendant's probation where he tested positive for drugs and alcohol numerous times; a probation officer's affidavit, a violation report, the supervision contact notes, and the drug test results were admitted into evidence without objection and confirmed testimony relating to the positive test results. The State only had to prove one violation. Ryan v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 105, 484 S.W.3d 689 (2016).

Time Limitation.

Requirement that a suspension or revocation hearing be conducted within statutory period after arrest applies only to arrest for a revocation or suspension of a suspended sentence, not an arrest on another charge while defendant was allegedly serving a suspended sentence. Walker v. State, 262 Ark. 215, 555 S.W.2d 228 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where a defendant was arrested not for violation of the terms of suspension, but for a new offense, the statutory period which runs from the date of arrest on a petition to revoke a suspended sentence, would not apply and a revocation order entered more than statutory period after the arrest was valid. Blake v. State, 262 Ark. 301, 556 S.W.2d 427 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statutory period contained in this section begins to run from his arrest for a violation of the terms of suspension, not from his arrest upon other charges. Lincoln v. State, 262 Ark. 511, 558 S.W.2d 146 (1977); Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 603 S.W.2d 410 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statutory period specified in subsection (b) was not intended by the legislature to be jurisdictional but merely represents the period beyond which the hearing cannot be delayed if the defendant objects. Haskins v. State, 264 Ark. 454, 572 S.W.2d 411 (1978) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

It would not be proper to hold that the statutory period of this section applies not only to cases on which the state has filed to revoke suspension, but to cases on which it has not filed, where there is no inference that failure was the result of an improper motive. Gordon v. State, 269 Ark. 946, 601 S.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Since the purpose of the limitation period is to assure that a defendant is not detained in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing, the limitation loses its meaning when he is already serving time on another charge. Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 603 S.W.2d 410 (1980); Phillips v. State, 17 Ark. App. 86, 703 S.W.2d 471 (1986); Green v. State, 29 Ark. App. 69, 777 S.W.2d 225 (1989); Parks v. State, 303 Ark. 208, 795 S.W.2d 49 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Statutory period for a revocation hearing did not begin to run on date warrant of arrest was issued on revocation petition where defendant was already incarcerated on other charge. Boone v. State, 270 Ark. 83, 603 S.W.2d 410 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statutory period of subsection (b) begins to run from the date of a defendant's arrest for the alleged violation of the terms of his suspended sentence. Lark v. State, 276 Ark. 441, 637 S.W.2d 529 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where the state was put on notice by defendant's motion for habeas corpus that he was seeking a speedy hearing on revocation petition and he never backed away from this position at any time, the state should have conducted the hearing no later than the statutory period after arrest and where a greater period of time had elapsed before hearing, petition for revocation must be dismissed. McKee v. State, 7 Ark. App. 273, 647 S.W.2d 490 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

This section relates to an arrest for violation of the conditions of a suspended sentence and not an arrest on another charge; accordingly, where defendant, who was arrested on another charge, was brought to a hearing within the statutory period from the time he was notified that the petition for revocation had been filed, the requirements of this section were met. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The appellate courts look to the provisions of Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3 for guidance in computing excludable periods of time from the statutory period required for revocation hearings under subsection (b) of this section. Cheshire v. State, 16 Ark. App. 34, 696 S.W.2d 322 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

A period of days after defendant was arrested in another state as a fugitive and before he was returned to Arkansas was excludable from the statutory period required for revocation hearings under subsection (b). Cheshire v. State, 16 Ark. App. 34, 696 S.W.2d 322 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

A clearly established distinction has been made between arrest for violation of the conditions of a suspended sentence and arrest for other charges in determining whether a revocation hearing under subsection (b) has been held within statutory period after arrest. Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The statutory period for a revocation hearing provided by subsection (b) of this section must also be applied to former § 5-4-309(e) (see now § 16-93-308(f)) in determining whether a defendant has been arrested for violation of the conditions of a suspended or probated sentence before the expiration of the period of the suspension or probation. Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant suffered no prejudice by the revocation hearing not being held within the statutory period, because after his arrest he had already been incarcerated on an unrelated charge. Phillips v. State, 17 Ark. App. 86, 703 S.W.2d 471 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

This section does not require that judgment must be given within 60 days of arrest. Felix v. State, 20 Ark. App. 44, 723 S.W.2d 839 (1987) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The purpose of the requirement that the hearing must be held within 60 days of the arrest is to assure that a defendant is not detained in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing. Felix v. State, 20 Ark. App. 44, 723 S.W.2d 839 (1987) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Time limitation for holding hearing relates to the time for having a hearing after the defendant is notified that the revocation petition has been filed, and that is all that is required. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

When there has been no arrest, the requirement of holding the hearing within 60 days is not absolute. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Compliance with former § 5-4-309 (see now § 16-93-308) and this section was sufficient where the defendant was not surprised by the timing of the hearing nor was he prejudiced in any way by not having been arrested or summoned. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The specific wording of subdivision (b)(2) states that the hearing must be held within 60 days “after” the defendant's arrest. Therefore, for purposes of computation, counting would begin on the day following defendant's arrest. Petty v. State, 31 Ark. App. 119, 788 S.W.2d 744 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The purpose of subdivision (b)(2) is to assure that a defendant is not detained in jail for an unreasonable time awaiting his revocation hearing. Holmes v. State, 33 Ark. App. 168, 803 S.W.2d 563 (1991) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant, until he waived extradition, was “unavailable” for trial for the purpose of computing the 60 days. Rodgers v. State, 49 Ark. App. 136, 898 S.W.2d 475 (1995) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

When a defendant chooses to have the revocation matter be deferred until disposition of an underlying charge, he cannot then turn around and complain of delay pursuant to subsection (b)(2). White v. State, 329 Ark. 487, 951 S.W.2d 556 (1997) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

The constitutional right to a speedy trial does not apply to probation revocation hearings. White v. State, 330 Ark. 720, 957 S.W.2d 683 (1997) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Hearing on a petition for revocation was held within the 60-day time limit under subdivision (b)(2) of this section and, thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Lindsey v. State, 86 Ark. App. 297, 184 S.W.3d 458 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Because defendant failed to raise his argument that his probation revocation hearing was not held before the expiration of the 60 days provided in subdivision (b)(2) of this section, defendant waived his right to insist on a timely hearing. Cooper v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 861 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

In an appeal from a suspended sentence revocation proceeding, defendant waived his speedy hearing argument under subdivision (b)(2) of this section because he failed to raise it in the revocation proceeding. Simpson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 33 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Waiver.

On appeal of the decision revoking defendant's suspended sentence for burglary, his argument that the trial court erred by failing to provide a reason for the revocation as required by subdivision (b)(5) of this section was not preserved for review because he failed to object. Love v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 600 (2012).

Defendant claimed that the trial court's revocation of his probation was subject to reversal because the trial court failed to include a written explanation as required by this section; however, defendant failed to raise this issue below. In line with precedent, the issue was not addressed, and defendant's claim that certain case law made new law in regards to error preservation was rejected. Massey v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 240 (2015).

Defendant waived his right to demand that the revocation hearing be held within 60 days because he did not request that the circuit court hold the hearing within 60 days, and asked the circuit court for a continuance, which was denied; although defendant claimed that subdivision (b)(2) of this section provides a substantive right and shifting the burden to a defendant to ask for a timely hearing would limit that right, his contention was rejected. Lane v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 672 (2015).

Issue defendant raised on appeal regarding the circuit court's failure to comply with the writing requirement in subdivision (b)(5) of this section was not preserved, as he did not object. Lane v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 672 (2015).

Written Statement.

Although the order entered by the trial court in revoking defendant's suspended sentence did not give a statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the revocation, when the “Bill of Exceptions” showed the trial court relied on a subsequent conviction, there was substantial compliance with this section. Rutledge v. State, 263 Ark. 300, 564 S.W.2d 511 (1978) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where defendant failed to request a written statement of the court's basis for revoking probation, as provided for in subsection (b), failure to object to the omission precluded consideration of the point on appeal. Lockett v. State, 271 Ark. 860, 611 S.W.2d 500 (1981) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

One purpose of the written statement is to permit the defendant to know the precise basis of the trial court's decision so that he may conduct an intelligent appeal. Phillips v. State, 25 Ark. App. 102, 752 S.W.2d 301 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Where the defense has failed to show the prejudicial effect of not receiving a written statement, the trial court must be affirmed. Phillips v. State, 25 Ark. App. 102, 752 S.W.2d 301 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Written findings are required under subdivision (b)(5) only when suspension or revocation is revoked. DeHart v. State, 312 Ark. 323, 849 S.W.2d 497 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant waived the right to receive a written statement of the evidence used by a trial court to revoke defendant's probation by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. Sisk v. State, 81 Ark. App. 276, 101 S.W.3d 248 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Defendant waived his right to a written statement on the evidence relied on in revoking his suspended sentence by failing to object to the trial court’s failure to furnish such a statement. Dooly v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 591, 377 S.W.3d 471 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-310).

Cited: Richards v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 15 (2013); Alls v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 713 (2013); Parmer v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 5 (2017).

16-93-308. Probation generally — Revocation — Definition.

    1. At any time before the expiration of a period of suspension of sentence or probation, a court may summon a defendant on probation or who is serving a suspended imposition of sentence to appear before the court or may issue a warrant for the defendant's arrest.
    2. The warrant may be executed by any law enforcement officer.
    1. At any time before the expiration of a period of suspension of sentence or probation, any law enforcement officer may arrest a defendant on probation or serving a suspended imposition of sentence without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that the defendant:
      1. Has failed to comply with a condition of his or her suspension of sentence or probation; or
      2. Is exhibiting behavior that can be construed to be a threat to:
        1. Abscond from supervision; or
        2. Not comply with an intermediate sanction under § 16-93-306(d) or § 16-93-309(a)(4).
    2. If a defendant on probation is arrested by a probation officer employed by the Division of Community Correction for a violation of the defendant's probation and taken to a county jail for a reason listed under subdivision (b)(1)(B) of this section, the state shall reimburse the county for the costs of incarceration at the prevailing rate of reimbursement.
    1. A defendant arrested for violation of suspension of sentence or probation shall be taken immediately before the court that suspended imposition of sentence or, if the defendant was placed on probation, before the court supervising the probation, or, if the defendant is subject to administrative probation sanction under § 16-93-306(d), to the appropriate authority in the Division of Community Correction if practicable or, if transport to an appropriate authority of the Division of Community Correction is not practicable, then to the county jail.
    2. If a defendant subject to administrative probation sanction is transported to a county jail, then the county shall be reimbursed at the daily prevailing rate for the costs of incarceration.
  1. If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his or her suspension of sentence or probation, the court may revoke the suspension of sentence or probation at any time prior to the expiration of the period of suspension of sentence or probation.
  2. A finding of failure to comply with a condition of suspension of sentence or probation as provided in subsection (d) of this section may be punished as contempt under § 16-10-108.
  3. A court may revoke a suspension of sentence or probation subsequent to the expiration of the period of suspension of sentence or probation if before expiration of the period:
    1. The defendant is arrested for violation of suspension of sentence or probation;
    2. A warrant is issued for the defendant's arrest for violation of suspension of sentence or probation;
    3. A petition to revoke the defendant's suspension of sentence or probation has been filed if a warrant is issued for the defendant's arrest within thirty (30) days of the date of filing the petition; or
    4. The defendant has been:
      1. Issued a citation in lieu of arrest under Rule 5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure for violation of suspension of sentence or probation; or
      2. Served a summons under Rule 6 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure for violation of suspension of sentence or probation.
      1. If a court revokes a defendant's suspension of sentence or probation, the court may enter a judgment of conviction and may impose any sentence on the defendant that might have been imposed originally for the offense of which he or she was found guilty.
      2. However, any sentence to pay a fine or of imprisonment, when combined with any previous fine or imprisonment imposed for the same offense, shall not exceed the limits of § 5-4-201 or § 5-4-401, or if applicable, § 5-4-501.
      1. As used in this subsection, “any sentence” includes the extension of a period of suspension of sentence or probation.
      2. If an extension of suspension of sentence or probation is made upon revocation, the court is not deprived of the ability to revoke the suspension of sentence or probation again if the defendant's conduct again warrants revocation.
    1. A court shall not revoke a suspension of sentence or probation because of a person's inability to achieve a high school diploma, high school equivalency diploma approved by the Adult Education Section, or gainful employment.
      1. However, the court may revoke a suspension of sentence or probation if the person fails to make a good faith effort to achieve a high school diploma, high school equivalency diploma approved by the Adult Education Section, or gainful employment.
      2. As used in this section, “good faith effort” means a person:
        1. Has been enrolled in a program of instruction leading to a high school diploma or a high school equivalency diploma approved by the Adult Education Section and is attending a school or an adult education course; or
        2. Is registered for employment and enrolled and participating in an employment-training program with the purpose of obtaining gainful employment.
      1. Except as provided for in subdivision (i)(2) of this section, if a defendant on probation is subject to a revocation hearing under this subchapter or an administrative probation sanction for a technical conditions violation or a serious conditions violation, the defendant on probation is subject to confinement according to the time periods set out in § 16-93-306(d) and § 16-93-309(a)(4) without having his or her probation revoked.
        1. A defendant on probation is subject to having his or her probation revoked and being sentenced to the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction for a subsequent violation of his or her probation if the defendant has been confined six (6) times under § 16-93-306(d).
        2. After a defendant on probation has been confined two (2) times under either § 16-93-306(d) or § 16-93-309(a)(4) for any combination of a technical conditions violation or serious conditions violation for any period of time, the defendant on probation is subject to having his or her probation revoked and being sentenced to the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction for a subsequent violation of his or her probation.
      1. A defendant is subject to having his or her probation revoked under this section for a technical conditions violation or a serious conditions violation without having been sanctioned for a period of confinement set out under § 16-93-306(d) or § 16-93-309(a)(4) if upon the filing of a petition in the court with jurisdiction the Division of Community Correction or the prosecuting attorney proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is engaging in or has engaged in behavior that poses a threat to the community.
      2. If a prosecuting attorney alleges a technical conditions violation or a serious conditions violation under subdivision (i)(2)(A) of this section and meets the standard established under subdivision (i)(2)(A) of this section, the court may revoke the defendant's probation and sentence him or her to a period of time exceeding the time periods set out under § 16-93-306(d) or § 16-93-309(a)(4).
    1. A period of confinement that a defendant on probation serves for a probation violation but before being administratively sanctioned or sanctioned by the circuit court shall not count as a period of confinement for the purposes of the aggregate number of periods of confinement under this subsection or under § 16-93-306(d)(3)(E)(ii)(a) , nor shall the number of days of confinement count toward the total accumulation of days of confinement as set forth in § 16-93-306(d)(3)(E)(ii)(b) .
  4. To the extent that a participant in a specialty court program is subject to this section, any period of confinement ordered by the specialty court is not subject to the accumulation of sanctions under subsection (i) of this section, nor is a specialty court program bound by the time periods under § 16-93-306(d) or § 16-93-309(a)(4).

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90; 2015, No. 1115, § 25; 2017, No. 423, § 18; 2019, No. 910, §§ 897-903.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “high school equivalency diploma approved by the Department of Career Education” for “general education development certificate” throughout (h).

The 2017 amendment inserted “of sentence” following “suspension” throughout (a) through (g); inserted “on probation or who is serving a suspended imposition of sentence” in (a)(1); redesignated former (b) as the introductory language of (b)(1) and (b)(1)(A); inserted “on probation or serving a suspended imposition of sentence” in the introductory language of (b)(1); added (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2); redesignated former (c) as (c)(1); added the language beginning with “or, if the defendant is subject” in (c)(1); added (c)(2); added (i) and (j); and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section; substituted “Adult Education Section of the Division of Workforce Services” for “Department of Career Education” throughout (h); and substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (i)(1)(B)(i) and (i)(1)(B)(ii).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Case Notes

Burden of Proof.

In order to revoke probation or a suspension trial court has to find by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of the probation or suspension. Rudd v. State, 76 Ark. App. 121, 61 S.W.3d 885 (2001) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where evidence showed that a law enforcement officer saw a car stopped in a road in the middle of night in a high crime area, the officer saw the driver exchange something with another driver, the officer stopped one of the cars and smelled burnt marijuana, defendant was the only passenger in that car, during a consensual search of the car the officer found four baggies of marijuana packaged as if for sale, and the marijuana was in a location accessible to defendant in the car, the state met its burden under subsection (d) of showing that defendant had violated a condition of his probation by the constructive possession of contraband. Jones v. State, 355 Ark. 630, 144 S.W.3d 254 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Revocation of a defendant’s probation was supported by a preponderance of the evidence: defendant admitted to more than one violation of defendant’s probation and a judge was not required to believe defendant’s explanations or excuse defendant’s failure to comply with the conditions of defendant’s probation. Ingram v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 729, 363 S.W.3d 6 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Cause for Revocation.

The trial court did not err in taking into consideration, in revoking defendant's probation and suspended sentence, that defendant had been associating with a convicted felon, who was his first cousin and who was regarded as a member of his immediate family. Cureton v. State, 266 Ark. 1034, 589 S.W.2d 204 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

A conviction in municipal court for loitering, as well as a prior conviction for burglary, would constitute good cause to revoke probation. Murphy v. State, 269 Ark. 181, 599 S.W.2d 138 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the suspended sentence was expressly conditioned upon the successful completion of the drug rehabilitation program, but where defendant did not complete the program, and there was no showing that defendant was arbitrarily dismissed from the program, then the trial judge could justifiably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his suspension or probation. Adams v. State, 269 Ark. 601, 599 S.W.2d 437 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where probationer failed to pay fines, restitution, court costs, and attorney's fees until after his arrest for probation violation and where probationer failed to report his change of address to the probation officer, the trial court was correct in finding that these were not de minimis excusable violations and revoking probation. Simmons v. State, 13 Ark. App. 208, 681 S.W.2d 422 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

A conviction in violation of probation warrants revocation even though the conviction may have been appealed. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where one of the conditions of the probation was that the defendant subject himself and his home to being searched, the defendant's refusal gave the officers “reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his probation.” Therefore, his actual arrest, occurring a few minutes later, was not illegal. Wilson v. State, 25 Ark. App. 45, 752 S.W.2d 46 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The fact that the defendant had been truant once, tardy twice and suspended for ten days from school, all within a period of less than a month, was sufficient proof of his lack of a good faith effort to obtain his high-school diploma or GED in violation of his probation. Ramsey v. State, 60 Ark. App. 206, 959 S.W.2d 765 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Despite the fact that an order suspending defendant's sentence for theft of property and residential burglary did not specifically state that defendant was required to surrender to police on a certain date in order to serve jail time, the preponderance of the evidence showed that defendant's failure to report violated the provisions of the order that required good behavior and a law-abiding lifestyle; evidence showed that defendant was caught after leading police on a chase. Richardson v. State, 85 Ark. App. 347, 157 S.W.3d 536 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation as the state successfully showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant failed to pay his fees and abide by the terms of his probation; moreover, defendant was convicted of two new criminal offenses, kidnapping and attempted burglary. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 351, 246 S.W.3d 433 (2007) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant's drug-court probation under §§ 16-98-301 to 16-98-304 was revoked for failing to attend drug testing, failing to attend a group meeting, and being arrested because she inexcusably failed to comply, despite a delirium diagnosis. Defendant did not show that she was suffering from such on the dates that probation was violated; moreover, an examination showed no mental defect, and her hallucinations were not involved with her probation revocation. Anglin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 34, 249 S.W.3d 836 (2007) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended sentence for sexual abuse and sentenced defendant to six years in prison because it was undisputed that defendant never completed the Arkansas Reduction of Sexual Victimization Program, and evidence was presented that showed that defendant refused to comply with the program's entry requirements. Seamster v. State, 2009 Ark. 258, 308 S.W.3d 567 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant pleaded guilty to commercial burglary, breaking or entering, two counts of theft of property, and first-degree criminal mischief, he was sentenced to 60 months' supervised probation. Because defendant consented to going to the residential drug treatment in accordance with § 16-98-201, his placement in a regional punishment facility could not be classified as a probation revocation; when he violated the terms of the drug-court program based on his public intoxication and testing positive for cocaine, the trial court did not err by revoking his probation and imposing a 120 month sentence in the Arkansas Department of Correction, with 48 months suspended. Doyle v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 94, 302 S.W.3d 607 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

When defendant was placed on two years' probation on his plea of guilty to possession of cocaine, one of the conditions was that he not violate any state law; defendant's plea of guilty to criminal trespass in violation of § 5-39-203(a)(2) alone was sufficient to support the finding that he violated his probation. An adverse evidentiary ruling and the denial of his motion for continuance at the revocation hearing was not prejudicial; therefore, defendant's appeal of the revocation order lacked merit. Johnson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 527, 334 S.W.3d 419 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant’s suspended sentence was properly revoked because defendant committed a robbery, and defendant’s parole officer testified that when she conducted a “parole search” of the motel room where defendant was staying, “possible marijuana,” cocaine, and drug paraphernalia were found in the room; defendant admitted that he would test positive for marijuana. Williams v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 551 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the state’s three witnesses testified that defendant threatened to kill the victim during an argument over money, the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed second-degree terroristic threatening. The trial court was free to reject defendant’s testimony that he never threatened the victim and was not a violent person; the trial court did not err by revoking his suspended sentence. Whitney v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 726 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Decision to revoke probation due to a probationer’s failure to comply with conditions was proper because written conditions were provided probationer as required by § 5-4-303; there was evidence that the conditions were expressly communicated in writing and verbally to the probationer; and there was no evidence of confusion on the probationer’s part. White v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 157 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant’s suspended sentence on the ground that he committed the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine because the evidence showed that a reliable source had tipped off the police to the fact that defendant, contrary to the terms and conditions of his release, was continuing to manufacture methamphetamine, and defendant directed the purchases and provided an explanation for each component of the methamphetamine recipe; it was shown that defendant conceived and proposed the methamphetamine cook, buy, and sell arrangement for the manufacture and distribution of the illegal substance, and simply by asserting the defense of entrapment, § 5-2-209, defendant necessarily admitted committing the offense. Lowe v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 284 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Judgment revoking appellant’s probated sentence was affirmed where (1) despite appellant’s attempt to excuse his failure to pay fines and restitution, the trial court found that appellant had committed a multitude of violations and that these violations specifically included a failure to make good-faith efforts to pay fines and restitution; and (2) there was evidence that appellant spent his money on something nonessential, alcohol, and this use of alcohol was also in violation of his terms of probation. Barringer v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 369 (2010)Trial court did not err in finding that defendant violated the conditions of his suspended imposition of sentence by failing to pay child support since pleading guilty to nonpayment of support because the state presented testimony that the victim had not received any payments in more than six months, the child-support registry was introduced without objection, and defendant himself testified that he had failed to pay child support since he had pleaded guilty to the charge of nonpayment of support. Vick v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 29 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Even if defendant's motivations for moving to Texas were good, the conditions of his probation did not allow him to unilaterally relocate to Texas. Even though defendant offered his reasons for moving, he offered no reasonable justification for failing to get written permission to do so from his probation officer. Perry v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 312, 550 S.W.3d 907 (2018).

Competency.

There was no evidence to suggest incompetency other than the fact that defendant rambled, had an unusual speech pattern, and testified to irrelevant matters, which was insufficient to require the trial court to sua sponte halt the proceedings and order a competency evaluation. Thus, defendant could not avail himself of the exception to the rule that a court would not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and as he failed to raise the issue below, and the trial court was not obligated to raise it sua sponte, the revocation of probation was affirmed. Lewis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 503, 505 S.W.3d 725 (2016).

Court's Authority.

The fact that defendant was not arrested with a warrant for violation of his suspended sentence nor given formal notice of the time and place of the revocation hearing did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the petition, nor void the trial court's action in revoking the suspended sentence. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where more than five years had passed since the defendant was given a suspended sentence of three years on the condition that he pay court costs and a fine, the trial court no longer had the authority to revoke the suspended sentence for the defendant's failure to pay the fine. Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant was sentenced to 10 years with 5 years suspended and was paroled from the penitentiary, the court held to have no authority to revoke that suspension more than five years later. Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the defendant had violated conditions of her suspended imposition of sentence was purely a question which required resolution of the witnesses' credibility and was one within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jared v. State, 17 Ark. App. 223, 707 S.W.2d 325 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where, while the defendant was serving probation imposed by the court of one county, he was convicted of an unrelated felony by the court of a second county, the court of the second county was without authority to revoke his probation; instead, the defendant should have been returned to the first county for a revocation hearing. Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 716 S.W.2d 746 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where revocation of probation did not occur until after the completion of the defendant's imposed sentence, the trial court could not sentence the defendant to serve additional time in prison. Gautreaux v. State, 22 Ark. App. 130, 736 S.W.2d 23 (1987) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

This section does not require that one accused of violation of probation be summoned or arrested, only that he may be. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The revocation of a suspension for a subsequent crime prior to conviction of that crime was not an abuse of discretion. Rudd v. State, 308 Ark. 401, 825 S.W.2d 565 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The fact that a municipal court judgment is on appeal does not prevent the trial court from using it as a basis for revocation. DeHart v. State, 312 Ark. 323, 849 S.W.2d 497 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant's suspended imposition of sentence had expired, and defendant's subsequent offense on which the revocation of the suspended sentence was based did not occur until nearly 4 years later, and although defendant allegedly had also violated the conditions of his suspension by failing to pay court-ordered restitution and costs, but the State presented no proof and the court made no findings on those allegations, then neither of the exceptions in subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section and § 5-4-303(f) (see now § 16-93-311) to subsection (d) of this section were applicable, and the trial court was without authority to revoke the suspension. Jones v. State, 52 Ark. App. 179, 916 S.W.2d 766 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The court did not have the power to revoke defendant's suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the suspension period. Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Although the trial court had the authority to revoke defendant's probation after the state's second request because it was based on a violation of a condition in the original probation order, the trial court exceeded its authority when it entered a three-year suspended sentence. Thronebury v. State, 85 Ark. App. 352, 154 S.W.3d 272 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court lacked authority to revoke defendant’s probation because defendant’s initial 24-month probationary period had expired and defendant was not lawfully on probation at the time of the revocation hearing. Cross v. State, 2009 Ark. 597, 357 S.W.3d 895 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not utilize defendant’s failure to register as a sex and child offender as an additional ground to support the revocation of his suspended sentence because the trial court merely entered a judgment declaring defendant guilty of that charge and pronounced a prison sentence on the registration violation for which he was originally given a suspended sentence; imposition of the sentence was separate and apart from the revocation and was well within the discretion of the trial court. Lowe v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 284 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Expiration of Period.

Under the plain language of subsection (e) (now (f)), a warrant issued in 1990, during defendant's probationary period, but not served until 1995, after the expiration of defendant's probationary period, was not stale. Richmond v. State, 326 Ark. 728, 934 S.W.2d 214 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

When defendant's probation period expired without her having been arrested for a probation violation and without an arrest warrant having been issued for violation of probation, the circuit court lost jurisdiction to revoke probation. Carter v. State, 350 Ark. 229, 85 S.W.3d 914 (2002) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The circuit court erred in not dismissing the petition for revocation where the probationary term had expired and the state failed to arrest the defendant or issue an arrest warrant during the period of probation as required by subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section. Troup v. State, 80 Ark. App. 323, 95 S.W.3d 823 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

An “alias bench warrant” did not meet the requirements of subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section because such a warrant was not issued for an arrest due to violation of probation; however, under former § 5-4-303(h)(2) (see now § 16-93-311), which was adopted after this section, the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation, even beyond the expiration of defendant's probation period in 2000, where defendant had failed to pay the full amount of required restitution. Smith v. State, 83 Ark. App. 48, 115 S.W.3d 820 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Hearings.

Requirement that a suspension or revocation hearing be conducted within 60 days after arrest applies only to arrest for a revocation or suspension of a suspended sentence, not an arrest on another charge while defendant was allegedly serving a suspended sentence. Walker v. State, 262 Ark. 215, 555 S.W.2d 228 (1977). But see Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The 60-day limitation for a revocation hearing provided by § 5-4-310(b) (now § 16-93-307(b)) must also be applied to subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section in determining whether a defendant has been arrested for violation of the conditions of a suspended or probated sentence before the expiration of the period of the suspension or probation. Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Compliance with this section and § 5-4-310 (now § 16-93-307) was sufficient where the defendant was not surprised by the timing of the hearing nor was he prejudiced in any way by not having been arrested or summoned. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the revocation of his probation because defendant waived his right to have a preliminary hearing since he never requested a preliminary hearing but filed a motion to dismiss over a year after his arrest; defendant failed to show how the delay, which the circuit court determined was caused by his repeated requests for continuances, prejudiced him. Hart v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 434, 530 S.W.3d 366 (2017).

Implied Repeal.

Subsection (f) (now (g)) of this section was partially repealed by implication by a 1979 amendment to former § 16-93-402 (repealed 2011), which provided that when a court revoked an offender's probation, it could require him to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence which might have been originally imposed. Culpepper v. State, 268 Ark. 263, 595 S.W.2d 220 (1980) (decision under prior law), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986).

Jurisdiction.

Trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation because the revocation occurred after the end of his probationary term and there were no circumstances allowing for revocation after the end of the probationary term; defendant was not arrested during the probation period for matters relating to his probation within the meaning of subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section. Harris v. State, 80 Ark. App. 181, 92 S.W.3d 690 (2002) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Although defendant's probation was revoked several months after his one-year probationary period had expired, the fact that a valid arrest warrant was issued prior to the expiration of his probation established extraordinary jurisdiction. Duncan v. State, 103 Ark. App. 107 (2008) (substituted op.) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court erred in sentencing defendant pursuant to a probation revocation that involved two cases; while defendant was arrested for a violation of probation prior to the expiration of the probation period, the trial court lost jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation based on subsection (f) of this section without entry of a sentencing order or an order extending defendant's probation, despite defendant's plea of guilty, where defendant was not arrested nor was an arrest warrant issued pursuant to one of the case numbers. Trif v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 452, 503 S.W.3d 802 (2016).

Circuit court lost jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation for third-degree escape and public-intoxication charges upon the expiration of the probationary period. Rowton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 174, 598 S.W.3d 522 (2020).

No Cause for Revocation.

Trial court had no jurisdiction to revoke defendant's suspended sentence, because defendant owed no restitution at the end of his suspended sentence, and the trial court could not retain jurisdiction over him; defendant's child support was not to make good an actual economic loss of a victim of his failure to comply with the reporting requirements of the Sex and Child Offender Registration Act. Owens v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 532, 337 S.W.3d 527 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court erred in revoking defendant’s probation for failure to pay a child support arrearage following a conviction for felony nonsupport in violation of § 5-26-401(a) and (b)(2)(B) where defendant asserted an inability to pay and offered a disability as a reasonable excuse for his nonpayment and where the state offered no evidence of defendant’s other sources of income, his assets, or his expenses. The trial court should have applied the general inexcusably failed to comply standard in subsection (d) of this section as refined by the restitution-specific factors in § 5-4-205(f). Hanna v. Arkansas, 2009 Ark. App. 809, 372 S.W.3d 375 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Notice.

There was no error in failure to give defendant written notice of the time and place of revocation hearing, in light of the fact that defendant did receive actual notice of the time and place of the hearing and did not ask for a continuance. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Revocation petition did not notify defendant of the allegation regarding drug possession, but because the trial court did not err in finding that he constructively possessed a revolver, a finding that independently supported the violation of conditions, the lack of notice regarding drugs did not require reversal. Webb v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 257, 460 S.W.3d 820 (2015).

One Violation.

Since only one violation is necessary to support a revocation, the second ground given for revoking defendant's probation was not addressed. Whitmore v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 445 (2015).

Procedure.

Trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss a revocation petition for lack of a notary where appellant cited no authority requiring a verified affidavit for a petition to revoke, and this section contains no requirement that a petition to revoke be notarized, verified, or accompanied by an affidavit. Todd v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 270, 493 S.W.3d 350 (2016).

Proof.

While revocation of a suspended sentence requires only a preponderance of the evidence, a conviction requires the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellerson v. State, 261 Ark. 525, 549 S.W.2d 495 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Since a defendant in a probation revocation proceeding is not being tried on a criminal charge where the defendant's guilt has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of the evidence is necessary to support a finding that the probationer has inexcusably breached a condition associated with his release resulting in a revocation order. Thornton v. State, 267 Ark. 675, 590 S.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

In order to revoke a suspended sentence, the state must prove not only that a condition was violated but also that there was nothing that could be said to fairly excuse the violation; however, these factors need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Brown v. State, 10 Ark. App. 387, 664 S.W.2d 507 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

On a hearing to revoke a suspended sentence, the burden is upon the state to prove the violation of a condition by a preponderance of the evidence. Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d 508 (1984); Reese v. State, 26 Ark. App. 42, 759 S.W.2d 576 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

To revoke a suspended sentence, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of her suspension. Jared v. State, 17 Ark. App. 223, 707 S.W.2d 325 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The burden of proof does not shift; however, once the state has introduced evidence of nonpayment of restitution, the burden of going forward does shift to the defendant to offer some reasonable excuse for his failure to pay. To hold otherwise would place a burden upon the state which it could never meet; it would require the state, as part of its case in chief, to negate any possible excuses for nonpayment. Reese v. State, 26 Ark. App. 42, 759 S.W.2d 576 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

A revocation of suspended sentence hearing is not a criminal prosecution and requires only the lowest showing of proof. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The burden of proof on the State in a revocation hearing is to prove the violation of a condition of probation by a preponderance of the evidence; “reasonable doubt” has no application in revocation proceedings. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not err under subsection (d) of this section in revoking defendant's suspended sentence because the state presented evidence that defendant committed various new drug crimes; one of the terms of defendant's suspension was that defendant not use, sell, distribute, or possess any controlled substance. Sherman v. State, 2009 Ark. 275, 308 S.W.3d 614 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant’s probation based on his possessing and using alcohol and drinking in public, although defendant testified that he did not have a beer and that police fabricated their story because they were angry defendant had been granted an appeal bond. Credibility was an issue for the trial court. Graves v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 32 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Review.

In appeal from revocation of probation, defendant must show that court's finding that he violated the terms of his probation was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Pearson v. State, 262 Ark. 513, 558 S.W.2d 149 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

A reviewing court will not overturn a decision in the trial court to grant a petition to revoke a suspended sentence unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984); Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d 508 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

To revoke probation, the burden is on the state to prove the violation of a condition of probation by a preponderance of the evidence, and on appellate review, the trial court's findings will be upheld unless they are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Lemons v. State, 310 Ark. 381, 836 S.W.2d 861 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant could raise for the first time on appeal the issue that the revocation of his suspended sentence needed to be reversed because, inter alia, the period of suspension had expired. Jones v. State, 52 Ark. App. 179, 916 S.W.2d 766 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Appeal from revocation of suspended sentences which were revoked on the basis that defendant violated their terms by using marijuana, was unsuccessful because defendant admitted using marijuana and, although violation of this condition was not among the allegations in the state’s petition to revoke, defendant did not object to testimony elicited on the subject nor to the trial court’s ruling in open court. Josenberger v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 243 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

In a probation revocation case, the appellate court did not need to reach the merits of defendant's argument that she did not willfully fail to pay as ordered because she failed to challenge the other two bases for the revocation that she failed to report to her probation officer and committed criminal mischief when she damaged another individual's vehicle. Williams v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 601, 509 S.W.3d 677 (2016).

Order revoking appellant's suspended imposition of sentence was upheld, where there was nothing before the appellate court showing appellant's release date on his initial charge. With no evidence of appellant's date of release, there was no evidence of error. Cooper v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 580, 565 S.W.3d 130 (2018).

Revocation Improper.

Where the defendant had failed to work all the hours that he was required to as a condition of suspension of his sentence, but both he and his wife had been sick or injured during much of that time, the violation was not inexcusable, and his suspended sentence should not have been revoked. Cogburn v. State, 264 Ark. 173, 569 S.W.2d 658 (1978) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the state failed to prove that the check was issued or presented for payment prior to the closure of the bank account upon which it was drawn, the trial court could not reasonably infer that the check was forged; therefore, the trial court erred in finding that defendant violated the terms of her probation by passing a forged instrument. Bedford v. State, 96 Ark. App. 38, 237 S.W.3d 516 (2006) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the state did not establish that proper procedures were followed in testing defendant's urine sample for drugs, the trial court's finding that he violated a condition of his probation was against the preponderance of the evidence under subsection (d) of this section. The probation officer testified that defendant's sample was stored overnight in a refrigerator, and tested next day without checking the temperature; medication that defendant was taking for acid reflux could have caused a false-positive reading. Wilcox v. State, 99 Ark. App. 220, 258 S.W.3d 785 (2007) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Order revoking defendant's suspended sentences was overturned where the trial court erred in failing to consider whether defendant's failure to pay fines, costs, and restitution was excusable under § 5-4-205(f)(3); there was evidence showing that defendant had only $60 left after monthly expenses. Phillips v. State, 101 Ark. App. 190, 272 S.W.3d 123 (2008) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court erred in revoking defendant's suspended sentence for failure to enroll in and complete a prison sex offender program because defendant did all that he could do to enroll in the program by being placed on a waiting list for the program, it was unlikely that he could get into the program before his release, and the State did not introduce any testimony or other evidence to support its argument regarding an inmate's options when ordered released under the Emergency Powers Act of 1987, § 12-28-601 et seq. Reyes v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 55, 454 S.W.3d 279 (2015).

Insufficient evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant violated his conditions of probation where nothing in his probation conditions required him to move to a different, more stable residence if requested by his probation officer, and being charged with aggravated robbery in another county did not show that he had actually committed that crime. Baney v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 20, 510 S.W.3d 799 (2017).

While there was sufficient evidence to support the new convictions, the circuit court's order was illegal on its face regarding the theft of property misdemeanor where the 12-month sentence for the misdemeanor was completed before the State even filed its first petition to revoke defendant's suspended sentence. Payne v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 265 (2017).

Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the State's petition to revoke her probation, because the State did not present evidence at the revocation hearing to support that defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor other than the docket sheet showing the guilty plea and the docket sheet was silent on whether defendant was represented by counsel when she pleaded guilty in the district court. King v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 278, 549 S.W.3d 407 (2018).

Because defendant's conviction for residential burglary was not supported by the evidence, as the trial court found that defendant committed a crime with which he was not charged, and that conviction was used for the revocation of the suspended imposition of sentence, the revocation was reversed. Williams v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 349, 553 S.W.3d 753 (2018).

Revocation of probation as to defendant's misdemeanor theft-of-property charge was reversed where she had already served her sentence as to that charge. Vangilder v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 385, 555 S.W.3d 413 (2018).

Circuit court erred by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the petition to revoke his probation as the evidence was insufficient to show that he committed a driving while intoxicated (DWI) offense and thus violated his probation because the record was devoid of any evidence of defendant's alleged DWI offense; the docket sheet was never admitted into evidence, and the probation officer had no knowledge of the facts giving rise to the conviction and merely testified that defendant had been convicted. Boyd v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 363, 583 S.W.3d 406 (2019).

Revocation Proper.

Revocation of probation for failure to report and make payments and for receiving new criminal charges was proper because the probationer’s signature on the documents listing the conditions of probation was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the probationer knew, understood, and consented to the conditions. Berry v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 217 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Probation was properly revoked under subsection (d) of this section because, even setting aside alleged fine delinquencies and a misdemeanor conviction, appellant violated the conditions of his probation that prohibited him from possessing or using alcohol or illegal drugs. Pfeifer v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 556 (2012).

Revocation of defendant's suspended sentence under subsection (d) of this section was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence because while the case rested largely on the credibility of a passenger in defendant's vehicle, who was a convicted felon, and police officers, the trial court was in the best position to judge their credibility. Wooten v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 729 (2013).

Because additional adverse rulings pertained only to a firearm violation, and the State presented conclusive evidence that defendant inexcusably failed to pay costs and fees, this was another reason why any potential error was rendered harmless because the State only needed to prove one violation, and revocation was proper. Alexander v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 40 (2014).

State presented evidence that defendant had paid nothing toward his costs and fees as required by the conditions of his suspension, and defendant offered no excuse, and thus the trial court's decision to revoke was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Alexander v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 40 (2014).

Counsel's motion to withdraw was granted because counsel's “no merit” brief demonstrated that an appeal would be wholly without merit, where a sheriff's department employee testified that defendant paid nothing toward his costs and fines, defendant admitted that he was convicted on several criminal counts and other violations, and the trial judge's decision to revoke defendant's probation was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Bishop v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 41 (2014).

Defendant violated the conditions of his suspended impositions of sentence because a trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant's confession about selling 10 oxycodone pills was sufficient to show that he possessed the drugs with the purpose to deliver. The trial court was free to reject testimony regarding defendant's personal use of oxycodone and to assess conflicting testimony. Jones v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 167 (2014).

Circuit court did not err by admitting evidence regarding a probationer's arrest for public intoxication, when the incident was not listed in the petition as a basis for revocation, because the challenged testimony by a probation officer was presented and allowed by the court merely to explain the circumstances leading up to the officer's assignment to the case. Moreover, the court revoked the probation because of the probationer's failure to report to the probation officer as directed. Seaton v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 296 (2014).

State clearly showed that defendant was significantly delinquent in paying his court-ordered restitution, and he offered no reasonable excuse, plus, although only one violation was necessary to revoke the suspension, the State further showed that defendant violated his conditions by committing first-degree battery, and thus the decision to revoke defendant's suspended sentence was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Sherril v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 411, 439 S.W.3d 76 (2014).

Counsel complied with the rule and there was no merit to the appeal in this probation revocation case; there was proof of a serious and long-term delinquency on payments due, defendant stated that he did not pay despite consistently working, and he admitted not reporting to his probation officer and moving without having permission to do so, such that there was no clear error in finding that defendant inexcusably violated the conditions of his probation. White v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 24 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient for the trial court to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence because he was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic violation (the driver was not wearing a seat belt), the driver and other occupants of the vehicle were persons of bad character who encouraged violation of the law (known gang members), and drugs and paraphernalia of which none of the occupants admitted ownership were present in the vehicle. Khanthamany v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 46 (2015).

Trial court, which revoked defendant's suspended sentences, could reasonably conclude that pinning the victim down and stabbing a knife into the floor around her head was purposeful conduct and that the purpose could not be anything other than evoking fear of death or serious physical injury. Ta v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 220, 459 S.W.3d 325 (2015).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended imposition of sentences because a theft victim explained her initial naming of defendant's brother and later identifications of defendant, and defendant failed to comply with his court-ordered payments and presented no excuse for his failure to pay while he was not incarcerated. Lewis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 222 (2015).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's probation because he admitted that he had made no payments toward his court-ordered fines and costs, could not give a logical excuse or reason as to why he had not paid them, and committed additional criminal offenses. Peel v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 226 (2015).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant constructively possessed the gun and the safe, or that, based upon the smell in the car, he knew that the safe contained marijuana, and thus the finding that he violated the terms of his probation was not against the weight of the evidence, and revocation of probation was affirmed. Webb v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 257, 460 S.W.3d 820 (2015).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's probation because he admitted that he quit reporting to probation after he failed a drug test; although the State presented evidence of multiple probation violations, the State only needed to prove one violation to sustain a revocation. Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 353 (2015).

Trial court's decision to revoke defendant's probation was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, and no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal to reverse that finding. Accordingly, defendant's appeal was wholly without merit. Griffin v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 405 (2015).

Adverse evidentiary rulings did not provide any meritorious grounds for reversal on appeal, and even assuming that there was any error, such was harmless because defendant's probation was revoked on another basis; the State was only required to show that defendant committed one violation in order to sustain a revocation. Henderson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 411, 466 S.W.3d 418 (2015).

Based on the probation officer's testimony that defendant had failed to report to him as directed on several occasions, as well as the documents showing that defendant admitted to the use of marijuana during the term of his probation, there would be no merit to an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's revocation of probation. Kirkland v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 20 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the revocation of defendant's probation given the witness testimony that defendant possessed a knife and had stabbed the victim, and the probation officer's testimony that defendant had failed to report. Brown v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 403, 500 S.W.3d 781 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the revocation of a probationary sentence based on defendant's commission of domestic battering in the third degree and failure to pay fees. Defendant's boyfriend reported the incident to police, and photographs of his injuries were admitted into evidence without objection; defendant did not contest that her boyfriend was a household member or that his injuries met the statutory definition, and the boyfriend's testimony was sufficient to show that defendant caused the injuries recklessly or purposefully. In addition, the trial court was entitled to assess defendant's explanations for her failure to pay fees and conclude that the nonpayment was not excusable. Glennon v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 25, 480 S.W.3d 894 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in revoking defendant's suspended sentence based on defendant's constructive possession of a handgun, which was found in a car that defendant was driving. Although defendant was not the owner of the car, he was exercising dominion and control of the car when he was pulled over; and the gun was found in the glove compartment of the car, which was within close proximity to defendant. Phounsavath v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 65, 482 S.W.3d 332 (2016).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant inexcusably violated conditions of his probation where a deputy sheriff's testimony showed that defendant had committed the offense of fleeing, and the probation officer's testimony established that defendant had used methamphetamine and alcohol and was not gainfully employed. Lewis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 101, 484 S.W.3d 277 (2016).

Evidence that defendant admitted to his probation officer, on several occasions, that he had been drinking alcohol in violation of a condition of his probation and testimony from the arresting officer that defendant appeared to be under the influence of some substance when he was arrested was sufficient to support the revocation of defendant's probation. King v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 292 (2016).

Defendant's probation was properly revoked because the State of Arkansas introduced sufficient evidence, through the testimony of an employee of the county sheriff's department and defendant's probation officer, to support the trial court's finding that defendant violated the conditions of his probation by failing to pay his fines and costs, failing to report to his probation officer as directed, and failing to remain in the jurisdiction of the court. Maxwell v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 348 (2016).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant's probation because, at the revocation hearing, defendant's probation officer testified that the terms and conditions of defendant's probation had been explained to him and that he had appeared to understand them; the probation officer's testimony established that defendant had failed to report as directed; one of the conditions of his probation was that he refrain from the use or possession of any alcoholic beverage; and, even if defendant had tested positive for controlled substances due to prescribed pain medication, that did not explain why he also tested positive for alcohol. Kidwell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 4, 511 S.W.3d 341 (2017).

Although defendant argued that the trial court impermissibly revoked his probation on the basis that he failed to register a change of address, which requirement applied to persons convicted of sex offenses, the record revealed that the trial court's displeasure with defendant's failure to register his new address was for sex-offender-registry and probation purposes and the trial court did not clearly err in revoking defendant's probation. Defendant informed the probation officer of his change in residence only after her visit to his grandmother's house, which he had listed as his address, and after the probation officer's request for an explanation from him; and defendant did not request prior approval, nor did he provide notice of his change in residence as soon as possible. Dunhoo v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 232, 547 S.W.3d 720 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant inexcusably violated a condition of probation that he not leave Arkansas without the written permission of his probation officer. Perry v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 312, 550 S.W.3d 907 (2018).

Defendant's probation was properly revoked because he failed to challenge the grounds for revocation based on his failure to report to his probation officer upon release from incarceration, failure to report changes of residence, and consumption of alcohol; although those unchallenged violations were enough to support the revocation, the circuit court's finding that defendant willfully violated the no-contact order involving his mother was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Clark v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 362, 584 S.W.3d 680 (2019).

Revocation of probation upheld. Lamb v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 494, 588 S.W.3d 409 (2019).

Circuit court did not err by finding that defendant inexcusably violated the terms and conditions of her probation where the probation officer's unchallenged testimony showed that she failed to report as directed, she was found at the home of a felon on multiple occasions and was living there, failed to provide a change of address after being told to move, and failed to pay supervision fees. Turner v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 534, 590 S.W.3d 158 (2019).

Revocation of defendant's probation was appropriate because the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of probation that she not drink or possess intoxicating or alcoholic beverages. Defendant's probation officer testified that defendant denied having consumed any alcohol, but tested positive for alcohol; the probation officer further testified that on a subsequent probation visit, defendant confessed to consuming alcohol. Rowton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 174, 598 S.W.3d 522 (2020).

Revocation of probation upheld. Morgan v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 212 (2020).

—Drug Use.

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation because she admitted to using methamphetamine, admitted to failing to pay her court fines and costs, and there was testimony by the police officer that he found narcotics and two pipes at her residence; the court found defendant possessed and used controlled substances. McLane v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 258 (2013).

Only adverse ruling in this case was the trial court's decision to revoke defendant's suspension, and there could be no meritorious challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting revocation; the State demonstrated that, during the period of his suspension, defendant tested positive for controlled substances in violation of his conditions, which was alone a sufficient basis to revoke, and the trial court's decision was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Paschal v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 409 (2015).

Decision to revoke was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, as defendant's conditions of probation required that he refrain from using alcohol and controlled substances, and it was undisputed that he had used alcohol and marijuana during the term of his probation. Henderson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 411, 466 S.W.3d 418 (2015).

State proved defendant inexcusably violated probation by testing positive for marijuana; while defendant was not explicitly required to pass mandatory drug screens, (1) defendant was required to obey state and federal laws, and (2) a positive drug screen could be evidence defendant violated a probation condition to lead a law-abiding life. Stewart v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 306, 550 S.W.3d 916 (2018).

—Failure to Pay Fines, Costs, Fees.

The state has an interest in punishment and deterrence and is justified in pursuing a revocation of probation and the sentencing of a probationer for nonpayment of a fine when the defendant has willfully failed to pay the fine or failed to make bona fide efforts to do so. Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

In revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay; if the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority; however if the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternate measures of punishment other than imprisonment. Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant’s suspended sentence was properly revoked because the state proved that defendant failed to pay fines and fees as ordered; fine-payment records introduced without objection showed that defendant was behind in payment of required fines and fees, and defendant provided no excuse for his failure to follow the court’s orders. Tyson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 856 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant’s suspended sentence for nonpayment of court costs and fines because the state introduced, without objection, a ledger sheet reflecting defendant’s nonpayment and defendant did not have a reasonable excuse for failing to pay, pursuant to § 5-4-205(f)(3); the state proved defendant’s failure to pay was inexcusable. Burkhart v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 462 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's decision to revoke defendant's probation for residential burglary because he and a county employee testified that he did not pay his fines, costs, and fees as directed. Although defendant testified that he did not have a job or any income, the trial court did not err in revoking his probation because he did not provide a reasonable excuse under subsection (d) of this section for his failure to comply with his probation conditions. Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 2 (2013).

Conditions of probation signed by defendant warned him that any violation could result in a sentence of up to 10 years' imprisonment, and because he was sentenced within the range allowed by the applicable statutes, the revocation and sentence were affirmed. Leal v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 673 (2014).

State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated his probationary conditions by failing to pay his fines, costs, and fees as required, and he did not rebut this evidence; he offered nothing to explain his nonpayment or prove that he had become current on his payments, and thus the circuit court did not err in considering his payment delinquency as a basis for probation revocation. Leal v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 673 (2014).

Probation was properly revoked because the State presented testimony by a sheriff's department employee and the probationer's supervisor that the probationer, although employed and advising the supervisor that the probationer had made payments, had not made payments on the probationer's fines and costs, as directed. Furthermore, the probationer offered no reasonable excuse. Trotter v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 408, 465 S.W.3d 860 (2015).

Once the State introduced evidence of nonpayment of fines and costs associated with defendant's sentence, the burden of going forward shifted to defendant to offer some reasonable excuse for his failure to pay as directed, but defendant did not present any evidence in support of an alleged inability to pay or other justification for nonpayment. The trial court's decision revoking probation was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. McDonald v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 510 (2015).

In a probation revocation proceeding, the trial court's finding that appellant's failure to pay fines, costs, and probation fees was inexcusable was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. The State produced evidence of nonpayment, demonstrating that over a period of three years appellant had paid just $45 toward his costs and fines and was $595 behind on his probation fees. Cochran v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 511 (2015).

Trial court's determination that a probationer inexcusably failed to pay his costs, fines, and fees was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and this single violation justified revocation of probation. Collins v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 600, 474 S.W.3d 531 (2015).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's probation because its finding that defendant's failure to pay fines was inexcusable was not clearly erroneous; defendant had sufficient disability income to cover the monthly payments but failed to make even one such payment. Holmes-Childers v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 464, 504 S.W.3d 645 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant inexcusably failed to make her court-ordered payments and in revoking her probation because the State presented testimony from the collector of fines and costs for the county sheriff's department that defendant was assessed a $1,000 fine and $875 in costs associated with her two guilty pleas; defendant had access to $14,000 at the time she was placed on probation and suspension, but she did not use the funds to make any payments toward her obligations; she also had an employment opportunity but did not take advantage of it; and defendant offered nothing to support her self-serving testimony that her bank accounts had been frozen. Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 4, 479 S.W.3d 588 (2016).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the revocation of his probation because the circuit court, as trier of fact, was entitled to assess defendant's explanation for his failure to pay court-ordered fines and conclude that his nonpayment was inexcusable; the circuit court's finding was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence Hart v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 434, 530 S.W.3d 366 (2017).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's suspended imposition of sentence because defendant did not present a reasonable excuse regarding his nonpayment of fines and costs. London v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 585, 534 S.W.3d 758 (2017).

Defendant's claim that the State did not prove defendant's failure to pay fines, costs, and fees was inexcusable failed because defendant offered no testimony or evidence of defendant's inability to pay. Stewart v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 306, 550 S.W.3d 916 (2018).

Circuit court, which revoked appellant's suspended sentence, did not clearly err in finding that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant inexcusably failed to pay restitution, fines, fees, and costs. The case profiles showed that appellant had made no payments for restitution, fines, fees, and costs, and when the State introduced the documents, appellant did not object to their admissibility. Keyes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 202, 575 S.W.3d 166 (2019).

Defendant's probation was properly revoked because the State introduced testimony that defendant had not paid fines, fees, and costs as directed; once the State established a record of nonpayment, defendant had the burden of demonstrating an inability to pay or some reasonable excuse for his failure to pay; defendant acknowledged that he had been employed at times during the term of his probation; and the circuit court, as the trier of fact, was entitled to assess defendant's explanation for his failure to pay and conclude that his nonpayment was not excusable. Straub v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 302, 577 S.W.3d 776 (2019).

—Failure to Pay Restitution.

Where the record revealed the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's failure to pay restitution to his theft victims was inexcusable, and was not due solely to his inability to make the restitution payments, the revocation of the defendant's suspended sentence was justified. Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d 508 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

When defendant was serving a suspended sentence for overdraft, theft of property, theft by deception, and two counts of failure to appear, he failed to pay his court-ordered restitution of $82,000 in violation of the terms of his suspended sentence under this section; the trial court found that he willfully failed to pay his restitution. While defendant did have child support and daycare expenses, he testified that he made partial payments due to his mistaken understanding as to the amount due; the trial court did not err by revoking defendant’s suspended sentence and ordering him to serve ten years of incarceration. Reese v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 678 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Circuit court did not err in revoking the suspended sentence defendant received for second-degree forgery because the circuit court’s finding that defendant’s failure to pay restitution, a fine, and court costs was both willful and inexcusable was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the circuit court could find that defendant was capable of working, that he was employed in some capacity, and that he received income from the government, and instead of meeting his financial obligations, defendant chose to spend money on nonessential items such as alcohol and cigarettes. Wicks v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 499, 375 S.W.3d 769 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Because a probationer offered no evidence to excuse the probationer's failure to pay after the State introduced the restitution-payment record, and because the probationer had not worked for two-and-a-half years, revocation of the probationer's suspended imposition of sentence was not clearly erroneous. Pitchford v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 188 (2011) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Revocation of defendant's probation was proper because the circuit court's finding that he willfully violated the condition of his probation requiring him to make payments as directed was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, it was undisputed that he failed to pay ordered amounts of restitution, fines, fees, and costs, the evidence also showed that he had the ability to pay, but chose not to, and the State only needed to prove one violation of probation to sustain a revocation. Haynes v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 363 (2014).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that defendant willfully violated the condition of her probation requiring her to make payments of court costs, a fine, and restitution and in revoking her probation because the circuit court found that she had paid $1,483.60 toward her fines and restitution, but that the remainder of the agreed-upon payments of $5,236.72 was outstanding; the amount of restitution and fines defendant agreed to pay were clearly explained in the judgment-and-disposition order she had signed; defendant's testimony that she had been ill or injured and unable to work was unsubstantiated; and the circuit court did not believe that she was making a sufficient effort to make payments. Bohannon v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 434, 439 S.W.3d 735 (2014).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended imposition of sentence for willfully failing to comply with its terms and conditions because restitution was a condition of the suspended imposition of sentence and defendant's failure to pay restitution was “willful” where the State introduced, without objection, evidence of defendant's nonpayment of his restitution; it was only after defendant was arrested on the revocation warrant that he attempted to make payments towards his court-ordered restitution, and, although he had the complete ability to pay, he did not do so. Robertson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 113 (2015).

Circuit court's decision to revoke defendant's probation was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence due to defendant's failure to pay monthly restitution as ordered; the State showed the nonpayment was willful based on evidence defendant's disability income exceeded her expenses, which included nonessential items, including cable television. Young v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 580, 591 S.W.3d 385 (2019).

—Failure to Report.

Defendant inexcusably violated the terms of her probation where she admitted that she did not notify the probation officer of her change of address and that she purposely failed to report because she was “hiding out” from police. Dority v. State, 329 Ark. 631, 951 S.W.2d 559 (1997) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Because the trial court's finding that appellant failed to report to his probation officer was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence as the probation officer testified that if appellant had in fact reported on August 10 it would be reflected in his records, revocation of his probation was proper under subsection (d) of this section. Major v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 501 (2012).

Defendant admitted that he did not report after he lost his job, and he stated that he no longer reported because he could not try to find a ride while attempting to secure employment, and this was enough to support the trial court's finding that defendant inexcusably failed to report to his probation officer as directed. Whitmore v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 445 (2015).

Revocation of defendant's probation was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The record was clear that defendant failed to report to her probation officer twice. Wells v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 619 (2015).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's probation because defendant failed to make a good-faith effort to comply with the terms and conditions of her probation; defendant's failure to report was inexcusable because she could have overcome the obstacle by putting forth even a modicum of effort to look up the phone number. Holmes-Childers v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 464, 504 S.W.3d 645 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in revoking defendant's probation because the State proved that she failed to report to her probation officer; and, although defendant now argued that no proof was submitted that she had appointments scheduled with her probation officer on the specific dates that he asserted she missed and that she missed later appointments because she was in jail, no evidence of those contentions was submitted to the circuit court. Alsbrook v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 8, 479 S.W.3d 584 (2016).

State proved defendant's failure to report to a probation officer was inexcusable because the State showed defendant failed to comply, requiring defendant to then show the noncompliance was excusable, which defendant did not; while defendant's mother offered excuses for the failure to report, the mother also testified defendant “chose” not to go. Stewart v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 306, 550 S.W.3d 916 (2018).

Trial court's finding that defendant violated the terms and condition of her probation by failing to report was affirmed where the probation officer testified that defendant had been informed of the reporting requirement, failed to report at least twice, and despite phone calls and a home visit, defendant made no contact with the probation office. Vangilder v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 385, 555 S.W.3d 413 (2018).

Revocation of probation upheld for failure to report. Thompson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 421, 586 S.W.3d 682 (2019).

—New Offenses.

Defendant’s suspended sentence was properly revoked where the state proved that defendant committed third-degree domestic battery, under § 5-26-305(a), by showing that defendant inflicted physical injury under § 5-1-102 by pulling his wife’s hair and throwing her against a vehicle. Andrews v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 624 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Suspension of an earlier sentence was properly revoked because defendant committed domestic battery in the third degree where an infant child suffered an arm fracture in defendant's care, and a medical examination revealed healing fractures other places; moreover, there was evidence that other injury incidents had occurred while the child was in defendant's care, and there was testimony that defendant was too rough with the child. The standard for reckless was what a reasonable person in the circumstances would have observed. Singletary v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 699 (2013).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's suspended imposition of sentences because he did not challenge one of the bases for them, specifically, the new offense of resisting arrest; the State had to prove only one violation to establish that defendant violated the conditions of his suspended sentence. Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 68 (2015).

Trial court properly revoked appellant's suspended imposition of sentence because the evidence supported the trial court's finding that appellant violated the terms and conditions of appellant's suspended sentence by committing theft, a charge for which appellant pleaded guilty. Sparkman v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 156 (2015).

Probation was properly revoked because a trial court's finding that probationer stole and pawned a window-unit air conditioner, violating the terms of his suspended sentence, was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the probationer admitted to stealing the air conditioner from the window of a homeowner who hired the probationer to mow the homeowner's yard. Collins v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 600, 474 S.W.3d 531 (2015).

Circuit court's decision to revoke defendant's probation based on his committing the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine was not in error; although the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant committed that offense, it was sufficient to support the offense of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine. Atteberry v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 331 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in granting the State's petition to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence and in sentencing him to 144 months based on its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the crimes of false imprisonment, assault, possession of a firearm as a felon, and battery in the third degree; the victims testified that they were met outside a house by a man and were brought inside, where they were held while defendant—armed with a silver and black automatic gun—asked who was responsible for a burglary of his stuff; and defendant hit, slapped, and kicked one of the victims. Mosley v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 353, 499 S.W.3d 226 (2016).

Trial court's decision to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence based on his participation in the robbery was not against a preponderance of the evidence, which showed that defendant actively participated in the robbery by driving his SUV while his passengers discussed, planned, and committed the robbery of the victim in the SUV, he was still driving when the victim was kicked out on the side of the road, and he joined in divvying up the stolen cash and smoking the marijuana taken. Collins v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 563, 566 S.W.3d 139 (2018).

Uncorroborated testimony of defendant's alleged accomplice in a murder was a sufficient basis for the revocation of defendant's probation. Furthermore, the revocation did not have to be deferred until after the new murder charge was adjudicated; even if defendant was acquitted in the criminal trial, defendant's probation could still be revoked. Clark v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 158, 573 S.W.3d 551 (2019).

Right to Confront Witnesses.

Even assuming any Confrontation Clause error in the probation officer testifying to information gained from former probation officers, the error would be harmless because there was sufficient other evidence to support revoking defendant's suspended imposition of sentence for failing to remain on good behavior and committing new offenses. Gilbreth v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 86, 596 S.W.3d 29 (2020).

Sentence After Revocation.

Nothing in this section prohibited the trial court from revoking probation and imposing any sentence which might have originally been imposed; thus, defendant's sentence of 90 days in the county jail with 90 days credit as a period of confinement in the trial court's original order of probation did not preclude the court from ordering six years' imprisonment following the state's second petition for revocation and a finding of guilt on the part of the defendant for violating his probation. Moseley v. State, 349 Ark. 589, 80 S.W.3d 325 (2002) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Upon the revocation of defendant’s probation for eight violations of the Arkansas Hot Check Law, the trial court was authorized under § 5-4-301(d)(2) and this section to modify the original order and impose multiple sentences of imprisonment to be served consecutively in accordance with § 5-4-403(a). The trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to twenty years in prison each on four hot-check counts to run consecutively and ten years in prison each on the other felony hot-check counts to run concurrently. Maldonado v. State, 2009 Ark. 432 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Circuit court did not err in revoking defendant’s suspended sentence and probation and in sentencing him to 197 months imprisonment with forty-seven months suspended because the circuit court was within its authority to revoke the original sentences and prescribe the resulting sentence and was also within its authority to run the prescribed sentences consecutively when the prescribed sentence in the first case, thirty months with an additional forty-seven months’ suspended, was within the circuit court’s authority. Because defendant was convicted of a Class C felony, the circuit court could have originally sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment for failure to appear pursuant to § 5-4-401(a)(4). The sentence imposed as a result of revocation in the second case did not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense and was not illegal on its face, and a notation on the judgment and disposition order in the second case was an insufficient basis for defendant’s allegation that the circuit court unambiguously intended to impose a presumptive sentence of thirty-six months in the event he failed to comply with the conditions of his probation. Ward v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 79, 374 S.W.3d 62 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Argument that appellant's due process rights under Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 8 were violated when a trial court failed to consider all of the sentencing options available after a revocation of probation was not preserved for appellate review because the argument was not raised when appellant was sentenced. Mewborn v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 195 (2012).

In a case where probation was revoked, a 20-year sentence for Class B felony kidnapping was not improper since it was authorized under § 5-4-401(a)(3); the appellate court was unable to reduce a sentence within the range of punishment contemplated by the Arkansas Legislature. Moreover, since appellant failed to object to the sentence imposed, he was unable to argue on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternatives to the 20-year sentence. Pfeifer v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 556 (2012).

Counsel was allowed to withdraw, because the appeal was wholly without merit, when the petitioner's sentence was appropriate; the petitioner was sentenced to ten years' incarceration on each charge to be run consecutively, for a total of twenty years, and the sentence was within the sentencing range for a Class B felony. Fritts v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 404 (2013).

In a probation revocation case, defendant’s argument that the imposition of more time than her original sentence was improper was rejected because, even though the period of probation began to run when defendant was sentenced, the trial court could have imposed any sentence upon revocation that could have been imposed originally under former § 5-4-309(g)(1)(A) (now this section). Defendant pled guilty to 2 Class C felonies and was subject to a maximum sentence of 10 years on both counts; therefore, sentences of 72 months and 50 months upon revocation were permitted. Whitson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 283 (2014).

Trial court did not impose an illegal sentence because defendant was a habitual offender and the nine-year sentence imposed by the circuit court following revocation of defendant's suspended sentence was lawfully within the range of sentences that he originally could have been given. Adams v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 718, 452 S.W.3d 113 (2014).

Trial court erred in resentencing defendant because the five-year sentence with five years' suspended imposition of sentence that the court imposed on revocation of defendant's probation exceeded the maximum allowable sentence available for defendant's conviction for tampering with physical evidence, a Class D felony. Additionally, it appeared that the court improperly revoked defendant's probation on misdemeanor theft-of-property and resisting-arrest offenses, because the probations on those offenses had already expired. Wilson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 342 (2016).

Because appellant was not determined to be a habitual offender when his plea was accepted and he was placed on suspended imposition of sentence (SIS), he could not be sentenced as a habitual offender on revocation of that SIS. Appellant's 20-year sentence on revocation did not exceed the nonhabitual range for Class B felonies, but the sentencing order erroneously reflected that he was sentenced as a habitual offender and the case was remanded in part for entry of a corrected sentencing order. Robertson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 379, 499 S.W.3d 247 (2016).

In a no-merit appeal, revocation of defendant's probation was affirmed; the four-year sentence with a judicial transfer to the regional punishment facility was less than the 10-year maximum sentence for a Class C felony, and was permissible. Parmer v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 5 (2017).

In a probation revocation case, defendant's original sentence on a Class A misdemeanor was remanded for correction, because (1) the sentence was illegal on its face, as defendant was sentenced to both 20 days in jail and 12 months' probation and, contrary to § 5-4-304(a), the original sentencing order did not show that the 20 days' confinement was a condition of defendant's probation; and (2) the trial court failed to give defendant credit for the 20 days he was ordered to serve in the original order. Thompson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 158, 516 S.W.3d 297 (2017).

When the trial court found defendant had violated the conditions of his suspended imposition of sentence by having a firearm in his possession, the trial court did not err in sentencing him to the Department of Correction for 10 years for the underlying offense of hindering apprehension or prosecution, a Class B felony that carried a 20-year maximum; the original sentence he received was 10 years in the Department of Correction, followed by 10 years' suspended imposition of sentence with jail-time credit for 554 days. Defendant's jail-time-credit argument did not involve the imposition of an illegal sentence and was not one that could be raised for the first time on appeal. Easley v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 317 (2017).

Defendant's 12-year sentence on revocation of probation was not illegal where the sentence was within the sentencing range for Class B felony arson. Taylor v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 30, 540 S.W.3d 295 (2018) (no-merit-appeal) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a one-year jail sentence following revocation of appellant's probation for repeated positive drug and alcohol tests; appellant had been placed on probation for the Class A misdemeanor offenses of negligent homicide and two counts of third-degree battery, and Class A misdemeanors carried a maximum one-year jail term. Talbert v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 412, 558 S.W.3d 396 (2018).

After revoking defendant’s probation, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 10 years' imprisonment for second-degree domestic battery, six years' imprisonment for one count of aggravated assault on a family member, four years' imprisonment followed by two years' suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) for one count of aggravated assault on a family member, and six years' SIS for first-degree terroristic threatening, and in ordering the sentences to run consecutively, except the six years' SIS for first-degree terroristic threatening, which was to run concurrent to the second-degree battery sentence, because the sentences imposed by the circuit court were within the statutory range prescribed by law. The circuit court had been repeatedly lenient with defendant and warned him of the potential consequences of violating the no-contact order concerning his mother. Clark v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 362, 584 S.W.3d 680 (2019).

Circuit court did not err in sentencing defendant after revoking his probation because the court considered evidence only from the revocation hearing and did not consider evidence from defendant's prior hearing. Neal v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 489, 588 S.W.3d 759 (2019).

—Additional Cases.

Where part of terms of imprisonment was suspended during good behavior and it was ordered that the sentences in both convictions would run concurrently, the sentences were pronounced and only the execution of a portion of the sentences was suspended; thus, under these circumstances, the court was not authorized to change the prior sentences that were pronounced so as to make them run consecutively rather than concurrently, for once the concurrent sentences were imposed, the court was without jurisdiction to modify the sentences to make them run consecutively. Wolfe v. State, 266 Ark. 811, 586 S.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant was placed on probation after conviction and was subsequently convicted of loitering and his probation revoked, defendant was imprisoned for his original misconduct, not for what might appear to be a simple act of loitering. Murphy v. State, 269 Ark. 181, 599 S.W.2d 138 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Sentence is not imposed until the court pronounces a fixed term of imprisonment as opposed to simply specifying a definite period of time of probation. McGee v. State, 271 Ark. 611, 609 S.W.2d 73 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment at the Department of Correction, the court could not impose a term of probation on the defendant in addition to the imprisonment. Marion v. State, 4 Ark. App. 359, 631 S.W.2d 315 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where court revoked suspension of sentence to run concurrently with sentence in federal court on a separate offense, and then over a year later entered order to the effect that defendant had violated the conditions of the suspended sentence and ordered him committed for five years, the second sentence was void since a second sentence cannot be imposed at a subsequent revocation hearing; moreover, since the first sentence had already been put into execution, the court was without jurisdiction when it pronounced the second sentence, for once a valid sentence is put into execution the trial court is without jurisdiction to modify, amend, or revise it. Cooper v. State, 278 Ark. 394, 645 S.W.2d 950 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant was sentenced to period of imprisonment for one year and any additional term of imprisonment for a period of up to five years was suspended, imposition of nine year sentence upon revocation of suspension when court found defendant, subsequent to his release, committed the crime of robbery was proper since 10 years is the maximum for the crime for which he was placed on suspension. Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

In accepting defendant's guilty plea, adjudicating him guilty, and placing him on probation for five years, trial court did not impose a sentence on defendant, and, upon revoking probation and sentencing defendant, court was not limited to the length of the probation, but could impose any sentence that it might have originally imposed for the charges to which defendant pleaded guilty. Lee v. State, 299 Ark. 187, 772 S.W.2d 324 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where an order of suspension and a judgment contain conflicting information as to the sentence imposed, the judgment is controlling. Green v. State, 29 Ark. App. 69, 777 S.W.2d 225 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Once the defendant's probation was revoked for commission of a drug-related offense and the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he could not later again have his probation revoked and be sentenced to an even longer term of imprisonment. Ramey v. State, 62 Ark. App. 204, 972 S.W.2d 952 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where no sentence was imposed upon the appellant when he entered his guilty plea and, instead, he was placed on probation, the trial court was authorized to impose any sentence on the appellant which might have been originally imposed for the offense of which he was found guilty, even though the petition to revoke probation was filed on the last day of his probation. Lewis v. State, 336 Ark. 469, 986 S.W.2d 95 (1999) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Although the defendant's terms of probation on two separate crimes ran concurrently, when his probation was revoked, the court had authority to impose consecutive sentences. Webb v. State, 66 Ark. App. 367, 990 S.W.2d 591 (1999) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Subsection (f) (now (g)) provides a circuit court with ample authority and jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction upon a second or subsequent revocation and to impose any sentence that might have been imposed originally for the offense of which the defendant was found guilty. Bonham v. State, 73 Ark. App. 320, 43 S.W.3d 753 (2001) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction under subsection (f) (now (g)) of this section to modify defendant's sentence by imposing an additional term of 15-year suspended sentence because, before Acts 1999, No. 1569 was enacted, once an original sentence was put into execution, an attempted modification of the original order was erroneous. Gates v. State, 353 Ark. 333, 107 S.W.3d 868 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where appellant had been sentenced to five years' probation and fined for first-degree sexual abuse, a trial court properly sentenced him to 10 years in prison upon revocation of probation because appellant could have originally received that term and there had been no sentence imposed that had been improperly modified. Rickenbacker v. Norris, 361 Ark. 291, 206 S.W.3d 220 (2005) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

After revoking defendant's probation for controlled substance offenses, the trial court did not err in ordering him to serve a 40-year sentence where it could have done so originally; former § 16-93-402(e)(5) was inapplicable to the case because no sentence was originally imposed on defendant, he was placed on probation and fined. Cox v. State, 365 Ark. 358, 229 S.W.3d 883 (2006) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Sentences.

A prosecutor should not be required to file a revocation petition prior to the expiration of the suspension or probationary period in cases involving unpaid restitution because it cannot be known until the period has fully expired whether the defendant has made restitution; a defendant could conceivably pay the full amount owed on the last day of the period and fulfill his or her obligation. Kyle v. State, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Since, pursuant to § 5-4-303(f) (see now § 16-93-311), the trial court retains jurisdiction until the full amount of restitution is paid, even beyond the period originally allowed, the prosecutor was not required to comply with the requirements of subsection (e) (now (f)), because appellant's deferred sentence was not revoked but merely extended to allow her to pay the restitution. Kyle v. State, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Sexual-Offender Registration.

Where defendant was convicted of a sex offense and registered as a sex offender in another state, and while living in Arkansas for five years he was convicted of breaking and entering and felony theft of property and was given suspended sentences, but all the while he failed to register as a sex offender as required by § 12-12-905(a)(2) of the Sex Offender Registration Act, § 12-12-901 et seq., his failure to register or report a change of address was a Class D felony, and the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated a condition of his suspended sentences. Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 229, 91 S.W.3d 68 (2002) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant made no effort to comply with sexual-offender registration requirements. Therefore, the trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended sentence. Muldrew v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 568 (2012).

Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Circumstantial evidence can be relevant to a revocation decision and may be sufficient to support revocation. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The complete constructive-possession analysis does not apply to revocation proceedings; evidence sufficient for establishing possession in a revocation proceeding may be inadequate to establish a criminal conviction. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence that is insufficient to convict a person of the offense may be sufficient to revoke probation. McKenzie v. State, 60 Ark. App. 161, 961 S.W.2d 775 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant's probation based on circumstantial evidence that he was in constructive possession of a firearm found in the trunk of a car in which he was a passenger as defendant admitted that he was going to deer camp and was wearing hunter-orange clothing and a jumpsuit. Newborn v. State, 91 Ark. App. 318, 210 S.W.3d 153 (2005) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended sentence because a preponderance of the evidence supported the finding that defendant was guilty of associating with other felons and associating with others violating criminal laws; when the police searched a car that defendant had been riding in, a rock of cocaine was found between the passenger seat and the door where defendant's hand had been. Blakes v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 451, 320 S.W.3d 651 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Because defendant failed to timely object to the admission of certain testimony, and because the circuit court was charged with resolving all questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence, pursuant to §§ 5-4-309(d) and 5-4-310(c)(2) (now §§ 16-93-308(d) and 16-93-307(c)(2)), a preponderance of the evidence supported the revocation of defendant's probation. Ellis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 654 (2011).

Trial court revoked defendant's suspended sentence for burglary based on allegations that he failed to pay his court-ordered fees, did not notify the sheriff of his current address, and committed new criminal offenses; at the revocation hearing, a county employee testified that defendant did not make any payments toward his $700 bill for costs and the court also heard testimony indicating that defendant shot a man seven times. Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation of his suspended sentence under subsection (d) of this section. Love v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 600 (2012).

Revocation of defendant's probation was proper under this section because defendant admitted to drinking alcohol and failing to report to his probation officer. Any argument that the trial court's findings were against the preponderance of the evidence would clearly be without merit; because of that, counsel's motion to be relieved as counsel under Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 4-3 was properly granted. Martin v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 7 (2013).

Trial court did not err under subsection (d) of this section in revoking defendant's probation for possession of a controlled substance; defendant admittedly failed to abide by the terms of probation, particularly with respect to an obligation to report to the probation officer in person. Lanfair v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 51 (2013).

—Evidence Insufficient.

Trial court's decision that defendant inexcusably failed to comply with probation conditions was clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Baldridge v. State, 31 Ark. App. 114, 789 S.W.2d 735 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where a defendant appealed the revocation of his probation, there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation. The testimony by a probation officer in Arkansas was insufficient for the trial court to conclude that defendant willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation, as there was no evidence that he was required to report in Pennsylvania, there was no testimony from anyone that he was given directions to whom to report in Pennsylvania, and there was no evidence of any violation of any condition of defendant's probation. Prillerman v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 46 (2014).

—Evidence Sufficient.

Revocation of probation was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Morgan v. State, 267 Ark. 28, 588 S.W.2d 431 (1979); Jones v. State, 31 Ark. App. 23, 786 S.W.2d 851 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The trial court's finding that defendant had inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of his probation and suspended sentence held not to be against the preponderance of the evidence. Cureton v. State, 266 Ark. 1034, 589 S.W.2d 204 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Finding that defendant had inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of his probation held supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Thornton v. State, 267 Ark. 675, 590 S.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence sufficient to find that it was proper to revoke defendant's suspended sentence under this section. Queen v. State, 271 Ark. 929, 612 S.W.2d 95, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 963, 102 S. Ct. 502, 70 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), cert. denied, United States ex rel. Dzambazovic v. Lane, 454 U.S. 903, 102 S. Ct. 411, 70 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1981); Dunavin v. State, 18 Ark. App. 178, 712 S.W.2d 326 (1986); Palmer v. State, 31 Ark. App. 97, 788 S.W.2d 248 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence sufficient to find that there was no error in a trial court's revocation of probation. Brewer v. State, 274 Ark. 38, 621 S.W.2d 698 (1981); Brandon v. State, 300 Ark. 32, 776 S.W.2d 345 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence was sufficient to support the court's judgment that defendant's failure to pay was inexcusable. Finn v. State, 36 Ark. App. 89, 819 S.W.2d 25 (1991) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Even if the defendant was badly influenced by other inmates of the county jail and fell victim to the excitement of their escape, he inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of suspended sentence where he committed third degree battery, rape, kidnapping, and escape from jail. Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence sufficient to prove by preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated his conditions of probation and suspension of sentence. Greene v. State, 324 Ark. 465, 921 S.W.2d 951 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Revocation upheld where the defendant's own testimony placed him in the stolen vehicle shortly before it was found within a block of his parents' home and the defendant went to Tennessee and stayed in a motel because he was aware the police were looking for him. Lamb v. State, 74 Ark. App. 245, 45 S.W.3d 869 (2001) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence showed that defendant violated at least one condition of his probation on drug charges and supported the trial court's order revoking defendant's probation and sentencing defendant to prison. Sisk v. State, 81 Ark. App. 276, 101 S.W.3d 248 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where victim testified that she was working at the hospital during the night shift when defendant, her supervisor, pushed her to the ground and raped her, the evidence of rape was sufficient to support revocation of defendant's probation; although the victim had difficulty identifying defendant at the rape trial because he changed his hairstyle, added facial hair, and gained weight since the time of the rape, during the revocation proceeding the victim positively identified defendant as the rapist and the medical director for the hospital also recognized defendant in the courtroom. Stewart v. State, 88 Ark. App. 110, 195 S.W.3d 385 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation after defendant entered a guilty plea, without counsel, to a misdemeanor theft charge, as the crime was one that could potentially have resulted in a period of imprisonment and, thus, defendant violated a condition of his probation by committing a crime that was punishable by imprisonment; further, the state entered sufficient evidence at the revocation hearing, independent of the guilty plea, that showed defendant had committed the theft. Haley v. State, 96 Ark. App. 256, 240 S.W.3d 615 (2006) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant's suspended sentence was properly revoked based on committing an aggravated assault upon an employee of a correctional facility in violation of § 5-13-211 because there was ample evidence that he purposely spat on a deputy, resulting in his saliva coming in contact with the deputy under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the deputy's personal hygiene. Foster v. State, 104 Ark. App. 108, 289 S.W.3d 476 (2008) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

During a hearing on the state’s petition to revoke a defendant’s suspended sentence, defendant admitted that he slapped his pregnant wife and a responding officer testified to a personal observation of the wife’s injuries; this evidence was sufficient to find that defendant inexcusably violated a condition of that suspension. May v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 703 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Pregnant wife’s testimony that appellant pushed and threatened her — causing red marks on her neck and arm—was sufficient to prove by a preponderance, as required by subsection (d) of this section, that appellant violated the conditions of his suspended sentence by committing the criminal offenses of domestic battery in the third degree, pursuant to § 5-26-305(b)(2)(A), and terroristic threatening in the second degree, under § 5-13-301(b)(1). Autrand v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 245 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's suspended sentence because the state presented evidence that the glass door of a store front was shot out in a drive-by shooting, the owner recognized defendant's car driving away from the scene, defendant was stopped a short time later with marijuana, a loaded gun, and ammunition matching the brand and caliber used in the shooting in his vehicle, and a search of defendant's phone revealed photos of him holding the gun. Ortiz v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 442 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation on the basis of terroristic threatening because the victim testified that he heard a noise outside his bedroom window, he received a phone call from defendant threatening to cut his throat with the same knife he used to cut his window screen, and while the screen had not been cut, it had been tampered with and was loose in its frame. Coupey v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 446 (2013).

Based on the evidence, the circuit court's decision that defendant used or possessed alcohol in violation of the conditions of his probation was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Jefferson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 509, 470 S.W.3d 687 (2015).

Revocation of appellant's suspended sentence was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence where a witness had testified that the pills appellant sold to her in the video were the ones she turned over to the police. Robertson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 379, 499 S.W.3d 247 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) because, on July 22, 2015, defendant and his ex-girlfriend argued and she told defendant that they needed a break; defendant went back to the ex-girlfriend's house later and assaulted her; the July 22 allegations against defendant were for assault on a family or household member and second-degree domestic battery; the ex-girlfriend suffered broken teeth, a broken nose, and a black eye; and defendant failed to raise objections to the State's failure to enter into evidence the actual SIS document or the failure to ask the trial court to take judicial notice of the original order placing him on SIS, precluding consideration of those issues on appeal. Baker v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 468 (2016).

—Preponderance of the Evidence.

Ruling of trial court which revoked suspension of sentence was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, which is all that the law requires. Gordon v. State, 269 Ark. 946, 601 S.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Alleged sexual assault victim's prior sexual conduct completely irrelevant to the issue of the revocation of defendant's suspended sentences on prior, unrelated charges. Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Although defendant's conviction required a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, revocation of prior suspended sentences required a finding based upon only a preponderance of the evidence; thus, based on the jury's finding of guilt, the judge's decision to revoke the suspension of sentence was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Cited: Egger v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 471, 469 S.W.3d 811 (2015); Jones v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 621 (2015).

16-93-309. Probation generally — Revocation hearing — Sentence alternatives — Sanctions.

  1. Following a revocation hearing held under § 16-93-307 and in which a defendant on probation or who is serving a suspended imposition of sentence has been found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court may:
    1. Continue the period of suspension of sentence or continue the period of probation;
    2. Lengthen the period of suspension of sentence or the period of probation within the limits set by § 5-4-306;
    3. Increase the fine within the limits set by § 5-4-201;
      1. Impose a period of confinement to be served during the period of suspension of sentence or period of probation.
        1. A period of confinement ordered under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of this section resulting from a technical conditions violation or serious conditions violation of probation shall be for the following periods, subject to subsection (b) of this section and § 16-93-308(i)(2)(A), before the defendant on probation is released and returned to probation:
          1. Up to ninety (90) days' confinement for a technical conditions violation; and
          2. Exactly one hundred eighty (180) days' confinement for a serious conditions violation.
        2. Any time in custody for which the defendant is held before a period of confinement is ordered by the court under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of this section shall not be credited to the overall period of confinement ordered under this subdivision (a)(4) or toward the maximum number of periods of confinement or the maximum number of days authorized under § 16-93-306(d)(3)(E).
      2. The periods of confinement under subdivision (a)(4)(B) of this section are not available to a person serving a suspended imposition of sentence; or
    4. Impose any conditions that could have been imposed upon conviction of the original offense.
    1. A period of confinement under subdivision (a)(4) of this section may be reduced by the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction for good behavior and successful program completion.
    2. A period of confinement shall not be reduced under subdivision (a)(4) of this section for more than fifty percent (50%) of the total time of confinement ordered to be served.
    3. A period of confinement under subdivision (a)(4) of this section shall not be reduced by any time served by the defendant while he or she awaits a court hearing to challenge the imposition of the sanction.
    1. If a defendant is in custody awaiting a hearing under this section for a technical conditions violation or a serious conditions violation, the hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable but no later than thirty (30) business days from the date the defendant was taken into custody.
    2. If a defendant on probation is in custody in a county jail awaiting a hearing to challenge the imposition of a sanction under subdivision (a)(4) of this section, the state shall reimburse the county for the costs of incarceration at the prevailing rate of reimbursement.
  2. Following a revocation hearing in which a defendant is ordered to continue on a period of suspension of sentence or a period of probation, upon finding the defendant guilty at a subsequent revocation hearing, the court may:
    1. Revoke the suspension of sentence or period of probation; and
    2. Sentence the defendant to incarceration in the Division of Correction.
  3. If the suspension of sentence or probation of a defendant is subsequently revoked and the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, any period of time actually spent in confinement due to the original revocation shall be credited against the subsequent sentence.
  4. The location of the appropriate confining facility in which a defendant serves a period of confinement for a technical conditions violation or a serious conditions violation shall be determined by the Board of Corrections.
  5. Noncompliance with program requirements approved by the board or violent or sexual behavior while confined for a technical conditions violation or serious conditions violation under this section may result in revocation of the defendant's probation for a period of time exceeding the limitations of subdivision (a)(4) of this section, up to and including the time remaining on the defendant's original sentence.
  6. To the extent that a participant in a specialty court program is subject to this section, any period of confinement ordered by the specialty court is not subject to the periods of confinement required under subdivision (a)(4) of this section.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90; 2017, No. 423, § 19; 2019, No. 910, §§ 904, 905.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added “Sanctions” in the section heading; inserted “on probation or who is serving a suspended imposition of sentence” in the introductory language of (a); deleted “of imposition” following “suspension” in (a)(1); inserted “of sentence” in (a)(2); redesignated former (a)(4) as (a)(4)(A); deleted “of imposition” following “suspension” in (a)(4)(A); added (a)(4)(B) and (C); inserted present (b) and (c), and redesignated former (b) and (c) as (d) and (e); rewrote (d); inserted “of sentence” following “suspension” in (e); and added (f) through (h).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (b)(1) and (d)(2); and substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (b)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Case Notes

Credit.

Because the 120 days defendant served in confinement did not result from a revocation of his probation, but was a condition of it, this section provided no relief for defendant. Burgess v. State, 2016 Ark. 175, 490 S.W.3d 645 (2016).

Sentence After Revocation.

Argument that appellant's due process rights under Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 8 were violated when a trial court failed to consider all of the sentencing options available after a revocation of probation was not preserved for appellate review because the argument was not raised when appellant was sentenced. Mewborn v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 195 (2012).

16-93-310. Probation generally — Revocation — Community correction program.

  1. When a person sentenced under a community correction program, § 5-4-312, violates any terms or conditions of his or her sentence or term of probation, revocation of the sentence or term of probation shall be consistent with the procedures under this subchapter.
  2. Upon revocation, the court of jurisdiction shall determine whether the offender shall remain under the jurisdiction of the court and be assigned to a more restrictive community correction program, facility, or institution for a period of time or committed to the Division of Community Correction.
    1. If committed to the Division of Correction, the court shall specify if the commitment is for judicial transfer of the offender to the Division of Community Correction or is a regular commitment.
      1. The court shall commit the eligible offender to the custody of the Division of Correction under this subchapter for judicial transfer to the Division of Community Correction subject to the following:
        1. That the sentence imposed provides that the offender shall serve no more than three (3) years of confinement, with credit for meritorious good time, with initial placement in a Division of Community Correction facility; and
        2. That the initial placement in the Division of Community Correction is conditioned upon the offender's continuing eligibility for Division of Community Correction placement and the offender's compliance with all applicable rules established by the Board of Corrections for community correction programs.
      2. Post-prison supervision shall accompany and follow community correction programming when appropriate.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90; 2017, No. 423, § 20; 2019, No. 910, §§ 906, 907.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “three (3) years” for “two (2) years” in (c)(2)(A)(i); deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (c)(2)(A)(ii); and inserted “community correction” in (c)(2)(B).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” and “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

16-93-311. Probation generally — Restitution.

If the court has suspended imposition of sentence or placed a defendant on probation conditioned upon the defendant's making restitution and the defendant has not satisfactorily made all of his or her payments when the probation period has ended, the court may:

  1. Continue to assert the court's jurisdiction over the recalcitrant defendant; and
  2. Either:
    1. Extend the probation period as the court deems necessary; or
    2. Revoke the defendant's suspended sentence.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Court retained jurisdiction to revoke the suspended sentence for failure to pay restitution, because the petitioner was charged with fleeing to avoid arrest for possession of marijuana and causing property damage while fleeing, and was ordered to pay restitution for the damage he caused during the course of the criminal episode. Arter v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 327, 414 S.W.3d 391 (2012).

Trial court erred by revoking defendant's probation imposed upon her plea of guilty to breaking or entering and theft of property, because her probation was previously revoked and she was no longer under any probationary sentence with a condition of restitution; thus, the court did not retain jurisdiction to revoke for nonpayment of restitution. Mott v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 529 (2013).

16-93-312. Probation generally — Modification.

  1. During a period of suspension or probation, upon the petition of a probation officer or a defendant or upon the court's own motion, a court may:
    1. Modify a condition imposed on the defendant;
    2. Impose an additional condition authorized by § 5-4-303;
    3. Impose an additional fine authorized by §§ 5-4-201 and 5-4-303; or
    4. Impose a period of confinement authorized by § 5-4-304.
  2. Nothing in this section shall limit the Department of Community Correction from authorizing sanctions within the intermediate sanctions grid when warranted by the defendant's conduct.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90.

16-93-313. Probation generally — Transfer of jurisdiction.

  1. If a defendant during a period of probation goes from a county where he or she is being supervised to another county, jurisdiction over the defendant may be transferred in the discretion of the supervising court to a court of comparable jurisdiction in the other county if the court in the other county concurs.
  2. If jurisdiction over a defendant is transferred under subsection (a) of this section, the court in the county to which jurisdiction is transferred has any power with respect to the defendant previously possessed by the transferring court.
  3. The procedure under this section may be repeated if a defendant goes from the county where he or she is being supervised to another county during the period of his or her probation.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90.

16-93-314. Probation generally — Discharge.

    1. The court may discharge the defendant from probation at any time.
    2. If a judgment of conviction was not entered by the court at the time of suspension or probation and the defendant fully complies with the conditions of suspension or probation for the period of suspension or probation, the court shall discharge the defendant and dismiss any proceedings against him or her.
    1. Subject to the provisions of §§ 5-4-501 — 5-4-504, a person against whom proceedings are discharged or dismissed under subsection (a) of this section may seek to have the criminal record sealed, consistent with the procedures established in the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.
    2. This subsection does not apply if:
      1. The person applying for discharge has been convicted of a sexual offense as defined by § 5-14-101 et seq.; and
      2. The victim was under eighteen (18) years of age.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 90; 2013, No. 1460, § 13.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401” for “§ 16-90-901” in (b)(1).

Case Notes

In General.

Where defendant received only probation, i.e., no fine or prison term, no conviction judgment should have been entered, thus entitling her later to be discharged and have all proceedings dismissed against her if she complied with the conditions of her probation; however, where defendant failed to object to the entry of her judgment of conviction, she lost that relief to which she was entitled under this section. Baker v. State, 318 Ark. 223, 884 S.W.2d 603 (1994) (decided under former § 5-4-311).

Applicability.

Where a term of imprisonment was entered after a guilty plea to a drug offense, the trial court erred by later entering an order to seal the criminal record under former § 5-4-311 (see now this section) since expungement was only allowed if a judgment of conviction was not entered; the fact that boot camp was an alternative did not make former § 5-4-311 (see now this section) applicable. State v. Burnett, 368 Ark. 625, 249 S.W.3d 141 (2007).

Subchapter 4 — Probation — Suspension of Sentence

16-93-401. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning grounds and conditions for probation, was repealed by Acts 1991, No. 586, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1973, No. 818, § 1; 1981, No. 620, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2331.

16-93-402. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning probation officers, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 91. The section was derived from Acts 1973, No. 818, § 2; 1975, No. 602, § 1; 1979, No. 326, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2332; Acts 1993, No. 549, § 9.

16-93-403. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning county probation advisory boards, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 549, § 9. The section was derived from Acts 1973, No. 818, §§ 4, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2334, 43-2335.

Subchapter 5 — Alternative Service Act

16-93-501 — 16-93-510. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning the Alternative Service Act, was repealed by identical Acts 1993, Nos. 531 and 548, § 11. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-93-501. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 1; 1983, No. 344, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2339.

16-93-502. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 2; 1983, No. 229, § 2; 1983, No. 344, § 2; 1983, No. 795, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2340; Acts 1989, No. 831, § 1.

16-93-503. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2345.

16-93-504. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 11; 1983, No. 795, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2348; Acts 1989, No. 831, § 2.

16-93-505. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 3; 1981, No. 905, § 1; 1983, No. 795, § 4; 1985, No. 592, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2341; Acts 1989, No. 831, § 3.

16-93-506. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 10; 1983, No. 795, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2347; Acts 1989, No. 831, § 4.

16-93-507. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 4; 1977, No. 670, § 1; 1983, No. 692, § 1; 1983, No. 795, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2342; Acts 1989, No. 831, § 5.

16-93-508. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 9; 1977, No. 670, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2346.

16-93-509. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 5; 1977, No. 670, § 1; 1983, No. 795, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2343; Acts 1989, No. 831, § 6.

16-93-510. Acts 1975, No. 378, § 7; 1983, No. 795, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2344; Acts 1987, No. 775, § 2; 1989, No. 831, § 7.

Subchapter 6 — Parole — Eligibility

Effective Dates. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 46: Mar. 1, 1968. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds that the penal system of the State of Arkansas is in need of immediate reform, in order better to effectuate the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crime and to make possible their return as useful members of the community, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to establish a Department of Correction to effectuate such rehabilitation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after March 1, 1968.”

Acts 1969, No. 48, § 4: became law over Governor's veto, Feb. 12, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under the present provisions relating to paroles, a convicted person is eligible for parole without serving at least 1/3 of the time for which he was convicted; and that in order to clarify the parole eligibility provisions and to promote the more efficient administration of criminal justice in this State, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1969, No. 94, § 4: Feb. 24, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that legislation has recently been enacted providing for a First Offenders Penal Institution to which persons under twenty-one (21) years of age who are first convicted of a felony may be committed; that the purpose of establishing such institution is to separate first offenders and habitual and repeater criminals so that better educational and rehabilitation opportunities can be provided for first offenders; that in order to further the purposes of rehabilitating such first offenders it is believed that parole eligibility requirements for first offenders whether committed to the First Offenders Penal Institution or to the Department of Correction should be more lenient than those provided for habitual and repeater criminals; and, that this Act is immediately necessary to provide more liberal parole eligibility requirements for first offenders under the age of twenty-one years. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1157, § 4: Feb. 11, 1976. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that the length of confinement of persons convicted of a crime using a deadly weapon is too lenient and that the enactment of this Act will provide for more stringent confinement requirements. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1161, § 3: Feb. 11, 1976. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under present law relating to the eligibility for parole for individuals serving a term of years in the State Penitentiary, credit for good time is allowed regardless of the number of times an individual is confined in such institution; that under present law the circuit judge has no authority to mandate, in the appropriate case, that an individual confined in the State Penitentiary serve not less than one half (½) of the sentence imposed with credit for good time; and that it is in the best interests of the citizens of this State that this Act be effective immediately upon its passage in order to encourage and promote the more efficient administration of justice. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 93, § 5: Apr. 1, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present system of parole eligibility does not adequately deter crime, especially the habitual offenders, and that such habitual offenders should have their parole eligibility bear a direct relationship to the number of times they have been incarcerated. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after April 1, 1977.”

Acts 1983, No. 772, § 2: Mar. 24, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the existing parole law allows persons who have repeatedly committed first degree murder, rape and aggravated robbery, as well as other felonies, to be eligible for release on parole; that second and subsequent offenders of first degree murder, rape and aggravated robbery should not be eligible for parole; that in order to implement said policy this Act should go into effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 825, § 7: Apr. 1, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the parole eligibility established by this Act should be in effect on April 1, 1983, and that unless an emergency is declared that such will not occur. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after April 1, 1983.”

Acts 1987, No. 990, § 3: Apr. 14, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that because of the case Ricarte v. State, CR 86-31, a question has arisen over the validity of Act 1161 of the Extended Session of 1976; that this Act is a reenactment of the former law; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to clarify the state of the law on this issue. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2013, No. 136, § 2: Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that certain sex offenses qualify for mandatory parole under the current parole laws; that sex offenses are very serious crimes and parole for those offenses should be discretionary; and that this act is immediately necessary because those persons who will be required to register as sex offenders upon release from the Department of Correction should first serve a meaningful sentence in prison before being eligible for mandatory parole. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 14: Mar. 20, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, more than one hundred persons in Arkansas are entitled to relief under those decisions; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to make those persons eligible for parole in order to be in compliance with Montgomery v. Louisiana. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 1029, § 5: Apr. 6, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Senate Bill 294 of 2017 recently became Acts 2017, No. 539, with an immediate effective date; that an internal citation in three (3) of the sections of the act was found to be incorrect; and that this act is immediately necessary because the three internal citations need to be corrected. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Hearsay evidence: Admissibility at revocation hearings. 11 A.L.R.4th 999.

Power of court to revoke or modify probation for violations committed during the probation term. 13 A.L.R.4th 1240.

Revocation: Acts committed after imposition of sentence but prior to commencement of probation term. 22 A.L.R.4th 755.

Increased sentence following revocation. 23 A.L.R.4th 883.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

16-93-601. Felonies committed prior to April 1, 1977.

  1. Death Sentence. An individual under sentence of death is not eligible for release on parole.
  2. Life Imprisonment.
    1. An individual sentenced to life imprisonment prior to March 1, 1968, and any individual sentenced to life imprisonment after February 12, 1969, and before April 1, 1977, is not eligible for release on parole unless the sentence is commuted to a term of years by executive clemency. When the life sentence is commuted to a term of years, the individual is eligible for release on parole after having served one-third (1/3) of the time to which the life sentence is commuted, with credit for good-time allowances.
    2. An individual sentenced to life imprisonment on and after March 1, 1968, and prior to February 12, 1969, is eligible for release on parole after he or she serves fifteen (15) years of the sentence, with credit for good-time allowances not to exceed five (5) years.
  3. Sentence of Years. An individual sentenced to a term of years in the Department of Correction or the Division of Correction after February 11, 1976, and before April 1, 1977, is eligible for release on parole after he or she serves the following terms:
    1. An individual sentenced to a term of years for other than a Class Y felony who is confined in the department or division for the second time is eligible for release on parole after he or she serves one-third (1/3) of the time for which sentenced, with credit for good-time allowances, or one-third (1/3) of the time to which sentence is commuted by executive clemency, with credit for good-time allowances. However, a judge may require one-half (½) of the sentence as imposed, or one-half (½) of the sentence as commuted by executive clemency, to be served, with credit for good-time allowances; and
    2. An individual sentenced to a term of years who is confined in the department or division and who pleads guilty to or is convicted of a Class Y felony or who has previously been confined in the department or division two (2) or more times is eligible for release on parole after he or she serves one-half (½) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency, with credit for good-time allowances.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)-(c) of this section, the court may require anyone convicted of a crime involving the use of a deadly weapon to serve one-half (½) of the time for which sentenced, with credit for good-time allowances.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 28; 1969, No. 48, § 1; 1969, No. 94, § 1; 1975, No. 378, § 6; 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1157, § 1; 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1161, § 1; 1981, No. 620, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2807; reen. Acts 1987, No. 990, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 908.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was reenacted by Acts 1987, No. 990, § 1. Acts 1987, No. 834, provided that 1987 legislation reenacting acts passed in the 1976 Extended Session should not repeal any other 1987 legislation and that such other legislation would be controlling in the event of conflict.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “or the Division of Correction” in the introductory language of (c); and inserted “or division” in (c)(1) and twice in (c)(2).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The disparity resulting from determining “good-time towards” credit and minimum parole eligibility time among various prisoners does not deny 14th amendment equal protection. West v. State, 257 Ark. 582, 518 S.W.2d 497 (1975).

Change in Parole Law.

Parole status is properly governed by the parole statute in effect at the time the crime was committed, not the statute in effect at the time of sentencing. Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 677 S.W.2d 292 (1984).

Application of a parole statute less favorable to one who had been sentenced prior to its passage than the parole law existing at the time of his sentencing would be unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, in violation of Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 17. Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 677 S.W.2d 292 (1984).

Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

Sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment, and defendant was not without any opportunity for parole eligibility since executive clemency was available by commutation of sentence. Rogers v. State, 257 Ark. 144, 515 S.W.2d 79 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S. Ct. 1656, 44 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1975).

Cumulative Sentence.

Cumulative minimum meant the minimum sentence possible to be served under the provisions of this section, and cumulative maximum meant the total amount of time fixed for incarceration, as shown by the face of the commitments, considered as a single cumulative commitment. Jackson v. State, 254 Ark. 246, 492 S.W.2d 897 (1973).

Where petitioner was sentenced to a six year prison term and later, but before being incarcerated, was given a one year term for escape, the sentences were considered cumulatively as a seven year sentence. Jackson v. State, 254 Ark. 246, 492 S.W.2d 897 (1973).

Habeas Corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate method to challenge the determination of parole eligibility; habeas corpus petitions are restricted to the questions of whether the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid conviction or whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction. Bargo v. Lockhart, 279 Ark. 180, 650 S.W.2d 227 (1983).

Jury Instructions.

Although the trial court should not attempt to explain matters concerning parole, a trial court can recite to the jury that capital murder is punishable by imprisonment for life without parole, and the jury may receive a verdict form reflecting that language. Robertson v. State, 304 Ark. 332, 802 S.W.2d 920 (1991).

Liberty Interest.

A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

This section does not create a liberty interest. Pittman v. Gaines, 905 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1990).

Recidivists.

There was no prejudice to defendant resulting from the trial court's statement in the judgment that, in view of evidence showing this to be the defendant's second offense, he would have to serve one-third of his sentence before he became eligible for parole. Watson v. State, 271 Ark. 661, 609 S.W.2d 673 (1980).

Sentence of Years.

Sentence of imprisonment for not less than 30 nor more than 90 years was not an indeterminate sentence, but a sentence of 90 years, with one third of it to be served before the prisoner became eligible for parole. Moore v. State, 262 Ark. 27, 553 S.W.2d 29 (1977).

Where defendant's sentence was life imprisonment without parole instead of life imprisonment, before defendant could be subject to be released on parole, his sentence must be commuted to a term of years by executive clemency. Rogers v. State, 265 Ark. 945, 582 S.W.2d 7 (1979).

Sentence for life was not subject to parole unless executive clemency was first obtained, but if sentence was commuted, and if defendant had served one-third of the newly fixed term of years, the defendant became immediately eligible for parole. Rogers v. Britton, 476 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Ark. 1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939, 101 S. Ct. 2021, 68 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1981).

Time of Eligibility.

A prisoner is not eligible for parole at all until he has been sentenced. Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969).

Under this section, a prisoner can be eligible for parole immediately only if the sentence has not provided otherwise. Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969).

Prisoner who had served sufficient time in out-of-state penitentiary was entitled to release under concurrent Arkansas sentence. Campbell v. State, 253 Ark. 307, 485 S.W.2d 748 (1972).

Evidence supported finding that there had been no difference between what the defendant had bargained for and what the trial court had ordered so that any cause of action the defendant had would be only against the Department of Correction for the method it used in computing his parole eligibility date. Houff v. State, 268 Ark. 19, 593 S.W.2d 39 (1980).

Three sentences totaling 56 years must, for parole eligibility purposes, be treated as a single commitment for that length of time. Welch v. State, 269 Ark. 208, 599 S.W.2d 717, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996, 101 S. Ct. 535, 66 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1980).

Cited: Andrews v. State, 251 Ark. 279, 472 S.W.2d 86 (1971); Patterson v. State, 253 Ark. 393, 486 S.W.2d 19 (1972); Jackson v. State, 254 Ark. 246, 492 S.W.2d 897 (1973); Clark v. Lockhart, 379 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Ark. 1974); Rogers v. Britton, 466 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984); Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1987); Hale v. Lockhart, 903 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1990).

16-93-602. Felonies committed between April 1, 1977, and April 1, 1983 — Purpose and construction of sections.

  1. It is the purpose and intent of this section and §§ 16-93-603 and 16-93-604 to establish parole eligibility for a person convicted of a felony committed on or after April 1, 1977, and prior to April 1, 1983.
  2. Nothing in this section and §§ 16-93-603 and 16-93-604 is to be construed to repeal the parole eligibility laws in effect on the date criminal offenses were committed prior to April 1, 1977.

History. Acts 1977, No. 93, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2830.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This classification scheme of inmates to establish parole eligibility violates no constitutional due process right; there is no constitutional right or entitlement to parole. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

This section and §§ 16-93-603, 16-93-604, which provide for the classification of convicted felons for purposes of parole eligibility based on the number of prior convictions, do not violate the constitutions of the United States and this state. Blevins v. Norris, 291 Ark. 70, 722 S.W.2d 573, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1040, 107 S. Ct. 1980, 95 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1987).

Purpose.

Acts 1977, No. 93, was intended to deal not only with the offense for which a prisoner is presently incarcerated but also previous incarcerations. Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984).

Purpose of this section is to lengthen period of confinement before parole eligibility as number of prior convictions increases. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

Applicability.

No person may have the relatively more stringent parole eligibility requirements contained in this section and §§ 16-93-603 and 16-93-604 applied to him if his latest felony — that for which he is now being classified — occurred prior to April 1, 1977; instead, the appropriate law would be that effective at the time the crime was committed. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

This section and §§ 16-93-603 and 16-93-604 are applicable to individuals whose latest felony occurred after April 1, 1977; where this section and §§ 16-93-603, 16-93-604 apply, those felony convictions occuring prior to April 1, 1977, may be computed for purposes of tallying the individual's number of convictions. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

The fact that defendant's previous incarcerations occurred before the effective date of this section was irrelevant where he was currently incarcerated for felony committed after April 1, 1977. Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984).

Nothing in this section and §§ 16-93-603 and 16-93-604 requires that a prisoner be adjudicated a habitual offender before the sections become applicable. Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984).

The application of this section and §§ 16-93-603 and 16-93-604 to a defendant who was convicted of murder in 1968 and sentenced to life imprisonment was a violation of the ex post facto provisions of the Arkansas and United States constitutions because this section and §§ 16-93-603 and 16-93-604 were not in effect at the time defendant's first crime was committed, even though the defendant committed a second felony in 1978 which resulted in the addition of three years to the original life sentence. Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 677 S.W.2d 292 (1984).

Sentencing.

Sentencing is the domain of the trial court and parole is entirely within the control of the parole board; a decision on parole eligibility does not affect sentencing and such a decision can neither enlarge nor reduce the sentence determined by the trial court; therefore, this section and §§ 16-93-603 and 16-93-604 are parole law, not sentencing law. Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984).

Sentence held not improperly computed after second conviction. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

Cited: Houff v. State, 268 Ark. 19, 593 S.W.2d 39 (1980); Wells v. State, 279 Ark. 55, 648 S.W.2d 466 (1983); Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1984); Fain v. State, 286 Ark. 35, 688 S.W.2d 940 (1985); Clawitter v. Lockhart, 286 Ark. 131, 689 S.W.2d 558 (1985); Schwindling v. Smith, 777 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1985); Wiggins v. Lockhart, 825 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1987); Garner v. Howell, 840 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1988).

16-93-603. Felonies committed between April 1, 1977, and April 1, 1983 — Classification of inmates.

For the purposes of §§ 16-93-60216-93-604, inmates are to be classified as follows:

  1. A first offender is an inmate convicted of one (1) or more felonies but who has not been incarcerated in some correctional institution in the United States, whether local, state, or federal, for a crime which was a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offender was incarcerated, prior to being sentenced to a correctional institution in this state for the offense or offenses for which he or she is being classified;
  2. A second offender is a inmate convicted of two (2) or more felonies who has been incarcerated one (1) time in some correctional institution in the United States, whether local, state, or federal, for a crime which was a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offender was incarcerated, prior to being sentenced to a correctional institution in this state for the offense or offenses for which he or she is being classified;
  3. A third offender is an inmate convicted of three (3) or more felonies who has been incarcerated two (2) times in some correctional institution in the United States, whether local, state, or federal, for a crime which was a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offender was incarcerated, prior to being sentenced to a correctional institution in this state for the offense or offenses for which he or she is being classified; and
  4. A fourth offender is an inmate convicted of four (4) or more felonies who has been incarcerated three (3) or more times in some correctional institution in the United States, whether local, state, or federal, for a crime which was a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offender was incarcerated, prior to being sentenced to a correctional institution in this state for the offense or offenses for which he or she is being classified.

History. Acts 1977, No. 93, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2828.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This classification scheme of inmates to establish parole eligibility violates no constitutional due process right; there is no constitutional right or entitlement to parole. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

This section and §§ 16-93-602 and 16-93-604, which provide for the classification of convicted felons for purposes of parole eligibility based on the number of prior convictions, do not violate the constitutions of the United States and this state. Blevins v. Norris, 291 Ark. 70, 722 S.W.2d 573, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1040, 107 S. Ct. 1980, 95 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1987).

Applying §§ 16-93-602 through 16-93-604 to a prisoner without a prior determination by the sentencing court that its provisions apply to him does not violate due process, and alleged errors in the interpretation or application of these sections does not state a federal due process cause of action where the state provides a forum for redetermination of the contested date. Garner v. Howell, 840 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1988).

Purpose.

Purpose of this section is to lengthen period of confinement before parole eligibility as number of prior convictions increases. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

Applicability.

No person may have the relatively more stringent parole eligibility requirements contained in this section and §§ 16-93-602 and 16-93-604 applied to him if his latest felony — that for which he is now being classified — occurred prior to April 1, 1977; instead, the appropriate law would be that effective at the time the crime was committed. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Attack on Prior Conviction.

The earlier of two convictions may be used for purposes of parole ineligibility because nothing suggests that, in determining parole eligibility, a state must look behind a valid judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea where the record shows the defendant to have been represented by counsel. St. John v. Lockhart, 286 Ark. 234, 691 S.W.2d 148 (1985).

Judicial Determination.

Fact that there had been no judicial determination that plaintiff fits the classification of fourth offender did not invalidate his classification as a fourth offender for parole eligibility purposes. Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984).

Liberty Interest.

A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

Sentencing.

Sentence held not improperly computed after second conviction. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

Subsequent Offenses.

The increase in the time defendant was required to serve before he would be eligible for parole resulted from his commission of subsequent offenses and had nothing to do with any change in legislation. Gilmer v. Massey, 303 Ark. 634, 799 S.W.2d 526 (1990).

Third Offenders.

Where defendant was previously convicted of a felony in 1975 and served one year of a five-year sentence with four years suspended, but violated parole in 1978 and served the remaining four years, and in 1979, was convicted of a felony and sentenced to five years imprisonment, the defendant was properly classified as a third offender when he was convicted of five felonies in 1983 and received five concurrent 10-year sentences. Patterson v. Smith, 289 Ark. 564, 712 S.W.2d 922 (1986).

Cited: Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 677 S.W.2d 292 (1984); Brown v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 483, 707 S.W.2d 304 (1986); Wiggins v. Lockhart, 825 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1987); Fruit v. Lockhart, 304 Ark. 457, 802 S.W.2d 930 (1991); Abdullah v. Lockhart, 780 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. Ark 1991).

16-93-604. Felonies committed between April 1, 1977, and April 1, 1983 — Parole eligibility.

  1. A person who committed felonies prior to April 1, 1977, and who was convicted and incarcerated therefor, is eligible for release on parole in accordance with the parole eligibility law in effect at the time the crime was committed.
  2. A person who committed felonies on and after April 1, 1977, and prior to April 1, 1983, and who has been convicted and incarcerated therefor, is eligible for release on parole as follows:
    1. An inmate under sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole is not eligible for release on parole but may be pardoned or have his or her sentence commuted by the Governor, as provided by law. An inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for release on parole unless the sentence is commuted to a term of years by executive clemency. Upon commutation, the inmate is eligible for release on parole as provided in this section;
    2. An inmate classified as a first offender under § 16-93-603, except one under twenty-one (21) years of age as described in subsection (c) of this section and except one who pleads guilty to or has been convicted of a Class Y felony, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-third (1/3) of his or her sentence has been served, with credit for good-time allowances, or one-third (1/3) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency is served, with credit for good-time allowances. However, if the trier of fact determines that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the crime, a first offender twenty-one (21) years of age or older shall not be eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-half (½) of the sentence is served, with credit for good-time allowances;
    3. An inmate classified as a second offender under § 16-93-603 and one who pleads guilty to or is convicted of a Class Y felony, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-half (½) of his or her sentence is served, with credit for good-time allowances, or one-half (½) of the time to which sentence is commuted by executive clemency, with credit for good-time allowances;
    4. An inmate classified as a third offender under § 16-93-603, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of three-fourths (¾) of his or her sentence is served, with credit for good-time allowances, or three-fourths (¾) of the time to which sentence is commuted by executive clemency, with credit for good-time allowances; and
    5. An inmate classified as a fourth offender under § 16-93-603, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for parole, but is entitled to good-time allowances as provided by law.
  3. Any person under twenty-one (21) years of age who is first convicted of a felony and committed to the first offender penal institution or to the Department of Correction for a term of years is eligible for parole at any time, unless a minimum time to be served is imposed consisting of not more than one-third (1/3) of the total time sentenced. In the event the individual is sentenced to a minimum time to be served, he or she is eligible for release on parole after serving the minimum time prescribed, with credit for good-time allowances, and for commutation by the exercise of executive clemency.
    1. When any convicted felon, while on parole, is convicted of another felony, the felon is to be committed to the Department of Correction to serve the remainder of his or her original sentence, including any portion suspended, with credit for good-time allowances. Upon conviction for the subsequent felony, the court is to require the sentence for the subsequent felony to be served consecutively with the sentence for the previous felony.
    2. Any person found guilty of a felony and placed on probation or suspended sentence therefor who is subsequently found guilty of another felony committed while on probation or suspended sentence is to be committed to the Department of Correction to serve the remainder of his or her suspended sentence plus the sentence imposed for the subsequent felony. The sentence imposed for the subsequent felony is to be served consecutively with the remainder of the suspended sentence.
  4. For parole eligibility purposes, consecutive sentences by one (1) or more courts or for one (1) or more counts is considered as a single commitment reflecting the cumulative sentence to be served.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to reduce, lessen, or in any manner take away or affect the good-time allowances earned by any individual prior to April 1, 1977.

History. Acts 1977, No. 93, § 2; 1981, No. 620, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2829.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Irving and Schoen, Criminal Procedure, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 129.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This classification scheme of inmates to establish parole eligibility violates no constitutional due process right; there is no constitutional right or entitlement to parole. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Subdivision (b)(5) of this section not void for vagueness; the proscribed activity is committing four or more felonies, and the result is ineligibility for parole. Fain v. State, 286 Ark. 35, 688 S.W.2d 940 (1985).

Subsection (b) of this section does not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution because it is not retrospective and it does not disadvantage the offender affected by it. Brown v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 483, 707 S.W.2d 304 (1986).

This section and §§ 16-93-602 and 16-93-603, which provide for the classification of convicted felons for purposes of parole eligibility based on the number of prior convictions, do not violate the constitutions of the United States and this state. Blevins v. Norris, 291 Ark. 70, 722 S.W.2d 573, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1040, 107 S. Ct. 1980, 95 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1987).

Juvenile offender's life sentence for attempted capital murder violated U.S. Const. amend. VIII because attempted capital murder was not a homicide offense that rendered the juvenile offender ineligible for parole. Bramlett v. Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 146, 463 S.W.3d 283 (2015).

Purpose.

The obvious intent of subdivision (b)(4) of this section is to lengthen the period of confinement before parole eligibility as the number of prior convictions increases. Tisdale v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 203, 703 S.W.2d 849 (1986).

Purpose of this section is to lengthen period of confinement before parole eligibility as number of prior convictions increases. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

Applicability.

No person may have the relatively more stringent parole eligibility requirements contained in this section applied to him if his latest felony — that for which he is now being classified — occurred prior to April 1, 1977; instead, the appropriate law would be that effective at the time the crime was committed. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Authority to Determine Eligibility.

Determining parole eligibility according to the sentences imposed by the trial courts is the prerogative of the Department of correction. Fain v. State, 286 Ark. 35, 688 S.W.2d 940 (1985).

Consecutive Sentences.

In determining parole eligibility status when consecutive sentences are involved, the parole eligibility statute governing the original sentence is the one that should control the cumulative sentence. Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 677 S.W.2d 292 (1984).

Where the defendant was convicted of a rape committed while he was on probation from a federal conviction for possession of a stolen government check, the 35-year sentence for rape was not being served consecutively with his sentence on the federal felony conviction; consequently, subsections (d) and (e) of this section were not applicable, and the defendant had to serve a minimum of one-half of the 35 year sentence, with credit for good time, before he would become eligible for parole under subdivision (b)(3) of this section. Brown v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 483, 707 S.W.2d 304 (1986).

Double Jeopardy.

A defendant who was sentenced as a habitual offender and determined to be ineligible for parole until he had served three-fourths of his sentence was not placed in double jeopardy; denial of parole is not a new punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. Clawitter v. Lockhart, 286 Ark. 131, 689 S.W.2d 558 (1985).

Habeas Corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate method to challenge the determination of parole eligibility; habeas corpus petitions are restricted to the questions of whether the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid conviction or whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction. Bargo v. Lockhart, 279 Ark. 180, 650 S.W.2d 227 (1983).

Liberty Interest.

A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

Post-Conviction Relief.

Where there was voluntary plea on defendant's part, since there was substantial, if not technical, compliance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.4 by the trial judge, defendant's remedy concerning parole eligibility, if any, was an action against the Department of Corrections rather than a proceeding under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. Clark v. State, 271 Ark. 866, 611 S.W.2d 502 (1981).

Evidence showed defendant's allegation was not an allegation that could properly be considered on a petition for post-conviction relief because it attacked the execution of the sentence rather than the validity of the sentence imposed by the trial court; furthermore, any action the defendant might have as to the correctness of the computation of his sentence and the execution thereof would be against the Department of Correction. Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

Evidence showed trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to vacate or modify sentence based on the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in that he was not informed, prior to his plea, that he would be subject to the provisions of this section. Wells v. State, 279 Ark. 55, 648 S.W.2d 466 (1983).

A question involving parole eligibility is not an attack on the validity of the sentence imposed but rather is an attack on the execution of the sentence; such a challenge is not a proper matter to be considered in a petition for post-conviction relief. Carter v. State, 283 Ark. 23, 670 S.W.2d 439 (1984).

Defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief on the ground that his plea was rendered involuntarily. Carter v. State, 283 Ark. 23, 670 S.W.2d 439 (1984).

Prior Convictions.

An unconstitutional prior conviction cannot be used in determining parole eligibility. Abdullah v. Lockhart, 780 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. Ark 1991).

Sentencing.

Sentence held not improperly computed after second conviction. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

Trial court cannot modify a valid sentence once execution has begun; thus, trial court, which had the discretion at the initial sentencing of imposing sentences concurrently or consecutively, made sentences concurrent and, having done so, had no power to change them to consecutive sentences after execution had begun. Avants v. State, 293 Ark. 24, 732 S.W.2d 149 (1987).

Third Offenders.

Where defendant committed his third felony while on parole from a 21-year sentence and received a 10-year sentence, which was to run concurrently with the 21-year sentence, the defendant was not eligible for parole under subdivision (b)(4) of this section until he had served three-fourths of the 10-year sentence, with credit for good-time, which would be later than his parole eligibility under the earlier 21-year sentence. Tisdale v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 203, 703 S.W.2d 849 (1986).

Cited: Houff v. State, 268 Ark. 19, 593 S.W.2d 39 (1980); Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1984); Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Walker v. Lockhart, 807 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1986); Wiggins v. Lockhart, 825 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1987); Woods v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 37, 727 S.W.2d 849 (1987); Garner v. Howell, 840 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1988); Chenowith v. State, 26 Ark. App. 256, 763 S.W.2d 103 (1989); Ford v. Lockhart, 904 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1990); Abdullah v. Lockhart, 302 Ark. 506, 790 S.W.2d 440 (1990).

16-93-605. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning felonies committed on or after April 1, 1983 — purpose and construction of sections, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 92. The section was derived from Acts 1983, No. 825, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2830.5.

16-93-606. Parole eligibility — Felonies committed on or after April 1, 1983, but before January 1, 1994 — Classification of inmates — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “felony” means a crime classified as Class Y felony, Class A felony, or Class B felony by the laws of this state.
  2. For the purposes of § 16-93-607, inmates shall be classified as follows:
    1. A first offender is an inmate convicted of one (1) or more felonies but who has not been incarcerated in some correctional institution in the United States, whether local, state, or federal, for a crime that was a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offender was incarcerated, prior to being sentenced to a correctional institution in this state for the offense or offenses for which he or she is being classified;
    2. A second offender is an inmate convicted of two (2) or more felonies and who has been once incarcerated in some correctional institution in the United States, whether local, state, or federal, for a crime that was a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offender was incarcerated, prior to being sentenced to a correctional institution in this state for the offense or offenses for which he or she is being classified;
    3. A third offender is an inmate convicted of three (3) or more felonies and who has been twice incarcerated in some correctional institution in the United States, whether local, state, or federal, for a crime that was a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offender was incarcerated, prior to being sentenced to a correctional institution in this state for the offense or offenses for which he or she is being classified; and
    4. A fourth offender is an inmate convicted of four (4) or more felonies and who has been incarcerated in some correctional institution in the United States, whether local, state, or federal, three (3) or more times for a crime that was a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offender was incarcerated, prior to being sentenced to a correctional institution in this state for the offense or offenses for which he or she is being classified.

History. Acts 1983, No. 825, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2830.1, 43-2830.2; Acts 2011, No. 570, § 93.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added “Parole eligibility” and “but before January 1, 1994” in the section heading; and substituted “that” for “which” in four places.

Case Notes

Felony Classification.

Inmate's petition for a writ of mandamus filed against officials of the Department of Corrections, in which he contended that the Department improperly classified him as a third offender for parole-eligibility purposes, was properly denied as the record was insufficient for the appellate court to determine whether a 1989 conviction for possession of crack cocaine, in violation of former § 5-64-401, fell under subsection (a) or (c) of the statute and, thus, the felony classification for the conviction; furthermore, the precise subsection under which inmate was convicted was a critical component in determining his status under this section. Robertson v. Norris, 360 Ark. 591, 203 S.W.3d 82 (2005).

Liberty Interest.

A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

Sentence.

There is no provision under Arkansas law or the United States Constitution which prohibits a sentence of a term of years which exceeds usual life span of human beings. Malone v. State, 294 Ark. 127, 741 S.W.2d 246 (1987).

16-93-607. Parole eligibility — Felonies committed on or after April 1, 1983, but before January 1, 1994 — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “felony” means a crime classified as Class Y felony, Class A felony, or Class B felony by the laws of this state.
  2. A person who committed a felony prior to April 1, 1983, and who was convicted and incarcerated for that felony, shall be eligible for release on parole in accordance with the parole eligibility law in effect at the time the crime was committed.
  3. A person who commits felonies on or after April 1, 1983, and who shall be convicted and incarcerated for that felony, shall be eligible for release on parole as follows:
    1. An inmate under sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole is not eligible for release on parole but may be pardoned or have his or her sentence commuted by the Governor, as provided by law. An inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for release on parole unless the sentence is commuted to a term of years by executive clemency. Upon commutation, the inmate is eligible for release on parole as provided in this section;
    2. An inmate classified as a first offender under § 16-93-606, except one under twenty-one (21) years of age as described in subsection (d) of this section and except one who pleads guilty or has been convicted of a Class Y felony, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-third (1/3) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency is served, with credit for good-time allowances. However, if the trier of fact determines that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the crime, a first offender twenty-one (21) years of age or older is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-half (½) of the sentence is served, with credit for good-time allowances;
    3. An inmate classified as a second offender under § 16-93-606 and one who pleads guilty or was convicted of a Class Y felony, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, are not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of one-half (½) of his or her sentence shall have been served, with credit for good-time allowances, or one-half (½) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency is served, with credit for good-time allowances;
    4. An inmate classified as a third offender under § 16-93-606, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for release on parole until a minimum of three-fourths (¾) of his or her sentence shall have been served, with credit for good-time allowances, or three-fourths (¾) of the time to which the sentence is commuted by executive clemency shall have been served, with credit for good-time allowances; and
    5. An inmate classified as a fourth offender under § 16-93-606, upon entering a correctional institution in this state under sentence from a circuit court, is not eligible for parole, but he or she shall be entitled to good-time allowances as provided by law.
  4. Any person under twenty-one (21) years of age who is first convicted of a felony and committed to the first offender penal institution or to the Department of Correction, as the Division of Correction was known as prior to July 1, 2019, now known as the “Division of Correction”, for a term of years is eligible for parole at any time unless a minimum time to be served is imposed consisting of not more than one-third (1/3) of the total time sentenced. In the event the individual is sentenced to a minimum time to be served, he or she is eligible for release on parole after serving the minimum time prescribed, with credit for good-time allowances, and for commutation by the exercise of executive clemency.
    1. When any convicted felon, while on parole, is convicted of another felony, the felon is to be committed to the division to serve the remainder of his or her original sentence, including any portion suspended, with credit for good-time allowances. Upon conviction for the subsequent felony, the court shall require the sentence for the subsequent felony to be served consecutively with the sentence for the previous felony.
    2. Any person found guilty of a felony and placed on probation or suspended sentence therefor who is subsequently found guilty of another felony committed while on probation or suspended sentence is to be committed to the division to serve the remainder of his or her suspended sentence plus the sentence imposed for the subsequent felony. The sentence imposed for the subsequent felony is to be served consecutively with the remainder of the suspended sentence.
  5. For parole eligibility purposes, consecutive sentences by one (1) or more courts or for one (1) or more counts are to be considered as a single commitment reflecting the cumulative sentence to be served.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to reduce, lessen, or in any manner take away or affect the good-time allowances earned by any individual prior to April 1, 1983.

History. Acts 1983, No. 825, §§ 1, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2830.1, 43-2830.3; Acts 2011, No. 570, § 94; 2019, No. 910, §§ 909, 910.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added “Parole eligibility” and “but before January 1, 1994” in the section heading.

The 2019 amendment inserted “as the Division of Correction was known as prior to July 1, 2019, now known as the Division of Correction” in (d); substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (e)(1); and substituted “division” for “department” in (e)(2).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Criminal Procedure, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 149.

Case Notes

Amendments to Statute.

Parole eligibility is determined by the law in effect at the time the crime is committed and, therefore, a more favorable version of the statute enacted after a defendant's crime will not apply to him. Boles v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 410, 12 S.W.3d 201 (2000).

Authority to Revoke Probation.

Where, while the defendant was serving probation imposed by the court of one county, he was convicted of an unrelated felony by the court of a second county, the court of the second county was without authority to revoke his probation; instead, the defendant should have been returned to the first county for a revocation hearing. Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 716 S.W.2d 746 (1986).

Felony Classification.

Inmate's petition for a writ of mandamus filed against officials of the Department of Corrections, in which he contended that the Department improperly classified him as a third offender for parole-eligibility purposes, was properly denied as the record was insufficient for the appellate court to determine whether a 1989 conviction for possession of crack cocaine, in violation of former § 5-64-401, fell under subsection (a) or (c) of the statute and, thus, the felony classification for the conviction; furthermore, the precise subsection under which inmate was convicted was a critical component in determining his status under this section. Robertson v. Norris, 360 Ark. 591, 203 S.W.3d 82 (2005).

Liberty Interest.

A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

Subdivision (c)(1) of this section, which gives the Governor discretion to grant clemency, does not create a liberty interest in parole eligibility. Arkansas statutes have not created a liberty interest in parole eligibility. Millsap v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 406 (2016).

Sentence.

There is no provision under Arkansas law or the United States Constitution which prohibits a sentence of a term of years which exceeds usual life span of human beings. Malone v. State, 294 Ark. 127, 741 S.W.2d 246 (1987).

Although subdivision (e)(1) of this section speaks in terms of revoking parole and returning a felon to the Department of Correction, there is no material difference between parole from a state sentence and parole from a federal institution where the defendant is serving state time concurrently with the federal sentence; therefore, where the circuit court ordered that its 30-year sentence should run consecutively to such state sentences, its order was not in error. Kelley v. Washington, 311 Ark. 73, 843 S.W.2d 797 (1992).

Defendant's sentence that required defendant to serve his Class D and Class C felony convictions consecutively with a sentence for revocation of parole was not illegal because the restrictions on imposing a consecutive sentence under subdivision (e)(1) of this section applied only to convictions for a Class Y, Class A, or Class B felony. Campea v. State, 87 Ark. App. 225, 189 S.W.3d 459 (2004).

Cited: Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984); Smith v. State, 300 Ark. 291, 778 S.W.2d 924 (1989); Blanks v. State, 300 Ark. 398, 779 S.W.2d 168 (1989); Cranford v. State, 303 Ark. 393, 797 S.W.2d 442 (1990); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1991); Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1993); Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 81, 941 S.W.2d 411 (1997).

16-93-608. Parole eligibility — Class C or Class D felonies committed on or after April 1, 1983, but before January 1, 1994.

A person who commits a Class C felony or Class D felony on or after April 1, 1983, and who is incarcerated therefor is eligible for release on parole after having served one-third (1/3) of his or her sentence, with credit for good-time allowances, or one-third (1/3) of the time to which his or her sentence is commuted by executive clemency, with credit for good-time allowances.

History. Acts 1983, No. 825, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2830.4; Acts 2011, No. 570, § 95.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added “Parole eligibility” and “but before January 1, 1994” in the section heading.

Case Notes

Liberty Interest.

A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

16-93-609. Effect of more than one conviction for certain felonies — Definition.

  1. Any person who commits murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, rape, § 5-14-103, or aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103, subsequent to March 24, 1983, and who has previously been found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, rape, § 5-14-103, or aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103, shall not be eligible for release on parole by the Parole Board.
    1. Any person who commits a violent felony offense or any felony sex offense subsequent to August 13, 2001, and who has previously been found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to any violent felony offense or any felony sex offense shall not be eligible for release on parole by the board.
    2. As used in this subsection, “a violent felony offense or any felony sex offense” means those offenses listed in § 5-4-501(d)(2).

History. Acts 1983, No. 772, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2807.1; Acts 2001, No. 1805, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment rewrote this section.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

Case Notes

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

—Prejudice Not Shown.

Counsel's deficient performance in failing to correct instructional error that defendant was eligible for parole when he was not did not establish prejudice because the prosecutor emphasized the serious nature of the crime and the injury the petitioner inflicted on the mentally impaired victim and her family and the petitioner's seven prior felony convictions, and after deliberating less than 30 minutes, the jury imposed a sentence that would likely exceed his life span whether or not he would be granted parole. Stewart v. Kelley, 890 F.3d 1124 (8th Cir. 2018).

Instructions.

Trial court's erroneous instruction during the sentencing phase that defendant would be eligible for parole after serving 70% of his sentence for first-degree murder did not provide any relief to defendant, because he failed to object to the error when it occurred and the error did not fit within the third Wicks exception concerning certain flagrant and highly prejudicial errors. Muhammad v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 87, 572 S.W.3d 21 (2019).

Liberty Interest.

A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

Parole.

Department of Corrections calculated prisoner's parole time in accordance with the law in effect at the time his second offense was committed and, in doing so, it correctly determined he must serve the entire sentence he received for that offense; while such a determination may indirectly affect any parole eligibility he may have otherwise received for his other prior convictions, his parole status was determined by the correct parole statutes in effect at the time prisoner committed his numerous crimes. Woods v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 37, 727 S.W.2d 849 (1987).

Defendant's sentence was not illegal under this section where he was sentenced as an habitual offender, and judicial precedent held that this section applied to a sentence for second-degree sexual assault. Ward v. State, 2016 Ark. 8, 479 S.W.3d 9 (2016).

Cited: Smith v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 360 (2012).

16-93-610. Computation of sentence.

  1. Time served is deemed to begin on the day sentence is imposed, not on the day a prisoner is received by the Department of Corrections. It shall continue only during the time in which a prisoner is actually confined in a county jail or other local place of lawful confinement or while under the custody and supervision of the department.
  2. When the sentencing judge imposes sentence, he or she is to direct that the time already served by the defendant in jail or other place of detention is to be credited against the defendant.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 34; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2813; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 440; 2019, No. 910, § 911.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (b), substituted “judge shall” for “judge, in his discretion, may,” inserted “or she” and substituted “against the defendant” for “against the sentence.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “Department of Corrections” for “Department of Correction” in the first sentence of (a).

Cross References. Deduction of confinement under prior conviction, Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 12.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Disparity resulting from determining “good-time” towards credit and minimum parole eligibility time among various prisoners does not deny equal protection under U.S. Const., Amend. 14. West v. State, 257 Ark. 582, 518 S.W.2d 497 (1975).

Commencement of Sentence.

Where the defendant was convicted and sentenced for two offenses in state court, but before he was confined, he was tried on a deferral charge and imprisoned in a federal penitentiary, his state sentence started running on the date he was delivered to the state penitentiary to start serving his sentence. Young v. State, 252 Ark. 184, 477 S.W.2d 823 (1972).

Credit of Pretrial Jail Time.

Where record failed to show that the court did not afford to petitioner the opportunity to ask for credit for his jail time prior to sentencing, or that any objection was ever offered to the pronouncement of the sentence without crediting the pretrial jail time against the term imposed by the jury, circuit court properly denied the credit for time spent in pretrial incarceration. Coleman v. State, 257 Ark. 538, 518 S.W.2d 487 (1975).

Even if defendant were otherwise entitled to credit for the time he was held in custody, there is simply no way to credit this time against a life sentence; life less five years is a period not susceptible of prognostication. Campbell v. State, 265 Ark. 77, 576 S.W.2d 938 (1979).

A prisoner may receive jail time credit for time he has spent at his residence with his liberties restricted. Garrett v. McDonagh, 303 Ark. 348, 796 S.W.2d 582 (1990).

Discretion of Court.

It was not a violation of U.S. Const., Amend. 14, to deny credit for presentence confinement where no indigency was alleged and where accused was held on presumption of guilt for a nonbailable offense. Smith v. State, 256 Ark. 425, 508 S.W.2d 54 (1974).

Court has discretion on whether to count time spent by defendant in county jail awaiting trial and it did not abuse that discretion by refusing to count that time unless defendant showed that he failed to make bond because of indigency. Charles v. State, 256 Ark. 690, 510 S.W.2d 68 (1974).

This section does not direct or permit a judge to make the sentence effective retroactively to a pretrial incarceration. West v. State, 257 Ark. 582, 518 S.W.2d 497 (1975).

Where defendant was not given the right of allocution, the Arkansas Supreme Court could not indulge in the presumption that the trial court did its duty according to law or exercised its discretion pursuant to this section. Smith v. State, 257 Ark. 781, 520 S.W.2d 301 (1975).

This section vests discretion in the trial judge to decide whether credit for “jail time” should be given. Barnes v. State, 258 Ark. 565, 528 S.W.2d 370 (1975).

Cited: Standridge v. State, 290 Ark. 150, 717 S.W.2d 795 (1986).

16-93-611. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning Class Y felonies, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 96. The section was derived from Acts 1995, No. 1326, § 1; 1997, No. 945, § 1; 1997, No. 1197, § 2; 1999, No. 717, § 1; 1999, No. 1268, § 4; 1999, No. 1337, § 1; 2005, No. 1034, § 1; 2009, No. 363, § 1.

For current law, see § 16-93-618.

16-93-612. Parole eligibility — Date of offense.

  1. A person's parole eligibility shall be determined by the laws in effect at the time of the offense for which he or she is sentenced to the Division of Correction.
  2. For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed before April 1, 1977, § 16-93-601 governs that person's parole eligibility.
  3. For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed between April 1, 1977, and April 1, 1983, § 16-93-604 governs that person's parole eligibility.
  4. For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed on or after April 1, 1983, but before January 1, 1994, § 16-93-607 governs that person's parole eligibility.
  5. For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed on or after January 1, 1994, § 16-93-614 governs that person's parole eligibility, unless otherwise noted and except:
    1. If the felony is murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, kidnapping, if a Class Y felony, § 5-11-102(b)(1), aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103, rape, § 5-14-103, or causing a catastrophe, § 5-38-202(a), and the offense occurred after July 28, 1995, § 16-93-618 governs that person's parole eligibility;
    2. If the felony is manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the former § 5-64-401, or possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, the former § 5-64-403(c)(5), and the offense occurred after April 9, 1999, § 16-93-618 governs that person's parole eligibility;
    3. If the felony is battery in the second degree, § 5-13-202, aggravated assault, § 5-13-204, terroristic threatening, § 5-13-301, domestic battering in the second degree, § 5-26-304, or residential burglary, § 5-39-201(a), and the offense occurred on or after April 1, 2015, § 16-93-620 governs that person's parole eligibility; or
    4. If the felony was committed by a person who was a minor at the time of the offense, he or she was committed to the Department of Correction, or to the division, and the offense occurred before, on, or after March 20, 2017, § 16-93-621 governs that person's parole eligibility.
  6. For an offender serving a sentence for a felony committed on or after January 1, 1994, § 16-93-615 governs that person's parole eligibility procedures.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 97; 2015, No. 895, § 24; 2017, No. 539, § 9; 2019, No. 910, §§ 912, 913.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017’.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 2, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a)(1) The General Assembly acknowledges and recognizes that minors are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences must be taken into account when minors are sentenced for adult crimes.

“(2) As the United States Supreme Court quoted in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), ‘only a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior,’ and ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,’ including ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’.

“(3) Minors are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers, and they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.

“(4) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized through its cases in Miller, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes’.

“(5) Youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.

“(b) In the wake of these United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging juvenile brain and behavioral development science, several states, including Texas, Utah, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Alaska, West Virginia, Colorado, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachussets, and the District of Columbia, have eliminated the sentence of life without parole for minors.

“(c) It is the intent of the General Assembly to eliminate life without parole as a sentencing option for minors and to create more age-appropriate sentencing standards in compliance with the United States Constitution for minors who commit serious crimes.”

Amendments. The 2015 amendment added (e)(3).

The 2017 amendment added (e)(4).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a); and inserted “or to the Division of Correction” in (e)(4).

16-93-613. Parole eligibility — Class Y, Class A, or Class B felonies.

  1. A person who commits a Class Y felony, Class A felony, or Class B felony, except those drug offenses addressed in § 16-93-618 or those Class Y felonies addressed in § 16-93-614 or § 16-93-618, and who shall be convicted and incarcerated for that felony, shall be eligible for release on parole as follows:
    1. An inmate under sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole is not eligible for release on parole but may be pardoned or have his or her sentence commuted by the Governor, as provided by law; and
      1. An inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for release on parole unless the sentence is commuted to a term of years by executive clemency.
      2. Upon commutation, the inmate is eligible for release on parole as provided in this subchapter.
  2. For parole eligibility purposes, consecutive sentences by one (1) or more courts or for one (1) or more counts are to be considered as a single commitment reflecting the cumulative sentence to be served.
  3. Except as provided for under § 16-93-621, for an offense committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, a person who was a minor at the time of committing an offense listed under subsection (a) of this section is eligible for release on parole under this section.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 98; 2017, No. 539, § 10; 2017, No. 1029, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017’.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 2, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a)(1) The General Assembly acknowledges and recognizes that minors are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences must be taken into account when minors are sentenced for adult crimes.

“(2) As the United States Supreme Court quoted in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), ‘only a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior,’ and ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,’ including ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’.

“(3) Minors are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers, and they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.

“(4) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized through its cases in Miller, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes’.

“(5) Youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.

“(b) In the wake of these United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging juvenile brain and behavioral development science, several states, including Texas, Utah, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Alaska, West Virginia, Colorado, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachussets, and the District of Columbia, have eliminated the sentence of life without parole for minors.

“(c) It is the intent of the General Assembly to eliminate life without parole as a sentencing option for minors and to create more age-appropriate sentencing standards in compliance with the United States Constitution for minors who commit serious crimes.”

Amendments. The 2017 amendment by No. 539 added (c).

The 2017 amendment by No. 1029 substituted “§ 16-93-621” for “§ 16-93-619” in (c).

16-93-614. Parole eligibility — Offenses committed after January 1, 1994 — Definition.

  1. As used in this section and §§ 16-93-615 — 16-93-617, “felonies” means those crimes classified as Class Y felonies, Class A felonies, Class B felonies, Class C felonies, Class D felonies, or unclassified felonies by the laws of this state.
    1. A person who committed a felony before January 1, 1994, and who was convicted and incarcerated for that felony shall be eligible for release on parole under this section and §§ 16-93-615 — 16-93-617 in accordance with the parole eligibility law in effect at the time the crime was committed.
    2. A person who committed a target offense under the Community Punishment Act, § 16-93-1201 et seq., before January 1, 1994, and who has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration may waive the right to be released under the parole eligibility law in effect at the time the crime was committed and shall become eligible for judicial transfer pursuant to the transfer provisions provided in subdivision (c)(2) of this section.
    3. A person who has committed a felony who is within a target group as currently defined under § 16-93-1202(10) and who is released on parole shall be eligible, pursuant to rules established by the Parole Board, for commitment to a community correction facility if he or she is found to be in violation of any of his or her parole conditions, unless the parole violation constitutes a nontarget felony offense.
  2. A person who commits a felony on or after January 1, 1994, and who shall be convicted and incarcerated for that felony shall be eligible for transfer to community correction as follows:
      1. An inmate under sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole shall not be eligible for transfer, but may be pardoned or have his or her sentence commuted by the Governor as provided by law.
      2. An inmate sentenced to life imprisonment shall not be eligible for transfer unless his or her sentence is commuted to a term of years by executive clemency.
      3. Upon commutation, an inmate shall be eligible for transfer as provided in this section;
        1. (a) An offender convicted of a target offense under the Community Correction Act, § 16-93-1201 et seq., may be committed to the Division of Correction and judicially transferred to the Division of Community Correction by specific provision in the commitment that the trial court order such a transfer.
        2. A copy of the commitment shall be forwarded immediately to the Division of Correction and to the Division of Community Correction.
        3. In the event that an offender is sentenced to the Division of Correction without judicial transfer on one (1) sentence and concurrently sentenced to the Division of Correction with judicial transfer on another sentence, the offender shall remain in the Division of Correction, and the sentence with judicial transfer may be discharged in the same manner as that of an offender transferred back to the Division of Correction.
      1. The Division of Community Correction shall take over supervision of the offender in accordance with the order of the court.
      2. The Division of Community Correction shall provide for the appropriate disposition of the offender as expeditiously as practicable under rules developed by the Board of Corrections.
      3. The offender shall not be transported to the Division of Correction on the initial placement in a Division of Community Correction facility pursuant to a judicial transfer.
      4. An offender who is transferred back to the Division of Correction for disciplinary reasons may be considered for transfer to Division of Community Correction supervision after earning good-time credit equal to one-half (½) of the remainder of his or her sentence.
      5. An offender who is sentenced after July 31, 2007, and who is transferred back to the Division of Correction for administrative reasons is eligible for transfer to Division of Community Correction supervision in the same manner as an offender who is sentenced to the Division of Correction without a judicial transfer to the Division of Community Correction; and
      1. Every other classified or unclassified felon who is incarcerated therefor shall be eligible for transfer to community correction after having served one-third (1/3) or one-half (½), with credit for meritorious good time, of his or her sentence depending on the seriousness determination made by the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, or one-half (½), with credit for meritorious good time, of the time to which his or her sentence is commuted by executive clemency.
      2. For example, a six-year sentence with optimal meritorious good-time credits will make the offender eligible for transfer in one (1) year if he or she is required to serve one-third (1/3) of his or her sentence, or one and one-half (1½) years if he or she is required to serve one-half (½) of his or her sentence.
  3. Except as provided for under § 16-93-621, for an offense committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, a person who was a minor at the time of committing an offense listed under subsection (c) of this section is eligible for release on parole under this section.

(b) No other offender is eligible for transfer to a Division of Community Correction facility.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 99; 2017, No. 539, § 11; 2017, No. 1029, § 2; 2019, No. 315, §§ 1309, 1310; 2019, No. 910, § 914.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017’.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 2, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a)(1) The General Assembly acknowledges and recognizes that minors are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences must be taken into account when minors are sentenced for adult crimes.

“(2) As the United States Supreme Court quoted in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), ‘only a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior,’ and ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,’ including ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’.

“(3) Minors are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers, and they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.

“(4) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized through its cases in Miller, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes’.

“(5) Youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.

“(b) In the wake of these United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging juvenile brain and behavioral development science, several states, including Texas, Utah, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Alaska, West Virginia, Colorado, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachussets, and the District of Columbia, have eliminated the sentence of life without parole for minors.

“(c) It is the intent of the General Assembly to eliminate life without parole as a sentencing option for minors and to create more age-appropriate sentencing standards in compliance with the United States Constitution for minors who commit serious crimes.”

Amendments. The 2017 amendment by No. 539 added (d).

The 2017 amendment by No. 1029 substituted “§ 16-93-621” for “§ 16-93-619” in (d).

The 2019 amendment by No. 315 deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (b)(3) and (c)(2)(C).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout (c)(2).

16-93-615. Parole eligibility procedures — Offenses committed after January 1, 1994.

      1. An inmate under sentence for any felony, except those listed in subsection (b) of this section, shall be transferred from the Department of Correction to the Department of Community Correction under this section and §§ 16-93-614, 16-93-616, and 16-93-617, subject to rules promulgated by the Board of Corrections or the Parole Board and conditions adopted by the Parole Board.
      2. The determination under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section shall be made by reviewing information such as the result of the risk-needs assessment to inform the decision of whether to release a person on parole by quantifying that person's risk to reoffend, and if parole is granted, this information shall be used to set conditions for supervision.
      3. The Parole Board shall begin transfer release proceedings or a preliminary review under this subchapter no later than six (6) months before a person's transfer eligibility date, and the Parole Board shall authorize jacket review procedures no later than six (6) months before a person's transfer eligibility at all institutions holding parole-eligible inmates to prepare parole applications.
      4. This review may be conducted without a hearing when the inmate has not received a major disciplinary report against him or her that resulted in the loss of good time, there has not been a request by a victim to have input on transfer conditions, and there is no indication in the risk-needs assessment review that special conditions need to be placed on the inmate.
      1. When one (1) or more of the circumstances in subdivision (a)(1) of this section are present, the Parole Board shall conduct a hearing to determine the appropriateness of the inmate for transfer.
      2. The Parole Board has two (2) options:
        1. To transfer the individual to the Department of Community Correction accompanied by notice of conditions of the transfer, including without limitation:
          1. Supervision levels;
          2. Economic fee sanction;
          3. Treatment program;
          4. Programming requirements; and
          5. Facility placement when appropriate; or
        2. To deny transfer based on a set of established criteria and to accompany the denial with a prescribed course of action to be undertaken by the inmate to rectify the Parole Board's concerns.
      3. Upon completion of the course of action determined by the Parole Board and after final review of the inmate's file to ensure successful completion, the Parole Board shall authorize the inmate's transfer to the Department of Community Correction under this section and §§ 16-93-614, 16-93-616, and 16-93-617, in accordance with administrative policies and procedures governing the transfer and subject to conditions attached to the transfer.
    1. Should an inmate fail to fulfill the course of action outlined by the Parole Board to facilitate transfer to community correction, it shall be the responsibility of the inmate to petition the Parole Board for rehearing.
      1. The Parole Board shall conduct open meetings and shall make public its findings for each eligible candidate for parole.
        1. Open meetings held under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section may be conducted through video-conference technology if the person is housed at that time in a county jail and if the technology is available.
        2. Open meetings utilizing video-conference technology shall be conducted in public.
    2. Inmate interviews and related deliberations may be closed to the public.
    1. An inmate under sentence for one (1) of the following felonies is eligible for discretionary transfer to the Department of Community Correction by the Parole Board after having served one-third (1/3) or one-half (½) of his or her sentence, with credit for meritorious good time, depending on the seriousness determination made by the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, or one-half (½) of the time to which his or her sentence is commuted by executive clemency, with credit for meritorious good time:
      1. Unless the offense is listed under § 16-93-612(e)(1), the following offenses:
        1. Capital murder, § 5-10-101, or attempted capital murder;
        2. Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, or attempted murder in the first degree;
        3. Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103;
        4. Manslaughter, § 5-10-104;
        5. Negligent homicide, § 5-10-105; or
        6. An offense under § 5-54-201 et seq.;
      2. Unless the offense is listed under § 16-93-612(e)(1), the following Class Y felonies:
        1. Kidnapping, § 5-11-102;
        2. Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103, or attempted aggravated robbery;
        3. Terroristic act, § 5-13-310;
        4. Causing a catastrophe, § 5-38-202(a);
        5. Arson, § 5-38-301;
        6. Aggravated residential burglary, § 5-39-204; or
        7. Unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, § 5-74-107;
      3. Unless the offense is listed under § 16-93-612(e)(1), an offense for which the inmate is required upon release to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.;
      4. Battery in the first degree, § 5-13-201;
      5. Domestic battering in the first degree, § 5-26-303;
      6. Engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, § 5-64-405; or
      7. Simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, § 5-74-106.
    2. The transfer of an offender convicted of an offense listed in subdivision (b)(1) of this section is not automatic.
      1. Review of an inmate convicted of the enumerated offenses in subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be based upon policies and procedures adopted by the Parole Board for the review, and the Parole Board shall conduct a risk-needs assessment review.
      2. The policies and procedures shall include a provision for notification of the victim or victims that a hearing shall be held and records kept of the proceedings and that there be a listing of the criteria upon which a denial may be based.
    3. Any transfer of an offender specified in this subsection shall be issued upon an order, duly adopted, of the Parole Board in accordance with such policies and procedures.
    4. After the Parole Board has fully considered and denied the transfer of an offender sentenced for committing an offense listed in subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the Parole Board may delay any reconsideration of the transfer for a maximum period of two (2) years.
    5. Notification of the court, prosecutor, county sheriff, and the victim or the victim's next of kin for a person convicted of an offense listed in subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall follow the procedures set forth below:
        1. Before the Parole Board shall grant any transfer, the Parole Board shall solicit the written or oral recommendations of the committing court, the prosecuting attorney, and the county sheriff of the county from which the inmate was committed.
        2. If the person whose transfer is being considered by the Parole Board was convicted of one (1) of the offenses enumerated in subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the Parole Board shall also notify the victim of the crime or the victim's next of kin of the transfer hearing and shall solicit written or oral recommendations of the victim or his or her next of kin regarding the granting of the transfer unless the prosecuting attorney has notified the Parole Board at the time of commitment of the prisoner that the victim or his or her next of kin does not want to be notified of future transfer hearings.
        3. The recommendations shall not be binding upon the Parole Board in the granting of any transfer but shall be maintained in the inmate's file.
        4. When soliciting recommendations from a victim of a crime, the Parole Board shall notify the victim or his or her next of kin of the date, time, and place of the transfer hearing;
        1. The Parole Board shall not schedule transfer hearings at which victims or relatives of victims of crimes are invited to appear at a facility wherein inmates are housed other than the Central Administration Building of the Department of Correction at Pine Bluff.
        2. Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting the Parole Board from conducting transfer hearings in two (2) sessions, one (1) at the place of the inmate's incarceration for interviews with the inmate, the inmate's witnesses, and correctional personnel, and the second session for victims and relatives of victims as set out in subdivision (b)(6)(B)(i) of this section;
        1. At the time that any person eligible under subdivision (c)(1) of this section is transferred by the Parole Board, the Department of Community Correction shall give written notice of the granting of the transfer to the county sheriff, the committing court, and the chief of police of each city of the first class of the county from which the person was sentenced.
        2. If the person is transferred to a county other than that from which he or she was committed, the Parole Board shall give notice to the chief of police or marshal of the city to which he or she is transferred, to the chief of police of each city of the first class and the county sheriff of the county to which he or she is transferred, and to the county sheriff of the county from which the person was committed; and
        1. It shall be the responsibility of the prosecuting attorney of the county from which the inmate was committed to notify the Parole Board at the time of commitment of the desire of the victim or his or her next of kin to be notified of any future transfer hearings and to forward to the Parole Board the last known address and telephone number of the victim or his or her next of kin.
        2. It shall be the responsibility of the victim or his or her next of kin to notify the Parole Board of any change in address or telephone number.
        3. It shall be the responsibility of the victim or his or her next of kin to notify the Parole Board after the date of commitment of any change in regard to the desire to be notified of any future transfer hearings.
    1. In all other felonies, before the Parole Board sets conditions for transfer of an inmate to community correction, a victim, or his or her next of kin in cases in which the victim is unable to express his or her wishes, who has expressed the wish to be consulted by the Parole Board shall be notified of the date, time, and place of the transfer hearing.
      1. A victim or his or her next of kin who wishes to be consulted by the Parole Board shall inform the Parole Board in writing at the time of sentencing.
      2. A victim or his or her next of kin who does not so inform the Parole Board shall not be notified by the Parole Board.
      1. Victim input to the Parole Board shall be limited to oral or written recommendations on conditions relevant to the offender under review for transfer.
      2. The recommendations shall not be binding on the Parole Board, but shall be given due consideration within the resources available for transfer.
    1. The Parole Board shall approve a set of conditions that shall be applicable to all inmates transferred from the Department of Correction to the Department of Community Correction.
    2. The set of conditions is subject to periodic review and revision as the Parole Board deems necessary.
    1. The course of action required by the Parole Board shall not be outside the current resources of the Department of Correction nor the conditions set be outside the current resources of the Department of Community Correction.
    2. However, the Department of Correction and Department of Community Correction shall strive to accommodate the actions required by the Board of Corrections or the Parole Board to the best of their abilities.
  1. Transfer is not an award of clemency, and it shall not be considered as a reduction of sentence or a pardon.
  2. Every inmate while on transfer status shall remain in the legal custody of the Department of Correction under the supervision of the Department of Community Correction and subject to the orders of the Parole Board.
  3. An inmate who is sentenced under the provisions of § 5-4-501(c) or § 5-4-501(d) for a serious violent felony or a felony involving violence may be considered eligible for parole or for community correction transfer upon reaching regular parole or transfer eligibility, but only after reaching a minimum age of fifty-five (55) years.
  4. Decisions on parole release, courses of action applicable prior to transfer, and transfer conditions to be set by the Parole Board shall be based on a reasoned and rational plan developed in conjunction with an accepted risk-needs assessment tool such that each decision is defensible based on preestablished criteria.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 100; 2013, No. 136, § 1; 2013, No. 485, § 1; 2015, No. 609 §§ 2, 3; 2015, No. 895, § 25; 2015, No. 1152, § 16.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Pursuant to § 1-2-207, subdivision (b)(1) of this section is set out as amended by Acts 2013, No. 485, § 1. Subdivision (b)(1) of this section was also amended by Acts 2013, No. 136, § 1, to read as follows:

“(b)(1) An inmate under sentence for one (1) of the following felonies is eligible for discretionary transfer to the Department of Community Correction by the Parole Board after having served one-third (1/3) or one-half (½) of his or her sentence, with credit for meritorious good time, depending on the seriousness determination made by the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, or one-half (½) of the time to which his or her sentence is commuted by executive clemency, with credit for meritorious good time:

“(A) Unless the offense is listed under § 16-93-612(e)(1), the following homicide offenses:

“(i) Capital murder, § 5-10-101;

“(ii) Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;

“(iii) Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103;

“(iv) Manslaughter, § 5-10-104; or

“(v) Negligent homicide, § 5-10-105;

“(B) An offense for which the inmate is required upon release to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq., unless the offense is listed under § 16-93-612(e)(1);

“(C) Battery in the first degree, § 5-13-201;

“(D) Domestic battering in the first degree, § 5-26-303;

“(E) Unless the offense is listed under § 16-93-612(e)(1), the following Class Y felonies:

“(i) Kidnapping, § 5-11-102;

“(ii) Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103; or

“(iii) Causing a catastrophe, § 5-38-202(a);

“(F) Engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, § 5-64-405; or

“(G) Simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, § 5-74-106.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment by No. 485 rewrote (b)(1).

The 2015 amendment by No. 609, in (a)(1)(A), substituted “Board of Corrections or the Parole Board and conditions adopted” for “Board of Corrections and conditions set”; and in (e)(2), inserted “or the Parole Board” and substituted “abilities” for “ability” at the end of the sentence.

The 2015 amendment by No. 895 inserted “and related deliberations” in (a)(5).

The 2015 amendment by No. 1152 deleted “homicide” preceding “offenses” in the introductory language of (b)(1)(A).

Case Notes

Retroactive Application.

Circuit court erred in denying an inmate's in forma pauperis petition because he stated sufficient non-conclusory facts to assert a colorable claim for judicial review of an alleged violation of the ex post-facto prohibition; the inmate specifically alleged that his term of incarceration was extended by two years through the retroactive application of the current parole-eligibility statute, § 16-93-615, as compared to the former statute that was in effect when he committed his crime. Ruiz v. Felts, 2017 Ark. 85, 512 S.W.3d 626 (2017).

16-93-616. Parole eligibility procedures — Offenses committed after January 1, 1994 — Computation of sentence.

    1. Time served for a sentence shall be deemed to begin on the day sentence is imposed, not on the day a prisoner is received by the Division of Correction.
    2. Time served shall continue only during the time in which an individual is actually confined in a county jail or other local place of lawful confinement or while under the custody and supervision of the division.
    3. Once sentenced to the division, the division shall retain legal custody of the inmate for the duration of the original sentence.
  1. The sentencing judge shall direct, when he or she imposes sentence, that time already served by the defendant in jail or other place of detention shall be credited against the sentence.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 101; 2019, No. 910, § 915.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a)(1); and substituted “division” for “department” in (a)(2) and twice in (a)(3).

16-93-617. Parole eligibility procedures — Offenses committed after January 1, 1994 — Revocation of transfer.

  1. In the event an offender transferred under this section, §§ 16-93-614 — 16-93-616, or § 16-93-618 violates the terms or conditions of his or her transfer, a hearing shall follow all applicable legal requirements and shall be subject to any additional policies and rules set by the Parole Board.
    1. In the event an offender transferred under this section and §§ 16-93-614 — 16-93-616, or § 16-93-618 is found to be or becomes ineligible for transfer into a Division of Community Correction facility, he or she shall be transported to the Division of Correction to serve the remainder of his or her sentence.
    2. Notice of the ineligibility and the reasons therefor shall be provided to the offender, and a hearing may be requested before the board if the offender contests the factual basis of the ineligibility. Otherwise, the board may administratively approve the transfer to the Division of Correction.
  2. An offender who is judicially transferred to a Division of Community Correction facility and subsequently transferred back to the Division of Correction by the board for disciplinary or administrative reasons may not become eligible for any further transfer under § 16-93-614(c)(2)(E) and (F).

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 102; 2019, No. 315, § 1311; 2019, No. 910, § 916.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by No. 315 substituted “policies and rules” for “policies, rules, and regulations” in (a).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” and “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section.

16-93-618. Parole eligibility — Certain Class Y felony offenses and certain methamphetamine offenses — Seventy-percent crimes.

    1. Notwithstanding any law allowing the award of meritorious good time or any other law to the contrary, a person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to subdivisions (a)(1)(A)-(I) of this section shall not be eligible for parole or community correction transfer, except as provided in subdivision (a)(3) or subsection (c) of this section, until the person serves seventy percent (70%) of the term of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced, including a sentence prescribed under § 5-4-501:
      1. Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;
      2. Kidnapping, Class Y felony, § 5-11-102;
      3. Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;
      4. Rape, § 5-14-103;
      5. Trafficking of persons, Class Y felony, § 5-18-103;
      6. Causing a catastrophe, § 5-38-202(a);
      7. Manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the former § 5-64-401;
      8. Trafficking methamphetamine, § 5-64-440(b)(1); or
      9. Possession of drug paraphernalia with the purpose to manufacture methamphetamine, former § 5-64-403(c)(5).
      1. The seventy-percent provision of subdivision (a)(1) of this section has no application to any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to kidnapping, Class B felony, § 5-11-102, regardless of the date of the offense.
      2. The provisions of this section shall apply retroactively to all persons presently serving a sentence for kidnapping, Class B felony, § 5-11-102.
        1. Regardless of the date of the offense, the seventy-percent provision under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall include credit for the award of meritorious good time under § 12-29-201 to any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to:
          1. Manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or former § 5-64-401;
          2. Trafficking methamphetamine, § 5-64-440(b)(1); or
          3. Possession of drug paraphernalia with the purpose to manufacture methamphetamine, former § 5-64-403(c)(5).
        2. Regardless of the date of the offense and unless the person is sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, the seventy-percent provision under subdivision (a)(1) of this section may include credit for the award of meritorious good time under § 12-29-202 to any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to:
          1. Manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the former § 5-64-401;
          2. Trafficking methamphetamine, § 5-64-440(b)(1); or
          3. Possession of drug paraphernalia with the purpose to manufacture methamphetamine, former § 5-64-403(c)(5).
      1. In no event shall the time served by any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or former § 5-64-401, trafficking methamphetamine, § 5-64-440(b)(1), or possession of drug paraphernalia with the purpose to manufacture methamphetamine, § 5-64-443(b), be reduced to less than fifty percent (50%) of the person's original sentence.
      1. When any person sentenced under subdivision (a)(3) of this section becomes eligible for parole, the Division of Community Correction shall send a notice of the parole hearing to the prosecuting attorney of the judicial district or districts in which the person was found guilty or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to an offense listed in subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
      2. The notice shall contain the following language in 12-point capital letters, bold type: “INMATE SENTENCED UNDER ARKANSAS CODE § 16-93-618”.
  1. A jury may be instructed under § 16-97-103 regarding the awarding of meritorious good time under subdivision (a)(3) of this section.
  2. The sentencing judge, in his or her discretion, may waive subsection (a) of this section under the following circumstances:
    1. The defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense;
    2. The juvenile was merely an accomplice to the offense; and
    3. The offense occurred on or after July 28, 1995.
  3. The awarding of meritorious good time under § 12-29-201 or § 12-29-202 does not apply to persons sentenced under subdivisions (a)(1)(A)-(E) of this section.
  4. A person who commits the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia with the purpose to manufacture methamphetamine, § 5-64-443(b), after July 27, 2011, shall not be subject to the provisions of this section.
  5. Except as provided for under § 16-93-621, for an offense committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, a person who was a minor at the time of committing an offense listed under subsection (a) of this section is eligible for release on parole under this section.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 103; 2013, No. 132, § 7; 2013, No. 133, § 7; 2013, No. 1335, § 4; 2017, No. 539, § 12; 2017, No. 1029, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2013, No. 133, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be cited as the ‘Arkansas Human Trafficking Act of 2013’.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017’.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 2, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a)(1) The General Assembly acknowledges and recognizes that minors are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences must be taken into account when minors are sentenced for adult crimes.

“(2) As the United States Supreme Court quoted in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), ‘only a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior,’ and ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,’ including ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’.

“(3) Minors are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers, and they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.

“(4) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized through its cases in Miller, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes’.

“(5) Youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.

“(b) In the wake of these United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging juvenile brain and behavioral development science, several states, including Texas, Utah, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Alaska, West Virginia, Colorado, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachussets, and the District of Columbia, have eliminated the sentence of life without parole for minors.

“(c) It is the intent of the General Assembly to eliminate life without parole as a sentencing option for minors and to create more age-appropriate sentencing standards in compliance with the United States Constitution for minors who commit serious crimes.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment by identical acts Nos. 132 and 133, in (a)(1), substituted “(a)(1)(A)-(I)” for “(a)(1)(A)-(H)” and “community correction” for “community punishment”; and inserted present (a)(1)(E) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

The 2013 amendment by No. 1335, in (d), substituted “does not apply” for “shall not be applicable” and “(a)(1)(A)-(E)” for “(a)(1)(A)-(H)”.

The 2017 amendment by No. 539 added (f).

The 2017 amendment by No. 1029 substituted “§ 16-93-621” for “§ 16-93-619” in (f).

16-93-619. Rulemaking authority.

The Parole Board may adopt rules to implement, administer, and enforce this subchapter.

