Prior Laws.

Former section 16-101, which comprised S.L. 1905, ch. 28, § 1, reen. R.C. & C.L., § 4629; C.S., § 7052; I.C.A.,§ 10-101, was repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 1, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

For further information on the Idaho infant toddler program, see https://healthand welfare.idaho.gov/Children/InfantToddler Program/tabid/4120/Default.aspx .

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

The bracketed word “with” was inserted in (11)(b) by the compiler to correct the enacting legislation.

Cross References.

State council on developmental disabilities,§ 67-6701 et seq.

Superintendent of public instructions,§ 67-1501 et seq.

Federal References.

The individuals with disabilities education act, referred to in paragraph (1)(a)(iv), is codified as 20 USCS § 1400 et seq.

A.L.R.

A.L.R. — Construction and application of individuals with disabilities education act’s child find requirements, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(3), 1412(a)(10). 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 201.

Construction and Application of 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, and Prior Codifications, Providing for Independent Educational Evaluation under Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.). 10 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 2.

Federal References.

Title V, Social Security Act, Title XIX, Social Security Act; the Head Start Act; and subpart 2, part b, chapter I of title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 1964, as amended, referred to in paragraphs (c)(i) to (c)(iii) and (c)(v), are compiled as 42 USCS § 701 et seq.; 42 USCS § 1396 et seq.; 42 USCS § 9831 et seq.; 20 USCS § 6371 et seq. Parts B and H of the individuals with disabilities education act, referred to in paragraph (c)(iv), were repealed effective October 1, 1997, by Act June 4, 1997, P.L. 105-17. For present federal provisions relating to education of individuals with disabilities, see 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400 et seq.

The developmentally disabled assistance and bill of rights act (P.L. 100-146), referred to in paragraph (c)(vi), was repealed by Act Oct. 30, 2000, P.L. 106-402. For present comparable provisions, see 42 USCS § 15001 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Federal References.

P.L. 99-457, part H, referred to in this section, was repealed by Act June 4, 1997, P.L. 105-17. See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400 et seq., for current provisions relating to education of individuals with disabilities.

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertion in subsection (2) was added by the compiler to correct the enacting legislation.

Cross References.

State department of education,§ 33-125 et seq.

State department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Federal References.

Titles V and XIX of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsections (2) and (3), are compiled as 42 USCS § 701 et seq. and 42 USCS § 1396 et seq., respectively.

Compiler’s Notes.

The school for the deaf and blind, referred to in subsection (4), was repealed by S.L. 2009, ch. 168, § 1. For current provisions relating to education of deaf and blind, see§ 33-3401 et seq.

The bracketed insertion in subsection (3) was added by the compiler to correct the enacting legislation.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 543 to 549; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4639 to 4645; C.S., §§ 7053 to 7059; I.C.A.,§§ 10-201 to 10-207, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 2, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 550 to 558, 560; R.S. & R.C., §§ 4650 to 4658, 4660; am. 1911, ch. 194, §§ 1, 3, p. 651; C.L., §§ 4650 to 4658, 4660; C.S., §§ 7060 to 7068, 7070; am. 1927, ch. 113, §§ 1 to 3, p. 156; am. 1929, ch. 190, § 1, p. 352; I.C.A.,§§ 10-301 to 10-309, 10-311; am. 1945, ch. 65, § 1, p. 83; am. 1951, ch. 107, § 1, p. 253, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 3, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 562 to 571; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4666 to 4675; C.S., §§ 7072 to 7081; I.C.A.,§§ 10-401 to 10-410, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 4, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 572 to 577; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4680 to 4685; C.S., §§ 7082 to 7087; I.C.A.,§§ 10-501 to 10-506, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 5, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

For present comparable law, see§ 8-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 578 to 582; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4686 to 4690; C.S., §§ 7088 to 7092; I.C.A.,§§ 10-601 to 10-605, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 6, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

For present comparable law, see§§ 8-301 et seq. and 8-501 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 585 to 589; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4701 to 4705; C.S., §§ 7095 to 7099; am. 1927, ch. 113, §§ 5, 6, p. 156; I.C.A.,§§ 10-701 to 10-706, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 7, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 590 to 599; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4711 to 4720; C.S., §§ 7100 to 7109; I.C.A.,§§ 10-801 to 10-810, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 8, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 583, 584; R.S. & R.C., §§ 4695, 4696; am. 1911, ch. 194, § 4, p. 652; C.L., §§ 4695, 4696; C.S., §§ 7093, 7094; I.C.A.,§§ 10-901, 10-902; am. 1945, ch. 19, § 1, p. 27, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 9, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 600 to 608; R.S., §§ 4725 to 4733; reen. R.C., §§ 4725 to 4733; C.L., §§ 4725 to 4733; C.S., §§ 7110 to 7118; I.C.A.,§§ 10-1001 to 10-1009; am. 1949, ch. 59, § 1, p. 103; am. 1957, ch. 107, § 1, p. 185, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 10, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, § 609; R.S., R.C., & C.L., § 4734; C.S., § 7119; I.C.A.,§ 10-1010 was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 223, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 610, 611; R.S., §§ 4730, 4735; R.C., §§ 4735, 4736; am. 1915, ch. 25, p. 78, § 1; reen. C.L., §§ 4735, 4736; C.S., §§ 7120, 7121; I.C.A.,§§ 10-1011, 10-1012; am. 1963, ch. 223, §§ 2, 3, p. 631, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 11, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 612 to 616; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4741 to 4745; C.S., §§ 7122 to 7126; I.C.A.,§§ 10-1101 to 10-1105, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 11, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

For present comparable law, see§ 11-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 617 to 621; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4750 to 4754; C.S., §§ 7127 to 7131; I.C.A.,§§ 10-1201 to 10-1205, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 12, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

For present comparable law, see§ 7-601 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 622 to 629; R.S., §§ 4759 to 4766; am. 1899, p. 401, §§ 1, 2; reen. R.C. & C.L., §§ 4759 to 4767; C.S., §§ 7132 to 7140; I.C.A.,§§ 10-1301 to 10-1309, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 13, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised C.C.P. 1881, §§ 630 to 635, 637; R.S., R.C., & C.L., §§ 4771 to 4778; C.S., §§ 7141 to 7148; am. 1927, ch. 82, § 1, p. 100; I.C.A.,§§ 10-1401 to 10-1408; am. 1935, ch. 148, §§ 1, 2, p. 366, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 113, § 14, effective 12:01 a.m., January 11, 1971.

Cross References.

Adoption of hard-to-place children,§ 56-801 et seq.

Adoption of persons born in foreign countries, new birth certificate,§ 39-259.

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 138, added subsection (3).

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 97, substituted “25 U.S.C. 1901” for “25 U.S.C. section 1902” in subsection (3).

Effective Dates.

Section 6 of S.L. 1996, ch. 195 declared an emergency and provided that “Adoptions of adults accomplished prior to the effective date of this act shall not be subject to procedural challenge on the basis that the procedures used in the prior adoption do not meet the requirements of this act.” Approved March 12, 1996.

Adult Adoptions.

The legislature did not intend for parental consent statute to apply to adult adoptions. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment§ 16-1506).

Section 1-1622, which requires the court to adopt any suitable process or mode of process which appears most comfortable to the spirit of the code, is not applicable to permit the court to establish the procedure for adult adoption; this is an area which is entirely statutory and should be established by the legislature. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment§ 16-1506).

Since the only statutory reference to a procedure for adult adoptions is found in§ 16-1506, presumably the legislature only intended that adult adoptions be addressed and provided for under this section; however, it did not provide the procedure for such adoption. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment§ 16-1506).

While this section does permit adoptions of an adult by another adult, there is no procedure set forth by which to effectuate an adult adoption; therefore, stepfather could not adopt 18-year-old stepdaughter. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment§ 16-1506).

Construction.

Surrender of legal guardianship must be in accordance with law and the procedure prescribed therefor. Ex parte Martin, 29 Idaho 716, 161 P. 573 (1916).

Contracts of Adoption.

Contracts for adoption of children are no longer opposed to public policy of state, although those formerly made when common law was in force are invalid. Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641 (1923). Oral contract of adoption whereby adopting party agrees to make adopted child his heir will not be specifically enforced, unless it is definite and certain and is proved by his clear and convincing evidence. Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641 (1923).

Due Process.

In adoption proceeding where natural father was served with notice of the adoption and the magistrate then allowed the natural father to testify and took into consideration his testimony, natural father did not suffer any deprivation of his right to due process. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994).

Magistrate court erred in dismissing an adoption petition filed by the long-time partner of the children’s biological mother because (1) the magistrate violated the partner’s due process rights, when it dismissed her adoption petition without affording her the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner; (2) by not holding a hearing, the magistrate court acted contrary to Idaho’s adoption statutes; and (3) the adoption statutes unambiguously allow a second, prospective parent to adopt, regardless of marital status, and the statutory scheme contained no provisions that limited adoption to those who are married. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 326 P.3d 347 (2014).

Grounds for Adoption.

Adoption of child on the sole ground that its parents are unknown is not authorized. Vaughan v. Hubbard, 38 Idaho 451, 221 P. 1107 (1923).

Persons Not Minors.

By using the term “persons not minors” in this section, the legislature clearly made a distinction between a minor child and an adult child; thus, when the adoption statutes refer to “children” or “child” they are referring to a person who is not eighteen years old; therefore, there is no indication the legislature intended the parental consent statute to apply to an adult adoption. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment§ 16-1506).

Surrogate Parents.

Unless and until the legislature chooses to enact legislation specifically addressing surrogacy, intended parents must proceed within the legal avenues available to them to establish legal parenthood, a parental-rights termination proceeding under Title 16, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, and an adoption proceeding under Title 16, Chapter 15, Idaho Code. Doe v. Doe (In re Declaration of Parentage & Termination of Parental Rights), 160 Idaho 360, 372 P.3d 1106 (2016).

ALR.

Adoption of child by same-sex partners. 61 A.L.R.6th 1.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1961, ch. 14 declared an emergency. Approved February 2, 1961.

Section 3 of S.L. 1991, ch. 39 declared an emergency. Approved March 12, 1991.

Adult Adoptions.

The legislature did not intend for parental consent statute to apply to adult adoptions. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment of§ 16-1506).

By using the term “persons not minors” in§ 16-1501, the legislature clearly made a distinction between a minor child and an adult child; thus, when the adoption statutes refer to “children” or “child” they are referring to a person who is not eighteen years old; therefore, there is no indication the legislature intended the parental consent statute to apply to an adult adoption. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994).

Construction.

Fact that this section requires consent of both husband and wife to adoption of child by either of them negatives idea that common-law disability of married woman in this respect has been removed. Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 P. 641 (1923).

Termination of Parental Rights.

Father’s claim that a mother’s consent to the father’s child’s adoption by the child’s stepfather did not comply with§ 16-2005, preventing a court from determining whether termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest, failed because (1) the claim was first raised on appeal, and (2) the validity of the mother’s consent was irrelevant to whether termination was in the child’s best interest. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 194, 395 P.3d 814 (2017).

Cross References.

State registrar of vital statistics,§ 39-243.

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 138, substituted “all requirements” for “the requirements” in the introductory paragraph of subsection (2); inserted “any one (1) or more of” in paragraph (2)(a)(ii); inserted “all of” near the end of paragraph (2)(a)(iii); substituted “subsection and prior to the date of the filing of any proceeding to terminate the parental rights of the birth mother. The father shall have strictly complied with all of the requirements of this subsection by” for “subsection prior to the placement for adoption of the child in the home of prospective parents or prior to the date of commencement of any proceeding to terminate the parental rights of the birth mother, whichever event occurs first. The father shall” in the introductory paragraph of paragraph (2)(b); in paragraph (2)(b)(i), substituted “Filing proceedings” for “Commence proceedings”; in paragraph (2)(b)(ii), substituted “a notice of the proceedings” for “a notice of his commencement of proceedings”; in subsection (4), in the first sentence, added “In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born out of wedlock” at the beginning and substituted “filed notice of the proceedings” for “filed notice of his commencement of proceedings” near the end; rewrote subsection (5), which formerly read: “An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply with each of the conditions provided in this section, is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required”; and rewrote subsection (9), which formerly read: “Notwithstanding section 7-1107, Idaho Code, a proceeding to establish paternity filed pursuant to this section may be filed prior to the birth of the child.”

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 140, inserted “the filing of any proceeding to adopt the child; or the execution of a consent to terminate the birth mother’s parental rights under the provisions of section 16-2005(4), Idaho Code, whichever occurs first” at the end of the first sentence in the introductory language of paragraph (2)(b), in the introductory language of paragraph (5)(a), and in subsection (9).

Compiler’s Notes.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 330, in subsection (1), inserted “of a child” in the introductory paragraph, deleted “unless the adoptee is eighteen (18) years of age or older” at the end of paragraph (b), substituted “subsection (3)(a) or (b)” for “subsection (2)(a) or (b)” near the middle of paragraph (e); deleted former paragraph (g), which read: “The guardian or conservator of an incapacitated adult, if one has been appointed,” and redesignated former paragraphs (h) to (j) as present paragraphs (g) to (i); added subsection (2) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; and substituted “subsection (1) or (3) of this section” for “subsection (1) or (2) of this section” near the beginning of present subsection (4); Compiler’s Notes.

The vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare, referred to throughout this section, is the bureau of vital records and health statistics. See http://www.healthand welfare.idaho.gov/Health/VitalRecordsand HealthStatistics/tabid/102/Ddefault.aspx .

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1970, ch. 101 declared an emergency. Approved March 5, 1970.

Abandonment.

Abandonment means to desert or forsake. Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943).

The mere failure of the parents of a minor child, in the custody and under the care of a third party, to contribute, while it is in such custody and care, to the support and maintenance of such child for a period of one year does not itself constitute an abandonment of the minor within the purview of this section. Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947).

A divorced father who, because of lack of earning power due to a physical handicap, was not required by the divorce decree to contribute to the support of his children, was given visitation rights by the decree, visited the children at infrequent and irregular intervals, and occasionally gave them presents had not abandoned his children within the meaning of this section, and such children could not be adopted by their mother’s subsequent husband without such father’s consent. Clayton v. Jones, 91 Idaho 87, 416 P.2d 34 (1966).

Adult Adoptions.

The legislature did not intend for parental consent statute to apply to adult adoptions. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment of§ 16-1506). By using the term “persons not minors” in§ 16-1501, the legislature clearly made a distinction between a minor child and an adult child; thus, when the adoption statutes refer to “children” or “child” they are referring to a person who is not eighteen years old; therefore, there is no indication the legislature intended the parental consent statute to apply to an adult adoption. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment of§ 16-1506).

Application.

This section providing that notice to a parent in an adoption proceeding is not necessary where the parent has either abandoned or ceased to provide for the support of a minor child is not applicable when the court was without jurisdiction over the parties. Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947).

Because a grandmother, and legal guardian, did not consent in writing to her former girlfriend’s adoption of her granddaughters, the magistrate court properly dismissed the petition for co-adoption. A petition for co-adoption, filed by the parties, was not sufficient written consent for an adoption. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 636, 402 P.3d 1089 (2017).

Consent of Agency.

Summary judgment was properly awarded to the Idaho department of health and welfare on grandparents’ petition to adopt a child because the grandparents could not adopt the child without written consent from the department regardless of what facts they presented; the department had stated that it would not consent to the adoption. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 491, 248 P.3d 742 (2011).

Consent of Parents.

Although the natural mother not only consented to the payment of her legal fees by the adopting parents, but undoubtedly insisted upon it, there was no evidence in the record that the attorney allowed the adopting parents to regulate his professional judgment in rendering services to the natural mother; therefore, the natural mother’s consent to adoption was executed without fraud, duress, or undue influence. DeBernardi v. Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986).

Construction.

Adoption statutes open to construction and interpretation should be strictly construed and every intendment taken in favor of the natural parent not consenting to adoption. Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947).

Final and Irrevocable.

In the absence of fraud, duress, or undue influence, consents to adoption become final and irrevocable upon execution of the consent to adoption by the natural parents and delivery and surrender of the child to the adoptive parents; the estoppel approach to an attempted revocation of a consent to adoption is overruled. DeBernardi v. Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986).

Loss of Right of Consent.

Loss of right of consent of natural father to adoption of child by virtue of his failure to keep up support orders pursuant to divorce decree is a matter for determination by probate court. Wilson v. Wilson, 73 Idaho 326, 252 P.2d 197 (1953). Court determined that biological father had no cognizable parental rights, and, thus, his consent to adoption was not required; where he had not had his paternity established by court decree, he had never filed an acknowledgement of paternity with vital statistics, he had not filed an acknowledgement of paternity, commenced paternity proceedings, or provided any monetary support toward the mother’s pregnancy, he was clearly aware of the strong possibility that he was the child’s father, particularly when the child was born nine months after he had engaged in sexual relations with the mother, and he had done nothing to affirmatively establish a relationship with the child. Doe v. Roe (In re Doe), 142 Idaho 202, 127 P.3d 105 (2005).

Nonconsent of Parents.

In order to make order of adoption valid without consent of parents, it must appear in record that case comes within some of exceptions mentioned in this statute. Parent is not judicially deprived of his child’s custody except by a final, absolute and unconditional judgment. Jain v. Priest, 30 Idaho 273, 164 P. 364 (1917).

Adoption without personal appearance of qualified parent cannot be sustained unless record of adoption proceeding affirmatively shows that such parent was not a resident of, and was not within, county of residence of adopting person. Vaughan v. Hubbard, 38 Idaho 451, 221 P. 1107 (1923).

Where the divorce complaint charged both cruelty and desertion, evidence of both was presented at the trial, and the divorce decree merely decreed “that the plaintiff have judgment and decree of this court in accordance with the complaint filed herein,” there was no adjudication of cruelty so as to render consent of the defendant for adoption of her children unnecessary under this section. Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541 (1965).

Where the divorce complaint did not charge adultery beyond such inferences as might be drawn from the allegation of cruelty in that “defendant has engaged in numerous affairs with other men” and no evidence of adultery was offered, the defendant will not be considered to have been divorced for adultery so as to render her consent to the adoption of her children unnecessary under this section. Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541 (1965).

Lack of consent by the natural parents renders an adoption decree void. In re Andersen, 99 Idaho 805, 589 P.2d 957 (1978), overruled on other grounds, DeBernardi v. Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986).

Notice to Parents.

As to whether parents of child must in all cases be notified of adoption proceedings, quaere. Jain v. Priest, 30 Idaho 273, 164 P. 364 (1917).

On conflicting evidence, the trial court’s finding that the father had abandoned his minor children so that his consent to adoption of them was unnecessary to the validity thereof, and that he was not entitled to a notice of adoption proceeding, was sustained. Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943).

This section does not dispense with notice to parents of a pending adoption proceeding, even when consent of such parents is unnecessary under this section. Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541 (1965).

By requiring that consent to adoption must be given by an “unmarried biological father who has filed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity with the vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare pursuant to§ 7-1106;” clearly, when a father files an affidavit acknowledging paternity with the knowledge and consent of the mother, he is entitled to notice of hearings and his consent must be obtained before terminating the parent child relationship. Roe Family Servs. v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 139 Idaho 930, 88 P.3d 749 (2004). Subsection (2)(b) did not relieve a grandmother seeking to adopt a grandchild of the duty to provide the child’s father with notice of the possible termination of the father’s parental rights, because nothing showed (1) the child had been placed for adoption, or (2) proceedings had been initiated to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 315 P.3d 848 (2013).

Grandmother’s petition to adopt a grandchild was insufficient notice to the child’s father of the possible termination of the father’s parental rights, because the petition did not state any grounds for seeking such termination. Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 315 P.3d 848 (2013).

Substantial Relationship.

Biological father was not a “parent” under§ 16-2002 and had no parental rights to the child; substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s findings that the father failed to meet the requirements of subdivision (2)(a) of this section, as he had not developed a substantial relationship with the child and never took any of the steps available to establish himself as the child’s parent. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, v. In re Doe, 150 Idaho 88, 244 P.3d 232 (2010) (see 2013 amendment).

Variance.

Where there was no allegation of abandonment of a minor child by its father contained in the petition, although abandonment was recited in the order, the order was not sustained by the petition. Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947).

ALR.

Sufficiency of parent’s consent to adoption of child. 15 A.L.R.5th 1.

Natural parent’s indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption — factors other than employment status. 84 A.L.R.5th 191.

Requirements and effects of putative father registries. 28 A.L.R.6th 349.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1505, which comprised 1879, p. 8, § 5; R.S., § 2549; reen. R.C. & C.L., § 2704; C.S., § 4686; I.C.A.,§ 31-1105, was repealed by S.L. 2000, ch. 171, § 3, effective July 1, 2000.

Amendments.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 124, substituted “twenty-one (21) days” for “twenty (20) days” twice in subsection (4), in paragraphs (5)(a) and (5)(b) and twice in paragraph (6)(a).

Compiler’s Notes.

The vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare, referred to paragraph (6)(c), is the bureau of vital records and health statistics. See http://www.healthand welfare.idaho.gov/Health/VitalRecordsand HealthStatistics/tabid/102/Default.aspx .

In General.

In circumstances where the father and the mother both acknowledge who the biological father is and the father is willing to accept the rights and responsibilities of paternity, the provisions of§§ 16-2007 and 16-1505 apply; if, on the other hand, the mother does not join in the acknowledgment of paternity, then the father is required to follow the mandates of§ 16-1513 and file proceedings for paternity and a notice with the bureau of vital records and health statistics. Roe Family Servs. v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 139 Idaho 930, 88 P.3d 749 (2004).

Sufficiency of Notice.

Grandmother’s petition to adopt a grandchild was insufficient notice to the child’s father of the possible termination of the father’s parental rights, because the petition did not state any grounds for seeking such termination. Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 315 P.3d 848 (2013).

Cross References.

Child protective act,§ 16-1601 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 347, added subsection (2) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 58, substituted “chapter 30, title 30, Idaho Code” for “chapter 3, title 30, Idaho Code” near the middle of the thirteenth sentence in subsection (4).

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 1969, ch. 188 declared an emergency. Approved March 18, 1969.

Section 2 of S.L. 1970, ch. 14 declared an emergency. Approved February 10, 1970.

Section 34 of S.L. 1980, ch. 197 read: “(1) Section 1 and sections 3 through 33 of this act [including amendment of this section] shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1980. “(2) Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1981.”

Adult Adoptions.

The legislature did not intend for parental consent statute to apply to adult adoptions. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment of this section).

By using the term “persons not minors” in§ 16-1501, the legislature clearly made a distinction between a minor child and an adult child; thus, when the adoption statutes refer to “children” or “child” they are referring to a person who is not eighteen years old; therefore, there is no indication the legislature intended the parental consent statute to apply to an adult adoption. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment of this section).

Section 1-1622, which requires the court to adopt any suitable process or mode of process which appears most comfortable to the spirit of the code, is not applicable to permit the court to establish the procedure for adult adoption; this is an area which is entirely statutory and should be established by the legislature. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment of this section).

The legislature only intended that adult adoptions be addressed and provided for under§ 16-1501; however, it did not provide the procedure for such adoption. Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994) (see 1996 amendment of this section).

Pursiant to subsection (6), a biological mother’s consent is required for the adoption of a cognitively impaired adult son by his step-mother; and, to be given a chance to consent, the biological mother is entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding. Doe v. Doe, 164 Idaho 482, 432 P.3d 31 (2018).

Consent.

The rule is that an attempted adoption of a minor child by its mother and her second husband without the consent of the natural father from whom the mother was granted a divorce for cruelty and by decree awarded the custody of the minor child with reservations of certain rights to the father is void; therefore, such a judgment may be attacked by the father either directly or collaterally. Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947).

Loss of right of consent of natural father to adoption of child by virtue of his failure to keep up support orders pursuant to divorce decree is a matter for determination by probate court. Wilson v. Wilson, 73 Idaho 326, 252 P.2d 197 (1953).

Although the natural mother not only consented to the payment of her legal fees by the adopting parents, but undoubtedly insisted upon it, there was no evidence in the record that the attorney allowed the adopting parents to regulate his professional judgment in rendering services to the natural mother; therefore, the natural mother’s consent to adoption was executed without fraud, duress, or undue influence. DeBernardi v. Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986). Summary judgment was properly awarded to the Idaho department of health and welfare on grandparents’ petition to adopt a child because the grandparents could not adopt the child without written consent from the department regardless of what facts they presented; the department had stated that it would not consent to the adoption. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 491, 248 P.3d 742 (2011).

Given that, once a parent or guardian gives consent for a specified individual to adopt a child, that consent cannot be revoked and becomes permanent, strict compliance with the requirements of§ 16-2005(4) and subsection (2) of this section is required. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 636, 402 P.3d 1089 (2017).