History. Acts 2015, No. 609, § 4.

16-93-620. Parole eligibility procedures — Certain offenses committed on or after April 1, 2015.

  1. An inmate sentenced for one (1) of the following felonies on or after April 1, 2015, is eligible for discretionary transfer to the Department of Community Correction by the Parole Board after having served one-third (1/3) or one-half (½) of his or her sentence, with credit for meritorious good time, depending on the seriousness determination made by the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, or one-half (½) of the time to which his or her sentence is commuted:
    1. Battery in the second degree, § 5-13-202;
    2. Aggravated assault, § 5-13-204;
    3. Terroristic threatening, § 5-13-301;
    4. Domestic battering in the second degree, § 5-26-304; or
    5. Residential burglary, § 5-39-201.
  2. The transfer of an inmate convicted of an offense listed in this section is not automatic.
  3. All other provisions governing the procedures regarding the granting and administration of parole for persons convicted of an offense listed under subsection (a) of this section shall be governed by §§ 16-93-615 — 16-93-617.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 26.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

16-93-621. Parole eligibility — A person who was a minor at the time of committing an offense that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017.

    1. A minor who was convicted and sentenced to the Department of Correction or Division of Correction for an offense committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age and in which the death of another person did not occur is eligible for release on parole no later than after twenty (20) years of incarceration, including any applicable sentencing enhancements, and including an instance in which multiple sentences are to be served consecutively or concurrently, unless by law the minor is eligible for earlier parole eligibility.
      1. A minor who was convicted and sentenced to the department or the division for an offense committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age, in which the death of another person occurred, and that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, is eligible for release on parole no later than after twenty-five (25) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102, or no later than after thirty (30) years of incarceration if he or she was convicted of capital murder, § 5-10-101, including any applicable sentencing enhancements, unless by law the minor is eligible for earlier parole eligibility.
      2. Subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section applies retroactively to a minor whose offense was committed before he or she was eighteen (18) years of age, including minors serving sentences of life, regardless of the original sentences that were imposed.
    2. Credit for meritorious good time shall not be applied to calculations of time served under this subsection for minors convicted and sentenced for capital murder, § 5-10-101(c), or when a life sentence is imposed for murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102.
    3. The calculation of the time periods under this subsection shall include any applicable sentence enhancements to which the minor was sentenced that accompany the sentence for the underlying offense.
    1. The Parole Board shall ensure that a hearing to consider the parole eligibility of a person who was a minor at the time of the offense that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, takes into account how a minor offender is different from an adult offender and provides a person who was a minor at the time of the offense that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, with a meaningful opportunity to be released on parole based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
    2. During a parole eligibility hearing involving a person who was a minor at the time of the offense that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017, the board shall take into consideration in addition to other factors required by law to be considered by the board:
      1. The diminished culpability of minors as compared to that of adults;
      2. The hallmark features of youth;
      3. Subsequent growth and increased maturity of the person during incarceration;
      4. Age of the person at the time of the offense;
      5. Immaturity of the person at the time of the offense;
      6. The extent of the person's role in the offense and whether and to what extent an adult was involved in the offense;
      7. The person's family and community circumstances at the time of the offense, including any history of abuse, trauma, and involvement in the child welfare system;
      8. The person's participation in available rehabilitative and educational programs while in prison, if those programs have been made available, or use of self-study for self-improvement;
      9. The results of comprehensive mental health evaluations conducted by an adolescent mental health professional licensed in the state at the time of sentencing and at the time the person becomes eligible for parole under this section; and
      10. Other factors the board deems relevant.
    3. A person eligible for parole under this section may have an attorney present to represent him or her at the parole eligibility hearing.
      1. The board shall notify a victim of the crime before the board reviews parole eligibility under this section for an inmate convicted of the crime and provide information regarding victim input meetings, as well as state and national victim resource information.
      2. If the victim is incapacitated or deceased, the notice under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section shall be given to the victim's family.
      3. If the victim is less than eighteen (18) years of age, the notice under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section shall be given to the victim's parent or guardian.
    1. Victim notification under this subsection shall include:
      1. The location, date, and time of parole review; and
      2. The name and phone number of the individual to contact for additional information.

History. Acts 2017, No. 539, § 13; 2019, No. 910, § 917.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2017, No. 539, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017’.”

Acts 2017, No. 539, § 2, provided: “Legislative intent.

“(a)(1) The General Assembly acknowledges and recognizes that minors are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences must be taken into account when minors are sentenced for adult crimes.

“(2) As the United States Supreme Court quoted in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), ‘only a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ who engage in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior,’ and ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,’ including ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’.

“(3) Minors are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers, and they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.

“(4) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized through its cases in Miller, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes’.

“(5) Youthfulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.

“(b) In the wake of these United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging juvenile brain and behavioral development science, several states, including Texas, Utah, South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Alaska, West Virginia, Colorado, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Vermont, Massachussets, and the District of Columbia, have eliminated the sentence of life without parole for minors.

“(c) It is the intent of the General Assembly to eliminate life without parole as a sentencing option for minors and to create more age-appropriate sentencing standards in compliance with the United States Constitution for minors who commit serious crimes.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “or Division of Correction” in (a)(1); and substituted “Department of Correction or Division of Correction” for “department” in (a)(2)(A).

Case Notes

Applicability.

Parole-eligibility provisions in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, which were enacted by the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA), apply only to those juvenile offenders who are serving a sentence for either capital murder or first-degree murder. Therefore, the provisions did not apply to defendant, whose mandatory sentence of life without parole had been vacated in 2016 under Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, and his case remanded for resentencing. Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179 (2018).

In accord with Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179. Robinson v. State, 2018 Ark. 353, 563 S.W.3d 530 (2018).

Appeal by State.

The limited number of individuals affected by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), coupled with the unsettled state of the law regarding sentencing of juvenile offenders, was reason enough to find that the State had not demonstrated that its appeal involved the correct and uniform administration of the law or was a proper State appeal. State v. Lasley, 2017 Ark. 311, 530 S.W.3d 350 (2017).

Although the State argued that a declaration of error was needed to ensure correctness and uniformity across the state on the use of jury instructions in similar juvenile resentencing cases, the State's appeal was dismissed under Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 3 as it did not present an issue with “widespread ramifications” concerning interpretation of the criminal rules. The Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017, § 16-93-621, provided for parole for offenders who were juveniles when they committed capital murder. State v. Lasley, 2017 Ark. 311, 530 S.W.3d 350 (2017).

Juveniles Sentenced to Life Imprisonment.

Circuit court properly denied defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus because the sentence of life imprisonment that was imposed after he entered a negotiated plea of guilty to first-degree murder when he was 15 years old did not violate the Eighth Amendment, as 2017 statutory changes created a possibility of parole. Lohbauer v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 26 (2018).

16-93-622. Parole discharge for offenders who are minors — Reinstatement of rights.

  1. The Parole Board may discharge a person from parole if:
    1. The person:
      1. Was released on parole under § 16-93-621 for having committed an offense as a minor; and
      2. Has served at least five (5) years on parole without a violation; and
    2. The prosecuting attorney in the county where the person was originally convicted has consented to the discharge of the person from parole.
  2. Unless otherwise provided by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 51, a person who has been discharged from parole under subsection (a) of this section shall have his or her constitutional right to vote restored.

History. Acts 2019, No. 821, § 2.

Subchapter 7 — Parole

Effective Dates. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 46: Mar. 1, 1968. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds that the penal system of the State of Arkansas is in need of immediate reform, in order to better effectuate the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crime and to make possible their return as useful members of the community, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to establish a Department of Correction to effectuate such rehabilitation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after March 1, 1968.”

Acts 1971, No. 33, § 4: Feb. 3, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to provide for proper law enforcement and for proper supervision of individuals paroled from the State Penitentiary, it is essential that the appropriate law enforcement officials of each county to which a person is paroled be given notice of such parole by the Parole Board, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to require that said notice be given and to protect the public peace, health and safety. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 735, § 6: Apr. 3, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventieth General Assembly that the Board of Pardons and Paroles lack the power to issue oaths and subpoena witnesses to testify or appear before the Board thereby preventing them from carrying out their assigned responsibilities with respect to parole revocation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 8, § 3: Feb. 1, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the State Parole Board should not grant paroles to convicted felons prior to receiving recommendations from the committing court, prosecuting attorney, the sheriff and the victims of the crime or their next of kin; that present law does not require such procedure to be utilized by the Parole Board except in cases of capital murder, Class A felonies or Class B felonies; that this Act is necessary to expand the present law to include all felons, and that there is no justification in delaying the effective date of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 525, § 4: Mar. 17, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that parole hearings are now held, at least in some instances, at the State Prison; that this results in undue hardship and intimidation of the victims and relatives of victims who appear at such parole hearings; that this Act would prohibit parole hearings from being held at the State Prison and is immediately necessary to protect the victims of crime. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 771, § 3: Mar. 24, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Section 31 of Act 50 of 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.) (Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2810) needs immediate amending in order to comply with guidelines and procedures set out by the United States Supreme Court for the return of parole violators. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 269, § 4: Mar. 6, 1985; 1985, No. 917, § 4: Apr. 15, 1985. Emergency clauses provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that while present law requires all victims or their next of kin be notified by the Board of Pardons and Parole of a parole hearing for an inmate confined for commission of Class Y, A, or B felonies, there are victims or their families who wish to put the ugly past behind them, to forget forever the criminal offense perpetrated against them; that the present law does not have a mechanism to allow these persons to make their wishes known; that there will be trials immediately after the passage of this Act but before the effective date of this Act; that the victims of offenses tried during that interim period will be denied the privilege allowed in this Act and will suffer psychological trauma and disturbances by letting their wishes be known to the prosecuting attorney at the time of commitment of the inmates. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 1188, § 6: Apr. 8, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the physical and psychological health of our children is one of our most compelling interests. Furthermore, taking responsible measures to protect our children from persons who have sexually victimized them will significantly decrease the possibility of recurrences. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 18: Jan. 1, 1998.

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-93-701. Authority to grant and parameters.

    1. The Parole Board may release on parole any eligible inmate who is confined in any correctional institution administered by the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction, when in the board's opinion there is a reasonable probability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the community or himself or herself and is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.
    2. All paroles shall issue upon order, duly adopted, of the board.
    1. Before ordering the release of an eligible inmate, the inmate shall be interviewed by the board or a parole revocation judge or investigator employed by the board, unless a hearing is not required under § 16-93-615(a)(1)(D) and, for all parole decisions after January 1, 2012, the board shall consider the results of the risk-needs assessments of all parole applicants.
    2. The parole shall be ordered only for the best interest of society and shall not be considered as a reduction of sentence or pardon.
    3. An inmate while on parole shall remain in the legal custody of the agency from which he or she was released, but shall be subject to the orders of the board.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 29; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2808; Acts 1989, No. 937, § 6; 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2015, No. 609, § 5; 2019, No. 910, § 918.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in the section heading, substituted “Authority to grant” for “Grant” and “parameters” for “procedures generally”; added “and, for all parole decisions after January 1, 2012, the board shall conduct a risk-needs assessment review of all parole applicants” in (b)(1); and made a stylistic change.

The 2015 amendment rewrote (a)(1) and (b)(1); deleted the (b)(2)(A) designation; substituted “shall not be considered as a reduction of sentence or pardon” for “not as an award for clemency” in present (b)(2); deleted (b)(2)(B) and (b)(3); redesignated (b)(4) as (b)(3); and, in (b)(3), substituted “An inmate” for “Every prisoner” and “agency” for “institution”.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (a)(1).

Case Notes

Liberty Interest.

For discussion of criteria which give rise to a protected liberty interest in parole, see Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

This section does not produce a liberty interest. Pittman v. Gaines, 905 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1990).

Possibility of Parole.

While the possibility of parole is established by this section, there is nothing further established than a mere possibility; nothing in this section creates a right of an inmate to release on parole which would invoke due process protection. Robinson v. Mabry, 476 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ark. 1979).

By committing a felony while incarcerated, a prisoner increases the portion of his original sentence which he must serve before he is again eligible for parole. Garner v. Howell, 840 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1988).

Cited: Tabor v. State, 246 Ark. 983, 440 S.W.2d 536 (1969); Smith v. State, 1 Ark. App. 241, 614 S.W.2d 527 (1981); Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 791 S.W.2d 354 (1990).

16-93-702. Procedures — Required recommendations.

  1. Before the Parole Board shall grant any parole, the board shall solicit the written or oral recommendations of the committing court, the prosecuting attorney, and the county sheriff of the county from which the inmate was committed.
  2. If the person whose parole is being considered by the board was convicted of capital murder, § 5-10-101, or of a Class Y felony, Class A felony, or Class B felony, or any violent or sexual offense, the board shall also notify the victim of the crime, or the victim's next of kin, of the parole hearing and shall solicit written or oral recommendations of the victim or the victim's next of kin regarding the granting of the parole, unless the prosecuting attorney has notified the board at the time of commitment of the prisoner that the victim or the victim's next of kin does not want to be notified of future parole hearings.
  3. The board shall retain a copy of the recommendations in the board's file.
  4. The recommendations shall not be binding upon the board in the granting of any parole but shall be maintained in a file that shall be open to the public during reasonable business hours.
  5. When soliciting recommendations from a victim of a crime, the board shall notify the victim or the victim's next of kin of the date, time, and place of the parole hearing.

History. Acts 1969, No. 153, § 1; 1981, No. 530, § 1; 1983, No. 8, § 1; 1983, No. 246, § 1; 1985, No. 269, § 1; 1985, No. 917, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2819; Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 17; 2011, No. 570, § 104.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 2, codified as § 16-90-1102, provided:

“Failure to comply with this act does not create a claim for damages against a government employee, official, or entity.”

Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 15, codified as § 16-90-1115, provided:

“None of the provisions of this act shall be deemed to relieve any person of the duty of providing information or notices required by any other law.”

Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “Procedures” for “Grant” in the section heading; and substituted “that” for “which” in (d).

Cross References. Victim notification system, § 12-12-1201 et seq.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislation of the 1983 General Assembly, Criminal Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 613.

Case Notes

Cited: Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984).

16-93-703. Procedures — Place of hearings.

  1. The Parole Board shall not schedule parole hearings at which victims or relatives of victims of crime are invited to appear at a facility wherein inmates are housed other than the Central Administration Building of the Division of Correction at Pine Bluff.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the board from conducting parole hearings in two (2) sessions, one (1) at the place of the inmate's incarceration for interviews with the inmate, the inmate's witnesses, and correctional personnel, and the second session for victims and relatives of victims as set out in subsection (a) of this section.

History. Acts 1983, No. 525, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2819.1, 43-2819.2; Acts 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2019, No. 910, § 919.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “Procedures” for “Grant” in the section heading.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a).

16-93-704. Procedures — Notice to law enforcement personnel and committing court.

  1. At the time that any person is paroled by the Parole Board, the board shall give written notice of the granting of the parole to the county sheriff, the committing court, and the chief of police of all cities of the first class of the county from which the person was sentenced.
  2. If the person is paroled to a county other than that from which he or she was committed, the board shall give notice to the chief of police or marshal of the city to which he or she is paroled, to the chief of police of all cities of the first class, to the county sheriff of the county to which he or she is paroled, and to the county sheriff of the county from which the person was committed.

History. Acts 1969, No. 153, § 2; 1971, No. 33, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2820; Acts 2011, No. 570, § 104.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “Procedures” for “Grant” in the section heading; and substituted “all cities of the first class, to the sheriff” for “all cities of the first class and to the sheriff” in (b).

16-93-705. Revocation — Procedures and hearings generally.

        1. At any time during a parolee's release on parole, the Parole Board may issue a warrant for the arrest of the parolee for violation of any conditions of parole or may issue a notice to appear to answer a charge of a violation.
        2. The Division of Community Correction shall provide the information necessary for the board to issue a warrant under subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i) of this section.
        1. The board shall issue a warrant for the arrest of a parolee if the board determines that the parolee has been charged with a felony involving violence, as defined under § 5-4-501(d)(2), or a felony requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.
        2. The Division of Community Correction shall provide the information necessary for the board to issue a warrant under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) of this section.
        3. A parolee arrested on a warrant issued under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) of this section shall be detained pending a mandatory parole revocation hearing.
    1. The warrant or notice shall be served personally upon the parolee.
    2. The warrant shall authorize all officers named in the warrant to place the parolee in custody at any suitable detention facility pending a hearing.
    3. Any parole officer may arrest a parolee without a warrant or may deputize any officer with power of arrest to arrest the parolee without a warrant by giving him or her a written statement setting forth that the parolee, in the judgment of the parole officer, violated conditions of his or her parole.
    4. The written statement delivered with the parolee by the arresting officer to the official in charge of the detention facility to which the parolee is brought shall be sufficient warrant for detaining him or her pending disposition.
    5. If the board or its designee finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parolee has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his or her parole, the parole may be revoked at any time prior to the expiration of the period of parole.
    6. A parolee for whose return a warrant has been issued by the board shall be deemed a fugitive from justice if it is found that the warrant cannot be served.
    7. The board shall determine whether the time from the issuance of the warrant to the date of arrest, or any part of it, shall be counted as time served under the sentence.
    1. A parolee arrested for violation of parole shall be entitled to a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that he or she has violated a condition of parole.
    2. The preliminary hearing shall be scheduled within seven (7) days after arrest and conducted within fourteen (14) days after arrest, excluding a weekend, holiday, or delay caused by an act of nature, by the parole revocation judge for the board and reasonably near the place of the alleged violation or arrest.
    3. The parolee shall be given prior notice of the date, time, and location of the preliminary hearing, the purpose of the preliminary hearing, and the conditions of parole he or she is alleged to have violated.
    4. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the parolee shall have the right to hear and controvert evidence against him or her, to offer evidence in his or her own behalf, and to be represented by counsel.
    5. If the parole revocation judge finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the parolee has violated a condition of parole, the parole revocation judge may order the parolee returned to the nearest facility of the Division of Correction or Division of Community Correction where the parolee shall be placed in custody for a parole revocation hearing before the board.
    6. If the parole revocation judge finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the parolee has violated a condition of parole, the parole revocation judge may return the parolee to parole supervision rather than to the custody of the Division of Correction and may impose additional supervision conditions in response to the violating conduct.
    7. If the parole revocation judge does not find reasonable cause, he or she shall order the parolee released from custody, but that action shall not bar the board from holding a parole revocation hearing on the alleged violation of parole or from ordering the parolee to appear before the board.
    8. The parole revocation judge shall prepare and furnish to the board and the parolee a summary of the parole revocation hearing, including the substance of the evidence and testimony considered along with the ruling or determination, within twenty-one (21) days from the date of the preliminary hearing, excluding a weekend, holiday, or delay caused by an act of nature.
      1. Unless a parole revocation hearing is knowingly and intelligently waived by the parolee, a parole shall not be revoked except after a parole revocation hearing, which shall be conducted by the board or its designee within a reasonable period of time after the parolee's arrest.
      2. If a waiver is granted under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section, the parolee may subsequently appeal the waiver to the board.
    1. The parolee shall be given prior notice of the date, time, and location of the parole revocation hearing, the purpose of the parole revocation hearing, and the conditions of parole he or she is alleged to have violated.
    2. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the parolee shall have the right to hear and controvert evidence against him or her, to offer evidence in his or her own defense, and to be represented by counsel.
    3. If parole is revoked, the board or its designee shall prepare and furnish to the parolee a written statement of evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole.
  1. At a preliminary hearing under subsection (b) of this section or a parole revocation hearing under subsection (c) of this section:
    1. The parolee shall have the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the parole revocation judge or the board or its designee specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation; and
    2. The parolee may introduce any relevant evidence of the alleged violation, including letters, affidavits, and other documentary evidence, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence.
  2. A preliminary hearing under subsection (b) of this section shall not be required if:
    1. The parolee waives a preliminary hearing; or
    2. Unless a parole revocation hearing is knowingly and intelligently waived by the parolee under subsection (c) of this section, the parole revocation hearing under subsection (c) of this section is held within fourteen (14) calendar days after the arrest and reasonably near the place where the alleged violation occurred or where the parolee was arrested.
  3. A preliminary hearing under subsection (b) of this section and a parole revocation hearing under subsection (c) of this section shall not be necessary if the parole revocation is based on the parolee's conviction, guilty plea, or plea of nolo contendere to a felony offense for which he or she is sentenced to the Division of Correction or to any other state or federal correctional institution.
  4. The county sheriff or keeper of the county jail may permit the parolee to be held in the county jail while awaiting the parole revocation hearing under this section and ruling of the board or its designee.
  5. A parolee whose parole is revoked under this section due to a technical conditions violation or serious conditions violation and who is sentenced to any period of incarceration resulting from that revocation is subject to the periods of incarceration under § 16-93-715.

History. Acts 1968 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 50, § 31; 1983, No. 771, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2810; 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2013, No. 130, §§ 1, 2; 2013, No. 320, §§ 4-6; 2013, No. 1029, § 1; 2015, No. 1239, § 1; 2017, No. 423, § 21; 2019, No. 910, §§ 920-923.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “Revocation — Procedures and hearings generally” for “Revocation — Return of parole violator — Hearings” in the section heading; and inserted (b)(6) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

The 2013 amendment by No. 130 redesignated (c)(1) as (c)(1)(A); added “Unless a parole revocation hearing is knowingly and intelligently waived by the parolee” in (c)(1)(A); added (c)(1)(B); and substituted “Unless a parole revocation hearing is knowingly and intelligently waived by the parolee under subsection (c) of this section, the parole” for “The” in (e)(2).

The 2013 amendment by No. 320 substituted “revocation judge” for “hearing examiner” in (b)(2), and (b)(5) through (b)(8); and substituted “parole revocation judge” for “hearing examiner” in (d)(1).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1029 added (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B).

The 2015 amendment, in (b)(2), inserted “preliminary” preceding “hearing”, substituted “scheduled within seven (7) days after arrest and conducted within fourteen (14) days after arrest, excluding a weekend, holiday, or delay caused by an act of nature” for “conducted”, and deleted “as soon as practical after arrest” following “board”; substituted “nearest facility of the Department of Correction or Department of Community Correction where the parolee shall be placed in custody” for “custody of the Department of Correction” in (b)(5); in (b)(8), inserted “parole revocation” preceding “hearing” and added “along with the ruling or determination, within twenty-one (21) days from the date of the preliminary hearing, excluding a weekend, holiday, or delay caused by an act of nature”; substituted “within fourteen (14) calendar days” for “promptly” in (e)(2); substituted “correctional” for “penal” in (f); added (g); and made technical corrections.

The 2017 amendment added (h).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” and “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Case Notes

Assistance in Making Arrest.

A parole officer may recruit the assistance of a city policeman or a state policeman, or any other officer authorized to make arrests, to assist him in performing his duty to make an arrest. Giles v. State, 261 Ark. 413, 549 S.W.2d 479, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894, 98 S. Ct. 272, 54 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1977).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence that is insufficient to support a criminal conviction may be sufficient to support a probation revocation. Billings v. State, 53 Ark. App. 219, 921 S.W.2d 607 (1996).

Warrantless Arrest.

An arrest without a warrant in a private dwelling may be made at night as well as during daylight hours. Giles v. State, 261 Ark. 413, 549 S.W.2d 479, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894, 98 S. Ct. 272, 54 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1977).

Defendant's arrest without a warrant was not illegal since § 16-93-705 allows summary arrest for violation of parole, and such arrest is not unconstitutional since this section provides that a parolee remains in the legal custody of the institution from which he is released. Smith v. State, 1 Ark. App. 241, 614 S.W.2d 527 (1981).

Although there was no written statement from defendant's parole officer to arrest defendant as required by this section, the appellate court upheld the arrest because it was otherwise supported by probable cause. Medlock v. State, 79 Ark. App. 447, 89 S.W.3d 357 (2002).

16-93-706. Revocation — Subpoena of witnesses and documents.

    1. The Chair of the Parole Board or his or her designee, the hearing officer presiding over any preliminary hearing with respect to an alleged parole violation, the administrator of the board, or any member of the board pursuant to the authority of the board to meet and determine whether to revoke parole shall have the power to issue oaths and to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify and bring before the hearing officer or the board any relevant books, papers, records, or documents.
    2. The subpoena shall be directed to any county sheriff, county coroner, or constable of any county where the designated witness resides or is found. The endorsed affidavit on the subpoena of any person of full age shall be proof of the service, which shall be served and returned in the same manner as subpoenas in civil actions in the circuit courts are served and returned.
  1. The fees and mileage expenses as prescribed by law for witnesses in civil cases shall be paid by the Division of Correction.
    1. In case of failure or refusal by any person to comply with a subpoena issued under this section to testify or answer to any matter regarding which the person may be lawfully interrogated, any circuit court in this state, on application of the hearing officer or the chair, shall, in term or vacation, issue an attachment for the person and compel him or her to comply with the subpoena and appear before the hearing officer or the board and to produce any testimony and documents as may be required.
    2. The circuit court shall have the power to punish any contempt, in case of disobedience, as in civil cases, or it shall be a misdemeanor for a witness to refuse or neglect to appear and testify, punishable upon conviction by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).
  2. Any person willfully testifying falsely under oath before the board or at a preliminary hearing in which probable cause for parole revocation is to be considered as to any matter material to a lawful inquiry by the board or hearing officer may be charged with perjury and upon conviction punished accordingly.

History. Acts 1975, No. 735, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2824 — 43-2827; Acts 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2019, No. 910, § 924.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “Subpoena of witnesses and documents” for “Powers of officials and circuit courts — Penalties” in the section heading.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (b).

Cross References. Perjury generally, § 5-53-102.

16-93-707. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning notice of future parole hearings to victim or victim's next of kin, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 1262, § 22. The section was derived from Acts 1985, No. 269, § 2; 1985, No. 917, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2819.3; Acts 1997, No. 1112.

Pursuant to § 1-2-207, the amendment of this section by Acts 1997, No. 1112, was superseded by the repeal of this section by Acts 1997, No. 1262.

For current law, see §§ 16-93-615 and 16-93-702.

16-93-708. Parole alternative — Home detention — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Approved electronic monitoring or supervising device” means an electronic device approved by the Board of Corrections that meets the minimum Federal Communications Commission regulations and requirements and that utilizes available technology that is able to track a person's location and monitor his or her location;
    2. “Hospice” means an autonomous, centrally administered, medically directed, coordinated program providing a continuum of home, outpatient, and homelike inpatient care for the terminally ill patient and the patient's family and which employs an interdisciplinary team to assist in providing palliative and supportive care to meet the special needs arising out of the physical, emotional, spiritual, social, and economic stresses that are experienced during the final stages of illness and during dying and bereavement;
    3. “Permanently incapacitated” means an inmate who, as determined by a licensed physician:
      1. Has a medical condition that is not necessarily terminal but renders him or her permanently and irreversibly incapacitated; and
      2. Requires immediate and long-term care; and
    4. “Terminally ill” means an inmate who, as determined by a licensed physician:
      1. Has an incurable condition caused by illness or disease; and
      2. Will likely die within two (2) years due to the illness or disease.
      1. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(2) of this section, a defendant convicted of a felony or misdemeanor and sentenced to imprisonment may be incarcerated in a home detention program when the Director of the Department of Correction or the Director of the Department of Community Correction communicates to the Parole Board when, in the independent opinions of either a Department of Correction physician or Department of Community Correction physician and a consultant physician in Arkansas, an inmate is either terminally ill, permanently incapacitated, or would be suitable for hospice care and should be considered for transfer to parole supervision.
      2. The Director of the Department of Correction or the Director of the Department of Community Correction shall make the facts described in subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section known to the Parole Board for consideration of early release to home detention.
    1. The Board of Corrections shall promulgate rules that will establish policy and procedures for incarceration in a home detention program.
    1. In all instances in which the Department of Correction may release any inmate to community supervision, in addition to all other conditions that may be imposed by the Department of Correction, the Department of Correction may require the criminal defendant to participate in a home detention program.
      1. The term of the home detention shall not exceed the maximum number of years of imprisonment or supervision to which the inmate could be sentenced.
      2. The length of time the defendant participates in a home detention program and any good-time credit awarded shall be credited against the defendant's sentence.
    1. The Board of Corrections shall establish policy and procedures for participation in a home detention program, including, but not limited to, program criteria, terms, and conditions of release.
    2. An inmate who is not serving a sentence of life without parole who is released on parole under this section because he or she is terminally ill, permanently incapacitated, or would be suitable for hospice care may be released to the care of his or her family or to a friend or a facility, subject to board approval.
  2. If the medical condition of an inmate who is released under this section because he or she is terminally ill, permanently incapacitated, or would be suitable for hospice care changes to the point that the inmate is no longer terminally ill, permanently incapacitated, or suitable for hospice care, the inmate shall be returned to the custody of the Department of Correction and shall be required to be reconsidered for parole.

History. Acts 1991, No. 263, §§ 1-3; 1991, No. 307, §§ 1-3; 2005, No. 680, § 3; 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2013, No. 1335, § 5; 2015, No. 895, § 27.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “Board of Corrections” for “board of correction” in (a); inserted present (b); redesignated former (b) and (c) as present (c) and (d); and substituted “Corrections” for “Correction” in present (d).

The 2011 amendment added “Parole alternative” in the section heading; inserted the introductory language of (a), the (a)(1) designation, (a)(2), and (a)(3) (now (a)(3) and (4)); added “the Director of the Department of Correction ... considered for transfer to parole supervision” at the end of (b)(1)(A); deleted (b)(1)(A)(i) and (b)(1)(A)(ii); and substituted “Department of Correction” for “department” in three places in (c)(1).

The 2013 amendment substituted “utilizes available technology that is able to track a person's location and monitor his or her location” for “is limited in capability to recording or transmitting information as to the criminal defendant's presence in the home” in (a)(1).

The 2015 amendment inserted (a)(2) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; in (b)(1)(A), substituted “communicates” for “shall communicate” and inserted “or would be suitable for hospice care”; substituted “in which” for “where” in (c)(1); inserted designation (d)(1); and added (d)(2) and (e).

Research References

ALR.

Validity of condition of probation, supervised release, or parole restricting computer use or internet access. 4 A.L.R.6th 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 335.

Case Notes

Cited: Bush v. State, 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761 (1999).

16-93-709. Sex offender may not reside with minors.

  1. Whenever an inmate in a facility of the Division of Correction who has been found guilty of or has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to any sexual offense defined in § 5-14-101 et seq., or incest as defined by § 5-26-202, and the sexual offense or incest was perpetrated against a minor, becomes eligible for parole and makes application for release on parole, the Parole Board shall prohibit, as a condition of granting the parole, the parolee from residing upon parole in a residence with any minor, unless the board makes a specific finding that the inmate poses no danger to the minors residing in the residence.
  2. If the board, upon a hearing under § 16-93-705, finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parolee has failed to comply with this condition of parole, the parole may be revoked and the parolee returned to the custody of the division.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1188, § 2; 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2019, No. 910, § 925.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “under” for “pursuant to” in (b).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a); and substituted “division” for “department” in (b).

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Conditions of Probation or Supervised Release Prohibiting Contact with Minors or Frequenting Places Where Minors Congregate — State Cases. 4 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).

16-93-710. Parole for inmates who have served their term of imprisonment in a county jail prior to being processed into the Division of Correction.

    1. Subject to conditions set by the Parole Board, an offender convicted of a felony and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two (2) years or less in the Division of Correction, and who has served his or her term of imprisonment in a county jail prior to being processed into the Division of Correction, may be paroled from the Division of Correction county jail backup facility directly to the Division of Community Correction under parole supervision, and upon eligibility determination, processed for release by the board.
    2. Transfer release proceedings or a preliminary review under this subchapter shall begin no later than six (6) months prior to a person's transfer eligibility date, and the board shall authorize jacket review procedures at all institutions holding parole-eligible inmates to prepare parole applications to comply with this time frame.
    3. The jacket review will be conducted by staff either from the Division of Community Correction or the Division of Correction.
  1. An offender who has been found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a violent offense as defined by § 5-4-501(c)(2) or a Class Y felony offense shall be ineligible under this section.
  2. As determined by the county sheriff, an offender who has committed violent or sexual acts while incarcerated in a county jail facility shall be ineligible to participate in the program established by this section.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2019, No. 910, § 926.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout (a).

16-93-711. Parole alternatives — Electronic monitoring of parolees — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “approved electronic monitoring or supervising device” means a device described in § 16-93-708(a).
      1. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(2) of this section, an inmate serving a sentence in the Department of Correction may be released from incarceration if the:
        1. Sentence was not the result of a jury or bench verdict;
        2. Inmate has served one hundred twenty (120) days of his or her sentence;
        3. Inmate has an approved parole plan;
        4. Inmate does not have a prior felony conviction for a sex offense or for a felony offense that involved the use or threat of violence or bodily harm;
        5. Inmate was sentenced from a cell in the sentencing guidelines with:
          1. An incarceration range of thirty-six (36) months or less; or
          2. A presumptive sentence of probation;
        6. Conviction is for a Class C or Class D felony;
        7. Conviction is not for a crime of violence, regardless of felony level;
        8. Conviction is not for a sex offense, including failure to register as a sex offender under § 12-12-906, regardless of felony level;
        9. Conviction is not for manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the former § 5-64-401;
        10. Conviction is not for possession of drug paraphernalia with the purpose to manufacture methamphetamine, § 5-64-443, if the conviction is a Class C felony or higher;
        11. Conviction is not for a crime involving the use or threat of violence or bodily harm;
        12. Conviction is not for a crime that resulted in a death; and
        13. Inmate has not previously failed a drug court program.
      2. The Director of the Department of Correction shall make the facts described in subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section known to the Parole Board for consideration of electronic monitoring.
    1. The Board of Corrections shall promulgate rules that will establish policy and procedures for an electronic monitoring program.
    1. An inmate released from incarceration on parole under this section shall be supervised by the Department of Community Correction using electronic monitoring until the inmate's transfer eligibility date or for at least ninety (90) days of full compliance by the inmate, whichever is sooner.
      1. The term of electronic monitoring shall not exceed the maximum number of years of imprisonment or supervision to which the inmate could be sentenced.
      2. The length of time the defendant participates in an electronic monitoring program and any good-time credit awarded shall be credited against the defendant's sentence.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2013, No. 1335, § 6; 2015, No. 895, § 28.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment deleted “or the Director of the Department of Community Correction” following “Correction” in (b)(1)(B).

The 2015 amendment inserted (b)(1)(A)(iv) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; rewrote present (b)(1)(A)(v); inserted “including failure to register as a sex offender under § 12-12-906” in present (b)(1)(A)(viii); and, in (b)(1)(A)(xi), inserted “for” and “use or”.

16-93-712. Parole supervision.

    1. The Parole Board shall establish written policies and procedures governing the supervision of parolees designed to enhance public safety and to assist the parolees in reintegrating into society.
      1. The supervision of parolees shall be based on evidence-based practices, including a validated risk-needs assessment.
      2. Decisions shall target the parolee's criminal risk factors with appropriate supervision and treatment designed to reduce the likelihood of reoffense.
  1. A parole officer shall:
    1. Investigate each case referred to him or her by the Chair of the Parole Board, the Division of Community Correction, or the prosecuting attorney;
    2. Furnish to each parolee under his or her supervision a written statement of the conditions of parole and instruct the parolee that he or she must stay in compliance with the conditions of parole or risk revocation under § 16-93-705;
    3. Develop a case plan for each individual who is assessed as being moderate to high risk to reoffend based on the risk and needs assessment that targets the criminal risk factors identified in the assessment, is responsive to individual characteristics, and provides supervision of offenders according to that case plan;
    4. Stay informed of the parolee's conduct and condition through visitation, required reporting, or other methods and shall report to the board that information upon request;
    5. Use practicable and suitable methods that are consistent with evidence-based practices to aid and encourage a parolee to improve his or her conduct and condition and to reduce the risk of recidivism;
      1. Conduct a validated risk-needs assessment of the parolee, including without limitation criminal risk factors and specific individual needs.
      2. The actuarial assessment shall include an initial screening and, if necessary, a comprehensive assessment;
    6. Make decisions with the assistance of the risk-needs assessment that are consistent with evidence-based practices on the type of supervision and services necessary to each parolee; and
    7. Receive annual training on evidence-based practices and criminal risk factors, as well as instruction on how to target these factors to reduce recidivism.
    1. The Division of Community Correction shall allocate resources, including the assignment of parole officers, to focus on moderate-risk and high-risk offenders as determined by the validated risk-needs assessment provided in subdivision (b)(6) of this section.
    2. The Division of Community Correction shall require each public and private treatment and service provider that receives state funds for the treatment of or service for parolees to use evidence-based programs and practices.
    1. The Division of Community Correction shall have the authority to sanction a parolee administratively without engaging the revocation process under § 16-93-705.
        1. The Division of Community Correction shall develop an intermediate sanctions procedure and grid to guide a parole officer in determining the appropriate response to a violation of conditions of supervision.
        2. The intermediate sanctions procedure shall include a requirement that the parole officer consider multiple factors when determining the sanction to be imposed, including previous violations and sanctions and the severity of the current and prior violation.
      1. Intermediate sanctions administered by the Division of Community Correction are required to conform to the sanctioning grid.
    2. Intermediate sanctions shall include without limitation:
      1. Day reporting;
      2. Community service;
      3. Increased substance abuse screening or treatment, or both;
      4. Increased monitoring, including electronic monitoring and home confinement; and
        1. Incarceration in a county jail for no more than seven (7) days or incarceration in a Division of Community Correction facility or Division of Correction facility for no more than one hundred eighty (180) days.
          1. Incarceration as an intermediate sanction shall not be used more than six (6) times with an individual parolee.
          2. A parolee shall accumulate no more than twenty-one (21) days' incarceration in a county jail or no more than three hundred sixty (360) days' incarceration in a Division of Community Correction facility or Division of Correction facility as an intermediate sanction before the parole officer recommends a violation of the person's parole under § 16-93-706.
          3. A parolee is subject to a period of incarceration of:
            1. Up to ninety (90) days in a Division of Community Correction facility or Division of Correction facility for a technical conditions violation; and
            2. Exactly one hundred eighty (180) days in a Division of Community Correction or Division of Correction facility for a serious conditions violation.
          4. A parolee may not be incarcerated more than two (2) times as a parole sanction in a Division of Community Correction facility or Division of Correction facility.
          5. Any time in custody for which the parolee is held before a period of incarceration under this section is administered shall not count as a period of incarceration ordered under subdivision (d)(3)(E)(ii)(a) of this section or toward the total accumulation of days of incarceration as set forth in subdivision (d)(3)(E)(ii)(b) of this section.
          6. A period of incarceration under this section:
            1. May be reduced by the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction for good behavior and successful program completion; and
            2. Shall not be reduced under this section for more than fifty percent (50%) of the total time of incarceration ordered to be served.
          7. If a parolee is in custody in a county jail awaiting an administrative sanction under this section, the state shall reimburse the county for the costs of incarceration at the prevailing rate of reimbursement.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 104; 2013, No. 1415, § 1; 2015, No. 895, § 29; 2017, No. 423, § 22; 2019, No. 910, §§ 927-932.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (d)(3)(E)(ii), substituted “seven (7)” for “ten (10)” and “twenty-one (21)” for “thirty (30)”.

The 2015 amendment inserted designation (d)(2)(A)(i); and added (d)(2)(A)(ii).

The 2017 amendment substituted “Department of Community Correction” for “department” throughout (c), (d)(1), and (d)(2); added “or incarceration in a Department of Community Correction facility or Department of Correction facility for no more than one hundred eighty (180) days” in (d)(3)(E)(i); rewrote and redesignated former (d)(3)(E)(ii) as (d)(3)(E)(ii) (a) ; added (d)(3)(E)(ii) (b) through (d)(3)(E)(ii) (d) ; and added (e) through (g).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” and “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

16-93-713. Rulemaking authority.

The Parole Board may adopt rules to implement, administer, and enforce this subchapter.

History. Acts 2015, No. 609, § 6.

16-93-714. Denial of parole — Detriment to the community.

The Parole Board may deny parole to any otherwise eligible person, regardless of the sentence that he or she is serving, if five (5) members of the board determine that the person upon release would be a detriment to the community into which the person would be released.

History. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 30.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

16-93-715. Revocation — Technical conditions violations and serious conditions violations.

    1. If a parolee is subject to a parole revocation hearing under this subchapter for a technical conditions violation or a serious conditions violation, the parolee is subject to confinement for the following periods, subject to subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, before being released and returned to parole supervision:
      1. Up to ninety (90) days' confinement for a technical conditions violation; and
      2. Exactly one hundred eighty (180) days' confinement for a serious conditions violation.
      1. A period of confinement under subdivision (a)(1) of this section may be reduced by the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction for good behavior and successful program completion.
      2. A period of confinement shall not be reduced under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section for more than fifty percent (50%) of the total time of confinement ordered to be served.
    2. Any time in custody for which the person is held before a period of confinement is ordered to be served under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall not be credited to the overall period of confinement ordered under subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
    1. Except as provided for in subdivision (b)(2) of this section, if a parolee is subject to a revocation hearing under this subchapter or an administrative parole sanction for a technical conditions violation or a serious conditions violation, the parolee is subject to confinement according to the time periods set out in § 16-93-712(d) and subdivision (a)(1) of this section without having his or her parole revoked.
      1. A parolee is subject to having his or her parole revoked and being returned to the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction for the next violation of his or her parole if the parolee has been confined six (6) times under § 16-93-712(d).
      2. After a parolee has been confined two (2) times under subdivision (a)(1) of this section for any combination of a technical conditions violation or serious conditions violation for any period of time, the parolee is subject to having his or her parole revoked and being returned to the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction for the next violation of his or her parole.
      3. A parolee is subject to having his or her parole revoked and being returned to the Division of Correction or the Division of Community Correction under this section without having been sanctioned for a period of confinement set out under § 16-93-712(d) or subdivision (a)(1) of this section if the Parole Board determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the parolee is engaging in or has engaged in behavior that poses a threat to the community.
  1. The location of the appropriate confining facility in which a parolee serves a period of confinement under this section shall be determined by the Board of Corrections.
  2. A period of confinement that a parolee serves as a result of being arrested for a parole violation but before being administratively sanctioned shall not count as a period of confinement for the purposes of the aggregate number of periods of confinement under this section.
  3. Noncompliance with Division of Correction or Division of Community Correction program requirements or violent or sexual behavior while confined for a technical conditions violation or serious conditions violation under this section may result in revocation of the parolee's parole for a period of time exceeding the limitations of subdivision (a)(1) of this section, up to and including the time remaining on the person's original sentence.

History. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 23; 2019, No. 910, §§ 933-935.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 423, § 37: “(a) Sections 16 through 23 of this act are effective on and after October 1, 2017. (b) Section 15 of this act is effective on and after January 1, 2018.”

Subchapter 8 — Parole — Work-Release

16-93-801 — 16-93-806. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning parole and work-release, was repealed by Acts 1993, Nos. 532 and 550, § 9. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-93-801. Acts 1983, No. 230, § 7; 1985, No. 1071, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2841; Acts 1987, No. 904, § 3.

16-93-802. Acts 1983, No. 230, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2842.

16-93-803. Acts 1983, No. 230, §§ 1-3; 1985, No. 1071, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2835 — 43-2837; Acts 1987, No. 904, § 1; 1989, No. 434, § 1; 1991, No. 583, § 1.

16-93-804. Acts 1983, No. 230, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2838; Acts 1987, No. 904, § 2.

16-93-805. Acts 1983, No. 230, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2839.

16-93-806. Acts 1983, No. 230, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2840.

For current law, see § 16-93-1201 et seq.

Subchapter 9 — Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision

16-93-901 — 16-93-903. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning out-of-state parolee supervision, was repealed by Acts 2001, No. 253, § 1. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-93-901. Acts 1937, No. 172, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 5400; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2816.

16-93-902. Acts 1937, No. 172, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2817n.

16-93-903. Acts 1937, No. 172, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 5402; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-2817.

For current law, see § 12-51-101 et seq.

Subchapter 10 — Community Service Work — Acts 1989, No. 957

16-93-1001 — 16-93-1004. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning community service work — Acts 1989, No. 957, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 105. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-93-1001. Acts 1989, No. 957, § 1.

16-93-1002. Acts 1989, No. 957, § 2.

16-93-1003. Acts 1989, No. 957, § 6.

16-93-1004. Acts 1989, No. 957, §§ 3, 4; 1991, No. 545, §§ 1, 2.

Subchapter 11 — Community Service Work — Acts 1989, No. 613

16-93-1101 — 16-93-1105. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning community service work — Acts 1989, No. 613, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 106. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-93-1101. Acts 1989, No. 613, § 1.

16-93-1102. Acts 1989, No. 613, § 2.

16-93-1103. Acts 1989, No. 613, § 3.

16-93-1104. Acts 1989, No. 613, § 4; 1991, No. 542, § 5.

16-93-1105. Acts 1989, No. 613, § 5.

Subchapter 12 — Community Correction

Effective Dates. Acts 1995, No. 577, § 6: Mar. 9, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the inmate transfer provisions of Arkansas Code 16-93-206 and 1301 expire on April 1, 1995; that those provisions should continue in effect until April 1, 1997; that this act so provides; and that unless this act goes into effect immediately it will not be effective until after the expiration of those provisions. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 1170, § 13: Apr. 11, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that confusion exists regarding the status of ineligible offenders judicially transferred to Department of Community Punishment facilities; that there is an immediate need to clarify the law applicable to transferring ineligible offenders back to the Department of Correction; and that it is in the best interest of the courts which already have crowded documents to immediately reduce the reporting requirements for departure sentences. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2005, No. 186, § 3: July 1, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional; that the voluntary presumptive standards of the State of Arkansas may be challenged as unconstitutional; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to confirm that the sentencing guidelines, as originally enacted, are advisory. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2005.”

Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 17. Effective on and after January 1, 2014.

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 99.

16-93-1201. Findings and determinations.

  1. The State of Arkansas hereby finds that the cost of incarcerating the ever-increasing numbers of offenders in traditional penitentiaries is skyrocketing, bringing added fiscal pressures on state government, and that some inmates can be effectively punished, with little risk to the public, in a more affordable manner through the use of community correction programs and nontraditional facilities.
  2. As a result of the rising cost of traditional incarceration, the state finds that the purpose of corrections in Arkansas is twofold:
    1. “Community correction”, defined as both nontraditional correction centers and nonresidential community corrections, including supervision on probation, parole, and transfer, is charged with the provision of correction focused on promoting offender accountability and the supervision of offenders at appropriate levels to promote public safety; and
      1. “Institutions”, defined as traditional prison beds, are charged with the appropriate incapacitation of high risk offenders.
      2. “Incapacitation” involves traditional aspects of incarceration coupled with highly supervised community correction when appropriate.
      3. “High risk” is defined as those convicted of the most serious offenses, those who have longer criminal histories, and those who have repeatedly failed to comply with conditions imposed under less restrictive sanctions.
  3. Furthermore, the state determines that services designed to address offender needs must be integrated into the framework of both institutions and community correction programs and must be balanced with supervision and correction such that the community is repaid for the offense, public safety is promoted through supervision, and the offender is assisted in becoming a law-abiding member of society.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, § 1; 1993, No. 548, § 1; 2005, No. 1994, § 287.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “correction” for “punishment” throughout this section; and redesignated former (b)(1), (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) as present (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C).

Case Notes

Cited: Arnold v. State, 2011 Ark. 395, 384 S.W.3d 488 (2011).

16-93-1202. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Board” means the Board of Corrections;
  2. “Community correction” means:
    1. Probation, a judicially imposed criminal sanction permitting varying levels of supervision of eligible offenders in the community;
    2. Economic sanctions programs, including an active organized collection of fees, fines, restitution, day fines, day reporting centers, and penalties attached for nonpayment of fines;
    3. Home detention programs, ranging from curfew programs to house arrest with and without electronic monitoring;
    4. Community service programs, including both supervised and unsupervised work assignments and projects such that offenders provide substantial labor benefit to the community;
    5. Work-release programs, including residential and nonresidential forms of labor, with salary, in the community;
    6. Restitution programs, an organized collection and dissemination of restitution by a designated entity within the community correction range of services, including, when necessary, the use of restitution centers such that the offender is held accountable and the victim receives restitution ordered by the court in a timely fashion;
      1. Community correction facilities, multipurpose facilities encompassing security, correction, and services such that offenders can be housed therein when necessary but can also be assigned to or access correction programs and services which are housed there.
      2. Included therein are revocation centers, restitution centers, work-release centers, and community correction centers;
    7. Boot camps, highly regimented programs encompassing strict discipline, education, treatment, and counseling designed to have the greatest positive impact on the offender in the shortest period of time;
    8. Drug and alcohol treatment services, including both inpatient and outpatient drug and alcohol abuse treatment and counseling provided by qualified community correction service provider programs for correctional clients;
    9. Educational programs, including programs focused on the acquisition of basic learning skills, general educational developmental preparation, literacy training, and other applicable areas of education that are of value to correctional clients;
    10. Vocational programs, focused on the learning of a marketable skill by correctional clients utilizing qualified vocational and technical community correction service provider programs whenever possible;
    11. Job skills programs, focused on the acquisition of basic job skills, especially those related to how to get a job and how to keep a job;
    12. Mental health treatment services, including both inpatient and outpatient mental health, family, and psychological counseling and treatment provided by qualified community correction service provider programs for correctional clients;
    13. Parole, an administrative condition permitting state supervision of eligible offenders sentenced to state correctional facilities and released therefrom to community correction programs or supervision;
    14. Post-prison supervision, an administrative condition permitting state supervision of offenders sentenced to state correctional facilities and transferred from there to community correction programs or community supervision; and
    15. Pretrial programs, including the supervision and monitoring of certain defendants while awaiting sentencing or disposition by a court;
  3. “Community correction service provider program” means a public or private organization which provides treatment, guidance, training, support, or other rehabilitative services to individual offenders, offender groups, and their families in such areas as health, education, vocational training, special education, social services, psychological counseling, alcohol and drug treatment, and other applicable correctional concerns;
  4. “Division of Community Correction” means the administrative structure in place to oversee the development and operation of community correction facilities, programs, and services, including probation and parole supervision;
  5. “Division of Correction” means the administrative structure in place to oversee the daily operation of secure prison facilities;
  6. “Eligibility” or “eligible offender” means any person convicted of a felony who is by law eligible for such sentence or who is otherwise under the supervision of the Division of Community Correction and who falls within the population targeted by the General Assembly for inclusion in community correction facilities and who has not been subject to a disciplinary violation for a violent act or for sexual misconduct while in the custody of a jail or correctional facility and does not have a current or previous conviction for a violent or sexual offense listed under subdivision (10)(A)(iii) of this section;
  7. “Incarceration” means commitment to the Division of Correction;
  8. “Supervision” means direct supervision at varying levels of intensity by either probation officers, in the case of sentences to probation with a condition of community correction, or parole and post-prison supervision officers, in the case of offenders eligible for release on parole or offenders transferred to community correction or community supervision from the Division of Correction;
  9. “Suspended imposition of sentence” means a procedure whereby a defendant who pleads or is found guilty of an offense is released by the court without pronouncement of sentence and without supervision;
      1. “Target group” means a group of offenders and offenses determined to be, but not limited to, theft, theft by receiving, hot checks, residential burglary, commercial burglary, failure to appear, fraudulent use of credit cards, criminal mischief, breaking or entering, drug paraphernalia, driving while intoxicated, fourth or subsequent offense, all other Class B felonies, Class C felonies, or Class D felonies that are not either violent or sexual and that meet the eligibility criteria determined by the General Assembly to have significant impact on the use of correctional resources, Class A controlled substance felonies and Class B controlled substance felonies, and all other unclassified felonies for which the prescribed limitations on a sentence do not exceed the prescribed limitations for a Class B felony and that are not either violent or sexual.
      2. Offenders committing solicitation, attempt, or conspiracy of the substantive offenses listed in subdivision (10)(A)(i) of this section are also included in the group.
      3. As used in this subdivision (10)(A), “violent or sexual” includes all offenses against the person codified in § 5-10-101 et seq., § 5-11-101 et seq., § 5-12-101 et seq., § 5-13-201 et seq., § 5-13-301 et seq., and § 5-14-101 et seq., any offense containing as an element of the offense the use of physical force, the threatened use of serious physical force, the infliction of physical harm, or the creation of a substantial risk of serious physical harm, and an offense for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.
      4. For the purpose of the sealing of a criminal record under § 16-93-1207, “target group” includes any misdemeanor conviction except a misdemeanor conviction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender or a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated.
    1. Except for those offenders assigned to a technical violator program, only those offenders and offenses falling within the target group population may access community correction facilities whether by judicial transfer, administrative transfer, drug court sanction, or probation sanction.
    2. Final determination of eligibility for placement in any community correction center or program is the responsibility of the Division of Community Correction;
  10. “Transfer” means an administrative condition permitting transfer of eligible offenders sentenced to traditional state correctional facilities to community correction facilities, programming, and community supervision, provided that only target offenders are eligible for the facilities;
    1. “Transfer date” means the earliest date on which an offender is eligible for transfer from the Division of Correction to the Division of Community Correction.
    2. The date may be extended based on disciplinary behavior while under the custody of the Division of Correction; and
  11. “Trial court” means any court of this state having jurisdiction of an eligible offender and the power to sentence the eligible offender to the included options, subject to eligibility determination by the Division of Community Correction.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, § 3; 1993, No. 548, § 3; 1995, No. 577, § 1; 1997, No. 279, § 1; 1997, No. 945, § 2; 2001, No. 1255, § 1; 2003, No. 245, § 1; 2003, No. 1018, § 1; 2005, No. 1994, § 287; 2007, No. 744, § 3; 2013, No. 1460, § 14; 2015, No. 549, § 2; 2017, No. 423, §§ 24-26; 2019, No. 910, §§ 936-939.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 548, § 3, provided, in part:

“Community Punishment Target Group Table in Code Section Numerical Order Code Section Name of crime 5-36-401 Nonsupport 5-36-103 Theft of property (Class B, C, and D) 5-36-104 Theft of services (Class B and C) 5-36-105 Theft of property lost, mislaid, delivered by mistake 5-36-106 Theft by receiving (Class B and C) 5-36-115 Theft of leased or rented prop. (Class B and C) 5-37-201 Forgery (first and second degrees) 5-37-203 Defrauding secured creditors 5-37-204 Fraud in insolvency 5-37-207 Fraudulent use of a credit card 5-37-209 Criminal possession of forgery device 5-37-210 Obtaining signature by deception 5-37-211 Defrauding judgment creditors 5-37-212 Using slugs of $100 or more 5-37-213 Criminal simulation 5-37-302 Hot checks (Class B and C) 5-37-524 Fraud in acquisition of authority to provide motor vehicle transportation of property 5-37-525 Defrauding a materialman of $5000 or more 5-38-203 Criminal mischief I 5-38-204 Criminal mischief II 5-39-201 Commercial burglary 5-39-202 Breaking and entering 5-54-120 Failure to appear 5-56-102 Illegal use of food coupons 5-56-103 Illegal presentation of food coupons 5-64-403 Delivery, possession or manufacture of drug paraphernalia 5-65-103 DWI4”

Click to view table.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment, in (l)(1)(A), inserted “residential burglary,” deleted “and” following “subsequent offense” and inserted the language following “correctional resources” at the end.

The 2003 amendment by No. 245 inserted “Class A and Class B controlled substance felonies” in (j)(1)(A).

The 2003 amendment by No. 1018 added “or who is otherwise under the supervision of the Department of Community Correction” to the end of (f).

The 2005 amendment substituted “community correction” for “community punishment” throughout this section; and substituted “community correction” for “Regional punishment” in (b)(7)(A).

The 2013 amendment substituted “As used in” for “For the purpose” in (10)(A)(iii); substituted “the sealing of a criminal” for “an expungement or a sealing of a” in (10)(A)(iv); and deleted “§ 16-93-1206 or” following “pursuant to” in (10)(B).

The 2015 amendment added “and who has not been subject to a disciplinary violation for a violent act or for sexual misconduct while in the custody of a jail or correctional facility” in (6).

The 2017 amendment, in (6), inserted “or who is otherwise under the supervision of the Department of Community Correction”, deleted “or who is otherwise under the supervision of the Department of Community Correction” following “community correction facilities”, and added “and does not have a current or previous conviction for a violent or sexual offense listed under subdivision (10)(A)(iii) of this section”; in (10)(A)(i), inserted “Class B felonies” in the middle and substituted “Class B” for “Class C” near the end; added “and an offense for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.” in (10)(A)(iii); in (10)(B), substituted “Except for those offenders assigned to a technical violator program, only those offenders” for “Offenders” and “whether by judicial transfer, administrative transfer, drug court sanction, or probation sanction” for “pursuant to § 16-93-1208”; added (10)(C); and added “subject to eligibility determination by the Department of Community Correction” in (13).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” and “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Community Correction Facility Placement, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 441.

16-93-1203. Board of Corrections — Powers and duties.

The Board of Corrections shall have the following duties and responsibilities with regard to community correction programming:

  1. Establish community correction programs to which eligible offenders may be assigned as a condition of probation, sentenced to by the trial court pursuant to this subchapter, paroled to upon release from incarceration, or transferred to after incarceration in the Division of Correction;
  2. Notify the trial courts of the state having criminal jurisdiction of the availability of certified and approved community correction programs;
  3. Establish standards for the monitoring, auditing, and certification of community correction programs;
  4. Establish rules relating to the operation of community correction programs and the supervision of eligible offenders participating therein;
  5. Promote cooperation among the courts and various law enforcement and correctional agencies of this state in the implementation of community correction programs;
  6. Direct the departments, divisions, and other entities involved in the implementation of community correction options in a manner that will promote the safety and welfare of the people of this state;
  7. Establish rules and procedures which shall be required or deemed appropriate for the implementation and ongoing operation of community correction; and
  8. Establish minimum standards of eligibility and certification processes for all community correction programs eligible to receive offenders under this subchapter.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, § 4; 1993, No. 548, § 4; 2005, No. 1994, § 287; 2019, No. 315, §§ 1312, 1313; 2019, No. 910, §§ 940, 941.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As enacted the introductory paragraph began:

“Effective July 1, 1993.”

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “community correction” for “community punishment” throughout this section.

The 2019 amendment by No. 315 deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (4); and deleted “regulations” following “rules” in (7).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (1); and inserted “divisions” in (6).

16-93-1204. Authorization.

  1. The Board of Corrections shall implement a correctional plan, to be developed in conjunction with the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, which ensures the efficient use of prison beds, which are becoming scarce resources, through the development and expansion of community correction options which will provide supervision, correction, and services to a primary target group of nonviolent offenders who would otherwise have been eligible for and likely to be sentenced to traditional incarceration.
  2. The community correction target group shall consist of those offenders:
    1. Who are involved in less serious criminal activity or are nonviolent by nature and crime, or both, even though the offender and the offense may be repetitive;
    2. Who are technical violators of community supervision; and
    3. Who are returning to the community from incarceration who are in need of enhanced supervision options due to the nature of their criminal conviction.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, §§ 1, 2; 1993, No. 548, §§ 1, 2; 2005, No. 1994, § 287.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “correction” for “punishment” throughout this section; and, in (b), substituted “or” for “and/or” preceding “are nonviolent” and inserted “or both.”

16-93-1205. Operation and supervision of community correction programs.

  1. The Board of Corrections shall promulgate policies and rules relating to the operation of community correction facilities and programs, the supervision of eligible offenders participating therein, and the termination of that participation, including but not limited to:
    1. The terms, conditions, and qualifications of program eligibility;
    2. The time to be spent in specific correction and treatment programs designated as community correction;
    3. Receipt of compensation in the form of fees or other available sources from the eligible offender while participating in a community correction program;
    4. Allocation of compensation received by an eligible offender while participating in a community correction program, including designation to the Division of Community Correction of a percentage of any compensation received for the purpose of defraying the costs to the division of establishing and operating community correction programs and the costs of the offender's custody and care;
    5. Receipt of compensation from public entities who benefit from the labor of offenders involved in community correction work programs; and
    6. Collection of economic sanctions imposed by the court, including, but not limited to, restitution, fines, fees, or other monetary penalties attached to an offender's sentence.
  2. The division shall supervise all eligible offenders participating in any community correction program with the goal of promoting the safety and welfare of the people of the state.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, § 5; 1993, No. 548, § 5; 2005, No. 1994, § 287; 2019, No. 315, § 1314.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “correction” for “punishment” throughout this section.

The 2019 amendment substituted “policies and rules” for “policies, rules, and regulations” in the introductory language of (a).

16-93-1206. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning sentencing alternatives, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 107. The section was derived from Acts 1993, No. 531, § 6; 1993, No. 548, § 6; 1995, No. 1170, § 1; 1999, No. 485, § 1; 2005, No. 1994, § 287.

16-93-1207. Order of court.

  1. Upon the sentencing or placing on probation of any person under the provisions of this subchapter, the sentencing court shall issue an order or commitment, whichever is appropriate, in writing, setting forth the following:
    1. That the offender is being:
      1. Committed to the Division of Correction;
      2. Committed to the Division of Correction with judicial transfer to the Division of Community Correction;
      3. Placed on suspended imposition of sentence;
      4. Placed on probation under the provisions of this subchapter; or
      5. Committed to a county jail for a misdemeanor offense committed after January 1, 2007;
    2. That the offender has knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the sentence or placement on probation and violations thereof;
    3. A designation of sentence or supervision length along with community correction program distinctions of that sentence or supervision length;
    4. Any applicable terms and conditions of the sentence or probation term; and
    5. Presentence investigation or sentencing information, including, but not limited to, criminal history elements and other appropriate or necessary information for correctional use.
    1. Upon the successful completion of probation or a commitment to the Division of Correction with judicial transfer to the Division of Community Correction or a commitment to a county jail for one (1) of the offenses targeted by the General Assembly for community correction placement, the court may direct that the record of the offender be sealed with regards to the offense of which the offender was either convicted or placed on probation under the condition that the offender has no more than one (1) previous felony conviction and that the previous felony was other than a conviction for:
      1. A capital offense;
      2. Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;
      3. Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103;
      4. Rape, § 5-14-103;
      5. Kidnapping, § 5-11-102;
      6. Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103; or
      7. Delivering controlled substances to a minor as prohibited in the former § 5-64-410.
    2. The fact that a prior felony conviction has been previously sealed shall not prevent its counting as a prior conviction for the purposes of this subsection.
    3. The procedure, effect, and definition of “sealed” for the purposes of this subsection shall be in accordance with that established in the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.
  2. A court as a condition of probation shall order the defendant to:
        1. Enroll in and complete a vocational, technical, educational, or similar program if the court finds that the defendant's lack of an employable or marketable skill contributes to the defendant's being unemployed.
        2. The court may order the person to pay tuition for any vocational, technical, educational, or similar program in installments after the completion of the vocational, technical, educational, or similar program.
      1. If the defendant is on probation at the end of the vocational, technical, educational, or similar program required under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section, he or she shall be required to work in suitable employment for the remainder of his or her probation or for three (3) years, whichever occurs earlier; or
    1. Work consistently in suitable employment for the entire duration of his or her probation or for three (3) years, whichever occurs earlier.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, § 7; 1993, No. 548, § 7; 1995, No. 998, § 10; 2005, No. 1994, § 477; 2007, No. 744, § 4; 2013, No. 1460, § 15; 2015, No. 1198, § 9; 2019, No. 910, §§ 942, 943.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “community correction” for “community punishment” in (a)(3) and (b)(1); in (b)(1), substituted “either convicted or placed on probation … as prohibited in § 5-64-701(a)(2)” for “convicted under the following conditions”; deleted former (b)(1)(A)-(C); and made minor punctuation changes.

The 2013 amendment substituted “sealed with regards to the offense of” for “expunged of the offense of” in (b)(1); substituted “Rape” for “First-degree rape” in (b)(1)(D); inserted “the former” in (b)(1)(G); substituted “sealed” for “expunged” in (b)(2); and, in (b)(3), substituted “sealed” for “expungement” and “the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401” for “§ 16-90-901”.

The 2015 amendment added (c).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Conditions of Probation or Supervised Release Prohibiting Contact with Minors or Frequenting Places Where Minors Congregate — State Cases. 4 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).

Case Notes

Construction.

In a case in which appellant challenged the denial of his petition to seal the record in his 1997 theft-of-property case, the Supreme Court declined to engage in an interpretation of the 1997 version of this section, where appellant failed to object below to the application of the 2011 version and failed to raise any arguments on appeal in relation to the 1997 version. Sullivan v. State, 2012 Ark. 178 (2012).

Advisory Opinion.

In a case in which appellant challenged the denial of his petition to seal the record in his 1997 theft-of-property case, the Supreme Court declined to address the arguments that were raised by appellant in relation to the 2011 version of this section, because to do so would be to issue an advisory opinion on a version of the statute that had no application to the instant case. Sullivan v. State, 2012 Ark. 178 (2012).

Jurisdiction.

The circuit court had jurisdiction to expunge the defendant's criminal record, notwithstanding that the judgment and disposition order did not specifically recite that he was sentenced under this section. Fulmer v. State, 337 Ark. 177, 987 S.W.2d 700 (1999).

Probation Revocation.

Circuit court erred in expunging defendant's felony conviction under the Community Punishment Act, § 16-93-1201 et seq., because the court only referenced the original three-year probation order and not the post-revocation order imposing four years of probation, defendant failed to successfully complete probation under the original, revoked order, and the Act was explicitly made inapplicable to defendant's post-revocation sentence by the sentencing court. State v. Brown, 2019 Ark. 395, 590 S.W.3d 121 (2019).

Cited: Edwards v. State, 70 Ark. App. 127, 15 S.W.3d 358 (2000).

16-93-1208. Post commitment transfer.

      1. Upon commitment of an eligible offender to the Division of Correction, the Division of Correction will transfer the eligible offender to a community correction program, when he or she reaches his or her transfer date, in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Board of Corrections and conditions set by the Parole Board.
      2. Legal custody of inmates transferred to the Division of Community Correction shall remain with the Division of Correction unless altered by court order.
    1. A person eligible for release from incarceration on parole may be placed in community correction programming while under parole supervision upon the recommendation of the condition by the releasing authority.
    1. The Board of Corrections and the Division of Correction are authorized to release medical and psychological data in their possession to a community correction service provider concerning an eligible offender transferred to that community correction program.
    2. The community correction service provider shall use any medical or psychological data received from the Division of Correction and the Board of Corrections in compliance with rules concerning the use of that data as adopted by the Board of Corrections.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, § 8; 1993, No. 548, § 8; 1995, No. 1170, § 2; 2005, No. 186, § 2; 2005, No. 1994, § 288; 2019, No. 315, § 1315; 2019, No. 910, § 944.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment by No. 186 deleted former (a)(2); and redesignated former (a)(3) as present (a)(2).

The 2005 amendment by No. 1994 substituted “community correction” for “community punishment” throughout this section; and inserted “or her” and “or she” in (a)(1)(A).

The 2019 amendment by No. 315 deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (a)(1)(A).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section; and substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (a)(1)(B).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Hurricane Blakely and the Calm After the Storm Found in Booker, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 449.

16-93-1209. Liability.

The Division of Correction, the Board of Corrections, the Division of Community Correction, the Parole Board, and all governmental agencies and units utilizing eligible offenders in community correction programs as defined in this subchapter are immune from liability and suit for damages, and no tort action shall lie against the Division of Correction, the Board of Corrections, the Division of Community Correction, the Parole Board, and any governmental agency or unit or any of their employees because of any acts of eligible offenders utilized under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, § 9; 1993, No. 548, § 9; 2005, No. 1994, § 288; 2019, No. 910, § 945.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “community correction programs” for “community punishment programs.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” twice and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” twice.

16-93-1210. Sentence optional.

Nothing in this subchapter shall grant any offender the right to be sentenced or transferred under this subchapter as a matter of right.

History. Acts 1993, No. 531, § 10; 1993, No. 548, § 10.

Case Notes

Cited: State v. Brown, 2019 Ark. 395, 590 S.W.3d 121 (2019).

Subchapter 13 — Criteria for Transfer to Community Punishment Programs

16-93-1301 — 16-93-1304. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning criteria for transfer to community punishment programs, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 108. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-93-1301. Acts 1993, No. 534, § 1; 1993, No. 555, § 1; 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 8, § 2; 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 9, § 2; 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 19, § 1; 1995, No. 1170, § 3; 1997, No. 945, § 3; 2001, No. 904, § 1; 2005, No. 1994, § 478; 2007, No. 592, § 1.

16-93-1302. Acts 1993, No. 534, § 2; 1993, No. 555, § 2; 1995, No. 1009, § 2; 1995, No. 1011, § 2; 2005, No. 1994, § 289.

16-93-1303. Acts 1993, No. 534, § 3; 1993, No. 555, § 3.

16-93-1304. Acts 1993, No. 534, § 4; 1993, No. 555, § 4; 1995, No. 1170, § 4.

The amendment by Acts 2011, No. 180, § 1, to § 16-93-1302(f) was superseded by the repeal of this section by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 108.

Subchapter 14 — Notification of Offenders' Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Status

16-93-1401. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Correctional institution” means any state or privately operated prison, community correctional facility, county jail, city jail, or any other state, local, or privately operated detention facility; and
  2. “Parole or probation officer” means a parole or probation officer of the Department of Community Correction.

History. Acts 1997, No. 282, § 1.

16-93-1402. Notice to parole or probation officer.

  1. The purpose of this subchapter is to provide parole or probation officers with information so they can make informed programming decisions and direct offenders to autoimmune deficiency syndrome-related resources, including appropriate financial, housing, legal, medical, and counseling services.
  2. Upon the release of an offender from a correctional institution, a medical representative of the correctional institution shall notify the offender's parole or probation officer when the offender has tested positive for infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), or has been diagnosed as having acquired deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or acquired immune deficiency syndrome-related conditions.
  3. Information obtained by a parole or probation officer pursuant to this subchapter shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as specifically authorized by this subchapter.

History. Acts 1997, No. 282, § 2.

Subchapter 15 — Parole — Sentence Served in County Jail

16-93-1501, 16-93-1502. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning parole — sentence served in county jail, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 570, § 109. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-93-1501. Acts 2003, No. 1394, § 1.

16-93-1502. Acts 2003, No. 1394, § 2.

Subchapter 16 — Transitional Housing Facilities

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2005, No. 678, § 1, provided:

“Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to:

“(a) Establish rules for facilities that house offenders who have been transferred, paroled, or placed on probation through the Arkansas criminal justice system in order to promote, protect, and improve the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the State of Arkansas; and

“(b) Establish these rules in order to help reduce recidivism in our criminal justice system and to provide regulations to protect the individuals in the programs and to protect the neighborhoods and communities in which the programs and facilities are located.”

This subchapter is set out below as enacted by Acts 2005, No. 1378, § 1. Acts 2005, No. 678, § 2, also enacted a new subchapter 16 of this chapter concerning transitional housing facilities which could not be conformed to the later act, to read as follows:

“19-93-1601. Definitions.

“As used in this subchapter:

“(1) ‘Applicant’ means any individual, business, or organization that has applied to receive an Arkansas Transitional Housing Facility License;

“(2) ‘License’ means Arkansas Transitional Housing Facility License; and

“(3) ‘Transitional housing’ means a program that provides housing for one (1) or more offenders who have either been transferred or paroled from the Department of Correction by the Post Prison Transfer Board or placed on probation by a circuit or district court. An offender's home or the residence of an offender's family member shall not be considered a transitional housing facility for purposes of this subchapter.

“16-93-1602. Powers and duties of the Board of Corrections.

“(a) The Board of Corrections shall promulgate rules that will set minimum standards for all transitional housing facilities in the State of Arkansas.

“(b) All of the standards set by the rules described in subsection (a) of this section must be established prior to the Post Prison Transfer Board or a district or circuit court releasing a transferee, parolee, or probationer to a transitional housing facility as a resident.

“(c) The rules described in subsection (a) of this section shall include at least the following:

“(1) Compliance with any local health and safety codes, including housing codes, fire codes, plumbing codes, and electrical codes, set by the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the facility is located;

“(2) Compliance with any local zoning ordinances;

“(3) Compliance with any state and federal health and safety codes

“(4) Allowable ratio of facility square footage to residents; and

“(5) Allowable ratio of bathing and restroom facilities to residents.

“(d)(1) The rules described in subsection (a) of this section shall be promulgated on or before January 1, 2006.

“(2) The Board of Corrections is authorized to make additions, amendments, changes, or alterations to the rules in accordance with the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq.

“16-93-1603. Powers and duties of the Department of Community Correction.

“(a) The Department of Community Correction shall implement the rules described in § 16-93-1602 on or before July 1, 2006.

“(b)(1) The Department of Community Correction shall be responsible for the enforcement of the rules established by the Board of Corrections under § 16-93-1602.

“(2) The Department of Community Correction shall establish all procedures and forms it deems necessary to implement the rules, and the procedures shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

“(A) Creating a state-issued Arkansas Transitional Housing Facility License for applicant facilities that have met the standards established by the rules of the Board of Corrections;

“(B) Establish the process to be followed by individuals, businesses, or organizations in making application to the Department of Community Correction to receive a state-issued license to operate an approved transitional housing facility, which will include a reasonable application fee to be established by the Board of Corrections;

“(C) Establish procedures for the Department of Community Correction to accept applications for facilities wishing to obtain a license to operate a transitional housing facility and to investigate whether applicants meet the standards established by the rules of the Board of Corrections;

“(D) Establish procedures for the Department of Community Correction to notify an applicant when its application has been approved or denied. All denials shall specify in writing the reason for the application's denial;

“(E) Establish procedures to investigate complaints that a licensed facility is in violation of the standards established by the rules of the Board of Corrections; and

“(F) Establish procedures for the Department of Community Correction to suspend or revoke licenses when a license holder is no longer in compliance with or violates the rules of the Board of Corrections.

“(c) The Director and staff of the Department of Community Correction shall provide administrative support to the Board of Corrections.”

Acts 2007, No. 1286, § 15, provided: “TRANSITIONAL HOUSING PROGRAM FUNDING REQUIREMENTS. A minimum of one million five hundred thousand ($1,500,000) dollars each fiscal year shall be expended for Transitional Housing costs associated with inmate and/or parolee placement. In the event that a minimum of one million five hundred thousand ($1,500,000) dollars can not be expended each fiscal year for Transitional Housing Program costs, the Director of the Department of Community Correction shall notify and seek approval by the Arkansas Legislative Council or Joint Budget Committee.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-93-1601. Legislative intent.

It is the intent of the General Assembly to:

  1. Establish rules for facilities that house offenders who have been transferred, paroled, or placed on probation through the Arkansas criminal justice system in order to promote, protect, and improve the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the State of Arkansas; and
  2. Establish these rules in order to help reduce recidivism in our criminal justice system and to provide rules to protect the individuals in the programs and to protect the neighborhoods and communities in which the programs and facilities are located.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1378, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 1316.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” preceding the first occurrence of “to protect” in (2).

16-93-1602. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Applicant” means any individual, business, or organization that has applied to receive an Arkansas transitional housing facility license;
  2. “License” means an Arkansas transitional housing facility license; and
    1. “Transitional housing” means a program that provides housing for one (1) or more offenders who either have been transferred or paroled from the Division of Correction by the Parole Board or placed on probation by a circuit court or district court.
    2. An offender's home or the residence of an offender's family member shall not be considered a transitional housing facility as used in this subchapter.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1378, § 2; 2019, No. 910, § 946.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (3)(A).

16-93-1603. Powers and duties of the Board of Corrections.

  1. The Board of Corrections shall promulgate rules or develop administrative directives that set minimum standards for all transitional housing facilities in the State of Arkansas.
    1. The Parole Board, a district court, or a circuit court shall not release a transferee, parolee, or probationer to a transitional housing facility as a resident unless the transitional housing facility provides a copy of a current license issued by the Division of Community Correction under § 16-93-1604.
    2. The transitional housing facility shall comply with all the standards set by the rules or administrative directives established by the Board of Corrections under subsection (a) of this section.
  2. The rules and administrative directives described in subsection (a) of this section shall include at least the following:
    1. Compliance with any local health and safety codes, including housing codes, fire codes, plumbing codes, and electrical codes, set by the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the transitional housing facility is located;
    2. Compliance with any local zoning ordinances;
    3. Compliance with any state and federal health and safety codes;
    4. Consideration of geographic dispersement of transitional housing facilities;
    5. Allowable ratio of transitional housing facility square footage to residents; and
    6. Allowable ratio of bathing facilities and restroom facilities to residents.
  3. Each transitional housing facility shall be licensed by its type.
  4. As used in this section, “transitional housing facility” includes a reentry, self-governed, or other type of post-incarceration housing as approved by the Board of Corrections and licensed by the division.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1378, § 2; 2009, No. 615, § 1; 2019, No. 159, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (b), which read: “All of the standards set by the rules described in subsection (a) of this section shall be established prior to the Parole Board's or a district or circuit court's releasing a transferee, parolee, or probationer to a transitional housing facility as a resident.”

The 2019 amendment inserted “or develop administrative directives” and deleted “shall” following “that” in (a); inserted “or administrative directives” in (b)(2); inserted “and administrative directives” in the introductory language of (c); rewrote (d); and added (e).

Case Notes

No Waiver of Sovereign Immunity.

Arkansas Department of Community Correction (DCC) was entitled to sovereign immunity from the city action's to enjoin it from changing the use of a portion of its facility under Ark. Const. Art. 5, § 20 because a judgment against the DCC would operate to control the action of the State as it would allow the city to direct how the DCC used its property. The court further held that this section did not contain either an express or an implied waiver of sovereign immunity because nothing in the statutory scheme indicated a legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity. Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, 425 S.W.3d 731 (2013).

16-93-1604. Powers and duties of the Division of Community Correction.

  1. The Division of Community Correction shall implement the rules or administrative directives described in § 16-93-1603.
    1. The division shall be responsible for the enforcement of the rules and administrative directives established by the Board of Corrections under § 16-93-1603.
    2. The division shall establish all procedures and forms that it deems necessary to implement the rules or administrative directives, and the procedures shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
      1. Creating state-issued Arkansas transitional housing facility licenses by type for applicant facilities that have met the standards established by the rules and administrative directives of the board;
      2. Establishing the process to be followed by an applicant in making application to the division to receive a license to operate an approved transitional housing facility, which shall include a reasonable application fee to be established by the board;
      3. Establishing procedures for the division to accept applications for facilities wishing to obtain a license to operate a transitional housing facility and to investigate whether applicants meet the standards established by the rules and administrative directives of the board;
        1. Establishing procedures for the division to notify an applicant when its application has been approved or denied.
        2. All denials shall specify in writing the reason for the application's denial;
      4. Establishing procedures to investigate complaints that a licensed transitional housing facility is in violation of the standards established by the rules and administrative directives of the board;
      5. Establishing procedures for the division to suspend or revoke a license when a license holder is no longer in compliance with or violates the rules and administrative directives of the board; and
      6. Establishing procedures for the division to impose civil penalties for the operation of a transitional housing facility without a valid license issued by the division.
  2. The Director of the Division of Community Correction and the staff of the division shall provide administrative support to the board.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1378, § 2; 2009, No. 615, § 2; 2019, No. 159, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (b)(2)(G) and made related changes.

The 2019 amendment inserted “or administrative directives” in (a) and the introductory language of (b)(2); deleted “on or before July 1, 2006” from the end of (a); inserted “and administrative directives” throughout (b); substituted “licenses by type” for “license” in (b)(2)(A); and made a stylistic change.

16-93-1605. License required.

  1. In order to operate a transitional housing facility for criminal offenders who have been transferred, paroled, or placed on probation through the Arkansas criminal justice system, the operator shall obtain a license by facility type from the Division of Community Correction.
    1. Operation of a transitional housing facility without a license issued by the division shall result in the imposition of civil penalties against the operator by the division.
    2. Civil penalties for operation of a transitional housing facility without a valid license shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) per day for each day the violation continues.
    3. However, no civil penalty may be assessed until the person charged with the violation has been given the opportunity for a hearing on the violation.
  2. A criminal offender who has been transferred, paroled, or placed on probation through the Arkansas criminal justice system shall not be sent via court order to a transitional housing facility that is not properly licensed by the division.

History. Acts 2009, No. 615, § 3; 2019, No. 159, § 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “by facility type” in (a).

Subchapter 17 — Swift and Certain Accountability on Probation Pilot Program

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

16-93-1701. Establishment.

The Administrative Office of the Courts shall:

  1. Create the Swift and Certain Accountability on Probation Pilot Program, awarding up to five (5) grants in the program's first year to counties or judicial districts requesting funds to establish probation programs to be administered by the Department of Community Correction designed to reduce recidivism by requiring swift, certain, and graduated sanctions for probationers in noncompliance;
  2. Possess the discretion to determine the appropriate number of grants based on the amount of money allocated for the program and the capacity of the applicants based on submitted proposals to successfully implement and evaluate the program;
  3. Ensure that grants awarded under this subchapter are awarded in a manner that promotes the strongest proposals and evaluation designs that have the broadest impact and that are evenly geographically distributed; and
  4. Employ a person who shall have as one-half (½) of his or her designated job duties the management of the program established under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 110.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

16-93-1702. Application.

  1. A county or judicial district may apply for a grant award under this subchapter by submitting a written application to the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. The application shall include the following:
    1. A description of the proposed probation program and the need in the county or judicial district for the establishment of a probation program under this subchapter;
    2. A description of the long-term strategy and a detailed plan of implementation, including how the county or judicial district intends to pay for the probation program after the grant funding is exhausted;
    3. A certification that all government or private entities that would be affected by the proposed probation program have been appropriately consulted regarding the development of the probation program;
    4. A description of the coordination plan involving all government or private entities in the implementation process;
    5. Identification of the governmental and judicial partners in the proposed probation program, including the chief judge of the circuit court as well as other participating judges in the applicable jurisdiction, the court administrator, the probation administrator, the county sheriff, the prosecuting attorney, the public defender, applicable private defense attorneys, applicable municipal law enforcement administrators, and applicable treatment provider administrators; and
    6. A description of how and assurances that the applicant will collect key process measures, including the:
      1. Number of probationers enrolled in the probation program;
      2. Frequency of drug testing probationers;
      3. Positive drug test rate and other rates of noncompliance with the measurable conditions of supervision;
      4. Kinds of sanctions available for a violation of probation;
      5. Kinds of rewards available for positive behavior;
      6. Certainty of the application of an appropriate sanction;
      7. Average period of time from detection of a violation to issuance of a sanction for the violation;
      8. Severity of the sanction; and
      9. Time between the completion of the sanction and a subsequent violation, if any.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 110.

16-93-1703. Grant uses — Definition.

  1. A grant awarded under this subchapter shall be used by the grantee to establish probation programs that:
    1. Identify probationers for enrollment in the probation program, through, among other tools, a validated risk-needs assessment tool, who are:
      1. Serving a term of probation;
      2. At high risk of failing to observe the conditions of supervision; and
      3. At high risk of being returned to incarceration as a result of that failure;
    2. Notify probationers of the rules of the probation program, and consequences for violating those rules;
    3. Monitor probationers for illicit drug use with regular and rapid-result drug screening;
    4. Monitor probationers for violations of other rules and probation terms, including failure to pay court-ordered financial obligations such as child support or victim restitution;
    5. Respond to violations of those rules with immediate arrest of the violating probationer and swift and certain modification of the conditions of probation, including imposition of short jail stays;
    6. Immediately respond to probationers who have absconded from supervision with service of bench warrants and immediate sanctions;
      1. Provide rewards to probationers who comply with those rules.
      2. Rewards shall include without limitation:
        1. Reduced reporting requirements;
        2. Less frequent drug testing;
        3. Certificates of achievement;
        4. Other rewards as determined by the locality; and
        5. Early termination of the sentence;
    7. Ensure funding for and referral to substance abuse treatment for probationers who repeatedly fail to refrain from illicit drug use;
    8. Establish procedures to terminate probation program participation by and initiate revocation to a term of incarceration for probationers who habitually fail to abide by probation program rules and pose a threat to public safety; and
    9. Include regular coordination meetings for key partners of the probation program, including the partners identified under § 16-93-1702(b)(5).
  2. As used in this section, “validated risk-needs assessment” means a determination of a person's risk to reoffend and the needs that, when addressed, reduce the risk to reoffend through the use of an actuarial assessment tool that assesses the dynamic and static factors that drive criminal behavior.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 110.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

16-93-1704. Determination of probation program savings.

  1. Each county or judicial district receiving a grant under this subchapter shall:
    1. Not later than twelve (12) months after an initial grant award under this section and annually thereafter through the end of the grant period calculate the amount of cost savings and costs averted, if any, resulting from the reduced incarceration achieved through the Swift and Certain Accountability on Probation Pilot Program; and
    2. Report to the Administrative Office of the Courts:
      1. The amount calculated under subdivision (a)(1) of this section; and
      2. The portion of the amount, if any, that will be reinvested for expansion of the program.
  2. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall:
    1. Annually evaluate:
      1. The methods used by courts to calculate the cost savings reported under subdivision (a)(1) of this section; and
      2. The use of the savings by the courts to reinvest for expansion of the program; and
    2. Provide guidance, assistance, and recommendations to such courts relating to the potential reinvestment of such savings for expansion of the program.
  3. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall select an entity to serve as the program initiative evaluation coordinator to:
    1. Analyze and provide feedback on the measures and outcomes the individual initiative probation programs are required to collect and conduct, respectively, in accordance with § 16-93-1702(b)(6);
    2. Ensure consistent tracking of the progress of the demonstration programs carried out under this section, including such measures and outcomes; and
    3. Ensure that the aggregate data from all such programs is available to each of the programs and to the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  4. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall report annually to the General Assembly and the Governor the results of the program initiative carried out under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 110.

Chapter 94 Extradition

Research References

Am. Jur. 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extrad., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Conflict of Laws, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 25.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1978-82, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 191.

C.J.S. 35 C.J.S., Extrad., § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1925, No. 364, § 3: approved Apr. 1, 1925. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, for the reason that several persons are now under indictment and a delay might defeat their return to the State, hence an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1981, No. 71, § 3: Feb. 16, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Arkansas law does not presently specifically authorize the Governor to consent to the transfer of convicted foreign nationals to their country of citizenship, and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide such authorization. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-94-101. Expenses incurred in return of fugitives.

  1. County judges may and are authorized and empowered to pay out of the general revenue fund of the county the necessary expenses incurred by the county sheriff of the county incident to the return of fugitives to the state.
  2. In order for a county sheriff or his or her deputy to avail himself or herself of the provisions of this section, it shall be necessary to secure a requisition from the Governor for the return of the fugitive and to file an itemized account of the necessary expenses incurred in the capture and return of the fugitive to the state, which account shall be properly sworn to and verified.

History. Acts 1925, No. 364, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 6110, 6111; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-3029, 43-3030.

16-94-102. Transfer of convicted foreign citizens or nationals under treaty.

When a treaty is in effect between the United States and a foreign country providing for the transfer of a convicted offender who is a citizen or national of the foreign country to that country, the Governor is authorized, subject to the terms of the treaty, to consent to the transfer of the convicted offender.

History. Acts 1981, No. 71, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3002.1.

16-94-103. Waiver of extradition warrant.

    1. Any person arrested in this state charged with having committed any crime in another state or alleged to have escaped from confinement or broken the terms of his or her bail, probation, or parole may waive the issuance and service of the warrant provided under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 16-94-201 et seq., and all other procedures incidental to extradition proceedings, by executing or subscribing in the presence of a judge of any court of record within this state a writing which states that he or she consents to return to the demanding state.
    2. Before the waiver shall be executed or subscribed to by the person, it shall be the duty of such judge to inform such person of his or her rights to await the issuance and service of a warrant of extradition and to contest extradition following issuance of the warrant of the Governor as provided for in § 16-94-207.
    3. Following waiver of extradition, the person shall be placed in custody without bail to await delivery to the agent of the demanding state.
    4. The agent of the demanding state need not be present at the waiver.
    1. If and when the consent has been duly executed, it shall immediately be forwarded to the office of the Governor of this state and filed there.
    2. The judge shall direct the officer having the person in custody to deliver forthwith the person to the duly accredited agent or agents of the demanding state, and shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the agent or agents a copy of such consent.
  1. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit the rights of the accused person to return voluntarily and without formality to the demanding state, nor shall this waiver procedure be deemed to be an exclusive procedure or to limit the powers, rights, or duties of the officers of the demanding state or of this state.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a law enforcement agency in this state holding a person who is alleged to have broken the terms of his or her probation, parole, bail, or any other release in the demanding state shall immediately deliver the person to the duly authorized agent of the demanding state without the requirement of a Governor's warrant if all of the following apply:
    1. Waiver. The person has signed a prior waiver of extradition as a term of his or her current probation, parole, bail, or other release in the demanding state; and
    2. Authenticated Copy. The law enforcement agency holding the person has received an authenticated copy of the prior waiver of extradition signed by the person and photographs or fingerprints or other evidence properly identifying the person as the person who signed the waiver.

History. Acts 1995, No. 841, § 1.

16-94-104. Extradition for theft of certain property.

The Governor may request the extradition of a person charged with theft of property if the person committed the theft of property by:

  1. Being subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq., as it existed on January 1, 2013;
  2. Obtaining livestock from a commission merchant by representing that the person will make prompt payment; and
  3. Failing to make payment in accordance with 7 U.S.C. § 228b, as it existed on January 1, 2013.

History. Acts 2013, No. 498, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Uniform Criminal Extradition Act

Publisher's Notes. For Comments regarding the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, see Commentaries Volume B.

Case Notes

Executive Agreement.

An executive agreement providing for the return of prisoners to another state after their trial in Arkansas on robbery charges, but before serving their sentences in Arkansas, was not violative of this subchapter nor invalid as an interstate agreement made without consent of Congress and was not a violation of due process. Hinkle v. Rockefeller, 249 Ark. 110, 458 S.W.2d 371 (1970).

Taking of Prisoner.

This subchapter does not place any limit on the time during which the agent of the demanding state must take charge of the prisoner. Long v. Cauthron, 22 Ark. App. 1, 731 S.W.2d 792 (1987).

Time of Trial.

A person incarcerated in a sister state at the time of his indictment in Arkansas has the right to ask Arkansas to extradite him for trial but, if the sister state refuses or requires some kind of waiver which the prisoner does not accomplish, the prisoner will not be entitled to discharge under the former “two-term-discharge” statute; however, if the sister state does agree to extradition upon conditions met, then Arkansas must extradite and try the prisoner with due diligence or he will be entitled to the benefit of the statute. Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225 Ark. 459, 283 S.W.2d 162 (1955).

16-94-201. Definitions.

Where appearing in this subchapter, the term “Governor” includes any person performing the functions of Governor by authority of the law of this state. The term “executive authority” includes the Governor and any person performing the functions of governor in a state other than this state. And the term “state” referring to a state other than this state refers to any other state or territory organized or unorganized of the United States of America.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 6081; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3001.

16-94-202. Duty of Governor.

Subject to the qualifications of this subchapter, and the provisions of the Constitution of the United States controlling, and acts of Congress in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the Governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 6082; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3002.

Case Notes

In General.

The act of honoring a requisition from a foreign state by the executive branch of this state is a summary one conditioned on the Governor finding that the documents presented by the demanding state meet the requirements of the extradition statutes. Rivera v. State, 19 Ark. App. 100, 717 S.W.2d 493 (1986).

Arrest.

Evidence sufficient to authorize the governor of Arkansas to issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and hold him in jail for extradition. Hammond v. State, 244 Ark. 186, 424 S.W.2d 861, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 839, 89 S. Ct. 116, 21 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1968).

16-94-203. Procedure generally.

No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by an information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereon. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state; and the copy must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand, which shall be prima facie evidence of its truth.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 6083; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3003.

Case Notes

Extraditable Offenses.

Misdemeanors are extraditable offenses. Glover v. State, 257 Ark. 241, 515 S.W.2d 641 (1974).

Federal Law.

The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act must be considered along with the federal statutes because the federal act controls where there is an inconsistency, however, the legislature of the asylum state may permit its governor to surrender a fugitive on terms less exacting than those imposed by Congress. Glover v. State, 257 Ark. 241, 515 S.W.2d 641 (1974).

Any information supported by an affidavit is adequate to meet the requirements of extradition in this state regardless of federal law requiring that an indictment or affidavit before a magistrate be issued by the requesting state before it can be honored. Carrico v. Pearson, 262 Ark. 278, 555 S.W.2d 951 (1977).

Sufficiency of Affidavit.

Evidence sufficient to show defendant was lawfully charged by information supported by an affidavit sufficient to warrant the issuance of the warrant of extradition by the Governor. Glover v. State, 257 Ark. 241, 515 S.W.2d 641 (1974).

Extradition warrant issued in another state was not void where the defendant fell far short of proving that the affidavit on which such warrant was issued was erroneous, untrue, or insufficient. Wilkins v. State, 258 Ark. 578, 528 S.W.2d 382 (1975).

Variance.

In habeas corpus proceeding to prevent extradition, alleged variance in the charge as set out by affidavit and information and proof offered need not be considered where there was a “substantial charge” of a violation of the laws of the demanding state. Stuart v. Johnson, 192 Ark. 757, 94 S.W.2d 715 (1936).

16-94-204. Investigation by Attorney General.

When a demand shall be made upon the Governor of this state by the executive authority of another state for the surrender of a person so charged with crime, the Governor may call upon the Attorney General or any prosecuting officer in this state to investigate or assist in investigating the demand, and to report to him or her the situation and circumstances of the person so demanded and whether he or she ought to be surrendered.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 6084; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3004.

Case Notes

Other Investigators.

This section does not preclude the governor from employing persons other than the attorney general to make the investigation concerning the requested extradition nor from relying on the report of and information supplied by such person in determining whether or not to issue the warrant. Hammond v. State, 244 Ark. 186, 424 S.W.2d 861, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 839, 89 S. Ct. 116, 21 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1968).

16-94-205. Warrant generally.

A warrant of extradition must not be issued unless documents presented by the executive authority making the demand show that:

I. Except in cases arising under § 16-94-206, the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and thereafter fled from the state;

II. The accused is now in this state; and

III. He or she is lawfully charged by indictment found or by information filed by a prosecuting officer and supported by affidavit to the facts, or by affidavit made before a magistrate in that state, with having committed a crime under the laws of that state, or that he or she has been convicted of a crime in that state and has escaped from confinement or broken his or her parole.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 6085; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3005.

Case Notes

Requirements for Issuance.

Defendant was lawfully charged by information supported by affidavit as to the facts sufficient to warrant the issuance of the warrant of extradition by the governor. Glover v. State, 257 Ark. 241, 515 S.W.2d 641 (1974).

16-94-206. Absence of fugitive from other state when crime committed.

The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state in the manner provided in § 16-94-205 with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand; and the provisions of this subchapter not otherwise inconsistent shall apply to such cases, notwithstanding that the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 6086; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3006.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is based on a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Lindley v. Crider, 223 Ark. 200, 265 S.W.2d 498 (1954).

In General.

A person need not be a fugitive from the requesting state in order to be extradited to that state; a person may be extradited if he is found to be a nonfugitive accused of committing an act in Arkansas intentionally resulting in a crime in the requesting state. Fullerton v. McCord, 339 Ark. 45, 2 S.W.3d 775 (1999).

16-94-207. Governor to sign warrant.

If the Governor shall decide that the demand should be complied with, he or she shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the state seal, and be directed to a sheriff, marshal, coroner, or other person whom he or she may think fit to entrust with the execution thereof; and the warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issue.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 6087; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3007.

Case Notes

Habeas Corpus.

Contention in habeas corpus proceeding to prevent extradition that charge is barred by limitation was a matter of defense to the charge not offerable as a ground for a writ of habeas corpus. Stuart v. Johnson, 192 Ark. 757, 94 S.W.2d 715 (1936).

After the issuance of the Governor's warrant, the only proceeding available to an accused in an extradition proceeding was by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the only matters for the court to consider in such case were the identity of the accused and if he was a fugitive. Cadle v. Cauthron, 266 Ark. 419, 584 S.W.2d 6 (1979).

Source of Information.

Legality of the Governor's action in signing the warrant of arrest is not dependent on the source of the information upon which he acts. Hammond v. State, 244 Ark. 186, 424 S.W.2d 861, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 839, 89 S. Ct. 116, 21 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1968).

The Governor of the State of Arkansas is not required by the constitution or this subchapter to make an investigation outside the record nor to hold a hearing to allow the accused to present his views; if the papers furnished by the demanding state supply the necessary information, it is not necessary for the governor to look further. Cadle v. Cauthron, 266 Ark. 419, 584 S.W.2d 6 (1979).

16-94-208. Contents of warrant.

Such warrant shall authorize the officer or other person to whom directed to arrest the accused at any place where he may be found within the state and to command the aid of all sheriffs and other peace officers in the execution of the warrant, and to deliver the accused subject to the provisions of this subchapter to the duly authorized agent of the demanding state.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 6088; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3008.

16-94-209. Arresting officer.

Every such officer or other person empowered to make the arrest shall have the same authority in arresting the accused to command assistance therein, as sheriffs and other officers have by law in the execution of any criminal process directed to them, with the like penalties against those who refuse their assistance.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 9; Pope's Dig., § 6089; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3009.

16-94-210. Accused to be informed of demand — Habeas corpus.

No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding the person shall have appointed to receive the person unless he or she has been informed of the demand made for his or her surrender and of the crime with which he or she is charged and that he or she has the right to demand legal counsel; and if the prisoner, his or her friends, or counsel shall state that he or she or they desire to test the legality of the arrest, the prisoner shall be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this state, who shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed the prisoner within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. And when such writ is applied for, notice thereof, and of the time and place of hearing thereon, shall be given to the public prosecuting officer of the county in which the arrest is made and in which the accused is in custody, and to the said agent of the demanding state.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 10; Pope's Dig., § 6090; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3010.

Cross References. Habeas corpus, § 16-112-101 et seq.

Case Notes

Evidence.

The Uniform Rules of Evidence do not apply to proceedings for extradition or rendition because the purpose of the extradition hearing is simply to determine whether the evidence of the fugitive's criminal conduct is sufficient to justify his extradition. Rivera v. State, 19 Ark. App. 100, 717 S.W.2d 493 (1986).

Unsworn statements of an absent witness may be considered in an extradition hearing as there is no inherent right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. Rivera v. State, 19 Ark. App. 100, 717 S.W.2d 493 (1986).

Habeas Corpus.

Once the Governor has honored the requisition, the circuit court can consider a petition for habeas corpus for only two purposes — to establish the identity of the accused and to determine whether he is a fugitive. Rivera v. State, 19 Ark. App. 100, 717 S.W.2d 493 (1986).

16-94-211. Penalty.

Any officer who shall deliver to the agent for extradition of the demanding state a person in his or her custody under the Governor's warrant in disobedience to the last section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned not more than six (6) months, or both.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 11; Pope's Dig., § 6091; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3011.

16-94-212. Confining of accused in jail while en route.

The officer or person executing the Governor's warrant of arrest, or the agent of the demanding state to whom the prisoner may have been delivered, may when necessary confine the prisoner in the jail of any county or city through which he or she may pass; and the keeper of such jail must receive and safely keep the prisoner until the person having charge of him or her is ready to proceed on his or her route, such person being chargeable with the expense of keeping.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 12; Pope's Dig., § 6092; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3012.

16-94-213. Arrest prior to requisition.

Whenever any person within this state shall be charged on the oath of any credible person before any judge or other magistrate of this state with the commission of a crime in any other state, and, except in cases arising under § 16-94-206, with having fled from justice; or whenever complaint shall have been made before any judge or other magistrate in this state setting forth on the affidavit of any credible person in another state that a crime has been committed in such other state and that the accused has been charged in such state with the commission of the crime, and except in cases arising under § 16-94-206, has fled therefrom and is believed to have been found in this state, the judge or magistrate shall issue a warrant directed to the sheriff of the county in which the oath or complaint is filed directing him or her to apprehend the person charged, wherever he or she may be found in this state, and bring him or her before the same or any other judge, court, or magistrate who may be convenient of access to the place where the arrest may be made, to answer the charge or complaint and affidavit; and a certified copy of the sworn charge or complaint and affidavit upon which the warrant is issued shall be attached to the warrant.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 13; Pope's Dig., § 6093; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3013.

Case Notes

Civil Rights Violations.

Bail bondsman was not a state actor when he filed an affidavit requesting a plaintiff's arrest under this section and, therefore, was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on claim that he deprived plaintiff of his civil rights, under § 16-123-105. Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1997).

16-94-214. Arrest without warrant — Delivery to other state without Governor's warrant.

  1. The arrest of a person may be lawfully made also by an officer or a private citizen without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of another state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one (1) year; but when so arrested the accused must be taken before a judge or magistrate with all practicable speed and complaint must be made against him or her under oath setting forth the ground for the arrest as in the last section; and thereafter his or her answer shall be heard as if he or she had been arrested on a warrant.
  2. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a law enforcement officer shall deliver a person in custody to the accredited agent or agents of a demanding state without the Governor's warrant provided that:
    1. Such person is alleged to have broken the terms of his or her probation, parole, bail or any other release of the demanding state; and
    2. The law enforcement agency has received from the demanding state an authenticated copy of a prior waiver of extradition signed by such person as a term of his or her probation, parole, bail or any other release of the demanding state. The copy shall contain photographs, fingerprints or other evidence properly identifying such person as the person who signed the waiver.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 14; Pope's Dig., § 6094; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3014; Acts 1995, No. 556, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Subsection (b) of this section is not in the official version of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.

Cross References. Authority to arrest without warrant, Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1.

Case Notes

Cited: Cadle v. Cauthron, 266 Ark. 419, 584 S.W.2d 6 (1979).

16-94-215. Jailing of accused by magistrate.

If from the examination before the judge or magistrate it appears that the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged and that he or she probably committed the crime, and, except in cases arising under § 16-94-206, that he or she has fled from justice, the judge or magistrate must commit him or her to jail by a warrant reciting the accusation for such a time specified in the warrant as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the Governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the accused gives bail as provided in the next section, or until he or she shall be legally discharged.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 15; Pope's Dig., § 6095; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3015.

Cross References. Procedure for pretrial release of arrested persons, Ark. R. Crim. P. 8.1 et seq.

16-94-216. Bail.

Unless the offense with which the prisoner is charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment under the laws of the state in which it was committed, the judge or magistrate must admit the person arrested to bail by bond or undertaking, with sufficient sureties, and in such sum as the judge or magistrate deems proper, for the prisoner's appearance before the judge or magistrate at a time specified in such bond or undertaking, and for the prisoner's surrender, to be arrested upon the warrant of the Governor of this state.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 16; Pope's Dig., § 6096; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3016.

Cross References. Bail, § 16-81-109.

Bail generally, § 16-84-101 et seq.

Release on money bail, Ark. R. Crim. P. 9.2.

Research References

ALR.

Allowance of Bail in International Extradition Proceedings. 60 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 203.

Case Notes

Time.

Accused had the right to be taken before a magistrate and to have bail fixed at any time prior to the issuance of the Governor's warrant; however, after the issuance of the Governor's warrant, the only proceeding available to an accused in an extradition proceeding was by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the only matters for the court to consider in such case were the identity of the accused and if he was a fugitive. Cadle v. Cauthron, 266 Ark. 419, 584 S.W.2d 6 (1979).

16-94-217. Discharge of warrant.

If the accused is not arrested under warrant of the Governor by the expiration of the time specified in the warrant, bond, or undertaking, the judge or magistrate may discharge the accused or may recommit the accused to a further day, or may again take bail for his or her appearance and surrender, as provided in § 16-94-216; and at the expiration of the second period of commitment, or if the accused has been bailed and appeared according to the terms of his or her bond or undertaking, the judge or magistrate may either discharge the prisoner, or may require the prisoner to enter into a new bond or undertaking, to appear and surrender himself or herself at another day.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 17; Pope's Dig., § 6097; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3017.

16-94-218. Forfeiture of bond.

If the prisoner is admitted to bail and fails to appear and surrender himself or herself according to the condition of his or her bond, the court by proper order shall declare the bond forfeited; and recovery may be had thereon in the name of the state as in the case of other bonds or undertakings given by the accused in criminal proceedings within this state.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 18; Pope's Dig., § 6098; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3018.

16-94-219. Criminal prosecution in this state.

If a criminal prosecution has been instituted against the person under the laws of this state and is still pending, the Governor at his or her discretion either may surrender him or her on the demand of the executive authority of another state or may hold him or her until the person has been tried and discharged or convicted and punished in this state.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 19; Pope's Dig., § 6099; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3019.

16-94-220. Pertinence of guilt or innocence of accused.

The guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which he or she is charged may not be inquired into by the Governor or in any proceeding after the demand for extradition accompanied by a charge of crime in legal form as above provided shall have been presented to the Governor, except as it may be involved in identifying the person held as the person charged with the crime.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 20; Pope's Dig., § 6100; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3020.

Case Notes

Proof of Identity.

Proof of identity held sufficient. Stuart v. Johnson, 192 Ark. 757, 94 S.W.2d 715 (1936).

Res Judicata.

The discharge of a prisoner in a sister state in a habeas corpus proceeding under extradition on ground that the prisoner was not identified is not res judicata in subsequent similar proceedings in Arkansas in which the identity of the prisoner was established. Letwick v. State, 211 Ark. 1, 198 S.W.2d 830 (1947).

16-94-221. Recall of warrant or issuance of alias.

The Governor may recall his or her warrant of arrest or may issue another warrant whenever he or she deems proper.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 21; Pope's Dig., § 6101; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3021.

16-94-222. Issuance of warrant for fugitives from this state.

Whenever the Governor of this state shall demand a person charged with crime in this state from the chief executive of any other state, or from the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia authorized to receive such demand under the laws of the United States, he or she shall issue a warrant under the seal of this state, to some agent, commanding him or her to receive the person so charged if delivered to him or her and convey him or her to the proper officer of the county in this state in which the offense was committed.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 22; Pope's Dig., § 6102; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3022.

16-94-223. Obtaining Governor's requisition.

When the return to this state of a person charged with crime in this state is required, the prosecuting attorney (of the county in which the offense is committed) shall present to the Governor his or her written application for a requisition for the return of the person charged, in which application shall be stated the name of the person so charged, the crime charged against him or her, and the approximate time, place, and circumstances of its committal, the state in which he or she is believed to be, including the location of the accused therein at the time the application is made, and certifying that in the opinion of the said prosecuting attorney the ends of justice require the arrest and return of the accused to this state for trial, and that the proceeding is not instituted to enforce a private claim. The application shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate and shall be accompanied by two (2) certified copies of the indictment returned, or information and affidavit filed, or of the complaint made to the magistrate, stating the offense with which the accused is charged. The prosecuting officer may also attach such further affidavits and other documents in duplicate as he or she shall deem proper to be submitted with such application. One (1) copy of the application with the action of the Governor indicated by endorsement thereon, and one (1) of the certified copies of the indictment or complaint or information and affidavit, shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State to remain of record in that office. The other copies of all papers shall be forwarded with the Governor's requisition.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 23; Pope's Dig., § 6103; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3023.

16-94-224. Expenses.

When the punishment of the crime shall be the confinement of the criminal in the penitentiary, the expenses shall be paid out of the State Treasury, on the certificate of the Governor and warrant of the Auditor of State; and in all other cases they shall be paid out of the county treasury in the county wherein the crime is alleged to have been committed. The expenses shall be the fees paid to the officers of the state on whose governor the requisition is made, and not exceeding cents a mile for all necessary travel in returning such prisoner.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 24; Pope's Dig., § 6104; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3024.

16-94-225. Immunity from service of process.

A person brought into this state on extradition based on a criminal charge shall not be subject to service of personal process in civil actions arising out of the same facts as the criminal proceeding to answer which he or she is returned, until he or she has been convicted in the criminal proceeding, or if acquitted, until he or she has had ample opportunity to return to the state from which he or she was extradited.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 25; Pope's Dig., § 6105; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3025.

16-94-226. Trial for other crimes.

After a person has been brought back to this state upon extradition proceedings, he or she may be tried in this state for other crimes which he or she may be charged with having committed here, as well as that specified in the requisition for his or her extradition.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 26; Pope's Dig., § 6106; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3026.

16-94-227. Construction.

This subchapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 27; Pope's Dig., § 6107; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3027.

16-94-228. Separability.

If any part of this subchapter is for any reason declared void, such invalidity shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 28; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3027n.

16-94-229. Repealer.

All acts or parts of acts and administrative rules inconsistent with this subchapter are hereby repealed.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 29; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3027n.

16-94-230. Title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.”

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 30; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3028.

16-94-231. Effective date.

Whereas, under the present laws there is no effective way whereby the extradition of criminals may be effectively had; and,

Whereas, it is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety for an efficient statute covering the subject of extradition of criminals, an emergency is hereby declared and this subchapter shall take effect and be in force from and after its approval.

History. Acts 1935, No. 126, § 31; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3028n.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1935, No. 126, was signed by the Governor on March 19, 1935.

Chapter 95 Interstate Agreement on Detainers

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 11: Apr. 28, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that prosecuting authorities in this State do not now have adequate means by which to secure prisoners incarcerated in other jurisdictions for trial before the expiration of their sentences; that prosecuting officials of other states face an equal problem of securing prisoners incarcerated in this State for trial before the expiration of their sentences; and that it is in the immediate public interest that the State of Arkansas join with other states in the establishment of lawful procedures for the clearing of detainers, thereby expediting the enforcement of criminal laws of this State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Am. Jur. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Crim. L., § 492 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1978-82, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 191.

Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1983-87, 41 Ark.L.Rev. 63.

16-95-101. Agreement on Detainers.

The Agreement on Detainers is enacted into law and entered into by the State of Arkansas with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:

The contracting states solemnly agree that:

ARTICLE I

The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.

ARTICLE II

As used in this agreement:

  1. “State” shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
  2. “Sending state” shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he or she initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article III or Article IV thereof.

ARTICLE III

  1. Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he or she shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he or she shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment and his or her request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his or her counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
  2. The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of him or her, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
  3. The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him or her of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him or her and shall also inform him or her of his or her right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which the detainer is based.
  4. Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
  5. Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him or her, after completion of his or her term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his or her body in any court where his or her presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
  6. Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his or her execution of the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the request.

ARTICLE IV

  1. The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he or she has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded, and transmitted the request: and provided further that there shall be a period of thirty (30) days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his or her own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
  2. Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving states who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
  3. In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty (120) days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his or her counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
  4. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he or she may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
  5. If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

ARTICLE V

  1. In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information, or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
  2. The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
    1. Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
    2. A duly certified copy of the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
  3. If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.
  4. The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one (1) or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for his or her attendance at court and while being transported to or from any place at which his or her presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
  5. At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
  6. During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to run, but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
  7. For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state, and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.
  8. From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one (1) or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.

ARTICLE VI

  1. In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction in the matter.
  2. No provisions of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.

ARTICLE VII

Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.

ARTICLE IX

This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3201.

Cross References. Prosecutor's obligations, Ark. R. Crim. P. 29.1.

Research References

ALR.

Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to “Speedy Trial” Requirement, and Construction of Essential Terms. 51 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to “Anti-Shuttling” Provision, Dismissal of Action Against Detainee, and Adequacy of Certificate. 52 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and Application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to Custody, Temporary Custody, Contest as to Legality of Custody, Necessity of Hearing, and Transmittal Orders. 53 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) — Issues Related to “Speedy Trial” Requirement, and Construction of Essential Terms. 70 A.L.R.6th 361.

Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related to Certificate, Request by Defendant for Disposition, and “Anti-Shuttling” Provision. 71 A.L.R.6th 335.

Construction and Application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): Issues Related To Custody, Duties of Prison Officials, Waiver of Extradition, Escape, Assistance of Counsel, and Necessity of Hearing. 72 A.L.R.6th 141.

Case Notes

In General.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers amounts to nothing more than a statutory set of procedural rules which do not rise to the level of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).

Construction.

While the agreement should be liberally construed, this does not mean that courts are free to bend the legislation out of shape or to remold it to some other form. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).

Defendant erroneously claimed that, under Article IV(e) of this section, an Arkansas county circuit court lost jurisdiction of a capital felony murder charge against him after his trial was declared a mistrial and he was returned to federal prison; that reading of this section was clearly distorted since this section merely provides that an indictment, information, or complaint is invalidated only where a criminal defendant is not brought to trial at all on pending state charges before he is returned to federal custody. Hutcherson v. State, 316 Ark. 551, 873 S.W.2d 164 (1994).

Purpose.

Sanctions contained in Art. IV(e) are intended to prevent excessive interference with a prisoner's rehabilitation in the state prisoner system. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).

This subchapter is designed to standardize interstate rendition procedures in order to protect the inmate's right to speedy trial and reduce any uncertainties which might obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).

This act deals specifically with ensuring that prisoners with pending charges in other states are protected from speedy trial violations. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

Applicability.

A detainer that was issued due to a previous conviction, and not due to pending charges, is not subject to this Act. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

Once a prisoner is released on parole, he or she is no longer in the class of prisoners covered by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Cunningham v. State, 341 Ark. 99, 14 S.W.3d 869 (2000).

Where defendant was returned to Arkansas after waiving extradition, the Interstate Agreements on Detainers was never triggered; extraditions are governed by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 16-94-201 et seq.Gondolfi v. Clinger, 352 Ark. 156, 98 S.W.3d 812 (2003).

Because defendant plead nolo contendere on the charges underlying the original sentence of probation, there was nothing “untried” within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), § 16-95-101 et seq.; a charge of violating the terms of a suspended sentence was not an untried indictment within the scope of the meaning of the IAD and was inapplicable and, even if the court found that the IAD did apply, defendant made no demand for trial in compliance with the statute. Lindsey v. State, 86 Ark. App. 297, 184 S.W.3d 458 (2004).

Detainer.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act itself contains no definition of the word “detainer.” Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).

Defined generally, a detainer is the restraint of a man's personal liberty against his will. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

For purposes of this act, a detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence advising that he is wanted to face criminal charges in another jurisdiction. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

The state's notifying federal authorities that defendant should be returned to Arkansas custody after completion of his federal sentence was not a detainer as defined by this chapter. Harper v. State, 315 Ark. 195, 865 S.W.2d 647 (1993).

A detainer is placed on a prisoner in another jurisdiction for purposes of having that prisoner return to the claiming jurisdiction to stand trial on pending charges; the definition does not include a notice that the prisoner has a sentence to serve in a foreign jurisdiction. Harper v. State, 315 Ark. 195, 865 S.W.2d 647 (1993).

Dismissal of Charges.

Evidence showed defendant held not deprived of his right to a speedy trial by the court's refusal to grant the motion to dismiss charges. Curan v. State, 260 Ark. 461, 541 S.W.2d 923 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843, 98 S. Ct. 144, 54 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1977).

Any violation of Article III does not automatically require dismissal of the charges and release of a habeas corpus petitioner for the petitioner must not only show a clear violation of the statute but also that he was prejudiced as a direct result of the violation. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Defendant was not entitled to dismissal pursuant to Article III(d) as a result of being returned to federal custody before the charge against him was disposed of. Derring v. State, 273 Ark. 347, 619 S.W.2d 644 (1981).

On appeal of defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery and theft, he did not show that the State failed to follow proper extradition procedures under Article IV(e) as the record did not indicate that he was sent to Arkansas before the extradition process and then returned to Mississippi only to be sent back to Arkansas. Thus, he was not entitled to dismissal of the criminal information. Spearman v. State, 2013 Ark. 196, 427 S.W.3d 593 (2013).

Mandamus.

Where the sheriff issued a detainer, the fact that there was not a statute that specifically granted the sheriff the authority to issue detainers did not show the specific legal right required for a writ of mandamus to issue. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

Nonparty States.

Defendant, tried after expiration of 180 days from request for trial, could not assert that there was a violation of his statutory rights where the state of incarceration was not a party to the interstate agreement. Young v. State, 254 Ark. 72, 491 S.W.2d 789 (1973).

Request for speedy trial held ineffective because the arresting state had not adopted the statute and hence was not a party to the interstate agreement. Smith v. State, 258 Ark. 533, 528 S.W.2d 359 (1975).

Claim by prisoner in federal custody arising under this section as it operates in conjunction with the federal enactment of the agreement was a claim arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254; it was of no consequence that the state where the U.S. Penitentiary was located was not a party to the agreement since that state was never a custodial state within the meaning of this subchapter. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Speedy Trial.

The speedy trial provisions in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act are nonjurisdictional and waivable. Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988).

Time Limitations.

—Demand by Officer.

The defendant's time limit in this chapter was never triggered where the state never filed a detainer and the defendant was never served with a detainer while incarcerated in another state. Durdin v. State, 59 Ark. App. 207, 955 S.W.2d 912 (1997).

—Demand by Prisoner.

This section cannot stand where no demand for trial was ever made in compliance with Art. III(a). Walker v. State, 263 Ark. 485, 565 S.W.2d 605 (1978).

Date of receipt of notice by the prosecuting authorities triggers the 180-day running of the statutory period; the key word in the statutory language is “delivered” and, comporting with the purpose of the notice provision, the term would have little meaning if something other than the receipt of the notice were contemplated inasmuch as the state authorities are bound to act within 180 days toward bringing the prisoner to trial in the receiving jurisdiction and to abrogate the uncertainties of the pending charges against the prisoner. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

There is a positive duty upon a prisoner to seek a trial after he is notified that charges are pending; an accused in prison in another state, for a different crime, must affirmatively request trial in order to activate the speedy trial rule or statute. Dukes v. State, 271 Ark. 674, 609 S.W.2d 924 (1981).

Where defendant made no demand for trial in compliance with Article III(a), there was no violation of the time limit in this chapter. Patterson v. State, 318 Ark. 358, 885 S.W.2d 667 (1994).

Tolling.

The statutory time limits should be tolled during those periods when a prisoner is removed from the custodial place of incarceration and taken to another jurisdiction, other than the demanding jurisdiction, to stand trial on charges pending there. Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Tolling provision of Article VI(a) held applicable. Young v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853, 100 S. Ct. 107, 62 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1979).

Failure to accord a timely trial, as required by Art. III(a), may mandate dismissal of the untried charge; however, the time limits are tolled during the periods when the prisoner is removed from the custodial place of incarceration to a place other than the demanding jurisdiction. Spears v. State, 280 Ark. 577, 660 S.W.2d 913 (1983).

Untried Indictment.

Charge of violation of probation, absent an allegation of the commission of an indictable offense, is not an “untried indictment, information, or complaint” within the scope and meaning of Article III(a). Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).

A probation revocation proceeding does not involve “untried” matters within the purview of Article III(a). Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S.W.2d 797 (1983).

The 180-day time limitation contained in Article III(a) is triggered only when a prisoner has complied with the requirements of the article. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).

Defendant failed to substantially meet the necessary requirements of the agreement and, therefore, the 180-day time limitation was never activated. Phillips v. State, 15 Ark. App. 372, 695 S.W.2d 388 (1985).

Waiver.

Violation of Art. IV(e) by the United States was a nonjurisdictional error waivable by a criminal defendant. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978).

Cited: State v. Davidson, 254 Ark. 172, 492 S.W.2d 246 (1973); Young v. Arkansas, 533 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1976); Grooms v. State, 260 Ark. 879, 545 S.W.2d 610 (1977); Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981); Blackmon v. Weber, 277 Ark. 393, 642 S.W.2d 294 (1982); Dukes v. Lockhart, 769 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1985); Marshall v. State, 289 Ark. 462, 712 S.W.2d 894 (1986).

16-95-102. “Appropriate court.”

The phrase “appropriate court” as used in the Agreement on Detainers shall, with reference to the courts of this state, mean any and all courts having jurisdiction over criminal matters.

History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3202.

16-95-103. Enforcement.

All courts, departments, agencies, officers, and employees of this state and its political subdivisions are directed to enforce the Agreement on Detainers and to cooperate with one another and with other party states in enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose.

History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3203.

16-95-104. Applicability of habitual offenders law.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require the application of any habitual offenders law to any person on account of any conviction had in a proceeding brought to final disposition by reason of the use of the Agreement on Detainers.

History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3204.

16-95-105. Escape — Penalty.

Any prisoner who shall escape from custody while in another state or jurisdiction pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be sentenced to a term of not less than three (3) years nor more than five (5) years in the Division of Correction.

History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3205; Acts 2019, No. 910, § 947.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction”.

16-95-106. Surrender of inmates.

It shall be lawful and mandatory upon the superintendent or other official in charge of a penal or correctional institution in this state to give over the person of any inmate thereof whenever so required by the operation of the Agreement on Detainers.

History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3206.

16-95-107. Administration.

The Director of the Division of Correction or his or her designee is authorized to serve as central administrator of, and information agent for, the Agreement on Detainers.

History. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-3207; Acts 2017, No. 305, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1971, No. 705, § 8, provided that copies of this chapter would, upon its approval, be transmitted to the governor of each state, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of General Services of the United States, and the Council of State Governments.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “or his or her designee is” for “is designated and”.

Chapter 96 Proceedings in Inferior Courts

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

Criminal Procedure: A Survey of Arkansas Law and the American Bar Association's Standards, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 169.

Subchapter 1 — City Courts

A.C.R.C. Notes. City courts have been consolidated into district courts. See § 16-17-1201 et seq.

Cross References. District courts, § 16-17-102.

Territorial jurisdiction of certain courts generally, § 16-88-105.

Effective Dates. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 24, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1935, No. 43, § 2: Feb. 16, 1935.

16-96-101. Procedure generally.

The proceedings in circuit courts for the trial of criminal cases, so far as applicable, shall govern the proceedings of the city courts, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter.

History. Crim. Code, § 310; C. & M. Dig., § 3287; Pope's Dig., § 4135; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-102.

Case Notes

Cited: Fortune v. Incorporated Town of Wilburton, 142 F. 114 (8th Cir. 1905); Cherry v. State, 347 Ark. 606, 66 S.W.3d 605 (2002).

16-96-102. Applicability to judge acting as clerk.

Where a judge acts as the clerk of the court, the provisions of this subchapter as to the clerk shall apply to him or her.

History. Crim. Code, § 313; C. & M. Dig., § 3296; Pope's Dig., § 4144; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-103.

16-96-103. Terms of sessions.

The judge of the city court may, by orders entered on its minutes, fix terms for its sessions, to which process shall be returnable, but may hold the court at any time for the transaction of business brought before him or her.

History. Crim. Code, § 301; C. & M. Dig., § 3284; Pope's Dig., § 4132; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-101.

16-96-104. Pleadings and indictments.

  1. No written information or pleadings are required in prosecutions in which an indictment is not required.
  2. No indictment shall be necessary in prosecutions for violations of the bylaws or ordinances of a city or town nor in other prosecutions in city courts.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 300, 311; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3285, 3286; Pope's Dig., §§ 4133, 4134; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-104, 44-105; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 279.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted “police or” preceding “city courts” in (b).

Case Notes

Bylaws or Ordinances.

No written information or pleadings are required in prosecutions for violation of bylaws or ordinances of a city or town. McConnell v. City of Booneville, 123 Ark. 561, 186 S.W. 82 (1916).

Traffic Laws.

Inasmuch as a shopping center parking lot was not a highway, a defendant whose car collided with another vehicle as defendant was pulling out of a parking space could not be charged with the violation of failure to yield right-of-way. Hartson v. City of Pine Bluff, 270 Ark. 748, 606 S.W.2d 149 (1980).

16-96-105. Summons.

  1. Upon information given by a peace officer, or by a private person on oath, to the judge or clerk of a court that an offense within the jurisdiction of the court has been committed, the judge or clerk shall issue a summons against the offender.
    1. The summons shall command the peace officer to whom it is directed to summon the defendant, naming him or her, to appear in the court, on a day to be named in the summons, to answer the charge made against him or her of having committed an offense, naming or briefly describing it, and the peace officer shall return the summons on a day to be named.
    2. It shall be signed by the judge or clerk and directed to the peace officer of the town or city, but it may be executed by any peace officer of the city or county.
  2. The summons shall be executed by the officer reading it to the defendant or stating to him or her its contents; and, if required, the officer shall show it to him or her.

History. Crim. Code, §§ 303, 304, 307; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3291, 3292, 3294; Pope's Dig., §§ 4139, 4140, 4142; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-106, 44-107, 44-109.

16-96-106. Warrant of arrest.

Upon information on oath made to the judge of the court, he or she may order a warrant of arrest to be issued, which shall be similar to the summons except in the command to arrest the defendant instead of summon him or her.

History. Crim. Code, § 305; C. & M. Dig., § 3293; Pope's Dig., § 4141; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-108.

16-96-107. Subpoenas.

The clerk shall issue subpoenas for witnesses at the request of the officers of the city or of the defendant, and the court may compel their attendance in the manner prescribed in the Code of Practice in Civil Cases.

History. Crim. Code, § 308; C. & M. Dig., § 3295; Pope's Dig., § 4143; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-110.

Publisher's Notes. For codification of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases, see the parallel references for the Civil Code of 1869 in the Tables Volume A.

16-96-108. Right to speedy trial or bail.

When a person has been arrested and brought before the city court, or the judge thereof, charged with an offense within the jurisdiction of the court, he or she shall be immediately tried or, at the discretion of the judge, held to bail for his or her future appearance for trial, or discharged from custody.

History. Crim. Code, § 302; C. & M. Dig., § 3297; Pope's Dig., § 4145; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-111.

16-96-109. Time of trial.

  1. All prosecutions in city courts shall stand for trial immediately, where the defendant is in custody or on bail for the offense charged, or on the day when the defendant has been summoned to appear, but only if the summons was executed within the limits of the court's jurisdiction one (1) day or, elsewhere, ten (10) days before the day on which he or she is warned to appear.
  2. If not executed as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the trial shall be postponed to a day to be fixed by the court.

History. Crim. Code, § 306; C. & M. Dig., § 3289; Pope's Dig., § 4137; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-112.

16-96-110. Trial by judge or jury for violations of other than ordinances.

The issues of law and of fact in cases for violations of other than ordinances may be tried by the judge unless the defendant demands a trial by jury, in which case the issues shall be tried by a jury of twelve (12) persons unless the defendant shall consent to be tried by a lesser number.

History. Crim. Code, § 312; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [312]; p. 256; C. & M. Dig., § 3288; Pope's Dig., § 4136; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-114.

16-96-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning trials in police court, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 553. The section was derived from Acts 1885, No. 67, § 4, p. 92; C. & M. Dig., § 7734; Pope's Dig., § 9930; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-115.

16-96-112. Trials in city court.

All trials in the city court for violation of the bylaws or ordinances of any city or incorporated town shall be before the judge without the intervention of a jury, but the defendant, upon appeal, shall have the right to a trial by jury in the circuit court.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 24, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 7685; Acts 1935, No. 43, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9814; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-116.

16-96-113. Continuances.

The court may, for good cause, grant continuances or postponements of the trial.

History. Crim. Code, § 309; C. & M. Dig., § 3290; Pope's Dig., § 4138; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-113.

Subchapter 2 — Justice of the Peace Courts.

16-96-201 — 16-96-211. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, regarding justice of the peace courts, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 554. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-96-201. Crim. Code, § 324; C. & M. Dig., § 3299; Pope's Dig., § 4147; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-202.

16-96-202. Crim. Code, § 321; C. & M. Dig., § 3298; Pope's Dig., § 4146; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-201.

16-96-203. Crim. Code, §§ 317-319; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3315-3317; Pope's Dig., §§ 4163-4165; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-203 — 44-205.

16-96-204. Crim. Code, § 320; C. & M. Dig., § 3318; Pope's Dig., § 4166; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-206.

16-96-205. Crim. Code, § 316; C. & M. Dig., § 3314; Pope's Dig., § 4162; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-209.

16-96-206. Crim. Code, §§ 314, 315; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3312, 3313; Pope's Dig., §§ 4160, 4161; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-207, 44-208.

16-96-207. Crim. Code, §§ 322, 323; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [322], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3319, 3320; Pope's Dig., §§ 4167, 4168; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-210, 44-211.

16-96-208. Acts 1887, No. 25, §§ 1-5, p. 30; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3306-3310; Pope's Dig., §§ 4154-4158; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-212 — 44-216.

16-96-209. Acts 1893, No. 11, §§ 1-6, p. 16; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3300-3305; Pope's Dig., §§ 4148-4153; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-217 — 44-222.

16-96-210. Acts 1875, No. 61, §§ 1-3, p. 150; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2824-2826; Pope's Dig., §§ 3542-3544; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-223 — 44-225.

16-96-211. Acts 1953, No. 409, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-226.

Subchapter 3 — Bond for Costs.

16-96-301 — 16-96-304. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, regarding bond for costs, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 555. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

16-96-301. Acts 1871, No. 31, § 6, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., § 3283; Pope's Dig., § 4130; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-304.

16-96-302. Acts 1871, No. 31, §§ 1, 4, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., §§ 3279, 3282; Pope's Dig., §§ 4127, 4131; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-301, 44-305.

16-96-303. Acts 1871, No. 31, § 2, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., § 3280; Pope's Dig., § 4128; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-302.

16-96-304. Acts 1871, No. 31, § 3, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., § 3281; Pope's Dig., § 4129; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-303.

Subchapter 4 — Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures

Preambles. Acts 1933, No. 148, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, there is much confusion existing in this state, as to the disposition of fines and costs, in cases which have been appealed to the circuit court from the police courts and municipal courts of cities of the first class for the violation of municipal ordinances….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1883, No. 114, § 226: effective on passage.

Acts 1933, No. 148, § 2: Mar. 24, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “That there is an emergency existing in this state because of the numerous crimes now being committed within the cities of the first class, and because of their depleted revenues such cities have not sufficient funds to protect their citizens from these crimes, all laws and parts of laws conflicting herewith are hereby repealed and this law will go into full force and effect from and after its approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 788, § 36: became law without the Governor's signature. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 35: became law without the Governor's signature. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the effectiveness of this act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the state court system, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental progress. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

16-96-401. Collection and payment.

  1. All justices of the peace are prohibited from collecting fines, penalties, and forfeitures.
  2. Quarterly on the first Mondays in July, October, January, and April, all constables or other collecting officers of any township shall turn over to the county treasurer of their respective counties all fines, penalties, and forfeitures, less the commission due the officers, which shall be three percent (3%) for constables on the amount collected by them, taking duplicate receipts therefor, one (1) of which shall be immediately filed with the clerk of the county court of their respective counties.
    1. On or before the first Mondays of July, October, January, and April of each year, the clerks of the county courts shall audit the accounts of constables and other collecting officers referred to in subsection (b) of this section. To that end, the clerks of the county courts shall open a separate account with each of the officers in a book to be kept by the clerks for that purpose.
    2. They shall charge the collecting officer with the amount of fines, penalties, and forfeitures adjudged against defendants in justice of the peace courts or other courts in the county, excepting only circuit courts, as shown by the transcript of the judicial officers on file in the offices of the clerks of the county courts.
  3. The clerks of the county courts shall further charge the county treasurer with all fines, penalties, and forfeitures turned over by constables and other collecting officers in pursuance of the provisions of this section.
    1. The constables and other collecting officers shall not be credited with any deficits as to fines and penalties unless they shall be able to show the death of the party against whom the fine or penalty was adjudged or that imprisonment in default of the payment of fine has been complied with in accordance with the provisions of the criminal law.
    2. The constables and other collecting officers shall not be credited with any deficit on forfeited bail bonds or recognizances unless the return of the officer serving the execution in the case shall show that the defendant had no property subject to execution. In that case, a certified copy of the return shall be filed with the clerk of the county court by the officer charged with the collection.
    1. At the commencement of each session of the circuit court of the clerk's county, the clerk of the county court shall furnish the prosecuting attorney with a written statement of all deficits of constables and other collecting officers on account of fines, penalties, and forfeitures.
    2. It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to bring suit against the constables and collecting officers and their securities for the deficiency due and also to prosecute the officers by indictment for malfeasance in office.

History. Acts 1883, No. 114, §§ 213, 215-218, 221, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., §§ 10184, 10186-10189, 10192; Pope's Dig., §§ 13967, 13969-13972, 13975; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-401, 44-405 — 44-409; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 325.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (a), substituted “forfeitures” for “forfeitures, but that duty shall devolve upon sheriffs and constables exclusively.”

Case Notes

Cited: Town of Hackett City v. State ex rel. Greenwood Dist., 56 Ark. 133, 19 S.W. 426 (1892).

16-96-402. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning reports by justices of the peace, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 556. The section was derived from Acts 1889, No. 101, §§ 1-4, p. 142; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1405-1407; Pope's Dig., §§ 1668-1670; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 44-402 — 44-404, 44-404n.

16-96-403. Imposition by circuit court on appeal — Costs.

The fines, penalties, forfeitures, and costs imposed by a circuit court for offenses which are misdemeanors or violations under state law or local ordinance or for traffic offenses which are misdemeanors or violations under state law or local ordinance in cases appealed from a court of limited jurisdiction shall be collected and disbursed in the following manner:

  1. If the appeal proceeds to a de novo bench trial or jury trial, the fines, penalties, forfeitures, and costs imposed by the circuit court shall be collected under § 16-13-709 and paid to the county treasurer;
    1. If the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere or the circuit court dismisses the appeal, including dismissals under Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 36(h), the judgment of the court from which the appeal originated shall be affirmed.
      1. The circuit court clerk shall notify in writing, within thirty (30) days of the affirmance or dismissal, the court from which the appeal originated of the affirmance or dismissal and shall return any bond or other security which has been transmitted to the circuit court.
      2. Upon receipt of the notice of affirmance or dismissal and the bond or other security, the court from which the appeal originated shall collect and disburse the fines, penalties, forfeitures, and costs under §§ 14-44-108, 14-45-106, 16-10-209, 16-10-308, and 16-17-707; and
  2. Nothing in this section shall affect the right of a court of limited jurisdiction to require the defendant to post a bond or other security to guarantee the appearance of the defendant before the circuit court nor the ability of these courts to collect any fine, penalty, forfeiture, or costs imposed in the absence of the bond or other security.

History. Acts 1933, No. 148, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 11826; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-410; Acts 1995, No. 1252, § 1; 1997, No. 788, § 24; 1997, No. 1341, § 24; 1999, No. 1081, § 9; 2003, No. 1185, § 220; 2003, No. 1765, § 25; 2009, No. 633, § 17.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment by No. 1185 substituted “any court of limited jurisdiction” for “the municipal, city or police courts of this state” in the introductory paragraph; substituted “court from which the appeal originated” for “municipal, city or police court” in the introductory paragraph of (2); substituted “court from which the appeal originated” for “municipal, city or police court” in (2)(ii); and substituted “a court of limited jurisdiction” for “municipal, city or police courts” in (3).

The 2003 amendment by No. 1765 substituted “any court of limited jurisdiction” for “the municipal, city or police courts of this state” in the introductory paragraph; substituted “court from which the appeal originated” for “municipal, city or police court” in the introductory paragraph of (2); inserted “notify in writing” and deleted “notify in writing the municipal, city or police” following the second occurrence of “dismissal” in (2)(i); in (2)(ii), substituted “court from which the appeal originated” for “municipal, city or police court” and substituted “§§ 16-10-209, 16-10-308, 16-17-707, 16-18-104, 14-44-108, and 14-45-106” for “§§ 16-17-707”; and substituted “a court of limited jurisdiction” for “municipal, city or police courts” in (3).

The 2009 amendment subdivided (2), inserted “including dismissals under Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 36(h)” in (2)(A), inserted “and shall return any bond or other security which has been transmitted to the circuit court” in (2)(B)(i), and inserted “and the bond or other security” in (2)(B)(ii); in (3), substituted “the defendant to post a bond or other security to guarantee the appearance of the defendant before the” for “a supersedeas bond for an appeal to” and substituted “the bond or other security” for “a supersedeas bond”; and made related and minor stylistic changes.

Cross References. Legislative intent of Acts 1997, No. 1341, § 16-10-601.

Legislative intent of Acts 1997, No. 788, § 16-10-601.

Transition to state funding, §§ 16-87-301 and 16-87-302.

Subchapter 5 — Appeals to Circuit Court

Effective Dates. Acts 1874, No. 18, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1905, No. 151, § 5: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1945, No. 197, § 4: approved Mar. 7, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained that since the passage of Act Number 125 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the year 1943, which Act is hereby repealed, many persons who were not informed of their legal rights or of the meaning of pleas of guilty have suffered grave injustices because they have been induced to enter pleas of guilty when they were in fact innocent, or, though guilty of some minor crime, have been wrongfully punished by judgments upon pleas of guilty of much more serious crimes involving far greater punishment than the facts warranted.

“It is further ascertained that many such persons remained ignorant of their rights too long to apply to the circuit judge of the county where they were convicted to have him grant an appeal from such conviction and were therefore denied a trial of their case de novo in the circuit court.

“For the foregoing reasons and because it should be and is the policy of the law to promote justice by insuring that every person accused of crime be afforded a fair and impartial trial after being fully informed of the crime which he is charged and given an opportunity to prepare and present his defense on appeal to a competent court, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

16-96-501. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. See now Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 36(a). This section was derived from Acts 1945, No. 197, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-502.

16-96-502. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the state having no right of appeal from judgments of justices' courts, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 557. The section was derived from Crim. Code, § 355, C. & M. Dig., § 3381; Pope's Dig., § 4224; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-503.

16-96-503. Jurisdiction.

The court shall have appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of city courts in their respective counties without regard to the amount in controversy.

History. Crim. Code, § 354; Acts 1874, No. 18, § 1, p. 61; C. & M. Dig., § 3380; Pope's Dig., § 4223; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-501; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 280.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment deleted “justices' courts, and of police and” following “judgments of.”

Case Notes

Corporation Courts.

Circuit courts have jurisdiction in appeals from corporation courts in both civil and criminal cases. Ullery v. Town of Ft. Smith, 35 Ark. 214 (1879).

16-96-504. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning appeal bond, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 558. The section was derived from Acts 1881, No. 81, § 7, p. 148; 1893, No. 33, § 2, p. 50; C. & M. Dig., § 3386; Pope's Dig., § 4229; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-508.

16-96-505. [Superseded.]

Publisher's Notes. This section was superseded by former Arkansas Inferior Court Rule 9. See Bocksnick v. City of London, 308 Ark. 599, 825 S.W.2d 267 (1992); see now Ark. R. Crim. P. 36. The section was derived from Acts 1905, No. 151, § 2, p. 375; C. & M. Dig., § 3383; Pope's Dig., § 4226; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-505.

16-96-506. Time of trial.

All appeals to the circuit court in criminal cases shall stand for trial at any time after the transcript and papers are, or should have been, filed in the circuit court as provided in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1905, No. 151, § 3, p. 375; C. & M. Dig., § 3384; Pope's Dig., § 4227; Acts 1955, No. 68, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-506.

Case Notes

In General.

Although litigants are free to utilize the same defense in circuit court asserted in the municipal court, they are not required to raise that same defense, nor is the trial in the circuit court to be influenced or affected by what occurred in the municipal court. Bussey v. State, 315 Ark. 292, 867 S.W.2d 433 (1993).

A case appealed to the circuit court is to be tried as though there had been no trial in the lower court. Bussey v. State, 315 Ark. 292, 867 S.W.2d 433 (1993).

Construction.

This section does not imply that there is no need to refile pleadings. Bussey v. State, 315 Ark. 292, 867 S.W.2d 433 (1993).

Purpose.

The purpose of the trial de novo is to conduct a trial as though there had been no trial in the lower court. Bussey v. State, 315 Ark. 292, 867 S.W.2d 433 (1993).

Notice.

The trial in circuit court should be treated as an entirely new trial, and notice given prior to the trial in municipal court was not applicable to a later trial de novo in circuit court. Bussey v. State, 315 Ark. 292, 867 S.W.2d 433 (1993).

Cited: Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967).

16-96-507. Trial de novo.

Upon the appeal, the case shall be tried anew as if no judgment had been rendered, and the judgment shall be considered as affirmed if a judgment for any amount is rendered against the defendant, and thereupon he or she shall be adjudged to pay costs of the appeal.

History. Crim. Code, § 357; C. & M. Dig., § 3387; Pope's Dig., § 4230; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-509.

Case Notes

Appellate Jurisdiction.

Circuit court clearly erred when it found that it could not rule on defendant's constitutional challenge to a city ordinance; although defendant had not raised the claim in the municipal court, appeals from a municipal court to circuit court are tried de novo under § 16-96-507, defendant was permitted to raise an argument for the first time on de novo review, and it was undisputed that he had raised the constitutional claim before the circuit court. Wright v. City of Bearden, 2017 Ark. App. 534, 532 S.W.3d 611 (2017).

Default Judgment.

A defendant has a direct right of appeal to circuit court from the entry of a default judgment in municipal court. Murdock v. Slater, 326 Ark. 1067, 935 S.W.2d 540 (1996).

Discovery.

Because a trial in circuit court is treated as an entirely new trial, appellant was required to refile a motion for discovery in order to prevent the state from being relieved of its duty to disclose. Smith v. State, 55 Ark. App. 97, 931 S.W.2d 792 (1996).

Error.

The defendant could not rely on an error in the municipal court as a ground for reversing judgment after he had received an entirely new trial in the circuit court, unaffected by the proceedings in the municipal court. Hogan v. State, 289 Ark. 402, 712 S.W.2d 295 (1986).

It was error for the circuit court to dismiss an appeal from the municipal court on its own motion without notice or prior hearing. Harrell v. City of Conway, 296 Ark. 247, 753 S.W.2d 542 (1988).

Even though the municipal court venue might have been erroneous, where the appellant does not question the fact that he received a fair trial with proper venue in circuit court, there is no basis for reversing the judgment of the circuit court. Griffin v. State, 297 Ark. 208, 760 S.W.2d 852 (1988).

Failure to Appear.

Court is not authorized to affirm the judgment on failure of the appellant to appear, but may, in its discretion, order him to be brought in on warrant, or may dismiss his appeal and order the justice to execute his judgment. Thomas v. State, 41 Ark. 408 (1883).

Former Jeopardy.

Appellant was not required to plead former jeopardy since record of the lower court was before the circuit court on appeal, and it showed an implied acquittal of the higher charge by a jury in the lower court. Strickbine v. State, 201 Ark. 1031, 148 S.W.2d 180 (1941).

Jury Trial.

Circuit court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a jury trial on her appeal from a fine for violating a municipal ordinance. Johnston v. City of Pine Bluff, 258 Ark. 346, 525 S.W.2d 76 (1975).

Lack of Jurisdiction Below.

Information filed in mayor's court is not demurrable because of lack of jurisdiction since the trial on appeal to the circuit court is de novo. Hill v. State, 174 Ark. 886, 298 S.W. 321 (1927).

Where a municipal court's exercise of its jurisdiction was erroneous, defendant was entitled to an entirely new trial before the circuit court, which was not deprived of jurisdiction to hear the matter de novo on appeal by the irregular municipal court proceeding. Killion v. City of Waldron, 260 Ark. 560, 542 S.W.2d 744 (1976); Stephens v. State, 295 Ark. 541, 750 S.W.2d 52 (1988).

In a prosecution for night hunting, the circuit court had jurisdiction to order forfeiture of a truck and shotgun, notwithstanding that the municipal court may not have had jurisdiction to do so. Crow v. State, 56 Ark. App. 100, 938 S.W.2d 874 (1997).

Right to Counsel.

Failure to assign counsel to an indigent misdemeanor defendant in the justice of the peace and mayor's courts did not deprive him of his constitutional rights where, upon appeal to the circuit court, the causes were tried de novo and the defendant was represented by counsel. Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967).

Same Offense.

The accused must be tried in the circuit court, on appeal, for the same offense for which he was tried before the justice. Marre v. State, 36 Ark. 222 (1880); Thomas v. State, 41 Ark. 408 (1883).

Cited: Jaynes v. State, 212 Ark. 410, 206 S.W.2d 7 (1947); City of Star City v. Shepherd, 287 Ark. 188, 697 S.W.2d 113 (1985); Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 774 S.W.2d 830 (1989); Woodberry v. State, 35 Ark. App. 129, 811 S.W.2d 339 (1991); Sundeen v. Kroger, 355 Ark. 138, 133 S.W.3d 393 (2003).

16-96-508. Judgment on default.

If the appellant shall fail to appear in the circuit court when the case is set for trial or the judge or magistrate who tried the case shall fail to file the transcript and papers as provided in this subchapter and the appellant shall fail to appear and move the court for an order to compel the judge or magistrate to so file within the first three (3) days of the first term of the circuit court beginning more than ten (10) days after the appeal was prayed, then the circuit court may, unless good cause is shown to the contrary, affirm the judgment and enter judgment against the appellant for the same fine or penalty that was imposed in the court of limited jurisdiction, with costs. This judgment shall have the same force and effect as other judgments of the circuit court in cases of convictions or indictments for misdemeanors.

History. Acts 1905, No. 151, § 4, p. 375; C. & M. Dig., § 3385; Pope's Dig., § 4228; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-507; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 281.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “judge or magistrate” for “justice or other magistrate” following “in the event that the,” and “judge” for “justice” following “compel the,” deleted “of the justice, police, or city court” following “affirm the judgment” and substituted “court of limited jurisidction, with costs” for “inferior court.”

Case Notes

Affirming Judgment.

When the accused fails to appear in circuit court for trial, the circuit court may, unless for good cause shown, affirm the judgment of a justice, police or city court. Jaynes v. State, 212 Ark. 410, 206 S.W.2d 7 (1947).

Evidence sufficient to show prejudicial error where circuit court summarily affirmed municipal court judgment, from which defendant was appealing, when defendant failed to appear in court on time. Prine v. State, 267 Ark. 304, 590 S.W.2d 25 (1979).

Circuit court has no authority to revoke the suspension of an affirmed sentence because of failure to appear and failure to pay costs. Wade v. State, 269 Ark. 685, 599 S.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1980).

Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold the trial in defendant's absence, dismissing the appeal, and ordering that the municipal court sentence be put into execution because defendant failed to appear for trial. Whitmire v. State, 50 Ark. App. 34, 901 S.W.2d 20 (1995).

Dismissal Improper.

Dismissal of defendant's appeal on the grounds that his attorney failed to appear at a pretrial hearing was improper; where dismissal of the appeal from district court was not authorized by former § 16-96-508, the effect of the trial court's action was to deny defendant his right to a jury trial without the express waiver thereof required by the Arkansas Constitution. Ayala v. State, 92 Ark. App. 356, 214 S.W.3d 282 (2005), rev'd, 365 Ark. 192, 226 S.W.3d 766 (2006).

Dismissal of defendant's appeal of his conviction in the city court was improper as this section did not apply where defendant only failed to show up to a pre-trial hearing, and the dismissal would waive defendant's right to a jury trial, which he did not waive. Ayala v. State, 365 Ark. 192, 226 S.W.3d 766 (2006).

Circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing defendant's appeal pursuant to this section where it based the dismissal on his initial failure to appear, recalled the case the same day, defendant was present when the case was recalled, and the court indicated that it was having a trial that same day. Lampkin v. State, 101 Ark. App. 275, 275 S.W.3d 679 (2008).

Due Process.

Due process dictates that appellant be afforded proper notice and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding involving the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and that interested parties as well as their attorneys receive notice from the clerk of the court of proceedings scheduled, and that time should be afforded counsel to prepare for trial. Rawls v. State, 266 Ark. 919, 587 S.W.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1979).

Where the defense attorney had two days notice before the trial date that the case would be reset for a day within ten days or two weeks and there was no reason shown for the attorney's stated inability to contact defendant in Iowa so that he could be present for trial, statutory and due process requirements were met. Whitmire v. State, 50 Ark. App. 34, 901 S.W.2d 20 (1995).

Good Cause.

Defendant did not show good cause for not showing up at trial where he claimed his attorney had rescheduled the trial by an agreement with the prosecutor as attorneys cannot vary a trial date set by the court. Rischar v. State, 307 Ark. 429, 821 S.W.2d 25 (1991).

Setting Case for Trial.

Evidence sufficient to constitute a setting of the case for trial within the meaning of this section. Renfro v. City of Conway, 260 Ark. 852, 545 S.W.2d 69 (1977).

Cited: Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967); Winkle v. State, 310 Ark. 713, 841 S.W.2d 589 (1992); Cagle v. State, 47 Ark. App. 1, 882 S.W.2d 674 (1994); Ibsen v. Plegge, 341 Ark. 225, 15 S.W.3d 686 (2000).

16-96-509. Judgment for defendant.

If judgment is rendered for the defendant, any money paid into the circuit court which has been collected from the defendant on the original judgment shall be forthwith returned to the defendant.

History. Crim. Code, § 359; C. & M. Dig., § 3389; Pope's Dig., § 4232; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-511.

Case Notes

Repayment of Funds.

Defendant was entitled to repayment of funds where he had paid the fine and costs related to his 1988 conviction in municipal court; the trial court's order of dismissal set aside the 1988 conviction and constituted a judgment rendered for the defendant under this section and, as such, any money paid by defendant into the circuit court that was collected on the original judgment should have been forthwith returned to him. Donald v. City of W. Memphis, 84 Ark. App. 90, 133 S.W.3d 410 (2003).

16-96-510. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning attorney's fees, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 559. The section was derived from Crim. Code, § 358; C. & M. Dig., § 3388; Pope's Dig., § 4231; A.S.A. 1947, § 44-510.

Chapter 97 Sentencing

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1993, Nos. 535 and 551, § 7, provided:

“The bifurcation procedures in Sections 1 and 2 of this act [codified as § 5-4-103 and §§ 16-97-10116-97-104] shall become effective on January 1, 1994 and shall expire on June 30, 1997.”

Acts 1995, No. 892, § 1, provided:

“The uncodified Section 7 of Act 551 of 1993 which sunsets the bifurcated sentencing procedures in Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 5-4-103, 16-97-101, 16-97-102, 16-97-103, and 16-97-104 is repealed.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Procedure, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 99.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Arkansas's new bifurcated sentencing laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because they did not criminalize conduct that was previously non-criminal, did not increase the severity or harshness of the punishment for the offenses that defendant committed, and did not deprive defendant of a defense that was available to him at the time he committed the offenses with which he was charged; because the penalty or sentence authorized under the prior and new sentencing statutes remains the same as applied in defendant's situation, any change was merely procedural and not substantively prejudicial or an ex post facto violation. Williams v. State, 318 Ark. 846, 887 S.W.2d 530 (1994).

Where, on the first day of trial, the trial court conducted a proceeding under the heading of “Bill of Exceptions” in which witnesses and other trial-related matters were discussed at length and defendant had ample opportunity to make any motions, and where defendant elected to wait until the second day of trial to file his motion concerning the constitutionality of Acts 1993, Nos. 535 and 551, and alerted the court of its pendency only on the third day of trial, because an issue must be presented to the trial court at the earliest opportunity in order to preserve it for appeal, the motion in question was untimely. Watkins v. State, 320 Ark. 163, 895 S.W.2d 532 (1995).

Construction.

Acts 1993, No. 535, which is codified in part as this chapter, provided, in part, that all laws in conflict with the act were repealed, thus repealing section 16-91-101(c). Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

Section 16-97-101, which provides for sentencing by a jury after a plea of guilty under certain conditions, is not repugnant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.1 [superseded], which provides in part that, except as provided by Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b), there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere; the statute is to stand as compatible with the rule, recognizing that the legislature has provided not only for separate and distinct procedures governing jury trials and sentencing by jury but for evidentiary matters as well. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

Cited: Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996).

16-97-101. Bifurcated sentencing procedures.

The following procedure shall govern jury trials which include any felony charges:

  1. The jury shall first hear all evidence relevant to every charge on which a defendant is being tried and shall retire to reach a verdict on each charge;
  2. If the defendant is found guilty of one (1) or more charges, the jury shall then hear additional evidence relevant to sentencing on those charges. Evidence introduced in the guilt phase may be considered, but need not be reintroduced at the sentencing phase;
  3. Following the introduction of additional evidence relevant to sentencing, if any, instruction on the law, and argument, the jury shall again retire and determine a sentence within the statutory range;
  4. The court, in its discretion, may also instruct the jury that counsel may argue as to alternative sentences for which the defendant may qualify. The jury, in its discretion, may make a recommendation as to an alternative sentence. However, this recommendation shall not be binding on the court;
  5. After a jury finds guilt, the defendant, with the agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court, may waive jury sentencing, in which case the court shall impose sentence; and
  6. After a plea of guilty, the defendant, with the agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court, may be sentenced by a jury impaneled for purposes of sentencing only.

History. Acts 1993, No. 535, § 2; 1993, No. 551, § 2.

Cross References. Role of jury and court in sentencing, § 5-4-103.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Dustin K. Doty, Case Note: Saving Face: Arkansas's Application of the Confrontation Clause to Jury Sentencing Proceedings, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 549 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Cassandra Howell, Note: Braving Confrontation: Arkansas's Progressive Position Regarding Criminal Defendants' Confrontation Rights at Sentencing, 35 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 691 (2013).

Case Notes

Construction.

The permissive tone of the language in subdivision (4) is unmistakable in that the trial court has discretion and “may” give the alternative sentence instruction. Hayes v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 158, 544 S.W.3d 587 (2018).

Applicability.

The bifurcated procedures outlined in this chapter are applicable to cases involving an alleged habitual offender. Daniels v. State, 322 Ark. 367, 908 S.W.2d 638 (1995).

Construction.

This section, which provides for sentencing by a jury after a plea of guilty under certain conditions, is not repugnant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.1 [superseded], which provides in part that, except as provided by Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b), there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere; this section is to stand as compatible with the rule, recognizing that the legislature has provided not only for separate and distinct procedures governing jury trials and sentencing by jury but for evidentiary matters as well. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

The permissive tone of the language in subdivision (4) of this section is unmistakable. Dale v. State, 55 Ark. App. 184, 935 S.W.2d 274 (1996).

The court was clearly authorized under subdivision (4) of this section, although not obligated, to consider the recommended alternative sentence recommended by the jury. Slaughter v. State, 69 Ark. App. 65, 12 S.W.3d 240 (2000).

Alternative Sentences.

Trial court abused its discretion when it failed to allow a jury to consider alternative punishment after it convicted defendant of sexual assault in the first degree, rather than rape. Miller v. State, 97 Ark. App. 285, 248 S.W.3d 487 (2007).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give defendant's requested instruction on the alternative sentence of probation because the decision on jury instructions was within the scope of the trial court and had such an instruction been given it was unlikely that the jury would have recommended probation, as it recommended consecutive twenty-five year terms, event though the minimum term was ten years. Benjamin v. State, 102 Ark. App. 309, 285 S.W.3d 264 (2008).

Because the permissive language of subdivision (4) of this section did not require a trial court to give an instruction on alternative sentencing, the trial court committed no error in declining defendant's request for an instruction recommending probation; even if the jury was so instructed, the trial court had the discretion to reject the jury's recommendation for probation, and the trial court did not believe that an alternative sentence was appropriate under the facts of the case. Stigger v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 596 (2009).

During defendant's trial for theft by receiving and theft of property, the court did not err under subdivision (4) of this section in refusing to give defendant's proffered jury instruction on the availability of probation as an alternative sentence because it gave the request for the instruction more than proper consideration; after previously completing a drug program, defendant had once again become involved with known felons. Malone v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 280 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give an alternative sentencing instruction given the jury’s reactions to the images of child pornography and the jury’s convicting defendant on all 20 counts and sentencing him to much more than the minimum punishment. Steele v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 257, 434 S.W.3d 424 (2014).

Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in not instructing the jury to consider a suspended sentence as an alternative sentence recommendation where the jury was instructed that it could give a nonbinding alternative-sentence recommendation of probation, but the jury declined to make such a recommendation and instead sentenced defendant to the maximum that it could under the law. Bell v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 458 (2014).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on probation as an alternative sentence where subdivision (4) of this section was permissive. Squyres v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 665, 476 S.W.3d 839 (2015).

Defendant was charged as a habitual offender, having been previously convicted of four felonies, and the jury convicted him of a Class D felony for possessing a usable amount of cocaine, and thus the jury could have imposed punishment within a range of zero years to not more than 15 years in prison; the circuit court explicitly considered defendant's criminal history and determined that an alternative sentence of probation would not be appropriate, and this was not an abuse of discretion, but an exercise of it. Wells v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 174, 518 S.W.3d 106 (2017).

Alternative sentence instruction was requested at the outset of sentencing, the trial court replied that it usually waited until the end of such proceedings to consider it, and when requested at the end, the trial court rejected it, and thus the trial court did exercise its discretion and no abuse of discretion was found. Morevover, defendant could not demonstrate prejudice, as the jury sentenced him for Class B felony first-degree battery to the maximum prison term, plus a $10,000 fine, and it strained credulity to argue that the jury would have recommended probation had it been given the option. Hayes v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 158, 544 S.W.3d 587 (2018).

Section 16-90-107(d) did not apply to defendant's case where the jury fixed his sentences at 20 years' imprisonment on a battery count and 10 years' imprisonment on a firearm count, recommended the terms be served consecutively, and its recommendation of an alternative sentence of probation was not binding on the court. McElroy v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 342, 553 S.W.3d 182 (2018).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's request for an alternative sentencing instruction; the circuit court considered that defendant had now been convicted of three counts of sexual assault against very young children, and prejudice could not be shown, as the jury imposed a sentence more severe than the minimum sentencing option, indicating the jury would not have imposed an alternative sentence if provided that option. Mondy v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 290, 577 S.W.3d 460 (2019).

Appeal.

Where defendant failed to object to the bifurcation of his trial on ex post facto grounds and failed to obtain a ruling on that specific issue, he waived that argument on appeal. Smith v. State, 318 Ark. 142, 883 S.W.2d 837 (1994).

Some exceptions to the rule in § 16-91-101(c), that there is no right to appeal from a guilty plea, include (1) Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) permits an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty following the denial of a motion to suppress, (2) an appeal on the issue of the application of jail-time credit appears to be permissible, (3) the denial of a post-judgment motion, filed after a guilty plea to correct an illegal sentence, is appealable, and (4) a defendant may also appeal after a guilty plea when a jury sets punishment under the bifurcated procedure established by subdivison (6) of this section. Hampton v. State, 48 Ark. App. 93, 890 S.W.2d 279 (1995).

Since the enactment of this section, the court has generally disallowed appeals in guilty plea cases, the one exception being that the court reviews nonjurisdictional issues such as the admission of testimony and evidence which arose during the penalty phase of the trial; this position does not indicate a willingness to review the imposition of a sentence simply where the defendant maintains his sentence is excessive when in fact his sentence is within the range prescribed by statute for the offense in question. Cupit v. State, 324 Ark. 438, 920 S.W.2d 853 (1996).

Discovery.

This section and § 16-97-102 do not prevent the rules of discovery from applying; therefore, trial court erred in holding the rules of discovery were inapplicable to the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial. Phillips v. State, 321 Ark. 160, 900 S.W.2d 526 (1995).

Error Not Found.

While a trial court was authorized to instruct the jury on alternative sentences for which defendant might have qualified under subdivision (4) of this section, the statute was permissive and did not require the trial court to give such an instruction. The trial court's reasons for not offering the instruction based on the facts of defendant's case did not amount to an abuse of discretion. Suggs v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 571, 377 S.W.3d 461 (2010).

Evidence.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's attempted escape in the sentencing part of his trial for robbery. Skiver v. State, 336 Ark. 86, 983 S.W.2d 931 (1999).

Harmless Error.

Failure to bifurcate trial for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated, first offense, held to be harmless error. Tauber v. State, 324 Ark. 47, 919 S.W.2d 196 (1996).

Right of Confrontation.

Right of confrontation guaranteed by U.S. Const. Amend. VI and Ark. Const. Art. II, § 10 extends to a defendant's sentencing proceeding before a jury. To the extent Wallace v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 706, 378 S.W.3d 269 (2010), conflicted with this holding, it was overruled. Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, 385 S.W.3d 144 (2011).

Where defendant pled guilty to rape and elected to be sentenced by a jury in a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped statement of the child rape victim during the sentencing proceeding, because this violated defendant's right of confrontation under U.S. Const. Amend. VI and Ark. Const. Art. II, § 10. Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, 385 S.W.3d 144 (2011).

Sentencing by Trial Court.

Where the jury convicted defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and recommended a sentence of 3 years' probation, the trial court was permitted to sentence defendant to 20 years' imprisonment rather than follow the jury's recommendation; the jury's recommendation of 3 years' probation was not authorized by former § 5-64-401(a)(1) (see now § 5-64-420), which required a minimum sentence of 20 years. Ewings v. State, 85 Ark. App. 411, 155 S.W.3d 715 (2004).

In a case dealing with domestic offenses, although the jury was permitted to recommend an alternative sentence, the trial court had the discretion as to whether to impose it; thus, the trial court was permitted to accept a jury's recommended alternative sentences of probation and suspended sentences and then impose fines as a condition of those sentences, pursuant to § 5-4-303(c)(10) (now § 5-4-303(c)(8)). Sullivan v. State, 366 Ark. 183, 234 S.W.3d 285 (2006).

Trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it rejected a jury's verdict and took it upon itself to sentence defendant where the jury's sentencing verdict of zero years in prison and a fine of zero dollars was a proper and valid sentence for second-degree battery; the appellate court sentenced defendant to three years of probation in accordance with the jury's alternative verdict under subdivision (4) of this section. Donaldson v. State, 370 Ark. 3, 257 S.W.3d 74 (2007).

Voir Dire.

Circuit court did not violate defendant's right to a bifurcated trial when it included the word “feloniously” in the description of the charges read during voir dire; the court had considered the issue, decided it was necessary to inform the jury of the nature of the charges as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 32.2, and provided a cautionary statement after reading the information so as to limit any prejudice. Hall v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 411, 558 S.W.3d 399 (2018).

Waiver of Jury Sentencing.

Defendant waived any issue about voir dire of the jury panel when he waived his right to have the jury decide punishment, asked the trial judge to set the sentence, and made no record of the reason for so doing. Armer v. State, 326 Ark. 7, 929 S.W.2d 705 (1996).

Sentencing, as in trial, allowed a defendant to waive a jury only with the agreement of the state; where the state declined to consent to defendant's request to waive a jury for his resentencing, the trial court did not err in submitting the matter to a jury. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1058, 123 S. Ct. 633, 154 L. Ed. 2d 539 (2002).

Cited: Rush v. State, 324 Ark. 147, 919 S.W.2d 933 (1996); Higgins v. State, 326 Ark. 1030, 936 S.W.2d 740 (1996); McClish v. State, 331 Ark. 295, 962 S.W.2d 332 (1998); Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002); Polivka v. State, 2010 Ark. 152, 362 S.W.3d 918 (2010).

16-97-102. Sentencing by the court.

The following procedure shall govern sentencing by the court:

  1. When either party requests to present evidence relevant to sentencing, the court shall hear or receive such evidence and any rebuttal by the opposing party;
  2. If neither party requests a sentencing hearing, the court may order one or may order a presentence investigation pursuant to § 5-4-102; and
  3. The court may hear or may request argument relevant to the appropriate sentence following either a hearing or a presentence investigation.

History. Acts 1993, No. 535, § 2; 1993, No. 551, § 2; 1997, No. 1262, § 23.

Cross References. Victim notification system, § 12-12-1201 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

The right to be present at sentencing is critical and vital to our criminal law system. Eberlein v. State, 315 Ark. 591, 869 S.W.2d 12 (1994).

Consideration of Evidence.

In sentencing defendant for first-degree murder, the circuit court clearly considered defendant's intoxication but determined that it was not a mitigating factor, which the circuit court was free to do. Griffin v. State, 2015 Ark. 340, 470 S.W.3d 676 (2015).

Discovery.

This section and § 16-97-101 do not prevent the rules of discovery from applying; therefore, trial court erred in holding the rules of discovery were inapplicable to the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial. Phillips v. State, 321 Ark. 160, 900 S.W.2d 526 (1995).

Cited: Epps v. State, 100 Ark. App. 344, 268 S.W.3d 362 (2007).

16-97-103. Evidence.

Evidence relevant to sentencing by either the court or a jury may include, but is not limited to, the following, provided no evidence shall be construed under this section as overriding the rape shield statute, § 16-42-101:

  1. The law applicable to parole, meritorious good time, or transfer;
  2. Prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor. The jury may be advised as to the nature of the previous convictions, the date and place thereof, the sentence received, and the date of release from confinement or supervision from all prior offenses;
  3. Prior judicial determinations of delinquency in a juvenile division of circuit court, subject to the following limitations:
  4. Victim impact evidence or statements;
  5. Relevant character evidence;
  6. Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The criteria for departure from the sentencing standards may serve as examples of this type of evidence;
  7. Evidence relevant to guilt presented in the first stage;
  8. Evidence held inadmissible in the first stage may be resubmitted for consideration in the second stage if the basis for exclusion did not apply to sentencing; and
  9. Rebuttal evidence.

(i) That prior delinquency adjudications be subject to a judicial determination that the relevant value of the prior juvenile adjudication outweigh its prejudicial value;

(ii) That consideration only be given to juvenile delinquency adjudications for crimes for which the juvenile could have been tried as an adult; and

(iii) That in no event shall delinquency adjudications for acts occurring more than ten (10) years prior to the commission of the offense charged be considered;

History. Acts 1993, No. 535, § 2; 1993, No. 551, § 2.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Arkansas' bifurcated sentencing procedures in § 5-4-103 and this section are not violative of the ex post facto clause in the United States Constitution or Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 17. Diffee v. State, 319 Ark. 669, 894 S.W.2d 564 (1995).

The fact that a jury may take into consideration when a person convicted of a certain class of felony is eligible for parole or transfer is in no way a usurpation of the executive' department's power and authority to decide when an individual defendant should be released, and does not violate Ark. Const., Art. 4. Teague v. State, 328 Ark. 724, 946 S.W.2d 670 (1997).

In General.

Sentencing is now, in essence, a trial in and of itself, in which new evidence may be submitted. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

Defendant's allegation that subdivision (1) conflicts with court rules was without merit where he failed to cite any express rule with which it conflicts. Travis v. State, 328 Ark. 442, 944 S.W.2d 96 (1997).

The evidence listed in the statute, including victim-impact evidence, is subject to the rules of evidence. Walls v. State, 336 Ark. 490, 986 S.W.2d 397 (1999).

Although defendant had been accused but not yet convicted of forgery, evidence that defendant was out on bond when he committed residential burglary and theft of property provided proof of his character and was relevant to the jury's determination of an appropriate punishment; the jury need not have learned of the details of defendant's bond requirements to understand that the fact that defendant was out on bond when he committed the new crimes said something about his character. Helms v. State, 92 Ark. App. 79, 211 S.W.3d 53 (2005).

Construction.

This section simply allows the jury or court to exercise its discretion in considering all evidence relevant to sentencing and does not mandate automatic enhancement due to prior misdemeanor convictions. Davis v. State, 330 Ark. 76, 953 S.W.2d 559 (1997).

Applicability.

The trial court's retroactive employment of the 1994 versions of § 5-4-103 and this section to offenses committed in 1993 did not subject defendant to substantive prejudice in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Williams v. State, 318 Ark. 846, 887 S.W.2d 530 (1994).

The admission of the defendant's prior juvenile adjudications did not violate the ex post facto principle, notwithstanding the contention that this section was improperly applied retroactively, since the admission of the prior adjudications did not change the nature or definition of the offense or increase the penalty to which he was subject. Snyder v. State, 332 Ark. 279, 965 S.W.2d 121 (1998).

Admissibility.

The introduction of evidence during this stage must be governed by the rules of admissibility and exclusion; otherwise, these proceedings would not pass constitutional muster, which is all the more reason to permit appeal. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

Testimony regarding defendant's prior robbery attempt was properly admitted as an aggravating circumstance of the present robbery conviction under subdivision (6) of this section. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

Evidence of uncharged misconduct held admissible as an aggravating factor during the sentencing phase. Davis v. State, 60 Ark. App. 179, 962 S.W.2d 815 (1998).

Evidence of defendant's prior deferred sentence in Oklahoma and plea of nolo contendere to the offense of rape in the first degree held admissible for sentencing purposes. McClish v. State, 331 Ark. 295, 962 S.W.2d 332 (1998).

Trial court did not err by allowing two witnesses to testify during sentencing that they had seen defendant “acting suspiciously” in the neighborhood park on the day of his initial contact with police because the trial court specifically instructed the jury that the testimony was only to be considered to show why the witnesses called the police and was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the testimony was not unduly prejudicial, and the testimony went to defendant's character. Adkins v. State, 371 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.3d 523 (2007).

Trial court did not err by allowing a police officer to testify that defendant's pants were unbuttoned and unzipped at the time of his arrest because defendant cured any prejudice by cross-examining the officer and the appearance of defendant's clothing was relevant to why the officer searched defendant. Adkins v. State, 371 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.3d 523 (2007).

Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing into evidence the transcript of chats between defendant and the officer, whom defendant believed to be a 14-year old female, because the transcript was the best method for the court to gauge the veracity of defendant's attempts to downplay his activities and contained much relevant information not found in the agreed statement of facts; in this section, the Arkansas Legislature listed several other types of evidence that could be considered, including evidence relevant to guilt presented at the first stage. Howerton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 331, 413 S.W.3d 861 (2012).

In an aggravated robbery case, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence at sentencing of appellant's participation in a prior robbery; it was of no consequence that appellant had not yet been convicted in the robbery at issue. As to relevance, the fact that appellant was an active participant in two robberies, just days apart and committed in nearly the same fashion, was relevant character evidence and was evidence of aggravated circumstances showing his propensity to engage in similar criminal conduct. Thomas v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 466, 422 S.W.3d 217 (2012).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by allowing testimony about subsequent crimes, as they were similar to the crimes in the present appeal, and the testimony was relevant as an aggravating circumstance and showed defendant's character and his lack of potential for rehabilitation, plus prejudice could not be shown as his sentence was under the maximum amount allowed. Stover v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 393, 437 S.W.3d 695 (2014).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting on-line chats and photographs depicting snuff sexual acts found on defendant's computer in the sentencing phase of his jury trial where the photos were the best method for the jury to gauge the veracity of defendant's attempts to downplay his activities, and they directly challenged witness testimony about defendant's care for his disabled wife and his good reputation in the community. Shreck v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 374, 499 S.W.3d 677 (2016).

In the sentencing hearing for defendant's convictions under § 5-27-602, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony from defendant's former stepdaughter in which she identified herself and her sister in photographs found at defendant's residence and testified about defendant's past molestation of her when she was a child many years earlier; defendant's history of attraction to underage girls was relevant to his character and the crimes for which he was convicted. Antoniello v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 105, 542 S.W.3d 878 (2018).

Aggravating Circumstances.

In a prosecution for violation of a minor, the testimony of the victim's mother that defendant violated a no contact order, which provided that defendant was to have no contact with the victim, was evidence of an aggravating circumstance because it related to the offenses for which defendant was convicted; when he violated the no contact order, defendant continued to harm the victim, thus adding to the injurious consequences of his crime. Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226, 118 S.W.3d 542 (2003).

Section 16-90-804 clearly indicates that the list of departure factors in that section is not exclusive; therefore, evidence of subsequent drug manufacturing was admissible in the sentencing phase of a drug trial because it was relevant for departure purposes. Crawford v. State, 362 Ark. 301, 208 S.W.3d 146 (2005).

Trial court did not err in admitting testimony during sentencing that defendant had raped another boy subsequent to his rape of the victim in the present case as the evidence was relevant to defendant's character and his propensity to continue to engage in similar activity in the future. Williams v. State, 363 Ark. 395, 214 S.W.3d 829 (2005).

During the penalty phase of defendant's trial for driving while intoxicated in violation of § 5-65-103 and refusal to submit to a chemical test in violation of § 5-65-205, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of his prior convictions for refusal to submit to a chemical test; the evidence was admissible under this section, as it was relevant to his sentencing as either character evidence or aggravating circumstances. Williams v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 554 (2009).

Appeal.

Review on appeal shall be confined to nonjurisdictional issues which arise during the penalty phase of the trial. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994).

Character Evidence.

Plain language of this section indicates that, while evidence introduced during the sentencing phase may include evidence described in this section, the list is not exhaustive; thus, evidence of subsequent drug manufacturing was admissible in the sentencing phase of the trial despite the fact that it was inadmissible in the guilt phase under Ark. R. Evid. 404. Crawford v. State, 362 Ark. 301, 208 S.W.3d 146 (2005).

After defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual assault, a woman was properly allowed to testify at the sentencing hearing that he had raped her nine years earlier, as other crime evidence that might not be admissible at the guilt phase under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) was admissible at sentencing under subdivision (5) of this section as relevant evidence of defendant's character that the jury could consider in determining the appropriate sentence. McElroy v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 533, 385 S.W.3d 406 (2011).

Although the testimony of the three witnesses regarding prior incidents involving defendant did not involve kidnapping, given the similarities between the events, including missing underwear, deceptive tactics to gain entry into a witness's home, use of a latex glove, and his use of a pellet gun and his threat to attack another witness's husband, under Ark. R. Evid. 401 and subdivision (5) of this section, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony at the sentencing phase of the trial. Huff v. State, 2012 Ark. 388, 423 S.W.3d 608 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of subsequent charges against defendant in the sentencing phase of his trial pursuant to this section. Vaughn v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 136, 456 S.W.3d 767 (2015).

Trial court did not err in permitting questions regarding defendant's past behavior in the sentencing phase of his murder trial where he posed a broad question regarding his aggressiveness, thereby opening the door to questions regarding specific instances in which he had displayed aggression. Kinsey v. State, 2016 Ark. 393, 503 S.W.3d 772 (2016).

Circuit court properly admitted into evidence, during the sentencing phase of defendant's trial, conversations regarding “snuff” sex; while the evidence was obviously prejudicial to defendant, the evidence was both relevant and not unduly prejudicial. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit rape of two minor children and he not only expressed his interest in snuff sex during the planning of the act with an undercover police officer, he also indicated that he was interested in performing it with minors. Shreck v. State, 2017 Ark. 39, 510 S.W.3d 750 (2017).

Trial court misapplied the law by overruling defendant's objection at sentencing to admission of evidence concerning nude images found on his computer without first engaging in the required Ark. R. Evid. 403 inquiry; from the trial court's comments from the bench in response to defendant's objection, it was apparent that the trial court was under the erroneous impression that Rule 403 did not apply at the sentencing stage of the proceedings. Peebles v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 483, 588 S.W.3d 355 (2019).

Consideration of Evidence.

In sentencing defendant for first-degree murder, the circuit court clearly considered defendant's intoxication but determined that it was not a mitigating factor, which the circuit court was free to do. Griffin v. State, 2015 Ark. 340, 470 S.W.3d 676 (2015).

Criminal History.

Trial court's decision to permit the introduction of evidence relating to defendant's criminal history during the sentencing phase of his trial was consistent with the mandates of this section; at sentencing, under § 5-4-401(a)(1), defendant was subjected to the normal ranges of Class A and Y felonies as opposed to the enhanced ranges designated for habitual offenders. Defendant actually received the minimum sentences allowed on two of his four convictions and less than the maximum on the other two and, under § 5-4-403, his sentences were ordered to run concurrently rather than consecutively, as they could have; thus, defendant not only failed to establish a threshold evidentiary error supporting reversal, but he also failed to show that he suffered prejudice during sentencing. Wilson v. State, 100 Ark. App. 14, 262 S.W.3d 628 (2007).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of defendant's previous convictions to be introduced during the sentencing phase after he was convicted of a single misdemeanor count of harassment; the circuit court did not act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration in deciding to admit the evidence, it recognized that the jury could give the evidence whatever weight it chose, and it acknowledged the defense's prerogative to argue what weight the jury should give the evidence. Rose v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 446, 558 S.W.3d 415 (2018).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Department of Correction pen pack and an uncertified copy of a court of appeals opinion for sentencing-enhancement purposes; although the pen pack incorrectly reflected a guilty plea to two prior felonies, it included defendant's prior convictions, offense dates, sentencing dates, felony classifications, and sentences for each conviction, and the appellate opinion showed that the conviction and sentence were affirmed. Although neither of the documents strictly complied with § 5-4-504(b), the documents did satisfy the circuit court beyond a reasonable doubt under § 5-4-504(a) that defendant had been found guilty of the prior felonies. Rayburn v. State, 2019 Ark. 254, 583 S.W.3d 385 (2019).

Different Judge.

While evidence presented during the guilt phase of a trial was relevant to sentencing under subdivision (7) of this section, there was no merit to defendant's claim that having a different judge preside over the sentencing phase of trial meant that the evidence presented during the guilt phase would not be considered. Rasul v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 137 (2013).

Discretion of Court.

Permitting the state rebuttal argument in the sentencing phase when it has the burden of obtaining some penalty falls within the court's broad discretion. Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995), cert. denied, Caldwell v. Arkansas, 517 U.S. 1124, 116 S. Ct. 1361, 134 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1996).

Evidence Held Irrelevant.

The court properly refused to allow defendant at sentencing phase to testify as to his experiences of prison life as such observations are irrelevant under this section. Clark v. State, 328 Ark. 501, 944 S.W.2d 533 (1997).

Failure to Object.

Upon defendant's conviction for rape and second-degree battery, he argued that the admission of evidence of his prior alleged misconduct involving a minor during the sentencing phase of trial violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; however, the error was not preserved for review. Pursuant to this section, certain evidence was admissible at sentencing that would not have been admissible at the guilt phase of a trial, and if defendant did not wish for this evidence to come in during sentencing, he should have raised an objection. White v. State, 2012 Ark. 221, 408 S.W.3d 720 (2012).

Fugitive Status.

Where a habitual offender with a prior child-molestation conviction in another state pleaded guilty to multiple child sexual-abuse charges in Arkansas, the trial court did not err in considering the fact that the defendant was a fugitive from an indictment for sexual solicitation of a child in that other state; the trial judge specifically stated that he would not be considering the indictment for purposes of a conviction or as evidence of guilt, and the defendant failed to meet his burden to overcome the presumption that the trial court only considered competent evidence. Marshall v. State, 342 Ark. 172, 27 S.W.3d 392 (2000).

Hearsay.

In a prosecution on two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed a police officer to present hearsay testimony during the sentencing phase of the trial regarding prior drug activity of the defendant for which he was never charged, tried, or convicted; prejudice was shown by the fact that the jury sentenced the defendant to two life sentences. Buckley v. State, 341 Ark. 864, 20 S.W.3d 331 (2000).

Jury Instructions.

It is not error for a trial court to inform the jury of the Governor's power to pardon. Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 81, 941 S.W.2d 411 (1997).

As this section controls over the ruling in Andrews v. State, the court did not err in permitting a jury instruction relating to parole and transfer. Spann v. State, 328 Ark. 509, 944 S.W.2d 537 (1997).

In an aggravated robbery case where habitual offender status was at issue, a trial court did not err by refusing to give the jury an instruction on the sentences that appellant had received in federal court for prior bank robbery convictions because it was within the trial court's discretion to do so, pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section. Walden v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 307, 419 S.W.3d 739 (2012).

“Nature of Previous Convictions”.

The plain meaning of the term “nature of the previous convictions” refers to the general character of the pertinent crime. Rush v. State, 324 Ark. 147, 919 S.W.2d 933 (1996).

Prejudicial Error Not Shown.

Circuit court properly convicted defendant of first-degree battery and second-degree murder because the admission of the prosecutor's report from his prior conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle did not violate his rights under this section or his Confrontation Clause rights where he conceded that he received a sentence less than the maximum for both convictions; the fact that defendant was not parole eligible and had to serve 100% of his sentence did not change the result. Nelson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 697, 477 S.W.3d 569 (2015).

Even if the circuit court erred in the sentencing hearing in failing to exclude the screenshots of the text messages between the undercover officer and the defendant, no prejudice was shown and any error was harmless; defendant had already pleaded guilty to the crimes and a defendant who has received a sentence within the statutory range short of the maximum sentence cannot show prejudice from the sentence itself. Montgomery v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 376, 586 S.W.3d 187 (2019).

Victim Impact Evidence.

Videotape of victim's family and friends and its concomitant narration held admissible where the trial judge viewed the videotape before allowing it to be played to the jury, ruled portions of the tape inadmissible, ordered the narrator to describe the pictures, but not embellish them, and otherwise gave expressed and careful consideration of the videotape's relevancy and purpose. Hicks v. State, 327 Ark. 727, 940 S.W.2d 855 (1997).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding, in the sentencing phase, victim-impact evidence of the victim's arrests that were abated by his death where the defendant was allowed to introduce the victim's prior felony convictions. Brooks v. State, 328 Ark. 32, 941 S.W.2d 409 (1997).

In the prosecution of a boy scout leader for the rapes of several boys under his care, testimony regarding the defendant's involvement in the murder of one of the boy's parents was not proper victim impact evidence. Walls v. State, 336 Ark. 490, 986 S.W.2d 397 (1999).

Victim impact evidence is not applicable in juvenile proceedings as juveniles are not “convicted” and “sentenced” and, instead, are “adjudicated” and have their cases go to “disposition.” Hunter v. State, 341 Ark. 665, 19 S.W.3d 607 (2000).

As to the state's appeal regarding the defense's use of victim-impact evidence under this section, there was jurisdiction over the appeal because the application of statutory sentencing procedures required uniformity and consistency. However, the state's argument was not addressed because it was not preserved for review; the state's contemporaneous relevance objection did not encompass the arguments made on appeal. Jones v. State, 374 Ark. 475, 288 S.W.3d 633 (2008).

Testimony of the chairman of a non-profit group's board about the group's response to a flooding disaster, the resulting funerals, and the chairman's personal relationships with the bereaved was relevant victim-impact evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 402 and this section at defendant's sentencing hearing. Although the group was able to meet the disaster victims' needs, the testimony illustrated the difficulties the group experienced due to defendant's theft; the evidence was not unduly prejudicial. Brown v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 608 (2011).

Cited: Pryor v. Norris, 103 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 1997); Vanesch v. State, 70 Ark. App. 277, 16 S.W.3d 306 (2000); Ridling v. State, 348 Ark. 213, 72 S.W.3d 466 (2002); MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006); Bell v. State, 371 Ark. 375, 266 S.W.3d 696 (2007); Peer v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 181, 598 S.W.3d 59 (2020).

16-97-104. Proof of prior convictions.

Proof of prior convictions, both felony and misdemeanor, and proof of juvenile adjudications shall follow the procedures outlined in §§ 5-4-5025-4-504.

History. Acts 1993, No. 535, § 2; 1993, No. 551, § 2.

Case Notes

In General.

After a determination of guilt by the jury, the trial court hears proof of a charged habitual offender's prior convictions outside of the presence of the jury; the court then instructs the jury on the number of such offenses and the statutory range. Rush v. State, 324 Ark. 147, 919 S.W.2d 933 (1996).

Chapter 98 Treatment for Drug Abuse

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved.]

Subchapter 2 — Pretrial or Posttrial Treatment, Intervention, and Diversion Programs

16-98-201. Qualifications — Waiver.

Any judicial district, with the agreement of the parties, may establish a program whereby a defendant may be transferred to a pretrial or post-trial treatment program for drug abuse, provided that:

  1. The treatment program is at least one (1) year in length and meets the minimum standards of treatment promulgated by the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services;
  2. The charge or charges against the defendant carries a punishment which may be suspended;
  3. The defendant waives his or her rights to a speedy trial and such other rights as are agreed to by the parties and executes a consent for a limited release of confidential information regarding treatment permitting the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney access to information relating to attendance, attitude, participation, and results of drug screens; and
    1. The defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older.
    2. This provision may be waived with the consent of the prosecuting attorney.

History. Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 53, § 1; 2013, No. 1107, § 14; 2017, No. 913, § 44.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (1), substituted “Division of Behavioral Health Services” for “Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” and deleted “Health and” following “the Department of”.

The 2017 amendment substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” in (1).

Case Notes

Illustrative Cases.

Where appellant did not complete drug court in accordance with § 16-98-201, he was required to serve a six-year sentence for forgery and a ten-year suspended sentence for theft. Under § 5-4-404, he was entitled to 53 days credit for the time he spent in jail before he entered drug court; appellant was not entitled to credit for the time that his case was in drug court. Laxton v. State, 99 Ark. App. 1, 256 S.W.3d 518 (2007).

Probation Revocation.

Where defendant pleaded guilty to commercial burglary, breaking or entering, two counts of theft of property, and first-degree criminal mischief, he was sentenced to 60 months' supervised probation. Because defendant consented to participation in the residential drug treatment in accordance with this section, his placement in a regional punishment facility could not be classified as a probation revocation; when he violated the terms of the drug-court program based on his public intoxication and testing positive for cocaine, the trial court did not err by revoking his probation. Doyle v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 94, 302 S.W.3d 607 (2009).

Subchapter 3 — Arkansas Drug Court Act

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No 1266, § 5: July 1, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is serious overcrowding in Department of Correction facilities; that the overcrowding is likely to worsen if alternative sentencing measures are not enacted; and that this act is immediately necessary because it is designed to establish a procedure to help alleviate the overcrowding by offering sentencing alternates to person charged with certain drug offenses and should be given immediate effect. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2003.”

Acts 2007, No. 1022, § 6: Apr. 4, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is a critical need for judicial intervention and support for effective treatment programs that reduce the incidence of drug use, drug addiction, and family separation due to parental substance abuse and drug-related crimes; that this act expands drug court programs and creates the Drug Court Advisory Committee; and that this act is immediately necessary because any delay in the expansion of drug court programs or the creation of the Drug Court Advisory Committee will harm citizens of this state who will benefit from judicial monitoring of intensive treatment and strict supervision of addicts in drug and drug-related cases. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2013, No. 282, § 17: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a one-year period; that the effectiveness of this act as soon as possible is essential to the operation of the judiciary and the administration of justice; and that this act is immediately necessary because the delay in the effective date of this act could cause irreparable harm upon the proper administration of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2013, No. 1460, § 17. Effective on and after January 1, 2014.

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 49: Apr. 1, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that prison overcrowding is one of the largest problems currently burdening the state both from a public safety and budgetary standpoint; that safe and effective measures are needed to immediately combat this problem; and that this act is immediately necessary because in the interests of public safety and the state budget the Department of Correction, Department of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, and the Parole Board should be allowed to immediately implement these new measures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Case Notes

Revocation.

Defendant's drug-court probation under §§ 16-98-301 to 16-98-304 was revoked for failing to attend drug testing, failing to attend a group meeting, and being arrested because she inexcusably failed to comply under former § 5-4-309(d) (now § 16-93-308(d)), despite a delirium diagnosis. Defendant did not show that she was suffering from such on the dates that probation was violated; moreover, an examination showed no mental defect, and her hallucinations were not involved with her probation revocation. Anglin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 34, 249 S.W.3d 836 (2007).

After defendant's drug-court probation was revoked, her argument that she was ineligible due to a mental health issue was not considered on review because it was not raised to the trial court. Anglin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 34, 249 S.W.3d 836 (2007).

16-98-301. Short title and definitions.

  1. This subchapter shall be known as the “Arkansas Drug Court Act”.
  2. As used in this subchapter:
    1. “Evidence-based practices” means supervision, policies, procedures, and practices proven through research to reduce recidivism;
    2. “Validated risk-needs assessment” means a determination of a person's risk to reoffend and the needs that, when addressed, reduce the risk to reoffend through the use of an actuarial assessment tool that assesses the dynamic and static factors that drive criminal behavior; and
    3. “Violent felony offense” means an offense that is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year, and during the course of the offense:
      1. The person carried, possessed, or used a firearm or other dangerous weapon and the use of deadly force was used against another person; or
      2. Death or serious physical injury was inflicted upon another person, regardless of whether death or serious physical injury was an element of the crime for which the person was convicted.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1266, § 1; 2011, No. 570, § 111; 2015, No. 895, § 31.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added “and definitions” in the section heading; and added the (a) designation and (b).

The 2015 amendment inserted “supervision, policies, procedures, and” in (b)(1).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Drug Intervention Program, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 448.

Case Notes

Due Process.

Circuit court's order denying a petition for postconviction relief was reversed where drug-court participants were to be afforded the same protections as a probationer on revocation, the circuit court failed to hold a hearing prior to petitioner's expulsion from the drug-court program, and that failure amounted to a due-process violation. Neal v. State, 2016 Ark. 287, 497 S.W.3d 666 (2016).

Probation Revocation.

Trial court lacked authority, pursuant to § 5-4-303(d)(2), to lengthen defendant's probationary period where defendant had made progress in the drug-court program under the Drug Court Act (§ 16-98-301 et seq.), because the trial court did not hold a revocation hearing pursuant to former § 5-4-310 (see now § 16-93-307). Cross v. State, 2009 Ark. 597, 357 S.W.3d 895 (2009).

16-98-302. Purpose and intent.

  1. There is a critical need for judicial intervention and support for effective treatment programs that reduce the incidence of drug use, drug addiction, and family separation due to parental substance abuse and drug-related crimes. It is the intent of the General Assembly for this subchapter to enhance public safety by facilitating the creation, expansion, and coordination of drug court programs.
  2. The goals of the drug court programs in this state shall be consistent with the standards adopted by the United States Department of Justice and recommended by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals and shall include the following key components:
    1. Integration of substance abuse treatment with justice system case processing;
    2. Use of a nonadversarial approach in which prosecution and defense promote public safety while protecting the right of the accused to due process;
    3. Early identification, with the use of a validated risk-needs assessement, of eligible moderate-to-high-risk participants and prompt placement of eligible participants;
    4. Access to a continuum of treatment, rehabilitation, and related services;
    5. Frequent testing for alcohol and illicit drugs;
    6. A coordinated strategy among the judge, prosecution, defense, and treatment providers to govern offender compliance;
    7. Ongoing judicial interaction with each participant;
    8. Monitoring and evaluation of the achievement of program goals and effectiveness;
    9. Continuing interdisciplinary education to promote effective planning, implementation, and operation; and
    10. Development of partnerships with public agencies and community-based organizations to generate local support and enhance drug court effectiveness.
    1. Drug court programs are specialized court dockets within the existing structure of the Arkansas court system. Drug court programs offer judicial monitoring of intensive treatment and strict supervision of addicts in drug and drug-related cases.
    2. The creation of a drug court docket and the appointment of a circuit judge to that docket shall be approved by the administrative judge in each judicial circuit and made a part of the judicial circuit's administrative plan required by Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 14.
  3. Drug court program success shall be determined by the rate of recidivism of all drug court participants, including participants who do not graduate.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1266, § 2; 2007, No. 1022, § 3; 2011, No. 570, § 112.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (b)(3), inserted “with the use of a validated risk-needs assessment” and “moderate-to-high-risk”; and added (d).

Case Notes

Due Process.

Circuit court's order denying a petition for postconviction relief was reversed where drug-court participants were to be afforded the same protections as a probationer on revocation, the circuit court failed to hold a hearing prior to petitioner's expulsion from the drug-court program, and that failure amounted to a due-process violation. Neal v. State, 2016 Ark. 287, 497 S.W.3d 666 (2016).

16-98-303. Drug court programs authorized.

    1. Each judicial district of this state is authorized to establish a drug court program under this subchapter.
    2. A drug court established under this subchapter shall be approved under § 16-10-139.
      1. A drug court program may be preadjudication or post-adjudication for an adult offender or a juvenile offender.
      2. A juvenile drug court program or services may be used in a delinquency case or a family in need of services case.
      3. A juvenile drug court program or services may be used in a dependency-neglect case under § 9-27-334.
    3. Notwithstanding the authorization described in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, a judge of a circuit court, drug court, or juvenile division of circuit court may not order any services or treatment under subsection (b) of this section or § 16-98-305 unless:
      1. An administrative and programmatic appropriation has been made for those purposes;
      2. Administrative and programmatic funding is available for those purposes; and
      3. Administrative and programmatic positions have been authorized for those purposes.
    4. As determined by the Division of Community Correction, an adult drug court program established under this section shall target high-risk offenders and medium-risk offenders.
    1. A drug court program shall incorporate services from the Division of Community Correction, the Department of Human Services, and the Administrative Office of the Courts.
    2. Subject to an appropriation, funding, and position authorization, both programmatic and administrative, and subject to the requirements of eligibility as defined in § 16-93-1202, the Division of Community Correction:
      1. Shall:
        1. Establish standards regarding the classification of a drug court program participant as a high-risk offender or medium-risk offender;
        2. Provide positions for persons to serve as probation officers, drug counselors, and administrative assistants;
        3. Provide for drug testing for drug court program participants;
        4. Provide for intensive outpatient treatment for drug court program participants;
        5. Provide for intensive short-term and long-term residential treatment for drug court program participants; and
        6. Develop clinical assessment capacity, including drug testing, to identify a drug court program participant with a substance addiction and develop a treatment protocol that improves the drug court program participant's likelihood of success; and
      2. May:
        1. Provide for continuous alcohol monitoring for drug court program participants, including a minimum period of one hundred twenty (120) days; and
        2. Develop clinical assessment capacity, including continuous alcohol monitoring, to identify a drug court program participant with a substance addiction and develop a treatment protocol that improves the drug court program participant's likelihood of success.
    3. Subject to an appropriation, funding, and position authorization, both programmatic and administrative, the department shall:
      1. Provide positions for persons to serve as drug counselors and administrative assistants in delinquency cases, dependency-neglect cases, and family in need of services cases;
      2. Provide for drug testing for drug court program participants in delinquency cases, dependency-neglect cases, and family in need of services cases;
      3. Provide for intensive outpatient treatment for drug court program participants in delinquency cases, dependency-neglect cases, and family in need of services cases;
      4. Provide for intensive short-term and long-term residential treatment for drug court program participants in delinquency cases, dependency-neglect cases, and family in need of services cases;
      5. Certify and license treatment providers and treatment facilities that serve drug court program participants;
      6. Provide and oversee residential beds for drug court programs;
      7. Oversee catchment area facilities for drug court programs;
      8. Act as a liaison between the courts and drug court program participants; and
      9. Oversee performance standards for residential and long-term facilities providing services to drug court programs.
    4. Subject to an appropriation, funding, and position authorization, both programmatic and administrative, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall:
      1. Provide state-level coordination and support for drug court judges and their programs;
      2. Administer funds for the maintenance and operation of local approved drug court programs;
      3. Provide training and education to drug court judges and other professionals involved in drug court programs;
      4. Operate as a liaison between drug court judges and other state-level agencies providing services to drug court programs;
      5. Develop criteria for determining new drug court locations that take into account:
        1. The current size of the defendant population that meets the criteria for drug court participation;
        2. Recent trends indicating an increasing defendant population that meets the criteria for drug court participation;
        3. Existing drug treatment programs currently in place and operating through the courts, the county jail, or the Division of Correction; and
        4. The drug court program's use of evidence-based practices by key partners involved in the prospective drug court including those to assess the needs of drug court participants in order to effectively target programming toward high-risk participants.
    1. A drug court program shall not be available to any defendant who:
      1. Has a pending charge for a violent felony against him or her;
      2. Has been convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in this subchapter or adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile of a violent felony offense; or
        1. Is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12-901 et seq.
        2. The exclusion under subdivision (c)(1)(C)(i) of this section shall not apply to the offense of prostitution, § 5-70-102.
    2. Eligible offenses may be further restricted by the rules of a specific drug court program.
    3. Nothing in this subchapter shall require a drug court judge to consider or accept every offender with a treatable condition or addiction, regardless of the fact that the controlling offense is eligible for consideration in the drug court program.
    4. Any defendant who is denied entry to a drug court program shall be prosecuted as provided by law.
    1. Drug court programs may require a separate judicial processing system differing in practice and design from the traditional adversarial criminal prosecution and trial systems.
    2. A drug court team shall be designated by a circuit judge assigned to manage the drug court docket and may include a circuit judge, a prosecuting attorney, a public defender or private defense attorney, one (1) or more addiction counselors, one (1) or more probation officers, one (1) or more private treatment provider representatives, and any other individual or individuals determined necessary by the drug court judge.
      1. The administrative judge of the judicial district shall designate one (1) or more circuit judges to administer the drug court program.
      2. If a county is in a judicial district that does not have a circuit judge who is able to administer the drug court program on a consistent basis, the administrative plan for the judicial circuit required by Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14 may designate a district court judge to administer the drug court program.
  1. Each judicial district may develop a training and implementation manual for drug court programs with the assistance of the:
    1. Department;
    2. Division of Elementary and Secondary Education;
    3. Adult Education Section;
    4. Division of Community Correction; and
    5. Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. A Division of Drug Court Programs is created within the Administrative Office of the Courts. The position of Drug Court Coordinator is created within the Division of Drug Court Programs, and the Drug Court Coordinator shall:
    1. Provide assistance, counsel, and advice to the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee;
    2. Serve as a coordinator between drug court judges, the Division of Community Correction, the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services, private treatment provider representatives, and public health advocates;
    3. Establish, manage, and maintain a uniform statewide drug court information system to track information and data on drug court program participants to be reviewed by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee;
    4. Train and educate drug court judges and drug court staff in those judicial districts maintaining a drug court program;
    5. Provide staff assistance to the Arkansas Drug Court Professionals Association;
    6. Oversee the disbursement of funds appropriated to the Administrative Office of the Courts for the maintenance and operation of local approved drug court programs based on a formula developed by the Administrative Office of the Courts and reviewed by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee; and
    7. Develop guidelines to be reviewed by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee to serve as a framework for developing effective local drug court programs and to provide a structure for conducting research and evaluation for drug court program accountability.
    1. A drug court program judge, on his or her own motion or upon a request from an offender, may order dismissal of a case and the sealing of the record if:
      1. The offender has successfully completed a drug court program, as determined by the drug court program judge;
      2. The offender has received aftercare programming;
      3. The drug court program judge has received a recommendation from the prosecuting attorney for dismissal of the case and the sealing of the record; and
      4. The drug court program judge, after considering the offender's past criminal history, determines that dismissal of the case and the sealing of the record are appropriate.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (g)(2)(B) of this section, if the offender has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to or has been found guilty of an offense falling within a target group under § 16-93-1202(10)(A)(i) in another Arkansas court, the drug court program judge may order sealing and dismissal of the offense falling within a target group with the written concurrence of the other Arkansas court.
      2. The following offenses are not eligible for sealing under subdivision (g)(2)(A) of this section:
        1. Residential burglary, § 5-39-201(a);
        2. Commercial burglary, § 5-39-201(b);
        3. Breaking or entering, § 5-39-202; and
        4. The fourth and subsequent offense of driving while intoxicated, § 5-65-103.
    2. Unless otherwise ordered by the drug court program judge, sealing under this subsection shall be as described in the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1266, § 3; 2007, No. 1022, § 4; 2009, No. 1491, § 2; 2011, No. 570, §§ 113-115; 2011, No. 1137, § 3; 2013, No. 1107, § 15; 2013, No. 1460, § 16; 2015, No. 895, §§ 32-35; 2017, No. 423, § 27; 2017, No. 913, § 45; 2019, No. 910, §§ 948-952.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2011, No. 1137, § 1, provided: “Legislative findings.

“(a) In a per curiam opinion dated February 9, 2011, the Supreme Court addressed the recommendations of the District Court Resource Assessment Board, one (1) of which stated that the General Assembly could authorize a state district court judge to preside over a drug court program, probation revocation proceeding, or a parole revocation proceeding. In Re Amendments to Administrative Order Nos. 4 and 18 and Regulations of the Arkansas Board of Certified Court Reporter Examiners § 1, 2011 Ark. 57 (2011).

“(b) That the General Assembly finds that allowing a state district court judge to preside over a drug court, a probation revocation proceeding, or a parole revocation proceeding promotes the sound and efficient administration of justice.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (g).

The 2011 amendment by No. 570 added (b)(2)(E) (now (b)(2)(A)(vi)) and (b)(4)(E); substituted “charge for a violent felony” for “violent criminal charge” in (c)(1)(A); and inserted “as defined in this subchapter” in (c)(1)(B).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1137 added (d)(3)(B).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1107 substituted “Division of Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services” for “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (f)(2).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1460 inserted “program” in (g)(1), (g)(1)(A), (g)(1)(C), (g)(1)(D), and (g)(2)(A); deleted “expungement and” preceding “dismissal” in (g)(1) and (g)(1)(C); inserted “and the sealing of the record” in (g)(1), (g)(1)(C), and (g)(1)(D); substituted “determines that” for “feels expungement and” in (g)(1)(D); substituted “sealing and” for “expungement and” in (g)(2)(A); substituted “sealing” for “expungement” in (g)(2)(B) and (g)(3); and, in (g)(3), inserted “program judge” and substituted “the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401” for “§ 16-90-901”.

The 2015 amendment inserted present (a)(2), deleted former (a)(2)(A), and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; added “or a juvenile offender” in (a)(3)(A); deleted “pursuant to a diversion agreement under § 9-27-323” at the end of (a)(3)(B); in (a)(4), substituted “a judge” for “no judge” and “may not order” for “may order”; added (a)(5); redesignated and rewrote (b)(2); inserted “approved” in (b)(4)(B); and, in (f)(6), inserted “approved” and substituted “Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee” for “Drug Court Advisory Committee”.

The 2017 amendment by No. 423 inserted “and subject to the requirements of eligibility as defined in § 16-93-1202” in the introductory language of (b)(2).

The 2017 amendment by No. 913 substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” in (f)(2).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section; substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (b)(4)(E)(iii); substituted “Division of Elementary and Secondary Education” for “Department of Education” in (e)(2); and substituted “Adult Education Section of the Division of Workforce Services” for “Department of Career Education” in (e)(3).

Cross References. Disposition, family in need of services, generally, § 9-27-332.

16-98-304. Cost and fees.

  1. The adult or juvenile drug court judge may order the offender to pay:
    1. Court costs as provided in § 16-10-305;
    2. Treatment costs;
    3. Drug testing costs;
    4. A local program user fee;
    5. Necessary supervision fees, including any applicable residential treatment fees;
    6. Any fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) that are to be paid to the Department of Community Correction;
    7. Global Positioning System monitoring; and
    8. Continuous alcohol monitoring fees.
    1. The drug court judge shall establish a schedule for the payment of costs and fees.
    2. The cost for treatment, drug testing, continuous alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision shall be set by the treatment and supervision providers respectively and made part of the order of the drug court judge for payment.
    3. Program user fees shall be set by the drug court judge.
    4. Treatment, drug testing, continuous alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision costs or fees shall be paid to the respective providers.
    5. Fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) shall be paid to the Department of Community Correction.
      1. All court costs and program user fees assessed by the drug court judge shall be paid to the court clerk for remittance to the county treasury under § 14-14-1313.
      2. All installment payments shall initially be deemed to be collection of court costs under § 16-10-305 until the court costs have been collected in full with any remaining payments representing collections of other fees and costs as authorized in this section and shall be credited to the county administration of justice fund and distributed under § 16-10-307.
      3. Local program user fees shall be credited to a fund known as the “drug court program fund” and appropriated by the quorum court for the benefit and administration of the drug court program.
    6. Court orders for costs and fees shall remain an obligation of the offender with court monitoring until fully paid.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1266, § 4; 2009, No. 490, § 1; 2013, No. 282, § 12; 2015, No. 895, § 36.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1266, § 4, is also codified as § 19-6-489.

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment, in (a), inserted “as provided in § 16-10-305” in (a)(1), deleted “not to exceed twenty dollars ($20.00) per month” following “fee” in (a)(4), and inserted (a)(6); in (b), rewrote (b)(3) and (b)(5), substituted “the MAGNUM Drug Court Fund” for “The remaining user fees shall be remitted to the Treasurer of State by the court clerk for deposit in the MAGNUM Drug Court Fund, which” in (b)(6)(A), deleted “user fees and any” following “consist of” in (b)(6)(B), inserted (b)(7), and redesignated the subsequent subdivision accordingly; and made related changes.

The 2013 amendment rewrote (b)(7)(B) (now (b)(6)(B)).

The 2015 amendment inserted “adult or juvenile” in the introductory language of (a); inserted “local” in (a)(4); substituted “that are” for “which are” in (a)(6); added (a)(7) and (a)(8); inserted “continuous alcohol monitoring if ordered” in (b)(2) and (b)(4); deleted former (b)(6) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and substituted “Local program” for “All program” in (b)(6)(C).

16-98-305. Required resources.

Each approved drug court program established under this subchapter, subject to an appropriation, funding, and position authorization, both programmatic and administrative, shall be provided with the following resources:

  1. The Department of Community Correction shall provide the following pursuant to § 16-98-303(b)(2) for adult offenders:
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (1)(A)(ii) of this section, provide a minimum of one (1) drug counselor position for every thirty (30) drug court participants.
      2. If a drug court judge does not require the drug counselor position or positions described in subdivision (1)(A)(i) of this section, funding for a drug counselor or counselors shall be provided under subdivision (1)(E)(i) of this section;
    1. Provide a minimum of one (1) probation officer position for every forty (40) drug court participants;
    2. Provide a minimum of one (1) administrative assistant position for each drug court program;
    3. Provide for drug screens and testing as needed; and
      1. Based upon a formula to be developed by the Administrative Office of the Courts, reviewed by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee, and approved by the Legislative Council, provide for:
        1. Intensive outpatient treatment to be made available to the drug court program in each judicial district;
        2. Short-term and long-term inpatient treatment to be made available to the drug court program in each judicial district; and
        3. A drug court judge to contract with a local licensed treatment provider for counseling services for drug court participants so that each privately contracted addiction counselor does not have more than thirty (30) drug court participants in his or her caseload.
      2. The Department of Community Correction shall enter into an interagency memorandum of understanding with the Administrative Office of the Courts in order to establish the process and procedures for the payment of treatment services ordered by a drug court judge and funded through the Department of Community Correction.
      3. Expenditures of funds for treatment services allocated to each approved drug court program under the formula described in subdivision (1)(E)(i) of this section shall be at the direction of a drug court judge, except as limited by the procedures adopted in the memorandum of understanding described in subdivision (1)(E)(ii) of this section;
  2. The Department of Human Services shall:
    1. Provide a minimum of one (1) drug counselor position for every thirty (30) drug court participants in delinquency cases, dependency-neglect cases, and family in need of services cases;
    2. Provide for drug screens and testing as needed in delinquency cases, dependency-neglect cases, and family in need of services cases; and
    3. Provide for intensive outpatient treatment and short-term and long-term inpatient treatment to be made available to the drug court program in each judicial district in delinquency cases, dependency-neglect cases, and family in need of services cases based upon a formula developed by the Administrative Office of the Courts and reviewed by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee; and
  3. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall:
    1. Provide funding to be reviewed by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee for additional ongoing maintenance and operation costs of a local approved drug court program not provided by the Department of Community Correction or the Department of Human Services, including local drug court program supplies, education, travel, and related expenses;
    2. Provide direct support to the drug court judge and drug court program;
    3. Provide coordination between the multidisciplinary team and the drug court judge;
    4. Provide case management;
    5. Monitor compliance of drug court participants with drug court program requirements; and
    6. Provide assistance and support to the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee for the evaluation of adult and juvenile specialty court programs.

History. Acts 2007, No. 1022, § 5; 2015, No. 895, §§ 37–39.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2015 amendment inserted “approved” in the introductory language and in (1)(E)(iii); in (3)(A), substituted “Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee” for “Drug Court Advisory Committee” and “a local approved drug court program” for “local drug court programs”; and rewrote (3)(F).

Cross References. Disposition, delinquency, alternatives, § 9-27-330.

Disposition, dependent-neglected, generally, § 9-27-334.

Disposition, family in need of services, generally, § 9-27-332.

16-98-306. Collection of data.

    1. An approved drug court program shall collect and provide monthly data on drug court applicants and all participants as required by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee in accordance with the rules promulgated under § 10-3-2901.
    2. The data shall include:
      1. The total number of applicants;
      2. The total number of participants;
      3. The total number of successful applicants;
      4. The total number of successful participants;
      5. The total number of unsuccessful participants and the reason why each unsuccessful participant did not complete the drug court program;
      6. Information about what happened to each unsuccessful participant;
      7. The total number of participants who were arrested for a new criminal offense while in the drug court program;
      8. The total number of participants who were convicted of a new criminal offense while in the drug court program;
      9. The total number of participants who committed a violation of one (1) or more conditions of the drug court program and the resulting sanction;
      10. The results of the initial risk-needs assessment or other appropriate clinical assessment conducted on each participant;
      11. The total amount of time each program participant was in the drug court program; and
      12. Any other data or information as required by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee in accordance with the rules promulgated under § 10-3-2901.
  1. The data collected for evaluation purposes under subsection (a) of this section shall:
    1. Include a minimum standard data set developed and specified by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee; and
    2. Be maintained in the court files or be otherwise accessible by the courts and the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee.
    1. As directed by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee, after an individual is discharged either upon completion or termination of a drug court program, the drug court program shall conduct, as much as practical, follow-up contacts with and reviews of former drug court participants for key outcome indicators of drug use, recidivism, and employment.
      1. The follow-up contacts with and reviews of former drug court participants shall be conducted as frequently and for a period of time as determined by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee based upon the nature of the drug court program and the nature of the participants.
      2. The follow-up contacts with and reviews of former drug court participants are not extensions of the drug court's jurisdiction over the drug court participants.
  2. For purposes of standardized measurement of success of drug court programs across the state, the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee shall adopt an operational definition of terms such as “recidivism”, “retention”, “relapses”, “restarts”, “sanctions imposed”, and “incentives given” to be used in any evaluation and report of drug court programs.
  3. Each drug court program shall provide to the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee all information requested by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee.
  4. The Division of Drug Court Programs, the Division of Community Correction, the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services, and the Arkansas Crime Information Center shall work together to share and make available data to provide a comprehensive data management system for the state's drug court programs.
  5. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall collect monthly data reports submitted by approved drug courts and provide the monthly data reports to the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee.
  6. The Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee shall:
    1. Submit a report by July 1 of each year summarizing the data collected and outcomes achieved by all approved drug courts; and
    2. Contract with a third-party evaluator every three (3) years to conduct an evaluation on the effectiveness of the drug court program in complying with the key components of § 16-98-302(b).

History. Acts 2007, No. 1022, § 5; 2011, No. 570, § 116; 2015, No. 895, § 40; 2017, No. 253, § 2; 2017, No. 913, § 46.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Acts 2015, No. 895, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly to implement wide-ranging reforms to the criminal justice system in order to address prison overcrowding, promote seamless reentry into society, reduce medical costs incurred by the state and local governments, aid law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and keeping the peace, and to enhance public safety.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “and all participants” for “drug court participants, and the entire drug court program” in (a)(1); and added (a)(2).

The 2015 amendment rewrote (a)(1); inserted “total number of unsuccessful participants and the” in (a)(2)(E); substituted “or other appropriate clinical assessment conducted on each participant” for “review for each participant” in (a)(2)(J); inserted present (a)(2)(K) and redesignated and rewrote former (a)(2)(K) as (a)(2)(L); substituted “Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee” for “Division of Drug Court Programs” in (b), (c), and (e) and for “Division of Drug Court Programs in consultation with other state agencies and subject to the review of the Drug Court Advisory Committee” in (d); substituted “Division of Behavioral Health Services” for “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (f); rewrote (g); and added (h).

The 2017 amendment by No. 253 substituted “Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee” for “Division of Drug Court Programs” at the end of (e).

The 2017 amendment by No. 913 substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” in (f).

16-98-307. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the creation of the Drug Court Advisory Committee, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 895, § 41. This section was derived from Acts 2007, No. 1022, § 5; 2011, No. 5, § 1; 2013, No. 1107, § 16.

For current law, see § 10-3-2901 concerning the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee.

Chapter 99 Performance Incentive Funding for Recidivism and Crime Reduction

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Subchapter 1 — Performance Incentive Act of 2011

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-99-101. Purpose and intent.

  1. Both state and local agencies that implement criminal justice practices resulting in outcomes that reduce commitments to the Division of Correction should be rewarded.
  2. If a state agency, county, or judicial district has implemented proven risk-reduction strategies that reduce the number of offenders returning to the Division of Correction with no resultant increase in the crime rate; then, in order to reward the state agency, county, or judicial district and as an incentive to encourage similar practices elsewhere, the state agency, county, or judicial district should receive a monetary reward to continue those practices.
  3. The award would represent a portion of the monetary savings from the costs that would have been incurred had the state agency, county, or judicial district not reduced its impact on the Division of Correction.
  4. The goal of this subchapter is to align state and local fiscal incentives by rewarding the Division of Community Correction, county governments, and judicial districts for each entity's role in reducing its impact on the Division of Correction.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 117; 2019, No. 910, § 953.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section; and substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (d).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

16-99-102. Program authorized — Administration.

  1. Costs averted due to a reduction in commitments to the Division of Correction or a reduction in the period of time served in the Division of Correction, to the extent possible, shall be reinvested into those state agencies, counties, or judicial districts as an incentive to further the crime and recidivism reduction strategies being employed.
  2. The Division of Community Correction shall be the recipient of incentive funds upon meeting the requirements set out in this subchapter.
    1. Counties, multicounty partnerships, and judicial districts shall be eligible to apply for participation in the performance incentive funding program set out in this subchapter on the reduction in the Division of Correction's population.
    2. Participation in the program will be determined through a competitive grant process.
  3. The Board of Corrections shall have the authority to manage the program and administer the grant funds to appropriate applicants and the Division of Community Correction.
    1. Subject to the available funding, the Division of Community Correction shall manage and administer grant funds to itself and counties, multicounty partnerships, and judicial districts in order to implement the policies and programs authorized by this program.
    2. These shall be one-time-only grants not contingent on measured performance.
    3. All future funding under this section shall be tied to measured performance.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 117; 2019, No. 910, § 954.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” throughout the section.

16-99-103. Application.

    1. The Division of Community Correction shall receive additional funding for committing to a reduction in the number of probation revocations that result from a technical violation or a new crime.
    2. The baseline for comparing probation revocation data shall be based on the number of probation revocations and expected length of stay.
    3. In order to qualify for the additional monetary incentives under this subchapter, the felony conviction rate for probationers must remain stable or decrease from the previous year.
    4. Each year the Division of Community Correction shall receive additional funds for reducing the net impact of revocations on the Division of Correction.
    5. The Division of Community Correction shall promulgate rules for the distribution and use of incentive funds that it receives, requiring that:
      1. No less than one-third (1/3) of the funds received each year are distributed to the individual probation or parole areas responsible for the revocation reductions while maintaining or improving public safety; and
      2. All of the funds received by the Division of Community Correction are invested in programs and practices designed to reduce recidivism.
    1. A competitive grant process will distribute grants to five (5) individual counties, multicounty partnerships, or judicial districts that meet criteria established to improve public safety and reduce their net impact on the Division of Correction.
    2. The Board of Corrections shall have the authority to:
      1. Manage the competitive grant process;
      2. Determine appropriate criteria;
      3. Award grants; and
      4. Collect and evaluate the data from all grantee sites.
    3. Applications can come from:
      1. Individual counties;
      2. Multicounty partnerships; or
      3. Judicial districts.
    4. Four (4) of the five (5) grants shall be awarded to the counties, multicounty partnerships, or judicial districts with the largest number of annual Division of Correction commitments that meet the program criteria and submit acceptable applications.
    5. One (1) grant shall be awarded to a county, multicounty partnership, or judicial district representing a rural region of the state, notwithstanding the number of Division of Correction commitments from the applicant so long as the program criteria are met and the application is acceptable.
    6. Each year, the grant recipient shall receive additional funds equal to one-half (½) of the averted costs for reducing the net impact of its sentences on the Division of Correction.
    7. The baseline for comparing the net impact of sentences shall be based on the number of admissions and expected length of stay.
    8. In order to qualify for the additional monetary incentives under this subchapter, the net impact of the county's, and multicounty's, judicial district's above-guidelines sentences, based on admissions and expected length of stay, must remain stable or decrease from the previous year.
    9. The board shall promulgate rules for the distribution and use of incentive funds to successful applicants.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 117; 2019, No. 315, §§ 1317, 1318; 2019, No. 910, §§ 955-958.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by No. 315 deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in the introductory language of (a)(5) and in (b)(9).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” and “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mason L. Boling, Legislative Note: That Was the Easy Part: The Development of Arkansas's Public Safety Improvement Act of 2011, and Why the Biggest Obstacle to Prison Reform Remains Intact, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1109 (2013).

16-99-104. Implementation.

The Board of Corrections shall:

  1. Establish rules for counties, multicounty partnerships, or judicial districts to apply for funds under this subchapter;
  2. Calculate and determine the baseline for the Division of Community Correction's revocation rate and for the Division of Correction's commitments' length of stay for evaluation purposes; and
  3. Calculate the averted costs to determine the amount to redirect to successful applicants who qualify for funds awarded under the performance incentive funding program.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 117; 2019, No. 315, § 1319; 2019, No. 910, § 959.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by No. 315 deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (1).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division of Community Correction’s” for “Department of Community Correction’s” and “Division of Correction’s” for “Department of Correction’s” in (2).

16-99-105. Reporting and data collection.

    1. The Division of Community Correction shall provide data and information as requested by the Board of Corrections.
    2. That data and information shall include without limitation:
      1. The total number of probationers from each of the Division of Community Correction's individual probation or parole areas for the current year and previous years, as available;
      2. The total number of probation revocations, including revocations that result from violations and from new crimes for the current year and previous years, as available;
      3. The total number of new felony convictions and the rate of new felony convictions from each of the Division of Community Correction's individual probation or parole areas for the current year and previous years, as available;
      4. The amount of grant funds distributed to each individual probation or parole areas; and
      5. The evidence-based programs established or enhanced by the Division of Community Correction as part of its effort to reduce revocations and improve public safety and any subsequent evidence-based programs that contribute to the outcomes of the performance incentive funding program under this subchapter.
  1. Each grantee shall provide data and information as requested by the board, including without limitation:
    1. The list of counties, if in a multicounty partnership, participating;
    2. The amount of grant funds distributed under this subchapter to each county, multicounty partnership, or judicial district; and
    3. The programs established or enhanced as part of each applicant's successful grant proposal and any subsequent evidence-based programs that contribute to the outcomes of the program under this subchapter.
  2. The board shall report all data, findings, and recommendations annually for improvement to the:
    1. Governor;
    2. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;
    3. Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts;
    4. Speaker of the House of Representatives;
    5. President of the Senate;
    6. Chair of the House Committee on Judiciary; and
    7. Chair of the Senate Committee on Judiciary.
    1. The board's report shall include an analysis of the impact of the performance incentive funding program.
    2. This analysis shall include without limitation the effect, compared to baseline, on net Division of Correction bed usage by the Division of Community Correction and by all county grantees, as well as Division of Correction admissions and lengths-of-stay, moneys paid out, revocation rates and new crime conviction rates for the Division of Community Correction, and guidelines compliance for participating counties.
    3. The board shall provide analyses on an area-by-area basis for the Division of Community Correction performance incentive funding program and on a county-by-county, multicounty-partnership, or judicial-district basis for the local performance incentive funding program.
  3. The board shall conduct a study and make recommendations, as needed, to those persons or entities listed in subsection (b) of this section, three (3) years after the implementation of the program established under this subchapter and every third year thereafter to determine whether to change the baseline year that determines revocation reduction benchmarks.

History. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 117; 2019, No. 910, §§ 960-964.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” and “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section.

Chapter 100 Mental Health and the Criminal Justice System

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-100-101. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Evidence-based practices” means supervision, policies, procedures, and practices proven through research to reduce recidivism;
  2. “Mental illness” means a condition of a person who has or has had in the past a diagnosable mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder of sufficient duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as it existed on January 1, 2017, that has resulted in functional impairment that substantially interferes with or limits one (1) or more major life activities; and
  3. “Validated risk-needs assessment” means a determination of a person's risk of reoffending and the needs that, when addressed, reduce the risk of reoffending through the use of an actuarial assessment tool that assesses the dynamic and static factors that drive criminal behavior.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Mental Health Specialty Courts

16-100-201. Authorization — Evaluation — Restriction on services and treatment.

  1. A judicial district may establish a mental health specialty court program, which shall consist of at least one (1) mental health specialty court, subject to approval by the Supreme Court in the administrative plan submitted under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14.
  2. A mental health specialty court program authorized under this subchapter is also subject to evaluation by the Specialty Court Program Advisory Committee under § 16-10-139.
    1. A mental health specialty court may not order any services or mental health treatment under this subchapter unless:
      1. An administrative and programmatic appropriation has been made for services or mental health treatment under this subchapter;
      2. Administrative and programmatic funding is available for services or mental health treatment under this subchapter; and
      3. Administrative and programmatic positions have been authorized for services or mental health treatment under this subchapter.
    2. If the requirements of subdivision (c)(1) of this section are not met, a mental health specialty court may still order services or mental health treatment if the provider waives payment, or if the mental health specialty court program participant has private insurance that will pay for the services or mental health treatment.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

16-100-202. Goals of mental health specialty court program.

  1. The goals of a mental health specialty court program established under this subchapter include the following:
    1. Integration of mental health treatment with criminal justice system case processing;
    2. Use of a nonadversarial approach in which the prosecution and defense promote public safety while protecting the right of a mental health specialty court program participant to due process;
    3. Early identification of eligible mental health specialty court program participants, with the use of a validated risk-needs assessment, and prompt placement of eligible mental health specialty court program participants;
    4. Access to a continuum of treatment, rehabilitation, and related services for mental health specialty court program participants;
    5. Periodic testing for alcohol and controlled substances at the discretion of the mental health specialty court, if a mental health specialty court program participant has been identified as a user of alcohol or controlled substances;
    6. A coordinated strategy among the mental health specialty court judge, prosecution, defense, and mental health treatment providers to govern the compliance of a mental health specialty court program participant with the mental health specialty court program;
    7. Ongoing judicial interaction with each mental health specialty court program participant;
    8. Monitoring and evaluation of the achievement of mental health specialty court program goals and effectiveness;
    9. Continuing interdisciplinary education to promote effective planning, implementation, and operation of the mental health specialty court program; and
    10. Development of partnerships with public agencies and community-based organizations to generate local support and enhance mental health specialty court program effectiveness.
  2. Mental health specialty court program success is determined by the rate of recidivism of all mental health specialty court program participants, including mental health specialty court program participants who do not graduate from the mental health specialty court program.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

16-100-203. Establishment of mental health specialty court.

  1. A mental health specialty court is a specialized court within the existing structure of the court system.
  2. A mental health specialty court program shall offer judicial monitoring of intensive mental health treatment and strict supervision of mental health specialty court program participants.
  3. The creation of a mental health specialty court and the appointment of a circuit judge to the mental health specialty court shall be approved by the administrative judge in each judicial circuit and made a part of the judicial circuit's administrative plan required by Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

16-100-204. Administration of mental health specialty court program.

  1. A mental health specialty court program may require a separate judicial processing system differing in practice and design from the traditional adversarial criminal prosecution and trial systems.
    1. The administrative judge of the judicial district shall designate one (1) or more circuit judges to be mental health specialty court judges and to administer the mental health specialty court program.
    2. If a county is in a judicial district that does not have a circuit judge who is able to administer the mental health specialty court program on a consistent basis, the administrative plan for the judicial circuit required by Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 14 may designate a district court judge to be a mental health specialty court judge and to administer the mental health specialty court program.
  2. A mental health specialty court team shall be designated by a mental health specialty court judge and may include:
    1. A circuit judge;
    2. A prosecuting attorney;
    3. A public defender or private defense attorney;
    4. One (1) or more healthcare providers with experience in the field of mental health treatment;
    5. One (1) or more probation officers;
    6. One (1) or more private mental health treatment provider representatives with experience in the field of mental health treatment; and
    7. Any other individual determined necessary by the mental health specialty court judge.
  3. Each judicial district may develop a training and implementation manual for the mental health specialty court program with the assistance of the:
    1. Department of Human Services;
    2. Department of Health;
    3. Division of Community Correction;
    4. Administrative Office of the Courts; and
    5. Other federal, state, and local agencies, organizations, or entities with an established history of expertise in mental health conditions.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

16-100-205. Eligible persons — Waiver of certain rights.

  1. A person is eligible for participation in a mental health specialty court program if:
    1. The person has a mental illness;
    2. The person is charged with a criminal offense other than a criminal offense listed in subsection (b) of this section;
    3. The person waives his or her rights to a speedy trial and other rights as determined by the mental health specialty court and executes a consent for a limited release of confidential information regarding mental health treatment permitting the mental health specialty court, the prosecuting attorney, and the defense attorney access to information relating to attendance, attitude, participation, results of drug screens if ordered, and all pertinent medical records; and
      1. The person is eighteen (18) years of age or older.
      2. Subdivision (a)(4)(A) of this section may be waived with the consent of the prosecuting attorney.
  2. A person charged with one (1) or more of the following offenses is ineligible to participate in a mental health specialty court program:
    1. A serious felony involving violence as defined in § 5-4-501(c)(2);
    2. A felony offense that would require the person to register as a sex offender; or
    3. An offense specifically excluded by the rules of a specific mental health specialty court program.
  3. This subchapter does not require a mental health specialty court to consider or accept every person with a treatable mental health condition, regardless of the fact that the criminal offense for which the person is charged is eligible for consideration in the mental health specialty court program.
  4. A person who is denied entry into a mental health specialty court program is subject to prosecution for the criminal offense with which he or she was charged as provided by law.
  5. A mental health specialty court may require the circuit court clerk or probate clerk to submit to the Arkansas Crime Information Center a copy of an order transferring a person to the mental health specialty court.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

16-100-206. Transfer of cases.

  1. A circuit court or district court that determines, on the circuit court's or district court's own motion or upon application by a person charged with but not yet convicted of a criminal offense in the court, that the person may be better served in a mental health specialty court program may transfer the case to the mental health specialty court if the person charged with the criminal offense would otherwise be eligible to enter into a mental health specialty court program.
    1. The person charged with a criminal offense whose case the circuit court or district court is attempting to transfer to a mental health specialty court may oppose the transfer.
      1. A person who opposes a transfer of his or her case to a mental health specialty court under this subsection shall be appointed counsel if he or she has not already retained counsel or had counsel retained for him or her by another person or entity.
      2. If after consulting his or her counsel the person still opposes the transfer of his or her case to a mental health specialty court, the case shall remain on the current docket and shall proceed under the normal course of that circuit court's or district court's docket.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

16-100-207. Mental health treatment under program — Failure to comply with program.

    1. A mental health specialty court shall order mental health treatment for a mental health specialty court program participant for at least six (6) months.
    2. Any mental health treatment ordered under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall meet the minimum standards of mental health treatment promulgated by the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services.
  1. A mental health specialty court program participant may be removed from a mental health specialty court program by the mental health specialty court following a hearing with notice and an opportunity for the mental health specialty court program participant to be heard, if:
    1. The mental health specialty court program participant:
      1. Knowingly fails to abide by the terms and conditions of the mental health specialty court program; or
      2. Is not suffering from a recognized mental illness in the opinion of a healthcare provider or mental health specialist assigned or ordered by the mental health specialty court to determine whether or not the mental health specialty court program participant suffers from a recognized mental illness; or
    2. The mental health specialty court finds that retaining the mental health specialty court program participant in a mental health specialty court program does not serve the best interests of justice, the public, the state, or the mental health specialty court program participant.
  2. If a mental health specialty court program participant is removed from a mental health specialty court program for any of the reasons set out under subsection (b) of this section, the mental health specialty court program participant's case shall be transferred to the appropriate court having jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

16-100-208. Completion of program — Dismissal of case — Sealing of record.

  1. Upon the mental health specialty court's own motion or upon a request from a mental health specialty court program participant or his or her attorney, a mental health specialty court may order dismissal of the case against the mental health specialty court program participant and the sealing of the record if:
    1. The mental health specialty court program participant has successfully completed the mental health specialty court program, as determined by the mental health specialty court;
    2. The mental health specialty court program participant has received aftercare programming or a course of continuing mental health treatment if recommended by the mental health specialty court program participant's healthcare provider;
    3. The mental health specialty court has received a recommendation from the prosecuting attorney for dismissal of the case and the sealing of the record; and
    4. The mental health specialty court, after considering the mental health specialty court program participant's criminal history, determines that dismissal of the case and the sealing of the record are appropriate.
  2. Unless otherwise ordered by the mental health specialty court, sealing of the record under this section shall be as described in the Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013, § 16-90-1401 et seq.
  3. If a mental health specialty court program participant has successfully completed the program and has his or her case dismissed under this section, he or she may petition the mental health specialty court for relief from disability to restore the mental health specialty court program participant's right to purchase a firearm and to otherwise be removed from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Instant Criminal Background Check System database.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1.

16-100-209. Costs and fees.

  1. The mental health specialty court may order the mental health specialty court program participant to pay:
    1. Court costs as provided in § 16-10-305;
    2. Healthcare and treatment costs not otherwise covered by the health insurance of the mental health specialty court program participant;
    3. Drug testing costs;
    4. A mental health specialty court program user fee;
    5. Necessary supervision fees, including any applicable residential treatment fees;
    6. Any fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) that are to be paid to the Division of Community Correction;
    7. Global Positioning System monitoring costs; and
    8. Continual alcohol monitoring fees.
    1. The mental health specialty court shall establish a schedule for the payment of costs and fees.
    2. The cost for health care, treatment, drug testing, continual alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision shall be set by the treatment and supervision providers respectively and made part of the order for payment of the mental health specialty court.
    3. Mental health specialty court user fees shall be set by the mental health specialty court.
    4. Health care, treatment, drug testing, continual alcohol monitoring if ordered, and supervision costs or fees shall be paid to the respective providers.
    5. Fees determined or authorized under § 12-27-125(b)(17)(B) or § 16-93-104(a)(1) shall be paid to the division.
      1. All court costs and mental health specialty court program user fees assessed by the mental health specialty court shall be paid to the circuit court clerk or district court clerk, as applicable, for remittance to the county treasury under § 14-14-1313.
      2. All installment payments shall initially be deemed to be collection of court costs under § 16-10-305 until the court costs have been collected in full with any remaining payments representing collections of other fees and costs as authorized in this section and shall be credited to the county administration of justice fund and distributed under § 16-10-307.
      3. Mental health specialty court program user fees shall be credited to a fund to be known as the “mental health specialty court program fund” and appropriated by the quorum court for the county in which the mental health specialty court program participant committed the offense for which he or she is charged for the benefit and administration of the mental health specialty court program.
    6. Court orders for costs and fees shall remain an obligation of the mental health specialty court program participant with mental health specialty court monitoring until fully paid.
  2. All costs and fees under this section may be fully or partially waived by the mental health specialty court upon a showing of indigency.

History. Acts 2017, No. 506, § 1; 2019, No. 385, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “costs” in (a)(7).

Chapters 101-104 [Reserved.]

[Reserved.]

Subtitle 7. Particular Proceedings And Remedies

Chapter 105 Abatement of Nuisances

Cross References. Place for illegal sale of narcotic drugs deemed common nuisance, § 20-64-213.

Research References

Am. Jur. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuis., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 66 C.J.S, Nuis., § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved.]

Subchapter 2 — Roadhouses, Tourist Camps, Etc.

Effective Dates. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 11: approved Mar. 6, 1915. Emergency declared.

Acts 1937, No. 331, § 3: Mar. 25, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “It is found that a great number of the so called roadhouses, tourist camps, public dance halls, places where alcoholic liquors are sold, and other similar places of entertainment in this State are so operated and conducted as to result in constant violations of the various laws of this State and that consequently it is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety that this act become effective immediately upon its adoption and approval; therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall become effective immediately upon its adoption and approval.”

Acts 1957, No. 188, § 3: Mar. 8, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined that the practice of nudism in this State is against public policy and is a violation of the laws of the State, that any club, camp, building or place used to practice nudism is injurious to the public morals, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary in order to prevent the use of any club, camp, building or place from being used to practice nudism in this State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Equity — Enjoinability of Threatened Nuisance, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 231.

16-105-201. Definition.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “owner” means any person, persons, or corporation having an actual legal interest, vested in possession, in any building or place that may become a public nuisance under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 8; C. & M. Dig., § 6203; Pope's Dig., § 10925; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-108.

Case Notes

Nickelodeons.

Owners of nickelodeon operated for the mutual profit of themselves and the owner of the dance hall where located were “owners” within this section defining owners of property deemed a public nuisance, and the machine was subject to the order of the court abating the dance hall as a public nuisance. Hood v. State, 206 Ark. 900, 175 S.W.2d 205 (1944).

16-105-202. Subchapter cumulative.

This subchapter shall not repeal any law or laws prohibiting or regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors now in force, but shall be cumulative to all laws now in force.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 6205; Pope's Dig., § 10927; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-110.

Case Notes

Cited: Fraternal Order of Eagles v. State, 246 Ark. 568, 439 S.W.2d 36 (1969).

16-105-203. Penalties.

  1. If any person shall break into or enter or use any building or place while closed under a preliminary injunction granted under the provisions of this subchapter or shall violate any permanent injunction under the provisions of this subchapter, he or she shall be subject to punishment for contempt.
  2. Upon conviction for the contempt, the person shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. The building or place shall be closed and not thereafter used for any purpose whatever for a period of twelve (12) months, except by order of the court having cognizance of the case.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 6202; Pope's Dig., § 10924; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-107; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 397.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “or she” in (a); and, in (b), substituted “guilty of a Class B misdemeanor” for “imprisoned in the county jail not less than thirty (30) days nor more than six (6) months and may also be fined in any sum not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00).”

Cross References. Fines — Limitations on amount, § 5-4-201.

Sentence, § 5-4-401.

Case Notes

In General.

The circuit court has the power to abate a nuisance by injunction and thus has power to punish a party for contempt for disobedience of its order. Adams v. State, 153 Ark. 202, 240 S.W. 5 (1922).

Closure of Establishments.

In directing that buildings be closed and not used for any purpose for a period of 12 months, the trial court exceeded its statutory powers where, at the time the order was made, there had been no contempt proceeding. Futrell v. State, 207 Ark. 452, 181 S.W.2d 680 (1944).

Evidence.

The test is whether the preponderance of the evidence in contempt proceedings supports the finding of the trial court since the rules of chancery procedure are applicable. Vandergriff v. State, 239 Ark. 1119, 396 S.W.2d 818 (1965).

Information.

Official oath of prosecuting attorney is a sufficient verification of an information for contempt when filed by him. Nichols v. State, 171 Ark. 987, 287 S.W. 190 (1926).

16-105-204. Public nuisance created by certain unlawful acts and materials.

  1. The conducting, maintaining, carrying on, or engaging in the sale of alcoholic liquors, including wines and beer of all kinds, in violation of any of the laws of this state, in any building, structure, or place within this state, and the conducting, maintaining, carrying on, or engaging in the operation of any so-called roadhouses or other similar places of entertainment, of any so-called tourist camp, of any public dance hall or place, or of any nudist camp or club or building or place used to practice nudism, in violation of any of the laws of this state, and all means, appliances, fixtures, appurtenances, materials, and supplies used for the purpose of conducting, maintaining, or carrying on of either of such unlawful or unlawfully operated businesses or occupations or practices or places of business or occupation or practice, are declared to be public nuisances and may be abated under the provisions of this subchapter.
  2. Any person, persons, association, partnership, firm, or corporation conducting, maintaining, carrying on, or engaging in any of the businesses or occupations or practices or undertakings pursuant to subsection (a) of this section that shall suffer or permit violations of any of the laws of this state in, upon, or about the premises operated or maintained by him, her, them, or it shall be deemed and held to be conducting, maintaining, carrying on, and engaging in the business, occupation, practice, or undertaking in violation of the laws of this state.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 6196; Acts 1937, No. 331, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 10918; Acts 1957, No. 188, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-101.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is valid. Marvel v. State ex rel. Morrow, 127 Ark. 595, 193 S.W. 259 (1917); Adams v. State, 153 Ark. 202, 240 S.W. 5 (1922).

In General.

A place of public business where the proprietor and agents are engaged in certain affirmative actions violative of the law or permit or suffer violations of any law of this state on or about the premises may be declared a public nuisance. Alston v. State, 216 Ark. 604, 226 S.W.2d 988 (1950).

Applicability.

This section has no applicability to “snooker parlors” or pool halls and billiard rooms, but only to the sale of intoxicating liquors in violation of law. Rogers v. State ex rel. Robinson, 194 Ark. 633, 109 S.W.2d 120 (1937).

Alcoholic Beverages.

One having a place in Arkansas from which he solicited orders for a liquor house in Missouri was maintaining a public nuisance. Hickey v. State, 123 Ark. 180, 184 S.W. 459 (1916).

Unlawful sale in defendant's home may be restrained. Nichols v. State, 171 Ark. 987, 287 S.W. 190 (1926).

This section, as it stood before amendment, was not repealed by Liquor Control Act, and it still conferred jurisdiction upon the courts to abate as a public nuisance the business of one engaged in selling beer to minors. Digiacomo v. State, 194 Ark. 24, 105 S.W.2d 78 (1937).

State was not precluded from proceeding to abate defendant's liquor store as a public nuisance because other methods outlined under the Alcoholic Control Act might have been followed. Click v. State, 206 Ark. 648, 176 S.W.2d 920 (1944).

The sale of alcoholic beverages at a private club is a “public nuisance” and thus abatable. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. State, 246 Ark. 568, 439 S.W.2d 36 (1969).

Allowing minors to possess intoxicating liquors and allowing patrons to consume intoxicating beverages on unlicensed public premises were each violations of this section. Rendezvous Club v. State, 247 Ark. 670, 447 S.W.2d 842 (1969).

Evidence.

The fact that minors drank beer in cafe purchased outside, in the absence of proof that any person engaged with operating the cafe knew or could have known of the activity, was insufficient evidence to constitute a public nuisance so as to warrant closing the cafe as a public nuisance. Alston v. State, 216 Ark. 604, 226 S.W.2d 988 (1950).

Since the state offered ample proof to support the trial court's finding as to the acts of nuisance, whatever error the court might have made as to the burden of proof was harmless. Siesta Cafe v. State, 231 Ark. 1004, 333 S.W.2d 722 (1960).

Nudism.

Where theater owner merely exhibited films depicting nude persons, theatre was not a “nudist camp or club or building or place used to practice nudism” within meaning of abatement of nuisance statute and showing of films could not be enjoined under statutes defining nudism and prohibiting advocacy thereof. Mini-Art Operating Co. v. State, 253 Ark. 364, 486 S.W.2d 8 (1972).

A motion picture theater showing obscene films is not a nuisance under this section. Southland Theaters, Inc. v. State ex rel. Tucker, 254 Ark. 639, 495 S.W.2d 148 (1973).

Roadhouses, etc.

When strictly construed, the statutory reference to roadhouses and similar places of entertainment could not have been interpreted to include motion picture theaters. Southland Theatres, Inc. v. State, 254 Ark. 192, 492 S.W.2d 421 (1973).

Use of Property.

Purchaser of equipment which had formerly been used by vendor in a place restrained from operation for violation of this section may not be deprived of the use and enjoyment of the property he has purchased unless he so conducts his place of business as to make it become a nuisance under this section. Rogers v. State ex rel. Robinson, 194 Ark. 633, 109 S.W.2d 120 (1937).

Cited: Citizens Coach Co. v. Wright, 228 Ark. 1143, 313 S.W.2d 94 (1958).

16-105-205. Jurisdiction — Parties who may bring action.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the circuit courts of this state to abate the public nuisances defined in § 16-105-204, upon petition in the name of the state, upon relation of the Attorney General or any prosecuting attorney of the state, or without the concurrence of the officers, upon the relation of five (5) or more citizens and freeholders of the county wherein the public nuisances may exist, in the manner provided in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 6197; Pope's Dig., § 10919; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-102; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 221.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “chancery and” preceding “circuit courts.”

Case Notes

Cited: Adams v. State, 153 Ark. 202, 240 S.W. 5 (1922); Click v. State, 206 Ark. 648, 176 S.W.2d 920 (1944); Alston v. State, 216 Ark. 604, 226 S.W.2d 988 (1950); Vandergriff v. State, 239 Ark. 1119, 396 S.W.2d 818 (1965).

16-105-206. Petition for abatement.

  1. Whenever a public nuisance, as defined in this subchapter, is kept, maintained, carried on, or exists in any county in this state, a bill or petition may be filed in any circuit court of the county, in the name of the state, by and upon the relation of any persons named in § 16-105-205, against the person or persons keeping, maintaining, or carrying on the public nuisance, and all aiders and abettors therein, and the owners, proprietors, or agents or persons or corporations, in charge or control of the building or place wherein the public nuisance exists, for the purpose of having the public nuisance abated and permanently discontinued.
    1. However, when a bill or petition is filed by citizens and freeholders, they shall make bond in such sums as the circuit court shall prescribe, conditioned to pay all costs and damages, in the event the circuit court trying the case shall find and adjudge that the proceeding was instituted without probable cause.
    2. No bond for costs or damages shall be required when the proceeding is instituted by and upon the relation of the Attorney General or a prosecuting attorney for the state.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 6198; Pope's Dig., § 10920; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-103; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 221.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), deleted “chancery or” preceding “circuit court”; and substituted the first occurrence of “court” for “judges or chancellors” in (b)(1).

Case Notes

Sufficiency of Petition.

Petition on ground of sale of beer to minors did not need to designate the particular kind of liquor sold, it being immaterial what kind of liquors were sold if they were in fact intoxicating. Digiacomo v. State, 194 Ark. 24, 105 S.W.2d 78 (1937).

16-105-207. Hearings for temporary and permanent injunction — Bond — Notice.

    1. In the proceedings, the circuit court, upon the presentation of a bill therefor alleging that the public nuisance complained of exists, shall award a temporary injunction, with such bond as required by law in cases where the bill is filed by citizens and freeholders.
    2. However, no bond shall be required when the bill or petition is filed by the officers mentioned in this subchapter if it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the circuit court, by evidence in the form of a due and proper verification of the bill or petition under oath, or of affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or otherwise, as the complainants or petitioners may elect, that the allegations of the bill or petition are true, enjoining and restraining the further continuance of the public nuisance, and the closing of the building or place wherein the public nuisance is conducted until the further order of the circuit court.
    1. Five (5) days' notice in writing shall be given the defendant of the hearing of an application for a permanent injunction, but no notice shall be required of the hearing of a temporary injunction. If a hearing is continued at the instance of defendant, the writ as prayed for shall be granted as a matter of course.
    2. When the injunction has been granted, it shall be binding upon the defendant throughout the county until modified or set aside by the circuit court having cognizance of the case.
    3. Any violation thereof, by the defendant or upon his or her procurement, shall be a contempt of court and punished as provided in § 16-105-203.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 6199; Pope's Dig., § 10921; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-104; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 221.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “judge, or chancellor” following “the court” throughout.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Constitutional Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 179.

Case Notes

Notice.

The granting of a temporary injunction without notice addresses itself to judicial discretion in granting or withholding the relief; thus, the requirement of due process is satisfied in a case of such brief restraint. Vandergriff v. State, 239 Ark. 1119, 396 S.W.2d 818 (1965).

An objection for lack of proper notice cannot be raised after a hearing on the merits in which the injunction is made permanent. Vandergriff v. State, 239 Ark. 1119, 396 S.W.2d 818 (1965).

Time Limit.

The court has no power to order the closing of a building for any length of time except during the period from the granting of the temporary order until the final hearing of the petition for abatement and except by way of additional punishment for violation of the court's order enjoining the nuisance. Futrell v. State, 207 Ark. 452, 181 S.W.2d 680 (1944).

Cited: Fraternal Order of Eagles v. State, 246 Ark. 568, 439 S.W.2d 36 (1969).

16-105-208. Hearings for temporary and permanent injunction — Procedures.

  1. Upon the trial of all causes pursuant to this subchapter, evidence of the general reputation of the building or place where the public nuisance is alleged to exist shall be admissible for the purpose of proving or tending to prove the existence of the public nuisance.
    1. The fact that the defendant has paid the internal revenue special tax as a retail liquor dealer or is in possession of an internal revenue tax stamp as a retail liquor dealer shall be prima facie evidence of sales of intoxicating liquors by the defendant during the time for which he or she has paid the internal revenue special tax.
    2. Copies of the records of the office of the Internal Revenue Service showing that the defendant has paid the internal revenue special tax shall be admissible in evidence in the proceeding when the copies are certified to be full, true, and complete by the district internal revenue collector.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 6200; Pope's Dig., § 10922; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-105; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 221.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted former (a); and redesignated former (b) and (c) as present (a) and (b).

Cross References. Alcoholic beverages, excise taxes, § 3-7-101 et seq.

Alcoholic beverages generally, § 3-4-101 et seq.

Applicability of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Ark. R. Civ. P. 81.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Permitting introduction of evidence of general reputation of the building or place where nuisance is alleged to exist, for the purpose of proving its existence is not unconstitutional. Foley v. State, 200 Ark. 521, 139 S.W.2d 673 (1940).

Applicability.

Proof must show unlawful business is being conducted before this section applies. State v. One Ford Auto., 151 Ark. 29, 235 S.W. 378 (1921).

Appeals.

If preponderance of testimony supported circuit court's finding that defendant's liquor store was a public nuisance, the Arkansas Supreme Court was required to affirm the order abating it. Click v. State, 206 Ark. 648, 176 S.W.2d 920 (1944).

Since the state offered ample proof to support the trial court's finding as to the acts of nuisance, whatever error the court might have made as to the burden of proof was harmless. Siesta Cafe v. State, 231 Ark. 1004, 333 S.W.2d 722 (1960).

Evidence.

Proof that defendant has himself sold beer to minors or had directed it to be done is not essential. Digiacomo v. State, 194 Ark. 24, 105 S.W.2d 78 (1937).

In action to abate operation of restaurant as a public nuisance, evidence was sufficient to justify finding that beer and wine were sold, dancing permitted, and gambling carried on in the establishment. Portman v. State ex rel. Wood, 204 Ark. 349, 162 S.W.2d 67 (1942).

Evidence of unlawful sales and drinking of intoxicating liquor and of numerous quarrels, affrays, and breaches of the peace within, around, and about the liquor store was sufficient to sustain order closing store as a public nuisance. Click v. State, 206 Ark. 648, 176 S.W.2d 920 (1944).

Cited: Alston v. State, 216 Ark. 604, 226 S.W.2d 988 (1950); Vandergriff v. State, 239 Ark. 1119, 396 S.W.2d 818 (1965).

16-105-209. Order of abatement.

  1. If, upon the trial of a cause pursuant to this subchapter, the existence of the public nuisance is established, an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment or decree of the circuit court.
    1. The order shall direct the removal from the building or place wherein the public nuisance exists or is maintained of all means, appliances, fixtures, appurtenances, materials, supplies, and instrumentalities used for the purpose of conducting, maintaining, or carrying on the unlawful business or occupation constituting the public nuisance and shall direct the sale thereof, or such portion thereof as may be lawfully sold, upon terms as the circuit court may order, and the payment of the proceeds into the circuit court to be applied to costs or paid over to the owner, and destruction of the portion thereof, if any, as cannot be lawfully sold within this state.
    2. The judgment or decree shall perpetually enjoin the defendants from engaging in, conducting, continuing, or maintaining the public nuisance, directly or indirectly, by themselves or their agents or representatives, and perpetually forbid the owner of the building from permitting or suffering the same to be done or carried on in the building or place.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 6201; Pope's Dig., § 10923; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-106.

Case Notes

Disobedience of Order.

The circuit court has the power to abate a nuisance by injunction and thus has power to punish a party for contempt for disobedience of its order. Adams v. State, 153 Ark. 202, 240 S.W. 5 (1922).

Cited: Fraternal Order of Eagles v. State, 246 Ark. 568, 439 S.W.2d 36 (1969).

16-105-210. Proceedings against two or more owners.

  1. When one (1) of two (2) or more joint owners has been served with the notice prescribed in this subchapter, the cause shall proceed against the owner on whom notice has been served, and the proceeding shall not be a bar to subsequent proceedings against one (1) or all of the joint owners not heretofore proceeded against.
  2. If the notice prescribed in this subchapter cannot be served on the owner or owners of the building or place that may become a public nuisance under the provisions of this subchapter, by reason of nonresidence or otherwise, then and in that case, notice may be served on any agent or agents or trustee that may have charge of, or be in control of, the building or place, and the cause shall proceed against the agent, agents, or trustee in all respects as if he or she or they were the actual owner or owners of the building or place.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 8; C. & M. Dig., § 6203; Pope's Dig., § 10925; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-108.

16-105-211. Fees of prosecuting attorney.

In all cases wherein the bill or petition is filed upon the relation of a prosecuting attorney of this state and a permanent injunction is granted therein, the officer shall receive such fees as are now provided by law for convictions for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors. The fees shall be paid by the defendant as part of the costs of the case.

History. Acts 1915, No. 109, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 6204; Pope's Dig., § 10926; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-109.

Case Notes

Appeals.

Where an injunction was obtained preventing the defendant from conducting a nuisance, no provision was made for the assessment of an affirmance fee on appeal. Hickey v. State, 124 Ark. 18, 186 S.W. 291 (1916).

Subchapter 3 — Dance Halls

Effective Dates. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 10: approved Feb. 24, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety and public morals, an emergency is deemed to exist, and the same shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Constitutional Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 179.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This subchapter, authorizing a temporary or permanent injunction against operation of a dance hall without notice and an opportunity to be heard, fails to meet the fundamental requirements of the due process clause of the U.S. Const., Amends. 5 and 14 and Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 21. Franklin v. State, 267 Ark. 311, 590 S.W.2d 28 (1979).

16-105-301. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Dance hall” means any building, premise, pavilion, or place of business wherein dancing is permitted, conducted, or engaged in, by the public in general, either for profit or not; and
  2. “Owner” means any person, persons, or corporation having an actual legal interest, vested in possession, in any building or place that may become a public nuisance under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, §§ 1, 9; Pope's Dig., §§ 10909, 10917; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-111, 34-119.

Case Notes

Dance Halls.

Where cafe operator kept a music machine and permitted couples to dance, the cafe fell within the statutory definition of a dance hall. Lawson v. State, 226 Ark. 170, 288 S.W.2d 585 (1956).

Owners.

Owners of a nickelodeon operated for the mutual profit of themselves and the owner of the dance hall where the nickelodeon was located were “owners” within this section defining owners of property deemed a public nuisance; thus, the machine was subject to the order of the court abating the dance hall as a public nuisance. Hood v. State, 206 Ark. 900, 175 S.W.2d 205 (1944).

16-105-302. Penalties.

  1. If any person shall break into or enter or use any building or place while closed under a preliminary injunction granted under the provisions of this subchapter or shall violate any permanent injunction under the provisions of this subchapter, he or she shall be subject to punishment for contempt.
  2. Upon conviction of the contempt, the person shall be imprisoned in the county jail not less than thirty (30) days nor more than six (6) months and may also be fined in any sum not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00). The building or place shall be closed and not used thereafter for any purpose whatever for a period of twelve (12) months, except by order of the circuit court having cognizance of the case.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 10916; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-118.

Case Notes

Closure of Establishments.

Court, in directing that buildings be closed and not used for any purpose for a period of 12 months, exceeded its statutory powers where, at the time the order was made, there had been no contempt proceeding. Futrell v. State, 207 Ark. 452, 181 S.W.2d 680 (1944).

The more severe course of closing the establishment for a year is authorized only in contempt proceedings for a violation of the final injunctive order. Lawson v. State, 226 Ark. 170, 288 S.W.2d 585 (1956); Siesta Cafe v. State, 231 Ark. 1004, 333 S.W.2d 722 (1960).

16-105-303. Public nuisance.

The operation of a dance hall in which, or around which, public disturbances, the unlawful drinking of intoxicating liquors, quarrels, affrays, or general breaches of the peace are frequent is declared to be a public nuisance and detrimental to the public morals and may be abated under the provisions of this subchapter as set out.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 10910; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-112.

16-105-304. Jurisdiction — Persons who may bring abatement proceedings.

  1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the circuit courts of this state to abate the public nuisance defined in § 16-105-303, upon petition in the name of the State of Arkansas on relation of the Attorney General or any prosecuting attorney of the state or without the concurrence of the officers upon the relation of ten (10) or more qualified electors and freeholders of the county living within a radius of two (2) miles wherein the public nuisance may exist, in the manner set forth in this subchapter.
  2. On petition, addressed to the prosecuting attorney, of ten (10) qualified electors and freeholders of the county wherein the public nuisance may exist, it shall become the mandatory duty of the prosecuting attorney for the county and district wherein the public nuisance may exist to institute action in the circuit courts of this state to abate the public nuisance defined in § 16-105-303 in the manner provided in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 10911; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-113; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 222.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “circuit courts” for “chancery and circuit court” in (a); and deleted “chancery and” preceding “circuit courts” in (b).

16-105-305. Petition for abatement.

  1. Whenever a public nuisance, as defined in this subchapter, is kept, maintained, carried on, or exists in any county in this state, a bill or petition may be filed in any circuit court of the county, in the name of the State of Arkansas, by and upon the relation of any person named in § 16-105-304 against the person or persons keeping, maintaining, or carrying on the public nuisance, and all aiders and abettors therein, and the owners, proprietors, or agents or persons or corporations, in charge or control of the building or place wherein the public nuisance exists, for the purpose of having the public nuisance abated and permanently discontinued.
  2. However, when the bill or petition is filed by electors and freeholders, they shall make bond in such sums as the circuit court shall prescribe, conditioned to pay all costs and damages, in the event the circuit court trying the case shall find and adjudge that the proceeding was instituted without probable cause. No bond for costs or damages shall be required when the proceeding is instituted by and upon the relation of the Attorney General or a prosecuting attorney for the state.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 10912; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-114; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 222.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “chancery or” preceding “circuit court” in (a); and substituted “court” for “judges or chancellors” in (b).

16-105-306. Hearings for temporary and permanent injunction — Bond — Notice.

    1. The circuit court, upon the presentation of a bill in the proceedings alleging that the public nuisance complained of exists, shall award a temporary injunction, with such bond as required by law in cases in which the bill is filed by citizens and electors and freeholders.
    2. However, no bond shall be required where bill or petition is filed by the officers mentioned in this subchapter if it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the circuit court, by evidence in the form of a due and proper verification of the bill or petition under oath, or if affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or otherwise, as the complainants or petitioners may elect, that the allegations of the bill or petition are true, enjoining and restraining the further continuance of the public nuisance and the closing of the building or place wherein the public nuisance is conducted until the further order of the circuit court.
    1. Five (5) days' notice in writing shall be given the defendant of the hearing of an application for a permanent injunction, but no notice shall be required of the hearing of a temporary injunction.
    2. If a hearing is continued at the instance of the defendant, the writ as prayed for shall be granted as a matter of course.
    3. When the injunction shall have been granted, it shall be binding upon the defendant throughout the county until modified or set aside by the circuit court having cognizance of the case.
    4. Any violation thereof by the defendant, or upon his or her procurement, shall be a contempt of court and punished as provided in § 16-105-302.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 10913; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-115; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 222.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “judge or chancellor” following “the court” throughout; and deleted “or a judge or chancellor in vacation” following “The court” in (a)(1).

Case Notes

Time Limit.

The court has no power to order the closing of a building for any length of time except during the period from the granting of the temporary order until the final hearing of the petition for abatement and except by way of additional punishment for violation of the court's order enjoining the nuisance. Futrell v. State, 207 Ark. 452, 181 S.W.2d 680 (1944).

16-105-307. Hearings for temporary and permanent injunction — Evidence.

Upon the trial of all causes pursuant to this subchapter, evidence of the general reputation of the building or place where the public nuisance is alleged to exist shall be admissible for the purpose of proving or tending to prove the existence of the public nuisance.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 10914; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-116; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 222.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted (a).

Cross References. Applicability of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Ark. R. Civ. P. 81.

Case Notes

Evidence.

Testimony that drunks were seen around night club on several occasions, evidence of fighting, some evidence of gambling, and a lot of evidence of bad reputation of the club was held to support finding that place was a public nuisance. Foley v. State, 200 Ark. 521, 139 S.W.2d 673 (1940).

In action to abate operation of restaurant as a public nuisance, evidence was held sufficient to justify finding that beer and wine were sold, dancing permitted, and gambling carried on in the establishment. Portman v. State ex rel. Wood, 204 Ark. 349, 162 S.W.2d 67 (1942).

16-105-308. Order of abatement.

  1. If upon the trial of a cause pursuant to this subchapter, the existence of the public nuisance is established, an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment or decree of the circuit court.
  2. The order shall direct the removal from the building or place wherein the public nuisance exists or is maintained all means, appliances, fixtures, appurtenances, materials, supplies, and instrumentalities used for the purpose of conducting, maintaining, or carrying on the public nuisance.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 10915; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-117.

Case Notes

Scope of Order.

Initial order of abatement cannot provide for closing of establishment for a year; initial injunctive order can only provide for abatement of the nuisance and the more severe course of closing the establishment for a year is only authorized under § 16-105-302 for a violation of the initial order. Lawson v. State, 226 Ark. 170, 288 S.W.2d 585 (1956).

The court erred in its final order by denying the owner the right to operate her cafe premises in a legitimate and lawful manner and by further ordering that her place of business be kept padlocked for an indefinite period of time as the court's order was too broad, for this section contemplates that the initial order shall merely abate the nuisance. Siesta Cafe v. State, 231 Ark. 1004, 333 S.W.2d 722 (1960).

Where the final judgment perpetually enjoined the defendants from operating a dance hall and roadhouse upon the property but permitted its use for any other lawful purpose, they should have been given the opportunity to conduct their business in a lawful manner, for, if they failed to do so, the state had a prompt and effective remedy through the institution of contempt proceedings. B. & M. Land Co. v. State, 232 Ark. 815, 340 S.W.2d 395 (1960).

16-105-309. Proceedings against two or more owners.

  1. When one (1) of two (2) or more joint owners has been served with the notice prescribed in this subchapter, the cause shall proceed against the owner on whom notice has been served. The proceeding shall not be a bar to subsequent proceedings against one (1) or all of the joint owners not heretofore proceeded against.
  2. If the notice prescribed in this subchapter cannot be served on the owner or owners of the building or place that may become a public nuisance under the provisions of this subchapter, by reason of nonresidence or otherwise, then and in that case, the notice may be served on any agent or agents or trustee that may have charge of or be in control of the building or place. The cause shall proceed against the agent, agents, or trustee in all respects as if he, she, or they were the actual owner or owners of the building or place.

History. Acts 1937, No. 118, § 9; Pope's Dig., § 10917; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-119.

Case Notes

Husband and Wife.

In an action to have wife's place of business declared a public nuisance, the admissibility of the criminal record of the husband was not error because there was evidence that he also assisted in the operation of the cafe and exercised other acts of ownership. Siesta Cafe v. State, 231 Ark. 1004, 333 S.W.2d 722 (1960).

Subchapter 4 — Arkansas Drug Abatement Act of 1989

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 4: Mar. 14, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that buildings, locations, and places where drugs are used are a common nuisance and are proliferating in our State; that it is essential that local governments be authorized to abate such nuisances to prevent lawlessness and deterioration in neighborhoods and locales within their jurisdiction; that this Act is designed to accomplish this purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 926, § 7: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that there has been a recent Pulaski County court case, City of Little Rock v. Jessie Martain, a.k.a. Jessie Hall, which indicated that there should be additional equitable remedies available to the judge to abate nuisances. That because of the above-referenced case, and because of the need to fight the war on drugs, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall become effective immediately upon passage.”

Acts 1991, No. 1187, § 7: Apr. 10, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that there has been a recent Pulaski County court case, City of Little Rock v. Jessie Martain, a.k.a. Jessie Hall, which indicated that there should be additional equitable remedies available to the judge to abate nuisances. That because of the above-referenced case, and because of the need to fight the war on drugs, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall become effective immediately upon passage.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Property, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 659.

16-105-401. Title.

This subchapter shall be called the “Arkansas Drug Abatement Act of 1989”.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-402. Common nuisance declared — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “owner” means a person in whom is vested the ownership and title of property and who is the owner of record, including without limitation a local, city, state, or federal governmental entity.
    1. A store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house, building, boat, airplane, or other property or structure used for the purpose of unlawfully selling, storing, keeping, manufacturing, using, or donating a controlled substance, precursor, or analog under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, § 5-64-101 et seq., is detrimental to the public morals and is a common nuisance, and a court shall order that the common nuisance be enjoined, abated, and prevented.
    2. Costs of enjoinment, abatement, and prevention and damages may be recovered against a person or entity found to be the owner of the common nuisance property.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1; 2013, No. 1219, § 1; 2015, No. 1099, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2015 amendment substituted “a person” for “any person” in (a); deleted former (b) and redesignated former (c) as (b); rewrote (b)(1); and, in (b)(2), substituted “and damages” for “as well as damages” and “a person” for “any person”.

Cross References. Prostitution, § 5-70-102.

Premises and real property used by criminal gangs, organizations, or enterprises, or used by anyone in committing a continuing series of violations — Civil remedies, § 5-74-109.

Municipal corporations' powers and restrictions, § 14-54-102.

Criminal nuisance abatement boards, § 14-54-1701 et seq.

16-105-403. Action to abate — Permanent injunction — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “established neighborhood or community organization” means a group, whether or not incorporated, that:
    1. Consists of persons who reside or work at or in a building, complex of buildings, street, block, or neighborhood any part of which is located on or within one thousand feet (1,000') of the premises alleged to be a common nuisance; and
    2. Has the purpose of benefitting the quality of life in its neighborhood or community, including without limitation treatment programs.
  2. The following persons or entities may bring a cause of action under this subchapter to enjoin, abate, and prevent a common nuisance that is being kept, maintained, or that exists to prevent the common nuisance, and to perpetually enjoin the person, entity, owner, lessee, or agent of the place listed under § 16-105-402(b), in or upon which the common nuisance exists, from directly or indirectly maintaining or permitting the common nuisance:
    1. The prosecuting attorney of the county;
    2. The city attorney of any incorporated city;
    3. Any citizen of the state or resident of the county, in his or her own name;
    4. The county attorney;
    5. The Attorney General; or
    6. Any established neighborhood or community organization.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1; 1991, No. 926, § 1; 1991, No. 1187, § 1; 2013, No. 1219, § 2.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote this section.

16-105-404. Verification of complaint.

Unless filed by the prosecuting attorney, or the city attorney of an incorporated city, the complaint in the action shall be verified.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1; 1991, No. 926, § 2; 1991, No. 1187, § 2.

16-105-405. Temporary injunction.

If the existence of the common nuisance is shown in the action to the satisfaction of the court or judge, the court or judge shall allow a temporary writ of injunction to abate and prevent the continuance or recurrence of the common nuisance. The notice requirements of Rule 65 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure shall be followed in maintaining this action.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-406. Bond required — Exceptions.

On granting the temporary writ, the court or judge shall require a bond on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the defendant enjoined such damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, as the defendant sustains by reason of the injunction if the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. No bond shall be required where the proceeding is instituted by the prosecuting attorney or city attorney.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-407. Precedence of action — Exceptions.

The action shall have precedence over all other actions, except criminal proceedings, election contests, and hearings on injunctions.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-408. Dismissal for want of prosecution.

If a complaint under this subchapter is filed by a citizen of the state, resident of the county, or established neighborhood or community organization, the complaint shall not be dismissed by the citizen of the state, resident of the county, or established neighborhood community organization or for want of prosecution except upon a sworn statement setting forth the reasons why the complaint should be dismissed and by dismissal ordered by the court.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1; 2013, No. 1219, § 3.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote this section.

16-105-409. Costs.

If a cause of action under this subchapter is brought by a citizen of the state, resident of the county, or established neighborhood or community organization and the court finds there was no reasonable ground or cause for the cause of action, the costs incurred by the defendant shall be taxed against the citizen of the state, resident of the county, or established neighborhood or community organization.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1; 2013, No. 1219, § 4.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote this section.

16-105-410. Order of abatement — Lien for costs — Enforcement.

If the existence of the common nuisance is established in the action, an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment in the case, and the plaintiff's costs in the action are a lien upon the building or place. The lien is enforceable and collectible by execution issued by order of the court.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-411. Violations — Criminal penalties.

A violation or disobedience of the injunction or order for abatement is punishable as a contempt of court by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than one (1) nor more than six (6) months, or by both.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-412. Order of abatement — Civil penalty — Damages.

  1. If the existence of the common nuisance is established in the action, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment, which order shall direct the removal from the building or place of all fixtures and other movable property used in conducting, maintaining, aiding, or abetting the common nuisance and shall direct their sale in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution.
  2. The order shall provide for any appropriate equitable relief as determined by the court to be necessary to abate said common nuisance and may further provide, if determined to be the least restrictive alternative available to effectively accomplish said abatement, for the effectual closing of the building or place for such period of time as is determined to be necessary by the court as adequate to abate said common nuisance. An alternative to closure may be considered only as provided in this section.
    1. If the court finds that any vacancy resulting from closure of the building or place may create a nuisance or that closure is otherwise harmful to the community, in lieu of ordering the building or place closed, the court may order the person who is responsible for the existence of the common nuisance, or the person who knowingly permits controlled substances to be unlawfully sold, served, stored, kept, or given away in or from a building or place he or she owns, to pay damages in an amount equal to the fair market rental value of the building or place for such period of time as determined appropriate by the court to the city or county in whose jurisdiction the common nuisance is located for the purpose of carrying out their drug prevention and education programs. If awarded to a city, eligible programs may include those developed as a result of cooperative programs among schools, community agencies, and the local enforcement agency. If awarded to a county, funds shall be used for those programs that are part of any county program in place or used by the county law enforcement agency. These funds shall not be used to supplant existing city, county, state, or federal resources used for drug prevention and education programs.
    2. For purposes of this subsection, the actual amount of rent being received for the rental of the building or place, or the existence of any vacancy therein, may be considered, but shall not be the sole determinant of the fair market rental value. Expert testimony may be used to determine the fair market rental value.
  3. In addition, the court may assess a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) against any or all of the defendants, based upon the severity of the common nuisance and its duration.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1; 1991, No. 926, § 3; 1991, No. 1187, § 3.

16-105-413. Custody of building.

While the order of abatement remains in effect, the building or place is in the custody of the court.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-414. Fees — Closing of building or place.

For removing and selling the movable property, the city, county, or responsible law enforcement agency is entitled to charge and receive the same fees as would be charged and received for levying upon and selling like property on execution; and for closing the premises and keeping them closed, a reasonable sum shall be allowed by the court.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-415. Disposition of sale proceeds.

The proceeds of the sale of the movable property shall be applied as follows:

  1. First, to the fees and costs of the removal and sale;
  2. Second, to the allowances and costs of closing and keeping closed the building or place;
  3. Third, to the payment of the plaintiff's costs in the action; and
  4. Fourth, the balance, if any, to the owner of the property.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-416. Release of building to owner.

  1. If the owner of the building or place has not been guilty of any contempt of court in the proceedings, and appears and pays all costs, fees, and allowances that are a lien on the building or place and files a bond in the full value of the property conditioned that the owner will immediately abate any common nuisance that may exist at the building or place and prevent it from being established or kept thereat within a period of one (1) year thereafter, the court or judge may, if satisfied of the owner's good faith, order the building or place to be delivered to the owner, and the order of abatement cancelled so far as it may relate to the property.
  2. The release of property under the provisions of this section does not release it from any judgment, lien, penalty, or liability to which it may be subject.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

16-105-417. Lien of fine — Enforcement.

  1. Whenever the owner of a building or place upon which the act or acts constituting the contempt have been committed, or the owner of any interest therein, has been guilty of a contempt of court, and fined in any proceedings under this subchapter, the fine is a lien upon the building or place to the extent of his or her interest in it.
  2. The lien is enforceable and collectible by execution issued by order of the court.

History. Acts 1989, No. 556, § 1.

Subchapter 5 — Noise Pollution

Cross References. Regulation of use of firearms and archery equipment, § 14-16-501 et seq.

16-105-501. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Local unit of government” means a county, city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town;
  2. “Person” means an individual, proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity; and
  3. “Sport shooting range” or “range” means an area designed and operated for the use of rifles, shotguns, pistols, silhouettes, skeet, trap, black powder, or any other similar sport shooting.

History. Acts 1997, No. 602, § 1.

16-105-502. Sport shooting ranges.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person who operates or uses a sport shooting range in this state shall not be subject to civil liability or criminal prosecution for noise or noise pollution resulting from the operation or use of the sport shooting range if the sport shooting range is in compliance with noise control ordinances of local units of government that applied to the sport shooting range and its operation at the time the sport shooting range was constructed and began operation.
  2. A person who operates or uses a sport shooting range is not subject to an action for nuisance, and no court of the state may enjoin the use or operation of a sport shooting range on the basis of noise or noise pollution, if the sport shooting range is in compliance with noise control ordinances of units of local government that applied to the sport shooting range and its operation at the time the sport shooting range was constructed and began operation.
  3. A person who subsequently acquires title to or who owns real property adversely affected by the use of property with a permanently located sport shooting range shall not maintain a nuisance action against the person who owns the sport shooting range to restrain, enjoin, or impede the use of the sport shooting range unless there has been a substantial change in the nature of the use of the sport shooting range or by a person using the sport shooting range.
  4. Rules adopted by any state agency for establishing levels of noise allowable in the outdoor atmosphere shall not apply to a sport shooting range exempted from liability under this subchapter.
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit civil liability except in the limited case of noise pollution.

History. Acts 1997, No. 602, § 2; 2019, No. 315, § 1320.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted “or regulations” following “Rules” in (d).

Case Notes

Immunity from Suit.

Circuit court properly dismissed the neighbors' nuisance lawsuit against a charitable organization's operation of a shooting range on its property because the organization was statutorily immune from suit under this section, where no local noise control ordinances existed at the time the shooting range began operation, and the burden on the neighbors' use of their property, and its diminution in value, was insufficient to rise to the level of a taking under Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 22. 3 Rivers Logistics, Inc. v. Brown-Wright Post No. 158, 2018 Ark. 91, 548 S.W.3d 137 (2018).

16-105-503. Applicability.

This subchapter does not affect rights or duties that matured, liabilities or penalties that were incurred, or proceedings begun before August 1, 1997.

History. Acts 1997, No. 602, § 3.

Chapter 106 Actions by or Against State

Cross References. Actions by state to recover money, § 25-16-708.

Actions involving state to be brought in Pulaski county, § 16-60-104.

Property of state not liable to be seized and sold on execution, §§ 16-66-114, 16-66-205.

Recovery of state property, § 22-5-401.

State not required to give security for costs, § 16-68-304.

Suits against state prohibited, Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 20.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, A Guide to Arkansas Venue, 1995 Ark. L. Notes 83.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. Because Acts 1997, No. 371, added Subchapter 2, and Acts 1997, No. 851, added Subchapter 3, the existing provisions of this chapter have been designated as Subchapter 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 1855, § 13, p. 196: effective on passage.

Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 3, § 3: effective on passage.

16-106-101. Actions generally.

  1. All actions in favor of and in which the state is interested shall be brought in the name of the state and shall be prosecuted by the prosecuting attorney.
  2. All actions by or against the state shall be prosecuted and defended, proceeded in, and conducted to final judgment in the same manner as actions by and against individuals.
  3. Precedence shall be given, in all courts, to actions or other proceedings in which the state is a party, over any other business of the court.
  4. All actions for debts due the State of Arkansas, all actions in favor of any state officer, state board, or commissioner, in their official capacity, all actions which are authorized by the provisions of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases or by law to be brought in the name of the state, and all actions against the board, commissioner, or state officer for or on account of any official act done or omitted to be done shall be brought and prosecuted in the county where the defendant resides.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 147, §§ 4, 5; Civil Code, §§ 484, 488; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [484], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1175, 9298, 9299, 9304; Pope's Dig., §§ 1397, 11984, 11985, 11990; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-201, 34-206, 34-208, 34-209.

Publisher's Notes. For codification of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases, see the parallel references for the Civil Code of 1869 in the Tables Volume A.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Grounds For Venue in Arkansas — A Survey, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 468.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Civil Procedure, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 893.

Case Notes

In General.

Subsection (d) relates to venue rather than jurisdiction and is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Ark. Sav. & Loan Ass'n Bd. v. Corning Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 264, 478 S.W.2d 431 (1972).

Judge's discretion to control a docket is not completely obviated by subsection (c) of this section; therefore, state's petition for a writ of mandamus was denied where the state was seeking to remove a mayor from office under Ark. Const. art. 5, § 9 because the trial judge had the discretion to control the docket, and the judge was not required to postpone other cases where the state was not a party in order to accommodate the state. State v. Vittitow, 358 Ark. 98, 186 S.W.3d 237 (2004).

Prosecution, Etc. of Actions.

This section was not impliedly repealed by statute authorizing regulation and enforcement of liquor laws. Southwestern Distilled Products, Inc. v. Trimble, 198 Ark. 970, 132 S.W.2d 196 (1939).

Suits Against State Agency.

Venue in suit against petitioner state administrative agency to have certain regulations it adopted declared unconstitutional had to be brought and prosecuted in the county where petitioner resided, pursuant to subsection (d), which for petitioner was in Pulaski County where petitioner's official residence was located. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Harkey, 345 Ark. 279, 45 S.W.3d 829 (2001).

Suits Not Against State.

Suit to prevent filing of assessment of contributions to unemployment fund and the resulting judgment, lien, and cloud on title of property, being not a suit against the state, was held properly instituted in the county of plaintiff's residence where its property was located. McCain v. Hammock, 204 Ark. 163, 161 S.W.2d 192 (1942).

While this section makes it mandatory that any action against the head of the state agency for public welfare be brought and prosecuted in Pulaski County, where he and the referee of the juvenile court of Pulaski County were only nominal or theoretical party defendants to the instant suit, a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody of the two minor children, and had no interest in it, the jurisdiction would be governed by the residence of the actual parties in interest, those having actual custody of the children when the suit was instituted. Johnson v. McClure, 228 Ark. 1081, 312 S.W.2d 347 (1958).

A quiet title action in which a state commission is made a defendant because of its claim to the land was not such an action against the state or a commission as falls within the purview of this section and, therefore, the proper county for the action was the county in which the land lies. State ex rel. Ark. Publicity & Parks Comm'n v. Butt, 229 Ark. 433, 316 S.W.2d 204 (1958).

Venue Where Defendant Resides.

Section 16-60-103 (now § 16-60-104), requiring all actions brought on the behalf of the state to be filed in county where seat of government is located, is superseded by this section, which requires all actions filed in behalf of the state to be filed in county of residence of defendant. Cook v. Gore, 214 Ark. 777, 218 S.W.2d 82 (1949).

Former § 16-60-113 (see now § 16-60-101), fixing venue of actions for damages to personal property due to negligence of another either in county where accident occurred or county where the owner of the property resides, applies only to persons and not the state, and does not amend this section which requires all actions brought in behalf of the state to be filed in county of where defendant resides. Cook v. Gore, 214 Ark. 777, 218 S.W.2d 82 (1949).

The venue of an action brought by a county in the name of the state to recover damages to county property against a foreign corporation admitted to do business in Arkansas and an individual resident of Pulaski County was in Pulaski County. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Roberts, 246 Ark. 864, 440 S.W.2d 208 (1969).

Action seeking a declaratory judgment interpreting a lease agreement did not involve recovery of an interest in real property and should have been brought by the state in the county of defendant's residence. Doyle v. Williams, 251 Ark. 797, 475 S.W.2d 170 (1972).

Where candidate filed a petition for qualification as an independent candidate for the office of Arkansas House of Representatives and his petition was denied because it did not contain the required number of verified signatures, the candidate erred by filing a civil rights action against the Arkansas Secretary of State in the Phillips County Circuit Court; subsection (d) of this section required the suit to be filed in Pulaski County, Arkansas. Daniels v. Weaver, 367 Ark. 327, 240 S.W.3d 95 (2006).

—State Officers.

The State Treasurer may not be sued except in the county of his official residence even though he is alleged to be a joint tortfeasor with defendant resident of another county in which suit is brought. Leonard v. Henry, 187 Ark. 75, 58 S.W.2d 430 (1933).

A mandamus proceeding against the State Land Commissioner to require him to perform a ministerial duty must be instituted in the county where such officer resides. Reed v. Wilson, 163 Ark. 520, 260 S.W. 438 (1924); Clark v. Trammell, 208 Ark. 450, 186 S.W.2d 668 (1945). See also Lewis v. Owen, 146 Ark. 469, 225 S.W. 648 (1920).

Where statute requires all actions against a state officer to be brought in the county of the officer's official residence, the word “officer” means one who holds an office, or specifically a person lawfully invested with an office. Downey v. Toler, 214 Ark. 334, 216 S.W.2d 60 (1948).

This section is not changed by former § 16-60-102 (now § 16-60-103), which fixes the venue in actions against other public officers, except state officers, on the ground of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” as it refers to actions against state officers and former § 16-60-102 (now § 16-60-103) refers to actions against public officers. Downey v. Toler, 214 Ark. 334, 216 S.W.2d 60 (1948).

Members of the Arkansas State Police are state members and therefore can be sued only in the official residence of the state police, which is Pulaski County. Downey v. Toler, 214 Ark. 334, 216 S.W.2d 60 (1948).

Former § 16-60-112 (see now § 16-60-101), providing venue for all actions for damages for personal injuries as the county where the accident occurred, did not change the venue as provided by this section and two state police officers were entitled to venue in Pulaski County, the official county residence for all state police. Downey v. Toler, 214 Ark. 334, 216 S.W.2d 60 (1948).

As the official residence of the gas board and its director is Pulaski County, the proper venue is Pulaski County. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Bd. v. Newton, 230 Ark. 267, 322 S.W.2d 67 (1959).

Taxpayer's suit against state police official in his official capacity for permitting individual to operate overweight trucks and to purchase improper licenses for trucks could only be maintained in Pulaski County, the official residence of the Arkansas State Police. Dean v. Cole, 236 Ark. 64, 364 S.W.2d 305 (1963).

Cited: Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Colvin, 257 Ark. 889, 521 S.W.2d 206 (1975); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Mills, 371 Ark. 317, 265 S.W.3d 760 (2007); State v. Hammame, 102 Ark. App. 87, 282 S.W.3d 278 (2008).

16-106-102. Actions against corporations.

  1. Any action required by law to be brought in the name of the state against any corporation, or to vacate or repeal any charter, may be brought in any county in the state before any court having jurisdiction of the action.
  2. Service of process in any such action may be made in any county in the state upon any defendant to the action in like manner as is provided by law in other cases, and the defendant shall be required to appear and defend the action in the county where the action may be commenced.

History. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 3, §§ 1, 2, p. 4; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1181, 1182; Pope's Dig., §§ 1403, 1404; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-202, 34-203.

16-106-103. Actions against officers, corporations, etc., for certain penalties.

Where officers, corporations, or officers of corporations are required to report to the Auditor of State the moneys in their hands belonging to the state or due by them or by a corporation to the state, at a certain period or periods fixed by law, and a fine or penalty is imposed for the failure, the action for the recovery thereof may be commenced at any time after the failure.

History. Civil Code, § 486; C. & M. Dig., § 9301; Pope's Dig., § 11987; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-205.

16-106-104. Actions against county sheriff, clerk, collector of the revenue, etc., for recovery of money.

When the debt is due by a county sheriff, clerk, or the Director of the Revenue Division of the Department of Finance and Administration, or any other receiver of public moneys, for money collected or received, and the officer, collector, or receiver has failed to pay the money in the manner and at the time prescribed by law, the action for the recovery of the debt may be commenced at any time after the failure.

History. Civil Code, § 485; C. & M. Dig., § 9300; Pope's Dig., § 11986; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-204.

16-106-105. Actions against state regarding federal land grants.

  1. All actions and suits for the recovery of the purchase money of lands which were granted to this state by the United States by Acts of Congress, March 2, 1827, June 23, 1836, and September 4, 1841, and any and all lands which have at any time, and from time to time, been granted to this state by the United States for any and all purposes, except grants made for railroad purposes, and all actions to enforce the vendor's lien upon the lands, and all actions to recover the possession of, or for trespasses upon, the lands, shall be brought and prosecuted in the name of the State of Arkansas.
  2. The fact that any and all of the lands may have been set apart, allotted, or granted by the state to any county, township, or school district shall not be a defense to any action brought under this section and shall not affect the jurisdiction of the court in which the action may be pending, but all questions as to the rights of the counties, townships, or school districts shall be reserved.

History. Civil Code, § 29; C. & M. Dig., § 1094; Pope's Dig., § 1310; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-207.

16-106-106. Setoff against state.

In suits brought in behalf of the state, no debt or claim shall be allowed as a setoff other than those which have been exhibited to the Auditor of State and by him or her allowed, except only in cases when it shall be proven to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant at the time is in possession of vouchers which he or she could not produce to the Auditor of State or that he or she was prevented from exhibiting the claims to the Auditor of State in consequence of sickness or absence.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 18, § 13; C. & M. Dig., § 9303; Pope's Dig., § 11989; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-210.

16-106-107. Enforcement of execution.

  1. Whenever an execution against a public debtor shall not be satisfied in the regular course of proceeding and the Attorney General or prosecuting attorney is of the opinion that the lack of satisfaction is caused by fraudulent concealment of the debtor's property, or by any other obstruction thereto, he or she may cause actions to be brought, either in the court in which the judgment was obtained or in any other circuit court within whose jurisdiction the property may be, or the debtor may be found, to set aside the fraudulent conveyances, to remove any obstructions to the execution, or to obtain satisfaction of the judgment.
  2. For the purpose of bringing an action, the Attorney General or the prosecuting attorney may employ an attorney to bring the action, or an agent to prepare the suit and attend to the collection of the judgment, and may agree as to a compensation to be paid for their services, either certain or contingent on success. However, the amount of the contingent compensation shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) on the first three hundred dollars ($300) and ten percent (10%) on any excess over that amount. When the compensation is due, the Auditor of State, upon the certificate of the Attorney General or prosecuting attorney, shall issue a warrant on the Treasurer of State.

History. Civil Code, § 489; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [489], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 9305; Pope's Dig., § 11991; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-211.

16-106-108. Disposition of state money.

  1. The county sheriff or other officer collecting any money due to the state shall pay the money into the State Treasury and obtain a final discharge therefor. No money due the state shall be paid to the Attorney General or any other attorney or agent employed in the collection of the money, or to any other person, unless otherwise directed by law.
  2. The court rendering a judgment in favor of the state shall certify the amount thereof, together with the costs, to the Auditor of State and shall also certify the fees due to officers and to witnesses for attendance on behalf of the state, for which the Auditor of State shall issue his or her warrant on the Treasurer of State to the person entitled.

History. Civil Code, §§ 490, 491; C. & M. Dig., §§ 9306, 9307; Pope's Dig., §§ 11992, 11993; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-212, 34-213.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The words “the sheriff or other officer collecting any money due to the state shall pay the money into the public treasury” have reference solely to the state itself and not to any of its political subdivisions. Williams v. State, 65 Ark. 159, 46 S.W. 186 (1898).

16-106-109. Appeal and error by state.

  1. Appeals and writs of error may be brought by any of the prosecuting attorneys, in the name and on behalf of the state, in like manner as by individuals, except when it may be otherwise provided by law.
  2. All appeals or writs of error taken or prosecuted by the state shall, ipso facto, operate as a supersedeas and suspension of all further proceedings in the cause in which the appeal may be taken or writ of error sued out, until the final disposition thereof, without bond, recognizance, or security.
  3. In no case in which the state applies for an injunction shall security be required. However, if the state is entitled thereto in other respects, the injunction may be granted according to the justice and equity of the case.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 117, § 4; Acts 1855, § 10, p. 196; C. & M. Dig., 2142, 9308; Pope's Dig., §§ 2748, 11994; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-214, 34-215.

Cross References. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment, Ark. R. Civ. P. 62.

Case Notes

Criminal Cases.

An appeal lies in a felony on behalf of the state from a judgment sustaining a motion in arrest of a judgment of conviction. State v. Robinson, 55 Ark. 439, 18 S.W. 541 (1892).

Cited: State ex rel. Greene County Bar Ass'n v. Huddleston, 173 Ark. 686, 293 S.W. 353 (1927); State v. One 1993 Toyota Camry, 333 Ark. 503, 969 S.W.2d 663 (1998).

16-106-110. Repayment of Attorney General or prosecuting attorney for postage used.

The Attorney General or prosecuting attorney may make out and certify to the Auditor of State an account of the postage he or she may have paid in sending out notices and process, and upon letters sent or received by him or her, relating to actions or proceedings in which the state is interested, who shall thereupon issue his or her warrant on the Treasurer of State for the amount thereof.

History. Civil Code, § 492; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [492], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 4533; Pope's Dig., § 5590; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-216.

16-106-111. Exception to judicial immunity — Definitions.

  1. The General Assembly finds that:
    1. The common law doctrine of judicial immunity from civil suit has been accepted by the courts under Peterson v. Judges of Jefferson County Circuit Court, 2014 Ark. 228 (per curiam) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and is state law; and
    2. An exception to this blanket grant of judicial immunity is necessary to protect the public from certain criminal and unethical acts committed by judges and justices.
  2. A person who has had an adverse decision against him or her in a court in this state may file a claim in the circuit court with jurisdiction against a judge or justice who made the adverse decision in the judge or justice's individual capacity if the judge or justice:
    1. Made or influenced the adverse decision as a result of bribery;
    2. Has been found guilty of, or pleaded guilty to, nolo contendere to, or the equivalent of nolo contendere to, a criminal offense for conduct constituting bribery in any state or federal court; and
    3. The bribery conviction described in subdivision (b)(2) of this section resulted from the conduct described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
  3. A person is entitled to the following remedies if he or she prevails on a claim under subsection (b) of this section:
    1. Costs;
    2. Damages, including without limitation punitive damages; and
    3. Attorney's fees.
  4. A prosecuting attorney may bring a cause of action under this section, and may, in his or her discretion, use any proceeds recovered in the proceeding to:
    1. Cover the prosecuting attorney's costs of the proceeding in which the adverse decision described in subsection (b) of this section occurred;
    2. Give to the victim or the estate of the victim of the crime that the prosecuting attorney was prosecuting in the proceeding in which the adverse decision described in subsection (b) under this section occurred;
    3. Donate to a nonprofit victims' rights advocacy group; or
    4. Donate to the State Treasury.
  5. The statute of limitations for a cause of action under this section:
    1. Is three (3) years; and
    2. Begins to run the day the judge or justice is found guilty of, or pleads guilty to, nolo contendere to, or the equivalent of nolo contendere to, a criminal offense for conduct constituting bribery in any state or federal court.
    1. If a cause of action is timely filed under this section and the judge or justice is deceased at the time of the filing or dies during the pendency of the cause of action, the person or the estate of the person filing the cause of action may proceed against the estate of the judge or justice.
    2. The estate of a person may proceed with a cause of action under this section against a judge, justice, or the estate of the judge or justice, if the person dies before the cause of action accrues or during the pendency of the action.
  6. As used in this section:
    1. “Adverse decision” means a ruling in which a judge's or justice's order differs from the relief or request sought by a litigant on a motion or objection in a civil or criminal matter;
    2. “Bribery” means giving, offering, accepting, or agreeing to accept money or any other benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, for the purpose of affecting the outcome of a court proceeding or decision; and
    3. “Person” means any individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.

History. Acts 2017, No. 430, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Prisoners — Court Actions

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 371, § 8: Mar. 6, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that litigation of a frivolous nature by incarcerated persons is flooding the State court systems. Therefore in order to immediately implement this measure, and thereby alleviate the burden on the court systems, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-106-201. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Frivolous” means having no reasonable basis in law or fact, or lacking any good faith legal argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
  2. “Inmate” or “inmate in a penal institution” includes, but is not limited to, a person in the custody or under the supervision of the Division of Correction, the Division of Community Correction, or the United States Bureau of Prisons; and
  3. “Malicious” means filing numerous actions, or actions brought in bad faith on de minimis issues.

History. Acts 1997, No. 371, § 2; 2019, No. 910, § 965.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (2).

16-106-202. Premature, frivolous, or malicious lawsuits.

  1. A civil action or claim initiated against the state, the Board of Corrections, the Division of Correction, the Division of Community Correction, another state agency, or a political subdivision, or an original action in an appellate court, or an appeal of an action, whether or not the plaintiff was represented in court, by an inmate in a penal institution or an incarcerated person appearing pro se may be:
    1. Dismissed without prejudice by the court on its own motion or on a motion of the defendant, if all administrative remedies available to the inmate have not been exhausted; or
    2. Dismissed with prejudice by the court on a motion of the defendant if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
  2. As used in this section, “civil action” does not include a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or other petition for post-conviction release in which the court is jurisdictionally empowered to grant release from incarceration or a reduction in sentence.

History. Acts 1997, No. 371, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 966.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in the introductory language of (a).

Case Notes

Application.

Petitioner failed to show that the circuit court erred when it determined his habeas petition was a civil action that constituted one strike for purposes of § 16-68-607, because this section had no application to § 16-68-607, and § 16-68-607 did apply, when the circuit court correctly found that the petition for writ of habeas corpus failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. McArty v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 257, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 920, 133 S. Ct. 371, 184 L. Ed. 2d 219 (2012).

16-106-203. Sanctions.

If the court determines before or at trial that one (1) or more of the causes of action are frivolous or malicious, any one (1) or more of the following sanctions may be imposed:

  1. Award attorney's fees and actual costs incurred by the state, the Division of Correction, or the Division of Community Correction, another state agency, a political subdivision, the Attorney General's office, or the defendant, not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per frivolous cause of action;
  2. Court costs not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) per cause of action;
  3. Order the Division of Correction to revoke up to thirty (30) days' earned good-time credits accrued, under § 12-29-201 et seq.;
  4. Order the Division of Correction to revoke permission to have nonessential personal property of the inmate, including, but not limited to, televisions, radios, stereos, or tape recorders. If permission is revoked, the Division of Correction shall take appropriate precautions to protect the property during the period of the revocation; or
  5. Impose a civil sanction in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History. Acts 1997, No. 371, § 3; 2019, No. 910, §§ 967, 968.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” throughout the section; and substituted “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (1).

16-106-204. Fees and costs.

  1. Any award of attorney's fees or costs, or the imposition of a sanction shall serve as a judgment against the inmate, and the Division of Correction is authorized to take up to fifty percent (50%) of the inmate's account per month until paid.
  2. The judgment shall be subject to execution without further order of any court for a period of ten (10) years from the date of an award or imposition of a sanction.

History. Acts 1997, No. 371, § 4; 2019, No. 910, § 969.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (a).

Subchapter 3 — Prisoners — Administrative Remedies

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 851, § 6: Mar. 27, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that litigation of a frivolous nature by incarcerated persons is flooding the state court systems. Therefore, in order to immediately implement this measure, and thereby alleviate the burden on the court systems, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-106-301. Exhaustion of administrative remedies required — Definition.

  1. An incarcerated person may not bring an action with respect to prison conditions under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., any other state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other federal law until the incarcerated person has exhausted all available administrative remedies.
  2. As used in this section, “incarcerated person” means a person who:
    1. Has been convicted of an offense and is incarcerated for that offense; or
    2. Is being held in custody for trial or sentencing.
  3. This section does not apply to an action challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence, including without limitation the following actions:
    1. Direct appeal;
    2. A petition under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure;
    3. A petition for writ of error coram nobis; or
    4. A petition for writ of habeas corpus.
  4. When determining the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, including if a dismissal of an action is without prejudice, the court may look to state and federal court decisions that interpret the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

History. Acts 1997, No. 851, § 1; 2019, No. 444, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote the section.

Case Notes

Construction.

It would be inconsistent with this section to adopt a prisoner's argument that the statute of limitations was tolled while his untimely grievances were being processed; the first purpose of the statute required that incarcerated persons exhausted their administrative remedies before filing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Winston v. Kelly, No. 5:10CV00180 JLH-JJV, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20836 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 15, 2013).

16-106-302. Sanctions for frivolous, malicious, or wasteful claim.

  1. The court shall, on its own motion or on the motion of a party, dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law, by any incarcerated person if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
  2. In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

History. Acts 1997, No. 851, § 2.

Case Notes

Cited: Brown v. Ark. Dep't of Cor., 339 Ark. 458, 6 S.W.3d 102 (1999).

Subchapter 4 — Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 298, § 3: Mar. 4, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that in the case of Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 10 S.W.3d 892 (2000), the Supreme Court held that the state waived its sovereign immunity by offering a proposed settlement in a class action case that, if approved by the trial court, would have provided for payment by the state of attorneys' fees to counsel for the plaintiff class representative; the Supreme Court further held that such waiver of immunity survived even though the proposed settlement was rejected by the trial court and the Supreme Court. It is further found and determined by the General Assembly that the Supreme Court's decision has a chilling effect on the ability and willingness of the state and its attorneys to discuss, propose, negotiate or communicate with regard to potential settlement of class action and other pending or threatened claims or litigation. It is further found and determined by the General Assembly that such chilling effect will hinder or deter settlement of pending or threatened litigation in which the state is involved and is, therefore, contrary to sound public policy. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-106-401. Settlement negotiations.

The State of Arkansas does not waive its sovereign immunity when, through its counsel or otherwise, it enters into negotiations concerning the possible settlement of pending or threatened claims or litigation, whether the pending or threatened claims or litigation are governed by Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or otherwise.

History. Acts 2003, No. 298, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 441.

16-106-402. Communications regarding claims or litigation.

The State of Arkansas does not waive its sovereign immunity when, through its counsel or otherwise, it communicates to a court, counsel, or citizens, or otherwise, with respect to the possibility of settling, on any terms or conditions, any pending or threatened claims or litigation, whether the pending or threatened claims or litigation are governed by Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or otherwise.

History. Acts 2003, No. 298, § 2.

Chapter 107 Actions Involving Bonds, Notes, Etc.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-107-101. Liability of surety upon forgery, erasure, or withdrawal of cosurety's name.

If it appears that the name of any person has been signed to any bond or other obligation as surety thereon without his or her consent, or that the name of any person which has been at any time properly signed as surety to any bond or obligation has been erased or withdrawn therefrom before delivery thereof, without the consent of other persons signing the bond or other obligation as sureties prior or subsequently to the erasure or withdrawal, the signing without authority or erasure or withdrawal shall not have the effect of rendering the bond or other obligation void as to all of the other obligors thereon. The sole effect thereof shall be to diminish the extent of the liability of the sureties thereon, other than those whose names may have been so signed without authority or erased as aforesaid, by an amount equal to that which would have been contributed to discharge the common liability by the persons whose names were so signed without authority, or erased as aforesaid, had the want of authority, or erasure not existed.

History. Acts 1891, No. 55, § 1, p. 91; C. & M. Dig., § 8283; Pope's Dig., § 10860; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-328.

Case Notes

Forgery.

Where the names of three persons appearing as sureties were forged, the action as to them must be dismissed and the liability of the remaining sureties reduced proportionately. Johnson v. T.M. Dover Merc. Co., 164 Ark. 371, 261 S.W. 913 (1924).

Where defense was that none of the defendants signed the bond, an instruction that the signature of one of the defendants being forged would relieve the other defendants from liability was properly refused, although such forgery would diminish the liability of the other defendants by an amount equal to that which would have been contributed by the defendant whose name was forged. Bauer v. North Ark. Hwy. Imp. Dist. No. 1, 168 Ark. 220, 270 S.W. 533 (1925).

16-107-102. Signature of surety conditional upon signature of cosurety no defense — Liability.

  1. It shall not be a defense in favor of any surety on any bond or obligation that he or she became surety thereon on the condition that the principal obligor should procure the cosuretyship of other persons before the instrument should be delivered. This shall be the case whether the names of the contemplated cosureties appear upon the face of the instrument at the time the condition is stated or are specified in an independent agreement or understanding.
  2. In case of every failure to procure the joinder of the contemplated cosureties, the liability of the sureties who actually sign the bond or other obligation shall be as complete and valid as if no condition had been mentioned. The instrument to which their names are signed shall be deemed and taken to all intents and purposes as their obligation.

History. Acts 1891, No. 55, § 2, p. 91; C. & M. Dig., § 8296; Pope's Dig., § 10873; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-329.

Subchapter 2 — Actions on Bonds

Cross References. Actions brought in county where cause of action arose, § 16-60-103.

Research References

ALR.

Liability of surety on private bond for punitive damages. 2 A.L.R.4th 1254.

Recovery of damages from wrongful issuance of injunction as limited to amount of bond. 30 A.L.R.4th 273.

Am. Jur. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bonds, § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Creditors' Provisional Remedies and Debtors' Due Process Rights: Statutory Liens in Arkansas, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 185.

16-107-201. Applicability.

  1. The provisions of this subchapter in relation to suits on official bonds shall apply as well to suits on bonds of administrators, executors, guardians, and others required by law to give bond, with condition for the performance of any duty or trust, as to suits on bonds of officers.
  2. The persons aggrieved may prosecute suits in the same manner, with like effect, and subject in all respects to the provisions contained in this subchapter, in respect to suits on official bonds.
  3. The court shall possess the same power in relation to the suits.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, § 27; C. & M. Dig., § 8186; Pope's Dig., § 10617; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-327.

Case Notes

Fixed Penalty.

A surety bond under a fixed penalty who fails to make payment when liability attaches subjects himself to interest even though its payment will exceed the penalty. James v. State, 65 Ark. 415, 46 S.W. 937 (1898).

16-107-202. Breach of condition to pay money.

  1. In all actions brought upon bonds to which there is a condition or defeasance annexed by which the bond is to become void on the payment of a less sum, the plaintiff shall set out the condition in his or her complaint and may assign as many breaches as he or she may think proper.
  2. The defendant in the action may plead payment of the principal sum and interest due by the condition of the bond before the commencement of the action in bar thereof, although the payment was not strictly according to the condition.
  3. Whenever any action shall be pending on the bond, the defendant may, at any time before judgment rendered in the action, pay to the plaintiff, or bring into court for the plaintiff's use, the principal sum and interest due on the bond, together with the costs in the action, and thereupon the action shall be discontinued.
  4. If judgment is recovered on any such bond, the judgment shall be rendered for the sum of money really due, according to the condition, with interest and costs, and execution shall issue thereon accordingly.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §§ 1-4; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8164-8166; Pope's Dig., §§ 10595-10597; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-301 — 34-304.

16-107-203. Breach of condition other than to pay money.

  1. When an action shall be prosecuted in any court of law, upon any bond for the breach of any condition other than for payment of money, or shall be prosecuted for any penal sum for the nonperformance of any covenant or written agreement, the plaintiff in his or her complaint shall assign the specific breaches for which the action is brought.
  2. Upon the trial of the action, if the jury finds that any assignment of the breaches is true, they shall assess the damages occasioned by the breach, in addition to their finding.
  3. If, in the action, the plaintiff shall obtain judgment upon demurrer, by confession or default, the court shall make an order therein that the truth of the breaches assigned be inquired into and the damages sustained thereby assessed, at the same or the next term, and the court shall proceed thereon in the same manner as in other cases of inquiry of damages.
  4. In every action, if the plaintiff recovers, the verdict assessing the damages shall be entered on the record, and judgment shall be entered for the penalty of the bond, or for the penal sum forfeited, together with costs of suit, and with a further judgment that the plaintiff have execution for the damages so assessed, which damages shall be specified in the judgment.
  5. The execution on the judgment shall be in the usual form, reciting the recovery, and directing the county sheriff to levy the amount of damages so assessed, which amount shall be stated with interest thereon from the time of the assessment, and the costs of the suit.
    1. If the amount so directed to be levied shall be collected or otherwise paid or satisfied, the real and personal estate and body of the defendant shall be exonerated from further liability for the damages so assessed.
    2. However, the judgment rendered for the penalty of the bond shall remain as a security for any damages that may be thereafter sustained by the further breach of any condition of the bond or the nonperformance of any other covenant or written agreement by the defendant, the performance of which was secured by the penal sum.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §§ 5-10; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8167-8171; Pope's Dig., §§ 10598-10602; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-305 — 34-310.

Case Notes

Jury Determinations.

The jury must be sworn to inquiry into the truth of the breaches, as well as to assess the damages. Phillips & Martin v. Governor, 2 Ark. 382 (1840); Adams v. State, 6 Ark. 497 (1846). See also McLain v. Taylor, 9 Ark. 358 (1849); Lee v. Leech, 9 Ark. 423 (1849).

16-107-204. Subsequent breaches.

  1. Whenever further breaches shall occur, the plaintiff or his of her personal representative may have a scire facias upon the judgment, suggesting the breaches against the defendant, and all parties bound thereby, and commanding that they be summoned to show cause why an execution should not be had upon the judgment for the amount of damages sustained by the further breaches.
  2. The like proceedings to ascertain damages shall be had upon the writ, as provided in the original suit on the bond. If the plaintiff recovers, judgment shall be rendered that the plaintiff have execution to collect the amount of damages assessed and costs.
  3. The execution issued on the judgment shall have like effect and be proceeded on in all things as in the first instance. However, the judgment shall remain as a security for further breaches, and so on, as often as occasion may require.
  4. Whenever in any action brought according to the provisions of this subchapter the jury finds that any assignment of breaches is not true, this finding shall be a bar to any other or further suit by scire facias or otherwise, for the recovery of any damages alleged to have been sustained by occasion of the same breaches so assigned.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §§ 11-14; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8172-8175; Pope's Dig., §§ 10603-10606; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-311 — 34-314.

16-107-205. Official bonds generally.

  1. In all cases where by the laws of this state, any person is authorized to prosecute a suit to his or her own use on any official bond, he or she shall sue in the name of the state or other obligee named in the bond, stating in the process, pleadings, proceedings, and record in the action, that the suit is brought for the use of the person suing.
  2. In the actions, the same pleadings and proceedings shall be had as before provided in cases of suits upon bonds with conditions other than for the payment of money, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter.
  3. A judgment for the defendant in the action shall be a bar to any other suit that may be brought on the same official bond for the use of the same person for any delinquency or default which was assigned as a breach of the condition of the bond in the action in which the judgment was rendered.
  4. Any other party aggrieved may in like manner prosecute an action on an official bond, and the pendency of any suit for the use of any other person on the same bond, or a judgment recovered by or against any other person on the bond, shall not abate or in any manner affect the suit or the proceedings therein, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter.
  5. Every suit brought on an official bond to the use of the party aggrieved and every judgment thereon shall be deemed the private suit and judgment of the relator, in the same manner as if he or she were the nominal plaintiff, and the relator shall be liable for costs as other plaintiffs.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §§ 15-18, 21; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8176-8178; Pope's Dig., §§ 10607-10609; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-315 — 34-318, 34-321.

16-107-206. Official bonds — Subsequent breaches.

  1. Any person who may have recovered any judgment upon an official bond may, in like manner, again prosecute an action on the bond whenever he or she may be aggrieved by any default or delinquency, other than such as shall have been the subject of a former suit, and shall proceed as provided in this subchapter.
  2. No scire facias shall be brought upon any judgment rendered upon an official bond, by the same or any other relator, for any breach of the condition of the bond.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §§ 19, 20; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8179, 8180; Pope's Dig., §§ 10610, 10611; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-319, 34-320.

16-107-207. Official bonds — Plea and liability of surety.

  1. No suit shall be barred nor shall the amount which the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover be affected by any plea made by any surety in the bond of a former judgment recovered thereon unless it is accompanied by an allegation that the sureties, or some of them, have been obliged to pay the damages on the judgment, or some part thereof, for the want of sufficient property of the principal whereon to levy the damages, or that they will be obliged to pay the damages, or a part thereof, for the same reason; nor unless the plea is verified by oath.
  2. If it shall appear that the amount of damages so recovered which a security has been or will be obliged to pay, as specified in subsection (a) of this section, is equal to the amount for which the defendant shall be liable by virtue of the bond, he or she shall be acquitted and discharged from all further liability, and judgment rendered in his or her favor.
  3. If it shall appear that the amount of damages so recovered and which the surety has paid or will be obliged to pay is not equal to the amount of his or her liability, the amount thereof shall be allowed to him or her in estimating the extent of his or her liability in the action.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §§ 22-24; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8181-8183; Pope's Dig., §§ 10612-10614; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-322 — 34-324.

16-107-208. Official bonds — Judgment.

  1. Whenever a judgment shall be obtained on any official bond, against principal and sureties, a direction shall be endorsed on the execution, by the plaintiff or his or her attorney, to levy the amount, in the first place, on the property of the principal and, if sufficient property of the principal cannot be found to satisfy the execution, then to levy the deficiency on the property of the sureties.
  2. If several judgments are obtained at the same time upon any official bond for damages amounting in the whole to more than the sum for which the sureties are liable, the court shall order the moneys levied from the property of the sureties on the judgments to be divided and distributed among the persons to whose use the judgments were rendered respectively, in proportion to the amount of their respective recoveries.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §§ 25, 26; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8184, 8185; Pope's Dig., §§ 10615, 10616; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-325, 34-326.

Subchapter 3 — Sureties' Remedies

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Murphey, Twenty Years After: Reflections on the Uniform Commercial Code in Arkansas — Articles 3 and 4, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 523.

16-107-301. Action against principal to discharge debt.

A surety may maintain an action against his or her principal to compel the principal to discharge the debt or liability for which the surety is bound after the debt or liability has become due.

History. Civil Code, § 749; C. & M. Dig., § 8284; Pope's Dig., § 10861; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-330.

Case Notes

In General.

This remedy is supplemental to the remedy in equity. Rice v. Dorrian, 57 Ark. 541, 22 S.W. 213 (1893).

Applicability.

An indorser on a note is not a “surety” within this section. Rice v. Dorrian, 57 Ark. 541, 22 S.W. 213 (1893).

Jurisdiction.

Equity has jurisdiction to compel a principal to exonerate surety. Uptmoor v. Young, 57 Ark. 528, 22 S.W. 169 (1893).

Nature of Action.

A surety has no implied authority to sue his principal in the name of the creditor for whose debt he is surety; rather, he has an action for indemnity. Caruth-Byrnes Hdwe. Co. v. Deere, Mansur & Co., 53 Ark. 140, 13 S.W. 517 (1890).

16-107-302. Action against principal before debt due.

  1. A surety may maintain an action against his or her principal to obtain indemnity against the debt or liability for which the surety is bound, before it is due, whenever any of the grounds exist upon which, by the provisions of §§ 16-109-102 [repealed], 16-110-101, 16-110-104, 16-110-202, or 16-110-203, an order may be made for arrest and bail, or for attachment.
  2. In the action the surety may obtain any of the provisional remedies in Title VIII of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases upon the ground and in the manner prescribed therein.

History. Civil Code, §§ 750, 751; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8285, 8286; Pope's Dig., §§ 10862, 10863; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-331, 34-332.

Publisher's Notes. Title VIII of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases is codified as §§ 16-63-102, 16-109-10116-109-106, 16-109-11116-109-116, 16-110-101, 16-110-102, 16-110-10416-110-113, 16-110-11516-110-122, 16-110-12416-110-136, 16-110-138, 16-110-139, 16-110-20116-110-211, 16-113-10116-113-104, 16-113-20116-113-207, 16-113-30116-113-304, 16-113-306, 16-113-40116-113-406, 16-117-207, 18-60-809, 18-60-810, and 18-60-81218-60-818.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is constitutional. Ruddell v. Childress, 31 Ark. 511 (1876).

Release of Sureties.

A release of a surety is no release of the principal; a release of one of two sureties is a release of the other from one-half the liability. Gordon v. Moore, 44 Ark. 349 (1884).

Agreement of the holder with the maker, upon a valuable consideration, to extend time of payment without consent of the surety will discharge the surety. Vestal v. Knight, 54 Ark. 97, 15 S.W. 17 (1891).

Removal of Principal.

The sureties of an executor who has converted the assets into money and chooses in action and refuses to pay them over under an order of the probate court and is about to remove from the state without leaving means to indemnify may have the executor arrested and restrained from departing from the state until he executes a bond, with good security, to indemnify his sureties against liability. Ruddell v. Childress, 31 Ark. 511 (1876).

16-107-303. Recovery of money and property from principal debtor.

  1. When any bond, bill, or note for the payment of money or delivery of property shall not be paid by the principal debtor, according to the tenor thereof, and the bond, bill, or note, or any part thereof shall be paid by the security, the principal debtor shall refund to the security the amount or value, with interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, from the time of payment.
    1. When the payment by a security shall be made in money, the security may recover the money with interest, in an action for so much money, paid to the use of the defendant.
    2. When payment is made in property, he or she may recover the value, with the interest, in an action for so much property sold to the defendant.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 137, §§ 4, 5; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8290, 8291; Pope's Dig., §§ 10867, 10868; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-336, 34-337.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to sureties in the common or technical meaning of the term and not the joint-debtors who make default payment of that part of the debt which they ought to pay. McGee v. Russell, 49 Ark. 104, 4 S.W. 284 (1886).

Volunteers cannot recover under this section. McCabe v. Patterson, 131 Ark. 523, 199 S.W. 548 (1917).

Payment by Surety.

Where a surety pays a debt on default of his principal, there is such an implied assent on the part of the principal as will entitle the surety to maintain an action against him for money paid. Snider v. Greathouse, 16 Ark. 72 (1855); Bone v. Torrey, 16 Ark. 83 (1855); Chipman v. Fambro, 16 Ark. 291 (1855).

A surety need not wait for judgment against him before paying but, by paying before judgment, he undertakes the burden of showing that he was actually bound to pay. Fishback v. Weaver, 34 Ark. 569 (1879).

Surety knowingly paying usurious debt of principal cannot hold him liable. Roe v. Kiser, 62 Ark. 92, 34 S.W. 534 (1896).

Surety on supersedeas bond, after paying the judgment, has no right to summary judgment against his principal. Prairie Creek Coal Mining Co. v. Kittrell, 107 Ark. 361, 155 S.W. 496 (1913).

Surety's complaint against guardian of an estate, seeking to recover the amount of a deficiency paid to the estate, held to be a simple indemnification suit to collect the money that it paid on behalf of a principal obligor and, thus, authorized by this section. Lawyers Sur. Co. v. Cagle, 49 Ark. App. 131, 898 S.W.2d 476 (1995).

Priorities of Sureties.

A surety on a vendee's note for the purchase money has a right to enforce the vendor's lien superior to any other claim against the land on account of the vendee. Beattie v. Dickinson, 39 Ark. 205 (1882).

Surety is entitled to have principal's property first resorted to. Kempner v. Dooley, 60 Ark. 526, 31 S.W. 145 (1895).

Subrogation.

A surety cannot be subrogated until he has paid the entire debt. McConnell v. Beattie, 34 Ark. 113 (1879).

Sureties on guardian's bond who have paid his debts are entitled to subrogation to the ward's remedies against him. Gilbert v. Neely, 35 Ark. 24 (1879).

Successive Sureties.

Where successive sureties are given at various stages of a litigation, each set exonerates the preceding; while all are liable to the creditor, as between themselves, they are liable to exoneration in inverse order. Chrisman v. Jones, 34 Ark. 73 (1879).

In an action against principal and sureties, where property of the principal is attached and he gives cross-bond, with sureties, the latter are primarily liable, as between themselves and the original sureties, to the extent of the value of the property. Fletcher v. Menken, 37 Ark. 206 (1881).

16-107-304. Action against cosurety.

  1. When there are two (2) or more securities in the bond, bill, or note and any of them shall pay in money or property, more than his or her due proportion of the original demand, the security may recover the excess in the same form of action as provided in this subchapter for a security against the principal debtor.
  2. No security shall be compelled in any action, as specified in subsection (a) of this section, to pay more than his or her due proportion of the original demand. When the security shall have previously paid any part thereof, he or she shall be liable in the action to pay only so much as the amount already paid by him or her falls short of his or her due proportion of the original demand.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 137, §§ 6, 7; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8292, 8293; Pope's Dig., §§ 10869, 10870; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-338, 34-339.

Case Notes

Contribution from Heirs.

Sureties who are compelled to pay the debt after the close of the administration on the estate of a co-surety can subject assets descended to the heir to contribution. Williams v. Ewing & Fanning, 31 Ark. 229 (1876).

Mortgage by One Surety.

The giving of a mortgage by one surety to secure the debt does not render him liable for the whole amount as between himself and his co-sureties, and, if one of them pays the debt, he can only recover contributions from the mortgaging surety. Chollar v. Temple, 39 Ark. 238 (1882). See Boone County Bank v. Byrum, 68 Ark. 71, 56 S.W. 532 (1900).

Cited: Thorsen v. Poe, 123 Ark. 77, 184 S.W. 427 (1916).

16-107-305. Judgment against principal on motion.

  1. In all cases where judgment is given in any circuit court upon any bond, bill, or note for the payment of money or the delivery of property, against the principal debtor and securities therein, and the security shall pay the judgment or any part thereof, he or she shall be entitled, upon motion, to judgment in the same court against the principal debtor for the amount he or she is entitled to recover, together with costs.
  2. No judgment shall be rendered as provided in subsection (a) of this section unless the party applying therefor shall have given the adverse party at least ten (10) days' notice in writing of the motion, nor unless the motion shall be made within one (1) year from the rendition of the original judgment.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 137, §§ 8, 9; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8294, 8295; Pope's Dig., §§ 10871, 10872; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-340, 34-341.

Case Notes

Provisions Cumulative.

This section is cumulative and does not bar an independent action. Washum v. Lester, 183 Ark. 298, 36 S.W.2d 76 (1931).

16-107-306. Action against executors and administrators.

Actions for the remedies given by this section and §§ 16-107-30316-107-305, 21-2-111, and 21-2-112, may be maintained by and against executors and administrators in all cases where they could be maintained by or against their testators or intestates.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 137, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 8305; Pope's Dig., § 10882; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-342.

Chapter 108 Arbitration and Award

Research References

ALR.

Appealability of state court's order or decree compelling or refusing to compel arbitration. 6 A.L.R.4th 652.

Corruption, fraud, or undue means in obtaining award justifying avoidance of award. 22 A.L.R.4th 366.

Attorney's submission of dispute to arbitration, or amendment of arbitration agreement, without client's knowledge or consent. 48 A.L.R.4th 127.

Liability of organization sponsoring or administering arbitration to parties involved in proceeding. 69 A.L.R.6th 513.

Am. Jur. 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Alternative Dispute Res., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Notes.

Carnes, Arbitration in Arkansas — At Common Law and Under the 1869 Statute, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 17.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Flaccus, Anderson, The Family Home and the Bankruptcy Aftermath of Divorce, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 31.

C.J.S. 6 C.J.S., Arbitration, § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-108-101. Proceedings.

The proceedings upon arbitration and award made under an order or rule of court, or by consent of parties in vacation, shall be as follows in this subchapter.

History. Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., § 414; Pope's Dig., § 451; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-501.

Case Notes

Common Law.

The provisions of this subchapter do not repeal the common law on the same subject nor are parties thereby prohibited from submitting controversies to arbitration without the intervention of a court. Wilkes v. Cotter, 28 Ark. 519 (1873); Alexander v. Fletcher, 206 Ark. 906, 175 S.W.2d 196 (1944).

Compliance.

An award will not be good as a statutory award unless the proceedings of the arbitrators as to the oath taken by them and other duties have substantially, if not strictly, complied with this subchapter; however, an arbitration and award as at common law are still good and enforceable, notwithstanding this subchapter. Collins v. Karatopsky, 36 Ark. 316 (1880).

A statutory arbitration is abortive where this subchapter is not complied with. Franks v. Battles, 147 Ark. 169, 227 S.W. 32 (1921).

Consent of Parties.

If parties select a private tribunal, they are bound by the result. Kirten v. Spears, 44 Ark. 166 (1884).

The legislature cannot substitute boards of arbitration for the courts without consent of the parties. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Williams, 49 Ark. 492, 5 S.W. 883 (1887).

The fact that parties agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration implies an agreement to be bound thereby. Alexander v. Fletcher, 206 Ark. 906, 175 S.W.2d 196 (1944).

Cited: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deislinger, 289 Ark. 248, 711 S.W.2d 771 (1986).

16-108-102. Submission of controversy.

  1. All controversies which might be the subject of a suit or action may be submitted to the decision of one (1) or more arbitrators, or to two (2) and their umpire, in the manner provided in this subchapter.
  2. Parties may make submission by rule of any court having jurisdiction of the subject matter or by consent, in vacation. The parties making the submission shall, where there is no suit or action pending, by written agreement filed and noted on the record or by an entry on the record, state what matter is submitted.
  3. The rule of the court shall state the time in which the award is to be made and returned. The court may enlarge the time for making and returning an award.

History. Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., §§ 415-418; Pope's Dig., §§ 452-455; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-502.

Case Notes

Agreement for Arbitration.

Agreement for arbitration need not be in writing; submission might be inferred from conduct of the parties. Couch v. Harrison, 68 Ark. 580, 60 S.W. 957 (1901).

An agreement that the parties to a dispute would submit the testimony of certain witnesses to the court and let the court say whether the defendant was guilty and assess his punishment, whereupon the court should appoint three disinterested men, counsel them, and let them hear the testimony, and the parties were to abide by their decision, was a contract for statutory arbitration. Franks v. Battles, 147 Ark. 169, 227 S.W. 32 (1921).

Barred Causes.

Although defendant is barred by statute of limitations from recouping damages, cause may be suspended to enable parties to arbitrate. Soudan Planting Co. v. Stevenson, 94 Ark. 599, 128 S.W. 574 (1910).

Withdrawal.

After submission, arbitration cannot be defeated by withdrawal of one of the arbitrators. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Boon, 76 Ark. 153, 88 S.W. 915 (1905).

Parties may withdraw from a common law arbitration agreement at any time before the award when the agreement to arbitrate is founded only on the mutual agreement of the parties and not on a special consideration. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Kemper, 132 Ark. 215, 200 S.W. 986 (1918). Compare Ferguson v. Rogers, 129 Ark. 197, 195 S.W. 22 (1917).

16-108-103. Oath and powers of arbitrators and umpires.

    1. Arbitrators and the umpire, if there is one, before they proceed to act, shall take an oath to decide the controversy submitted to them according to law and evidence and the equity of the case, to the best of their judgment, without favor or affection.
    2. A certificate of the oath shall be returned to the court with the award.
  1. They shall have power to examine either party, on oath, at the request of his or her adversary.
    1. Any one (1) of the arbitrators shall have power to issue subpoenas for witnesses to attend their sitting and give evidence touching the matters referred to them, to which all county sheriffs and other like officers shall give obedience.
    2. Witnesses failing to attend before arbitrators at the time and place designated or who refuse to give evidence when they do attend shall be reported to the court by the arbitrators and proceeded against and punished as if the case had been pending in court.

History. Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., §§ 419-421; Pope's Dig., §§ 456-458; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-503, 34-504.

Case Notes

Appellate Review.

The circuit court erred by awarding pre- and post-judgment interest where the arbitrator denied appellee's request for interest; this section provides that, unless the award is modified, the court shall confirm the award as made. 200 Garrison Assocs. v. Crawford Constr. Co., 53 Ark. App. 7, 918 S.W.2d 195 (1996).

Even though arbitrator's award may be modified or corrected if there is evident miscalculation of figures in the award, an arbitrator's decision on all questions of law and fact is conclusive and should be affirmed by the court unless grounds are established to support vacating or modifying the award. 200 Garrison Assocs. v. Crawford Constr. Co., 53 Ark. App. 7, 918 S.W.2d 195 (1996).

16-108-104. Submission by fiduciaries.

  1. The personal representatives of a decedent, guardian of an infant, guardian of an idiot or lunatic, or any trustee may make a submission as provided for in this subchapter touching the estate of the decedent, infant, insane person, or person in respect to which he or she is trustee.
  2. Any submission so made in good faith, and the award made thereon, shall be binding and shall be entered as the judgment or decree of the court.
  3. No fiduciary shall be responsible for any loss sustained by an award adverse to the interest he or she represents unless the adverse award is caused by his or her fault or neglect.

History. Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., § 422; Pope's Dig., § 459; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-505.

16-108-105. Refusal of arbitrator to act.

If any arbitrator fails or refuses to act, the court may set aside the order of reference.

History. Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., § 423; Pope's Dig., § 460; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-506.

16-108-106. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning proceedings before justice's court and appeals, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 223. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., §§ 427, 428; Pope's Dig., §§ 464, 465; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-510.

16-108-107. Award.

    1. The arbitrators and umpire, if there is one, shall meet at such convenient times and places as may be necessary, of which the parties shall have reasonable notice. They shall hear such evidence as either party may adduce.
    2. They shall have power to administer oaths.
    3. They shall make their award in writing, stating therein the time when it is made, and shall sign it.
    4. When the award is made out, one (1) copy shall be delivered to each of the contending parties. The original shall be returned to the court, and on it the arbitrators shall note the time of delivering a copy to each party.
  1. If the award is made out and returned, and copies delivered ten (10) days before the term of court next succeeding the delivery, the award shall be entered of record and made the judgment or decree of the court unless, on exceptions filed, the award shall be set aside.
  2. No award shall be set aside for the want of form. However, courts shall have power over awards on equitable principles as heretofore.

History. Civil Code, § 494; C. & M. Dig., §§ 424-426; Pope's Dig., §§ 461-463; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-507 — 34-509.

Case Notes

In General.

As at common law, an arbitration which appears regular and unimpeached by facts or denials is of the very highest authority. Harris v. Hanie, 37 Ark. 348 (1881).

Every reasonable presumption is in favor of the award. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Boon, 76 Ark. 153, 88 S.W. 915 (1905).

Conclusiveness of Awards.

Parties to an arbitration are concluded by award. Harris v. Hanie, 37 Ark. 348 (1881); Blanton v. Littell, 65 Ark. 76, 44 S.W. 716 (1898).

If parties select a private tribunal, they are bound by the result. Kirten v. Spears, 44 Ark. 166 (1884).

Arbitrators have full power to decide upon questions of law and fact which directly or incidentally arise in considering and determining the question embraced in the submission, and their decision upon such matters is conclusive. Kirten v. Spears, 44 Ark. 166 (1884).

The fact that parties agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration implies an agreement to be bound thereby. Alexander v. Fletcher, 206 Ark. 906, 175 S.W.2d 196 (1944).

Notice.

The award is not binding upon a party who was without notice. McFarland v. Mathis, 10 Ark. 560 (1850).

If a party has notice, he is bound by the award even though not present at the meeting. Couch v. Harrison, 68 Ark. 580, 60 S.W. 957 (1901).

Setting Aside of Awards.

Unless the illegality of the decision of arbitrators appears upon the face of their award, the court will not set it aside on the ground merely that they mistook the law or decided contrary to the rules of established practice of courts of law or equity. Kirten v. Spears, 44 Ark. 166 (1884).

Every reasonable intendment and presumption is in favor of award; it should not be vacated unless it clearly appears that it was made without authority or was the result of fraud or mistake, or of the misfeasance or malfeasance of the appraisers. Alexander v. Fletcher, 206 Ark. 906, 175 S.W.2d 196 (1944).

Testimony of an arbitrator tending to impeach the award was held incompetent and should have been disregarded. Alexander v. Fletcher, 206 Ark. 906, 175 S.W.2d 196 (1944).

Suits Based on Awards.

Award of arbitration is condition precedent to bringing an action. Soudan Planting Co. v. Stevenson, 94 Ark. 599, 128 S.W. 574 (1910).

In suit based on an arbitration award valid and binding on the parties, there is nothing to submit to the jury and verdict should be directed. Alexander v. Fletcher, 206 Ark. 906, 175 S.W.2d 196 (1944).

Subchapter 2 — Uniform Arbitration Act

A.C.R.C. Notes. The style and numbering of this subchapter have been changed from its enacted version to conform to the official version of the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Effective Dates. Acts 1981, No. 616, § 3: Mar. 23, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that doubt and confusion exist as to the applicability of the Uniform Arbitration Act to certain disputes; that it is imperative that such doubt and confusion be resolved at once; and that said doubt and confusion can be resolved only through enactment of this bill. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Publisher's Notes. For Comments regarding the Uniform Arbitration Act, see Commentaries Volume B.

Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1, completely revised this subchapter. Where appropriate, prior histories have been carried over under the new section numbers. Former §§ 16-108-215, 16-108-221 through 16-108-224 were deleted altogether. Those sections were derived from:

16-108-215. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-525.

16-108-221. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 21; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-531.

16-108-222. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 22.

16-108-223. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 23; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-532.

16-108-224. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 24.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Kilpatrick, How Much Do You Know (or Care) About Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 53.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

John C. Williams, Arbitration Agreements in Arkansas After Concepcion , 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 235 (2015).

Case Notes

In General.

This state has a strong public policy favoring arbitration. May Constr. Co. v. Benton Sch. Dist. No. 8, 320 Ark. 147, 895 S.W.2d 521 (1995).

16-108-201. Definitions.

In this subchapter:

  1. “Arbitration organization” means an association, agency, board, commission, or other entity that is neutral and initiates, sponsors, or administers an arbitration proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an arbitrator.
  2. “Arbitrator” means an individual appointed to render an award, alone or with others, in a controversy that is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
  3. “Court” means a court of competent jurisdiction in this State.
  4. “Knowledge” means actual knowledge.
  5. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government; governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; public corporation; or any other legal or commercial entity.
  6. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Case Notes

Cited: Tilley v. Malvern Nat'l Bank, 2017 Ark. 343, 532 S.W.3d 570 (2017).

16-108-202. Notice.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a person gives notice to another person by taking action that is reasonably necessary to inform the other person in ordinary course, whether or not the other person acquires knowledge of the notice.
  2. A person has notice if the person has knowledge of the notice or has received notice.
  3. A person receives notice when it comes to the person's attention or the notice is delivered at the person's place of residence or place of business, or at another location held out by the person as a place of delivery of such communications.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-203. When subchapter applies.

  1. This subchapter governs an agreement to arbitrate made on or after July 27, 2011.
  2. This subchapter governs an agreement to arbitrate made before July 27, 2011, if all the parties to the agreement or to the arbitration proceeding so agree in a record.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Arkansas did not adopt subsection (c) in Section 3 of the official version of the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Case Notes

Agreement to Arbitrate.

Subject matter was clear from the arbitration provision, there was mutual obligation because both sides had to arbitrate all controversies other than collection cases, and there was mutual agreement, with both parties assenting to the agreement having a meeting of the minds, and thus all the elements of a contract had been met and the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate the disputes raised in the petition. Diamante v. Dye, 2013 Ark. App. 630, 430 S.W.3d 196 (2013).

16-108-204. Effect of agreement to arbitrate — Nonwaivable provisions.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), a party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration proceeding may waive or, the parties may vary the effect of, the requirements of this subchapter to the extent permitted by law.
  2. Before a controversy arises that is subject to an agreement to arbitrate, a party to the agreement may not:
    1. waive or agree to vary the effect of the requirements of § 16-108-205(a), § 16-108-206(a), § 16-108-208, § 16-108-217(a), § 16-108-217(b), § 16-108-226, or § 16-108-228;
    2. agree to unreasonably restrict the right under § 16-108-209 to notice of the initiation of an arbitration proceeding;
    3. agree to unreasonably restrict the right under § 16-108-212 to disclosure of any facts by a neutral arbitrator; or
    4. waive the right under § 16-108-216 of a party to an agreement to arbitrate to be represented by a lawyer at any proceeding or hearing under this subchapter, however an employer and a labor organization may waive the right to representation by a lawyer in a labor arbitration.
  3. A party to an agreement to arbitrate or arbitration proceeding may not waive, or the parties may not vary the effect of, the requirements of this section or § 16-108-203(a), § 16-108-207, § 16-108-214, § 16-108-218, § 16-108-220(d), § 16-108-220(e), § 16-108-222, § 16-108-223, § 16-108-224, § 16-108-225(a), § 16-108-225(b), § 16-108-230, or § 16-108-233.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-205. Application for judicial relief.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 16-108-228, an application for judicial relief under this subchapter must be made by motion to the court and heard in the manner provided by law or rule of court for making and hearing motions.
  2. Unless a civil action involving the agreement to arbitrate is pending, notice of an initial motion to the court under this subchapter must be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a summons in a civil action. Otherwise, notice of the motion must be given in the manner provided by law or rule of court for serving motions in pending cases.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-526; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-206. Validity of agreement to arbitrate.

  1. An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.
  2. The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
  3. An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.
  4. If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the existence of, or claims that a controversy is not subject to, an agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration proceeding may continue pending final resolution of the issue by the court, unless the court otherwise orders.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 1; 1981, No. 616, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-511; Acts 1993, No. 287, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 224; 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “at law or in equity” preceding “for the revocation of any contract” throughout.

Research References

ALR.

Enforcement of arbitration agreement contained in construction contract by or against nonsignatory. 100 A.L.R.5th 481.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Attorneys, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 61.

Case Notes

Mutuality of Obligation.

Language in a contract between a check cashing service and its customers which required the customers to arbitrate all claims was unenforceable as there was no mutuality of obligation; customers were required to submit all disputes and controversies of every kind and nature to arbitration, but the check cashing service was permitted to proceed immediately to court to collect amounts due it. Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 342 Ark. 112, 27 S.W.3d 361 (2000) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Mutuality of contact had to exist in an arbitration agreement between a check cashing company and consumers in order for the agreement to be valid; the company could not exercise any one of the remedies listed in the default portion of the agreement while the consumers were bound to arbitration because the agreement lacked mutuality and could not stand. Cash in a Flash Check Advance of Ark., L.L.C. v. Spencer, 348 Ark. 459, 74 S.W.3d 600 (2002) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Subject matter was clear from the arbitration provision, there was mutual obligation because both sides had to arbitrate all controversies other than collection cases, and there was mutual agreement, with both parties assenting to the agreement having a meeting of the minds, and thus all the elements of a contract had been met and the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate the disputes raised in the petition. Diamante v. Dye, 2013 Ark. App. 630, 430 S.W.3d 196 (2013).

Parties.

An arbitration clause contained in the prime contract was not binding upon a party that merely served as a supplier of structural steel to subcontractors since the party had not contracted to perform any work outside of delivery. Baldwin Co. v. Weyland Mach. Shop, Inc., 14 Ark. App. 118, 685 S.W.2d 537 (1985) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Punitive Damages.

Arbitration panel was without power to rule upon any action by the parties which would have supported an award of punitive damages. McLeroy v. Waller, 21 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Subcontracts.

Where contract proposal submitted by subcontractor on project for construction of a fire station provided for arbitration of any controversy or claim under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and where the subcontract was accepted by the general contractor in Arkansas and performed in Arkansas, the subcontract would not be construed as an agreement finally consummated at any place other than Arkansas. Prepakt Concrete Co. v. Whitehurst Bros., 261 Ark. 814, 552 S.W.2d 212 (1977) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Validity of Trust.

If the appellate court were to decide that this section is applicable to a trust agreement, the appellate court would also conclude that, under subsection (b) of this section, it is within the province of the court to decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists and that would include the dispute here concerning whether the settlor/grantor was subject to undue influence or had insufficient testamentary capacity to execute the amendment to the trust. A challenge to the validity of a trust on the grounds of undue influence or incompetency is a determination for the court and not one for arbitration. Gibbons v. Anderson, 2019 Ark. App. 193, 575 S.W.3d 144 (2019).