— Final and Irrevocable.

In the absence of fraud, duress, or undue influence, consents to adoption become final and irrevocable upon execution of the consent to adoption by the natural parents, and delivery and surrender of the child to the adoptive parents; the estoppel approach to an attempted revocation of a consent to adoption is overruled. DeBernardi v. Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986).

— Lack of.

Lack of consent by the natural parents renders an adoption decree void. In re Andersen, 99 Idaho 805, 589 P.2d 957 (1978), overruled on other grounds, DeBernardi v. Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986).

Because a grandmother, and legal guardian, did not consent in writing to her former girlfriend’s adoption of her granddaughters, the magistrate court properly dismissed the petition for co-adoption. A petition for co-adoption, filed by the parties, was not sufficient written consent for an adoption. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 636, 402 P.3d 1089 (2017).

— Waiver.

The informal consent procedure provided for by this section fails to make any allowance for requiring a showing that the waiver effected thereby is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In re Andersen, 99 Idaho 805, 589 P.2d 957 (1978), overruled on other grounds, DeBernardi v. Steve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986).

Unmarried Partner.

Magistrate court erred in dismissing an adoption petition filed by the long-time partner of the children’s biological mother because (1) the magistrate violated the partner’s due process rights, when it dismissed her adoption petition without affording her the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner; (2) by not holding a hearing, the magistrate court acted contrary to Idaho’s adoption statutes; and (3) the adoption statutes unambiguously allow a second, prospective parent to adopt, regardless of marital status, and the statutory scheme contained no provisions that limited adoption to those who are married. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 326 P.3d 347 (2014).

Contents.

An order of adoption is not rendered void by a recital therein that the consent of named persons designated as parents of the children was the only consent necessary to their adoption, where the named persons, though not parents of the children, were foster parents of the deceased mother of the children and foster parents of the children themselves who had been abandoned to them by the children’s father, and who were the next of kin, in the county, upon whom the children were dependent for food and care. Finn v. Rees, 65 Idaho 181, 141 P.2d 976 (1943).

Direct or Collateral Attack.

Order of adoption may be attacked either directly or collaterally where record of proceedings shows lack of statutory power to make such order. Vaughan v. Hubbard, 38 Idaho 451, 221 P. 1107 (1923).

Practice and Procedure.

While the magistrate judge had the authority to deny the adoption of the children by family that had been selected by the department of health & welfare, if it was satisfied the interests of the children would not be promoted by the adoption, it did not have the authority to choose the foster parents as the adoptive parents over the department’s selection. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Hays, 137 Idaho 233, 46 P.3d 529 (2002).

ALR.

Race as factor in adoption proceedings. 34 A.L.R.4th 167.

Postadoption visitation by natural parent. 78 A.L.R.4th 218.

Amendments.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 82, substituted “section 15-2-103, Idaho Code” for “section 14-103, Idaho Code” near the end of the section.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1963, ch. 63 declared an emergency. Approved March 6, 1963.

Decisions Under Prior Law

Workmen’s Compensation.

Minor children are entitled to payment of workmen’s [now workers’] compensation benefits growing out of the death of their father in covered employment, even if the children had been legally adopted by a married couple. In re Jones, 84 Idaho 327, 372 P.2d 406 (1962).

ALR.

Adopted child as within class named in deed or inter vivos trust instrument. 37 A.L.R.5th 237.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised 1879, p. 8, § 10; R.S., § 2554; reen. R.C. & C.L., § 2709; C.S., § 4691; I.C.A.,§ 31-1110; am. 1965, ch. 41, § 1, p. 64, was repealed by S.L. 2000, ch. 171, § 6, effective July 1, 2000.

Effective Dates.

Section 6 of S.L. 1996, ch. 195 declared an emergency and provided that “Adoptions of adults accomplished prior to the effective date of this act shall not be subject to procedural challenge on the basis that the procedures used in the prior adoption do not meet the requirements of this act.” Approved March 12, 1996.

ALR.

§ 16-1512. Appeal from order — Binding effect of adoption order.

1. Any appeal from an order granting or refusing to grant an order of adoption shall be taken to the supreme court.
2. After the order of adoption by the court becomes final, no party to an adoption proceeding, nor anyone claiming under such party, may later question the validity of the adoption proceedings by reason of any defect or irregularity therein, jurisdiction or otherwise, but shall be fully bound by the order, except for such appeal as may be allowed in subsection (1) of this section. In no event, for any reason, other than fraud on the part of the party adopting a child, shall an adoption be overturned by any court or collaterally attacked by any person or entity after six (6) months from the date the order of adoption becomes final. This provision is intended as a statute of repose.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 16-1512, as added by 1957, ch. 189, § 2, p. 376; am. 1971, ch. 170, § 1, p. 805; am. 2000, ch. 173, § 1, p. 441; am. 2010, ch. 26, § 1, p. 46.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 26, in the section heading, deleted “to district court” following “Appeal from order”; and rewrote subsection (1), which formerly read: “An appeal may be taken to the district court of the county from an order of the magistrates division of the district court granting or refusing to grant an order of adoption or from any other intermediate order in adoption proceedings”.

Applicability.

This section, regarding the binding effect of an adoption order, only applies to an adoption that has become final. It has no application to an interlocutory order. Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 315 P.3d 848 (2013).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Penalty for misdemeanor when not otherwise provided,§ 18-113.

State registrar of vital statistics,§ 39-243.

Vital statistics unit,§ 39-242.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 2005 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2005 amendments by both ch. 25, § 75 and ch. 391, § 4 corrected citations throughout the section.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 138, rewrote the section, substituting references to the filing of paternity proceedings for references to the commencement of paternity proceedings in the section heading and throughout the section and adding subsections (6) and (11) through (15).

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 140, inserted “the filing of any proceeding to adopt the child; or the execution of a consent to terminate the birth mother’s parental rights under the provisions of section 16-2005(4), Idaho Code, whichever occurs first” in the first sentence in subsection (4).

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 141, substituted “chapter 1, title 74” for “chapter 3, title 9” in subsections (2) and (8).

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 330, substituted “section 16-1504(6), Idaho Code” for “section 16-1504(5), Idaho Code” near the beginning of subsection (4).

Compiler’s Notes.

The vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare, referred to throughout this section, is the bureau of vital records and health statistics. See http://www.healthand welfare.idaho.gov/Health/VitalRecordsand HealthStatistics/tabid/102/Default.aspx .

For putative father registration form, see http://healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Portals/0/Health/Vital%20Records/CommencePat.pdf .

The abbreviation enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 111 of S.L. 1990, ch. 213 as amended by § 16 of S.L. 1991, ch. 329 provided that §§ 3 through 45 and 48 through 110 of the act [including amendment of this section] should take effect July 1, 1993 and that §§ 1, 2, 46 and 47 should take effect July 1, 1990.

Section 6 of S.L. 1992, ch. 341 read: “The amendments to Section 16-1513, Idaho Code, made by this act shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1992, and shall be in addition to and shall not negate the amendments to Section 16-1513, Idaho Code, made by Section 9, ch. 213, Laws of 1990, which shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1993.”

Application.

Section 7-1101 et seq. and this section are mutually exclusive and the provisions of this section do not apply to paternity actions brought pursuant to§ 7-1101 et seq. Burch v. Hearn, 116 Idaho 956, 782 P.2d 1238 (1989).

It was error to terminate a biological father’s parental rights based on his failure to file and register his notice of commencement of paternity proceedings under§ 16-1513, because the father and mother had filled out and had notarized a paternity affidavit requesting that he be listed as the father on the child’s birth certificate; it was, therefore, unnecessary for him to file a paternity action; he was the biological father of the child and, pursuant to§ 16-2007, he was entitled to have had notice of the termination hearing. Roe Family Servs. v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 139 Idaho 930, 88 P.3d 749 (2004).

In circumstances where the father and the mother both acknowledge who the biological father is and the father is willing to accept the rights and responsibilities of paternity, the provisions of§§ 16-2007 and 16-1505 apply; if, on the other hand, the mother does not join in the acknowledgment of paternity, then the father is required to follow the mandates of§ 16-1513 and file proceedings for paternity and a notice with the bureau of vital records and health statistics. Roe Family Servs. v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 139 Idaho 930, 88 P.3d 749 (2004).

Where putative father never commenced paternity proceedings before the department of health and welfare petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights, the magistrate judge correctly held that father was not even entitled to notice of a hearing on a petition by the department requesting an Order of Non-Establishment of Parental Rights. The magistrate’s decision is reversible only if father can show that his due process rights were violated. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 36, 304 P.3d 1202 (2013) (see 2014 amendment).

Intent.

Cited

Subsection (3) of this section was never intended to prevent a father from voluntarily coming forward and, in the absence of an adoption or termination proceeding, filing an action under§ 7-1101 et seq. to establish his rights and obligations with regard to the child, without first having filed and registered the notice of claim to paternity required by subsection (3) of this section. Burch v. Hearn, 116 Idaho 956, 782 P.2d 1238 (1989). Cited Johnson v. Studley-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 812 P.2d 1216 (1991).

ALR.

§ 16-1514. Petition for adoption of foreign born child.

1. Proceedings to adopt a foreign born child who has been allowed to enter the United States for the purpose of adoption shall be commenced by the filing of a petition under this section. A petition under this section shall be initiated by the person or persons proposing to adopt the child and shall be filed with the district court of the judicial district in which said person or persons reside. The petitioner shall have resided and maintained a dwelling within the state of Idaho for at least six (6) consecutive months prior to the filing of a petition. The petition shall set forth the following:
   1. The name and address of the petitioner or petitioners;
   2. The name of the child proposed to be adopted and the name by which he or she shall be known when adopted;
   3. The degree of relationship of the child, if any, to the petitioner or petitioners;
   4. The child’s country of origin, and date of birth, if known;
   5. That the child has been issued a visa or other document authorizing entry into the United States as an immigrant or for the purpose of adoption or for humanitarian reasons relating to adoption in the United States and the date of the person’s entry into the United States;
   6. That a home study of the petitioner or petitioners was prepared and the name of the person or agency performing the home study. A copy of the home study shall be attached to the petition;
   7. That, to the information and belief of the petitioners, the biological parents of the child to be adopted are residents of another country;
   8. That the adoption of such child is in the child’s best interests.
2. At the time fixed for the hearing on a petition for adoption under this section, the person or persons adopting the child and the child to be adopted must appear before the court where the petition was filed. The judge shall examine the petitioner or petitioners at the hearing and, if satisfied that the proposed adoption is in the best interests of the child to be adopted, shall enter a decree of adoption. The petitioner or petitioners shall at such time execute an agreement to the effect that the child shall be adopted and treated in all respects as the petitioner’s own lawful child.
3. This section governs the adoption of all foreign born children who have entered the United States to be adopted. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no consent shall be required from the biological parents of the child to be adopted if the child has been granted permission by the United States department of state or United States department of homeland security to enter the United States for the purpose of adoption or for humanitarian reasons relating to adoption by United States citizens. A visa or other document from the United States department of state or United States department of homeland security authorizing entry into the United States for the purpose of adoption, or for humanitarian reasons relating to adoption by United States citizens, shall be deemed conclusive evidence of the termination of the parental rights of the biological parents and compliance with the laws of the country of the child’s birth. The provisions of chapter 20, title 16, Idaho Code, shall not apply to adoptions under this section. (4) The decisions and orders of foreign courts and government agencies, authorized to approve adoptions, shall be accorded judicial comity or the same full faith and credit accorded a judgment of a sister state without additional proceedings or documentation, provided the United States department of state or United States department of homeland security has allowed the child to enter the United States as set forth in subsection (3) of this section.

History.

I.C.,§ 16-1514, as added by 1996, ch. 188, § 2, p. 595; am. 1998, ch. 313, § 1, p. 1034; am. 2006, ch. 77, § 1, p. 234.

Amendments.

The 2006 amendment, by ch. 77, rewrote the section heading, which read: “International adoption”; deleted the former second sentence of the introductory paragraph of subsection (1), which read: “Similarly, United States citizen parents who have adopted a child in a foreign country may commence proceedings to have the foreign adoption recognized and granted judicial comity by the filing of a petition under this section”; substituted “homeland security” for “justice, immigration and naturalization service” twice in subsection (3) and once in subsection (4); in subsection (3), deleted “or who have entered the United States as immigrants after having been adopted in a foreign country by United States citizens” from the end of the first sentence, “or as an immigrant after having been adopted in a foreign country by United States citizens” at the end of the second sentence, and deleted “or as an immigrant due to adoption in a foreign county by United States citizens” in the third sentence following “United States citizens.”

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 1996, ch. 188 declared an emergency. Approved March 12, 1996.

Section 2 of S.L. 1998, ch. 313 declared an emergency. Approved March 24, 1998.

Cross References.

Injury to children as a crime,§ 18-1501.

Prior Laws.

Former§§ 16-1601 to 16-1623, which comprised S.L. 1919, ch. 161,§§ 1-23, p. 529; C.S.,§§ 7902-7924; I.C.A.,§§ 31-1201 to 31-1223; 1959, ch. 100, § 1, p. 214, were repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 321. Former§§ 16-1624 to 16-1643, which comprised S.L. 1963, ch. 321,§§ 2-17, 20, 21, p. 909; 1969, ch. 31, § 1, p. 55; 1972, ch. 196, § 2, p. 483; 1973, ch. 210, §§ 2, 3, 5, p. 462; 1974, ch. 92, § 1, p. 1191, were repealed S.L. 1976, ch. 204, § 1.

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 287, added subsection (5).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act”, referred to in paragraph (4), was added by S.L. 1996, ch. 272, which is codified as§§ 16-1601 to 16-1603, 16-1609, 16-1610 to 16-1612, 16-1615, 16-1616, 16-1621, 16-1622, 16-1626, 16-1627, 16-1629, 16-1631, 16-1633, 16-1634, and 18-2604. The term should probably read “this chapter”, being chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code.

Duty of Department.

Department of health and welfare and a social worker had a duty to competently investigate the report of suspected child abuse, based on the special relationship between the department and abused children. Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006).

School Liability.

School personnel incur no liability for allowing use of school facilities for purposes of child abuse investigation so long as the reporting was done in good faith and without malice.OAG 93-2.

The department of health and welfare has the authority to investigate reports of suspected child abuse, abandonment and neglect; such authority to investigate extends to school facilities; such investigation should proceed in accordance with governing statutes, the department’s promulgated rules, and internal policies.OAG 93-2.

Parental Notification.

The responsibility of notifying parents of child protective investigations is that of the department of health and welfare and is not required until such time as the department deems it necessary to ensure that the best interests and needs of the child are met.OAG 93-2.

Medical Treatment.

The standard for state intervention for the medical treatment of children is that intervention is authorized when children are threatened by, or are in, actual harm. The rules of the department of health and welfare regarding the handling of child abuse, neglect and abandonment are neutral toward religious beliefs; the investigation of child abuse and neglect will proceed and determination of neglect will be made based upon the threat of harm to the child, not upon the religious beliefs of the parents. OAG 93-9. RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sexual abuse of child by parent as ground for termination of parent’s right to child. 58 A.L.R.3d 1074.

Parent’s involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as evincing neglect, unfitness, or the like in dependency or divestiture proceeding. 79 A.L.R.3d 417.

Abused.

Magistrate erred in finding that, in not specifically using the word “abuse,” the state did not allege abuse as a ground for termination under§ 16-2005(1)(b), when the language used by the state in describing the second ground for termination was almost identical to the definition of abused under subdivision (1)(a) of this section. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Wealth v. Doe (In re Doe), 149 Idaho 653, 239 P.3d 451 (Ct. App. 2010).

Although the parents provided an explanation for the older child’s injuries, the magistrate was free to determine that the parents’ explanation did not justifiably explain the child’s injuries in light of the testimony regarding her injuries and the photographic evidence depicting them. Thus, there was sufficient evidence presented allowing the magistrate to find that the child was abused and within the court’s jurisdiction. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 244 P.3d 247 (Ct. App. 2010).

Aggravated Circumstances.

Mother’s acknowledgment that the state presented evidence of aggravated circumstances, which she disputed, reflected the existence of substantial, competent evidence to support the finding of aggravated circumstances Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 156 Idaho 103, 320 P.3d 1262 (2014).

Application.

Where charges of lewd conduct with a minor were dismissed upon conditions set out in an agreement between defendant and victim’s mother and one of the conditions provided that, if defendant sexually abused victim again, the state could take legal action “under the Child Protective Act and/or appropriate criminal statutes,” the court properly applied the definition of sexual abuse found in this section, rather than the definition contained in§ 18-1506, to the agreement. State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782, 918 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1996).

Chronic Abuse.

Evidence clearly supported a magistrate’s finding that a father had subjected his youngest child to chronic abuse, where it showed that the child had been deprived of food for a sufficiently long period of time that his height and weight were well below the third percentile, he had muscle wasting and was very weak, he lacked subcutaneous tissue, and his abdomen was protruding, and a pediatrician had testified that it would have taken about five months for a healthy child to reach that condition. Doe v. State, 144 Idaho 420, 163 P.3d 209 (2007).

Custodian.

Summary judgment was properly awarded to the Idaho department of health and welfare on grandparents’ petition to adopt a child because the grandparents could not adopt the child without written consent from the department regardless of what facts they presented; the department, as the child’s custodian, had stated that it would not consent to the adoption. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 491, 248 P.3d 742 (2011).

Neglected.

Where children were without proper parental care even when they would spend time with their parents, as the parents were unable to appropriately discharge their responsibilities as parents, evidenced by the lack of supervision over the children, the health, safety and well-being of the children were at risk, meeting the definition of “neglected” in this section. In re Termination of Doe v. Doe (In re Termination of Doe), 147 Idaho 353, 209 P.3d 650 (2009).

Under§§ 16-2002 and 16-1629 and this section, termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children, based on the parents’ history, and ongoing use, of controlled substances, which resulted in neglect of the children who were in foster care for seventeen out of twenty-two months. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 149 Idaho 474, 235 P.3d 1195 (2010).

Mother’s failure to stop using methamphetamine, her continued association with known drug users, her continuing lack of employment, and her failure to comply with her case plan were sufficient evidence supporting the finding that she had neglected the child, as defined this section. In re Doe 2009-19, 150 Idaho 201, 245 P.3d 953 (2010).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights, because there was substantial evidence that he neglected his children. After his release from prison, he failed to establish suitable living arrangements, failed to obtain adequate employment, and was convicted of driving without privileges. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 498, 260 P.3d 1169 (2011).

In terminating a father’s parental rights, evidence of his failure to comply with his case plan was properly considered as a basis for neglect. Ida. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 356, 256 P.3d 764 (2011).

Because subdivisions (25) [now (31)] (a) and (b) of this section are written in the disjunctive, there is no requirement that a magistrate court consider the statutory timeframe in§ 16-1629(9) when it is making a finding of neglect based on subdivision (25)(a) [now (31)(a)] of this section. Ida. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 356, 256 P.3d 764 (2011).

Termination of mother’s parental rights by a finding that she neglected her children was justified, where she neither completed the drug treatment programs mandated by her case plan, nor did she timely seek help with her anger management, also as required by the case plan. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 846, 264 P.3d 953 (2011).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights under paragraph (25)(a) [now (31)(a)], because he neglected his child by conduct or omission, which caused the child to be without proper parental care and control, subsistence, medical, or other care or control. The father had not expressed a genuine interest in learning about the child’s special needs, let alone how to care for those needs on a daily basis. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 644, 273 P.3d 685 (2012).

In a termination of parental rights case, the magistrate court found that appellant mother neglected her children, because they were without proper parental care and control, proper subsistence, and the medical and other care necessary for their well-being. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 910, 277 P.3d 357 (2012).

Mother failed to show that the trial court erred in finding neglect; in part, the mother failed to get her children to school and counseling sessions and did not provide financial support; and, it was hard to find any area of parental responsibility that the mother consistently met. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 156 Idaho 103, 320 P.3d 1262 (2014).

Willfulness is not necessary to a finding of neglect, as father’s incarceration, long history of addiction and failed treatment, and failure to maintain stable housing or employment were properly considered in determining that he had neglected his child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 158 Idaho 764, 351 P.3d 1222 (2015). There was substantial evidence to support the termination of a father’s parental rights based on neglect and abuse. He failed to provide for the well-being of his children, as he did not complete counseling services, did not actively participate in parenting classes, and did not intervene when his children were being abused by his spouse. Further, the father’s inability to discharge parental responsibilities had been ongoing for years. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 159 Idaho 664, 365 P.3d 420 (Ct. App. 2015).

District court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to her children, because clear and convincing evidence established that she abandoned the children by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship and neglected them by failing to provide meaningful support where she had some financial ability to do so, had a difficult time keeping a job and permanent residence, and did not provide any resources to help the children, cover expenses of any kind or cover the cost of keeping the children while they were in the care of their paternal great-grandparents. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 161 Idaho 532, 387 P.3d 785 (2016).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper on the basis of neglect because, despite the mother’s recent progress, she had longstanding history of drug abuse and relapses and neglectful conduct: one of the children was seriously injured in an automobile accident due to the mother driving while under the influence; she used drugs while pregnant or while the children were in her care; she had failed to provide stable and safe housing for her children; and she was not a consistent presence in the children’s lives, as she had been absent because of drug usage, because the care of the children was overwhelming to her, and because of incarceration. Idaho Dep’t of Health v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 162 Idaho 69, 394 P.3d 112 (Ct. App. 2017).

Magistrate court’s decision to terminate a father’s parental rights based on neglect was supported by substantial and competent evidence, because the father neglected his child, provided no excuse for failing to provide financial support, and provided no explanation for his failure to try to make efforts to visit with his child or to return to the court to enforce the order allowing him visitation. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 653, 402 P.3d 1106 (2017).

Magistrate court’s finding that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests based on neglect was supported by substantial, competent evidence, where the mother was unable to provide a stable and permanent home for child; there was ample evidence that the child improved under foster care, and the mother demonstrated a consistent inability to care for the child. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 274, 411 P.3d 1175 (2018).

Magistrate court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights, based on neglect and the child’s best interest, because there was no reason to make the child wait for a permanency hearing where nothing was going to change significantly, due to the mother’s lack of progress and failure to comply with the case plan, her chronic and untreated substance abuse, and her mental health concerns which impaired her ability to provide a stable, consistent home for the child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 164 Idaho 143, 426 P.3d 1243 (2018).

Substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s finding that the mother neglected her children, including evidence that the mother and eldest child both tested positive for methamphetamine, the mother had 15 months to obtain a stable house and employment, but obtained neither, and the mother had been in and out of jail during the 15 months she was given to work on her case plan. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 486, 432 P.3d 35 (2018). Magistrate court’s finding of neglect based solely on a mother’s non-completion of drug treatment was supported by substantial and competent evidence. The magistrate court could properly find that the mother lacked proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for her child’s well-being, because of the conduct or omission of the mother in failing to complete drug treatment. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 849, 436 P.3d 670 (2019).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights based on neglect was proper because, although the mother challenged the magistrate court’s finding of neglect based on her failure to complete her case plan, the mother did not challenge the additional bases upon which the magistrate court found the mother neglected the child; and the court found neglect on the additional bases of the mother’s continued methamphetamine use, periods of incarceration, and probation violations. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 437 P.3d 922 (2019).

Magistrate court did not err in determining that the mother neglected a child, where the finding was based upon the developmental delays shown in the child and his malnourishment that occurred between his first and second placements in foster care. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1162 (2019).

Substantial, competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s finding that a father neglected his children, as defined by this section, where the child was born prematurely due to being prenatally exposed to methamphetamine, the mother testified that she and the father had used methamphetamine for years, and the father had exhibited violence and had pending criminal charges for felony grand theft and several misdemeanors, including injury to a child, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia at the time of the hearing. State v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1140 (2019).

Substantial, competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s finding that the mother neglected her children, where she was not able to maintain stable housing or employment at any point leading up to the termination hearing, and at trial she testified that she was unemployed and relying on the father’s income for support. State v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1151 (2019).

Magistrate court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights, because she had a drug addition, had left on a trip to California, had been incarcerated, and was unable to provide a safe and stable home for the child based on her spotty employment and housing history. The child’s best interests and need for stability could not wait for the mother to finish her case plan or have the time that she needed to devote to the child. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2019-32) (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 457 P.3d 154 (2020).

Protective Supervision.

Magistrate court correctly took custody of two children under§ 16-1603, where the son was abused by the father and the daughter lived in the same home and witnessed the father’s actions. However, the court improperly retained legal custody of the children after returning physical custody to the mother; protective supervision provided an adequate safeguard where there was no evidence that the mother was unfit. Doe v. Doe, 151 Idaho 300, 256 P.3d 708 (2011).