16-108-207. Motion to compel or stay arbitration.

  1. On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement:
    1. if the refusing party does not appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate; and
    2. if the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
  2. On motion of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there is no agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue. If the court finds that there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, it shall order the parties to arbitrate.
  3. If the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not under subsection (a) or subsection (b) order the parties to arbitrate.
  4. The court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not been established.
  5. If a proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration under an alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending in court, a motion under this section must be made in that court. Otherwise, a motion under this section may be made in any court as provided in § 16-108-227.
  6. If a party makes a motion to the court to order arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration until the court renders a final decision under this section.
  7. If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-512; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Research References

ALR.

Enforcement of arbitration agreement contained in construction contract by or against nonsignatory. 100 A.L.R.5th 481.

Application of Equitable Estoppel by Nonsignatory to Compel Arbitration — Federal Cases. 39 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 17.

Application of Equitable Estoppel Against Nonsignatory to Compel Arbitration Under Federal Law. 43 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 275.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Because appellant did not refuse to arbitrate, the Arkansas Arbitration Act did not require appellee to file a motion to compel arbitration. Helton v. Joseph D. Calhoun, Ltd., 2017 Ark. App. 418 (2017).

Agreement for Arbitration.

Pursuant to former similar provision, the appellate court's reversal only pertained to the appellees' breach of contract claims, which had to be stayed and ordered to arbitration. Hot Spring County Med. Ctr. v. Ark. Radiology Affiliates, P.A., 103 Ark. App. 252, 288 S.W.3d 676 (2008) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Mutuality of Obligation.

Used car center's motion to compel arbitration was properly denied where the arbitration agreement lacked mutuality; because the arbitration agreement lacked mutuality of obligation, the arbitration clauses were unenforceable. Asbury Auto. Used Car Ctr., L.L.C. v. Brosh, 364 Ark. 386, 220 S.W.3d 637 (2005) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Stay Pending Arbitration.

Circuit court erroneously dismissed a subcontractor's counterclaim because under this section the court on just terms had to stay any judicial proceedings when it ordered arbitration; thus, the circuit court was directed to stay the judicial action and retain jurisdiction of the controversy until the arbitration process had been concluded. R.E.C. Enters., LLC v. Gaillard Builders, Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 188 (2018).

Waiver.

For over seven months, a club used the circuit court to decide motions, raise various defenses, and participate in a hearing, and the owners spent a lot of attorney time and expense in preparing pleadings and responses; the circuit court did not err in finding that the club waived its right to raise arbitration due to the unnecessary delay and prejudice to the owners and the failure to raise the issue earlier, and the circuit court thus did not err in denying the club's motion to compel arbitration. Diamante v. Dye, 2013 Ark. App. 630, 430 S.W.3d 196 (2013).

16-108-208. Provisional remedies.

  1. Before an arbitrator is appointed and is authorized and able to act, the court, upon motion of a party to an arbitration proceeding and for good cause shown, may enter an order for provisional remedies to protect the effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding to the same extent and under the same conditions as if the controversy were the subject of a civil action.
  2. After an arbitrator is appointed and is authorized and able to act:
    1. the arbitrator may issue such orders for provisional remedies, including interim awards, as the arbitrator finds necessary to protect the effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding and to promote the fair and expeditious resolution of the controversy, to the same extent and under the same conditions as if the controversy were the subject of a civil action; and
    2. a party to an arbitration proceeding may move the court for a provisional remedy only if the matter is urgent and the arbitrator is not able to act timely or the arbitrator cannot provide an adequate remedy.
  3. A party does not waive a right of arbitration by making a motion under subsection (a) or subsection (b).

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Katherine B. Church, Comment: Arkansas and Mandatory Arbitration: Is the Feeling Really Mutual?, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 343 (2012).

16-108-209. Initiation of arbitration.

  1. A person initiates an arbitration proceeding by giving notice in a record to the other parties to the agreement to arbitrate in the agreed manner between the parties or, in the absence of agreement, by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested and obtained, or by service as authorized for the commencement of a civil action. The notice must describe the nature of the controversy and the remedy sought.
  2. Unless a person objects for lack or insufficiency of notice under § 16-108-215(c) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing, the person by appearing at the hearing waives any objection to lack of or insufficiency of notice.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-210. Consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), upon motion of a party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration proceeding, the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to all or some of the claims if:
    1. there are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbitration proceedings between the same persons, or one of them is a party to a separate agreement to arbitrate or a separate arbitration proceeding with a third person;
    2. the claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate arise in substantial part from the same transaction or series of related transactions;
    3. the existence of a common issue of law or fact creates the possibility of conflicting decisions in the separate arbitration proceedings; and
    4. prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not outweighed by the risk of undue delay or prejudice to the rights of or hardship to parties opposing consolidation.
  2. The court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to some claims and allow other claims to be resolved in separate arbitration proceedings.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the court may not order consolidation of the claims of a party to an agreement to arbitrate if the agreement prohibits consolidation.
    1. An agreement that prohibits the consolidation of arbitration claims or proceedings or denies arbitration for a class of persons involving substantially similar issues shall be closely scrutinized and shall not be enforced if found unconscionable.
    2. An agreement may be found unconscionable under this subsection (d) if:
      1. The agreement is unreasonable, one-sided, or contains language that is difficult to notice or to understand;
      2. A meaningful choice of whether or not to agree to the arbitration provisions of the agreement is not provided; or
      3. The agreement is not balanced or fair under reasonable standards of fair dealing.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Subsection (d) of this section is not in Section 10 of the official version of the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Research References

ALR.

Consolidation by State Court of Arbitration Proceedings Brought Under State Law. 31 A.L.R.6th 433.

Ark. L. Rev.

Katherine B. Church, Comment: Arkansas and Mandatory Arbitration: Is the Feeling Really Mutual?, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 343 (2012).

16-108-211. Appointment of arbitrator — Service as a neutral arbitrator.

  1. If the parties to an agreement to arbitrate agree on a method for appointing an arbitrator, that method must be followed, unless the method fails. If the parties have not agreed on a method, the agreed method fails, or an arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act and a successor has not been appointed, the court, on motion of a party to the arbitration proceeding, shall appoint the arbitrator. An arbitrator so appointed has all the powers of an arbitrator designated in the agreement to arbitrate or appointed pursuant to the agreed method.
  2. An individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an arbitrator required by an agreement to be neutral.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-513; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-212. Disclosure by arbitrator.

  1. Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and the arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including:
    1. a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; and
    2. an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator.
  2. An arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and the arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any facts that the arbitrator learns after accepting appointment which a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator.
  3. If an arbitrator discloses a fact required by subsection (a) or (b) to be disclosed and a party timely objects to the appointment or continued service of the arbitrator based upon the fact disclosed, the objection may be a ground under § 16-108-223(a)(2) for vacating an award made by the arbitrator.
  4. If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by subsection (a) or (b), upon timely objection by a party, the court under § 16-108-223(a)(2) may vacate an award.
  5. An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is presumed to act with evident partiality under § 16-108-223(a)(2).
  6. If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the procedures of an arbitration organization or any other procedures for challenges to arbitrators before an award is made, substantial compliance with those procedures is a condition precedent to a motion to vacate an award on that ground under § 16-108-223(a)(2).

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-213. Action by majority.

If there is more than one arbitrator, the powers of an arbitrator must be exercised by a majority of the arbitrators, but all arbitrators shall conduct the hearing under § 16-108-215(c).

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-514; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-214. Immunity of arbitrator — Competency to testify — Attorney's fees and costs.

  1. An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity is immune from civil damages for any statement or decision made in connection with or arising out of the conduct of an arbitrator in a dispute resolution process unless the person acted in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct.
  2. The immunity afforded by this section supplements any immunity under other law.
  3. The failure of an arbitrator to make a disclosure required by § 16-108-212 does not cause any loss of qualified immunity under this section.
  4. In a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding, an arbitrator or representative of an arbitration organization is not competent to testify, and may not be required to produce records as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling occurring during the arbitration proceeding, to the same extent as a judge of a court of this State acting in a judicial capacity. This subsection does not apply:
    1. to the extent necessary to determine the claim of an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of the arbitration organization against a party to the arbitration proceeding; or
    2. to a hearing on a motion to vacate an award under § 16-108-223(a)(1) or (2) if the movant establishes prima facie that a ground for vacating the award exists.
  5. If a person commences a civil action against an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization arising from the services of the arbitrator, organization, or representative or if a person seeks to compel an arbitrator or a representative of an arbitration organization to testify or produce records in violation of subsection (d), and the court decides that the arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization is immune from civil liability or that the arbitrator or representative of the organization is not competent to testify, the court shall award to the arbitrator, organization, or representative reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Subsection (a) of this section substantially differs from Section 14(a) of the official version of the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Katherine B. Church, Comment: Arkansas and Mandatory Arbitration: Is the Feeling Really Mutual?, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 343 (2012).

16-108-215. Arbitration process.

  1. An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in such manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding. The authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the power to hold conferences with the parties to the arbitration proceeding before the hearing and, among other matters, determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.
  2. An arbitrator may decide a request for summary disposition of a claim or particular issue:
    1. if all interested parties agree; or
    2. upon request of one party to the arbitration proceeding if that party gives notice to all other parties to the proceeding, and the other parties have a reasonable opportunity to respond.
  3. If an arbitrator orders a hearing, the arbitrator shall set a time and place and give notice of the hearing not less than five days before the hearing begins. Unless a party to the arbitration proceeding makes an objection to lack or insufficiency of notice not later than the beginning of the hearing, the party's appearance at the hearing waives the objection. Upon request of a party to the arbitration proceeding and for good cause shown, or upon the arbitrator's own initiative, the arbitrator may adjourn the hearing from time to time as necessary but may not postpone the hearing to a time later than that fixed by the agreement to arbitrate for making the award unless the parties to the arbitration proceeding consent to a later date. The arbitrator may hear and decide the controversy upon the evidence produced although a party who was notified of the arbitration proceeding does not appear. The court, on request, may direct the arbitrator to conduct the hearing promptly and render a timely decision.
  4. At a hearing under subsection (c), a party to the arbitration proceeding has a right to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.
  5. If an arbitrator ceases or is unable to act during the arbitration proceeding, a replacement arbitrator must be appointed under § 16-108-211 to continue the proceeding and to resolve the controversy.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-515; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Case Notes

Notice.

The party attempting to overturn an arbitration award — not party attempting to sustain it — bears the burden of proof of showing insufficient notice. Lancaster v. West, 319 Ark. 293, 891 S.W.2d 357 (1995) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Representation.

Nonlawyer's representation of a corporation in arbitration proceedings constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Arbitration proceedings bear significant indicia of legal proceedings under the Uniform Arbitration Act, which has been adopted by Arkansas, and if a hearing is held during arbitration, the parties have the right to be heard, present evidence material to the controversy, and cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing. NISHA, LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Group, LLC, 2012 Ark. 130, 388 S.W.3d 444 (2012) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

16-108-216. Representation by lawyer.

A party to an arbitration proceeding may be represented by a lawyer.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-516; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Suzannah R. McCord, Comment: Corporate Self-Representation: Is It Truly the Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 371 (2014).

16-108-217. Witnesses — Subpoenas — Depositions — Discovery.

  1. An arbitrator may issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness and for the production of records and other evidence at any hearing and may administer oaths. A subpoena must be served in the manner for service of subpoenas in a civil action and, upon motion to the court by a party to the arbitration proceeding or the arbitrator, enforced in the manner for enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action.
  2. In order to make the proceedings fair, expeditious, and cost effective, upon request of a party to or a witness in an arbitration proceeding, an arbitrator may permit a deposition of any witness to be taken for use as evidence at the hearing, including a witness who cannot be subpoenaed for or is unable to attend a hearing. The arbitrator shall determine the conditions under which the deposition is taken.
  3. An arbitrator may permit such discovery as the arbitrator decides is appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the parties to the arbitration proceeding and other affected persons and the desirability of making the proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost effective.
  4. If an arbitrator permits discovery under subsection (c), the arbitrator may order a party to the arbitration proceeding to comply with the arbitrator's discovery-related orders, issue subpoenas for the attendance of a witness and for the production of records and other evidence at a discovery proceeding, and take action against a noncomplying party to the extent a court could if the controversy were the subject of a civil action in this State.
  5. An arbitrator may issue a protective order to prevent the disclosure of privileged information, confidential information, trade secrets, and other information protected from disclosure to the extent a court could if the controversy were the subject of a civil action in this State.
  6. All laws compelling a person under subpoena to testify and all fees for attending a judicial proceeding, a deposition, or a discovery proceeding as a witness apply to an arbitration proceeding as if the controversy were the subject of a civil action in this State.
  7. The court may enforce a subpoena or discovery-related order for the attendance of a witness within this State and for the production of records and other evidence issued by an arbitrator in connection with an arbitration proceeding in another State upon conditions determined by the court so as to make the arbitration proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost effective. A subpoena or discovery-related order issued by an arbitrator in another State must be served in the manner provided by law for service of subpoenas in a civil action in this State and, upon motion to the court by a party to the arbitration proceeding or the arbitrator, enforced in the manner provided by law for enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action in this State.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-517; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Research References

ALR.

Discovery in Federal Arbitration Proceedings Under Discovery Provision of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 7, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as Permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B). 45 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 51.

16-108-218. Judicial enforcement of preaward ruling by arbitrator.

If an arbitrator makes a preaward ruling in favor of a party to the arbitration proceeding, the party may request the arbitrator to incorporate the ruling into an award under § 16-108-219. A prevailing party may make a motion to the court for an expedited order to confirm the award under § 16-108-222, in which case the court shall summarily decide the motion. The court shall issue an order to confirm the award unless the court vacates, modifies, or corrects the award under § 16-108-223 or § 16-108-224.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-219. Award.

  1. An arbitrator shall make a record of an award. The record must be signed or otherwise authenticated by any arbitrator who concurs with the award. The arbitrator or the arbitration organization shall give notice of the award, including a copy of the award, to each party to the arbitration proceeding.
  2. An award must be made within the time specified by the agreement to arbitrate or, if not specified in the agreement, within the time ordered by the court. The court may extend or the parties to the arbitration proceeding may agree in a record to extend the time. The court or the parties may do so within or after the time specified or ordered. A party waives any objection that an award was not timely made unless the party gives notice of the objection to the arbitrator before receiving notice of the award.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-518; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Case Notes

Written Findings.

Former section does not require that the arbitrators make specific written findings on each issue raised during arbitration. Hart v. McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

16-108-220. Change of award by arbitrator.

  1. On motion to an arbitrator by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator may modify or correct an award:
    1. upon a ground stated in § 16-108-224(a)(1) or (3);
    2. because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or
    3. to clarify the award.
  2. A motion under subsection (a) must be made and notice given to all parties within twenty days after the movant receives notice of the award.
  3. A party to the arbitration proceeding must give notice of any objection to the motion within ten days after receipt of the notice.
  4. If a motion to the court is pending under § 16-108-222, § 16-108-223, or § 16-108-224, the court may submit the claim to the arbitrator to consider whether to modify or correct the award:
    1. upon a ground stated in § 16-108-224(a)(1) or (3);
    2. because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or
    3. to clarify the award.
  5. An award modified or corrected under this section is subject to § 16-108-219(a) and §§ 16-108-222 — 16-108-224.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-519; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

16-108-221. Remedies — Fees and expenses of arbitration proceeding.

  1. An arbitrator may award any damages that a court is authorized to award by law in a civil action involving the same claim and the evidence produced at the hearing justifies the award under the legal standard otherwise applicable to the claim.
  2. An arbitrator may award reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of arbitration if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to the arbitration proceeding.
  3. As to all remedies other than those authorized by subsections (a) and (b), an arbitrator may order such remedies as the arbitrator considers just and appropriate under the circumstances of the arbitration proceeding. The fact that such a remedy could not or would not be granted by the court is not a ground for refusing to confirm an award under § 16-108-222 or for vacating an award under § 16-108-223.
  4. An arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other expenses, must be paid as provided in the award.
  5. If requested by a party at any time prior to receipt of notice of the award, the arbitrator shall specify in the award the basis in fact justifying and the basis in law authorizing the award.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-520; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Subsection (e) of this section substantially differs from Section 21(e) of the official version of the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

16-108-222. Confirmation of award.

After a party to an arbitration proceeding receives notice of an award, the party may make a motion to the court for an order confirming the award at which time the court shall issue a confirming order unless the award is modified or corrected under § 16-108-220 or § 16-108-224 or is vacated under § 16-108-223.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-521; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Case Notes

Attorney's Fees.

There was no abuse of discretion in ordering the payment of attorney's fees after the voluntary nonsuit of a motion to vacate an arbitration award because there was statutory authority to do so under § 16-108-225(c). Appellee was the prevailing party after the circuit court registered and confirmed the arbitration award following a contested proceeding. Unifirst Corp. v. Ludwig Props., 2015 Ark. App. 694, 476 S.W.3d 852 (2015).

Confirmation.

Legislature did not intend for § 17-42-107(b), regarding the capacity to sue for real estate commissions, to operate to prohibit individuals from consummating their arbitration proceeding by having a circuit court confirm their award and enter judgment thereon; to hold otherwise would deprive arbitrating parties of their traditional remedies, and the confirmation of an arbitration award could not be likened to filing suit. Keahey v. Plumlee, 94 Ark. App. 121, 226 S.W.3d 31 (2006) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Judicial Review.

Judicial review of an arbitration award is more limited than appellate review of a trial court's decision; whenever possible, a court must construe an award so as to uphold its validity. Chrobak v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 46 Ark. App. 105, 878 S.W.2d 760 (1994) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Vacating, Modifying, or Correcting Awards.

The decision of the arbitration board on all questions of law and fact is conclusive, and the award shall be confirmed unless grounds are established to support vacating or modifying the award. McLeroy v. Waller, 21 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitration award may include both the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown and the refusal to hear evidence material to the controversy so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party. McLeroy v. Waller, 21 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

16-108-223. Vacating award.

  1. Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
    1. the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
    2. there was:
      1. evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator;
      2. corruption by an arbitrator; or
      3. misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
    3. an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to § 16-108-215 so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
    4. an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;
    5. there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection under § 16-108-215(c) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
    6. the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration as required in § 16-108-209 so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
  2. A motion under this section must be filed within ninety days after the movant receives notice of the award under § 16-108-219 or within ninety days after the movant receives notice of a modified or corrected award under § 16-108-220, unless the movant alleges that the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means, in which case the motion must be made within ninety days after the ground is known or, by the exercise of reasonable care would have been known by the movant.
  3. If the court vacates an award on a ground other than that set forth in subsection (a)(5), it may order a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground stated in subsection (a)(1) or (2), the rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If the award is vacated on a ground stated in subsection (a)(3), (4), or (6), the rehearing may be before the arbitrator who made the award or the arbitrator's successor. The arbitrator must render the decision in the rehearing within the same time as that provided in § 16-108-219(b) for an award.
  4. If the court denies a motion to vacate an award, it shall confirm the award unless a motion to modify or correct the award is pending.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-522; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 225; 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment redesignated former (a)(5) as present (a)(5)(A) and (a)(5)(B); deleted “of law or equity” following “court” in (a)(5)(B).

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Carnes, Arbitration in Arkansas — At Common Law and Under the 1869 Statute, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 17.

Flaccus, Anderson, The Family Home and the Bankruptcy Aftermath of Divorce, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 31.

Case Notes

In General.

The fact that parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration implies an agreement to be bound by the arbitration board's decision, thus, every reasonable intendment and presumption is in favor of the award and it should not be vacated unless it clearly appears that it was made without authority, or was the result of fraud or mistake, or misfeasance or malfeasance; unless the illegality of the decision appears on the face of the award, courts will not interfere merely because the arbitrators have mistaken the law or decided contrary to the rules of established practice as observed by courts of law and equity. McLeroy v. Waller, 21 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Judicial review of an arbitration award is more limited than appellate review of a trial court's decision; whenever possible, a court must construe an award so as to uphold its validity. Chrobak v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 46 Ark. App. 105, 878 S.W.2d 760 (1994) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

On a motion to vacate an arbitration award, an arbitrator's procedural decisions are entitled to deference. Hart v. McChristian, 71 Ark. App. 178, 36 S.W.3d 357 (2000), modified, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Trial court correctly ruled that a terminated school principal's suit against a school district was barred by res judicata as the principal had a full and fair opportunity in the arbitration proceeding to litigate the matters raised in the instant suit; further, the arbitrator denied reconsideration and the principal neither appealed from that ruling nor asked the circuit court to vacate or modify award. Davis v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 92 Ark. App. 174, 211 S.W.3d 587 (2005) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Burden of Proof.

The interest, partiality, or bias which will overturn an arbitration award must be certain and direct, not remote, uncertain, or speculative; the party attempting to set aside the award bears the burden of proof to establish partiality. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deislinger, 289 Ark. 248, 711 S.W.2d 771 (1986); Lancaster v. West, 319 Ark. 293, 891 S.W.2d 357 (1995) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Grounds.

Neither the failure to keep a record of the arbitration proceedings nor the failure to follow the rules of evidence is enumerated in this section as being a ground for setting aside an arbitration award. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deislinger, 289 Ark. 248, 711 S.W.2d 771 (1986) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Even though Unif. R. Evid. 406 may have permitted some of the evidence that was excluded at the arbitration hearing to have been considered by a court of law or equity, the exclusion of the evidence in the arbitration proceeding was not a statutory ground for vacating the arbitration award. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deislinger, 289 Ark. 248, 711 S.W.2d 771 (1986) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

The decision of the arbitration board on all questions of law and fact is conclusive, and the award shall be confirmed unless grounds are established to support vacating the award; the grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitration award may include both the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown and the refusal to hear evidence material to the controversy so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party. McLeroy v. Waller, 21 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

“Undue means” means something akin to fraud and corruption; a mistake does not amount to undue means. Ark. Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389 (1988) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Mistakes of fact or law are not a basis to set aside an award. Ark. Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389 (1988) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

The trial judge properly declined to vacate an arbitration award where the appellant failed to raise a substantive issue sufficient to avoid the arbitration procedure and the finality of the award. Chrobak v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 46 Ark. App. 105, 878 S.W.2d 760 (1994) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Trial court properly refused to vacate an arbitral decision under subsection (a) of this section that held that the renewal provisions in a lease constituted an express covenant for continued renewals as: (1) the arbitrators attempted to ascertain the parties' intent; (2) the mining lease required a substantial capital investment by the tenants such that they intended the lease to continue for an extended period; (3) the landlords were paid the fair market rate for stone and rock; (4) the renewal language was more specific than an ordinary covenant to renew; and (5) the arbitrators acted within their jurisdiction. Parks v. Rogers Group, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 109 (2011) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Limitation of Actions.

The proper state statute of limitations to be applied in determining the timeliness of actions brought by a union employee against an employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement and against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation was subsection (b), governing the vacating of arbitration awards. Hunt v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 561 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1984) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Party to an arbitration proceeding cannot wait until award is made and then complain about something that could have been questioned or discovered during the process. Ark. Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389 (1988) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Refusal to Vacate Affirmed.

Although both parties submitted valuations reflecting an LLC member's interest in the LLC, only appellees' valuation complied with the terms of the LLC agreement; thus, the member failed to prove a statutory ground for vacating the arbitration award. Shannon v. Steinberg, 2017 Ark. App. 231, 519 S.W.3d 363 (2017) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Cited: Goldtrap v. Bold Dental Mgmt., LLC, 2018 Ark. App. 209, 547 S.W.3d 104 (2018).

16-108-224. Modification or correction of award.

  1. Upon motion made within ninety days after the movant receives notice of the award under § 16-108-219 or within ninety days after the movant receives notice of a modified or corrected award under § 16-108-220, the court shall modify or correct the award if:
    1. there was an evident mathematical miscalculation or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing, or property referred to in the award;
    2. the arbitrator has made an award on a claim not submitted to the arbitrator and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the claims submitted; or
    3. the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the decision on the claims submitted.
  2. If a motion made under subsection (a) is granted, the court shall modify or correct and confirm the award as modified or corrected. Otherwise, unless a motion to vacate is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
  3. A motion to modify or correct an award under this section may be joined with a motion to vacate the award.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-523; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Carnes, Arbitration in Arkansas — At Common Law and Under the 1869 Statute, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 17.

Flaccus, Anderson, The Family Home and the Bankruptcy Aftermath of Divorce, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 31.

Case Notes

Grounds.

The decision of the arbitration board on all questions of law and fact is conclusive, and the award shall be confirmed unless grounds are established to support modifying the award. McLeroy v. Waller, 21 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Cited: Goldtrap v. Bold Dental Mgmt., LLC, 2018 Ark. App. 209, 547 S.W.3d 104 (2018).

16-108-225. Judgment on award — Attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

  1. Upon granting an order confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying, or correcting an award, the court shall enter a judgment in conformity with the award. The judgment may be recorded, docketed, and enforced as any other judgment in a civil action.
  2. A court may allow reasonable costs of the motion and subsequent judicial proceedings.
  3. On application of a prevailing party to a contested judicial proceeding under § 16-108-222, § 16-108-223, or § 16-108-224, the court may add reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation incurred in a judicial proceeding after the award is made to a judgment confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying, or correcting an award.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-524; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Case Notes

Award Proper.

There was no abuse of discretion in ordering the payment of attorney's fees after the voluntary nonsuit of a motion to vacate an arbitration award because there was statutory authority to do so under subsection (c) of this section. Even though the motion to vacate was voluntarily dismissed, appellee was the prevailing party after the circuit court registered and confirmed the arbitration award following a contested § 16-108-222 proceeding. Unifirst Corp. v. Ludwig Props., 2015 Ark. App. 694, 476 S.W.3d 852 (2015).

Arguments that the circuit court failed to consider the relevant factors in determining the reasonableness of the attorney's fee award or that fees based on unnecessary pleadings should have been disallowed were not preserved for appellate review. Unifirst Corp. v. Ludwig Props., 2015 Ark. App. 694, 476 S.W.3d 852 (2015).

16-108-226. Jurisdiction.

  1. A court of this state having jurisdiction over the controversy and the parties may enforce an agreement to arbitrate.
  2. An agreement to arbitrate providing for arbitration in this State confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court to enter judgment on an award under this subchapter.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-527; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 226; 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “or chancery” preceding “court.”

Case Notes

Arbitration.

Legislature did not intend for § 17-42-107(b), regarding the capacity to sue for real estate commissions, to operate to prohibit individuals from consummating their arbitration proceeding by having a circuit court confirm their award and enter judgment thereon; to hold otherwise would deprive arbitrating parties of their traditional remedies, and the confirmation of an arbitration award could not be likened to filing suit. Keahey v. Plumlee, 94 Ark. App. 121, 226 S.W.3d 31 (2006) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

16-108-227. Venue.

A motion under § 16-108-205 must be made in the court of the county in which the agreement to arbitrate specifies the arbitration hearing is to be held or, if the hearing has been held, in the court of the county in which it was held. Otherwise, the motion may be made in the court of any county in which an adverse party resides or has a place of business or, if no adverse party has a residence or place of business in this State, in the court of any county in this State. All subsequent motions must be made in the court hearing the initial motion unless the court otherwise directs.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-528; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 226; 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “or chancery” preceding “court.”

16-108-228. Appeals.

  1. An appeal may be taken from:
    1. an order denying a motion to compel arbitration;
    2. an order granting a motion to stay arbitration;
    3. an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
    4. an order modifying or correcting an award;
    5. an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
    6. a final judgment entered under this subchapter.
  2. An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a judgment in a civil action.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 19; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-529; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Adoption of manifest disregard of law standard as nonstatutory ground to review arbitration awards governed by Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA). 14 A.L.R.6th 491.

Case Notes

Appealable Orders.

Order refusing to vacate an arbitration award was tantamount to an order confirming an arbitration award and was therefore appealable under subdivision (a)(3) of this section. ESI Group, Inc. v. Brown, 90 Ark. App. 6, 203 S.W.3d 664 (2005) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Appellate court overruled the credit card customer's assertion that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to review the denial of the bank's petition and application to confirm the arbitration award against the customer, because the bank was appealing from the denial of its petition to confirm the arbitration award, not from the denial of its motion for summary judgment. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Blanks, 100 Ark. App. 8, 262 S.W.3d 618 (2007) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the denial of the motion to compel arbitration was under the rule and statute. Progressive Eldercare Services—Chicot v. Long, 2014 Ark. App. 661, 449 S.W.3d 324 (2014).

Nonappealable Orders.

An order compelling arbitration is not appealable. Chem-Ash, Inc. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 296 Ark. 83, 751 S.W.2d 353 (1988) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Cited: HPD, LLC v. Tetra Techs., Inc., 2012 Ark. 408, 424 S.W.3d 304 (2012); Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Quarles, 2013 Ark. 228, 428 S.W.3d 437 (2013); BHC Pinnacle Pointe Hosp., LLC v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 70, 594 S.W.3d 62 (2020).

16-108-229. [Reserved.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Arkansas did not adopt Section 29 of the official version of the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Section 29 deals with uniformity of application and construction.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-108-229 has been renumbered as § 16-108-230.

16-108-230. Relationship to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

The provisions of this subchapter governing the legal effect, validity, and enforceability of electronic records or electronic signatures, and of contracts performed with the use of such records or signatures conform to the requirements of Section 102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

History. Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-108-229 and was renumbered as § 16-108-230 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-108-230 has been renumbered as § 16-108-233.

U.S. Code. Section 102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act referred to in this section is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7002.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Katherine B. Church, Comment: Arkansas and Mandatory Arbitration: Is the Feeling Really Mutual?, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 343 (2012).

16-108-231, 16-108-232. [Reserved.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Arkansas did not adopt Sections 31 and 32 of the official version of the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Section 31 deals with the effective date of the act and Section 32 deals with repeal of the prior Uniform Arbitration Act.

16-108-233. Savings clause — Certain actions excluded.

  1. This subchapter does not affect an action or proceeding commenced or a right accrued before this subchapter takes effect.
  2. This subchapter does not apply to:
    1. Personal injury or tort matters;
    2. Employer-employee disputes; or
    3. An insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract.

History. Acts 1969, No. 260, § 20; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-530; Acts 2011, No. 695, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Subsection (b) of this section is not in Section 33 of the official version of the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-108-230 and was renumbered as § 16-108-233 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

John C. Williams, Arbitration Agreements in Arkansas After Concepcion , 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 235 (2015).

Case Notes

Applicability.

Since this subchapter, until amended in 1981, validated only arbitration agreements with respect to construction and manufacturing contracts, an arbitration contract regarding the purchase of an agricultural commodity that was expected to grow during the 1980 crop season was unenforceable under this subchapter. McEntire v. Monarch Feed Mills, Inc., 276 Ark. 1, 631 S.W.2d 307 (1982) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Personal injury or tort matters cannot be the subject of arbitration. Chem-Ash, Inc. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 296 Ark. 83, 751 S.W.2d 353 (1988) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Where two offer-and-acceptance real estate contracts were at issue, one executed after the termination of employment, this subchapter applied to commission dispute between former employer-employee real estate brokers. Lancaster v. West, 319 Ark. 293, 891 S.W.2d 357 (1995) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Trial court erred in declaring a matter nonarbitrable under the Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act merely because the manner in which a party chose to characterize its action initially appeared to render the matter as falling outside the AUAA; although the construction company characterized its claims in tort, it was actually a breach of contract action and the company's claims were arbitrable. Lehman Props., L.P. v. BB&B Constr. Co., 81 Ark. App. 104, 98 S.W.3d 470 (2003) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Trial court properly denied defendants' motion to compel arbitration in plaintiff's negligence action; although plaintiff agreed that any claims that she had against defendants would be governed by the Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act, the Act specifically excluded claims sounding in tort from its boundaries. Wyatt v. Giles, 95 Ark. App. 204, 35 S.W.3d 552 (2006) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Farm owners' claims against a poultry processor for violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 4-88-101 et seq., were arbitrable under a broad arbitration clause contained in an agreement between the parties; an Arkansas choice-of-law provision in the agreement did not require application of former § 16-108-201(b)(2) (see now this section) of the Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act, under which contractual arbitration provisions did not apply to tort claims. Hudson v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 484 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2007) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

In a dispute arising out of an agreement to buy an insurance brokerage corporation, the parties' stock-purchase agreement was referred to in order to determine if the purchasers, a trustee, trusts, and family members, intended to arbitrate their dispute with a financial corporation. The agreement indicated that the trustee's, trusts', and family members' claims, which included tort claims stemming from a breach of contract claim, fell squarely within the agreement. Ruth R. Remmel Revocable Trust v. Regions Fin. Corp., 369 Ark. 392, 255 S.W.3d 453 (2007) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

In a case in which a nursing home facility sought to arbitrate an underlying state case for wrongful death pursuant to an arbitration clause in the admission agreement and the special administratrix argued that the arbitration clause was an attempt to contract away the deceased's constitutional right to a jury, while subdivision (b)(2) of former section (see now this section) provided that an agreement to arbitrate had no application to personal injury or tort matters, the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state law, which would invalidate an otherwise valid agreement to arbitrate. Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC v. Robinson, No. 08-5223, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6482 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 12, 2009) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., not the Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act, applied to the parties' agreement. Both parties acknowledged that the parties' distribution agreement involved interstate commerce, and the agreement specifically stated that the FAA applied “as needed to uphold the validity or enforceability of the arbitration provisions of this Agreement.” Gruma Corp. v. Morrison, 2010 Ark. 151, 362 S.W.3d 898 (2010) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Employer-Employee Dispute.

Trial court did not err in refusing to compel arbitration with respect to a former employer's breach-of-contract actions against former employees because this section, the Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act, expressly excluded employer-employee disputes, and the only arbitration clause was found in an employment agreement that had expired three years earlier but the employer made no claim based on the employment agreement; rather, the employer based the breach-of-contract claims on a merger agreement and a covenant not to compete agreement, which unambiguously did not provide for arbitration. Phillippy v. ANB Fin. Servs., LLC, 2011 Ark. App. 639, 386 S.W.3d 553 (2011).

Insurance.

This section, which purports to prevent the enforceability of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, “directly or indirectly affects or governs” crop insurance contracts authorized by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation; therefore, it is inconsistent with, and preempted by, the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., which mandates arbitration. IGF Ins. Co. v. Hat Creek P'ship, 349 Ark. 133, 76 S.W.3d 859 (2002) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Circuit court did not err in denying an insurer's motion to compel arbitration in insurers' action alleging breach of an insurance contract because the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq., did not allow the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, to preempt this section, the Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act, which prohibited arbitration under the facts. Southern Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 2011 Ark. 490, 385 S.W.3d 770 (2011) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Subdivision (b)(2) of former section (now subsection (b) of this section), the Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act, regulates the business of insurance by exempting arbitration agreements in insurance contracts from enforcement, and subdivision (b)(2) regulates insurance within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq.; subdivision (b)(2) affects policyholder risk by transferring or spreading the risk by introducing the possibility of jury verdicts into the process for resolving disputed claims, it regulates an integral part of the relationship between an insurer and insured by invalidating an otherwise mandatory insurance-contract term that would allow either party to compel arbitration of disputes arising thereunder, and it is not limited to entities within the insurance industry as it also exempts tort and employment claims from arbitration. Southern Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 2011 Ark. 490, 385 S.W.3d 770 (2011) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Surety Bonds.

A surety bond is not an “insurance policy” as contemplated by this subchapter or subsection (b) of this section and, therefore, party was bound by the arbitration provision incorporated by reference in the performance bond. Matson, Inc. v. Lamb & Assocs. Packaging, 328 Ark. 705, 947 S.W.2d 324 (1997) (decided under prior version of uniform act).

Chapter 109 Arrest of Civil Defendant

16-109-101 — 16-109-116. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This chapter, concerning arrest of civil defendant, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 227. The chapter was derived from the following sources:

16-109-101. Civil Code, § 173; C. & M. Dig., § 438; Pope's Dig., § 475; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-601.

16-109-102. Civil Code, § 174; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [174], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 439; Pope's Dig., § 476; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-602.

16-109-103. Civil Code, §§ 175-179, 778; C. & M. Dig., §§ 440-444, 9167; Pope's Dig., § 477-481, 11829; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-603 — 34-608.

16-109-104. Civil Code, §§ 180-183; C. & M. Dig., §§ 445-448; Pope's Dig., §§ 482-485; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-609 — 34-612.

16-109-105. Civil Code, §§ 184-188; C. & M. Dig., §§ 449-453; Pope's Dig., §§ 486-490; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-613 — 34-617.

16-109-106. Civil Code, § 189; C. & M. Dig., § 454; Pope's Dig., § 491; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-618.

16-109-107. Civil Code, §§ 192-194; C. & M. Dig., §§ 465-467; Pope's Dig., §§ 502-504; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-629 — 34-631.

16-109-108. Rev. Stat., ch. 79, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 458; Pope's Dig., § 495; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-622.

16-109-109. Rev. Stat., ch. 79, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 459; Pope's Dig., § 496; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-623.

16-109-110. Rev. Stat., ch. 79, §§ 8-10; C. & M. Dig., §§ 460-462; Pope's Dig., §§ 497-499; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-624 — 34-626.

16-109-111. Civil Code, §§ 190, 191; C. & M. Dig., §§ 463, 464; Pope's Dig., §§ 500, 501; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-627, 34-628.

16-109-112. Civil Code, §§ 192-194; C. & M. Dig., §§ 465-467; Pope's Dig., §§ 502-504; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-629 — 34-631.

16-109-113. Civil Code, §§ 195, 196; C. & M. Dig., §§ 468, 469; Pope's Dig., §§ 505, 506; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-632, 34-633.

16-109-114. Civil Code, § 197; C. & M. Dig., § 470; Pope's Dig., § 507; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-634.

16-109-115. Civil Code, §§ 198-200; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [198, 199], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., §§ 471-473; Pope's Dig., §§ 508-510; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-635 — 34-637.

16-109-116. Civil Code, § 201; C. & M. Dig., § 474; Pope's Dig., § 511; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-638.

Chapter 110 Attachment and Garnishment

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court has held the prejudgment attachment provisions of §§ 16-110-101 et seq. — 16-110-301 et seq. unconstitutional. See McCory v Johnson , 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Research References

ALR.

Special bank deposits as subject of attachment or garnishment to satisfy depositor's general obligations. 8 A.L.R.4th 998.

Garnishee's duty to give debtor notice of garnishment prior to delivery of money without judgment against the garnishee on the debt. 36 A.L.R.4th 824.

Liquor license as subject to execution or attachment. 40 A.L.R.4th 927.

Am. Jur. 6 Am Jur. 2d, Attach., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of Garnishment: A Compendium of the Pertinent Cases and Statutes, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 39.

Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of Garnishment: Does a Corporate Garnishee Need a Lawyer to Answer the Writ?, 1997 Ark. L. Notes 95.

Ark. L. Rev.

Garnishment Before Judgment in Arkansas, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 141.

Attachment in Arkansas, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 116.

Conflict of Laws — Constitutional Law — Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Based on Attachment of Out-of-State Defendant's Liability Insurance Policy, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 651.

Constitutional Law — Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 660.

Creditor's Rights — Attachment Revised, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 225.

Creditor's Provisional Remedies and Debtors' Due Process Rights: Attachment and Garnishment in Arkansas, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 607.

Creditors' Provisional Remedies and Debtors' Due Process Rights: Statutory Liens in Arkansas, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 185.

Laurence, Enforcing a Money Judgment Against the Defendant's Stocks and Bonds: A Brief Foray into the Forbidding Realms of Article Eight and the Fourth Amendment, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 561.

Notes, Illuminating a Gray Area: Prejudgment Attachment in Arkansas After Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 881.

Note, McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988), 42 Ark. L. Rev. 1122.

C.J.S. 7 C.J.S., Attachment, § 1 et seq.

38 C.J.S., Garnishment, § 1 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Looney, Business Law, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 99.

Survey — Constitutional Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 161.

Note, Constitutional Law — Writ of Execution Statutes Held Unconstitutional — Has the Due Process Notice Requirement Left Creditors Out in the Cold? Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990), 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 293.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Bonds not void for want of form, § 16-68-204.

Claiming constitutional exemptions, § 16-66-211.

Exemptions from attachment, § 16-66-201 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1861, No. 146, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1875, No. 6, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1881, No. 53, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1915, No. 290, § 24: June 1, 1915.

Case Notes

Equity.

This subchapter authorizes proceedings by attachment in equity. American Land Co. v. Grady, 33 Ark. 550 (1878).

16-110-101. Grounds generally for attachment.

The plaintiff in a civil action, at or after its commencement, may have an attachment against the property of the defendant, in the cases and upon the grounds stated in this section, as a security for the satisfaction of such judgment as may be recovered:

    1. In an action for the recovery of money, where the action is against a defendant who, or several defendants who, or one (1) of whom:
      1. Is a foreign corporation, or nonresident of the state. However, an attachment shall not be granted on the ground that the defendant or defendants, or any of them, is a foreign corporation or nonresident of this state, for any claim other than a debt or demand arising upon contract;
      2. Has been absent therefrom four (4) months;
      3. Has departed from this state, with intent to defraud his or her creditors;
      4. Has left the county of his or her residence to avoid the service of a summons;
      5. So conceals himself or herself that a summons cannot be served upon him or her;
      6. Is about to remove, or has removed, his or her property, or a material part thereof, out of this state, not leaving enough therein to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, or the claim of the defendant's creditors;
      7. Has sold, conveyed, or otherwise disposed of his or her property, or suffered or permitted it to be sold, with the fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder, or delay his or her creditors; or
      8. Is about to sell, convey, or otherwise dispose of his or her property, with such intent.
    2. The cause of attachment mentioned in subdivision (1)(A) of this section against one (1) or more defendants to a civil action shall not authorize an attachment against any of the defendants who are not embraced in subdivision (1)(A) of this section; but the estate or interest of the defendants, only as are embraced therein, shall be subject to attachment; or
  1. In an action to recover possession of personal property, where it has been ordered to be delivered to the plaintiff and where the property, or part thereof, has been disposed of, concealed, or removed, so that the order for its delivery cannot be executed by the officer.

History. Civil Code, § 216; C. & M. Dig., § 494; Pope's Dig., § 531; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-101.

Publisher's Notes. As to the constitutionality of this section, see case notes for McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; expressly overruling Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

The lack of prompt notice to the debtor of a prejudgment attachment and of possible state or federal exemptions and the lack of a prompt hearing at which the debtor can claim exemptions leaves the prejudgment attachment provisions inadequate to prevent an erroneous deprivation of property in violation of due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Claims Arising Upon Contract.

This section has reference only to debts or demands due. Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark. 166 (1877).

An attachment may issue against a nonresident for refusal to perform a contract although the damages claimed are unliquidated. Messinger v. Dunham, 62 Ark. 326, 35 S.W. 435 (1896).

A nonresident purchasing a tenant's crop knowing of a lien for rent is liable to the landlord on an implied contract. Judge v. Curtis, 72 Ark. 132, 78 S.W. 746 (1904).

A general attachment levied on the property of a nonresident defendant for a violation of the state anti-trust laws by the attorney general to recover a penalty was invalid as a claim was not a debt arising upon a contract. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Ehle, 112 Ark. 385, 166 S.W. 535 (1914).

—Foreign Corporations.

Where the writ of attachment is filed against a foreign corporation, this is in itself a sufficient ground for the attachment; when that ground is asserted, there is no statutory requirement that a fraudulent intent be shown. Sun Marine Terminals v. Tosco Corp., 287 Ark. 233, 697 S.W.2d 901 (1985).

—Nonresidents.

Residence in the attachment laws generally implies an established abode fixed permanently for a time, for business or other purposes, although there may be an intent existing all the while to return at some time to the true domicile; an actual resident of this state, having a domicile in another, cannot be attached in this state as a nonresident. Krone v. Cooper, 43 Ark. 547 (1884).

When the debtor and creditor were domiciled in different states and the creditor proceeded by attachment in the courts of his domicile against the property of his debtor, there was no cause for interference by the courts of the debtor's domicile even though the creditor was found within their jurisdiction. Griffith v. Langsdale, 53 Ark. 71, 13 S.W. 733 (1890).

In proceedings by attachment against the property of a nonresident, this section must be strictly followed. Bush v. Visant, 40 Ark. 124 (1882); McClelland v. Linton, 121 Ark. 79, 180 S.W. 482 (1915).

Where the defendant lived in a hotel in the state for over a year in the same town where he carried on a real estate business and was absent from the state only for short periods on business, he was a “resident” of the state within the meaning of this section, though his domicile was in another state, and attachment against his property could not be obtained on the ground that he was a nonresident. Jarrell v. Leeper, 178 Ark. 6, 9 S.W.2d 778 (1928).

Where the defendants, after building a home in Arkansas, moved to Dallas and the husband was employed in California at the time of the trial, they were nonresidents within the meaning of this section as the words “residence” and “domicile” are not synonymous. Stephens v. AAA Lumber Co., 238 Ark. 842, 384 S.W.2d 943 (1964).

Determination of Grounds.

The better practice is for the trial court to determine the existence of the ground of attachment rather than to submit that issue to the jury; however, it is not reversible error. Ward v. Nu-Wa Laundry Cleaners, Inc., 205 Ark. 713, 170 S.W.2d 381 (1943).

Defendant who requested and secured two instructions on attachment issue could not predicate reversible error on submission of that issue to the jury. Ward v. Nu-Wa Laundry Cleaners, Inc., 205 Ark. 713, 170 S.W.2d 381 (1943).

It is proper for trial court to decide as to existence of alleged grounds for attachment rather than to submit such issue to the jury. Marvin v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 204, 281 S.W.2d 926 (1955).

Where evidence does not sustain allegations as to grounds for attachment, trial court is correct in finding that attachment is wrongfully issued. Marvin v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 204, 281 S.W.2d 926 (1955).

Disposal of Property.

An assignment for the benefit of creditors executed otherwise than required by statute is ground for attachment. Richmond v. Mississippi Mills, 52 Ark. 30, 11 S.W. 960 (1889); Box v. Goodbar, 54 Ark. 6, 14 S.W. 925 (1890).

Where the pleading contained an allegation that (1) the value of the security was diminishing and that the debtor was in the process of selling or disposing of the collateral, (2) that the collateral was in danger of being sold, concealed, or moved from the premises in derogation of the rights and interest of the secured party without the proceeds being applied to the debt and contrary to the terms of the security agreement, and (3) where it was further alleged that, if the property were not attached, it would greatly diminish, the allegations made by the secured party stated a ground for attachment. Hackworth v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Ark. 668, 580 S.W.2d 465 (1979).

—About to Sell, Etc.

Where the plaintiff alleges only that the defendant is about to sell or convey his property with fraudulent intent, an instruction that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had, at the date of issuing the attachment, sold or disposed of his property with such fraudulent intent is erroneous since it is sufficient to prove that he was about to do so. Waples-Platter Co. v. Low, 54 F. 93 (8th Cir. 1893).

—Cheat, Hinder, or Delay.

A pledge of choses in action to a trustee for the benefit of certain creditors does not constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors since an equitable estate remains in the pledgor; nor does it hinder or delay unsecured creditors since they may reach the pledgor's equitable estate under process. Goodbar v. Locke, 56 Ark. 314, 19 S.W. 924 (1892).

Evidence in action on note executed by husband and wife operating separate drug stores, for merchandise furnished to wife's store, was held to justify issuance of attachment on ground of husband's insolvency and removal of merchandise from wife's store to husband's store, together with failure to pay creditors. Archer Drug Co. v. Kimpel, 202 Ark. 27, 150 S.W.2d 605 (1941).

Property of debtor residing in another county could not be attached based on affidavit that debtor was intending to hinder or delay his creditors. Mahan v. Parks, 220 Ark. 514, 248 S.W.2d 880 (1952).

—Fraudulent Intent.

Fraudulent intent may be inferred when the debtor, while seeking an extension of time for payment, asserts that his assets are in excess of liabilities and at the same time threatens that, if the extension is not granted, a disposition of property would be made so that the creditor would realize nothing. Hanks v. Andrews, 53 Ark. 327, 13 S.W. 1102 (1890).

Proof that a few hours after the levy the debtor made a fraudulent disposition of property was not conclusive evidence that a fraudulent disposition was contemplated at the time the attachment was issued. Blass v. Lee, 55 Ark. 329, 18 S.W. 186 (1892).

The preference in an assignment of a creditor, in excess of his debt, with the intent to subsequently direct the payment of the excess to another creditor, is a fraud which vitiates the assignment and sustains the attachment. Waples-Platter Co. v. Low, 54 F. 93 (8th Cir. 1893).

Evidence that a merchant in failing circumstances sold his entire stock to one creditor to cancel debt and for additional cash, and thereafter collected outstanding claims but made only small payments to creditors, justified attachment on ground of fraudulent intent to hinder creditors. Shibley & Wood Grocery Co. v. Ferguson, 60 Ark. 160, 29 S.W. 275 (1895).

It was error to refuse evidence of attempted fraudulent disposition although such attempt was subsequent to the attachment. Milwaukee Harvester Co. v. Tymich, 68 Ark. 225, 58 S.W. 252 (1900).

In making a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, a secret reservation of an interest will constitute grounds for attachment for making a fraudulent disposition of property. Winter v. Kirby, 68 Ark. 471, 60 S.W. 34 (1900).

Disposing of property to pay debts and applying the proceeds thereto is not fraudulent. Blakemore v. Eagle, 73 Ark. 477, 84 S.W. 637 (1905).

When a sale is made by an insolvent debtor and proceeds are withheld from creditors, there is the inference that the sale was made with fraudulent intent to cheat creditors. Farris v. Gross, 75 Ark. 391, 87 S.W. 633 (1905).

The sale of property by an insolvent debtor in the usual course of business or for the purpose of paying debts does not constitute grounds for attachment; but where it can be shown that such sale was made for the fraudulent purpose of converting the property into money, so as to place it beyond the reach of creditors by execution or other process, a ground for attachment is made. Ark. Nat'l Bank v. Stuckey, 121 Ark. 302, 181 S.W. 913 (1915).

Sale of property by an insolvent debtor for the fraudulent purpose of converting it into money to be placed beyond the reach of creditors constitutes a ground for attachment even if such sales be made in the usual course of business. Archer Drug Co. v. Kimpel, 202 Ark. 27, 150 S.W.2d 605 (1941).

Insufficient Grounds.

Attachment cannot be issued in suit to compel marshaling of assets. Buck v. Bransford, 58 Ark. 289, 24 S.W. 103 (1893).

Property, Etc., Subject to Attachment.

Where an attachment is sued out against two persons jointly, it may be sustained as against the property of one alone. Allen, West & Bush v. Clayton & Prewitt, 11 F. 73 (E.D. Ark. 1882).

The individual property of an innocent partner is not subject to attachment at the instance of a firm creditor for the fraud of a copartner. Worthley v. Goodbar, 53 Ark. 1, 13 S.W. 216 (1890).

Partnership property is not subject to attachment by a creditor of one of the partners until there has been executed a bond to his copartner by one or more sureties to the effect that he will pay to such copartner the damages he may sustain by the wrongful suing out of order. Noble v. Knobel Hoop Co., 85 Ark. 306, 107 S.W. 988 (1908).

Where materials are furnished to a contractor to be used in the construction of a building, the presumption is that they were furnished on the credit of the building and its owner; unless such presumption is rebutted by proof that they were furnished on the personal credit of the contractor, they will not be subject to attachment at the instance of the contractor's creditors. Pratt v. Nakdimen, 99 Ark. 293, 138 S.W. 974 (1911).

Estate of devisee is subject to attachment against him in same manner as other beneficial legal estates. Taylor v. Bacon, 102 Ark. 97, 142 S.W. 1128 (1912).

Trial court did not err in finding that funds in the hands of a garnishee obtained to pay a judgment debtor's attorney's fees were subject to garnishment by the judgment creditor; although the garnishee, the debtor's wife, maintained that those funds were in a constructive trust to pay the debtor's attorney, there was no proof that the money was assigned to the debtor's counsel for payment of attorney fees prior to the writ of garnishment being served. Hudson v. Cook, 82 Ark. App. 246, 105 S.W.3d 821 (2003).

Removing Property from State.

If a debtor is removing his property out of the state without leaving sufficient property to pay all his debts, a creditor may attach even though sufficient property is left to pay his debts; further, testimony of other debts is admissible to prove the insufficiency of the property to pay all debts. Holliday v. Cohen, 34 Ark. 707 (1879).

The removal by a debtor of a material portion of his property outside the state, not leaving sufficient property to pay his debts, is cause for attachment even if he has no intention to cheat, hinder, or delay his creditors. Durr v. Hervey, 44 Ark. 301 (1884).

The removal by a corporation of a material part of its property out of the state, not leaving enough to pay debts, is grounds for attachment. Simon v. Sevier County Co-op. Ass'n, 54 Ark. 58, 14 S.W. 1101 (1890).

A debtor who removed a material part of his property outside the state without leaving sufficient property to pay his debts, although the removed property was shipped in payment of a debt owed to the consignee and such shipment was not with fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder, and delay his creditors, was subject to attachment. Goodbar v. Bailey, 57 Ark. 611, 22 S.W. 568 (1893).

Under subdivision (1)(A)(vi) of this section, the word “property” does not mean all the debtor's property and, hence, there is not inconsistency is in alleging in the affidavit for attachment that the defendants have disposed of their property and that they are about to dispose of the property. Salmon v. Mills, 68 F. 180 (8th Cir. 1895).

True test in determining whether an attached debtor has left enough property in the state to pay debts is to ascertain whether at its fair market value it is sufficient. Nesbit v. Schwab Clothing Co., 62 Ark. 22, 34 S.W. 79 (1896); Foster v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387, 38 S.W. 1114 (1897).

Where a farmer abandoned his crop and the landlord took possession of the crop and gathered and sold it, and at the same time attached his goods upon the grounds that he was about to remove his property from the state without leaving enough to pay his claim, the validity of the attachment depended on whether the market value of the crop at the time of the attachment was equal to the landlord's claim. Southern Orchard Planting Co. v. Turner, 87 Ark. 382, 112 S.W. 956 (1908).

16-110-102. Garnishment generally.

    1. Whenever, in a civil action, the plaintiff shall have reason to believe that any other person is indebted to the defendant or has in his or her hands or possession goods and chattels, moneys, credits, and effects belonging to the defendant, the plaintiff may sue out a writ of garnishment. This writ shall set forth his or her cause of action against the defendant, and command the officer charged with the execution thereof to summon the person named therein as garnishee to appear at the return day of the summons in the action if the writ shall have been issued at the commencement thereof and, if not so issued, on such day as the court shall designate to answer what goods, chattels, moneys, credits, and effects he or she may have in his or her hands or possession belonging to the defendant.
    2. In all such actions where the plaintiff has obtained judgment, he or she may sue out a writ of garnishment setting forth the judgment and shall proceed in the manner directed for the enforcement and collection thereof.
  1. The plaintiffs in all cases of garnishment may also have an attachment against the property of a garnishee, who is made a defendant thereto, by stating in his or her affidavit one (1) or more of the grounds of attachment mentioned in § 16-110-101, § 16-110-104, § 16-110-202, or § 16-110-203 and the amount for which the garnishee is indebted to the principal debtor, and by executing bond to the garnishee.

History. Civil Code, § 224; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [224], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., §§ 503, 504; Pope's Dig., §§ 540, 541; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-102, 31-142.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Holdway v. Duvoisin: Garnishment Payments as Preferences Under Section 547, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 217.

Case Notes

Applicability.

It is only in suits by attachment that subsection (a) authorizes the issuance of a writ of garnishment before judgment against the defendant. Leingardt v. Deitz, 30 Ark. 224 (1875); Littlejohn v. Lewis, 32 Ark. 423 (1877).

Interpleader by Garnishee.

Where the garnishee had filed in interpleader and did not contest the validity of the garnishments, the garnishee's rights were guarded and the garnishments were valid. Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979).

Liable to Garnishment.

Executors and administrators are not, as such, liable to garnishment. Thorn & Robins v. Woodruff, 5 Ark. 55 (1843); Gill v. Middleton, 60 Ark. 213, 29 S.W. 465 (1895).

A judgment debtor is not liable to garnishment. Trowbridge & Jennings v. Means, 5 Ark. 135 (1843); Fowler v. McClelland, 5 Ark. 188 (1843); Tunstall v. Means, 5 Ark. 700 (1844).

A judgment debtor might be subject to garnishment if there is not a resultant clash of jurisdictions and the garnishee subjected to the hazard of paying the same debt twice. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Richter, 48 Ark. 349, 3 S.W. 56 (1886).

There was substantial evidence to support the court's finding that the defendant had in its hands or possession property belonging to the garnishor and was, therefore, properly held liable as garnishee even though it owed no debt to the garnishor. L & S Concrete Co. v. Bibler Bros., 34 Ark. App. 181, 807 S.W.2d 50 (1991).

Although the garnishee, the debtor's wife, maintained the debtors funds were in a constructive trust to pay the debtor's attorney, there was no proof that the money was assigned to the debtor's counsel for payment of attorney fees prior to the writ of garnishment being served; thus, the facts differed from those in which there were formal assignments to the other creditor before the garnishment of the funds in question, and the funds were subject to garnishment by the judgment creditor. Hudson v. Cook, 82 Ark. App. 246, 105 S.W.3d 821 (2003).

Lien of Garnishment.

The lien of a garnishment dates from the time the garnishment writ is served upon the garnishee, and a sale and transfer by the defendant of choses in action, not subject to execution, before such service will be good. Bergman v. Sells & Co., 39 Ark. 97 (1882).

A lien is fixed upon the assets in the hands of a garnishee by the service of the garnishment upon him, and he cannot afterwards pay any portion of them to attorneys for defending the attachment suit. Adams v. Penzell & Co., 40 Ark. 531 (1883).

Right to Reach Debt.

The right to reach a debt is not affected by it being in suit. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Richter, 48 Ark. 349, 3 S.W. 56 (1886).

An action begun by a plaintiff in an attachment suit against one summoned therein as a garnishee is an ancillary proceeding and cannot be prosecuted to judgment before the plaintiff has recovered judgment in the principal suit. Adler-Goldman Comm'n Co. v. Bloom, 62 Ark. 616, 37 S.W. 305 (1896).

Setoff.

A debt due from a sole plaintiff to one of several defendants may be pleaded as a setoff by the defendant to whom such debt is due. Leach v. Lambeth, 14 Ark. 668 (1854).

Tort Actions.

Garnishment is a specie of attachment and historical background shows that attachment in tort action is restricted to cases where defendant is a nonresident; thus, plaintiff was not entitled to garnish bank account of a defendant in an action for personal injuries resulting from gunshot wounds, even though § 16-110-401 on its face permits garnishment in all actions where plaintiff has knowledge that another person owes the defendant. Allen v. Stracener, 214 Ark. 688, 217 S.W.2d 620 (1949).

16-110-103. Attachment in tort actions.

  1. In actions for torts committed in this state or to recover statutory penalties, a writ of attachment may be issued against the property of a defendant who is a nonresident of the state in the same manner as in actions ex contractu.
  2. Before the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment in the action, the plaintiff shall make an affidavit and execute a bond in the same manner as provided by law in other cases of attachment.

History. Acts 1915, No. 290, § 21; C. & M. Dig., § 495; Pope's Dig., § 532; Acts 1947, No. 153, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-103.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Acts of 1947: Attachment in Tort Actions, 1 Ark. L. Rev. 223.

Case Notes

Construction.

Proceedings by attachment against the property of a nonresident is statutory, out of the course of the common law, and must be strictly followed to make a valid sale of property. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bounds, 198 Ark. 149, 127 S.W.2d 629 (1939).

Affidavit and Bond.

Affidavit for attachment in tort action against foreign corporation which failed to state that the corporation could not be served in person with process in the action within the state was fatally defective and attachment secured thereon was void. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bounds, 198 Ark. 149, 127 S.W.2d 629 (1939).

In action by the state for the use and benefit of a county against foreign corporation to recover statutory penalty for doing business in the state without qualifying under statutes, denial of corporation's motion to quash attachment of truck on ground that the state failed to make affidavit and execute bond was not error since the state is not required to give bond or security for costs in any case, nor is it required to verify its pleadings. Vaccinol Prods. Corp. v. State ex rel. Phillips County, 203 Ark. 302, 156 S.W.2d 250 (1941).

Jurisdiction.

Before an attachment can be obtained in a tort action, the defendant must not only be a nonresident of the state but also such a nonresident that cannot be served in person with process in the action within the state. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bounds, 198 Ark. 149, 127 S.W.2d 629 (1939).

Service on foreign soup company by publication as result of a writ in attachment was invalid where sheriff made a return of no property seized as jurisdiction of court is based on seizure of property of the defendant in an attachment proceeding. Rodgers v. Howard, 215 Ark. 43, 219 S.W.2d 240 (1949), overruled, Aldridge v. Marco Chemical Co., 234 Ark. 1080, 356 S.W.2d 615 (1962).

16-110-104. Attachment before debt due.

  1. In an action brought by a creditor against his or her debtor, the plaintiff may, before his or her claim is due, have an attachment against the property of the debtor, where:
    1. The debtor has sold, conveyed, or otherwise disposed of his or her property or suffered or permitted it to be sold, with the fraudulent intent to cheat or defraud his or her creditors, or to hinder or delay them in the collection of their debts;
    2. The debtor is about to make such fraudulent sale, conveyance, or disposition of his or her property with such intent; or
    3. The debtor is about to remove his or her property, or a material part thereof, out of this state with the intent or to the effect of cheating or defrauding his or her creditors or of hindering or delaying them in the collection of their debts.
  2. The attachment authorized by subsection (a) of this section may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, by the clerk or judge thereof, or by any circuit judge in vacation, where the complaint, verified by oath of the plaintiff, his or her agent, or attorney, shows:
    1. Any of the grounds for attachment enumerated in subsection (a) of this section;
    2. The nature and amount of the plaintiff's claim; and
    3. When the claim becomes due.
  3. The order of the court, clerk, or judge granting the attachment shall specify the amount for which it is allowed, not exceeding a sum sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, and the probable costs of the action.
  4. The order of attachment as granted by the court, clerk, or judge shall not be issued by the clerk until there has been executed in his or her office such bond on the part of the plaintiff as is directed in § 16-110-107.
  5. Provisions of §§ 16-110-102, 16-110-105 — 16-110-109, 16-110-111 — 16-110-113, 16-110-115 — 16-110-117, 16-110-119, 16-110-121, 16-110-122, 16-110-126, 16-110-127, 16-110-129, 16-110-131 — 16-110-136, and 16-110-139 shall, so far as they are applicable, regulate attachments authorized by the article.

History. Civil Code, §§ 259-263; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [260], p. 219; 1881, No. 53, § 1, p. 99; C. & M. Dig., §§ 549-553; Pope's Dig., §§ 586-590; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-201 — 31-205.

Publisher's Notes. As to the constitutionality of this section, see case notes for McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; this expressly overrules Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlory Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 633 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

The lack of prompt notice to the debtor of a prejudgment attachment and of possible state or federal exemptions and the lack of a prompt hearing at which the debtor can claim exemptions leaves the prejudgment attachment provisions inadequate to prevent an erroneous deprivation of property in violation of due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Attachment Authorized.

A debt not due may be consolidated with one that is due and attachment issued for the aggregate sum when grounds applicable to both are alleged. Kahn v. Kuhn, 44 Ark. 404 (1884).

Where a debt became due before the action was heard and determined, it was proper to render personal judgment on the debt without issuing a new summons. Hutchison v. First Nat'l Bank, 156 Ark. 142, 246 S.W. 484 (1922).

Attachment Not Allowed.

Shipment of cotton by debtor to creditor in another state to pay debt in good faith would not authorize attachment. Rice, Stix & Co. v. Pertuis, 40 Ark. 157 (1882).

Junior attachment creditors could intervene to show there was no ground for attachment before debt due. Davis v. H.B. Claflin Co., 63 Ark. 157, 38 S.W. 662 (1896).

Order of Attachment.

The purpose of the requirement that the order of the court or judge specify the amount of the claim is to provide a means by which the clerk should be able to ascertain what amount to insert in the attachment; therefore, it is not necessary for the clerk to make an order specifying the amount for which the attachment is allowed. People's Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Batchelder Egg Case Co., 51 F. 130 (8th Cir. 1892).

It is not necessary for the clerk to make the order of attachment when he issues it. Baker v. Ayers, 58 Ark. 524, 25 S.W. 834 (1894).

Cited: Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 309 Ark. 192, 828 S.W.2d 833 (1992).

16-110-105. Venue.

Attachments may be sued out, and the actions in which the attachments are obtained may be prosecuted, in any county in which property may be attached or where a garnishee, who is indebted or has property belonging to the defendant, is served with process.

History. Civil Code, § 223; C. & M. Dig., § 502; Pope's Dig., § 539; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-104.

Case Notes

In General.

Attachment proceedings may be prosecuted in any county where property of nonresident found. L.O. Umsted Auto Co. v. Edwards, 159 Ark. 327, 251 S.W. 878 (1923).

Property of debtor residing in another county could not be attached based on affidavit that debtor was intending to hinder or delay his creditors. Mahan v. Parks, 220 Ark. 514, 248 S.W.2d 880 (1952).

Applicability.

This section applies only to attachment and garnishment sued out upon the statutory grounds enumerated in § 16-110-101 and has no application to a garnishment sued out under § 16-110-401. Hancock v. Gibson, 72 Ark. 322, 79 S.W. 1061 (1904).

Cited: Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 309 Ark. 192, 828 S.W.2d 833 (1992).

16-110-106. Order of attachment.

    1. An order of attachment shall be made by the clerk of the court in which the action is brought in any case mentioned in § 16-110-101(1), where there is filed in his or her office an affidavit of the plaintiff or of someone in his or her behalf, showing:
      1. The nature of the plaintiff's claim;
      2. That it is just;
      3. The amount which the affiant believes the plaintiff ought to recover; and
      4. The existence in the action of one (1) of the grounds for an attachment enumerated in § 16-110-101(1). In the case mentioned in § 16-110-101(2), where it is shown by affidavit or by the return of the county sheriff or other officer upon the order for the delivery of the property claimed, the facts mentioned in § 16-110-101(2) must exist.
    2. When the return by the proper officer upon a summons against a defendant states that he or she has left the county to avoid the service of the summons or has concealed himself or herself therein for that purpose, it shall be equivalent to the statement of the fact in the affidavit mentioned in subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
    1. The affidavit or grounds of attachment, may be amended so as to embrace any grounds of attachment that may exist up to, and until, the final judgment upon the attachments. If the amendment embraces grounds existing at the time of the commencement of the proceedings, and is sustained upon such grounds, the lien created by the suing out or levying of the original attachment shall be held to be good.
    2. However, if the amendments embrace new grounds not existing at the time of suing out the original attachment and the attachment shall be sustained on the new grounds only, the lien shall exist on the property, levied upon from the filing of the original attachment.
    3. A general order sustaining the attachment without designating the grounds upon which it is sustained shall be equivalent to sustaining the order on grounds that existed at the time the attachment was sued out.
    1. The order of attachment shall be directed and delivered to the county sheriff or other officer, with as many copies thereof as the plaintiff may direct.
    2. It shall require him or her to attach and safely keep the property of the defendant in his or her county not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as will satisfy the plaintiff's claim specified in his or her affidavit, which shall be stated in the order and the probable costs of the action, not exceeding thirty dollars ($30.00). It shall also require him or her to summon the garnishees to answer in the action on the return day of the order and to make due return thereof.
    3. The return day of the order of attachment when issued at the commencement of the action shall be the same as that of the summons. When the order of attachment is issued afterward, the commencement of the action may be another day in term at the option of the plaintiff.

History. Civil Code, §§ 217, 218, 220, 222; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [217], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., §§ 496, 497, 499, 501; Pope's Dig., §§ 533, 534, 536, 538; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-105 — 31-107, 31-110.

Publisher's Notes. As to the constitutionality of this section, see case notes for McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; this expressly overrules Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

The lack of prompt notice to the debtor of a prejudgment attachment and of possible state or federal exemptions, and the lack of a prompt hearing at which the debtor can claim exemptions, leaves the prejudgment attachment provisions inadequate to prevent an erroneous deprivation of property in violation of due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

In General.

Where affidavit and complaint were marked “filed” and the bond “approved” and writs issued and delivered to the officer before he took the papers to the clerk's office, which he did immediately after these acts and deposited them in their proper place, this was a sufficient compliance with this section to make the process good. People's Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Batchelder Egg Case Co., 51 F. 130 (8th Cir. 1892).

Affidavits.

The defendant could not object in the Arkansas Supreme Court for the first time, that the affidavit for the attachment was insufficient; such objection had to be first made in the circuit court. Fletcher v. Menken, 37 Ark. 206 (1881).

An affidavit for attachment improperly signed, or not signed at all, or without the jurat of the officer is defective; however, but such defects are amendable. Fortenheim v. Claflin, 47 Ark. 49, 14 S.W. 462 (1885).

—Amendment.

An affidavit for an attachment may be amended by inserting an omitted fact existing when it was made before judgment to quash for the insufficiency. Rogers v. Cooper, 33 Ark. 406 (1878); Nolen v. Royston, 36 Ark. 561 (1880).

An affidavit in the court of a justice of the peace may be amended after appeal in the circuit court if the amendment contains no cause for the attachment not existing at the commencement of the suit. Sherrill v. Bench & Bro., 37 Ark. 560 (1881).

An order of attachment not running in the name of the state is amendable, and it should be amended by the court of its own motion or be considered amended. Kahn v. Kuhn, 44 Ark. 404 (1884).

On appeal, an affidavit in attachment will not be considered amended to conform to the proof of a new ground of attachment not existing at the time the original attachment was sued out when no offer to amend was made at the trial. Blass v. Lee, 55 Ark. 329, 18 S.W. 186 (1892); Hanger v. Ives, 69 Ark. 52, 62 S.W. 68 (1901).

An affidavit may be amended before the trial. Sellers v. Bowie, 183 Ark. 726, 38 S.W.2d 560 (1931).

—Contents.

The affidavit must be positive; if made upon belief only, the attachment may be quashed at the instance of the defendant. Sannoner v. Jacobson, 47 Ark. 31, 14 S.W. 458 (1885).

An affidavit made upon belief is not a nullity, but is amendable. Landfair v. Lowman, 50 Ark. 446, 8 S.W. 188 (1887).

Complaint.

There can be no attachment without a complaint, and there should be both a complaint and an affidavit, but both may be included in the affidavit if it contains all the essentials of both. Sannoner v. Jacobson, 47 Ark. 31, 14 S.W. 458 (1885); Lehman v. Lowman, 50 Ark. 444, 8 S.W. 187 (1887).

Court acquired jurisdiction to issue writ of attachment although complaint was not verified as it is not required that both complaint and affidavit be verified. Smith v. Moschetti, 213 Ark. 968, 214 S.W.2d 73 (1948).

Contents of Order.

An order of attachment and a writ of summons may be embodied in the same writ. Weil & Bros. v. Kittay, 40 Ark. 528 (1883); Rice, Stix & Co. v. Dale & Richardson, 45 Ark. 34 (1885).

Cited: Hackworth v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Ark. 668, 580 S.W.2d 465 (1979); Sun Marine Terminals v. Tosco Corp., 287 Ark. 233, 697 S.W.2d 901 (1985); Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990); Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 309 Ark. 192, 828 S.W.2d 833 (1992).

16-110-107. Bond.

  1. The order of attachment shall not be issued by the clerk until there has been executed in his or her office, by one (1) or more sufficient sureties of the plaintiff, a bond to the effect that the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant all damages which he or she may sustain by reason of the attachment if the order is wrongfully obtained.
  2. The defendant may, at any time before judgment, after reasonable notice to the plaintiff, move the court for additional security on the part of the plaintiff. If on the motion, the court is satisfied that the surety in the plaintiff's bond has removed from this state or is not sufficient for the amount thereof, it may vacate the order of attachment. The court may direct restitution of any property taken under it unless in a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, sufficient security is given by the plaintiff.

History. Civil Code, §§ 219, 258; C. & M. Dig., §§ 498, 548; Pope's Dig., §§ 535, 585; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-108, 31-109.

Case Notes

Defects in Bonds.

When objections to an attachment bond are sustained by the court, the filing of an amended bond, under the leave and approval of the court, will cure the defects of the original bond and support the attachment and lien. Bergman v. Sells & Co., 39 Ark. 97 (1882).

Where ground of attachment is undisputed, defect in bond does not defeat jurisdiction. Hurley v. Bryan, 160 Ark. 277, 254 S.W. 694 (1923).

Failure to File.

The defendant could not object in the Arkansas Supreme Court, for the first time, that no bond was filed by the plaintiff before the order of attachment was issued; such objection had to be made in the circuit court. Fletcher v. Menken, 37 Ark. 206 (1881).

Failure to file bond is irregularity which may be waived. Austin v. Goodbar Shoe Co., 60 Ark. 444, 30 S.W. 888 (1895).

Where the defendant in an attachment suit before a justice of the peace went to trial without objecting that the plaintiff failed to file an attachment bond, he cannot object in the circuit court on appeal if the plaintiff is permitted to file such bond. Gamble v. Harvey-Greenhaw Mercantile Co., 89 Ark. 37, 115 S.W. 946 (1908).

Liability for Damages.

The measure of damages on the bond when property of a third person is attached is the actual value of the property at the time and place of attachment with interest thereon. Straub v. Wooten, 45 Ark. 112 (1885).

The bond is an absolute obligation to pay the court's judgment and it cannot be avoided by proof that the property was not subject to the attachment lien. Lott v. Porter, 97 Ark. 97, 133 S.W. 180 (1910).

A surety on an attachment bond who undertakes to pay all damages which may be sustained by the defendant is not liable for a trespass committed to the property of a third person. Maloney v. Jones-Wise Comm'n Co., 117 Ark. 180, 174 S.W. 239 (1915).

In a suit on a promissory note and account and an affidavit for attachment, the defendant furnished a bond to pay all sums, including costs and damages, that might be charged against the defendant; when judgment was for the plaintiff and the property could not be produced, the defendant and his sureties were liable for a sum not exceeding the value of the property. Wright v. Stevens, 212 Ark. 373, 205 S.W.2d 853 (1947).

Cited: McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988); Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990); Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 309 Ark. 192, 828 S.W.2d 833 (1992).

16-110-108. Service of orders and processes.

The orders and processes in provisional remedies issued from the circuit court may be directed to, or served by, the county sheriff or any other officer mentioned in § 16-58-107 [superseded] and shall be valid for all purposes as if the orders and processes had been served by the county sheriff.

History. Civil Code, § 225; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [225], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 505; Pope's Dig., § 542; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-111.

Publisher's Notes. For information concerning the supersession of § 16-58-107, see the note at § 16-58-107.

Case Notes

Improper Execution.

The plaintiff's right to an attachment is not affected by the manner in which the order of attachment is executed; the execution of the order, if wrongful, may be quashed, or the return, if defective, may be amended to conform to the facts, but in either case there is no cause for discharging the attachment. Kurtz v. Dunn, 36 Ark. 648 (1880).

Cited: Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 309 Ark. 192, 828 S.W.2d 833 (1992).

16-110-109. Priority of orders of attachment.

Where there are several orders of attachment against the same defendant, they shall be executed in the order in which they were received by the county sheriff or other officer.

History. Civil Code, § 226; C. & M. Dig., § 506; Pope's Dig., § 543; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-112.

Case Notes

Federal Courts.

When the state statute provides for successive levies as well as for a method of settling all priorities of the several liens arising from successive levies, the United States marshal may make a levy or a writ of attachment sub modo, and such levy will be sufficient where the property is already in the custody of the law by virtue of a prior levy upon a writ issued by a state court to enable a plaintiff to assert his lien if the attachment is sustained as it may affect the property remaining after the satisfaction of the first attachment. Brooks v. Fry, 45 F. 776 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891).

Where a sheriff, to satisfy an attachment issued from a state court, levies upon a stock of goods in value exceeding the amount he is required to make, and a marshal, to satisfy an attachment issued from a federal court, makes a constructive levy upon such property in the sheriff's hands, the creditor attaching in the federal court, after establishing his claim in that court and presenting proper proof thereof to the state court, is entitled to appear in the latter court as an intervener and to share in the proceeds of the attached property in his proper order. Goodbar v. Brooks, 57 Ark. 450, 22 S.W. 96 (1893).

Seizure of Property.

This section does not contemplate that the officer go through the empty formality of seizing afresh under each writ property of which is already in possession; the prior seizure inures to the benefit of the subsequent writs. Claflin v. Furstenheim, 49 Ark. 302, 5 S.W. 291 (1887).

Writs Going to Deputies.

When different writs go into the hands of different deputies, they stand as if they all went into the hands of the sheriff at the time each went into the deputies' hands and had been successively levied by him. Claflin v. Furstenheim, 49 Ark. 302, 5 S.W. 291 (1887).

Cited: Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 309 Ark. 192, 828 S.W.2d 833 (1992).

16-110-110. Issuance of orders of attachments to other counties.

  1. Orders of attachment may be issued to the county sheriffs or other officers of other counties, and several of them may, at the option of the plaintiff, be issued at the same time or in succession.
  2. Only those attachments which have been executed in whole or in part shall be taxed in the costs unless otherwise directed by the court.

History. Civil Code, § 221; C. & M. Dig., § 500; Pope's Dig., § 537; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-113.

Case Notes

Cited: Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 309 Ark. 192, 828 S.W.2d 833 (1992).

16-110-111. Execution of order of attachment generally.

  1. The order of attachment shall be executed by the county sheriff or other officer without delay, in the following manner:
    1. Upon real property by leaving a copy of the order with the occupant thereof or, if there is no occupant, in a conspicuous place thereon;
    2. Upon personal property, capable of manual delivery, by taking it into his or her custody and holding it subject to the order of the court; or
    3. Upon other personal property by delivering a copy of the order, with a notice specifying the property attached, to the person holding the property; or as to a debt or demand, to the person owing it; or as to stock in a corporation, or property held, or a debt or demand owing by it, to the chief officer, or to the secretary, cashier, treasurer, or managing agent thereof, and by summoning the person or corporation to answer as a garnishee in the action. The county sheriff shall deliver copies to and summon such persons as garnishees as the plaintiff may direct.
  2. It shall be the duty of every person mentioned in subdivision (a)(3) of this section, to whom the county sheriff shall apply therefor, to furnish him or her with a certificate of the number of shares of the defendant in the stock of the corporation, a description of the property held by the corporation or person belonging to, or for the benefit of, the defendant, or the amount of the debt owing to the defendant by the corporation or person, whether due or not. A failure to perform this duty may be punished by the court as a contempt.
  3. A county sheriff having an order of attachment, or for the delivery of property, may enter any building or enclosure containing the property, to take it; and, if necessary for this purpose, he or she may break the building or enclosure, having first publicly demanded the property.
  4. The defendant's personal property shall be first taken under an attachment. If enough thereof is not found, then his or her real property shall be taken.

History. Civil Code, §§ 227-229, 777; C. & M. Dig., §§ 507-509, 9166; Pope's Dig., §§ 544-546, 11828; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-114 — 31-117.

Publisher's Notes. As to the constitutionality of this section, see case notes for McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The lack of prompt notice to the debtor of a prejudgment attachment and of possible state or federal exemptions, and the lack of a prompt hearing at which the debtor can claim exemptions, leaves the prejudgment attachment provisions inadequate to prevent an erroneous deprivation of property in violation of due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Corporate Stock.

A delivery by a sheriff of a notice to the proper officer of a corporation after the order of attachment had been filed in the clerk's office was a delivery after the sheriff's power to act had ceased to exist and, consequently, there was no attachment of the shares. Deutschman v. Byrne, 64 Ark. 111, 40 S.W. 780 (1897).

Delivery of a writ of attachment containing a garnishment clause to the president of a corporation is not sufficient to fix a lien on any stock in such corporation held by the debtor. H.B. Claflin Co. v. Bretzfelder, 69 Ark. 271, 62 S.W. 905 (1901).

Debts or Demands.

The jurisdiction of the circuit court over the funds in the hands of a garnishee is not dependent upon the amount of his indebtedness to the defendant. Moore v. Kelley, 47 Ark. 219, 1 S.W. 97 (1886).

A debtor's credits can only be levied upon by garnishment or judicial proceedings; a levy upon his books or accounts is a levy only upon the materials which compose them, i.e., the books themselves, and not the evidence of debts therein. Goodbar v. Lindsley, 51 Ark. 380, 11 S.W. 577 (1888).

Personal Property Capable of Manual Delivery.

To constitute an attachment of personal property capable of manual delivery, the sheriff must take the property into his custody and actual possession. Adler, Goldman & Co. v. Roth, 5 F. 895 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1881).

A declaration by constable that he levied upon goods inside a building was not a valid levy as against a sheriff who subsequently took the goods into his custody. Meyer v. Missouri Glass Co., 65 Ark. 286, 45 S.W. 1062 (1898).

Where deputy sheriff under writ of attachment took the truck and drove it away without having the writ in his possession and without serving a copy on any person, there was no lack of service as an order of attachment may be executed upon personal property capable of manual delivery by the officer taking it into custody. Smith v. Moschetti, 213 Ark. 968, 214 S.W.2d 73 (1948).

Cited: Hackworth v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Ark. 668, 580 S.W.2d 465 (1979); Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 309 Ark. 192, 828 S.W.2d 833 (1992).

16-110-112. Attachment of funds in court.

  1. Where the property to be attached is a fund in court, the execution of the order of attachment shall be made by leaving with the clerk of the court a copy thereof, with a notice specifying the fund.
  2. Where several orders of attachment are executed upon the fund on the same day, they shall be satisfied out of it ratably.

History. Civil Code, § 230; C. & M. Dig., § 510; Pope's Dig., § 547; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-118.

Case Notes

In General.

As a general rule, a fund in court becomes subject to garnishment upon entry of a judgment ordering its payment to the garnishment debtor. Hooten v. Conklin, 236 Ark. 911, 370 S.W.2d 607 (1963).

Where chancellor awarded garnishment debtor portion of funds which defendant in suit by the garnishment debtor had deposited into court in order to avoid interference with oil runs, these funds could be reached by writ of garnishment notwithstanding that suit by garnishment debtor was subsequently dismissed on stipulation of parties. Hooten v. Conklin, 236 Ark. 911, 370 S.W.2d 607 (1963).

A fund subject to control and disposition by a court, and not by any of the parties, is subject to garnishment even though there has been no order to pay the fund to the debtor. Saunders v. Adcock, 249 Ark. 856, 462 S.W.2d 219 (1971).

Bail Money.

Funds held by the sheriff as bail money in lieu of an appearance bond are subject to garnishment. McGill v. Robbins, 231 Ark. 411, 329 S.W.2d 540 (1959).

Money deposited by a criminal defendant in lieu of bail is not deemed to belong to him; it would have disastrous effect on the bail bond system if money put up by a bondsman were held to be subject to garnishment for the debts of the criminal defendant. Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Skelton, 287 Ark. 378, 700 S.W.2d 44 (1985).

Balance of Funds.

A balance remaining in the hands of the clerk of the court after the purposes have been accomplished for which the fund was places in his hands is subject to attachment. Green v. Robertson, 80 Ark. 1, 96 S.W. 138 (1906).

Proceeds of Partition Sales.

Widow's share of the proceeds of a partition sale in possession of chancery clerk who conducted the sale was a fund in court subject to garnishment based on judgment obtained by heirs against widow for their share of rents and profits derived by her from the realty since her husband's death. Dove v. Donn, 203 Ark. 719, 158 S.W.2d 259 (1942).

Cited: Deutschman v. Byrne, 64 Ark. 111, 40 S.W. 780 (1897); H.B. Claflin Co. v. Bretzfelder, 69 Ark. 271, 62 S.W. 905 (1901); Independence Fed. Bank v. Paine Webber, 302 Ark. 324, 789 S.W.2d 725 (1990).

16-110-113. Attachment on joint or common property.

The county sheriff shall not, in executing an order of attachment upon personal property held by the defendant jointly or in common with another person, take possession of the property until there has been executed a bond to the other person, by one (1) or more sufficient sureties of the plaintiff, to the effect that he or she will pay to the person the damages he or she may sustain by the wrongful suing out of the order.

History. Civil Code, § 231; C. & M. Dig., § 511; Pope's Dig., § 548; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-119.

Case Notes

Partnership Property.

Partnership property cannot be attached by a creditor of one of the partners until after the execution of a bond in favor of the other partners. Noble v. Knobel Hoop Co., 85 Ark. 306, 107 S.W. 988 (1908).

16-110-114. Attachment on property claimed by another.

  1. When any county sheriff shall levy a writ of attachment upon property claimed by a person not a party to the writ, the person may make oath to the property. The property shall then be delivered to the claimant upon him or her, or his of her attorney, giving bond in favor of the plaintiff, with good and sufficient security, to be approved by the county sheriff, in a sum double the value of the property attached.
  2. Value shall be ascertained by the oaths of two (2) citizens of the county where the writ is levied, to be chosen by the county sheriff, on the condition that he or she will interplead at the term of the court to which the writ shall be returnable and that he or she will prosecute the interpleader to judgment without delay. If, on the trial of the interpleader, the property shall be found to be the property of the defendant in the writ and the plaintiff shall recover judgment against the defendant, the property shall be delivered to the county sheriff, or his or her successor in office, whenever demanded by the county sheriff, after execution upon the judgment comes to his or her hand to be levied thereon. The bond shall be returned by the county sheriff with the writ.
  3. If any person to whom the property is so returned shall neglect or refuse to deliver the property to the county sheriff in office, in accordance with the condition of the bond, it shall be the duty of the county sheriff, forthwith, to return the writ of fieri facias, issued upon the judgment rendered in the cause, setting forth the fact that the condition of the bond has been broken.
  4. The bond shall, in addition to the provisions of subsections (a)-(c) of this section, contain a condition, that in case the property so levied upon shall not be delivered, the bond shall have the force and effect of a judgment for the amount of the appraised value of the property and the costs of interpleading, if the appraised value is less than the amount of the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, and if the appraised value exceeds the amount of the judgment, then for the amount of the judgment, and all the costs, on which judgment execution may be issued against all the obligors thereof.
  5. On the return of the writ of fieri facias, showing the forfeiture of the bond, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to which the writ is returned to issue an execution in favor of the plaintiff against all obligors, for the amount which may be due on the forfeited bond, in accordance with the provisions of subsections (a)-(d) of this section.

History. Acts 1861, No. 146, §§ 1, 2, p. 296; C. & M. Dig., §§ 579-584; Pope's Dig., §§ 616-621; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-120, 31-121.

Case Notes

In General.

An intervener may present his claim to the attached property as an independent proceeding without reference to any controversy between other parties, and the determination of it does not affect the right of property as between him and the defendant in the attachment of other person. Bloom v. McGehee, 38 Ark. 329 (1881).

Applicability.

This section applies as well to property about to be sold under a special execution in attachment as to that levied on under a general execution. State v. Spikes, 33 Ark. 801 (1878).

This section does not apply to the assignee of a foreign judgment. Gebhart v. Merchant, 84 Ark. 426, 105 S.W. 1036 (1907).

Appraisement.

The appraisement is the foundation of judgment. Turner v. Collier & Davis, 37 Ark. 528 (1881).

The value of goods in controversy is ascertained by appraisement at the time the retaining bond is executed by interveners. Faulkner v. Cook, 83 Ark. 205, 103 S.W. 384 (1907).

Bond.

Intervener giving bond for attached property does not exempt it from subsequent levy in another case. Harris v. Stewart, 65 Ark. 566, 47 S.W. 634 (1898).

Sheriff is not protected in delivering attached property to a claimant without bond. Fitzhugh v. Hackley, 70 Ark. 54, 66 S.W. 146 (1902).

Money deposited in lieu of bond is to be treated as a pledge for the return of the chattel, and not as being absolutely liable for the judgment. Fondren v. Norton, 86 Ark. 410, 111 S.W. 647 (1908).

Evidence.

The burden of proof is on the intervener who is entitled to open and conclude. Excelsior Mfg. Co. v. Owens, 58 Ark. 556, 25 S.W. 868 (1894).

On the trial of an intervention in an attachment suit, where the plaintiff admits the sale and delivery of possession of the attached property to the intervener before an attachment, but alleges that the sale was fraudulent, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and he is entitled to open and conclude the argument. Mansur &Tebbetts Implement Co. v. Davis, 61 Ark. 627, 33 S.W. 1074 (1896).

Intervention and attachment being tried together, intervener cannot object to evidence competent on attachment issue. Carl & Tobey Co. v. Beal & Fletcher Grocer Co., 64 Ark. 373, 42 S.W. 664 (1897).

Judgment.

On the trial of the interplea, if the property be found subject to the attachment, the judgment should be that the plaintiff have execution against the property and, if the same is not delivered to the sheriff by the interpleader on demand, that execution issue, on the facts in the scire facias by the sheriff, against the interpleader and his securities. Adams v. Hobbs, 27 Ark. 1 (1871).

Judgment does not accrue until the officer shows by his return on the fieri facias issued against the defendant in the original action the failure of the obligators to deliver the property according to the conditions of the bond. Turner v. Collier & Davis, 37 Ark. 528 (1881).

When attached property has been sold under orders of the court and the proceeds are in the hands of the sheriff, a judgment cannot be rendered in favor of an interpleader against the plaintiff in an attachment for the value of the property. Maloney v. Jones-Wise Comm'n Co., 117 Ark. 180, 174 S.W. 239 (1915).

Pleadings.

The answer to an interplea in the circuit court should be written. Rosewater v. Schwab Clothing Co., 58 Ark. 446, 25 S.W. 73 (1894).

It is too late, after judgment, for the intervener to allege that the debt has been paid. Faulkner v. Cook, 83 Ark. 205, 103 S.W. 384 (1907).

An unverified petition is good after judgment. Burke v. Sharp, 88 Ark. 433, 115 S.W. 145 (1908).

16-110-115. Lien of attachment on property of defendant.

  1. An order of attachment binds the defendant's property in the county, which might be seized under an execution against him or her, from the time of the delivery of the order to the county sheriff or other officer.
  2. The lien to the plaintiff is completed upon any property or demand of the defendant by executing the order upon it in the manner directed in §§ 16-110-101, 16-110-102, 16-110-104 — 16-110-113, 16-110-115 — 16-110-122, 16-110-124 — 16-110-136, 16-110-138, 16-110-139, and 16-110-201 — 16-110-211.

History. Civil Code, § 232; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [232], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., § 512; Pope's Dig., § 549; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-122.

Case Notes

In General.

The lien of an attachment springs by operation of law out of the act of the plaintiff in bringing his suit properly and of the officers in issuing and serving the process and, upon the performance of these acts, the lien, though inchoate, is perfect and substantial. Harrison v. Trader, 29 Ark. 85 (1874).

This lien is allowed for no purpose except for which the attachment is allowed; it creates no estate in the property attached, nor divests prior rights or equities therein. Tennant v. Watson, 58 Ark. 252, 24 S.W. 495 (1893).

Execution of Order.

A public declaration by an officer to whom a writ of attachment was directed, that he attached certain land as the property of the defendant named in the writ, made in the presence of a citizen of the county, was a good levy and created a lien on the land from the date of the attachment. Harrison v. Trader, 29 Ark. 85 (1874).

Except in cases of escape or of the removal of property after an order of attachment comes into his hands, a sheriff has no authority to execute process beyond his own county. Blevins v. State, 31 Ark. 53 (1876).

Attachment is lien from time it reaches constable's hands. Bergman v. Sells & Co., 39 Ark. 97 (1882); Merriman v. Sarlo, 63 Ark. 151, 37 S.W. 879 (1896); McKinney v. Blakely, 87 Ark. 405, 112 S.W. 976 (1908); Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Harris, 113 Ark. 100, 167 S.W. 706 (1914).

Property levied on and held by constable was not subject to seizure by sheriff without his consent. Derrick v. Cole, 60 Ark. 394, 30 S.W. 760 (1895).

Priority of Liens.

The lien of an attachment, when perfected by judgment sustaining it, is superior to a prior unrecorded mortgage upon the same property. Cross v. Fombey, 54 Ark. 179, 15 S.W. 461 (1891).

The lien of an attachment first placed in the sheriff's hands is superior to that of a subsequent attachment which is first levied. Simon v. Adler-Goldman Comm'n Co., 56 Ark. 275 (1892).

Lien of attachment does not affect prior right of third persons. Tennant v. Watson, 58 Ark. 252, 24 S.W. 495 (1893).

If a writ is placed in the hands of the officer with directions not to serve unless some other creditor has attachment issued, the lien will not attach until the directions are countermanded; thus, so another writ given to the officer before such countermand will have priority. Florsheim Dry Goods Co. v. Taylor Comm. Co., 59 Ark. 307, 27 S.W. 79 (1894).

Where an attachment levied on real estate was subsequently sustained, but no sale under the attachment was made, the attachment will be considered abandoned, though the land was sold under execution based upon a money judgment, and a lien upon the property acquired after the levy of the attachment, but before rendition of the judgment upon which the execution was based, will take precedence over the execution sale. Snell v. Cummins, 67 Ark. 261, 54 S.W. 342 (1899).

When writs are handed to different officers, the one first levied on personal property gives prior lien. Lien of specific attachment is not prior to that of general attachment first levied. Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. McNutt, 68 Ark. 417, 59 S.W. 761 (1900).

16-110-116. Property removed from county.

If, after an order of attachment has been placed in the hands of the county sheriff or other officer, any property of the defendant is removed from the county, the county sheriff may pursue and attach the property in another county, within twenty-four (24) hours after removal.

History. Civil Code, § 233; C. & M. Dig., § 513; Pope's Dig., § 550; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-123.

16-110-117. Bond of defendant for retention of property.

  1. The county sheriff may deliver any attached property to the person in whose possession it was found upon the execution, in the presence of the county sheriff, of a bond to the plaintiff, by the person, with one (1) or more sufficient sureties to the effect that the obligors are bound, in double the value of the property, that the defendant shall perform the judgment of the court in the action, or that the property or its value shall be forthcoming, and subject to the orders of court for the satisfaction of the judgment.
  2. For the purpose of taking this bond, the county sheriff shall cause the property to be appraised by three (3) disinterested householders, to be selected and sworn by him or her to make fair appraisement on the order of attachment.
  3. In any proceeding on this bond, it shall not be a defense that the property was not subject to the attachment.

History. Civil Code, §§ 234-236; C. & M. Dig., §§ 514-516; Pope's Dig., §§ 551-553; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-124 — 31-126.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; this expressly overrules Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Interpleader.

The execution by the person in whose possession attached property is found of the bond provided for in this section does not estop him from asserting his claim to the property by an interplea filed in apt time; further, he may prefer his claim without first surrendering the property to the officer holding the attachment. Applewhite v. Harrell Mill Co., 49 Ark. 279, 5 S.W. 292 (1887).

Bond of defendant does not release plaintiff's attachment lien but merely transfers custody of property from sheriff to defendant; thus, when court found property to belong to intervener, plaintiff's lien and the bond given therefor by defendant, were discharged. Rogers v. Reliable Feed Co., 169 Ark. 391, 275 S.W. 705 (1925).

Replevin.

The owner of personal property seized under attachment against the property of another may maintain replevin against the officer having possession of it. Willis v. Reinhardt, 52 Ark. 128, 12 S.W. 241 (1889).

Satisfaction of Judgment.

The obligors in a bond executed under this section have a right to retain the property until the court orders a sale of it to satisfy the judgment against the defendant; when such order is made, they may pay off the judgment or deliver the property or its value to the sheriff. Adams v. Jacoway, 34 Ark. 542 (1879).

A bond can only be satisfied by actual delivery or by bringing the property forward, pointing it out and tendering it to the officer; telling the officer where the property is and to go and get it is not sufficient. Chapline v. Robertson, 44 Ark. 202 (1884).

In an action upon a bond, the officer's return of the failure to deliver made upon the process is conclusive. Chapline v. Robertson, 44 Ark. 202 (1884).

The officer's return is not conclusive as to the third parties. Straub v. Wooten, 45 Ark. 112 (1885).

Judgment can only be rendered upon the bond given pursuant to this section when an assessment has been made of the value of the property retained by the principal, and such assessment is made only when the plaintiff demands it. Lowenstein v. McCadden, 54 Ark. 13, 14 S.W. 1095 (1890).

A bond given under this section conditioned that the person in possession, not the defendant, shall perform the judgment of the court in the action cannot be enforced as a statutory bond. Lowenstein v. McCadden, 54 Ark. 13, 14 S.W. 1095 (1890).

The measure of damages for failure to deliver is the value of the property which could have been delivered, and not the amount stated in the bond. Starnes v. Bender, 172 Ark. 788, 290 S.W. 357 (1927).

Sureties.

By executing the bond provided for by this section, the sureties become parties to the suit and subject to summary judgment in the action without notice. Fletcher v. Menken, 37 Ark. 206 (1881).

The sureties cannot set up the defense that the vendor had released his claim upon the chattel. Lott v. Porter, 97 Ark. 97, 133 S.W. 180 (1910).

Cited: McFerrin v. Clarksville Wood Indus., 217 Ark. 383, 230 S.W.2d 49 (1950); Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

16-110-118. Motion to discharge before term of court.

  1. On reasonable notice to the plaintiff, the defendant may, at any time before the term next after the levy of the attachment, move the judge of the court in vacation to discharge the attachment, on the grounds of its having been issued contrary to the provisions of §§ 16-110-101, 16-110-102, 16-110-105 — 16-110-113, 16-110-115 — 16-110-117, 16-110-119, 16-110-121, 16-110-122, 16-110-126, 16-110-127, 16-110-129, 16-110-131 — 16-110-136, and 16-110-139.
  2. The judge, on an inspection of the papers in the action or of the authenticated copies of them, shall have the same power of discharging the attachment by his or her written order, filed by the clerk, as he or she would have in court and shall have like power to permit amendments by the plaintiff.

History. Civil Code, § 285; C. & M. Dig., § 574; Pope's Dig., § 611; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-128.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; this expressly overrules Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

16-110-119. Return of writ.

  1. The county sheriff shall return, upon every order of attachment, what he or she has done under it.
    1. The return must show the property attached, the time it was attached, and the disposition made of it.
    2. Where garnishees are summoned, their names and the time each was summoned must be stated.
    3. Where real property is attached, the county sheriff shall describe it with sufficient certainty to identify it, and where he or she can do so, a reference to the deed or title under which the defendant holds it.
  2. The county sheriff shall return with the order all bonds taken under it.

History. Civil Code, § 237; C. & M. Dig., § 517; Pope's Dig., § 554; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-127.

Case Notes

Amendment.

Return may be amended to show property levied on. Stout v. Brown, 64 Ark. 96, 40 S.W. 701 (1897).

Control of Property.

It is the duty of an officer who seizes property under attachment to retain control of it so that he may return it if required. Farris v. State, 33 Ark. 70 (1878).

Effect.

Sheriff is not authorized to act under writ after it is returned. Deutschman v. Byrne, 64 Ark. 111, 40 S.W. 780 (1897).

16-110-120. Removal of pending proceedings.

  1. In all actions in which attachments may be pending in the circuit court, held in any county, and in the inferior courts of the county, and which have been levied upon the same property, in whole or in part, it shall be the duty of the judge of the circuit court, or of the inferior court, upon the motion of either party in the action or actions, to make an order for the removal of the actions pending in the inferior court to the circuit court, where they shall be tried as if originally brought in the circuit court.
  2. In all actions which may be brought in the circuit court of this state, in which attachments may be pending, and which may be levied upon the same property, in whole or in part, the judges of the court where the actions are pending shall have power to make an order for the removal of the actions, or some of them, by change of venue, so as to have them all upon the same docket and under the control of the same court. The order of removal shall only be made upon petition filed, and in such cases as the judge shall be satisfied that the removal is necessary for the proper distribution of the attached property, and the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the actions. In making the order of removal, due regard shall be given to the convenience of the parties.
  3. The order of removal may be made in open court or by the judge of the courts in vacation. However, in either case, notice of the application shall be given to the opposite party, and affidavits may be read for and against such application.
    1. Where the order of removal is made, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the circuit court and of the judges of the inferior courts immediately to remove the papers in the action, as directed by the order, and to file an authentic copy of the orders which have been made in the case or cases.
    2. If the order of removal is to another county, the clerk shall have the same fees now allowed for like services in other cases of change of venue, to be paid in advance by the applicant for the removal, to be taxed as costs, and finally paid out of the attached funds, or by such of the parties as the court shall order.

History. Civil Code, §§ 288-291; C. & M. Dig., §§ 575-578; Pope's Dig., §§ 612-615; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-129 — 31-132.

16-110-121. Collection, preservation, and sale of property.

    1. The court shall make proper orders for the preservation and use of the property during the pending of the action and for paying into court or securing the debts and funds attached.
      1. The court may direct a sale of the property where, by reason of its perishable nature or of the cost of keeping it, a sale would be for the benefit of the parties.
      2. In vacation, the sale may be ordered by the judge of the court.
      3. The sale shall be public, after advertisement, and made in such manner and upon such terms of credit, with security, as the court or judge, having regard to the probable duration of the action, may direct.
      4. The proceeds, if collected by the county sheriff, together with all the money received by him or her from garnishees, shall be held and paid over by him or her under the same requirement and responsibilities of the county sheriff and his or her sureties, as are provided in respect to money deposited in lieu of bail.
      5. But no sale shall be made in vacation without reasonable notice in writing to the opposite party or his or her attorney, if either of them reside in the county in which the cause is pending, of the time and place of the application therefor.
    1. A judge of the circuit court in vacation of the circuit court shall have power to appoint a receiver to take charge of, collect, and account for all choses in action attached in any action, and said receiver shall have full power to collect the choses in action. He or she shall give bond and in all respects be subject to the same responsibilities as if appointed by the court in term time.
    2. The defendant or any claimant of any attached property may be required by the court or by the receiver to give information on oath respecting the property.

History. Civil Code, §§ 238, 239; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [238, 239], p. 219; C. & M. Dig., §§ 518-522; Pope's Dig., §§ 555-559; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-133, 31-134.

Case Notes

Power of Court.

Attached property is within the control of the court and the plaintiff has no right to it as property; to remove and sell such property, with or without the consent of the attaching officer, is a contempt of court which a party commits at his peril. Atkins v. Swope, 38 Ark. 528 (1881).

The court has the inherent power to compel the plaintiff to account for attached property converted by him before giving judgment for him or allowing execution, or, if judgment is against plaintiff, may compel him to refund. Atkins v. Swope, 38 Ark. 528 (1881).

Sale of Property.

One who was not a party to an attachment suit until after an order of sale of the attached property was made in vacation and who had no notice of the application for the sale was not bound by such sale and could sue the purchaser for possession of the property. Klondike Lumber Co. v. Bender Wagon Co., 71 Ark. 339, 75 S.W. 855 (1903).

Title does not pass under an attachment sale until confirmation by the court. Kenady v. Gilkey, 81 Ark. 147, 98 S.W. 969 (1906).

Where the original seizure of property was unauthorized because the person having possession was not a party to the proceeding, the subsequent sale of the property under order of the court could be justified only by showing that the person's rights were adjudicated by the court before ordering the sale. Albie v. Jones, 82 Ark. 414, 102 S.W. 222 (1907).

16-110-122. Bond for restitution of property.

  1. If the defendant at any time before the judgment causes a bond to be executed to the plaintiff by one (1) or more sufficient sureties, to be approved by the county sheriff, to the effect that the defendant shall perform the judgment of the court, the attachment shall be discharged and restitution made of any property taken under it, or the proceeds thereof. However, the giving of this bond by the defendant shall not preclude his or her right to controvert the existence of the grounds stated by the plaintiff in his or her affidavit for the order of attachment.
  2. The bond may, in vacation, be executed in the presence of the county sheriff having the order of attachment in his or her hands or, after the return of the order, before the clerk, with the same effect upon the attachment as if executed in court. The sureties, in either case, shall be approved by the officer.

History. Civil Code, §§ 242-243; Acts 1891, No. 33, § 1, p. 55; C. & M. Dig., §§ 525, 526; Pope's Dig., §§ 562, 563; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-136, 31-137.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; this expressly overrules Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

Applicability.

In a suit in which no affidavit or bond was filed nor order of attachment issued, the bond of a surety under this section is unauthorized, answers no purpose, and gives the court no jurisdiction as to him. Williams v. Skipwith, 34 Ark. 529 (1879).

The provisions of this section apply in cases of attachment for rent and judgment may be rendered against the obligors of the discharging bond. Cole v. Tipton, 196 Ark. 1177, 114 S.W.2d 464 (1938).

Discharge of Attachment.

Upon the execution of a bond to discharge an attachment, the attachment becomes discharged, the grounds for attachment are no longer in controversy, and the obligor becomes bound absolutely to pay whatever judgment the plaintiff may recover in the action. Ferguson v. Glidewell, 48 Ark. 195, 2 S.W. 711 (1886).

Upon the dissolution of an attachment, the court properly refused judgment against the sureties. Ford v. Wilson, 172 Ark. 335, 288 S.W. 712 (1926).

The manner of dissolving attachment before trial is to execute the bond authorized by this section. Cole v. Tipton, 196 Ark. 1177, 114 S.W.2d 464 (1938).

Discharge of Bond.

Where attachment proceeding was filed by creditor and intervenor claimed title to the attached property by reason of a prior mortgage, and court found for intervenor and dismissed the attachment, the attachment bond was therefore discharged. McFerrin v. Clarksville Wood Indus., 217 Ark. 383, 230 S.W.2d 49 (1950).

Right to Controvert Grounds.

The fact that the defendant in an attachment suit executes a discharging bond does not preclude him from controverting the grounds of attachment and, consequently, no judgment can be entered against the surety of such bond where the attachment is not sustained. Burgener v. Spooner, 167 Ark. 316, 268 S.W. 6 (1925); Ford v. Wilson, 172 Ark. 335, 288 S.W. 712 (1926).

16-110-123. Appearance by execution of bond.

In an action where an attachment has been granted, the execution by or for the defendant of a bond whereby the attachment is discharged, or the possession of the attached property is obtained or retained by him or her, shall be an appearance of the defendant in the action.

History. Civil Code, § 793; C. & M. Dig., § 527; Pope's Dig., § 564; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-138.

Case Notes

Nonresidents.

Where, in an action against nonresidents, summons was issued and an attachment levied on property, defendants, by filing a forthcoming bond, were held to have entered their general appearance and waived objection to the court's jurisdiction or to any irregularity in the form of the writ of attachment. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Walker, 190 Ark. 1, 76 S.W.2d 949 (1934).

16-110-124. Defendant's answer by affidavit.

  1. The defendant may file his or her affidavit denying all or any of the material statements of the affidavit upon which the attachment is issued. Thereupon, the attachment shall be considered as controverted and the affidavits of the plaintiff and defendant shall be regarded as the pleadings in the attachment and have no other effect.
  2. Where the attachment was obtained at the commencement of an action, the defendant may file his or her affidavit at such time after the levy of the attachment as is given by the Code of Practice in Civil Cases for filing his defense, after the service of the summons. The period may be extended by the court for sufficient cause.

History. Civil Code, § 280; C. & M. Dig., § 570; Pope's Dig., § 607; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-139.

Publisher's Notes. For codification of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases, see the parallel references for the Civil Code of 1869 in the Tables Volume A.

Case Notes

Denial of Allegations.

Though the allegations of an affidavit for attachment must be denied under oath, this may be done by a verified answer, though the usual and better practice is to file a controverting affidavit. Ford v. Wilson, 172 Ark. 335, 288 S.W. 712 (1926).

16-110-125. Proof by deposition or testimony.

Either party may take proof by deposition, to be read on the trial of the attachment, or, by permission of the court, the witnesses may be orally examined in court.

History. Civil Code, § 281; C. & M. Dig., § 571; Pope's Dig., § 608; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-140.

16-110-126. Testimony required for insufficient property.

  1. When it appears by the affidavit of the plaintiff or by the return of an officer to an order of attachment that no property is known to the plaintiff or the officer on which the order of attachment can be executed, or not enough to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, the defendant may be required by the court to attend before it and give information on oath respecting his or her property.
  2. Where it also appears by the affidavit of the plaintiff that some person other than the defendant has in his or her possession property of the defendant, or evidences of debt, the person may also be required by the court to attend before it and give information on oath respecting the property or evidences of debt.

History. Civil Code, § 241; C. & M. Dig., § 524; Pope's Dig., § 561; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-141.

16-110-127. Appearance by garnishee.

  1. Each garnishee summoned shall appear. The appearance may be in person or by affidavit of the garnishee filed in court disclosing truly the amount owing by him or her to the defendant, whether due or not, and the property of the defendant in the possession or under the control of the garnishee and, in the case of a corporation, any shares of stock therein held, by or for the benefit of the defendant, at or after the service of the order of attachment.
    1. Where a garnishee, or officer of a corporation summoned as a garnishee, appears in person, he or she may be examined on oath.
    2. If it is discovered on the examination that, at or after the service of the order of attachment upon him or her, he or she or the corporation was possessed of any property of the defendant or was indebted to the defendant, the court may order the delivery of the property and the payment or security for the payment of the amount owing by the garnishee, into the court, or to such person as it may direct. That person shall give bond, with security for the property or amount owing, or the court may permit the garnishee to retain the property or the amount owing, upon the execution of a bond with one (1) or more sufficient sureties, to the effect that the amount shall be paid or the property shall be forthcoming, as the court may direct.
    3. Performance of these bonds may be summarily enforced by orders and proceedings as in cases of contempt.
  2. The court may, on motion of the plaintiff, compel the appearance in person, and examination, of any garnishee, or officer of a corporation summoned as a garnishee, by process, as in cases of contempt. Where a garnishee makes a default by not appearing, the court may hear proof of any debt or property owing or held by him or her to, or for, the defendant and make such order in relation thereto, as if what is so proved had appeared on the examination of the garnishee.

History. Civil Code, §§ 245-247; C. & M. Dig., §§ 529-531; Pope's Dig., §§ 566-568; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-143 — 31-145.

Case Notes

Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof that a purchase of debts made on the same day of service of a garnishment was before the service is upon the purchaser. Bergman v. Sells & Co., 39 Ark. 97 (1882).

Failure to Appear.

Where a garnishee does not appear in person, the plaintiff is not entitled to an order that the garnishee shall deliver the property of the defendant or that he shall pay the money owing the defendant into court; rather, plaintiff must compel appearance under subsection (c) or pursue his remedy under § 16-110-133. Allen-West Comm'n Co. v. Grumbles, 129 F. 287 (8th Cir. 1904).

Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the circuit court over the funds in the hands of the garnishee does not depend upon the amount of his indebtedness to the debtor. Moore v. Kelley, 47 Ark. 219, 1 S.W. 97 (1886).

16-110-128. Time for disposition of attachment.

  1. An attachment obtained at the commencement of an action shall be sustained or discharged at the time that judgment is rendered in the action unless for sufficient cause the court extends the time of deciding upon it.
  2. An attachment obtained after the commencement of an action shall not be sustained until the defendant has had the time for controverting it as provided in §§ 16-110-101, 16-110-102, 16-110-104 — 16-110-113, 16-110-115 — 16-110-122, 16-110-124 — 16-110-136, 16-110-138, 16-110-139, and 16-110-201 — 16-110-211.

History. Civil Code, § 276; C. & M. Dig., § 566; Pope's Dig., § 603; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-148.

Case Notes

Trial of Issues.

The court should try the issue as to grounds of attachment. Von Berg v. Goodman, 85 Ark. 605, 109 S.W. 1006 (1908).

16-110-129. Discharge of garnishee.

  1. The garnishee may pay the money owing to the defendant by him or her to the county sheriff having in his or her hands the order of attachment or into the court.
  2. He or she shall be discharged from liability to the defendant for any money so paid, not exceeding the plaintiff's claim.
    1. He or she shall not be subjected to costs beyond those caused by his or her resistance of the claim against him or her.
    2. If he or she discloses the property of the defendant in his or her hands or the true amount owing by him or her and delivers or pays the amount owing according to the order of the court, he or she shall be allowed his or her costs.

History. Civil Code, § 244; C. & M. Dig., § 528; Pope's Dig., § 565; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-146.

Case Notes

Construction.

There is nothing in this section to except it from the general rule that statutes regulating costs are strictly construed against the party claiming them. W.A. Krueger Co. v. Saint Bernard's Regional Medical Ctr., 267 Ark. 180, 590 S.W.2d 1 (1979).

Cited: Saunders v. Kleier, 296 Ark. 25, 751 S.W.2d 343 (1988).

16-110-130. Motion to discharge.

  1. At any time before the attachment is sustained, the defendant, upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, may move the court to discharge the attachment, the hearing of which may be postponed by the court, upon sufficient cause, from time to time.
  2. Upon the hearing, if the court is of the opinion that the attachment was obtained without sufficient cause or that the grounds of attachment being controverted are not sustained, the attachment shall be discharged.

History. Civil Code, § 282; C. & M. Dig., § 572; Pope's Dig., § 609; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-149.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; this expressly overrules Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

The lack of prompt notice to the debtor of a prejudgment attachment and of possible state or federal exemptions and the lack of a prompt hearing at which the debtor can claim exemptions leaves the prejudgment attachment provisions inadequate to prevent an erroneous deprivation of property in violation of due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

In General.

This is a procedural section that provides for a court hearing when the attachment has been issued by the clerk of the court; the court may discharge the attachment issued by the clerk if it was obtained without sufficient cause, which means without a statutory ground, or if the existence of the asserted ground is successfully controverted by evidence presented to the court upon the motion to discharge the attachment. Sun Marine Terminals v. Tosco Corp., 287 Ark. 233, 697 S.W.2d 901 (1985).

Grounds Sufficient.

Where the pleading contained an allegation that the value of the security was diminishing and that the debtor was in the process of selling or disposing of the collateral and that the collateral was in danger of being sold, concealed, or moved from the premises in derogation of the rights and interest of the secured party, without the proceeds being applied to the debt and contrary to the terms of the security agreement, and where it was further alleged that if the property were not attached it would greatly diminish, the allegations made by the secured party stated a ground for attachment. Hackworth v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Ark. 668, 580 S.W.2d 465 (1979).

Judgment.

Upon the discharge of an attachment, the defendant should have judgment for the return of the attached property. Jackman v. Anderson, 33 Ark. 414 (1878).

16-110-131. Judgment for defendant.

  1. If judgment is rendered in the action for the defendant, the attachment shall be discharged, and the property attached or its proceeds shall be returned to him or her.
  2. In all actions of attachment in which the defendant shall recover for the discharge of the attachment, the court or jury trying the attachment shall assess the damages sustained by the defendant by reason of the attachment, and the court shall render judgment against the plaintiff and his or her sureties in the attachment bond for the amount of the damages and cost of the attachment.

History. Civil Code, § 249; Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 6, § 1, p. 7; C. & M. Dig., §§ 533, 534; Pope's Dig., §§ 570, 571; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-151, 31-152.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Absent a judge's participation or supervision, there is a significant risk that a writ of attachment will be issued even though the statutory attachment procedures have not been met; this expressly overrules Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), which held that the issue of prejudgment attachments by the clerk met the “safeguards test” and satisfied due process. McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

In General.

Upon discharge of an attachment, defendant is entitled to judgment for the value of the property sold under the writ of attachment. Hines v. Stephens, 90 Ark. 518, 119 S.W. 664 (1909).

The defendant might elect to proceed under subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section, but cannot avail himself of the provisions of both. Harrison v. Fulk, 128 Ark. 229, 193 S.W. 532 (1917).

Construction.

This section is mandatory and requires all issues to be disposed of in one suit. Davidson v. Mayhue, 120 Ark. 344, 179 S.W. 371 (1915).

Applicability.

Where, because of lack of jurisdiction, no issues were determined in the justice court, defendant's right to bring subsequent suit for damages resulting from alleged wrongful attachment would not be controlled by this section. Smyrna Baptist Church v. Burbridge, 205 Ark. 108, 167 S.W.2d 501 (1943).

Costs.

Judgment for the defendant in an action when the debt is controverted carries with it the costs of an attachment ancillary to the suit. Malpas v. Lowenstine, 46 Ark. 552 (1885) (decision under prior law).

Damages.

Owner of property is not estopped to claim damages for wrongful attachment by consenting to application of proceeds. Walker v. Fetzer, 62 Ark. 135, 34 S.W. 536 (1896).

—Assessment of Damages.

There should be no assessment of damages upon the discharge of an attachment before the trial or final disposition of the case. Kurtz v. Dunn, 36 Ark. 648 (1880).

In assessing damages for a wrongful attachment, evidence is admissible to prove the value before the seizure and the extent of its depreciation at time of restoration, and it may not be shown that, had the levy not been made, the debtor would have sold the property at a reduced price. Estes v. Chesney, 54 Ark. 463, 16 S.W. 267 (1891).

When the attached property has been sold, the court should not order a return of the property but, rather, should assess damages to cover the value at time of seizure and interest to day of trial. Norman v. Fife, 61 Ark. 33, 31 S.W. 740 (1895).

When the jury disregarded the evidence and instructions of the court and returned a verdict for excessive damages, the judgment must be reduced. Hines v. Stephens, 90 Ark. 518, 119 S.W. 664 (1909).

It is error, on dissolving an attachment, to refuse to permit the jury to assess damages where the evidence tends to show that defendant has sustained damages by reason of the attachment. Rodgers v. Cades, 103 Ark. 187, 146 S.W. 507 (1912).

Damages should be assessed by the jury. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stafford & Wimmer, 129 Ark. 172, 195 S.W. 397 (1917).

—Measure of Damages.

Damages are not recoverable for injury to credit and loss of prospective profits in business. Holliday v. Cohen, 34 Ark. 707 (1879).

Upon the discharge of an attachment, only such damages can be recovered by the defendant as are actual and the natural and direct consequences of the attachment; these damages do not include attorney's fees. Patton v. Garrett, 37 Ark. 605 (1881).

Upon a showing that the attachment was wrongfully sued out, the measure of damages is the actual loss from being deprived of the use of the property, the injury to it, and the expenses incurred in defending the attachment; the value of the property when attached is not the measure unless the property is entirely lost. Boatwright v. Stewart, 37 Ark. 614 (1881).

When goods are seized and sold under a wrongful attachment which is subsequently dissolved, their value at the time of seizure with interest to the date of trial, less the sum for which they sold, will constitute the measure of damage. Blass v. Lee, 55 Ark. 329, 18 S.W. 186 (1892); Norman v. Fife, 61 Ark. 33, 31 S.W. 740 (1895).

When, upon the dissolution of an attachment, defendant is awarded damages less than the amount he is adjudged to owe the plaintiff, the smaller claim should set off against the larger and judgment rendered for the balance in favor of plaintiff. Popplewell v. Hill, 55 Ark. 622, 18 S.W. 1054 (1892).

Where property was sold and proceeds applied to payment of plaintiff's judgment, the amount so applied should be deducted from the damages recoverable by defendant on dissolution of attachment. Scanlan v. Guiling, 63 Ark. 540, 39 S.W. 713 (1897).

Liability of Plaintiffs.

When the attachment is wrongfully sued out, the plaintiff and his sureties are liable for any waste occurring to the attached property in the hands of the officer levying the attachment. Boatwright v. Stewart, 37 Ark. 614 (1881).

The personal expenses of a defendant in attachment, incurred in prosecuting his suit for injury caused by the attachment, cannot be assessed against the plaintiff and his bondsmen on discharge of the attachment. Goodbar v. Lindsley, 51 Ark. 380, 11 S.W. 577 (1888).

Plaintiff in attachment is not liable for injury resulting from the sale of defendant's property under execution, although the issue of the execution may have been precipitated by the attachment. Goodbar v. Lindsley, 51 Ark. 380, 11 S.W. 577 (1888).

The attempted levy upon accounts by seizing the books containing them does not render the plaintiff liable for losses incurred in the collection thereof through a supposed inability to collect the accounts owing to such levy. Goodbar v. Lindsley, 51 Ark. 380, 11 S.W. 577 (1888).

Parties.

In proceedings under this section no service of notice or process on the sureties is necessary. Fletcher v. Menken, 37 Ark. 206 (1881).

Parties executing a bond of indemnity to induce a levy on certain goods under attachment become participants in the trespass where the goods are wrongfully attached. Rice v. Wood, 61 Ark. 442, 33 S.W. 636 (1896).

Cited: Lide v. Carothers, 570 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1978); Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

16-110-132. Judgment in favor of plaintiff.

  1. If judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and no affidavit or answer verified by oath by the defendant is filed denying the statements of the affidavit upon which the attachment was issued or motion is made to discharge it, the court shall sustain the attachment.
  2. Upon an attachment being sustained, the property attached, its proceeds, or the securities taken upon the attachment, shall, by appropriate orders, be applied in satisfaction of the judgment.
    1. If judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, the court shall apply in satisfaction thereof:
      1. The moneys arising from the sales of perishable property; and
      2. The proceeds of the debts and funds attached in the hands of the garnishees.
    2. If these are not sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, the court shall order a sale, by the county sheriff, of any other attached property which may be under its control, in the following order:
      1. Personal property; and
      2. Real property, or so much of it as may be necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's claim.

History. Civil Code, §§ 250, 278, 279; C. & M. Dig., §§ 535, 568, 569; Pope's Dig., §§ 572, 605, 606; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-153 — 31-155.

Case Notes

Attachments Sustained.

The court is required to sustain an attachment whenever the defendant fails to file either an affidavit denying the grounds of attachment or a motion to discharge the attachment. Weibel v. Beakley, 90 Ark. 454, 119 S.W. 657 (1909).

Judgment sustaining attachment was correct where no controverting affidavit was filed, verified answer did not controvert alleged ground for attachment, and parties stipulated that only issue to be tried was whether attachment was lawful. Cue Ball Co. v. East Ark. Lumber Co., 194 Ark. 251, 106 S.W.2d 594 (1937).

Denial of Allegations.

While allegations of affidavit must be denied under oath to make an issue as to the attachment, this may be done by a verified answer as well as by a controverting affidavit. Ford v. Wilson, 172 Ark. 335, 288 S.W. 712 (1926).

Sale of Property.

A sale of lands under a junior attachment does not release the lien of a prior attachment and the money arising from such sale is not to be applied in payment of the prior attachment. Hanauer & Co. v. Casey, 26 Ark. 352 (1870).

In attachment suits where there is only constructive service on the defendant, the court acquires no jurisdiction over any property not attached and a sale of any other property under a personal judgment and execution rendered in the case is void. Wilson v. Spring, 38 Ark. 181 (1881).

When the defendant has been constructively summoned and has not appeared in the actions, his land, which has been attached and ordered to be sold, cannot be sold until the statutory bond has been executed and filed. Bush v. Visant, 40 Ark. 124 (1882); Visart v. Bush, 46 Ark. 153 (1885).

A judgment sustaining a general attachment and ordering the property sold does not debar the debtor from asserting his right of homestead in the property at any time before sale. Robinson v. Swearingen, 55 Ark. 55, 17 S.W. 365 (1891).

A debtor cannot claim exemption in the proceeds of personal property sold under attachment where he had an opportunity and neglected to claim his exemptions in specific articles before sale. Surratt v. Young, 55 Ark. 447, 18 S.W. 539 (1892).

16-110-133. Judgment against garnishee.

  1. Upon the service of a summons upon any garnishee or after his or her failure to make a disclosure satisfactory to the plaintiff, the latter may proceed in an action against him or her by filing a complaint verified as in other cases and causing a summons to be issued upon it.
  2. Thereupon, the proceeding may be had as in other actions and judgment may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff to subject the property of the defendant into the hands of the garnishee, or for what shall appear to be owing to the defendant by the garnishee.
  3. The judgment may be enforced by execution or other proper means.

History. Civil Code, § 248; C. & M. Dig., § 532; Pope's Dig., § 569; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-147.

Case Notes

In General.

The effect of a garnishment is to fasten the indebtedness to the defendant in the garnishee's hand and confer on the plaintiff the same right to collect it that the defendant had before garnishment, subject to all defenses that the garnishee would have had against the defendant. Lewis v. Faul, 29 Ark. 470 (1874); Giles v. Hicks, 45 Ark. 271 (1885); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Richter, 48 Ark. 349, 3 S.W. 56 (1886); Penyan v. Berry, 52 Ark. 130, 12 S.W. 241 (1889).

Actions Against Garnishees.

No judgment can be rendered against a garnishee in an attachment proceedings if he fails to answer or answers unsatisfactorily; the plaintiff's remedy is by an action against him. Lewis v. Faul, 29 Ark. 470 (1874); Giles v. Hicks, 45 Ark. 271 (1885); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Richter, 48 Ark. 349, 3 S.W. 56 (1886); Penyan v. Berry, 52 Ark. 130, 12 S.W. 241 (1889).

Where the garnishee does not appear in person as required by § 16-110-127, in the absence of a proceeding under § 16-110-127 to compel appearance, the plaintiff is not entitled to an order against the garnishee; rather, his remedy is under this section. Allen-West Comm'n Co. v. Grumbles, 129 F. 287 (8th Cir. 1904).

An action cannot be maintained against a wife as garnishee by a creditor of her husband. Allen-West Comm'n Co. v. Grumbles, 161 F. 461 (8th Cir. 1908).

Scope of Proceedings.

A garnishment proceeding cannot settle disputes between the defendant and the garnishees; that must be done in a direct suit. Moore v. Kelley, 47 Ark. 219, 1 S.W. 97 (1886); Penyan v. Berry, 52 Ark. 130, 12 S.W. 241 (1889).

Ancillary garnishment suit should not be tried before judgement recovered in attachment, nor should the attachment and garnishment suits should be consolidated. Adler-Goldman Comm'n Co. v. Bloom, 62 Ark. 616, 37 S.W. 305 (1896).

Cited: May v. Bob Hankins Distrib. Co., 301 Ark. 494, 785 S.W.2d 23 (1990).

16-110-134. Intervention before sale.

  1. Before the sale of any attached property, or before the payment to the plaintiff of the proceeds thereof or of any attached debt, any person may present his or her complaint verified by oath to the court. This complaint shall dispute the validity of the attachment, or state a claim to the property or an interest in, or lien on it under any other attachment, or otherwise, and set forth the facts upon which the claim is founded, and his or her claim shall be investigated.
  2. A nonresident claimant shall, in such cases, give security for costs.
  3. The court may hear the proof, may order a reference to a commissioner, or may impanel a jury to inquire into the facts.
  4. If it is found that the claimant has a title to, a lien on, or any interest in the property, the court shall make such order as may be necessary to protect his or her rights.
  5. The costs of this proceeding shall be paid by either party, at the discretion of the court.
  6. Where several attachments are executed on the same property, the court, on the motion of any one (1) of the attaching plaintiffs, may order a reference to a commissioner, to ascertain and report the amounts and priorities of the several attachments.

History. Civil Code, § 257; C. & M. Dig., §§ 544-547; Pope's Dig., §§ 581-584; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-157.

Case Notes

Appeals.

Judgment dismissing petition of intervenor is appealable. Citizens Bank of Mammoth Spring v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 107 Ark. 142, 155 S.W. 102 (1913).

Evidence.

Where claimants alleged in their interplea that the mortgaged property had been levied on by attachment in a proceeding in which the interplea was filed and they admitted in the progress of the trial that the attached property and that which they claimed was the same, it was held on the trial of the interplea that it was not necessary for the attaching creditor to offer the record of the attachment in evidence in order to show that he had secured a lien on the property. Swofford Bros. Dry-Goods Co. v. Smith-McCord Dry-Goods Co., 85 F. 417 (8th Cir. 1898).

Intervenors.

Where a sheriff has seized property on an attachment exceeding in amount the sum due under the writ and prevented a United States marshal from taking possession under a subsequent writ, the creditor who sued in the federal court could, after judgment sustaining his attachment therein, intervene in the suit in which the sheriff took possession and have distribution according to order of priority of the writs. Goodbar v. Brooks, 57 Ark. 450, 22 S.W. 96 (1893); Rosewater v. Schwab Clothing Co., 58 Ark. 446, 25 S.W. 73 (1894).

Intervenor is not estopped by judgment discharging attachment. De Loach Mill Mfg. Co. v. Little Rock Mill & Elevator Co., 65 Ark. 467, 47 S.W. 118 (1898).

After a court ordered a garnishee to pay over an amount of money to be determined by subsequent events but before actual payment by the garnishee, another party could intervene in order to assert a claim to the fund in question. Lawrence v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 247 Ark. 1125, 449 S.W.2d 695 (1970).

Judgment creditor had standing in its own right to challenge the constitutionality of prejudgment attachments made by another creditor of the same debtor. Springdale Farms, Inc. v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984), overruled, McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988).

—Junior Creditors.

A junior attaching creditor may intervene in a prior attachment suit and contest his rights with the plaintiff in that suit; the contest of the intervenor cannot be in lieu of the defendants, and he cannot take any advantage of amendable defects in the proceedings nor defend the suit and grounds of attachment, but may object to jurisdictional and other unamendable defects in the proceedings. Sannoner v. Jacobson, 47 Ark. 31, 14 S.W. 458 (1885); Caruth-Byrnes Hdwe. Co. v. Deere, Mansur & Co., 53 Ark. 140, 13 S.W. 517 (1890); Rice v. Dorrian, 57 Ark. 541, 22 S.W. 213 (1893).

A junior attaching creditor may set aside a prior attachment when the suit was not authorized by the plaintiff, and only ratified after his attachment was levied. Caruth-Byrnes Hdwe. Co. v. Deere, Mansur & Co., 53 Ark. 140, 13 S.W. 517 (1890); Davis v. H.B. Claflin Co., 63 Ark. 157, 38 S.W. 662 (1896).

A junior attacher can, for the purpose of protecting his rights in the property attached, dispute the validity of a prior attachment and establish the rights of his own to precedence by showing that the first exists without authority or is not allowed by law. Rice v. Dorrian, 57 Ark. 541, 22 S.W. 213 (1893).

A junior creditor cannot take advantage of irregularities in the proceedings in a prior attachment though constituting good grounds for setting aside the attachment. Glaser v. First Nat'l Bank, 62 Ark. 171, 34 S.W. 1061 (1896).

Pleadings.

The interplea filed under this section must be treated as other pleadings and answer filed thereto as a complaint. Rosewater v. Schwab Clothing Co., 58 Ark. 446, 25 S.W. 73 (1894).

The unverified petition of intervenor is good after judgment. Burke v. Sharp, 88 Ark. 433, 115 S.W. 145 (1908).

Written interplea may be waived by trying issues. Wray Bros. v. H.A. White Auto Co., 155 Ark. 153, 244 S.W. 18 (1922).

Scope of Proceedings.

This section does not allow an intervenor to contest the grounds of the attachment. Rice v. Adler-Goldman Comm'n Co., 71 F. 151 (8th Cir. 1895).

The proceeding authorized by this section is one to determine the ownership of the property in the hands of the court and, in such a proceeding, the interpleader may not recover from the plaintiff the value of the attached property. Swift & Co. v. Russell, 97 F. 443 (8th Cir. 1899).

The proceedings under this section contemplate only a trial of the right of property; damages for the detention of the property can only be recovered in a separate action. Jefferson v. Dunavant, 53 Ark. 133, 13 S.W. 701 (1890).

There is no authority to deliver possession to the intervenor under this section. Fitzhugh v. Hackley, 70 Ark. 54, 66 S.W. 146 (1902).

Standing.

Under subsection (a) of this section, “any person” is permitted to present his complaint to the court, including a person who has assigned the funds that are the subject of a garnishment. Watkins v. Hadamek, 48 Ark. App. 78, 892 S.W.2d 515 (1994).

Cited: Burbridge Found., Inc. v. Reinholdt & Gardner, 363 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Ark. 1973); Turner v. Farnam, 82 Ark. App. 489, 120 S.W.3d 616 (2003); Collins v. Hall, 2014 Ark. App. 731, 455 S.W.3d 331 (2014).

16-110-135. Repossession of property by county sheriff.

  1. The court may order the county sheriff to repossess himself or herself, for the purpose of selling it, any of the attached property which may have passed out of his or her hands, without having been sold or converted into money.
  2. The county sheriff shall, under the order, have the same power to take the property as upon an order of the attachment.

History. Civil Code, § 256; C. & M. Dig., § 541; Pope's Dig., § 578; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-156.

16-110-136. Sale of property.

  1. The court may compel the delivery to the county sheriff, for sale, of any of the attached property for which a bond may have been given and may proceed summarily on the bond to enforce the delivery of the property, or the payment of such sums as may be due upon the bond, by rules and attachments as in cases of contempt.
    1. The sales shall be public, upon such notice, and at such time and place, as the court may direct.
    2. When credits are given, bonds, with security, shall be required and the credit shall not be longer than three (3) months for personal property, and not less than three (3) nor more than twelve (12) months for real property, or on installments equivalent to not more than twelve (12) months' credit on the whole. Upon real property, a lien shall be retained.
    3. The sales shall be subject to the confirmation of the court.
  2. Any surplus of the attached property or its proceeds shall be returned to the defendant.
  3. No order for the sale of real property attached in virtue of the provisions of §§ 16-110-101, 16-110-102, 16-110-105 — 16-110-113, 16-110-115 — 16-110-117, 16-110-119, 16-110-121, 16-110-122, 16-110-126, 16-110-127, 16-110-129, 16-110-131 — 16-110-136, and 16-110-139 shall be made in any action in which the defendant has not appeared or been actually summoned until there has been filed an affidavit of the plaintiff, or of his or her agent or attorney, to the effect that the defendant has no personal property or not enough to satisfy the claim of the plaintiff, in this state, known to the affiant.

History. Civil Code, §§ 251-254; C. & M. Dig., §§ 536-539; Pope's Dig., §§ 573-576; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-158 — 31-161.

Case Notes

Affidavit.

The affidavit required to obtain sale of lands was not required when a constable levied an attachment on the land and certified that the defendant had no personal property. Webster v. Daniel, 47 Ark. 131, 14 S.W. 550 (1886).

Confirmation by Court.

The sale of attached property is not complete till confirmed by the court; an action to recover the purchase money before such confirmation is premature and cannot be maintained. Freeman v. Watkins, 52 Ark. 446, 13 S.W. 79 (1889); Kenady v. Gilkey, 81 Ark. 147, 98 S.W. 969 (1906); Henry Quellmalz Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Day, 132 Ark. 469, 201 S.W. 125 (1918).

After confirmation by the court, a sale will not be set aside for irregularities as to notice. Stout v. Brown, 64 Ark. 96, 40 S.W. 701 (1897).

Failure to Sell.

No liability accrues for a failure of a sheriff to sell attached property condemned by order of court to be sold until legal demand has been made for the execution of the order. State ex rel. Cotton v. Atkinson, 53 Ark. 98, 13 S.W. 415 (1890).

Lien is abandoned if no sale is made. Snell v. Cummins, 67 Ark. 261, 54 S.W. 342 (1899).

Redemption.

A sale under a judgment or order of a court of law in a suit in which an attachment issues is not a judicial sale and the right of redemption exists for one year, as in cases of sales under execution. Beard v. Wilson, 52 Ark. 290, 12 S.W. 567 (1889).

16-110-137. Judgment on bond.

  1. If the plaintiff shall recover against the defendant, and the attachment shall have been discharged upon the execution of a bond, as provided by § 16-110-122(a), then the court shall render judgment against the defendant and his or her sureties in the bond for the amount recovered and the costs of the suit.
  2. If the defendant shall have given bond for the retention of the property attached, as provided by § 16-110-117(a), and the attachment shall be sustained, the court or jury, in addition to finding the amount of debt or damages due to the plaintiff, shall, upon demand of the plaintiff, also assess the value of the property attached. The court shall, in addition to judgment against the defendant for the amount found due to the plaintiff, and costs, render further judgment, that in case the property shall not be delivered up to the proper officer to be sold, and the officer shall not be able to make the judgment out of the property of the defendant, execution shall then issue against the property of the sureties for so much of the judgment as shall not exceed the value of the property, which execution shall be enforced as in other cases.

History. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 6, § 1, p. 7; C. & M. Dig., §§ 542, 543; Pope's Dig., §§ 579, 580; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-162, 31-163.

Case Notes

Discharging Bonds.

A plaintiff in attachment may recover judgment against the sureties in a discharging bond upon the trial of the main cause. Brugman v. McGuire, 32 Ark. 733 (1878).

Upon execution of discharging bond, attachment becomes discharged, the grounds of attachment are no longer in controversy and obligors on bond become bound absolutely to pay whatever judgment plaintiff may recover. Ferguson v. Glidewell, 48 Ark. 195, 2 S.W. 711 (1886).

There can be no judgment on a discharging bond unless the attachment is sustained. Burgener v. Spooner, 167 Ark. 316, 268 S.W. 6 (1925).

Where payee's son instituted suit upon a note before a justice of the peace, the note was filed, and the bond for attachment showed that the son was acting as agent for the payee who was the real party in interest, the fact that the suit was instituted on behalf of the payee could be made to appear by amendment, though the cause had been erroneously docketed, and judgment in favor of payee was proper. Truitt v. Baker, 197 Ark. 330, 122 S.W.2d 467 (1938).

Where attachment proceeding was filed by creditor and intervenor claimed title to the attached property by reason of a prior mortgage, and court found for intervenor and dismissed the attachment, the attachment bond discharged. McFerrin v. Clarksville Wood Indus., 217 Ark. 383, 230 S.W.2d 49 (1950).

Forthcoming Bonds.

The judgment provided for in subsection (b) of this section must be for the value of the property as found by the court or jury trying the case and not the value fixed by the appraisers for taking the bond. Creanor v. Creanor, 36 Ark. 91 (1880); Fletcher v. Menken, 37 Ark. 206 (1881).

In action against the principal and sureties on a note, when the principal executes a delivery bond with sureties, the latter are, as between them and the sureties on the note, primarily liable to the extent of the value of the property attached for the satisfaction of the debt. Fletcher v. Menken, 37 Ark. 206 (1881).

The remedy provided in subsection (b) of this section is cumulative. Chapline v. Robertson, 44 Ark. 202 (1884).

Judgment on bond cannot be rendered unless, on demand of plaintiff, assessment has been made of value of property retained by defendant. Lowenstein v. McCadden, 54 Ark. 13, 14 S.W. 1095 (1890).

Sureties on a forthcoming bond in attachment proceedings conditioned for the return of the property or payment of its value on their failure to return the property within the time specified in the bond are not entitled to notice before judgment is rendered against them on the bond. Dent v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 162 Ark. 325, 258 S.W. 322 (1925).

Where will provided for appointment of widow as executrix without giving bond and without making reports and settlements, remainderman in the estate has no right to require a bond and an accounting from widow who was life tenant without alleging and proving mismanagement, waste, or conversion. Dillen v. Fancher, 197 Ark. 995, 125 S.W.2d 110 (1939).

16-110-138. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure [now the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil and Rules of Apellate Procedure — Criminal] and the Arkansas Rules for Inferior Courts [now the Arkansas Rules for District Courts]. This section was derived from Civil Code, § 283; C. & M. Dig., § 573; Pope's Dig., § 610; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-165.

16-110-139. Powers of court.

The court may, from time to time, make and enforce proper orders respecting the property, sales, and the confirmation thereof, and the application and payment of the moneys collected.

History. Civil Code, § 255; C. & M. Dig., § 540; Pope's Dig., § 577; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-164.

Subchapter 2 — Attachment Against Specific Property

Cross References. Action by vendor for recovery, § 16-118-104.

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1877, No. 49, § 6: effective on passage.

16-110-201. Other procedures applicable.

The provisions of §§ 16-110-101, 16-110-102, 16-110-10516-110-113, 16-110-11516-110-117, 16-110-119, 16-110-121, 16-110-122, 16-110-126, 16-110-127, 16-110-129, 16-110-13116-110-136, and 16-110-139 not inconsistent with this subchapter may be applied, so far as shall be proper, to regulate the proceedings in cases of attachment against specific property.

History. Civil Code, § 275; C. & M. Dig., § 565; Pope's Dig., § 602; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-312.

Case Notes

Cited: Sellers v. Bowie, 183 Ark. 726, 38 S.W.2d 560 (1931).

16-110-202. Enforcement of mortgage, lien, etc., of personal property.

In an action to enforce a mortgage of, or lien upon, personal property; for the recovery, partition, or sale of the property; or by a plaintiff having a future estate or interest therein, for the security of his or her rights, where it satisfactorily appears by the complaint, verified on oath or by affidavits or the proofs in the cause, that the plaintiff has a just claim and that the property is about to be sold, concealed, or removed from the state, or where the plaintiff states on oath that he or she has reasonable cause to believe and does believe that, unless prevented by the court, the property will be sold, concealed, or removed from the state, an attachment may be granted against the property.

History. Civil Code, § 264; C. & M. Dig., § 554; Pope's Dig., § 591; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-301.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Justices of the peace have no jurisdiction under this section. Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark. 166 (1877); Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. McNutt, 68 Ark. 417, 59 S.W. 761 (1900).

16-110-203. Action by vendor to vacate fraudulent purchase.

In an action by a vendor of property fraudulently purchased to vacate the contract and have a restoration of the property or compensation therefor, where the complaint shows the fraudulent purchase of property and the amount of the plaintiff's claim, and is verified by his or her oath, an attachment against the property may be granted.

History. Civil Code, § 265; C. & M. Dig., § 555; Pope's Dig., § 592; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-302.

16-110-204. Grant of attachments generally.

The attachments in the cases mentioned in §§ 16-110-202 and 16-110-203 may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, by the judge or clerk thereof, or by any judge of the circuit court upon such terms and conditions as to security on the part of the plaintiff for the damages which may be occasioned by them, and with such direction as to the disposition to be made of the attached property, as may be just and proper under the circumstances of each case.

History. Civil Code, § 266; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [266], p. 219; 1877, No. 49, § 1, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 556; Pope's Dig., § 593; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-303.

Case Notes

Clerk.

This section does not authorize the clerk to issue the order of attachment, but merely authorizes him to grant it. Baker v. Ayers, 58 Ark. 524, 25 S.W. 834 (1894).

16-110-205. Security and bond.

  1. In every case the plaintiff shall be required to give security for the damage to the defendant in an adequate sum to be specified in the order granting the attachment.
  2. When it may be proper, the court, or judge or clerk thereof, may direct that the defendant or person in possession of the attached property be permitted to retain it upon giving bond, with security, for such sum as the court, or judge or clerk thereof, may prescribe.
  3. No order of attachment shall be issued by the clerk until the bond on the part of the plaintiff required by the order of the court, or judge or clerk thereof, is executed and filed in his or her office by one (1) or more sufficient securities of the plaintiff.

History. Civil Code, §§ 267, 268; Acts 1877, No. 49, §§ 2, 3, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., §§ 557, 558; Pope's Dig., §§ 594, 595; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-304, 31-305.

Case Notes

Failure to Give Bond.

Where plaintiff fails to give bond, the attachment will be subject to a motion to quash or to set aside the order. Alexander v. Pardue, 30 Ark. 359 (1875).

Order by Clerk.

Where clerk grants order of attachment, an order in writing made by the clerk directing himself to issue the order is superfluous and unnecessary. Baker v. Ayers, 58 Ark. 524, 25 S.W. 834 (1894).

Cited: Terminal Truck Brokers v. Memphis Truck & Trailer, Inc., 279 Ark. 427, 652 S.W.2d 34 (1983).

16-110-206. Order of attachment.

  1. The order of attachment shall describe the specific property against which it is issued and shall have endorsed upon it the direction of the court, or judge or clerk thereof, as to the disposition to be made of the attached property.
  2. It shall be directed, executed, and returned as other orders of attachment.

History. Civil Code, § 269; Acts 1877, No. 49, § 4, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 559; Pope's Dig., § 596; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-306.

16-110-207. Disposition of attached property.

The county sheriff shall make such disposition of the attached property as may be directed by the court, or judge or clerk thereof. When there is no direction upon the subject, he or she shall safely keep the property subject to the order of the court.

History. Civil Code, § 270; Acts 1877, No. 49, § 5, p. 48; C. & M. Dig., § 560; Pope's Dig., § 597; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-307.

Case Notes

Liability for Wrongful Surrender.

A sheriff who surrenders property seized by him under a writ of specific attachment to a claimant without authority from court or the plaintiff and without actually taking bond is responsible for actual damages; however, if he shows that the property was not subject to the writ, he will be liable for nominal damages only. De Yampert v. Johnson, 54 Ark. 165, 15 S.W. 363 (1891).

16-110-208. Conditions of bond to obtain discharge.

The court may, in any of the cases mentioned in § 16-110-202 or § 16-110-203, direct the terms and conditions of the bond to be executed by the defendant, with security, in order to obtain a discharge of the attachment.

History. Civil Code, § 271; C. & M. Dig., § 561; Pope's Dig., § 598; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-308.

16-110-209. Removal of property from county.

Where, after an order of attachment against specific property has been placed in the hands of the county sheriff, the property is removed from the county, the county sheriff may pursue and attach it in another county within twenty-four (24) hours after the removal.

History. Civil Code, § 272; C. & M. Dig., § 562; Pope's Dig., § 599; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-309.

16-110-210. Concealment of property.

Where it appears, by return of the county sheriff or by the affidavit of the plaintiff, that any specific property against which an order of attachment is issued has been concealed or removed by the defendant, the court may require him or her to attend and be examined on oath respecting the matter and may enforce its orders in this respect as in cases of contempt.

History. Civil Code, § 273; C. & M. Dig., § 563; Pope's Dig., § 600; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-310.

16-110-211. Enforcement of bonds.

Performance of bonds to obtain discharge of specific attachments or for the forthcoming of property specifically attached may, in all cases, be summarily enforced by rules and proceedings as in cases of contempt.

History. Civil Code, § 274; C. & M. Dig., § 564; Pope's Dig., § 601; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-311.

Subchapter 3 — Attachment of Boats and Vessels

Effective Dates. Acts 1860, No. 17, § 4: effective on passage.

16-110-301. Liability for debts for building, repairing, fitting, etc.

  1. Boats and vessels of all descriptions built, repaired, or equipped in this state, or running upon any of the navigable waters of this state, shall be liable for all debts contracted by the owners, masters, or supercargoes, or assignees thereof, on account of all work done, or supplies or materials furnished, by mechanics, tradesmen, and others for, on account of, or towards building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, or equipping the boats or vessels, their engines, machinery, sails, rigging, tackle, apparel, and furniture.
  2. The debts shall have the preference of all other debts due from the owners or proprietors, except wages of mariners, boatmen, and others employed in the service of boats and vessels, which shall be first paid.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 585; Pope's Dig., § 622; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-401.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

The states cannot empower their courts to proceed in rem against a boat after the manner of the admiralty courts where a maritime lien is involved; however, contracts for shipbuilding and furnished material are not maritime contracts and may be enforced in the state courts. Davis v. Mason, 44 Ark. 553 (1884).

16-110-302. Liability for contracts and torts.

  1. All boats and vessels of all descriptions built, repaired, or equipped in this state, or running upon any of the navigable waters of this state, shall be liable for all contracts of every kind made by the owners, masters, or supercargoes of the boats or vessels for or on account of the boats or vessels.
  2. When the boats or vessels mentioned in subsection (a) of this section commit any tort whatever, the boats or vessels shall be liable for the tort.
  3. For all contracts and torts mentioned in this section, the boats or vessels may be sued by name or description and attached in the manner now prescribed by law in other cases of attachment of boats and vessels.

History. Acts 1860, No. 17, §§ 1-3, p. 27; C. & M. Dig., §§ 586-588; Pope's Dig., §§ 623-625; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-402 — 31-404.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Steamboat Renaissance: The Rationale of Choice for Inland Admiralty Practice, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 336.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

The states cannot empower their courts to proceed in rem against a boat after the manner of the admiralty courts where a maritime lien is involved; however, contracts for shipbuilding and furnished material are not maritime contracts and may be enforced in the state courts. Davis v. Mason, 44 Ark. 553 (1884).

16-110-303. Affidavit for attachment.

Any person having a demand, contracted as mentioned in § 16-110-301, against any boat or vessel, upon affidavit being made and filed with the clerk of the circuit court, setting forth the nature and the amount of the demand, and upon bond being given by the plaintiff as in other cases of attachment may have an attachment, to be issued by the clerk of the circuit court, in any county in the state in which the boat or vessel may be found.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 589; Pope's Dig., § 626; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-405; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 228.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “or with any justice of the peace” following the first occurence of “circuit court” and “or by any justice of the peace having jurisdiction of the amount claimed” following the second occurence of “circuit court.”

Case Notes

In General.

For the attachment of boats in the state courts, the same affidavit is required as in attachment of other property. Thompson v. Robinson, 34 Ark. 44 (1879).

16-110-304. Election of remedy.

  1. The plaintiff may make his or her election either to proceed against the owner or owners by their proper names or by the name and style of their partnership, if known, or against the boat or vessel by its name or description only.
  2. The writ shall authorize and direct the seizure and detention of the boat or vessel and the boat or vessel's engine, machinery, sails, rigging, tackle, apparel, and furniture by the county sheriff or constable.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 590; Pope's Dig., § 627; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-406.

16-110-305. Bond of plaintiff.

In all cases where the proceedings are instituted against the boat or vessel by its name or description only, the bond to be given by the plaintiff shall be made payable to the State of Arkansas, for the use and benefit of the owners of the boat or vessel. The owners may institute a suit thereon, if damages are occasioned by the issuing of the attachment wrongfully, and have recovery thereon in the same manner as if the bond had been given to the person in his or her proper name, or in the name and style of the partnership.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 591; Pope's Dig., § 628; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-407.

16-110-306. Filing complaint on return of attachment.

Upon the return of the attachment, the plaintiff shall file a written declaration or statement against the boat or vessel by its name or description or against the owner or owners, as the case may be. The declaration or statement shall briefly recite the nature of the demand, whether for work and labor done or for materials, firewood, or provisions furnished, and whether at the request of the owner, master, supercargo, or consignee of the boat or vessel, and that the demand remains unpaid. The plaintiff shall annex to the declaration or statement a bill of the particulars constituting the demand, in separate and distinct items.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 592; Pope's Dig., § 629; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-408.

16-110-307. Procedure.

The attachment shall proceed in like manner in all other respects, and like judgment and execution shall be had, as in other cases of attachment.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 593; Pope's Dig., § 630; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-409.

16-110-308. Collection of wages.

All engineers, pilots, mariners, boatmen, and others employed in any capacity in or about the boat or vessel who may be entitled to arrearages of wages in consequence of their services may proceed to collect the wages under the provisions of §§ 16-110-301 and 16-110-30316-110-309 and shall be entitled to all the benefits thereof.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, § 8; C. & M. Dig., § 594; Pope's Dig., § 631; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-410.

16-110-309. Discharging bond.

If the owner, master, supercargo, or consignee of any such boat or vessel seized by attachment shall, at any time before judgment, give bond to the plaintiff with security to be approved by the clerk of the circuit court or by the judge, as the case may be, in double the amount of the demand sued for, conditioned to pay and satisfy such judgment as the court may render against the boat or vessel, or against the owner, as the case may be, together with cost of suit, then the boat or vessel shall forthwith be discharged from the attachment, seizure, and detention. The boat shall nevertheless be liable to be taken and sold on any execution to be issued on any such judgment or upon the judgment that may be rendered at any time on the bond required to be given by the defendant party.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 14, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 595; Pope's Dig., § 632; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-411; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 229.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “in term time, or justice of the peace” following “judge” and “or justice” following “satisfy such judgment as the court.”

Subchapter 4 — Garnishment Proceedings

Cross References. Exemption of wages of laborers and mechanics from garnishment, § 16-66-208.

Effective Dates. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 13: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 134, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 43, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1923, No. 627, § 20, provided: “That … each and every part of this act shall be deemed to be retroactive to the date when Act 113 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1913 first took effect, except only insofar as any part of this act is herein expressly made to take effect at a subsequent date, and except only insofar as any suit now pending, other than ex parte liquidation of the affairs of an insolvent bank, may be affected thereby; and that this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1925, No. 177, § 5: approved Mar. 21, 1925. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety an emergency is declared and this act shall take effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1991, No. 1027, § 5, provided: “The provisions of this act shall be effective with respect to any writs of garnishment issued after April 8, 1991, regardless of the date of judgment on the debt or obligation of the judgment debtor.”

Acts 1991, No. 1027, § 8: Apr. 8, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that the Supreme Court of Arkansas held in Bob Hankins Distributing Company v. Willie Francies May, 90-227, Opinion Delivered March 18, 1991, that the Arkansas garnishment laws violate a garnishee's right to due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because they do not provide for an adequate notice to garnishees that they may be liable for the judgment against the debtor if they failed to properly answer the writ of garnishment. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Creditors' Rights — Garnishment of a Joint Bank Account, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 352.

Note, Aluminum Company of America v. Higgins: Bankruptcy's Automatic Stay Meets Arkansas Garnishment, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 591.

Laurence, The Supreme Court and the Defaulting Garnishee, etc., 40 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Note, Holdway v. Duvoisin: Garnishment Payments as Preferences Under Section 547, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 217.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Business Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 579.

Notes, Garnishment Procedures Must Provide for Notice to Postjudgment Debtor, etc., 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 517.

Survey — Debtor-Creditor, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 173.

Survey — Debtor-Creditor, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 573.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

Case Notes

Statutes Controlling.

To the extent the garnishment procedures prescribed in this subchapter differ from those prescribed in the Rules of Civil Procedure, the statutes control. Travelodge Int'l, Inc. v. Handleman Nat'l Book Co., 288 Ark. 368, 705 S.W.2d 440 (1986).

Cited: Jones v. Goodson, 299 Ark. 495, 772 S.W.2d 609 (1989).

16-110-401. Grounds.

    1. In all cases where any plaintiff may begin an action in any court of record, or before any justice of the peace, or may have obtained a judgment before any of the courts, and the plaintiff shall have reason to believe that any other person is indebted to the defendant or has in his or her hands or possession goods and chattels, moneys, credits, and effects belonging to the defendant, the plaintiff may sue out a writ of garnishment, setting forth the claim, demand, or judgment and commanding the officer charged with the execution thereof to summon the person therein named as garnishee, to appear at the return day of the writ and answer what goods, chattels, moneys, credits, and effects he or she may have in his or her hands or possession belonging to the defendant to satisfy the judgment, and answer such further interrogatories as may be exhibited against him or her.
    2. Further, the writ of garnishment served on the garnishee shall contain one (1) of the following notices:
      1. “NOTICE TO NON-EMPLOYER GARNISHEE
      2. “NOTICE TO EMPLOYER GARNISHEE
    3. This notice shall be in addition to the notice required to employer garnishees under § 16-110-416.
  1. However, if the garnishment is issued before the judgment, the plaintiff shall give bond in double the amount for which the garnishment is issued that he or she will pay the defendant all damages that he or she may sustain by the wrongful bringing of his or her suit or the issuing of the garnishment.

FAILURE TO ANSWER THIS WRIT WITHIN 30 DAYS OR FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO ANSWER THE INTERROGATORIES ATTACHED HERETO SHALL RESULT IN THE COURT ENTERING A JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU AND YOU BECOMING PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE FULL AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN THIS WRIT TOGETHER WITH COSTS OF THIS ACTION AS PROVIDED BY ARKANSAS CODE ANNOTATED § 16-110-407.”; or

FAILURE TO ANSWER THIS WRIT WITHIN 30 DAYS OR FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO ANSWER THE INTERROGATORIES ATTACHED HERETO SHALL RESULT IN THE COURT ENTERING A JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU AND YOU BECOMING PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE NON-EXEMPT WAGES OWED THE DEBTOR-EMPLOYEE ON THE DATE YOU WERE SERVED THIS WRIT AS PROVIDED BY ARKANSAS CODE ANNOTATED § 16-110-407.”

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 1, p. 168; 1895, No. 134, § 1, p. 196; C. & M. Dig., § 4906; Pope's Dig., § 6119; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-501; Acts 1991, No. 1027, § 3; 2013, No. 229, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was held unconstitutional, as violating due process, in Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986) and In re McDougal, 65 Bankr. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986).

The 1987 amendment to § 16-110-402 appeared to address the due process concerns raised in Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986) and In re McDougal, 65 Bankr. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986). However, the provisions of this subchapter in effect in 1987 were again held unconstitutional in Bob Hankins Distrib. Co. v. May, 305 Ark. 56, 805 S.W.2d 625 (1991). The 1991 amendment to this section was a response to the decision in Bob Hankins Distrib. Co. v. May, 305 Ark. 56, 805 S.W.2d 625 (1991). See Acts 1991, No. 1027, § 8.

Acts 1991, No. 1027, § 2, provided that the act would neither amend nor repeal § 16-110-406.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “WITHIN 30 DAYS” for “WITHIN 20 DAYS” in (a)(2)(B).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Vanished in the Blink of an Eye: Split-Second Garnishment Liability and Loan Manager Accounts in the Wake of In re Southwestern Glass, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 893.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

A prejudgment garnishment is unconstitutional regardless of whether it is against wages or accounts receivable. G.A.C. Trans-World Acceptance Corp. v. Jaynes Enter., Inc., 255 Ark. 752, 502 S.W.2d 651 (1973).

Because the statutes pertaining to postjudgment garnishment, this section and §§ 16-66-208 and 16-66-211, do not require notice to the judgment debtor informing him or her of the garnishment, notice of possible state and federal exemptions, a prompt hearing to permit the judgment debtor to claim exemptions, an affidavit from the creditor stating that the writ would not cause the attachment of exempt funds, or the posting of a bond to compensate the judgment debtor for injury in case of wrongful garnishment, these sections do not contain sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent erroneous seizures to satisfy due process and thus are unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

This section is violative of due process because property of the debtor is subject to garnishment without prior notice. In re McDougal, 65 B.R. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986).

Since this section is invalid, the creditor's service of a writ of garnishment on the debtor's insurer did not create a lien, and the creditor was unsecured. In re McDougal, 65 B.R. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986).

Service on garnishee was invalid due to the invalidity of this section on which it was based, and the constitutional deficiency was not supplied by actual notice to garnishee of items constitutionally required. Gravett v. Marks, 304 Ark. 549, 803 S.W.2d 551 (1991).

The Arkansas garnishment provisions in effect at the time of the action were unconstitutional insofar as they did not require that adequate notice be given to the garnishee that his property may be subject to satisfaction of the original judgment when served with a writ of garnishment. Bob Hankins Distrib. Co. v. May, 305 Ark. 56, 805 S.W.2d 625 (1991).

In General.

Garnishment vests in the plaintiff a complete right to the indebtedness, including a lien to secure the payment thereof. Smith v. Butler, 72 Ark. 350, 80 S.W. 580 (1904).

Garnishment creates a lien on the money due from the garnishee. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Vanderberg, 91 Ark. 252, 120 S.W. 993 (1909).

The effect of the service of the writ of garnishment is to impound all property in the hands of the garnishee belonging to the judgment debtor at the time of service, or that may thereafter come into his hands, up until the filing by his of a true and correct answer. Harris v. Harris, 201 Ark. 684, 146 S.W.2d 539 (1941).

Beneficiary waived any right to challenge insurance company's decision to withhold annuity payments by failing to seek a hearing and determination on his motion to quash the September 16, 1999, writ of garnishment before the writ of garnishment was issued on October 4, 2002; when a writ of garnishment was issued, it reached money held by others belonging to the defendant, in this case, the beneficiary, and the sum was subject to garnishment as money then owning by the insurance company. Thompson v. Bank of Am., 356 Ark. 576, 157 S.W.3d 174 (2004).

Construction.

This section must be strictly construed. Beasley v. Haney, 96 Ark. 568, 132 S.W. 646 (1910).

Strict compliance with garnishment statutes and judicial process is essential to the validity of garnishment proceedings. Hervey v. Farms, Inc., 252 Ark. 881, 481 S.W.2d 348 (1972).

Applicability.

This section has no applicability to equitable garnishments. C.A. Rees & Co. v. Pace, 156 Ark. 473, 246 S.W. 491 (1923).

This section must be construed in the light of historical background of various statutes authorizing garnishment and attachment proceedings, and therefore does not extend to tort actions against residents. Allen v. Stracener, 214 Ark. 688, 217 S.W.2d 620 (1949).

A judgment creditor had a remedy under the garnisment statutes and, therefore, could not bring a separate action for fraud where a company first identified itself as a garnishee for a judgment debtor and then, three months later, amended its response to claim that it was not the judgment debtor's employer. T & T Materials, Inc. v. Mooney, 340 Ark. 646, 12 S.W.3d 635 (2000).

Bankruptcy.

The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not automatically stay a proceeding against a guarantor of the bankrupt debtor. The filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy effects an automatic stay as to the commencement or continuance of any claim against the debtor or his estate, but the stay is not for the benefit of other parties. Aluminum Co. of America v. Higgins, 5 Ark. App. 296, 635 S.W.2d 290 (1982).

Where the federal bankruptcy court clerk twice mistakenly told the garnishee employer that it was not required to file an answer in the pending garnishment proceeding because the debtor employee's filing of a bankruptcy petition effected an automatic stay as to any claim against the debtor or his estate, the failure of the garnishee employer to file an answer, limiting its liability to the moneys it may have held for and owed to the debtor employee was due to excusable neglect and the judgment rendered against the garnishee employer would be reversed. Aluminum Co. of America v. Higgins, 5 Ark. App. 296, 635 S.W.2d 290 (1982).

Defenses.

Where a garnishee in an attachment proceeding answered that his indebtedness to the defendant, if any, would be determined in certain pending suits, a delay on the plaintiff's part of more than five years before taking further steps to enforce his claim against the garnishee was such laches as would prevent his having the final decrees therein applied to the payment of his claim, where such suits were prosecuted in the defendant's name for the benefit of other creditors. Johnson v. Meyer, 60 Ark. 50, 28 S.W. 797 (1894).

Equity will not restrain the repeated issuance of writs of garnishment against a master for the purpose of seizure of a servant's wages alleged to be exempt upon an allegation that the purpose of the defendant in issuing such writs is to annoy and harass the plaintiff and tie up his wages, the remedy, if any, being at law for a malicious abuse of process. Baxley v. Laster, 82 Ark. 236, 101 S.W. 755 (1907).

A railroad company, when sued in this state upon a complaint in favor of an employee residing here, could defend on the ground that judgment against it had been previously served in a garnishment proceeding instituted in another state in favor of creditor of plaintiff. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Vanderberg, 91 Ark. 252, 120 S.W. 993 (1909).

Judgment.

Judgment against garnishee cannot be lawfully rendered until judgment is rendered against the defendant. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. McDermitt, 91 Ark. 112, 120 S.W. 831 (1909); W. A. Smith & Bro. v. Spinnenwebber & Peters, 114 Ark. 384, 170 S.W. 84 (1914); Smith v. Bank, 115 Ark. 216, 170 S.W. 1008 (1914).

Federal Civil Rights Act did not have effect or removing judicial immunity of justice of the peace so as to permit plaintiff to maintain action against justice of peace in federal court based on allegation that justice of peace, while acting under color of office, issued unlawful writs of garnishment before judgment. Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955); Thompson v. Baker, 133 F. Supp. 247 (W.D. Ark. 1955).

Jurisdiction.

Justice of the peace has no jurisdiction of garnishment of claim exceeding $300. Traylor v. Allen, 61 Ark. 13, 31 S.W. 570 (1895).

A citizen of the state can garnish a foreign railroad company operating within the state for a debt due to one of its employees for labor performed in the state, though employee is a resident of a foreign state. Kansas City, Pittsburg & Gulf Ry. v. Parker, 69 Ark. 401, 63 S.W. 996 (1901).

Jurisdiction of nonresident debtor is acquired by garnishment of debt owing to him by resident and publication of warning letter. Johnson v. Foster, 69 Ark. 617, 65 S.W. 105 (1901).

The situs of a debt for the purposes of garnishment is wherever the debtor may be found. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Vanderberg, 91 Ark. 252, 120 S.W. 993 (1909).

Where the plaintiff sued the Dillard & Kilgore Co., a corporation, and procured a judgment to be sued out against a third person and subsequently sued the Dillard & Kilgore Co., a partnership, but in the latter suit did not procure a garnishment to be issued against the third person, no jurisdiction of the latter was acquired in the suit against the partnership. Edwin Schiele & Co. v. Dillard, 94 Ark. 277, 126 S.W. 835 (1910).

Jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is coextensive with the county in garnishment. Foster v. Pollack, 173 Ark. 48, 291 S.W. 989 (1927).

Where there was but a single defendant, the clerk of the court had no authority to name another as judgment debtor in writ of garnishment. Garner v. Cluck, 209 Ark. 912, 193 S.W.2d 661 (1946).

After judgment, a writ of execution or garnishment is issuable only from the court in which the judgment was rendered. McGehee Bank v. Charles W. Greeson & Sons, 223 Ark. 18, 263 S.W.2d 901 (1954).

A garnishee cannot be held upon a garnishment when the court from which it is issued has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the principal cause of action. Hervey v. Farms, Inc., 252 Ark. 881, 481 S.W.2d 348 (1972).

In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, only the court in which the judgment was rendered has authority to issue a garnishment thereon. Hervey v. Farms, Inc., 252 Ark. 881, 481 S.W.2d 348 (1972).

Liability of Garnishees.

An employer is not liable as garnishee when his employee has, in the line of his employment, collected funds in excess of his salary which he has failed to pay over. Frank v. Dungan & Lee, 76 Ark. 599, 90 S.W. 17 (1905).

Where a railway company was properly served with writs of garnishment in which were given the correct names of the defendants to whom the garnishee was indebted, no subsequent payment of the money in the garnishee's hands belonging to such defendants would relieve it of liability, even though made to the defendants under assumed names, if the garnishee's officers or agents in charge knew that the persons to whom the payments were made were the defendants. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Matiatas, 97 Ark. 206, 133 S.W. 600 (1910).

The garnishee who, in an action before a justice, pays the money garnished to the plaintiff will be liable for the money to an intervener who has filed an interplea claiming the money and when, on appeal from a judgment of the justice dismissing the interplea, it is determined that he is entitled to the money in the garnishee's hands. Citizens Bank of Mammoth Spring v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 107 Ark. 142, 155 S.W. 102 (1913).

Where garnishee's answer which admitted owing judgment debtor was not denied, judgment for greater amount could not be rendered and garnishee would not be required to take notice of any act or order of the court except rendition of judgment or order to pay over the amount stated. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wasson, 192 Ark. 554, 92 S.W.2d 860 (1936).

A garnishee after service of the writ upon him must retain possession of all property and effects of the principal debtor in his hands, and if he fails to do so, he is liable for the value of the property and effects to the plaintiff in the principal action. Harris v. Harris, 201 Ark. 684, 146 S.W.2d 539 (1941).

Garnishee making payments on his note in possession of judgment debtor at the time of service of writ and paying to him, prior to filing full, true, and complete answers to interrogatories, amount more than necessary to pay judgment was liable for amount of judgment though note was not due when payments were made. Harris v. Harris, 201 Ark. 684, 146 S.W.2d 539 (1941).

Where writ of garnishment was quashed and no supersedeas bond was filed to supersede the order of quashing, the garnishee was released from the garnishment and judgment could not be obtained against garnishee, notwithstanding appeal from order quashing garnishment. Griffin v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 227 Ark. 1018, 303 S.W.2d 242 (1957).

Where final judgment was entered against bank which was subject to plaintiff's levy of execution and writ of garnishment by a creditor of plaintiff, all parties were not interpled, plaintiff's creditor failed to file writ of garnishment with court clerk after bank posted supersedeas bond, and clerk paid settlement amount to plaintiff from proceeds of bond on court approval, subsequent judgment making plaintiff's creditor's writ of garnishment a lien on bank's judgment debt to plaintiff was reversed as bank was subject to the hazard of being liable for the same debt twice and was not required to file an interpleader action. Independence Fed. Bank v. Paine Webber, 302 Ark. 324, 789 S.W.2d 725 (1990).

Notice.

Actual notice is insufficient where a notice statute is constitutionally insufficient. Gravett v. Marks, 304 Ark. 549, 803 S.W.2d 551 (1991).

Actual notice was insufficient where statutory notice required by former subchapter was constitutionally insufficient. Bob Hankins Distrib. Co. v. May, 305 Ark. 56, 805 S.W.2d 625 (1991).

Pleadings.

The burden of proof is not met by proving contradictory statements of garnishee and his agents. Frank v. Dungan & Lee, 76 Ark. 599, 90 S.W. 17 (1905).

A writ of garnishment may not issue until after an action has been commenced by filing a complaint and procuring summons to be issued. First Nat'l Bank v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 184 Ark. 812, 43 S.W.2d 535 (1931).

In garnishment proceeding, equitable or statutory, recovery can be had only to the date of filing answer. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wasson, 192 Ark. 554, 92 S.W.2d 860 (1936).

An oral answer by a garnishee to allegations contained in a writ of garnishment issued out of a municipal court was held to amount to a failure to answer justifying judgment by default against garnishee. Harmon v. Bell, 204 Ark. 290, 161 S.W.2d 744 (1942).

Where an action was begun by the filing of a complaint in the office of the clerk of the proper court and placing the summons in the hand of the officer, the fact that the service of summons was quashed did not render void the writ of garnishment sued out after the action was begun. Mainprize v. Bates, 240 Ark. 249, 398 S.W.2d 894 (1966).

Garnishee waived no statutory protection by signing over guaranty surrendering defaulted contract rights to garnishor where the latter proceeded, without due notice, upon garnishment rather than contract grounds; nor could garnishor raise the waiver for the first time on appeal. G.A.C. Trans-World Acceptance Corp. v. Jaynes Enter., Inc., 255 Ark. 752, 502 S.W.2d 651 (1973).

Where the garnishee, judgment debtor had filed in interpleader and did not contest the validity of the garnishments, the garnishee's rights were guarded and the garnishments were valid. Equifax, Inc. v. Luster, 463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Luster, 604 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1979).

Subjects of Garnishment.

Where property is placed in the hands of a person as a pledge for a debt, it cannot be taken by garnishment until the debt is paid. Patterson v. Harland, 12 Ark. 158 (1851).

In the absence of a statute authorizing it, a fund in court is not subject to garnishment until the purpose for which it is held is accomplished. Green v. Robertson, 80 Ark. 1, 96 S.W. 138 (1906).

Where one holds funds of a debtor as trustee to be paid pro rata to all of his creditors, such funds cannot be taken by a garnishment at the instance of one of the creditors; but any fund left in the trustee's hands after execution of the trust by paying to the creditors who accepted it their pro rata of the funds are subject to garnishment. State Nat'l Bank v. Wheeler-Motter Mercantile Co., 104 Ark. 222, 148 S.W. 1033 (1912).

—Exemptions from Garnishment.

The fact that land sold by a debtor did not constitute his homestead did not deprive him of the right to hold the purchase money received therefor exempt from garnishment as personal property. Wheeler v. Eatman, 67 Ark. 133, 53 S.W. 571 (1899).

Garnishment is not proper writ to fasten lien on corporate stock. H.B. Claflin Co. v. Bretzfelder, 69 Ark. 271, 62 S.W. 905 (1901).

Where the evidence showed that the judgment debtor was a sharecropper and his portion of the proceeds from the cotton crop would be one-half of the gross, less the cost advanced for seed, fertilizer, and picking, which could not be determined at the time of service of garnishment because the crop had not yet been picked, the amount due the sharecropper was entirely contingent and not subject to garnishment. Coward v. Barnes, 232 Ark. 177, 334 S.W.2d 894 (1960).

—Items Subject to Garnishment.

Debts contracted, although not presently payable or matured, but which will certainly become payable in the future, may be reached by garnishment. Harris v. Harris, 201 Ark. 684, 146 S.W.2d 539 (1941).

Widow's share of the proceeds of a partition sale in possession of chancery clerk who conducted the sale was a fund in court subject to garnishment based on judgment obtained by heirs against widow for their share of rents and profits derived by her from the realty since her husband's death. Dove v. Donn, 203 Ark. 719, 158 S.W.2d 259 (1942).

Trial court finding that, even though husband owned one-half of the funds in joint bank account with his wife, one owning judgment against husband could not maintain writ of garnishment against the bank was error; any funds adjudged to belong to the husband were subject to garnishment. Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 381 S.W.2d 752 (1964).

—Joint Bank Accounts.

A joint bank account is prima facie subject to garnishment, i.e., there is a presumption that the money is owned by the judgment debtor. Maloy v. Stuttgart Mem'l Hosp., 42 Ark. App. 16, 852 S.W.2d 819 (1993), aff'd, 316 Ark. 447, 872 S.W.2d 401 (1994).

Garnishment of two certificates of deposit, held jointly in the names of debtor and her mother, upheld. Maloy v. Stuttgart Mem'l Hosp., 316 Ark. 447, 872 S.W.2d 401 (1994).

Cited: Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978); May v. Bob Hankins Distrib. Co., 301 Ark. 494, 785 S.W.2d 23 (1990); Moory v. Quadras, Inc., 333 Ark. 624, 970 S.W.2d 275 (1998).

16-110-402. Procedure in issuing writs of garnishment.

    1. Upon application for a writ of garnishment by any qualified judgment creditor, the clerk of the court shall attach to the writ of garnishment the following “Notice to Defendant”:
    2. As an alternative, the “Notice to Defendant” may be incorporated as a part of the writ of garnishment.
      1. A writ of garnishment together with the “Notice to Defendant” shall be directed, served, and returned in the same manner as a writ of summons.
      2. In addition, the judgment creditor or the judgment creditor's attorney shall mail a copy of the writ of garnishment and the “Notice to Defendant” to the judgment debtor and the judgment debtor's attorney, if any, within five (5) days from the date the writ of garnishment is served on the garnishee.
      1. The judgment creditor or the judgment creditor's attorney shall mail the writ of garnishment and the “Notice to Defendant” by first-class mail to the last known residential address of the judgment debtor.
      2. However, if the letter is returned “undeliverable” by the post office or if the last known residential address of the judgment debtor is not discoverable after diligent search, then the writ of garnishment and the “Notice to Defendant” shall be sent by first-class mail to the judgment debtor at his or her place of employment, if known.
    1. The judgment creditor or the judgment creditor's attorney is not required to mail another “Notice to Defendant” to the judgment debtor for future garnishments on the same debt within twelve (12) months of the original garnishment.
    2. If further garnishments are filed after the original garnishment, then the “Notice to Defendant” is required to be mailed by the judgment creditor or the judgment creditor's attorney annually.
    1. Upon return of the clerk's writ of garnishment for filing with the court, the judgment creditor or judgment creditor's attorney shall include a “Notice to Defendant” certificate of service statement, including the name and last known address for the judgment debtor and the date the “Notice to Defendant” was sent to the judgment debtor.
    2. The certificate of service statement shall be signed by the judgment creditor or judgment creditor's attorney.
      1. The judgment debtor may claim exemptions according to law after service of the writ of garnishment on the garnishee by filing an exemption claim with the clerk.
      2. Within five (5) days after an exemption claim is filed with the clerk, the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor's attorney shall notify the judgment creditor or the judgment creditor's attorney by fax transmission and concurrent mailing of the judgment debtor's exemption claim.
    1. A hearing shall not be required and a writ of supersedeas shall issue unless the judgment creditor files within ten (10) days from the date the judgment debtor or judgment debtor's attorney files an exemption claim a statement in writing that the judgment debtor's claim of exemption is contested.

“NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF YOUR RIGHT TO KEEP WAGES, MONEY, AND OTHER PROPERTY FROM BEING GARNISHED

The Writ of Garnishment or Writ of Execution delivered to you with this Notice means that wages, money, or other property belonging to you has been garnished in order to pay a court judgment against you. HOWEVER, YOU MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP YOUR MONEY OR PROPERTY FROM BEING TAKEN, SO READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY.

State and federal laws say that certain money and property may not be taken to pay certain types of court judgments. Such money or property is said to be ‘exempt’ from garnishment.

For example under the Arkansas Constitution and state law, you will be able to claim as exempt all or part of your wages or other personal property.

As another example, under federal law the following are also exempt from garnishment:

Social Security, SSI, Veteran's benefits, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, unemployment compensation, and workers' compensation.

You have a right to ask for a court hearing to claim these or other exemptions. If you need legal assistance to help you try to save your wages or property from being garnished, you should see a lawyer. If you can't afford a private lawyer, contact your local bar association or ask the clerk's office about any legal services program in your area.”

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 2, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 4909; Pope's Dig., § 6122; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-504; Acts 1987, No. 523, § 1; 2015, No. 932, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted the former introductory language; redesignated (1)(A) and (B) as (a)(1) and (2); in (a)(1), substituted “the writ of garnishment” for “said writ” in the introductory language, inserted “as exempt” in the third paragraph of the notice, and substituted “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families” for “AFDC (welfare)” in the next to last paragraph of the notice; added “of garnishment” to the end of (a)(2); and redesignated (2) through (5) as (b) through (e) and rewrote them.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Debtor-Creditor, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 573.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Constitutionality of a writ of garnishment is not something which an employer-garnishee must determine before complying with its terms. Walsh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 836 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1988).

In General.

Strict compliance with garnishment statutes and judicial process is essential to the validity of garnishment proceedings. Hervey v. Farms, Inc., 252 Ark. 881, 481 S.W.2d 348 (1972).

Beneficiary had a right of $750 per month from the insurance company as long as he may live, and the insurance company had a contractual obligation to pay the beneficiary the sum each month, but there was no debt presently due or certain to come due until the day of payment arrived and the beneficiary was alive. Thompson v. Bank of Am., 356 Ark. 576, 157 S.W.3d 174 (2004).

Attachment of Liens.

The debt is bound in the hands of the garnishee from the time of the service of the writ, and the right of a garnishor to a satisfaction of his judgment out of the debt cannot be defeated by a subsequent payment of the garnishee, whether made voluntarily or by legal coercion. Desha v. Baker, 3 Ark. 509 (1841); Watkins v. Field, 6 Ark. 391 (1846); Martin v. Foreman, 18 Ark. 249 (1856).

The lien of a garnishment dates from the time the garnishment writ is served upon the garnishee, and a sale and transfer by the defendant of his choses in action, not subject to execution, before such service will be good. The burden of proof that a purchase of debts made on the same day of the service of a garnishment was before the service is upon the purchaser. Bergman v. Sells & Co., 39 Ark. 97 (1882).

Foreign Judgments.

Foreign child-support judgments and accompanying writs of garnishment are recognized and enforced by Arkansas courts under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § 16-66-601 et seq., and the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, § 9-14-301 et seq. (repealed, see now § 9-17-101 et seq.). Walsh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 836 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1988).

Judgment debtor failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where he sought judgment in the amount of wages withheld by his employer pursuant to a writ of garnishment entered in a state court and enforced under the Arkansas Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, § 9-14-301 et seq. (repealed, see now § 9-17-101 et seq.), alleging that the writ was facially invalid, that he did not receive notice of his rights, and that his employer knew that this fact rendered the garnishment invalid. Walsh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 836 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1988).

Invalid Service.

Where a writ of garnishment was issued on a bank and the sheriff contended that he served it on a vice-president of the bank but no notation was made on the return that the bank president was not available, the service was invalid. First Nat'l Bank v. H & M Lumber Co., 252 Ark. 175, 477 S.W.2d 850 (1972).

Joinder of Garnishees.

A writ of garnishment may be against several garnishees where the writ, allegations, and interrogatories show a joint indebtedness and a joint possession of goods. Moreland v. Pelham, 7 Ark. 338 (1847).

It is error to join several garnishees in the same writ of garnishment without allegations of joint liability or indebtedness. Cincinnati & Little Rock Slate Co. v. Bridge & Co., 17 Ark. 364 (1856).

Liability.

An employer presented with a court order and writ of garnishment is required to comply with that order and garnish its employee's wages; failure to garnish may render the employer-garnishee liable to the judgment creditor. Walsh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 836 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1988).

Notice.

This section places the responsibility upon the judgment creditor, not the garnishee, to insure that the judgment debtor receives notice of his rights as required by Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986). Walsh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 836 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1988).

Notice to judgment debtor, to be constitutional, need not supply the judgment debtor with a “laundry list” of statutory or constitutional exemptions or inform him of all available exemptions. Such notice need only inform the debtor that postjudgment execution is being levied and that state and federal exemptions may be available with respect to the property subject to the levy. Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990).

Circuit court erred in denying a garnishee's motion for relief from an order to pay in a garnishment proceeding; the garnishee's constitutional right to due process was not met because the garnishee did not receive notice of the hearing, and there was neither an attempt to alert the garnishee of the hearing nor an actual awareness of it on the garnishee's part. Cardinal Health v. Beth's Bail Bonds, Inc., 2017 Ark. 54, 511 S.W.3d 327 (2017).

Statutory scheme for garnishment proceedings sets some procedural rules, but the general rules of civil procedure fill in the gaps. Thus, the relevant consideration is Ark. R. Civ. P. 5, which sets out requirements for service of pleadings and papers filed after the complaint. Cardinal Health v. Beth's Bail Bonds, Inc., 2017 Ark. 54, 511 S.W.3d 327 (2017).

Cited: DeSoto, Inc. v. Crow, 257 Ark. 882, 520 S.W.2d 307 (1975); Kennedy v. Kelly, 295 Ark. 678, 751 S.W.2d 6 (1988); McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 755 S.W.2d 566 (1988); Stephens v. Walker, 743 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Ark. 1990); May v. Bob Hankins Distrib. Co., 301 Ark. 494, 785 S.W.2d 23 (1990); Brimer v. State, 301 Ark. 540, 785 S.W.2d 458 (1990); Turner v. Farnam, 82 Ark. App. 489, 120 S.W.3d 616 (2003).

16-110-403. Filing of interrogatories.

The plaintiff shall, on the day on which he or she sues out his writ of garnishment, prepare and file all the allegations and interrogatories, in writing, with the clerk or justice issuing the writ upon which he or she may be desirous of obtaining the answer of the garnishee touching the goods and chattels, moneys, credits, and effects of the defendant, and the value thereof, in his or her hands and possession, at the time of the service of the writ or at any time thereafter.

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 3, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 4910; Pope's Dig., § 6123; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-505.

Case Notes

Purpose.

This section was enacted for the benefit of the garnishee and not as a prerequisite to acquiring a lien on funds in the hands of a garnishee. Lerner v. Lutes, 184 Ark. 1133, 45 S.W.2d 33 (1932).

Filing Requirements.

The allegations and interrogatories may be filed with the clerk at any time before the expiration of the return day of the writ, and it is not necessary that they be filed in open court, or that the filing appear off record. Moreland v. Pelham, 7 Ark. 338 (1847); Lawrence v. Sturdivent, 10 Ark. 130 (1849); Richardson v. White, 19 Ark. 241 (1857).

In garnishments, the allegations and interrogatories should conform to the writ. Frizzell v. Willard, 37 Ark. 478 (1881).

Judgment against garnishee without allegations and interrogatories is irregular, but not void. Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co. v. Wilson, 66 Ark. 582, 53 S.W. 43 (1899).

Suit failed where the interrogatories filed merely sought information upon which to base a subsequent suit. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, 206 S.W.2d 771 (1947).

Joinder of Garnishees.

When the effects of a defendant are in the hands of several persons who are jointly liable to him for them, and they are not under the exclusive control of either of them, all must be joined as garnishees before interrogatories can be filed against either. Frizzell v. Willard, 37 Ark. 478 (1881).

Cited: Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955).

16-110-404. Answers to interrogatories.

The garnishee shall, on the return day named in the writ, exhibit and file, under his or her oath, full, direct, and true answers to all such allegations and interrogatories as may have been exhibited against him or her by the plaintiff.

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 4, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 4911; Pope's Dig., § 6124; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-506.

Case Notes

In General.

The answer of a garnishee must be taken as prima facie true, and if not contradicted or if no issue is taken thereon, it will be presumed to be absolutely true. Beasley v. Haney, 96 Ark. 568, 132 S.W. 646 (1910).

Admissions.

A garnishee answering and admitting his indebtedness, as the maker of negotiable paper, without reserve or qualification, does so at his peril. If notified at any time before final judgment that his note had been assigned before the service of the writ upon him, he is bound to apply for leave to interpose the defense. Cross v. Haldeman, 15 Ark. 200 (1854).

Failure to Answer.

Oral answer by garnishee to allegations contained in writ of garnishment issued out of a municipal court was held to amount to a failure to answer justifying judgment by default against garnishee. Harmon v. Bell, 204 Ark. 290, 161 S.W.2d 744 (1942).

A garnishee did not comply with this section by filing an unverified answer signed only by his attorneys. Bohner v. Faught, 237 Ark. 639, 374 S.W.2d 825 (1964).

Garnishee did not substantially comply with this section by mailing answers to interrogatories in an unverified letter to the judgment creditor's attorney without filing them with the court. Professional Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Williams, 299 Ark. 462, 773 S.W.2d 824 (1989).

Liability of Garnishees.

Garnishee making payments on his note in possession of judgment debtor at the time of service of writ and paying to him, prior to filing full, true, and complete answers to interrogatories, amount more than necessary to pay judgment was liable for amount of judgment, though note was not due when payments were made. Harris v. Harris, 201 Ark. 684, 146 S.W.2d 539 (1941).

A garnishee filing an untrue answer is liable for sums paid by him to the judgment debtor until a correct answer is filed. Bell v. West, 241 Ark. 89, 406 S.W.2d 316 (1966).

Cited: O'Connor v. Methodist Hosp., 42 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984); Medical & Dental Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Lake Hamilton Camp & Conference Grounds, 291 Ark. 353, 724 S.W.2d 477 (1987).

16-110-405. Denial of answer.

  1. If the garnishee files his or her answer to the interrogatories exhibited and the plaintiff deems the answers untrue or insufficient, he or she may deny the answer and cause his or her denial to be entered on the record.
  2. The court or justice, if neither party requires a jury, shall proceed to try the facts put in issue by the answer of the garnishee and the denial of the plaintiff.

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 5, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 4912; Pope's Dig., § 6125; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-508.

Case Notes

In General.

The law provides a statutory remedy for a party who proves, after a trial on the issues, that false answers to interrogatories propounded with a writ of garnishment have been filed; thus, no separate and independent fraud action exists in any county arising out of the alleged untruthful or insufficient answers to interrogatories exhibited against any garnishee. T & T Materials, Inc. v. Mooney, 68 Ark. App. 77, 4 S.W.3d 512 (1999), aff'd, 340 Ark. 646, 12 S.W.3d 635 (2000).

Denial of Answer.

Where a school district, being garnished, answered that the contractor abandoned the work he undertook to do and that the work done by him was without value, such answer, not being denied, will be conclusive and garnishment dismissed. Hoxie Lumber Co. v. Chidister, 184 Ark. 612, 43 S.W.2d 69 (1931).

A garnishee's answer not denied is conclusive of the truth of its allegations. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. W.O. Perkins & Son, 185 Ark. 830, 49 S.W.2d 606 (1932).

The answer of a garnishee is not conclusive of the facts which it recites, but it is prima facie true and must be controverted as provided by the statute. Graham v. Littleton, 198 Ark. 763, 131 S.W.2d 637 (1939).

The answer of a garnishee must be taken as prima facie true, and if not controverted or if no issue is taken thereon, it will be presumed to be absolutely true. Wyatt Lumber & Supply Co. v. Hansen, 201 Ark. 534, 147 S.W.2d 366 (1940).

Denial of garnishee's answer must be in writing. Beasley v. Haney, 96 Ark. 568, 132 S.W. 646 (1910); Wyatt Lumber & Supply Co. v. Hansen, 201 Ark. 534, 147 S.W.2d 366 (1940).

Trial of Issues.

Upon a trial of issues made under this section, the court could not render judgment for the full amount of the plaintiff's judgment because of the fact that the garnishee's answer was defective in that it was unverified and signed only by his attorneys, but could only render judgment according to the evidence. Bohner v. Faught, 237 Ark. 639, 374 S.W.2d 825 (1964).

In an action at law, alleged fraud in assignment of the fund subject to garnishment, which assignment is pledged by the garnishee defendant as a defense, may not be tried when all claimants of the fund are not before the court, even though the fund might be subjected to payment of a debt to the garnisher in another proceeding. Saunders v. Adcock, 249 Ark. 856, 462 S.W.2d 219 (1971).

Unsatisfactory Answer.

The proper practice in a justice's court where a garnishee in an attachment suit fails to answer satisfactorily the answers and allegations propounded to him is to institute a suit against him; a personal judgment against the garnishee in the original suit is not authorized. Nelson v. Blanks, 67 Ark. 347, 56 S.W. 867 (1900).

16-110-406. Failure of bank to answer.

  1. If any garnishee that is a bank, savings bank, or trust company domiciled in this state, after having been served with a writ of garnishment ten (10) days before the return day thereof, shall neglect to answer on or before the return day the writ or any interrogatories which have been exhibited against it, the court or justice before whom the matter is pending shall enter judgment in general terms against the garnishee. The general judgment shall be deemed to be for costs of the garnishment and for an amount not exceeding the full amount specified in the plaintiff's judgment against the original defendant and also not exceeding the amount or value in which at the time when served and thereafter up to and including said return day the garnishee was indebted, or had in its hands or possession goods, chattels, moneys, credits, and effects belonging to the original defendant.
  2. At any time after the general judgment the plaintiff may have, from the court or justice in the matter, a discovery against the garnishee and at its cost to ascertain the specific amount due thereunder.

History. Acts 1913, No. 113, [§ 62], as added by Acts 1923, No. 627, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 746; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-507.

Publisher's Notes. The time for filing pleadings in civil actions is now governed by Ark. R. Civ. P. 12.

Acts 1991, No. 1027, § 2, provided that the act would neither amend nor repeal this section.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Arkansas's appellate courts have long interpreted garnishment statutes like this section to mean that a creditor-garnishor has a lien on all the defendant's property as soon as the writ is served on the garnishee. Eagle Bank & Trust Co. v. Raynor Mfg. Co., 2019 Ark. App. 168, 574 S.W.3d 196 (2019).

Circuit court did not err in finding that a bank that had been served with a writ of garnishment was liable to the judgment creditor for the amount transferred from the judgment debtor's account after that account had been closed and then reopened; even assuming that the bank properly answered the writ of garnishment and was a payor bank under § 4-4-403, this section controlled and required the bank to lien all money at the time the writ was served — immediately. As a result, the circuit court did not err in applying the garnishment statutes instead of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Eagle Bank & Trust Co. v. Raynor Mfg. Co., 2019 Ark. App. 168, 574 S.W.3d 196 (2019).

Liability.

The liability of a bank, on failure to timely answer a writ of garnishment, is limited to the amount which the bank owed the debtor up until the time the bank answered. Woodcock v. First Commercial Bank, 284 Ark. 490, 683 S.W.2d 605 (1985).

Cited: Searcy Steel Co. v. Mercantile Bank, 19 Ark. App. 220, 719 S.W.2d 277 (1986).

16-110-407. Failure of garnishee to answer.

  1. If any garnishee, after having been duly served with a writ of garnishment, shall neglect or refuse to answer the interrogatories exhibited to him or her, on or before thirty (30) days after service of the writ, the court, upon motion of the plaintiff, may issue a notice to the garnishee, requiring him or her to appear personally at a hearing not later than ten (10) days after receipt of said notice or at such other later date as the court may fix and answer the allegations and interrogatories of the plaintiff. Service of the notice may be made either by the clerk, or by the plaintiff, by any method prescribed by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure for service of notice.
  2. The court, after hearing and reviewing the evidence and testimony of both parties, may then render judgment against the garnishee in such amount, if any, as the court finds the garnishee held at the time of service of the writ of garnishment, of any goods, chattels, wages, credits and effects belonging to the defendant, not otherwise exempt under state or federal law; together with attorney's fees and such other reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiff, as the court may deem appropriate under the facts and circumstances.

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 9, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 4916; Pope's Dig., § 6129; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-512; Acts 1989, No. 463, § 1; 1991, No. 1027, § 1; 2013, No. 229, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. The time for filing pleadings in civil actions is now governed by Ark. R. Civ. P. 12.

Acts 1991, No. 1027, § 2, provided that the act would neither amend nor repeal § 16-110-406.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “thirty (30)” for “twenty (20)” in (a).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Laurence, The Supreme Court and the Defaulting Garnishee, Redux: An Essay on McCourt Manufacturing Company v. The Credit Bureau of Fort Smith and a Few of Its Predecessors, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, Procedural Notes from All Over, 1989 Ark. L. Notes 65.

Case Notes

Appeals.

The order ascertaining amount of garnishee's indebtedness is appealable, and subject to supersedeas. Furstenheim v. Adams, 42 Ark. 283 (1883).

Where the garnishee filed an unverified answer signed only by his attorneys, the judgment plaintiff, by filing a denial of such answer and going to trial on the issues thus made, without questioning the lack of verification, is deemed to have waived such defect in the answer and cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. Bohner v. Faught, 237 Ark. 639, 374 S.W.2d 825 (1964).

Liability upon Default.

The default of the garnishee admits his liability to the full extent of plaintiff's demand, and no proof is necessary to charge him. Wilson v. Phillips, 5 Ark. 183 (1843).

Final judgment may be rendered against a garnishee upon default made by him or when on trial the court finds that he is indebted to the defendant in the original judgment. Wilson v. Overturf, 157 Ark. 385, 248 S.W. 898 (1923).

Oral answer by garnishee to allegations contained in writ of garnishment issued out of a municipal court was held to amount to a failure to answer justifying judgment by default against garnishee. Harmon v. Bell, 204 Ark. 290, 161 S.W.2d 744 (1942).

Where garnishee filed no responsive pleading within the time fixed by statute, judgment was properly rendered against garnishee. Karoley v. A.R. & T. Elecs., Inc., 235 Ark. 609, 363 S.W.2d 120 (1962).

Any recovery to which judgment creditor would be entitled from garnishee because of garnishee's failure to file timely answer to allegations would be limited to the amount alleged by the creditor to be due the debtor by the garnishee. Carter v. Helena Marine Serv., Inc., 251 Ark. 876, 475 S.W.2d 528 (1972).

Employer, as garnishee, was required to withhold only $1,086.37 from the employee's wages under this section and Wash. Rev. Code § 6.27.200 as both parties conceded the proper amount owed to the insurer was $1,086.37, not $11,523.39 listed in the default judgment; to allow the insurer's collection of entire amount owed before reduction would be inequitable. Nationwide Ins. Enter. v. Ibanez, 368 Ark. 432, 246 S.W.3d 883 (2007).

Trial court erred in entering a writ of garnishment against an employer in the amount the employer owed at the time of service of the writ, plus the amount of nonexempt wages earned through the date of judgment, because this section specifically limited a defaulting garnishee's liability to the amount of nonexempt wages held at the time of service of the writ of garnishment. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. D.A.N. Joint Venture III L.P., 374 Ark. 489, 288 S.W.3d 627 (2008).

Cited: O'Connor v. Methodist Hosp., 42 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984); Woodcock v. First Commercial Bank, 284 Ark. 490, 683 S.W.2d 605 (1985); May v. Bob Hankins Distrib. Co., 301 Ark. 494, 785 S.W.2d 23 (1990); Adams v. Owen, 316 Ark. 99, 870 S.W.2d 741 (1994); McCourt Mfg. Co. v. Credit Bureau, 319 Ark. 23, 888 S.W.2d 650 (1994).

16-110-408. Discharge of garnishment issued before judgment upon filing of bond by defendant.

    1. Whenever a garnishment is issued in any action before judgment, the defendant may have the garnishment discharged and all funds or property of his or hers in the hands of the garnishee released therefrom by filing with the clerk of the court a bond in double the amount for which the garnishment was issued that he or she will pay any judgment which may finally be rendered against him or her in the action.
    2. Upon judgment being rendered against the defendant, summary judgment may be rendered against the sureties in the bond.
  1. The bond provided for in this section shall be executed as surety by some surety company authorized to transact business in the State of Arkansas or by at least two (2) individuals who are residents and citizens of the county in which the suit is pending. In addition, each of them shall be the owner of real estate located in the county, worth over and above all encumbrances against the property and all exemptions allowed by law to the surety, a sum equal to or in excess of the amount of the bond so executed.
  2. Before any clerk shall approve any bond so presented, he or she shall require that the sureties on the bond, if they are individuals, to qualify on the bond by making oath to the facts required in subsection (b) of this section. If any person shall knowingly swear falsely in the affidavit, he or she shall be deemed guilty of perjury and be punished accordingly.
  3. The clerk shall satisfy himself or herself of the sufficiency of the bond before he or she shall approve it. If the clerk shall approve the bond, he or she shall file it and shall issue a notice directed to the garnishee notifying him or her of the filing and approval of the bond and the release of the garnishment. The notice shall be signed by the clerk, bear the seal of the court, and be served on the garnishee by the county sheriff or constable, and return shall be made thereon as in cases of other writs of process.

History. Acts 1925, No. 177, §§ 1-4; Pope's Dig., §§ 6132-6135; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-515 — 31-518; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 230.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, deleted “or the justice of the peace before whom action may be pending” following “clerk of the court” in (a); in (c), deleted “or justice of the peace” following “clerk” and substituted “subsection (b) of this section” for “preceding paragraph”; in (d), deleted “or justice of the peace” following “The clerk”, “or justice of the peace issuing it and if issued by the clerk it shall also” preceding “bear the seal of the court”, and “shall” preceding “be served on the garnishee”.

Cross References. Perjury, § 5-53-102.

Case Notes

In General.

Where the defendants executed and filed a bond for the release of a garnishment, the garnishment is thereby eliminated and it cannot thereafter be quashed or dismissed on motion. Kettle Creek Ref. Co. v. Scales, 181 Ark. 295, 25 S.W.2d 446 (1930).

Sureties.

Where a judgment dismissing a suit and discharging garnishments was not superseded on appeal, the surety on a bond securing release of the funds impounded by the garnishments was also discharged. Hot Springs Concrete Co. v. Rosamond, 180 Ark. 690, 22 S.W.2d 368 (1929).

Upon giving a bond to release a garnishment, the garnishees were no longer in court and a subsequent judgment should have been directed against the sureties on the bond. Kettle Creek Ref. Co. v. Scales, 181 Ark. 295, 25 S.W.2d 446 (1930).

16-110-409. Discharge of garnishee before judgment upon surrender of property.

  1. If on the return day of any writ of garnishment the garnishee shall surrender to the plaintiff all the goods and chattels, moneys, credits, and effects which may be in his or her hands or possession belonging to the defendant, he or she shall be discharged with costs.
  2. The court or justice shall enter up an order releasing and discharging the garnishee from all responsibility to the defendant, in relation to the goods and chattels, moneys, credits, and effects so surrendered.

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 7, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 4914; Pope's Dig., § 6127; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-510.

Case Notes

Cited: L & S Concrete Co. v. Bibler Bros., 34 Ark. App. 181, 807 S.W.2d 50 (1991).

16-110-410. Discharge of garnishee upon judgment or judgment for plaintiff.

  1. If the issue is found for the garnishee, he or she shall be discharged without further proceedings.
  2. However, if the issue is found for the plaintiff, judgment shall be entered for the amount due from the garnishee to the defendant in the original judgment, or so much thereof as will be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment, with costs.

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 6, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 4913; Pope's Dig., § 6126; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-509.

Case Notes

In General.

The law provides a statutory remedy for a party who proves, after a trial on the issues, that false answers to interrogatories propounded with a writ of garnishment have been filed; thus, no separate and independent fraud action exists in any county arising out of the alleged untruthful or insufficient answers to interrogatories exhibited against any garnishee. T & T Materials, Inc. v. Mooney, 68 Ark. App. 77, 4 S.W.3d 512 (1999), aff'd, 340 Ark. 646, 12 S.W.3d 635 (2000).

Appeals.

An appeal lies to the circuit court from the judgment of a justice of the peace in a garnishment proceeding. Smith v. Parker, 25 Ark. 518 (1869).

Discharge of Garnishee.

Where the plaintiff gave the bond required as a prerequisite for the issuance of garnishment before judgment and subsequently released the surety on the application, but granted leave to the plaintiff to file a new bond, which was not done, whereupon the garnishee was discharged, it was held, in the absence of a showing in the record to the contrary, that it will be presumed that the court acted upon evidence sufficient to sustain the order releasing the surety and discharging the garnishee. Helton v. Howe, 162 Ark. 243, 258 S.W. 391 (1924).

Judgment Against Garnishee.

It is error to render judgment against the garnishee until judgment is obtained against defendant. Adler-Goldman Comm'n Co. v. Bloom, 62 Ark. 616, 37 S.W. 305 (1896); Norman v. Poole, 70 Ark. 127, 66 S.W. 433 (1902).

A “judgment” against a garnishee which does not specify the amount to be paid is not a final judgment. Lawrence v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 247 Ark. 1125, 449 S.W.2d 695 (1970).

16-110-411. Effect of judgment against garnishee.

In all cases where judgment shall be rendered against any garnishee on an answer to interrogatories filed, the judgment shall have the effect to release the garnishee from all responsibility in relation to the goods and chattels, moneys, credits, and effects for which the judgment may have been rendered.

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, § 8, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 4915; Pope's Dig., § 6128; A.S.A. 1947, § 31-511.

Case Notes

Indeterminate Amount.

Where a garnishee is ordered to pay over an indeterminate amount of money, he should be discharged when the amount is determined and paid into court. Lawrence v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 247 Ark. 1125, 449 S.W.2d 695 (1970).

16-110-412. Issuance of writ and judgment to another county.

Writs of garnishment may be issued from the circuit court of one (1) county to any other county in the state.

History. Acts 1889, No. 115, §§ 10, 11, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4917, 4918; Pope's Dig., §§ 6130, 6131; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-513, 31-514; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 231.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted (b).

Case Notes

Judgments by Justices of Peace.

A writ of garnishment may be issued from the circuit court of one county to any other county in the state upon judgment for an amount exceeding $10 rendered by a justice of the peace of which certified copies have been duly filed in the circuit court, as well as upon judgment originally rendered in the circuit court. St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Bowman, 76 Ark. 32, 88 S.W. 1033 (1905).

Jurisdiction.

After judgment, a writ of execution or garnishment is issuable only from the court in which the judgment was rendered. McGehee Bank v. Charles W. Greeson & Sons, 223 Ark. 18, 263 S.W.2d 901 (1954).

Upon the failure of the husband to pay “statutory dower,” the chancery court had the power to issue garnishment and/or execution on its decree. Horn v. Horn, 232 Ark. 723, 339 S.W.2d 852 (1960).

In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, only the court in which the judgment was rendered has authority to issue a garnishment thereon. Hervey v. Farms, Inc., 252 Ark. 881, 481 S.W.2d 348 (1972).

16-110-413. Garnishment against state or subdivision of state after judgment.

    1. Any indebtedness, goods and chattels, moneys, credits, or effects, except for refunds for overpayment of Arkansas state income tax belonging to a defendant in a civil action and in the hands or possession of the State of Arkansas, or any subdivision thereof, institution, department, or special district or instrumentality of the State of Arkansas, shall be subject to garnishment as is now provided by law.
    2. Nothing in subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be construed in any way to eliminate or limit the provisions of § 26-36-301 et seq. concerning the set-off of debt owed to a state program.
    1. Any writ of garnishment sued out pursuant to this section shall be served upon the individual representing the State of Arkansas, subdivision thereof, institution, department, special district, or instrumentality of the State of Arkansas, who has such indebtedness, goods and chattels, moneys, credits, or effects in his or her custody, and he or she shall answer the writ and satisfy the garnishment as provided by law.
    2. However, if the writ of garnishment is of salary or wages, it shall be served upon, answered, and satisfied by the institution, agency, department, special district, or instrumentality employing the person whose salary or wages are sought by the garnishment.
  1. A writ of garnishment shall be sued out pursuant to this section only after judgment.

History. Acts 1945, No. 44, §§ 1-3; 1965, No. 441, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-519 — 31-521; Acts 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 41, § 1; 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 55, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 55, was vetoed by the Governor. However, the Attorney General opined that the veto was invalid (Opinion No. 87-241) on the grounds that the veto occurred after the expiration of the twenty-day period allowed by Ark. Const., Art. 6, § 15. According to the Attorney General's opinion, the act became law on June 26, 1987.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Debtor-Creditor, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 573.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is constitutional. Ross v. Rich, 210 Ark. 74, 194 S.W.2d 297 (1946).

Applicability.

This section has no applicability to funds held custodia legis. McGill v. Robbins, 231 Ark. 411, 329 S.W.2d 540 (1959).

Disbursing Officers.

Judgment requiring garnishee disbursing officer to turn over to clerk of the circuit court so much of judgment defendant's salary as required to satisfy judgment would be modified to require disbursing officer to issue his voucher to such clerk for so much of judgment defendant's salary as is necessary to satisfy judgment, since no money passes through hands of disbursing officer. Ross v. Rich, 210 Ark. 74, 194 S.W.2d 297 (1946).

Exemptions.

This section does not impair the right to claim as exempt any wages due the employee, when that right otherwise exists. Ross v. Rich, 210 Ark. 74, 194 S.W.2d 297 (1946).

16-110-414. Garnishment against railroad for certain wages after judgment.

  1. No garnishment shall be issued by any court in any cause where the sum demanded is two hundred dollars ($200) or less, and where the property sought to be reached is wages due to a defendant by any railroad corporation, until after judgment has been recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant in the action.
    1. No railroad corporation shall be required to make answer to, nor shall any default or other liability attach because of its failure to answer any interrogatories propounded to it, in any action against any person to whom it may be indebted on account of wages due for personal services, where a writ of garnishment was issued in advance of the recovery by plaintiff of a personal judgment against the defendant in any action for two hundred dollars ($200) or less.
    2. Any judgment rendered against any railroad corporation for its failure or refusal to make answer to any garnishment so issued before the recovery of final judgment in the action between the plaintiff and defendant in the cases mentioned in subsection (a) of this section shall be void. Any officer entering such a judgment or who may execute or attempt to execute the judgment shall be taken and considered a trespasser.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 43, §§ 1, 2, p. 109; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4907, 4908; Pope's Dig., §§ 6120, 6121; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-502, 31-503.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section constitutes a valid exercise of the state's power. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Walsh, 86 Ark. 147, 110 S.W. 222 (1908).

Applicability.

This section applies to garnishment by attachment. Metcalf v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry., 101 Ark. 193, 141 S.W. 1167 (1911).

Cited: Stone v. Drake, 79 Ark. 384, 96 S.W. 197 (1906).

16-110-415. Garnishment of wages.

  1. Upon the garnishment of salaries, wages, or other compensation due from the employer garnishee, the employer garnishee shall hold, to the extent of the amount due upon the judgment and costs, subject to the order of the court, any nonexempt wages due or which subsequently become due. The judgment or balance due thereon is a lien on salaries, wages, or other compensation due at the time of the service of the execution, or as set out in subsection (b) of this section.
  2. The lien provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall continue as to subsequent earnings until the total amount due upon the judgment and costs is paid or satisfied. The lien on subsequent earnings shall terminate sooner if the employment relationship is terminated or if the underlying judgment is vacated or modified.

History. Acts 1981, No. 794, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 31-522 — 31-524; Acts 1991, No. 192, § 1; 1995, No. 276, § 1.

Case Notes

Cited: Thompson v. Bank of Am., 356 Ark. 576, 157 S.W.3d 174 (2004).

16-110-416. Notice to employer garnishee.

In any garnishment of salaries, wages, or other compensation due from the employer garnishee, the plaintiff shall include the following notice to the employer garnishee:

“NOTICE TO EMPLOYER GARNISHEE”

The amount of wages available for withholding for this judgment and costs is subject to certain prior claims. Under Arkansas law, income withholding for child support has a priority over all other legal processes. Under federal law, the total amount to be withheld cannot exceed the maximum amount allowed under § 303(b).”

History. Acts 1989, No. 463, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The reference in this section to “§ 303(b)” probably is to Public Law 90-321, Title III, § 303, which is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1673.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, Procedural Notes from All Over, 1989 Ark. L. Notes 65.

16-110-417. Handling costs for withholding.

  1. A payor may withhold up to two dollars and fifty cents ($2.50) per pay period in addition to any court-ordered income withholding amount for the administrative cost incurred in each withholding.
  2. The income withholding provisions of this section shall not apply to unemployment compensation benefits except to the extent allowed pursuant to the procedures set forth in §§ 11-10-109 and 11-10-110.
  3. The income withholding provisions of this section shall not apply to workers' compensation benefits except to the extent allowed pursuant to the procedures set forth in § 11-9-110.

History. Acts 1997, No. 972, § 1.

Chapter 111 Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act

A.C.R.C. Notes. The style and numbering of this chapter have been changed to conform to the official version of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Publisher's Notes. For Comments regarding the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, see Commentaries Volume B.

Cross References. Declaratory judgments, Ark. R. Civ. P. 57.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 1030, § 2: Apr. 6, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that taxpayer appeals of property taxes or other tax issues are unduly complicated by current state law and that school districts and other government bodies with no control over taxation administration are incurring unnecessary and excessive legal expenses due to being required to be named as defendants in lawsuits rather than having the right to notice and participate in lawsuits. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Right to jury trial in action for declaratory relief in state court. 33 A.L.R.4th 146.

Am. Jur. 22A Am. Jur. 2d, Decl. J., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Proceedings of Legal Institute — Panel on Declaratory Judgments, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 53.

Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies in Arkansas, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 397.

Leopold and Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable Alternative, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 131.

Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

C.J.S. 26 C.J.S., Decl. J., § 1 et seq.

Case Notes

Cited: Bryant v. English, 311 Ark. 187, 843 S.W.2d 308 (1992); Fairchild v. Norris, 317 Ark. 166, 876 S.W.2d 588 (1994); Potty Pals, Inc. v. Carson Fin. Group, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Ark. 1995); City of Fort Smith v. Didicom Towers, Inc., 362 Ark. 469, 209 S.W.3d 344 (2005); Bramlett v. Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 146, 463 S.W.3d 283 (2015).

16-111-101. Scope.

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2501.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-103(a) and was renumbered as § 16-111-101 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-101 was renumbered as § 16-111-113.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Debt Adjusting Statutes. 90 A.L.R.6th 1.

What Constitutes Plain, Speedy, and Efficient State Remedy Under Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341), Prohibiting Federal District Courts from Interfering with Assessment, Levy, or Collection of State Business Taxes. 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.

Case Notes

In General.

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions have the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Bryant v. Picado, 338 Ark. 227, 996 S.W.2d 17 (1999).

Attorney’s Fees.

Section 23-79-209 required an insurer to pay an insured attorney's fees for defending the insurer's declaratory judgment action because, inter alia, by declaring the insurer was, in fact, obligated to defend the insured in three suits, the district court rendered judgment against the insurer. Hortica-Florists' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pittman Nursery Corp., 729 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2013).

Discretion of Court.

Declaratory judgment statutes are intended to supplement rather than supersede ordinary causes of action. Consequently, when another action between the same parties, in which all issues could be determined, is actually pending at the time of the commencement of an action for a declaratory judgment, the court abuses its discretion when it entertains jurisdiction. UHS of Ark., Inc. v. Charter Hosp. of Little Rock, Inc., 297 Ark. 8, 759 S.W.2d 204 (1988).

Federal Jurisdiction.

In an action to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes, and where the plaintiffs had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Arkansas courts under this section, § 14-90-501, § 14-90-804, and § 16-113-306, the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, barred federal jurisdiction. Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

Giving a broad construction to the Tax Injunction Act's (TIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, use of “tax,” access and hook-up fees for new installations of water and sewer services qualified as taxes for purposes of the TIA. Because homebuilders' action was to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes, and because the homebuilders had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the state courts via § 16-113-306 and this section, the TIA barred federal jurisdiction over the illegal exaction claims based on Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 13 against a city, a utility, and a water and sewer commission, raised by the homebuilders. Northwest Ark. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Rogers, No. 07-5148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19772 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 3, 2008).

Because a declaratory judgment action to declare a will invalid was not cognizable under the general jurisdiction of Arkansas's circuit courts, the probate exception deprived the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction over the estate's request for a declaration that the will was void. Estate of Miller v. Miller, 51 F. Supp. 3d 861 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

Final Order.

Order denying the motion for declaratory judgment was not a final order. Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 322 Ark. 308, 908 S.W.2d 653 (1995).

Jurisdiction.

The mere fact that petitioner sought a declaratory judgment in addition to an injunction did not give the court jurisdiction to grant the injunction. Robinson v. Morgan, 228 Ark. 1091, 312 S.W.2d 329 (1958).

Where a jurisdictional question was not free from doubt and it was quite possible that the chancery court, if the petition for declaratory judgment were entertained, might decide the point one way while the justice of the peace court in which city had filed action, or the circuit court on appeal, might reach exactly the opposite conclusion, it would be manifestly desirable if such jurisdictional question be finally determined in the suit at law where it arose in the first instance. Cabot v. Morgan, 228 Ark. 1084, 312 S.W.2d 333 (1958).

Where in an action for declaratory judgment, the complaint did not show that there was either a justifiable controversy or subject matter jurisdiction, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ross-Lawhon, 290 Ark. 578, 290 Ark. 578, 721 S.W.2d 658 (1986).

Arkansas's declaratory judgment act empowers a circuit court to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of a will only by virtue of its probate jurisdiction. A declaratory judgment action to declare a will invalid is not cognizable under the general jurisdiction of Arkansas's circuit courts. Estate of Miller v. Miller, 51 F. Supp. 3d 861 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

Justiciable Controversy.

Declaratory Judgment Act does not require actual litigation as a prerequisite to asking for a declaratory judgment, but, as a general rule, litigation must be pending or threatened. Jessup v. Carmichael, 224 Ark. 230, 272 S.W.2d 438 (1954).

An attorney seeking fees for a worker's compensation suit to be based on a percentage of the medical payments made by an employer and his insurer, even though the full amount of payments was not yet known, could not obtain a declaratory judgment if he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Ragon v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954).

The Declaratory Judgment Act is not intended to allow any question to be presented by any person; rather, a justiciable controversy must exist. Andres v. First Ark. Dev. Fin. Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97 (1959); Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Olive's Sporting Goods, Inc., 25 Ark. App. 81, 753 S.W.2d 284 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 297 Ark. 516, 764 S.W.2d 596 (1989).

Suit for declaratory judgment as to constitutionality of statutes presents a justiciable controversy. Bennett v. NAACP, 236 Ark. 750, 370 S.W.2d 79 (1963); Coley v. Clinton, 479 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Ark. 1979).

A declaration of law in a separate and independent action when a justiciable controversy exists, in anticipation of future litigation, would be proper and the judgment appealable, but declaratory relief is not proper when the identical questions involved in the declaratory judgment proceeding are already at issue between the parties in a pending action. Boyett v. Boyett, 269 Ark. 36, 598 S.W.2d 86 (1980).

Proposed Amendments to State Constitution.

Voter demonstrating that a proposed constitutional amendment was unconstitutional was entitled to both declaratory and mandamus relief, as (1) declaratory relief is available whether or not other relief can be obtained; (2) the Arkansas Supreme Court has routinely ordered the Arkansas Secretary of State to not count or certify any ballots cast for a proposed amendment that does not meet the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution or Arkansas law; and (3) a voter has a right to cast a ballot only on referred constitutional amendments that meet the standards set forth by the Arkansas Constitution. Martin v. Humphrey, 2018 Ark. 295, 558 S.W.3d 370 (2018).

Statute of Limitations.

In a declaratory judgment action, even if the five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until there was notice that a first lease was being relied on, a complaint was time-barred due to a recordation of an assignment; the recording served as constructive notice from the time the instrument was filed for record, and the case was filed more than 5 years after an assignment was recorded. The circuit court did not err by treating the claim as raising contract enforcement issues and applying the relevant statutory period of limitations. McDougal v. Sabine River Land Co., 2015 Ark. App. 281, 461 S.W.3d 359 (2015).

Sufficiency of Complaints.

In declaratory judgment action wherein plaintiff sought judgment declaring her right to make such use of her lot as would prevent surface water from flowing across it from lands of defendants where some defendants stated they would hold her liable in damages if she interfered with the drainage of the water, chancellor did not abuse his discretion in dismissing the petition where it appeared that persons other than the named defendants might be damaged by her action and where it did not appear in detail just what action she proposed or what the probable damage to defendants and others might be. Jessup v. Carmichael, 224 Ark. 230, 272 S.W.2d 438 (1954).

The criteria for a declaratory judgment were met where, although neither complaint used the words “declaratory judgment,” the effect of the complaints was to request that the court “declare rights, status, and other legal relations.” Equity Gen. Agents, Inc. v. O'Neal, 15 Ark. App. 302, 692 S.W.2d 789 (1985).

Declaratory relief was not available where the plaintiff did not seek a declaration of his rights under the terms of an insurance contract, but, instead, alleged that a misrepresentation of the insurance contract terms was made in 1984 and that as a consequence of that misrepresentation, he wais entitled to have the contract of insurance reformed to conform with the representations made to him at that time. Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 344 Ark. 177, 40 S.W.3d 733 (2001).

In a putative class action against an air ambulance service, declaratory judgment claims as pleaded were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713; a judgment declaring that an air ambulance service had no claim for breach of contract, and no right to recover for services it actually provided under any equitable theory, because it did not disclose its pricing term before providing services, would be clearly preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act's express preemption provision. Ferrell v. Air EVAC EMS, Inc., 900 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2018).

Cited: White v. Thornbrough, 229 Ark. 96, 313 S.W.2d 384 (1958); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Downs, 230 Ark. 77, 320 S.W.2d 765 (1959); Watson v. Jones, 233 Ark. 203, 343 S.W.2d 415 (1961); Faubus v. Miles, 237 Ark. 957, 377 S.W.2d 601 (1964); American Television Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 253 Ark. 760, 489 S.W.2d 754 (1973); Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 254 Ark. 956, 497 S.W.2d 15 (1973); Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1980); Capehart-Creager Enters., Inc. v. O'Hara & Kendall Aviation, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Worthen v. Dillard, 275 Ark. 132, 628 S.W.2d 7 (1982); Stephenson v. Whittington, 6 Ark. App. 4, 636 S.W.2d 878 (1982); Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Kildow, 9 Ark. App. 86, 654 S.W.2d 600 (1983); Integon Life Ins. Co. v. Vandegrift, 11 Ark. App. 270, 669 S.W.2d 492 (1984); Murphy v. Epes, 283 Ark. 517, 678 S.W.2d 352 (1984); Webb v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 286 Ark. 399, 692 S.W.2d 233 (1985); Lawson v. City of Mammoth Spring ex rel. Smith, 287 Ark. 12, 696 S.W.2d 712 (1985); Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992); Hardy v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 95 Ark. App. 48, 233 S.W.3d 165 (2006); Perroni v. Sachar, 2017 Ark. 59, 513 S.W.3d 239 (2017).

16-111-102. Power to construe, etc.

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 2; 1957, No. 35, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2502.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-104 and was renumbered as § 16-111-102 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-102 was renumbered as § 16-111-112.

Case Notes

In General.

While this section recognizes a party's right to a declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy is required. Mastin v. Mastin, 316 Ark. 327, 871 S.W.2d 585 (1994).

All four elements for declaratory relief were met and the action was improperly dismissed for the customer's failure to join her daughter where the customer sought a determination of her obligation for unauthorized charges by the daughter on a charge account, as: (1) there was a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy existed between two parties having adverse interests; (3) the customer claimed the customer did not owe for the charges; and (4) the issue was ripe for adjudication because the store continued to pursue recovery of the debt from the customer. Wilmans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Ark. 668, 144 S.W.3d 245 (2004).

In a city's challenge to the county assessor's allocation of millage rates, the matter was appropriate for declaratory judgment as it involved questions that directly affected an existing bond issue and presented a justiciable issue for the trial court to decide. City of Fayetteville v. Wash. County, 369 Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844 (2007).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to the State of Arkansas and a prosecuting attorney on petitioner's complaint for a declaratory judgment that a statute was unconstitutional because petitioner was not in custody; because petitioner was on probation, and therefore not in custody, petitioner was not entitled to any postconviction relief. Neely v. McCastlain, 2009 Ark. 189, 306 S.W.3d 424 (2009).

Circuit court properly dismissed a physician's complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Arkansas State Medical Board where the statutes and regulations he sought to challenge did not completely bar any class of physicians from a certain act, and he failed to pursue the administrative remedy afforded him. Ahmad v. Beck, 2016 Ark. 30, 480 S.W.3d 166 (2016).

Beneficiaries of a state Medicaid program were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing their declaratory judgment action in the circuit court because any irreparable harm to the beneficiaries warranted application of the futility exception; also, § 25-15-207(d) provided the beneficiaries the statutory scheme for seeking a declaratory judgment in lieu of pursuing the exhaustion of remedies. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 2017 Ark. 308, 530 S.W.3d 336 (2017).

Applicability.

Petition for declaratory relief was denied as the individual's petition sought a declaration that her son, who witnessed his sister's death following an accident with the driver, could bring a claim for emotional damages; the Declaratory Judgment Act was not appropriate simply to determine whether a cause of action existed. Hardy v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 95 Ark. App. 48, 233 S.W.3d 165 (2006).

In an action arising out of a state-chartered bank's practices regarding the order in which debit card transactions were posted to maximize overdraft fees, customers were entitled to seek declaratory relief that the contracts at issue, or portions thereof, were unconscionable, as well as supplemental relief in the form of monetary damages. Hanjy v. Arvest Bank, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1012 (E.D. Ark. 2015).

Affected by Statutes.

Insurance company has a right to use the declaratory judgment proceeding to have determined its duty to pay or defend where it questions whether the policy covers the situation out of which the injury arose. Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 232 Ark. 41, 334 S.W.2d 688 (1960).

Under this section, an independent candidate for office could have had a judicial determination of the constitutionality of a statute before paying the filing fee provided therein, and having failed to do so and paid the fee voluntarily, he could not raise the question after his defeat in the general election by an action for refund of the fee. County of Searcy v. Stephenson, 244 Ark. 54, 424 S.W.2d 369 (1968).

Mandamus was not the proper remedy where a petitioner was seeking an order for the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to rescind and void all permits issued to private clubs pursuant to statute for the dispensing of alcoholic beverages, because the constitutionality of the statute could be determined in a proceeding for declaratory judgment and because the petitioner was attempting to enforce an alleged duty which was not a plain ministerial duty for which a writ of mandamus could issue. Kemp-Bradford VFW Post 4764 v. Wood, 262 Ark. 168, 554 S.W.2d 344 (1977).

Defendant, who was convicted in a municipal court and filed suit for declaratory judgment that the legislation creating the court was unconstitutional and that his conviction was void had standing to bring the action as a person whose rights were affected by the legislation. Lawson v. City of Mammoth Spring ex rel. Smith, 287 Ark. 12, 696 S.W.2d 712 (1985).

Section 25-15-212 unconstitutionally deprives inmates of review of constitutional questions, because judicial review of all other administrative questions may be granted, or withheld, according to the Legislature's discretion. Clinton v. Bonds, 306 Ark. 554, 816 S.W.2d 169 (1991).

A municipal corporation had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute which permitted a landowner or group of landowners to have their land detached from a municipality and annexed to another municipality in order to obtain additional municipal services where that was once a part of its borders has now been annexed by a neighboring city pursuant to the statute. City of Cave Springs v. City of Rogers, 343 Ark. 652, 37 S.W.3d 607 (2001).

There was no requirement that appellants had to raise to the Arkansas State Medical Board their facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 17-95-102, which requires physicians to receive prior approval from the board in order to dispense legend drugs, or that the physician had to apply for a permit before bringing the declaratory action in circuit court. Appellants did not bring their case under the Administrative Procedure Act, but instead filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief; and an exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary to bring an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act where appellants had no pending claims before an agency and raised a facial constitutional challenge to the statute. Abraham v. Beck, 2015 Ark. 80, 456 S.W.3d 744 (2015).

Insurance Contracts.

Insurance contracts come within the purview of the declaratory judgment statute. Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 232 Ark. 41, 334 S.W.2d 688 (1960).

There is no law authorizing a declaratory judgment to be sought by a third party; the insured is the only one that can seek such a judgment. Nall v. Scott, 233 Ark. 21, 342 S.W.2d 418 (1961).

A declaratory judgment action rendered against the insured in favor of the insurer while the plaintiff injured party has an action pending against the insured is not res judicata when the plaintiff exhausts his remedies against the insured and sues the insurance company where the plaintiff was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 236 Ark. 268, 365 S.W.2d 454 (1963).

Where there exists a justiciable controversy in which an insurance policyholder is vitally concerned with the number of “occurrences” and amount of his aggregate coverage, a declaratory judgment action is proper. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Olive's Sporting Goods, Inc., 297 Ark. 516, 764 S.W.2d 596 (1989).

Summary judgment was properly granted in a declaratory judgment action as it related to an intentional act exclusion in a homeowner's policy because a negligence lawsuit brought by an injured party was based upon injuries caused by the unexpected result of an insured's intentional act of shooting a gun. However, there was ambiguity in the language of a general liability exclusion; therefore, summary judgment was precluded because it was susceptible to more than one reasonable construction. Parker v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 104 Ark. App. 301, 292 S.W.3d 311 (2009).

Justiciable Controversy.

Declaratory relief was proper in appellants' action to have the Arkansas Check-Cashers Act declared unconstitutional because a justiciable controversy was present between appellants and the Arkansas State Board of Collection Agencies as to the implementation, application, and effect of the Act. McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 375 Ark. 52, 289 S.W.3d 18 (2008).

Circuit court did not err in denying declaratory relief to a tobacco products manufacturer where it sought declaratory relief on events only hypothetical in nature and, therefore, the manufacturer lacked standing because no justiciable controversy existed. McLane Southern, Inc. v. Ark. Tobacco Control Bd., 2010 Ark. 498, 375 S.W.3d 628 (2010).

Doctor who had allowed his Arkansas medical license to lapse did not have standing to obtain a judgment declaring that § 17-95-409(b) did not apply to contracts under the Community Match Loan and Scholarship Program, established under § 6-81-715 et seq., because the Declaratory Judgment Statute, § 16-111-101 et seq., was applicable only where there was a present actual controversy. Nelson v. Ark. Rural Med. Practice Loan & Scholarship Bd., 2011 Ark. 491, 385 S.W.3d 762 (2011).

Because the operator failed to present a justiciable controversy under this section, the declaratory judgment in its favor was not proper; the requested declaratory relief regarding any alleged due-process violations, which were based upon the lack of a hearing, was moot, and the circuit court erred in granting the operator's motion for summary judgment. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Civitan Ctr., Inc., 2012 Ark. 40, 386 S.W.3d 432 (2012).

Court did not err in concluding that the business was not entitled to declaratory relief, because there was no existing legal controversy, when the business sought a declaration that its conduct (sweepstakes promotion) was legal and not subject to prosecution, and it was apparent the business was seeking an advisory opinion rather than the resolution of an actual controversy; courts do not sit for the purpose of determining speculative and abstract questions of law or laying down rules for future conduct. Cancun Cyber Cafe & Bus. Ctr., Inc. v. City of N. Little Rock, 2012 Ark. 154 (2012).

Circuit court's determination that §§ 25-19-104 and 25-19-106 were unconstitutional was improper because declaratory relief was inappropriate under this section as appellees did not yet have a case or controversy ready for decision by the courts. Appellees received a legal opinion on the effects of certain provisions of the state's Freedom of Information Act rather than resolution of an actual controversy. McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith, 2012 Ark. 452, 425 S.W.3d 671 (2012).

Circuit court erred in denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment in the hospitals' action to declare the Arkansas Peer Review Fairness Act, § 20-9-1301 et seq., unconstitutional because the court did not elaborate on its ruling that the Act was not unconstitutional and a justiciable controversy had not been presented for review where the hospitals did not state they were violating the Act, did not allege a threat of imminent enforcement under the Act, and did not present a sufficient factual record to show an actual, present controversy, which was a necessary element of a declaratory-judgment suit. Baptist Health Sys. v. Rutledge, 2016 Ark. 121, 488 S.W.3d 507 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in denying resident's petition for declaratory judgment because no justiciable controversy existed; the allocation of the cost of the improvements to the water system was sufficiently detailed in the 2005 receivership order, the order had been entered and affirmed, and the city had no control over the receivership or the handling or financing of the projects undertaken pursuant to its authority. Williams v. City of Sherwood, 2019 Ark. App. 487, 586 S.W.3d 711 (2019).

Municipal Annexation.

A city in which property was originally located had standing to argue that another city which annexed the property did not meet the requirements of the annexation statute, § 14-40-2002, as the issue of whether the property remained a part of the first city depended upon whether the second city met its obligations under the annexation statute. City of Lowell v. City of Rogers, 345 Ark. 33, 43 S.W.3d 742 (2001).

Municipal Ordinances.

Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was improperly granted because a complaint filed by a lessor and a lessee sufficiently alleged that their rights or other legal relations were affected by Avoca, Ark., Ordinance No. 69 where a town was making demands regarding the removal of billboards; therefore, the lessor and the lessee were entitled to declaratory relief under this section. They were arguing that the town lacked power to regulate the billboards at issue. Statewide Outdoor Adver., LLC v. Town of Avoca, 104 Ark. App. 10, 289 S.W.3d 111 (2008).

Rights of Third Parties.

In a property owner's suit to decide which of two public entities had the right to set a sewer connection fee, the owner had standing to seek a declaratory judgment because: (1) the owner was a beneficiary of a contract between the entities, and (2) under this section, any person (even a non-beneficiary) whose legal relations were affected by a contract could obtain a declaration of legal relations under the contract. McAlmont Suburban Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 242 v. McCain-Hwy. 161, LLC, 99 Ark. App. 431, 262 S.W.3d 185 (2007).

Cited: Roberts v. Watts, 263 Ark. 822, 568 S.W.2d 1 (1978); Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Kildow, 9 Ark. App. 86, 654 S.W.2d 600 (1983); City of Jacksonville v. Martin, 286 Ark. 288, 692 S.W.2d 226 (1985); Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992); Stilley v. James, 345 Ark. 362, 48 S.W.3d 521 (2001); Stilley v. James, 347 Ark. 74, 60 S.W.3d 410 (2001); Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002); Weaver v. Collins, 2010 Ark. App. 707, 379 S.W.3d 582 (2010).

16-111-103. [Reserved.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Arkansas did not adopt Section 3 of the official version of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Section 3 provides that “a contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof”.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 16-111-103(a) has been renumbered as § 16-111-101. Former 16-111-103(b) has been renumbered as § 16-111-105.

16-111-104. Executor, etc.

Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic, or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto:

  1. To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others;
  2. To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
  3. To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2503.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-105 and was renumbered as § 16-111-104 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-104 was renumbered as § 16-111-102.

16-111-105. Enumeration not exclusive.

The enumeration in §§ 16-111-102 and 16-111-104 does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in § 16-111-101, in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2504.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-103(b) and was renumbered as § 16-111-105 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-105 was renumbered as § 16-111-104.

16-111-106. Discretionary.

The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2505.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-108 and was renumbered as § 16-111-106 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-106 was renumbered as § 16-111-111.

Case Notes

Pending Federal Action.

Trial court did not err in dismissing a declaratory judgment action on the ground that the issues present in a city's declaratory-judgment suit against a telecommunications company would be determined in a federal case that the telecommunications company was preparing to file between the parties in federal court; further, the state court action might not have resolved all the issues between the parties. City of Fort Smith v. Didicom Towers, Inc., 362 Ark. 469, 209 S.W.3d 344 (2005).

Parties Not Included.

Where all of the parties with an interest in the election that would be affected were not parties to the action, a declaratory judgment voiding election was properly refused as it would actually complicate the controversy rather than terminate it. McFarlin v. Kelly, 246 Ark. 1237, 442 S.W.2d 183 (1969).

Where all necessary parties have not been brought into court, the trial court should refuse to render a declaratory judgment in the case. Board of Educ. v. Ozark Sch. Dist., 2 Ark. App. 112, 619 S.W.2d 304 (1981).

Cited: Cairns v. Witt, 242 Ark. 735, 415 S.W.2d 47 (1967); American Television Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 253 Ark. 760, 489 S.W.2d 754 (1973); Yamauchi v. Sovran Bank/Central S., 309 Ark. 532, 832 S.W.2d 241 (1992).

16-111-107. Review.

All orders, judgments and decrees under this chapter may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2506.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-109 and was renumbered as § 16-111-107 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-107 was renumbered as § 16-111-109.

Case Notes

In General.

Judgment of circuit court in declaratory judgment proceeding is reviewed in same manner as any other judgment, and if there is any substantial evidence to support finding upon which the judgment is based, it will be affirmed. Mid-South Ins. Co. v. Dellinger, 239 Ark. 169, 388 S.W.2d 6 (1965); Commercial Printing Co. v. Rush, 261 Ark. 468, 549 S.W.2d 790 (1977).

Cited: American Television Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 253 Ark. 760, 489 S.W.2d 754 (1973); Poff v. Peedin, 2010 Ark. App. 365, 374 S.W.3d 879 (2010).

16-111-108. Supplementary relief.

Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2507.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-110 and was renumbered as § 16-111-108 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-108 was renumbered as § 16-111-106.

Case Notes

Applicability.

In an action arising out of a state-chartered bank's practices regarding the order in which debit card transactions were posted to maximize overdraft fees, customers were entitled to seek declaratory relief that the contracts at issue, or portions thereof, were unconscionable, as well as supplemental relief in the form of monetary damages. Hanjy v. Arvest Bank, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1012 (E.D. Ark. 2015).

Mandamus Relief.

Voter demonstrating that a proposed constitutional amendment was unconstitutional was entitled to both declaratory and mandamus relief, as (1) declaratory relief is available whether or not other relief can be obtained; (2) the Arkansas Supreme Court has routinely ordered the Arkansas Secretary of State to not count or certify any ballots cast for a proposed amendment that does not meet the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution or Arkansas law; and (3) a voter has a right to cast a ballot only on referred constitutional amendments that meet the standards set forth by the Arkansas Constitution. Martin v. Humphrey, 2018 Ark. 295, 558 S.W.3d 370 (2018).

16-111-109. Jury trial.

When a proceeding under this chapter involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2508.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-107 and was renumbered as § 16-111-109 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-109 was renumbered as § 16-111-107.

Case Notes

Cited: American Television Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 253 Ark. 760, 489 S.W.2d 754 (1973); Crawford v. Cashion, 2010 Ark. 124, 361 S.W.3d 268 (2010).

16-111-110. Costs.

In any proceeding under this chapter the court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2509.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-111 and was renumbered as § 16-111-110 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-110 was renumbered as § 16-111-108.

Case Notes

Costs Awarded.

Statutory attorney's fees under § 16-22-308 were not available in an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act; however, costs were available under this section. Hanners v. Giant Oil Co. of Ark., Inc., 373 Ark. 418, 284 S.W.3d 468 (2008).

Costs Denied.

Trial court did not err in denying a telecommunications company's motion for costs following the dismissal of a city's declaratory judgment action against the company because there was no resolution on the merits of the action; rather, it was merely dismissed because a similar action was pending in federal court, which the trial court believed would determine the issues between the parties. City of Fort Smith v. Didicom Towers, Inc., 362 Ark. 469, 209 S.W.3d 344 (2005).

Cited: Mid-South Ins. Co. v. Dellinger, 239 Ark. 169, 388 S.W.2d 6 (1965).

16-111-111. Parties.

  1. When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the State shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
    1. When declaratory relief is sought with respect to a tax, a person or group of persons challenging the tax shall provide a governmental entity and a school district whose direct revenue could be affected by the declaration with notice of the action by providing a copy of the complaint to the governmental entity or school district.
    2. A governmental entity or school district provided with notice under subdivision (b)(1) of this section has the right to intervene in the action but is not required to be named as a party to the action nor is the governmental entity or school district considered an indispensable or necessary party to the action.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2510; Acts 2017, No. 1030, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The 2017 amendment to this section is not part of the official version of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-106 and was renumbered as § 16-111-111 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-111-111 was renumbered as § 16-111-110.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (b).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Hardin, Survey of Arkansas Law: Public Law, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 281.

Survey — Constitutional Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 161.

Case Notes

In General.

Although appellant did argue his constitutional claim to the trial court, the record did not reveal that either the Attorney General was notified of the state's right to be represented in the proceeding, or that the issues were otherwise adequately argued or briefed by truly adversarial parties. Therefore, the constitutional challenge would not be considered on appeal. Reagan v. City of Piggott, 305 Ark. 77, 805 S.W.2d 636 (1991).

This section did not require notice to the Attorney General in order to challenge rules promulgated by the appellate court; the statute specifically listed statutes, ordinances, and franchises, but made no mention of rules and was not applicable. Smith v. Sidney Moncrief Pontiac, Buick, GMC Co., 353 Ark. 701, 120 S.W.3d 525 (2003).

Although there was nothing in the record to indicate that the real property owner complied with the statutory requirement to provide notice to the Attorney General of the real property owner's challenge to the constitutionality of § 26-37-301, the Supreme Court of Arkansas addressed the real property owner's constitutional challenge because the record indicated that the arguments were fully developed before the trial court. Tsann Kuen Enters. Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 129 S.W.3d 822 (2003).

Declaratory relief was not the proper mechanism to determine if an individual's son had a claim for emotional distress after witnessing the death of his sister, who was involved in an accident with the driver, the insurer's insured, as the relationship between the insurer and the insured had no bearing on the potential claim by the individual's son. Hardy v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 95 Ark. App. 48, 233 S.W.3d 165 (2006).

Purpose.

Purpose of the notice requirement is to prevent a statute from being declared unconstitutional in a proceeding which might not be a fully adversary and complete adjudication. Prater ex rel. Estate of Prater v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 547, 739 S.W.2d 676 (1987).

Since the constitutional arguments were not fully developed before the trial court, a decision on the merits would have circumvented the purpose of the notice requirement. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Heath, 307 Ark. 147, 817 S.W.2d 885 (1991).

Adversarial Proceeding.

The appellate court did not consider the constitutionality of the public service penalty in § 5-65-306 because the appellate court will not strike down a legislative act on constitutional grounds without first having the benefit of a fully developed adversarial case. Drummond v. State, 320 Ark. 385, 897 S.W.2d 553 (1995).

Appellate Review.

Defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of a statute was not preserved for appellate review because defendant gave no required notice of the challenge to the Attorney General of the State of Arkansas. Mason v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 285, 435 S.W.3d 510 (2014).

Attorney General.

The purpose of the notice requirement is to prevent an ordinance or statute from being declared unconstitutional in a proceeding which might not be a fully adversary and complete adjudication. City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982), cert. denied, Cash v. Little Rock, 462 U.S. 1111, 103 S. Ct. 2464, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1341 (1983), overruled in part, T&T Chem. v. Priest, 351 Ark. 537, 95 S.W.3d 750 (2003).

Since this section requires service on the Attorney General, but does not require him to appear or to be made a party, the requirement of service is not jurisdictional; therefore, even though noncompliance with the notice requirement is generally reversible error, reversal is not mandated by this section. City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982), cert. denied, Cash v. Little Rock, 462 U.S. 1111, 103 S. Ct. 2464, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1341 (1983), overruled in part, T&T Chem. v. Priest, 351 Ark. 537, 95 S.W.3d 750 (2003).

In action by taxpayers seeking to declare invalid ordinances, the chancellor erred in not requiring that the Attorney General be given notice and an opportunity to be heard; however, since all points were exhaustively briefed and argued by city attorneys, such error was not prejudicial. City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982), cert. denied, Cash v. Little Rock, 462 U.S. 1111, 103 S. Ct. 2464, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1341 (1983), overruled in part, T&T Chem. v. Priest, 351 Ark. 537, 95 S.W.3d 750 (2003).

Trial court erred in not requiring that Attorney General be served with notice of proceeding and be given an opportunity to be heard. Prater ex rel. Estate of Prater v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 547, 739 S.W.2d 676 (1987); Olmstead v. Logan, 298 Ark. 421, 768 S.W.2d 26 (1989).

Failure to notify the Attorney General was not grounds for reversal where there had been a full adjudication of the issue, the Attorney General was a party at the hearing and even submitted a brief. Carney v. State, 305 Ark. 431, 808 S.W.2d 755 (1991).

Where plaintiff notified the Attorney General of her constitutional challenge within the allotted period under this section, but failed to pursue the issue further, neither filing motions with the trial court on the question nor requesting a ruling on her previous challenge, the trial court never ruled on the constitutional issue; the burden of obtaining a ruling is on the movant, and matters left unresolved are waived any may not be raised on appeal. Parmley v. Moose, 317 Ark. 52, 876 S.W.2d 243 (1994).

Where no notice of appellant's constitutional challenge was given to the Attorney General pursuant to this section, the appellate court could choose not to consider the argument on appeal. Brumley v. Naples, 320 Ark. 310, 896 S.W.2d 860 (1995).

In a termination of parental rights case, the appellate court declined to consider a mother's constitutional challenge because it was not preserved for appellate review; moreover, the mother failed to give proper notice to the Arkansas Attorney General. Maxwell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 90 Ark. App. 223, 205 S.W.3d 801 (2005).

Automatic License Plate Reader System Act, § 12-12-1801 et seq., provided for enforcement only through private actions for damages. While the Attorney General may intervene and defend the constitutionality of the Act in a private damages suit, the Attorney General does not initiate enforcement or seek relief against a putative defendant; thus, the companies' injury was “fairly traceable” only to the private civil litigants who may seek damages under the Act and the companies lacked standing to sue the Governor and Attorney General challenging the Act's constitutionality. Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2015).

Argument that a mother's constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause were violated by the current interpretation of § 28-65-204 was not considered on appeal because notice was not given to the Arkansas Attorney General. Sherland v. Sherland, 2015 Ark. App. 342, 465 S.W.3d 3 (2015).

Defendant's arguments regarding the constitutionality of § 5-26-203, if preserved, could be heard even though she had not notified the Attorney General pursuant to this section where the State was a party to the proceedings and had the opportunity to fully defend against the constitutional challenge. Bynum v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 201, 546 S.W.3d 533 (2018).

Counterclaim.

When appellant law firm nonsuited its Freedom of Information Act claim under § 25-19-105, the circuit court did not err in permitting appellees, several doctors, an attorney, and a hospital, to move forward on their counterclaim. Under Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(3), a defendant has the right to pursue a counterclaim even though the plaintiff has dismissed its original claim. Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Farrar, 2012 Ark. 180, 402 S.W.3d 511 (2012).

Municipalities.

In action seeking to establish the validity of a municipal ordinance where necessary parties are not made parties to the suit, a declaratory judgment should not be rendered. Laman v. Martin, 235 Ark. 938, 362 S.W.2d 711 (1962).

Counties, cities, and towns are municipal corporations within the meaning of this section. Roberts v. Watts, 263 Ark. 822, 568 S.W.2d 1 (1978).

Where challenged ordinances levied privilege tax against waterworks commission, which was therefore technically a necessary party to taxpayers' suit, but the ordinance passed on the tax to the consumer so that the waterworks was merely a conduit for the city, there was no prejudice to any of the parties as a result of failure to require the operating authority of the waterworks and its commissioners to be made parties. City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982), cert. denied, Cash v. Little Rock, 462 U.S. 1111, 103 S. Ct. 2464, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1341 (1983), overruled in part, T&T Chem. v. Priest, 351 Ark. 537, 95 S.W.3d 750 (2003).

Parties in Interest.

For the purposes of removal, federal law determines who is plaintiff and who is defendant; it is a question of construction of the federal statute on removal and not the state statute, and the state's procedural provisions cannot control the privilege of removal granted by federal statute. Mitchell v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Ark. 1961).

A suit brought by a voter seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether the senate should be divided into two classes by lot was fatally defective when only the five senators from the voter's senatorial district were named parties defendant, it being necessary under this section to name all senators parties defendant. Block v. Allen, 241 Ark. 970, 411 S.W.2d 21 (1967).

Where all the objectors to a petition are residents of the same residential zone or district where the petitioner's property is located, it is not error for the chancellor to restrict his decree to such zone or district. Ark. Release Guidance Found. v. Hummel, 245 Ark. 953, 435 S.W.2d 774 (1969).

Where a voter brought a class action for a declaratory judgment to have an election set aside, but neither the unsuccessful election contestant nor the election winner was made a party to the action, the failure to include the election contestants was fatal to the declaratory judgment action, since their interest would certainly have been affected by the outcome of the action. Files v. Hill, 268 Ark. 106, 594 S.W.2d 836 (1980).

Where all necessary parties have not been brought into court, the trial court should refuse under this section and former § 16-111-108 (now § 16-111-106) to render a declaratory judgment in the case. Board of Educ. v. Ozark Sch. Dist., 2 Ark. App. 112, 619 S.W.2d 304 (1981).

Complete relief could not be afforded without making the guardian of a lifetime beneficiary and the remainder beneficiaries parties to an action; consequently, chancellor erred in exercising jurisdiction because the guardian and the remaindermen could later raise identical issues, and thus, there would be no termination of the uncertainty or controversy. Yamauchi v. Sovran Bank/Central S., 309 Ark. 532, 832 S.W.2d 241 (1992).

A declaratory judgment action by a candidate for public office and a registered voter seeking a declaration that the candidate was the winner of a Democratic Party primary election was nonjusticiable where neither the Secretary of State nor the state Democratic Committee were joined as parties in the action. Willis v. Circuit Court of Phillips County, 342 Ark. 128, 27 S.W.3d 372 (2000).

State of Arkansas, through the Arkansas Attorney General and the Prosecuting Attorney for the State of Arkansas, had standing to appeal the dismissal of school district's action for the implementation of an additional levy of 7.55 mills because the state had been named as a party and a constitutional question was at issue. Beebe v. Fountain Lake Sch. Dist., 365 Ark. 536, 231 S.W.3d 628 (2006).

Where child's biological father was denied the right to consent to his child's adoption and claimed that the Arkansas adoption statutes violated his right to due process, the state had a right to intervene. Escobedo v. Nickita, 365 Ark. 548, 231 S.W.3d 601 (2006).

County clerks and county election commissioners were not necessary parties under this section, where the named parties were the individual commissioners of the State Board of Election Commissioners and the Secretary of State, and those officials were responsible for training and directing the county clerks and election commissioners. Martin v. Kohls, 2014 Ark. 427, 444 S.W.3d 844 (2014).

Cited: Cairns v. Witt, 242 Ark. 735, 415 S.W.2d 47 (1967); Pulaski County Mun. Court v. Scott, 272 Ark. 115, 612 S.W.2d 297 (1981); Handy Dan Improv. Ctr., Inc. v. Adams, 276 Ark. 268, 633 S.W.2d 699 (1982); Equity Gen. Agents, Inc. v. O'Neal, 15 Ark. App. 302, 692 S.W.2d 789 (1985); Lawson v. City of Mammoth Spring ex rel. Smith, 287 Ark. 12, 696 S.W.2d 712 (1985); City of Star City v. Shepherd, 287 Ark. 188, 697 S.W.2d 113 (1985); Cummings v. City of Fayetteville, 294 Ark. 151, 741 S.W.2d 638 (1987); Spires v. Members of Election Comm'n, 302 Ark. 407, 790 S.W.2d 167 (1990); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Heath, 312 Ark. 206, 848 S.W.2d 927 (1993); Davis v. Child Support Enforcement Unit, 326 Ark. 677, 933 S.W.2d 798 (1996); Oliver v. Washington County, 328 Ark. 61, 940 S.W.2d 884 (1997); Beulah v. State, 352 Ark. 472, 101 S.W.3d 802 (2003); Landers v. Jameson, 355 Ark. 163, 132 S.W.3d 741 (2003); Osborne v. Bekaert Corp., 97 Ark. App. 147, 245 S.W.3d 185 (2006); Parker v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 104 Ark. App. 301, 292 S.W.3d 311 (2009); Barrett v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 36, 593 S.W.3d 1 (2020); Ring v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 150, 596 S.W.3d 76 (2020).

16-111-112. Construction.

This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2511.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-102 and was renumbered as § 16-111-112 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Case Notes

Attorney’s Fees.

Section 23-79-209 required an insurer to pay an insured attorney's fees for defending the insurer's declaratory judgment action because, inter alia, by declaring the insurer was, in fact, obligated to defend the insured in three suits, the district court rendered judgment against the insurer. Hortica-Florists' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pittman Nursery Corp., 729 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2013).

Constitutionality of Legislation.

There was no requirement that appellants had to raise to the Arkansas State Medical Board their facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 17-95-102, which requires physicians to receive prior approval from the board in order to dispense legend drugs, or that the physician had to apply for a permit before bringing the declaratory action in circuit court. Appellants did not bring their case under the Administrative Procedure Act, but instead filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief; and an exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary to bring an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act where appellants had no pending claims before an agency and raised a facial constitutional challenge to the statute. Abraham v. Beck, 2015 Ark. 80, 456 S.W.3d 744 (2015).

No Existing Legal Controversy.

Court did not err in concluding that the business was not entitled to declaratory relief, because there was no existing legal controversy, when the business sought a declaration that its conduct (sweepstakes promotion) was legal and not subject to prosecution, and it was apparent the business was seeking an advisory opinion rather than the resolution of an actual controversy; courts do not sit for the purpose of determining speculative and abstract questions of law or laying down rules for future conduct. Cancun Cyber Cafe & Bus. Ctr., Inc. v. City of N. Little Rock, 2012 Ark. 154 (2012).

Cited: Roberts v. Watts, 263 Ark. 822, 568 S.W.2d 1 (1978); Lawson v. City of Mammoth Spring ex rel. Smith, 287 Ark. 12, 696 S.W.2d 712 (1985); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Olive's Sporting Goods, Inc., 297 Ark. 516, 764 S.W.2d 596 (1989); Stilley v. James, 345 Ark. 362, 48 S.W.3d 521 (2001); Wilmans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Ark. 668, 144 S.W.3d 245 (2004); Hardy v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 95 Ark. App. 48, 233 S.W.3d 165 (2006); McAlmont Suburban Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 242 v. McCain-Hwy. 161, LLC, 99 Ark. App. 431, 262 S.W.3d 185 (2007); Statewide Outdoor Adver., LLC v. Town of Avoca, 104 Ark. App. 10, 289 S.W.3d 111 (2008).

16-111-113. Words construed.

The word “person” wherever used in this chapter, shall be construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association, or society, or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2512.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-111-101 and was renumbered as § 16-111-113 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Case Notes

Newspapers.

Since this section provides that the word “person” shall also mean, inter alia, a corporation of any character whatsoever, a newspaper reporter had standing to have her right to attend committee meeting of board of trustees of university declared by the court. Ark. Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350 (1975).

Cited: Roberts v. Watts, 263 Ark. 822, 568 S.W.2d 1 (1978).

16-111-114. Provisions severable.

The several sections and provisions of this chapter except §§ 16-111-101 and 16-111-102, are hereby declared independent and severable, and the invalidity, if any, of any part or feature thereof shall not affect or render the remainder of the chapter invalid or inoperative.

History. Acts 1953, No. 274, § 13.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This chapter as initially enacted did not indicate that it is a uniform act. This section which was part of the initial enactment is included in the reorganization of the chapter in proper form as a uniform act.

16-111-115 — 16-111-117. [Reserved.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. Arkansas did not adopt Sections 15-17 of the official version of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Section 15 deals with uniformity of interpretation, Section 16 deals with the title of the act, and Section 17 deals with the time the act takes effect.

Chapter 112 Habeas Corpus

Cross References. Habeas corpus, Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 11.

Power of county judge during absence of circuit judge, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 37.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 100, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1877, No. 2, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 93, § 2: effective on passage.

Research References

ALR.

When is person in governmental custody for purpose of exercise of remedy. 26 A.L.R.4th 455.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding appellate and postconviction remedies. 15 A.L.R.4th 582.

Am. Jur. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Hab. Corp., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Post-Conviction Relief in Arkansas, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 57.

C.J.S. 39 C.J.S., Hab. Corp., § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-112-101. Procedure.

The writ of habeas corpus shall be issued, served, and tried in the manner prescribed in this chapter.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5075; Pope's Dig., § 6338; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1701.

Case Notes

Error in Granting Writ.

In a capital murder case, a circuit court erred by granting habeas corpus relief to an applicant because it did not make a specific finding of probable cause or otherwise conduct other proceedings required by the habeas corpus statutes. Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207, 461 S.W.3d 704 (2015).

Hearing.

There is no requirement that a habeas corpus hearing be given any petitioner regardless of the content of the petition. George v. State, 285 Ark. 84, 685 S.W.2d 141 (1985).

Scope of Writ.

The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error. State ex rel. Ark. Indus. Co. v. Neel, 48 Ark. 283, 3 S.W. 631 (1886); Ex parte Brandon, 49 Ark. 143, 4 S.W. 452 (1886); Ex parte Barnett, 51 Ark. 215, 10 S.W. 492 (1888); In re Burrow v. Cross, 55 Ark. 275, 18 S.W. 170 (1892); Ex parte Foote, 70 Ark. 12, 65 S.W. 706 (1901).

Validity of judgment of conviction for violating a statute can be tested only by appeal. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Byles, 93 Ark. 612, 126 S.W. 94 (1910), writ of error, Byles v. Arkansas, 225 U.S. 717, 32 S. Ct. 836, 56 L. Ed. 1270 (1912).

The action of a chief of police in refusing bail for insufficient sureties is not reviewable on habeas corpus. Ex parte Johnston, 99 Ark. 201, 137 S.W. 803 (1911).

The habeas corpus writ is granted only when a person is detained without lawful authority or imprisoned when by law he or she is entitled to bail. Kozal v. Board of Corr., 310 Ark. 648, 840 S.W.2d 164 (1992).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable by habeas corpus. McConaughy v. Lockhart, 310 Ark. 686, 840 S.W.2d 166 (1992).

A writ of habeas corpus will not issue to correct errors or irregularities that occurred at trial. McConaughy v. Lockhart, 310 Ark. 686, 840 S.W.2d 166 (1992).

Writ of habeas corpus would issue when a commitment was invalid on its face or when the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to enter or modify the sentence; the trial court, not the juvenile court, had jurisdiction and the mere detention of defendant in a juvenile facility did not give the juvenile court jurisdiction such that, because no juvenile proceedings had commenced against defendant, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings initiated against him upon the filing of the information charging him as an adult. Morgan v. Norris, 355 Ark. 678, 144 S.W.3d 243 (2004).

Writ Denied.

Appellant sentenced to 540 months' incarceration for manufacturing a controlled substance, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and failure to appear was not entitled to proceed with an appeal of the decision denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to §§ 16-112-101 to 16-112-123, because his allegations did not establish that the commitment was facially invalid; and his ineffective assistance of counsel and due process claims were not cognizable in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court was not without jurisdiction to accept appellant's guilty plea for the charges of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, as it was not a lesser-included offense of manufacturing methamphetamine. McHaney v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 361 (2012).

Trial court did err in denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to §§ 16-112-101 to 16-101-123, because he did not establish that the trial court lacked jurisdiction by virtue of a defective information. Murry v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 29 (2013).

Trial court correctly held that a habeas petition was not properly addressed to it where, at the time the prisoner filed the petition, he was incarcerated in another county, and thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Leach v. State, 2017 Ark. 176, 518 S.W.3d 670 (2017).

Inmate was not entitled to habeas relief because (1) the inmate's claim that he was charged under an incorrect name did not implicate the facial validity of the trial court's judgment or jurisdiction, and (2) the inmate's actual-innocence claim effectively contesting sufficiency of the evidence was not cognizable on habeas corpus. Collier v. Kelley, 2020 Ark. 77, 594 S.W.3d 50 (2020).

Written Findings.

Circuit court committed no error if it did not make written findings to support its decision denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the statutes relating to habeas-corpus proceedings that were not filed under Acts 2001, No. 1780, contained no such requirement. Bradford v. State, 2011 Ark. 494 (2011).

Cited: Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1992).

16-112-102. Officers permitted to issue.

    1. The writ of habeas corpus shall be issued upon proper application by a Justice of the Supreme Court or a judge of the circuit court. The power of the Supreme Court and circuit court to issue writs of habeas corpus shall be coextensive with the state.
      1. The county judge shall have power coextensive with his or her county in the absence of the circuit judge therefrom to issue, hear, and determine writs of habeas corpus on proper application of parties entitled thereto, in all cases and with like powers, in which the circuit judge may issue and determine a writ of habeas corpus.
      2. However, no county judge shall have power to issue or hear any writ of habeas corpus in any case in which an indictment has been found by a grand jury.
  1. If any officer enumerated in subsection (a) of this section shall, when legally applied to, refuse to issue the writ of habeas corpus to the petitioner, he or she shall forfeit and pay to the petitioner five hundred dollars ($500).

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; 1875, No. 100, § 1, p. 219; 1877, No. 2, § 1, p. 1; 1883, No. 93, § 1, p. 170; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5084, 5093; Pope's Dig., §§ 6347, 6356; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1702, 34-1707; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 232.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a)(1), deleted “or a judge of any chancery court during the sitting of their respective courts or in vacation” from the end of the first sentence and substituted “Supreme Court and circuit court” for “Supreme Court, circuit, or chancery courts” in the second sentence.

Case Notes

Coextensive Power.

Under this section a court's power to issue writs of habeas corpus is coextensive with the state and is not limited by former § 16-60-103 (see now § 16-60-104) concerning the venue of actions against state officers. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Lipe, 257 Ark. 1015, 521 S.W.2d 526 (1975).

Federal Habeas Relief.

Although the filing of state habeas corpus petitions pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section qualified for statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), such petitions still had to be properly filed. Inmate's first two state habeas petitions did not have the effect of statutorily tolling the one-year statute of limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) because they were not “properly filed,” as they were filed in the wrong state circuit court, but his third habeas petition did statutorily toll the limitations period while the habeas proceedings were pending because that third habeas petition was properly and timely filed in the correct state court. Ben-Yah v. Norris, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (E.D. Ark. 2008).

Jurisdiction.

The scope of inquiry for a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner is in custody under process regular on its face is limited to the jurisdiction of the court from where the process came. Mitchell v. State, 233 Ark. 578, 346 S.W.2d 201 (1961).

—Circuit Judges.

The jurisdiction of a circuit judge is coextensive with the state. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Stevenson, 89 Ark. 31, 116 S.W. 202 (1909).

—County Judges.

Supreme Court will not review action of county judge who, in absence of circuit judge, denies the writ. Ex parte Dame, 162 Ark. 382, 259 S.W. 754 (1923).

—Supreme Court.

Where there is no subordinate court competent to issue the writ, the Supreme Court will award it. Ex parte Robins, 15 Ark. 402 (1855); Ex parte Good, 19 Ark. 410 (1858); Ex parte Kittrel, 20 Ark. 499 (1859); State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Williams, 97 Ark. 243, 133 S.W. 1017 (1911).

Parties.

Upon habeas corpus to procure a petitioner's release from imprisonment for contempt of court, the only parties entitled to be heard are the applicant for the writ and the officer having him in custody, unless it be the state. Ex parte Boles, 88 Ark. 388, 114 S.W. 918 (1909).

Review.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the proceedings of inferior courts and of judges and chancellors at chambers, upon applications for writs of habeas corpus, and the proceedings thereon. Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158 (1885); State ex rel. Ark. Indus. Co. v. Neel, 48 Ark. 283, 3 S.W. 631 (1886); State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Williams, 97 Ark. 243, 133 S.W. 1017 (1911).

One who was not a party to a habeas corpus proceeding before a chancellor is not entitled to apply for a writ of certiorari to review the chancellor's finding. Ex parte Boles, 88 Ark. 388, 114 S.W. 918 (1909).

The proper method of bringing up proceedings on habeas corpus for review is by means of a writ of certiorari. Taylor v. Moore, 99 Ark. 412, 138 S.W. 634 (1911).

The proper method of bringing up for review the actions of inferior courts or judges in proceeding for habeas corpus is by certiorari and not by appeal; yet where the Attorney General representing the state concedes that the record is correct and has agreed that a case on appeal may be heard as if a petition for certiorari has been duly presented and the record brought up for review in obedience to the writ issued thereon, the cause will be so considered. Ex parte Holdaway, 105 Ark. 1, 150 S.W. 123 (1912).

Where a juvenile was not provided with defense counsel at the hearing finding him in criminal contempt and in violation of his Division of Youth Services aftercare plan, the juvenile's due process rights were violated, the trial court's order commitment order was invalid, and the juvenile's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mainard, 358 Ark. 204, 188 S.W.3d 901 (2004).

Circuit court erred by denying appellant juvenile's petition for writ of habeas corpus; because he was only fourteen years old when he committed capital-murder and aggravated-robbery, his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole violated the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. VIII. On review, the Supreme Court of Arkansas issued the writ pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906 (2013).

Cited: Simpson v. Sheriff of Dallas County, 333 Ark. 277, 968 S.W.2d 614 (1998).

16-112-103. Petition.

    1. The writ of habeas corpus shall be granted forthwith by any of the officers enumerated in § 16-112-102(a) to any person who shall apply for the writ by petition showing, by affidavit or other evidence, probable cause to believe he or she is detained without lawful authority, is imprisoned when by law he or she is entitled to bail, or who has alleged actual innocence of the offense or offenses for which the person was convicted.
    2. The procedures for persons who allege actual innocence shall be in accordance with § 16-112-201 et seq.
    1. The writ of habeas corpus shall be granted upon the application, and in the name of the father, mother, guardian, or next friend of any married woman or infant, against any person who shall unlawfully have or detain in custody or bondage any infant or married woman.
    2. Similar proceedings shall be had for hearing and determining the cause and affording the relief demanded as in other cases.
  1. Writs of habeas corpus shall issue upon the application of the husband, father, mother, guardian, or next friend of any married woman or infant detained by any religious or other association or by persons acting under the authority of the association. The prosecuting attorney, where the detention is made, shall prosecute the writ without fee, if required to do so.
  2. If the restraint or confinement is by virtue of any warrant, order, or process, a copy thereof must accompany the petition, or it must appear by affidavit annexed thereto, showing that by reason of the person being concealed before the application, a demand of the copy could not be made, or that the demand was made of the person by whom the prisoner is confined or restrained, and a copy refused.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 1, § 5; Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5086-5089; Pope's Dig., §§ 6349-6352; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1703 — 34-1706; Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 1, provided:

“The General Assembly finds that the mission of the criminal justice system is to punish the guilty and to exonerate the innocent. The General Assembly further finds that Arkansas laws and procedures should be changed in order to accommodate the advent of new technologies enhancing the ability to analyze scientific evidence.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment, in (a)(1), inserted “or she” and added “or who has alleged… was convicted”; and added (a)(2) and made related changes.

Cross References. Physical evidence in sex offense prosecutions — Retention and disposition, § 12-12-104.

Research References

ALR.

Actual Innocence Exception to Procedural Bars in State Post-Conviction Proceedings. 97 A.L.R.6th 263 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Criminal Procedure — Waiver of Appellate Review of Death Sentences In Arkansas; Standing — Capacity to Litigate Matters of Public Interest in Arkansas, Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988), 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 569.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

Case Notes

Construction.

Because the legislature has declined several opportunities to amend this section in response to the court's interpretation that a writ of habeas corpus will issue only if the commitment was invalid on its face or the committing court lacked jurisdiction, the court's interpretation remains the law. Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421, 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997).

Actual Innocence.

Where appellant gave the police a statement in which he admitted shooting the murder victim, appellant failed to show that DNA testing of blood splatter would have proved that he was actually innocent of the crime. The trial court did not err by denying his petition to vacate or set aside the judgment pursuant to § 16-112-201 et seq. Leaks v. State, 371 Ark. 581, 268 S.W.3d 866 (2007).

A petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus who does not allege his actual innocence and proceed under Acts 2001, No. 1780, codified as § 16-112-201 et seq., must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or lack of jurisdiction by the trial court. Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 121, 199 L. Ed. 2d 74 (2017).

Appellant inmate's claims in the petition for writ of habeas corpus that he was innocent and that the evidence was insufficient were not within the purview of the habeas proceeding, as appellant did not invoke Acts 2001, No. 1780, codified as § 16-112-201 et seq.; further, proceedings under Acts 2001, No. 1780 must be filed in the county of conviction, but appellant's petition was filed in the county of his incarceration. Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 121, 199 L. Ed. 2d 74 (2017).

Capital Offenses.

An indictment in a capital case does raise such a presumption against the defendant as to deprive him of the privilege of habeas corpus as a matter of right, so to be entitled to the writ he must rebut the presumption raised against him. Ex parte White, 9 Ark. 222, 9 Ark. 223 (1848) (decision under prior law).

Where there is no subordinate court competent to issue a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court will issue the writ. Ex parte Robins, 15 Ark. 402 (1855) (decision under prior law).

If the circuit court or judge refuse bail, the Supreme Court, upon proper showing of facts upon which the circuit judge acted, may award certiorari and bring him before it by habeas corpus and admit him to bail or direct the circuit judge to do so. Ex parte Good, 19 Ark. 410 (1858); Ex parte Bird & Bailey, 24 Ark. 275 (1866) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The circuit court has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus and admit to bail in capital cases. Ex parte Kittrel, 20 Ark. 499 (1859) (decision under prior law).

Unless a manifest error in the circuit court appears, the Supreme Court will not reverse its refusal of bail. Ex parte Osborn, 24 Ark. 185 (1866) (decision under prior law).

Early decisions concerning habeas corpus in capital cases were not weakened by subsequent legislation, and the chancellor was without power to issue the writ or grant bail to a person under indictment for a capital offense; only the judge of the circuit court had such authority which could be exercised in term time or vacation. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Williams, 97 Ark. 243, 133 S.W. 1017 (1911).

Claim of Illegal Sentence.

Appellant's claim that his 60-year sentence was illegal fell within the bounds of a habeas action, as he claimed that he could have been found guilty only of one count of violating § 5-27-602, rather than 30 counts; appellant's claim failed on the merits, however. Pelletier v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 347, 561 S.W.3d 730 (2018).

Denial of Petition.

Where relief sought in habeas corpus petition was of the kind that could be granted pursuant to former Ark. R. Crim. P. 37 (see now Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1), the court properly refused to consider Rule 37 relief when it had already been sought and denied. Miller v. State, 301 Ark. 59, 781 S.W.2d 475 (1989).

In a capital murder case, as defendant failed to show the conviction was invalid on its face or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the trial court properly denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus; defendant's assertion that his guilty plea was invalid should have been raised in a motion for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 as this issue required the kind of factual inquiry that went beyond the facial validity of the commitment. Friend v. Norris, 364 Ark. 315, 219 S.W.3d 123 (2005).

Where the trial court accepted appellant's plea for capital-felony murder on a Sunday in violation of § 16-10-114, the statutory violation did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction over the matter; further, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was not the proper method with which to claim a statutory violation, rather, appellant's argument should have been raised on direct appeal. Noble v. Norris, 368 Ark. 69, 243 S.W.3d 260 (2006).

Circuit court did not err in dismissing the inmate's petition for habeas corpus where although the inmate's original judgment and commitment order was erroneous, the sentencing court had jurisdiction to amend the order to reflect the correct statute; the inmate failed to show that commitment was invalid. Baker v. Norris, 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007).

Where appellant was denied habeas relief and his appeal was dismissed, he stated no valid reason for the court to grant his motion for reconsideration. Appellant's constitutional challenge arising from the alleged invalidity of his arrest did not result in an invalid conviction and required a factual inquiry that was improper in a habeas proceeding under subdivision (a)(1) of this section; appellant made only a general due process argument that he was unlawfully imprisoned, and cited no authority for the proposition that his sentence was illegal. Russell v. Norris, 2009 Ark. 472 (2009).

Circuit court did not err in denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because to the extent that appellant would directly challenge his conviction, the sentence that he received for the conviction had since expired; to the extent that appellant would raise the issue of validity of his sentence concerning its use to enhance his life sentence in his prior conviction, he failed to raise a claim that would support relief. Bradford v. State, 2011 Ark. 494 (2011).

Circuit court did not err in denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because his claims that some of the judgments used to enhance his sentence were invalid did not constitute a challenge to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the charge or to the facial validity of the commitment order; therefore, appellant failed to present a claim that would support habeas corpus relief. Bradford v. State, 2011 Ark. 494 (2011).

Circuit court did not err in denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because although appellant argued that he was still being held by the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), even though his conviction was reversed on appeal, the ADC's records did not reflect that appellant was incarcerated pursuant to his conviction; appellant's challenge to the conviction, even if it was valid at the time the petition was filed, was moot because any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon an existing legal controversy. Bradford v. State, 2011 Ark. 494 (2011).

Denial of writ of habeas corpus was proper, because allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding, none of the claims called into question the trial court's jurisdiction or the validity of the judgment-and-commitment order, and neither the question concerning the validity of the agreement between the petitioner and his attorney for representation nor the assertions of trial error were sufficient to warrant granting the writ. Thomas v. State, 2012 Ark. 79 (2012).

Dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus was proper, because the applicant did not present a claim that could be resolved through a habeas proceeding, when the issue was one concerning an excessive sentence and not an illegal sentence, and the majority of the applicant's claims were assertions of trial error that did not implicate the facial validity of the judgment or the jurisdiction of the trial court. Bliss v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 315 (2012).

Defendant argued that he was not told, prior to entering his guilty plea, that § 16-93-609 would apply to his sentence, however, he failed to show how this allegation would make the judgment against him facially invalid or support his claim that he was illegally detained under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. All claims of ineffective assistance had to be brought under a timely Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 petition, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus was not a substitute for a timely petition for postconviction relief. Smith v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 360 (2012).

Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus that challenged the judgment that imposed an aggregate sentence of 1080 months' imprisonment for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The trial court did not err by denying appellant's petition, because he failed to provide probable cause that he was illegally detained as required by subdivision (a)(1) of this section and presented only conclusory allegations to support his claim that his sentence was improperly enhanced using an out-of-state conviction. Darrough v. State, 2013 Ark. 28 (2013).

Habeas corpus relief was not warranted based on an inmate's allegations of a conflict of interest, a coerced confession, speedy-trial violations, prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, and due process violations because they did not implicate the facial validity of the judgment or the jurisdiction of the trial court; moreover, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. In addition, the inmate's claim of incompetency at the time she entered her plea, even if cognizable, was not supported by a factual basis, and her claims that a sentence imposed upon the revocation of probation was an illegal second sentence or that it was illegal due to a speedy trial violation were rejected. Murphy v. State, 2013 Ark. 155 (2013).

Circuit court order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed where appellant offered nothing in his petition to demonstrate that the trial court in his case did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes, and he failed to establish that the judgment was invalid on its face. Dunbar v. State, 2015 Ark. 3 (2015).

Appellant inmate's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, trial error, and judicial bias were not within the purview of the habeas statute. Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 121, 199 L. Ed. 2d 74 (2017).

Because appellant inmate failed to challenge the facial validity of the judgment or the circuit court's jurisdiction, his claims of prosecutorial misconduct did not fall within the parameters of the remedy of writ of habeas corpus. Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 121, 199 L. Ed. 2d 74 (2017).

Because the nature of the offense remained the same and an amendment changed only the manner of the alleged commission of the crime, appellant failed to state a claim for habeas relief on the ground of a defective information. Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 121, 199 L. Ed. 2d 74 (2017).

Because petitioner alleged that he was being held according to an invalid conviction and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the circuit court appropriately considered any basis for the writ of habeas corpus that petitioner could have raised outside Acts 2001, No. 1780, as amended by Acts 2005, No. 2250, § 16-112-201 et seq.; however, prosecutorial misconduct was not cognizable as it did not implicate the facial validity of the judgment or the trial court's jurisdiction, and actual innocence is not cognizable in habeas proceedings that are not brought under § 16-112-201 et seq.Muldrow v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 126, 542 S.W.3d 856 (2018).

After the Arkansas Supreme Court in a Rule 37 appeal had directed dismissal of two of petitioner's three convictions stemming from a jury trial, the circuit court did not clearly err in dismissing petitioner's subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus because none of petitioner's arguments provided evidence of probable cause to believe that he was being illegally detained on the remaining delivery conviction; defendant did not establish the circuit court's lack of subject-matter or territorial jurisdiction, his sentence was not facially invalid, he was not being detained for an illegal period of time, and the sentence for the delivery charge was statutorily authorized. A claim that the improper admission of evidence may have contributed to a sentence is not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Conley v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 23, 566 S.W.3d 116 (2019).

Inmate's appeal of the dismissal of his habeas petition was dismissed because the inmate's speedy trial, involuntary plea, evidence sufficiency, and ineffective assistance claims were not cognizable, as (1) the writ would not issue to correct errors or irregularities at trial, (2) lack of a speedy trial did not implicate the facial validity of a judgment or the trial court's jurisdiction, (3) a plea claim did not raise an illegal sentence, (4) habeas proceedings were not a means to contest the sufficiency of the evidence, and (5) ineffective assistance had to be raised in a postconviction motion under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. Bell v. Gibson, 2019 Ark. 127 (2019).

Habeas petitioner's argument that the sentence was grossly disproportionate was not cognizable as it would have required an evaluation of the circumstances of his case. Proctor v. Payne, 2020 Ark. 142, 598 S.W.3d 17 (2020).

Although a circuit court clearly erred in determining that petitioner's Fair Sentencing of Minors Act (FSMA) arguments were previously considered in a prior habeas petition, his argument regarding the FSMA's parole-eligibility provisions were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Parole eligibility falls clearly within the domain of the executive branch and specifically the Department of Corrections, as fixed by statute. Proctor v. Payne, 2020 Ark. 142, 598 S.W.3d 17 (2020).

Detention Without Lawful Authority.

The court could not say that the circuit judge's contempt order was invalid on its face or that the judge lacked jurisdiction to enter the order where the circuit court held two prosecuting attorneys in contempt and incarcerated them after they refused to proceed with the jury trial in a criminal case. Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492 (2000).

Where a juvenile was not provided with defense counsel at the hearing finding him in criminal contempt and in violation of his Division of Youth Services aftercare plan, the juvenile's due process rights were violated, the trial court's order commitment order was invalid, and the juvenile's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mainard, 358 Ark. 204, 188 S.W.3d 901 (2004).

Habeas corpus relief was granted to the extent that a trial court imposed drug treatment as a condition of imprisonment because this was an illegal sentence; former § 5-64-401(a)(1)(A)(i) did not authorize this condition when an inmate's probation was revoked. Murphy v. State, 2013 Ark. 155 (2013).

Effect of Writ.

A writ of habeas corpus is issued in a criminal case only when the prisoner is being detained without lawful authority. Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993).

Where the judgment of conviction and order of commitment were void, but where the petitioner remained charged with capital murder, the granting of a writ of habeas corpus did not mean that the petitioner had to be set free; the prisoner was released from the Arkansas Department of Correction and placed in the custody of the county sheriff to be held on the charge of capital murder. Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993).

Error in Granting Writ.

Where defendant was committed to an alcohol treatment facility pursuant to former § 20-64-709 (see now § 20-64-801 et seq.) and was unable to make her appeal bond, circuit court erred in granting defendant's writ of habeas corpus as defendant was not detained without lawful authority, or imprisoned when by law she was entitled to bail, but had simply failed to make bond and did not petition to have bond reduced though represented by an attorney at all times. City of Clinton v. Jones, 302 Ark. 109, 787 S.W.2d 242 (1990).

Trial court's decision granting a writ of habeas corpus was reversed because (1) the trial court did not explicitly find probable cause, as required by subdivision (a)(1) of this section, before moving forward with the remaining habeas corpus procedures, and (2) such a finding was mandatory. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364 (2014).

In a capital murder case, a circuit court erred by granting habeas corpus relief to an applicant because it did not make a specific finding of probable cause or otherwise conduct other proceedings required by the habeas corpus statutes; the circuit court failed to follow the mandatory procedures, failed to issue the writ to the State, erroneously granted relief from the underlying commitment, and did not otherwise require the State to provide a return. Rather than vacating the applicant's sentence of life imprisonment and remanding for resentencing, the circuit court first should have made a probable-cause finding. Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207, 461 S.W.3d 704 (2015).

Jurisdiction.

Inmate's pro se petition seeking release under subsection (a) of this section could not be granted by the circuit court in which he filed his motion for postconviction relief because the inmate was not in custody in that court's jurisdiction. Hill v. State, 2010 Ark. 102 (2010).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying the prisoner's habeas petition because § 16-93-607(d) did not apply to the prisoner as he was an habitual offender, he committed the offenses that led to the sentence when he was 18 years old, and the life sentence was within the range of sentencing for his rape and kidnapping convictions. Mitchell v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 79, 484 S.W.3d 659 (2016).

Prisoner's challenge to the sentence based on his ineligibility for parole was rejected as the Arkansas Department of Correction's determination that a prisoner was not eligible for parole did not amount to a modification of his sentence or render the sentence imposed illegal on its face. Mitchell v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 79, 484 S.W.3d 659 (2016).

Petition Denied Without Hearing.

Trial court did not err in denying a prisoner's petition for habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing because the prisoner failed to demonstrate that his attempted murder conviction was facially invalid or that the trial court was without jurisdiction. His claim that he was not competent to stand trial could have been raised in the original trial or appeal. Henderson v. State, 2010 Ark. 30 (2010).

Circuit court did not err by failing to conduct a hearing when it denied appellant's writ of habeas corpus petition because appellant failed to demonstrate probable cause for the issuance of the writ pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section; the records of the Arkansas Department of Correction did not reflect that appellant was incarcerated pursuant to his conviction, and appellant's challenge to the conviction, even if it was valid at the time the petition was filed, was moot because any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon an existing legal controversy. Bradford v. State, 2011 Ark. 494 (2011).

Right to Maintain.

If, pending an appeal, the restriction is removed and the accused procures his release, he cannot thereafter maintain a proceeding previously begun for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Rubly, 222 Ark. 423, 261 S.W.2d 4 (1953).

A writ of habeas corpus will not be issued as a substitute for post-conviction relief. Rather, the writ of habeas corpus will be issued only when the commitment is invalid on its face or the committing court lacked jurisdiction. Mackey v. Lockhart, 307 Ark. 321, 819 S.W.2d 702 (1991).

Inmate's claim that the inmate was held without lawful authority as the inmate's sentence of life in prison without parole violated the Eighth Amendment, since the inmate was a juvenile when the inmate's crime was committed and the sentence was mandatory, was cognizable in habeas corpus because it had previously been held that such claims were cognizable and appropriate for the writ. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364 (2014).

Sufficiency of Petition.

If petition for habeas corpus raises no question of jurisdiction of the trial court to try petitioner on the charges of which he was convicted, or as to the regularity of the commitment on which he was being held, the court can grant no relief in habeas corpus proceedings. State ex rel. Williams v. Auten, 211 Ark. 703, 202 S.W.2d 763 (1947); Miller v. State, 301 Ark. 59, 781 S.W.2d 475 (1989).

Where nothing was alleged in the petition that was not or could not have been raised on appeal in the first instance except the allegation of present insanity, defendant was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Mitchell v. State, 233 Ark. 578, 346 S.W.2d 201 (1961).

Because defendant raised no argument that demonstrated a jurisdictional defect in the proceeding against defendant or that defendant's commitment was invalid, defendant did not state a basis to warrant issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under subdivision (a)(1) of this section; consequently, the circuit court did not err in denying the relief sought. Randolph v. State, 2011 Ark. 510 (2011).

Inmate who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief based on the murder taking place in a county other than the county of the trial court, because the evidence indicated that the inmate and his codefendant planned the murder and picked the victim up in Craighead County, where the trial was held. Bryant v. May, 2013 Ark. 168 (2013).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 72 and held that petitioner had failed to state a colorable claim for habeas relief, as the same claims concerning his motion in limine for joinder of offenses had been previously addressed and found to be outside the purview of habeas proceedings; petitioner's latest iteration of his claims represented an abuse of the writ. Watts v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 207, 575 S.W.3d 558 (2019).

—Infants.

In deciding contests upon writs of habeas corpus for the custody of infant children, the principles adopted in the chancery court must govern, and no rigid rules to govern the practice have been or can be formulated. Subject to a few general rules, to be taken as a guide, the chancellor must exercise his judgment upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, and act as humanity, respect for the parental affection, and regard for the infant's best interest may prompt; all three should be considered. Neither should be conclusive. Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27 (1881).

On habeas corpus by the father to obtain custody, the proof tended to show that while he was a moral man and worthy to assume the education and control of his child, the advantages to an infant of tender years were with the “adoptive” family. Washaw v. Gimble, 50 Ark. 351, 7 S.W. 389 (1887).

Where there were no allegations of unfitness or findings of fitness of the child's mother or any other person, nor any hearing with respect to the best interest of the child, no previous order conferring custody of the child upon anyone and no delay on the part of the mother in seeking custody of her child, given the natural right of the parent to the custody of her child there was no basis for denial of mother's writ for the custody of her child. Bruce ex rel. Bruce v. Dillahunty, 293 Ark. 479, 739 S.W.2d 522 (1987).

—Probable Cause.

In a habeas corpus hearing, the question is whether there is a showing of probable cause that the petitioner is being detained unlawfully; one is held without lawful authority when it is shown the commitment is invalid on its face or the court lacked jurisdiction. George v. State, 285 Ark. 84, 685 S.W.2d 141 (1985).

A petition for writ of habeas corpus is restricted to the questions of whether the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid conviction and whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction; a writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy for attacking parole decisions. Baker v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 91, 702 S.W.2d 403 (1986).

Circuit court properly denied inmate leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the habeas corpus petition because he failed to present a colorable cause of action under Ark. R. Civ. P. 72(c); the inmate's pleading did not satisfy the additional requirement under this section that he make a showing of probable cause. Morgan v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 189, 575 S.W.3d 108 (2019).

—Warrant, Order, or Process.

A copy of the warrant, order, or process must accompany the petition, or a legal excuse be shown for the omission; for if the warrant, order, or process shows a valid and legal commitment, the application should be denied. In re Beard, 4 Ark. 9 (1842); Ex parte Royster, 6 Ark. 28 (1845).

Cited: Johnson v. State, 298 Ark. 479, 769 S.W.2d 3 (1989); Tate v. Sharpe, 300 Ark. 126, 777 S.W.2d 215 (1989); Meny v. Norris, 340 Ark. 418, 13 S.W.3d 143 (2000); Davis v. State, 366 Ark. 401, 235 S.W.3d 902 (2006); Carter v. Norris, 367 Ark. 360, 240 S.W.3d 124 (2006); Mitchael v. State, 2012 Ark. 256 (2012); McHaney v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 361 (2012); Murry v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 29 (2013); King v. State, 2013 Ark. 133 (2013); Philyaw v. Kelley, 2015 Ark. 465, 477 S.W.3d 503 (2015).

16-112-104. Bond prior to issuance of writ.

  1. The officer granting the writ may previously require bond, with surety, in sufficient penalty, payable to the state or to the person against whom the writ is directed, conditioned that the person detained shall not escape by the way, and for the payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against him or her.
  2. The bond shall be filed with the other proceedings in the court and may be sued on by the state for the benefit of any person injured by the breach of it.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5096; Pope's Dig., § 6359; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1708.

Case Notes

Enforcement.

A bond for the production of a child executed by a mother in a habeas corpus proceeding was held enforceable for the benefit of the father though the sheriff was named as obligee where the father was the party interested and the bond was made to protect him. State ex rel. Lee v. McMillin, 191 Ark. 96, 83 S.W.2d 57 (1935).

Liability.

Under a bond for the production of a child in court, the obligor's liability was limited to the amount stated in the bond and did not include attorney's fees. State ex rel. Lee v. McMillin, 191 Ark. 96, 83 S.W.2d 57 (1935).

Validity.

A bond executed in a habeas corpus proceeding for the production of a child was held a valid common law bond where its execution was not prohibited by statute nor contrary to public policy and was based on a sufficient consideration and entered into by competent parties. State ex rel. Lee v. McMillin, 191 Ark. 96, 83 S.W.2d 57 (1935).

16-112-105. Form of writ.

  1. Writs of habeas corpus may be granted without the seal of the officer but shall be signed by him or her.
    1. The writ shall be directed to the person in whose custody the prisoner is detained, and made returnable as soon as may be, before the Supreme Court Justices, or before the circuit judges of the county in which it may be served, if either are within the county.
    2. The writ shall specify the time and place to which it shall be returned.
    1. In a writ of habeas corpus, the person having the custody of the prisoner may be designated either by his or her name of office, if he or she has any, or his or her own name. If both names are uncertain or unknown, he or she may be described by any assumed appellation.
    2. The person directed to be produced may be designated by his or her name. If his or her name is uncertain or unknown, he or she may be described in any other way so as to designate or identify the person intended.
  2. Writs of habeas corpus shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form. Anyone who shall be served therewith shall be deemed to be the person to whom it is directed, though it may be directed to him or her by a wrong name, or description, or to another person.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 1, §§ 10, 11; Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5085, 5091, 5092, 5095; Pope's Dig., §§ 6348, 6354, 6355, 6358; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1709 — 34-1712.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Where appellant was incarcerated in Lee County, Arkansas, for rape and burglary, the Circuit Court of Hot Spring County did not have personal jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus for his release under § 16-112-105. The circuit court did not err when it declined to grant relief on appellant's motion for reconsideration. Lukach v. State, 369 Ark. 475, 255 S.W.3d 832 (2007).

Because petitioner inmate challenged a conviction in another county, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction under Acts 2001, No. 1780, as amended by Acts 2005, No. 2250, § 16-112-201 et seq.; the court did have jurisdiction for claims for the writ not under that act. Muldrow v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 126, 542 S.W.3d 856 (2018).

Person Having Custody.

In a habeas corpus action for a person detained in the Arkansas Children's Colony, the defendant should be the superintendent of the Arkansas Children's Colony and not the officers of the state department of public welfare nor the members of the board of mental retardation. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Lipe, 257 Ark. 1015, 521 S.W.2d 526 (1975).

Cited: Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207, 461 S.W.3d 704 (2015).

16-112-106. Service of writ.

  1. The writ shall be served by any qualified officer or by any private individual designated by the judge on the person to whom it is directed or, in his or her absence from the place where the petitioner is confined, on the person having him or her in immediate custody.
  2. If the person upon whom the writ ought to be served conceals himself or herself or refuses admittance to the person attempting the service, it may be served by affixing a copy of the writ in some conspicuous place on the outside either of the dwelling house or jail, or place where the party is confined.
  3. Anyone having in his or her custody or under his or her power any person for whose relief a writ of habeas corpus shall have been issued or who is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her detention who shall transfer the person to the custody of another or place the person under the control or power of another, conceal the person, or change the place of the person's confinement with the intent to elude the service of the writ shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and shall pay the party injured five hundred dollars ($500).

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 2, § 2; Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 4, §§ 13, 16; Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5097, 5098, 5108; Pope's Dig., §§ 6360, 6361, 6371; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1713 — 34-1715; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 225.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “or her” throughout this section; and substituted “Class A misdemeanor” for “misdemeanor. Upon conviction, he shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisoned not exceeding one (1) year, or punished by both fine and imprisonment” in (c).

16-112-107. Removal from county within 15 days of term of certain court prohibited — Exception.

No person charged with a criminal offense shall be removed by a writ of habeas corpus out of the county in which he or she is confined at any time within fifteen (15) days next preceding the term of the court at which the prisoner ought to be tried, except to convey him or her into the county where the offense with which he or she is charged is properly cognizable.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 4, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 5116; Pope's Dig., § 6379; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1716.

16-112-108. Return.

  1. The writ shall be made returnable within three (3) days after it is served. However, if the person is to be brought more than twenty (20) miles, the writ shall be made returnable within so many days more as will be equal to one (1) day for every twenty (20) miles for the further distance. It shall be returned with the person of the petitioner, with the cause of his or her detention or his or her imprisonment stated in the return.
  2. The officer or other person serving the writ shall leave a copy with the person on whom it is served, upon which the cause of detention shall be stated, and return the original to the proper officer.
    1. Every officer or other person upon whom a writ of habeas corpus shall be served shall state in his or her return plainly and unequivocally:
      1. Whether he or she has or has not the party in his or her custody or under his or her power or restraint;
      2. If he or she has the party in his or her custody or power or under his or her restraint, the authority and true cause of the imprisonment or restraint, setting forth the same at large; and
      3. If the person making the return shall have had the party in his or her power or custody or under his or her restraint, at any time before the service of the writ, and has transferred the custody or possession to another, particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority the transfer took place.
    2. If the party is restrained, imprisoned, or detained by virtue of any writ, order, warrant, or other written authority, a copy thereof shall be annexed to the return. The original shall be exhibited on the return of the writ, to the court or judge to whom it is returnable.
    3. The return must be signed by the person making the return, and except where the person shall be a sworn officer and shall make his or her return in his or her official capacity, it shall be verified by his or her oath.

History. Rev. Stat. ch. 73, art. 2, §§ 7, 8; Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5099, 5101-5103; Pope's Dig., §§ 6362, 6364-6366; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1717 — 34-1719.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

In the absence of any request that the writ of habeas corpus be made returnable to the proper court, the chancellor correctly sustained the motion to quash where the judge of the Pulaski Chancery Court, while having the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, did not have the power to make it returnable before himself or to determine the custody issue raised in the petition where the real parties defendant were residents of a county in another chancery district. Johnson v. McClure, 228 Ark. 1081, 312 S.W.2d 347 (1958).

16-112-109. Information relating to commitment.

  1. When the party for whose relief a writ of habeas corpus has been issued shall stand committed for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, it shall be the duty of the officer or person upon whom the writ is served to bring with the writ all and every examination and information in his or her hands, possession, custody, or charge, relating to the commitment.
  2. If no examination shall accompany the commitment nor be in the possession of the officer having the prisoner in custody, the officer shall exhibit the habeas corpus, when served on him or her, to the judge or magistrate by whom the prisoner was committed or the clerk of the court if the papers are in his or her office. It shall be the duty of the judge, magistrate, or clerk to deliver to the officer having the custody of the prisoner the examinations and proofs relating to the offense charged to be returned by the officer with the writ.
  3. If no examination has been filed with the commitment or in the office of the clerk and none is produced by the committing judge or magistrate upon the exhibition of the writ of habeas corpus to him or her, as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the judge or magistrate shall appear in person at the time and place to which the writ is returnable and, if he or she fails to do so, may be proceeded against by attachment.

History. Rev. Stat. ch. 73, art. 2, §§ 15-17; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5104-5106; Pope's Dig., §§ 6367-6369; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1720 — 34-1722; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 282.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “or her” throughout this section; inserted “judge or” preceding “magistrate” in (b) and twice in (c); inserted “judge” preceding “magistrate or clerk” in (b); and inserted “or she” in (c).

Cross References. Attachment, § 16-110-101 et seq.

Case Notes

Habeas Corpus.

Where defendant on bail gave notice that his defense would be mental disease or defect, and was then incarcerated by the trial court, pending his mental health evaluation, the trial court was required to enter findings of fact and the reasons for the petitioner's incarceration pending the mental health evaluation. Rook v. Sheriff, Pulaski County, 323 Ark. 443, 914 S.W.2d 316 (1996).

Cited: Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207, 461 S.W.3d 704 (2015).

16-112-110. Failure to produce petitioner.

If any person on whom a writ of habeas corpus is served fails to bring the body of the petitioner, with a return of the cause of his or her detention, at the time and place specified in the writ, he or she shall forfeit and pay the prisoner one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5107; Pope's Dig., § 6370; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1723.

16-112-111. Order to produce petitioner.

When the person who applies for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be in the custody of a jailor or other officer, the judge may, for good cause shown, direct the officer or person serving the writ to take the applicant into his or her custody and produce him or her on the return of the writ.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5094; Pope's Dig., § 6357; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1723.

16-112-112. Failure to produce person because of sickness or infirmity.

  1. Whenever, from sickness or other infirmity of the person directed to be produced by a writ of habeas corpus, the person cannot, without danger, be brought before the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable, the person in whose custody he or she is may state the fact in his or her return, verifying the fact by his or her oath. The court or judge, if satisfied of the truth of the allegations, if the return is otherwise sufficient, shall proceed thereon to dispose of the matter in the same manner, as if the prisoner were brought before him or her, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
  2. If, in the case mentioned in subsection (a) of this section, it appears that the prisoner is legally imprisoned or restrained and not bailable, the judge shall proceed no further therein. If the prisoner ought to be held to answer for a bailable offense, an order shall be made accordingly. When it appears the prisoner is entitled to his or her discharge, the judge shall make an order to that effect.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 3, §§ 22, 23; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5113, 5114; Pope's Dig., §§ 6376, 6377; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1724, 34-1725.

16-112-113. Denial, allegations, and amendment of return.

  1. The party brought before any court or judge, by virtue of any writ of habeas corpus, may deny the material facts set forth in the return, or allege any fact to show either that his or her detention or imprisonment is unlawful, or that he or she is entitled to his or her discharge. The allegations or denials shall be on oath.
  2. The return and the allegations made against it may be amended, by leave of the court or judge before whom the writ is returned at any time, that thereby material facts may be ascertained.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 3, §§ 2, 3; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5109, 5110; Pope's Dig., §§ 6372, 6373; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1726, 34-1727.

Case Notes

Constitutional Rights.

Petitioner's contention that, by refusing him habeas corpus, the state failed to provide him a clearly defined post conviction remedy by which claims of infringement of federal rights could be asserted was rejected where he could have asserted any alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights on appeal in the first instance. Mitchell v. State, 233 Ark. 578, 346 S.W.2d 201 (1961).

Cited: Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207, 461 S.W.3d 704 (2015).

16-112-114. Witnesses.

  1. The officer issuing the writ in vacation or the officer before whom it may be returned for trial shall have the same power to compel the attendance of witnesses or to punish a contempt of his or her authority, as a court of record has. His or her judgment on the trial of the writ shall be considered and be enforced as if it were a judgment of the court.
  2. At the discretion of the judge before whom the writ is returned, the affidavits of witnesses taken by either party, on reasonable notice to his or her agent or attorney, may be read as evidence on the trial of the return. However, no county judge or circuit judge shall hear or permit any evidence on the hearing or examination before him or her, other than the return to the writ, if the process or commitment shall appear regular on its face.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5111, 5112; Pope's Dig., §§ 6374, 6375; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1728, 34-1729.

Case Notes

Attendance.

Habeas corpus may issue to produce a witness confined in jail. Gibony v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 462 (1877).

16-112-115. Discharge, remand, admission to bail, or other order — Costs.

The judge before whom the writ is returned, after hearing the matter, both upon the return and any other evidence, shall either discharge or remand the petitioner, admit the prisoner to bail, or make such order as may be proper. He or she shall adjudge the costs of the proceeding, including the charge for transporting the prisoner, to be paid as shall seem right. The payment may be enforced by attachment or otherwise by the court to which the proceedings are returned.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5115; Pope's Dig., § 6378; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1730.

Case Notes

Determination.

The writ of habeas corpus should be determined as soon as possible. Wright v. Johnson, 5 Ark. 687 (1844).

If the prisoner is held by process, the judge or court can, on writ of habeas corpus, only inquire into the validity of the process of its face. If it is issued by a court having jurisdiction of the crime charged, and is regular on its face, the prisoner will be remanded to custody; but if the sentence is a nullity or the court without jurisdiction to commit for the matter charged, or it does not charge a crime for which he could be held in custody, then he should be released. Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158 (1885); Ex parte Brandon, 49 Ark. 143, 4 S.W. 452 (1886); Ex parte Barnett, 51 Ark. 215, 10 S.W. 492 (1888); In re Burrow v. Cross, 55 Ark. 275, 18 S.W. 170 (1892); Ex parte Perdue, 58 Ark. 285, 24 S.W. 423 (1893); Ex parte Adams, 60 Ark. 93, 28 S.W. 1086 (1894); Ex parte Foote, 70 Ark. 12, 65 S.W. 706 (1901).

Where a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus is in custody under process regular on its face, nothing will be inquired into except the jurisdiction of the court whence the process came. Rowland v. Rogers, 199 Ark. 1041, 137 S.W.2d 246 (1940).

Effect of Writ.

Where the judgment of conviction and order of commitment were void, but where the petitioner remained charged with capital murder, the granting of a writ of habeas corpus did not mean that the petitioner had to be set free; the prisoner was released from the Arkansas Department of Correction and placed in the custody of the county sheriff to be held on the charge of capital murder. Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993).

Writ Granted.

Circuit court erred by denying appellant juvenile's petition for writ of habeas corpus; because he was only fourteen years old when he committed capital-murder and aggravated-robbery, his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole violated the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. VIII. On review, the Supreme Court of Arkansas issued the writ pursuant to this section. Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906 (2013).

Cited: Hobbs v. Hodge, 2015 Ark. 207, 461 S.W.3d 704 (2015).

16-112-116. Remand generally.

It shall be the duty of the court or judge forthwith to remand the prisoner if it shall appear that he or she is held in custody, either:

  1. By virtue of any process issued by any court or judge of the United States in a cause where the court or judge has exclusive jurisdiction;
  2. By virtue of the final judgment or decree of any competent court of civil or criminal jurisdiction;
  3. For any contempt especially and plainly charged in the commitment by some court, judge, or body politic having authority by law to commit for contempt so charged; and
  4. Where the time during which the party may be legally detained has not expired.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 3, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 5076; Pope's Dig., § 6339; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1731.

Case Notes

Federal Jurisdiction.

The federal judges have exclusive jurisdiction of habeas corpus whenever the applicant is illegally restrained of his liberty under, or by color of, the authority of the United States, whether by virtue of a formal commitment or otherwise. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 16 L. Ed. 169 (1858).

If the state judge or court is advised by the petition for the writ that the applicant is confined under the authority, or claim and color of authority of the United States by an officer of that government, the writ shall be refused. Where that fact does not appear in the application for the writ, but is made to appear in the return thereto, the state judge or court, being thus judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, can proceed no further. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 20 L. Ed. 597 (1871).

When a person who is an officer of the United States is charged in a state court with an offense alleged to have been committed by him in the discharge of his official duties, the judgment of a federal court or judge, having jurisdiction, discharging such officer on habeas corpus cannot be attacked for informality of procedure in a suit by the state to forfeit the bail of such officer. State v. Adler, 67 Ark. 469, 55 S.W. 851 (1900).

16-112-117. Admission to bail or remand.

Upon the trial of a habeas corpus, if the judge shall be of the opinion that the prisoner has been guilty of a misdemeanor or felony, for which the prisoner may be liable to be tried and that the proceedings against him or her are so defective that he or she cannot be detained by them, the judge shall admit him or her to bail, if he or she is entitled to bail, to appear at the court having jurisdiction over the case, or remand him or her to the custody of the proper officer, to be conveyed to the proper county for new proceedings to be had against the prisoner.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5081; Pope's Dig., § 6344; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1737.

16-112-118. Discharge.

  1. No person shall be discharged under the provisions of this act:
    1. Who is in custody or held by virtue of any legal engagement or enlistment in the United States Army or the United States Navy;
    2. Who, being subject to the rules and articles of war, is confined by anyone legally acting under the authority thereof;
    3. Who is held as a prisoner of war under the authority of the United States; or
    4. Who is in custody for any treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor committed in any other state or territory and who, by the United States Constitution and laws of the United States, ought to be delivered up to the legal authorities of the state or territory.
    1. If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted or issued by any officer in the exercise of judicial proceedings before him or her, the prisoner can only be discharged in one (1) of the following cases:
      1. Where the jurisdiction of the court or officer has been exceeded, either as to matter, place, sum, or person;
      2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet, by some act, omission, or event which has taken place afterward, the party has become entitled to his or her discharge;
      3. Where the process is defective in some matter or substance required by law, rendering the process void;
      4. Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued in a case, or under circumstances, not authorized by law;
      5. Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued or executed by a person who is not authorized to issue or execute the process, or where the person having the custody of the prisoner, under the process, is not the person empowered by law to detain him or her; or
      6. Where the process is not authorized by any judgment, order, decree, or by any provision of law.
    2. No court under this act shall in any other matter have power to inquire into the legality or justice of the process, judgment, decree, or order of any court, legally constituted, nor into the justice or propriety of any commitment for contempt made by any court, officer, or body corporate, according to law, and plainly charged in the commitment, as provided in this act.
  2. No person imprisoned on an indictment, found in any court of competent jurisdiction, or by virtue of any process or commitment to enforce an indictment, can be discharged under the provisions of this act. However, if the offense is bailable, he or she may be let to bail, and if the offense is not bailable, he or she shall be remanded forthwith.
  3. Where the imprisonment is for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, the court or judge before whom the prisoner shall be brought, under the provisions of this act, shall not discharge him or her for informality, insufficiency, or irregularity of the commitment. However, if from the examination taken and certified by the committing magistrate, or other evidence, it appears that there is sufficient legal cause for commitment, he or she shall proceed to take bail, if the offense is bailable and sufficient bail is offered, and if not, he or she shall recommit the prisoner to jail.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 3, §§ 7, 9, 10, 12, 13; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5077-5081; Pope's Dig., §§ 6340-6344; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1732 — 34-1736.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 73 codified as §§ 16-112-103, 16-112-10516-112-109, 16-112-112, 16-112-113, 16-112-116, 16-112-118, 16-112-12116-112-123.

Cross References. Persons privileged from arrest, discharge on habeas corpus, § 16-81-102.

Case Notes

In General.

Generally, the writ of habeas corpus will not be issued if the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid order or under process regular on its face and the court making the commitment did not lack jurisdiction. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Shock, 282 Ark. 262, 667 S.W.2d 956 (1984).

When the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a process which appears regular and valid on its face, the circuit court has jurisdiction to try the petitioner on the charge pending against him and petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Wade v. Tomlinson, 284 Ark. 432, 682 S.W.2d 751 (1985).

Juvenile Offenders.

What may constitute a valid order for an adult prisoner will not be facially valid where a juvenile offender in custody is involved; the constitutional right to counsel has been extended to juveniles, and where that right has been denied to the juvenile within the juvenile commitment process, then an order emanating from such a proceeding which does not reflect the fact that the juvenile was represented by legal counsel will not constitute a facially valid order and habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Shock, 282 Ark. 262, 667 S.W.2d 956 (1984).

Writ Granted.

A person in the penitentiary was granted a writ of habeas corpus where he had been convicted by the officers of a court sitting at a time not fixed for holding court. Ex parte Jones, 27 Ark. 349 (1871).

A writ of habeas corpus may be issued to a person in a city prison convicted of a violation of a city ordinance. Ex parte Martin, 27 Ark. 467 (1872).

A convict who has been in custody of a contractor for a sufficient time to extinguish his fine and costs will be discharged. Duncan v. West, 167 Ark. 14, 267 S.W. 567 (1924).

Person committed to state hospital by county and probate judge without notice, hearing, or examination was entitled to release on habeas corpus in that the warrant or order delivered to the sheriff was not authorized by law. Rowland v. Rogers, 199 Ark. 1041, 137 S.W.2d 246 (1940).

Writ Not Granted.

Prisoner was not entitled to release because the commitment for misdemeanor failed to direct that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Bomer v. Jones, 100 Ark. 226, 140 S.W. 22 (1911).

Cited: Von Luce v. Rankin, 267 Ark. 34, 588 S.W.2d 445 (1979); Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (1980); Bruce ex rel. Bruce v. Dillahunty, 293 Ark. 479, 739 S.W.2d 522 (1987).

16-112-119. Return of proceedings.

The proceedings upon a writ of habeas corpus shall be returned to the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the writ was heard or the court in which the prosecution, if any, is pending.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5119; Pope's Dig., § 6382; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1738.

Case Notes

Cited: Ex parte Hunt, 100 Ark. 419, 140 S.W. 710 (1911).

16-112-120. Subsequent imprisonment or commitment prohibited — Exceptions.

A person released upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not again be imprisoned or committed for the same offense, except by the legal order or process of the court wherein he or she shall be bound by recognizance to appear or some other court having jurisdiction of the same cause.

History. Crim. Code, § 388; Acts 1871, No. 49, § 1 [388], p. 255; C. & M. Dig., § 5117; Pope's Dig., § 6380; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1739.

16-112-121. Second writ.

  1. If a prisoner remanded under the provisions of this act shall obtain a second writ of habeas corpus, it shall be the duty of the officer or other person on whom the writ shall be served to return therewith the order, remanding the prisoner. If it appears that the prisoner was remanded for an offense adjudged not bailable, the prisoner shall forthwith be remanded without further proceedings.
  2. It shall not be lawful for any court or judge, on a second writ of habeas corpus, to discharge the prisoner, if he or she is clearly and specifically charged in the order remanding him or her or in the warrant of commitment, with a criminal offense. However, the prisoner, on the return of the writ, shall be bailed or remanded to prison, according to the circumstances of the case.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 4, §§ 7, 8; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5082, 5083; Pope's Dig., §§ 6345, 6346; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1740, 34-1741.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 16-112-118.

Case Notes

Offenses Not Bailable.

Where it appears from an officer's return to a writ of habeas corpus that, upon a prior application for bail, the prisoner had been remanded for an offense adjudged not bailable, such judgment is a bar to further application for bail. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Williams, 97 Ark. 243, 133 S.W. 1017 (1911).

16-112-122. Issuance of writ by judge without application.

Whenever any court of record, any justice of the Supreme Court, or any judge of the circuit court or judge of the county court, shall have evidence, from any judicial proceedings had before them, that any person is illegally confined or restrained of his or her liberty within the jurisdiction of the court or judge, it shall be the duty of the court or judge to issue a writ of habeas corpus for his or her relief, although no application or petition is presented for writ.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 1, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 5090; Pope's Dig., § 6353; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1742.

Case Notes

Cited: Ex parte Dame, 162 Ark. 382, 259 S.W. 754 (1923); State v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 326 Ark. 886, 934 S.W.2d 915 (1996).

16-112-123. Emergency warrant.

    1. When it shall appear by satisfactory proof that any person is illegally imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty and that there is good reason to believe that he or she will be carried out of the state, or suffer some irreparable injury before he or she can be relieved by a writ of habeas corpus, any court or judge authorized to issue the writ may issue a warrant reciting the facts and directed to any county sheriff, county coroner, constable, or other person, commanding him or her to take the prisoner and to bring the prisoner forthwith before the court or judge, to be dealt with according to law.
    2. Where the proof shall also be sufficient to justify the arrest of the person having the prisoner in his or her custody, as for a criminal offense committed in the taking and detaining the prisoner, the warrant shall also contain an order for the arrest of the offender.
  1. The warrant shall be executed according to the command thereof, and, when the prisoner is brought before the court or judge, the person detaining the prisoner shall make a return in like manner, and the like proceedings shall be had as if a writ of habeas corpus had been issued in the first instance.
  2. If the person having the prisoner in custody is brought before a court or a judge as for a criminal offense, he or she shall be examined, committed, bailed, or discharged in the same manner as in other criminal cases of like nature.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 4, §§ 1-4; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5121-5124; Pope's Dig., §§ 6384-6387; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1743 — 34-1746.

Subchapter 2 — New Scientific Evidence

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 1, provided:

“The General Assembly finds that the mission of the criminal justice system is to punish the guilty and to exonerate the innocent. The General Assembly further finds that Arkansas laws and procedures should be changed in order to accommodate the advent of new technologies enhancing the ability to analyze scientific evidence.”

16-112-201. Writ of Habeas Corpus — New scientific evidence.

  1. Except when direct appeal is available, a person convicted of a crime may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the court in which the conviction was entered to vacate and set aside the judgment and to discharge the petitioner or to resentence the petitioner or grant a new trial or correct the sentence or make other disposition as may be appropriate, if the person claims under penalty of perjury that:
    1. Scientific evidence not available at trial establishes the petitioner's actual innocence; or
    2. The scientific predicate for the claim could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would find the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.
  2. Nothing contained in this subchapter shall prevent the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, upon application by a party, from granting a stay of an appeal to allow an application to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 4; 2005, No. 2250, § 2.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “under penalty of perjury” in (a).

Cross References. Physical evidence in sex offense prosecutions—Retention and disposition, § 12-12-104.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing. 72 A.L.R.6th 227.

Actual Innocence Exception to Procedural Bars in State Post-Conviction Proceedings. 97 A.L.R.6th 263 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Criminal Law, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 924.

J. Thomas Sullivan, Brady, Arkansas Rule 17.1, and Disclosure of Scientific Evidence and Expert Opinion, 35 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 245 (2013).

Case Notes

In General.

Because habeas petitioner had not sought postjudgment relief from the circuit court on the basis that he had been denied due process of law by the court's alleged failure to follow several procedural requirements, including delivering a copy of the petition to the prosecuting attorney and to the Attorney General, the Court was precluded from addressing the appeal as the due-process claims were not preserved for appellate review. Randall v. State, 368 Ark. 279, 244 S.W.3d 662 (2006).

Applicability.

Sections 16-112-201 — 16-112-207 do not provide a remedy to persons desirous of attacking a plea on the grounds that a defendant had a history of mental illness, that the plea was coerced, or obtained by false promises, threats, misinformation, deception, or misconduct. Graham v. State, 358 Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004).

Just as Acts 2001, No. 1780 (the Act), §§ 16-112-20116-112-207, does not provide a substitute for proceeding under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, the Act does not provide a substitute for a petition for writ of error coram nobis filed in the trial court. Graham v. State, 358 Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004).

Where the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the denial of defendant's petition for postconviction relief seeking to retest certain DNA evidence and ordered that certain negroid hairs introduced into evidence be retested, but on remand the trial court instead entered an order finding that the state had complied with the requirement because the hairs had been retested in preparation for the second trial, the trial court had complied with the Supreme Court's mandate. Johnson v. State, 366 Ark. 390, 235 S.W.3d 872 (2006).

Because appellant did not proceed under Acts 2001, No. 1780, codified as § 16-112-201 et seq., and because he was incarcerated in another county, the habeas-corpus petition was properly denied by the circuit court located in the county of his conviction, as it did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. Hinkston v. State, 2016 Ark. 4 (2016).

Appellant inmate's claims in the petition for writ of habeas corpus that he was innocent and that the evidence was insufficient were not within the purview of the habeas proceeding, as appellant did not invoke Acts 2001, No. 1780, codified as § 16-112-201 et seq.; further, proceedings under Acts 2001, No. 1780 must be filed in the county of conviction, but appellant's petition was filed in the county of his incarceration. Jefferson v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 29, 509 S.W.3d 626, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 121, 199 L. Ed. 2d 74 (2017).

Because petitioner inmate challenged a conviction in another county, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction under Acts 2001, No. 1780, as amended by Acts 2005, No. 2250, § 16-112-201 et seq.Muldrow v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 126, 542 S.W.3d 856 (2018).

Grounds for Relief.

Circuit court did not err by denying appellant's petition to vacate and/or set aside the judgment convicting him of murder under Acts 2001, No. 1780 (codified as §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208), because his claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct, due process, equal protection, and denial of counsel violations were not cognizable in a petition under Acts 2001, No. 1780. Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. 61 (2013).

Guilty Pleas.

Denial of the prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Acts 2001, No. 1780 (the Act), §§ 16-112-20116-112-207, was affirmed where (1) the prisoner claimed in the petition that the guilty plea was coerced and obtained by false promises, threats, misinformation, deception, and misconduct, (2) any challenge to the guilty plea was properly raised under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, (3) the remedy provided in an error coram nobis proceeding in the trial court was also available to the prisoner to raise allegations concerning the prisoner's history of mental illness and the claim that the plea was coerced, (4) in short, there were remedies in place for the prisoner to attack the plea of guilty, and (5) if the prisoner did not avail himself of them, the prisoner could not have expanded the narrow purview of the Act to encompass any and all claims concerning the validity of the guilty plea. Graham v. State, 358 Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004).

Jurisdiction.

Circuit court did not clearly err when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to address petitioner's claim for habeas relief because petitioner's conviction was entered in another county; a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging entitlement to new scientific testing under § 16-112-201 et seq. must be addressed to the court that entered the conviction. Hill v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 118, 542 S.W.3d 852 (2018).

Procedure.

Inmate's requests for scientific testing were barred by his previous petitions under the law of the case doctrine. Hill v. State, 2010 Ark. 102 (2010).

Inmate's motion under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 for additional forensic testing of evidence that had already been determined, on prior similar motions, to have low probative value and to be unlikely to substantially advance his claim of actual innocence of an armed robbery, was properly summarily denied by the trial court. Cooper v. State, 2013 Ark. 180 (2013).

Relief Denied.

Defendant's petition did not comport with the prevailing rules of procedure and his appeal was dismissed as he merely concluded that he was innocent and wished to have testing performed to prove that fact; defendant failed to state the basis for proving his innocence with scientific testing, identify the evidence to be tested and specify the scientific tests to be conducted on the evidence, and he made no showing that good cause prevented him from filing his petition within 36 months from the date of his conviction. Douthitt v. State, 366 Ark. 579, 237 S.W.3d 76 (2006).

Habeas corpus relief was not warranted under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 because, even if appellant's deoxyribonucleic acid and fingerprints were not found on a mask, his actual innocence would not have been established in light of the evidence as a whole where a witness recognized appellant's clothing and voice; no evidentiary hearing was required because the petition, files, and records showed that appellant was entitled to no relief. Moreover, appellant was not entitled to relief on the grounds of errors made by the trial court and ineffectiveness of counsel because petitions under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 were limited to claims related to scientific testing of evidence, and appellant failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness where the testing suggested by appellant was either available at the time of his trial or not shown to be substantially more probative than technology available at the time. King v. State, 2013 Ark. 133 (2013).

Because appellant, convicted of capital murder as an accomplice, failed to state a basis on which the trial court could have ordered scientific testing, he could not prevail on appeal; appellant failed to satisfy the statutory requirements because the results of proposed testing to determine whether there were other individuals at the crime scene would not support the theory of defense he relied on in a way to establish his innocence or raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit the offense. Evidence connecting another person to the crime scene would not exonerate defendant. Bienemy v. State, 2016 Ark. 427, 504 S.W.3d 588 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in holding that death row defendant, convicted of a 1993 murder, failed to meet the predicate requirements for DNA testing of 26 pieces of evidence because the proposed testing could not have raised a reasonable probability that defendant did not commit the offense given the significant evidence tying him to the murder; the presence of another male's DNA from testing of items such as the Caucasian hairs could not significantly advance defendant's claim of innocence. Johnson v. State, 2019 Ark. 391, 591 S.W.3d 265 (2019).

Scientific Evidence.

Where appellant gave the police a statement in which he admitted shooting the murder victim, appellant failed to show that DNA testing of blood splatter would have proved that he was actually innocent of the crime as required by § 16-112-103(a)(1). The trial court did not err by denying his petition to vacate or set aside the judgment pursuant to § 16-112-201 et seq. Leaks v. State, 371 Ark. 581, 268 S.W.3d 866 (2007).

Whether or not the court correctly determined identity was not at issue as required to grant a motion for testing under § 16-112-202, and appellant, an inmate, was not entitled to relief. More fundamentally, he failed to show a basis to commence a proceeding for the writ under either basis set out in subsection (a) of this section. Guy v. State, 2011 Ark. 305 (2011).

Denial of inmate's petition for habeas corpus under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 was appropriate because he had sought and received DNA testing, the results of which were inconclusive and the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory did not have a duty to perform, or direct to be performed, additional mitochondrial DNA testing, § 16-112-208(b). Pitts v. State, 2011 Ark. 322 (2011).

In appellant's rape case, a court properly denied DNA testing of other hairs found at the scene because genetic material from two individuals was discovered, with the major component attributable to appellant, and another person's hair at the scene would in no way preclude appellant's having committed the offenses. Pankau v. State, 2013 Ark. 162 (2013).

Supreme Court reinvested jurisdiction in the circuit court and granted petitioner permission to seek relief via a writ of error coram nobis. A review conducted by the federal government concluded that there were errors in a forensic hair analyst's work, and the prosecutor conceded that the analyst's work was material to petitioner's capital felony murder conviction. Pitts v. State, 2016 Ark. 345, 501 S.W.3d 803 (2016).

Stay.

Trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's petition for scientific testing even where proceedings might be pending before the state Supreme Court or a state appellate court, thus, the state Supreme Court was authorized to issue a stay of proceedings before it in order to allow the trial court to consider defendant's petition for scientific testing, including whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Echols v. State, 350 Ark. 42, 84 S.W.3d 424 (2002).

Time Limitations.

Petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief (seeking a ruling on the motion for extension of time to lodge the record on appeal), because the petitioner filed his petition to vacate and or to set aside the judgment in the circuit court nearly five years after the date of his conviction. Section 16-112-202(10)(B) mandated that there shall be a rebuttable presumption against timeliness for any motion not made within thirty-six months of the date of conviction and since the DNA testing was available at the time of his trial, the petitioner's attempt to rebut the presumption against timeliness failed, and nothing in the record suggested that the prosecuting attorney was properly served and the petition for writ of mandamus did not allege that the prosecuting attorney was served. Mitchael v. State, 2012 Ark. 256 (2012).

Circuit court did not err by denying appellant's petition for DNA testing under Acts 2001, No. 1780 (codified as §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208), because it was filed 44 months after entry of the judgment convicting him of murder and he failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness under § 16-112-202(10). Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. 61 (2013).

Cited: Davis v. State, 366 Ark. 401, 235 S.W.3d 902 (2006); Aaron v. State, 2010 Ark. 249 (2010); Hill v. State, 2012 Ark. 204 (2012); Bliss v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 315 (2012); Girley v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 447 (2012).

16-112-202. Form of motion.

Except when direct appeal is available, a person convicted of a crime may make a motion for the performance of fingerprinting, forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, or other tests which may become available through advances in technology to demonstrate the person's actual innocence if:

  1. The specific evidence to be tested was secured as a result of the conviction of an offense's being challenged under § 16-112-201;
  2. The specific evidence to be tested was not previously subjected to testing and the person making the motion under this section did not:
    1. Knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to request testing of the evidence in a court proceeding commenced on or after August 12, 2005; or
    2. Knowingly fail to request testing of the evidence in a prior motion for post-conviction testing;
  3. The specific evidence was previously subjected to testing and the person making a motion under this section requests testing that uses a new method or technology that is substantially more probative than the prior testing;
  4. The specific evidence to be tested is in the possession of the state and has been subject to a chain of custody and retained under conditions sufficient to ensure that the evidence has not been substituted, contaminated, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any respect material to the proposed testing;
  5. The proposed testing is reasonable in scope, utilizes scientifically sound methods, and is consistent with accepted forensic practices;
  6. The person making a motion under this section identifies a theory of defense that:
    1. Is not inconsistent with an affirmative defense presented at the trial of the offense being challenged under § 16-112-201; and
    2. Would establish the actual innocence of the person in relation to the offense being challenged under § 16-112-201;
  7. The identity of the perpetrator was at issue during the investigation or prosecution of the offense being challenged under § 16-112-201;
  8. The proposed testing of the specific evidence may produce new material evidence that would:
    1. Support the theory of defense described in subdivision (6) of this section; and
    2. Raise a reasonable probability that the person making a motion under this section did not commit the offense;
  9. The person making a motion under this section certifies that he or she will provide a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or other sample or a fingerprint for comparison; and
  10. The motion is made in a timely fashion subject to the following conditions:
    1. There shall be a rebuttable presumption of timeliness if the motion is made within thirty-six (36) months of the date of conviction. The presumption may be rebutted upon a showing:
      1. That the motion for a test under this section is based solely upon information used in a previously denied motion; or
      2. Of clear and convincing evidence that the motion filed under this section was filed solely to cause delay or harassment; and
    2. There shall be a rebuttable presumption against timeliness for any motion not made within thirty-six (36) months of the date of conviction. The presumption may be rebutted upon a showing:
      1. That the person making a motion under this section was or is incompetent and the incompetence substantially contributed to the delay in the motion for a test;
      2. That the evidence to be tested is newly discovered evidence;
      3. That the motion is not based solely upon the person's own assertion of innocence and a denial of the motion would result in a manifest injustice;
      4. That a new method of technology that is substantially more probative than prior testing is available; or
      5. Of good cause.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 5; 2005, No. 2250, § 3.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment rewrote this section.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing. 72 A.L.R.6th 227.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Defendant's petition did not comport with the prevailing rules of procedure and his appeal was dismissed as he merely concluded that he was innocent and wished to have testing performed to prove that fact; defendant failed to state the basis for proving his innocence with scientific testing, identify the evidence to be tested and specify the scientific tests to be conducted on the evidence, and he made no showing that good cause prevented him from filing his petition within 36 months from the date of his conviction.Douthitt v. State, 366 Ark. 579, 237 S.W.3d 76 (2006).

Pursuant to subdivision (10) of this section, defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for testing was not timely; defendant's requests for testing did not point to any new technology that was more probative than what was available at trial and each of the items that he sought to have tested was available at the time of his trial. Scott v. State, 372 Ark. 587, 279 S.W.3d 66 (2008).

Guilty Plea.

There was no basis to find that the trial court erred when it denied the prisoner's petition for scientific testing of a hair recovered at the crime scene where (1) in entering the plea of guilty, the prisoner admitted that he committed the offense, (2) thus, the prisoner's identity was not in question, and (3) there was a remedy in place for challenging a plea of guilty on the grounds advanced by the prisoner. Graham v. State, 358 Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004).

Identity Not at Issue.

Where appellant gave the police a statement in which he admitted shooting the murder victim, the trial court did not err by denying his petition to vacate or set aside the judgment pursuant to § 16-112-201 et seq. Appellant could not prove that the identity of the perpetrator was at issue during the investigation or prosecution of the offense, as required by subdivision (7) of this section. Leaks v. State, 371 Ark. 581, 268 S.W.3d 866 (2007).

Appellant's motion for retesting of DNA on a sock he used to clean himself with after raping a 15-year-old girl was properly denied because appellant failed to satisfy the predicate requirement for such retesting: that his identity have been at issue, as required by subdivision (7) of this section. The victim and other evidence clearly identified appellant as the only possible rapist. Strong v. State, 2010 Ark. 181, 372 S.W.3d 758 (2010).

Petition Denied.

Defendant's motion for scientific testing was properly denied because the motion was filed almost 16 years after the judgment was entered, but defendant failed to establish in the motion a rebuttal of the presumption arising from one of the five grounds listed in subdivision (10) of this section; the record did not support defendant's claim that he alleged his incompetence in the motion for testing or the proposed amendments and neither the motions nor the proposed amendments referenced the presumption against timeliness, any cause for delay, or incompetence of any kind. Defendant did not identify newly discovered evidence to be tested and failed to clearly identify the evidence that he did wish to be tested and, despite defendant's assertion, he did not include in the motion a showing that a new method of technology was available that was substantially more probative than prior testing. Aaron v. State, 2010 Ark. 249 (2010).

Petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief (seeking a ruling on the motion for extension of time to lodge the record on appeal), because the petitioner filed his petition to vacate and or to set aside the judgment in the circuit court nearly five years after the date of his conviction. Subdivision (10)(B) of this section mandated that there shall be a rebuttable presumption against timeliness for any motion not made within thirty-six months of the date of conviction and since the DNA testing was available at the time of his trial, the petitioner's attempt to rebut the presumption against timeliness failed, and nothing in the record suggested that the prosecuting attorney was properly served and the petition for writ of mandamus did not allege that the prosecuting attorney was served. Mitchael v. State, 2012 Ark. 256 (2012).

Because appellant, convicted of capital murder as an accomplice, failed to state a basis on which the trial court could have ordered scientific testing, he could not prevail on appeal; appellant failed to satisfy the statutory requirements because the results of proposed testing to determine whether there were other individuals at the crime scene would not support the theory of defense he relied on in a way to establish his innocence or raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit the offense. Evidence connecting another person to the crime scene would not exonerate defendant. Bienemy v. State, 2016 Ark. 427, 504 S.W.3d 588 (2016).

Postconviction DNA Testing.

Postconviction DNA testing was properly denied as to some evidence for an African American inmate who was convicted of capital murder where: (1) caucasian hairs had not been tested at trial even though testing was available and, because it was stipulated that the inmate was not the donor, they were not materially relevant; and (2) a cigarette butt had already been retested with the result of decreasing the probability that the saliva was from a different donor; however, postconviction DNA testing of other evidence was improperly denied and the case was remanded to the trial court to have such tests conducted. Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.3d 151, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 932, 125 S. Ct. 326, 160 L. Ed. 2d 235 (2004).

In appellant's rape case, a court properly denied DNA testing of other hairs found at the scene because genetic material from two individuals was discovered, with the major component attributable to appellant, and another person's hair at the scene would in no way preclude appellant's having committed the offenses. Pankau v. State, 2013 Ark. 162 (2013).

Testimony from appellant’s girlfriend that the drugs and gun were hers did not serve to exonerate appellant, as her ownership would not preclude appellant’s possession of them and did not place identity in question such that DNA testing should have been ordered. Edwards v. State, 2014 Ark. 185 (2014).

Defendant's motion for postconviction forensic DNA testing was improperly denied without an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant satisfied the chain-of-custody requirements. Defendant alleged in his petition that the knife was in the possession of the State, that the knife had been subject to a chain of custody, and that the knife had been retained under sufficient conditions for testing; and the State did not present any evidence that a break in the chain of custody had occurred, or that the knife had not been retained under conditions sufficient to ensure that it had not been contaminated, tampered with, or altered in any respect material to the proposed testing. Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 57 (2015).

Circuit court erred in ruling that defendant was not entitled to seek postconviction forensic DNA testing based on his motion amounting to a successive petition for similar relief because defendant's previous petitions did not request the use of the DNA technologies requested in the current petition, specifically STR and Y-STR testing. Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 57 (2015).

Appellant could not prevail on his habeas petition where he had not demonstrated that an electron microscope was unavailable at the time of his original trial, that the proposed testing would have been more probative than testing available, or that any evidence was available for testing other than the victim's own hair and blood. Hall v. State, 2017 Ark. 77, 511 S.W.3d 842 (2017).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying a postconviction petition for DNA testing of a hair ascribed to an accomplice where even if the hair had not come from the accomplice, it only showed that someone had been in the abandoned house before the murder or during the several-month interlude between the crime and the discovery of the victim's body, and the State had presented sufficient evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony to implicate petitioner in the murder. Martin v. State, 2018 Ark. 176, 545 S.W.3d 763 (2018).

Petitioner's request for DNA testing of the victim's clothing and the materials used to bind the victim's body was properly denied as untimely where all of the evidence was available at the time of trial, petitioner's desire to test additional evidence based on a different theory of the crime was at best a bare assertion of innocence, and the methods of testing he sought were available at the time of trial. Martin v. State, 2018 Ark. 176, 545 S.W.3d 763 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in holding that death row defendant, convicted of a 1993 murder, failed to meet the predicate requirements for DNA testing of 26 pieces of evidence because the proposed testing could not have raised a reasonable probability that defendant did not commit the offense given the significant evidence tying him to the murder; the presence of another male's DNA from testing of items such as the Caucasian hairs could not significantly advance defendant's claim of innocence. Johnson v. State, 2019 Ark. 391, 591 S.W.3d 265 (2019).

Prima Facie Case.

Writ of habeas corpus could issue based upon new scientific evidence proving a person was actually innocent of the offense for which he was convicted; however, defendant's identity was not an issue at trial, such that he failed to state a prima facie case of actual innocence or to produce any evidence to bring his petition within the purview of § 16-112-201 et seq.Orndorff v. State, 355 Ark. 261, 132 S.W.3d 722 (2003).

Scientific Testing.

Prisoner's petition to vacate and set aside the judgment against him was properly denied as the petition failed to identify a generally accepted scientific testing method that would have produced new and non-cumulative evidence materially relevant to prisoner's assertion of actual innocence; the prisoner failed to reveal in his pleadings a generally accepted scientific method that could have proved that the victims were virgins after July 12, 1997, based on blood, tissue, or other samples taken nearly a decade later and, by the prisoner's own admission, the requested scientific testing would have merely duplicated medical records in existence at the time of his conviction. Davis v. State, 366 Ark. 401, 235 S.W.3d 902 (2006).

State inmate's federal habeas claim that the state courts violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and to present a complete defense by denying his postconviction petition to require additional fingerprint testing of the gun found near victim's body pursuant to the new state habeas cause of action under this section was procedurally barred because the inmate raised no issue of federal constitutional law and cited no federal authority in the state courts, and even if it had been raised, the inmate cited no Supreme Court decision clearly establishing that the right to present a complete defense applies to postconviction proceedings, or that due process includes the right to postconviction testing using new technological advances; the district court also did not abuse its discretion by not ordering the fingerprint testing he requested under R. Governing § 2254 Cases U.S. Dist. Cts. 6(a) because the federal claim was procedurally barred, and the state courts' decision that the inmate failed to show “more than a slight chance” that additional testing would yield a favorable result was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Rucker v. Norris, 563 F.3d 766 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 950, 130 S. Ct. 401, 175 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2009).

Petitioner seeking scientific testing of crime evidence from his 21-year-old rape conviction did not offer a factual basis for his claim that the evidence was available with an unbroken chain of custody as required by this section; therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that his petition was a successive petition and subject to summary denial under § 16-112-205(d). Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 29 (2010).

Whether or not the court correctly determined identity was not at issue as required to grant a motion for testing under this section, and appellant, an inmate, was not entitled to relief. More fundamentally, he failed to show a basis to commence a proceeding for the writ under either basis set out in § 16-112-201(a). Guy v. State, 2011 Ark. 305 (2011).

Time Limitations.

Inmate's motion for scientific testing was properly denied by the trial court because the motion was not made within 36 months of defendant's original conviction and the inmate had not provided any evidence to rebut the presumption that the petition was not timely; there was no showing that incompetence contributed to the delay, that the evidence to be tested was newly discovered, or that a new method of technology was available. Brown v. State, 367 Ark. 315, 239 S.W.3d 481 (2006).

Under subdivision (10)(B) of this section, there was a rebuttable presumption of untimeliness for a petition for DNA testing filed more than 36 months after a conviction. The circuit court correctly determined that the petition was untimely because the petition failed to establish any of the enumerated grounds for rebutting the presumption. Cooper v. State, 2012 Ark. 123 (2012).

Trial court did not err in dismissing defendant's petition for postconviction relief because defendant's petition failed to establish the required rebuttal of the presumption of untimeliness, pursuant to subdivision (10)(B) of this section, and, therefore, failed to provide a basis for the court to assume jurisdiction under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208. Hill v. State, 2012 Ark. 204 (2012).

Habeas corpus petitioner failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness pursuant to subdivision (10)(B) of this section; while petitioner alleged that petitioner was placed in administrative segregation, no other reference was made to the nearly five years that elapsed between petitioner's conviction and the filing of the petition. Garner v. State, 2012 Ark. 271 (2012).

Circuit court did not err by denying appellant's petition for DNA testing under Acts 2001, No. 1780 (codified as §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208), because it was filed 44 months after entry of the judgment convicting him of murder and he failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness under subdivision (10) of this section. Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. 61 (2013).

Habeas corpus relief was not warranted under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 because, even if appellant's deoxyribonucleic acid and fingerprints were not found on a mask, his actual innocence would not have been established in light of the evidence as a whole where a witness recognized appellant's clothing and voice; no evidentiary hearing was required because the petition, files, and records showed that appellant was entitled to no relief. Moreover, appellant was not entitled to relief on the grounds of errors made by the trial court and ineffectiveness of counsel because petitions under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 were limited to claims related to scientific testing of evidence, and appellant failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness where the testing suggested by appellant was either available at the time of his trial or not shown to be substantially more probative than technology available at the time. King v. State, 2013 Ark. 133 (2013).