Cited Roe v. State, 134 Idaho 760, 9 P.3d 1226 (2000); In re Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 149 Idaho 401, 234 P.3d 725 (2010); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 752, 250 P.3d 803 (Ct. App. 2011); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 953, 277 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2012); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 154 Idaho 175, 296 P.3d 381 (2013); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 236, 395 P.3d 1269 (2017); In re Termination of the Parental Rights of Doe, 162 Idaho 280, 396 P.3d 1162 (2017); State v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 450 P.3d 323 (Ct. App. 2019). Decisions Under Prior Law

Abandonment.

Evidence that a father, after a divorce in which custody of his children was awarded to his wife and after the wife’s remarriage and removal to the state of Connecticut, failed to make substantial contribution to their support, to visit them, or to make sufficient inquiry of their whereabouts was sufficient to support a finding that such father had abandoned his children. Clark v. Jelinek, 90 Idaho 592, 414 P.2d 892 (1966).

Definition of “abandoned” in former law supported trial court’s finding of abandonment where the father did not contact the children for 28 months, made no support payments although financially able and where the wife did not know his whereabouts for 16 months. In re Ewing, 96 Idaho 424, 529 P.2d 1296 (1974).

Medical Treatment.

Neither the express language of Idaho’s religious exemption nor traditional constitutional principles of religious freedom limit administrative or judicial authority to provide medical services to children.OAG 93-9.

The standard for state intervention for the medical treatment of children is that intervention is authorized when children are threatened by, or are in, actual harm. The rules of the department of health and welfare regarding the handling of child abuse, neglect and abandonment are neutral toward religious beliefs; the investigation of child abuse and neglect will proceed and determination of neglect will be made based upon the threat of harm to the child, not upon the religious beliefs of the parents.OAG 93-9.

History.

I.C.,§ 16-1603, as added by 1976, ch. 204, § 2, p. 732; am. 1982, ch. 186, § 3, p. 491; am. 1991, ch. 212, § 3, p. 500; am. 1996, ch. 272, § 3, p. 884; am. 1999, ch. 123, § 2, p. 360; am. 2001, ch. 107, § 3, p. 350; am. 2003, ch. 279, § 3, p. 748; am. 2005, ch. 391, § 6, p. 1263.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1603 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Protective Supervision.

Magistrate court correctly took custody of two children under§ 16-1603, where the son was abused by the father and the daughter lived in the same home and witnessed the father’s actions. However, the court improperly retained legal custody of the children after returning physical custody to the mother; protective supervision provided an adequate safeguard where there was no evidence that the mother was unfit. Doe v. Doe, 151 Idaho 300, 256 P.3d 708 (2011).

Cited Ortiz v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 113 Idaho 682, 747 P.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1987); Doe v. State (In re Doe), 145 Idaho 650, 182 P.3d 707 (2008); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 244 P.3d 247 (Ct. App. 2010); In re Doe, 152 Idaho 910, 277 P.3d 357 (2012). OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

School Attendance.

The child protective act may be available as a means of addressing situations in which a child is not attending a public school.OAG 83-12.

Protection of Unborn.

Idaho’s child protective act could be amended by the Idaho Legislature to provide specific legal rights and protections for the unborn, as the state does have a compelling interest in protecting potential human life from gestational drug abuse, but the act presently would not permit the state to intervene in the case of gestational drug abuse in order to protect the fetus and an action brought under the child protective act would in all likelihood be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.OAG 91-1.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1604 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Conflicting Orders.

Magistrate’s decision to award custody of child to the department of health and welfare does not conflict with an earlier order granting “father” legal custody to child after father and mother separated, as the father was allowed to participate in the termination proceedings fully, including presentation of evidence relating to his status as parent, as well as relating to the merits of the termination claims. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 195, 245 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2010).

School Personnel.

School personnel must report all instances of suspected child abuse, abandonment and neglect to either law enforcement or the department of health and welfare within 24 hours of discovery. Failure to do so is a misdemeanor.OAG 93-2.

Religious Exemption.

The religious exemption provision of this act does not affect the normal reporting and investigation provision for suspected child abuse, neglect and abandonment of this section.OAG 93-9.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1606 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1620.

Former§ 16-1606 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1611 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 13.

Bad Faith or Malice.

The question of whether a person makes a report or allegation of child abuse knowing it to be false or reports in bad faith or with malice is to be tried to a court rather than a jury. Davidson v. Davidson, 150 Idaho 455, 248 P.3d 242 (Ct. App. 2011).

Summary Judgment.

The traditional summary judgment standard applies in the context of liability of persons reporting instances of suspected child abuse. Thus, where the substance of some of the allegations of child abuse to the department, as well as the timing of those reports, raises genuine issues of material fact regarding the reporter’s motivation, summary judgment should not be granted. Davidson v. Davidson, 150 Idaho 455, 248 P.3d 242 (Ct. App. 2011).

School Facilities.

School personnel incur no liability for allowing use of school facilities for purposes of child abuse investigation, so long as the reporting was done in good faith and without malice.OAG 93-2.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1607 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 128, substituted “two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500)” for “five hundred dollars ($500).”

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1620A.

Former§ 16-1607 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1612 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 14.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is amended and redesignated as§ 16-1613 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 15.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1608 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 2001 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2001 amendment by ch. 107, § 13, changed the section head to read “Emergency removal”; in subsection (a)(1) substituted “shelter care” for “custody” and “16-1608” for “16-1610”; and in subsection (b) substituted “shelter care” for “custody”.

The 2001 amendment by ch. 357, § 3, in subsection (a)(1) added the language “or where the child is an abandoned child pursuant to the provision of chapter 81, title 39, Idaho Code”

This section was amended by two 2005 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 25, § 76, corrected a reference in paragraph (1)(a). The 2005 amendment, by ch. 391, § 10, made the same correction as ch. 25, § 76, renumbered the section from§ 16-1612, and made additional citation changes.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1612.

Former§ 16-1608 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1619 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 21.

Hearing.

Magistrate’s failure to hold a timely shelter care hearing and adjudicatory hearing and the department of health and welfare’s failure to timely disclose its investigation report were not jurisdictional issues that could be raised for the first time on appeal, did not require reversal of the magistrate’s subsequent actions, and did not operate to divest the magistrate of subject matter jurisdiction under this chapter. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 244 P.3d 247 (Ct. App. 2010).

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1609 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 2001 act which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2001 amendment by ch. 107, § 14, changed the head to read “Emergency Removal — Notice.”; in subsection (a), substituted “shelter care” for “custody”; in subsection (a)(3), substituted “shelter care” for “custody”; in subsection (b), substituted “shelter care” for “custody”; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2001 amendment by ch. 357, § 4, in subsection (a)(3) added “with the exception of a child abandoned pursuant to the provisions of chapter 81, title 39, Idaho Code,”.

This section was amended by two 2005 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 25, corrected a reference in paragraph (1)(c).

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 391, made the same correction as ch. 25, renumbered the section from§ 16-1613, and made additional stylistic and citation changes.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1613.

Former§ 16-1609 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1616 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 18.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is amended and redesignated as§ 16-1617 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 19.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is amended and redesignated as§ 16-1618 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 20.

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

County prosecuting attorneys,§ 31-2601 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1610 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, substituted “were not required because aggravated circumstances were found” for “were not required as the parent subjected the child to aggravated circumstances” at the end of paragraph (2)(a)(i)(iii).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1605.

Former§ 16-1610 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1621 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 23.

ALR.

§ 16-1611. Summons.

1. After a petition has been filed, the clerk of the court may issue a summons requiring the person or persons who have custody of the child to bring the child before the court at the adjudicatory hearing held in accordance with section 16-1619, Idaho Code. Each parent or guardian shall also be notified in the manner hereinafter provided of the pendency of the case and the time and place set for the hearing. A summons shall be issued and served requiring the appearance of each parent and legal guardian, and a summons may be issued and served for any other person whose presence is required by the child, either of his parents or guardian or any other person whose presence, in the opinion of the court, is necessary.
2. A copy of the petition shall be attached to each summons.
3. The summons shall notify each of the parents, guardian or legal custodian of their right to retain and be represented by counsel. Each parent or legal guardian of each child named in the petition shall be notified by the court of the case and of the time and place set for the hearing.
4. If based on facts presented to the court, it appears that the court has jurisdiction upon the grounds set forth in section 16-1603, Idaho Code, and the court finds that the child should be removed from his present condition or surroundings because continuation in such condition or surroundings would be contrary to the welfare of the child and vesting legal custody with the department or other authorized agency would be in the child’s best interests, the court shall include on the summons an order to remove the child. The order to remove the child shall specifically state that continuation in the present condition or surroundings is contrary to the welfare of the child and shall require a peace officer or other suitable person to take the child at once to a place of shelter care designated by the authorized agency which shall provide shelter care for the child.
5. If it appears that the child is safe in his present condition or surroundings and it is not in his best interest to remove him at this time, the court may issue a protective order based on an affidavit pending the adjudicatory hearing. If the child is in joint custody, the protective order shall state with specificity the rights and responsibilities of each parent. Each parent shall be provided with a copy of the protective order.

History.

I.C.,§ 16-1606, as added by 1976, ch. 204, § 2, p. 732; am. 1982, ch. 186, § 6, p. 491; am. 1989, ch. 302, § 2, p. 752; am. 1996, ch. 272, § 5, p. 884; am. 2001, ch. 107, § 6, p. 350; am. and redesig. 2005, ch. 391, § 13, p. 1263; am. 2007, ch. 223, § 1, p. 669.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1611 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 223, in subsection (4), in the first sentence, inserted “the court finds,” and substituted “the court shall include on the summons an order to remove the child” for “the court may so order by endorsement upon the summons,” and in the last sentence, substituted “order to remove the child” for “endorsement.”

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1606.

Former§ 16-1611 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1622 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 24.

Counsel.

In a termination of parental rights case, although a father did not have counsel during two shelter care hearings, an adjudicatory hearing, and two review hearings, he was represented by counsel for over two years afterward. To prevail on an inadequate representation claim, father must provide argument and authority establishing how lack of counsel during the first nine months of the case constituted a due process violation. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 159 Idaho 664, 365 P.3d 420 (Ct. App. 2015).

Voluntary Appearance.

Failure to personally serve the father in a child protective act proceeding, in accordance with subsection (a), was of no effect in a termination of parental rights proceeding, because the father’s voluntary general appearance was equivalent to service of summons and cured any defects in service. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 154 Idaho 175, 296 P.3d 381 (2013).

Cross References.

Contempt,§ 7-601 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1612 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1607.

Former§ 16-1612 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1608 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 10.

Cross References.

Juvenile corrections act,§ 20-501 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1613 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1607A.

Former§ 16-1613 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1609 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 11.

The term “this act” near the beginning of subsection (2) was added by S.L. 2001, ch. 107, which is compiled as§§ 16-1601 to 16-1604, 16-1608, 16-1609, 16-1610, 16-1611, 16-1613 to 16-1617, 16-1619, 16-1621, 16-1622, 16-1624, 16-1625, 16-1629, 56-204B, 66-317, and 66-324. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1614 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 221, rewrote the section providing that an attorney may not serve as an attorney and a guardian ad litem for a child in the same case and providing specific representation of children involved in child protection actions.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1618.

Former§ 16-1614 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1615 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 17.

CASE NOTES

Cited

James v. Dunlap, 100 Idaho 697, 604 P.2d 711 (1979); In the Interest of Doe, 164 Idaho 84, 425 P.3d 285 (2018).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1615 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 223, in subsection (5)(b), deleted “that reasonable efforts to prevent the placement of the child in shelter care could not be provided because of the immediate danger to the child or were provided but were not successful in eliminating the need for foster care placement of the child” from the end of the introductory paragraph, and added subsections (5)(b)(i) and (ii).

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 265, in subsection (5), deleted former paragraph (f), which read: “There is reasonable cause to believe that the child comes within the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter, but a reasonable effort to prevent placement of the child outside the home could be affected by a protective order safeguarding the child’s welfare and maintaining the child in his present surroundings” and rewrote the first sentence in the last paragraph, which formerly read: “the court shall issue, within twenty-four (24) hours of such hearing, an order of temporary legal custody and/or a protective order”; in subsection (6), substituted “finding reasonable cause” for “ordering shelter care” and added the second sentence; rewrote subsection (7), which formerly read: “If the court does not find that the child should remain in shelter care under subsection (5) of this section, the child shall be released and the court may dismiss the petition”; and added subsections (8) through (10).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1614.

Former§ 16-1615 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1624 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 26.

Counsel.

In a termination of parental rights case, although a father did not have counsel during two shelter care hearings, an adjudicatory hearing, and two review hearings, he was represented by counsel for over two years afterward. To prevail on an inadequate representation claim, father must provide argument and authority establishing how lack of counsel during the first nine months of the case constituted a due process violation. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 159 Idaho 664, 365 P.3d 420 (Ct. App. 2015).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1616 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Compiler’s Notes.

The reference to “the act” at the end of the first sentence in subsection (3) is seemingly a reference to the child protective act, being chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1609.

Former§ 16-1616 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1627 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 29.

Report.

Cited

Magistrate’s failure to hold a timely shelter care hearing and adjudicatory hearing and the department of health and welfare’s failure to timely disclose its investigation report were not jurisdictional issues that could be raised for the first time on appeal, did not require reversal of the magistrate’s subsequent actions, and did not operate to divest the magistrate of subject matter jurisdiction under this chapter. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 244 P.3d 247 (Ct. App. 2010). Cited Roe v. State, 134 Idaho 760, 9 P.3d 1226 (2000).

Family Privacy.

Interviews of suspected victims of child abuse, abandonment and neglect without parental consent or notification do not violate the parent’s right to privacy in family relationships and the responsibility of notification is that of the department of health and welfare.OAG 93-2.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1618 was repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 120, inserted “or child advocacy centers” at the end of the first sentence.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1609B.

Former§ 16-1618 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1614 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 16.

For further information on the Idaho network of children’s advocacy centers, see https://cacidaho.org .

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Juvenile Corrections Act,§ 20-501 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1619 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 223, in subsection (2), deleted “the date set for” preceding “the pretrial conference” at the end; rewrote subsection (6)(b), which formerly read: “Reasonable efforts were not made because of immediate danger to the child”; and deleted the last sentence in subsection (7), which read: “The decree shall state that the department shall prepare a written case plan within thirty (30) days of placement.”

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 216, near the middle of paragraph (6)(d), inserted “or an injury to a child” and “or great.”

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, substituted “of the department” for “in his own home” in paragraph (5)(a) and rewrote paragraph (6)(d), which formerly read: “Reasonable efforts were not required as the parent had subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as determined by the court including, but not limited to: abandonment; torture; chronic abuse; sexual abuse; committed murder; committed voluntary manslaughter of another child; aided or abetted, attempted, conspired or solicited to commit such a murder or voluntary manslaughter; committed a battery or an injury to a child that results in serious or great bodily injury to a child; or the parental rights of the parent to a sibling of the child have been terminated involuntarily and that as a result, a hearing to determine the permanent future plan for this child will be held within thirty (30) days of this determination.”

This section was amended by two 2016 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together. The 2016 amendment, by ch. 265, added subsection (7) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 347, inserted “and, when contested by any party, judicial approval” near the middle of paragraph (5)(b).

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 287, in subsection (7), substituted “their home” for “the home” near the beginning of paragraph (b)(ii) and substituted “inquire about” for “inquire as to” near the beginning of paragraph (c)(ii); and added subsection (12).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1608.

Former§ 16-1619 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1605 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 7.

Determination of Remedy.

Magistrate court correctly took custody of two children under§ 16-1603, where the son was abused by the father and the daughter lived in the same home and witnessed the father’s actions. However, the court improperly retained legal custody of the children after returning physical custody to the mother; protective supervision provided an adequate safeguard where there was no evidence that the mother was unfit. Doe v. Doe, 151 Idaho 300, 256 P.3d 708 (2011).

Jurisdiction.

Magistrate’s failure to hold a timely shelter care hearing and adjudicatory hearing and the department of health and welfare’s failure to timely disclose its investigation report were not jurisdictional issues that could be raised for the first time on appeal, did not require reversal of the magistrate’s subsequent actions, and did not operate to divest the magistrate of subject matter jurisdiction under this chapter. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 244 P.3d 247 (Ct. App. 2010).

Although the parents provided an explanation for the older child’s injuries, the magistrate was free to determine that the parents’ explanation did not justifiably explain the child’s injuries in light of the testimony regarding her injuries and the photographic evidence depicting them. Thus, there was sufficient evidence presented allowing the magistrate to find that the child was abused and within the court’s jurisdiction. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 244 P.3d 247 (Ct. App. 2010).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Child protective act,§ 16-1601 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1620 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, added “Finding of aggravated circumstances” in the section heading, rewrote subsections (1) through (3), and added subsections (4) through (8).

This section was amended by two 2016 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 265, added “and every twelve (12) months thereafter for as long as the court has jurisdiction” at the end of the first sentence in subsection (1); inserted “for youth age sixteen (16) years and older only” in subsection (2); in subsection (3), deleted “special” preceding “educational” in paragraph (a), in paragraph (f), substituted “Address” for “Consider” at the beginning, added the second sentence, rewrote paragraph (g), which formerly read: “In the case of a child who has attained the age of sixteen (16) years, identify the services needed to assist the child to make the transition from foster care to independent living”, and added paragraphs (h) through (j); in subsection (4), added the second sentence in the introductory paragraph and added paragraphs (a) through (c); and rewrote subsection (7), which formerly read: “If the permanency goal is not termination of parental rights and adoption or guardianship, the court may approve a permanency plan with a permanency goal of another planned permanent living arrangement only upon written case-specific findings that specify why a more permanent plan is not in the best interest of the child”. The 2016 amendment, by ch. 347, added paragraph (3)(h) [now (3)(k)].

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 58, redesignated the last paragraph in subsection (3) as paragraph (k), resolving a conflict caused by the multiple 2016 amendments of this section.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1620 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1606 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 8.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1620A was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1607 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 9.

Appellate Review.

Where evidence establishing existence of sexual abuse of a young child was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to accept it and to rely upon it, the trial court’s finding of abuse, based upon such evidence, could not be deemed clearly erroneous. Ortiz v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 113 Idaho 682, 747 P.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1987).

Effect of Decree on Criminal Charge.

A collateral estoppel did not arise from the circumstance that the very incident which gave rise to the criminal charge for lewd conduct with a minor had earlier been the subject of a child protective act (CPA) proceeding, notwithstanding that the state was a party to the CPA proceedings which went to a final “judgment,” the findings in the CPA hearing did not bar the criminal prosecution on the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct because a conclusion as to whether a particular incident of abuse took place is not essential to the determination of the child’s best interests under the CPA and, unlike a criminal prosecution, a CPA proceeding does not have the effect of placing a defendant in jeopardy. State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707, 819 P.2d 561 (1991).

Failure to Comply.

In a termination of parental rights case, substantial evidence supported the finding that appellant mother neglected her children by failing to comply with her case plan that had been prepared pursuant to this section to set forth reasonable efforts that would make it possible for the children to return to appellant’s home. Appellant failed to maintain safe housing and employment as required by the case plan, did not demonstrate adequate parenting skills, and resisted her caseworkers’ suggestions for improvement. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 910, 277 P.3d 357 (2012).

Reunification.

Magistrate did not err by finding that the Idaho department of health and welfare made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with her children, where it developed four case plans for her, provided her with a variety of resources and support to allow her to comply with the plans, and gave her the opportunity to live at a shelter and to attend parenting counseling programs. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 160 Idaho 824, 379 P.3d 1094 (2016).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1622 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 223, rewrote subsection (5), which formerly read: “By order of the court a hearing officer may be appointed to conduct hearings under this section.”

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, rewrote the section heading, which formerly read: “Review and permanency hearings,” and rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 23, updated references in paragraph (2)(a) in light of the 2013 revision of§ 16-1621.

This section was amended by two 2016 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 265, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 347, added “and, if the permanency goal is termination of parental rights and adoption, then in addition to the information set forth in section 16-1620(3), Idaho Code, the permanency plan shall also name the proposed adoptive parents when known” at the end of the fifth sentence and added the sixth sentence in paragraph (2)(a).

Compiler’s Notes.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 287, in paragraph (2)(a), added “however, if the circumstances that caused the child to be placed into protective custody resulted in a conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct or felony injury to a child, if the child has been in protective custody for more than six (6) months, or if a high risk of repeat maltreatment or reentry into foster care exists due to a parent’s recent completion of substance abuse treatment or other compelling circumstances, then the permanency plan shall include a period of protective supervision or trial home visit period of no less than ninety (90) days prior to the court vacating the case” at the end of the fourth sentence, added the present fifth through seventh sentences, and added the present last sentence. Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1611.

Former§ 16-1622 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1628 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 30.

The term “this act” in the introductory paragraph in paragraph (1)(a) refers to S.L. 2013, Chapter 287, which is codified as§§ 16-1602, 16-1610, 16-1619, 16-1620, 16-1621 to 16-1625, 16-1629, 16-2002 and 16-2005. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code.

Limitation on Review.

The magistrate court abused its discretion, where it disregarded the sibling placement priority and the department of health and welfare’s primary role when considering permanency plans. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 565, 416 P.3d 937 (2018).

Permanency Hearing Unnecesary.

Magistrate court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights, based on neglect and the child’s best interest, because there was no reason to make the child wait for a permanency hearing where nothing was going to change significantly, due to the mother’s lack of progress and failure to comply with the case plan, her chronic and untreated substance abuse, and her mental health concerns which impaired her ability to provide a stable, consistent home for the child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 164 Idaho 143, 426 P.3d 1243 (2018).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1623 has been repealed, see Prior Laws,§ 16-1601.

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, inserted “except for Saturdays, Sundays and holidays” in subsection (3).

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 265, in subsection (3), substituted “pursuant to subsection (1)(a) or (b) of this section without a hearing, a redisposition hearing” for “a hearing” in the first sentence and added the last sentence; and rewrote the former second sentence as present second through fourth sentences in subsection (5).

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1623 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1629 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 31.

Cross References.

Child protective act,§ 16-1601 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1624 which comprised S.L. 1973, ch. 210, § 2 was repealed by S.L. 1976, ch. 204, § 1, p. 732. A prior§ 16-1624 which comprised S.L. 1963, ch. 321, § 1, p. 909 was repealed by S.L. 1973, ch. 210, § 1, p. 462.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 147, inserted “fit and willing” near the end of the third sentence.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, added the subsection designations; added the second sentence in subsection (1); added subsection (2); in subsection (3), substituted “thirty (30) days” for “sixty (60) days” and “because aggravated circumstances were present” for “because the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as determined by the court pursuant to section 16-1619(6)(d), Idaho Code”; deleted the former last sentence in subsection (5), which read: “A petition to terminate parental rights shall be filed in the child protective act case”; and added subsection (6).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1615.

Former§ 16-1624 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1630 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 32.

Denial of Reinstatement Proper.

Mother’s motion to reinstate parental rights due to newly discovered evidence was properly denied because (1) three months after the mother’s parental rights were terminated, the mother discovered that a foster family’s foster license had been temporarily revoked due to physical abuse on another foster child; (2) the mother had not made a showing that the physical abuse on another child in the foster family was relevant to the issue of her own character and fitness as a parent; (3) a magistrate court reached its decision through an exercise of reason by comparing all the evidence and weighing how it related to the child’s best interest; and (4) the magistrate court addressed the issue of physical abuse and found that, at the age of 17, it would not have been in the child’s best interest to reinstate the mother’s parental rights. Doe v. State (In re Doe), 145 Idaho 650, 182 P.3d 707 (2008).

Finding of Neglect.

Magistrate’s finding that a mother neglected her children was supported by substantial and competent evidence where the mother had been completely noncompliant with her case plan until her release from incarceration, and, upon release, the mother merely complied with the terms of her probation rather than the terms of her case plan, and there were several enumerated specific instances of neglect. State v. Doe (In re Doe), 145 Idaho 662, 182 P.3d 1196 (2008).

Termination Proper.

The facts indicated that, when under the mother’s care, children were in an unstable, unnurturing and dangerous environment; therefore, the trial court found sufficient evidence to support termination of the mother’s parental rights based on the conclusion that she had neglected the children and that the children’s best interests would be served by termination. Doe v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 122 Idaho 644, 837 P.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1992). Once the department had legal custody of the children — the parents stipulated to jurisdiction under the Idaho child protection act and the court placed the children in the department’s legal custody — the department, and not the court, had the authority to determine where the children were to live and the department was authorized to petition for termination. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 883, 436 P.3d 1232 (2019).

Prior Laws.