Dismissal of a habeas petition as untimely was proper where appellant had not rebutted the presumption against timeliness by establishing his incompetence, the existence of newly discovered evidence, or that the denial of his petition would result in a manifest injustice. Hall v. State, 2017 Ark. 77, 511 S.W.3d 842 (2017).

—Presumption Rebutted.

For purposes of defendant's motion for postconviction forensic DNA testing, defendant rebutted the presumption against untimeliness by showing that a new method of technology that was substantially more probative than prior testing was available because no DNA testing methods were available at the time of his trial in 1987, and today's DNA testing methods were, by definition, substantially more probative. Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 57 (2015).

16-112-203. Contents of motion.

  1. The petition filed under this subchapter shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner versus the State of Arkansas and shall contain:
      1. A statement of the facts and the grounds upon which the petition is based and relief desired.
      2. All grounds for relief shall be stated in the petition or any amendment to the petition, unless the grounds could not reasonably have been set forth in the petition.
      3. The petition may contain argument or citation of authorities;
    1. An identification of the proceedings in which the petitioner was convicted, including the date of the entry of conviction and sentence or other disposition complained of;
    2. An identification of any previous proceeding, together with the grounds asserted in the previous proceeding, which sought to secure relief for the petitioner from the conviction and sentence or other disposition; and
      1. The name and address of any attorney representing the petitioner.
      2. If the petitioner is without counsel, the circuit clerk shall immediately transmit a copy of the petition to the judge and shall advise the petitioner of that referral.
  2. The filing of the petition and any related documents and any proceedings pursuant to the petition shall be without any costs or fees charged to the petitioner.
  3. The petition shall be:
    1. Verified by the petitioner or signed by the petitioner's attorney; and
    2. Addressed to the court in which the conviction was entered.
  4. The circuit clerk shall deliver a copy of the petition to the prosecuting attorney and to the Attorney General.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 6.

Case Notes

In General.

Because habeas petitioner had not sought postjudgment relief from the circuit court on the basis that he had been denied due process of law by the court's alleged failure to follow several procedural requirements, including delivering a copy of the petition to the prosecuting attorney and to the Attorney General, the Court was precluded from addressing the appeal as the due-process claims were not preserved for appellate review. Randall v. State, 368 Ark. 279, 244 S.W.3d 662 (2006).

Defendant's petition did not comport with the prevailing rules of procedure and his appeal was dismissed as he merely concluded that he was innocent and wished to have testing performed to prove that fact; defendant failed to state the basis for proving his innocence with scientific testing, identify the evidence to be tested and specify the scientific tests to be conducted on the evidence, and he made no showing that good cause prevented him from filing his petition within 36 months from the date of his conviction. Douthitt v. State, 366 Ark. 579, 237 S.W.3d 76 (2006).

Cited: Davis v. State, 366 Ark. 401, 235 S.W.3d 902 (2006).

16-112-204. Other pleadings.

  1. Within twenty (20) days after the filing of the petition, the prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General shall respond to the petition by answer or motion which shall be filed with the court and served on the petitioner if unrepresented or served on the petitioner's attorney.
    1. No further pleadings are necessary except as the court may order.
    2. However, the court may at any time prior to its decision on the merits permit:
      1. A withdrawal of the petition;
      2. Amendments to the petition; and
      3. Amendments to the answer.
    3. The court shall examine the substance of the pleading and shall waive any irregularities or defects in form.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 7.

Case Notes

In General.

Because habeas petitioner had not sought postjudgment relief from the circuit court on the basis that he had been denied due process of law by the court's alleged failure to follow several procedural requirements, including delivering a copy of the petition to the prosecuting attorney and to the Attorney General, the Court was precluded from addressing the appeal as the due-process claims were not preserved for appellate review. Randall v. State, 368 Ark. 279, 244 S.W.3d 662 (2006).

While there was a mandatory response requirement in subsection (a) of this section for habeas corpus petitions seeking the scientific testing of crime evidence, there was no provision for a default judgment as in Ark. R. Civ. P. 55, and the trial court did not err in denying a petitioner's motion for a default judgment. The rules of civil procedure did not apply in the habeas proceeding. Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 29 (2010).

16-112-205. Hearing.

  1. Unless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the court shall promptly set an early hearing on the petition and response, promptly determine the issues, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and either deny the petition or enter an order granting the appropriate relief.
  2. Hearings on a petition filed pursuant to this subchapter shall be open and shall be held in the court in which the conviction was entered.
    1. The court may order the petitioner to be present at the hearing.
    2. If the petitioner is represented by an attorney, the attorney shall be present at any hearing.
    3. A verbatim record of any hearing shall be made and kept.
    4. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the petitioner shall bear the burden of proving the facts alleged in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.
    5. The court may receive evidence in the form of affidavit, deposition, or oral testimony.
  3. The court may summarily deny a second or successive petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner and may summarily deny a petition if the issues raised in it have previously been decided by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in the same case.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 8.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing. 72 A.L.R.6th 227.

Case Notes

Denial of Petition Without Hearing.

Petitioner seeking scientific testing of crime evidence from his 21-year-old rape conviction did not offer a factual basis for his claim that the evidence was available with an unbroken chain of custody as required by § 16-112-202; therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that his petition was a successive petition and subject to summary denial under subsection (d) of this section. Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 29 (2010).

Habeas corpus relief was not warranted under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 because, even if appellant's deoxyribonucleic acid and fingerprints were not found on a mask, his actual innocence would not have been established in light of the evidence as a whole where a witness recognized appellant's clothing and voice; no evidentiary hearing was required because the petition, files, and records showed that appellant was entitled to no relief. Moreover, appellant was not entitled to relief on the grounds of errors made by the trial court and ineffectiveness of counsel because petitions under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 were limited to claims related to scientific testing of evidence, and appellant failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness where the testing suggested by appellant was either available at the time of his trial or not shown to be substantially more probative than technology available at the time. King v. State, 2013 Ark. 133 (2013).

Denial Proper.

Inmate's motion under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 for additional forensic testing of evidence that had already been determined, on prior similar motions, to have low probative value and to be unlikely to substantially advance his claim of actual innocence of an armed robbery, was properly summarily denied by the trial court. Cooper v. State, 2013 Ark. 180 (2013).

Evidentiary Hearing.

Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, as required under this section, on a motion for new trial, brought under the Arkansas DNA testing statutes, §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208, because the petition, the file, and the records of the proceeding did not conclusively show that defendant was entitled to no relief. Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, 373 S.W.3d 892 (2010).

Defendant's motion for postconviction forensic DNA testing was improperly denied without an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant satisfied the chain-of-custody requirements. Defendant alleged in his petition that the knife was in the possession of the State, that the knife had been subject to a chain of custody, and that the knife had been retained under sufficient conditions for testing; and the State did not present any evidence that a break in the chain of custody had occurred, or that the knife had not been retained under conditions sufficient to ensure that it had not been contaminated, tampered with, or altered in any respect material to the proposed testing. Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 57 (2015).

Cited: Graham v. State, 358 Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004).

16-112-206. Appeals.

  1. The appealing party, within thirty (30) calendar days after the entry of the order, shall file a notice of appeal if the party wishes to appeal.
    1. If the appeal is by the petitioner, the service shall be on the prosecuting attorney and the Attorney General.
    2. If the appeal is by the state, the service shall be on the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney.
  2. No fees or bond for costs shall be required for the appeal.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 9.

16-112-207. Appointment of counsel — Latent fingerprinting services.

    1. A person financially unable to obtain counsel who desires to pursue the remedy provided in this subchapter may apply for representation by the Arkansas Public Defender Commission or appointed private attorneys.
    2. The trial public defenders or appointed private attorneys may represent indigent persons who apply for representation under this section.
      1. With the approval of the court, petitioners may use the services of the State Crime Laboratory for latent fingerprinting identification, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, and other tests which may become available through advances in technology.
        1. If approved by the court, the laboratory shall provide the requested services.
        2. Samples shall be of sufficient quantity to allow testing by both the prosecution and the defense.
        3. Neither the prosecution nor the defense shall consume the entire sample in testing in the absence of a court order allowing the sample to be entirely consumed in testing.
    1. Subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall not apply to any tests before trial of a matter that will be governed by relevant constitutional provisions, statutory law, or court rules.
  1. The Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission and the laboratory shall give priority to claims based on factors including:
    1. The opportunity for conclusive or near conclusive proof through scientific evidence that the person is actually innocent; and
    2. A lengthy sentence of imprisonment or a death sentence.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1780, § 10.

Research References

ALR.

Actual Innocence Exception to Procedural Bars in State Post-Conviction Proceedings. 97 A.L.R.6th 263 (2014).

Case Notes

In General.

Because habeas petitioner had not sought postjudgment relief from the circuit court on the basis that he had been denied due process of law by the court's alleged failure to follow several procedural requirements, including delivering a copy of the petition to the prosecuting attorney and to the Attorney General, the Court was precluded from addressing the appeal as the due-process claims were not preserved for appellate review. Randall v. State, 368 Ark. 279, 244 S.W.3d 662 (2006).

Cited: Davis v. State, 366 Ark. 401, 235 S.W.3d 902 (2006); Douthitt v. State, 366 Ark. 579, 237 S.W.3d 76 (2006).

16-112-208. Testing procedures — Definition.

    1. A court that orders any deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under this subchapter shall direct the testing to be carried out by the State Crime Laboratory.
      1. However, the court may order deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing by another qualified laboratory if the court makes all necessary orders to ensure the integrity of the specific evidence and the reliability of the testing process and test results.
      2. As used in this section, “qualified laboratory” means a laboratory that is accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors or certified through the National Forensic Science Technology Center.
    2. The court may order the person who requested any deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under this subchapter to pay for the cost of the testing if the court determines that the person has the ability to pay for the testing.
  1. If the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results obtained under this subchapter are inconclusive, the court may order additional testing or deny further relief to the person who requested the testing.
    1. If deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results obtained under this subchapter establish that the person who requested the testing was the source of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, the court shall deny any relief to the person.
    2. On motion of the state, the court shall determine if the person's assertion of actual innocence was false. If the court finds that the person's assertion of actual innocence was false, the court may:
      1. Hold the person in contempt;
      2. Assess against the person the cost of any deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing carried out under this subchapter;
      3. Forward the finding to the Board of Corrections for consideration in the awarding of meritorious good time to the person; or
      4. Forward the finding to the Parole Board for consideration in the granting of parole to the person.
  2. In any prosecution of a person for perjury or other conduct resulting from a proceeding under this subchapter, upon conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere the court shall sentence the person to a term of imprisonment that shall run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment the person is serving.
    1. If deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results obtained under this subchapter exclude a person as the source of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, the person may file a motion for a new trial or resentencing.
    2. The court shall establish a reasonable schedule for the person to file a motion under subdivision (e)(1) of this section and for the state to respond to the motion.
    3. The court may grant the motion of the person for a new trial or resentencing if the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results, when considered with all other evidence in the case regardless of whether the evidence was introduced at trial, establish by compelling evidence that a new trial would result in an acquittal.
  3. In a case in which a person is sentenced to death, any deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing ordered under this subchapter shall be completed:
    1. No later than sixty (60) days after the date on which the state responds to the motion described in §§ 16-112-202 and 16-112-203; or
    2. No later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the date on which the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing was ordered under any post-conviction testing procedures under this subchapter.
    1. The results of any deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing ordered under this subchapter shall be simultaneously disclosed to the court, the person that requested the testing, and the State of Arkansas.
      1. The state shall submit any test results relating to a person's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to the National DNA Index System.
      2. If the deoxyribonucleic acid test (DNA) results obtained under this subchapter are inconclusive or show that the person tested was the source of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample of the person tested may be retained in the system and State DNA Data Base.
      3. If the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results obtained under this subchapter exclude the person tested as the source of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence but a comparison of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample of the person tested results in a match between the person's sample and another offense, the State Crime Laboratory shall notify the appropriate agency and preserve the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample of the person tested.
      4. The State Crime Laboratory shall destroy the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample of the person tested and ensure that the information is not retained in the system or the data base if:
        1. The deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results obtained under this subchapter exclude the person tested as the source of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence;
        2. A comparison of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample through a search of the data base or system does not match the person's sample and another offense; and
        3. There is no other legal authority to retain the sample of the person tested in the data base or system.

History. Acts 2005, No. 2250, § 4.

Cross References. Perjury generally, § 5-53-102.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing. 72 A.L.R.6th 227.

Case Notes

Conclusive Results.

Where it was undisputed that the results of a DNA test conclusively excluded three codefendants as the source of the DNA evidence tested, subsection (b) of this section was inapplicable and the trial court erred in denying one defendant's motion for new trial under that subsection. Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, 373 S.W.3d 892 (2010).

Motion for New Trial.

Where defendant was convicted on three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death, subdivision (e)(3) of this section did not require defendant to present a compelling claim of actual innocence on a motion for new trial, brought under the Arkansas DNA testing statutes, §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208, but stated that defendant had to establish by compelling evidence that a new trial would result in an acquittal. Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, 373 S.W.3d 892 (2010).

No Constitutional Right.

Court rejected defendant's argument that he had a constitutional right to additional testing under the due process clause of Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 8. When DNA test results matched the person requesting additional testing, it was not fundamentally unfair to refuse additional testing. Isom v. State, 2010 Ark. 496, 372 S.W.3d 809 (2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1023, 131 S. Ct. 3029, 180 L. Ed. 2d 853 (2011).

Relief Properly Denied.

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's postconviction request for additional DNA testing under subsection (b) of this section as an earlier postconviction DNA test did not exclude him as the source of the DNA evidence and further testing of third parties would not conclusively eliminate him as the source. Isom v. State, 2010 Ark. 496, 372 S.W.3d 809 (2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1023, 131 S. Ct. 3029, 180 L. Ed. 2d 853 (2011).

Denial of inmate's petition for habeas corpus under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 was appropriate because he had sought and received DNA testing, the results of which were inconclusive and the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory did not have a duty to perform, or direct to be performed, additional mitochondrial DNA testing under subsection (b) of this section. Pitts v. State, 2011 Ark. 322 (2011).

Cited: Hill v. State, 2012 Ark. 204 (2012).

Chapter 113 Injunctions

Publisher's Notes. Some provisions of this chapter may be superseded by Ark. R. Civ. P. 65.

Research References

ALR.

Recovery of damages resulting from wrongful issuance of injunction as limited to amount of bond. 30 A.L.R.4th 273.

Ark. L. Rev.

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration — Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Injunctions and temporary restraining orders, Ark. R. Civ. P. 65.

Research References

Am. Jur. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Inj., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 43A C.J.S., Inj., § 1 et seq.

16-113-101. Injunction defined.

The injunction provided by the Code of Practice in Civil Cases is a command to refrain from a particular act.

History. Civil Code, § 293; C. & M. Dig., § 5816; Pope's Dig., § 7532; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-101.

Publisher's Notes. For codification of the Code of Practice in Civil Cases, see the parallel references for the Civil Code of 1869 in the Tables Volume A.

16-113-102. Final judgment or provisional remedy.

An injunction may be the final judgment in an action, or may be allowed as a provisional remedy. Where so allowed, it shall be by order.

History. Civil Code, § 293; C. & M. Dig., § 5791; Pope's Dig., § 7506; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-101.

16-113-103. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning punishment for breach of injunction, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 311; C. & M. Dig., § 5281; Pope's Dig., § 7537; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-401.

16-113-104. Writ abolished.

The writ of injunction is abolished.

History. Civil Code, § 293; C. & M. Dig., § 5815; Pope's Dig., § 7531; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-101.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Becker, The Remedial Side of Contempt When Injunctions Are Disregarded, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 5.

Subchapter 2 — Proceedings

Research References

Am. Jur. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Inj., § 226 et seq.

C.J.S. 43A C.J.S., Inj., § 308 et seq.

16-113-201. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning notice of application for an injunction, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Civil Code, §§ 298-300; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5796-5798; Pope's Dig., §§ 7512-7514; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 32-201—32-203.

16-113-202. Affidavits.

  1. On the hearing of an application for an injunction of which notice has been given, each party may read affidavits.
  2. The affidavits read upon an application for an injunction shall be filed with the papers of the case.

History. Civil Code, §§ 301, 312; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5789, 5790; Pope's Dig., §§ 7504, 7505; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 32-204, 32-205.

16-113-203. Injunction bonds.

  1. In every case, the court or judge granting an injunction shall specify in the order therefor an amount, for which the party obtaining it shall give security in a bond to the party enjoined, before the injunction shall become effectual. The amount of the bond shall be sufficient to cover all the probable damages and costs that may be occasioned by the injunction.
  2. The court or judge may prescribe the effect of the bond, so as to secure to the party enjoined the damages to which he or she may become entitled if it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted.
    1. Where the injunction is to stay proceedings upon a judgment or final order for money, the amount for which security is required shall be sufficient to cover, with other damages, the sum enjoined, with five (5) years' interest thereon.
    2. When the injunction is to stay proceedings upon a judgment for property, the amount specified in the order shall be sufficient to cover also the rent, hire, or value of the use thereof for two (2) years; and in case of personal property, its value likewise.
  3. The order of injunction shall not be issued by the clerk until the bond mentioned in subsections (a)-(c) of this section has been executed in his or her office by one (1) or more sufficient sureties of the party obtaining the injunction.
    1. Where the injunction is to stay proceedings upon a judgment or final order, the bond shall be to the effect that the party obtaining the injunction will satisfy the judgment or order, or so much of it as is enjoined, to the extent to which the injunction may be dissolved and that he or she will also satisfy any modified judgment or order that may be rendered or made in lieu of it, or so much of it as exceeds the amount left unenjoined.
    2. In other cases, unless otherwise directed by the court or judge, the bond shall be to the effect that the party giving it will pay to the party enjoined such damages as he or she may sustain if it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted.
    1. In case of injunction to stay proceedings upon a judgment or final order, the officer granting the injunction may authorize a bond to be executed to the effect that the party obtaining the injunction will pay to the party enjoined such damages as he or she may sustain if it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted.
    2. However, if, at the time the injunction is granted and bond executed, any execution or attachment has been levied upon the property of the party obtaining the injunction, the levy shall not be discharged by reason of the injunction, but it shall remain in full force until the final decision as to the injunction unless the party obtaining the injunction shall give bond in the form prescribed by law.
  4. Sureties in injunction bonds shall be taken by the clerk, under the same responsibilities as in other cases of sureties taken by him or her.
    1. A party enjoined may, at any time before judgment, upon reasonable notice to the party who has obtained the injunction, move the court for additional security on behalf of the party enjoined.
    2. If it appears on the notice that the surety in the injunction bond has removed from this state, or is insufficient, the court may vacate the order of injunction unless in a reasonable time sufficient security is given.

History. Civil Code, §§ 302-304, 313, 314; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5801-5808, 5819; Pope's Dig., §§ 7517-7524, 7535; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 32-206 — 32-210.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that subsections (a)-(c) of this section were deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case Notes

Damages.

Where a person was unlawfully jailed in defiance of an unlawful temporary injunction, damages therefrom could not be recovered against the temporary injunction bond because such damages were collateral to, and not the natural consequence of, the wrongful issuance of the temporary injunction. Hayes v. State, 254 Ark. 680, 496 S.W.2d 372 (1973).

Liability.

When a judgment has been enjoined and the injunction dissolved, the party on the bond is not required to pay the judgment enjoined if it does not appear that an opportunity to collect it has been lost by reason of the injunction. Neal v. Taylor, 56 Ark. 521, 20 S.W. 352 (1892). But see Ford v. Ferguson & Son, 184 Ark. 670, 43 S.W.2d 546 (1931).

There is no liability on a bond where the injunction was rightfully issued. Bowen v. Lovewell, 119 Ark. 64, 177 S.W. 929 (1915).

Requirement.

The judge may, if it appears that the rights of the parties demand it, require a bond to pay the judgment sought to be enjoined, as a condition of granting it. Neal v. Taylor, 56 Ark. 521, 20 S.W. 352 (1892).

An order for temporary injunction without requiring bond is void unless made under § 16-113-201(a) [superseded]. Harahan Viaduct Imp. Dist. v. Martineau, 172 Ark. 189, 288 S.W. 10 (1926).

It is only where an injunction is granted as a provisional remedy and not where it is granted as a final judgment that a bond is required to be executed by the plaintiff. Citizens Pipe Line Co. v. Twin City Pipe Line Co., 183 Ark. 1006, 39 S.W.2d 1017 (1931).

A chancery court has no jurisdiction to award a temporary injunction without first requiring a bond in an adequate amount, and with sufficient sureties, insuring that those obtaining it will pay any damages resulting from improper issuance of the temporary injunction. Brown v. Adept, Inc., 242 Ark. 1, 411 S.W.2d 868 (1967).

16-113-204. Order of injunction — Issuance — Service.

  1. The order of injunction shall be addressed to the party enjoined, shall state the injunction, and shall be dated and signed by the clerk.
    1. Where the order of injunction is issued at the commencement of the action, it shall be endorsed upon the summons, and the copy thereof delivered to the county sheriff.
    2. Where the order of injunction is issued during the litigation, it shall be delivered to him or her with as many copies thereof as there are parties enjoined.
  2. The county sheriff shall forthwith serve the order of injunction by delivering a copy to each party enjoined and make return thereof on the order.

History. Civil Code, § 305; C. & M. Dig., § 5817; Pope's Dig., § 7533; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-211.

16-113-205. Service of order unnecessary where notice given — Party bound upon execution of bond.

Where notice of the application for an injunction has been given to the party enjoined, it shall not be necessary to serve the order upon him or her. He or she is bound by the injunction as soon as the bond required of the adverse party is executed.

History. Civil Code, § 306; C. & M. Dig., § 5818; Pope's Dig., § 7534; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-212.

Case Notes

In General.

A defendant in an injunction suit is bound to take notice of the issuance of a permanent injunction. Sullivan v. State, 191 Ark. 180, 83 S.W.2d 824 (1935).

Cited: Brown v. Adept, Inc., 242 Ark. 1, 411 S.W.2d 868 (1967).

16-113-206. Party bound upon notice.

An injunction binds the party from the time he or she is informed thereof.

History. Civil Code, § 307; C. & M. Dig., § 5820; Pope's Dig., § 7536, A.S.A. 1947, § 32-213.

Case Notes

Cited: Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S.W. 742 (1909).

16-113-207. Not granted when motion overruled — Certificate of refusal.

  1. No injunction shall be granted by a circuit judge after a motion therefor has been overruled by the court.
  2. A judge refusing an application for an injunction, if requested by the defendant, shall give him or her a certificate thereof.

History. Civil Code, § 310; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5799, 5800; Pope's Dig., §§ 7515, 7516; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-214; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 233.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), deleted “or probate” preceding “judge” in the first sentence, and deleted the second sentence.

Case Notes

Disqualification of Judge.

Petitioner was not prevented from securing injunction from another judge where chancellor disqualified himself, since chancellor did not pass on petition. Lykes v. City of Texarkana, 223 Ark. 287, 265 S.W.2d 539 (1954).

Subchapter 3 — Grant

Cross References. Power of county judge to issue injunctions in absence of circuit judge from county, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 37.

Preambles. Acts 1935, No. 94, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, it is provided by an act of Congress passed June 8, 1910, and subsequently amended on March 3, 1911, March 4, 1913, and February 13, 1925, that if before final hearing of an application for an injunction in a United States District Court to restrain the enforcement of a statute or order of an administrative board or commission, a suit shall be brought in a court of the State having jurisdiction thereof under the laws of such State, accompanied by a stay in such State Court of proceedings to enforce such statute or order pending the determination of such suit by such State Court, all proceedings in any court of the United States to restrain the execution of such statute or order shall be stayed pending the final determination of such suit in the courts of the State….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [890]: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1875, No. 100, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1935, No. 94, § 2: approved Mar. 2, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “It is found to be a fact that undue and unnecessary delay is often caused by the filing of injunction suits in the United States District Court against the enforcement of statutes and orders of administrative boards of the State, and that such delay can be avoided by conferring jurisdiction upon the State courts to grant stays, which will result in the staying of proceedings in the United States District Court pending the determination of such suit in the courts of the State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1991, No. 266, § 17: Feb. 28, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that since the recent court decision in Bates v. Bates, this state has lacked adequate remedies for dealing with domestic violence and abuse; that the problem of domestic violence and abuse in our society is so complex that proper judicial remedies for victims and potential victims transcend the traditional jurisdictions of circuit and municipal court; that every potential remedy should be made available to members of households who have been subjected to abuse or are likely to be subjected to abuse such as to provide for the issuance of a protective order. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force upon its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Inj., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 43A C.J.S., Inj., § 1 et seq.

16-113-301. Authority to grant — Time of grant.

  1. The injunction may be granted at the commencement of the action or at any time before judgment by the circuit court when it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled thereto. During litigation, it may be granted by the circuit court when it satisfactorily appears by affidavits that sufficient grounds exist therefor.
  2. In the absence of the circuit judge from the county, the county judge of any county shall have power to issue orders for injunctions and other provisional writs in his or her county, returnable to the circuit court having jurisdiction. However, each party may have the order reviewed by the circuit judge.

History. Civil Code, § 295; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [295], p. 219; 1875, No. 100, § 2, p. 219; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5794, 5795; Pope's Dig., §§ 7510, 7511; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 32-102, 32-104; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 234.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), substituted “circuit court” for “court, the judge thereof, or any chancellor” in the first sentence and deleted “by the judge thereof, or by any chancellor” following “court” in the second sentence; and substituted “the circuit judge” for “any superior judge in vacation, when notice of the application shall be given at least ten (10) days before the application is made” in (b).

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Where an injunction is issued as a provisional remedy only, the order must be returnable to the court having jurisdiction of the cause, which alone has power to make the injunction perpetual. Cox v. Railway Co., 55 Ark. 454, 18 S.W. 630 (1892).

Preliminary injunction.

A common function of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits of a controversy are decided. American Investors Life Ins. Co. v. TCB Transp., Inc., 312 Ark. 343, 849 S.W.2d 509 (1993).

Cited: McClain v. McClain, 222 Ark. 729, 263 S.W.2d 911 (1953); Cummings v. Fingers, 296 Ark. 276, 753 S.W.2d 865 (1988); Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990).

16-113-302. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning temporary injunctions, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 294; C. & M. Dig., § 5792; Pope's Dig., § 7508; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-103.

16-113-303. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning staying proceedings on judgment of justice of the peace or probate court and jurisdictional amount, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 235. The section was derived from Civil Code, § 308; C. & M. Dig., § 5787; Pope's Dig., § 7502; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-107.

16-113-304. Injunction to stay proceedings on judgment or order brought in court rendering judgment or order — Affidavit.

An injunction to stay proceedings on a judgment or final order of a court shall not be granted in an action brought by the party seeking the injunction in any other court than that in which the judgment or order was rendered or made, nor shall such injunction be granted by any officer unless the party applying therefor makes affidavit that no injunction has been previously granted to stay the proceedings on the judgment or order.

History. Civil Code, § 309; C. & M. Dig., § 5788; Pope's Dig., § 7503; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-108.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section has no applicability to judgments rendered or orders made by a justice of the peace. Twin City Bank v. J.S. McWilliams Auto. Co., 182 Ark. 1086, 34 S.W.2d 229 (1931).

Adequate Remedy.

Injunction cannot be granted against judgment where other adequate remedy is available. Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. Asman, 79 Ark. 284, 95 S.W. 134 (1906).

Cited: Sledge-Norfleet Co. v. Matkins, 154 Ark. 509, 243 S.W. 289 (1922).

16-113-305. Stay of enforcement of statutes or orders of administrative boards.

In all cases where applications are made in any court in this state having jurisdiction thereof to enforce any statute or order of an administrative board or commission of this state, a stay against the enforcement of the statute or order may be issued by the court pending the determination of the suit by the state court.

History. Acts 1935, No. 94, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7542; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-105.

Case Notes

Applicability.

In an action challenging a regulation issued by the Game and Fish Commission which prohibited commercial duck hunting guides from operating on three wildlife management areas on Saturdays and Sundays during the duck hunting season and also prohibited waterfowl hunters from hunting while being guided by a commercial duck guide on those same areas on weekends, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a stay under this section as the plaintiffs did not make an application to enforce any statute or order. Ark. State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Sledge, 344 Ark. 505, 42 S.W.3d 427 (2001).

Federal Courts.

The filing of an action in the state court to enforce an order of the state refunding board in which a stay was entered was held not to prevent the federal district court from proceeding with the suit to enjoin the execution of such order where the state court action was only a sham proceeding in which there was no real dispute between the parties concerned. Peltason, Tenebaum & Harris, Inc. v. Refunding Bd., 16 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. Ark. 1935).

16-113-306. Illegal or unauthorized taxes and assessments enjoined.

The circuit judge for any county may grant injunctions and restraining orders, in all cases of illegal or unauthorized taxes and assessments by county, city, or other local tribunals, boards, or officers. No clerk or deputy clerk shall be authorized to grant restraining orders or injunctions.

History. Civil Code, § 296; Acts 1871, No. 48, § 1 [296], p. 219; 1873, No. 88, § 1 [296], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., § 5786; Pope's Dig., § 7501, A.S.A. 1947, § 32-106.

Cross References. Illegal exactions, Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 13.

Research References

ALR.

What Constitutes Plain, Speedy, and Efficient State Remedy Under Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341), Prohibiting Federal District Courts from Interfering with Assessment, Levy, or Collection of State Business Taxes. 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.

Ark. L. Rev.

Taxpayers' Suits to Prevent Illegal Exactions in Arkansas, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 129.

Case Notes

In General.

The court of equity would not restrain the collection of an illegal tax unless irreparable injury would otherwise ensue. Oliver, Sheriff & Collector v. Memphis & Little Rock R.R., 30 Ark. 128 (1875) (decision under prior law).

Where there may have been a flaw in the assessment or collection procedures concerning the manner in which the building was assessed as a parcel separate from the lot itself, the flawed procedure does not make the assessment or the exaction illegal or unauthorized. McIntosh v. Southwestern Truck Sales, 304 Ark. 224, 800 S.W.2d 431 (1990).

Appellate jurisdiction over injunctive relief that was granted to stop the county's assessment and collection of real property tax based on a reappraisal of the real property was confined to a review of the circuit court's interlocutory order granting the injunction, not on the tax issues. Villines v. Harris, 340 Ark. 319, 11 S.W.3d 516 (2000).

Federal Jurisdiction.

In an action to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes, and where the plaintiffs had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Arkansas courts under this section, § 14-90-501, § 14-90-804, and former § 16-111-103 (see now §§ 16-111-101 and 16-111-105), the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, barred federal jurisdiction. Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

Giving a broad construction to the Tax Injunction Act's (TIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, use of “tax,” access and hook-up fees for new installations of water and sewer services qualified as taxes for purposes of the TIA. Because homebuilders' action was to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes, and because the homebuilders had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the state courts via this section and former § 16-111-103 (see now §§ 16-111-101 and 16-111-105), the TIA barred federal jurisdiction over the illegal exaction claims based on Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 13 against a city, a utility, and a water and sewer commission, raised by the homebuilders. Northwest Ark. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Rogers, No. 07-5148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19772 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 3, 2008).

Improper Levy.

Where the record shows a prima facie valid levy of taxes, which it would require extrinsic evidence to show the invalidity of, or where the parties affected by an illegal levy are numerous so that redress at law would require a multiplicity of suits, a court of equity will enjoin. Greedup v. Franklin County, 30 Ark. 101 (1875).

In a proceeding to form an improvement district, the board of improvement is not authorized to substitute for the improvement asked an entirely different and more expensive improvement, and the collections of all assessments to pay for the improvement will be enjoined. Watkins v. Griffith, 59 Ark. 344, 27 S.W. 234 (1894).

In the absence of a showing that the quorum court had abused its discretion in ordering the levy of a three-mill tax to retire county bonds, the tax itself not being illegal or unauthorized, the chancellor was without power to enjoin the collection upon a complaint merely that the levy was excessive. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Fish, 181 Ark. 863, 28 S.W.2d 333 (1930).

Taxes assessed on the market value of property, instead of on one-half of its value, while excessive, were neither illegal nor unauthorized as to authorize an injunction against their collection. Beard v. Wilcockson, 184 Ark. 349, 42 S.W.2d 557 (1931).

Parties.

A citizen and taxpayer is entitled to an injunction against the collection of an illegal or unauthorized tax. Merwin v. Fussell, 93 Ark. 336, 124 S.W. 1021 (1910).

Any taxpayer, citizen, or corporation has the right to obtain from a court of equity an injunction against the collection of an illegal or unauthorized tax. McDaniel v. Texarkana Cooperage & Mfg. Co., 94 Ark. 235, 126 S.W. 727 (1910).

Cited: Scott County v. Frost, 305 Ark. 358, 807 S.W.2d 469 (1991).

16-113-307. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning physical violence or threat by spouse, was repealed by Acts 1989, No. 636, § 8, and Acts 1991, No. 266, § 13. The section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 425, § 1.

Subchapter 4 — Modification or Dissolution

Effective Dates. Acts 1915, No. 102, § 3: approved Mar. 3, 1915. Emergency declared.

Research References

Am. Jur. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Inj., § 283 et seq.

C.J.S. 43A C.J.S., Inj., § 389 et seq.

16-113-401. Injunctions before final judgment — Control of court.

All injunctions granted before final judgment shall be subject to the further order of the court.

History. Civil Code, § 297; C. & M. Dig., § 5809; Pope's Dig., § 7525; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-301.

16-113-402. Motion to dissolve or modify — Notice.

  1. The party enjoined may, at any time, upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff, move the court, upon the plaintiff's complaint and affidavits alone, to dissolve or modify an injunction of the application for which no notice was given.
  2. After answer filed by the party enjoined, he or she may give notice to the plaintiff of a motion to be made to the court in not less than ten (10) days thereafter, upon the whole case, to dissolve or modify the injunction.
  3. Upon the motion, each party may read depositions and other competent evidence in writing for the purposes of the motion.
  4. The court shall not be bound to take the answer as true.
  5. Only one (1) motion to dissolve or modify an injunction upon the whole case shall be allowed.

History. Civil Code, §§ 314.5, 316, 319; Acts 1873, No. 88, § 1 [316], p. 213; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5810, 5811, 5814; Pope's Dig., §§ 7526, 7527, 7530; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 32-302, 32-303.

16-113-403. Continuance of motion to dissolve or modify.

  1. The motion upon the whole case to dissolve or modify the injunction may be postponed, on the application of either party, to a subsequent day, or to the next term, where the court is satisfied that, under the circumstances of the case, the delay is proper.
  2. When delay is asked, in order to obtain the testimony of a witness, it must appear by affidavit what facts the witness is expected to prove, that the affiant believes his or her testimony will be true, and that it could not have been obtained by due diligence.

History. Civil Code, § 317; C. & M. Dig., § 5812; Pope's Dig., § 7528; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-304.

16-113-404. Order upon hearing.

After hearing the motion, the court or judge shall overrule the motion, or dissolve or modify the injunction, according to the right of the case.

History. Civil Code, § 318; C. & M. Dig., § 5813; Pope's Dig., § 7529; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-305.

Case Notes

Appeals.

An appeal to the Supreme Court from an order dissolving an injunction does not revive the injunction during the pendency of the appeal. Payne v. McCabe, 37 Ark. 318 (1881).

Orders in Vacation.

A circuit judge has power to dissolve in vacation an injunction ordered by himself in vacation, but the defendant cannot have any damages on the bond. Sanders v. Plunkett, 40 Ark. 507 (1883), overruled, Sager v. Hibbard, 203 Ark. 672, 158 S.W.2d 922 (1942).

16-113-405. Assessment of damages upon dissolution of injunction or restraining order.

    1. Upon the dissolution in whole or in part of any injunction or restraining order of any and every kind and nature whatsoever, the circuit court wherein the injunction or restraining order was pending may assess and render against principal and sureties on the injunction bond a valid judgment for any and all damages occasioned by the issuance of such injunction or restraining order.
    2. The court may either appoint a master to report as to the damages, or may render summary judgment therefor, or at its discretion may cause a jury to be empaneled to find the damages.
  1. Where money is enjoined, the damages may be any rate percent on the amount released by the dissolution which in the discretion of the court may be proper, not exceeding ten percent (10%).
  2. Where the delivery of property has been delayed by the injunction, the value of the use, hire, or rent thereof shall be assessed.

History. Civil Code, § 320; Acts 1915, No. 102, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5822-5824; Pope's Dig., §§ 7538-7540; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 32-307 — 32-309.

Case Notes

Appeals.

On appeal from chancery court decree awarding damages upon dissolution of injunction previously granted, the question of excessive damages is a question of fact to be tried de novo by the Supreme Court. Evans v. Weise, 234 Ark. 137, 350 S.W.2d 616 (1961).

In appeal from chancery court's judgment dissolving injunction previously issued and awarding damages allegedly suffered because of injunction, where chancellor made the finding of the jury his finding, he will be credited with soundness and be charged with the fallacies of the logic and conclusions that entered into the jury's finding. Evans v. Weise, 234 Ark. 137, 350 S.W.2d 616 (1961).

Damages.

This section confers a discretionary power on the circuit court to award damages in any sum not to exceed 10 percent upon the dissolution of an injunction, which the Supreme Court will not assume to control. Moore v. Granger, 30 Ark. 574 (1875).

This section does not prevent a defendant in other cases from filing a cross-complaint asking for the recovery of damages growing out of the issuance of the injunction. Chicot Lumber Co. v. Dardell, 84 Ark. 140, 104 S.W. 1100 (1907).

Where the trial court, in a preliminary decree dissolving an injunction, reserved for future decision the question of damages on account of the issuance of a wrongful injunction, it had no power to render a decree for such damages in a subsequent action, since the matter was involved in the original action and therefore had become res judicata. Harding Constr. Co. v. Drainage Dist. No. 17, 178 Ark. 778, 13 S.W.2d 312 (1929).

This section contemplates a judgment for damages during the life of the temporary injunction only and not for subsequent damages sustained by reason of the injunction being made permanent by an erroneous order of the chancellor, as damages by action of the court are damnum absque injuria. Citizens Pipe Line Co. v. Twin City Pipe Line Co., 183 Ark. 1006, 39 S.W.2d 1017 (1931).

Where temporary restraining order has been dissolved, defendant was entitled to at least nominal damages, but where all costs were adjudged against plaintiff, defendant has, in effect, received nominal damages. Reader R.R. v. Green, 228 Ark. 4, 305 S.W.2d 327 (1957).

Where evidence showed that, except for some minor losses, no damages were suffered as a result of temporary injunction that was dissolved by business that was being liquidated, award was reduced to amount of minor losses. Evans v. Weise, 234 Ark. 137, 350 S.W.2d 616 (1961).

Damages under this section are discretionary with the trial court, and absent an abuse of discretion by the court, its ruling will not be disturbed under ARCP 52. Folk Constr. Co. v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 271 Ark. 836, 611 S.W.2d 198 (1981).

Judgments.

Upon the dissolution of an injunction where an execution at law upon a money judgment is enjoined, the court should remit to the creditor his judgment at law for satisfaction of the judgment and interest, render a decree for not more than 10 percent upon the amount enjoined for damages, and award execution thereon. It is error to render a decree for the amount of the judgment enjoined and interest added as damages. Coblentz v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 40 Ark. 180 (1882).

On dissolution, the court may render judgment on the bond according to its terms. Felker v. Rice, 110 Ark. 70, 161 S.W. 162 (1913).

A temporary injunction issued at the commencement of an action restraining the defendant from enforcing an attachment lien on personal property did not operate as a release of the property from the officer's custody nor discharge the lien; and it was error upon its dissolution to render a decree against the plaintiff for the amount of the defendant's debt in the absence of proof that the attached property had been lost, damaged, or depreciated in value by reason of the issuance of the restraining order. Johnson v. Gillenwater, 75 Ark. 114, 87 S.W. 439 (1905); Lesser-Goldman Cotton Co. v. Adams, 158 Ark. 10, 249 S.W. 371 (1923).

When execution of judgment is stayed for definite period, court may render judgment on bond on expiration of such period though no formal order dissolving the injunction has been entered. Ford v. Ferguson & Son, 184 Ark. 670, 43 S.W.2d 546 (1931).

Cited: Greer v. Stewart, 48 Ark. 21, 2 S.W. 251 (1886); Stanley v. Bonham, 52 Ark. 354, 12 S.W. 706 (1889); Adcock v. Coker, 105 Ark. 210, 151 S.W. 253 (1912); Shugart v. Sorrells, 133 Ark. 520, 202 S.W. 817 (1918).

16-113-406. Liability of sureties — Notice.

  1. The judgment for damages shall be rendered against the party who obtained the restraining order or injunction and against his or her sureties on the bond, and the judgment for damages shall be conclusive against them.
  2. In proceedings under this subchapter, the sureties shall be considered parties in the cause. The court may, in its discretion, require reasonable notice to the sureties before finding and judgment.

History. Civil Code, § 320; Acts 1915, No. 102, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 5825; Pope's Dig., § 7541; A.S.A. 1947, § 32-310.

Case Notes

In General.

The assessment of damages against the plaintiff is conclusive against the sureties on the injunction bond. Bailey v. Gibson, 29 Ark. 472 (1874); Clayton v. Martin, 31 Ark. 217 (1876) (decisions prior to 1915 amendment).

Appeals.

Judgment against sureties would not be reversed on appeal of principal alone. Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Ark. 266 (1882) (decision prior to 1915 amendment).

Chapter 114 Malpractice Actions

Case Notes

Malpractice Actions.

By passing the Medical Malpractice Act, the Arkansas General Assembly did not repeal the Wrongful Death Act in cases where the death was caused by a medical injury. Meredith v. Buchman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 764 (W.D. Ark. 2000).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved.]

Subchapter 2 — Actions for Medical Injury

Effective Dates. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 11: Apr. 2, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found, determined and declared by the General Assembly that the threat of legal actions for medical injury have resulted in increased rates for malpractice insurance which in turn causes and contributes to an increase in health care costs placing a heavy burden on those who can least afford such increases and that the threat of such actions contributes to expensive medical procedures to be performed by physicians and others which otherwise would not be considered necessary and that this Act should be given effect immediately to help control the spiraling cost of health care. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2003, No. 649, § 26. Mar. 25, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that in this state, existing conditions, such as the application of joint and several liability regardless of the percentage of fault, are adversely impacting the availability and affordability of medical liability insurance; that those existing conditions recently have caused several medical liability carriers to stop offering coverage in the state and have caused some medical care providers to curtail or end their practices; that the decreasing availability and affordability of medical liability insurance is adversely affecting the accessibility and affordability of medical care and of health insurance coverage in this state; that long term care facilities are having great difficulty hiring qualified medical directors because physicians could be held liable for an entire judgment even if they are found to be minimally at fault; and that there is a need to improve access to the courts for deserving claimants; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to remedy these conditions and improve access to health care in this state. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house.”

Research References

ALR.

Druggist's civil liability for injuries sustained as result of negligence in incorrectly filling drug prescriptions. 3 A.L.R.4th 270.

Admitting testimony regarding physician's usual custom or habit in order to establish nonliability. 10 A.L.R.4th 1243.

Physician-patient relationship for malpractice purposes. 17 A.L.R.4th 132.

Standard of care. 18 A.L.R.4th 603.

Blood transfusion: Liability for injury or death resulting. 20 A.L.R.4th 136.

Instrument breaking in course of surgery or treatment. 20 A.L.R.4th 1179.

In personam jurisdiction, under long-arm statute, over nonresident physician, dentist, or hospital in medical malpractice action. 25 A.L.R.4th 706.

Failure of physician to inform patient of alternative modes of diagnosis or treatment. 38 A.L.R.4th 900.

Statute providing for periodic payment of future damages in medical malpractice action. 41 A.L.R.4th 275.

Third person's action against psychiatrist, psychologist, or other mental health practitioner, based on failure to warn persons against whom patient expressed threats. 41 A.L.R.4th 1078.

Misrepresentation of nature and hazards of treatment. 42 A.L.R.4th 543.

Physician's liability to third person for prescribing drug to known drug addict. 42 A.L.R.4th 586.

Physician's liability, for injury to or death of third party, due to failure to disclose driving-related impediment. 43 A.L.R.4th 153.

Revocation of license or other disciplinary action in connection with malpractice action. 44 A.L.R.4th 248.

Physician's withdrawal of life supports from comatose patient. 47 A.L.R.4th 18.

Res ipsa loquitur doctrine in action against anesthetist for malpractice. 49 A.L.R.4th 63.

Causing patient to become addicted to drugs. 44 A.L.R.6th 391.

Malpractice: Liability in Connection with Insertion of Prosthetic or Other Corrective Devices in Patient's Body, 21 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

Liability for Medical Malpractice of Treatment for Sleep-Related Disorders, 29 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2018).

Malpractice or Negligence in Conducting Colonoscopy, Including Pre- and Postoperative Care, 34 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2018).

Am. Jur. 61 Am. Jur. 2d, Phys. & S., § 285 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Notes, National Standard of Care — A New Dimension of the Locality Rule, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 161.

Prognosis Questionable: An Examination of the Constitutional Health of Arkansas Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 691.

Haase v. Starnes: The Arkansas Supreme Court's Refusal to Require Expert Testimony in Express Warranty Medical Malpractice Litigation, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 731.

Ark. L. Notes.

Leflar, Advance Health Care Directives Under Arkansas Law, 1994 Ark. L. Notes 37.

C.J.S. 70 C.J.S., Phys. & S., § 81 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Powell, Survey of Torts, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 316.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Torts, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 247.

Leflar, Liberty and Death: Advance Health Care Directives and the Law of Arkansas, 39 Ark. L. Rev. 375.

Lisk, a physician's respondeat superior liability for the negligent acts of other medical professionals — when the captain goes down without the ship, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 183.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Where a medical malpractice plaintiff contended that this subchapter was unconstitutional in its entirety because it denied equal protection to victims of medical malpractice, because it constituted special legislation, and because it denied or delayed a remedy to medical malpractice victims, but the notice of intent to sue provision, § 16-114-204 (repealed), was the only challenged portion of this subchapter that had been applied to the plaintiff's detriment, the plaintiff had standing to challenge only § 16-114-204 (repealed). Gay v. Rabon, 280 Ark. 5, 652 S.W.2d 836 (1983).

In General.

Actions for medical malpractice are not statutory in origin. Sandusky v. First Elec. Coop., 266 Ark. 588, 587 S.W.2d 37 (1979) (decision under prior law).

Construction with Other Laws.

By passing this subchapter, the Arkansas General Assembly did not repeal the Wrongful Death Act, § 16-62-102, in cases where the death was caused by a medical injury. Meredith v. Buchman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 764 (W.D. Ark. 2000).

Cited: Haney v. DeSandre, 286 Ark. 258, 692 S.W.2d 214 (1985); Southwestern Human Servs. Inst., Inc. v. Mitchell, 287 Ark. 59, 696 S.W.2d 722 (1985); Livingston v. Ark. State Medical Bd., 288 Ark. 1, 701 S.W.2d 361 (1986); Goodwin v. Harrison, 300 Ark. 474, 780 S.W.2d 518 (1989); Blankenship v. Burnett, 304 Ark. 469, 803 S.W.2d 539 (1991); Oglesby v. Baptist Medical Sys., 319 Ark. 280, 891 S.W.2d 48 (1995); Sosebee v. County Line Sch. Dist., 320 Ark. 412, 897 S.W.2d 556 (1995); Norris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 899 S.W.2d 70 (1995).

16-114-201. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Action for medical injury” means all actions against a medical care provider, whether based in tort, contract, or otherwise, to recover damages on account of medical injury as defined in this section;
  2. “Medical care provider” means a physician, certified registered nurse anesthetist, physician's assistant, nurse, optometrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, dentist, podiatrist, pharmacist, veterinarian, hospital, nursing home, community mental health center, psychologist, clinic, or not-for-profit home healthcare agency licensed by the state or otherwise lawfully providing professional medical care or services, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of employment in the providing of such medical care or medical services; and
  3. “Medical injury” or “injury” means any adverse consequences arising out of or sustained in the course of the professional services being rendered by a medical care provider to a patient or resident, whether resulting from negligence, error, or omission in the performance of such services; or from rendition of such services without informed consent or in breach of warranty or in violation of contract; or from failure to diagnose; or from premature abandonment of a patient or of a course of treatment; or from failure to properly maintain equipment or appliances necessary to the rendition of such services; or otherwise arising out of or sustained in the course of such services.

History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2613; Acts 2013, No. 1196, §§ 2, 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1196, § 1, provided: “Intent — Limitation.

“(a) This act is intended to ensure that:

“(1) A person who suffers a medical injury has the opportunity to seek compensation to return to the state of health that he or she enjoyed before the medical injury; and

“(2) For any one (1) medical injury, a person is not compensated more than once.

“(b) This act is not intended to affect punitive damages.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (1), substituted “all actions” for “any action” and added “as defined in this section”; and inserted “to a patient or resident” following “provider” in (3).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Schmidt v. Gibbs: The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Arkansas Medical Malpractice Litigation, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 397.

Wrongful Death Damages Under the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act: Would a Change Make Cents?, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 577 (2001).

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

J. Taylor White, Case Note: Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., and Negligent Credentialing: A Look into Peer-Review Statutes and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 879 (2013).

J. Thomas Sullivan, Arkansas, Meet Tarasoff: The Question of Expanded Liability to Third Persons for Mental Health Professionals, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 987 (2016).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Statute of limitations in the Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., has a rational basis and it does not deprive a claimant of a constitutional right to a redress of wrongs or a jury trial, nor does it violate the right to equal protection. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).

Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., in its entirety passes the rational-basis test; there is a clear rational relationship between the burden of proof required and the achievement of the legitimate governmental objective of reducing healthcare costs. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).

Construction.

A pharmacy is a medical care provider within the meaning of this subchapter and the reference to a pharmacist in subdivision (2) of this section should be deemed to include a pharmacy. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

Two-year limitations period of Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., conflicts with the three-year limitations period provided under the Wrongful Death Act, § 16-62-102(c) and is therefore controlling where death ensues from medical injuries. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).

Medical Injury.

Patient was under a doctor's care while he was in the nursing home, but his death from leaving unnoticed in a wheelchair and being struck by a car, was not the result of a “medical injury”; instead, the question was whether the patient was properly supervised by the one LPN and five nurse's aides on duty that night. The answer to this question merely requires the jury to decide whether the nursing home used ordinary care in furnishing the patient the care and attention reasonably required by his mental and physical condition. Bailey v. Rose Care Ctr., 307 Ark. 14, 817 S.W.2d 412 (1991).

The actions of a licensed practical nurse in revealing confidential information she acquired at work did not fall within subdivision (3)'s definition of a medical injury. Wyatt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 315 Ark. 547, 868 S.W.2d 505 (1994).

Subdivision (3) of this section defines “medical injury” sufficiently broadly; claims based on allegations of a failure to provide needed medical care and attention or the timely diagnosis of medical problems come within the ambit of this subchapter and are dependent upon expert testimony as outlined in § 16-114-206(a). Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).

Broad language in this section defining “medical injury” encompasses a cause of action for failure to diagnose child abuse. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 323 Ark. 390, 915 S.W.2d 262 (1996), supp. op., 323 Ark. 406A, 917 S.W.2d 167 (1996).

Where husband and wife were receiving treatment at a counseling center, wife did not suffer a medical injury from the center's failure to end an affair which developed between the center's receptionist and the husband. Howard v. Ozark Guidance Ctr., 326 Ark. 224, 930 S.W.2d 341 (1996).

A claim for adverse consequences arising from an allegedly defective product supplied in the course of rendering a surgical procedure falls within the definition of medical injury as well as actions based on strict or products liability. Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53, 969 S.W.2d 598 (1998).

The defendants were not entitled to summary judgment in an action in which a decedent's estate alleged that the decedent died as the result of injuries sustained while a resident in a nursing home and that the employees of the nursing home were negligent because they intentionally abused the decedent, failed to use ordinary care in properly supervising the decedent, or failed to follow a physician's order that the decedent be restrained. A question existed as to whether the injuries sustained by the decedent were medical injuries sustained while the decedent was thrashing about in bed or whether there was a negligent breach by custodial personnel of the physician's orders to restrain the decedent, causing a fall that resulted in her injuries. Loewer v. Cla-Cliff Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 344 Ark. 258, 39 S.W.3d 771 (2001).

Husband's claims against a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a clinic fell within the purview of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act as the claims involved the failure to properly diagnose, assess, and manage his wife's care and treatment. Dodd v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr., 90 Ark. App. 191, 204 S.W.3d 579 (2005).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a hospital in an action by appellants for negligent credentialing of a surgeon because the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, subdivision (3) of this section, did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing as a “medical injury”; credentialing decisions did not involve a professional service, a doctor's treatment or order, or a matter of medical science related to specific patient care. Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., 2012 Ark. 55, 386 S.W.3d 462 (2012).

Cause of action brought by the personal representative of a decedent's estate was an action for medical injury because the decedent's death was a medical injury in that the patient of a treating psychiatrist shot and killed the decedent when the psychiatrist began to withdraw the level of pharmaceuticals administered to the patient. Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, 475 S.W.3d 576 (2015).

Professional Services.

A hospital is required to consider the patient's capacity to care for himself and to protect the patient from dangers created by his weakened condition; providing a safe environment for patients is within the scope of the professional services by a hospital. Sexton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 275 Ark. 361, 631 S.W.2d 270 (1982).

A physician's actions in improperly touching or fondling his patients' breasts did not constitute the rendering of professional services, despite the fact that the touching occurred during physical examinations at the physician's office. McQuay v. Guntharp, 336 Ark. 534, 986 S.W.2d 850 (1999).

The drug manufacturer may rely on the prescribing physician to warn the ultimate user of the risk of a prescription drug, and pharmacies generally have no common-law or statutory duty to warn customers of the risks associated with the prescription drugs they purchase, unless there is evidence the pharmacy compounded the drug or changed the drug in some manner after receiving it from the manufacturer. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

Cited: Dawson v. Gerritsen, 290 Ark. 499, 720 S.W.2d 714 (1986); HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988); Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988); Cox v. Bard, 302 Ark. 1, 786 S.W.2d 570 (1990); Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2d 843 (1992); Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996); Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 326 Ark. 140, 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996); Dodson v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 335 Ark. 96, 983 S.W.2d 98 (1998); Dooley v. Cap-Care of Ark., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Ark. 2004).

16-114-202. Applicability.

This subchapter applies to all causes of action for medical injury accruing after April 2, 1979, and, as to such causes of action, shall supersede any inconsistent provision of law.

History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2620n.

Case Notes

In General.

This subchapter is only applicable to professional services. Sexton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 275 Ark. 361, 631 S.W.2d 270 (1982).

Medical Injury.

Section 16-114-201(3) defines “medical injury” sufficiently broadly; claims based on allegations of a failure to provide needed medical care and attention or the timely diagnosis of medical problems come within the ambit of this subchapter and are dependent upon expert testimony as outlined in § 16-114-206(a). Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).

Husband's claims against a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a clinic fell within the purview of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act as the claims involved the failure to properly diagnose, assess, and manage his wife's care and treatment. Dodd v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr., 90 Ark. App. 191, 204 S.W.3d 579 (2005).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a hospital in an action by appellants for negligent credentialing of a surgeon because the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing as a “medical injury”; credentialing decisions did not involve a professional service, a doctor's treatment or order, or a matter of medical science related to specific patient care. Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., 2012 Ark. 55, 386 S.W.3d 462 (2012).

Negligence.

The trial court erred in treating a medical malpractice claim as an ordinary negligence claim, and in permitting the issues raised by the medical malpractice claim to rest on lay testimony. Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).

Res Ipsa Loquitur.

In action under this subchapter, the trial court properly refused the proffered instruction on res ipsa loquitur where all of the essential elements were not present. National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996), overruled in part, Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2006).

Statute of Limitations.

This subchapter's two-year statute superseded the Products Liability three-year statute of limitations to govern plaintiff's product-liability claims brought against a drug company for medical injury as a result of taking the diet drug popularly known as Fen/Phen. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

Wrongful Death.

The limitations period provided under this subchapter conflicts with the limitations period provided under the Wrongful Death Act, § 16-62-102; pursuant to this subchapter, § 16-62-102's statute of limitations, as an inconsistent provision of law, is superseded by § 16-114-203's statute of limitations where the two conflict. Hertlein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 323 Ark. 283, 914 S.W.2d 303 (1996).

Cited: HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988); Howard v. Northwest Ark. Surgical Clinic, 324 Ark. 375, 921 S.W.2d 596 (1996).

16-114-203. Statute of limitations.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions for medical injury shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.
  2. The date of the accrual of the cause of action shall be the date of the wrongful act complained of and no other time. However, where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of the injured person which is not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered within such two-year period, the action may be commenced within one (1) year from the date of discovery or the date the foreign object reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is earlier.
    1. If an individual is nine (9) years of age or younger at the time of the act, omission, or failure complained of, the minor or person claiming on behalf of the minor shall have until the later of the minor's eleventh birthday or two (2) years from the act, omission, or failure in which to commence an action.
    2. However, if no medical injury is known and could not reasonably have been discovered prior to the minor's eleventh birthday, then the minor or his or her representative shall have until two (2) years after the medical injury is known or reasonably could have been discovered, or until the minor's nineteenth birthday, whichever is earlier, in which to commence an action.

History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2616; Acts 1991, No. 997, § 1; 1995, No. 735, § 1.

Cross References. Commencement of new action after nonsuit or judgment arrested or reversed, § 16-56-126.

Persons under disabilities at time of accrual of action, § 16-56-116.

Research References

ALR.

Timeliness of action under medical malpractice statute of repose, aside from effect of fraudulent concealment of patient's cause of action. 14 A.L.R.6th 301.

Application of Relation-Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Medical Malpractice Cases in Actions Involving Hospitals, Clinics, and the Like. 100 A.L.R.6th 139 (2014).

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Developments, Thompson v. Dunn, 319 Ark. 6, 889 S.W.2d 31 (1994), 48 Ark. L. Rev. 885.

Prognosis Questionable: An Examination of the Constitutional Health of Arkansas Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 691.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Torts — Limitations on Actions — Arkansas Adopts Continuous Treatment Rule to Toll Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988), 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 405.

Survey — Property, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 225.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions, absent fraudulent concealment, is not too short a time as to deprive patients of due process of law. Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976) (decision under prior law).

Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge this section on grounds that it violates the “open door” provision of Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 13. Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997), overruled in part, Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49 (2013).

The statutory distinction between foreign-object medical malpractice claimants and typical medical malpractice claimants does not violate equal protection since a rational basis exists for the distinction in light of staleness considerations that are not as likely present in foreign-object cases. Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53, 969 S.W.2d 598 (1998).

In General.

Former similar statute which stated all tort actions for medical malpractice must be brought within two years merely fixed the time in which action could be filed, and did not create a right, as it already existed. Partin v. Wade, 172 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1949) (decision under prior law).

Any action alleging medical malpractice must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. Gilpin v. Tack, 256 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Ark. 1966) (decision under prior law).

The limitations period on medical malpractice claims under Arkansas law is two years in most circumstances. Burrows v. Turner Mem'l Hosp., 762 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ark. 1991).

The two-year statute of limitations and the tolling provision of § 16-114-203 supersede the three-year period that § 16-56-116 allows after a disability is removed for persons insane at the time the right of action accrued. Smith v. Diversicare Leasing Corp. of Am., 65 Ark. App. 138, 985 S.W.2d 749 (1999).

Construction.

The limitation in this section has consistently been strictly construed, commencing the two-year period from the date of the act of alleged malpractice; although the continuous treatment doctrine has been adopted, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize other doctrines which would ameliorate the strictness of the requirement. Green v. National Health Lab., Inc., 316 Ark. 5, 870 S.W.2d 707 (1994).

Former § 16-114-204 (repealed) was invalidated in its entirety by Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2d 843 (1992); the two-year statute of limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this section is controlling. Parmley v. Moose, 317 Ark. 52, 876 S.W.2d 243 (1994).

This section is irrelevant when a patient dies from his injuries before the two-year period has run. Brown v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 558, 732 S.W.2d 130 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Bailey v. Rose Care Ctr., 307 Ark. 14, 817 S.W.2d 412 (1991); Brown v. Saint Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 308 Ark. 361, 823 S.W.2d 908 (1992).

Wrongful death statute of limitations, and not medical malpractice statute of limitations, applied to action for damages for loss of consortium, mental anguish, and funeral expenses for the death of the decedent, even though his death was the result of a medical injury. Brown v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 558, 732 S.W.2d 130 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Bailey v. Rose Care Ctr., 307 Ark. 14, 817 S.W.2d 412 (1991).

Where statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions at the time of patient's original surgery provided that an action must be brought within two years after the action's accrual, the fact that a new limitation period was enacted before patient's action was barred did not repeal the previous applicable section for actions already accrued. Sheridan v. Struble, 977 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1992).

Former § 16-114-204 has been superseded and the sixty-day notice requirement and its accompanying ninety-day grace period no longer exist; the two-year limitations period of this section is controlling, notwithstanding compliance with § 16-114-204. Baker v. Milam, 321 Ark. 234, 900 S.W.2d 209 (1995).

The limitations period provided under this subchapter conflicts with the limitations period provided under the Wrongful Death Act, § 16-62-102; the wrongful death statute of limitations, as an inconsistent provision of law, is superseded by this section where the two conflict. Hertlein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 323 Ark. 283, 914 S.W.2d 303 (1996).

Where the alleged cause of the decedent's death is a medical injury, the two-year statute of limitations provided by this section, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in § 16-62-102, is applicable. Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997), overruled in part, Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49 (2013).

This section's two-year limitations period is controlling where death ensues from medical injuries accruing after April 2, 1979. Looney v. Bolt, 330 Ark. 530, 955 S.W.2d 509 (1997).

Two-year limitations period of Medical Malpractice Act, § 16-114-201 et seq., conflicts with the three-year limitations period provided under the Wrongful Death Act, § 16-62-102(c) and is therefore controlling where death ensues from medical injuries. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).

Accrual of Cause of Action.

An amendment to a medical malpractice complaint relates back to the filing of the original complaint, unless a new cause of action is stated by the amendment. Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975) (decision under prior law).

In an action against physicians for negligence in reading decedent's x-rays, the statute of limitations commenced running when the x-rays were read, and such commencement was not delayed until discovery of the negligence on the theory that it was a continuing tort. Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Former statute commenced to run when alleged negligence took place, absent fraudulent concealment. Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976) (decision under prior law).

If the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the patient's illness, injury, or condition is of such a nature as to impose on the doctor a duty of continuing treatment and care, this section does not commence running until treatment by the doctor for the particular disease or condition involved has terminated — unless during treatment the patient learns or should learn of negligence, in which case the statute runs from the time of discovery, actual or constructive. Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988).

Where a patient was clearly under a continuing course of treatment by physician, the limitations period did not begin to run until the patient's treatment terminated; to hold otherwise might require a plaintiff to bring suit against his or her physician before treatment is even terminated, and such a result could conceivably afford the physician a defense that a patient left before treatment was terminated and before the physician had a chance to effectuate a proper result. Taylor v. Phillips, 304 Ark. 285, 801 S.W.2d 303 (1990).

The evidence presented on the issue of whether this section barred the claim did not entitle the defendants to a summary judgment. Green v. National Health Lab., Inc., 316 Ark. 5, 870 S.W.2d 707 (1994).

Actions Barred.

Where more than three years after patient's release from the medical center where she had been committed for psychiatric observation, patient filed a second amended complaint alleging for the first time negligence on psychiatrist's part, any cause of action for negligence was barred either by two-year statute applicable to medical malpractice or by the three-year statute applicable to actions for personal injuries. Turner v. Baptist Medical Center, 275 Ark. 424, 631 S.W.2d 275 (1982) (decision under prior law).

Plaintiff's medical malpractice action for injury resulting from a misdiagnosis was barred by this section where it was filed nine years after the misdiagnosis occurred, but within two years of the time the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had misdiagnosed her condition. Treat v. Kreutzer, 290 Ark. 532, 720 S.W.2d 716 (1986).

Where parents did not even become parties to the action, and then only as guardians, until the second amended complaint, which was filed over two years after last wrongful act complaint occurred, their claims were time barred. National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996), overruled in part, Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2006).

Where plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action on March 4, 1994, two days short of the two-year statute of limitations under subsection (a) of this section, and had until July 2, 1994, to complete service of process pursuant to ARCP 4, requested another 120 days on June 23, 1994, and was granted a 30-day extension on July 28, 1994, and where plaintiff, after failing to obtain service, requested a nonsuit on August 18, 1994, which was granted on September 14, 1994, the claim refiled on August 11, 1995, had not invoked the one-year savings statute, § 16-56-126, and was barred by the statute of limitations. Thomson v. Zufari, 325 Ark. 208, 924 S.W.2d 796 (1996).

Claim brought within two years after the decedent's death, but over two years since the doctor last saw the patient and the cause of action accrued, was held barred by this section. Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997), overruled in part, Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49 (2013).

Because the date of the accrual of the cause of action for medical malpractice is the date of the wrongful act complained of and plaintiff filed her suit more than two years after she last filled a prescription for the diet drugs popularly known as Fen/Phen, any claims she had against the pharmacy defendants were barred by the statute of limitations. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

Patient's medical malpractice claim based on a surgery performed when he was minor, which was filed when patient reached age of majority five years after the cause of action accrued, was barred by the two-year statute of limitation under this section. Raley v. Wagner, 346 Ark. 234, 57 S.W.3d 683 (2001).

Although the estate contended that the statute of limitations did not bar an action for medical negligence when the resulting damages occurred many years later, the statute of limitations began to run from the date that the negligent act occurred and the court specifically declined to abandon the traditional rule for applying the statute. Harris v. Ozment, 83 Ark. App. 94, 117 S.W.3d 647 (2003).

Where appellants' attorneys, who were licensed in Oklahoma but not in Arkansas, filed appellants' medical malpractice complaint on the last day of the limitations period but did not file motions for admission pro hac vice until eight months later, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint; since Ark. R. Admis. Bar. XIV required that the pro hac vice motions be filed before the attorneys practiced law in Arkansas, the complaint was a nullity and, thus, no valid complaint was filed within the limitations period. Preston v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 354 Ark. 666, 128 S.W.3d 430 (2003).

Where couple's attorneys were unauthorized to practice law in Arkansas, their medical malpractice complaint was a nullity, as if it had never been filed, and since the limitations for medical malpractice expired on November 19, 2001, the day the complaint was filed, no valid complaint was filed within the required two-year period. Preston v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 354 Ark. 666, 128 S.W.3d 430 (2003).

Wrongful death action filed against healthcare providers by a decedent's parents was void ab initio where the decedent had no personal representative and the complaint failed to include as a plaintiff the decedent's half-brother; hence, subdivision (c)(1) of this section did not apply to allow the parents to add the half-brother after the limitations period had run. Andrews v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 86 Ark. App. 161, 170 S.W.3d 303 (2004).

In a wrongful death action filed by the special administrator of decedent's estate, the trial court properly granted the doctors' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the suit was filed before the order appointing the administrator was filed with the court clerk and the administrator did not re-file the suit before the expiration of the two-year limitations; under Ark. R. Civ. P. 58 and Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2, the order appointing the administrator was not effective until it was filed with the clerk of court, therefore, the complaint was a nullity. Filyaw v. Bouton, 87 Ark. App. 320, 191 S.W.3d 540 (2004).

Since family did not name decedent's siblings as plaintiffs in a lawsuit against defendants for medical malpractice as required by § 16-62-102 where probate had not been opened, the complaint was a nullity and summary judgment in favor of defendants was proper; siblings were not named until after statute of limitations in this section expired. Rice v. Tanner, 363 Ark. 79, 210 S.W.3d 860 (2005).

Order dismissing executor's complaint alleging medical malpractice in the care and treatment of his mother prior to her death was affirmed because the executor of her estate had been discharged as executor before he sued, so the first complaint was a nullity, and the new complaint was not filed before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Johnson v. Greene Acres Nursing Home Ass'n, 364 Ark. 306, 219 S.W.3d 138 (2005).

Motion to set aside a default judgment in a medical malpractice case should have been granted as the patient lacked standing to pursue the claim based on the fact that she had filed bankruptcy; moreover, the statute of limitations had run when she filed a motion to substitute a bankruptcy trustee as a party. Fields v. Byrd, 96 Ark. App. 174, 239 S.W.3d 543 (2006).

Wrongful-death and survival action brought by the administratrix of the decedent's estate against the medical center was time-barred under this section as the order appointing the administratrix was not effective until it was filed almost two weeks after the complaint was filed, thereby making the complaint a nullity. Hubbard v. Nat'l Healthcare of Pocahontas, Inc., 371 Ark. 444, 267 S.W.3d 573 (2007).

Trial court did not err by granting the doctors' summary judgment motion because the medical malpractice action was not properly filed within the two-year statute of limitations of subsection (a) of this section. The trial court did not err in holding that the November 3, 2009 order of substitution of parties was ineffective and therefore the action was barred by the statute of limitations because: (1) the wrongful death complaint filed by the patient's daughter and husband in April 2009 was a nullity because four siblings of the patient were omitted as party plaintiffs as required by § 16-62-102(b) and therefore it never existed; (2) the order of substitution of parties that substituted the daughter in her capacity of estate administrator as the party plaintiff did not allege any facts supporting the action and therefore did not constitute an amended complaint; (3) the order of substitution was entered on November 3, 2009, after the statute of limitations had expired as to each doctor in July 2009 and September 2009; and (4) the estate administrator could not establish the first element of the continuous-course-of-treatment doctrine because she could not establish that the doctors provided continuous treatment to the patient up to November 3, 2009. Mendez v. Glover, 2010 Ark. App. 808, 379 S.W.3d 92 (2010).

Heirs' negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death claims against the medical facilities were barred by this section where the facilities were not named as parties until the limitations period had expired, and any argument that the amended complaint related back under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c) had not been raised in the trial court. Worden v. Kirchner, 2013 Ark. 509, 431 S.W.3d 243 (2013).

Circuit court properly dismissed a patient's medical-malpractice action against doctors with prejudice because service was not obtained within 120 days as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 4, and there was simply no proof of timely service presented to support the patient's claim that the doctors had been served by certified mail. No green cards were returned for three of the defendant doctors. Although a green card was returned for a fourth defendant doctor, there was no proof that the person who signed it was the doctor's agent. McCoy v. Robertson, 2018 Ark. App. 279, 550 S.W.3d 33 (2018).

Actions Not Barred.

Where plaintiff filed a tort action for malpractice against the defendant within two-year period of limitations and took a nonsuit, plaintiff could maintain a second suit based on same cause of action where filed within one year of the nonsuit, though second action was filed more than two years after the occurrence of the tort. Partin v. Wade, 172 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1949) (decision under prior law).

Physician was not estopped from pleading statute of limitations in a malpractice action because of the fiduciary relationship between the doctor and patient. Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Since it is the issuance of a summons and placing it in the hands of the sheriff of the proper county, not its serving, that commences an action, where summons was issued but not served and a second summons issued after the running of the statute of limitations, the action was not barred, since the action commenced with the issuing of the first summons before the statute had run. Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975) (decision under prior law).

The dismissal of the original complaint without prejudice extended for one year the limitations period for that cause of action. Burrows v. Turner Mem'l Hosp., 762 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ark. 1991).

Appeals.

Court order denying motion for summary judgment, holding statute of limitations to be unconstitutional insofar as it denied a remedy to the plaintiff, was not appealable. Ross v. McDaniel, 252 Ark. 253, 478 S.W.2d 430 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Continuing Tort.

The misreading of a pap smear was not a continuing tort, accruing freshly until the mistake was discovered, but was a single wrongful act. Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1993).

With one exception, Arkansas courts do not recognize either the discovery rule or a continuing tort theory in the context of medical malpractice cases. Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1993).

Where there was a single, isolated act of alleged medical malpractice involving the choice of the particular procedure used during a foot surgery, and where the procedure actually used on the patient's foot was correctly performed, the informal, weekly trimming of the patient's calluses did not amount to a series of negligent acts or continuing course of improper treatment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Hobbs v. Naples, 993 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1993).

The continuous-treatment doctrine does not apply to toll this section coextensively with the physician-patient relationship, even if no continuing treatment occurs. Raynor v. Kyser, 338 Ark. 366, 993 S.W.2d 913 (1999).

Where there is no more physician-patient interaction occurring other than the scheduling of future visits, the continuous treatment does not apply to toll the statute of limitations. Raynor v. Kyser, 338 Ark. 366, 993 S.W.2d 913 (1999).

The period between January 1985 and October 1994 was barred by the statute of limitations, notwithstanding the plaintiff's assertion of the continuous treatment theory, where it was undisputed that the plaintiff did not seek treatment for her nasal polyps from March 1991 until October 1994, even though she had been instructed to schedule a follow-up appointment six months after her March 1991 visit. Raynor v. Kyser, 64 Ark. App. 365, 984 S.W.2d 451 (1998).

The statute of limitations began to run from the time of the plaintiff's last post-operative follow-up examination, notwithstanding that she was instructed to come back again in six months and that she did return to the defendant doctor about four months later, since that visit was prompted by unrelated concerns and the plaintiff did not mention the surgery during that visit. Raynor v. Kyser, 64 Ark. App. 365, 984 S.W.2d 451 (1998).

The continuous course of treatment doctrine did not apply in an action for medical malpractice arising from the reading of the plaintiff's annual mammograms since each mammogram was a single, isolated act of alleged negligence. Baker v. Radiology Assocs., 72 Ark. App. 193, 35 S.W.3d 354 (2000).

Continuing Treatment Doctrine.

The continuing treatment doctrine did not apply to toll the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action, notwithstanding that the plaintiff amended his complaint to allege that the defendant physician “failed to properly and adequately treat, diagnose and repair the medical conditions … incurred as a result of the previous] surgical procedures,” where it was clear the alleged injuries and damages stemmed from the surgeries themselves, rather than the follow-up care, and that the injuries were not of a cumulative nature that prevented the court from identifying which individual acts caused the damages. Hicks v. Armstrong, 253 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2001).

Appellate court reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a doctor and clinic as husband was prevented from completing discovery that might have established that the continuous-treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations in his medical malpractice claim involving the death of his wife. Pledger v. Carrick, 362 Ark. 182, 208 S.W.3d 100 (2005).

Grant of summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations in this section was inappropriate because material facts were in dispute as to whether the treating psychiatrist continuously treated the patient when the psychiatrist began to withdraw the level of pharmaceuticals administered to the patient before the patient shot and killed the personal representative's late spouse. Fleming v. Vest, 2015 Ark. App. 636, 475 S.W.3d 576 (2015).

Discovery of Foreign Objects.

Action for malpractice based on operation performed in 1926 where patient knew within seven or eight weeks that something was causing her to suffer but did not discover that a gauze had been left in her body until another operation in 1936, absent allegation of fraudulent concealment by physician, was barred by former statute. Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 123 S.W.2d 520 (1939) (decision under prior law).

Where the “foreign objects” are discovered within the two-year period, the exception in subsection (b) is not applicable and the action still needs to be commenced within two years of the date of the wrongful act complained of; the one-year extension applies only if the object is not discovered, and could not reasonably have been discovered, within the two-year period. Thompson v. Dunn, 319 Ark. 6, 889 S.W.2d 31 (1994).

Where the presence of a foreign object left in a patient is concealed by the physician, the act of concealment is part of the wrongful act, and the cause of action does not accrue until the concealment ends. Howard v. Northwest Ark. Surgical Clinic, 324 Ark. 375, 921 S.W.2d 596 (1996).

Doctor's motion to dismiss the patient's malpractice case was granted where, pursuant to this section, the patient did not provide the Arkansas Supreme Court with authority that would compel a finding that her own ovary should constitute a foreign object, the later discovery of which should toll the running of the statute of limitations. Reed v. Guard, 374 Ark. 1, 285 S.W.3d 662 (2008).

Fraudulent Concealment.

Doctor's reference in a discharge summary to the conclusions of another doctor held not to constitute fraudulent concealment. Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997), overruled in part, Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49 (2013).

Doctor was under an affirmative duty to inform patient that he had removed her only remaining ovary during surgery to remove her bladder, and his failure to disclose removal of patient's ovary constituted fraudulent concealment, tolling the statute of limitations. Roberts v. Francis, 128 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1997).

There was no fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action where the defendant physician allegedly misrepresented the nature of the product Orthoblock; this is a question regarding the efficacy of the material to be used, and not a fraudulent concealment of a negligent act. Johnson v. Arthur, 65 Ark. App. 220, 986 S.W.2d 874 (1999).

There was no fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations where the plaintiffs alleged facts that only amounted to a failure to inform and a continuation of a prior nondisclosure. Martin v. Arthur, 65 Ark. App. 276, 986 S.W.2d 143, aff'd in part, reversed in part, 339 Ark. 149, 3 S.W.3d 684 (1999).

The repealer clause added to the savings statute found in § 16-56-116 does not have the effect of repealing the specific savings statute enacted for minor children in this section. Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d 557 (2000).

Because a general statute must yield when there is a specific statute involving the particular subject matter, in a minor child's medical malpractice action, the two-year statute of limitations in this section applied rather than the three-year statute of limitation in § 16-56-116. Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d 557 (2000).

There was no fraudulent concealment arising from a misstatement in the plaintiff's medical records regarding the size of her reconstructive breast implant, which report was relied on by a physician replacing the implant and led to his not having the correct size implant available during surgery, since (1) the act allegedly perpetrated was not done in such a way that it concealed itself, and, on the contrary, was part of the plaintiff's medical record, (2) there was no evidence that the defendant actually knew of the error in his report, (3) there was no evidence that the defendant was ever informed of the error in his report, and (4) the plaintiff could easily have detected the error by merely requesting her medical records in their entirety. Meadors v. Still, 344 Ark. 307, 40 S.W.3d 294 (2001).

Tolling of Statute.

Statute of limitations does not bar suit if there has been fraudulent concealment of cause of action. Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953) (decision under prior law).

Issue as to whether fraudulent concealment tolled statute was for jury where doctor did not advise patient that he had used wire to close operational wound, though presence of wire was easily ascertained by another doctor. Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953) (decision under prior law).

Knowledge of the wrong done on the part of the physician is a necessary prerequisite to a tolling of the statute of limitations; thus where a doctor negligently read a patient's X ray thereby causing concealment of patient's disease there was no tolling of the statute. Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Summary judgment on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations had expired was proper in a medical malpractice action, where the patient's continued ingestion of medicine prescribed by her physician was not enough to establish an on-going course of treatment for the purpose of applying the continuous treatment doctrine in order to toll the statute of limitations until treatment was discontinued. Tullock v. Eck, 311 Ark. 564, 845 S.W.2d 517 (1993).

Where defendant did nothing to prevent plaintiff from discovering the falsity of his reputed representation, plaintiff failed to show an affirmative act of concealment, and her cause of action advanced under either a medical injury or invasion of privacy theory accrued on her last treatment date. Norris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 899 S.W.2d 70 (1995).

The limitations period of this section is not tolled during the period after the decedent dies but before the doctor issues a written report. Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997), overruled in part, Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49 (2013).

Where a patient is able to identify the specific negligent treatment that caused her injury, the continuous treatment doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations. Roberts v. Francis, 128 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1997).

The continuous treatment doctrine which tolls this section's limitations period becomes relevant when the medical negligence consists of a series of negligent acts, or a continuing course of improper treatments. Wright v. Sharma, 330 Ark. 704, 956 S.W.2d 191 (1997).

There will not always be genuine issues of material fact as to fraudulent concealment in all informed consent cases so as to defeat a motion for summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations; there must be something more than nondisclosure or a continuation of that nondisclosure to toll the limitations period. Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53, 969 S.W.2d 598 (1998).

Suit by the administrator of decedent's estate for wrongful death resulting from alleged medical malpractice was time-barred because it had not been filed within two years of the decedent's death as required by this section; although the suit had been filed within one year of the date on which a previous suit against the same healthcare providers filed by the decedent's heirs had been non-suited, the estate had not been a party to the first action and could not, therefore, rely on the saving provision contained in § 16-56-126 to overcome the running of the statute of limitations. Tatus v. Hayes, 79 Ark. App. 371, 88 S.W.3d 864 (2002).

Statute of limitations had run on a medical malpractice action and had not been tolled where the estate administrator's claims related to the failure of the physicians and clinic to inform decedent of the aortic aneurysm, failure to diagnose, failure to read the x-ray correctly, and failure to provide follow-up care; thus, none of the points rose to the level of a positive act of fraud sufficient to have tolled the statute. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).

Although the amended complaint in parents' medical malpractice action was filed before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, the limitations period was not tolled because a summons was never issued, and parents admitted they failed to complete service of process of the amended complaint as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 4; while Ark. R. Civ. P. 3 provides that an action is commenced by filing a complaint with the clerk of the proper court, the effectiveness of the commencement date is dependent upon a party satisfying the requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i), which provides that service of process on a defendant must be accomplished within 120 days after the filing of the complaint. Posey v. St. Bernard's Healthcare, Inc., 365 Ark. 154, 226 S.W.3d 757 (2006).

Dismissal of a mother and father's wrongful death and survival action against the doctors, nurses, and hospital when their child was stillborn was proper as the tolling provisions of subsection (c) of this section did not apply where the mother was appointed personal representative of the infant's estate at the time the complaint was filed, and the complaint was filed more than two years after the death of the infant. Dachs v. Hendrix, 103 Ark. App. 184, 287 S.W.3d 627 (2008), superseded, 2009 Ark. 542, 354 S.W.3d 95 (2009).

Minority tolling provision of subdivision (c)(1) of this section was inapplicable where the minor at issue was stillborn. Dachs v. Hendrix, 2009 Ark. 542, 354 S.W.3d 95 (2009).

Waiver.

Affirmative acts by plaintiff's agents and attorney did not waive notice requirement under subsection (a). Ofili v. Osco Drug, Inc., 300 Ark. 431, 780 S.W.2d 11 (1989); Hailey v. Kemp, 300 Ark. 120, 776 S.W.2d 828 (1989).

Wrongful Death.

Any medical injury, even one resulting in death, is governed by this section and not the wrongful death statute of limitations found in § 16-62-102. Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 326 Ark. 140, 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996).

When a death results from a medical injury, a resulting lawsuit must be filed within the two-year limitations period of the Medical Malpractice Act, not within the three-year period of the Wrongful Death Act. Scarlett v. Rose Care, Inc., 328 Ark. 672, 944 S.W.2d 545 (1997).

Medical malpractice in a wrongful death action was controlled by the 2-year medical malpractice statute of limitations in this section, and the action was barred where the alleged negligence occurred on January 26 and 29, 2001, and the complaint was filed on February 25, 2004, more than 3 years from the date of the alleged misreadings of deceased's chest x-rays. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 208 S.W.3d 162 (2005).

Cited: Gay v. Rabon, 280 Ark. 5, 652 S.W.2d 836 (1983); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984); McEntire v. Malloy, 288 Ark. 582, 707 S.W.2d 773 (1986); Dawson v. Gerritsen, 290 Ark. 499, 720 S.W.2d 714 (1986); HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988); Green v. Wiggins, 304 Ark. 484, 803 S.W.2d 536 (1991); Black v. Crawley, 304 Ark. 716, 804 S.W.2d 366 (1991); Chapman v. Alexander, 307 Ark. 87, 817 S.W.2d 425 (1991); Brown v. Saint Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 308 Ark. 361, 823 S.W.2d 908 (1992); Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2d 843 (1992); Thomas v. Cornell, 316 Ark. 366, 872 S.W.2d 370 (1994); Williams v. Hudson, 320 Ark. 635, 898 S.W.2d 465 (1995); Pugh v. Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997); McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 963 S.W.2d 583 (1998); Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53, 969 S.W.2d 598 (1998); Baylark v. Helena Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 405 (2012).

16-114-204. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning notice of intent to sue, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1296, § 63. The section was derived from Acts 1979, No. 709, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2617; Acts 1991, No. 346, § 1.

16-114-205. Allegation of damages.

  1. In any action for medical injury, the declaration or other affirmative pleading shall not specify the amount of damages claimed but shall, instead, contain a general allegation of damage and shall state that the damages claimed are within any minimum or maximum jurisdictional limits of the court to which the pleading is addressed.
  2. At any time after service of the pleading, the defendant may, by special interrogatory, demand a statement of the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff, which shall be answered within thirty (30) days.

History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2618.

Case Notes

Damages Specified.

Where appellants violated this section by specifying their damages rather than alleging a general claim for damages, the trial court misapplied ARCP 15(a), and abused its discretion by striking an amended complaint and dismissing the original complaint without prejudice, where appellee did not show any resulting prejudice or undue delay as a result of the filing of the amendment. Travis v. Houk, 307 Ark. 84, 817 S.W.2d 207 (1991).

Cited: HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988); Cox v. Bard, 302 Ark. 1, 786 S.W.2d 570 (1990).

16-114-206. Burden of proof.

  1. In any action for medical injury, when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving:
    1. By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant, the degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and used by members of the profession of the medical care provider in good standing, engaged in the same type of practice or specialty in the locality in which he or she practices or in a similar locality;
    2. By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant that the medical care provider failed to act in accordance with that standard; and
    3. By means of expert testimony provided only by a qualified medical expert that as a proximate result thereof the injured person suffered injuries that would not otherwise have occurred.
    1. Without limiting the applicability of subsection (a) of this section, when the plaintiff claims that a medical care provider failed to supply adequate information to obtain the informed consent of the injured person, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the treatment, procedure, or surgery was performed in other than an emergency situation and that the medical care provider did not supply that type of information regarding the treatment, procedure, or surgery as would customarily have been given to a patient in the position of the injured person or other persons authorized to give consent for such a patient by other medical care providers with similar training and experience at the time of the treatment, procedure, or surgery in the locality in which the medical care provider practices or in a similar locality.
    2. In determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the following matters shall also be considered as material issues:
      1. Whether a person of ordinary intelligence and awareness in a position similar to that of the injured person or persons giving consent on his or her behalf could reasonably be expected to know of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery;
      2. Whether the injured party or the person giving consent on his or her behalf knew of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery;
      3. Whether the injured party would have undergone the treatment, procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or whether he or she did not wish to be informed thereof; and
      4. Whether it was reasonable for the medical care provider to limit disclosure of information because such disclosure could be expected to adversely and substantially affect the injured person's condition.

History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2614; Acts 2003, No. 649, § 18.

Publisher's Notes. Provisions in subsection (a) of this section, which provide that expert testimony may only be given by medical care providers “of the same specialty as the defendant”, were held unconstitutional in Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385 (2012).

Amendments. The 2003 amendment inserted “when the asserted negligence … of common knowledge” in the introductory paragraph of (a); inserted “By means of expert testimony… the defendant” in (a)(1) and (a)(2); inserted “By means of expert… medical expert that” in (a)(3); and made gender neutral and minor punctuation changes.

Research References

ALR.

Liability of dentist for extraction of teeth—Lack of informed consent. 125 A.L.R.5th 403.

Ark. L. Rev.

Haase v. Starnes: The Arkansas Supreme Court's Refusal to Require Expert Testimony in Express Warranty Medical Malpractice Litigation, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 731.

Recent Development: Arkansas Constitutional Law — Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 1005.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

Rachel A. Orr, Recent Developments: Language of Expert Medical Witness Statute Violates Separation-of-Powers Doctrine, Amendment 80, and Inherent Authority of Courts to Control Procedural Matters — Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc. , 65 Ark. L. Rev. 163 (2012).

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Issued Interim Report of Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases Regarding Possible Changes to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Because of the Invalidation of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Torts, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 245.

Survey, Torts, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 417.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 442.

Jarred Kibbey, Note: A Call For the Arkansas General Assembly to Modernize the Standard of Care Requirement in Medical Malpractice Cases, 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 673 (2014).

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Plaintiff's argument that this subchapter violates the prohibition against special legislation in Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 25 held without merit. Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996).

Even assuming that patient and physician had a contract for physician to perform hair transplant, it was not an existing contract when the General Assembly enacted this subchapter; accordingly, this section did not violate the federal contract clause in the case. Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996).

Subsection (b) of this section, which sets forth the burden of proof for plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases involving informed consent, is constitutional because there is a rational relationship between the burden of proof required and the achievement of a legitimate governmental objective; therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of a physician who submitted an affidavit of an expert regarding proper standard of care because a patient failed to offer an affidavit from his own expert witness. Eady v. Lansford, 351 Ark. 249, 92 S.W.3d 57 (2002).

Because the language, “By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant” in subsection (a) of this section adds requirements to Ark. R. Evid. 702, attempts to dictate procedure, and invades the province of the judiciary's authority to set and control procedure, it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 3, and the inherent authority of the courts to protect the integrity of proceedings and the rights of the litigants. Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385 (2012).

Applicability.

An action by an administrative board, reviewing the conduct of a professional and ultimately punishing that professional, was not an “action for medical injury,” because it was not an action to recover damages; this section was therefore inapplicable. Livingston v. Ark. State Medical Bd., 288 Ark. 1, 701 S.W.2d 361 (1986).

Where patient was under a doctor's care while in nursing home, but his death was from leaving unnoticed in a wheelchair and being struck by a car, it was not the result of a “medical injury”. Bailey v. Rose Care Ctr., 307 Ark. 14, 817 S.W.2d 412 (1991).

Although the United States argued that the current version of this section applied to a medical malpractice suit filed by Arkansas plaintiffs, it did not present any authority showing that the section was intended to apply retroactively. The current version of the section did not apply to plaintiffs' claims because they accrued prior to March 25, 2007, which was when the current version took effect. [The current version of this section, as amended by Acts 2003, No. 649, § 18, was effective March 25, 2003.] McMullin v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 909 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Affidavit.

Medical malpractice complaint that was not accompanied by an expert's affidavit was properly dismissed; although plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of the doctor in allowing a sharp instrument to fall into patient's spinal cord was within a jury's comprehension as a matter of general knowledge, the court found that an expert was required for the jury to understand what a cervical diskectomy and fusion was, what instruments were used to perform the procedures, what procedures and risks were involved, and whether the doctor's actions proximately caused the injury alleged by appellants. Robbins v. Johnson, 367 Ark. 506, 241 S.W.3d 747 (2006) (decided in part under § 16-114-209, now deemed superseded).

Breach of Warranty.

This section does not apply to actions for medical injury based on breach of express warranty when the issue is whether the medical-care provider guaranteed the results, for to do so would defy common sense and produce absurd results. Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996).

The three requirements of subsection (a), namely the “degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and used by members of the profession,” failure to “act in accordance with that standard,” and “proximate result,” typify three requirements of a cause of action sounding in tort: duty, breach, and cause; these three requirements have no relevance in a contract-based cause of action arising out of a guarantee of specific, favorable results, and the standard of care used by medical-care providers in similar communities and situations simply has no relevance in a case where the sole issue is whether a medical-care provider breached this particular express warranty. Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996).

Duty to Disclose Risks.

The physician's duty to disclose risks is measured by the customary practice of physicians in the community in which he practices or in a similar community. Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 597 S.W.2d 88 (1980).

In a medical malpractice action, the issue of informed consent is foundational to individual claims and cannot be tried on a class basis. Arthur v. Zearley, 320 Ark. 273, 895 S.W.2d 928 (1995).

Doctor's failure to supply to patient that type of information regarding the treatment and surgery as would have been customarily given to a patient in patient's position by other medical providers with similar training and experience at the time of the treatment and surgery in Little Rock or in a similar locality was a proximate cause of patient's damages. Aronson v. Harriman, 321 Ark. 359, 901 S.W.2d 832 (1995).

Evidence.

Trial court erred in granting doctor's motion to dismiss a complaint that alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for medical malpractice where the complaint alleged that (1) the doctor required plaintiff mother, after achieving maximum dilation, to go through over four hours of hard labor before performing a caesarean section, (2) the doctor's failure to timely schedule and perform a caesarean section was a breach of the applicable standard of care, and (3) the child suffered neurological damage and the mother suffered injury to her bladder and associated nerves. Thomas v. Pierce, 87 Ark. App. 26, 184 S.W.3d 489 (2004).

Where the expert witnesses failed to testify regarding the standard of care in the state, the widow failed to establish the requisite standard of care for purposes of this section. Young v. Gastro-Intestinal Ctr., Inc., 361 Ark. 209, 205 S.W.3d 741 (2005).

Expert Testimony.

The question of whether to use a Posey vest (a safety restraint) on a patient involved a professional service where only a doctor could authorize its use, although actual placement on the patient was left to the nurse's discretion; accordingly, expert testimony as to the degree of skill used by other hospitals in the locality was required in a suit alleging negligence based on the hospital's failure to use such a vest, and in the absence of such evidence, a directed verdict for the hospital was warranted. Sexton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 275 Ark. 361, 631 S.W.2d 270 (1982).

The provisions of this section providing that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to act in accordance with the degree of skill ordinarily used by doctors in good standing in the local area do not mean that the standing of plaintiff's medical expert is a direct, rather than collateral, issue in a medical malpractice case. Garst v. Cullum, 291 Ark. 512, 726 S.W.2d 271 (1987).

Expert testimony is required when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury's comprehension, when the applicable standard of care is not a matter of common knowledge, and when the jury must have the assistance of expert witnesses to decide the issue of negligence. Prater ex rel. Estate of Prater v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 547, 739 S.W.2d 676 (1987); Courteau v. Dodd, 299 Ark. 380, 773 S.W.2d 436 (1989); Skaggs v. Johnson, 323 Ark. 320, 915 S.W.2d 253 (1996).

In a case involving the diagnosis of appendicitis, expert medical testimony was essential to establish the standard of care required of the diagnosing physician and that the physician failed to act in accordance with that standard. Absent such testimony by a medical expert, plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof and no issue of fact existed for trial. Reagan v. City of Piggott, 305 Ark. 77, 805 S.W.2d 636 (1991).

Section 16-114-201 defines “medical injury” sufficiently broadly; claims based on allegations of a failure to provide needed medical care and attention or the timely diagnosis of medical problems come within the ambit of this subchapter and are dependent upon expert testimony as outlined in subsection (a) of this section. Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).

Case presented an issue outside the jury's common knowledge that required expert testimony in that physicians made a conscious, medical decision to leave the piece of penrose drain tube in patient's leg, as opposed to the typical foreign object case, which involves the inadvertent leaving of objects in a patient's body, and does not involve a physician's judgment. Skaggs v. Johnson, 323 Ark. 320, 915 S.W.2d 253 (1996).

Where testifying doctor's opinion was general and based on his experience as an infectious disease expert and did not address a surgical decision by an orthopedist, and where the doctor did not offer testimony that the conduct of the orthopedic surgeons in this case fell below the standard of care for orthopedic surgeons in Little Rock, the defendants met their burden of proving a prima facie case for summary judgment by showing that the plaintiffs had no expert to testify as to the breach of the applicable standard of care. Skaggs v. Johnson, 323 Ark. 320, 915 S.W.2d 253 (1996).

An expert witness need not be one who has practiced in the particular locality, or one who is intimately familiar with the practice in it in order to be qualified as an expert in a medical malpractice action, if an appropriate foundation is established to demonstrate that the witness is familiar with the standard of practice in a similar locality, either by his testimony or by other evidence showing the similarity of localities. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 323 Ark. 390, 915 S.W.2d 262 (1996).

Where a duly licensed and practicing physician has gained knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a specialty in which he is not directly engaged but as to which he has an opinion based on education, experience, observation or association with that specialty, his opinion is competent. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 323 Ark. 390, 915 S.W.2d 262 (1996).

The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the medical expert testimony of physician where he was able to testify as to the standard of care for a family practitioner and where there was an appropriate foundation established to demonstrate witness's familiarity with the standard of practice in a similar locality. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 323 Ark. 390, 915 S.W.2d 262 (1996).

When the particular issue relates to a question within the general practitioner's own area of expertise, he is not prohibited by the malpractice statute from testifying upon that question as an expert. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 323 Ark. 390, 915 S.W.2d 262 (1996).

Expert testimony is not necessary per se in every medical malpractice case; expert testimony is required only when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, when the applicable standard of care is not a matter of common knowledge, and when the jury must have the assistance of experts to decide the issue of negligence. Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996).

Plaintiff's argument that subsection (a) is in direct conflict with Evid. Rule 702 was based on a false premise, that subsection (a) mandates the presentation of expert testimony while the rule permits such testimony; however, it is the facts of any given case that determine whether expert testimony is required in a medical malpractice claim for negligence, and accordingly, plaintiff's argument was without merit. Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996).

When expert testimony is required for proof of a plaintiff's claim for medical malpractice, and the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff's failure to produce the requisite expert testimony, then the defendant has demonstrated that no genuine issues of material fact exist for presentation to a jury and is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Robson v. Tinnin, 322 Ark. 605, 911 S.W.2d 246 (1995).

Exclusion of the deposition testimony of expert witnesses was prejudicial error since this subchapter provides that in any action for medical injury the plaintiff must prove the applicable standard of care, that the medical provider failed to act in accordance with that standard, and that such failure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff's burden of proving the applicable standard of care and the defendant's failure to comply with that standard requires expert testimony when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge. National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996), overruled in part, Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2006).

The violation of the standard of care in a medical malpractice case must be established by expert testimony when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge. Hall v. Arthur, 141 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1998).

Where the expert testimony tended to show that a surgeon violated the relevant standard of care, the jury could reasonably conclude that a surgeon assisting him similarly violated the standard of care; additional expert testimony as to the standard of care applicable to an assistant was not required. Hall v. Arthur, 141 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1998).

Affidavit of estate administrator's expert was not sufficient to overcome the motion for summary judgment where it failed to demonstrate that the expert was knowledgeable by either training or experience as to the standard of care for psychiatric patients. Dodd v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr., 90 Ark. App. 191, 204 S.W.3d 579 (2005).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a physician in a patient's medical malpractice action where the patient failed to identify an expert witness; the patient had a significant amount of time to identify a medical expert to support the claims but failed to do so. Neal v. Farris, 101 Ark. App. 375, 278 S.W.3d 129 (2008).

District court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony of a nurse because the record reflected that she either had repudiated the conclusions expressed in her written report, or at a minimum, had not developed her conclusions to the point where she could provide a qualified expert opinion at trial. Without expert testimony to support the allegation of negligence against the hospital, as required by this section, the district court acted appropriately in excluding evidence relating to alleged institutional negligence. Csiszer v. Wren, 614 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2010).

Trial court erred in ruling that § 16-114-207(3) was unconstitutional; the statute simply created a privilege for purposes of trial. It gave medical care providers, or their representatives, the privilege to refuse to testify as to the matters set forth in this section. Bedell v. Williams, 2012 Ark. 75, 386 S.W.3d 493 (2012).

Summary judgment was appropriately granted to the medical providers on a negligence claim where the couple, in failing to respond to the requests for admissions, admitted that they had no expert testimony as required by this section. Hardesty v. Baptist Health, 2013 Ark. App. 731, 431 S.W.3d 327 (2013).

Plaintiff, allegedly injured during a physical therapy session, failed to establish the elements of his medical malpractice case by expert testimony, as required by this section; a doctor's testimony referred to the failure to report, yet plaintiff did not establish any injury from failure to report, other testimony was too vague as the standard of care was not stated with specificity and did not establish that defendant proximately caused plaintiff's injuries, and an orthopedic surgeon never testified about the standard of care for physical therapists treating knee-surgery patients or that defendant's actions constituted a breach. Johnson v. Schafer, 2018 Ark. App. 630, 565 S.W.3d 144 (2018).

Plaintiff's case required the explanation of knee anatomy, knee surgery, physical therapy rehabilitation practices and procedures, and pharmacology of anticoagulants, which did not justify a departure from the general rule that a plaintiff must prove a medical-malpractice claim through expert testimony. Johnson v. Schafer, 2018 Ark. App. 630, 565 S.W.3d 144 (2018).

—Feeding Tube Placement.

Although the representative argued that she needed no expert testimony because it was common knowledge that a feeding tube was misplaced if it was in a patient's lung instead of her stomach, to fully understand the standard of care and the allegations of negligence against these doctors, the fact-finder would require an understanding of medical terminology and anatomy as well as medical protocol, such as what an attending physician or radiologist must do upon learning of a mis-positioned feeding tube and what information one physician must impart to another; thus, the representative had to produce expert testimony to assist the fact-finder. Lee v. Martindale, 103 Ark. App. 36, 286 S.W.3d 169 (2008).

—Informed Consent.

Testimony of doctor, when given its fullest weight, lacked essential constituent of proof required by subdivision (b)(1), where he made no attempt to compare facilities, practices or advantages in similar localities, but merely asserted that he was familiar with the information which would customarily have been given in order to obtain informed consent. Grice v. Atkinson, 308 Ark. 637, 826 S.W.2d 810 (1992).

Where upon its review of the deposition of plaintiff's expert, the trial court determined that he could not offer expert testimony on the issue of informed consent as required by subsection (b) of this section, the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff had not met her burden of proof and that no material issue of fact existed with respect to informed consent which required presentation of the case to a jury. Brumley v. Naples, 320 Ark. 310, 896 S.W.2d 860 (1995).

Common knowledge exception did not apply to subsection (b) of this section; therefore, a patient was required to produce expert testimony in order to survive a physician's motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case involving the issue of informed consent. Eady v. Lansford, 351 Ark. 249, 92 S.W.3d 57 (2002).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendant doctors on plaintiff patient's informed consent and medical battery claims where patient failed to provide expert testimony on her informed consent claim, and her battery claim, in turn, was based on her informed consent claim. Parkerson v. Arthur, 83 Ark. App. 240, 125 S.W.3d 825 (2003).

—Locality Rule.

Medical expert could testify in a medical malpractice suit because plaintiffs presented evidence showing that Atlanta, Georgia, where the expert practiced, was similar to the rural Arkansas locality where their deceased son was treated. Both the expert and the son's treating physician were board certified pediatricians; and the expert's deposition testimony and supplemental affidavit sufficiently established the similarity of the localities because he stated that the same diagnostic services were available to both himself and the son's treating physician, except for one specialized test that was not necessary to diagnose the son's infective bacterial endocarditis, and that the son would have been properly diagnosed if the treating physician had ordered some of those basic diagnostic tests to be performed. McMullin v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 909 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

In a wrongful death action against a physician, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict to the physician based on the locality rule, subsection (a) of this section, because the expert witness provided by an administratrix demonstrated a total lack of knowledge concerning the local medical community, medical facilities, and local standard of care. Gilbow v. Richards, 2010 Ark. App. 780 (2010).

In a medical malpractice action, the trial court did not err in granting the doctor's motion for directed verdict because the evidence did not show that the patient's medical expert was informed as to the standard of care in the locality as required by subsection (a) of this section. Plymate v. Martinelli, 2013 Ark. 194 (2013).

Expert knew the differences between the locality where he practiced and the town where the patient passed away, plus the expert was one of the primary teaching faculty members for general surgical residents, and those who graduated went throughout the county, plus there were no situations where the patient would have been treated differently in a different locality, and thus the expert's testimony met the requirements of the statute. Heritage Physician Group, P.A. v. Minton, 2014 Ark. App. 155, 432 S.W.3d 682 (2014).

Even if the locality rule was applicable to defense experts in a medical negligence action, the testimony of the witness was sufficient to satisfy the rule as he testified about his extensive experience practicing medicine in Arkansas, his education in Arkansas, and his service on the Arkansas Medical Society Board of Trustees, all of which provided the basis for his understanding of the standard of practice in Rogers/Bentonville. He expressly stated that the standard of practice in Rogers/Bentonville was the same as in Van Buren, where he practiced. Brazeal v. Cooper, 2016 Ark. App. 442, 503 S.W.3d 829 (2016).

—Nursing Home.

Where decedent's estate alleged that a nursing care facility engaged in medical malpractice and the estate's expert nurse practitioner testified to familiarity with the standard of care for nursing homes, based upon knowledge of federal guidelines and state regulations governing long-term care and knowledge of the policies and procedures of the facility, the testimony did not indicate that the expert's knowledge of the standards of care for nursing homes was limited to federal and state guidelines; the expert practiced in a nearby town of similar population and affirmatively testified to familiarity with the standard of care in the area where the facility was located. Dooley v. Cap-Care of Ark., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Ark. 2004).

—Nursing Staff.

Where the patient alleged that a doctor and a medical center's nursing staff were negligent in connection with a fall she sustained while a patient at the medical center, the trial court did not err by denying the patient's proffered instruction that would have allowed the jury to consider the testimony of her physician expert on the standard of care for the nursing staff; the physician was never qualified as an expert on nursing. Furthermore, the patient did not appeal the circuit judge's ruling that subsection (a) of this section controlled the admissibility of the doctor's testimony as to the standard of care for nurses rather than Ark. R. Evid. 702. Nelson v. Stubblefield, 2009 Ark. 256, 308 S.W.3d 586 (2009).

—Staph Infection.

In a patient's medical malpractice suit, summary judgment in favor of her surgeon and the hospital was proper as the patient's allegations regarding her surgery were not matters of common knowledge, and she failed to provide expert testimony pursuant to this section so that the jury could evaluate her claims; absent testimony supporting her allegations, she had no proof of the standard of care, deviation, or proximate cause. Similarly, the care reasonably required by the hospital regarding the patient's staph infection and wound complications were not within the common knowledge of most jurors and needed expert testimony. Taylor v. Landherr, 101 Ark. App. 279, 275 S.W.3d 656 (2008).

Informed Consent.

Where the patient testified that he would not have had surgery to remove part of his bowel had he known that no general surgeon would be in attendance to assist the urologist, it was for the jury to decide whether he gave his informed consent under subdivision (b)(1) of this section; therefore, the trial court erred by granting the urologist a directed verdict in the patient's medical malpractice case. Haupt v. Kumar, 103 Ark. App. 298, 288 S.W.3d 704 (2008).

Genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether a hospital was negligent in failing to obtain a patient's informed consent for the administration of spinal-block anesthesia prior to surgery, because the patient signed a blank form, with no information as to the anesthesia to be used, while he was under the influence of pain medication. Villines v. N. Ark. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2011 Ark. App. 506, 385 S.W.3d 360 (2011).

Jury Instructions.

The submission of Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 203, in its standard form, correctly instructed the jury as to the burden of proof to be met under any theory of recovery in a medical malpractice action, and it was not error for the trial court to have refused proffered instructions where the model instructions accurately stated the law and where the proposed instructions were potentially misleading. Blankenship v. Burnett, 304 Ark. 469, 803 S.W.2d 539 (1991).

Doctor gave justifications for his medical decisions, and if Arkansas courts considered justifications for medical decisions as affirmative defenses, it would result in imposing a judicially created burden-shifting procedure onto medical defendants to prove why they made their decisions, which is contrary to the intent of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act; there was no error in the trial court's refusal to give a particular jury instruction on the burden of proof proffered by appellants, in which they claimed it was the doctor's burden to prove certain facts. Hartman v. Edwards, 2014 Ark. App. 480, 442 S.W.3d 13 (2014).

Lay Testimony.

The trial court erred in treating a medical malpractice claim as an ordinary negligence claim, and in permitting the issues raised by the medical malpractice claim to rest on lay testimony. Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).

Preservation for Review.

Claimants failed to preserve for appellate review the arguments that appellees' motion for summary judgment was unsupported by sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact. The arguments were not timely raised since the arguments were made for the first time in the motion for reconsideration. Quattlebaum v. McCarver, 2013 Ark. App. 376 (2013).

Proximate Cause.

This section implements the traditional tort standard of requiring proof that “but for” the tortfeasor's negligence, the plaintiff's injury or death would not have occurred. Ford v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 339 Ark. 434, 5 S.W.3d 460 (1999).

In a medical malpractice case, where the appellate court remanded a case following entry of a default judgment for a trial on the issue of damages only, the trial court erred in permitting the doctor to introduce evidence regarding proximate causation because proximate causation was an element of liability, not an element of damages. Jones v. McGraw, 374 Ark. 483, 288 S.W.3d 623 (2008).

Although appellees stipulated that they were negligent in failing to remove a surgical clamp from appellant's abdomen, there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict that appellant failed to prove that she sustained any damages as a result of the negligence; therefore, she did not meet her burden of proof under subdivision (a)(3) of this section. Thomas v. Sharon, 2013 Ark. App. 305, 427 S.W.3d 756 (2013).

Expert explained why he believed the doctor's negligence led to the patient's death, saying the prolonged period of low blood pressure and his low blood count led to an emergency operation, where a large amount of blood was found in his abdomen, the bleeding and the surgery caused him to have a heart attack and die, and the patient was salvageable up until his blood pressure bottomed out; there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the doctor's negligence proximately caused the patient's death. Heritage Physician Group, P.A. v. Minton, 2014 Ark. App. 155, 432 S.W.3d 682 (2014).

Trial court properly granted a doctor and a medical practice summary judgment in an administratrix's action alleging medical negligence because the expert testimony failed to establish proximate cause; the expert testimony the administratrix cited failed to clearly articulate that the doctor's negligence was the proximate cause of the patient's death. One expert opined that the patient's awakening from the anesthesia was more likely if the surgery had been stopped, but the issue was whether the patient would have lived, not whether he would have awakened. Thomas v. Meadors, 2017 Ark. App. 421, 527 S.W.3d 724 (2017).

Res Ipsa Loquitur.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply in cases of medical malpractice on the part of any and all medical care providers as defined by the Medical Malpractice Act if the essential elements for application of the doctrine exist. Schmidt v. Gibbs, 305 Ark. 383, 807 S.W.2d 928 (1991).

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did apply where the defendant was an insurer for a medical center and the operating room, equipment, and nurses involved were all under the control or management of the medical center. Schmidt v. Gibbs, 305 Ark. 383, 807 S.W.2d 928 (1991).

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to anesthesiologists where the expert witness testified in clear and unequivocal terms that the care and treatment offered by the anesthesiologists was not below the standard of care required. Schmidt v. Gibbs, 305 Ark. 383, 807 S.W.2d 928 (1991).

The trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur for a plaintiff who developed a vesicovaginal fistula following her abdominal hysterectomy. Taylor v. Riddell, 320 Ark. 394, 896 S.W.2d 891 (1995).

Standard of Care.

The definition of standard of care found in this section creates an objective standard, and the court improperly instructed the jury on Arkansas law by using a model instruction which added the language “using his best judgment”, inserting subjective considerations into the objective standard. Pearce v. Cornerstone Clinic for Women, 938 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1991).

An objective standard for determining the effect of complete information on patient's decision is used; this approach permits the jury to take into account patient's testimony with regard to whether he would have consented to risks but will not predicate the outcome of the case solely on that testimony. Aronson v. Harriman, 321 Ark. 359, 901 S.W.2d 832 (1995).

Physicians were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law in an action for medical malpractice where plaintiffs offered no argument that either physician deviated below the required standard of care. National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996), overruled in part, Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2006).

To sustain a claim for medical malpractice a plaintiff must prove, among other elements, the applicable standard of care and the defendant's breach thereof. Skaggs v. Johnson, 323 Ark. 320, 915 S.W.2d 253 (1996).

Simply because treatment is available for a medical injury, it does not follow that it is negligence for a medical care provider not to provide the treatment. Robson v. Tinnin, 322 Ark. 605, 911 S.W.2d 246 (1995).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to defendants in husband's wrongful death action under the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act because, even if husband's expert had been qualified to offer an opinion, his affidavit did not include any statements setting forth the standard of care. Dodd v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr., 90 Ark. App. 191, 204 S.W.3d 579 (2005).

Widow had not established the requisite standard of care where her expert witnesses, both from Texas, failed to testify regarding the standard of care in Little Rock, Arkansas. Young v. Gastro-Intestinal Ctr., Inc., 361 Ark. 209, 205 S.W.3d 741 (2005).

Trial court properly found that a medical center and nurse did not owe a duty to widow's husband, a patient at the center, where the husband left against medical advice and the nurse had no right or legal duty to impose restrictions on the husband; there was no statute imposing a duty on a medical care provider to control a patient and the court refused to do so. Young v. Gastro-Intestinal Ctr., Inc., 361 Ark. 209, 205 S.W.3d 741 (2005).

Expert testimony was required for widow's medical malpractice claim as it was not common knowledge that transfusion of a leukemia patient with an allegedly improper blood type could cause injury to the patient and the widow's expert's affidavit was devoid of mention of the standard of care in Baxter County; thus, the widow's affidavit was insufficient to create a question of fact on the issue and the trial court did not err in granting doctor's motion for summary judgment. Mitchell v. Lincoln, 366 Ark. 592, 237 S.W.3d 455 (2006).

In a medical negligence case filed against an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Berryville, Arkansas, the trial court did not err in granting the surgeon's motion for a directed verdict, because the patient's medical experts did not satisfy the requirements of subdivision (a)(1) of this section as they did not show a familiarity with the standard of care applicable in Berryville or a similar locality. Bailey-Gray v. Martinson, 2013 Ark. App. 80 (2013).

Substantial Evidence.

Despite appellants' claims, there was substantial evidence to support a verdict for the doctor, and thus the circuit court did not err in denying a motion for a new trial; the doctor testified that he considered the potential risk of blood clotting when he chose not to administer blood thinners, and the defense expert opined that the amount and timing of the dosage did not affect the decedent's survival. Hartman v. Edwards, 2014 Ark. App. 480, 442 S.W.3d 13 (2014).

Summary Judgment Granted.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by deeming a doctor's requests for admission admitted and in granting summary judgment to the doctor because by failing to timely file their responses to the doctor's requests for admission, the patient and her husband admitted that they could not meet their burden of proving the essential elements of medical malpractice. Duncan v. Olive, 2014 Ark. App. 152 (2014).

Cited: Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M. & P. Equip. Co., 280 Ark. 560, 661 S.W.2d 345 (1983); Cathey v. Williams, 290 Ark. 189, 718 S.W.2d 98 (1986); HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988); Alexander v. Chapman, 299 Ark. 126, 771 S.W.2d 744 (1989); Cash v. Lim, 322 Ark. 359, 908 S.W.2d 655 (1995); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tucker, 353 Ark. 730, 120 S.W.3d 61 (2003); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kilgore, 85 Ark. App. 231, 148 S.W.3d 754 (2004); Whorton v. Dixon, 363 Ark. 330, 214 S.W.3d 225 (2005); Fryar v. Touchstone Physical Therapy, Inc., 365 Ark. 295, 229 S.W.3d 7 (2006); Newton v. Clinical Reference Lab., 517 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 2008).

16-114-207. Expert witnesses.

In any action for medical injury:

  1. Rule 702 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence [repealed] shall govern the qualifications of expert witnesses;
  2. No witness whose compensation for his or her services is in any way dependent on the outcome of the case shall be permitted to give expert testimony; and
  3. No medical care provider shall be required to give expert opinion testimony against himself or herself as to any of the matters set forth in § 16-114-206 at a trial. However, this shall not apply to discovery. Discovery information can be used at a trial as in other lawsuits.

History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2615.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Subdivision (1) of this section may be superseded by Rule 702 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. The Uniform Rules of Evidence were repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1148, § 2[7].

Cross References. Testimony by experts, Ark. R. Evid. 702.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Development: Arkansas Constitutional Law — Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 1005.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Where plaintiffs at trial merely made conclusory statements that this section was unconstitutional, argument on the issue was procedurally barred. National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996), overruled in part, Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2006).

Where patient alleged that this section was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and Ark. Const. art. 2, § 3, but failed to raise her strict scrutiny argument before the circuit court, the Arkansas Supreme Court applied a rational basis test and determined that the statute was rationally related to the purposes of the legislature in enacting the statute. Whorton v. Dixon, 363 Ark. 330, 214 S.W.3d 225 (2005).

Patient in a medical malpractice suit argued that her constitutional rights were violated when she was precluded from introducing a physician's original deposition in which the physician testified concerning the standard of care and the suturing of the patient's bladder during a hysterectomy, but the physician later corrected his statement. The patient failed to show that the patient was prejudiced by being precluded from introducing the testimony. Crowell v. Barker, 369 Ark. 428, 255 S.W.3d 858 (2007).

In reviewing plaintiff parents' challenge to the validity of subdivision (3) of this section, the court concluded that it was unlikely that the Supreme Court of Arkansas would have accepted either their equal protection argument or separation-of-powers challenge, and the statute had already survived rational basis review. Moreover, any error was harmless as plaintiff had the chance to cross-examine defendant obstetrician on the standard of care after the defendant had taken the stand and testified on direct examination about the proper standard of care, thereby losing the protection of subdivision (3). Csiszer v. Wren, 614 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2010).

Trial court erred in ruling that subdivision (3) of this section was unconstitutional; the statute simply created a privilege for purposes of trial. It gave medical care providers, or their representatives, the privilege to refuse to testify as to the matters set forth in § 16-114-206. Bedell v. Williams, 2012 Ark. 75, 386 S.W.3d 493 (2012).

Privilege to Refuse to Testify.

District court did not have to decide whether subdivision (3) of this section barred plaintiffs' expert witness from relying on the deposition testimony of a deceased child's treating physician to establish that the localities in which he and the treating physician practiced were similar for purposes of former version of § 16-114-206(a)(1). The expert's own deposition and supplemental affidavit were sufficient to establish that the same basic diagnostic services were available to board certified pediatricians in both Atlanta, Georgia, where he practiced and in rural Arkansas, where the treating physician practiced, and that the child would have been properly diagnosed if the treating physician had ordered some basic diagnostic tests to be performed. McMullin v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 909 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

In a medical malpractice action against a nursing home, the court erred in ruling that subdivision (3) of this section did not apply to the nurses because they did not testify against themselves, but rather against their employer; only those medical professionals employed by an entity, such as physicians and nurses, could be called upon to give expert medical testimony against the entity itself under the meaning of subdivision (3). Bedell v. Williams, 2012 Ark. 75, 386 S.W.3d 493 (2012).

Qualified to Testify.

Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert upon a particular question is a matter to be decided within the discretion of the trial court. Cathey v. Williams, 290 Ark. 189, 718 S.W.2d 98 (1986).

If there is a reasonable basis for saying a witness knows more about the subject than a person of ordinary knowledge, his evidence is admissible. Courteau v. Dodd, 299 Ark. 380, 773 S.W.2d 436 (1989).

Relevance.

In medical malpractice action, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding testimony regarding defendant doctor's past experience as a medical expert for a plaintiff's attorney was relevant. National Bank of Commerce v. Quirk, 323 Ark. 769, 918 S.W.2d 138 (1996), overruled in part, Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2006).

Use of Equipment.

The question of whether to use a Posey vest (a safety restraint) on a patient involved a professional service where only a doctor could authorize its use, although actual placement on the patient was left to the nurse's discretion; accordingly, expert testimony as to the degree of skill used by other hospitals in the locality was required in a suit alleging negligence based on the hospital's failure to use such a vest, and, in the absence of such evidence, a directed verdict for the hospital was warranted. Sexton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 275 Ark. 361, 631 S.W.2d 270 (1982).

Cited: Prater ex rel. Estate of Prater v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 547, 739 S.W.2d 676 (1987); HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988); Goodwin v. Harrison, 300 Ark. 474, 780 S.W.2d 518 (1989); First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rank, 323 Ark. 390, 915 S.W.2d 262 (1996).

16-114-208. Damage awards — Periodic payment of future damages.

      1. The damages awarded may include compensation for actual economic losses recognized by law suffered by the injured person by reason of medical injury, including, but not limited to, the cost of reasonable and necessary medical services, rehabilitation services, custodial care, loss of services, and loss of earnings or earning capacity.
      2. Any evidence of damages for the cost of any necessary medical care, treatment, or services received shall include only those costs actually paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff or which remain unpaid and for which the plaintiff or any third party shall be legally responsible.
    1. The damages awarded may include compensation for pain and suffering and other noneconomic loss recognized by law.
  1. In the event of a verdict for the plaintiff, the finder of fact shall separately state its awards for both past and future economic losses and for both past and future noneconomic losses.
    1. In the event of a judgment for the plaintiff, if the award for future damages exceeds one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), the court, at the request of either party, shall order that the future damages of the injured person exceeding one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) be paid, in whole or in part, by periodic payments as determined by the court, rather than by lump-sum payment, on such terms and conditions as the court deems just and equitable in order to protect the plaintiff's rights to future payments.
    2. As a condition to authorizing periodic payments of future damages, the court may order a judgment debtor who is not adequately insured to post security adequate to assure full payment of such damages.
    3. In the event of the death of the injured person prior to completion of installment payments of principal and interest upon motion of any party in interest, the court shall modify the order by deducting from the remaining balance the amount representing unpaid compensation for future pain and suffering and future expenses of care and by ordering the remainder to be paid into and become a part of the estate of the decedent.

History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2619; Acts 2003, No. 649, §§ 19, 20.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment redesignated former (a)(1) as present (a)(1)(A); added (a)(1)(B); and, in (c)(1), deleted “may” following “the court,” inserted “shall” following “either party,” inserted “and conditions” and added “in order to protect the plaintiff's rights to future payments” at the end.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is not to eliminate wrongful death damages in medical malpractice cases or to delineate the damages allowed in medical malpractice cases, but rather to determine how damages to the injured person would be awarded, to allow for installment payments in certain situations, and to provide for the reduction of damages if the injured person died before all the installment payments were made. Meredith v. Buchman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 764 (W.D. Ark. 2000).

Construction with Other Laws.

By passing this subchapter, the Arkansas General Assembly did not repeal the Wrongful Death Act, § 16-62-102, in cases where the death was caused by a medical injury. Meredith v. Buchman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 764 (W.D. Ark. 2000).

Evidence.

Evidence supported award of damages in wrongful death case resulting from medical negligence. Kelley v. Wiggins, 291 Ark. 280, 724 S.W.2d 443 (1987).

Punitive Damages.

Punitive damages are recoverable in medical malpractice actions. In enacting the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, the Arkansas General Assembly did not restrict an injured party for claiming punitive damages when a medical-care provider was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988).

16-114-209. False and unreasonable pleadings.

  1. If any action for medical injury is filed without reasonable cause, the party or attorney who signed the complaint shall thereafter, as determined by the court, be subject to:
    1. The payment of reasonable costs, including attorney's fees, incurred by the other party by reason of the pleading; and
    2. Appropriate sanctions.
    1. In all cases where expert testimony is required under § 16-114-206, reasonable cause for filing any action for medical injury due to negligence shall be established only by the filing of an affidavit that shall be signed by an expert engaged in the same type of medical care as is each medical care provider defendant.
    2. The affidavit shall be executed under oath and shall state with particularity:
      1. The expert's familiarity with the applicable standard of care in issue;
      2. The expert's qualifications;
      3. The expert's opinion as to how the applicable standard of care has been breached; and
      4. The expert's opinion as to how the breach of the applicable standard of care resulted in injury or death.
      1. The plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days after the complaint is filed with the clerk to file the affidavit before the provisions of subsection (a) of this section apply.
      2. If the affidavit is not filed within thirty (30) days after the complaint is filed with the clerk, the complaint shall be dismissed by the court.

History. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2620; Acts 2003, No. 649, § 21.

Publisher's Notes. By per curiam order reported at 2015 Ark. 88, the Supreme Court adopted an amendment to Ark. R. Civ. P. 11, effective April 1, 2015. The order states in part: “With the adoption of the revisions to Rule 11, section 21 of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-209, is superseded pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-11-301”.

Subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section previously had been held unconstitutional in Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415 (2007).

Amendments. The 2003 amendment rewrote this section.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Issued Interim Report of Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases Regarding Possible Changes to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Because of the Invalidation of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Sevawn Foster, Note: Constitutional Law — Arkansas’s Current Procedural Rulemaking Conundrum: Attempting to Quell the Political Discord, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Patient lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 16-114-209(b)(3) because the circuit court did not apply the 30-day time limitation to him; moreover, the patient did not present a convincing argument to overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality applied to the rest of § 16-114-209. A trial court's finding that part of the statute was unconstitutional was moot on appeal due to a finding that a dismissal was appropriate. Childers v. Payne, 369 Ark. 201, 252 S.W.3d 129 (2007).

The constitutional infirmity in § 16-114-209(b) is the provision for dismissal if an affidavit does not accompany a complaint within 30 days; therefore, a decision to dismiss a medical malpractice action for failing to file such an affidavit was reversed on appeal since this conflicted with Ark. R. Civ. P. 3 and Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 3. Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415 (2007).

District court's order dismissing a fired worker's medical negligence suit had to be reversed: (1) the district court held that Arkansas law pertaining to medical malpractice suits applied to the worker's negligence suit against a clinical laboratory, a medical review officer, and the officer's employer, who had examined her drug test and had concluded that she had tested positive for drug use; (2) the district court concluded that it was compelled by subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section, invalidated by Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231 (2007), to dismiss the suit with prejudice after the worker failed to timely present an expert affidavit that established reasonable cause for filing an action for medical injury due to negligence; (3) after the district court dismissed the suit, and while the worker's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Summerville, ruled that subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section was invalid and struck it from the Arkansas Code, thereby rendering the statute a legal nullity; and (4) the Eighth Circuit appeals found it appropriate to exercise its discretion to address the Summerville decision, even though the worker waited until her reply brief to challenge the statute's validity, because the state supreme court's ruling was determinative of the appeal. Newton v. Clinical Reference Lab., 517 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 2008).

In General.

Medical malpractice complaint that was not accompanied by an expert's affidavit was properly dismissed; although plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of the doctor in allowing a sharp instrument to fall into patient's spinal cord was within a jury's comprehension as a matter of general knowledge, the court found that an expert was required for the jury to understand what a cervical diskectomy and fusion was, what instruments were used to perform the procedures, what procedures and risks were involved, and whether the doctor's actions proximately caused the injury alleged by appellants. Robbins v. Johnson, 367 Ark. 506, 241 S.W.3d 747 (2006).

Cited: Haney v. DeSandre, 286 Ark. 258, 692 S.W.2d 214 (1985); HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. National Bank, 294 Ark. 525, 745 S.W.2d 120 (1988).

16-114-210. Employed medical care provider.

When a medical care provider is a codefendant with a medical care facility in an action for medical injury, and the only reason for naming the facility as a defendant is that the defendant medical care provider practices in the facility, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the defendant medical care provider is the employee of the facility before the facility may be held liable for the medical care provider's negligence, if any is proven.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 22.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Developments, 56 Ark. L. Rev. 703 (2003).

16-114-211. Surveys and inspection reports as evidence.

The results of any surveys or inspections by state or federal regulators, or by accrediting organizations, that are not otherwise privileged and that the plaintiff seeks to use as evidence against a medical care provider must be relevant to the plaintiff's injury to be admissible at trial.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 22.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Issued Interim Report of Special Task Force on Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases Regarding Possible Changes to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Because of the Invalidation of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

16-114-212. Tolling of the statute of limitations.

  1. If a plaintiff serves written notice of intention to file an action for medical injury within thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the statute of limitations shall be tolled for ninety (90) days only if the following conditions are met:
    1. The written notice shall be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, upon the medical care provider alleged to have caused the medical injury;
    2. The written notice shall include the following:
      1. The plaintiff's full name, date of birth, present address, address at the time of treatment at issue, and Social Security number;
      2. The date or dates of the treatment in question and a summary of the alleged wrongful conduct; and
      3. The names and addresses of the known medical care providers relating to the alleged medical injury; and
    3. An authorization to release medical records signed by the plaintiff, which shall authorize the medical care provider alleged to be liable to obtain pertinent medical records, shall be attached to the notice.
  2. Failure to comply with any of the requirements set forth in subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed to be material and shall result in the statute of limitation's not being tolled.
    1. If the plaintiff files an action for medical injury during this tolling period without the requisite affidavit required by § 16-114-209(b)(1) and (2), the complaint shall be dismissed and costs, attorney's fees, and appropriate sanctions as determined by the court shall be assessed.
    2. The provisions of § 16-114-209(b)(3) do not apply to cases filed during the tolling period.
    1. If a request for the production of copies of the medical records accompanies the written notice of intention to file an action for medical injury in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, and if copies of those medical records are not provided within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice, then the plaintiff may file an independent expedited declaratory action seeking a declaration that the medical care provider failed to produce the medical records within the thirty-day period.
      1. If the court finds that copies of the medical records were not produced as required by this subsection, the statute of limitations shall be tolled for a period of seventy-five (75) days from the date of the production of the copies of the medical records.
      2. If the court finds that the failure to produce copies of the requested medical records is without good cause, the court shall award the plaintiff his or her reasonable costs and attorney's fees for the declaratory judgment action.

History. Acts 2003, No. 649, § 22.

Case Notes

In General.

Medical malpractice complaint that was not accompanied by an expert's affidavit was properly dismissed; although plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of the doctor in allowing a sharp instrument to fall into patient's spinal cord was within a jury's comprehension as a matter of general knowledge, the court found that an expert was required for the jury to understand what a cervical diskectomy and fusion was, what instruments were used to perform the procedures, what procedures and risks were involved, and whether the doctor's actions proximately caused the injury alleged by appellants. Robbins v. Johnson, 367 Ark. 506, 241 S.W.3d 747 (2006) (decided in part under § 16-114-209, now deemed superseded).

16-114-213. Sole remedy.

This subchapter is the sole remedy with respect to any action for medical injury against a medical care provider.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1196, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1196, § 1, provided: “Intent — Limitation.

“(a) This act is intended to ensure that:

“(1) A person who suffers a medical injury has the opportunity to seek compensation to return to the state of health that he or she enjoyed before the medical injury; and

“(2) For any one (1) medical injury, a person is not compensated more than once.

“(b) This act is not intended to affect punitive damages.”

Subchapter 3 — Accountants and Attorneys

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 661, § 5: Apr. 6, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the liability of accountants and attorneys to persons not in privity of contract with them should be specifically outlined by legislative enactment; that this Act establishes the limits of such liability; and that this Act should go into effect as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-114-301. Applicability.

This subchapter shall apply only to acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services occurring or rendered on or after April 6, 1987.

History. Acts 1987, No. 661, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. This section is also codified as §§ 16-22-310(b) and 17-12-701.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

16-114-302. Liability of accountants.

No person, partnership, or corporation licensed or authorized to practice under the Public Accountancy Act of 1975, § 17-12-101 et seq., or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders shall be liable to persons not in privity of contract with the person, partnership, or corporation for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services performed by such person, partnership, or corporation, except for:

  1. Acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentations; or
  2. Other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct if the person, partnership, or corporation was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action. For the purposes of this subdivision (2), if the person, partnership, or corporation:
    1. Identifies in writing to the client those persons who are intended to rely on the services; and
    2. Sends a copy of the writing or similar statement to those persons identified in the writing or statement,

then the person, partnership, or corporation or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders may be held liable only to the persons intended to so rely, in addition to those persons in privity of contract with such person, partnership, or corporation.

History. Acts 1987, No. 661, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section is also codified as § 17-12-702.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Morrison & George, Arkansas's Privity Requirement for Attorney and Accountant Liability, 51 Ark. L. Rev. 697.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

Case Notes

Benefit to Others.

Where accounting firm never identified plaintiff as a person who was intended to rely on the accounting firm's services, nor did plaintiff allege in his complaint that firm sent him a copy of a statement announcing such intent, plaintiff was not in privity of contract, and did not qualify as a third-party beneficiary or fall within subdivision (2). Swink v. Ernst & Young, 322 Ark. 417, 908 S.W.2d 660 (1995).

Statute of Limitations.

The limitations period in professional malpractice cases begins to run when the wrongful acts occur, not when they are discovered. Swink v. Ernst & Young, 322 Ark. 417, 908 S.W.2d 660 (1995).

16-114-303. Liability of attorneys.

No person licensed to practice law in Arkansas and no partnership or corporation of Arkansas-licensed attorneys or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders shall be liable to persons not in privity of contract with the person, partnership, or corporation for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services performed by the person, partnership, or corporation, except for:

  1. Acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentations; or
  2. Other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct if the person, partnership, or corporation was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action. For the purposes of this subdivision (2), if the person, partnership, or corporation:
    1. Identifies in writing to the client those persons who are intended to rely on the services; and
    2. Sends a copy of the writing or similar statement to those persons identified in the writing or statement,

then the person, partnership, or corporation or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders may be held liable only to the persons intended to so rely, in addition to those persons in privity of contract with the person, partnership, or corporation.

History. Acts 1987, No. 661, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. This section is also codified as § 16-22-310(a).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Morrison & George, Arkansas's Privity Requirement for Attorney and Accountant Liability, 51 Ark. L. Rev. 697.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Tort Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1085.

Case Notes

Applicability.

In a negligence action, the real question was whether the property appraiser owed any legal duty to the plaintiff property owners, and the plaintiffs' reliance on §§ 4-86-101, 16-114-303, and 16-22-310 to support their proposition that privity of contract with an appraiser was not a requirement in their negligence suit was misplaced. Marlar v. Daniel, 368 Ark. 505, 247 S.W.3d 473 (2007).

Employees.

Employer attorney was not entitled to the immunity protection of this section or § 16-22-310 for her own negligence in not adequately supervising her employee, another attorney, who was suspected of dishonest conduct in his transaction with clients who were not in privity of contract with the employer attorney, as the employer attorney's negligence was not related to the performance of professional services as required under the statute, but instead involved her supervision of his conduct as his employer. Madden v. Aldrich, 346 Ark. 405, 58 S.W.3d 342 (2001).

Immunity.

Trial court properly concluded that the lawyer placed a lien on land in which he believed the landowner held an interest and that the acts were the lawful actions of an attorney representing his client; therefore, the lawyer was immune under § 16-22-310 and this section from the landowner's slander of title lawsuit. Fleming v. Cox Law Firm, 363 Ark. 17, 210 S.W.3d 866 (2005).

Pursuant to § 16-22-310 and this section, an attorney and law firm were immune from a couple's slander of title claim where there was no privity between the parties, there were no factual assertions of fraud, and it appeared that a lis pendens action to enforce a child support arrearage judgment obtained by the husband's ex-wife was simply filed in error. Fleming v. Cox Law Firm, 363 Ark. 17, 210 S.W.3d 866 (2005).

Chapter 115 Mandamus and Prohibition

Effective Dates. Acts 1991, No. 582, § 5: Mar. 18, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the requirement of holding a hearing on petitions for writs of prohibition and mandamus within two to seven days of application for the writ does not promote a thorough and fair consideration of the issues in such cases; and that the interests of justice and a fair determination of the issues demand that the courts be permitted to hold the hearings, where necessary, within a reasonable time of application. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall become effective immediately upon passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Availability of writ of prohibition or similar remedy against acts of public prosecutor. 16 A.L.R.4th 112.

Attorneys' fees in mandamus proceedings. 34 A.L.R.4th 457.

Am. Jur. 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Mand., § 1 et seq.

63C Am. Jur. 2d, Prohib., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in Arkansas, 11 Ark. L. Rev. 351.

Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies in Arkansas, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 397.

Gingerich, Mandamus of Unexecuted Executive Discretionary Powers, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 765.

Comment, The Writ of Prohibition in Arkansas, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 256.

C.J.S. 55 C.J.S., Mand., § 1 et seq.

72A C.J.S., Prohib., § 1 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Civil Procedure, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 131.

16-115-101. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Writ of mandamus” means an order of the circuit court granted upon the petition of an aggrieved party or the state when the public interest is affected, commanding an executive, judicial, or ministerial officer to perform an act or omit to do an act, the performance or omission of which is enjoined by law; and
  2. “Writ of prohibition” means an order of the circuit court to an inferior court or tribunal, prohibiting it from proceeding in a cause or matter over which it has no jurisdiction.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, §§ 2, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 33-102, 33-103; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 236.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “circuit or chancery court” throughout.

Case Notes

Mandamus.

Mandamus will not lie to control the judicial discretion or judgment of an inferior court or tribunal, but only to compel them to an exercise of their discretion or judgment. Gunn's Adm'r v. Pulaski, 3 Ark. 427 (1841); Ex parte Hutt, 14 Ark. 368 (1854); Ex parte Johnson, 25 Ark. 614 (1869); Ex parte Hays, 26 Ark. 510 (1871); McMillen v. Smith, 26 Ark. 613 (1871); County Court v. Robinson, 27 Ark. 116 (1871); Hempstead County v. Grave, 44 Ark. 317 (1884) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A jurat is necessary to a petition for mandamus. Black v. Auditor of State, 26 Ark. 237 (1870) (decision under prior law).

Where the writ of mandamus is sought for the enforcement of a public right, it is not necessary that the relator should have any special interest; but the proceeding must be in the name of the state. Moses v. Kearney, 31 Ark. 261 (1876) (decision under prior law).

The officer whose conduct is complained of should alone be made the party defendant in a petition for mandamus. Fry v. Reynolds, 33 Ark. 450 (1878) (decision under prior law).

The writ of mandamus is a writ to compel the performance of an act or duty, and not to prevent it; and the statutes do not intend that it shall take the place of an injunction. Crawford v. Carson, 35 Ark. 565 (1880) (decision under prior law).

Petitioner for the writ of mandamus to require a certain officer to perform some duty must show a valid statute imposing that duty. Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656 (1912); Hodges v. Keel, 108 Ark. 184, 159 S.W. 21 (1913); Robertson v. Derrick, 113 Ark. 40, 166 S.W. 936 (1914) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Mandamus will not issue unless there is a clear legal right to the writ shown and no other remedy is provided, nor will it issue to compel an officer to do what the law will not compel him to do without it. Coleman v. Eight Mile Drainage Dist., 106 Ark. 22, 152 S.W. 1004 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus is not a writ of right but is within the judicial discretion of courts to issue or withhold, and a party to be entitled to the writ must show that he has a clear legal right to the subject matter and that he has no other adequate remedy. State v. Board of Directors, 122 Ark. 337, 183 S.W. 747 (1916) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus cannot be used to establish a right, but may be used to enforce a right after it is once established. Bingham v. McGehee, 185 Ark. 707, 49 S.W.2d 358 (1932) (decision under prior law).

When, in the absence of statutory regulation, the proceedings are for the enforcement of a duty affecting not a private right, but a public one common to the whole community, it is not necessary that the relator should have a special interest in the matter or that he should be a public officer. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

Petition in “public interest” was held in substantial compliance with the statutory requirement that mandamus actions be in the name of the state. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

The writ of mandamus cannot be issued to the legislature, even when the duty sought to be compelled is clear and unmistakable. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

Mandamus will not lie to compel the presiding officer of the Senate or the Speaker of the House to perform any act which is within his legislative functions, except for acts which are purely ministerial in character. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

A mandamus action enforces the performance of a legal right after it has been established; a mandamus' purpose is not to establish a right. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

The Department of Human Services (DHS) was not entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the Claims Commission to dismiss a claim pending before it since the DHS had an adequate remedy of appealing the Claims Commission's ruling to the General Assembly. Hanley v. Arkansas State Claims Comm'n, 333 Ark. 159, 970 S.W.2d 198 (1998).

Judge's discretion to control a docket is not completely obviated by § 16-106-101(c); therefore, state's petition for a writ of mandamus was denied where the state was seeking to remove a mayor from office under Ark. Const. art. 5, § 9 because the trial judge had the discretion to control the docket, and the judge was not required to postpone other cases where the state was not a party in order to accommodate the state. State v. Vittitow, 358 Ark. 98, 186 S.W.3d 237 (2004).

Mandamus action was permitted to continue against a trial judge, despite the fact that a circuit court was improperly named as respondent, because the attorney general made an appearance after the petition was properly served on an individual judge. State v. Vittitow, 358 Ark. 98, 186 S.W.3d 237 (2004).

Court properly dismissed student's petition for a writ of mandamus requesting the court to enjoin school officials to reinstate his cancelled test scores in a voluntary reading program after he was accused of cheating; the court knew of no law to compel the school officials to reinstate the student's scores in a voluntary reading program and the student did not sufficiently plead any facts that gave rise to a legal remedy. T.J. v. Hargrove, 362 Ark. 649, 210 S.W.3d 79 (2005).

Voter demonstrating that a proposed constitutional amendment was unconstitutional was entitled to both declaratory and mandamus relief, as (1) declaratory relief is available whether or not other relief can be obtained; (2) the Arkansas Supreme Court has routinely ordered the Arkansas Secretary of State to not count or certify any ballots cast for a proposed amendment that does not meet the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution or Arkansas law; and (3) a voter has a right to cast a ballot only on referred constitutional amendments that meet the standards set forth by the Arkansas Constitution. Martin v. Humphrey, 2018 Ark. 295, 558 S.W.3d 370 (2018).

Prohibition.

Prohibition cannot be invoked in a cause arising out of jurisdiction until the want of jurisdiction has been pleaded and the plea overruled in the court where the proceeding is pending. Ex parte Little Rock, 26 Ark. 52 (1870) (decision under prior law).

The mere filing of the petition for prohibition and notice to the judge will not restrain him from proceeding. Henry v. Steele, 28 Ark. 455 (1873) (decision under prior law).

The writ of prohibition will never be granted unless the inferior court has clearly exceeded its authority and the applicant has no other remedy. Russell v. Jacoway, 33 Ark. 191 (1878); Jones v. Coffin, 96 Ark. 332, 131 S.W. 873 (1910) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is a sufficient compliance with the rule that objections must be made in the court to its jurisdiction before a petition for the writ of prohibition will be entertained. State ex rel. Butler v. Williams, 48 Ark. 227, 2 S.W. 843 (1886) (decision under prior law).

Upon a petition to prohibit a circuit judge from proceeding to hear a cause pending in his court, for want of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will not consider the truth or sufficiency of the allegation of the complaint in the case. American Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 56 Ark. 539, 20 S.W. 416 (1892) (decision under prior law).

Prohibition lies only to a court, and not to a judge. Reese v. Steel, 73 Ark. 66, 83 S.W. 335 (1904) (decision under prior law).

A writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court or tribunal from usurping or exercising jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law. Ferguson v. Martineau, 115 Ark. 317, 171 S.W. 472 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Prohibition is not available as a remedy if the statute of limitations governing a particular proceeding is not jurisdictional, but may only be raised as an affirmative defense. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Erwin, 304 Ark. 321, 802 S.W.2d 140 (1991).

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is granted only when the lower court is wholly without jursdiction, there are no disputed facts, there is no adequate remedy otherwise, and the writ is clearly warranted. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

Writs of prohibition are prerogative writs, extremely narrow in scope and operation; they are to be used with great caution and forbearance. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

A characteristic of prohibition is that it does not lie as a matter or right, but as a matter of sound judicial discretion. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

Prohibition is never granted to prevent an inferior tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction erroneously; it is only granted where such tribunal is wholly without jurisdiction. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

Cited: Ark. State Police Comm'n v. Davidson, 252 Ark. 137, 477 S.W.2d 852 (1972); Kemp-Bradford VFW Post 4764 v. Wood, 262 Ark. 168, 554 S.W.2d 344 (1977); Springdale School Dist. v. Jameson, 274 Ark. 78, 621 S.W.2d 860 (1981); DeSoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Ramsey, 2016 Ark. 22, 480 S.W.3d 144 (2016).

16-115-102. Jurisdiction.

The circuit court shall have power to hear and determine petitions for the writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition and to issue such writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition to all inferior courts, tribunals, and officers in its respective jurisdiction.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 33-101; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 236.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “circuit and chancery court.”

Cross References. Restraint of inferior courts, § 16-88-102.

Case Notes

County Judges.

A county judge may be compelled by mandamus to perform an act. Parker v. Saline County, 288 Ark. 108, 702 S.W.2d 7 (1986).

Election Officials.

Former statute empowered the circuit court to issue the writ of mandamus to election judges. Brooks v. Pullen, 187 Ark. 80, 58 S.W.2d 682 (1933) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court was held to have jurisdiction to issue mandamus directing county central committee of political party to have names of candidates for township committeemen placed on the ballot. Stock v. Harris, 193 Ark. 114, 97 S.W.2d 920 (1936) (decision under prior law).

The circuit court had no jurisdiction of a proceeding for a writ of mandamus requiring the secretary of a political party's county central committee to turn over all its books, records, and property to “new” committee chairman and secretary where their election was in question and where the members of the “former” committee were not parties to the action. Rosa v. Mabry, 196 Ark. 156, 116 S.W.2d 614 (1938) (decision under prior law).

Former statute gave the circuit court jurisdiction by writ of mandamus over the county central committee for the sole purpose of allowing the minority of a party a right of representation in choosing of judges and clerks for the primary, but the statute did not make county committeemen officers for other purposes; hence their election was a matter solely for determination by the party. Park v. Kincannon, 214 Ark. 398, 216 S.W.2d 376 (1949).

If candidate at preferential primary was entitled to have his name placed on general primary ballot and chairman and secretary of county committee refused to have his name printed thereon, chairman and secretary would be refusing to perform ministerial duty and could be compelled by mandamus to perform it. Higgins v. Barnhill, 218 Ark. 466, 236 S.W.2d 1011 (1951), overruled in part, Nethercutt v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 248 Ark. 143, 450 S.W.2d 777 (1970), overruled to such an extent as conflicts, Nethercutt v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 248 Ark. 143, 450 S.W.2d 777 (1970).

The officers of a county central committee can be compelled by the court to perform the ministerial duty of issuing a certificate of election to the person entitled to it. Cox v. Wentz, 231 Ark. 205, 329 S.W.2d 413 (1959).

The circuit court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus directing the city clerk to comply with Ark. Const., Amend. 7, by giving certain city residents written notice of the insufficiency of a referendum petition and to permit correction or amendment within 10 days. Bradley v. Galloway, 279 Ark. 231, 651 S.W.2d 445 (1983).

General Assembly.

Where the duty sought to be enforced by a writ of mandamus is imposed upon the Senate and the House and those bodies have refused to do that which is sought to be compelled, neither the president of the Senate nor the Speaker of the House has the power, without the concurrence of the house over which he presides, to execute the order, if made. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

Adjourning and extending a legislative session are clearly among the powers of the General Assembly; once it has exercised its powers, even if they have been exercised erroneously, it is clear that a circuit court has no power, without violating Ark. Const., Art. 4, § 2 and extending the scope of the writ of mandamus, to issue the writ to that body. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

In Vacation.

The court sitting in vacation, not a judge in vacation, can hear and award the writ. Miller v. Tatum, 170 Ark. 152, 279 S.W. 1002 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Justices of Peace.

When a justice of the peace refused to issue a supersedeas upon the filing of a schedule of exempt property, the proper remedy was by mandamus. Smith v. Ragsdale, 36 Ark. 297 (1880) (decision under prior law).

Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has power to issue writs of mandamus to the circuit court to compel it to act, but not to control its discretion, where it has any. It may enforce the performance of ministerial acts by the circuit court. McCreary v. Rogers, 35 Ark. 298 (1880) (decision under prior law).

The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to issue mandamus to clerk of circuit court to compel him to perform a duty required of him by law, although the circuit judge was disqualified to act in the matter. Ex parte Snoddy, 44 Ark. 221 (1884) (decision under prior law).

The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on a petition for mandamus to require a court stenographer to furnish a transcript of the proceedings; rather, its powers were limited to compelling the clerk of the trial court to send up such record as had been made. Ex parte Whitley, 113 Ark. 372, 168 S.W. 144 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed individuals' petition to set the date of an election for the date set out in the referendum petition as it did not have jurisdiction under this section to hear the petition. Spatz v. City of Conway, 362 Ark. 588, 210 S.W.3d 69 (2005).

Writ of Prohibition.

The purpose of a writ of prohibition is not to prohibit a lower court from committing error, but to prohibit the unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction when there is no other adequate remedy available by appeal or otherwise. McGlothlin v. Kemp, 314 Ark. 495, 863 S.W.2d 313 (1993).

Cited: Stilley v. Henson, 342 Ark. 346, 28 S.W.3d 274 (2000); Stilley v. Makris, 343 Ark. 673, 38 S.W.3d 889 (2001).

16-115-103. Precedence of petitions over other actions.

Petitions for a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition shall have precedence over all other actions and proceedings and shall be heard and determined summarily.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 33-104.

Case Notes

Joinder with Other Actions.

A suit for breach of contract and an action for mandamus were so procedurally incompatible as to prevent their joinder; thus a teacher who was not given the required notice that his contract was being terminated had to elect between the common-law action against the school district for money damages or the special proceeding for issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the school district to issue a voucher for amount of agreed salary. Rastle v. Marion County Rural School Dist. No. 1, 260 Ark. 740, 543 S.W.2d 923 (1976).

Cited: State ex rel. Robinson v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 300 Ark. 405, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989).

16-115-104. Hearings — Necessity — Time.

  1. It shall be within the discretion of the judge having jurisdiction, within forty-five (45) days from the date of application, to determine from the petition, and the records and files of the case, whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted.
  2. In the event a hearing is deemed necessary, the judge shall fix and announce a day of court to be held within forty-five (45) days from the date of application.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 33-106; Acts 1991, No. 582, § 1.

Cross References. Motion day and hearings on motions, Ark. R. Civ. P. 78.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Civil Procedure, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 747.

Case Notes

Effect of Noncompliance.

Even if the statutory procedure for mandamus was not precisely followed, that fact will not void a conviction, nor will it shorten the length of time defendant must serve before being eligible for parole. Gilmer v. Massey, 303 Ark. 634, 799 S.W.2d 526 (1990).

Notice.

The minimum two days' notice provided by this section is expressly mandatory. Savage v. Hawkins, 239 Ark. 658, 391 S.W.2d 18 (1965).

Request for Hearing.

Where teacher, whose notice of nonrenewal was late, filed suit for a writ of mandamus to compel members of school board to issue a teaching contract to her for 1982-83 school year, but case did not come to trial until school year had ended, and where teacher had failed to request hearing pursuant to this section, case was moot. Frisby v. Strong School Dist., 282 Ark. 81, 666 S.W.2d 391 (1984).

Cited: Rastle v. Marion County Rural School Dist. No. 1, 260 Ark. 740, 543 S.W.2d 923 (1976); State ex rel. Robinson v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 300 Ark. 405, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989); Buttolph Trust v. Jarnagan, 302 Ark. 393, 789 S.W.2d 466 (1990).

16-115-105. Notice of hearing.

  1. Notice of hearing upon any petition for a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition shall be served in writing upon the officer or persons against whom the relief is sought, for such time and in such manner as may be prescribed by the court having jurisdiction.
  2. The notice shall state the style of the court, the docket number of the action or proceeding, the date and place of hearing, and the relief sought.
  3. The sufficiency of the notice shall be a question for the court.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 33-105.

Case Notes

Time.

Ten days' notice of an application for a writ of prohibition was not necessary in original proceedings in the Supreme Court. State v. Martineau, 149 Ark. 237, 232 S.W. 609, cert. dismissed, 257 U.S. 665, 42 S. Ct. 52, 66 L. Ed. 424 (1921) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Cox v. Wentz, 231 Ark. 205, 329 S.W.2d 413 (1959).

16-115-106. Answer.

The party against whom the writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition is sought, when properly served with notice, shall file an answer before the hearing and show cause why the writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition should not be granted; otherwise, upon a proper showing, suitable relief shall be speedily granted.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 33-107.

Case Notes

Appeals.

The issue of an alleged default unmentioned in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal, especially where petitioner made no “proper showing” for relief and where defensive pleadings were timely. Mobley v. Conway County Court, 236 Ark. 163, 365 S.W.2d 122 (1963).

Proper Showing.

Where respondent fails to answer petition, the burden is upon petitioner to make a proper showing that he is entitled to the relief sought. Brown v. Curtis, 254 Ark. 162, 492 S.W.2d 235 (1973).

Show Cause.

A writ of prohibition will not issue until after opportunity is given to parties to show cause against it. Ex parte Tucker, 25 Ark. 567 (1870) (decision under prior law).

16-115-107. Determination of petition.

The court shall hear and determine all questions of law and fact arising on the petition for a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition. The granting or denying of the writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition shall be deemed a final order from which an appeal may be taken.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 33-108.

Case Notes

In General.

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is never issued to prevent a trial court from erroneously exercising its jurisdiction, but only where it proposes to act in excess of this jurisdiction. Its issuance is discretionary in cases of pressing necessity; it should never be granted unless the petitioner is clearly entitled to relief. Ridenhower v. Erwin, 303 Ark. 647, 799 S.W.2d 535 (1990); Turbyfill v. State, 312 Ark. 1, 846 S.W.2d 646 (1993).

Hearing.

The hearing upon mandamus must be by the court, and not by the judge at chambers. Palmer v. McChesney, 26 Ark. 452 (1871) (decision under prior law).

All questions of law and fact should be submitted together, and decided at the same time. Moses v. Kearney, 31 Ark. 261 (1876) (decision under prior law).

A suit for breach of contract and an action for mandamus were so procedurally incompatible as to prevent their joinder; thus a teacher who was not given the required notice that his contract was being terminated had to elect between the common-law action against the school district for money damages or the special proceeding for issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the school district to issue a voucher for amount of agreed salary. Rastle v. Marion County Rural School Dist. No. 1, 260 Ark. 740, 543 S.W.2d 923 (1976).

Mandamus Denied.

Mandamus would not lie to compel the Commissioner of State Lands to issue a second patent where the state had wrongfully issued a patent to another; the remedy of the applicant was in equity against the first patentee. Smithee v. Mosely, 31 Ark. 425 (1876) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus will not be granted to compel a public corporation to pay a debt until after the debt is established by judgment. School Dist. No. 3 v. Bodenhamer, 43 Ark. 140 (1884) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus never lies to compel an officer to do an act forbidden or not authorized by law. Chicot County v. Kruse, 47 Ark. 80, 14 S.W. 469 (1885); Fakes v. Stanley, 71 Ark. 30, 70 S.W. 307 (1902) (preceding decisions under former law).

Mandamus will not lie to a board of improvement to compel it to draw its warrant on an empty treasury. Board of Imp. v. McManus, 54 Ark. 446, 15 S.W. 897 (1891) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus would not lie to compel railway to stop trains at incorporated town where no tender of expenses was made as required by statute. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. B'Shears, 59 Ark. 237, 27 S.W. 2 (1894) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus will not lie to control an officer in a discretionary act. Collins v. Hawkins, 77 Ark. 101, 91 S.W. 26 (1905); McBride v. Hon, 82 Ark. 483, 102 S.W. 389 (1907); State ex rel. Nixon v. Grace, 98 Ark. 505, 136 S.W. 670 (1911); Ouachita Power Co. v. Donaghey, 106 Ark. 48, 152 S.W. 1012 (1912) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Where appeal will lie, the petition for mandamus will be denied. Rankin v. Fletcher, 84 Ark. 156, 104 S.W. 933 (1907); Hopson v. Frierson, 106 Ark. 292, 152 S.W. 1008 (1912); Smith v. Carter, 107 Ark. 21, 154 S.W. 951 (1913); Calloway v. Harley, 112 Ark. 558, 166 S.W. 546 (1914) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Mandamus is not allowable where there is any other adequate remedy. Automatic Weighing Co. v. Carter, 95 Ark. 118, 128 S.W. 557 (1910); Cotton v. Steel, 95 Ark. 623, 129 S.W. 1198 (1910); Rolfe v. Spybuck Drainage Dist. No. 1, 101 Ark. 29, 140 S.W. 988 (1911) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Under the rule that an officer of the executive branch of the government cannot be controlled by the courts in the exercise and performance of his official acts involving his judgment and discretion, the auditor would not be compelled by mandamus to audit and pay a claim alleged to be due by the state for the purchase of the state farm unless, by the statute providing for its payment, the auditor was divested of any discretion. Jobe v. Urquhart, 102 Ark. 470, 143 S.W. 121 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus will not lie to compel the commissioners of an improvement district to allow a set-off for improvements against the assessment. Casey v. Trout, 114 Ark. 359, 170 S.W. 75 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Where lowest bids on a governmental contract were held void under constitutional provision prohibiting interest, court properly refused to order contract awarded to the next lowest bidder, since a petition for mandamus was not the proper remedy. Parkin Printing & Stationery Co. v. Ark. Printing & Lithographing Co., 234 Ark. 697, 354 S.W.2d 560 (1962).

Where the petitioner failed to show a clear, certain, specific, or established legal right which could be enforced by writ of mandamus to the presiding officers of the house of the General Assembly, the courts could not interfere with the legislature or the legislative process by issuing such writs. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979).

Petition for writ of mandamus to enforce liability for court costs was denied where the matter was not properly before the Supreme Court since petitioner never attempted to obtain judgment in the trial court. Trice v. City of Pine Bluff, 282 Ark. 251, 667 S.W.2d 952 (1984).

Where sheriff issued a detainer, the fact that there was not a statute that specifically granted the sheriff the authority to issue detainers did not show the specific legal right required for a writ of mandamus to issue. Hicks v. Gravett, 312 Ark. 407, 849 S.W.2d 946 (1993).

Mandamus Granted.

The Supreme Court would, by mandamus, compel the circuit court to permit defendant in a criminal case to take the depositions of witnesses residing out of the state. Gibony v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 462 (1877) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus was the proper remedy to compel the receipt of county warrants for taxes. Fry v. Reynolds, 33 Ark. 450 (1878); Lusk v. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238, 2 S.W. 847 (1887) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The right to an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court is absolute and will be enforced by mandamus. McCreary v. Rogers, 35 Ark. 298 (1880) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a public officer is called upon to do a plain and specific public duty positively required by law, calling for the exercise of no discretion or official judgment. Willeford v. State ex rel. Circuit Clerk, 43 Ark. 62 (1884) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus will issue whenever the refusal or failure of an officer to act in a matter, in which it is his plain duty to act, may deprive one of his legal rights. Maddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121 (1885) (decision under prior law).

School directors may be compelled by mandamus to provide schools in their district. Maddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121 (1885) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus will lie to county officers to compel them to pay a judgment in the proper funds collected by them. Lee County v. Phillips County, 46 Ark. 156 (1885) (decision under prior law).

A county judge may be compelled by mandamus to apportion school funds belonging to a school district. Merritt v. School Dist., 54 Ark. 468, 16 S.W. 287 (1891) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus will lie to enforce a decision of the Supreme Court. Nunn v. Robertson, 80 Ark. 350, 97 S.W. 293 (1906) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus will lie in a proper case to require a court to assume jurisdiction. Gilbert v. Shaver, 91 Ark. 231, 120 S.W. 833 (1909) (decision under prior law).

Mandamus will lie to control an officer as to ministerial acts. Jobe v. Caldwell, 93 Ark. 503, 125 S.W. 423 (1910); Jobe v. Urquhart, 102 Ark. 470, 143 S.W. 121 (1912) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Mandamus will lie to compel the issuance of a commission to a notary public. State ex rel. Gray v. Hodges, 107 Ark. 272, 154 S.W. 506 (1913); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Hodges, 107 Ark. 401, 155 S.W. 508 (1913) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Mandamus will lie to enable an elector to inspect the election records. Bowden v. Webb, 116 Ark. 310, 173 S.W. 181 (1915).

Mandamus against an officer in a case where he may exercise discretion will lie only where he refuses to act at all. Miller v. Tatum, 170 Ark. 152, 279 S.W. 1002 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Where circuit court arbitrarily refuses to consider a motion for a new trial, the proper and only remedy is mandamus. Hudlow v. Williams, 196 Ark. 1178, 117 S.W.2d 341 (1938) (decision under prior law).

Voter demonstrating that a proposed constitutional amendment was unconstitutional was entitled to both declaratory and mandamus relief, as (1) declaratory relief is available whether or not other relief can be obtained; (2) the Arkansas Supreme Court has routinely ordered the Arkansas Secretary of State to not count or certify any ballots cast for a proposed amendment that does not meet the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution or Arkansas law; and (3) a voter has a right to cast a ballot only on referred constitutional amendments that meet the standards set forth by the Arkansas Constitution. Martin v. Humphrey, 2018 Ark. 295, 558 S.W.3d 370 (2018).

Prohibition Denied.

Where a cause was improperly remanded to the county court from the circuit court, prohibition would not lie to prevent the county court from assuming jurisdiction, that remedy being available only when the ordinary forms of remedy were insufficient. Thornton v. Allen, 101 Ark. 106, 141 S.W. 499 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Writ of prohibition denied where petitioners did not show that the issuance of an administrative order, whatever might be said of its propriety or validity, affecting the collection of child support, was an usurpation of jurisdiction by the respondents, or that the issues common to the proceedings were more appropriate to prohibition than to appeal. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Partlow, 311 Ark. 633, 846 S.W.2d 637 (1993).

Generally, a denial of a writ for prohibition is a nonappealable order; however, the appeal from a denial of a writ of prohibition will be treated as a petition for a writ of prohibition filed in the Supreme Court if it involves an important issue to be resolved. Sexson v. Municipal Court, 312 Ark. 261, 849 S.W.2d 468 (1993).

Prohibition Granted.

When a court is proceeding in a matter not within its jurisdiction, prohibition is the proper remedy. Hanger & Co. v. Keating, 26 Ark. 51 (1870) (decision under prior law).

Where the circuit court attempted to control the discretion of the county court in determining the result of an election for the removal of a county seat, a writ of prohibition would lie from the Supreme Court. Russell v. Jacoway, 33 Ark. 191 (1878) (decision under prior law).

Writ of prohibition was properly issued to prevent trial of defendant after expiration of period of limitation. Savage v. Hawkins, 239 Ark. 658, 391 S.W.2d 18 (1965).

Where a court order is based on invalid legislation, the court has no jurisdiction to act and therefore its order is void and subject to a writ of prohibition. Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W.2d 11 (1980).

A writ of prohibition was granted where defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated. Turbyfill v. State, 312 Ark. 1, 846 S.W.2d 646 (1993).

Cited: Venhaus v. Hale, 281 Ark. 390, 663 S.W.2d 930 (1984).

16-115-108. Interlocutory orders.

During the pendency of any proceeding upon a petition for a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition, the court having jurisdiction, or the judge in vacation, may make such temporary orders as appear expedient and proper to prevent injury, waste, or damage of whatsoever kind.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 33-109.

16-115-109. Appeals by state.

Where the interest or rights of the state or the public is affected by a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition, the prosecuting attorney or Attorney General may appeal without giving security for costs.

History. Acts 1939, No. 54, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 33-110.

Chapter 116 Products Liability

Cross References. Breach of warranty, liability, § 4-86-101.

Research References

ALR.

Flammable clothing. 1 A.L.R.4th 251.

Defect in boat or its parts, supplies, or equipment. 1 A.L.R.4th 411.

Defective heating equipment. 1 A.L.R.4th 748.

Manufacturer's liability for injuries caused by repairs made under warranty. 2 A.L.R.4th 576; 40 A.L.R.4th 1218.

Diethylstilbestrol. 2 A.L.R.4th 1091.

Snow throwers. 2 A.L.R.4th 1284.

Defective vehicular windows. 3 A.L.R.4th 489.

Farm machinery. 4 A.L.R.4th 13.

Expert or opinion evidence that product is or is not defective, dangerous, or unreasonably dangerous. 4 A.L.R.4th 651.

Vehicular bumpers. 5 A.L.R.4th 483.

Personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in electrical system in motor vehicle. 5 A.L.R.4th 662.

Clothes dryers. 6 A.L.R.4th 1262.

Glue and other adhesive products. 7 A.L.R.4th 155.

Industrial presses. 8 A.L.R.4th 70.

Liability of manufacturer, seller, or distributor of motor vehicle for defect which merely enhances injury from accident otherwise caused. 9 A.L.R.4th 494.

Applicability of comparative negligence doctrine to actions based on strict liability in tort. 9 A.L.R.4th 633.

Workers' Compensation Act as furnishing exclusive remedy for employee injured by product manufactured, sold, or distributed by employer. 9 A.L.R.4th 873.

Liability of builder of residence for latent defects therein as running to subsequent purchasers from original vendee. 10 A.L.R.4th 385.

Transformers and other electrical equipment. 10 A.L.R.4th 854.

Fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, etc. 12 A.L.R.4th 462.

Allowances of punitive damages. 13 A.L.R.4th 52.

Pre-emption of strict liability in tort by provisions of UCC Article 2. 15 A.L.R.4th 791.

Tire rims and wheels. 16 A.L.R.4th 137.

Liability of check printer for errors in identification or routing codes printed on check. 18 A.L.R.4th 923.

Firefighting equipment. 19 A.L.R.4th 326.

Admissibility of expert or opinion evidence as to adequacy of warning provided to user of product. 26 A.L.R.4th 377.

Protective clothing and equipment. 27 A.L.R.4th 815.

Strict products liability for failure to warn as dependent on defendant's knowledge of danger. 33 A.L.R.4th 368.

Stud guns, staple guns, or parts thereof. 33 A.L.R.4th 1189.

Household appliances relating to cleaning, washing, personal care, and water supply, quality, and disposal. 34 A.L.R.4th 95.

Patent or obvious dangers. 35 A.L.R.4th 861.

Bottle explosion or breakage. 36 A.L.R.4th 419.

Liability of person furnishing, installing, or servicing burglary or fire alarm system for burglary or fire loss. 37 A.L.R.4th 47.

Postinjury measures undertaken by defendant. 38 A.L.R.4th 583.

Manufacturer's responsibility for defective component supplied by another and incorporated in product. 39 A.L.R.4th 6.

Alteration of product after it leaves hands of manufacturer or seller as affecting liability for product-caused harm. 41 A.L.R.4th 47.

Construction materials or insulation containing formaldehyde. 45 A.L.R.4th 751.

Liability of manufacturer or seller as affected by failure of subsequent party in distribution chain to remedy or warn against defect of which he knew. 45 A.L.R.4th 777.

Perfumes, colognes, or deodorants. 46 A.L.R.4th 1197.

Evidence of industry custom or practice. 47 A.L.R.4th 621.

Validity and construction of statute terminating right of action for product-caused injury at fixed period after manufacture, sale, or delivery of product. 30 A.L.R.5th 1.

“Concert of activity,” “alternate liability,” “enterprise liability,” or similar theory as basis for imposing liability upon one or more manufacturers of defective uniform product, in absence of identification of manufacturer of precise unit or batch causing injury. 63 A.L.R.5th 195.

Ladders. 81 A.L.R.5th 245.

Bystander recovery under state law for emotional distress from witnessing another's injury in products liability context. 90 A.L.R.5th 179.

Firearms, Ammunition, and Chemical Weapons. 96 A.L.R.5th 239.

Elevators. 117 A.L.R.5th 267.

Household Equipment Relating to Storage, Preparation, Cooking, and Disposal of Food. 122 A.L.R.5th 515.

Home and Office Furnishings. 3 A.L.R.6th 355.

Mechanical or Chain Saw or Components Thereof. 4 A.L.R.6th 401.

Cardiac Pacemakers. 23 A.L.R.6th 223.

Escalators. 63 A.L.R.6th 495.

Defective Artificial Knee Devices or Prostheses. 89 A.L.R.6th 337.

Pain Pumps. 90 A.L.R.6th 75.

Hip Prostheses. 96 A.L.R.6th 1.

Products Liability: Clothes Washing Machines. 104 A.L.R.6th 97 (2015).

Federal Preemption of State Common-Law Products Liability Claims Pertaining to Medical Devices, Implants, and Other Health-Related Items. 74 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Am. Jur. 63 Am. Jur. 2d, Prod. Liab., § 1 et seq.

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the Use of the Uniform Commercial Code by Analogy, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 5.

Smolla, What Types of Losses Are Recoverable Under Arkansas's Products Liability Law, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 11.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, The Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 364.

Note, Liability of Builder-Vendor: Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 35 Ark. L. Rev. 654.

Woods, Some Observations on Contributions and Indemnity, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 44.

C.J.S. 72A C.J.S., Prod. Liab., § 1 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Powell, Survey of Torts, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 316.

Arkansas Law Survey, Saunders, Torts, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 259.

Arkansas Law Survey, Roberts and Deere, Torts, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 207.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

16-116-101. Liability of supplier.

  1. A supplier of a product is subject to liability in damages for harm to a person or to property if:
    1. The supplier is engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing, or otherwise distributing the product;
    2. The product was supplied by him or her in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous; and
    3. The defective condition was a proximate cause of the harm to a person or to property.
  2. The provisions of subsection (a) of this section apply although the claiming party has not obtained the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the supplier.
    1. Any licensee under § 17-42-103(7)(A) who is only providing brokerage and sales services under his or her license shall not be considered a supplier under this section.
      1. Except as provided in subdivisions (c)(2)(B) and (C) of this section, real estate and improvements located on real estate shall not be considered a product under this section.
      2. Any tangible object or good produced that is affixed to, installed on, or incorporated into real estate or any improvement on real estate shall be considered a product under this section.
      3. If environmental contaminants exist or have occurred in an improvement on real estate, the improvement on real estate shall be considered a product under this section.

History. Acts 1973, No. 111, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 85-2-318.2, 85-2-318.3; Acts 2007, No. 316, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 4-86-102 and was renumbered as § 16-116-101 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former §§ 16-116-10116-116-107 were renumbered as §§ 16-116-20116-116-207.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, The Implied Warranty of Habitability and the Use of the Uniform Commercial Code by Analogy, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 5.

Smolla, What Types of Losses Are Recoverable Under Arkansas's Products Liability Law, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 11.

Copeland, A Statutory Primer: Article 2 of the U.C.C., — When Do Its Rules Apply?, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 39.

Ark. L. Rev.

Legislative Note — Act 111 of 1973: An Act to Impose Liability for Injury and Damages Done in Certain Circumstances by Defective Products, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 562.

Brill, Harvey v. Eastman Kodak Company: Faculty Note, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 722.

Note, The Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 364 (1981).

Note, Liability of Builder-Vendor: Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 35 Ark. L. Rev. 654.

Woods, Product Liability: Is Comparative Fault Winning the Day?, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 360.

Note, The Decline of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Favor of Direct Patient Warnings of Drug Product Risks, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 821.

Recent Developments, Sproles v. Associated Brigham Contractors, Incorporated, 319 Ark. 94, 889 S.W.2d 740 (1994), 48 Ark. L. Rev. 883.

Thompson, The Arkansas Products Liability Statute: What Does “Unreasonably Dangerous” Mean in Arkansas?, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 663.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Torts, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Arkansas Law Survey, Saunders, Torts, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 259.

Arkansas Law Survey, Roberts and Deere, Torts, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 207.

Oliver, Rejecting the “Whipping-Boy” approach to tort law: Well-made handguns are not defective products, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 1.

Note, Torts — Product Liability — Arkansas Adopts Comment K as an Affirmative Defense in Prescription Drug Actions. 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 199.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Section held not retroactive in application to cause of action which accrued prior to its passage since section created a new cause of action. General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 516 S.W.2d 602 (1974). But see Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981).

Where grain cart was designed and manufactured prior to, and plaintiff was injured after, the passage of this section, trial court was correct in applying the statute to plaintiff since the prohibition against bill of attainder, ex post facto law and laws which impair the obligation of contracts did not apply to this section to prevent its retroactive application. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981).

Neither the Arkansas Products Liability Act, § 16-116-201 et seq., nor this section, the Arkansas strict liability statute, apply to the commercial leasing of an industrial building because the lease of the building does not qualify as a “product” within the meaning of the Arkansas statutes. McMichael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988).

Though majority of courts in the United States hold that a strict liability action cannot be successful if the only damages that occur are to the product itself, state law endorses the minority view allowing recovery in instances where the only damages are to the defective product itself. Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Central Flying Serv., Inc., 975 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1992).

Where worker was injured as a result of a defective platform, provided for his use by a contractor, this section did not apply because the contractor was not a supplier engaged in the business of manufacturing assembling, selling, leasing or otherwise distributing the defective product within the meaning of this section. Sproles v. Associated Brigham Contractors, 319 Ark. 94, 889 S.W.2d 740 (1994), overruled, Suneson v. Holloway Constr. Co., 337 Ark. 571, 992 S.W.2d 79 (1999).

Court rejected a tractor manufacturer's claim that the executor of a decedent's estate fraudulently joined a non-diverse tractor seller in her tort action against the manufacturer and the seller and remanded the executor's action to state court because (1) the claim against the seller was based on this section, and the court determined that the Arkansas Supreme Court would find that the seller, a corporation with a revoked charter, could be sued; (2) there was no basis for concluding that the state of the seller's citizenship would be changed by revocation of its charter as the seller had been incorporated by the State of Arkansas, and to the extent it had any citizenship, it was a citizen of the State of Arkansas under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332(c)(1); and (3) while the seller might be judgment-proof, but that did not dictate a finding that the executor had no intention to take a judgment against it as there might be liability insurance or other assets from which a judgment could be collected, in spite of the seller's corporate status, and even with the virtual abolition of joint liability under Arkansas law, an uncollectible judgment against one defendant might serve to increase the amount collectible on a judgment against another defendant pursuant to § 16-55-203. Davis v. CNH Am. LLC, No. 08-3015, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25774 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2008).

Causation.

In the absence of direct proof of a specific defect, it is sufficient if a plaintiff negates other possible causes of failure of the product, not attributable to the defendant, and thus raises a reasonable inference that the defendant is responsible for the defect. Southern Co. v. Graham, 271 Ark. 223, 607 S.W.2d 677 (1980); Higgins v. GMC, 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985).

Evidence sufficiently negated the other possible causes argued by defendant and, therefore, defendant was responsible for plaintiffs' damages. Southern Co. v. Graham, 271 Ark. 223, 607 S.W.2d 677 (1980).

Directed verdict for seller not warranted where jury could have found that later acts of negligence by third persons were merely concurrent, not superseding, causes of user's death. Moody Equip. & Supply Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 273 Ark. 319, 619 S.W.2d 637 (1981).

When a vehicle suddenly goes out of control while being operated, driver error is a likely cause, absent a reliable explanation in the alternative; however that factor can be ruled out, when the circumstances are such that common experience teaches that the accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect. Yielding v. Chrysler Motor Co., 301 Ark. 271, 783 S.W.2d 353 (1990).

The evidence presented by plaintiff in her effort to assign liability to the manufacturer was not substantial enough to negate the existence of other possibilities of sources of contamination. Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 319 Ark. 54, 889 S.W.2d 750 (1994).

Vehicle manufacturer was properly granted summary judgment in a driver's product liability suit alleging that injuries he sustained when he struck a tree while driving his vehicle were a result of defects in the air bag and seat belt and that the manufacturer was strictly liable for his injuries because pursuant to former §§ 4-86-102(a), 16-116-102(7)(A) (now §§ 16-116-101(a), 16-116-202(7)(A)), the driver had to prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous because of a design or manufacturing defect for which the manufacturer was responsible and he also had to prove that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the particular seller, but the driver offered no evidence regarding the existence of a specific defect in the occupant protection system, requiring speculation as to whether it was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's control, and the driver failed to demonstrate liability on the basis of circumstantial evidence because the intricacies of occupant protection systems and their potential design or manufacturing defects were outside the realm of a juror's everyday experience, and there were other potential explanations for the driver's injuries other than a defect for which the manufacturer would be responsible. Ruminer v. GMC, 483 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 2007).

In a case alleging negligence, breach of contract, breach of warranty, strict product liability, and violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act based on a claim that a casket was defective, the complaint failed to include the elements of the causes of actions pled because it failed to state facts that linked the damages to the conduct or product supplied; there was no way of knowing the condition of the casket purchased since it had not been disinterred or inspected since its burial in 1996. Clayton v. Batesville Casket Co., 2015 Ark. App. 361, 465 S.W.3d 441 (2015).

Circuit court properly granted summary judgment where the parents' evidence merely established that there were several possible sources of ignition of a child's hair while using a hair product, and thus, the parents failed to establish causation to support their strict-liability claims. Chandler v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 372, 498 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

In a products liability suit, summary judgment was properly granted to the auto dealer on the strict liability claim where the evidence and arguments focused causation on the later-added wheels and tires, not the inherent design of the vehicle as alleged in the complaint, and thus the evidence failed to show that the dealer knew that the original design of the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous. Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 2020 Ark. App. 231 (2020).

Defect.

Where there was no evidence of alteration, adjustment, etc., of the vehicle after it left the manufacturer, the jury could properly find that the defect existed when the vehicle left the factory and could allow recovery against the manufacturer. Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 272 Ark. 105, 612 S.W.2d 727 (1981).

Proof of a specific defect is not required when common experience teaches that the accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect; the mere fact of an accident, standing alone, does not make out a case that the product is defective, but the addition of other facts tending to show the defect existed before the accident, may be sufficient. Higgins v. GMC, 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985).

A user's testimony alone may be sufficient evidence of a defect. Higgins v. GMC, 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985).

Although the evidence established that a coating product did not adhere to the plaintiff's swimming pool and that the peeling coating caused injury to some people's feet, that evidence did not show that the product was defective, an essential element of a strict liability claim. Lakeview Country Club, Inc. v. Superior Prods., 325 Ark. 218, 926 S.W.2d 428 (1996).

District court did not err by refusing to grant tobacco company's motion for judgment as a matter of law because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the claim that its cigarettes had a design defect; the decedant's doctor testified that decedant died from the effects of cigarette smoke, the tobacco company's cigarettes had higher levels of carcinogenic tar than any other brand, and they lacked effective filter technology. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2005).

In buyer's action against seller and two manufacturers, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the theory of strict liability where buyer failed to submit proof that the used Hydro-Ax machine that he purchased for his logging business was defective and unreasonably dangerous; according to the testimony of buyer's own experts, the only defect that was found in the machine — the absence of a fire suppression system — was remedied by the inclusion of a fire suppression system on the machine when it was originally purchased. Pilcher v. Suttle Equip. Co., 365 Ark. 1, 223 S.W.3d 789 (2006).

Summary judgment dismissing plaintiff consumers' claim was affirmed where consumers failed to show the product was unreasonably dangerous or had either a manufacturing or design defect at the time it was purchased; supplier liability was also was not proven. Martin v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 464 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006).

Vehicle and seatbelt manufacturers were properly granted summary judgment on a products liability claim where even if the individual had worn her seatbelt during a collision and the seatbelt unlatched because of a defect, she did not establish that the defect was present when it left the manufacturers' control. Madden v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 45, 481 S.W.3d 455 (2016).

Summary judgment was properly granted to the sellers on a products liability claim where there was no evidence that would have allowed a jury to move beyond speculation as to the cause of the alleged defect in a seatbelt. Madden v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 45, 481 S.W.3d 455 (2016).

Instructions.

Since, under Arkansas law, the burden of proof in strict liability is quantitatively greater than it is in a breach of warranty action, as a general rule a failure to instruct the jury on the warranty issue cannot be rendered harmless by the granting of instructions on strict liability. Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 724 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1983).

Where jury instruction was proffered on the meaning of “unreasonably dangerous” that simply quoted the statutory definition in full, but the court rejected this instruction and gave the jury instead an instruction that tracked only the first sentence of the statute, omitting any reference to the legal definition of unreasonably dangerous as to a minor, it was error to refuse the instruction defining unreasonably dangerous as to a minor. Harris v. Pacific Floor Mach. Mfg. Co., 856 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1988).

The plaintiff originally has the burden of proving the warnings or instructions provided on a product's label were inadequate; once a plaintiff proves the lack of an adequate warning or instruction, a presumption arises that the user would have read and heeded adequate warnings or instructions, rebuttable by evidence which persuades the trier of fact that an adequate warning or instruction would have been futile under the circumstances. Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 Ark. 228, 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992).

If the proof regarding inadequate cattle feed shows that the feed was simply supplied in a defective condition, the strict liability instruction should not be given; however, if the proof shows that the feed was defective and unreasonably dangerous, for example, that it was toxic, the instruction should be given. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Askins, 317 Ark. 58, 875 S.W.2d 843 (1994).

Open and Obvious Danger.

The open and obvious danger rule is not an automatic bar to recovery on a strict liability claim in a defective design case. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

A manufacturer's failure to warn of a danger does not give rise to liability when the dangerous defect is open and obvious, and whether contributory negligence should preclude recovery is generally a question of fact for the jury. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

Product.

Where third purchaser of home filed complaint that carpet and pad installed by defendant builder emitted strong odor and fumes of formaldehyde, the word “product” used in this section was held to apply to a house, thus giving plaintiff a cause of action under a strict liability theory. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981).

The language of this section cannot conceivably be stretched to encompass a street as a product; the developer of a residential subdivision is obviously not engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing, or distributing streets. Milam v. Midland Corp., 282 Ark. 15, 665 S.W.2d 284 (1984), overruled, Suneson v. Holloway Constr. Co., 337 Ark. 571, 992 S.W.2d 79 (1999).

Proof.

Plaintiff is not required to prove a specific defect when common experience tells us that the accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect. Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 292 Ark. 376, 730 S.W.2d 479 (1987).

The doctrine of strict liability does not change the burden of proof as to the existence of a flaw or defect in a product; however, it does away with the necessity of proving negligence in order to recover for injuries resulting from a defective product. Southern Co. v. Graham, 271 Ark. 223, 607 S.W.2d 677 (1980); Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 292 Ark. 376, 730 S.W.2d 479 (1987).

The definitions in former § 16-116-102 (now § 16-116-202) of the key terms “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous,” when applied to this section, impose no requirement that a feasible and safer alternative be proven by a plaintiff in a personal injury action; the existence, practicality, and technological feasibility of an alternative safe design are not necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action, but rather are merely factors, that may be considered by the jury in determining whether a product was supplied in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous. French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981).

In order for a cause of action for strict liability to lie, Arkansas law requires demonstration of the additional element that the defect be of such a nature as to cause the product to become unreasonably dangerous. Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 724 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1983).

In order to recover under the strict product liability theory, the plaintiff must prove (1) that he has sustained damages; (2) that the defendant was engaged in the business of manufacturing or assembling or selling or leasing or distributing the product; (3) that the product was supplied by the defendant in a defective condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous; and (4) that the defective condition was a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Dillaha, 280 Ark. 477, 659 S.W.2d 756 (1983).

The procedural effect of strict liability in product liability actions is that the plaintiff is relieved of proving any negligence of the defendant whatsoever; this differs from the application of res ipsa loquitur which requires the defendant to go forward with evidence to offset the inference of negligence, but the primary burden of proving negligence still rests with the plaintiff. Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 282 Ark. 443, 669 S.W.2d 460 (1984).

The adoption in this section of the doctrine of strict liability in torts in products liability cases does not change the burden of proof as to the existence of a defect in a product. Such proof may be by circumstantial evidence. Petrus Chrysler-Plymouth v. Davis, 283 Ark. 172, 671 S.W.2d 749 (1984).

A plaintiff must prove the product was defective so as to render it unreasonably dangerous, and that the defect was the cause of the injury. Higgins v. GMC, 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985); Yielding v. Chrysler Motor Co., 301 Ark. 271, 783 S.W.2d 353 (1990).

The mere fact that under certain circumstances an accident may occur in connection with the use of a product does not make the product unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability. Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 725 S.W.2d 829 (1987).

Mere fact of an accident, standing alone, does not make out a case that product was defective, nor does fact that it was found in a defective condition after the event; but addition of other facts tending to show that defect existed before the accident may make out a sufficient case. Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 292 Ark. 376, 730 S.W.2d 479 (1987).

Defendant grader manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment on a strict liability claim under subsection (a) of this section; plaintiff county had no direct proof that the grader was defective because of a manufacturing flaw or inadequate design, and the county had not sufficiently negated the possibility that the failure of the hydraulic hose resulted from normal wear and tear or the natural loosening of the hose connection. Lee County v. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-00082 BSM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95745 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 20, 2008).

Punitive Damages.

A plaintiff who proceeds solely under a strict products liability theory may seek punitive damages under Arkansas law. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

Statute of Limitations.

This section which governs causes of action based on strict liability creates a new right that was not available at common law; but does not contain a specific period of limitation. Such actions are governed by the general statute of limitations applicable to all products liability cases in former § 16-116-103 (now § 16-116-203). Therefore, § 16-56-116 operates to extend the time for minors to file a products liability action brought on a strict liability theory. Harris v. Standardized San. Sys., 658 F. Supp. 438 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Suppliers.

A railroad company which owned a hopper car was a “supplier” of that car under the plain meaning of this section. Parker v. Seaboard C.L.R.R., 573 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1978).

The supplying of blood for transfusions is a service rather than a product; blood is not a “product” for purposes of imposing strict liability in tort. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989).

In suit involving an allegedly defective wheel and tire brought against the tire manufacturer, wheel manufacturer, and truck manufacturer, judgment as a matter of law was awarded to defendant truck manufacturer where plaintiffs offered no evidence that the wheel involved was supplied by the truck manufacturer, nor that the truck manufacturer was the original designer of the wheel. Fought v. Hayes Wheels Int'l, Inc., 101 F.3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1996).

In a case involving the group of diet drugs popularly known as Fen/Phen, the court, citing the factors involved in applying strict liability to a pharmacist's role as supplier in prescription drug transactions, declined to extend the rule of strict supplier liability to pharmacists. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

Unreasonably Dangerous.

The phrase “unreasonably dangerous” as used in this section requires that the defect render the product not simply deficient but dangerous; it contemplates a type of defect which renders the product not merely inadequate, but one which poses an actual danger to persons or property. Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).

The fact that irrigation pumps failed to produce the volume of water desired or expected by the buyer raised issues of warranty, negligence or misrepresentation, but it did not render the pumps “unreasonably dangerous.” Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).

“Unreasonably dangerous” is defined as requiring something beyond that contemplated by the ordinary and reasonable buyer, taking into account any special knowledge of the buyer concerning the characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and proper and improper uses of the product. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Askins, 317 Ark. 58, 875 S.W.2d 843 (1994).

For a case involving inadequate cattle feed to be correctly submitted to the jury on strict liability, the plaintiffs will have to offer proof that the feed was in a defective condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous and that the defective condition was a proximate cause of harm to the cattle; the possibility that manufactured feed for livestock might not contain the nutritional constituents recited on its labels, or that such levels might be affected by time, weather, or methods of storage, would hardly be beyond the contemplation of the ordinary buyer so as to constitute being “unreasonably dangerous.” Purina Mills, Inc. v. Askins, 317 Ark. 58, 875 S.W.2d 843 (1994).

Plaintiff demonstrated that a saw with a sawdust sawpit was defective and unreasonably dangerous where plaintiff demonstrated that the door to the sawpit could be opened while the saw blade was still spinning; plaintiff's familiarity with the open and obvious danger of the saw did not bar her strict liability claim. Buchanna v. Diehl Machine, Inc., 98 F.3d 366 (8th Cir. 1996).

In an action alleging that the use of pesticides in a home resulted in a child's multiple birth defects, the plaintiffs failed to show that the product was defective rendering it unreasonably dangerous and, therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants. National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1999).

Building owner's strict liability claim against a toilet supply line seller was properly dismissed where the owner did not present sufficient evidence that the danger of water escaping from the line was beyond the contemplation of an ordinary and reasonable consumer, and thus failed to show that the line was unreasonably dangerous. Apex Oil Co. v. Jones Stephens Corp., 881 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2018).

Cited: Cockman v. Welder's Supply Co., 265 Ark. 612, 580 S.W.2d 455 (1979); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982); W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982); Pruitt v. Cargill, Inc., 284 Ark. 474, 683 S.W.2d 906 (1985); Elk Corp. of Ark. v. Builders Transport, Inc., 862 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1988); Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Davis v. DuPont, 729 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Rogers v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Ark. 1990); Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 Ark. 228, 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992); Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2001); Harrell v. Madison County Miss. Mote Co., 370 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2004).

Subchapter 2 — Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979

Research References

ALR.

Products Liability: Clothes Dryers. 1 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2015).

Products Liability: Hormone Replacement Medications. 7 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2015).

Products Liability and Negligence Claims Arising from Use of Stud Guns, Staple Guns, Nail Guns, or Parts Thereof. 12 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2015).

Products Liability Issues Surrounding Design, Production, Distribution, and Use of Recreational and Vehicular Helmets. 13 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2015).

Validity, Construction, and Application of Products Liability Statute Precluding or Limiting Recovery Where Product Has Been Altered or Modified After Leaving Hands of Manufacturer or Seller. 13 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2015).

Products Liability: Personal Injury or Death Allegedly Caused by Defect in Motorcycle or Its Parts or Equipment. 14 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2015).

Products Liability: Necessity and Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Evidence as to Adequacy of Warning Provided to User of Prescription Drugs, 25 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2018).

Case Notes

In General.

The Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979 was designed to include, and not wipe away, prior precedent. Mulligan v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 786 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1986).

Applicability.

Although the accident giving rise to the plaintiff's personal injury suit took place two years before enactment of the Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979, the act applied to the proceedings in the suit since the act merely sets forth definitions of terms to be used, establishes a limitations period, and enumerates defenses and indemnification remedies available in product liability actions, but creates no new causes of actions, or substantive rights, or liabilities. Despite the general rule that statutes are not to be given retroactive effect unless the legislature has clearly expressed a contrary intention, the Product Liability Act falls within the exception to that rule which is recognized for procedural or remedial legislation that creates no new substantive rights or duties. French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981).

Neither this subchapter nor the Arkansas strict liability statute, former § 4-86-102 (now § 16-116-101), apply to the commercial leasing of an industrial building because the lease of the building does not qualify as a “product” within the meaning of the Arkansas statutes. McMichael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988).

The product liability remedies found in this subchapter are for buyers against manufacturers and suppliers, and for suppliers against manufacturers of defective products and did not apply to plaintiff's tort and contract claims against defendant for dissatisfaction with a horse; the parties did not fit those categories. Mason v. Jackson, 323 Ark. 252, 914 S.W.2d 728 (1996).

Strict Liability.

Strict liability is not absolute liability in Arkansas; a plaintiff in a strict product liability action can also be at fault. Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 725 S.W.2d 829 (1987).

Cited: Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 319 Ark. 54, 889 S.W.2d 750 (1994).

16-116-201. Title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979”.

History. Acts 1979, No. 511, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2801.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-101 and was renumbered as § 16-116-201 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-116-201 was renumbered as § 16-116-301.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Parham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkansas, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 781.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Oliver, Rejecting the “Whipping-Boy” Approach to Tort Law: Well-Made Handguns are not Defective Products, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 1.

Note, Torts — Product Liability — Arkansas Adopts Comment K as an Affirmative Defense in Prescription Drug Actions, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 199.

Survey, Torts, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 417.

Note, The Collision of Tort and Contract Law: Validity and Enforceability of Exculpatory Clauses in Arkansas, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 279.

Case Notes

Cited: E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Dillaha, 280 Ark. 477, 659 S.W.2d 756 (1983); Davis v. DuPont, 729 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1989); West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991); West v. G.D. Searle & Co., 317 Ark. 525, 879 S.W.2d 412 (1994).

16-116-202. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Anticipated life” means the period over which the product may reasonably be expected to be useful to the user as determined by the trier of facts;
  2. “Defective condition” means a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for reasonably foreseeable use and consumption;
  3. “Manufacturer” means the designer, fabricator, producer, compounder, processor, or assembler of any product or its component parts;
  4. “Product” means any tangible object or goods produced, excluding real estate and improvements located thereon. Provided, any tangible object or good produced that is affixed to, installed on, or incorporated into real estate or any improvement thereon shall constitute a product under this subchapter. Provided further, an improvement on real estate shall constitute a product in the event that environmental contaminants exist or have occurred in the improvement;
  5. “Product liability action” includes all actions brought for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, testing, service, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging, or labeling of any product;
    1. “Supplier” means any individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether the sale is for resale or for use or consumption.
    2. “Supplier” includes a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor and also includes a lessor or bailor engaged in the business of leasing or bailment of a product.
    3. “Supplier” does not include any licensee, as the term is defined in § 17-42-103, who is providing only brokerage and sales services under a license; and
    1. “Unreasonably dangerous” means that a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary and reasonable buyer, consumer, or user who acquires or uses the product, assuming the ordinary knowledge of the community or of similar buyers, users, or consumers as to its characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and proper and improper uses, as well as any special knowledge, training, or experience possessed by the particular buyer, user, or consumer or which he or she was required to possess.
    2. However, as to a minor, “unreasonably dangerous” means that a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by an ordinary and reasonably careful minor considering his or her age and intelligence.

History. Acts 1979, No. 511, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2802; Acts 2007, No. 315, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-102 and was renumbered as § 16-116-202 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-116-202 was renumbered as § 16-116-302.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, A Statutory Primer: Article 2 of the U.C.C., — When Do Its Rules Apply?, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 39.

Looney, The Toothless Cow, the Little Bull That Couldn't, and Udder Matters: Livestock Warranties and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 75.

Ark. L. Rev.

Thompson, The Arkansas Products Liability Statute: What Does “Unreasonably Dangerous” Mean in Arkansas?, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 663.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Eighth Circuit Adopts Narrow View: Only APLA Failure-to-Warn/Mislabeling Claims Against Generic Manufacturers Are Preempted Under Mensing, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 907 (2013).

Frank Griffin, The Trouble with the Curve: Manufacturer and Surgeon Liability for “Learning Curves” Associated with Unreliably-Screened Implantable Medical Devices, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 755 (2016).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Torts — Product Liability — Arkansas Adopts Comment K as an Affirmative Defense in Prescription Drug Actions. 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 199.

Case Notes

Defective Condition.

The definitions in this section of the key terms “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous,” when applied to the strict liability statute, impose no requirement that a feasible and safer alternative be proven by a plaintiff in a personal injury action, and it is clear that under former § 16-116-104 (now § 16-116-204) the existence, practicality, and technological feasibility of an alternative safer design are not necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action, but rather are merely factors that may be considered by the jury in determining whether a product was supplied in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous; accordingly, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that an alternative safer design was available. French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981).

Vehicle manufacturer was properly granted summary judgment in a driver's product liability suit alleging that injuries he sustained when he struck a tree while driving his vehicle were a result of defects in the air bag and seat belt and that the manufacturer was strictly liable for his injuries. Under former §§ 4-86-102(a), 16-116-102(7)(A) (now §§ 16-116-101(a), 16-116-202(7)(A)), the driver had to prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous because of a design or manufacturing defect for which the manufacturer was responsible and he also had to prove that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the particular seller. The driver offered no evidence, however, regarding the existence of a specific defect in the occupant protection system, requiring speculation as to whether it was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's control, and the driver failed to demonstrate liability on the basis of circumstantial evidence because the intricacies of occupant protection systems and their potential design or manufacturing defects were outside the realm of a juror's everyday experience, and there were other potential explanations for the driver's injuries other than a defect for which the manufacturer would be responsible. Ruminer v. GMC, 483 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 2007).

Defective Design.

The open and obvious danger rule is not an automatic bar to recovery on a strict liability claim in a defective design case. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

A manufacturer's failure to warn of a danger does not give rise to liability when the dangerous defect is open and obvious, and whether contributory negligence should preclude recovery is generally a question of fact for the jury. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

District court did not err by refusing to grant tobacco company's motion for judgment as a matter of law because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the claim that its cigarettes had a design defect; the decedant's doctor testified that decedent died from the effects of cigarette smoke, the tobacco company's cigarettes had higher levels of carcinogenic tar than any other brand, and they lacked effective filter technology. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2005).

Defenses.

“Common knowledge” is not a defense to strict liability claims for failure to warn of the health risks of tobacco from 1945 to 1969 because there seems to be no clear consensus among the reported cases as to whether the dangers of cigarette smoking were common knowledge, or if they were, when they became common knowledge. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Ark. 1999).

As a matter of Arkansas law, a plaintiff cannot maintain a product liability action, as defined in this section, against the manufacturer of a name-brand prescription drug if the plaintiff consumed only the generic equivalent of that drug. To prevail in such an action, the plaintiff must be able to show that it is more likely than not that exposure to a particular manufacturer's product was a substantial factor in producing his or her injuries, and proximate causation can not be shown if the plaintiff did not consume a product that was actually produced by a sued manufacturer. Fields v. Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (W.D. Ark. 2009).

Two prescription drug manufacturers were granted summary judgment as to a consumer's products liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and breach of implied warranty claims because the factual allegations in the complaint established that the suit was a “product liability action” as defined in this section, such an action required the consumer to show that it was more likely than not that exposure to the manufacturers' products was a substantial factor in producing her injuries, and the consumer could not make that showing because the manufacturers produced only brand-name version of a drug and the consumer stipulated that she had ingested only generic versions of the drug. The manufacturers could not be held liable for failure to warn and failure to label merely because generic drug manufacturers and the consumer's doctor may have relied upon information that they provided with regard to their own name-brand drugs. Fields v. Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (W.D. Ark. 2009).

Manufacturer.

Products liability contemplates that a manufacturer may be responsible for injuries resulting from defective manufacture as well as injuries arising out of erection and assembly of the product. Hergeth, Inc. v. Green, 293 Ark. 119, 733 S.W.2d 409 (1987).

Product.

The supplying of blood for transfusions is a service rather than a product; blood is not a “product” for purposes of imposing strict liability in tort. Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989).

Product Liability Action.

Strict product liability is not extended to include the process by which the shipper secures a product for transportation. Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 725 S.W.2d 829 (1987).

Banding of rolls of roofing was not “packaging” for purposes of “product liability action”; the rolls of roofing were the only product, and the act of banding them together was simply part of the loading and transporting process. Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 727 S.W.2d 856 (1987).

A plaintiff relying solely on a strict products liability theory may bring a claim for punitive damages under Arkansas law. Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).

Though majority of courts in the United States hold that a strict liability action cannot be successful if the only damages that occur are to the product itself, Arkansas law endorses the minority view allowing recovery in instances where the only damages are to the defective product itself. Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Central Flying Serv., Inc., 975 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1992).

Retail store chain, as a seller of the product which was the subject of a claim, was “marketing” the product as that term is used in subdivision (5) of this section. Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1994).

In a case involving the group of diet drugs, popularly known as Fen/Phen, citing the factors involved in applying strict liability to a pharmacist's role as supplier in prescription drug transactions, the court declined to extend the rule of strict supplier liability to pharmacists. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

Consumer's suit constituted a “product liability action” as defined in this section because although she asserted products liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and breach of implied warranty legal claims, the allegations in her complaint showed that she was seeking to recover for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained as the result of the failure of three prescription drug manufacturers to adequately warn about the side effects of a prescription drug that she ingested and failure to include adequate warnings on the labels used for the drug. Fields v. Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (W.D. Ark. 2009).

Appellants' warranty claims were barred by the limitations period of the Arkansas Product Liability Act, former § 16-116-103 (now § 16-116-203), instead of the limitations period of the Uniform Commercial Code, § 4-2-725, because a claim for the costs of repairing the buses with corroded flooring would be a claim for property damage within the meaning of the Act, under subdivision (5) of this section. IC Corp. v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., 2011 Ark. App. 589, 385 S.W.3d 880 (2011).

Consumer's product liability suit alleging a failure to warn of the side effects of a certain prescription drug failed as to claims against brand manufacturers because she only ingested generic products. Bell v. Pfizer, Inc., 716 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2013).

Consumer could not have held the brand manufacturers liable under Arkansas law because the consumer's claims were all product liability actions, so they were only viable if she was able to make a product identification, and the consumer stipulated that she never used the brand drug manufactured or distributed by any of the brand manufacturers. Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2013).

Unreasonably Dangerous.

The trial court in a personal injury action committed no error in giving a jury instruction requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's crane “contains some danger other than those all cranes pose, which danger was not and would not reasonably be appreciated by an ordinarily prudent person,” since that instruction, although not exceedingly clear, was consistent with the Arkansas statutory definition of “unreasonably dangerous” under this section. French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981).

The fact that irrigation pumps failed to produce the volume of water desired or expected by the buyer raised issues of warranty, negligence, or misrepresentation, but it did not render the pumps “unreasonably dangerous”; they were, at worst, merely useless. Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).

The definition of “unreasonably dangerous” indicates the emphasis in the Product Liability Act on determining the product and whether it is defective by its consumer use. The mere fact that under certain circumstances an accident may occur in connection with the use of a product does not make the product unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability. Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 725 S.W.2d 829 (1987).

Section 4-86-101, relating to liability for breach of warranty, does not limit strict liability actions to injuries to the ultimate consumer or user; nevertheless, the product has to meet the definition of unreasonably dangerous found in this section. Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 727 S.W.2d 856 (1987).

Where jury instruction was proffered on the meaning of “unreasonably dangerous” that simply quoted the statutory definition in full, but the court rejected this instruction and gave the jury instead an instruction that tracked only the first sentence of subdivision (7), omitting any reference to the legal definition of unreasonably dangerous as to a minor, it was error to refuse the instruction defining unreasonably dangerous as to a minor. Harris v. Pacific Floor Mach. Mfg. Co., 856 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1988).

The degradation of exterior walls was not found to make the house unreasonably dangerous. O'Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 942 S.W.2d 854 (1997).

Building owner's strict liability claim against a toilet supply line seller was properly dismissed where the owner did not present sufficient evidence that the danger of water escaping from the line was beyond the contemplation of an ordinary and reasonable consumer, and thus failed to show that the line was unreasonably dangerous. Apex Oil Co. v. Jones Stephens Corp., 881 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2018).

Cited: Elk Corp. of Ark. v. Builders Transport, Inc., 862 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1988); Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Rogers v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Ark. 1990); Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 Ark. 228, 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992); Lee v. Martin, 74 Ark. App. 193, 45 S.W.3d 860 (2001); Harrell v. Madison County Miss. Mote Co., 370 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2004).

16-116-203. Limitation on actions.

All product liability actions shall be commenced within three (3) years after the date on which the death, injury, or damage complained of occurs.

History. Acts 1979, No. 511, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2803.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-103 and was renumbered as § 16-116-203 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Former § 16-116-203 was renumbered as § 16-116-303.

Cross References. Commencement of new action after nonsuit or judgment arrested or reversed, § 16-56-126.

Research References

ALR.

Federal Preemption of State Common-Law Products Liability Claims Pertaining to Medical Devices, Implants, and Other Health-Related Items. 74 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Tort Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 980.

Case Notes

In General.

This section clearly rejects the concept found in some older Arkansas cases that a cause of action accrues when the tort is complete. Mulligan v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 786 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1986).

Actions Barred.

Where the plaintiff sought to bring a products liability action against the manufacturer of a cardiac pacemaker and the hospital through which the device was sold more than three years after the defective pacemaker was removed and a substitute pacemaker was inserted, the trial court properly entered a summary judgment for the defendants since the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Spickes v. Medtronic, Inc., 275 Ark. 421, 631 S.W.2d 5 (1982).

An action based on a product implanted by a physician during spinal surgery was barred where the action was not commenced until more than three years after surgery. Martin v. Arthur, 65 Ark. App. 276, 986 S.W.2d 143, aff'd in part, reversed in part, 339 Ark. 149, 3 S.W.3d 684 (1999).

The Medical Malpractice Act's two-year statute superseded the Products Liability three-year statute of limitations to govern plaintiff's product-liability claims brought against the drug company for medical injury as a result of taking the diet drug popularly known as Fen/Phen. Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because plaintiff became aware of her injury more than three years before she filed her complaint when, although not yet diagnosed with lung cancer, she had trouble breathing, began coughing up blood, was tired all the time, lost her appetite, and experienced constant coughing. Stewart v. Philip Morris, Inc., 205 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).

Nurse's product liability complaint brought against drug company for addiction to pain medication was untimely under the three-year statute of limitations in this section; overwhelming proof showed that the nurse was or should have been aware of the drug's harmfulness more than three years before bringing suit in 2000, including, inter alia, that in 1994 and 1995, the nurse's neurologist confronted the nurse about the drug, the nurse deceived other doctors in order to obtain the drug, and the licensing board sent the nurse a hearing notice referring to the drug. Uhiren v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 346 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2003).

Circuit court did not err in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on the ground that appellants' claims were barred by this section, the Arkansas Product Liability Act, because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding appellants' awareness of corrosion problems and its causal connection to alkaline copper quaternary (ACQ) and treated plywood more than three years before it filed its complaint; the statute of limitations could begin to run even though appellant could not have known the full extent of the damage caused by the ACQ, and the Act covered all of appellants' claims, including those based on warranty. IC Corp. v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., 2011 Ark. App. 589, 385 S.W.3d 880 (2011).

Actions Not Barred.

The plaintiff's product liability action, which was filed in 1979 against a drug manufacturer, was not barred by the statute of limitations where the plaintiff was injected with the defective drug in 1960, but there was sufficient evidence to conclude either that the true nature of the plaintiff's illness did not manifest itself until 1976 or that it took until 1976 for her to obtain a diagnosis that informed her of the nature and cause of her condition. Mulligan v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 786 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1986).

Breach of Warranty.

The three-year statute of imitations found in this section, rather than the Uniform Commercial Code general four-year limitation in § 4-2-725, governs a breach-of-warranty suit when damages for personal injury are sought; the Product Liability Act is both more specific and more recent than Arkansas's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1994).

Appellants' warranty claims were barred by the limitations period of the Arkansas Product Liability Act instead of the limitations period of the Uniform Commercial Code, § 4-2-725, because a claim for the costs of repairing the buses with corroded flooring would be a claim for property damage within the meaning of the Act, former § 16-116-102(5) (now § 16-116-202(5)). IC Corp. v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., 2011 Ark. App. 589, 385 S.W.3d 880 (2011).

Minors.

Former § 4-86-102 (now § 16-116-101), which governs causes of action based on strict liability, creates a new right that was not available at common law, but does not contain a specific period of limitation; such actions are governed by the general statute of limitations applicable to all products liability cases in this section. Therefore, § 16-56-116 operates to extend the time for minors to file a products liability action brought on a strict liability theory. Harris v. Standardized San. Sys., 658 F. Supp. 438 (W.D. Ark. 1987).

Running of Statute.

The statute of limitations in a products liability action begins to run when the negligent damage occurs, not from the time the full extent of the injury is ascertained. Spickes v. Medtronic, Inc., 275 Ark. 421, 631 S.W.2d 5 (1982).

The limitations period can begin running if the manifested damage, even if slight, reveals the nature of the injury, and the moment of accrual should be established by reference to a plaintiff's awareness of his condition, including both the fact of the injury and the probable causal connection between the injury and a product's use. Brown v. Dow Chem. Co., 875 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1989); Adkison v. G.D. Searle & Co., 971 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1992).

The statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date the damage was first detected. Sutterfield v. Holloway Constr. Co., 724 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

The limitations period begins running when the manifested damage reveals the nature of the injury; in other words, the plaintiff must be aware of the damage and its causes before the time begins to run. Saunders v. Holloway Constr. Co., 724 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

In product liability cases, the statute of limitations does not commence running until the plaintiff knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the causal connection between the product and the injuries suffered. Martin v. Arthur, 339 Ark. 149, 3 S.W.3d 684 (1999).

Jury could have found that a consumer's cause of action accrued at some point after the publication of a study's results, under this section, because (1) defendants, corporation and a company, changed their products' labeling significantly following the publication of the study's findings, devoting substantial label space to the results of the study; (2) the consumer presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the warnings were inadequate, contradictory, and confusing; and (3) the jury could have reasonably concluded that if medical doctors were unsure of the risk that hormone replacement therapy caused breast cancer, it was highly unlikely that a layperson would have been more aware of that risk. Scroggin v. Wyeth (In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig.), 586 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1019, 130 S. Ct. 3467, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (2010).

Court of appeals did not need to decide whether appellants' claims for “economic loss” were covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, § 4-2-725, instead of this section, the Arkansas Product Liability Act, because appellants failed to plead or present evidence as to its lost profits or lost goodwill, matters that had to be specifically pled under Ark. R. Civ. P. 9(g). IC Corp. v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., 2011 Ark. App. 589, 385 S.W.3d 880 (2011).

Cited: American Gen. Fire & Cas. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53, 969 S.W.2d 598 (1998).

16-116-204. Considerations for trier of fact.

    1. In determining the liability of the manufacturer, the state of scientific and technological knowledge available to the manufacturer or supplier at the time the product was placed on the market, rather than at the time of the injury, may be considered as evidence.
    2. Consideration may also be given to the customary designs, methods, standards, and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting, and testing by other manufacturers or sellers of similar products.
  1. The provisions of this section shall not apply to an action based on express warranty or misrepresentation regarding the product.

History. Acts 1979, No. 511, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2805.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-104 and was renumbered as § 16-116-204 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Torts — Product Liability — Arkansas Adopts Comment K as an Affirmative Defense in Prescription Drug Actions. 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 199.

Case Notes

Alternative Safer Design.

The definitions in former § 16-116-102 (now § 16-116-202) of the key terms “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous,” when applied to the strict liability statute, impose no requirement that a feasible and safer alternative be proven by a plaintiff in a personal injury action, and it is clear that under this section, the existence, practicality, and technological feasibility of an alternative safer design are not necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action, but rather are merely factors that may be considered by the jury in determining whether a product was supplied in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous; accordingly the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that an alternative safer design was available. French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981).

Evidence.

Arkansas plaintiffs in strict liability cases are not required to show a difference between the alleged defective product and all other similar products in every case; rather, it is evidence that may be considered by the trier of fact. Buchanna v. Diehl Machine, Inc., 98 F.3d 366 (8th Cir. 1996).

Evidence of the vehicle design change that was made to improve quality, not safety, was properly excluded because it did not tend to prove that the fiberglass liftgate rendered the vehicle defective and was, therefore, irrelevant. Lovett ex rel. Lovett v. Union Pac. R.R., 201 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2000).

Industry Standards.

Evidence of manufacturer's compliance with applicable industry standards in place at the time of manufacture and evidence that the saw at issue was as safe as other saws manufactured at the time did not prevent a reasonable jury from concluding that the manufacturer was negligent in its design of the saw. Buchanna v. Diehl Machine, Inc., 98 F.3d 366 (8th Cir. 1996).

Cited: Haynes v. AMC, 691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982).

16-116-205. Defenses generally.

  1. Compliance by a manufacturer or supplier with any federal or state statute or administrative regulation existing at the time a product was manufactured and prescribing standards of design, inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warning, or instructions for use of a product shall be considered as evidence that the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition in regard to matters covered by these standards.
  2. Supplying of a product after its anticipated life may be considered as a defense by the manufacturer as between the manufacturer and supplier if the product is supplied after the expiration date placed on the product by the manufacturer as required by law.
  3. Use of a product beyond its anticipated life by a consumer where the consumer knew or should have known the anticipated life of the product may be considered as evidence of fault on the part of the consumer.

History. Acts 1979, No. 511, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2804.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-105 and was renumbered as § 16-116-205 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Research References

ALR.

Application of “Bare Metal” Defense in Asbestos Products Liability Cases. 9 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2015).

Application of Parental Immunity Doctrine to Claims Against Parents of Minor Products Liability Plaintiffs. 10 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2015).

Products Liability: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Product Misuse Defense in Actions Concerning Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles, 18 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2018).

Products Liability: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Product Misuse Defense in Actions Concerning Cosmetics and Other Personal Care Products, 27 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2018).

Products Liability: Alteration or Modification of Motor Vehicle After It Leaves Hands of Manufacturer or Seller as Affecting Liability for Product-Caused Harm, 28 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2018).

Products Liability: Alteration or Modification of Machinery and Tools After They Leave Hands of Manufacturer or Seller as Affecting Liability for Product-Caused Harm, 28 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2018).

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, The Decline of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Favor of Direct Patient Warnings of Drug Product Risks, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 828.

Case Notes

Industry Standards.

Evidence of manufacture's compliance with applicable industry standards in place at the time of manufacture and evidence that the saw at issue was as safe as other saws manufactured at the time did not prevent a reasonable jury from concluding that the manufacturer was negligent in its design of the saw. Buchanna v. Diehl Machine, Inc., 98 F.3d 366 (8th Cir. 1996).

Cited: Haynes v. AMC, 691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982); Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 725 S.W.2d 829 (1987).

16-116-206. Evidence of alterations.

If a product is not unreasonably dangerous at the time it leaves the control of the manufacturer or supplier but was made unreasonably dangerous by subsequent unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance, or abnormal use, such conduct may be considered as evidence of fault on the part of the user.

History. Acts 1979, No. 511, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2807.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-106 and was renumbered as § 16-116-206 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Research References

ALR.

Products Liability: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Product Misuse Defense in Actions Concerning Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles, 18 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2018).

Products Liability: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Product Misuse Defense in Actions Concerning Cosmetics and Other Personal Care Products, 27 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2018).

Products Liability: Alteration or Modification of Motor Vehicle After It Leaves Hands of Manufacturer or Seller as Affecting Liability for Product-Caused Harm, 28 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2018).

Products Liability: Alteration or Modification of Machinery and Tools After They Leave Hands of Manufacturer or Seller as Affecting Liability for Product-Caused Harm, 28 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2018).

Case Notes

Evidence.

The evidence presented by plaintiff in her effort to assign liability to the manufacturer held not substantial enough to negate the existence of other possibilities of sources of contamination. Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 319 Ark. 54, 889 S.W.2d 750 (1994).

Cited: Elk Corp. v. Jackson, 291 Ark. 448, 725 S.W.2d 829 (1987).

16-116-207. Supplier's remedy.

A supplier of a defective product who was not the manufacturer shall have a cause of action for indemnity from the manufacturer of a defective product arising from the supplying of the defective product.

History. Acts 1979, No. 511, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2806.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-107 and was renumbered as § 16-116-207 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Retailer was not entitled to indemnification where the defective product claim failed. Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co., 322 Ark. 751, 911 S.W.2d 586 (1995).

Operation of Law.

Claim could not arise by operation of law where vicarious liability was not present, nor did case involve a defective product. Elk Corp. of Ark. v. Builders Transport, Inc., 862 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1988).

Cited: Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995).

Subchapter 3 — Firearms and Ammunition

16-116-301. Proximate cause.

  1. In a product liability action, the actual discharge of a firearm, a nonpowder gun, or ammunition by a person shall be the proximate cause of injury, damage, or death resulting from the use of the product, and not the inherent capability to cause injury, damage, or death of the firearm, the nonpowder gun, or ammunition.
  2. The manufacturer's, importer's, or distributor's mere placement of a firearm, a nonpowder gun, or ammunition into the stream of commerce shall not be conduct deemed sufficient to constitute the proximate cause of injury, damage, or death resulting from a person's use of the firearm, the nonpowder gun, or ammunition.
  3. Even if the accidental discharge of the firearm or nonpowder gun is found to be foreseeable, the manufacturer's, importer's, or distributor's mere placement of the firearm or nonpowder gun in the stream of commerce shall not be conduct deemed sufficient to constitute proximate cause in a product liability action concerning the accidental discharge of a firearm or nonpowder gun.

History. Acts 2003, No. 935, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-201 and was renumbered as § 16-116-301 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Protection for Dealers in Firearms, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 447.

16-116-302. Limitations on actions — Award of fees.

  1. A person or other public or private entity may not bring an action in tort, other than a product liability action, against a firearms, nonpowder gun, or ammunition manufacturer, importer, or dealer for any remedy arising from physical or emotional injury, physical damage, or death caused by the discharge of a firearm, a nonpowder gun, or ammunition unless the action alleges that the physical or emotional injury, physical damage, or death was caused by the intentional or negligent discharge of a firearm, a nonpowder gun, or ammunition by the manufacturer, importer, or dealer.
  2. A firearm, a nonpowder gun, or ammunition manufacturer, importer, or dealer shall not be held liable as a third party for the actions of another person involving the use of a firearm, a nonpowder gun, or ammunition in any cause of action.
    1. The court, upon the filing of a proper motion, shall dismiss any action brought against a firearms, nonpowder gun, or ammunition manufacturer, importer, or dealer, which the court determines is prohibited under subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section.
    2. Upon dismissal under this subsection, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees, in addition to costs, to each named defendant against whom the cause of action is dismissed.
    1. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a firearms, nonpowder gun, or ammunition manufacturer, importer, or dealer may be sued in tort for any damages proximately caused by an act of the manufacturer, importer, or dealer in violation of a state law or rule or federal law or regulation.
    2. In any action brought under this subsection, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the state law or rule or federal law or regulation.

History. Acts 2003, No. 935, § 2; 2019, No. 315, § 1321.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-202 and was renumbered as § 16-116-302 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “law or rule” in (d)(1) and (d)(2).

16-116-303. Applicability.

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall bar recovery by a plaintiff in a cause of action in which the plaintiff proves that the proximate cause of the injury, damage, or death was:

  1. A defective firearm, a defective nonpowder gun, or defective ammunition that caused the firearm, nonpowder gun, or ammunition to be at variance with its design; or
  2. A defectively designed firearm, a defectively designed nonpowder gun, or defectively designed ammunition that did not function in the manner reasonably expected by the ordinary consumer of the firearm, nonpowder gun, or ammunition.

History. Acts 2003, No. 935, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-116-203 and was renumbered as § 16-116-303 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Chapter 117 Receivership

Research References

Am. Jur. 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Receiv., § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 75 C.J.S., Receiv., § 1 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved.]

Subchapter 2 — Appointment and Powers of Receiver Generally

Cross References. Receivers, Ark. R. Civ. P. 66.

Surety companies, authority, § 23-63-1001 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1857, § 13, p. 164: effective on passage.

Acts 1931, No. 253, § 4: approved Mar. 31, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas an agricultural and economic crisis now exists in this State in that the great majority of farmers are unable to obtain money or supplies for the purpose of making crops from sources other than agricultural credit corporations, and said agricultural credit corporations are required by the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks with which they transact business to accompany the application for loans with written assurances from the holders of mortgages on farm lands of Arkansas that the possession of the party or parties will not be disturbed during the existence of said loan if made, and since the great bulk of the agricultural lands of this State are encumbered by mortgages and the holders of said mortgages are widely and diversely distributed through the United States and its territorial limits and foreign countries, thereby making it practically impossible to secure said written assurance of non-disturbance of possession in time to plant and cultivate crops during that year, and there therefore being great and immediate danger of the great bulk of the agricultural lands of Arkansas lying idle during the ensuing year, an emergency is therefore and hereby declared to exist and this act shall therefore be in force and effect from and after the date of its passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Appointment or discharge of receiver for marital or community property necessitated by suit for divorce or separation. 15 A.L.R.4th 224.

16-117-201, 16-117-202. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that these sections, concerning appointment and powers of receivers, were deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The sections derived from the following sources:

16-117-201. Acts 1857, §§ 1-3, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8600-8602; Pope's Dig., §§ 11178-11180; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 36-101 — 36-103.

16-117-202. Acts 1857, § 4, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., § 8603; Pope's Dig., § 11181; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-104.

16-117-203. Actions by receivers — Employment of attorneys.

In all cases where it is necessary or proper for a receiver to collect debts by suit, he or she may sue in his or her own name, but all moneys collected by the receiver shall be accounted for and paid into court or be subject to the order of the court. The receiver shall have power to employ attorneys and make to them a reasonable allowance for services. The attorneys shall be paid out of the funds collected by the receiver.

History. Acts 1857, § 5, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., § 8604; Pope's Dig., § 11182; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-105.

Case Notes

Authority to Sue.

Where a receiver is appointed by the court to collect certain notes, until he is discharged, he alone is qualified to bring suit to enforce their collection. Driver v. Lanier, 66 Ark. 126, 49 S.W. 816 (1899).

Legal Representation for Receivers.

Where drainage district bondholders and their trustee appealed from decree in their chancery court suit against district's receiver and certain of district's landowners for instructions to receiver, and latter was named as one of appellees on appeal, it was proper for chancery court, on petition of receiver, to direct him to have attorneys, who represented him in chancery court, represent him in Supreme Court. Greer v. Blocker, 218 Ark. 249, 236 S.W.2d 77 (1951).

16-117-204. [Superseded.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that this section, concerning actions by receivers, was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The section was derived from Acts 1857, § 6, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., § 8605; Pope's Dig., § 11183; A.S.A 1947, § 36-106.

16-117-205. Appointment for corporation, copartnership, or joint-stock company — Powers and duties.

  1. Whenever, in any case, a receiver is appointed for a corporation or its trustees, any copartnership, or joint-stock company, and the order or decree of the court is that the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, funds, assets, moneys, credits, choses in action, rights and interests of every kind, name, and nature, either in law or equity, or any part thereof, belonging to the corporation or its trustees, a copartnership or joint-stock company, be placed in the hands of the receiver, from thenceforward until the further order or decree of the court, the receiver shall have full possession, custody, and control thereof, and shall be vested with the title, so far as it shall be necessary to collect debts, preserve the assets and property for the benefit of creditors, and all persons interested. The receiver may, and shall, bring and prosecute and defend all suits in his or her own name that may be necessary for that purpose.
  2. In all suits which may be pending in any court, prosecuted by or brought against such corporation, trustees, copartnership, or joint-stock company or in which either may be interested, the receiver may be substituted as a party, on his or her own application, without process or revivor. He or she shall prosecute or defend the suit with the same effect as the original parties might or could do, and suits may progress against him or her by substitution in the same manner.

History. Acts 1857, §§ 7, 8, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8606, 8607; Pope's Dig., §§ 11184, 11185; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 36-107, 36-108.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Supreme Court stated in a Per Curiam of Nov. 24, 1986, that subsection (b) of this section was deemed superseded by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case Notes

Debts.

Payment to a former officer of a corporation of a debt due the corporation will not extinguish the debt if made after the appointment and qualification of a receiver, and the debtor may not defend that he had no notice of the appointment. Buchanan v. Hicks, 98 Ark. 370, 136 S.W. 177 (1911).

Dividends.

Receiver may recover dividends paid to stockholders of an insolvent corporation. Corn v. Skillern, 75 Ark. 148, 87 S.W. 142 (1905).

16-117-206. Cases between individuals.

The provisions of §§ 16-117-204 and 16-117-205 shall apply to cases between individuals, with like effect, as declared in §§ 16-117-204 and 16-117-205.

History. Acts 1857, § 9, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., § 8608; Pope's Dig., § 11186; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-109.

16-117-207. Receivers pendente lite generally.

  1. In an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of property, by a creditor to subject any property or fund to his or her claim, or between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund, on the application of plaintiff or of any party whose right to or interest in the property or fund or the proceeds thereof, is probable, and where it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, the court may appoint a receiver to take charge thereof during the pendency of the action, and may order and coerce the delivery of the property to him or her.
  2. No party or attorney, or person interested in an action, shall be appointed receiver therein.
  3. Before entering upon his or her duties, the receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully. With one (1) or more sureties approved by the court, he or she shall execute a bond to the person and in such sum as the court shall direct, to the effect that he or she will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action, and obey the orders of the court therein.
  4. The receiver has, under the control of the court, power to bring and defend actions, to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, and generally do such acts respecting the property as the court may authorize.

History. Civil Code, §§ 323, 325-327; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8611, 8613-8615; Pope's Dig., §§ 11189, 11191-11193; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 36-112, 36-114 — 36-116.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Templeton, Miscellaneous, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 189.

Case Notes

Appointment.

Subsection (b) is only declaratory of what the law was before the statute, but it emphasizes the requirement that the receiver must be and remain a disinterested and impartial agent of the courts and parties to the litigation. Cook v. Martin, 75 Ark. 40, 87 S.W. 625 (1905).

The court has power to appoint a receiver where an action is brought between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund when it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured. Ford v. Moore, 212 Ark. 248, 205 S.W.2d 209 (1947).

The chancery court had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver upon the application of a creditor to subject any property or fund to his claim under the provisions of the former bulk sales law. Bornsteine v. William R. Moore Dry Goods Co., 226 Ark. 746, 294 S.W.2d 52 (1956).

In a suit to determine the true ownership of the leasehold interest in lands apparently containing oil and gas, the chancellor could appoint a receiver pendente lite and authorize him to contract for the drilling of an oil well upon the property, to keep it from being drained by an existing well upon neighboring property. Davis v. Johnston, 251 Ark. 1078, 479 S.W.2d 525 (1972).

This section providing for the appointment of a receiver is not mandatory, but leaves it to the sound discretion of the court. Phillips v. Tires, Tubes, Wheels, Inc., 274 Ark. 326, 625 S.W.2d 449 (1981).

The trial court is not required to resolve all issues and affirmative defenses going to the merits of an alleged bulk transfer law violation before appointing a receiver pursuant to this section. Phillips v. Tires, Tubes, Wheels, Inc., 274 Ark. 326, 625 S.W.2d 449 (1981).

Duties.

A receiver is a fiduciary representing the court and all parties in interest. First Nat'l Bank v. Quality Chem. Corp., 36 Ark. App. 215, 821 S.W.2d 53 (1991).

Where a duly appointed receiver also had rights as a secured creditor, it was not allowed to personally benefit from its position as receiver to the detriment of other creditors by using that which had been delivered to debtor, without payment. First Nat'l Bank v. Quality Chem. Corp., 36 Ark. App. 215, 821 S.W.2d 53 (1991).

Intervention.

Where bank had itself appointed receiver even though it had an interest in the matter (an appointment which was in apparent violation of this section), basic fairness dictated that petitioner, also claiming an interest, be allowed to intervene and contest the appointment of bank as receiver. Pearson v. First Nat'l Bank, 325 Ark. 127, 924 S.W.2d 460 (1996).

Powers.

The rule that a receiver appointed by one court is not suable in another court does not apply where a receiver is appointed in one of the circuit courts of a county having two judicial districts and is sued in the other circuit court of the county presided over by the same judge who appointed the receiver. Ratcliff v. Adler, 71 Ark. 269, 72 S.W. 896 (1903).

Where drainage district bondholders and their trustee appealed from decree in their chancery court suit against district's receiver and certain of district's landowners for instructions to receiver, and latter was named as one of appellees on appeal, it was proper for chancery court, on petition of receiver, to direct him to have attorneys, who represented him in chancery court, represent him in Supreme Court. Greer v. Blocker, 218 Ark. 249, 236 S.W.2d 77 (1951).

Cited: Chapin v. Stuckey, 286 Ark. 359, 692 S.W.2d 609 (1985).

16-117-208. Receiver to preserve mortgaged property.

In an action by a mortgagee for the foreclosure of his or her mortgage, and the sale of the mortgaged property, a receiver may be appointed where it appears that the mortgaged property is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, or that the conditions of the mortgage have not been performed and that the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt. However, no receiver shall be appointed at the instance of the holder of the mortgage where it appears that the debtor or mortgagor has mortgaged his or her crops, or his or her interest therein, for the purpose of obtaining money or supplies for the making of the crop or waived his or her rents for that purpose, and that the mortgage debt or the consideration for the waiver of rents has not been repaid.

History. Acts 1931, No. 253, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 9469, 11190, A.S.A. 1947, § 36-113.

Case Notes

Appointment of Receivers.

While notice of appointment of receiver is desirable, it is not a prerequisite. Deming Inv. Co. v. Bank of Judsonia, 170 Ark. 65, 278 S.W. 634 (1926) (decision under prior law).

The chancery court in which a suit to foreclose a chattel mortgage was properly brought had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to take charge of the mortgaged property as an incident to its jurisdiction. Beeson v. Chambers, 192 Ark. 265, 90 S.W.2d 770 (1936).

This section is not mandatory, but leaves in the sound discretion of the court the power to appoint a receiver; and where there is no evidence in the record showing that the court abused its discretion, its action will not be disturbed. Federal Land Bank v. Duffey, 193 Ark. 126, 97 S.W.2d 908 (1936).

Creditors.

A creditor is not barred from participating in the distribution by the receiver of the debtor's assets because his claim is secured by a mortgage on other property. Taylor v. Moore, 64 Ark. 23, 40 S.W. 258 (1897) (decision under prior law).

Where a creditor holding a mortgage on a sawmill consented to the appointment of a receiver thereof and to the operation of the mill by the receiver, such debts as were incurred by the receiver in the operation of the mill would take precedence over the mortgage debt. Buster v. Mann, 69 Ark. 23, 62 S.W. 588 (1900) (decision under prior law).

Crops.

Where a mortgagee of land brought suit to foreclose his mortgage and procure the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the land, this action had the effect of impounding the unsevered crops then growing on the land. Bank of Weiner v. Jonesboro Trust Co., 168 Ark. 859, 271 S.W. 952 (1925) (decision under prior law).

Enforcement of Orders.

Where a mortgagor refuses to attorn or give up possession, the receiver taking possession of the land in a foreclosure proceeding must apply to the court to have his orders enforced in a summary way, and where he fails to do so, he cannot enforce a landlord's attachment. Van Pelt v. Russell, 134 Ark. 236, 203 S.W. 267 (1918) (decision under prior law).

Rents.

Assignee of rents could hold rents as against receiver appointed on petition of mortgagee. Purvis v. Elder, 175 Ark. 780, 1 S.W.2d 36 (1927), modified, Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co. v. Elder, 176 Ark. 1140, 5 S.W.2d 299 (1928) (decision under prior law).

The tenant of mortgaged premises upon which the rent was not yet due at the time of the foreclosure sale and for which no receiver was appointed did not thereafter owe rent to the landlord whose interest in the land was foreclosed and his purchase of the land at the foreclosure sale had the effect of extinguishing the rents. Wilson v. Campbell, 244 Ark. 451, 425 S.W.2d 518 (1968).

16-117-209. Reports and accounts.

    1. Receivers shall make report of their proceedings every six (6) months, or more often if required by the court.
    2. The performance of this duty may be enforced by attachment, sequestration, or other proper and effectual means.
  1. Receivers shall have credit for all taxes, expenses, attorney's fees, and necessary disbursements, in the execution of their trusts, and such reasonable and proper compensation for their own services as the court may allow, to be paid out of the trust fund as part of the costs and expenses.
    1. The court shall pass on their accounts.
    2. A confirmation of the accounts shall be conclusive against all persons whatsoever and not subject to be reinvestigated, except for actual fraud.

History. Acts 1857, § 11, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., § 8610; Pope's Dig., § 11188; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-111; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 237.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “judge, or chancellor” following “the court” throughout.

16-117-210. Removal.

Receivers and others appointed who are subject to the provisions of §§ 16-117-203, 16-117-205, 16-117-206, and 16-117-209, and this section, may be removed at any time by the court when it satisfactorily appears that they have failed to discharge any duty incumbent on them or for other sufficient cause. This may be done upon the motion of any person interested either as party, creditor, or otherwise.

History. Acts 1857, § 10, p. 164; C. & M. Dig., § 8609; Pope's Dig., § 11187; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-110; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 237.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “§§ 16-117-203, 16-117-205, 16-117-206, 16-117-209, and 16-117-210” for “§§ 16-117-20116-117-206” and deleted “judge, or chancellorship” following “court.”

Case Notes

Cited: Riner v. Ramey-Milburn Co., 166 Ark. 221, 265 S.W. 963 (1924).

Subchapter 3 — Petition by Insolvent Debtor

Publisher's Notes. As to effect of federal bankruptcy laws on this subchapter, see Friedman & Sons Cloak Co. v. Hogins, 175 Ark. 599, 299 S.W. 997 (1927).

Effective Dates. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 48, § 10: effective on passage.

Case Notes

Assignments for Benefit of Creditors.

Section 16-117-401 et seq., relating to assignments for the benefits of creditors, was not repealed by this subchapter. Finch v. Watson Inv. Co., 184 Ark. 312, 42 S.W.2d 214 (1931).

Authority of State.

A state is without power to make or enforce any law governing bankruptcies that impairs the obligation of contracts, or extends to persons or property outside the jurisdiction, or conflicts with the federal bankruptcy law. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 49 S. Ct. 108, 73 L. Ed. 318 (1929).

Federal Jurisdiction.

This subchapter is binding on creditors until the jurisdiction in bankruptcy of federal courts is properly invoked. Friedman & Sons Cloak Co. v. Hogins, 175 Ark. 599, 299 S.W. 997 (1927).

State laws governing the distribution of property of insolvents for the payment of their debts and providing for their discharge were superseded by the federal bankruptcy act. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 49 S. Ct. 108, 73 L. Ed. 318 (1929).

16-117-301. Complaint to be declared insolvent — Appointment of receiver.

Any insolvent debtor may file in the circuit court of the county in which he or she resides a complaint in which one (1) or more of his or her creditors shall be made defendants, asking to be declared an insolvent, and asking for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of his or her property and distribute the property among his or her creditors. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall appoint a receiver.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.) No. 48, § 1, p. 115; C. & M. Dig., § 5885; Pope's Dig., § 7607; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-201; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 238.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in the first sentence, substituted “circuit court” for “chancery court” and in the second sentence, substituted “court” for “chancery court, or judge thereof in vacation” and made gender neutral changes throughout.

Case Notes

Ancillary Receivers.

Where receiver is appointed in foreign state and ancillary receiver is then appointed in this state, the time within which ancillary receiver must move to discharge liens runs from his own, and not the principal receiver's appointment, the original and ancillary receivers being treated as different legal persons. Hill v. Caldarera, 197 Ark. 659, 124 S.W.2d 825 (1939).

16-117-302. Delivery of property — Selection of exempt property.

  1. When the receiver has been qualified, the debtor shall turn over to the receiver all of his or her property. For the real estate he or she shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the receiver a proper deed of conveyance.
  2. The debtor shall be allowed by the court to select and reserve whatever property may be allowed to him or her by law as exempt from execution.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 48, § 1, p. 115; C. & M. Dig., § 5885; Pope's Dig., § 7607; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-201.

Case Notes

Conflict of Law.

Where citizens of a state who are creditors of a nonresident or a foreign corporation have instituted proceedings in attachment and have acquired liens upon property in the state of their residence, receivers appointed in the domiciliary state will not be allowed to deprive such creditors of their rights, and the courts will protect the lien acquired by their citizens in preference to claims asserted by foreign receiver. Hill v. Caldarera, 197 Ark. 659, 124 S.W.2d 825 (1939).

16-117-303. List of creditors furnished — Notice.

The debtor shall furnish the names and addresses of his or her creditors, who shall be notified by mail and also by order of publication of the filing of the complaint.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 48, § 3, p. 115; C. & M. Dig., § 5887; Pope's Dig., § 7609; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-203.

16-117-304. Attachments — Intervention by receiver — Dismissal and return of property.

The receiver shall intervene in every case in which the property of the insolvent debtor has, within ten (10) days before the filing of the petition, been attached. Upon the receiver's motion, every such attachment shall be dissolved and the attached property shall be turned over to the receiver upon the payment by the receiver of all costs which have accrued in the attachment suit.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 48, § 2, p. 115; C. & M. Dig., § 5886; Pope's Dig., § 7608; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-202.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not apply to seizures of property under execution and does not require the receiver to intervene therein. J.M. McGuire & Co. v. Barnhill, 89 Ark. 209, 115 S.W. 1144 (1909).

16-117-305. Receiver to convert property into money.

As soon as the receiver shall have taken the property into his or her custody, he or she shall proceed under the direction of the court, or of the judge, in vacation, to convert the property into money.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 48, § 4, p. 115; C. & M. Dig., § 5888; Pope's Dig., § 7610; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-204.

16-117-306. Distribution of funds.

  1. Upon the final hearing, the court, after deducting the cost and paying all public taxes, shall order the proceeds to be distributed among the creditors in the order and with the following preferences:
    1. The salaries of employees earned within three (3) months and all laborers' wages shall be paid first;
    2. After making the payments provided for in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the funds in hand shall be applied pro rata towards the payment of the claims of all creditors who shall, before the making of the order of distribution, file in the court a stipulation for the use of the debtor to the effect that in consideration of the preference to be thus obtained, the debtor shall be acquitted of all further liability in personam to such creditor; and
    3. After making the payments provided for in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, the remainder of the funds, if any, shall be paid and distributed equally among the other creditors.
  2. If the action or proceeding is commenced within twelve (12) months from the filing of the stipulation provided for in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, the stipulation shall not be held or construed to affect or impair the right of the creditor to collect the remainder of his or her claim, if any, from any other person who is bound to him or her therefor, or to enforce any other security he or she may have for his or her claim, nor shall the stipulation be held to constitute a bar to any action brought or proceeding taken against the debtor for the balance of his or her debt, if the creditor proves that the debtor was guilty of fraud in obtaining the stipulation either by withholding his or her property from the receiver or otherwise.
  3. Any creditor having a lien upon any of the debtor's property for his or her claim shall be required to make a proper deduction for the value of his or her security before participating in the distribution of the general assets of the debtor.
  4. Except as to the creditors of the first class, as enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, no order for the distribution of the funds among the creditors shall be made within ninety (90) days from the first day of the publication of the order provided for in § 16-117-303.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 48, §§ 4-6, 8, p. 115; C. &. M. Dig., §§ 5888-5890, 5892; Pope's Dig., §§ 7610-7612, 7614; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 36-204 — 36-206, 36-208.

Case Notes

Salaries of Employees.

One appointed receiver for an insolvent corporation will be entitled to a preference for the amount due him for services rendered as an employee of the corporation before it was placed in the hands of a receiver. German Nat'l Bank v. Young, 114 Ark. 370, 169 S.W. 1178 (1914).

16-117-307. Insolvent partnerships.

In the case of an insolvent partnership, all or any of the partners may unite in one (1) complaint filed in the county where either one resides; but in such cases, all individual as well as firm property must be turned over to the receiver, and the firm property and the individual property shall be administered separately, according to the rules of equity.

History. Acts 1897 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 48, § 7, p. 115; C. & M. Dig., § 5891, Pope's Dig., § 7613; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-207.

Subchapter 4 — Assignments for Benefit of Creditors

Effective Dates. Acts 1859, No. 137, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 38, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1887, No. 101, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 109, § 6: effective on passage.

Case Notes

In General.

This subchapter was not repealed by § 16-117-301 et seq.Finch v. Watson Inv. Co., 184 Ark. 312, 42 S.W.2d 214 (1931).

Federal Jurisdiction.

This subchapter is not an insolvency law so as to conflict with federal bankruptcy law. Finch v. Watson Inv. Co., 184 Ark. 312, 42 S.W.2d 214 (1931).

16-117-401. Assignee to take possession of property — Inventory — Bond to be given.

  1. In all cases in which any person makes an assignment of his or her property for the benefit of his or her creditors, it shall be the duty of the assignee named in the deed of assignment to take immediate possession of the property for the purpose of making an inventory and description of the property and for the care and preservation of the property.
  2. Within ten (10) days after taking possession of the property, the assignee shall file with the clerk of the circuit court a full, true, and complete inventory and description of the property together with his or her bond in double the amount of the supposed value of the property with good security, to be approved by the clerk of the circuit court, which bond shall be conditioned that the assignee shall faithfully execute the trust confided to him or her under the provisions of the deed of assignment, and the order of the circuit court.

History. Acts 1895, No. 109, § 1, p. 162; C. & M. Dig., § 486; Pope's Dig., § 523; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-301; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 239.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (b), substituted “circuit court” for “court having equity jurisdiction” and “court” for “chancery court, or the judge thereof in vacation.”

Case Notes

In General.

A voluntary assignment of property by a debtor does not operate as security for the debts, nor does it create a lien on the property. It does pass the absolute title to the assignee for the purpose of raising a fund to pay debts. As against the assignee, the debtor has no estate which he can convey until the purposes of the trust are satisfied. Bartlett, Reid & Co. v. Teah, 1 F. 768 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1880) (decision under prior law).

Assignees.

Title to the property assigned vests in the assignee upon the execution and delivery of the deed by the assignor and cannot be defeated by an execution against the assignor coming to the hands of an officer after the delivery of the deed and before the filing of the schedule and bond. Clayton v. Johnson, 36 Ark. 406 (1880), overruled, Collier v. Davis, 47 Ark. 367, 1 S.W. 684 (1886) (decision under prior law); Phelps v. Wyler, 67 Ark. 97, 56 S.W. 632 (1899).

The assignee in a deed of assignment cannot maintain an action against an officer for taking the assigned goods under a writ of attachment against the assignor until he has filed the inventory and given the bond required by statute. Thatcher v. Franklin, 37 Ark. 64 (1881); Falconer v. Hunt, 39 Ark. 68 (1882) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Omission of clerk of United States court to endorse his approval on an assignee's bond will invalidate the assignment. Noyes v. Neel, 100 F. 555 (8th Cir. 1900).

A trust created by an assignment for the benefit of creditor will not be permitted to fail because the assignee fails to qualify. The court will either appoint a new trustee or entertain a complaint by the beneficiaries to execute the trust. H.B. Claflin Co. v. Middlesex Banking Co., 113 F. 958 (E.D. Ark. 1902).

Where the trustees in a deed which was in effect a general assignment for creditors had not taken possession of the property, made an inventory, or given bond, they could not recover the debtor's property which was taken on execution in a suit by the creditor. Brown v. Wilkes, 153 Ark. 545, 241 S.W. 383 (1922).

Deeds of Assignment.

The failure to attach a schedule of the property described in the deed renders such deed inoperative. Dodd v. Martin, 15 F. 338 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1882) (decision under prior law).

Any direction for the execution of the trust different from that provided by statute invalidates the assignment. Collier v. Davis, 47 Ark. 367, 1 S.W. 684 (1886); Richmond v. Mississippi Mills, 52 Ark. 30, 11 S.W. 960 (1889) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A conveyance made directly to a creditor by way of paying or securing his debt is not ordinarily an assignment; but a mortgage in form may constitute an assignment by reason of the intention of the parties and the operation of the instrument, and such intention may be shown by parol evidence of facts collateral to those stated in the instrument. Richmond v. Mississippi Mills, 52 Ark. 30, 11 S.W. 960 (1889) (decision under prior law).

Where one or more instruments are executed by a debtor in whatsoever form or by whatsoever name with the intention to have them operate as an assignment and with the intention of granting the property conveyed absolutely to the trustee to raise a fund to pay debts, the transaction constitutes an assignment; and if not made in conformity to statutory provisions regarding the execution of the trust is void. Richmond v. Mississippi Mills, 52 Ark. 30, 11 S.W. 960 (1889); Box v. Goodbar, 54 Ark. 6, 14 S.W. 925 (1890); Robson v. Tomlinson, 54 Ark. 229, 15 S.W. 456 (1891); Charles F. Penzel Co. v. Jett, 54 Ark. 428, 16 S.W. 120 (1891); Marquese v. Felsenthal, 58 Ark. 293, 24 S.W. 493 (1893) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A deed without defeasance which makes an absolute conveyance to a person directing him to take possession and sell to pay certain creditors, reserving the surplus for the grantor, is an assignment for creditors. State ex rel. West v. Dupuy, 52 Ark. 48, 11 S.W. 964 (1889) (decision under prior law).

The test to determine whether instruments executed by failing debtors in different forms constitute an assignment is: Can the grantee in such instruments be called to account for the proceeds of the conveyed property by other creditors? Fecheimer v. Robertson, 53 Ark. 101, 13 S.W. 423 (1890); Riggon v. Wolf, 53 Ark. 537, 14 S.W. 922 (1890) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A deed of assignment of property of a corporation executed by a majority of the directors merely at a meeting of which the absent directors had no notice is void. Simon v. Sevier County Co-op. Ass'n, 54 Ark. 58, 14 S.W. 1101 (1890) (decision under prior law).

A pledge of choses in action to a trustee for the benefit of certain creditors does not constitute an assignment. Goodbar v. Locke, 56 Ark. 314, 19 S.W. 924 (1892) (decision under prior law).

A provision in a deed of assignment authorizing the assignee to sue for notes and accounts is valid. Hill v. Woodberry, 49 F. 138 (8th Cir. 1892) (decision under prior law).

An assignment by partners granted “all the copartnership estate, property, assets and effects, choses in action, claims and demands” of the firm. The schedule of assets included land in another state which had been bought and paid for by the firm and deed thereon taken in the name of one partner. It was held that all title and interest in such land was conveyed by the assignment. Paxson v. Brown, 61 F. 874 (8th Cir. 1894) (decision under prior law).

General assignment of all property directing disposal in manner provided by law is not invalid. Adams v. Allen-West Comm'n Co., 64 Ark. 603, 44 S.W. 462 (1898).

Assignment was not invalidated by failure to provide expressly for disposition of residue. Moore v. Goodbar, 66 Ark. 161, 49 S.W. 571 (1899); Nelson v. Harper, 122 Ark. 39, 182 S.W. 519 (1916).

Married women may prefer claim of husband in general assignment. Phelps v. Wyler, 67 Ark. 97, 56 S.W. 632 (1899).

A conveyance to trustees for the payment of the grantor's debts without a defeasance in the event of payment by the grantor constituted a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. Brown v. Wilkes, 153 Ark. 545, 241 S.W. 383 (1922).

Filing Bond and Inventory.

A deed which stipulates that the assignee shall take possession of the property before giving bond or filing inventory is void. Rice v. Frayser, 24 F. 460 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1885) (decision under prior law).

Assignment is not invalidated by failure to file inventory. Vahlberg v. Birnbaum, 64 Ark. 207, 41 S.W. 581 (1897).

A provision in a deed to the effect that an assignee shall not take possession of the property until filing bond is surplusage and does not authorize him to take possession before filing an inventory. Sanger v. Flow, 48 F. 152 (8th Cir. 1891), writ of error dismissed, 149 U.S. 785, 13 S. Ct. 1051, 37 L. Ed. 962 (1893).

Assignment is not invalidated by failure to file bond in 10 days. Moore v. Goodbar, 66 Ark. 161, 49 S.W. 571 (1899); Nelson v. Harper, 122 Ark. 39, 182 S.W. 519 (1916).

Possession of Property.

When, in pursuance of a collateral agreement contemporary with the execution of the assignment, the assignor delivers possession to the assignee before the bond and inventory are filed, the assignment is void as to creditors. Gilkerson-Sloss Comm'n Co. v. London, 53 Ark. 88, 13 S.W. 513 (1890); Smith v. Patterson, 57 Ark. 537, 22 S.W. 342 (1893) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A direction in an assignment for the assignee to “forthwith” take possession vitiates the assignment. Lincoln v. Field, 54 Ark. 471, 16 S.W. 288 (1891) (decision under prior law).

When assigned property has been placed in the hands of a receiver, his possession cannot be interfered with under process from a court of concurrent jurisdiction. Walker v. Geo. Taylor Comm'n Co., 56 Ark. 1, 18 S.W. 1056 (1892) (decision under prior law).

A recital that the grantee make an inventory and give bond and, after first having given bond, take possession did not invalidate the assignment, as by its terms the inventory and bond were to precede the taking of possession. Excelsior Mfg. Co. v. Owens, 58 Ark. 556, 25 S.W. 868 (1894) (decision under prior law).

A provision in a deed of assignment that the assignee should not take possession of the property until he had filed an inventory and bond did not render evidence of a secret agreement to the contrary between the parties inadmissible. Badgett v. Johnson-Fife Hat Co., 85 F. 408 (8th Cir. 1898).

Trustee in assignment cannot recover property assigned after it has been taken under an execution. Brown v. Wilkes, 153 Ark. 545, 241 S.W. 383 (1922).

Preferences and Reservations.

An assignor may exact releases from his creditors as a condition of preference, but a reservation of the surplus either expressly or by operation of law to the assignor vitiates the assignment. McReynolds v. Dedman, 47 Ark. 347, 1 S.W. 552 (1886); Collier v. Davis, 47 Ark. 367, 1 S.W. 684 (1886); Wolf v. Gray, 53 Ark. 75, 13 S.W. 512 (1890) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The reservation in an assignment of a sum of money to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the assigned property, equal to the value of his exemptions in personal property, vitiates the assignment. King v. Ruble, 54 Ark. 418, 16 S.W. 7 (1891) (decision under prior law).

A preference in an assignment for more than the debt due the preferred creditor with the intention to subsequently dispose of the surplus by paying another creditor therewith vitiates the assignment. Waples-Platter Co. v. Low, 54 F. 93 (8th Cir. 1893) (decision under prior law).

In a general assignment, assignor may exact release as condition of preference. King v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry-Goods Co., 60 Ark. 1, 28 S.W. 514 (1894) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518, 53 S. Ct. 262, 77 L. Ed. 469 (1933).

16-117-402. Actions contesting assignment.

  1. All proceedings for the purpose of contesting the validity of the assignment shall be instituted within six (6) months from the date of the assignment, by filing complaint in the circuit court of the proper county, setting forth the grounds upon which the assignment is contested.
  2. Any creditor or person interested in the execution of the assignment may be made parties plaintiff or defendant to the proceeding.
  3. If, for any cause, the assignment is declared void, the assignment shall then be considered and treated as a general assignment of all his or her property, not exempt from execution, for the benefit of all his or her creditors pro rata. The property shall be disposed of and distributed for their benefit under the orders and direction of the circuit court. The assignee shall become subject to the control and direction of the circuit court in the same manner as if he or she had been appointed a receiver to take charge of the fund in circuit court.

History. Acts 1895, No. 109, § 3, p. 162; C. & M. Dig., § 489; Pope's Dig., § 526; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-304.

Case Notes

Collateral Attacks.

The appointment of a receiver of assigned property cannot be questioned collaterally. Lowenstein v. Finney, 54 Ark. 124, 15 S.W. 153 (1854) (decision under prior law).

Creditors.

A preferred creditor attacking assignment cannot claim under it. Adler-Goldman Comm'n Co. v. People's Bank, 65 Ark. 380, 46 S.W. 536 (1898).

16-117-403. Contest of assignment due to fraud.

Any assignment for the benefit of creditors may be contested or attacked for fraud by any creditors. Proof of fraud on the part of the assignor shall be sufficient to invalidate the assignment, whether the assignee knew of it or not.

History. Acts 1887, No. 101, § 1, p. 194; C. & M. Dig., § 488; Pope's Dig., § 525; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-303.

Case Notes

In General.

A fraudulent disposition of property invalidates a subsequent assignment only when it is part of the scheme to defraud and the provisions of the deed are calculated to promote that object. Hill v. Woodberry, 49 F. 138 (8th Cir. 1892); Excelsior Mfg. Co. v. Owens, 58 Ark. 556, 25 S.W. 868 (1894); Vahlberg v. Birnbaum, 64 Ark. 207, 41 S.W. 581 (1897).

Conjoined Assignments.

Fraud in one of three conjoined, but distinct, assignments did not affect the other two. Lazarus v. Camden Nat'l Bank, 64 Ark. 322, 42 S.W. 412 (1897).

Assignment of certain assets and a general assignment was held one transaction and fraudulent as reserving benefit to assignors. Winter v. Kirby, 68 Ark. 471, 60 S.W. 34 (1900).

Fraud of Assignor.

Prior to this section assignments could not be set aside for fraud of the assignor not participated in by the assignee or creditors. Hill v. Shrygley, 51 Ark. 56, 9 S.W. 845 (1888).

Title passes with the delivery of the deed and subsequent fraud will not violate it. Lowenstein v. Finney, 54 Ark. 124, 15 S.W. 153 (1854).

Intention to evade statutory provisions is not necessarily fraud. Worthen v. Griffith, 59 Ark. 562, 28 S.W. 286 (1894).

Mere general allegations that an assignment made by the assignor of his assets was made to defraud his creditors is insufficient. Baxter County Bank v. Copeland, 114 Ark. 316, 169 S.W. 1180 (1914).

Remedies.

Property fraudulently assigned may be attached. McReynolds v. Dedman, 47 Ark. 347, 1 S.W. 552 (1886) (decision under prior law).

Withholding of Property.

When a failing debtor makes an assignment, purporting to be of all his property, and intentionally withholds a valuable part, the assignment is fraudulent as to attaching creditors, although the property withheld was intended to, and actually did, pay other creditors. Probst & Hilb v. Welden, 46 Ark. 405 (1885) (decision under prior law); Penzel Grocer Co. v. Williams, 53 Ark. 81, 13 S.W. 736 (1890); Lazarus v. Camden Nat'l Bank, 64 Ark. 322, 42 S.W. 412 (1897).

The omission of a debtor to include in his assignment property held by a factor under a lien to secure a debt to himself, being in value less than the debt secured, is not a fraudulent withholding of assets. Wolf v. Gray, 53 Ark. 75, 13 S.W. 512 (1890).

An assignment purporting to convey all the property, not exempt, is vitiated by the intentional withholding of any material part other than the exemptions. Penzel Grocer Co. v. Williams, 53 Ark. 81, 13 S.W. 736 (1890).

The unintentional withholding of an immaterial portion of the assigned property, less in value than the assignor might have claimed as exempt, will not vitiate an assignment purporting to convey all of the assignor's property. Lowenstein v. Finney, 54 Ark. 124, 15 S.W. 153 (1854); Burks v. Goodbar, 58 Ark. 283, 24 S.W. 424 (1893).

Reservation of property claimed as exemptions does not invalidate the assignment. Baker v. Baer, 59 Ark. 503, 28 S.W. 28 (1894); King v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry-Goods Co., 60 Ark. 1, 28 S.W. 514 (1894); Lazarus v. Camden Nat'l Bank, 64 Ark. 322, 42 S.W. 412 (1897).

Reservation of a homestead of more than its legal value will not invalidate an assignment. Mansur & Tibbetts Implement Co. v. Wood, 63 Ark. 362, 38 S.W. 898 (1897).

Fraudulent withholding of assets was not cured by subsequently claiming them as exempt. Lazarus v. Camden Nat'l Bank, 64 Ark. 322, 42 S.W. 412 (1897).

Removing goods after the deed is made and before delivery renders the deed fraudulent. Ball-Warren Comm'n Co. v. Wills, 65 Ark. 270, 45 S.W. 687 (1898).

Insolvent firm preferring creditor of individual member is a withholding of assets and invalid. Bartlett v. Meyer-Schmidt Grocery Co., 65 Ark. 290, 45 S.W. 1063 (1898).

16-117-404. Sale or disposal of property.

  1. Upon the petition of any person interested in the execution of the assignment presented to the circuit court, setting forth the necessity for the sale or disposition of the property or any portion thereof not provided for in the deed of assignment, the circuit court shall make such order in relation thereto as may seem just and for the best interest of the estate, setting forth the time and terms of the sale. The order shall be endorsed upon the petition and filed with the clerk of the circuit court.
  2. Nothing in this section and §§ 16-117-401, 16-117-402, and 16-117-405 shall be construed as to authorize the assignee to sell or dispose of the property until he or she has executed his or her bond in accordance with the provisions of § 16-117-401.

History. Acts 1895, No. 109, §§ 2, 4, p. 162; C. & M. Dig., §§ 487, 490; Pope's Dig., §§ 524, 527; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 36-302, 36-305; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 240.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), substituted “circuit court” for “chancellor in court” and “court” for “chancellor.”

Case Notes

Creditors' Rights.

Election to claim under an assignment does not estop a creditor from enforcing certain other rights he has in assets held as collateral. Cockrill v. Joyce, 62 Ark. 216, 35 S.W. 221 (1896).

Creditors preferred by classes share pro rata in distribution in their class. Bank of Commerce v. Bland, 64 Ark. 226, 41 S.W. 762 (1897).

Provisions Mandatory.

The provisions of this section are mandatory and not directory. Jaffray v. McGehee, 107 U.S. 361, 2 S. Ct. 367, 27 L. Ed. 495 (1882).

16-117-405. Employment of counsel by assignee.

In case any portion of the property involved in the assignment becomes involved in litigation, that fact, when made known to the circuit court by the assignee, shall authorize the circuit court to direct the assignee to employ counsel either to prosecute or defend in the litigation. The circuit court shall stipulate in the order the percentage to be allowed the attorney as the fee for his or her services, which is to be paid out of the estate.

History. Acts 1895, No. 109, § 5, p. 162; C. & M. Dig., § 491; Pope's Dig., § 528; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-306; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 241.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in the first sentence, substituted “circuit court” for “court, or the chancellor in vacation” and “court” for “chancellor” and in the second sentence, deleted “or chancellor” and substituted “his or her” for “his.”

Case Notes

Attorney's Fees.

A provision in a deed of assignment for the payment of an attorney's fee for preparing and perfecting the assignment, and not for future services, was valid. Lowenstein v. Finney, 54 Ark. 124, 15 S.W. 153 (1854) (decision under prior law).

16-117-406. Account of assignee — Allowances to assignee.

  1. The assignee shall, in the circuit court of the county in which the assignment is made, after one (1) year from the date of the assignment, and every year thereafter until the proceeds of the property assigned are disposed of for the benefit of creditors, present to the circuit court a fair written statement or current account in which the assignee shall charge himself or herself with the whole amount of the property assigned, including all debts due or to become due, and credit himself or herself with all sums of money expended, either by payment of debts or otherwise, exhibiting with the account the receipts and vouchers for all moneys paid out to the creditors of the assignment.
  2. The account so made out shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county and become a part of the record thereof. Certified copies of the account shall be competent evidence of the facts contained therein, in any of the courts of this state, in the same manner and to the same extent as the records of any other court.
  3. The account shall be carefully examined by the circuit court. Upon the examination the circuit court shall allow the assignee for all debts with which he or she stands charged, which the circuit court shall be satisfied could not be collected, and shall allow the assignee any sum not exceeding ten percent (10%) on all sums less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and on all sums over one thousand dollars ($1,000), five percent (5%) for his or her risk and trouble in attending to the settlement of the assignment.

History. Acts 1859, No. 137, § 2, p. 151; 1883, No. 38, § 2, p. 60; C. & M. Dig., §§ 492, 493; Pope's Dig., §§ 529, 530; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 36-307, 36-308; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 242.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), substituted “in the circuit court” for “at the first term of the chancery court,” deleted “at the corresponding term of the court” preceding “every year thereafter” and made gender neutral changes; and, in (b), substituted “circuit court” for “chancery court.”

16-117-407. Liability of assignee on bond.

The assignee shall be liable upon his or her bond to anyone interested in the property included in the assignment for any loss that may occur by reason of his or her negligence or mismanagement of the property after the property comes into his or her possession. He or she shall also be liable for any failure upon his or her part to obey the orders of the circuit court in relation thereto or to carry out the provisions of the assignment.

History. Acts 1895, No. 109, § 2, p. 162; C. & M. Dig., § 487; Pope's Dig., § 524; A.S.A. 1947, § 36-302.

Case Notes

Right to Sue.

Any creditor may sue on the bond. The action is transitory, and he recovers only his pro rata share. Hays v. Comstock-Castle Co., 70 Ark. 151, 66 S.W. 649 (1902).

Void Assignments.

The mere fact that an assignment for the benefit of creditors may have been void could not impose liability on the assignees or their sureties where the assignees fully accounted for all assets coming into their hands. Finch v. Watson Inv. Co., 184 Ark. 312, 42 S.W.2d 214 (1931).

Chapter 118 Miscellaneous Actions

Effective Dates. Acts 1877, No. 48, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 46, § 11: approved Nov. 14, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an urgent need to validate otherwise legal marriages declared void by court decisions, to declare and preserve the legitimacy of the children born of such marriages, and to validate all property rights between the parties themselves and third persons; that it is in the best interest of the state that this act declaring such marriages take effect immediately. It is further determined that it is in the best interest of the state that the actions of alienation of affection and criminal conversation be abolished immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1997, No. 341, § 5: Mar. 5, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that victims of crime should be allowed to recover damages from the perpetrator of the crime; that in some instances the present law does not provide an adequate remedy to victims of crime; and that this act is immediately necessary to assist victims of crime. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1999, No. 985, § 5. Mar. 31, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that gambling on credit creates a serious social and economic problem for the citizens of this state; and that least one court has applied the statute amended by this act contrary to the best interests of the citizens of this state and the public policy of this state; that this act clarifies the law; and that this act should go into effect as soon as possible to settle the issues enumerated. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 556, § 7: Mar. 26, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention currently estimates that five hundred fifty-one (551) girls or women in Arkansas are at the risk of, or have undergone, female genital mutilation; that female genital mutilation is recognized globally as a human rights violation; and that this legislation is immediately needed to help the women of Arkansas as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto”.

16-118-101. Agreed cases.

  1. Parties to a question which might be the subject of a civil action may, without action, agree upon a case containing the facts upon which the controversy depends and present a submission of the case to any court which would have jurisdiction if an action had been brought.
  2. It must appear by affidavit that the controversy is real and the proceedings are in good faith to determine the rights of the parties.
  3. The court shall, upon submission of the case, hear and determine the case and render judgment as if an action were pending.
  4. The case, the submission, and the judgment shall constitute the record.
  5. The judgment shall be with costs, may be enforced, and shall be subject to reversal in the same manner as if it had been rendered in an action unless otherwise provided in the submission.

History. Civil Code, §§ 719-721; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1340-1342; Pope's Dig., §§ 1565-1567; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-401 — 34-403.

16-118-102. Obtaining discovery.

  1. No action to obtain a discovery shall be brought except in aid of some other action pending where any person or corporation is liable, either jointly or severally with others, by the same contract. In such a case, an action may be brought against any of the parties who are liable to obtain discovery of the names and residences of the others who are also liable.
    1. In such actions, the plaintiff shall state in his or her complaint, in effect, that he or she has used due diligence, without success, to obtain the information asked to be discovered and that he or she does not believe the parties to the contract, who are known to him or her, have property sufficient to satisfy his or her claims.
    2. The complaint and the cost of the action shall be paid by the plaintiff unless the discovery is resisted.

History. Civil Code, § 788; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1037-1039; Pope's Dig., §§ 1239-1241; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1101.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Discovery Procedure, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 314.

Case Notes

“Fishing Expeditions.”

Where the state asked the court to require the defendant to disclose confidential information contained in its books, so that the state could use that information on which to predicate an action for recovery, relief sought was denied, because to allow the sovereign to exercise such a “fishing expedition” would be far in excess of the doctrine of common law of bona vacantia. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, 206 S.W.2d 771 (1947).

Names.

Under allegations of complaint in suit to enforce liability of bank stockholders brought against inter-insurance exchange and two other parties alleged to be trustees holding large sums of money to which the exchange was entitled, this section was not applicable to obtain names of unknown members of the exchange. Vandover v. Lumber Underwriters, 197 Ark. 718, 126 S.W.2d 105 (1939).

16-118-103. Gambling debts and losses.

        1. Any person who loses any money or property at any game or gambling device, or any bet or wager whatever, may recover the money or property by obtaining a judgment ordering the return of the money or property following an action against the person winning the money or property.
        2. The suit shall be instituted within ninety (90) days after the paying over of the money or property so lost.
      1. The replevin suit provided for in subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section does not excuse a person from liability for or create a defense under § 5-2-601 et seq. to any crime of violence with which he or she may be charged as a result of conduct to recover money or property so lost.
    1. The heirs, executors, administrators, or creditors of the person losing any money or property at any game or gambling device, or on any bet or wager whatever, may have the same remedy as is provided in subdivision (a)(1) of this section for the person losing.
    2. Nothing in this subsection shall be so construed as to enable any person to recover any money or property lost on any turf race.
    1. All judgments, conveyances, bonds, bills, notes, securities, and contracts, where the consideration or any part thereof is money or property won at any game or gambling device, or any bet or wager whatever, or for money or property lent to be bet at any gaming or gambling device, or at any sport or pastime whatever, shall be void.
    2. The assignment of any bond, bill, note, judgment, conveyance, contract, or other security shall not affect the defense of the person executing the assignment.
  1. Any matter of defense under this section may be specially pleaded or may be given in evidence under the general issue.
    1. In all suits under this section, the plaintiff may call on the defendant to answer on oath any interrogatory touching the case, and if the defendant refuses to answer, the same shall be taken as confessed.
    2. The answer shall not be admitted as evidence against the person in any proceedings by indictment.
  2. It is the strong public policy of the State of Arkansas that gambling, whether regulated or unregulated, on credit is an unenforceable contract and the courts of this state shall not enforce gambling debts, regardless of whether the contract was entered into within this state or without this state.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 68, §§ 1-8; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4899-4905; Pope's Dig., §§ 6112-6118; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1601 — 34-1608; Acts 1999, No. 985, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 243; 2009, No. 460, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2009, No. 460, § 3, provided: “It is the intent of this Act to overrule Daniels v. State, 373 Ark. 536, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2008), and its interpretation of § 16-118-103(a)(1). That case and its interpretation of replevin and the holding in Davidson v. State, 200 Ark. 495, 139 S.W.2d 409 (1940), are contrary to the public policy of this State.”

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (d)(1), deleted “in the circuit court or before a justice of the peace.”

The 2009 amendment, in (a)(1), inserted (A)(1)(B), redesignated the remaining text accordingly, and inserted “obtaining a judgment ordering the return of the money or property following an” in (a)(1)(A)(i).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Bills and Notes — Holders in Due Course of Gaming Instruments, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 218.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section reaches only to notes or securities executed by the loser at a gaming device, or to the case where one has borrowed money or property to bet at a gaming device. Rumping v. Ark. Nat'l Bank, 121 Ark. 202, 180 S.W. 749 (1915).

This section does not apply to a stakeholder nor affect his liability to a bettor who requests return of the wager while the contract is executory, but applies only to the bettor after execution of the contract. Williams v. Kagy, 176 Ark. 484, 3 S.W.2d 332 (1928).

This section does not apply to the recovery of money alleged to have been paid as a bribe. Womack v. Maner, 227 Ark. 786, 301 S.W.2d 438 (1957).

Burden of Proof.

One who pleads this section in defense against a note and mortgage fair on their face must prove the defense by clear and strong proof. Johnson v. Godden, 33 Ark. 600 (1878).

When a person is induced by fraud to part with a check, the burden is upon a subsequent holder to show that he was an innocent holder for value. Ark. Nat'l Bank v. Martin, 110 Ark. 578, 163 S.W. 795 (1914).

In action on bank check signed by defendant, burden of proving defense that check was given for gambling debt was on defendant. Johnson v. Stout, 218 Ark. 599, 238 S.W.2d 97 (1951).

Construction with Other Laws.

Because defendant who stabbed a victim multiple times with a long knife was attempting to recover money that he had lost gambling with the victim, to which he had a right under this section, defendant could not be found guilty of aggravated robbery absent evidence that he was trying to get money in addition to money lost by gambling. Daniels v. State, 373 Ark. 536, 285 S.W.3d 205 (2008), superseded by statute as stated in, Heard v. State, 2009 Ark. 546, 354 S.W.3d 49 (2009).

Docket Entries.

The docket entries of a justice of the peace are quasi-records and, when certified, are receivable in evidence. Gates v. Bennett, 33 Ark. 475 (1878).

Judgments, Etc., Void.

Before one can be considered a bona fide holder of commercial paper, he must have acquired without notice or knowledge of defenses or circumstances which would put the purchaser on inquiry that such defenses existed. Little v. Ark. Nat'l Bank, 113 Ark. 72, 167 S.W. 75 (1914).

Note for money loaned to be bet in a dice game in which both maker and payee participated was void. Singley v. Norman, 202 Ark. 532, 150 S.W.2d 947 (1941).

The fact that the maker of a note given to a bank used part of the proceeds of the loan to pay gambling debts previously incurred did not render the note void under this section so as to release a guarantor on the note. Rauch v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 Ark. 941, 428 S.W.2d 89 (1968).

Public Policy.

Since Arkansas permits gambling in certain regulated contexts, and recognizes the opportunities to legally gamble in other states, there does not appear to be any Arkansas prohibition or policy against state-sanctioned and regulated gambling in Arkansas or any other state. In re Armstrong, 217 B.R. 569 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998).

Arkansas public policy does not necessarily preclude enforcement of valid and legal gambling debts incurred in another state. In re Armstrong, 217 B.R. 569 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998).

Recovery of Money and Property.

In an action to recover property lost on a horse race, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the race was not a turf race. Nelson v. Waters, 18 Ark. 570 (1857).

This section does not authorize the recovery of an article sold for value to be raffled off. Carey v. Watkins, 97 Ark. 153, 133 S.W. 1016 (1911).

Property lost in gambling may be recovered in an action of replevin. Lane v. Alexander, 168 Ark. 700, 271 S.W. 710 (1925).

Person seeking to recover possession by force of money which he lost gambling within 90 days thereafter would not be guilty of robbery, although he may be guilty of assault. Davidson v. State, 200 Ark. 495, 139 S.W.2d 409 (1940).

Right of Action.

An action will not lie to recover property lost on a bet or wager against a third person, to whom the winner has sold it. Nelson v. Waters, 18 Ark. 570 (1857).

No court will aid a man whose cause of action is founded upon an illegal or immoral act. Whenever the action appears to arise ex turpi causa or from the transgression of the law, the courts refuse their assistance, not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not aid such a plaintiff. Martin v. Hodge, 47 Ark. 378, 1 S.W. 694 (1886).

The only right of action given by this section is against the winner. Rumping v. Ark. Nat'l Bank, 121 Ark. 202, 180 S.W. 749 (1915).

Without the presentation of a winning Classix ticket, a bettor is precluded from asserting a claim sounding in either tort or contract. Register v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, Inc., 306 Ark. 318, 811 S.W.2d 315, modified on reh'g, 306 Ark. 321, 821 S.W.2d 475 (1991).

Cited: In re Morse, 236 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Ark. 1965); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977); Woodend v. Southland Racing Corp., 337 Ark. 380, 989 S.W.2d 505 (1999); Meeks v. Red River Entm't, 231 B.R. 739 (E.D. Ark. 1999).

16-118-104. Vendor's action for recovery of property.

  1. In any action brought in the courts of this state for the recovery of money contracted for property in possession of the vendee, it shall not be lawful to include the property in any schedule intended to protect the property, or exempt it from seizure on attachment or sale on execution or other process issued from any court for the collection of any debt upon the claim of the plaintiff.
  2. In any such action the court or clerk shall issue, on petition of the plaintiff, duly verified, describing the property and stating its value at or after commencement of the action, an order, which may be embodied in the original summons if the order is issued at the same time as the original, stating the name of the court and the style of the action and directing the county sheriff or other officer to take the property described in the petition and hold it subject to the orders of the court.
  3. The defendant may give bond for the retention of the property as in cases of orders of delivery of personal property.
  4. When it appears by affidavit of the plaintiff or by the return of the order of the court, or when it is shown by the plaintiff's petition, that the property has been disposed of or concealed so that the order cannot be executed, the court may compel the attendance of the defendant and examine him or her on oath as to the situation of the property, and the court punish a disobedience of its order as in cases of contempt.

History. Acts 1877, No. 48, §§ 1-4, p. 47; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8729-8732; Pope's Dig., §§ 11422-11425; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-2301 — 34-2304.

Cross References. Bond for retention of property in replevin, § 18-60-816.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Conditional Sales in Arkansas, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 19.

The Old and the New: Article IX, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 145.

Creditors' Provisional Remedies and Debtors' Due Process Rights: Attachment and Garnishment in Arkansas, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 607.

Case Notes

In General.

The section does not give a continuous, subsisting lien on the property for the purchase price, but only excepts it from exemption, and enables the vendor, in a suit for the purchase money, to seize it at once, if in control of the vendee, without alleging ordinary grounds of attachment. Bridgeford & Co. v. Adams, 45 Ark. 136 (1885).

Bond for Retention of Property.

There can be no summary judgment against the sureties on the delivery bond. Creanor v. Creanor, 36 Ark. 91 (1880).

The bond is absolute to perform the judgment of the court and cannot be avoided by an offer to return the property or by a plea that the vendor had no title to it. Mayfield v. Creamer, 39 Ark. 460 (1882).

Where, in a suit for the purchase money of a chattel, an order was issued directing the constable to take possession of the chattel and a stranger who had possession thereof delivered to the constable a sum of money in lieu of a bond and kept the chattel and thereafter interpleaded for it, it was error to treat the money as absolutely liable for whatever judgment might be rendered against the defendant instead of as a pledge for the return of the chattel in the event it should be liable for a judgment for the purchase money. Fondren v. Norton, 86 Ark. 410, 111 S.W. 647 (1908).

Where a bond executed by defendant provided that the property should be forthcoming and subject to the orders of the court, the sureties were discharged upon the delivery of the property. Rogers v. Tri-State Motor Sales Co., 165 Ark. 590, 265 S.W. 80 (1924).

Lien of Vendor.

When consideration is money value of services or other matters and the services are not performed, the lien exists. Swanger v. Goodwin, 49 Ark. 287, 5 S.W. 319 (1887).

When personal property is sold in another state and brought to Arkansas, this lien is enforceable, although there was none under the law of the state where the sale took place. Swanger v. Goodwin, 49 Ark. 287, 5 S.W. 319 (1887).

Right of redemption from sale under vendor's lien is exactly the same as from sale under mortgage. Pine Bluff, Monroe & New Orleans Ry. v. James, 54 Ark. 81, 15 S.W. 15 (1891).

A vendor of personal property who retains the possession thereof has a lien thereon for the unpaid purchase money, which he may enforce if there is no contract to the contrary. Mattar Bros. v. Wathen, 99 Ark. 329, 138 S.W. 455 (1911).

This section contemplates that the lien claimant shall be the vendor of the chattels on which the lien is sought to be established. Borengasser v. Chatwell, 207 Ark. 608, 182 S.W.2d 389 (1944).

Contract for sale of personalty providing that seller should have title not only to the present assets of the business but also to any new merchandise purchased was ineffectual insofar as it attempted to put title to new property in seller so as to give a vendor's lien under this section, but it gave vendor an equitable lien on assets subsequently acquired. Borengasser v. Chatwell, 207 Ark. 608, 182 S.W.2d 389 (1944).

Judgment providing a lien on a tractor in favor of the tractor seller amounted to harmless error where the seller's asserted lien, based on retention of title as provided for in the written sale contract, could be enforced by further proceedings pursuant to this section. Traylor v. Huntsman, 253 Ark. 704, 488 S.W.2d 30 (1972).

Remedies Available.

No lien is given to the vendor of personal property upon property sold, only a remedy for impounding it to prevent the vendee from putting it beyond his reach pendente lite. Roach v. Johnson, 71 Ark. 344, 74 S.W. 299 (1903).

On failure to receive payment, the seller, where title is retained, may waive his right to the property and sue for the debt, in which case he can impound the property. Coblentz & Logsdon v. L.D. Powell Co., 148 Ark. 151, 229 S.W. 25 (1921).

This section does not create an equitable lien in favor of the vendor of personal property who has retained title thereto until the purchase money is paid; he may either recover the property, or he may sue for the price, in which case the property is not exempt from execution. Olson v. Moody, Knight & Lewis, Inc., 156 Ark. 319, 246 S.W. 3 (1922).

Where the vendor of personal property takes notes for purchase money and retains title till they are paid, he has the right, on the failure of the vendee to pay the notes, to elect to treat the sale as absolute and sue to recover the debt and attach the property that his lien may be enforced against it. H.V. Beasley Music Co. v. Cash, 164 Ark. 572, 262 S.W. 656 (1924).

A vendor of personal property who has retained title thereto till the purchase price is paid may, on default in payment, treat the sale as absolute and sue to recover the debt and have the property attached to satisfy the judgment. Reed v. Webb, 165 Ark. 282, 262 S.W. 1001 (1924).

A vendor who has retained title in personal property until the purchase price is paid has only two remedies for a breach of the contract. He may treat the sale as canceled and bring replevin for the property, or treat the sale as absolute and sue for the unpaid purchase money and attach the property. Loden v. Paris Auto Co., 174 Ark. 720, 296 S.W. 78 (1927); Beene Motor Co. v. Dison, 180 Ark. 1064, 23 S.W.2d 971 (1930).

In an action by mortgagee to foreclose chattel mortgage on mortgagor's goods, where seller intervened and asked for judgment of unpaid balance of purchase price under conditional sale contract and that her lien be declared a first lien on all equipment sold under the contract, seller's action constituted an election to treat the sale as absolute and recover balance of purchase price, and prayer for lien did not change the nature of the action. Roy v. Notestine, 216 Ark. 447, 226 S.W.2d 66 (1950).

Specific attachment is available to a conditional seller. Davis v. Little, 225 Ark. 56, 279 S.W.2d 31 (1955).

Upon breach of a conditional sales contract the seller has two remedies: he can take possession of the merchandise, thereby canceling the obligation of the buyer to pay; or he can treat the sale as consummated and sue for the balance of the purchase price. Jones v. Cox, 227 Ark. 750, 301 S.W.2d 12 (1957).

Correct measure of damages for loss of use of truck where defendant, after having made first payment, defaulted and plaintiff brought action for balance due and had truck attached was the rental value or reasonable value of the use of the property. Mowery v. House, 234 Ark. 878, 355 S.W.2d 275 (1962).

Remedy Precluded.

This remedy provided by this section cannot be maintained when the property is held by assignee for the benefit of creditors. Bridgeford & Co. v. Adams, 45 Ark. 136 (1885).

The remedy provided by this section cannot be maintained when property has passed by death of vendee to his representatives. Blass v. Hood, 57 Ark. 13, 20 S.W. 544 (1892).

The remedy provided by this section cannot be maintained when the property is placed in receiver's hands. Halpern v. Clarendon Hardwood Lumber Co., 64 Ark. 132, 40 S.W. 784 (1897).

This remedy is not enforceable against purchaser for value, even if he had notice that purchase price had not been paid. Neal v. Cone, 76 Ark. 273, 88 S.W. 952 (1905); McComb v. Judsonia State Bank, 91 Ark. 218, 120 S.W. 844 (1909); Clements v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 99 Ark. 335, 138 S.W. 971 (1911); Lavender v. Finch, 144 Ark. 199, 222 S.W. 35 (1920).

This section does not authorize the vendor to follow the property into the hands of one who in good faith acquired from the vendee possession and ownership. Clements v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 99 Ark. 335, 138 S.W. 971 (1911).

Stock of groceries which had been regularly exposed to sale and replenished over 15-month period was not subject to attachment under this section in action by seller of grocery business against purchaser. Marvin v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 204, 281 S.W.2d 926 (1955).

Rights of Vendors.

The right of the vendor of personal property to have the property seized and applied to the purchase price is not personal to the vendor, but passes to the assignee of the note given for the property. Creanor v. Creanor, 36 Ark. 91 (1880).

It is immaterial whether a note for purchase money is assigned before or after maturity. Morris v. Ham, 47 Ark. 293, 1 S.W. 519 (1886).

The vendor's action is not to enforce a lien, but to create one by way of attachment. Fox v. Ark. Indus. Co., 52 Ark. 450, 12 S.W. 875 (1889).

The privilege of the vendor must be exercised while the property is in the possession of the vendee, and cannot take precedence of the right of a prior attaching creditor. Fox v. Ark. Indus. Co., 52 Ark. 450, 12 S.W. 875 (1889).

After property has been seized under attachment by a third person, it is no longer in the power of the vendee, and the vendor by subsequent process against it can acquire no right beyond that of a second attaching creditor. Fox v. Ark. Indus. Co., 52 Ark. 450, 12 S.W. 875 (1889); Bryan Brown Shoe Co. v. Block, 52 Ark. 458, 12 S.W. 1073 (1889).

Vendee garnished for purchase price of chattels cannot claim exemptions therein. Liddell v. Jones, 76 Ark. 344, 88 S.W. 961 (1905).

This section authorizes the sequestration of property only when found in the possession or control of the vendee. Holman v. Nutt, 120 Ark. 446, 179 S.W. 811 (1915).

The evidence supported the finding that there was no repossession and debt cancellation where the conditional seller took possession of the automobile and put it in company storage facilities after the conditional buyer had notified the assignee of the conditional sale contract that she was unable to continue payment and that the automobile was parked unattended on a public street, had mailed the assignee the keys for the automobile, had moved to another town, and had made no effort to reclaim the automobile after she had parked it on the street. Newbern v. Morris, 233 Ark. 938, 349 S.W.2d 662 (1961).

Cited: Woods v. Bournes, 228 Ark. 540, 309 S.W.2d 309 (1958).

16-118-105. Usurpation of office or franchise — Vacation of charters.

  1. In lieu of the writs of scire facias and quo warranto, or of information in the nature of a quo warranto, actions may be brought to vacate or repeal charters and prevent the usurpation of an office or franchise.
    1. Whenever a person usurps an office or franchise to which he or she is not entitled by law, an action may be instituted against him or her, either by the state or the party entitled to the office or franchise, to prevent the usurper from exercising the office or franchise.
    2. A person who continues to exercise an office after having committed an act, or omitted to do an act, of which the commission or omission, by law, created a forfeiture of his or her office, shall be subject to be proceeded against for a usurpation thereof.
      1. It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to institute the actions mentioned in this section against all persons who usurp county offices or franchises where there is no other person entitled thereto or the person entitled fails to institute the action for three (3) months after the usurpation.
      2. For usurpation of other than county offices or franchises, the action by the state shall be instituted and prosecuted by the Attorney General.
        1. When a person is adjudged to have usurped an office or franchise, he or she shall be deprived thereof by the judgment of the court, and the person adjudged entitled thereto shall be reinstated in the office or franchise.
        2. No one shall be adjudged entitled thereto unless the action is instituted by him or her.
      1. The court shall have power to enforce its judgment by causing the books and papers, and all other things pertaining to the office or franchise, to be surrendered by the usurper, and by preventing him or her from further exercising or using the office or franchise, and may enforce its orders by fine and imprisonment until obeyed.
    3. When the usurper has received fees and emoluments arising from the office or franchise, he or she shall be liable therefor to the person entitled thereto, who may claim the fees and emoluments in the action brought to deprive him or her of the office or franchise or in a separate action. If no one is entitled to the office or franchise, the fees and emoluments may be recovered by the state and paid into the State Treasury.
  2. The action to repeal or vacate a charter shall be in the name of the state and brought and presented by the Attorney General or, under his or her sanction and direction, by an attorney for the state.
  3. The pleadings in the actions named in this section are not required to be verified by affidavit unless prosecuted by a private individual.

History. Civil Code, §§ 522, 523, 525-531; C. & M. Dig., §§ 10325-10332; Pope's Dig., §§ 14325-14332; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-2201 — 34-2209; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 244.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a) through (b)(1), deleted “by proceedings at law” preceding “may be”; and made gender neutral changes.

Cross References. Actions by state to repeal charter of corporation, § 16-106-102.

Involuntary dissolutions of corporation, action brought by Attorney General, §§ 4-26-1107, 4-26-1108.

Violation of Unfair Practices Act, forfeiture of charter, § 4-75-205.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Wills, Constitutional Crisis: Can the Governor (or Other State Officeholder) Be Removed from Office in a Court Action after Being Convicted of a Felony?, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Election Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 904.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The statute only applies to the usurpation or exercising of an office to which one is not entitled following an election; it does not apply to an action challenging a candidate's qualifications to appear on a ballot as a candidate for public office. Jacobs v. Yates, 342 Ark. 243, 27 S.W.3d 734 (2000).

Burden of Proof.

In a usurpation proceeding, plaintiff has the burden of establishing his qualifications to hold the office. Jones v. Duckett, 234 Ark. 990, 356 S.W.2d 5 (1962).

Election Contests.

This section includes ordinary election contests for office. Wood v. Miller, 154 Ark. 318, 242 S.W. 573 (1922).

This section does not authorize a defeated candidate to contest the election by a suit in his own name, or to institute ouster proceedings, unless such candidate is able to show that he is entitled to the office. Cherry v. Webb, 196 Ark. 17, 115 S.W.2d 865 (1938).

Suits to contest municipal elections are triable by the circuit court. Purdy v. Glover, 199 Ark. 63, 132 S.W.2d 821 (1939).

Although an incumbent state senator had been defeated in the primary for reelection, he was ineligible to serve as a member of the county board of election commissioners. Jones v. Duckett, 234 Ark. 990, 356 S.W.2d 5 (1962).

Action by defeated candidate contesting winner's eligibility for office brought under this section is not a contest of the election, for there is nothing to contest concerning the results of the election. Jessup v. Hancock, 238 Ark. 866, 385 S.W.2d 24 (1964).

Where plaintiff in school board election could lay no claim to having received more votes than the defendant, for, even after the revised count conducted by the court, each party received equal number of votes, plaintiff did not qualify as a person authorized to bring suit under this section. Martin v. Hefley, 259 Ark. 484, 533 S.W.2d 521 (1976).

Action allowed under this section was a petition for a writ of quo warranto; thus, where the justice of the peace was certified as the winner of an election to Justice of the Peace and it was alleged that he was not qualified to serve, such that the action available was a petition for a writ quo warrant, the action had to be brought by the prosecuting attorney. Pederson v. Stracener, 354 Ark. 716, 128 S.W.3d 818 (2003).

Institution of Actions.

Quo warranto in the name of the state will issue only where the whole community is interested and will not be granted at the instance of an individual for the determination of a private right. Ramsey v. Carhart, 27 Ark. 12 (1871).

Action brought by the Attorney General in the name of the state in lieu of quo warranto is proper proceeding to test validity of organization of school district. Beavers v. State, 60 Ark. 124, 29 S.W. 144 (1895).

A joint action for the usurpation of an office may be maintained by the state and the party entitled to the office. Whittaker v. Watson, 68 Ark. 555, 60 S.W. 652 (1901); Barnett v. McCray, 169 Ark. 833, 277 S.W. 45 (1925).

The remedy for usurpation of the office of road overseer, not having been vested elsewhere, is by an action in the circuit court brought either by the state or the person entitled to the office. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Sams, 81 Ark. 39, 98 S.W. 955 (1906).

In an action to contest the right to hold office, with one alleged to be a usurper thereof, it devolves upon the party complaining in order to state a cause of action to allege that the defendant was not acting under an election to office and is a usurper; it is not sufficient merely to set forth facts invalidating the election. Ferguson v. Wolchansky, 133 Ark. 516, 202 S.W. 826 (1918).

The prosecuting attorney may be compelled by mandamus to bring ouster suit. Vanhoose v. Yingling, 172 Ark. 1009, 291 S.W. 420 (1927).

Prosecuting attorney is authorized to maintain actions in the nature of quo warranto proceedings to oust any and all persons from offices to which they are not eligible or the right to hold which they may have forfeited. State ex rel. Robinson v. Jones, 194 Ark. 445, 108 S.W.2d 901 (1937).

Suit to oust elected candidate or to declare him ineligible may be brought only by the prosecuting attorney, by proceeding in the nature of quo warranto. Cherry v. Webb, 196 Ark. 17, 115 S.W.2d 865 (1938).

Where elected justice of peace had acted as judge of election, his election being void, incumbent justice had the right to contest his eligibility to hold the office and to continue in office until a successor to him qualified. Faulkner v. Woodard, 203 Ark. 254, 156 S.W.2d 243 (1941).

—County Offices or Franchises.

A director of a levee district is not a county officer within the meaning of this section. State ex rel. Going v. Higginbotham, 84 Ark. 537, 106 S.W. 484 (1907).

This section does not authorize private citizens to bring a suit to oust a usurping county officer, the only persons authorized to bring such suits being the defeated candidate and the prosecuting attorney. Vanhoose v. McGregor, 172 Ark. 1012, 291 S.W. 422 (1927).

—Other Than County Offices or Franchises.

Municipal officers are not county officers within the meaning of this section, and the action in such case cannot be brought by prosecuting attorney, but must be prosecuted by the Attorney General. State v. Tyson, 161 Ark. 42, 255 S.W. 289 (1923).

The challenge of the right to hold the office of town marshal is within the usurpation statute. State v. Tyson, 161 Ark. 42, 255 S.W. 289 (1923).

An action by a taxpayer to compel the defendant to repay city money received as city attorney and enjoin him from collecting any further sums is an action at law against the usurpation of office which cannot be brought by a taxpayer. Scott v. McCoy, 212 Ark. 574, 206 S.W.2d 440 (1947).

A private individual has no right to question the title to the office of municipal judge; it can only be questioned by the Attorney General. Logan v. Harris, 213 Ark. 37, 210 S.W.2d 301 (1948); Beshear v. Clark, 292 Ark. 47, 728 S.W.2d 165 (1987).

The Attorney General is the proper person to institute proceedings for the ouster of a member of the Game and Fish Commission, but when such a member was properly holding office, the Attorney General properly refused. Drennen v. Bennett, 230 Ark. 330, 322 S.W.2d 585 (1959).

In action to remove legislator or prevent legislator from exercising his powers because he moved to another district from that in which he was elected, citizen was not the proper party to bring a writ of quo warranto because, under subdivision (b)(3)(B) of this section, for usurpation of other than county officers, such an action had to be instituted by the Attorney General; moreover, the matter was one to be determined by the Arkansas House of Representatives, not the circuit court. Magnus v. Carr, 350 Ark. 388, 86 S.W.3d 867 (2002).

Jurisdiction.

Chancery will not give relief by ousting one improperly holding office, as there is a plain, complete, and adequate remedy at law. Lucas v. Futrall, 84 Ark. 540, 106 S.W. 667 (1907).

Where jurisdiction, with respect to claims to public office, is not expressly, or by necessary implication, placed elsewhere, the circuit court, under the Arkansas Constitution, has residuary jurisdiction, and it is immaterial whether the actions be termed election contests, proceedings in the nature of quo warranto, or suits to oust usurpers. Purdy v. Glover, 199 Ark. 63, 132 S.W.2d 821 (1939).

Liability for Fees and Emoluments.

Rule applicable to damage cases has no applicability to the case of an officer suing for his salary, liability being not upon contract, and officer wrongfully excluded from office may recover salary without crediting his earnings thereon. Gentry v. Harrison, 194 Ark. 916, 110 S.W.2d 497 (1937).

Insurance commissioner and fire marshal deprived of his office by another prior to abolition of office, because of invalidity of emergency clause in statute, was entitled to amount of salary he would have received from time he was deprived of office until 90 days after adjournment of the General Assembly. Gentry v. Harrison, 194 Ark. 916, 110 S.W.2d 497 (1937).

A person acting as city marshal of a city of the second class although a de facto city marshal, without being duly elected is a usurper and where he has received fees and emoluments arising from the office or franchise, he shall be liable therefore to the person entitled thereto. A person entitled to the office may bring an action to recover the fees and the office. Sitton v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 574, 226 S.W.2d 544 (1950).

Mayor who illegally received money for labor in construction of pipeline from water and light plant was not required to refund money to governmental agencies, since he did not receive money as an officer, but as a laborer. Revis v. Harris, 219 Ark. 586, 243 S.W.2d 747 (1951).

Mayor who illegally served as municipal judge while mayor was required to refund to respective government agencies the amount received as municipal judge. Revis v. Harris, 219 Ark. 586, 243 S.W.2d 747 (1951).

Nature of Remedy.

An action to recover an office is at law. Lucas v. Futrall, 84 Ark. 540, 106 S.W. 667 (1907).

Statutory remedy against usurpation of office will be considered cumulative rather than exclusive of existing remedies, and though statutory proceeding is in lieu of the ancient common-law writ of quo warranto, it does not abolish the remedies for which that writ was created. State ex rel. Robinson v. Jones, 194 Ark. 445, 108 S.W.2d 901 (1937).

Notice.

There is no authority for a circuit court to remove a county officer without any notice; notice is the foundation of due process of law, and where there was none, an order for the removal of judge would be invalid. Anderson v. State, 266 Ark. 192, 583 S.W.2d 14 (1979).

Proceedings Not Permitted.

An action brought by a town marshal to restrain the mayor and recorder from collecting liquor licenses as being part of the marshal's duties could not be maintained under this section as a usurpation of office. Moody v. Lowrimore, 74 Ark. 421, 86 S.W. 400 (1905).

This section does not confer upon the attorney general the authority to maintain quo warranto proceedings to question the right of a licensed eclectic physician to practice, as jurisdiction over such physicians is vested in the eclectic state medical board. Schirmer v. Light, 222 Ark. 693, 262 S.W.2d 143 (1954).

Proceedings Permitted.

Although there was no common law right to a jury trial in usurpation-of-office cases where the plaintiff merely requested ouster of the alleged usurper, plaintiff has a constitutional right under Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 7, to a jury trial if he also made a claim for fees or emoluments. Hopper v. Garner, 328 Ark. 516, 944 S.W.2d 540 (1997).

Resignation.

Where plaintiff attempted to withdraw his resignation by letter stating he would resign unless a majority of the council members agreed he shouldn't, and the council subsequently voted to reject the withdrawal of resignation, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the resignation was never effectively withdrawn. Hopper v. Garner, 328 Ark. 516, 944 S.W.2d 540 (1997).

An instruction on resignation by implication was proper where a former city attorney represented two criminal defendants before bringing a usurpation-of-office action. Hopper v. Garner, 328 Ark. 516, 944 S.W.2d 540 (1997).

Trial by Jury.

The right of trial by jury does not extend to an action brought to prevent usurper from exercising an officer or franchise. Wheat v. Smith, 50 Ark. 266, 7 S.W. 161 (1887).

In quo warranto proceedings in courts of original jurisdiction brought under statutory provisions to annul, vacate, and cancel a charter or franchise, or any other property right (not including title to public office), the right of trial by jury of issues of fact is a constitutional right. Louisiana & Nw. R.R. v. State, 75 Ark. 435, 88 S.W. 559 (1905).

Cited: Langston v. Johnson, 255 Ark. 933, 504 S.W.2d 349 (1974); May v. Edwards, 255 Ark. 1041, 505 S.W.2d 13 (1974); May v. Edwards, 258 Ark. 871, 529 S.W.2d 647 (1975); Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 570, 781 S.W.2d 14 (1989).

16-118-106. Alienation of affection and criminal conversation.

The actions of alienation of affection and criminal conversation are abolished.

History. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 46, § 6.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 46, § 8, provided that § 6 of the act does not apply to litigation pending before the effective date of the act.

Research References

ALR.

Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against paramours. 99 A.L.R.5th 445.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Family Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 631.

Case Notes

Alienation of Affection.

Arkansas has not recognized the claim of alienation of affection by a parent with respect to a child. Poindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

Since Arkansas has abolished the claim of alienation of affection, the courts are not likely to reinstate the same in the guise of the tort of outrage. Poindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

Cited: Treiber v. Hess, 301 Ark. 97, 782 S.W.2d 43 (1990); Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 913 S.W.2d 761 (1996).

16-118-107. Civil action by crime victim.

    1. Any person injured or damaged by reason of conduct of another person that would constitute a felony under Arkansas law may file a civil action to recover damages based on the conduct.
    2. The burden of proof for showing conduct that constituted a felony shall be a preponderance of the evidence.
    3. If the person who is injured or damaged prevails, he or she shall be entitled to recover costs and attorney's fees.
  1. The action may be maintained by the person who was injured or damaged or, after the person's death, the executor, administrator, or representative of his or her estate.
  2. The remedy provided in this section shall be in addition to any other remedies in law or equity.
  3. This section does not apply to offenses under § 5-28-101 et seq. or the Medicaid Fraud Act, § 5-55-101 et seq.

History. Acts 1997, No. 341, § 1; 2011, No. 223, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added (d).

Cross References. Crime victims reparations, § 16-90-701 et seq.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

J. Lyn Entrikin, The Right of Privacy in Arkansas: A Progressive State, 35 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 439 (2013).

Case Notes

Claim Dismissed.

District court did not commit plain error or abuse its discretion in exercising its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and dismissing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff's pendent claim of this section with prejudice because that claim arose out of the same core of operative facts that gave rise to plaintiff's federal claims, which were dismissed, and plaintiff failed to defend the pendent state law claim and/or urge the district court to dismiss it without prejudice, which it had discretion to do. Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 902, 128 S. Ct. 2932, 171 L. Ed. 2d 864 (2008).

Trial court properly dismissed a doctor's Civil Action by Crime Victims Act claim against a medical center operator because there was no factual support for the doctor's theory that public benefits were fraudulently received by the operator. Hamby v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., 2015 Ark. App. 298, 462 S.W.3d 346 (2015) (decision in part under prior law).

Common-Law Remedies for Retaliation Under Workers' Compensation Law.

By enacting this section, the Arkansas General Assembly did not intend to revive the individual cause of action for common-law remedies for retaliation under Arkansas workers' compensation law which it expressly annulled at § 11-9-107. Lambert v. LQ Mgmt., L.L.C., 2013 Ark. 114, 426 S.W.3d 437 (2013) (answering certified question from federal district court).

Dismissal Denied.

Plaintiffs pleaded a facially plausible claim under this section where they alleged that the January patient notification letter defendants sent out could reasonably be construed as representing that plaintiffs were abandoning their patients or that defendants were terminating the physician-patient relationship between plaintiffs and the office's patients, the letter arguably constituted a written instrument that did or may have evidenced, created, transferred, terminated, or otherwise affected a legal right, interest, obligation, or status under § 5-37-201 (forgery). Murphy v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Ark. 2011).

Felony.

Conduct that constituted mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 did not constitute a felony under Arkansas law as was required for a civil action under this section. Murphy v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Ark. 2011).

Judgment on Pleadings.

Judgment on the pleadings was entered against several Arkansas counties as to their claims under § 5-64-1102 and this section, because the counties' allegations did not show that companies that produced and marketed cold remedies containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which ingredients were used in manufacturing methamphetamine (meth), unlawfully sold, distributed, or dispensed the remedies with reckless disregard as to how they would be used: (1) the counties did not allege that the companies failed to comply with federal law or §§ 5-64-1101 or 5-64-1103, which regulated the possession and sale of products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine; (2) it appeared that § 5-64-1101, rather than § 5-64-1102, applied to the companies because there was nothing in the record showing that the companies distributed their remedies to unlicensed or unregistered entities or that their commercial buyers, which included retailers, intended to use the remedies to manufacture meth; and (3) even if § 5-64-1102 applied, the counties did not offer any example of the companies' alleged reckless behavior beyond their broad assertion that distributing the remedies in their current pharmaceutical formulation was reckless. Independence County v. Pfizer, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Ark. 2008), aff'd, Ashley County v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2009).

Recovery Permitted.

Plaintiff may recover under this section where (1) defendants made misrepresentations to plaintiffs with the intent of collecting the commitment fees; and (2) accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, defendants received the commitment fees with the purpose of depriving plaintiff of its money. Terra Renewal, LLC v. McCarthy, No. 4:11CV00653-BRW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94935 (E.D. Ark. July 10, 2012).

Respondeat Superior.

Although an employer was not vicariously liable for the actions of his company's employee in killing the employer's neighbor, the verdict and damages award were upheld based on the employer's own conduct as an accomplice to manslaughter. Costner v. Adams, 82 Ark. App. 148, 121 S.W.3d 164 (2003).

16-118-108. Civil actions against sellers of drug paraphernalia — Definition.

  1. As used in this subchapter, “drug paraphernalia” means those items as defined by §§ 5-64-101, 5-64-403(a)(4), 5-64-443, and 5-64-505.
    1. Any person who becomes addicted to any controlled substance, as a result of the use of any drug paraphernalia sold to him or her by a store dealing in drug paraphernalia items, has a cause of action against the seller if the person can prove that the item purchased from the seller's store contributed to his or her addiction.
    2. Any parent or guardian may bring a cause of action described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section on behalf of a minor.
  2. Any third person injured or killed by a person using a controlled substance, whose use was caused or aided by the use of drug paraphernalia sold to the person by a store dealing in drug paraphernalia items, has a cause of action against the seller if the third person can prove that the item purchased from the store contributed to the person's use and the person's use proximately caused the third person's injury or death.
  3. Any person who requires hospitalization or outpatient service for drug abuse or a related medical problem is entitled to recover from any store that has sold any drug paraphernalia to the person and reimbursement for any such costs incurred.
  4. Any federal or state agency that provides medical or kindred treatment to any person who is addicted to drugs as a result of the use of any drug paraphernalia may cause litigation to be commenced against any store or individual that has sold an item of drug paraphernalia that contributed to the person's drug abuse and subsequent treatment, for the purpose of collecting the reasonable costs incurred by the federal or state agency.
  5. Prior to awarding any damages under this subchapter, the trier of fact shall make written determinations regarding the following questions:
    1. That a reasonably prudent person acting as the seller would have known or should have known that the item sold would be utilized in the unlawful use of drugs; and
    2. Considering all the facts and circumstances surrounding the sale, including the physical characteristics of the business establishment and its method of operation, that the seller knew or should have known that the items sold would be utilized in the unlawful use of drugs.

History. Acts 1981, No. 971, §§ 1-6; A.S.A. 1947, § 82-2645, § 82-2646, § 82-2647, 82-2648, 82-2649, 82-2650; Acts 2011, No. 570, § 118.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, § 1, provided: “The intent of this act is to implement comprehensive measures designed to reduce recidivism, hold offenders accountable, and contain correction costs.”

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 5-64-901 et seq.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “5-64-403(a)(4), 5-64-443” for “5-64-403” in (a).

Cross References. Drug Dealer Liability Act, § 16-124-101 et seq.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

16-118-109. Civil cause of action for victims of human trafficking — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “victim of human trafficking” means the same as defined in § 5-18-102.
  2. An individual who is a victim of human trafficking may bring a civil action in any appropriate state court.
  3. The court may award actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief.
  4. A prevailing plaintiff shall also be awarded attorney's fees and costs.
  5. Three (3) times actual damages shall be awarded on proof of actual damages when a defendant's acts were willful and malicious.
    1. A statute of limitation period imposed for the filing of a civil action under this section will not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers that the human trafficking incident occurred and that the defendant caused, was responsible for, or profited from the human trafficking incident.
    2. If the plaintiff is a minor, the limitation period will not begin until he or she is eighteen (18) years of age.
    3. If the plaintiff is under a disability at the time the cause of action accrues so that it is impossible or impracticable for him or her to bring an action, the time of the disability will not be part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
    4. If the plaintiff is subject to threats, intimidation, manipulation, or fraud perpetrated by the defendant or by any person acting in the interest of the defendant, the time period during which the threats, intimidation, manipulation, or fraud occurred will not be part of the statute of limitations for the commencement of this action.
    5. A defendant is estopped to assert a defense of the statute of limitations when the expiration of the statute of limitations is due to conduct by the defendant that induced the plaintiff to delay the filing of the action or placed the plaintiff under duress.

History. Acts 2013, No. 132, § 8; 2013, No. 133, § 8.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 133, § 1, provided: “Title. This act shall be cited as the ‘Arkansas Human Trafficking Act of 2013’.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Mary Ward, Note: Arkansas’s Human Trafficking Laws: Steps in the Right Direction or a False Sense of Accomplishment?, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 133 (2014).

16-118-110. Civil action for damages caused by violations of athletic association or conference regulations — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Athlete agent” means the same as defined in § 17-16-102;
    2. “Damages caused by violations of athletic association or conference regulations” means:
      1. Either:
        1. An institution of higher education or a student-athlete enrolled at the institution of higher education is declared ineligible to compete in intercollegiate athletics by a national association that promotes or regulates intercollegiate athletics or by an intercollegiate athletic association or conference; or
        2. An institution of higher education is placed on probationary status by a national association that promotes or regulates intercollegiate athletics or by an intercollegiate athletic association or conference; and
      2. As a result of the action under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, the institution of higher education:
        1. Loses the ability to grant an athletic scholarship;
        2. Loses the ability to recruit a student-athlete;
        3. Loses eligibility to participate in intercollegiate competition;
        4. Loses eligibility to participate in post-season intercollegiate competition;
        5. Forfeits an athletic contest; or
        6. Suffers an adverse financial impact, including without limitation lost revenue from media coverage of athletic events or lost revenue from ticket sales; and
    3. “Student-athlete” means an individual who engages in, is eligible to engage in, or may be eligible in the future to engage in an intercollegiate sport.
  2. An institution of higher education may bring a civil action against the following:
    1. An athlete agent violating a provision of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, § 17-16-101 et seq., if his or her actions result in damages caused by violations of athletic association or conference regulations; or
    2. A person who knowingly induces or otherwise knowingly causes a student-athlete to take actions that result in damages caused by violations of athletic association or conference regulations.
    1. An institution of higher education that prevails in a civil action under this section may recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees.
    2. A court may award punitive damages even if the court does not award compensatory damages.
  3. A court may grant equitable relief to an institution of higher education to prevent harm that could result from the acts or omissions of a person under subdivisions (b)(1) and (2) of this section if the court finds a reasonable likelihood that a violation occurred.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1324, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1324, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. The General Assembly finds:

“(1) Violations of athletic association or conference regulations impact the competitiveness and viability of intercollegiate athletic programs, negatively affecting the student athletes involved in the program, the students of the institution of higher education affected, the institution of higher education itself, and the community as a whole;

“(2) Violations of athletic association or conference regulations often occur due to the outside influence of persons unassociated with the institution of higher education, and these situations are often outside of the control of the institution of higher education; and

“(3) This act is necessary to deter conduct by persons seeking to violate athletic association or conference regulations or persons seeking to induce a student athlete to violate athletic association or conference regulations.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Graham C. Talley, Legislative Note: Hundred-Dollar Handshakes, Million-Dollar Lawsuits: Act 1324 — Providing a Civil Right of Action by Arkansas Universities for Losses Resulting from NCAA Violations, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 481 (2014).

16-118-111. Civil actions against operators of an unmanned aircraft system.

A person who violates § 5-60-103 is also liable to the owner of the critical infrastructure that is the subject of the violation as follows:

  1. Any actual damages sustained as a result of the violation, or ten thousand dollars ($10,000), whichever is greater;
  2. Three (3) times actual damages, or ten thousand dollars ($10,000), whichever is greater, in a case in which the violation resulted in profit or monetary gain; and
  3. The costs of an action brought under this section, together with reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1019, § 2.

16-118-112. Civil action for damages caused by wrongful dissemination of an electronic communication to influence a political vote — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Electronic communication” means any textual, visual, written, or oral communication of any kind made through the use of a computer online service, Internet service, telephone, or any other means of electronic communication, including without limitation to a local bulletin board service, an Internet chat room, electronic mail, a social networking site, phone texting, or an online messaging service; and
    2. “Political vote” means a vote by a member of the House of Representatives or Senate with respect to an issue before the General Assembly or a committee of the General Assembly.
  2. A victim whose identity is wrongfully misappropriated or misidentified by another person by that person's purposeful transmission or posting of an electronic communication that is purported to be from the victim without permission from the victim and that expresses an opinion concerning a political issue before the General Assembly with the purpose to influence a political vote may bring a civil action for any injury and recover any damages sustained and for the costs of the civil action.
  3. If a victim prevails in a civil action under this section, damages shall include without limitation a mandatory damage award of five thousand dollars ($5,000) per prosecutable act.
  4. A civil action under this section shall be brought within three (3) years from the date the action is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1111, § 1.

16-118-113. Civil cause of action for unauthorized access to property — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Commercial property” means:
      1. A business property;
      2. Agricultural or timber production operations, including buildings and all outdoor areas that are not open to the public; and
      3. Residential property used for business purposes; and
    2. “Nonpublic area” means an area not accessible to or not intended to be accessed by the general public.
  2. A person who knowingly gains access to a nonpublic area of a commercial property and engages in an act that exceeds the person's authority to enter the nonpublic area is liable to the owner or operator of the commercial property for any damages sustained by the owner or operator.
  3. An act that exceeds a person's authority to enter a nonpublic area of commercial property includes an employee who knowingly enters a nonpublic area of commercial property for a reason other than a bona fide intent of seeking or holding employment or doing business with the employer and without authorization subsequently:
    1. Captures or removes the employer's data, paper, records, or any other documents and uses the information contained on or in the employer's data, paper, records, or any other documents in a manner that damages the employer;
    2. Records images or sound occurring within an employer's commercial property and uses the recording in a manner that damages the employer;
    3. Places on the commercial property an unattended camera or electronic surveillance device and uses the unattended camera or electronic surveillance device to record images or data for an unlawful purpose;
    4. Conspires in an organized theft of items belonging to the employer; or
    5. Commits an act that substantially interferes with the ownership or possession of the commercial property.
  4. A person who knowingly directs or assists another person to violate this section is jointly liable.
  5. A court may award to a prevailing party in an action brought under this section one (1) or more of the following remedies:
    1. Equitable relief;
    2. Compensatory damages;
    3. Costs and fees, including reasonable attorney's fees; and
    4. In a case where compensatory damages cannot be quantified, a court may award additional damages as otherwise allowed by state or federal law in an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each day, or a portion of a day, that a defendant has acted in violation of subsection (b) of this section, and that in the court's discretion are commensurate with the harm caused to the plaintiff by the defendant's conduct in violation of this section.
  6. This section does not:
    1. Diminish the protections provided to employees under state or federal law; or
    2. Limit any other remedy available at common law or provided by law.
  7. This section does not apply to a state agency, a state-funded institution of higher education, a law enforcement officer engaged in a lawful investigation of commercial property or of the owner or operator of the commercial property, or a healthcare provider or medical services provider.

History. Acts 2017, No. 606, § 1.

16-118-114. Civil action against a person who engages in a riot or disorderly conduct, or who obstructs or interferes with emergency medical services personnel or first responder.

  1. In addition to any other cause of action available to a person, a person who suffers injury to himself or herself or to his or her property as a direct or indirect result of:
    1. An act of obstructing or interfering with emergency medical personnel or a first responder, § 5-60-123, if the act of obstructing or interfering with emergency medical personnel or a first responder is a felony or Class A misdemeanor, may bring a civil action against a person who obstructed or interfered with the emergency medical personnel or first responder; or
    2. A riot or the activity of a rioter under § 5-71-201 et seq., may bring a civil action against the rioter or a person or entity that incites the riot.
  2. A court hearing a civil action under this section may award compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and expenses to a plaintiff who prevails in the civil action.

History. Acts 2017, No. 952, § 2.

16-118-115. Civil actions regarding violations of § 5-73-326.

An employer or employee who knowingly violates § 5-73-326 is liable to the prevailing party in an action brought under this section and, upon proving the prevailing party's case by clear and convincing evidence, is entitled to one (1) or more of the following remedies:

  1. Equitable relief;
  2. Compensatory damages; and
  3. Costs and fees, including reasonable attorney's fees.

History. Acts 2017, No. 1071, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2017, No. 1071, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of this act to reinforce and protect the right of each citizen to lawfully transport and store a handgun within his or her private motor vehicle for lawful purposes in any place where the private motor vehicle is otherwise permitted to be located.”

16-118-116. Civil actions for unlawful female genital mutilation.

  1. A person who knowingly commits or attempts to commit unlawful female genital mutilation of a minor as described in § 5-14-136 is liable to the victim of the unlawful female genital mutilation.
  2. A person who knowingly directs or assists another person to violate or attempt to violate § 5-14-136 is jointly liable under this section.
  3. A court may award to a prevailing party in an action brought under this section one (1) or more of the following remedies:
    1. Compensatory damages, including treble damages if the defendant is shown to have acted willfully and maliciously;
    2. Punitive damages;
    3. Costs and fees, including reasonable attorney's fees; or
    4. Any other appropriate relief as provided by law.
  4. A cause of action under this section may be brought by a victim of an unlawful female genital mutilation, or her estate, at any point before the victim reaches or would have reached twenty-eight (28) years of age.
  5. The burden of proof under a cause of action under this section is preponderance of the evidence.
  6. The doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply to a claim arising under this section.

History. Acts 2019, No. 556, § 4.

Chapter 119 Preservation and Restoration of Records

Publisher's Notes. As enacted, Acts 1855, p. 113, applied only to the reinstatement of the records of Prairie County, Arkansas, which were destroyed by fire on September 16, 1854. Acts 1857, p. 81, however, extended the provisions of the act to all cases of lost, destroyed, or burned records, papers, or proceedings in the state.

Cross References. Microfilming of state records, § 25-18-102.

Preambles. Acts 1855, p. 113 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas on the sixteenth day of September, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four the office of the clerk of the circuit court, and ex officio recorder for Prairie county, in the State of Arkansas, was destroyed by fire, whereby the records of the circuit, county and probate courts of said county, as well as the different papers relating to the proceeding in said different courts as well as the records of deeds, mortgages, and other written evidence of and muniments of title to lands, slaves and other property, required by the laws of this State to be admitted of record, together with many of the originals of said written evidences and muniments of title, together with certificates of marriage, schedules of the separate property of and of property acquired through married women, filed in the office of the recorder for said courts, under and by virtue of the laws of this State, were destroyed by said fire, whereby great confusion has been created in the proceedings of said courts; and also with regard to titles to property, proofs of marriages, etc.; and it being desirable to remedy the disagreeable results that have already attended and to prevent, if possible, any further disagreeable results likely otherwise to attend such loss by fire, by legislative action, therefore….”

Acts 1868, No. 54 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the records of certain counties in this State are in a much dilapidated and worn condition on account of having been hurriedly removed during the war, and in many instances, having been subject to rain and dampness during such removal; and, as is the case in Jefferson and other counties, many of the record books are entirely in pieces, and there is much danger of valuable records being lost; therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1855, § 9, p. 113: effective on passage.

Acts 1857, § 4, p. 81: effective on passage.

Acts 1868, No. 54, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1997, No. 1044, § 5: Apr. 2, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present statutory procedure for the restoration of lost marriage records requires chancery court action which results in more expense to the parties and more time delay than is necessary; that a more inexpensive and efficient mechanism would be to utilize the county court; that this act grants that power to the county court; and that this act should go into effect as soon as possible in order that those couples whose marriage records have been lost can use an expedited procedure for reestablishing their marriage relationship as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-119-101. Other methods of restoration unaffected by chapter.

Nothing in this chapter shall be so construed as to hinder or prevent any lost, burned, or destroyed records, papers, or proceedings from being reinstated and reestablished by any other mode known to or recognized by laws existing prior to January 10, 1857, should the other mode be deemed more convenient and work no wrong or injustice to the parties interested.

History. Acts 1855, § 7, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8351; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10947; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-409, 16-412.

16-119-102. Proceedings for restoring records generally.

In adjudicating upon any petition filed under the provisions of this chapter, similar proceedings shall be had as upon any other cases pending in the court with the same right of appeal and of suing out writs of error to the high legal tribunals.

History. Acts 1855, § 7, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8351; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10947; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-409, 16-411, 16-412.

16-119-103. Restoration of destroyed judgments generally.

  1. If any person or persons, either in the person's or persons' own right or as guardian or guardians, executor or executors, or administrator or administrators, have obtained any allowance, judgment, or decree, either for money or any kind of property, or for the performance of any act, in a probate court, county court, or chancery court existing in any county in the State of Arkansas prior to July 1, 2001, or in any circuit court against any person or persons, either in the person's or persons' own right or as guardian or guardians, executor or executors, or administrator or administrators, the person or persons may file in the office of the clerk of the circuit court a petition, addressed to the circuit court, setting forth therein the amount, nature, and substance of the allowance, judgment, or decree and that the allowance, judgment, or decree has been lost, destroyed, or burned.
  2. Upon the hearing of the petition, if the circuit court is advised of the truth of the matter contained in the petition, it shall thereupon order, adjudge, or decree, as the case may be, that the allowance, judgment, or decree, in conformity with the allegations in the petition, be reinstated upon the records of the circuit court to have the same force and effect and to relate back and take effect from the time when the original allowance, judgment, or decree was rendered.

History. Acts 1855, § 1, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8344, 8346; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10939, 10942; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-403, 16-411, 16-412; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 245.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment rewrote (a).

16-119-104. Restoration of destroyed judgments — Procedural conditions.

No reinstating order, sentence, or decree shall be rendered by the court, unless:

  1. The petition is verified by affidavit and has been filed in the office of the clerk of the court thirty (30) days previous to the term of the court at which the application is intended to be made; and
  2. Due notice of the intended application, setting forth, in a brief manner, the object and intent of the application, is given to the adverse party or parties, either by personal service, by delivering a copy of the notice in writing at least thirty (30) days before the first day of the term of court at which the intended application is to be made, or by publication in some newspaper published in the county for two (2) consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least six (6) weeks before the first day of the term of the court at which the intended application is to be made. However, if there is no newspaper printed in the county, then the publication shall be made in some newspaper printed in Little Rock, Arkansas.

History. Acts 1855, § 1, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8344, 8346; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10939, 10942; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-403, 16-411, 16-412.

16-119-105. Restoration of records in pending cases.

  1. In case any matter or proceeding pending in the county court or circuit court of any county is still undisposed of, and the records or original papers on file in either of the county court or circuit court are lost, destroyed, or burned, any person or persons legally interested in any manner whatever in any such matters or proceedings may file a petition in the office of the clerk of the court in which the matter or proceeding is pending, addressed to the court, setting forth the nature and substance of the matter or proceedings, or of the original papers filed and lost, destroyed, or burned, and praying that the original papers may be reinstated upon the record.
  2. Thereupon, if the court is satisfied and advised of the truth of the allegation in the petition, it shall order, adjudge, or decree that the original papers, pursuant to the allegation of the petitioner, be filed and reinstated upon the records of the court, to have the same force and effect and to relate back and take effect from the time when the original was filed or the original matter or proceedings were had.
  3. No such order, judgment, or decree shall be made by any of the courts unless the applicant shall have given to the other party or parties interested or concerned in the matters or proceedings due notice of the intended application, according to the provisions regarding notice in § 16-119-104.

History. Acts 1855, § 2, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8344, 8346; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10940, 10942; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-404, 16-411, 16-412; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 246.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), deleted “probate” preceding “county,” “or chancery” following “circuit,” “judge or chancellor of the” preceding “court” and “as the case may be” following “court” and made related changes.

Case Notes

Matters Not Part of Record.

Where at the trial parties agreed that oral testimony be taken in shorthand by court stenographer, to be transcribed only upon request of appealing party, in the event of an appeal, and the notes were burned when the court house was destroyed by fire, chancellor's refusal to supply and restore the evidence was held not error, since notes were not a part of the court record, having not been filed, and appellants were not diligent in prosecuting their appeal. Stewart v. Hulett, 196 Ark. 403, 117 S.W.2d 1067 (1938).

Power of Court.

This section does not take away the inherent power of the court to restore its lost records. Fort Smith Auto. & Supply Co. v. Nedry, 100 Ark. 485, 140 S.W. 711 (1911); Cochran v. State, 169 Ark. 503, 275 S.W. 895 (1925).

The fact that the statutory method of restoring lost records was not followed was held to be immaterial where both parties submitted question as to whether the record had been lost to the court and took evidence on the question. Williams v. Dawson, 185 Ark. 1190, 46 S.W.2d 634 (1932).

Substitution of Copies.

The substitution of copies of pleadings for lost originals, without complying with this section, was not error in the absence of any contention that the substituted pleadings were incorrect or that appellant was prejudiced by their filing. Spadra Creek Coal Co. v. Eureka Anthracite Coal Co., 104 Ark. 359, 148 S.W. 644 (1912).

16-119-106. Papers evidencing title to real or personal property recorded anew.

  1. In all cases in which any deed of conveyance, title bond, mortgage, deed, or other written muniment of title of or concerning any property, either real or personal, which by the laws of this state could be admitted to record, have been admitted of record in any county and the record thereof has been lost, destroyed, or burned, but the original of the instrument of conveyance, or copy duly certified according to law, is in the possession of the person entitled to the instrument of conveyance, the original or duly certified copy of the instrument of conveyance may be recorded anew in the office of the clerk and county recorder. The record shall relate back and have full force and effect from the date of the first record of the instrument of conveyance.
    1. In case no original or duly certified copy has been preserved, then any person or persons interested in the instrument of conveyance, or the person's or persons' heirs, executor or executors, administrator or administrators, or guardian or guardians, may file a petition in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of any such county, addressed to the circuit court thereof, setting forth the names and relations of the different parties to the instrument of conveyance, and the subject matter thereof, and praying that the instrument of conveyance may be ordered to be admitted of record in the office of the county recorder.
    2. If the circuit court is sufficiently advised of the truth of the matters contained in the petition, it shall decree that the prayer of the petition be allowed and that a copy of the petition and decree be certified, under the seal of the circuit court, to the county recorder to be by him or her recorded. The record thereof shall relate back and have full force and effect from the date of the original record.
    3. No such decree shall be made by the circuit court unless previous notice of the intended application has been given to the other party or parties to the instrument of conveyance, or to their heirs, executors, or administrators according to the terms required in § 16-119-104.

History. Acts 1855, § 3, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8345, 8346; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10941, 10942; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-405, 16-411, 16-412; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 247.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (b)(1), substituted “circuit court” for “chancellor” and deleted “at least thirty (30) days before the first day of the term of the court at which the application is intended to be made” preceding “setting forth the names” and made gender neutral changes.

16-119-107. Restoration of marriage records.

    1. In cases where any marriage has been legally solemnized in any county, and the certificate of marriage required by law to be filed in the office of the recorder for the county, together with the record thereof, has been lost, destroyed, or burned, it shall be the duty of the person who solemnized the marriage, at the request and on the demand of either of the parties between whom the marriage was solemnized, to furnish him, her, or them, under his or her hand, a certificate of marriage.
    2. The certificate, in addition to setting forth the date of the marriage and the names, ages, and residences of the parties at the time the marriage ceremony was performed between them and that he or she performed the marriage ceremony between them, shall also set forth in what capacity the person granting the certificate acted, whether as a judge, justice of the peace, minister, priest, or otherwise, at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, and that the original certificate of the marriage was made out by him or her and duly filed in the office of the clerk and recorder for the county, as required by law.
    3. The person so receiving the certificate may, within ninety (90) days after procuring the certificate from the person who solemnized the marriage, file the certificate in the office of the clerk and recorder of the county, whose duty it shall be to record the certificate in his or her record of marriage certificates.
    4. The certificate shall relate back and have full force and effect from the date of the solemnization of such marriage.
    1. In case the person who solemnized the marriage has died or resides beyond the limits of this state so that the certificate cannot be obtained, then the parties between whom the marriage was originally solemnized, or the one surviving if either be dead, or their heirs, by their guardian, in case both the parties are dead, wishing to reinstate the record of the marriage may file their petition in the office of the clerk of the county court setting forth therein the substance of the original marriage certificate or the time when and the person by whom the marriage was performed, in what capacity the person acted, whether as judge, justice of the peace, minister, or priest, and that the certificate, with the record thereof, was lost, destroyed, or burned.
    2. Upon hearing the petition, if the county court is advised of the truth of the matters contained in the petition, it shall decree that the marriage record be reinstated upon the records of the recorder's office, and the clerk of the court shall certify a copy of the petition and decree down to the recorder, who shall record them.
    3. The marriage record shall relate back and have the same force and effect from the time when the marriage ceremony was first performed as though the original record had never been lost, destroyed, or burned.
    4. No such decree shall be made or rendered by the county court unless:
      1. The petition has been filed in the office of the clerk of the county court, verified by the affidavit of the petitioner or some other reputable person for him, her, or them; and
      2. The petitioner has caused a notice of the intended application to be published in some newspaper printed in the county at least six (6) weeks before filing the petition with the county court calling on all persons who might feel themselves concerned to file notice with the county court as to why the record should not be reinstated upon the records of the recorder of the county. If no newspaper is printed in the county at the time of the publication, then the publication may be made in some newspaper printed in the City of Little Rock, Arkansas.

History. Acts 1855, § 4, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8347, 8348; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10943, 10944; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-406, 16-411, 16-412; Acts 1997, No. 1044, § 1.

16-119-108. Restoration of record of married person's schedule of property.

    1. In all cases in which any married woman availed herself of the provisions of §§ 9-11-501 and 9-11-509 — 9-11-514 and has filed in the office of the county recorder a schedule of the property to which she is entitled under the provisions of §§ 9-11-501 and 9-11-509 — 9-11-514, and the schedule has been lost, destroyed, or burned, the married woman may file in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county, her petition addressed to the circuit court, setting forth a full description of the nature of the property and the manner in which she derived title to the property, and setting forth that a schedule of the property, under the provisions of §§ 9-11-501 and 9-11-509 — 9-11-514, has been filed in the office of the county recorder.
    2. The petition shall state, as nearly as possible, the time when the schedule was filed and pray that the schedule may be reinstated and admitted of record in the county recorder's office of the county. The petition shall be verified by the affidavit of the petitioner or some other disinterested reputable person for her.
  1. The circuit court, being sufficiently advised of the truth of the matters set forth in the petition, shall grant the prayer of the petition and shall direct a copy of the petition and decree of the circuit court, granting the prayer thereof, to be certified by the clerk of the circuit court under seal. The petition and decree shall be recorded in the county recorder's office of the county and shall relate back to and have full force and effect from the date of the filing of the original schedule of the property for record.
  2. No such decree shall be rendered by the circuit court unless the applicant has previously given public notice of the intended application, addressed to all whom it might concern, by publication for two (2) consecutive weeks in some newspaper published in the county or, if none is published therein, then in some newspaper printed in Little Rock, Arkansas, for at least six (6) consecutive weeks before the commencement of the term of circuit court at which the application is to be made.

History. Acts 1855, § 5, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8349; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10945; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-407, 16-411, 16-412; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 248.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1); in (a)(1), deleted “by her next friend” following “married woman,” “in chancery” following “circuit court of the county” and substituted “circuit court” for “judge of the court sitting in chancery”; and added (a)(2).

16-119-109. Restoration of bonds of executors, administrators, or guardians.

  1. In all cases relating to executorships, administrations, and guardianships in which the bonds of the executors, administrators, or guardians were lost, destroyed, or burned, it shall be the duty of the circuit court of the county to require all the executors, administrators, or guardians who have not already done so to file in the circuit court a report in which they shall set forth, as far as possible, their proceedings in their executorships, administrations, or guardianships, the amount and conditions of their bonds originally given, and the names of their securities.
  2. After the filing of the report, the circuit court shall immediately order the clerk to issue citations against all the securities named in the report as having been signers of the executor's, administrator's, or guardian's bond, which citations shall command the securities to appear before the circuit court on or before the date specified therein and show cause why the bonds so reported should not be established and reinstated upon the records of the circuit court with like effect as the original bond.
  3. At the return term of the citation, the circuit court shall proceed to hear the allegations and proofs of the parties in case opposition is made to the reinstating of the bond, and shall determine the same as the right thereof shall appear.
  4. If no opposition is made or if the finding of the circuit court shall be against the obligors in the bond, then the circuit court shall order that the copy set forth in the report be reinstated as the original bond, and the copy of the bond shall be recorded by the circuit clerk in the book kept by the circuit clerk in his or her office for that purpose, with a copy of the order reinstating the bond.
  5. No such order shall be entered in any case unless the securities have had thirty (30) days' notice before the commencement of the term of the circuit court at which the citation is returnable.
  6. Any executor, administrator, or guardian who fails to make any report as specified in this section, when required to do so by order of the probate division of the circuit court of the county, within thirty (30) days after the making and entering of the order, and being notified of the order, shall incur the same pains and penalties that are prescribed by law for failure to make any settlement required by existing laws. The probate division of the circuit court, at the next succeeding term after such a failure, shall revoke the executor's, administrator's, or guardian's letters, and the executor's, administrator's, or guardian's powers shall thenceforth cease.

History. Acts 1855, § 6, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8350; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10946; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-408, 16-411, 16-412; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 249.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “circuit court” for “judge of the court of probate” in (a); and, in (b), substituted “the court on or before the date specified therein” for “the court of probate on or before the second day of the next succeeding term of the court after the issuance of the citations” and deleted “if any they can” following “show cause.”

16-119-110. Certified copies of restored record admissible as evidence.

A duly certified copy of the record of any instrument, order, judgment, or decree made by virtue of this chapter shall be received in evidence in any of the courts of this state, without any further proof thereof, and shall be prima facie evidence of the loss, destruction, or burning of the original upon which the record, order, judgment, or decree is based, and of the contents thereof.

History. Acts 1855, § 8, p. 113; 1857, §§ 1, 2, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8342, 8352; Pope's Dig., §§ 10938, 10948; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-410 — 16-412.

Case Notes

Allowance of Claims.

A petition to restore a lost record of a claim against a county and of its allowance by the county court was not dismissible on the ground that the claim was then barred if it was not barred when allowed, since when restored it related back to the original allowance. McDaniel v. Prairie County, 187 Ark. 38, 58 S.W.2d 200 (1933).

The right to have the record of a claim against the county and its allowance by the court restored could not be defeated on the ground that the original claim was not properly verified. McDaniel v. Prairie County, 187 Ark. 38, 58 S.W.2d 200 (1933).

Where a claim against the county was duly allowed and no appeal therefrom was taken, on a petition to restore the claim and its allowance, it was no defense that the claim should not have been allowed under the Ark. Const., Amend. 10 prohibiting allowances in excess of the revenues of the current fiscal year. McDaniel v. Prairie County, 187 Ark. 38, 58 S.W.2d 200 (1933).

Matters Not Part of Record.

Where at the trial parties agreed that oral testimony be taken in shorthand by court stenographer, to be transcribed only upon request of appealing party, in the event of an appeal, and the notes were burned when the courthouse was destroyed by fire, chancellor's refusal to supply and restore the evidence was held not error, since notes were not a part of the court record, having not been filed, and appellants were not diligent in prosecuting their appeal. Stewart v. Hulett, 196 Ark. 403, 117 S.W.2d 1067 (1938).

Power of Court.

This section does not take away the inherent power of the court to restore its lost records. Fort Smith Auto. & Supply Co. v. Nedry, 100 Ark. 485, 140 S.W. 711 (1911).

Both at common law and under this section, the chancery court has authority to supply a lost deposition for use on appeal. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Hagler Special School Dist. No. 27, 178 Ark. 443, 12 S.W.2d 881 (1928).

Substitution of Pleadings.

The substitution of pleadings on motion without notice is not error in the absence of any contention that they were incorrect or that appellant was prejudiced thereby. Spadra Creek Coal Co. v. Eureka Anthracite Coal Co., 104 Ark. 359, 148 S.W. 644 (1912).

16-119-111. Record books unfit for preservation — Transcriptions to take place of originals.

  1. The county courts of the various counties of the state are authorized to have transcribed into well-bound books, suitable for that purpose, provided by the county courts, all records contained in books that, in the opinion of the county courts, are in a condition unfit for preservation.
  2. The transcript, after being submitted to the county court, examined, compared, and adopted, shall take the place of and be regarded as the original record and, as such, shall be deposited with other records in the office of the county court.

History. Acts 1868, No. 54, §§ 1, 2, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8353, 8354; Pope's Dig., §§ 10949, 10950; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-401, 16-402.

Chapter 120 Immunity from Tort Liability

Cross References. Liability of state and local governments, § 21-9-201 et seq.

Immunity from liability for volunteer services by retired physicians and surgeons, § 17-95-106.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Torts, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 609.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. Former §§ 16-120-10116-120-104 have been renumbered as §§ 16-120-70116-120-704. Former § 16-120-105 has been renumbered as § 16-120-801. Former § 16-120-106 has been renumbered as § 16-120-302.

Subchapter 2 — Equine and Livestock Activities

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 103, § 3, provided:

“This Act shall not apply to causes of action based upon conduct occurring prior to July 15, 1991.”

16-120-201. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Equine” means a horse, pony, mule, donkey, or hinny;
  2. “Equine activity” means:
    1. Equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances, or parades that involve any or all breeds of equines and any of the equine disciplines, including without limitation dressage, hunter and jumper horse shows, grand prix jumping, three-day events, combined training, rodeos, pulling, cutting, polo, steeplechasing, endurance trail riding and western games, and hunting;
    2. Equine training and teaching activities;
    3. Boarding equines;
    4. Riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine belonging to another person regardless of whether the owner receives monetary consideration or other thing of value for the use of the equine or is permitting a prospective purchaser of the equine to ride, inspect, or evaluate the equine; and
    5. Rides, hunts, or other equine activities, however informal or impromptu;
  3. “Equine activity sponsor” means an individual or legal entity that sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for an equine activity;
  4. “Livestock” means swine, bovine, sheep, and goats;
  5. “Livestock activity” means the following:
    1. Grazing, herding, feeding, branding, milking, or other activity that involves the care or maintenance of livestock;
    2. A livestock show, fair, competition, or auction;
    3. A livestock training or teaching activity;
    4. Boarding livestock; and
    5. Inspecting or evaluating livestock;
  6. “Livestock facility” means a property or facility at which a livestock activity is held;
  7. “Livestock owner” means a person who owns livestock that is involved in a livestock activity;
  8. “Livestock sponsor” means an individual or legal entity that sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for a livestock activity; and
  9. “Participant” means a person, whether amateur or professional, who engages in an equine activity or a livestock activity regardless of whether a fee is paid to participate in the equine activity or livestock activity.