Other former§§ 16-1625 — 16-1629 which comprised S.L. 1963, ch. 321,§§ 2-6, p. 909; 1972, ch. 196, § 2, p. 483; 1973, ch. 210, § 3, p. 462 were repealed by S.L. 1976, ch. 204, § 1.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 26, substituted “or may seek a direct permissive appeal to the supreme court as provided by rules adopted by the supreme court” for “within thirty (30) days of the filing of such order or decree” in the introductory language of subsection (1).

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, substituted “finding aggravated circumstances” for “finding that the parent subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as set forth in section 16-1619(6)(d), Idaho Code” at the end of paragraph (1)(c).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1617.

Former § 16-1625 was amended and redesignated as § 16-1631 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 33. CASE NOTES

Cited

Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 896, 318 P.3d 886 (2014); Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 156 Idaho 103, 320 P.3d 1262 (2014).

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1626 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1625.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1621.

Former§ 16-1626 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1640 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 42.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1627 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1625.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1616.

Former§ 16-1627 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1641 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 43.

Religious Exemption.

The religious exemption provision, which allows parents to treat their children through “spiritual means,” does not limit administrative or judicial authority to provide medical service to children.OAG 93-9.

Cross References.

Contempt,§ 7-601 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1628 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1625.

Amendments.

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 257, deleted “guardian” following “due notice to the parent” near the beginning of the first sentence in subsection (1).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1622.

Former§ 16-1628 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1642 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 44.

ALR.

§ 16-1629. Powers and duties of the department.

The department, working in conjunction with the court and other public and private agencies and persons, shall have the primary responsibility to implement the purpose of this chapter. To this end, the department is empowered and shall have the duty to do all things reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of this chapter, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. The department shall administer treatment programs for the protection and care of neglected, abused and abandoned children, and in so doing may place in foster care, shelter care, or other diagnostic, treatment, or care centers or facilities children of whom it has been given custody. The department is to be governed by the standards found in chapter 12, title 39, Idaho Code.
2. On December 1, the department shall make an annual statistical report to the governor covering the preceding fiscal year showing the number and status of persons in its custody and including such other data as will provide sufficient facts for sound planning in the conservation of children and youth. All officials and employees of the state and of every county and city shall furnish the department, upon request, such information within their knowledge and control as the department deems necessary. Local agencies shall report in such uniform format as may be required by the department.
3. The department shall be required to maintain a central registry for the reporting of child neglect, abuse and abandonment information. Provided however, that the department shall not retain any information for this purpose relating to a child, or parent of a child, abandoned pursuant to chapter 82, title 39, Idaho Code.
4. The department shall make periodic evaluation of all persons in its custody or under its protective supervision for the purpose of determining whether existing orders and dispositions in individual cases shall be modified or continued in force. Evaluations may be made as frequently as the department considers desirable and shall be made with respect to every person at intervals not exceeding six (6) months. Reports of evaluation made pursuant to this section shall be filed with the court that has jurisdiction. Reports of evaluation shall be provided to persons having full or partial legal or physical custody of a child. Failure of the department to evaluate a person or to reevaluate him within six (6) months of a previous examination shall not of itself entitle the person to a change in disposition but shall entitle him, his parent, guardian or custodian or his counsel to petition the court pursuant to section 16-1622, Idaho Code.
5. In a consultive capacity, the department shall assist communities in the development of constructive programs for the protection, prevention and care of children and youth.
6. The department shall keep written records of investigations, evaluations, prognoses and all orders concerning disposition or treatment of every person over whom it has legal custody or under its protective supervision. Department records shall be subject to disclosure according to chapter 1, title 74, Idaho Code, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the person consents to the disclosure, or disclosure is necessary for the delivery of services to the person. Notwithstanding the provisions restricting disclosure or the exemptions from disclosure provided in chapter 1, title 74, Idaho Code, all records pertaining to investigations, the rehabilitation of youth, the protection of children, evaluation, treatment and/or disposition records pertaining to the statutory responsibilities of the department shall be disclosed to any duly elected state official carrying out his official functions.
7. The department shall establish appropriate administrative procedures for the processing of complaints of child neglect, abuse and abandonment received and for the implementation of the protection, treatment and care of children formally or informally placed in the custody of the department or under its protective supervision under this chapter including, but not limited to:
   1. Department employees whose job duties are related to the child protective services system under this chapter shall first be trained as to their obligations under this chapter regarding the protection of children whose health and safety may be endangered. The curriculum shall include information regarding their legal duties, how to conduct their work in conformity with the requirements of this chapter, information regarding applicable federal and state laws with regard to the rights of the child, parent and others who may be under investigation under the child protective services system, and the applicable legal and constitutional parameters within which they are to conduct their work.
   2. Department employees whose job duties are related to the child protective services system shall advise the individual of the complaints or allegations made against the individual at the time of the initial contact, consistent with protecting the identity of the referent.
8. The department, having been granted legal custody of a child, shall have the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live, provided that the child shall not be placed outside the state without the court’s consent. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the child, which jurisdiction shall be entered on any order or petition granting legal custody to the department, and the court shall have jurisdiction over all matters relating to the child. The department shall not place the child in the home from which the court ordered the child removed without first obtaining the approval of the court. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, all other determinations relating to where and with whom the child shall live shall be subject to judicial review by the court and, when contested by any party, judicial approval.
9. The department shall give to the court any information concerning the child that the court may at any time require, but in any event shall report the progress of the child under its custody or under its protective supervision at intervals of not to exceed six (6) months. The department shall file with the court at least five (5) days prior to the permanency hearing either under section 16-1622, Idaho Code, or, in the case of a finding of aggravated circumstances, section 16-1620, Idaho Code, the permanency plan and recommendations of the department.
10. The department shall establish appropriate administrative procedures for the conduct of administrative reviews and hearings as required by federal statute for all children committed to the department and placed in out-of-the-home care.
11. At any time the department is considering a placement pursuant to this chapter, the department shall make a reasonable effort to place the child in the least restrictive environment to the child and in so doing shall consider, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child, placement priority of the child in the following order:
    1. A fit and willing relative;
    2. A fit and willing nonrelative with a significant relationship with the child;
    3. Foster parents and other persons licensed in accordance with chapter 12, title 39, Idaho Code, with a significant relationship with the child;
    4. Foster parents and other persons licensed in accordance with chapter 12, title 39, Idaho Code. (12) If the caseworker assigned to a foster care case recommends removing the child from a foster home in which the child has been placed for sixty (60) or more days, for placement in another foster home, then the case worker’s supervisor shall conduct a review of the foster care case and must approve such recommendation before a change in foster home placement occurs. The supervisor shall consider the best interests and special needs of the child, including:
12. If the caseworker assigned to a foster care case recommends removing the child from a foster home in which the child has been placed for sixty (60) or more days, for placement in another foster home, then the case worker’s supervisor shall conduct a review of the foster care case and must approve such recommendation before a change in foster home placement occurs. The supervisor shall consider the best interests and special needs of the child, including:
    1. The clearly stated reasons for the recommended change in placement;
    2. The number of times the child’s placement has been changed since removal from the child’s home and the reasons for each change;
    3. Whether the child will change schools as a result of the change in placement; and
    4. Whether the change in placement will separate or reunite siblings or affect sibling visitation.
13. If the supervisor determines that the recommended change in foster care placement is in the best interests of the child, then the department may change the placement of the child; provided that, the department shall give the foster parents and the court written notice of the planned change at least seven (7) days before the change in placement.
14. If the caseworker determines that there is abuse or neglect or a substantial risk of abuse or neglect in the foster home, then the department may change the placement of the child without a supervisor’s review; provided that, the department shall give the foster parents and the court written notice of the unplanned change within seven (7) days after the change in placement.
15. In its written notice of a planned or unplanned change required under this section, the department shall clearly state the reasons for the change in placement of the child.

History.

I.C.,§ 16-1623, as added by 1976, ch. 204, § 2, p. 732; am. 1982, ch. 186, § 22, p. 491; am. 1989, ch. 218, § 4, p. 527; am. 1990, ch. 213, § 10, p. 480; am. 1991, ch. 212, § 6, p. 500; am. 1996, ch. 272, § 14, p. 884; am. 1996, ch. 361, § 1, p. 1216; am. 1998, ch. 257, § 5, p. 850; am. 1999, ch. 30, § 8, p. 41; am. 2000, ch. 233, § 2, p. 653; am. 2001, ch. 93, § 1, p. 232; am. 2001, ch. 107, § 19, p. 350; am. 2001, ch. 358, § 1, p. 1261; am. and redesig. 2005, ch. 25, § 78, p. 82; am. 2005, ch. 332, § 1, p. 1041; am. and redesig. 2005, ch. 391, § 31, p. 1263; am. 2006, ch. 16, § 2, p. 42; am. 2007, ch. 223, § 5, p. 669; am. 2010, ch. 147, § 3, p. 314; am. 2013, ch. 287, § 10, p. 741; am. 2015, ch. 141, § 13, p. 379; am. 2016, ch. 347, § 6, p. 999; am. 2018, ch. 287, § 5, p. 675.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1629 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1625.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 1996 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 1996 amendment, by ch. 272, in subsection (d), added the fourth sentence; in the last sentence of subsection (h), substituted “department” for “dpeartment”; and added subsection (k). The 1996 amendment, by ch. 361, in subsection (f), added the last sentence; and in the last sentence of subsection (h), substituted “department” for “dpeartment”.

This section was amended by three 2001 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2001 amendment, by ch. 93, in subsection (a) deleted “group homes” following “shelter care”.

The 2001 amendment, by ch. 107, in subsection (f), substituted “prognoses” for “prognosis”; in subsection (i), inserted “The department shall file with the court at least five (5) days prior to the permanency hearing under section 16-1611, Idaho Code, the permanency plan and recommendations of the department.” following “exceed six (6) months.”; in subsection (j), inserted the word “the” preceding “home care.”

The 2001 amendment, by ch. 358, in subsection (c), added the second sentence.

This section was amended by three 2005 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 25, corrected a citation in subsection (3).

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 332, added “including, but not limited to” at the end of the introductory paragraph and paragraphs (1)[(a)] and (2)[(b)] in subsection (7).

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 391,, renumbered this section from§ 16-1623 and made stylistic citation changes.

The 2006 amendment, by ch. 16, redesignated former subsections (7)(1) and (7)(2) as subsections (7)(a) and (7)(b).

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 223, in the second sentence in subsection (9), inserted “either” and “or, in the case of a finding of aggravated circumstances, section 16-1620, Idaho Code.”

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 147, in the introductory paragraph in subsection (11), substituted “least restrictive environment” for “least disruptive environment” and “shall consider, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child, placement priority of the child in the following order:” for “may consider, without limitation, placement of the child with related persons”; and added paragraphs (a) through (c).

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, in subsection (4), inserted “protective” preceding “supervision” in the first sentence and substituted “that has jurisdiction” for “which vested custody of the person with the department” at the end of the third sentence; inserted “or under its protective supervision” near the beginnings of subsections (6), (7), and (9); and deleted “There shall be a rebuttable presumption that if a child is placed in the custody of the department and was also placed in out of the home care for a period not less than fifteen (15) out of the last twenty-two (22) months from the date the child entered shelter care, the department shall initiate a petition for termination of parental rights. This presumption may be rebutted by a finding of the court that the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights would not be in the best interest of the child or reasonable efforts have not been provided to reunite the child with his family, or the child is placed permanently with a relative” from the end of subsection (9).

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 141, substituted “chapter 1, title 74” for “chapter 3, title 9” in two instances in subsection (6).

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 347, in subsection (8), deleted “subject to the judicial review provisions of this subsection” following “legal custody of a child” near the beginning of the first sentence, deleted “Provided, however” from the beginning of the second sentence, and added the last sentence; in subsection (11), added present paragraph (c) and redesignated former paragraph (c) as paragraph (d); and added subsections (12) to (15). The 2018 amendment, by ch. 287, inserted “and the court” following “give the foster parents” in subsections (13) and (14).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1623.

Former§ 16-1629 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1643 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 45.

Effective Dates.

Section 111 of S.L. 1990, ch. 213 as amended by S.L. 1991, ch. 329, § 16 provided that §§ 3 through 45 and 48 through 110 of the act [including amendment of this section] should take effect July 1, 1993 and that §§ 1, 2, 46 and 47 should take effect July 1, 1990.

Applicability.

In terminating a father’s parental rights, evidence of his failure to comply with his case plan was properly considered under§ 16-2002(3)(a) as a basis for neglect, and the magistrate court did not have to make a finding as to the time requirements of this section. Ida. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 356, 256 P.3d 764 (2011).

Because§ 16-1602(25)(a) and (b) [now (31)(a) and (b)] are written in the disjunctive, there is no requirement that a magistrate court consider the statutory timeframe in subsection (9) of this section when it is making a finding of neglect based on§ 16-1602(25)(a) [(31)(a)]. Ida. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 356, 256 P.3d 764 (2011).

Once the department had legal custody of the children — the parents stipulated to jurisdiction under the Idaho child protection act and the court placed the children in the department’s legal custody — the department, and not the court, had the authority to determine where the children were to live and the department was authorized to petition for termination. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 883, 436 P.3d 1232 (2019).

Best Interest of Child.

Magistrate’s findings that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children was supported by substantial and competent evidence because social workers testified about the sporadic visitations and contacts by the mother, the repeated drug use relapses, unemployment, and issues regarding domestic violence, and it had been more than sixteen months since the mother had been able to provide her children with a stable home. State v. Doe (In re Doe), 145 Idaho 662, 182 P.3d 1196 (2008). Under§§ 16-1602 and 16-2002 and this section, termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children, based on the parents’ history, and ongoing use, of controlled substances, which resulted in neglect of the children who were in foster care for seventeen out of twenty-two months. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 149 Idaho 474, 235 P.3d 1195 (2010) (see 2013 amendment).

Intervention.

Since the child protection act gives the department of health and welfare the affirmative right to determine where the child will live so long as the state has legal custody, the magistrate court was correct in ruling that the maternal care-giving grandmother did not have a conditional statutory right to intervene based on subsection (11) of this section. Roe v. State, 134 Idaho 760, 9 P.3d 1226 (2000).

Limitation on Review.

The magistrate court abused its discretion, where it disregarded the sibling placement priority and the department of health and welfare’s primary role when considering permanency plans. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 565, 416 P.3d 937 (2018).

Neglected Child.

Neglect may be properly found under§ 16-2002(3)(b) where the mother was not reunified with her children for fifteen out of twenty-one months, while the state had spent over $80,000 on counseling, gas vouchers, rental assistance, and foster care and mother failed to maintain residential and financial stability. State v. Doe, 149 Idaho 409, 234 P.3d 733 (2010) (see 2013 amendment).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights to her children was proper because the magistrate court specifically found neglect on the grounds that the mother and her husband had failed to comply with their case plan by not: (1) providing Idaho department of health and welfare with a schedule of household chores, (2) completing a food safety course, (3) cooperating with visits from the department, (4) contacting a psychosocial rehabilitation agency, (5) following the recommendation in her psychological evaluation, (6) completing an 18-week parenting course, (7) writing out a list of developmental tasks for each child, and (8) coming up with a budget. Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, 244 P.3d 180 (2010).

Father’s parental rights were properly terminated on the ground of neglect because he had neither completed a case plan nor reunited with them within the time limits of subsection (9). This section contemplates reunification within 15 months and the children here had been in foster care for 18 months. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 846, 264 P.3d 953 (2011) (see 2013 amendment).

Termination of parental rights based upon neglect was proper and in the best interest of the child, where substantial evidence was presented at the termination hearing regarding the mother’s criminal history and drug use, her history with her other children, her general inability to support a child, and her insufficient efforts to comply with her case plan. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 145, 306 P.3d 230 (Ct. App. 2013).

Placement Decisions.

A CPA action is not intended to provide a forum for multiple claimants to litigate their right to custody, because, once the department has legal custody of a child under the CPA, the department and not the court has the authority to determine where the child should live; even though the court retains jurisdiction over the child as long as state custody continues, the CPA provides the court only limited authority to review the department’s placement decisions. Roe v. State, 134 Idaho 760, 9 P.3d 1226 (2000).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to the Idaho department of health and welfare on grandparents’ petition to adopt a child because the grandparents could not adopt the child without written consent from the department regardless of what facts they presented; the department had stated that it would not consent to the adoption. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 491, 248 P.3d 742 (2011).

Presumptions.

Magistrate court’s decision terminating a father’s parental rights was reversed, where the magistrate court began its analysis with the presumption that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Application of the incorrect legal standard infected the trial and did not constitute harmless error. Doe v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 164 P.3d 814 (2007).

While subsection (9) creates a rebuttable presumption that the department of health and welfare should initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights under certain conditions, it does not create a presumption that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Such a conclusion must be proved by by clear and convincing evidence. In re Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009) (see 2013 amendment).

The presumption in favor of the department initiating a termination petition set out in subsection (9) does not create a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights. A finding that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds, supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 953, 277 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2012) (see 2013 amendment).

Termination Petition.

Where a child was out of the mother’s care for 18 of the last 22 months, despite its reluctance, the department of health and welfare was obligated under the law to file a petition for termination of parental rights, but, the magistrate court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights was clearly erroneous. The magistrate erred in focusing on the mother’s conviction and past criminal behavior while dismissing relevant and competent evidence such as the social worker’s testimony and that reunification was possible and was occurring. State v. Roe (In re Doe), 142 Idaho 594, 130 P.3d 1132 (2006) (see 2013 amendment).

Father’s parental rights were properly terminated where court found that father had neglected his child by failing to comply with the court’s orders in a case plan, by failing to reunify with his son within fifteen of the last twenty-two months, and by failing to demonstrate consistency in housing, employment, and/or abstinence from controlled substances, impairing his ability to provide proper parental care. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 149 Idaho 401, 234 P.3d 725 (2010) (see 2013 amendment).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Other former§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637, which comprised S.L. 1963, ch. 321,§§ 7-14; 1969, ch. 31, § 1; 1974, ch. 251, § 1 were repealed by S.L. 1976, ch. 204, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1624.

Former§ 16-1630 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1632 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 34.

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

County prosecuting attorneys,§ 31-2601 et seq,

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1631 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1630.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1625.

Former§ 16-1631 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1633 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 35.

School Facilities.

School personnel incur no liability for allowing use of school facilities for purposes of child abuse investigation, so long as the reporting was done in good faith and without malice.OAG 93-2.

Interview Process.

The authority of the Idaho department of health and welfare to investigate reports of child abuse, abandonment and neglect includes the ability to determine who may be present and/or participate in the interview process.OAG 93-2.

Cross References.

Bureau of criminal identification,§ 67-3003.

Central sex offender registry,§ 18-8305.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1632 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1630.

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 26, in the section catchline and in the first sentence of subsection (2), substituted “guardian ad litem coordinator” for “child advocate coordinator”; added the language at the beginning of the introductory paragraph in subsection (1) preceding “the persons or entities”; deleted “central clearinghouse and” preceding “coordinator” in subsection (1)(c); and added subsection (3).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1630.

Former§ 16-1632 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1634 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 36.

For further information on the national court appointed special advocate association, referred to in the introductory paragraph in subsection (1), see https://casaforchildren.org .

Section 12 of S.L. 1989, ch. 281 read: “Sections 4 through 11 of this act [§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637] shall remain in full force and effect only until July 1 1991, and as of that date are repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before July 1, 1991, deletes or extends that date.” However, such section was repealed by § 1 of S.L. 1991, ch. 8, effective February 20, 1991, and, therefore, such sections are not repealed.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1633 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1630.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 284, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

Compiler’s Notes.

The reference to “the act” at the end of subsection (2) is seemingly a reference to the child protective act, being chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1631.

Former§ 16-1633 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1635 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 37.

Section 12 of S.L. 1989, ch. 281 read: “Sections 4 through 11 of this act [§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637] shall remain in full force and effect only until July 1, 1991, and as of that date are repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before July 1, 1991, deletes or extends that date.” However, such section was repealed by § 1 of S.L. 1991, ch. 8, effective February 20, 1991, and, therefore, such sections are not repealed.

Evidence.

In hearing regarding modification of temporary foster care, it was error for the magistrate to admit the guardian ad litem report into evidence in its entirety, as, in addition to the report being hearsay, many portions of the report related to statements made by third persons either to the guardian ad litem or to others. Wood v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 513, 903 P.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1995).

Level of Participation.

No error was committed by the magistrate in hearing regarding modification of temporary foster care in either refusing to limit the participation of the guardian ad litem or in failing to make a threshold determination as to what level of participation was necessary to represent the children in foster care proceedings. Wood v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 513, 903 P.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1995).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1634 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1630.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 2005 acts which appear to be compatible and are compiled together.

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 25, corrected a citation in subsection (3).

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 291, made the same correction as in ch. 25, renumbered this section from§ 16-1632, and made stylistic changes.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1632.

Former§ 16-1634 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1636 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 38. Section 12 of S.L. 1989, ch. 281 read: “Sections 4 through 11 of this act [§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637] shall remain in full force and effect only until July 1, 1991, and as of that date are repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before July 1, 1991, deletes or extends that date.” However, such section was repealed by § 1 of S.L. 1991, ch. 8, effective February 20, 1991, and, therefore, such sections are not repealed.

Representation of Children.

There is no statutory requirement that the magistrate make a threshold determination as to the level of participation necessary for a guardian ad litem to adequately represent the child or children. Wood v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 513, 903 P.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1995).

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1635 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1630.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1633.

Former§ 16-1635 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1637 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 39.

Section 12 of S.L. 1989, ch. 281 read: “Sections 4 through 11 of this act [§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637] shall remain in full force and effect only until July 1, 1991, and as of that date are repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before July 1, 1991, deletes or extends that date.” However, such section was repealed by § 1 of S.L. 1991, ch. 8, effective February 20, 1991, and, therefore, such sections are not repealed.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1636 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1630.

Federal References.

Public Law 93-247, referred to in this section, is codified as 42 USCS § 5101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1634.

Former§ 16-1636 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1638 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 40.

The bracketed insertion near the beginning of this section was added by the compiler to correct the syntax in the sentence.

Section 12 of S.L. 1989, ch. 281 read: “Sections 4 through 11 of this act [§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637] shall remain in full force and effect only until July 1, 1991, and as of that date are repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before July 1, 1991, deletes or extends that date.” However, such section was repealed by § 1 of S.L. 1991, ch. 8, effective February 20, 1991, and, therefore, such sections are not repealed.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1637 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1630.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1635.

Former§ 16-1637 was amended and redesignated as§ 16-1639 by S.L. 2005, ch. 391, § 41.

Section 12 of S.L. 1989, ch. 281 read: “Sections 4 through 11 of this act [§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637] shall remain in full force and effect only until July 1, 1991, and as of that date are repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before July 1, 1991, deletes or extends that date.” However, such section was repealed by § 1 of S.L. 1991, ch. 8, effective February 20, 1991, and, therefore, such sections are not repealed.

Prior Laws.

Former§§ 16-1638 — 16-1643, which comprised S.L. 1963, ch. 31,§§ 15-17, 20, 21; 1971, ch. 170, § 2; 1973, ch. 210, § 5; 1974, ch. 92, § 1, were repealed by S.L. 1976, ch. 204, § 1.

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 26, substituted “which moneys shall be used for the payment of grants” for “which shall in turn make payment of available moneys, upon request, to the grant administrator for the payment of grants” in subsection (4).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1636.

Section 12 of S.L. 1989, ch. 281 read: “Sections 4 through 11 of this act [§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637] shall remain in full force and effect only until July 1, 1991, and as of that date are repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before July 1, 1991, deletes or extends that date.” However, such section was repealed by § 1 of S.L. 1991, ch. 8, effective February 20, 1991, and, therefore, such sections are not repealed.

Cross References.

Guardian ad litem account,§ 16-1638.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1639 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1638.

Amendments.

Compiler’s Notes.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 26, in the introductory paragraph, inserted “requirements imposed by the supreme court and”; and in subsection (1)(a) and twice in subsection (2), substituted “guardian ad litem” for “child advocate.” Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1637.

Section 12 of S.L. 1989, ch. 281 read: “Sections 4 through 11 of this act [§§ 16-1630 — 16-1637] shall remain in full force and effect only until July 1, 1991, and as of that date are repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before July 1, 1991, deletes or extends that date.” However, such section was repealed by § 1 of S.L. 1991, ch. 8, effective February 20, 1991, and, therefore, such sections are not repealed.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1640 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1638.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1626.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1641 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1638.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1627.

Scope of Authority.

The authority of the Idaho department of health and welfare to investigate reports of child abuse, abandonment and neglect includes the ability to determine who may be present and/or participate in the interview process.OAG 93-2.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1642 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1638.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1628.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1643 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1638.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 16-1629.

Compiler’s Notes.

S.L. 2016, ch. 284, § 1, S.L. 2016, ch. 347, § 7, and S.L. 2016, ch. 360, § 2 each purported to enact a new section designated as§ 16-1644. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 284, § 1 has been redesignated by the compiler, through the use of brackets, as§ 16-1646. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 347, § 7 has been redesignated by the compiler, through the use of brackets, as§ 16-1645. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 360, § 2 has been retained as§ 16-1644.

Amendments.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 58, renumbered former§ 16-1644, as enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 347, § 7 as this section.

Compiler’s Notes.

S.L. 2016, ch. 284, § 1, S.L. 2016, ch. 347, § 7, and S.L. 2016, ch. 360, § 2 each purported to enact a new section designated as§ 16-1644. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 284, § 1 was redesignated by the compiler, through the use of brackets, as§ 16-1646. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 347, § 7 was redesignated by the compiler, through the use of brackets, as§ 16-1645. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 360, § 2 was retained as§ 16-1644. The redesignation of the enactment by S.L. 2016, ch. 347, § 7 as§ 16-1645 was made permanent by S.L. 2017, ch. 58, § 6.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 58, renumbered former§ 16-1644, as enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 284, § 1 as this section.

Compiler’s Notes.

S.L. 2016, ch. 284, § 1, S.L. 2016, ch. 347, § 7, and S.L. 2016, ch. 360, § 2 each purported to enact a new section designated as§ 16-1644. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 284, § 1 was redesignated by the compiler, through the use of brackets, as§ 16-1646. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 347, § 7 was redesignated by the compiler, through the use of brackets, as§ 16-1645. The section enacted by S.L. 2016, ch. 360, § 2 was retained as§ 16-1644. The redesignation of the enactment by S.L. 2016, ch. 284, § 1 as§ 16-1646 was made permanent by S.L. 2017, ch. 58, § 7.

Cross References.

Child protective act,§ 16-1601 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

For further information on the United States department of health and human services, referred to at the end of subsection (9), see https://www.hhs.gov .

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1905, p. 106, §§ 1 to 8, 10, 12, 13; am. 1907, p. 231, §§ 1 to 3; reen. R.C., §§ 8328 to 8335, 8336a, 8336c, 8336d, 8337; am. 1909, p. 272, §§ 1 to 3; am. 1911, ch. 159, §§ 152 to 159, 161, 163 to 165; am. 1917, ch. 84, p. 299; reen. C.L. 38:266 to 38:273, 38:275, 38:277 to 38:279; C.S., §§ 1010 to 1014, 1014a, 1014b, 1015 to 1017, 1019, 1021 to 1023; am. 1923, ch. 16, § 1, p. 17; am. 1927, ch. 167, § 1, p. 221; am. 1927, ch. 169, § 1, p. 225; am. 1929, ch. 99, § 1, p. 163; I.C.A.,§§ 31-1301 to 31-1314; am. 1953, ch. 260, §§ 1 to 13, p. 415, were repealed by S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 42, p. 603.

For present comparable law, see§ 20-501 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1801, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 2, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1801 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-501 by § 2 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1802, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 2, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1802 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-502 by § 3 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1803, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 3, p. 603; 1957, ch. 235, § 1, p. 560; 1959, ch. 119, § 1, p. 258, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1803 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-505 by § 6 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1804, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 4, p. 603; 1957, ch. 235, § 2, p. 560, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1804 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-506 by § 7 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1805, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 5, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1805 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-507 by § 8 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1806, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 6, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1806 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-508 by § 9 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1806A was amended and redesignated as§ 20-509 by § 10 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1807, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 7, p. 603; 1957, ch. 235, § 3, p. 560, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1807 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-510 by § 11 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1807A was amended and redesignated as§ 20-511 by § 12 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1808, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 8, p. 603; 1957, ch. 235, § 4, p. 560, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1808 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-512 by § 13 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1809, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 9, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1809 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-513 by § 14 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1809A was amended and redesignated as§ 20-514 by § 15 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1810, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 10, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1810 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-515 by § 16 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1811, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 11, p. 603; 1957, ch. 235, § 5, p. 560, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1811 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-516 by § 17 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1812, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 12, p. 603; 1957, ch. 235, § 6, p. 560, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1812 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-517 by § 18 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1812A was amended and redesignated as§ 20-518 by § 19 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1813, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 13, p. 876; am. 1974, ch. 251, § 2, p. 1646, was repealed by S.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 1.

A third former§ 16-1813, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 13, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1813 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-519 by § 20 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1814, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 14, p. 603; 1959, ch. 110, § 1, p. 234, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

A third former§ 16-1814, which comprised S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 14, p. 876; 1977, ch. 156, § 3, p. 399, was repealed by S.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1814 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-520 by § 21 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1814A was amended and redesignated as§ 20-521 by § 22 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1814B was amended and redesignated as§ 20-522 by § 23 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1814C was be amended and redesignated as§ 20-523 by § 24 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1815, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 15, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

A third former§ 16-1815, which comprised S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 15, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1815 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-524 by § 24 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1816, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 16, p. 603; 1957, ch. 235, § 7, p. 560, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1816 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-525 by § 26 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1816A was amended and redesignated as§ 20-525A by § 9 of S.L. 1995, ch. 277, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1817, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 17, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1817 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-526 by § 27 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1818, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 18, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1818 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-527 by § 28 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1819, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 19, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1819 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-528 by § 29 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1820, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 20, p. 603; 1957, ch. 235, § 8, p. 560, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1820 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-529 by § 30 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1821, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 21, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1821, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 21, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1822, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 22, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1822, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 22, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 31, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1823, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 23, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1823 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-530 by § 32 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another§ 16-1824, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 24, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1824, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 24, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 33, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another§ 16-1825, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 25, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1825, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 25, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 33, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1826, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 26, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1826 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-504 by § 5 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1827, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 27, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1827, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 27, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1827 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-531 by § 34 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1828, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 28, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1828 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-532 by § 35 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1829, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 29, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1829, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 29, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1829 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-533 by § 36 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1830, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 30, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1830, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 30, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1830, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1830, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 37, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1831, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 31, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1831, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 31, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1831, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1831, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 37, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1832, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 32, p. 876; am. 1986, ch. 84, § 4, p. 243, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1832, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 32, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1832, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1832, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371; am. 1993, ch. 84, § 1, p. 214, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 37, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1833, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 33, p. 876; am. 1984, ch. 81, § 14, p. 148, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1833, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 33, p. 603; 1961, ch. 127, § 187, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1833, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1833, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 37, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1834, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 34, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1834, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 34, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1834, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1834, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 37, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1835, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 35, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 1.

A third former§ 16-1835, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 35, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1835, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1835, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 37, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1836, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 36, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1836, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 36, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1836 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-534 by § 38 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1837, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 37, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 1.

A third former§ 16-1837, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 37, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1837 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-535 by § 39 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1838, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 38, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 1.

A third former§ 16-1838, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 38, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1838 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-536 by § 40 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1839, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 39, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 1.

A third former§ 16-1839, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 39, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1839 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-537 by § 41 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1840, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 40, p. 876; am. 1973, ch. 87, § 8, p. 137, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8, effective January 15, 1990.

A third former§ 16-1840, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 40, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1840 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-538 by § 42 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1841, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 41, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8.

A third former§ 16-1841, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 41, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1841 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-539 by § 43 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1842, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 42, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8.

A third former§ 16-1842, which comprised S.L. 1955, ch. 259, § 45, p. 603, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1842, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1842, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1992, ch. 194, § 2.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1843, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 43, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8.

A third former§ 16-1843, which comprised S.L. 1961, ch. 87, § 1, p. 111, was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 319, § 47.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1843, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1843, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1844, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 45, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1844 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-540 by § 45 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 16-1845, which comprised 1963, ch. 319, § 46, p. 876, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 155, § 8.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1845, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1845, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 46, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1846, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1990, ch. 289, § 1, effective April 5, 1990, retroactive to January 15, 1990.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1847 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-541 by § 47 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1848 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-547 by § 54 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 16-1849 was amended and redesignated as§ 20-542 by § 48 of S.L. 1995, ch. 44, effective October 1, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1850, as added by 1989, ch. 155, § 9, p. 371, was repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 44, § 49, effective October 1, 1995.

K. The interstate commission shall collect standardized data concerning the interstate movement of juveniles as directed through its rules which shall specify the data to be collected, the means of collection and data exchange and reporting requirements. Such methods of data collection, exchange and reporting shall insofar as is reasonably possible conform to up-to-date technology and coordinate its information functions with the appropriate repository of records. ARTICLE IV

POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

The commission shall have the following powers and duties:

1. To provide for dispute resolution among compacting states.
2. To promulgate rules to effect the purposes and obligations as enumerated in this compact, which shall have the force and effect of statutory law and shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent and in the manner provided in this compact.
3. To oversee, supervise and coordinate the interstate movement of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact and any bylaws adopted and rules promulgated by the interstate commission.
4. To enforce compliance with the compact provisions, the rules promulgated by the interstate commission, and the bylaws, using all necessary and proper means including, but not limited to, the use of judicial process.
5. To establish and maintain offices which shall be located within one (1) or more of the compacting states.
6. To purchase and maintain insurance and bonds.
7. To borrow, accept, hire or contract for services of personnel.
8. To establish and appoint committees and hire staff which it deems necessary for the carrying out of its functions including, but not limited to, an executive committee as required by article III of this compact which shall have the power to act on behalf of the interstate commission in carrying out its powers and duties hereunder.
9. To elect or appoint such officers, attorneys, employees, agents, or consultants, and to fix their compensation, define their duties and determine their qualifications; and to establish the interstate commission’s personnel policies and programs relating to, inter alia, conflicts of interest, rates of compensation, and qualifications of personnel.
10. To accept any and all donations and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials, and services, and to receive, utilize, and dispose of it.
11. To lease, purchase, accept contributions or donations of, or otherwise to own, hold, improve or use any property, real, personal, or mixed.
12. To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, abandon, or otherwise dispose of any property, real, personal or mixed.
13. To establish a budget and make expenditures and levy dues as provided in article VIII of this compact.
14. To sue and be sued.
15. To adopt a seal and bylaws governing the management and operation of the interstate commission.
16. To perform such functions as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this compact.
17. To report annually to the legislatures, governors, judiciary, and state councils of the compacting states concerning the activities of the interstate commission during the preceding year. Such reports shall also include any recommendations that may have been adopted by the interstate commission. 18. To coordinate education, training and public awareness regarding the interstate movement of juveniles for officials involved in such activity.

19. To establish uniform standards of the reporting, collecting and exchanging of data.

20. The interstate commission shall maintain its corporate books and records in accordance with the bylaws.

History.

I.C.,§ 16-1901, as added by 2004, ch. 97, § 2, p. 341.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1901, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1901, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 1, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008.

Former§ 16-1902, which comprised which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1902, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 2, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008.

Former§ 16-1903, Execution of additional article, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1903, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 2A, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008.

Former§ 16-1904, Execution of amendment, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1904, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 2B, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008.

Former§ 16-1905, Juvenile compact administrator, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1905, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 3, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008. Former§ 16-1906, Supplementary agreements, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1906, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 4, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008.

Former§ 16-1907, Financial arrangements, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1907, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 5, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008

Former§ 16-1908, Financial responsibility of parents and guardians of estate, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1908, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 6, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008.

Former§ 16-1909, Responsibilities of enforcement, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1909, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 7, p. 289, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008.

Former§ 16-1910, Clarification of term “delinquent juvenile”, which comprised I.C.,§ 16-1910, as added by 1961, ch. 194, § 8, p. 289; 1995, ch. 44, § 63, p. 65, was repealed by S.L. 2004, ch. 97, § 1, effective August 26, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

For further information on the interstate commission for juveniles, see https://www.juvenilecompact.org .

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 2004, ch. 97, provides: “This act shall become effective upon the enactment of the Interstate Compact for Juveniles into law by thirty-five states or July 1, 2004, whichever is later.” On August 26, 2008, the governor of Illinois approved a bill making that state the 35th state to enact the compact into law and making the compact effective in Idaho on that date.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 16-1902 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 16-1901.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” refers to S.L. 2004, Chapter 97, which is codified as§§ 16-1901 and 16-1902.

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 2004, ch. 97, provides: “This act shall become effective upon the enactment of the Interstate Compact for Juveniles into law by thirty-five states or July 1, 2004, whichever is later.” On August 26, 2008, the governor of Illinois approved a bill making that state the 35th state to enact the compact into law and making the compact effective in Idaho on that date.

Abandonment.

Failure of a father to exercise custody and visitation rights for fear that his insistence on such rights, in view of the mother’s attitude, would be detrimental to the child did not constitute abandonment of the child by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship. In re Matthews, 97 Idaho 99, 540 P.2d 284 (1975).

Adult Adoptions.

The parental termination statutes do not apply to adult adoptions for they expressly define the term “child” as “a person less than eighteen (18) years of age.” Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994).

Federal Policy.

The federal courts follow a long-standing policy to refrain from interfering in state domestic relations disputes. Tree Top v. Smith, 577 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978).

Psychotherapy for Parent.

Surrogate Parents.

There is no requirement in this chapter that explicitly mandates psychotherapy for a parent before the state seeks termination of parental rights, and psychotherapy would not have been a reasonable option for the state to pursue before petitioning for termination of slightly mentally retarded mother’s rights in light of the mother’s disregard of the other efforts of assistance by the state. Brown v. State, 112 Idaho 901, 736 P.2d 1355 (Ct. App. 1987). Surrogate Parents.

Unless and until the legislature chooses to enact legislation specifically addressing surrogacy, intended parents must proceed within the legal avenues available to them to establish legal parenthood, a parental-rights termination proceeding under Title 16, Chapter 20, Idaho Code, and an adoption proceeding under Title 16, Chapter 15, Idaho Code. Doe v. Doe (In re Declaration of Parentage & Termination of Parental Rights), 160 Idaho 360, 372 P.3d 1106 (2016).

Termination of Parental Rights.

Even though the father (who was incarcerated for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under 16 for his conduct with his adopted daughter) and his biological daughter shared a genuinely loving relationship, termination of the parent-child relationship was in the daughter’s best interest as she would be well supported by her maternal great-aunt, would benefit from a sense of finality and comparative normalcy and permanency following termination and her pending adoption, and would be entitled to public financial benefits following the adoption. Termination was also in the father’s best “psychological” interest in order to bring him closure and help him push past his delusions and seek the help he needed in psycho-sexual treatment. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 146 P.3d 649 (2006).

Termination of parental rights based upon neglect was proper and in the best interest of the child, because substantial evidence was presented at the termination hearing regarding the mother’s criminal history and drug use, her history with her other children, her general inability to support a child, and her insufficient efforts to comply with her case plan. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 145, 306 P.3d 230 (Ct. App. 2013).

Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, a court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 161 Idaho 745, 390 P.3d 866 (Ct. App. 2017).

ALR.

§ 16-2002. Definitions.

When used in this chapter, unless the text otherwise requires:

1. “Court” means the district court or magistrate’s division thereof or, if the context requires, a judge or magistrate thereof.
2. “Child” or “minor” means any individual who is under the age of eighteen (18) years.
3. “Neglected” means:
   1. Conduct as defined in section 16-1602(31[0]), Idaho Code; or
   2. The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a child protective act case and:
      1. The department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; and
      2. Reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the department.
4. “Abused” means conduct as defined in section 16-1602(1), Idaho Code.
5. “Abandoned” means the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact. Failure of the parent to maintain this relationship without just cause for a period of one (1) year shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment under this section; provided however, where termination is sought by a grandparent seeking to adopt the child, the willful failure of the parent to maintain a normal parental relationship as provided herein without just cause for six (6) months shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment.
6. “Legal custody” means status created by court order which vests in a custodian the following rights and responsibilities:
   1. To have physical custody and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live;
   2. To supply the child with food, clothing, shelter and incidental necessities;
   3. To provide the child with care, education and discipline; and
   4. To authorize medical, dental, psychiatric, psychological and other remedial care and treatment for the child, including care and treatment in a facility with a program of services for children;
7. “Guardianship of the person” means those rights and duties imposed upon a person appointed as guardian of a minor under the laws of Idaho. It includes but is not necessarily limited either in number or kind to:
   1. The authority to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed forces of the United States, and to major medical, psychiatric and surgical treatment; to represent the minor in legal actions; and to make other decisions concerning the child of substantial legal significance;
   2. The authority and duty of reasonable visitation, except to the extent that such right of visitation has been limited by court order;
   3. The rights and responsibilities of legal custody except where legal custody has been vested in another individual or in an authorized child placement agency;
   4. When the parent and child relationship has been terminated by judicial decree with respect to the parents, or only living parent, or when there is no living parent, the authority to consent to the adoption of the child and to make any other decision concerning the child which the child’s parents could make. (8) “Guardian ad litem” means a person appointed by the court pursuant to section 16-1614 or 5-306, Idaho Code.

provided that such rights and responsibilities shall be exercised subject to the powers, rights, duties and responsibilities of the guardian of the person.

(9) “Authorized agency” means the department, a local agency, a person, an organization, corporation, benevolent society or association licensed or approved by the department or the court to receive children for control, care, maintenance or placement.

(10) “Department” means the department of health and welfare and its authorized representatives.

(11) “Parent” means:

(a) The birth mother or the adoptive mother;

(b) The adoptive father;

(c) The biological father of a child conceived or born during the father’s marriage to the birth mother; and

(d) The unmarried biological father whose consent to an adoption of the child is required pursuant to section 16-1504, Idaho Code.

(12) “Presumptive father” means a man who is or was married to the birth mother and the child is born during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated.

(13) “Parent and child relationship” includes all rights, privileges, duties and obligations existing between parent and child, including inheritance rights, and shall be construed to include adoptive parents.

(14) “Parties” includes the child and the petitioners.

(15) “Unmarried biological father,” as used in this chapter and chapter 15, title 16, Idaho Code, means the biological father of a child who was not married to the child’s mother at the time the child was conceived or born.

(16) “Unmarried biological mother,” as used in this chapter, means the biological mother of a child who was not married to the child’s biological father at the time the child was conceived or born.

(17) “Disability” means, with respect to an individual, any mental or physical impairment which substantially limits one (1) or more major life activities of the individual including, but not limited to, self-care, manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, learning, or working, or a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. Disability shall not include transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, other sexual behavior disorders, or substance use disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania. Sexual preference or orientation is not considered an impairment or disability. Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be determined without consideration of the effect of corrective or mitigating measures used to reduce the effects of the impairment.

(18) “Adaptive equipment” means any piece of equipment or any item that is used to increase, maintain, or improve the parenting abilities of a parent with a disability.

History.

(19) “Supportive services” means services which assist a parent with a disability to compensate for those aspects of their disability which affect their ability to care for their child and which will enable them to discharge their parental responsibilities. The term includes specialized or adapted training, evaluations, or assistance with effective use of adaptive equipment, and accommodations which allow a parent with a disability to benefit from other services, such as Braille texts or sign language interpreters. History.

1963, ch. 145, § 2, p. 420; am. 1971, ch. 266, § 1, p. 1067; am. 1972, ch. 196, § 3, p. 483; am. 1988, ch. 138, § 1, p. 249; am. 1990, ch. 26, § 1, p. 40; am. 1996, ch. 365, § 1, p. 1222; am. 2000, ch. 171, § 8, p. 422; am. 2002, ch. 233, § 9, p. 666; am. 2005, ch. 391, § 47, p. 1263; am. 2013, ch. 287, § 11, p. 741; am. 2014, ch. 120, § 4, p. 337; am. 2016, ch. 265, § 8, p. 700; am. 2016, ch. 360, § 3, p. 1061.

Cross References.

Child protective act,§ 16-1601 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Guardians for minors,§ 15-5-201 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, substituted “section 16-1602(26)” for “section 16-1602(25)” in paragraph (3)(a) and rewrote paragraph (3)(b), which formerly read: “The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders in a child protective act case or the case plan, and reunification of the child with his or her parent(s) has not occurred within the time standards set forth in section 16-1629(9), Idaho Code.”

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 120, updated a reference in paragraph (3)(a) in light of the 2014 amendment of§ 16-1602.

This section was amended by two 2016 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 265, updated the statutory reference in paragraph (3)(a) to reflect the 2016 amendment of§ 16-1602.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 360, updated the statutory reference in paragraph (3)(a) to reflect the 2016 amendment of§ 16-1602.

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed data in paragraph (3)(a) is surplusage resulting from the reconciliation of the two 2016 amendments of this section.

Effective Dates.

Section 21 of S.L. 1972, ch. 196, provided that this act shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1972.

Abandonment.

The record contained substantial and competent evidence supporting a magistrate judge’s findings of abandonment of the child by each parent based upon lack of contact and support of the child, their drug-related activities, and repeated incarcerations; termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Doe v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 146 Idaho 759, 203 P.3d 689 (2009).

Where the father was serving probation for felony injury to a child, the terms of his sexual abuse treatment program required that he not contact any minor children and his wife refused to consent to his contact with their children. In a termination of parental rights proceeding, substantial evidence supported the magistrate’s finding that he did not willfully abandon his children within the meaning of subsection (5) of this section. Doe I v. Doe II (In re Doe), 148 Idaho 713, 228 P.3d 980 (2010).

Finding of abandonment was proper, although there was an enforceable no contact with mother order, where it was undisputed that father had no contact whatsoever with his daughter and he provided no financial support for her. Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 392, 234 P.3d 716 (2010).

Trial court erred in terminating a father’s parental rights to his child on the ground of abandonment, because the court did not adequately consider how the father’s position in the military might have severely limited his ability to maintain a normal relationship with his child and the court did not give adequate consideration to the fact that the father had stayed current on his child support payments. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 46, 244 P.3d 190 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported an order terminating a father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment where he failed to maintain regular contact with the children and the children had bonded with their stepfather; the magistrate was justified in finding that the father’s attempt to blame his financial difficulties was unpersuasive. Doe v. Doe, 152 Idaho 77, 266 P.3d 1182 (Ct. App. 2011).

Decision terminating the parental rights of a Mexican citizen to his daughter born in the United States on the ground of abandonment was not supported by substantial evidence, where there was no evidence that he had the ability to establish any relationship with his daughter as long as she was in the custody of the department and he was in Mexico, legally barred from entering the United States. Additionally, there is no evidence that he had the ability to pay support, and he consistently expressed the desire to have custody of daughter, doing all that he could do for that to happen. In re Doe, 153 Idaho 258, 281 P.3d 95 (2012).

Mother’s parental rights were properly terminated because substantial, competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s decision that the mother had willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child, as she failed to contact the child for over a year, even though at times she was geographically close to him, and, even when she eventually was in contact with him under the visitation stipulation, her visits were sporadic. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 505, 314 P.3d 187 (2013).

Magistrate court erred by terminating the father’s parental rights and granting the stepfather’s petition to adopt the child; because the record showed that the mother secreted herself and the child from the father, and that the father was active in the child’s life up until the mother asked the father to terminate his rights and, then, changed her phone number, job, and place of residence. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 156 Idaho 532, 328 P.3d 512 (2014).

Inconsistency between a magistrate court’s oral findings of fact and written conclusions of law required a vacation of an order terminating a biological father’s parental rights. The magistrate found that the husband failed to meet his burden of proving willful abandonment and instead determined that termination was appropriate, based on the biological father’s past and future incarceration. However, the subsequent memorandum decision stated that the biological father had abandoned the child by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 159 Idaho 461, 362 P.3d 536 (2015). District court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to her children, because clear and convincing evidence established that she abandoned the children by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship and neglected them by failing to provide meaningful support where she had some financial ability to do so, had a difficult time keeping a job and permanent residence, and did not provide any resources to help the children, cover expenses of any kind or cover the cost of keeping the children while they were in the care of their paternal great-grandparents. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 161 Idaho 532, 387 P.3d 785 (2016).

Father had abandoned child pursuant to this section, where, at the time of the hearing, the father had been completely absent from the child’s life for approximately one-half of her life and he made no effort to contact the child, when he knew, at least, where the mother worked. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 399, 414 P.3d 221 (2018).

Maternal grandmother and step-grandfather’s petition to adopt a child and terminate the father’s parental rights was properly granted, as the father willfully abandoned the child without just cause. He never supported the child financially; although, despite his time in prison, he had financial resources available, after the sale of his home and with his receipt of Social Security disability benefits. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 443 P.3d 213 (2019).

Grandparents were entitled to terminate the parental rights of a mother — their daughter — to the mother’s child — their grandchild — because the grandparents were caring for the child and wished to adopt the child. Furthermore, the mother had abandoned the child, had issues with mental health, substance abuse, periodic incarceration, and financial stability, and failed to maintain a normal parental relationship through reasonable support and/or regular personal contact with the child. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1130 (2019).