History. Acts 1991, No. 103, § 1; 1995, No. 353, § 1; 2013, No. 430, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Centner, Modifying Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A New Good Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 637.

16-120-202. Liability.

    1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, an equine activity sponsor, an employee of an equine activity sponsor, a livestock sponsor, an employee of a livestock sponsor, a livestock owner, a livestock facility, or a livestock auction market is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of an equine activity or a livestock activity.
    2. Subdivision (a)(1) of this section does not prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an employee of an equine activity sponsor, a livestock sponsor, an employee of a livestock sponsor, a livestock owner, a livestock facility, or a livestock auction market that:
      1. Provides the equipment or tack and knows or should know that the equipment or tack is faulty to the extent that the equipment or tack caused injury;
      2. With respect to an equine activity sponsor, an employee of a equine activity sponsor, a livestock activity sponsor, or an employee of a livestock activity sponsor, provides the equine or livestock and fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of a participant to engage safely in an equine activity or a livestock activity or to determine the ability of a participant to engage safely in an equine activity or a livestock activity and to safely manage the particular equine or livestock based on the participant's representation of his or her ability;
      3. Owns, leases, rents, or otherwise is in lawful possession and control of the facility upon which a participant sustains an injury because of a dangerous latent condition that is known or should have been known to the equine activity sponsor, an employee of the equine activity sponsor, the livestock activity sponsor, an employee of the livestock activity sponsor, the livestock facility, or the livestock auction market and for which warning signs had not been conspicuously posted;
      4. Commits an act or omission that:
        1. Constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of a participant; and
        2. Causes an injury; or
      5. Intentionally injures a participant.
    3. Subdivision (a)(1) of this section does not prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an employee of an equine activity sponsor, a livestock activity sponsor, an employee of a livestock activity sponsor, a livestock owner, a livestock facility, or a livestock auction market under products liability laws.
      1. An equine activity sponsor or a livestock activity sponsor shall post and maintain signs that contain the warning notice specified in subdivision (b)(2) of this section.
      2. The signs required under subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section shall be placed in a clearly visible location on or near stables, corrals, or arenas where the equine activity sponsor or livestock activity sponsor conducts an equine activity or livestock activity.
      3. The warning notice specified in subdivision (b)(2) of this section shall appear on the sign in black letters with each letter to be a minimum of one inch (1") in height.
    1. The signs described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall contain the following warning notice:
  1. The immunity provided under this section does not apply to thoroughbred horse racing as authorized and regulated in the Arkansas Horse Racing Law, § 23-110-101 et seq.

“WARNING

Under Arkansas law, an equine activity sponsor, livestock activity sponsor, livestock owner, livestock facility, and livestock auction market are not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant in equine activities or livestock activities resulting from the inherent risk of equine activities or livestock activities.”

History. Acts 1991, No. 103, § 2; 1995, No. 353, §§ 1, 2; 2013, No. 430, § 1; 2015, No. 1152, § 17.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2015 amendment substituted “an equine activity or livestock activity” for “equine or livestock activities” in (b)(1)(B).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Centner, Modifying Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A New Good Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 637.

Subchapter 3 — Injuries or Damages Related to Criminal Activity

16-120-301. Injury or damage to person committing felony.

If a person while committing a felony is injured or his or her property damaged, the person who causes such injury or damage shall not be liable for damages nor subject to suit for the injury or damage, provided that:

  1. The person causing such injury or damage has not acted with malice;
  2. The person committing the felony has not clearly retreated from the felonious activity;
  3. The person causing such injury or damage has not prearranged a trap that would automatically inflict injury or damage to any person entering a certain location; and
  4. The act causing the injury or damage was the result of or in response to the commission of the felony.

History. Acts 1993, No. 588, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 91.

16-120-302. Use of deadly physical force.

  1. A person is immune from civil action for the use of deadly physical force against another person who is an initial aggressor if the use of the deadly physical force was in accordance with § 5-2-607.
  2. A court shall award reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and trial-related expenses to a person in defense of a civil action brought by another person if the court finds that the person is immune from civil action as provided in this section.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1073, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 1073, § 1, provided: “Legislative findings.

“(a) The General Assembly finds that the current laws regarding self-defense and the use of deadly physical force in self-defense or in defense of another person are adequate in that the law explicitly does not require a person to retreat from certain life-threatening confrontations if a person cannot do so safely.

“(b) However, the General Assembly finds that there is currently not enough protection from civil liability for a person who rightfully uses deadly physical force in self-defense or in defense of another person.

“(c) The General Assembly finds that a more robust civil immunity statute is necessary to protect a person from civil damages stemming from an incident when he or she lawfully uses deadly physical force in self-defense or in defense of another person.”

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-120-106 and was renumbered as § 16-120-302 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

16-120-303. Attempting to protect persons during commission of a felony.

No person is civilly liable for an action or omission intended to protect himself or herself or another from a personal injury during the commission of a felony unless the action or omission constitutes a felony.

History. Acts 1981, No. 884, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-507.2; Acts 2005, No. 1994, § 480.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 5-2-621 and was renumbered as § 16-120-303 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Subchapter 4 — Emergency Assistance

Cross References. Donation of property or equipment, immunity, § 12-75-125.

Emergency responders, immunities and exemptions, § 12-75-128.

Good Samaritan law, § 17-95-101.

Limitations on civil liability for volunteer health practitioners, § 12-87-111.

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 1191, § 5: Apr. 16, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that a “Good Samaritan” law should be enacted to encourage persons and entities to provide their specialized equipment and personnel to respond to accidents and emergencies; that this act so provides; and that this act should go into effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-120-401. Exemption for requested assistance.

Any person or entity who, at the request of any city, county, or state agency, supplies specialized equipment or personnel in response to an emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages for good faith acts or omissions, provided that the services or equipment was provided without compensation and at the place of the emergency.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1191, § 1.

Subchapter 5 — Charitable Immunity for a Church or Other Place of Worship

16-120-501. Definitions.

As used in this section:

  1. “Church or other place of worship” means a physical location where persons congregate to practice a religion; and
  2. “Polling site” means the same as defined in § 7-1-101.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1118, § 1.

16-120-502. Charitable immunity for a church or other place of worship that is used as a polling site.

A church or other place of worship is entitled to tort immunity as provided in §§ 16-120-503 and 16-120-504 during the time the church or other place of worship is used as a polling site.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1118, § 1.

16-120-503. Church or other place of worship not vicariously liable.

A church or other place of worship or its agent is not vicariously liable for the negligence of another person on the property of the church or other place of worship during the time the church or other place of worship is used as a polling site.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1118, § 1.

16-120-504. Nonliability for damages — Exceptions.

A church or other place of worship is not liable for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage sustained by a person on the property of the church or other place of worship during the time the church or other place of worship is used as a polling site except as follows:

  1. If the church or other place of worship is covered by a policy of insurance, in which case liability for ordinary negligence is limited to the amount of insurance coverage provided by the policy of insurance; or
  2. If the church or other place of worship or its agent acts in bad faith or acts grossly negligent, recklessly, or intentionally.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1118, § 1.

16-120-505. Subchapter supplemental.

This subchapter is supplemental to and does not affect any tort immunity or charitable immunity a church or other place of worship may otherwise have under the law.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1118, § 1.

Subchapter 6 — Successor Corporation Asbestos-Related Liability Fairness Act [Effective January 1, 2020]

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 1241, § 2: Jan. 1, 2020.

16-120-601. Title. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Successor Corporation Asbestos-Related Liability Fairness Act”.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1241, § 1.

16-120-602. Legislative findings. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

The General Assembly finds that:

  1. Asbestos-related claims threaten the continued viability of uniquely situated companies that have never manufactured, sold, or distributed asbestos or asbestos products and are liable only as successor corporations;
  2. The viability of these businesses is threatened due solely to their status as successor corporations by merger or consolidation based on actions taken prior to the 1972 adoption of asbestos regulations by the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration;
  3. Over twenty (20) other states have enacted legislation similar to this subchapter to provide limits on successor asbestos-related liabilities for innocent successors; and
  4. The public interest as a whole is best served by limiting the successor asbestos-related liabilities of innocent successors so that they may remain viable.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1241, § 1.

16-120-603. Definitions. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Asbestos claim” means any civil cause of action, wherever or whenever made, arising out of, based on, or in any way related to asbestos, including the health effects of exposure to asbestos or the installation, presence, or removal of asbestos, and includes a claim made by or on behalf of any person exposed to asbestos, or a representative, spouse, parent, child, or other relative of the person;
  2. “Corporation” means a for-profit corporation, including a domestic corporation organized under the laws of this state or a foreign corporation organized under laws other than the laws of this state;
  3. “Successor” means a corporation that assumes or incurs or has assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liabilities, which is a successor and became a successor before January 1, 1972, or is any of that successor corporation's successors;
    1. “Successor asbestos-related liabilities” means any liabilities, whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, or due or to become due, which are related in any way to asbestos claims and were assumed or incurred by a corporation as a result of or in connection with a merger or consolidation, or the plan of merger or consolidation related to the merger or consolidation with or into another corporation, or that are related in any way to asbestos claims based on the exercise of control or the ownership of stock of the corporation before the merger or consolidation.
    2. “Successor asbestos-related liabilities” includes liabilities that, after the time of the merger or consolidation for which the fair market value of total gross assets is determined under § 16-120-604 were or are paid or otherwise discharged, or committed to be paid or otherwise discharged, by or on behalf of the corporation, or by a successor of the corporation, or by or on behalf of a transferor, in connection with settlements, judgments, or other discharges in this state or another jurisdiction; and
  4. “Transferor” means a corporation from which successor asbestos-related liabilities are or were assumed or incurred.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1241, § 1.

16-120-604. Limit on successor asbestos-related liabilities. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

  1. A successor is not liable for any asbestos claim when the successor's cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities exceed the fair market value of the total gross assets of the transferor determined as of the time of the merger or consolidation.
  2. If the transferor had assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liabilities in connection with a prior merger or consolidation with a prior transferor, then the fair market value of the total assets of the prior transferor determined as of the time of the earlier merger or consolidation shall be substituted for the limitation set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
  3. A successor does not have immunity under this section with respect to:
    1. Workers' compensation benefits paid by or on behalf of an employer to an employee under the Workers' Compensation Law, § 11-9-101 et seq., or a comparable workers' compensation law of another jurisdiction;
    2. A claim that does not constitute a successor asbestos-related liability;
    3. An obligation under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., as it existed on January 1, 2015, or under any collective bargaining agreement; or
    4. If the successor, after a merger or consolidation, continued in the business of mining asbestos or in the business of selling or distributing asbestos fibers or in the business of manufacturing, distributing, removing, or installing asbestos-containing products which were the same or substantially the same as those products previously manufactured, distributed, removed, or installed by the transferor.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1241, § 1.

16-120-605. Establishing fair market value of total gross assets. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

  1. A successor may establish the fair market value of total gross assets for the purpose of § 16-120-604 through any method reasonable under the circumstances, including:
    1. By reference to the growing concern value of the assets or to the purchase price attributable to or paid for the assets in an arm's-length transaction; or
    2. In the absence of other readily available information from which the fair market value can be determined, by reference to the value of the assets recorded on a balance sheet.
  2. Total gross assets under subsection (a) of this section include intangible assets.
    1. To the extent total gross assets include any liability insurance that was issued to the transferor whose assets are being valued for purposes of this section, the applicability, terms, conditions, and limits of the insurance shall not be affected by this section nor shall this section otherwise affect the rights and obligations of an insurer, transferor, or successor under an insurance contract or any related agreements, including without limitation preenactment settlements resolving coverage-related disputes and the rights of an insurer to:
      1. Seek payment for:
        1. Applicable deductibles;
        2. Retrospective premiums; or
        3. Self-insured retentions; or
      2. Seek contribution from a successor for uninsured or self-insured periods or periods where insurance is uncollectible or otherwise unavailable.
    2. Without limiting subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section, to the extent total gross assets include any liability insurance, a settlement of a dispute concerning any liability insurance coverage entered into by a transferor or successor with the insurers of the transferor before January 1, 2020, shall be determinative of the total coverage of the liability insurance to be included in the calculation of the transferor's total gross assets.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1241, § 1.

16-120-606. Adjustment. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

  1. Except as provided in subsections (b)-(d) of this section, the fair market value of total gross assets at the time of the merger or consolidation shall increase annually at a rate equal to the sum of:
    1. The prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year since the merger or consolidation unless the prime rate is not published in that edition of the Wall Street Journal, in which case any reasonable determination of the prime rate on the first day of the year may be used; and
    2. One percent (1%).
  2. The rate under subsection (a) of this section shall not be compounded.
  3. The adjustment of the fair market value of total gross assets shall continue as provided in subsection (a) of this section until the date the adjusted value is first exceeded by the cumulative amounts of successor asbestos-related liabilities paid or committed to be paid by or on behalf of the successor or a predecessor or by or on behalf of a transferor after the time of the merger or consolidation for which the fair market value of total gross assets is determined.
  4. An adjustment of the fair market value of total gross assets shall not be applied to liability insurance that may be included in the definition of total gross assets by § 16-120-605(c).

History. Acts 2015, No. 1241, § 1.

Subchapter 7 — Governing Bodies of Governmental Entities and Nonprofit Corporations

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1987, No. 970, § 6, provided that this act shall only apply to suits for recovery of damages based upon causes of action that accrue after Aug. 1, 1987.

16-120-701. Legislative determination.

The General Assembly has determined that nonprofit corporations serve important functions in providing services and assistance to persons in the state and that, in order for these nonprofit corporations to function effectively, persons serving on the board of directors should not be subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of corporate employees or other directors. The General Assembly has further determined that potential exposure to vicarious liability has a detrimental effect on the participation of persons as directors of nonprofit corporations and that providing immunity to directors of those corporations for certain types of liability will be in the best interest of the state and that the same immunity should be extended to members of governing bodies of governmental entities.

History. Acts 1987, No. 970, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-120-101 and was renumbered as § 16-120-701 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Sampson, Nonprofit Risk; Nonprofit Insurance, 2008 Ark. L. Notes 83.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Tort Law, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1041.

Case Notes

Cited: King v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 301 Ark. 148, 782 S.W.2d 574 (1990).

16-120-702. Persons granted immunity.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this subchapter, no member of any board, commission, agency, authority, or other governing body of any governmental entity and no member of the board of directors of a nonprofit corporation that holds a valid federal income tax exemption issued by the Internal Revenue Service shall be held personally liable for damages resulting from:
    1. Any negligent act or omission of an employee of the nonprofit corporation or governmental entity; or
    2. Any negligent act or omission of another director or member of the governing body of the governmental entity.
  2. The same immunity provided by this subchapter shall be extended to any athletic official during the officiating of an interscholastic, intercollegiate, or any other amateur athletic contest being conducted under the auspices of a nonprofit or governmental entity. No official shall be held personally liable in any civil action for damages to a player, participant, or spectator as a result of his or her acts of commission or omission arising out of officiating duties and activities. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person causing damage by his or her malicious, willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act.

History. Acts 1987, No. 970, §§ 2, 3.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-120-102 and was renumbered as § 16-120-702 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Case Notes

Cited: Conway Corp. v. Construction Engineers, Inc., 300 Ark. 225, 782 S.W.2d 36 (1989); King v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 301 Ark. 148, 782 S.W.2d 574 (1990); West Memphis Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Circuit Court, 316 Ark. 290, 871 S.W.2d 368 (1994).

16-120-703. Exceptions to immunity grant.

  1. The immunity provided by this subchapter shall not extend to acts or omissions of directors of nonprofit corporations or members of boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, or other governing bodies of any governmental entity which constitute ordinary or gross negligence personal to the director or member or to intentional torts committed by a director or member.
  2. The immunity provided by this subchapter shall not extend to acts or omissions of directors of nonprofit corporations which are licensed or permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division to dispense alcoholic beverages, beer, or wine.
  3. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the liability of a nonprofit corporate entity itself for damages resulting from any negligent act or omission of an employee of the nonprofit corporation.

History. Acts 1987, No. 970, §§ 4, 7.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-120-103 and was renumbered as § 16-120-703 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Tort Law, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1041.

Case Notes

Nonprofit Corporations.

Supreme Court of Arkansas declined to overrule Clayborn , which held that a nonprofit organization could be sued and found liable, but the prevailing party in the lawsuit against the nonprofit could not execute on the property or assets of the nonprofit in order to satisfy any judgment, and the direct action statute, § 23-79-210, only allowed a suit against the nonprofit's insurer if the nonprofit was immune from suit, not just immune for judgment. Scamardo v. Jaggers, 356 Ark. 236, 149 S.W.3d 311 (2004), overruled, Low v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005).

School Board Members.

Immunity will not extend to intentional torts committed by school board members. Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760 (1992).

16-120-704. Transfer of assets to avoid claims.

If a nonprofit corporation transfers assets to a member of the board of directors of the corporation or to another nonprofit corporation in order to avoid claims against corporate assets resulting from a judgment rendered as a result of a suit to recover damages for the negligence of the corporation, a corporate employee or a director, the director to whom the asset is transferred, or any director of the corporation from which assets are transferred to avoid those claims may be held personally liable for any judgment rendered. The immunity provided by this subchapter shall be of no force or effect.

History. Acts 1987, No. 970, § 5.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-120-104 and was renumbered as § 16-120-704 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Subchapter 8 — Miscellaneous Grants of Tort Immunity

16-120-801. Donors of firefighting equipment not liable — Exception — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Donor department” means any fire department in Arkansas, including a:
      1. Fire department for a suburban improvement district or a subordinate service district of a county;
      2. Fire protection district;
      3. Municipal fire department; or
      4. Volunteer fire department; and
    2. “Firefighting equipment” means any personal property owned by a donor department that is used for firefighting services or training, emergency medical services, or rescue services.
  2. The provisions of this section shall govern the good faith donations of firefighting equipment that is:
    1. Not sold for its full fair market value;
    2. Declared surplus equipment as no longer needed for the donor department's use; or
    3. Completely depreciated in book value as a property item in the donor department's inventory.
  3. All other provisions of law notwithstanding, a good faith donor of firefighting equipment that is serviceable and fit for use at the time it is donated to a bona fide charitable or not-for-profit organization for free distribution or redistribution at a nominal cost to other fire departments or is donated directly to another fire department shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability arising from an injury or death due to the condition of the firefighting equipment, except as provided under § 21-9-301.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1075, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-120-105 and was renumbered as § 16-120-801 in 2016 by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Cross References. Tort liability of political subdivisions — Immunity declared, § 21-9-301.

16-120-802. Possession of concealed handgun in parking lot.

  1. A business entity, owner or legal possessor of property, or private employer is not liable in a civil action for damages, injuries, or death resulting from or arising out of an employee's or another person's actions involving a handgun transported or stored under § 5-73-326(a) or from allowing a person to enter the private employer's place of business or parking lot under § 5-73-326(b), including without limitation the theft of a handgun from an employee's private motor vehicle, unless the business entity, owner or legal possessor of property, or private employer intentionally solicited or procured the other person's actions.
  2. Employees shall, within twenty-four (24) hours of obtaining knowledge of a theft occurring on a private employer's private parking lot, report a handgun as lost or stolen to the private employer and a local law enforcement agency with jurisdiction.
  3. A handgun possessed in a parking lot does not solely constitute a failure on the part of a private employer to provide a safe workplace.
    1. A private employer may terminate any employee for flagrantly or unreasonably displaying a handgun in plain sight of others at the private employer's place of business or in plain sight in an employee's motor vehicle.
    2. A private employer may bring a civil action against an employee who knowingly displays in a flagrant or unreasonable manner a handgun in plain sight of others at a private employer's place of business or in plain sight in an employee's motor vehicle, as described in § 16-118-115, except when an employee's display of a handgun is incidental and reasonably related to the transfer of the employee's handgun from his or her locked container located within the employee's motor vehicle to another part of the employee's motor vehicle or employee's person.

History. Acts 2017, No. 1071, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2017, No. 1071, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of this act to reinforce and protect the right of each citizen to lawfully transport and store a handgun within his or her private motor vehicle for lawful purposes in any place where the private motor vehicle is otherwise permitted to be located.”

16-120-803. Immunity for owners of stolen agricultural equipment or off-road vehicles — Definition.

    1. As used in this section, “agricultural equipment or off-road vehicle” means a self-propelled motorized vehicle that is not designed to operate on a roadway but may be used for an agricultural or recreational purpose.
    2. “Agricultural equipment or off-road vehicle” includes:
      1. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in § 27-21-102;
      2. A vehicle designed to be used for agricultural purposes, such as a tractor; and
      3. A riding lawnmower.
    3. “Agricultural equipment or off-road vehicle” does not include:
      1. A motor vehicle designed and used for a medical purpose;
      2. A motor vehicle designed to be used by an individual with a physical disability to assist in walking;
      3. A motorized scooter or other vehicle designed to be used as a toy by a child;
      4. A bicycle equipped with a small motor designed and used to assist the bicycle operator and that is not operated at a speed greater than twenty miles per hour (20 m.p.h.);
      5. An electric personal assistive mobility device that is designed to not be capable of a speed of more than twenty miles per hour (20 m.p.h.); or
      6. A device moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
  1. An owner of agricultural equipment or an off-road vehicle that is stolen or unlawfully appropriated by another person who commits a criminal offense using the agricultural equipment or off-road vehicle is not liable in a civil action for damages, injuries, or death resulting from or arising out of the use of the agricultural equipment or off-road vehicle in the commission of the criminal offense.

History. Acts 2019, No. 518, § 1.

Subchapter 9 — Wrongful Birth Civil Liability Protection Act

16-120-901. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Civil action for wrongful birth” means a cause of action that is brought by a parent or other person who is legally required to provide for the support of a child, seeking economic or noneconomic damages for the child because of a condition that existed at the time of the birth of the child and which is based on a claim that the act or omission of a person contributed to the child's being born; and
  2. “Civil action for wrongful life” means a cause of action that is brought by or on behalf of a child, seeking economic or noneconomic damages for the child because of a condition that existed at the time of the birth of the child and which is based on a claim that the act or omission of a person contributed to the child's being born.

History. Acts 2017, No. 385, § 1.

16-120-902. Wrongful birth claims — Wrongful life claims.

  1. A person is not liable for damages in a civil action for wrongful birth based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a child would not or should not have been born.
  2. A person is not liable for damages in a civil action for wrongful life based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, the person bringing the action would not or should not have been born.
  3. This section:
    1. Applies to a claim regardless of whether the child is born healthy or with a birth defect or other medical condition;
    2. Does not apply to a civil action for damages for an intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent act or omission, including without limitation an act or omission that violates a criminal law; and
    3. Does not limit or eliminate liability for an act or omission that is a proximate cause of any injury to the child before, during, or after birth.

History. Acts 2017, No. 385, § 1.

Subchapter 10 — Arkansas Cycling Activities Act

16-120-1001. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Arkansas Cycling Activities Act”.

History. Acts 2019, No. 573, § 1.

16-120-1002. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Bicycle” means a:
    1. Two-wheeled vehicle with a rear drive wheel that is solely human-powered; or
    2. Two-wheeled or three-wheeled vehicle with:
      1. Fully operable pedals and an electric motor of less than seven hundred fifty watts (750 W); and
      2. A maximum speed of less than twenty miles per hour (20 m.p.h.) on a paved level surface when powered solely by an electric motor and ridden by an operator who weighs one hundred seventy pounds (170 lbs.);
  2. “Bicycle outfitter” means an individual, group, club, partnership, corporation, or business entity, whether or not operating for profit, or an employee or organized agent, that sponsors, organizes, rents, or provides to a participant the use of a bicycle;
  3. “Cycling activity” means riding a bicycle on a road, trail, path, or other surface for:
    1. Competition, exercise, or other undertaking that involves a bicycle;
    2. A training or teaching activity; or
    3. A ride, trip, or other activity that is sponsored by a bicycle outfitter;
  4. “Inherent risk of a cycling activity” means the dangers or conditions that are an integral part of cycling activities on the roads, trails, paths, or other surfaces of the state, including without limitation:
    1. Injury or death caused by:
      1. A change or variation in the surface which may cause a participant to lose control, lose his or her balance, or crash the bicycle;
      2. A collision with a natural or man-made object on or adjacent to the cycling surface, including without limitation a:
        1. Tree;
        2. Rock; or
        3. Tree stump; or
      3. A collision with a pedestrian, a vehicle, or another cyclist which may result in injury or death;
    2. Weather-related illnesses or conditions, including without limitation:
      1. Hypothermia;
      2. Frostbite;
      3. Heat exhaustion;
      4. Heat stroke; or
      5. Dehydration;
    3. An act of nature, including without limitation:
      1. Falling rocks;
      2. Inclement weather;
      3. Thunder and lightning;
      4. Severe or varied temperatures;
      5. Winds; or
      6. Tornadoes;
    4. Operator error, including equipment failure due to operator error;
    5. Attack or injury by an animal; or
    6. The aggravation of an injury, illness, or condition because the injury, illness, or condition occurred in a remote place where medical facilities are not available; and
  5. “Participant” means a person who rents, leases, or uses a bicycle provided by a bicycle outfitter whether or not a fee is paid.

History. Acts 2019, No. 573, § 1.

16-120-1003. Liability of a bicycle outfitter.

Except as provided in § 16-120-1004(2):

    1. A participant assumes the inherent risk of a cycling activity by engaging in the cycling activity.
    2. A participant or a participant's representative shall not make a claim against, maintain an action against, or recover from a bicycle outfitter for the loss or damage or injury to or the death of the participant resulting from the inherent risk of a cycling activity; and
  1. A bicycle outfitter is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risk of a cycling activity.

History. Acts 2019, No. 573, § 1.

16-120-1004. Exclusions.

This subchapter does not:

  1. Apply to a relationship between an employer and an employee under the Workers' Compensation Law, § 11-9-101 et seq.; and
  2. Prevent or limit the liability of a bicycle outfitter or the bicycle outfitter's agent that:
    1. Intentionally injures a participant;
    2. Commits an act or omission of gross negligence concerning the safety of a participant that proximately causes injury to or the death of the participant;
    3. Provides an unsafe bicycle to a participant and knew or should have known that the bicycle was unsafe to the extent that it could cause an injury;
    4. Fails to provide a participant with a bicycle that meets the equipment and manufacturing requirements for bicycles adopted by the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission under 16 C.F.R. Part 1512, as it existed on January 1, 2017;
    5. Fails to use the degree of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances; or
    6. Commits other acts, errors, or omissions that constitute willful or wanton misconduct, gross negligence, or criminal conduct that proximately causes injury, damage, or death.

History. Acts 2019, No. 573, § 1.

16-120-1005. Supplemental to other law.

The limitation of liability provided by this subchapter is in addition to any other limitation of liability provided by law.

History. Acts 2019, No. 573, § 1.

16-120-1006. Signage.

A bicycle outfitter shall post and maintain signage in a clearly visible location at or near where the bicycle outfitter conducts cycling activities and in black letters at least one inch (1") high containing the following warning:

“WARNING — Under Arkansas law, § 16-120-1003, the liability of a bicycle outfitter is limited. You are assuming the risk of participating in a cycling activity.”

History. Acts 2019, No. 573, § 1.

Chapter 121 Utilities Tampering

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 595, § 7: Mar. 15, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that utility suppliers are presently inadequately protected from theft of their utility services by utility customers who tamper with metering devices or who otherwise divert utility services; that the utility suppliers have no cause of action for this theft; and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide such a cause of action. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

16-121-101. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Divert” means to change the intended course or path of gas, water, or electricity without the authorization or consent of the utility supplier;
  2. “Meter tampering” means:
    1. Removing metering devices;
    2. Connecting wires or other instruments to bypass a meter recording usage for billing;
    3. Breaking or defacing any seal, locking device, or other part that makes up the metering device;
    4. Preventing or retarding the action of a meter or other instrument used for measuring utility service;
    5. Transferring from one location to another a metering device;
    6. Using a metering device belonging to the utility supplier that has not been assigned to the utility customer's location and has not been installed by the utility supplier; and
    7. Any other means of tampering with or bypassing a metering device that deprives a supplier from receiving proper charges or payment for utility service;
  3. “Person” means an individual, a corporation, firm, company, or association;
  4. “Unauthorized reconnection” means the commencement of gas, water, or electric service, other than by the supplier, to a utility customer or any other person after utility service has been discontinued by the supplier;
  5. “Utility customer” means:
    1. The person or persons occupying the premises and receiving the benefits of utility service from a utility supplier, whether or not that person is listed on the records of the utility supplier as the customer liable for charges or payment for utility service received with or without charge; or
    2. The manager, superintendent, officer, or other responsible official of a corporation, partnership, proprietorship, association, or other business organization that has received utility service with or without proper charge; and
  6. “Utility supplier” or “supplier” means any regulated public or private utility authorized to provide electricity, natural gas, or water for sale to utility customers in any particular service area.

History. Acts 1989, No. 595, § 1.

16-121-102. Presumptions.

  1. The receipt of benefits because of meter tampering or unauthorized reconnection of utility services by a utility customer without incurring proper charges therefor shall be evidence creating presumption of an intent to defraud or deprive a utility supplier from receiving proper charge or payment for such utility service.
  2. The presence upon property served by a utility supplier of a metering device altered to improperly monitor the amount of utility service used on or by such property shall be evidence creating a presumption that the utility customer has diverted or obtained utility service with the intent to deprive or defraud a utility supplier from receiving proper charges or payment for such utility service.

History. Acts 1989, No. 595, § 2.

16-121-103. Civil cause of action.

  1. Any utility supplier damaged through meter tampering or other acts by any person; including any acts which divert, or cause to be diverted, any utility service by any means whatsoever; or which make, or cause to be made, any unauthorized reconnection with property owned or used by the supplier to provide utility services without the authorization or consent of the utility supplier, shall have a cause of action against any such person found in violation of this section in the circuit courts of this state for all damages resulting therefrom, including actual, consequential, and punitive damages.
  2. Such utility supplier shall be entitled to no less than three (3) times the amount of damages and shall also be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.
  3. The cause of action created by this section exists regardless of any criminal charge against a utility customer for defrauding or depriving a utility supplier of proper charges or payment for utility service or damaged metering devices.

History. Acts 1989, No. 595, § 3.

16-121-104. Statute of limitations.

Civil actions pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within two (2) years following the date of discovery of the violation.

History. Acts 1989, No. 595, § 4.

Chapter 122 Civil Liability of Persons Caught Shoplifting

Cross References. Shoplifting presumption, detention and arrest of person under shoplifting presumption, § 5-36-116.

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, No. 956, § 34: Apr. 6, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that laws concerning juveniles need to be amended and updated; that the fair and efficient administration of juvenile law is highly important to society at large; and that this act is immediately necessary because the judiciary needs to begin addressing these changes in laws involving juveniles. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-122-101. Liability of adult, employee, and parent.

  1. An adult or emancipated minor who takes possession of any goods, wares, or merchandise displayed or offered for sale by any wholesale or retail store or other mercantile establishment without the consent of the owner or seller, and with the intention of converting such goods, wares, or merchandise to his or her own use without having paid the purchase price thereof, shall be subject to civil damages and penalties as set forth in § 16-122-102.
  2. An employee who takes possession of any cash, goods, wares, or merchandise without the consent of the owner or seller, and with the intent of converting such cash, goods, wares, or merchandise to his or her own use without having paid the purchase price thereof, shall be subject to civil damages and penalties as set forth in § 16-122-102 in addition to the actual amount of any cash not returned or recovered.
    1. The parent or legal guardian having custody of an unemancipated minor under eighteen (18) years of age and over six (6) years of age who takes possession of any goods, wares, or merchandise displayed or offered for sale by any wholesale or retail store or other mercantile establishment without the consent of the owner or seller, and with the intent of converting such goods, wares, or merchandise to his or her own use without having paid the purchase price thereof, shall be subject to civil damages and penalties as set forth in § 16-122-102; provided, for the purpose of this subsection, liability shall not be imposed upon any government entity or private agency which has been assigned any responsibility for the minor child pursuant to court order or action of the Department of Human Services.
    2. However, no parent or legal guardian shall be civilly liable under the provisions of this subsection for any offense committed by an unemancipated minor under eighteen (18) years of age and over six (6) years of age who has not been in his or her physical custody for the thirty (30) days preceding the offense.

History. Acts 1993, No. 936, §§ 1-3.

16-122-102. Written demand required — Amount of damages.

  1. Under the provisions of this chapter, the owner or seller shall issue a written demand letter by certified mail for the return of the merchandise or, only if the merchandise has not been returned or recovered, its retail cash equivalent, and a penalty in the amount of two hundred dollars ($200) for an adult to the last known address of the adult.
  2. If the individual to whom the written demand is sent complies with the terms of the demand letter within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the letter, that individual shall not be subject to further civil liability with respect to that specific act of retail theft.
    1. If the individual to whom the written demand is sent does not comply within thirty (30) days of the receipt of a demand letter, then the owner or seller may bring an action against the individual for the recovery of civil damages and penalties in any court of competent jurisdiction if the total damages do not exceed the jurisdictional limit of that court.
    2. In an action brought under this subsection, the owner or seller may recover the following:
      1. Civil damages in an amount equal to the retail value of the merchandise if the merchandise is not recovered or returned, or if the merchandise is recovered or returned, civil damages in an amount equal to the difference between the market value of the recovered or returned merchandise and the retail value of the recovered or returned merchandise;
      2. A civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) for an adult;
      3. Court costs; and
      4. A reasonable attorney's fee.
  3. This section does not apply to juveniles subject to the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989, § 9-27-301 et seq.

History. Acts 1993, No. 936, § 4; 2003, No. 1185, § 250; 2009, No. 956, § 33.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (c)(1), deleted “including the small claims division of municipal court” following “competent jurisdiction.”

The 2009 amendment, in (a), deleted “or emancipated minor, or one hundred dollars ($100) for an unemancipated minor” following “for an adult,” and deleted “emancipated minor, employee, or parent or legal guardian of the unemancipated minor in question” following “address of the adult”; in (c), deleted (c)(2)(B)(ii), redesignated the remaining text accordingly, and deleted “or emancipated minor” following “for an adult” in present (c)(2)(B); and made related changes.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The trial court ruled that this section was unconstitutional and ordered a store to return $100 paid by the appellant's father; where neither party appealed the finding that this section was unconstitutional, that was the law of the case, and the appellant could not be subjected to the civil penalty imposed by this section. K.S. v. State, 343 Ark. 59, 31 S.W.3d 849 (2000).

16-122-103. Penalty.

A conviction for violation of § 5-36-103 shall not be a condition precedent to maintenance of a civil action authorized by this chapter, and nothing in this chapter shall prohibit or limit any other course of action a retailer or merchant may have against a person who unlawfully takes cash, goods, wares, or merchandise from the merchant's premises.

History. Acts 1993, No. 936, § 5.

Chapter 123 Civil Rights

Subchapter 1 — Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993

Research References

ALR.

Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of Sex Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2018).

Ark. L. Notes.

Richards, The Arkansas Civil Rights Act: Sometimes the Only Remedy for Employment Discrimination, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 87.

Ark. L. Rev.

Green, Mixed Motives and After-Acquired Evidence: Second Cousins Benefit From 20/20 Hindsight, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 211.

Note, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.: The Masquerading Doctor, the “Greatest Treason,” and After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Suits, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 625.

Beiner, An Overview of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 165.

Brittany Renai King, Comment: Fired for Being Gay: Should Arkansas Ban This Form of Discrimination?, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 1019 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Liberties, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 73.

Oliver, The Impact of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on Workers' Compensation Law, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 327.

Note, Constitutional Law — First Amendment and Freedom of Speech — Public Employers Must Conduct a Reasonable Investigation to Determine if an Employee's Speech is Protected Before Discharging the Employee Based Upon the Speech. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 511 U.S. 661, 128 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1994), 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 463.

Case Notes

Cited: Citizens to Establish a Reform Party v. Priest, 325 Ark. 257, 926 S.W.2d 432 (1996); Malone v. Trans-States Lines, 325 Ark. 383, 926 S.W.2d 659 (1996); Foster v. Jefferson County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 328 Ark. 223, 944 S.W.2d 93 (1997).

16-123-101. Title.

This subchapter shall be referred to as the “Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993”.

History. Acts 1993, No. 962, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was unaffected by the 1994 restructuring of this subchapter's codification scheme.

Research References

ALR.

Adverse Employment Action Taken Against Employee for Social Media Communications. 103 A.L.R.6th 19 (2015).

Case Notes

In General.

Mayor was entitled to summary judgment on police chief's claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., because the mayor was entitled to qualified immunity; the mayor could not have reasonably known that his termination of the police chief's employment, which was done upon the discovery of missing or incomplete police reports 15 days after the police chief made a statement at a city council meeting, would violate the police chief's constitutional right to free speech under Ark. Const. art. 2, § 6. Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005).

In a certified question, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the federal deliberate indifference standard as the proper standard to apply to claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Thus, a federal district court applied the correct standard to a pretrial detainee's state claims under the Act. Grayson v. Ross, 483 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2007).

Motorist's complaint brought under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., alleging that county officers were without jurisdiction to set up a roadblock and that the motorist's subsequent stop, detention, and arrest violated Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 15, was properly dismissed because the motorist failed to state a claim where the complaint did not assert that the officers' actions were unreasonable. Wade v. Ferguson, 2009 Ark. 618 (2009).

College, which was a community college, was an agency of the state and, thus, enjoyed Eleventh Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. XI, sovereign immunity from the teacher's lawsuit against it alleging race discrimination and retaliation claims for not renewing the teaching contract of the teacher. As a result, the teacher's claims under Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., had to be dismissed as claims against the state, but the teacher could still maintain an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.Reed v. College of the Ouachitas, No. 6:11-CV-6020, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 23, 2012).

City was not entitled to summary judgment on employee's claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., for failure to promote her on account of race, because the trial court failed to engage in the burden-shifting analysis required by McDonnell-Douglas. Additionally, the trial court erred in characterizing her failure to promote claim as a constructive discharge claim. Brodie v. City of Jonesboro, 2012 Ark. 5 (2012).

Accommodation.

Where an employee was demoted from manager to supervisor after the employee made an inappropriate remark about race, the employee's failure-to-accommodate claim failed because the employee's request that the employer allow the employee to stay in the employee's current position, even if considered an accommodation request, was untimely because it came after the employee's comment. Schaffhauser v. UPS, 794 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2015).

Burden Shifting.

Summary judgment was improperly granted in a case alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, §§ 16-123-101 to 16-123-108, because the trial court should have used the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis and explained its findings. Johnson v. Windstream Communs., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 590 (2012), dismissed without prejudice, 2016 Ark. App. 419 (2016).

Deliberate Indifference.

Judgment entered against a prison warden in a state prison inmate's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., suit was reversed because the evidence did not support the district court's finding that the warden was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety, in violation of the inmate's rights under U.S. Const., Amend. VIII, and the Arkansas Constitution: (1) the warden had investigated the grievances that were filed against two corrections officers, arising from their alleged mistreatment of prisoners, he had found that they were typical of grievances that were generally filed against corrections officers, and he had taken disciplinary action against the offending officer with regard to the one grievance that he found was substantiated; (2) the officers' employment records did not give the warden cause to believe that they presented a substantial risk to the safety of prisoners; and (3) the district court's disagreement with the warden's disciplinary choices, specifically the warden's failure to require the offending officer to participate in a remedial program in addition to the one-week suspension, temporary job reassignment, and reprimand that he received, was not sufficient to support the deliberate indifference finding. Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 998, 128 S. Ct. 504, 169 L. Ed. 2d 353 (2007).

Due Process.

Circuit court properly denied the city a directed verdict in a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process in charging installment fees even if the fine was paid off early. The lack of notice, as established by the evidence at trial, precluded satisfaction of due process; there was no evidence showing that plaintiff mother was advised of a refund or reconsideration of the fee, but instead, she was simply told by the court cashier that she had to pay the entire sum. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

Immunity.

Statutory immunity under § 19-10-305 barred the employee's claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., against the supervisor in her individual capacity where the employee's bare allegation of willful and wanton conduct was not enough to demonstrate malice. Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers, 2017 Ark. 213, 521 S.W.3d 459 (2017).

Sovereign immunity under Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 20, barred an employee's state civil rights claims against a state agency and a supervisor in her official capacity where the employee had not developed her arguments as to the ultra vires or bad faith exceptions below, and a judgment for the employee would have subjected the state to liability. Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers, 2017 Ark. 213, 521 S.W.3d 459 (2017).

No Due Process Violation.

Police chief did not show a due process violation when the chief was summarily terminated by the mayor because § 14-42-110 did not give the chief a right to a hearing before city council, so the termination did not violate the chief's rights under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-23-101 et seq.Sullivan v. Coney, 2013 Ark. 222, 427 S.W.3d 682 (2013).

Pretext.

Employee's racial discrimination claim against a school district under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000e and this section failed because there was insufficient evidence of pretext. There was no showing that the employee's qualifications for a new position were comparable to those of the successful applicant, and evidence that the school district did not follow its own hiring procedures was insufficient to establish pretext for discrimination. Dixon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 578 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2009).

Terminated employee's race discrimination claims failed because the employer stated that it discharged the employee for failing to follow a supervisor's directive, and the employee did not show pretext since nineteen youth care workers were not valid comparators because they had different immediate supervisors from the employee and did not engage in the same conduct as the employee, and the employee's allegations of shifting explanations amounted to nothing more than a semantic dispute as to whether the employer's ultimatum to resign or be fired was a resignation or a termination. Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1159, 133 S. Ct. 1252, 185 L. Ed. 2d 181 (2013).

Where a nursing home employee was terminated based on reports of improper sexual contact with a male resident, the employee's discrimination claims failed because (1) the employee's termination was not direct evidence of discrimination, and (2) the employee did not show pretext since the employee did not provide any evidence that any other employees who were not Pentecostal, female, or disabled were accused of the exact or similar behavior as the employee was. Evance v. Trumann Health Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 673 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 799, 187 L. Ed. 2d 596 (2013).

Where a white employee was demoted from manager to supervisor after the employee made an inappropriate remark about race, the employee's race discrimination claim failed because the union's statements or motives were not direct evidence, nothing in the facts showed that the employer was more likely motivated by race than by its proffered justification, the comparators were not similarly situated, and the employee did not show pretext. Schaffhauser v. UPS, 794 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2015).

Respondeat Superior.

Just like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, §§ 16-123-101 through 16-123-108; therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to the Arkansas Crime Information Center, its director, and a state governor, in an action alleging misuse of expunged records where someone allegedly accessed them inappropriately and posted them on the Internet. Jones v. Huckabee, 369 Ark. 42, 250 S.W.3d 241 (2007).

Circuit court properly denied the city a directed verdict in a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process because the installment fee policy constituted a governmental policy or custom to which municipal liability could attach; the district court judge consulted with deputy city attorneys and others in implementing the policy and the policy was automatically applied to all district court defendants on an installment plan. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34, 592 S.W.3d 633 (2020).

Retaliation.

Because plaintiff employee claimed that defendant city and supervisors retaliated against her because she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint, her retaliation claims were based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, §§ 16-123-101 through 16-123-108, not on whatever statute might apply to the underlying conduct of which she complained. Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2013).

Employee's retaliation claim failed because defendant and supervisors consistently had explained they terminated the employee's employment for two legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons (her work performance was unacceptable and her behavior toward other employees created a hostile work environment); the evidence supporting the explanation was strong, and the employee had presented no evidence that these legitimate reasons were pretextual. Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2013).

Specific Cases.

Where a deceased's estate appealed a district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants as to its Fourth Amendment and Arkansas Civil Rights Act excessive force claim, not only were two officers entitled to qualified immunity, but one officer's use of a taser and second officer's subsequent use of deadly force were reasonable. Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2017).

Cited: Ford v. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 335 Ark. 245, 979 S.W.2d 897 (1998); Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2000); City of Farmington v. Smith, 366 Ark. 473, 237 S.W.3d 1 (2006).

16-123-102. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Because of gender” means, but is not limited to, on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
  2. “Compensatory damages” means damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries, but “compensatory damages” does not include punitive damages;
  3. “Disability” means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life function, but “disability” does not include:
    1. Compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania;
    2. Current use of illegal drugs or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from illegal use of drugs; or
    3. Alcoholism;
  4. “Employee” does not include:
    1. Any individual employed by his or her parents, spouse, or child;
    2. An individual participating in a specialized employment training program conducted by a nonprofit sheltered workshop or rehabilitation facility; or
    3. An individual employed outside the State of Arkansas;
  5. “Employer” means a person who employs nine (9) or more employees in the State of Arkansas in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year;
  6. “National origin” includes ancestry;
  7. “Place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement” means any place, store, or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies accommodations, goods, or services to the general public, or that solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public, or that is supported directly or indirectly by government funds, but “place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement” does not include:
    1. Any lodging establishment which contains not more than five (5) rooms for rent and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as a residence; or
    2. Any private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public; and
  8. “Religion” means all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice.

History. Acts 1993, No. 962, § 9; 1995, No. 480, § 1; 2017, No. 191, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment deleted “or any agent of such person” at the end of (5).

Case Notes

Applicability.

Pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, §§ 16-123-10116-123-108, the trial court did not err in granting the employer's motion for summary judgment on the employer's gender discrimination claim as the employee was not eligible for leave under FMLA or pre-FMLA as she had only been with the company a short time; the employee did not proffer evidence to prove that the explanation provided by the employer was pretextual. Greenlee v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., 2009 Ark. 506, 342 S.W.3d 274 (2009).

Compensatory Damages.

Circuit court erroneously considered events and circumstances unrelated to the city's December 2015 due-process violations in determining the tenants' awards of damages under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act because much of the evidence recounted by the circuit court about mental anguish and emotional distress as a result of the city's actions lacked a causal connection to the violations. The February 2016 gas leak was not causally connected to the December 2015 due-process violation; one of the tenants moved from her apartment in November 2016 based on water-leak damage and a sewer back-up and not the due process violations; and there was no evidence that another tenant's worsened medical conditions were caused by the closure. City of Little Rock v. Alexander Apts., LLC, 2020 Ark. 12, 592 S.W.3d 224 (2020).

Disability.

Whether police officer's impairment due to obesity and hypertension qualified as a disability as defined by this section was a question of fact. Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996).

A food allergy does not constitute a disability within the meaning of the statute. Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 1999).

“Disability,” as defined in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., does not extend a cause of action for violation of civil rights to an individual who is regarded as having a disability. Faulkner v. Ark. Children's Hosp., 347 Ark. 941, 69 S.W.3d 393 (2002).

Employers were granted summary judgment on former employee's disability discrimination claim where the employee admitted that he had learned to shave, brush his teeth, groom himself, prepare meals and wash dishes with his left hand and, as a result, while he had some medically imposed restrictions, the employee had not met his burden of showing that the extent of his limitations due to his impairment was substantial in terms of caring for himself. Didier v. Schwan Food Co., 387 F. Supp. 2d 987 (W.D. Ark. 2005).

Employer.

Police officer's claims for discrimination brought against the city and the chief of police dismissed as to the chief of police because the chief, as her supervisor, did not fit the definition of “employer” in this section, and because the rights allegedly violated were not covered by the Arkansas Constitution and thus § 16-123-105 was not implicated. Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996).

16-123-103. Applicability.

  1. The provisions of this subchapter relating to employment shall not be applicable with respect to employment by a religious corporation, association, society, or other religious entity.
  2. It shall not constitute employment discrimination under this subchapter for an employer to refuse to accommodate the religious observance or practice of an employee or prospective employee if the employer demonstrates that he or she is unable to reasonably make such accommodation without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
  3. A defendant may avoid liability under this subchapter by showing that his or her actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors and not on unjustified reasons.
  4. Provided the conduct at issue is based on a bona fide business judgment and is not a pretext for prohibited discrimination, nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prohibit or restrict:
    1. An insurer, hospital, medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent or entity that administers benefit plans, or any bank, savings and loan, or other lender from underwriting insurance or lending risks or administering such risks that are based on or are not inconsistent with federal or state law;
    2. A person covered by this subchapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing, or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or are not inconsistent with federal or state law; or
    3. A person covered by this subchapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing, or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to federal or state laws that regulate insurance.
  5. This subchapter shall not apply to matters regulated by the Arkansas Insurance Code or the Trade Practices Act of the Arkansas Insurance Code, § 23-66-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1993, No. 962, §§ 6, 8.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-123-108.

For codification of the Arkansas Insurance Code, see the note at § 23-60-101.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Civil Rights, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 841.

Case Notes

Burden of Proof.

Trial court did not err in rejecting employees' proposed instruction because the employees had the burden to prove an adverse employment action motivated by intentional discrimination, and the proposed language improperly shifted the ultimate burden of proof to the employer. Brown v. UPS, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 501, 531 S.W.3d 427 (2017).

“Honest belief” rule is not an affirmative defense; it is simply a rule. Brown v. UPS, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 501, 531 S.W.3d 427 (2017).

Sexual Harassment.

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment against claims of sexual harassment in violation of § 16-123-107(a) of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., and for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy of the State of Arkansas, where there were genuine issues of fact as to whether an at-will female employee was terminated from her job in retaliation for resisting the sexual advances of her employer or because the employee's position was going to be given to the employer's son; a lack of termination, or a non-gender-based reason for the employee's termination, does not extinguish a harassed employee's cause of action for sexual harassment under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548, 103 S.W.3d 671 (2003).

Claims of sexual harassment premised under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., are analyzed in the same manner as claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548, 103 S.W.3d 671 (2003).

Termination from Employment.

Where an employee has alleged two separate injuries, one being a work-related physical injury and disability, for which she has received workers' compensation benefits, and one being a subsequent nonphysical injury arising from employer's action in terminating her based upon her new disability, the first injury is exclusively cognizable under the Workers' Compensation Act (see § 11-9-105), while the subsequent injury is of the type envisioned by this subchapter. Davis v. Dillmeier Enters., Inc., 330 Ark. 545, 956 S.W.2d 155 (1997).

16-123-104. Construction.

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the sovereign immunity of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1993, No. 962, § 7.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-123-109.

Case Notes

Dismissal Improperly Denied.

In a civil rights action against a state trooper, a trial court erred by denying the trooper's motion to dismiss because he was immune from liability under Ark. Const. art. 5, § 20 in his official capacity since there was no waiver of sovereign immunity under § 16-123-104; the action was tantamount to one against the State itself. Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 255 S.W.3d 838 (2007).

Cited: Smith v. Daniel, 2014 Ark. 519, 452 S.W.3d 575 (2014); Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers, 2017 Ark. 213, 521 S.W.3d 459 (2017).

16-123-105. Civil rights offenses.

  1. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of this state or any of its political subdivisions subjects, or causes to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Arkansas Constitution shall be liable to the party injured in an action in circuit court for legal and equitable relief or other proper redress.
  2. In the discretion of the court, a party held liable under this section shall also pay the injured party's cost of litigation and a reasonable attorney's fee in an amount to be fixed by the court.
  3. When construing this section, a court may look for guidance to state and federal decisions interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended and codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as in effect on January 1, 1993, which decisions and Civil Rights Act of 1871 shall have persuasive authority only.

History. Acts 1993, No. 962, § 2; 1995, No. 480, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 251.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-123-103.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), substituted “in circuit court for legal and equitable relief” for “at law, a suit in equity” and deleted “proceeding for” preceding “redress.”

Research References

ALR.

What constitutes substantial limitation on major life activity of working for purposes of state civil rights acts. 102 A.L.R.5th 1.

What constitutes racial harassment in employment violative of state civil rights acts. 17 A.L.R.6th 563.

Construction and Application of State Statutory Provisions Prohibiting Racial Profiling. 102 A.L.R.6th 621 (2015).

Retail Establishment's Surveillance of or Refusal to Serve Individuals on Basis of Race or Ethnicity, or Other Alleged Instances of Consumer “Racial Profiling,” as Infringement of Civil Rights Under State Law. 103 A.L.R.6th 1 (2015).

What is Reasonable Accommodation of Deaf or Hearing-Impaired Employee for Purposes of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 2 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Identity of Commenter and Relationship of Remark to Employment Decision as Determinants of Relevance of Stray Remark or Comment in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (2016).

Stray Remark or Comment Involving Male Plaintiffs in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 8 (2016).

Employment Discrimination Against Obese Persons as Violation of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 or Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 10 (2016).

Stray Remark or Comment Toward Female Plaintiffs Regarding Pregnancy, Child-Rearing, and Related References in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3 (2016).

Validity, Construction, and Application of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) Exempting Activities of Religious Organizations from Operation of Title VII Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2016).

Construction and Application of Four-Fifths Rule for Finding Evidence of Adverse Impact in Federal Employment Discrimination Cases. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Stray Remark or Comment Involving General References Toward Female Plaintiffs in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

Rights of Workers with Disabilities at Sheltered Workshops or Work Activity Centers under Federal Civil Rights Provisions. 8 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Employee's Unpaid Leave as Reasonable Accommodation Under Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 8 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

Application of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq.) or Regulations Promulgated Thereunder (40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10 et seq.) to Alleged Racial or National Origin Discrimination with Respect to Environmental Issues. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Stray Remark or Comment Involving Overt Sexual References Toward Female Plaintiffs in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination, 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Failure to Hire Deaf or Hearing-Impaired Job Applicant as Violation of Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (2016).

Employer's Dress Policy as Religious Discrimination Under Federal Law. 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

National Security Exception to Employment Discrimination Provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g)). 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Employer's Grooming Policy as Religious Discrimination under Federal Law. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Discrimination Against Credit Applicant on Basis of Race or National Origin Under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.). 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Retail Establishment's Surveillance of or Refusal To Serve Individuals on Basis of Race or Ethnicity, or Other Alleged Instances of Consumer “Racial Profiling,” as Infringement of Civil Rights Under Federal Law. 15 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Discrimination Based on Marital Status Under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.) as Defense to Liability for Financial Obligations. 16 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Rights of Employees with Bipolar Disorder Under Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act. 17 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Ark. L. Rev.

Recent Developments in Tort Law (Sheperd v. Washington County), 51 Ark. L. Rev. 219.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Miller, Arkansas Civil Rights Act–-School District's Liability for Peer Abuse: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds School Districts Have No Duty to Protect Students From Each Other. Rudd v. Pulaski County Special School District, 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000), 23 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 977 (Summer, 2001).

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Civil Rights, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 841.

Case Notes

In General.

This section is the portion of the chapter dealing with deprivation of a right secured by the Arkansas Constitution at the hands of governmental employers or employers acting under color of state authority, and as such is a sort of state version of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Smith v. Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

By enacting § 16-123-105(a), the General Assembly did not intend to repeal § 19-10-305(a), as repeal by implication is not favored and the two sections can be read in harmony. Robinson v. Langdon, 333 Ark. 662, 970 S.W.2d 292 (1998).

Attorney's fees imposed on a debtor as part of a civil rights action against him were dischargeable in bankruptcy where the Arkansas civil rights statute that the debtor allegedly violated did not require both willful and malicious conduct to impose liability, and both willfulness and malice were required to except a debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Solomon v. Jarrett (In re Jarrett), 303 B.R. 816 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2003).

Inmate who asserted wool blankets caused him to suffer rashes did not show a serious medical need that would have supported a claim of a violation of Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 9 or this section; the inmate's condition was not one that mandated treatment even though it may have been diagnosed by a doctor and, while the evidence showed he indeed suffered from discomfort and rashes, he had been provided with adequate treatment for those symptoms. Williams v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 362 Ark. 134, 207 S.W.3d 519, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1018, 126 S. Ct. 647, 163 L. Ed. 2d 531 (2005).

Attorney's Fees.

After a jury found that the city had violated the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., in charging excessive installment fees in traffic court, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney's fees to plaintiff under this section; the circuit court's intimate acquaintance with the record and quality of counsel's services gave it a superior opportunity to assess the critical factors. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 19 (2020).

Claim Dismissed.

Police officer's claims for discrimination brought against the city and the chief of police dismissed as to the chief of police because the chief, as her supervisor, did not fit the definition of “employer” in 16-123-102, and because the rights allegedly violated were not covered by the Arkansas Constitution and thus this section was not implicated. Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996).

The circuit court properly granted summary judgment regarding the appellants' claim that the appellee had violated a right guaranteed to them by this subchapter, as the appellants had no civil right to be free from a lawsuit filed against them based on probable cause. Carmical v. McAfee, 68 Ark. App. 313, 7 S.W.3d 350 (1999).

Federal district court rejected parents' argument that subsection (a) of this section created a cause of action against a school district and a vice principal because the district and the vice principal failed to enforce § 6-18-514, which guaranteed their son the right to receive a public education in an environment that was reasonably free from substantial intimidation, harassment, or harm or threat of harm by other students. Subsection (a) of this section created a private right of action when a person claimed that rights, privileges, or immunities that were secured by the Arkansas Constitution were violated, but did not create a private right of action for violation of state statutes. Wolfe v. Fayetteville Ark. Sch. Dist., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (W.D. Ark. 2009).

In a former inmate's action for damages stemming from a rape by a county jailer, a county judge was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the civil rights claims under this section on immunity grounds under § 21-9-301 because the inmate failed to establish that the County acted with deliberate indifference when it hired the jailer where the inmate only offered unsupported allegations that the jailer had previously inappropriately hugged and kissed a 16-year-old female inmate; an unwanted hug and kiss were not nearly identical enough to the inmate's allegations to constitute deliberate indifference. Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634, 361 S.W.3d 788 (2009).

Police officer was entitled as a matter of law to qualified immunity on claims under subsection (a) of this section asserted by appellee father because the undisputed facts demonstrated probable cause for the father's arrest for driving on the wrong side of the road in contravention of § 27-51-301(a). Martin v. Hallum, 2010 Ark. App. 193, 374 S.W.3d 152 (2010).

Where a city employee was terminated for refusing a state trooper's request to take a drug test, the employee's claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) failed because the district court explained that its rulings on the employee's federal claims applied equally to the employee's ACRA claims, and the employee did not explain why the ACRA claims warranted separate analysis. Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2013).

Where a deputy found an empty Xanax bottle on a decedent, took the decedent to jail, saw that the decedent slurred slightly, and knew that the decedent had taken medications, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity as to claims that the deputy was deliberately indifferent to the decedent's serious medical needs. The deputy did not have subjective knowledge that the decedent required medical attention; although the decedent exhibited signs of intoxication, the deputy easily awakened the decedent. Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2013).

Airport hangar operator failed to state a procedural due process claim; most of the operator's allegations fell outside the three-year statute of limitations applicable to civil rights claims, and a claim that a lease with a different airport tenant failed to comply with the county commission's airport standards did not sufficiently allege a property or liberty deprivation or a violation of procedural due process. Mt. Home Flight Serv. v. Baxter County, 758 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2014).

Summary judgment was granted on plaintiff's Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims alleging unreasonable seizure and an equal protection violation because there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and plaintiff failed to provide evidence establishing discriminatory effect or purpose on the part of the officers. Ratliff v. City of Shannon Hills, 52 F. Supp. 3d 904 (E.D. Ark. 2014).

In a civil rights action brought on behalf of a detainee who died at a detention center following a car accident, after being admitted suffering from severe intoxication and drug ingestion, the jail administrator was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that he failed to adequately train or supervise the booking deputy; the mere assertion of prior suits did not support an inference that the administrator had notice that the county's training procedures and supervision were inadequate and likely to result in constitutional violations. Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2018).

Claim Not Dismissed.

Plaintiff's complaint not dismissed even though she cited to the wrong section of this chapter, where the plaintiff's allegations were specific and the complaint stated that plaintiff was asserting a claim parallel to the federal claim, and thus the defendant had actual notice of her claim. Smith v. Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

Plaintiff's complaint sufficiently stated a civil-rights claim under this section and Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 8, where the facts alleged in the complaint demonstrated that defendants' actions in taking this particular violent inmate to a private medical clinic without taking necessary precautions to protect any potential victims at the clinic from being harmed by the inmate resulted in the plaintiff's injuries and her husband's death. Shepherd v. Washington County, 331 Ark. 480, 962 S.W.2d 779 (1998).

Where a towing company sold an arrestee's truck, the arrestee's due process claim survived summary judgment because (1) regarding the federal due process claim, the towing company was acting under color of state law, (2) the towing company owner's action of selling the truck was an action by someone representing official company policy, and (3) the Arkansas Civil Rights Act claim was essentially the same as the federal due process claim. Smith v. Insley's, Inc., 499 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2007).

Police officer engaged in racial profiling prohibited by state statute, the state constitution, the U.S. Constitution, and the city's written policy and the officer also illegally seized one of the plaintiffs, thereby violating U.S. Const., Amend. IV and the state constitution; the police chief, who supervised the officer and ran the police department, was deliberately indifferent to ongoing and systemic racial profiling of which he was aware and municipal liability was imposed on the city as it permitted the officer to establish and to carry out a custom and practice of engaging in racial profiling. The officer's true objective was not to enforce traffic laws prohibiting people from driving with their vision obstructed or other minor infractions; rather, the neutral traffic laws were used as a pretext for harassing Hispanics (whether here legally or illegally), for obtaining money through fines and towing charges for the financially troubled city, and to provide an incentive for Hispanics to move out of the area—clearly illegitimate objectives. Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Ark. 2010).

Where a decedent died at a jail, an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, because a reasonable jury could find that the officer had subjective knowledge of a serious medical need and deliberately disregarded that need since the officer was well-aware that the decedent exhibited a heightened intoxicated state and a fellow detainee warned the officer that the decedent needed help. Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2013).

Where a detainee was involved in a single-vehicle accident, failed a breath test, was arrested, fell to the ground and was not responsive, was transported to a detention center, and died in a holding room, a trooper was not entitled to statutory immunity under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., because the complaint alleged facts sufficient to create an inference of malice. Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2016).

Deputy was not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act; in light of the detainee's car accident, severe intoxication, drug ingestion, inability to stand, and inability to answer simple questions, a jury could find a medical need so obvious that a layperson would recognize the detainee's need for prompt medical attention and thus that the deputy was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2018).

Deliberate Indifference Standard.

Arkansas Supreme Court adopts deliberate indifference as the proper standard for the health needs of pretrial detainees under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Grayson v. Ross, 369 Ark. 241, 253 S.W.3d 428 (2007).

Federal deliberate-indifference standard has been adopted as the standard to be applied to claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2018).

Excessive Force.

In an excessive-force case, considering the entire “course of proceedings”, the trial court did not err in interpreting the claims against the officers and the police chief under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., as individual-capacity claims. Faughn v. Kennedy, 2019 Ark. App. 570, 590 S.W.3d 188 (2019).

In an excessive-force case, material questions of fact remained regarding whether the force the officers used against the father and son and the force used by the police chief against the father was reasonable; therefore, those defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Faughn v. Kennedy, 2019 Ark. App. 570, 590 S.W.3d 188 (2019).

Trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the police chief on the son's claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq.; while the son made excessive-force allegations against some officers, he did not allege that the police chief used any force against him. Faughn v. Kennedy, 2019 Ark. App. 570, 590 S.W.3d 188 (2019).

Federal Precedent.

The court uses the same principles to analyze a claim for disability discrimination under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., as it would to analyze a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2002).

Claims of sexual harassment premised under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-101 et seq., are analyzed in the same manner as claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548, 103 S.W.3d 671 (2003).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment against claims of sexual harassment in violation of § 16-123-107(a) of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., and for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy of the State of Arkansas, where there were genuine issues of fact as to whether an at-will female employee was terminated from her job in retaliation for resisting the sexual advances of her employer or because the employee's position was going to be given to the employer's son; a lack of termination, or a non-gender-based reason for the employee's termination, does not extinguish a harassed employee's cause of action for sexual harassment under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548, 103 S.W.3d 671 (2003) (citing subsection (c) of this section).

Retaliation.

Former university employee's free speech retaliation claim under this section and Ark. Const., Art. II, § 6 failed because the employee's filing of sexual harassment complaints against co-workers did not constitute protected speech; the employee was merely responding to sexual harassment allegations made against the employee by the co-workers, and the employee filed the complaints in an effort to avoid termination rather than as a matter of public concern. McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 559 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2009).

Where a white employee resigned, the employee's retaliation claim failed because (1) the employee said nothing in a phone call about race discrimination, and (2) the employee did not demonstrate a materially adverse action since the employee failed to offer sufficient evidence of a constructive discharge; the employee's racially hostile work environment claim also failed. Helton v. Southland Racing Corp., 600 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2010).

Special Relationship.

A school did not have a special relationship with a student who was fatally shot on a school bus, thereby imposing a duty upon the school to protect him from violent acts by the other student who shot him. Rudd v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000).

State Actors.

Bail bondsman was not a state actor when he filed an affidavit requesting a plaintiff's arrest under § 16-94-213, and therefore was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on claim that he deprived plaintiff of his civil rights. Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1997).

A high school student who fatally shot another student on a school bus was not a state actor, and the school district's failure to impose and maintain restraints upon him did not trigger the provisions of the Civil Rights Act. Rudd v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000); Casteel v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (W.D. Ark. 2003).

Supplemental Jurisdiction.

Pretrial detainee's claims under this section, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which were based on allegations that county officials failed to seek medical treatment for the detainee for severe drug intoxication, derived from a common nucleus of operative fact. The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over the state law claim was therefore appropriate. McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2009).

Cited: Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2000); Crockett v. Counseling Servs. of E. Ark., Inc., 85 Ark. App. 371, 154 S.W.3d 278 (2004); Jones v. Huckabee, 369 Ark. 42, 250 S.W.3d 241 (2007); Brown v. UPS, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 501, 531 S.W.3d 427 (2017).

16-123-106. Hate offenses.

  1. A person may bring a civil action for injunctive relief or damages, or both, if he or she is subject to an act motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic animosity and the act was an act of:
    1. Intimidation or harassment;
    2. Violence directed against his or her person; or
    3. Vandalism directed against his or her real or personal property.
  2. Any aggrieved party who initiates and prevails in a civil action authorized by this section is entitled to damages, including punitive damages, and in the discretion of the court to an award of the cost of the civil action, and a reasonable attorney's fee in an amount to be fixed by the court.
  3. This section does not apply to:
    1. Speech or conduct protected by the United States Constitution, Amendment I, or Arkansas Constitution, Article 2, § 6; or
    2. A civil action:
      1. Between an employee and his or her employer or between or among employees of the same employer;
      2. For damages arising out of an incident occurring in the workplace; or
      3. Arising out of the employee-employer relationship.

History. Acts 1993, No. 962, § 3; 2017, No. 191, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 16-123-104.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote the introductory language in (a); deleted “where such acts are motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic animosity” at the end of (a)(3); in (b), substituted “a civil action” for “an action” and “cost of the civil action” for “cost of the litigation”; redesignated former (c) as the introductory language of (c) and (c)(1); added (c)(2); and made stylistic changes.

16-123-107. Discrimination offenses.

  1. The right of an otherwise qualified person to be free from discrimination because of race, religion, national origin, gender, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:
    1. The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;
    2. The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;
    3. The right to engage in property transactions without discrimination;
    4. The right to engage in credit and other contractual transactions without discrimination; and
    5. The right to vote and participate fully in the political process.
  2. Any person who is injured by an intentional act of discrimination in violation of subdivisions (a)(2)-(5) of this section shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, to recover compensatory and punitive damages, and, in the discretion of the court, to recover the cost of litigation and a reasonable attorney's fee.
      1. Any individual who is injured by employment discrimination by an employer in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall have a civil action against the employer only in a court of competent jurisdiction, which may issue an order prohibiting the discriminatory practices and provide affirmative relief from the effects of the practices, and award back pay, interest on back pay, and, in the discretion of the court, the cost of litigation and a reasonable attorney's fee.
      2. No liability for back pay shall accrue from a date more than two (2) years prior to the filing of an action.
      1. In addition to the remedies under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section, any individual who is injured by intentional discrimination by an employer in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be entitled to recover compensatory damages and punitive damages.
      2. The total compensatory and punitive damages awarded under subdivision (c)(2)(A) of this section shall not exceed:
        1. The sum of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) in the case of an employer who employs fewer than fifteen (15) employees in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year;
        2. The sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in the case of an employer who employs more than fourteen (14) and fewer than one hundred one (101) employees in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year;
        3. The sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in the case of an employer who employs more than one hundred (100) and fewer than two hundred one (201) employees in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year;
        4. The sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) in the case of an employer who employs more than two hundred (200) and fewer than five hundred one (501) employees in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year; and
        5. The sum of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) in the case of an employer who employs more than five hundred (500) employees in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.
    1. Damages under subdivisions (c)(2)(B)(ii)-(v) of this section shall not duplicate or increase an award for damages over the statutory limit allowed by state law or any federal law, as the federal law existed on January 1, 2017.
    2. Any action based on employment discrimination in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be brought within one (1) year after the alleged employment discrimination occurred, or within ninety (90) days of receipt of a “Right to Sue” letter or a notice of “Determination” from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission concerning the alleged unlawful employment practice, whichever is later.

History. Acts 1993, No. 962, §§ 4, 5; 1995, No. 480, § 3; 2017, No. 783, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2017, No. 783, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this act not duplicate an award for damages over the statutory limit allowed by any other state or federal law, as this act is based on damages already provided for under federal law.”

Publisher's Notes. Subsection (a) of this section was formerly codified as § 16-123-105, subsection (b) as § 16-123-106, and subsection (c) as § 16-123-107.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment inserted “against the employer only” in (c)(1)(A); redesignated part of (c)(2)(A) as (c)(2)(B); substituted “subdivision (c)(2)(A) of this section” for “this subdivision (c)(2)(A)” in the introductory language of (c)(2)(B); inserted present (c)(3); and redesignated former (c)(3) as (c)(4).

Research References

ALR.

Discrimination against pregnant employee as violation of state fair employment laws. 99 A.L.R.5th 1.

What constitutes substantial limitation on major life activity of working for purposes of state civil rights acts. 102 A.L.R.5th 1.

Pursuit of nonjudicial remedy for employment discrimination as amounting to election against judicial remedy. 103 A.L.R.5th 557.

Necessity of, and what constitutes, employer's reasonable accommodation of employee's religious preference under state law. 107 A.L.R.5th 623.

Web Site as “Public Accommodation” for Purposes of Federal or State Civil Rights Statutes. 7 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2015).

Who is “Supervisor” for Purposes of Racial Harassment Claim Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) Imputing Liability to Employer. 92 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 91 (2015).

What is Reasonable Accommodation of Deaf or Hearing-Impaired Employee for Purposes of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 2 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Identity of Commenter and Relationship of Remark to Employment Decision as Determinants of Relevance of Stray Remark or Comment in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (2016).

Stray Remark or Comment Involving Male Plaintiffs in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 8 (2016).

Employment Discrimination Against Obese Persons as Violation of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 or Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 10 (2016).

Stray Remark or Comment Toward Female Plaintiffs Regarding Pregnancy, Child-Rearing, and Related References in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3 (2016).

Validity, Construction, and Application of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) Exempting Activities of Religious Organizations from Operation of Title VII Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2016).

Construction and Application of Four-Fifths Rule for Finding Evidence of Adverse Impact in Federal Employment Discrimination Cases. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Stray Remark or Comment Involving General References Toward Female Plaintiffs in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

Rights of Workers with Disabilities at Sheltered Workshops or Work Activity Centers under Federal Civil Rights Provisions. 8 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Employee's Unpaid Leave as Reasonable Accommodation Under Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 8 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2016).

Application of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq.) or Regulations Promulgated Thereunder (40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10 et seq.) to Alleged Racial or National Origin Discrimination with Respect to Environmental Issues. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Stray Remark or Comment Involving Overt Sexual References Toward Female Plaintiffs in Title VII Action for Sex Discrimination. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Failure to Hire Deaf or Hearing-Impaired Job Applicant as Violation of Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 7 (2016).

Employer's Dress Policy as Religious Discrimination Under Federal Law. 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

National Security Exception to Employment Discrimination Provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g)). 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Employer's Grooming Policy as Religious Discrimination under Federal Law. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016).

Discrimination Against Credit Applicant on Basis of Race or National Origin Under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.). 13 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Discrimination Based on Marital Status Under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.) as Defense to Liability for Financial Obligations. 16 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 9 (2016).

Rights of Employees with Bipolar Disorder Under Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act. 17 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Ark. L. Rev.

Madeline L. Kurrus, Comment: Taking It Personally: Holding Individual Supervisors Liable for Retaliation Under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 873 (2012).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Civil Rights, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 841.

Case Notes

In General.

Claims of sexual harassment premised under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-101, et seq., are analyzed in the same manner as claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548, 103 S.W.3d 671 (2003).

Attorney's fees imposed on a debtor as part of a civil rights action against him were dischargeable in bankruptcy where the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., that the debtor allegedly violated did not require both willful and malicious conduct to impose liability, and both willfulness and malice were required to except a debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Solomon v. Jarrett (In re Jarrett), 303 B.R. 816 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2003).

After employee received unemployment benefits based on a finding of no work-related misconduct, collateral estoppel did not bar the employer from asserting, in a racial discrimination case, that the employee was fired for inappropriate behavior; an administrative finding that the employee was discharged for reasons that did not disqualify him for unemployment benefits under § 11-10-514(a)(1) did not address the issue of whether an improper racial motive was present within the meaning of subdivision (a)(1) of this section and, absent evidence of racial animus, summary judgment for the employer was proper. Crockett v. Counseling Servs. of E. Ark., Inc., 85 Ark. App. 371, 154 S.W.3d 278 (2004).

“Honest belief” rule is not an affirmative defense; it is simply a rule. Brown v. UPS, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 501, 531 S.W.3d 427 (2017).

Appellate Review.

Because employees failed to object to the jury instructions on the elements of their discrimination claims, they waived their argument that the trial court erred in interpreting the Arkansas Civil Rights Act to require that the element of intent be proved. Brown v. UPS, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 501, 531 S.W.3d 427 (2017).

Claim Dismissed.

No civil rights violation where the employer articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating employee and employee failed to produce any evidence that these reasons were pretextual. Winkle v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 195 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 1999).

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant employer on the gender discrimination claims of two employees where one employee failed to adduce sufficient evidence of pretext and offered no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that gender considerations motivated the employer's actions in selecting other more favorably evaluated candidates over her for a promotion, and the other employee advanced no additional evidence to support an inference that, with regard to her, the selection process was anything but fair and impartial. Gentry v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 250 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2001).

Employee who claimed to have been discriminated against on the basis of race and gender following the employee's return from military duty failed to sufficiently allege an adverse employment action as required to establish a claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq.; the record did not support an allegation that the employee was not put back into the position that the employee held prior to military duty, and other alleged actions, including a delay in providing certain items and a temporary reassignment for training, did not affect material aspects of employment. Clegg v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 496 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2007).

Claim Not Dismissed.

Plaintiff's complaint not dismissed even though she cited to the wrong section of this chapter, where the plaintiff's allegations were specific and the complaint stated that plaintiff was asserting a claim parallel to the federal claim, and thus the defendant had actual notice of her claim. Smith v. Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

Damages.

An award of punitive damages was proper where the court also awarded compensatory damages under alternative theories of breach of contract and retaliation in violation of the Civil Rights Act. Odom Antennas, Inc. v. Stevens, 61 Ark. App. 182, 966 S.W.2d 279 (1998).

District court properly vacated a jury's award for emotional distress damages because even though the jury found for the employee on his Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) claim for retaliation, it did so based solely on the elements of a claim for FMLA retaliation, which was not a viable basis for an ACRA claim. Jackson v. City of Hot Springs, 751 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2014).

Disability Discrimination.

Where an employee has alleged two separate injuries, one being a work-related physical injury and disability, for which she has received workers' compensation benefits, and one being a subsequent nonphysical injury arising from employer's action in terminating her based upon her new disability, the first injury is exclusively cognizable under the Workers' Compensation Act (see § 11-9-105), while the subsequent injury is of the type envisioned by this subchapter. Davis v. Dillmeier Enters., Inc., 330 Ark. 545, 956 S.W.2d 155 (1997).

There is no remedy under § 11-9-101 et seq. for an employee who is terminated from his or her job on the basis of the work-related disability after the end of the rehabilitation and compensation period; thus, the exclusive-remedy provision of § 11-9-101 et seq. does not preclude an employee from bringing an action under this subchapter based upon employer's alleged discrimination in terminating her on the basis of her permanent restrictions and impairments. Davis v. Dillmeier Enters., Inc., 330 Ark. 545, 956 S.W.2d 155 (1997).

The plaintiff established a statutory violation where a county courthouse did not have an elevator, ramp, or other device making the second floor accessible to anyone with disabilities involving mobility, the public entrance doors to the courtroom were not wide enough for a wheelchair to pass through, and the restrooms on the second floor were not accessible to wheelchair bound individuals. Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1998).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that the employee was discriminated against because of a disability when the employee offered evidence of a disability that limited the employee's ability to perform a life activity, and that the employee was able to do the employee's job with an accommodation, but the employer refused to let the employee return to work. Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2002).

Where employee with depression sought meeting agendas as reasonable accommodation, employer was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the failure-to-accommodate claims because there was record support for the jury's findings that (1) employee was disabled due to depression and anxiety that substantially limited employee's ability to think and concentrate, (2) employer failed to engage in a good-faith interactive process with employee, and (3) employee's request was reasonable. Battle v. UPS, 438 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2006).

Where a terminated employee contended that his discharge was motivated by discrimination, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, a remand was necessary because the appellate court was unable to determine if a circuit court properly evaluated the case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. There was no mention in the circuit court's order about a prima facie case of discrimination, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, or pretext for discrimination. Alexander v. Eastern Tank Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 185, 486 S.W.3d 813 (2016).

Evidence.

In an employee's action claiming racial harassment and a racially motivated termination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and § 16-123-107 of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., the district court did not err in admitting evidence of racist remarks and threatening actions in the workplace of which the employee was not aware; the evidence was relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402 because the evidence of the extent of the hostile environment was probative on the matter of managerial motives and on the employee's eligibility for punitive damages. Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2004).

Employer was entitled to summary judgment on an employee's failure to promote claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-107 et seq., because the undisputed facts showed that the person who was promoted to the position at issue was substantially more qualified than the employee both in education and experience and there was no evidence of discrimination based on race or sex. Tabb v. Allen, No. 5:06CV00316 JLH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 4, 2009).

Employer was entitled to summary judgment on an employee's sex and race discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-107 et seq., involving the employer's failure to assign her a vehicle and fully reimburse her for certain mileage, because there was no evidence that discrimination based on race or sex influenced these decisions. Tabb v. Allen, No. 5:06CV00316 JLH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 4, 2009).

Pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, §§ 16-123-10116-123-108, the trial court did not err in granting the employer's motion for summary judgment on the employer's gender discrimination claim as the employee was not eligible for leave under FMLA or pre-FMLA as she had only been with the company a short time; the employee did not proffer evidence to prove that the explanation provided by the employer was pretextual. Greenlee v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., 2009 Ark. 506, 342 S.W.3d 274 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict in favor of an employer because employees failed to offer sufficient evidence to infer discriminatory animus was the real reason for the decision not to promote; there was sufficient evidence for the jury to be charged with an “honest belief” instruction because the decision makers involved in the promotion decision testified they honestly believed the employees were ineligible for promotion or less qualified than other candidates. Brown v. UPS, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 501, 531 S.W.3d 427 (2017).

Gender Discrimination.

A supervisor's statement that he was directed to terminate an employee because of her pregnancy established a prima facie case of discrimination. Rice v. Golf Enters., Inc. (In re McElhanon), 207 B.R. 188 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997).

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant bank in an action alleging gender discrimination where (1) the plaintiff made out a prima facie case, but (2) the bank cited its low profitability and the need to reduce operating costs, especially in personnel, as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory factor for discharging the plaintiff, as well as refusing to create or re-fill three additional positions at the bank, and (3) the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to present facts which if proven at trial would permit a jury to conclude that the bank's proffered reason was pretextual and that its actual reason was discriminatory. Flentje v. First Nat'l Bank, 340 Ark. 563, 11 S.W.3d 531 (2000).

Four elements are necessary to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination based on pregnancy; the party must show (1) that she is within the protected class; (2) that she met applicable job qualifications; (3) that her employment was terminated; and (4) that there is some “additional showing” that pregnancy was a factor in her termination. Flentje v. First Nat'l Bank, 340 Ark. 563, 11 S.W.3d 531 (2000).

This section is not restricted in application only to getting a job and being free from discriminatory discharge; this section also creates a right to be paid for that employment without discrimination on the basis of gender. Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 226 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2000).

Former employee's sex discrimination claim under this section of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act failed, given evidence that the employee was terminated for sexually harassing co-workers and then filing untruthful sexual harassment complaints against those co-workers. Nothing in the record indicated that the officials who decided to terminate the employee lacked a good-faith belief that the employee committed sexual harassment and was untruthful, and the evidence did not raise a reasonable inference that sex discrimination motivated the employee's termination. McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 559 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2009).

District court did not err in denying an employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to an employee's sex and disability discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and this section because a legally sufficient basis existed for a reasonable jury to determine that the employee had been discriminated against by the employer, and the jury was not required to accept the employer's proffered reasons for the employee's dismissal; the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying a motion for remittitur because the appellate court could not conclude that the award of $100,000 for mental anguish to the employee was monstrous, shocking, or grossly excessive considering precedent and the record made in the case. Hudson v. United Sys. of Ark., 709 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2013).

In an employment discrimination case in which an employer moved to dismiss, the district court rejected the employer's argument that because the Arkansas courts had rejected the so-called continuing-tort theory, and because that theory was analogous to the paycheck rule, the paycheck rule does not apply to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq.Holt v. Deer-Mt. Judea Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 898 (W.D. Ark. 2015).

In a gender discrimination action, none of a former employee's purported direct evidence established the required “specific link” between his termination and gender-based animus. The absence of conclusive evidence that the employee violated internet and conduct policies was insufficient to prove improper termination because the central question in determining if termination was proper was not whether the employee actually engaged in prohibited conduct, but whether the employer believed so in good faith. Rinchuso v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 944 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2019).

Racial Discrimination.

Employee's racial discrimination claim based on failure to promote failed because (1) the employer allegedly selected the other applicant based on, inter alia, experience, interview answers, and connections to government agencies, and (2) the employee failed to show pretext based on the employee's qualifications compared to the chosen applicant, false and shifting explanations for the decision, and other instances of discrimination. Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2011).

Employee's racial discrimination claim based on the employee's termination for insubordination failed because the employee did not show pretext based on, inter alia, allegations regarding disparate disciplinary treatment of several other employees who were not similarly situated, a supervisor's treatment of the employee, and the employer's explanations for the decision. Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff cardiologist's comparators were not similarly situated to him, and he failed to provide any evidence giving rise to an inference that a defendant hospital association, executive officer, and other doctors racially discriminated against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, or conspired to discriminate against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), when they revoked his hospital privileges based on plaintiff's behavior toward hospital staff, his poor record of patient care, and his failure to maintain proper medical records. Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 685 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2012).

Racial Harassment.

Where a white employee resigned based on condescending emails, denial of day shifts, and a supervisor's alleged attempt to implicate the employee in the theft of cash, the racially hostile work environment claim failed because the alleged verbal harassment was neither frequent nor severe, and the employee failed to offer sufficient evidence that the employee was constructively discharged. Helton v. Southland Racing Corp., 600 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2010).

Sexual Harassment.

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment against claims of sexual harassment in violation of § 16-123-107(a) of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., and for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy of the State of Arkansas, where there were genuine issues of fact as to whether an at-will female employee was terminated from her job in retaliation for resisting the sexual advances of her employer or because the employee's position was going to be given to the employer's son; a lack of termination, or a non-gender-based reason for the employee's termination, does not extinguish a harassed employee's cause of action for sexual harassment under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548, 103 S.W.3d 671 (2003).

Former employee failed to establish sexual harassment in violation of this section, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, because her supervisor's comments that he controlled her job and she should be nice to him and his acts of rubbing her shoulders were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a sexually hostile work environment. Anderson v. Family Dollar Stores of Ark., Inc., 579 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2009).

Former employee failed to establish quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of this section, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, because she did not show that she suffered an adverse tangible employment action as a result of her refusal to submit to an implied or inferred demand for sexual favors from her supervisor. Anderson v. Family Dollar Stores of Ark., Inc., 579 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2009).

Employer was not entitled to summary judgment on a former employee's sex discrimination claims because genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the employee truck driver subjectively felt abused by a coworker driver and whether the employer was aware of the coworker's conduct and failed to take appropriate action. Nichols v. Tri-National Logistics, Inc., 809 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2016).

Statute of Limitations.

One-year limitation period of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act is inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1981's interest in providing relief to victims of racial discrimination; thus, former employee's claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was governed by three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, § 16-56-105, not the one-year statute of limitations contained in subdivision (c)(3) of this section. Thompson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 842 (W.D. Ark. 2004).

Plaintiff's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 were governed by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1658, rather than the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, specifically subdivision (c)(3) of this section; accordingly, the district court improperly granted summary judgment with respect to such claims. Jackson v. Homechoice, Inc., 368 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2004).

Former employee filed her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge on December 5, 2006, far more than 180 days after her supervisor's last offensive email to her and the employee did not allege sexual harassment acts within the statutory period; her federal claim for sexual harassment was therefore time barred. The employee filed her suit on December 26, 2007, more than one year after the last date of alleged sexual harassment; because her EEOC charge alleging sexual harassment was untimely filed, the employee could not rely on it to support the timeliness of her Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., harassment claim. Burkhart v. Am. Railcar Indus., Inc., 603 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2010).

Employment retaliation claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-108, was subject to the three-year limitation period applicable when a statutory claim had no limitation period, § 16-56-105, rather than the one-year limitation provided in subsection (c) of this section. Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2013 Ark. 502, 431 S.W.3d 200 (2013).

Former employee's amended discrimination complaint was timely filed because the original complaint was filed within the allotted 90-day time period and the amended complaint related back to the date of the original complaint; the amended complaint clearly arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading. Orr v. City of Rogers, 232 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (W.D. Ark. 2017).

Former employee failed to properly exhaust his remedies in his suit alleging age and race discrimination because the employee filed his complaint more than one year after every alleged instance of discrimination, and while the employee filed suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, that letter arose from a charge that was either untimely or otherwise provided an insufficient basis for the claims he brought. Kirklin v. Joshen Paper & Packaging of Ark. Co., 911 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 2018).

Venue.

Prior to the 2001 passage of Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 19(b)(1) merging chancery and circuit courts, once judgment was entered in the circuit court, the employee was barred by res judicata from transferring the case to chancery court for imposition of further equitable remedies unavailable in the circuit court. Clark v. Farmers Exch., Inc., 347 Ark. 81, 61 S.W.3d 140 (2001).

Cited: Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Crone v. UPS, 301 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2002).

16-123-108. Retaliation — Interference — Remedies.

  1. Retaliation. A person shall not discriminate against any individual because the individual in good faith has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this subchapter or because the individual in good faith made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
  2. Interference, Coercion, or Intimidation. It is unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this subchapter.
    1. Remedies and Procedures. The remedies and procedures available in § 16-123-107(b) are available to aggrieved persons for a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section.
    2. An employment-related claim or a claim arising out of the employee-employer relationship for a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section may be brought only against an employer, and the remedies and procedures are limited to the remedies and procedures available under § 16-123-107(c).

History. Acts 1995, No. 480, § 4; 2017, No. 191, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment redesignated former (c) as (c)(1); substituted “a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (b)” for “violations of subsections (a) and (b)” in (c)(1); added (c)(2); and made stylistic changes.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes activity of employee protected under state whistleblower protection statute covering employee's “report,” “disclosure,” “notification,” or the like of wrongdoing—Sufficiency of report. 10 A.L.R.6th 531.

What constitutes activity of employee, other than “reporting” wrongdoing, protected under state whistleblower protection statute.13 A.L.R.6th 499.

Ark. L. Rev.

Madeline L. Kurrus, Comment: Taking It Personally: Holding Individual Supervisors Liable for Retaliation Under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 873 (2012).

Case Notes

Adverse Employment Action.

Employee who claimed to have been retaliated against following the employee's return from military duty failed to sufficiently allege an adverse employment action as required to establish a claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq.; the record did not support an allegation that the employee was not put back into the position that the employee held prior to military duty, and other alleged actions, including a delay in providing certain items and a temporary reassignment for training, did not affect material aspects of employment. Clegg v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 496 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2007).

Where a white employee resigned, the employee's retaliation claim failed because (1) a phone conversation was not protected conduct since the employee said nothing in the call about race discrimination, and (2) the employee did not demonstrate a materially adverse action since the employee failed to offer sufficient evidence of a constructive discharge. Helton v. Southland Racing Corp., 600 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2010).

Retaliation claim filed by plaintiff, a new zoning official, against defendant city employer, failed because a written warning did not threaten termination or any other employment-related harm, as the employee had suffered no loss of pay, reduction in hours or responsibilities, or exclusion from other opportunities, and further, a prior discipline for similar misconduct weakened any inference that the warning was considered “materially adverse.” Hill v. City of Pine Bluff, 696 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2012).

Causal Link.

Assuming that plaintiff cardiologist engaged in protected conduct when he complained about other physicians' bias and racial discrimination to administrators, the only evidence for which was cited in his complaint, plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between the complaint in 2005 and the ultimate revocation of his hospital privileges in 2007, and thus, his claim of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act failed as a matter of law. Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 685 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2012).

Employer was entitled to summary judgment on a former employee's retaliatory discharge claim because there was sufficient evidence that the employer was concerned about the employee's unsafe driving as a truck driver well before the employee complained about sexual harassment by a co-driver. Nichols v. Tri-National Logistics, Inc., 809 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2016).

Pretext.

That the employer forgave the employee's earlier errors did not prohibit it from terminating her when the mistakes continued and worsened; even if the employee could establish a prima facie retaliation case, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the employer's proffered reason for firing her was pretextual as required in the McDonnell Douglas framework. Burkhart v. Am. Railcar Indus., Inc., 603 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2010).

Employee's retaliation claim based on failure to promote and the employee's termination for insubordination failed because the employee did not show pretext since, inter alia, the proximity of the promotion decision to the employee's statement that the employee would file a discrimination charge if not promoted was not probative of pretext. Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2011).

Proper Defendants.

Law professor's Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) claims against state university officials were properly dismissed because the ACRA only permitted retaliation and interference claims against employers, not individuals. Steinbuch v. Univ. of Ark., 2019 Ark. 356, 589 S.W.3d 350 (2019).

Protected Activities.

Former employee's retaliation claim under this section of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act failed, given evidence that the employee was terminated for sexually harassing co-workers and for filing untruthful complaints accusing the co-workers of sexual harassment. The evidence showed that the employee was discharged not for filing complaints, but for filing untruthful complaints. McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, 559 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2009).

Former county juvenile detention officer failed to establish retaliation, as she did not engage in protected activity; her request for an extension of leave in order to obtain a new medical certification removing a restriction on lifting was not a request for a reasonable accommodation and therefore was not protected activity. Scruggs v. Pulaski County, 817 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2016).

Statute of Limitations.

Employment retaliation claim under this section, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, was subject to the three-year limitation period applicable when a statutory claim had no limitation period, § 16-56-105, rather than the one-year limitation provided in another part of the Act, § 16-123-107(c). Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2013 Ark. 502, 431 S.W.3d 200 (2013).

Summary Judgment.

In granting summary judgment against plaintiff former employees, the circuit court erred by failing to make the specific findings required for the former employees’ Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims where there was no mention of the McDonnell-Douglas framework or any of its requirements. Fennell v. City of Pine Bluff, 2016 Ark. App. 275, 492 S.W.3d 887 (2016).

Supervisor.

In a case involving the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., a default judgment was not set aside under Ark. R. Civ. P. 55 because a motion for an extension was not timely where the request was not made to a trial court before the expiration of the period originally prescribed, the failure to respond in a timely manner due to one attorney being distracted by the birth of a child was not excusable neglect, an amendment to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12 was inapplicable, and an argument that the complaint failed to state a claim was rejected. The denial of illegal intent was insufficient in a first affidavit, a second affidavit was filed after the default was granted, and an individual supervisor could have been held personally liable for alleged acts of retaliation under subsection (a) of this section. Eusanio v. Tippin, 2013 Ark. App. 38, 425 S.W.3d 838 (2013).

Cited: Wallace v. Sparks Health Sys., 415 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005).

Subchapter 2 — Arkansas Fair Housing Act

Research References

ALR.

Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of Sex Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2018).

Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.) — Supreme Court Cases, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3 (2018).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Non-Legislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant Laws: Report to Governor Mike Beebe, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and Speaker of the House December 31, 2012, 35 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 739 (2013).

16-123-201. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Arkansas Fair Housing Act”.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

16-123-202. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Housing accommodation” includes improved or unimproved real property, or a part thereof, which is used or occupied, or is intended, arranged, or designed to be used or occupied, as the home or residence of one (1) or more persons;
  2. “Real estate broker or salesperson” means a person, whether licensed or not, who:
    1. For or with the expectation of receiving a consideration, lists, sells, purchases, exchanges, rents, or leases real property;
    2. Negotiates or attempts to negotiate any of those activities;
    3. Holds himself or herself out as engaged in those activities;
    4. Negotiates or attempts to negotiate a loan secured or to be secured by a mortgage or other encumbrance upon real property;
    5. Is engaged in the business of listing real property in a publication; or
    6. Is a person employed by or acting on behalf of a real estate broker or salesperson;
  3. “Real estate transaction” means the sale, exchange, rental, or lease of real property, or an interest therein; and
  4. “Real property” includes a building, structure, mobile home, real estate, land, mobile home park, trailer park, tenement, leasehold, or an interest in a real estate cooperative or condominium.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

16-123-203. Legislative declaration.

  1. The opportunity to obtain housing and other real estate without discrimination because of religion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or familial status as prohibited by this chapter, is recognized and declared to be a civil right.
  2. Provided, the provisions of § 16-123-301 et seq. shall become effective after the statutes and regulations required by this subchapter are adopted as substantially equivalent to federal fair housing laws, as recognized by the appropriate federal agency designated to enforce the provisions of federal fair housing laws.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1; 2001, No. 1785, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment redesignated the former section as present (a); and added (b).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

16-123-204. Conduct prohibited in real estate transactions — Exception.

  1. A person engaging in a real estate transaction, or a real estate broker or salesperson, shall not on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or familial status of a person or a person residing with that person:
    1. Refuse to engage in a real estate transaction with a person;
    2. Discriminate against a person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a real estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith;
    3. Refuse to receive from a person or transmit to a person a bona fide offer to engage in a real estate transaction;
    4. Refuse to negotiate for a real estate transaction with a person;
    5. Represent to a person that real property is not available for inspection, sale, rental, or lease when in fact it is so available, or knowingly fail to bring a real property listing to a person's attention, or refuse to permit a person to inspect real property;
    6. Make, print, or publish or cause to be made, printed, or published, any notice, statement, or advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination; or
    7. Offer, solicit, accept, use, or retain a listing of real property with the understanding that a person may be discriminated against in a real estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith.
  2. This section shall not apply to:
    1. The rental of a housing accommodation in a building which contains housing accommodations for not more than two (2) families living independently of each other if the owner or a member of the owner's immediate family resides in one (1) of the housing accommodations, or to the rental of a room or rooms in a single family dwelling by a person if the lessor or a member of the lessor's immediate family resides therein; or
    2. The rental of a housing accommodation for not more than twelve (12) months by the owner or lessor where it was occupied by him or her and maintained as his or her home for at least three (3) months immediately preceding occupancy by the tenant and is temporarily vacated while maintaining legal residence.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

Research References

ALR.

Web Site as “Public Accommodation” for Purposes of Federal or State Civil Rights Statutes. 7 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2015).

16-123-205. Conduct in real estate financing prohibited — Exception.

  1. A person to whom application is made for financial assistance or financing in connection with a real estate transaction or in connection with the construction, rehabilitation, repair, maintenance, or improvement of real property, or a representative of that person, shall not:
    1. Discriminate against the applicant because of the religion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or familial status of the applicant or a person residing with the applicant; or
    2. Use a form of application for financial assistance or financing to make or keep a record or inquiry in connection with an application for financial assistance or financing which indicates, directly or indirectly, a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination as to the religion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or familial status of the applicant or a person residing with the applicant.
  2. Subdivision (a)(2) of this section shall not apply to a form of application for financial assistance prescribed for the use of a lender regulated as a mortgagee under the National Housing Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701—1750g (Supp. 1973), or by a regulatory board or officer acting under the statutory authority of this state or the United States.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

16-123-206. Contractual provisions.

  1. A condition, restriction, or prohibition, including a right of entry or possibility of reverter, which directly or indirectly limits the use or occupancy of real property on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or familial status is void, except this section shall not prohibit a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, from limiting the sale, rental, or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from giving preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted because of race, color, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin.
  2. A person shall not insert in a written instrument relating to real property a provision that is void under this section or honor such a provision in the chain of title.
  3. A person shall not threaten, intimidate, or interfere with persons in the enjoyment of their dwelling because of the race, color, national origin, sex, or familial status of such persons, or of visitors or associates of such persons.
  4. A person shall not discharge, threaten, coerce, intimidate, or take any other adverse action against an employee, broker, agent, or other person because he or she refused to take part in a discriminatory housing practice or because he or she has aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

16-123-207. Representations prohibited.

A person shall not represent, for the purpose of inducing a real estate transaction from which the person may benefit financially, that a change has occurred or will or may occur in the composition, with respect to religion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or familial status of the owners or occupants, in the block, neighborhood, or area in which the real property is located or represent that this change will or may result in the lowering of real property values, an increase in criminal or antisocial behavior, or a decline in the quality of schools in the block, neighborhood, or area in which in the real property is located.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

16-123-208. Retaliation.

Two (2) or more persons shall not conspire to, or a person shall not:

  1. Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this subchapter, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter;
  2. Attempt, directly or indirectly, to commit an act prohibited by this subchapter;
  3. Willfully interfere, obstruct, or prevent a person from complying with this subchapter or an order issued or rule promulgated under this subchapter; or
  4. Discharge, threaten, coerce, intimidate, or take any other adverse action against an employee, broker, agent, or other person because he or she refused to take part in a discriminatory housing practice or because he or she has aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

16-123-209. Violation.

A person shall not violate the terms of an order to an adjustment order made under this subchapter.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

16-123-210. Civil remedy — Definition.

    1. A person alleging a violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both.
    2. As used in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, “damages” means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this subchapter, including reasonable attorney's fees.
  1. An action commenced pursuant to subsection (a) of this section may be brought in the circuit court for:
    1. The county where the alleged violation occurred; or
    2. The county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his or her principal place of business.
  2. In a civil action under this subchapter, the court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
  3. A court rendering a judgment in an action brought pursuant to this subchapter may award all or a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees and witness fees, to the complainant in the action if the court determines that the award is appropriate.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1129, § 1; 1995, No. 1327, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Arkansas Fair Housing Commission

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1011, § 6: July 1, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2003 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2003 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2003.”

Acts 2003, No. 1775, § 13: Apr. 22, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the provisions of this act are designed to comply with the federal Fair Housing Law, and to make the state eligible for federal funds; that until this act becomes law those federal funds will not be available to the State of Arkansas; and therefore, this act should go into effect as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

16-123-301. Finding.

The General Assembly recognizes:

  1. That the right to seek housing underlies the general public's ability to secure health, safety, and welfare; and
  2. Seeks with this subchapter to protect the public's access to fair housing.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 2.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 523.

16-123-302. Definitions.

  1. “Aggrieved person” means a person who:
    1. Claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or
    2. Believes that a person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur;
  2. “Commission” means the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission;
  3. “Complainant” means a person, including the Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission acting on behalf of the commission who files a complaint under this subchapter;
  4. “Conciliation” means the process for resolving issues raised by a complaint or by the investigation of a complaint through informal negotiations involving the aggrieved person, the respondent, and the director on behalf of the commission;
  5. “Conciliation agreement” means a written agreement setting forth the resolution of the issues raised in conciliation;
  6. “Director” means the Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission created in § 16-123-303;
    1. “Disability” throughout this subchapter shall be interpreted identically to the term “handicap” within federal laws, regulations, cases, directives, and administrative rulings and positions on subject matter similar to the purposes of this subchapter and means a person:
      1. With a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one (1) or more of the person's major life activities;
      2. With a record of having an impairment which substantially limits one (1) or more of the person's major life activities; or
      3. Regarded as having an impairment which substantially limits one (1) or more of a person's major life activities.
    2. “Disability” does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance, as defined in § 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802, as in effect January 1, 2001;
  7. “Discriminatory housing practice” means an act that is prohibited under §§ 16-23-310 — 16-123-316 and § 16-23-344;
  8. “Dwelling” means any building, structure, or portion thereof, which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one (1) or more families and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one (1) or more families;
  9. “Familial status” means:
    1. The status resulting from one (1) or more individuals who are under eighteen (18) years of age being domiciled with:
      1. The parent or another person having legal custody of the individual under eighteen (18) years of age; or
      2. The designee of the parent or other person having custody, with the written permission of the parent or other person;
    2. The status resulting from being in the process of securing legal custody of any individual who is under eighteen (18) years of age; or
    3. The status resulting from being pregnant;
  10. “Family” includes a single individual;
  11. “Person” includes individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, bankruptcy trustees, receivers, and fiduciaries;
  12. “Prevailing party” has the same meaning as the term has in Section 722 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
  13. “Respondent” means:
    1. The person or other entity accused in a complaint or an unfair housing practice; and
    2. Any other person notified as required with respect to respondents under § 16-123-317(f); and
  14. “To rent” includes to lease, to sublease, to let, and otherwise to grant for a consideration the right to occupy premises not owned by the occupant.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 3.

16-123-303. Creation — Members.

  1. There is created the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission.
    1. The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall consist of thirteen (13) voting members, to be selected as follows: Seven (7) appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the Senate, three (3) appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and three (3) appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, as set forth in this subchapter, for terms of four (4) years whose terms begin on January 1 and end on December 31 of the fourth year or when their respective successors are appointed and qualified.
        1. One (1) member shall have been a licensed real estate broker or licensed real estate salesperson engaged in the practice of residential real estate sales for not fewer than five (5) years prior to his or her appointment.
        2. One (1) member shall have been a licensed real estate broker or licensed real estate salesperson engaged in the practice of multifamily real estate property management for no fewer than five (5) years prior to his or her appointment.
        3. One (1) member shall have been a licensed real estate broker or licensed real estate salesperson engaged in the practice of real estate for no fewer than five (5) years prior to his or her appointment.
      1. The Governor shall appoint members to fill vacancies under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section after consulting the Arkansas Realtors Association, subject to confirmation by the Senate.
      1. One (1) member shall have been a licensed homebuilder engaged in the homebuilding business for not fewer than five (5) years.
      2. The Governor shall appoint a member to fill a vacancy for the member to represent subdivision (b)(3)(A) of this section after consulting the Arkansas Home Builders Association and subject to confirmation by the Senate.
      1. One (1) member shall have been a mortgage broker employed for not fewer than five (5) years by a registered mortgage loan company or loan broker.
      2. The Governor shall appoint a member to fill a vacancy for the member to represent subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this section after consulting the Mortgage Bankers Association of Arkansas and subject to confirmation by the Senate.
      1. One (1) member shall have been a banker engaged in the banking business for not fewer than five (5) years.
      2. The Governor shall appoint a member to fill a vacancy for the member to represent subdivision (b)(5)(A) of this section after consulting Arkansas Community Bankers and the Arkansas Bankers Association and subject to confirmation by the Senate.
        1. Seven (7) members shall represent consumers and shall not be actively engaged in or retired from the business of real estate, homebuilding, mortgage lending, or banking, including one (1) member who shall be appointed by the Governor to represent persons meeting the definition of individuals with a disability in this subchapter after consulting the Governor's Commission on People with Disabilities and subject to confirmation by the Senate.
        2. Three (3) of the members to be appointed pursuant to subdivision (b)(6)(A)(i) of this section shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one (1) member who shall be a fair housing attorney or advocate with at least five (5) years of experience in advocacy for fair housing issues.
        3. Three (3) of the members to be appointed pursuant to subdivision (b)(6)(A)(i) of this section shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, one (1) member of whom shall be sixty (60) years of age or older who shall represent the elderly.
      1. A minimum of four (4) appointments made pursuant to subdivision (b)(6)(A)(i) of this section shall be given to persons protected under §§ 16-123-310 — 16-123-316.
  2. All members shall be full voting members of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission.
    1. Members of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission appointed by the Governor shall at all times include one (1) member from each Arkansas congressional district.
    2. Appointments by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be as follows:
      1. The three (3) members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate shall be from the First Congressional District and the Second Congressional District and the three (3) members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be from the Third Congressional District and the Fourth Congressional District;
      2. At the next time for appointments, the three (3) members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate shall be from the Third Congressional District and the Fourth Congressional District and the three (3) members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be from the First Congressional District and the Second Congressional District; and
      3. Future appointments shall alternate between the requirements of subdivisions (d)(2)(A) and (B) of this section.
  3. The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall elect a chair from its membership.
  4. The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall meet at least quarterly.
    1. The members of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall serve four-year terms, except that the initial appointees shall serve staggered terms determined by a procedure established by the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission so that six (6) serve a two-year term and seven (7) serve a four-year term.
    2. No member may serve more than two (2) four-year terms.
  5. Each commissioner may receive expense reimbursement and stipends in accordance with § 25-16-905.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 4; 2007, No. 178, § 1; 2013, No. 1359, § 1; 2015, No. 1100, § 19.

A.C.R.C. Notes. As amended in 2001, subdivision (b)(1) provided:

“The commission shall consist of thirteen (13) voting members, to be selected as follows: Seven (7) appointed by the Governor, three (3) appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and three (3) appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, as set forth in this subchapter, for terms of four (4) years[,except for the initial commissioners, whose terms shall be determined as set forth in § 16-123-303(f),] whose terms begin on January 1 and end on December 31 of the fourth year or when their respective successors are appointed and qualified.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment deleted former (d)(2) and (3) and added present (d)(2).

The 2015 amendment inserted “subject to confirmation by the Senate” and similar language throughout (b); substituted “after consulting” for “from a list of four (4) nominees submitted by” and similar language throughout (b); substituted “appointment” for “nomination” throughout (b)(2)(A); and rewrote (b)(2)(B).

16-123-304. Powers and duties.

  1. The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall adopt rules necessary to implement this subchapter substantially equivalent to those provided in federal fair housing laws and regulations.
  2. The commission shall receive, initiate, investigate, seek to conciliate, and, if conciliation fails, seek to resolve complaints alleging violations of this subchapter through the procedures described by this subchapter.
  3. The commission, at least annually, shall make a written report to the Legislative Council based upon and detailing the past year's activities and operations, including policy and program recommendations.
  4. The commission shall cooperate with and, as appropriate, may provide technical and other assistance to federal, state, local, and other public or private entities that are formulating or operating programs to prevent or eliminate discriminatory housing practices.
  5. The commission shall have the power to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum in connection with both its investigations and hearings.
  6. A witness summoned by a subpoena under this subchapter shall be entitled to a witness fee payable in the same amount as set forth in rules of procedure for civil proceedings.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 5; 2003, No. 1775, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted (f)(2) and made related changes.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Unfair Housing Practices, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 448.

16-123-305. Director.

    1. The Governor shall appoint a Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission who shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor.
    2. The director shall report to the Secretary of the Department of Inspector General.
    3. The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission may fix the compensation, duties, authority, and responsibilities of the director.
  1. The commission may authorize the director to hire necessary staff and to provide for services, furnishings, equipment, and office space and employees of the commission shall be employees of the Department of Inspector General.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 6; 2017, No. 774, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 5258.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment redesignated former (a) as (a)(1) and (a)(2); in (a)(1), substituted “The Governor shall appoint” for “The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission may employ” and “who shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor” for “and” at the end; and, in (a)(2), added “The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission may” and “of the director”.

The 2019 amendment inserted (a)(2) and redesignated former (a)(2) as (a)(3); and added “and employees of the commission shall be employees of the department” in (b).

16-123-306. Exemptions — Certain sales and rentals.

  1. Sections 16-123-310 and 16-123-312 — 16-123-314 do not apply to a single-family house sold or rented by an owner or rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four (4) families living independently of each other if the owner actually maintains and occupies one (1) of the living quarters as his or her residence and if:
    1. The private individual owner does not own more than three (3) single-family houses at any one (1) time;
    2. In the case of the sale of a single-family house by a private individual owner not residing in the house at the time of the sale, or who was not the most recent resident of the house prior to the sale, the exemption granted by this section shall apply only with respect to one (1) sale within any twenty-four-month period;
    3. A bona fide private individual owner does not own any interest in, nor is there owned or reserved on the owner's behalf, under any express or voluntary agreement, title to or any right to all or a portion of the proceeds from the sale or rental of more than three (3) single-family houses at any one (1) time; and
      1. The house is sold or rented:
        1. Without the services of any real estate broker, agent, or salesperson; and
        2. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of § 16-123-311.
      2. However, nothing in this subdivision (a)(4) shall prohibit the use of attorneys, escrow agents, abstracters, title companies, and other professional assistance as necessary to perfect or transfer the title.
  2. For the purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall be deemed to be in the business of selling or renting dwellings if:
    1. The person, within the preceding twelve (12) months, has participated as principal in three (3) or more transactions involving the sale or rental of any dwelling or any interest therein;
    2. The person, within the preceding twelve (12) months, has participated as agent, other than in the sale of his or her own personal residence, in providing sales or rental facilities or sales or rental services in two (2) or more transactions involving the sale or rental of any dwelling or any interest therein; or
    3. The person is the owner of any dwelling designed or intended for occupancy by, or occupied by, five (5) or more families.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 7.

16-123-307. Exemptions — Religious organizations, private clubs, and others — Definitions.

  1. This subchapter does not prohibit a religious organization, association, or society or a nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society from:
    1. Limiting the sale, rental, or occupancy of dwellings that it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, unless membership in the religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin; or
    2. Giving preference for those dwellings to persons of the same religion, unless membership in the religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin.
  2. This subchapter does not prohibit a private club not in fact open to the public that, as an incident to its primary purpose, provides lodging that it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose, from limiting the rental or occupancy of that lodging to its members or from giving preference to its members.
    1. Nothing in this subchapter limits the applicability of any reasonable local or state restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.
    2. Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a person from refusing to rent a dwelling by reason of reasonable occupancy standards established by the owner or the owner's agent that apply to persons of all ages, and that have been adopted and published before the event in issue.
    3. An occupancy limitation of two (2) persons per bedroom residing in a dwelling unit shall be presumed reasonable in this state or any political subdivision of this state.
    4. Nothing in this subchapter regarding familial status shall apply to housing for older persons.
    1. As used in this section, “housing for older persons” means housing:
      1. Provided under any state program that the Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission determines is specifically designed and operated to assist elderly persons, as defined in any state program, or provided under any federal program that the United States Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development determines is specifically designed and operated to assist elderly persons, as defined in any federal program;
      2. Intended for, and solely occupied by, persons sixty-two (62) years of age or older; or
      3. Intended and operated for occupancy by persons fifty-five (55) years of age or older, and:
        1. At least eighty percent (80%) of the occupied units are occupied by at least one (1) person who is fifty-five (55) years of age or older;
        2. The housing facility or community publishes and adheres to policies and procedures that demonstrate the intent required under this subdivision (d)(1); and
          1. The housing facility or community complies with rules issued by the director for verification of occupancy, which shall:
            1. Provide for verification by reliable surveys and affidavits; and
            2. Include examples of the types of policies and procedures relevant to a determination of compliance with the requirement of this subdivision (d)(1)(C)(iii)(a) .
          2. The surveys and affidavits authorized under subdivision (d)(1)(C)(iii)(a) of this section shall be admissible in administrative and judicial proceedings for the purposes of verification.
    2. Housing shall not fail to meet the requirements for housing for older persons by reason of persons residing in the housing as of August 13, 2001, who do not meet the age requirements of subdivision (d)(1)(B) of this section or subdivision (d)(1)(C) of this section, if:
      1. New occupants of the housing meet the age requirements of subdivision (d)(1)(B) of this section or subdivision (d)(1)(C) of this section; or
      2. The units are unoccupied units and are reserved for occupancy by persons who meet the age requirements of subdivision (d)(1)(B) of this section or subdivision (d)(1)(C) of this section.
        1. The person has no actual knowledge that the facility or community is not, or will not be, eligible for the exemption; and
        2. The facility or community has stated formally in writing that the facility or community complies with the requirements for the exemption.
  3. Nothing in this subchapter prohibits discrimination against a person because the person has been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of the illegal manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance as defined in § 102 of the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802, as in effect January 1, 2001.

(4)(A) A person shall not be held personally liable for monetary damages for a violation of this subchapter if the person reasonably relied in good faith on the application of the exemption under this section relating to housing for older persons.

(B) For the purposes of this subchapter, “good faith reliance” means:

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 8; 2003, No. 1775, § 2.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment added “unless membership in the religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin” at the end of (a)(1)(A); and made minor punctuation changes.

16-123-308. Exemption — Appraisals.

Nothing in this subchapter prohibits a person engaged in the business of furnishing evaluations, market analyses, or appraisals of real property to take into consideration factors other than race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 9.

16-123-309. Effect on other law.

This subchapter does not affect a requirement of nondiscrimination in any other act, state law, or federal law.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 10.

16-123-310. Discrimination in sale or rental of housing.

  1. Because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin a person shall not:
    1. Refuse to sell or rent a dwelling to a person who has made a bona fide offer;
    2. Refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of a dwelling; or
    3. Otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person.
  2. A person shall not discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling or in providing services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 11; 2003, No. 1775, § 3.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted (c).

16-123-311. Publication indicating discrimination.

A person shall not make, print, or publish or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make such a preference, limitation, or discrimination.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 12.

16-123-312. Availability for inspection.

A person shall not represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin that a dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when the dwelling is in fact so available.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 13.

16-123-313. Entry into neighborhood.

A person shall not for profit induce or attempt to induce a person to sell or rent a dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into a neighborhood of a person of a particular race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 14.

16-123-314. Disability — Definition.

  1. A person shall not discriminate in the sale or rental or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to a buyer or renter because of a disability of:
    1. That buyer or renter;
    2. A person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made available; or
    3. A person associated with that buyer or renter.
  2. A person shall not discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with the dwelling because of a disability of:
    1. That person;
    2. A person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made available; or
    3. A person associated with that person.
  3. For purposes of this section only, “discrimination” includes:
    1. A refusal to permit, at the expense of the person with the disability, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by the person with the disability if the modifications may be necessary to afford the person with the disability full enjoyment of the premises, except that an owner may:
      1. Where reasonable to do so, reasonably condition permission for modifications upon the agreement of the person with the disability to restore the premises to its condition as it existed prior to modification, reasonable wear and tear excepted; and
      2. Reasonably condition the permission on the person with a disability's providing to the owner a reasonable description of the proposed modifications and reasonable assurance that all work will be done in a professional manner, all required permits for the work timely obtained, and all work timely paid for;
    2. A refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when the accommodations may be necessary to afford a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, including public and common use areas; and
    3. In connection with the design and construction of covered multifamily dwellings for first occupancy after February 1, 2004, a failure to design and construct those dwellings in a manner that:
      1. Makes the public use and common use portions of the dwellings readily accessible to and usable by persons with a disability;
      2. Makes all the doors designed to allow passage into and within all premises within the dwellings sufficiently wide to allow passage by persons in wheelchairs; and
      3. Makes all premises within the dwellings contain the following features of adaptive design:
        1. An accessible route into and through the dwelling;
        2. Light switches, electrical outlets, thermostats, and other environmental controls in accessible locations;
        3. Reinforcements in bathroom walls to allow later installations of grab bars; and
        4. Usable kitchens and bathrooms so that an individual in a wheelchair can maneuver about the space.
  4. Compliance with the appropriate requirements of the American National Standards Institute, as in effect January 1, 2001, for buildings and facilities providing accessibility and usability for persons with a physical disability, commonly cited as ANSI A 117.1, suffices to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (c)(3) of this section.
  5. As used in subdivision (c)(3) of this section, “covered multifamily dwellings” means:
    1. Buildings consisting of four (4) or more units if the buildings have one (1) or more elevators; and
    2. Ground floor units in other buildings consisting of four (4) or more units.
  6. Nothing in this subchapter requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 15.

16-123-315. Residential real estate-related transaction — Definition.

  1. A person whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions shall not discriminate against a person in making a real estate-related transaction available, or in the terms or conditions of a real estate-related transaction because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin.
  2. As used in this section, “residential real estate-related transaction” means making or purchasing loans or providing other financial assistance:
    1. To purchase, construct, improve, repair, or maintain a dwelling;
    2. Secured by residential real estate; or
    3. Selling, brokering, or appraising residential real property.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 16.

16-123-316. Brokerage services.

A person shall not deny persons access to or membership or participation in a multiple listing service, real estate brokers' organization or other service, organization, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings, or discriminate against a person in the terms or conditions of access, membership, or participation in such an organization, service, or facility because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 17.

16-123-317. Complaint.

  1. The Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall investigate any discriminatory housing practices alleged in a complaint filed under this section.
  2. A complaint shall be:
    1. In writing and under oath; and
    2. In the form specified and standardized by this subchapter and the rules promulgated by the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, which shall not require that the complaint be notarized.
  3. An aggrieved person shall not file later than one (1) year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated a complaint with the commission alleging the discriminatory housing practice.
  4. Not later than one (1) year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated, the commission may file its own complaint.
  5. A complaint may be reasonably and fairly amended at any time.
  6. On the filing of a complaint, the director shall:
    1. Give the aggrieved person notice that the complaint has been received;
    2. Advise the aggrieved person of the time limits and choice of forums under this subchapter; and
    3. Not later than the tenth day after the filing of the complaint or after the identification of an additional respondent under § 16-123-320, provide each respondent:
      1. Notice identifying the alleged discriminatory housing practice and advising the respondent of the procedural rights and obligations of a respondent under this subchapter; and
      2. A copy of the original complaint.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 18; 2019, No. 315, § 1322.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (b)(2).

16-123-318. Answer.

  1. Not later than the tenth day after receipt of the notice and a copy of the complaint as required by § 16-123-317(f)(3), a respondent may file an answer to the complaint.
  2. An answer must be:
    1. In writing;
    2. Under oath; and
    3. In the form specified and standardized by this subchapter and the rules promulgated by the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, which shall not require that the answer be notarized.
  3. An answer may be reasonably and fairly amended at any time.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 19; 2003, No. 1775, § 4; 2019, No. 315, § 1323.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (b)(3), substituted “Arkansas Fair Housing Commission” for “commission” and “answer” for “complaint.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (b)(3).

16-123-319. Investigation.

  1. The Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall investigate all complaints, and except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, shall commence an investigation within thirty (30) days of receiving the complaint and shall complete the investigation no later than the one hundredth day after the complaint is filed, and shall dispose of all administrative proceedings related to the investigation not later than the first anniversary after the complaint is filed.
  2. If the director is unable to complete an investigation within the time periods prescribed by subsection (a) of this section, the director shall notify the complainant and the respondent in writing of the reasons for the delay.
  3. If the director is unable to begin an investigation within the time periods prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, the director shall notify the complainant and the respondent in writing of the reasons for the delay.
  4. If the director is unable to dispose of all administrative proceedings related to the investigation of a complaint within one (1) year after the complaint is filed, the director shall notify the complainant and the respondent in writing of the reasons for the delay.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 20.

16-123-320. Additional or substitute respondent.

  1. The Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission may join a person not named in the complaint as an additional or substitute respondent if, in the course of the investigation, the director determines that the person may have committed a discriminatory housing practice.
  2. In addition to the information required in the notice under § 16-123-317(f)(3), the director shall include in a notice to a respondent joined under this section an explanation of the basis for the determination that the person is properly joined as a respondent.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 21.

16-123-321. Conciliation.

  1. The Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, during the period beginning with the filing of a complaint and ending with the filing of a charge or a dismissal by the director or the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, to the extent feasible, shall engage in conciliation with respect to the complaint.
  2. A conciliation agreement reached through conciliation is a written agreement between a respondent, the complainant, and the commission requiring approval from all three (3).
    1. A conciliation agreement may provide for binding arbitration of the dispute arising from the complaint.
    2. A conciliation agreement may authorize appropriate relief, including monetary relief.
  3. A conciliation agreement shall be made public, unless the complainant and respondent agree otherwise and the director determines that disclosure is not necessary to further the purposes of this subchapter.
  4. If the director has reasonable cause to believe that a respondent has breached a conciliation agreement, the director may authorize and the Attorney General may file a civil action for the enforcement of the conciliation agreement as provided by § 16-123-330.
  5. No statements or actions made within the course of conciliation may be made public or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding under this subchapter without the written consent of the persons concerned.
  6. After completion of the director's investigation, the director shall make available to the aggrieved person and the respondent, at any time, information derived from the investigation and the final report related to that investigation.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 22; 2005, No. 250, § 1; 2017, No. 473, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (e), substituted “director may authorize and the Attorney General may” for “Attorney General shall be directed to” and added “or the Attorney General may authorize the director to hire outside counsel to seek enforcement” at the end.

The 2017 amendment deleted “or the Attorney General may authorize the director to hire outside counsel to seek enforcement” at the end of (e).

16-123-322. Temporary or preliminary relief.

  1. If the Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission concludes at any time following the filing of a complaint that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of this subchapter, and after consultation with the office of the Attorney General, the director may authorize the filing by the Attorney General of a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the respondent resides for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of the complaint.
  2. The filing of a civil action under this section does not affect the initiation or continuation of an administrative proceeding entitled “administrative hearing” under § 16-123-331.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 23; 2005, No. 250, § 2; 2017, No. 473, § 2.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment, in (a), substituted “and the Attorney General may file” for “of” and added “or the Attorney General may authorize the director to hire outside counsel to seek the relief” at the end.

The 2017 amendment, in (a), substituted “of a civil action” for “and the Attorney General may file a civil action” and deleted “or the Attorney General may authorize the director to hire outside counsel to seek the relief” at the end.

16-123-323. Investigative report.

  1. The Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall prepare a final investigative report showing:
    1. The names and dates of contacts with witnesses;
    2. A summary of correspondence and other contacts with the aggrieved person and the respondent showing the dates of the correspondence and contacts;
    3. A summary description of other pertinent records;
    4. A summary of witness statements; and
    5. Answers to interrogatories.
  2. A final report under this section may be amended if additional evidence is later discovered.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 24.

16-123-324. Reasonable cause determination.

  1. The Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall determine, based on the facts and after consultation with the office of the Attorney General, whether reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice occurred or is about to occur.
  2. The director shall make the determination under subsection (a) of this section not later than the one hundredth day a complaint is filed unless:
    1. It is impracticable to make the determination; or
    2. The director has approved a conciliation agreement relating to the complaint.
  3. If it is impracticable to make the determination within the time period provided by subsection (b) of this section, the director shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for the delay.
  4. If the director determines that reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice occurred or is about to occur, the director shall immediately issue a charge on behalf of the aggrieved person, except as provided by § 16-123-326.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 25.

16-123-325. Charge.

  1. A charge issued under § 16-123-324 shall:
    1. Consist of a short and plain statement of the facts on which the Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission has found reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice occurred or is about to occur;
    2. Be based on the investigation; and
    3. Not necessarily be limited to the facts or grounds alleged in the complaint.
  2. The director shall immediately send a copy of the charge with information concerning the process of election of judicial determination, as under § 16-123-329, to:
    1. Each respondent, together with a notice of the opportunity for a hearing provided by § 16-123-331; and
    2. Each aggrieved person on whose behalf the complaint was filed.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 26; 2003, No. 1775, § 5.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (b), deleted “Not later than the tenth day after the director issues a charge” from the beginning and inserted “immediately.”

16-123-326. Land use law.

If the Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission determines the matter involves the legality of a state or local zoning ordinance or other land use law or ordinance, the director shall not issue a charge, but shall immediately refer the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 27.

16-123-327. Dismissal.

  1. If the Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission determines that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice occurred or is about to occur, the director shall promptly dismiss the complaint.
  2. The director shall disclose each dismissal under this section both to the public and to all affected parties.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 28.

16-123-328. Pending civil trial.

The Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall not issue a charge under this section regarding an alleged discriminatory housing practice after the commencement of a civil action commenced under federal or state law or this subchapter seeking determination with respect to an alleged discriminatory housing practice.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 29.

16-123-329. Election of judicial determination.

  1. After a charge has been issued under § 16-123-325, a complainant, a respondent, or an aggrieved person on whose behalf the complaint was filed may elect to have the claims asserted in that charge decided in a civil action.
  2. The election shall be made no later than the twentieth day after the date of receipt by the electing person of service under § 16-123-325 or, in the case of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, not later than the twentieth day after the date the charge was issued.
  3. The person making the election shall give notice to the commission and to all other complainants and respondents to whom the charge relates.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 30.

16-123-330. Attorney General — Action for enforcement.

  1. If a timely election is made under § 16-123-329, the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall authorize and the Attorney General shall file and maintain on behalf of the aggrieved person a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction seeking appropriate relief under this section.
  2. If the commission determines, as under § 16-123-321, and after consultation with the office of the Attorney General, that a conciliation agreement has been breached by the respondent, the Attorney General may file a civil action on behalf of the aggrieved person in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the party seeking enforcement of the conciliation agreement resides.
  3. An aggrieved person may intervene in the civil action.
  4. If the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court may grant as relief any relief that a court may grant in a civil action under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 31; 2003, No. 1775, § 6; 2005, No. 250, § 3; 2017, No. 473, § 3; 2019, No. 385, § 3.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted “by a complainant” following “is made” in (a).

The 2005 amendment substituted “may” for “shall” twice in (a) and in (b); added “or the Attorney General may authorize the commission to hire outside counsel to pursue appropriate relief” at the end of (a); and added “or the Attorney General may authorize the commission to hire outside counsel to seek enforcement of the conciliation agreement” at the end of (b).

The 2017 amendment, in (a), substituted “shall” for “may” two times, substituted “person” for “party”, and substituted “seeking appropriate relief under this section” for “in the county where the respondent seeking appropriate relief under this section resides or the Attorney General may authorize the commission to hire outside counsel to pursue appropriate relief” at the end; in (b), substituted “party” for “respondent”, and deleted “or the Attorney General may authorize the commission to hire outside counsel to seek enforcement of the conciliation agreement”; deleted former (c); and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

The 2019 amendment inserted “civil” in (c).

16-123-331. Administrative hearing.

    1. If a timely election to commence a civil action is not made under § 16-123-329, the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall provide for an administrative hearing on the charge.
      1. The administrative hearing will be adjudicated by the commission.
      2. In that proceeding or any factually related proceeding under this section, no officer, employee, or agent of the State of Arkansas engaged in the performance of investigative, conciliatory, or prosecutorial functions in connection with the proceeding shall participate in or advise on the decision of the commission, except as a witness or counsel during the proceedings.
  1. Except as provided in this section, the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq., governs a hearing and an appeal of a hearing under this section.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 32.

16-123-332. Administrative penalties.

  1. If the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission determines at a hearing under § 16-123-331 that a respondent has engaged in or is about to engage in a discriminatory housing practice, the commission may order the appropriate relief, including actual damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and court costs.
  2. To vindicate the public interest, the commission may assess a civil penalty against the respondent in an amount that does not exceed:
    1. Eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) if the respondent has not been adjudged by order of the commission or a court to have committed a prior discriminatory housing practice;
    2. Except as provided by subsection (c) of this section, twenty-seven thousand five hundred dollars ($27,500) if the respondent has been adjudged by order of the commission or a court to have committed one (1) other discriminatory housing practice during the five-year period ending on the date of the filing of this charge; and
    3. Except as provided by subsection (c) of this section, fifty-five thousand dollars ($55,000) if the respondent has been adjudged by order of the commission or a court to have committed three (3) or more discriminatory housing practices during the five-year period ending on the date of the filing of the charge.
  3. If the acts constituting the discriminatory housing practice that is the object of the charge are committed by the same natural person who has been previously adjudged to have committed acts constituting a discriminatory housing practice, the civil penalties in subdivisions (b)(2) and (3) of this section may be imposed without regard to the period of time within which any other discriminatory housing practice occurred.
  4. In addition to all other penalties set forth in this subchapter, the commission may require the respondent to complete up to thirty (30) classroom hours of fair housing education courses designated by the commission or up to thirty (30) hours of community service designated by the commission, or both.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 33; 2003, No. 1775, § 7.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “natural person” for “individual” in (c).

16-123-333. Effect of a commission order.

An Arkansas Fair Housing Commission order under § 16-123-331 does not affect any contract, sale, encumbrance, or lease that:

  1. Was consummated before the commission issued the order; and
  2. Involved a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or tenant who did not have actual notice of the charge filed under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 34.

16-123-334. Licensed or regulated businesses.

If the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission issues an order with respect to a discriminatory housing practice that occurred in the course of a business subject to a licensing or regulation by a government agency, the commission, not later than thirty (30) days after the issuance of the order, shall send copies of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the order to the governmental agency.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 35.

16-123-335. Cooperation with state and federal agencies.

  1. The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission is encouraged to cooperate with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the United States Attorney General in the enforcement of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., as in effect January 1, 2001, and may assist the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or the United States Attorney General in any way consistent with the policies of this subchapter.
  2. The commission shall treat a complaint referred by the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or the United States Attorney General under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 USC § 3601 et seq., as in effect January 1, 2001, as a complaint filed under this section.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 36.

16-123-336. Civil action.

  1. An aggrieved person may file a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the respondent resides not later than two (2) years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice or the breach of a conciliation agreement entered into under this subchapter, whichever occurs last, to obtain appropriate relief with respect to the discriminatory housing practice or enforcement of a conciliation agreement.
    1. The two-year period does not include any time during which an administrative proceeding under this subchapter is pending with respect to a complaint or charge under this subchapter based on the discriminatory housing practice.
    2. This subsection does not apply to actions arising from a breach of a conciliation agreement.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, an aggrieved person may file an action under this section whether or not a complaint has been filed under § 16-123-317, and without regard to the status of any complaint filed under that section.
  3. If the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission has obtained a conciliation agreement with the consent of an aggrieved person, the aggrieved person may not file an action under this section with respect to the alleged discriminatory housing practice that forms the basis for the complaint except to enforce the terms of the conciliation agreement.
  4. An aggrieved person may not file a civil action under this section with respect to the alleged discriminatory housing practice forming the basis of that charge after the actual commencement of an administrative hearing.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 37; 2003, No. 1775, § 8.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment rewrote (e).

16-123-337. Court-appointed attorney.

On application by a person alleging a discriminatory housing practice or by a person against whom a discriminatory housing practice is alleged, the court may appoint an attorney for the person to the extent provided by applicable law concerning indigents in civil actions.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 38.

16-123-338. Relief.

In a civil action under this subchapter, if the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court may award to the plaintiff:

  1. Compensatory and punitive damages;
  2. Reasonable attorney's fees;
  3. Court costs; and
  4. Subject to § 16-123-339, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, including an order enjoining the defendant from engaging in the discriminatory housing practice or ordering affirmative action as may be appropriate.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 39.

16-123-339. Effect if relief granted.

Relief granted under this subchapter does not affect a contract, sale encumbrance, or lease that:

  1. Was consummated before the granting of the relief; and
  2. Involved a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or tenant who did not have actual notice of the filing of a complaint under this subchapter or a civil action under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 40.

16-123-340. Intervention by Attorney General.

  1. The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission may authorize the Attorney General to intervene and the Attorney General may intervene in an action if the case is of general public importance.
  2. The Attorney General may obtain the same relief available under § 16-123-341.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 41; 2005, No. 250, § 4.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission may authorize the Attorney General to intervene and the Attorney General may intervene in an action if” for “At the request of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, the Attorney General may intervene in an action if the commission certifies and the Attorney General concurs that” in (a).

16-123-341. Pattern and practice cases.

  1. At the request of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, the Attorney General may file a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the respondent resides for appropriate relief if the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that:
    1. A person is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any right granted by this subchapter; or
    2. A person has been denied any right granted by this subchapter and that denial raises an issue of general public importance.
  2. In an action under this section the court may:
    1. Award preventive relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person responsible for a violation of this subchapter as necessary to assure the full enjoyment of the right granted by this subchapter;
    2. Award other appropriate relief, including monetary damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and court costs; and
    3. To vindicate the public interest, assess a civil penalty against the respondent in an amount that does not exceed:
      1. Fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for a first violation; and
      2. One hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for a second or subsequent violation.
  3. A person may intervene in an action under this section if the person is:
    1. An aggrieved person to the discriminatory housing practice; or
    2. A party to a conciliation agreement concerning the discriminatory housing practice.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 42.

16-123-342. Subpoena enforcement.

The Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, on behalf of itself or other party at whose request a subpoena is issued under this subchapter, may enforce the subpoena in appropriate proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the respondent resides.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 43.

16-123-343. Prevailing party.

  1. A court in a civil action brought under this subchapter or the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission in an administrative hearing under § 16-123-331 may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
  2. However, nothing contained in this subchapter shall waive the sovereign immunity of the State of Arkansas or any of its officials, agencies, departments, boards, or commissions.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 44; 2005, No. 250, § 5.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted the subdivision (a) designation; deleted “and assess costs against the nonprevailing party” at the end of (a); and added (b).

16-123-344. Intimidation or interference.

A person commits an offense if the person, whether or not acting under color of law, intentionally intimidates or interferes with or attempts to intimidate or interfere with a person:

  1. Because of the person's race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin and because the person is or has been selling, purchasing, renting, financing, occupying, or contracting, or negotiating for the sale, purchase, rental, financing, or occupation of any dwelling or applying for or participating in a service, organization, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings; or
  2. Because the person is or has been, or to intimidate the person from:
    1. Participating, without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin, in an activity, service, organization, or facility described in subdivision (1) of this section;
    2. Affording another person opportunity or protection to so participate; or
    3. Lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate, without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or facility described in subdivision (1) of this section.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 45; 2003, No. 1775, § 9.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted (b).

16-123-345. Incentives for self-testing and self-correction.

    1. A report or result of a self-test, as that term is defined by rule of the Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, shall be considered to be privileged under subdivision (a)(2) of this section if a person:
      1. Conducts or authorizes an independent third party to conduct a self-test of any aspect of a residential real estate-related lending transaction or any part of that transaction by that person in order to determine the level or effectiveness of compliance with this subchapter by that person; and
      2. Has identified any possible violation of this subchapter by that person and has taken, or is taking, appropriate corrective action to address any such possible violation.
    2. If a person meets the conditions specified in subdivision (a)(1) of this section with respect to a self-test, any report or results of that self-test:
      1. Shall be privileged; and
      2. May not be obtained or used by the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission or any applicant, department, or agency in any:
        1. Proceeding or civil action in which one (1) or more violations of this subchapter are alleged; or
        2. Examination or investigation relating to compliance with this subchapter.
    1. No provision of this subchapter may be construed to prevent an aggrieved person, complainant, department, or agency from obtaining or using a report or results of any self-test in any proceeding or civil action in which a violation of this subchapter is alleged, or in any examination or investigation of compliance with this subchapter if:
      1. The person to whom the self-test relates or any person with lawful access to the report or the results:
        1. Voluntarily releases or discloses all or any part of the report or results to the commission, aggrieved person, complainant, department, or agency or to the general public; or
        2. Refers to or describes the report or results as a defense to charges of violations of this subchapter against the person to whom the self-test relates; or
      2. The report or results are sought in conjunction with an adjudication or admission of a violation of this subchapter for the sole purpose of determining an appropriate penalty or remedy.
    2. Any report or results of a self-test that are disclosed for the purpose specified in subdivision (b)(1)(B) of this section:
      1. Shall be used only for the particular proceeding in which the adjudication or admission referred to in subdivision (b)(1)(B) of this section is made; and
      2. May not be used in any other action or proceeding.
  1. An aggrieved person, complainant, department, agency, or the commission that challenges a privilege asserted under this section may seek a determination of the existence and application of that privilege in:
    1. A court of competent jurisdiction; or
    2. An administrative law proceeding with appropriate jurisdiction.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 46; 2003, No. 1775, §§ 10, 11; 2019, No. 315, § 1324.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “May” for “Shall” in (a)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(B); and substituted “Arkansas Fair Housing Commission” for “commission” in (a)(2)(B).

The 2019 amendment substituted “rule” for “regulation” in the introductory language of (a)(1).

16-123-346. Fair housing education program.

  1. The Director of the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission shall establish a statewide education and outreach program through contracts with local governments or their agencies, public or private nonprofit organizations or institutions, or other public or private entities that are formulating or carrying out programs to prevent or eliminate discriminatory housing practices.
  2. The program shall be designed to provide a centralized, coordinated effort for the development and dissemination of fair housing media products, including:
    1. Public service announcements, both audio and video;
    2. Television, radio, and print advertisements;
    3. Posters; and
    4. Pamphlets and brochures.
  3. The director shall encourage cooperation with real estate industry organizations in the program.
  4. The director shall encourage the dissemination of educational information and technical assistance to support compliance with the housing adaptability and accessibility guidelines contained in the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631, 2341, and 2342.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 47.

16-123-347. Arkansas Fair Housing Commission Trust Fund.

  1. There is hereby established on the books of the Treasurer of State, the Auditor of State, and the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State a fund to be known as the “Arkansas Fair Housing Commission Trust Fund”.
  2. The fund shall consist of:
    1. Funds received by the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission, and any other moneys as may be provided by the General Assembly, there to be used for the administration and operations of the commission; and
    2. Any administrative or civil penalty levied and collected pursuant to this subchapter, to be solely used for fair housing education of the public and the operational expenses of the commission.
  3. The appropriation to the commission providing for “public education” may be used to fund all expenses incurred in conducting educational seminars and other forms of educational projects for use and benefit generally of the public, including the production and distribution of information literature of an educational nature.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 48; 2003, No. 1011, § 3.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment added (c).

Cross References. Arkansas Fair Housing Commission Trust Fund, § 19-5-1135.

16-123-348. Violations — Bodily injury — Penalties.

  1. It is unlawful for a person, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force, to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with, or attempt to injure, intimidate, or interfere with:
    1. Any person because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, disability, as defined in § 16-123-302, familial status, as defined in § 16-123-302, or national origin or because the person is or has been selling, purchasing, renting, financing, occupying, or contracting or negotiating for the sale, purchase, rental, financing, or occupation of any dwelling, or applying for or participating in any service, organizations, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings;
    2. Any person because he or she is or has been, or in order to intimidate the person or any other person or any class of persons from:
      1. Participating, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, disability, as defined in § 16-123-302, familial status, as defined in § 16-123-302, or national origin, in any of the activities, services, organizations, or facilities described in subdivision (a)(1) of this section; or
      2. Affording any person or class of persons opportunity or protection so to participate; or
    3. Any citizen because he or she is or has been, or in order to discourage the citizen or any other citizen from lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, disability, as defined in § 16-123-302, familial status, as defined in § 16-123-302, or national origin, in any of the activities, services, organizations, or facilities described in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, or participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly opposing any denial of the opportunity to so participate.
  2. A person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall:
    1. If the violation results in bodily injury, be fined not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) or be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, or both;
    2. If the violation results in death, be imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years or life;
    3. If the violation results in property damage exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) or if the violation involves the use or attempted use of fire or a firearm, be fined not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) or be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or both; or
    4. Otherwise, be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or be imprisoned for not more then one (1) year, or both.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1785, § 49; 2003, No. 1775, § 12.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment deleted former (b) and (c); and added present (b).

Subchapter 4 — Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 975, § 2: Apr. 2, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is not a higher protection offered by the state than the protection of a person's right to religious freedom; and that this act is immediately necessary because every day that a person's right to religious freedom is threatened is a day that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is compromised. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Danielle Weatherby, The Arkansas “mini-RFRA” is bad policy, 2015 Ark. L. Notes 1669.

16-123-401. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Religious Freedom Restoration Act”.

History. Acts 2015, No. 975, § 1.

16-123-402. Legislative intent.

It is the intent of the General Assembly:

  1. To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases in which free exercise of religion is substantially burdened;
  2. That this subchapter be interpreted consistent with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, federal case law, and federal jurisprudence; and
  3. To provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.

History. Acts 2015, No. 975, § 1.

Case Notes

Particular Cases.

Where state imposed statewide ban on solicitation activity at state revenue offices, plaintiff failed to show that the ban substantially burdened his sincere religious exercise or belief. Brown v. Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 180 F. Supp. 3d 602 (W.D. Ark. 2016), aff'd, 674 Fed. Appx. 599 (8th Cir. 2017).

16-123-403. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Demonstrates” means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion;
  2. “Exercise of religion” means religious exercise;
  3. “Government” includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, political subdivision, official, or other person acting under color of state law; and
  4. “State law” includes without limitation a law of a political subdivision.

History. Acts 2015, No. 975, § 1.

16-123-404. Free exercise of religion protected.

  1. A government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that a government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is:
    1. In furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
    2. The least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
    1. A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.
    2. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section is governed by the general rules of standing under statute, the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, or any court holding from the state's appellate courts.

History. Acts 2015, No. 975, § 1.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) Exempting Activities of Religious Organizations from Operation of Title VII Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2016).

Employer's Dress Policy as Religious Discrimination Under Federal Law. 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2016).

Case Notes

Judges.

Arkansas judge did not state a plausible claim that Justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court violated this section by permanently barring him from presiding over death penalty cases based on his anti-death penalty statements and activities; Arkansas had compelling interests in the impartiality of the judiciary and in public perception of an impartial judiciary, and the judge did not allege any less restrictive means of furthering those compelling interests. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1176, 203 L. Ed. 2d 199 (2019).

16-123-405. Construction and applicability.

  1. This subchapter applies to all state law, and the implementation of state law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after April 2, 2015.
  2. State statutory law adopted after April 2, 2015, is subject to this subchapter unless the state statutory law explicitly excludes the application by reference to this subchapter.
  3. This subchapter does not authorize any part of a government to burden a religious belief.

History. Acts 2015, No. 975, § 1.

16-123-406. Interpretation.

  1. This subchapter does not affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion of the United States Constitution, Amendment I, prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion or of Arkansas Constitution, Article 2, § 25, concerning protection of religion.
  2. Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the United States Constitution, Amendment I, prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion or of Arkansas Constitution, Article 2, § 25, shall not constitute a violation of this subchapter.
  3. As used in this section, “granting”, with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions.

History. Acts 2015, No. 975, § 1.

16-123-407. Exemptions.

The Division of Correction, the Division of Community Correction, a county jail, and a detention facility are exempt from this subchapter.

History. Acts 2015, No. 975, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 970.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction”.

Chapter 124 Drug Dealer Liability Act

Cross References. Civil actions against sellers of drug paraphernalia, § 16-118-108.

16-124-101. Title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Drug Dealer Liability Act”.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 1.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Drug Dealer Liability Acts. 12 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2015).

16-124-102. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Illegal drug” means a drug whose distribution is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, § 5-64-101 et seq.;
  2. “Illegal drug market” means the support system of illegal drug-related operations, from production to retail sales, through which an illegal drug reaches the user;
  3. “Illegal drug market target community” means the area described under § 16-124-109;
  4. “Individual drug user” means the individual whose illegal drug use is the basis of an action brought under this chapter;
  5. “Level four offense” means:
    1. Possession of sixteen ounces (16 ozs.) or more, or distribution of four ounces (4 ozs.) or more, of a specified illegal drug; or
    2. Possession of sixteen pounds (16 lbs.) or more or one hundred (100) plants or more, or distribution of ten pounds (10 lbs.) or more, of marijuana;
  6. “Level one offense” means:
    1. Possession of one-quarter ounce (.25 oz.) or more but less than four ounces (4 ozs.), or distribution of less than one ounce (1 oz.), of a specified illegal drug; or
    2. Possession of one pound (1 lb.) or twenty-five (25) plants or more but less than four pounds (4 lbs.) or fifty (50) plants, or distribution of less than one pound (1 lb.), of marijuana;
  7. “Level three offense” means:
    1. Possession of eight ounces (8 ozs.) or more but less than sixteen ounces (16 ozs.), or distribution of two ounces (2 ozs.) or more but less than four ounces (4 ozs.), of a specified illegal drug; or
    2. Possession of eight pounds (8 lbs.) or more or seventy-five (75) plants or more but less than sixteen pounds (16 lbs.) or one hundred (100) plants, or distribution of more than five pounds (5 lbs.) but less than ten pounds (10 lbs.), of marijuana;
  8. “Level two offense” means:
    1. Possession of four ounces (4 ozs.) or more but less than eight ounces (8 ozs.), or distribution of one ounce (1 oz.) or more but less than two ounces (2 ozs.), of a specified illegal drug; or
    2. Possession of four pounds (4 lbs) or more or fifty (50) plants or more but less than eight pounds (8 lbs.) or seventy-five (75) plants, or distribution of more than one pound (1 lb.) but less than ten pounds (10 lbs.), of marijuana;
    1. “Participate in the illegal drug market” means to distribute, possess with an intent to distribute, commit an act intended to facilitate the marketing or distribution of, or agree to distribute, possess with an intent to distribute, or commit an act intended to facilitate the marketing and distribution of, an illegal drug.
    2. “Participate in the illegal drug market” does not include the purchase or receipt of an illegal drug for personal use only;
    1. “Period of illegal drug use” means, in relation to the individual drug user, the time of first use by an individual drug user of an illegal drug to the accrual of the cause of action.
    2. The period of illegal drug use is presumed to commence two (2) years before the cause of action accrues, unless the defendant proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence;
  9. “Person” means an individual, a governmental entity, corporation, firm, trust, partnership, or incorporated or unincorporated association, existing under or authorized by the laws of this state, another state, or a foreign country;
  10. “Place of illegal drug activity” means, in relation to the individual drug user, each county in which the individual drug user possesses or uses an illegal drug or in which the individual drug user resides, attends school, or is employed during the period of the illegal drug use of the individual drug user, unless the defendant proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence;
  11. “Place of participation” means, in relation to a defendant in an action brought under this chapter, each county in which the person participates in the illegal drug market or in which the person resides, attends school, or is employed during the period of the participation in the illegal drug market by the person; and
  12. “Specified illegal drug” means cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine, and any other drug the distribution of which is a violation of state law.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 2.

16-124-103. Liability in general.

  1. A person may recover damages under this chapter for injury resulting from the use of an illegal drug by that person.
  2. A person who knowingly participates in the illegal drug market is liable for civil damages as provided for in this chapter.
    1. A law enforcement officer or agency, the state, or a person acting at the direction of a law enforcement officer or agency of the state, is not liable for participating in the illegal drug market, if the participation is in furtherance of an official investigation.
    2. A third party, including an insurance company, shall not be required to pay damages awarded under this chapter, nor shall any person be vicariously liable for the act of another, nor shall a third party be made a party to any action brought under this chapter.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, §§ 3, 6.

16-124-104. Damages caused by illegal drug use — Distribution.

  1. One (1) or more of the following persons may bring an action in circuit court for damages caused by use of an illegal drug by an individual:
    1. A parent, legal guardian, child, spouse, or sibling of the individual drug user;
    2. An individual who was exposed to an illegal drug in utero;
    3. An employer of the individual drug user; and
    4. A medical facility, insurer, governmental entity, employer, or other entity that funds a drug treatment program or employee assistance program for the individual drug user or that otherwise expended money on behalf of the individual drug user.
  2. A person entitled to bring an action under this section may seek damages from one (1) or more of the following:
    1. A person who knowingly distributed, or knowingly participated in the chain of distribution of, an illegal drug that was actually used by the individual drug user; or
    2. A person who knowingly participated in the illegal drug market if:
      1. The place of the illegal drug activity by the individual drug user is within the illegal drug market target community of the defendant;
      2. The participation of the defendant in the illegal drug market was connected with the same type of illegal drug used by the individual drug user; and
      3. The defendant participated in the illegal drug market at any time during the illegal drug use of the individual drug user.
  3. A person entitled to bring an action under this section may recover all of the following damages:
    1. Economic damages, including, but not limited to:
      1. The cost of treatment and rehabilitation;
      2. Medical expenses;
      3. Loss of economic or educational potential;
      4. Loss of productivity;
      5. Absenteeism;
      6. Support expenses;
      7. Accidents or injury; and
      8. Any other pecuniary loss proximately caused by the illegal drug use;
    2. Noneconomic damages, including, but not limited to:
      1. Physical and emotional pain;
      2. Suffering;
      3. Physical impairment;
      4. Emotional distress;
      5. Mental anguish;
      6. Disfigurement;
      7. Loss of enjoyment;
      8. Loss of companionship, services, and consortium; and
      9. Other nonpecuniary losses proximately caused by an individual's use of an illegal drug;
    3. Exemplary damages;
    4. Reasonable attorney's fees; and
    5. Costs of suit, including, but not limited to, reasonable expenses for expert testimony.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 4.

16-124-105. Action by drug user prohibited — Exceptions.

    1. An individual drug user shall not bring an action for damages caused by the use of an illegal drug, except as otherwise provided in this subsection.
    2. An individual drug user may bring an action for damages caused by the use of an illegal drug only if all of the following conditions are met:
      1. The individual drug user personally discloses to narcotics enforcement authorities, more than six (6) months before filing the action, all the information known to the individual drug user regarding his or her source of illegal drugs;
      2. The individual drug user has not used an illegal drug within the six (6) months before filing the action; and
      3. The individual drug user continues to remain free of the use of an illegal drug throughout the pendency of the action.
  1. A person entitled to bring an action under this section may seek damages only from a person who distributed, or is in the chain of distribution of, an illegal drug that was actually used by the individual drug user.
  2. A person entitled to bring an action under this section may recover only the following damages:
    1. Economic damages, including, but not limited to:
      1. The cost of treatment, rehabilitation, and medical expenses;
      2. Loss of economic or educational potential;
      3. Loss of productivity;
      4. Absenteeism;
      5. Accidents or injury; and
      6. Other pecuniary loss proximately caused by the person's illegal drug use;
    2. Reasonable attorney's fees; and
    3. Costs of suit, including, but not limited to, reasonable expenses for expert testimony.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 5.

16-124-106. Joinder.

  1. Two (2) or more persons may join in one (1) action under this chapter as plaintiffs if:
    1. Their respective actions have at least one (1) place of illegal drug activity in common; and
    2. Any portion of the period of illegal drug use overlaps with the period of illegal drug use for every other plaintiff.
  2. Two (2) or more persons may be joined in one (1) action under this chapter as defendants if those persons are liable to at least one (1) plaintiff.
  3. A plaintiff need not be interested in obtaining and a defendant need not be interested in defending against all the relief demanded.
  4. Judgment may be given for one (1) or more plaintiffs according to their respective liabilities.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 8.

16-124-107. Right of action for contribution.

  1. A person subject to liability under this chapter has a right of action for contribution against another person subject to liability under this chapter.
  2. Contribution may be enforced either in the original action or by a separate action brought for that purpose.
  3. A plaintiff may seek recovery in accordance with this chapter and existing law against a person against whom a defendant has asserted a right of contribution.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 9.

16-124-108. Evidence of participation in the illegal drug market.

    1. Proof of participation in the illegal drug market in an action brought under this chapter shall be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
    2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, other elements of the cause of action shall be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
    1. A person against whom recovery is sought who has a criminal conviction pursuant to state drug laws or the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., is estopped from denying participation in the illegal drug market.
    2. Such a conviction is also prima facie evidence of the participation of the person in the illegal drug market during the two (2) years preceding the date of an act giving rise to a conviction.
  1. The absence of a criminal drug conviction of a person against whom recovery is sought does not bar an action against that person.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 10.

16-124-109. Illegal drug market target community.

A person whose participation in the illegal drug market constitutes the following level offense shall be considered to have the following illegal drug market target community:

  1. For a level one offense, the county in which the place of participation of the defendant is situated;
  2. For a level two offense, the illegal drug market target community described in subdivision (1) of this section along with all counties with a border contiguous to that illegal drug market target community;
  3. For a level three offense, the illegal drug market target community described in subdivision (2) of this section plus all counties with a border contiguous to that illegal drug market target community; and
  4. For a level four offense, anywhere.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 7.

16-124-110. Attachment against assets.

    1. A plaintiff under this chapter, subject to subsection (c) of this section, may request an ex parte prejudgment attachment order from the court against all assets of a defendant sufficient to satisfy a potential award.
    2. If attachment is instituted, a defendant is entitled to an immediate hearing.
    3. Attachment may be lifted if the defendant demonstrates that the assets will be available for a potential award or if the defendant posts a bond sufficient to cover a potential award.
  1. A person against whom a judgment has been rendered under this chapter is not eligible to exempt any property, of whatever kind, from process to levy or process to execute on the judgment.
  2. Any assets sought to satisfy a judgment under this chapter that are named in a forfeiture action or have been seized for forfeiture by any state or federal agency may not be used to satisfy a judgment unless and until the assets have been released following the conclusion of the forfeiture action or released by the agency that seized the assets.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 11.

16-124-111. Statute of limitations.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a claim under this chapter shall not be brought more than three (3) years after the cause of action accrues.
    2. A cause of action accrues under this chapter when a person who may recover has reason to know of the harm from illegal drug use that is the basis for the cause of action and has reason to know that the illegal drug use is the cause of the harm.
    1. For a plaintiff, the statute of limitations under this section is tolled when the individual potential plaintiff is incapacitated by the use of an illegal drug to the extent that the individual cannot reasonably be expected to seek recovery under this chapter or as otherwise provided for by law.
    2. For a defendant, the statute of limitations under this section is tolled until six (6) months after the individual potential defendant is convicted of a criminal drug offense as otherwise provided for by law.
  1. The statute of limitations under this chapter for a claim based on participation in the illegal drug market that occurred prior to July 28, 1995, does not begin to run until July 28, 1995.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 12.

16-124-112. Actions by state — Stays of action.

  1. The Attorney General may represent the state or a political subdivision of the state in an action under this chapter.
  2. On motion by a governmental agency involved in a drug investigation or prosecution, an action brought under this chapter shall be stayed until the completion of the criminal investigation or prosecution that gave rise to the motion for the stay of the action.

History. Acts 1995, No. 896, § 13.

Chapter 125 Immunity for Year 2000 Computer Errors

16-125-101 — 16-125-104. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This chapter, concerning immunity for year 2000 computer errors, was repealed by Acts 2009, No. 157, § 1. The chapter was derived from the following sources:

16-125-101. Acts 1999, No. 1482, § 2.

16-125-102. Acts 1999, No. 1482, § 1.

16-125-103. Acts 1999, No. 1482, § 3.

16-125-104. Acts 1999, No. 1482, § 4.

Chapter 126 Sale or Furnishing of Alcohol

Cross References. Furnishing to alcoholics or intoxicated persons, § 3-3-209.

Knowingly furnishing or selling to minor, § 3-3-202.

Social hosts, criminal liability, § 3-3-219.

Unknowingly furnishing or selling to minor, § 3-3-201.

Effective Dates. Acts 1999, No. 1596, § 10, became law without Governor's signature and emergency clause failed. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that recent court decisions indicate that the General Assembly must clarify the public policy of the State of Arkansas regarding liability for furnishing alcohol to a minor; that this act so provides; and that this act should go into effect as soon as possible in order that subsequent litigation be subject to this act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

16-126-101. In general.

The General Assembly finds and determines that it needs to clarify and establish its legislative intent regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages as addressed by the Supreme Court in Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 947 S.W.2d 349 (1997) and Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc., 337 Ark. 24, 986 S.W.2d 410 (1999).

History. Acts 1999, No. 1596, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Justice Robert L. Brown, A Judicial Retrospective: Significant Decisions by the Arkansas Supreme Court From 1991 Through 2011, 34 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 219 (2012).

Case Notes

In General.

The Dramshop Act's, § 16-126-101 et seq., proposed emergency clause: “this act should go into effect as soon as possible in order that subsequent litigation be subject to this act.” 1999 Ark. Acts 1596, § 10, was not adopted by the General Assembly and was erroneously included in the codification of 1999 Ark. Acts 1596. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc. v. Jackson, 347 Ark. 963, 69 S.W.3d 383 (2002).

16-126-102. Legislative findings and intent.

The General Assembly finds and determines that the knowing sale of alcoholic beverages by a retailer to a minor is contrary to the public policy of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1596, § 2.

16-126-103. Civil liability for sale of alcohol to a minor.

In cases where it has been proven that an alcoholic beverage retailer knowingly sold alcoholic beverages to a minor or sold under circumstances where such retailer reasonably should have known such purchaser was a minor, a civil jury may determine whether or not such knowing sale constituted the proximate cause of any injury to such minor, or to a third person, caused by such minor.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1596, § 3.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

John Norwood, Shannon v. Wilson and the Arkansas Dramshop Act of 1999, 2015 Ark. L. Notes 1744.

16-126-104. Civil liability for sale of alcohol to clearly intoxicated person.

In cases where it has been proven that an alcoholic beverage retailer knowingly sold alcoholic beverages to a person who was clearly intoxicated at the time of such sale or sold under circumstances where the retailer reasonably should have known the person was clearly intoxicated at the time of the sale, a civil jury may determine whether or not the sale constitutes a proximate cause of any subsequent injury to other persons. For purposes of this section, a person is considered clearly intoxicated when the person is so obviously intoxicated to the extent that, at the time of such sale, he or she presents a clear danger to others. It shall be an affirmative defense to civil liability under this section that an alcoholic beverage retailer had a reasonable belief that the person was not clearly intoxicated at the time of such sale or that the person would not be operating a motor vehicle while in the impaired state.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1596, § 4.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

John Norwood, Shannon v. Wilson and the Arkansas Dramshop Act of 1999, 2015 Ark. L. Notes 1744.

Case Notes

Alcohol Provider Not Liable.

Country club was not liable under this section to accident victims injured by a driver who had consumed alcohol at the country club's charitable fundraiser because there was no “sale” of alcohol to the driver by the country club; rather, the country club donated two bottles of wine for every table of 10 persons at the fundraiser. Under § 4-2-106(1), a sale consisted in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. Mason v. Chenal Country Club, 2010 Ark. App. 180 (2010).

Duty of Care.

The General Assembly has established a high duty of care on the part of licensed alcohol vendors not to endanger the public health, welfare, or safety, and that duty is breached when vendors sell alcohol to intoxicated persons in violation of § 3-3-209. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc. v. Jackson, 347 Ark. 963, 69 S.W.3d 383 (2002).

Pleadings.

In order to sustain an action under this section, patrons had to establish in their pleadings a connection between the sale to a clearly intoxicated person and the subsequent injury to another person; because the patrons failed to plead the elements in that natural and continuous sequence, which was required by statute, their complaint was insufficient and was properly dismissed. Sluder v. Steak & Ale of Little Rock, Inc., 361 Ark. 267, 206 S.W.3d 213 (2005).

Car accident victims failed to state a claim against a fraternity and its members who served kegs of beer at a party, leading one member to become intoxicated and crash into one of the victims, because liability was barred by § 16-126-106, and the fraternity was not a retailer of beverages under this section, although it charged admission to the party. Archer v. Sigma Tau Gamma Alpha Epsilon, Inc., 2010 Ark. 8, 362 S.W.3d 303 (2010).

16-126-105. Consumption instead of sale as proximate cause of injury generally.

Except in the knowing sale of alcohol to a minor or to a clearly intoxicated person, the General Assembly hereby finds and declares that the consumption of any alcoholic beverage, rather than the furnishing of any alcoholic beverage, is the proximate cause of injuries or property damage inflicted upon persons or property by a legally intoxicated person.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1596, § 5.

16-126-106. Immunity from civil liability for social hosts.

In no event will the act of providing alcoholic beverages to a person who can lawfully possess them by a social host, or other person who does not hold an alcoholic beverage vendor's permit, constitute a proximate cause of any personal injuries or property damages which may be subsequently caused by an individual consuming any alcoholic beverages so provided.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1596. § 6.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

John Norwood, Shannon v. Wilson and the Arkansas Dramshop Act of 1999, 2015 Ark. L. Notes 1744.

Case Notes

Liability.

Car accident victims failed to state a claim against a fraternity and its members who served kegs of beer at a party, leading one member to become intoxicated and crash into one of the victims, because liability was barred by this section, and the fraternity was not a retailer of beverages under § 16-126-104, although it charged admission to the party. Archer v. Sigma Tau Gamma Alpha Epsilon, Inc., 2010 Ark. 8, 362 S.W.3d 303 (2010).

Chapter 127 Stalker Liability Act

16-127-101. Title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Stalker Liability Act”.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1014, § 2.

16-127-102. Civil liability for stalking.

  1. A person may recover actual damages, and if applicable, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and court costs against another person if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that another person knowingly engaged in a course of conduct towards the person that would place a reasonable person in the person's position under emotional distress or in fear for his or her safety or a third person's safety.
  2. The definitions at § 5-71-229(f) apply to this chapter.
  3. A cause of action under subsection (a) of this section may be maintained whether or not the person who is alleged to have engaged in a course of conduct prohibited under § 5-71-229 has been charged or convicted under § 5-71-229.
  4. The existence or the termination of a cause of action under subsection (a) of this section does not prevent the criminal prosecution of a person for violation of § 5-71-229.
  5. A person shall commence a cause of action under subsection (a) of this section against another person one (1) year or less after the most recent conduct prohibited under § 5-71-229 by the other person toward the aggrieved party.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1014, § 2.

Research References

ALR.

Validity of State Stalking Statutes. 6 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2015).

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Civil Stalking Statutes. 14 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2015).

Chapter 128 Civil Liability for Acts of Terror

16-128-101. Forfeiture of and claims against property used to further an act of terrorism.

  1. All property, including money, used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of § 5-54-201 et seq., is subject to civil forfeiture to the state.
  2. A person injured as a result of a criminal offense under § 5-54-201 et seq., and a law enforcement agency or other governmental agency that participated in the investigation, mitigation, seizure, or forfeiture process for a criminal offense under § 5-54-201 et seq., may file a claim for costs or damages, and the property described in subsection (a) of this section shall be used to satisfy any costs or damages awarded for the claim.
    1. A forfeiture or disposition under this section shall not affect the rights of a factually innocent person.
    2. A mortgage, lien, privilege, other security interest, or joint ownership interest shall not be affected by a forfeiture under this section if the owner of the mortgage, lien, privilege, other security interest, or joint owner establishes that he or she is a factually innocent person.
  3. The allocation of proceeds from a forfeiture and disposition under this section shall be paid to claimants under subsection (b) of this section in the following order:
      1. First, the costs of investigation shall be paid to the law enforcement agency or governmental agency that conducted the investigation.
      2. If more than one (1) law enforcement agency or governmental agency equally conducted the investigation, the costs of investigation shall be paid equally to the law enforcement agencies and governmental agencies conducting the investigation.
      3. If one (1) law enforcement agency or governmental agency primarily conducted the investigation, the costs of investigation first shall be paid to that law enforcement agency or governmental agency, with actual vouchered costs reimbursed on a pro rata basis to the other law enforcement agencies or governmental agencies participating in the investigation, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the costs of investigation allocated to the primary law enforcement agency or governmental agency;
    1. Second, twenty-five percent (25%) of the proceeds plus the costs of prosecution or all of the remaining proceeds, whichever is less, shall be paid to the prosecuting attorney;
    2. Third, the costs of investigation shall be paid on a pro rata basis to a law enforcement agency or governmental agency that was not fully reimbursed under subdivision (d)(1)(C) of this section;
    3. Fourth, the costs of mitigation, seizure, or forfeiture shall be paid on a pro rata basis to a law enforcement agency or governmental agency that participated in the mitigation, seizure, or forfeiture process; and
    4. Fifth, any remaining proceeds shall be paid on a pro rata basis to satisfy any judgments under § 16-128-102 for persons injured as a result of the criminal offense under § 5-54-201 et seq.
    1. Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by a law enforcement officer upon the issuance of a court order.
    2. Seizure without a court order may be made if:
      1. The seizure is incident to a lawful arrest or search; or
      2. The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a forfeiture proceeding based on this section.
      1. A forfeiture action resulting from a seizure under this subsection shall be instituted promptly.
      2. Property taken or detained under this section is not subject to sequestration or attachment but is deemed to be in the custody of the law enforcement officer making the seizure, subject only to the order of the court.
      3. When property is seized under this section, pending forfeiture and final disposition, the law enforcement officer making the seizure may:
        1. Place the property under seal;
        2. Remove the property to a place designated by the court; or
        3. Request another agency authorized by law to take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location.
  4. The limitations period for a claim brought under this section is five (5) years from the date of the discovery of the violation of § 5-54-201 et seq.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1295, § 1.

16-128-102. Civil action by person injured by an act of terrorism.

  1. A person injured as a result of a criminal offense under § 5-54-201 et seq. may file an action for damages against the person who violated § 5-54-201 et seq.
  2. A person who files an action under this section is entitled to recover three (3) times the actual damages sustained or ten thousand dollars ($10,000), whichever is greater, as well as attorney's fees in the trial and appellate courts if the person prevails in the claim.
  3. The limitations period for an action under this section is five (5) years from the date of discovery of the violation of § 5-54-201 et seq.
  4. A person who receives a judgment under this section may seek satisfaction of the judgment under § 16-128-101.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1295, § 1.