Adult Adoptions.

The parental termination statutes do not apply to adult adoptions for they expressly define the term “child” as “a person less than eighteen (18) years of age.” Melling v. Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 887 P.2d 1061 (1994).

Neglected.

Parents’ failure to comply with the magistrate court’s orders to complete their case plan, for the proper care and supervision of their children, meets the definition of “neglected” in this section. In re Termination of Doe v. Doe (In re Termination of Doe), 147 Idaho 353, 209 P.3d 650 (2009).

Order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her five children under§ 16-2005(1)(b) was proper because she had neglected her children within the meaning of paragraph (3)(b) of this section by her failure to comply with her case plan, her failure to maintain safe, stable and adequate housing, and her ongoing relationship with a convicted sex offender. State v. Doe, 149 Idaho 409, 234 P.3d 733 (2010).

Neglect may be properly found under paragraph (3)(b) where the mother was not reunified with her children for fifteen out of twenty-one months, while the state had spent over $80,000 on counseling, gas vouchers, rental assistance, and foster care and mother failed to maintain residential and financial stability. State v. Doe, 149 Idaho 409, 234 P.3d 733 (2010). Under§§ 16-1602 and 16-1629 and this section, termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children, based on the parents’ history, and ongoing use, of controlled substances, which resulted in neglect of the children who were in foster care for seventeen out of twenty-two months. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 149 Idaho 474, 235 P.3d 1195 (2010).

Evidence supported the magistrate’s decision that termination was proper because the mother and father neglected the children by failing to comply with their case plan and by failing to provide proper care and control, given that: (1) the children had been seen unsupervised, (2) the mother and father had inconsistent compliance with their case plan, (3) they did not provide child support or maintain regular phone contact with the children, (4) all the witnesses were in agreement as to the inadequate and unstable living conditions and lack of improvement by the mother and father, and (5) the mother and father were unwilling or unable to provide the care and stability the children needed. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 149 Idaho 564, 237 P.3d 661 (Ct. App. 2010).

Finding of neglect was supported when the mother failed to perform many requirements of the care plan, including undergoing a psychological evaluation, providing verification of financial stability, maintaining a safe and stable home, developing a custody agreement with the father, and applying any learned parenting skills to caring for the child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 149 Idaho 627, 238 P.3d 724 (Ct. App. 2010).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights to her children was proper because the magistrate court specifically found neglect on the grounds that the mother and her husband had failed to comply with their case plan by not: (1) providing Idaho department of health and welfare with a schedule of household chores, (2) completing a food safety course, (3) cooperating with visits from the department, (4) contacting a psychosocial rehabilitation agency, (5) following the recommendation in her psychological evaluation, (6) completing an 18-week parenting course, (7) writing out a list of developmental tasks for each child, and (8) coming up with a budget. Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, 244 P.3d 180 (2010).

The magistrate court placed excessive emphasis upon father’s admittedly abhorrent behavior prior to the removal of the children from his home, and upon minor noncompliance with reporting requirements that had not been in effect for half a year prior to the termination hearing, while disregarding or giving minimal attention to the compelling evidence of father’s success in overcoming alcoholism, complying with treatment requirements, maintaining remunerative employment, and becoming a nurturing parent with whom the children had developed a strong bond. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 752, 250 P.3d 803 (Ct. App. 2011).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights because there was substantial evidence that he neglected his children. After his release from prison, he failed to establish suitable living arrangements, failed to obtain adequate employment, and was convicted of driving without privileges. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 498, 260 P.3d 1169 (2011).

In terminating a father’s parental rights, evidence of his failure to comply with his case plan was properly considered as a basis for neglect. Ida. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 356, 256 P.3d 764 (2011).

Termination of both parents’ rights was proper where the father was incarcerated, and where neither parent had reunited with the children or completed requirements of their case plans. Further, the children had lived in foster care for 18 months preceding trial. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 846, 264 P.3d 953 (2011). Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights under subsection (3), because he neglected his child by conduct or omission, which caused the child to be without proper parental care and control, subsistence, medical, or other care or control. The father had not expressed a genuine interest in learning about the child’s special needs, let alone how to care for those needs on a daily basis. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 644, 273 P.3d 685 (2012).

In a termination of parental rights case, substantial evidence supported the finding that appellant mother neglected her children by failing to comply with her case plan: appellant failed to maintain safe housing and employment, did not demonstrate adequate parenting skills, and resisted suggestions for improvement. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 910, 277 P.3d 357 (2012).

Termination of parental rights based upon neglect was proper and in the best interest of the child, because substantial evidence was presented at the termination hearing regarding the mother’s criminal history and drug use, her history with her other children, her general ability to support a child, and her insufficient efforts to comply with the case plan; there was no requirement to wait fifteen months to file a petition for termination of parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 145, 306 P.3d 230 (Ct. App. 2013).

Mother failed to show that the trial court erred in finding neglect; in part, the mother failed to get her children to school and counseling sessions and did not provide financial support; and, it was hard to find any area of parental responsibility that the mother consistently met. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 156 Idaho 103, 320 P.3d 1262 (2014).

There was substantial evidence to support the termination of a father’s parental rights based on neglect and abuse. He failed to provide for the well-being of his children, as he did not complete counseling services, did not actively participate in parenting classes, and did not intervene when his children were being abused by his spouse. Further, the father’s inability to discharge parental responsibilities had been ongoing for years. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 159 Idaho 664, 365 P.3d 420 (Ct. App. 2015).

Magistrate court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights because the evidence was substantial and competent support for its finding of neglect; the mother’s return with her child to live with the father after discovering his sexual abuse of the child’s older sister exemplified her inability to prioritize the child’s well-being over her own relationships, and her missed urinalysis tests and arrests reflected her general inability to care for the child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 160 Idaho 154, 369 P.3d 932 (2016).

Impossibility may be asserted as a defense to a claim of neglect founded upon failure to comply with the requirements of a case plan. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 161 Idaho 596, 389 P.3d 141 (2016).

Since the magistrate court had made no findings as to whether the mother was responsible for the circumstances which led to her failure to complete the case plan, possibly invoking the provisions of paragraph (3)(b), a remand was necessary. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 161 Idaho 596, 389 P.3d 141 (2016).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper on the basis of neglect because, despite the mother’s recent progress, she had longstanding history of drug abuse and relapses and neglectful conduct: one of the children was seriously injured in an automobile accident due to the mother driving while under the influence; she used drugs while pregnant or while the children were in her care; she had failed to provide stable and safe housing for her children; and she was not a consistent presence in the children’s lives, as she had been absent because of drug usage, because the care of the children was overwhelming to her, and because of incarceration. Idaho Dep’t of Health v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 162 Idaho 69, 394 P.3d 112 (Ct. App. 2017). Magistrate court correctly found that a mother failed to follow her case plan and was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities, establishing neglect. The mother’s recent and modest improvements were insufficient to overcome her history of demonstrated unfitness. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 161 Idaho 754, 390 P.3d 1281 (2017).

Evidence of incarceration is competent evidence of neglect. A parent who is incarcerated for a substantial portion of his or her child’s life cannot provide any amount of parental care and control, subsistence, medical or other care, or control necessary for the child’s well-being. Idaho Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 162 Idaho 400, 397 P.3d 1159 (Ct. App. 2017).

Magistrate court’s finding that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests based on neglect was supported by substantial, competent evidence, where the mother was unable to provide a stable and permanent home for child; there was ample evidence that the child improved under foster care, and the mother demonstrated a consistent inability to care for the child. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 274, 411 P.3d 1175 (2018).

Magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of neglect, where she failed to point to any evidence supporting her statement that she participated in the case plan, she failed to complete several of the tasks outlined in the plan, she was unable to protect the children from the father, and her mental and physical conditions impaired her ability to parent. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 163 Idaho 367, 413 P.3d 767 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the finding that the mother neglected her children, as the mother made almost no progress on the major case plan tasks, like obtaining stable housing and employment, completing drug treatment, having a history of negative drug tests, getting mental health treatment and an anger assessment, and completing parenting classes and applying what she learned. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 486, 432 P.3d 35 (2018).

Parents neglected their children and were unlikely to make the permanent changes necessary to properly care for the children, as the mother showed an inability to parent due to mental and substance abuse issues, the father failed to comply with his case plan, the children were in foster care for the required period without reunification being accomplished, and the father was unable to provide the parental care necessary for the children’s health, safety, and well-being. Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 437 P.3d 33 (2019).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was appropriate, because there was substantial, competent evidence supporting the magistrate court’s finding that the father neglected the father’s children, as he failed to complete his case plan. Despite periods of incarceration, which the magistrate court properly considered, the father was responsible, whether directly or indirectly, for non-compliance with the requirements of the case plan. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 875, 436 P.3d 1224 (2019).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights based on neglect was proper because, although the mother challenged the magistrate court’s finding of neglect based on her failure to complete her case plan, the mother did not challenge the additional bases upon which the magistrate court found the mother neglected the child; and the court found neglect on the additional bases of the mother’s continued methamphetamine use, periods of incarceration, and probation violations. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 437 P.3d 922 (2019). Magistrate court did not err in determining that the mother neglected a child, where the finding was based upon the developmental delays shown in the child and his malnourishment that occurred between his first and second placements in foster care. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1162 (2019).

Substantial, competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s finding that a father neglected his children, as defined by subdivision (3)(b), where the children had been in the custody of the Idaho department of health and welfare for 15 of the most recent 22 months without reunification occurring. While it was not impossible for the father to comply with any tasks in his case plan, his failure to do so stemmed largely from his lack of effort. State v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1140 (2019).

Substantial, competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s finding that the mother neglected her children, where she failed to comply with her case plan and the children had been in the custody of the Idaho department of health and welfare for 15 of the most recent 22 months prior to termination, without reunification occurring. State v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1151 (2019).

Parent.

Biological father was not a “parent” under this section and had no parental rights to the child; substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s findings that the father failed to meet the requirements of§ 16-1504(2)(a) [now (3)(a)], as he had not developed a substantial relationship with the child and never took any of the steps available to establish himself as the child’s parent. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, v. In re Doe, 150 Idaho 88, 244 P.3d 232 (2010).

Man, who is neither child’s adoptive nor biological father, cannot assert his status as child’s parent only on the basis of a child support order obtained by the department which stated hat he “is the legal father” of child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 140, 244 P.3d 1226 (2010).

Where substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate’s determination that the presumed father was never married to the mother and was not the child’s adoptive or biological father, the magistrate did not err when he determined that the presumed father did not meet the statutory definition of a “parent” or “presumptive father.” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 195, 245 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2010).

Cited Dayley v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 522, 733 P.2d 743 (1987); Tanner v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 818 P.2d 310 (1991); Doe v. Roe (In re Doe), 142 Idaho 202, 127 P.3d 105 (2005); In re Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 149 Idaho 401, 234 P.3d 725 (2010); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 953, 277 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2012); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 154 Idaho 175, 296 P.3d 381 (2013); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 236, 395 P.3d 1269 (2017); In re Termination of the Parental Rights of Doe, 162 Idaho 280, 396 P.3d 1162 (2017); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 380, 397 P.3d 1139 (2017); Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 1, 407 P.3d 588 (2017); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 849, 436 P.3d 670 (2019). RESEARCH REFERENCES

Idaho Law Review.

Idaho Law Review. — Way out West: A Comment Surveying Idaho State’s Legal Protection of Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Individuals, Comment. 49 Idaho L. Rev. 587 (2013).

ALR.

§ 16-2003. Jurisdiction.

The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction, other than as provided in title 32, Idaho Code, to hear petitions to terminate the parent and child relationship when the child is present in the state. When a court has jurisdiction over the child under the child protective act, chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code, that court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the action to terminate parental rights unless it consents to a different venue or jurisdiction in the best interests of the child.

History.

1963, ch. 145, § 3, p. 420; am. 2005, ch. 391, § 48, p. 1263.

Authorized Agency.

As an “authorized agency” under this section, the Idaho department of health and welfare may petition for the termination of a mother’s parental rights in her child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 498, 260 P.3d 1169 (2011).

Temporary Guardians.

Temporary guardians of child had standing to file petition for termination of father’s parental rights, in that they stood in loco parentis to child at time petition was filed. Craven v. Doe, 128 Idaho 490, 915 P.2d 720 (1996).

Cross References.

“Mentally ill” defined,§ 66-317.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 1994 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 1994 amendment, by ch. 393, added the present subdivision g and redesignated former subdivision g as present subdivision h.

The 1994 amendment, by ch. 426, in the first sentence of subdivision a added “willfully” preceding “failed to maintain”; added the last sentence of subdivision a; and added another subdivision h which has been designated as “[i.]” by the compiler.

This section was amended by two 2000 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2000 amendment, by ch. 77, in the introductory language, inserted “(1)” following “one”; at the end of subdivision j.(1), added “or”, in subdivision j.(2), added “if the court determines the parent has been convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter of another sibling of the child or has aided, abetted, conspired or solicited to commit such murder or voluntary manslaughter and/or if the court determines the parent has been convicted of a felony assault or battery which resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or a sibling; or”, at the end of subdivision j.(3), added “or”, and added subdivision j.(4).

The 2000 amendment, by ch. 171, in the introductory language, inserted “(1)” following “one”; in the paragraphs following subdivision f. substituted “..” for “19”; deleted former subdivision g. which read: “Where consent to termination of parental rights is implied by reason of the failure of a putative father to establish paternity in the manner prescribed in section 16-1513, Idaho Code”; redesignated former subdivision h. as present subdivision g.; deleted former subdivision i. which read: “In the case of a father’s parental relationship, where the father has failed to file notice of claim to paternity and willingness to assume responsibility as provided in section 16-1513(3), Idaho Code”; redesignated former subdivision j. as present subdivision h., and in concluding language, substituted “subsection h.” for “subsection j.” The 2013 amendment, by ch. 287, rewrote paragraph (2)(b) which formerly read: “The parent has subjected the child to torture, chronic abuse or sexual abuse, has committed murder or intentionally killed the other parent of the child, has committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child or has aided, abetted, conspired or solicited to commit such murder or voluntary manslaughter, and/or has committed battery which resulted in serious bodily injury to a child; or.”

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 296, deleted “18-6108” following “18-6101” in paragraph (2)(b)(ii).

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 1971, ch. 266 declared an emergency. Approved March 25, 1971.

Section 2 of S.L. 1999, ch. 314 declared an emergency. Approved March 24, 1999.

Abandonment.

Evidence that a father, after a divorce in which custody of his children was awarded to his wife and after the wife’s remarriage and removal to the state of Connecticut, failed to make substantial contribution to their support, to visit them, or to make sufficient inquiry of their whereabouts to locate them was sufficient to sustain a finding that such father had abandoned his children. Clark v. Jelinek, 90 Idaho 592, 414 P.2d 892 (1966). The standards prescribed by this section for determining abandonment are not applicable to that term in an adoption proceeding and the children of a divorced father could not be adopted by their mother’s subsequent husband without their father’s consent on the ground that he had abandoned them by failure to maintain a normal parental relationship. Clayton v. Jones, 91 Idaho 87, 416 P.2d 34 (1966).

Though failure of a parent to maintain the normal parental relationship without just cause for a period of over one year is prima facie evidence of abandonment, the burden of persuasion of abandonment remains with the petitioner who seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re Matthews, 97 Idaho 99, 540 P.2d 284 (1975).

Failure of a father to exercise custody and visitation rights for fear that his insistence on such rights, in view of the mother’s attitude, would be detrimental to the child did not constitute abandonment of the child by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship. In re Matthews, 97 Idaho 99, 540 P.2d 284 (1975).

Father’s failure to provide any support for his children or to make any real attempt to communicate with them for over one year, despite the fact that he knew their mother was unable to care for them and that they had been placed in foster care, was sufficient evidence to support a finding of abandonment. Crum v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 111 Idaho 407, 725 P.2d 112 (1986).

Where the trial court finds that abandonment is established by clear and convincing evidence, those findings will not be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous; clear error will not be deemed to exist where the findings are supported by substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. Crum v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 111 Idaho 407, 725 P.2d 112 (1986).

Substantial and competent evidence supported termination of father’s parental rights, where grounds of abandonment and neglect existed and termination was in the best interests of parent and child. Craven v. Doe, 128 Idaho 490, 915 P.2d 720 (1996).

Where the father was in prison when his child was born and had never seen his child or provided financial support for him, but after learning of the child’s birth, he sent the child several Christmas gifts, tried to speak with the child’s mother and maternal grandmother, wrote to the grandmother without receiving a response, signed documents authorizing medical treatment for the child, contacted the caseworker a number of times, and wrote a letter to the magistrate court indicating that he did not want his parental rights terminated, and the mother’s parental rights were already terminated, the father’s failure to complete the “rider” program after the child was born and get out of prison early was not substantial competent evidence that supported a finding by clear and convincing evidence of abandonment; the father’s efforts to maintain a relationship with the child had to be judged in terms of the reality of his imprisonment and not trivialized. Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 (2002).

Order terminating father’s rights was reversed, where the magistrate judge failed to adequately consider the father’s evidence that the lack of a normal parental relationship was not without just cause. There was no consideration of the distance between the parties or the fact that the father had missed work due to injuries and was heavily in debt. Roe v. Doe (In re Doe), 143 Idaho 188, 141 P.3d 1057 (2006).

Where the father was serving probation for felony injury to a child, the terms of his sexual abuse treatment program required that he not contact any minor children and his wife refused to consent to his contact with their children. In a termination of parental rights proceeding, substantial evidence supported the magistrate’s finding that he did not willfully abandon his children within the meaning of paragraph (1)(a) of this section. Doe I v. Doe II (In re Doe), 148 Idaho 713, 228 P.3d 980 (2010). Trial court erred in terminating a father’s parental rights to his child on the ground of abandonment under this section, because the court did not adequately consider how the father’s position in the military might have severely limited his ability to maintain a normal relationship with his child and the court did not give adequate consideration to the fact that the father had stayed current on his child support payments. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 46, 244 P.3d 190 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported an order terminating a father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment where he failed to maintain regular contact with the children and the children had bonded with their stepfather; the magistrate was justified in finding that the father’s attempt to blame his financial difficulties was unpersuasive. Doe v. Doe, 152 Idaho 77, 266 P.3d 1182 (Ct. App. 2011).

Decision terminating the parental rights of a Mexican citizen to his daughter born in the United States on the ground of abandonment was not supported by substantial evidence, where there was no evidence that he had the ability to establish any relationship with his daughter as long as she was in the custody of the department and he was in Mexico, legally barred from entering the United States. Additionally, there is no evidence that he had the ability to pay support, and he consistently expressed the desire to have custody of daughter, doing all that he could do for that to happen. In re Doe, 153 Idaho 258, 281 P.3d 95 (2012).

Magistrate’s finding that the father had legally abandoned his child under paragraph (1)(a) was supported by clear and convincing evidence, where the father willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship, did not provide any significant reasonable financial support, was unable to have regular personal contact with the child, was in prison when the child was born, continued to commit new offenses, and did not engage in any parent/child relationship. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 154 Idaho 175, 296 P.3d 381 (2013).

Mother’s parental rights were properly terminated, because substantial, competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s decision that the mother had willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child, as she failed to contact the child for over a year, even though at times she was geographically close to him, and, even when she eventually was in contact with him under the visitation stipulation, her visits were sporadic. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 505, 314 P.3d 187 (2013).

Magistrate court erred by terminating the father’s parental rights and granting the stepfather’s petition to adopt the child; because the record showed that the mother secreted herself and the child from the father, and that the father was active in the child’s life up until the mother asked the father to terminate his rights and, then, changed her phone number, job, and place of residence. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 156 Idaho 532, 328 P.3d 512 (2014).

Inconsistency between a magistrate court’s oral findings of fact and written conclusions of law required a vacation of an order terminating a biological father’s parental rights. The magistrate found that the husband failed to meet his burden of proving willful abandonment and instead determined that termination was appropriate, based on the biological father’s past and future incarceration. However, the subsequent memorandum decision stated that the biological father had abandoned the child by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 159 Idaho 461, 362 P.3d 536 (2015). Maternal grandmother and step-grandfather’s petition to adopt a child and terminate the father’s parental rights was properly granted, as the father willfully abandoned the child without just cause. He never supported the child financially; although, despite his time in prison, he had financial resources available, after the sale of his home and with his receipt of Social Security disability benefits. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 443 P.3d 213 (2019).

Grandparents were entitled to terminate the parental rights of a mother — their daughter — to the mother’s child — their grandchild — because the grandparents were caring for the child and wished to adopt the child. Furthermore, the mother had abandoned the child, had issues with mental health, substance abuse, periodic incarceration, and financial stability, and failed to maintain a normal parental relationship through reasonable support and/or regular personal contact with the child. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1130 (2019).

Abuse of Child.

Where evidence indicated that plaintiff’s daughter was subjected to extensive, long-term mistreatment, that plaintiff was aware of wife striking daughter and had admitted that fact to deputy sheriff, there was sufficient evidence to terminate parental rights to the child under this section, since plaintiff at the very least acquiesced to the physical abuse of his daughter and failed to take any preventive measures to assure the child’s future protection. Castro v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 102 Idaho 218, 628 P.2d 1052 (1981).

Magistrate erred in finding that, in not specifically using the word “abuse,” the state did not allege abuse as a ground for termination under paragraph (1)(b), when the language used by the state in describing the second ground for termination was almost identical to the definition of abused under§ 16-1602(1)(a). Idaho Dep’t of Health & Wealth v. Doe (In re Doe), 149 Idaho 653, 239 P.3d 451 (Ct. App. 2010).

Appellate Review.

Where, in an action to terminate parental rights, the burden of proving neglect by clear and convincing evidence has been noted explicitly and applied by the trial judge, the appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s findings unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

A parent-child relationship may be terminated by the court when it finds that the parent has neglected or abused the child or that termination is found to be in the best interests of the parent and child; on appeal the supreme court will not disturb those findings, if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Dayley v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 522, 733 P.2d 743 (1987).

There was substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence to affirm the finding of the magistrate court that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights of the parents. That evidence included findings by the magistrate that: (1) one child had difficulties with speech and suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and reactive attachment disorder, while the other child was significantly delayed in development, both physically and mentally; (2) the children had been removed from the home due to physical abuse, unsanitary conditions, and repeated reports of poor parenting; (3) the parents had a lack of recognition of the problems that brought the children to the attention of child protection services and an unwillingness to make changes necessary to allow reunification to occur; and (4) the parents lacked knowledge related to basic day-to-day care, parenting and behavior management coupled with the unwillingness or inability to utilize what they have been taught to improve the quality of their children’s life experiences. Doe v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 141 Idaho 511, 112 P.3d 799 (2005). Grounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, because each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child. Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. On appeal, an appellate court will not disturb the magistrate court’s decision to terminate parental rights, if there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the decision. Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. An appellate court is required to conduct an independent review of the magistrate court record, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgment because the magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive, and to judge the character of the parties. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 263, 270 P.3d 1048 (2012).

Where, in her opening brief, mother did not contest that substantial and competent evidence existed to support the district court’s holding that mother neglected child and was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities, she will have been deemed to have waived that issue. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 263, 270 P.3d 1048 (2012).

Best Interests of Child.

The best interests of the parent must be considered only when terminating the relationship under subsection (3); however, the best interests of the child must be considered when terminating the relationship under any provision of this section. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

Where the children’s behavior and school work generally improved while they were living away from the mother, the children themselves told the judge that they felt insecure at their mother’s home and did not want to live there, and the caseworker stated that the children needed a permanent, stable living arrangement that the mother had been unable to provide, the magistrate’s finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests was supported by substantial evidence and had to be sustained on appeal. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

The finding that reuniting the family would be extremely remote falls within the condition permitting termination in the best interests of the parent and child. Dayley v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 522, 733 P.2d 743 (1987).

Once a statutory ground for termination is found, the magistrate must then decide what is in the best interest of the child. Doe v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 502, 849 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1993).

Where mother failed to complete her chemical dependency program, continued to use drugs, refused to obey a curfew, and committed many other probation violations, the evidence supported the magistrate’s conclusion that the best interests of the child required that the parental rights be terminated. State v. Doe, 133 Idaho 826, 992 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999).

There is no requirement that a party seeking termination of parental rights present expert testimony to support the assertion that termination would be in the best interests of the child. Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 992 P.2d 1205 (1999). Termination of mother’s parental rights was in a child’s best interest under subsection (1), because the child was 22 months old and had been in foster care since seven weeks of age and mother had not demonstrated that she would not resume using methamphetamine. In re Doe 2009-19, 150 Idaho 201, 245 P.3d 953 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported the magistrate’s finding that termination of a father’s parental rights would be in the children’s best interest given that: (1) the father had a long criminal history, including gang membership, (2) he was currently incarcerated for aggravated assault, (3) he continued to incur new charges after the children were born, (4) he did not provide the children with daily support and it was likely to be a long time before he was prepared to be a parent to them, and (5) he could not provide the children with stability and permanency. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 797, 275 P.3d 23 (Ct. App. 2012).

The fact that a child may enjoy a higher standard of living in the United States than in a foreign country where the child’s parent resided was not a reason to terminate the parental rights of a foreign national; rather, the natural parent presumption applied. In re Doe, 153 Idaho 258, 281 P.3d 95 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights was in his child’s best interests where the father had been convicted of murder, the record suggested that the person he murdered was someone he believed helped the mother and the child escape, the father had prior felony convictions, the mother testified the father was violent to both her and the child, he had threatened to run away with the child, and he drank excessively every day, and he only contacted the mother twice in the four years since they had left him, and the father was to be incarcerated until after the child reached majority. Doe v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 358 P.3d 77 (2015).

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. When determining whether termination is in the child’s best interest, the trial court may consider: the parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. A finding that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds, supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 161 Idaho 745, 390 P.3d 866 (Ct. App. 2017).

Magistrate court’s conclusion that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in her children’s best interests was supported by substantial, competent evidence. Among other things, the mother had continuing problems with the law, as demonstrated by her frequent incarcerations, and the fact that the children improved while in the legal custody of the Idaho department of health and welfare. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 161 Idaho 754, 390 P.3d 1281 (2017).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, as the children had improved while in foster care; whereas, before entering foster care, the children did not have their emotional, educational, or physical needs met. Idaho Dep’t of Health v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 162 Idaho 69, 394 P.3d 112 (Ct. App. 2017).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest given the mother’s lack of stable employment, lack of effort to improve her situation, failure as to mental health treatment, resistance to drug testing, incarceration, and stability of the children in their placement. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 236, 395 P.3d 1269 (2017). Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. When determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Idaho Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 162 Idaho 400, 397 P.3d 1159 (Ct. App. 2017).

Magistrate court did not err when it found clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that the termination of a father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child, because it properly considered the child’s relationship with the stepfather and the fact that the father had not paid child support or made a substantial effort to contact the child. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 653, 402 P.3d 1106 (2017).

Substantial, competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s conclusion that termination of parents’ parental rights was in the best interest of their child: the parents failed to financially support the child; there was considerable testimony regarding the child’s physical, emotional, and academic improvement after being removed from the parents’ care; the guardian ad litem recommended termination of parental rights; and the child’s grandparents, with whom the child was living, wanted to adopt the child. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 1, 407 P.3d 588 (2017).

Magistrate court’s finding that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests based on neglect was supported by substantial, competent evidence, where the mother was unable to provide a stable and permanent home for child; there was ample evidence that the child improved under foster care, and the mother demonstrated a consistent inability to care for the child. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 274, 411 P.3d 1175 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the conclusion that termination of the mother and father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest, where the case manager testified that the father had not internalized the parental training he received and was not invested in making necessary changes in his parenting and that she was gravely concerned that he would revert to his past abusive behaviors, the magistrate court found that testimony credible, other witnesses testified similarly, and only the parents testified that they thought the father could have been a safe and protective parent. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 163 Idaho 367, 413 P.3d 767 (2018).

Finding that termination was in the best interest of child was supported by substantial and competent evidence of the father’s conduct, both before and after incarceration, because the father was incarcerated for having sex with girls that were underage. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 399, 414 P.3d 221 (2018).

Magistrate court’s decision that termination of a father’s parental rights was in child’s best interest was supported by substantial and competent evidence, because child was improving in foster care in a stable and safe home and child was with her half-brother, to whom she had a significant connection and attachment that she would lose if the father’s parental rights were not terminated. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 98, 425 P.3d 1241 (2018). Guardians’ request for termination of the mother’s parental rights was properly granted, because achieving some permanency for the children was in their best interests; the mother had a history of substance abuse before, during, and after her time caring for the children; the mother provided little to no financial support for the children while they were in her care and only minimal support while they were under the guardians’ care; both children had thrived under the guardians’ care and were treated as members of the family; and, when the older child was reunited with the mother, the stress of the interaction was enough for her to regress in her progress and suffer physical symptoms of anxiety. Doe I v. Doe (In re Doe II), 164 Idaho 511, 432 P.3d 60 (2018).

Magistrate court did not err in determining that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of her child. It was appropriate for the magistrate court to emphasize the mother’s lack of progress in drug treatment. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 849, 436 P.3d 670 (2019).

Termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest, because the parents failed to provide a stable, permanent home for the children and struggled with both sobriety and maintaining consistent, gainful employment; the children found a safe and stable home in foster care with their grandparents; the children made significant improvements while in foster care; and the children’s contact with the parents was never consistent or predictable. Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 437 P.3d 33 (2019).

Termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest because: the father did not have a suitable home for the child; he was currently on parole and was a registered sex offender; and the child had only known her grandparents as her parents.. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 443 P.3d 213 (2019).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, where the older child’s needs were not being met when she was living with her parents and she had substantially improved while in foster care, the father had not established a bond with the younger child, and her foster parents testified that the younger child required extra nurturing and patience, which the foster family had given to her since she was placed in their home. State v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1140 (2019).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, where the needs of two children were not being met, the two children had substantially improved while in foster care, a third child was born testing positive for methamphetamine and had benefitted from her foster parents’ nurturing, and all three children needed stable, structured, safe, and sober environments in order to thrive. State v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1151 (2019).

Magistrate court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights, because she had a drug addition, had left on a trip to California, had been incarcerated, and was unable to provide a safe and stable home for the child based on her spotty employment and housing history. The child’s best interests and need for stability could not wait for the mother to finish her case plan or have the time that she needed to devote to the child. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2019-32) (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 457 P.3d 154 (2020).

Best Interests of Parent.

While the best interests of the child must be considered when terminating the parent-child relationship under all provisions of this section, the best interests of the parent need not be considered unless termination is considered under subsection (e) [now (3)] of this section. Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 992 P.2d 1205 (1999). Consideration of best interests of mother was not required because once the trial court determined that termination of parental rights was proper under subsection (b) [now (1)(b)], there was no need to consider the merits of a claim under subsection (e) [now (3)]. Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 992 P.2d 1205 (1999).

Burden of Proof.

In a termination of parental rights action, the petitioner holds and retains the burden of persuasion to show that abandonment has occurred. This includes a showing that the defendant parent is without just cause for not maintaining a normal relationship with the child. If the petitioning party makes the prima facie case, then the defendant parent holds the burden of production to present evidence of just cause. If the trier of fact finds that there are no valid defenses or “just causes,” then the petitioning party has met the burden of persuasion. Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 392, 234 P.3d 716 (2010).

Conditional Termination.

An agreement to terminate parental rights, subject to certain explicit conditions, is invalid in Idaho. There are two methods of terminating parental rights: the first being voluntary by way of a consent, which must be an absolute and complete termination. The second method is involuntary termination which requires that the court find that termination is in the child’s best interest and that at least one statutory condition exists. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 896, 318 P.3d 886 (2014).

Consent.

Where none of the consents to terminate parental rights complied with Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) statutory formalities, and the order of June 1990 terminating the mother’s parental rights was invalid, the mother’s parental rights were not terminated, and she had standing to participate in adoption placement proceedings. Doe v. Roe, 127 Idaho 452, 902 P.2d 477 (1995).

Given that, once a parent or guardian gives consent for a specified individual to adopt a child, that consent cannot be revoked and becomes permanent, strict compliance with the requirements of§ 16-1506(2) and subsection (4) of this section is required. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 636, 402 P.3d 1089 (2017).

Consideration of Parent’s Past.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the father’s past along with other relevant evidence, where the evidence of the father’s past was considered in determining whether he would be a neglectful parent at the present time and in the future. Dayley v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 522, 733 P.2d 743 (1987).

Magistrate court’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights due to neglect properly focused on past as well as current conditions and was supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 172 P.3d 1114 (2007).

Constitutionality.

Default.

This section is not unconstitutionally vague. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 138 Idaho 893, 71 P.3d 1040 (2003). Default.

While the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow entry of default in a termination proceeding, it does not permit the entry of judgment (a decree terminating parental rights) against the non-appearing party unless the Idaho department of health and welfare has established the grounds for termination and the court finds termination is in the best interest of the child by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, there was no substantial and competent evidence to support a termination where the Idaho department of health and welfare did not seek to admit evidence and the decree indicated that the trial court’s decision was based upon review of the file. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 159 Idaho 386, 360 P.3d 1067 (Ct. App. 2015).

Disability.

Subsection (6) does not require the Idaho department of health and welfare and/or its caseworkers to notify a mother that she is disabled due to her bipolar and anxiety disorders Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 498, 260 P.3d 1169 (2011).

Effectiveness of Counsel.

Counsel’s decision not to call the mother to the stand and his option to argue rehabilitation rather than lack of evidence to support a finding of abuse were tactical decisions, and strategic and tactical decisions of counsel do not sustain a charge of ineffective counsel. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Mahoney-Williams, 101 Idaho 280, 611 P.2d 1065 (1980).

Incarceration.

In a proceeding to terminate a parent-child relationship, the due process clause mandates that the grounds for termination must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and where trial court finds that the grounds as defined by statute, which are alleged for termination, are established by clear and convincing evidence, these findings will not be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and clear error will not be deemed to exist where the findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence, albeit, conflicting evidence. Also, the appellate court in reviewing such findings will indulge in all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 936 P.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1997).

Order terminating an incarcerated father’s parental rights was proper as he had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter and was likely to remain incarcerated during the remainder of his children’s minority, and the children had no independent recollection of the father. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 148 Idaho 243, 220 P.3d 1062 (2009).

Father’s incarceration provided a basis for termination of his parental rights under paragraph (1)(e) because the father had been, and was likely to remain, incarcerated for a substantial (important or meaningful) period of the child’s minority. Given his history of drug abuse, prior criminal record and past failure to successfully complete the requirements of probation, it was likely that considerable time would pass before he was able to regain custody of the child; and the child was in her formative years. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 605, 261 P.3d 882 (Ct. App. 2011).

Father’s parental rights should not have been terminated under this section, as the decision to terminate his rights was based solely upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of murdering the children’s mother and the subsequent judgment of conviction, both of which were vacated upon appeal of the criminal case. In re Termination of the Parental Rights of Doe, 158 Idaho 548, 348 P.3d 163 (2015). Magistrate court’s decision that the mother had been and was likely to be incarcerated for a substantial period of the child’s minority applied an erroneous legal standard, as it focused on the duration of her past incarceration, not the expected duration of future incarceration. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 161 Idaho 596, 389 P.3d 141 (2016).

It was no error to find termination of an incarcerated father’s parental rights was in a child’s best interest because, inter alia, the child was three and a half years old when the father was sentenced to prison and would be 18 and a half years old when the father had served his minimum sentence. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 194, 395 P.3d 814 (2017).

Though what constitutes a “substantial period of time” is undefined in paragraph (1)(e), a trial court may consider factors including, but not limited to: the age of the child; the relationship, if any, that has developed between the parent and the child; and the likely period of time the parent will remain incarcerated. The court must consider the expected length of future incarceration, not the amount of time the parent has spent incarcerated in the past. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 98, 425 P.3d 1241 (2018).

Independent Grounds.

The statutory grounds for termination under this section are independent and, if any one or more of the grounds for termination are found, termination may be granted. Doe v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 502, 849 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1993).

Informal Relinquishing of Custody.

A parent is not relieved of his or her responsibility to provide appropriate parental care by informally relinquishing custody of a child to a relative or friend. Thompson v. Thompson, 110 Idaho 93, 714 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1986).

Mentally Deficient Parent.

Where a petition for termination alleges mental deficiency of the parent as a ground for termination under this section, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the alleged incompetent parent. State v. Doe, 123 Idaho 562, 850 P.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1993).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court’s conclusion that the father’s mental illness was not a defense to termination was not clear error. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 138 Idaho 893, 71 P.3d 1040 (2003).

Substantial evidence supported the decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights where the caseworker’s testimony showed that the mother had failed to attend and apply knowledge gained from a parenting class, obtain substance abuse education, or comply with a psychologist’s mental health recommendations as required by a parenting plan, and the psychological reports showed that she had been diagnosed with several mental disorders that required consistent care. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Termination of Parental Rights Regarding Doe), 144 Idaho 312, 160 P.3d 751 (2007).

Mentally Retarded Mother.

Neglect.

Termination of a slightly mentally retarded mother’s parental rights to her two children would be upheld in view of evidence that the children were abused, neglected, and abandoned, that, because of the mother’s inability or lack of desire, there appeared to be little or no chance of improvement in conditions for the children, and that the mother, although she expressed love for her children, was barely able to provide basic care for herself, let alone her children. Brown v. State, 112 Idaho 901, 736 P.2d 1355 (Ct. App. 1987). Neglect.

Nothing in the statutory definition of “neglect” suggests that a child must suffer demonstrable harm before the parent-child relationship can be terminated; it is sufficient that the child lacks parental care necessary for his health, morals and well-being. The termination statutes of this state exist not merely to alleviate harm but to prevent it. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Cheatwood, 108 Idaho 218, 697 P.2d 1232 (Ct. App. 1985).

Whether neglect has occurred is a question of fact, to be determined in the first instance by the trial judge upon a constitutionally mandated standard of clear and convincing evidence; when neglect has been found upon this standard, the judge’s finding — like any finding of fact — is reviewable upon the appellate standard of substantial evidence. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Cheatwood, 108 Idaho 218, 697 P.2d 1232 (Ct. App. 1985).

Where the acts by which the natural mother initially became noncustodial, as well as her conduct thereafter, are the very acts constituting neglect, her conduct toward the child would not be evaluated solely in terms of a noncustodial parent. Thompson v. Thompson, 110 Idaho 93, 714 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1986).

Termination for parental neglect under subdivision b [now (1)(b)] of this section is not contingent upon a showing that the parent will somehow benefit. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

Where the mother failed to provide the parental care necessary for the children’s health, morals and well-being, the magistrate’s finding that the mother had neglected her daughters was supported by substantial evidence and would not be disturbed. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

Substantial and competent evidence was presented to support the magistrate’s determination that the mother had neglected the children by failing to provide parental care necessary for the health, morals and well-being of the children. Doe v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 502, 849 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1993).

Neglect is a permissible ground for termination, even where the parent being terminated is a noncustodial parent. State v. Doe, 133 Idaho 826, 992 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999).

Magistrate did not err by dismissing the Idaho department of health and welfare’s petition to terminate parental rights, where there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the termination based on neglect; the evidence showed that the parent attempted to contact the children, sent them gifts, and provided child support payments. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Roe (In the Interest of Doe), 139 Idaho 18, 72 P.3d 858 (2003).

Substantial and competent evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the father neglected his child where he failed to provide the parental care necessary for the child’s health, morals, and well-being; the trial court properly considered relevant evidence about the father’s behavior and treatment of his son, he was granted visitation rights with his child, and the father’s visitation with his child was sporadic and infrequent and the father also failed to provide for his child’s health insurance or medical costs. Roe v. Doe (In re Termination of the Parental Rights of Doe), 142 Idaho 174, 125 P.3d 530 (2005). Father’s parental rights were properly terminated on grounds of neglect, where the father actively encouraged the child’s mother to take drugs and findings about his parenting skills were supported by substantial competent evidence; the father failed to provide care and it was in the child’s best interests for his rights to be terminated. Casi Found., Inc. v. Doe (In re Doe), 142 Idaho 397, 128 P.3d 934 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the father neglected his daughter, and, therefore, the magistrate judge properly terminated the father’s parental rights; the father’s neglect, violence and drinking had a highly detrimental effect and there was no point in further considering reunification. State v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 144 P.3d 597 (2006).

Magistrate’s finding that a mother neglected her children was supported by substantial and competent evidence where the mother had been completely noncompliant with her case plan until her release from incarceration, and, upon release, the mother merely complied with the terms of her probation rather than the terms of her case plan, and there were several enumerated specific instances of neglect. State v. Doe (In re Doe), 145 Idaho 662, 182 P.3d 1196 (2008).

Order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her five children under subdivision (1)(b) was proper because she had neglected her children within the meaning of§ 16-2002(3)(b) by her failure to comply with her case plan, her failure to maintain safe, stable and adequate housing, and her ongoing relationship with a convicted sex offender. State v. Doe, 149 Idaho 409, 234 P.3d 733 (2010).

Evidence supported the magistrate’s decision that termination was proper because the mother and father neglected the children by failing to comply with their case plan and by failing to provide proper care and control, given that: (1) the children had been seen unsupervised, (2) the mother and father had inconsistent compliance with their case plan, (3) they did not provide child support or maintain regular phone contact with the children, (4) all the witnesses were in agreement as to the inadequate and unstable living conditions and lack of improvement by the mother and father, and (5) the mother and father were unwilling or unable to provide the care and stability the children needed. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 149 Idaho 564, 237 P.3d 661 (Ct. App. 2010).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights to her children was proper, because the magistrate court specifically found neglect on the grounds that the mother and her husband had failed to comply with their case plan by not: (1) providing Idaho department of health and welfare with a schedule of household chores, (2) completing a food safety course, (3) cooperating with visits from the department, (4) contacting a psychosocial rehabilitation agency, (5) following the recommendation in her psychological evaluation, (6) completing an 18-week parenting course, (7) writing out a list of developmental tasks for each child, and (8) coming up with a budget. Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, 244 P.3d 180 (2010).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights under paragraph (1)(b), because he neglected his child by conduct or omission, which caused the child to be without proper parental care and control, subsistence, medical, or other care or control. The father had not expressed a genuine interest in learning about the child’s special needs, let alone how to care for those needs on a daily basis. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 644, 273 P.3d 685 (2012).

In a termination of parental rights case, substantial evidence supported the finding that appellant mother neglected her children by failing to comply with her case plan that had been prepared to set forth reasonable efforts that would make it possible for the children to return to appellant’s home. Appellant failed to maintain safe housing and employment as required by the case plan, did not demonstrate adequate parenting skills, and resisted her caseworkers’ suggestions for improvement. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 910, 277 P.3d 357 (2012). Termination of the mother’s parental rights on grounds of neglect under paragraph (1)(b) was proper, because the mother failed to comply with the case plan in areas of substance abuse and mental health and the mother never provided verification of full-time employment or adequate housing. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 152 Idaho 953, 277 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2012).

Magistrate’s finding of neglect under paragraph (1)(b) was supported by clear and convincing evidence, where the father had failed to comply with the case plan and the court orders that were entered in the child protection act case, and he was unable to provide proper parental care and control for the child’s well-being. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 154 Idaho 175, 296 P.3d 381 (2013).

Termination of parental rights based upon neglect was proper and in the best interest of the child, where substantial evidence was presented at the termination hearing regarding the mother’s criminal history and drug use, her history with her other children, her general ability to support a child, and her insufficient efforts to comply with the case plan. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 145, 306 P.3d 230 (Ct. App. 2013).

Mother failed to show that the trial court erred in finding neglect; in part, the mother failed to get her children to school and counseling sessions and did not provide financial support; and, it was hard to find any area of parental responsibility that the mother consistently met. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 156 Idaho 103, 320 P.3d 1262 (2014).

Willfulness is not necessary to a finding of neglect, as father’s incarceration, long history of addiction and failed treatment, and failure to maintain stable housing or employment were properly considered in determining that he had neglected his child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 158 Idaho 764, 351 P.3d 1222 (2015).

Magistrate court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights because the evidence was substantial and competent support for its finding of neglect; the mother’s return with her child to live with the father after discovering his sexual abuse of the child’s older sister exemplified her inability to prioritize the child’s well-being over her own relationships, and her missed urinalysis tests and arrests reflected her general inability to care for the child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 160 Idaho 154, 369 P.3d 932 (2016).

Magistrate court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights was supported by substantial and competent evidence, where the child had been in state custody for 15 of 22 months, reunification had not been accomplished, and the father failed to meet the requirement for clean drug testing. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 161 Idaho 660, 389 P.3d 946 (2016).

Magistrate court correctly found that a mother failed to follow her case plan and was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities, establishing neglect. The mother’s recent and modest improvements were insufficient to overcome her history of demonstrated unfitness. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 161 Idaho 754, 390 P.3d 1281 (2017).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper on the basis of neglect because, despite the mother’s recent progress, she had longstanding history of drug abuse and relapses and neglectful conduct: one of the children was seriously injured in an automobile accident due to the mother driving while under the influence; she used drugs while pregnant or while the children were in her care; she had failed to provide stable and safe housing for her children; and she was not a consistent presence in the children’s lives, as she had been absent because of drug usage, because the care of the children was overwhelming to her, and because of incarceration. Idaho Dep’t of Health v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 162 Idaho 69, 394 P.3d 112 (Ct. App. 2017). There was substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court’s determination that the mother’s compliance with the case plan was not impossible and the court’s order terminating her parental rights to the child for neglect, including evidence that the mother, who was incarcerated, committed 13 disciplinary offenses after the child was removed from the home and that she failed to complete a therapeutic community program. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 380, 397 P.3d 1139 (2017).

Magistrate court’s decision to terminate a father’s parental rights based on neglect was supported by substantial and competent evidence, because the father neglected his child, provided no excuse for failing to provide financial support, and provided no explanation for his failure to try to make efforts to visit with his child or to return to the court to enforce the order allowing him visitation. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 653, 402 P.3d 1106 (2017).

Magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of neglect, where she failed to point to any evidence supporting her statement that she participated in the case plan, she failed to complete several of the tasks outlined in the plan, she was unable to protect the children from the father, and her mental and physical conditions impaired her ability to parent. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 163 Idaho 367, 413 P.3d 767 (2018).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the parents neglected their children and were unlikely to make the permanent changes necessary to properly care for the children, as the mother showed an inability to parent due to mental and substance abuse issues, the father failed to comply with his case plan, the children were in foster care for the required period without reunification being accomplished, and the father was unable to provide the parental care necessary for the children’s health, safety, and well-being. Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 437 P.3d 33 (2019).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was appropriate, because there was substantial, competent evidence supporting the magistrate court’s finding that the father neglected the father’s children, as he failed to complete his case plan. Despite periods of incarceration, which the magistrate court properly considered, the father was responsible, whether directly or indirectly, for non-compliance with the requirements of the case plan. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 875, 436 P.3d 1224 (2019).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights based on neglect was proper because, although the mother challenged the magistrate court’s finding of neglect based on her failure to complete her case plan, the mother did not challenge the additional bases upon which the magistrate court found the mother neglected the child; and the court found neglect on the additional bases of the mother’s continued methamphetamine use, periods of incarceration, and probation violations. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 437 P.3d 922 (2019).

Magistrate court did not err in determining that the mother neglected a child, where the finding was based upon the developmental delays shown in the child and his malnourishment that occurred between his first and second placements in foster care. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1162 (2019).

Notice.

Where the state’s petition made reference to the father’s failure to comply with the agreement for reuniting the family, the father’s failure to cooperate in providing care and a stable home environment for the child, and the state’s belief that the best interests of the child would be served by terminating the father’s parental rights, the father was provided adequate notice that the state was seeking to terminate his parental rights. Dayley v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 522, 733 P.2d 743 (1987). Application of this section in a termination of parental rights proceeding did not result in a violation of the father’s due process rights. The state provided adequate notice that it was seeking to terminate his parental rights. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 138 Idaho 893, 71 P.3d 1040 (2003).

Party.

Idaho does not recognize equitable adoption; thus, a “father” claiming equitable parental rights is not a proper party to termination proceedings. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 195, 245 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2010).

Procedure.

It is not necessary that the state allege precisely which of the provisions of this section under which it is proceeding; a simple and concise statement of the facts is all that is necessary. Dayley v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 522, 733 P.2d 743 (1987).

The provisions of this section apply equally toward biological and adoptive children. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 83, 408 P.3d 81 (2017).

Rehabilitation of Parents.

The magistrate did not err in not making a finding as to whether the parents could or could not have been rehabilitated prior to a termination of their parental rights. Bush v. Phillips, 113 Idaho 873, 749 P.2d 492 (1988).

Although it was uncontroverted that the mother loved the child, that was not enough to permit continued custody where a caseworker testified that she did not feel the mother was capable of safely and effectively parenting the child, that the mother had not established a connection with the child and that no purpose would be served with additional time or services. The goals of permanency and the needs of the child were not met by preserving the mother’s parental rights with the hope she could someday be capable of caring for the child. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 149 Idaho 627, 238 P.3d 724 (Ct. App. 2010).

Standard of Proof.

The standard of proof required for termination of parental rights, “clear and convincing” evidence, is not affected by the private or public nature of the party seeking termination. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

Under paragraph (1)(d) of this section, the district court’s finding that father was unable to discharge parental responsibilities was supported by substantial and competent evidence where the magistrate relied heavily on statements from three DHW workers. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 207, 233 P.3d 138 (2010).

Termination Improper.

Grounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, because each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child. Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 236, 395 P.3d 1269 (2017). Termination Improper.

Where termination order was conditional; as it terminated the mother’s parental rights only in favor of the adoptive parents, it was invalid. Doe v. Roe, 127 Idaho 452, 902 P.2d 477 (1995).

Where a child was out of the mother’s care for 18 of the last 22 months, despite its reluctance, the department of health and welfare was obligated under the law to file a petition for termination of parental rights, but, the magistrate court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights was clearly erroneous. The magistrate erred in focusing on the mother’s conviction and past criminal behavior while dismissing relevant and competent evidence such as the social worker’s testimony and that reunification was possible and was occurring. State v. Roe (In re Doe), 142 Idaho 594, 130 P.3d 1132 (2006).

The magistrate court placed excessive emphasis upon father’s admittedly abhorrent behavior prior to the removal of the children from his home, and upon minor noncompliance with reporting requirements that had not been in effect for half a year prior to the termination hearing, while disregarding or giving minimal attention to the compelling evidence of father’s success in overcoming alcoholism, complying with treatment requirements, maintaining remunerative employment, and becoming a nurturing parent with whom the children had developed a strong bond. The evidentiary record does not provide objectively supportable grounds for the trial court’s decision that termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 752, 250 P.3d 803 (Ct. App. 2011).

Substantial and competent evidence did not support a finding that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest, where the parents were able to provide a beneficial environment that was responsive to child’s needs. That ability was especially important given that the child was in a residential treatment facility after sexually assaulting his younger sister, and there was no expert testimony that the child’s medical, physical, or emotional condition foreclosed his reentry into the parents’ home. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 83, 408 P.3d 81 (2017).

Termination Proper.

A magistrate correctly ordered the parent-child relationship terminated based on his findings that (1) the mother had physically abused the child; (2) the mother had neglected the child; (3) the mother and her husband had been dishonest with the department of health and welfare and had attempted to cover up their physical abuse of the child; (4) the parents’ prognosis for improving their parenting ability was poor; and (5) the child had bonded with her foster mother and would experience trauma and further developmental delay if she were removed from her foster mother’s care. Rhodes v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 107 Idaho 1120, 695 P.2d 1259 (1985).

Where father had neglected his children, failed to provide adequate voluntary support and had no realistic plans for their care, the magistrate court determined father had neglected and abused his children and that it was in the best interest of the children that his parental rights be terminated. Tanner v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 818 P.2d 310 (1991).

The facts indicated that when under the mother’s care, children were in an unstable, unnurturing and dangerous environment; therefore, the trial court found sufficient evidence to support termination of the mother’s parental rights based on the conclusion that she had neglected the children and that the children’s best interests would be served by termination. Doe v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 122 Idaho 644, 837 P.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1992). Substantial evidence supported court’s decision to terminate father’s parental rights upon a finding of abandonment. The mother presented evidence that he had no contact with the minor child for over two years, he stated he wasn’t ready to start raising a family, and he gave no support to the minor child apart from an isolated gift. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 138 Idaho 893, 71 P.3d 1040 (2003).

Court determined that biological father had no cognizable parental rights, where he had not had his paternity established by court decree, he had never filed an acknowledgement of paternity with vital statistics, he had not filed an acknowledgement of paternity, commenced paternity proceedings, or provided any monetary support toward the mother’s pregnancy, he was clearly aware of the strong possibility that he was the child’s father, particularly when the child was born nine months after he had engaged in sexual relations with the mother, and he had done nothing to affirmatively establish a relationship with the child. Doe v. Roe (In re Doe), 142 Idaho 202, 127 P.3d 105 (2005).

Even though the father (who was incarcerated for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under 16 for his conduct with his adopted daughter) and his biological daughter shared a genuinely loving relationship, termination of the parent-child relationship was in the daughter’s best interest as she would be well supported by her maternal great-aunt, would benefit from a sense of finality and comparative normalcy and permanency following termination and her pending adoption, and would be entitled to public financial benefits following the adoption. Termination was also in the father’s best “psychological” interest in order to bring him closure and help him push past his delusions and seek the help he needed in psycho-sexual treatment. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 146 P.3d 649 (2006).

District court did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support a magistrate’s decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights in her child. Although the mother’s case plan required her to complete substance abuse counseling, the mother did not enter counseling until over three years later, after the termination trial had begun. In re Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448 (2009).

Under paragraph (1)(d) of this section, the district court did not err in terminating the mother’s parental rights, as it was supported by substantial, competent evidence; the fact that the mother demonstrated that she had improved in her ability to pay attention to her children did not undermine the lower court’s finding that the mother was unable to carry out her parental responsibilities and this inability would be injurious to the health, morals, and well-being of the children. Idaho Dep. of Health and Welfare v. Doe (In re Child I), 149 Idaho 165, 233 P.3d 96 (2010).

Father’s parental rights were properly terminated where court found that father had neglected his child by failing to comply with the court’s orders in a case plan, by failing to reunify with his son within fifteen of the last twenty-two months, and by failing to demonstrate consistency in housing, employment, and/or abstinence from controlled substances, impairing his ability to provide proper parental care. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 149 Idaho 401, 234 P.3d 725 (2010).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper because she could not independently parent the child in the future based on the degenerative and incurable nature of her multiple sclerosis, her physical and mental impairments could be injurious to the child, and termination was in child’s best interests. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 153 Idaho 700, 291 P.3d 39 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father’s parental rights, where, because of the father’s ongoing incarceration, his alcohol abuse, and his violent and controlling behaviors, he was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities for a prolonged period, and this inability to parent was injurious to his child. Doe v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 358 P.3d 77 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father’s parental rights, where he failed to provide evidence that his murder conviction was on appeal or reason to believe that his conviction would be overturned, other than his conclusory opinion. Doe v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 358 P.3d 77 (2015).

There was substantial evidence to support the termination of a father’s parental rights based on neglect and abuse. He failed to provide for the well-being of his children, as he did not complete counseling services, did not actively participate in parenting classes, and did not intervene when his children were being abused by his spouse. Further, the father’s inability to discharge parental responsibilities had been ongoing for years. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 159 Idaho 664, 365 P.3d 420 (Ct. App. 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother’s parental rights based on her inability to discharge parental responsibilities, where it showed that she failed to secure court approved housing, complete drug treatment, make progress on her GED, or secure stable employment, and that she struggled with drug use and admitted she was addicted to methamphetamine, she was charged with felony drug crimes, and she struggled with her visitations with the children. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 160 Idaho 824, 379 P.3d 1094 (2016).

In a parental rights termination case, substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s finding that a father was likely to remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time during his sons’ minority and supported the court’s conclusion that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of his children. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 162 Idaho 266, 396 P.3d 695 (2017).

Magistrate court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights. The magistrate court’s finding that the father sexually abused his oldest daughter and would be incarcerated for a majority of the childhood years of his other children was supported by substantial and competent evidence. In re Termination of the Parental Rights of Doe, 162 Idaho 280, 396 P.3d 1162 (2017).

Magistrate court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights. The mother did not challenge the magistrate court’s finding she was not able to provide the care and control necessary for the children’s well-being and she had done nothing to protect her children from the abuse of their father. In re Termination of the Parental Rights of Doe, 162 Idaho 280, 396 P.3d 1162 (2017).

Cited State ex rel. Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834 (1970); Doe v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 146 Idaho 759, 203 P.3d 689 (2009); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 149 Idaho 474, 235 P.3d 1195 (2010); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 140, 244 P.3d 1226 (2010); Ida. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 356, 256 P.3d 764 (2011); Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 151 Idaho 846, 264 P.3d 953 (2011); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 164 Idaho 883, 436 P.3d 1232 (2019); State v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 450 P.3d 323 (Ct. App. 2019); State v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 454 P.3d 1169 (2019). RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Applicability of Americans With Disabilities Act. 119 A.L.R.5th 351.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Evidentiary issues. 122 A.L.R.5th 385.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning rehabilitative and reunification services. 12 A.L.R.6th 417.

Notice to Parents.

Grandmother’s petition to adopt a grandchild was insufficient notice to the child’s father of the possible termination of the father’s parental rights, because the petition did not state any grounds for seeking such termination. Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 315 P.3d 848 (2013).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 2005 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 25, corrected a citation in present subsection (6).

The 2005 amendment, by ch. 291, made the same correction as in ch. 25, and extensively rewrote the section, adding the subsection designations and the form in subsection (3). The 2013 amendment, by ch. 138, rewrote the last sentence of subsection (5), which formerly read: “Where the putative father has failed to timely commence proceedings to establish paternity under section 7-1111, Idaho Code, and by filing with the vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare, notice of his commencement of proceedings to establish his paternity of the child born out of wedlock, notice under this section is not required unless such putative father is one of those persons specifically set forth in section 16-1505(1), Idaho Code.”

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 330, substituted “section 16-1504(6), Idaho Code” for “section 16-1504(5), Idaho Code” near the beginning of the third sentence in subsection (5).

Compiler’s Notes.

The vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare, referred to the last sentence in subsection (5), is the bureau of vital records and health statistics. See http://www.healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Health/VitalRecordsandHealthStatistics/tabid/102/Default.aspx .

Applicability.

In circumstances where the father and the mother both acknowledge who the biological father is and the father is willing to accept the rights and responsibilities of paternity, the provisions of§§ 16-2007 and 16-1505 apply; if, on the other hand, the mother does not join in the acknowledgment of paternity, then the father is required to follow the mandates of§ 16-1513 and file proceedings for paternity and a notice with the bureau of vital records and health statistics. Roe Family Servs. v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 139 Idaho 930, 88 P.3d 749 (2004).

Where putative father never commenced paternity proceedings before the department of health and welfare petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights, the magistrate judge correctly held that father was not even entitled to notice of a hearing on a petition by the department requesting an Order of Non-Establishment of Parental Rights. The magistrate’s decision is reversible only if father can show that his due process rights were violated. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 36, 304 P.3d 1202 (2013).

Notice.

It was error to terminate a biological father’s parental rights based on his failure to file and register his notice of commencement of paternity proceedings under§ 16-1513, because the father and mother had filled out and had notarized a paternity affidavit requesting that he be listed as the father on the child’s birth certificate; it was, therefore unnecessary for him to file a paternity action, he was the biological father of the child and, pursuant to this section, he was entitled to have had notice of the termination hearing. Roe Family Servs. v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 139 Idaho 930, 88 P.3d 749 (2004).

Guardian Ad Litem.

Grandmother’s petition to adopt a grandchild was insufficient notice to the child’s father of the possible termination of the father’s parental rights, because the petition did not state any grounds for seeking such termination. Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 315 P.3d 848 (2013). Guardian Ad Litem.

Appointment of a guardian ad litem to the child is within the discretion of the trial court. Dayley v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 522, 733 P.2d 743 (1987).

Where a petition for termination alleges mental deficiency of the parent as a ground for termination under§ 16-2005, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the alleged incompetent parent. State v. Doe, 123 Idaho 562, 850 P.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1993).

In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the court did not err by failing to appoint a guardian. The court did not find the father was incompetent for purposes of the proceeding. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 138 Idaho 893, 71 P.3d 1040 (2003).

A guardian ad litem is not required in every termination of parental rights proceeding. Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 392, 234 P.3d 716 (2010).

Magistrate court properly denied the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a mother in proceedings terminating her parental rights, where the termination petition was filed almost two years after the mother’s involuntarily commitment was terminated, the mother’s diagnosis of schizophrenic disorder did not immediately and irrevocably qualify her as incompetent, and the mother was not determined to be incapable of understanding and/or participating in the proceedings. In re Termination of Parental Rights of Doe, 161 Idaho 393, 386 P.3d 916 (2016).

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Vital statistics unit,§ 39-342.

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 138, redesignated the former alphabetical subsection designations numerically and made internal reference updates; substituted “bureau of child support services” for “bureau of child support enforcement” in subsection (1); in the first sentence of subsection (2), substituted “this chapter” for “this act” and “division of family and community services” for “division of family and children’s services”; and rewrote subsection (3), which formerly read: “No social study or investigation as provided for in subsection b. of this section shall be directed by the court with respect to the putative father who has failed to timely commence proceedings to establish paternity under section 7-1111, Idaho Code, and by filing with the vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare, notice of his commencement of proceedings to establish his paternity of the child, unless such putative father is one of those persons specifically set forth in section 16-1505(1), Idaho Code.”

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 330, in subsection (3), substituted “section 16-1504(6), Idaho Code” for “section 16-1504(5), Idaho Code” near the beginning.

Compiler’s Notes.

For further information on Idaho child support services, referred to in subsection (1), see https://mychildsupport.idaho.gov/cswebsite/landing.action .

Factors for Court’s Consideration.

Report.

Findings of fact regarding children’s progress in adapting to foster homes and actions of father since children were taken into custody and his contacts with them and his attempts to influence them were proper factors for consideration of court in making decision as to termination of parent-child relationship with respect to the mother. State ex rel. Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834 (1970). Report.

While the better procedure is for the department to prepare a report as provided for in this section, it is not reversible error for failure to submit such a report where all the information required by the report was before the court through the pleadings and interrogatories. State ex rel. Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834 (1970).

Cross References.

County prosecuting attorneys,§ 31-2601 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the first sentence of the first paragraph refers to S.L. 1963, Chapter 145, which is codified as§§ 16-2001 through 16-2015. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 20, title 16, Idaho Code.

Section 5 of S.L. 1987, ch. 207 read: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of remaining portions of this act.” CASE NOTES

Appellate Review.

Whether neglect has occurred is a question of fact, to be determined in the first instance by the trial judge upon a constitutionally mandated standard of clear and convincing evidence; when neglect has been found upon this standard, the judge’s finding — like any finding of fact — is reviewable upon the appellate standard of substantial evidence. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Cheatwood, 108 Idaho 218, 697 P.2d 1232 (Ct. App. 1985).

Where, in an action to terminate parental rights, the burden of proving neglect by clear and convincing evidence has been noted explicitly and applied by the trial judge, the appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s findings unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

Where the trial court finds that abandonment is established by clear and convincing evidence, those findings will not be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous; clear error will not be deemed to exist where the findings are supported by substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. Crum v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 111 Idaho 407, 725 P.2d 112 (1986); State v. Doe, 149 Idaho 409, 234 P.3d 733 (2010).

A parent-child relationship may be terminated by the court when it finds that the parent has neglected or abused the child, or that termination is found to be in the best interests of the parent and child; on appeal the supreme court will not disturb those findings, if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Dayley v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 112 Idaho 522, 733 P.2d 743 (1987).

Attorney Fees.

Clear and Convincing.

Where attorney employed by legal aid services represented indigent mother in parent-child termination proceeding by appointment of the court under this section, he was entitled to attorney fees based on an hourly rate. Ellison v. Maynard, 101 Idaho 760, 620 P.2d 794 (1980). Clear and Convincing.

Where the father was serving probation for felony injury to a child, the terms of his sexual abuse treatment program required that he not contact any minor children and his wife refused to consent to his contact with their children. In a termination of parental rights proceeding, substantial evidence supported the magistrate’s finding that there was not clear and convincing evidence to show that the father willfully abandoned his children for purposes of this section. Doe I v. Doe II (In re Doe), 148 Idaho 713, 228 P.3d 980 (2010).

Default.

While the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows an entry of default in a termination proceeding, it does not permit the entry of judgment (a decree terminating parental rights) against the non-appearing party unless the Idaho department of health and welfare has established the grounds for termination and the court finds termination is in the best interest of the child by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, there was no substantial and competent evidence to support a termination where the Idaho department of health and welfare did not seek to admit evidence, and the decree indicated that the trial court’s decision was based upon review of the file. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 159 Idaho 386, 360 P.3d 1067 (Ct. App. 2015).

Due Process Satisfied.

In parental right termination hearing where father having been convicted of two murders was incarcerated in federal penitentiary in Texas, father requested that he be transported at state expense to the termination hearing so he could be present and testify in person was not deprived of procedural due process where magistrate in denying his request initially protected the father’s rights by appointing competent counsel to represent him and later applied the principles of Matthew v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, by considering the extent of the private and public interests affected, the risks and burdens involved, and the value of substitute safeguards in deciding whether to have the father present or whether to allow him to testify by way of deposition. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 936 P.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1997).

Parents due process rights were not violated when there were recording malfunction issues with the microphones at the termination of parental rights hearing, because an official transcript was created by a court reporter. Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 437 P.3d 33 (2019).

Adopted child’s procedural due process rights were not violated where a hearing was conducted under this section: the parties were represented by counsel, the child appeared telephonically, and the witnesses were subject to cross-examination. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 83, 408 P.3d 81 (2017).

Due Process Requirements.

Effectiveness of Counsel.

In determining whether the procedure followed in a parental rights termination proceeding satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process the criteria of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, consideration of three factors is mandated: 1. the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 2. the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 3. the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 936 P.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1997). Effectiveness of Counsel.

Counsel’s decision not to call the mother to the stand and his option to argue rehabilitation rather than lack of evidence to support a finding of abuse were tactical decisions, and strategic and tactical decisions of counsel do not sustain a charge of ineffective counsel. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Mahoney-Williams, 101 Idaho 280, 611 P.2d 1065 (1980).

Examination of Children.

In a proceeding to terminate a parent-child relationship, the fact that the trial judge examined the children involved in private with no record having been made of the examination was held to be harmless error since it is within the discretion of the trial judge to interview children outside the presence of parents in such an action. State ex rel. Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834 (1970).

Parent’s Right to Counsel.

As soon as the court perceived that a parental termination proceeding, originally scheduled as voluntary termination, would be involuntary, the court was obligated under this section to inform the mother of her right to be represented by counsel. State v. Doe, 123 Idaho 562, 850 P.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1993).

Where there was no showing of any conflict of interest and no showing of any prejudice to either the mother or the father resulting from their joint representation, the fact that separate counsel was not appointed for each did not constitute reversible error. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare (In re Doe), 150 Idaho 563, 249 P.3d 362 (2011).

Rules of Evidence.

The Idaho Rules of Evidence apply at parental termination hearings. To the extent this section allows impermissible hearsay evidence, it is not valid and should not be relied on for that purpose over a valid objection. State v. Doe (In re Doe), — Idaho —, 450 P.3d 323 (Ct. App. 2019).

Standard of Proof.

The standard of proof required for termination of parental rights, “clear and convincing” evidence, is not affected by the private or public nature of the party seeking termination. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

In a proceeding to terminate a parent-child relationship, evidence showing that the father had been unable to hold steady employment because of chronic alcoholism which resulted in numerous convictions for public intoxication as well as burglary was held to be sufficient to support a judgment of termination under this section when considered in conjunction with a finding that the mother of the children was incapable of providing her children with moral guidance, training, and support. State ex rel. Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834 (1970).

Where the children’s behavior and school work generally improved while they were living away from the mother, the children themselves told the judge that they felt insecure at their mother’s home and did not want to live there, and the caseworker stated that the children needed a permanent, stable living arrangement that the mother had been unable to provide, the magistrate’s finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests was supported by substantial evidence and had to be sustained on appeal. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986). Where the mother failed to provide the parental care necessary for the children’s health, morals and well-being, the magistrate’s finding that the mother had neglected her daughters was supported by substantial evidence and would not be disturbed. Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 719 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1986).

Termination of a slightly mentally retarded mother’s parental rights to her two children would be upheld in view of evidence that the children were abused, neglected, and abandoned, that because of the mother’s inability or lack of desire, there appeared to be little or no chance of improvement in conditions for the children, and that the mother, although she expressed love for her children, was barely able to provide basic care for herself, let alone her children. Brown v. State, 112 Idaho 901, 736 P.2d 1355 (Ct. App. 1987).

Mother’s parental rights were properly terminated, because substantial, competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s decision that the mother had willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child, as she failed to contact the child for over a year, even though at times she was geographically close to him, and, even when she eventually was in contact with him under the visitation stipulation, her visits were sporadic. Doe v. Doe (In re Doe), 155 Idaho 505, 314 P.3d 187 (2013).

Substantial and competent evidence did not support a finding that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest, where the parents were able to provide a beneficial environment that was responsive to child’s needs. That ability was especially important given that the child was in a residential treatment facility after sexually assaulting his younger sister, and there was no expert testimony that the child’s medical, physical, or emotional condition foreclosed his reentry into the parents’ home. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 83, 408 P.3d 81 (2017).

Magistrate court’s finding that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests based on neglect was supported by substantial, competent evidence, where the mother was unable to provide a stable and permanent home for child; there was ample evidence that the child improved under foster care, and the mother demonstrated a consistent inability to care for the child. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe), 163 Idaho 274, 411 P.3d 1175 (2018).

— Clear and Convincing.

This section, since the 1983 amendment, requires that at least one of the grounds for terminating parental rights be proved by clear and convincing evidence; even though this requirement was not a part of the statute until 1983, parental rights could not be terminated on a lesser standard because of due process requirements of the United States Constitution. Thompson v. Thompson, 110 Idaho 93, 714 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1986).

When Parent’s Presence not Required.

Where the father was in prison when his child was born and had never seen his child or provided financial support for him, but, after learning of the child’s birth, he sent the child several Christmas gifts, tried to speak with the child’s mother and maternal grandmother, wrote to the grandmother without receiving a response, signed documents authorizing medical treatment for the child, contacted the caseworker a number of times, and wrote a letter to the magistrate court indicating that he did not want his parental rights terminated, and the mother’s parental rights were already terminated, the father’s failure to complete the “rider” program after the child was born and get out of prison early was not substantial competent evidence that supported a finding by clear and convincing evidence of abandonment; the father’s efforts to maintain a relationship with the child had to be judged in terms of the reality of his imprisonment and not trivialized. Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 (2002). When Parent’s Presence not Required.

In action to terminate the parent-child relationship between father and child where father was incarcerated in federal penitentiary in Texas after conviction of two murders in Mexico, father was not deprived of procedural due process where magistrate denied father’s request to be present and went forward with the termination hearing while affording the father the opportunity to give his testimony by deposition, since magistrate took steps to protect the father’s rights initially by appointing counsel to represent him pursuant to this section and later by applying the principles enunciated in Matthews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, in determining whether to grant the father’s request. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 130 Idaho 47, 936 P.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1997).

ALR.

§ 16-2010. Decree.

1. Every order of the court terminating the parent and child relationship or transferring legal custody or guardianship of the person of the child shall be in writing and shall recite the findings upon which such order is based, including findings pertaining to the court’s jurisdiction.
2. 1. If the court finds sufficient grounds exist for the termination of the parent and child relationship, it shall so decree and: (2)(a) If the court finds sufficient grounds exist for the termination of the parent and child relationship, it shall so decree and:
      1. Appoint an individual as guardian of the child’s person, or
      2. Appoint an individual as guardian of the child’s person and vest legal custody in another individual or in an authorized agency, or
      3. Appoint an authorized agency as guardian of the child’s person and vest legal custody in such agency.
   2. The court shall also make an order fixing responsibility for the child’s support. The parent and child relationship may be terminated with respect to one (1) parent without affecting the relationship between the child and the other parent.
3. Where the court does not order termination of the parent and child relationship, it shall dismiss the petition; provided however, that where the court finds that the best interest of the child requires substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision, it shall make an order placing the child under protective supervision, or vesting temporary legal custody in an authorized agency, fixing responsibility for temporary child support, and designating the period of time during which the order shall remain in effect.
4. If termination of parental rights is granted and the child is placed in the guardianship or legal custody of the department of health and welfare, the court, upon petition, shall conduct a hearing as to the future status of the child within twelve (12) months of the order of termination of parental rights, and every twelve (12) months subsequently until the child is adopted or is in a placement sanctioned by the court.

History.

1963, ch. 145, § 10, p. 420; am. 1989, ch. 216, § 1, p. 524; am. 1989, ch. 218, § 5, p. 527; am. 1992, ch. 341, § 4, p. 1031; am. 1998, ch. 257, § 6, p. 850; am. 2000, ch. 171, § 12, p. 422; am. 2005, ch. 391, § 51, p. 1263.

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 1989 acts — chapter 216, § 1, and chapter 218, § 5 — which appear to be identical and have been compiled together. Both the amendments by ch. 216 and by ch. 218 inserted “(1)” in the second sentence of the last paragraph of subdivision a., and added subdivision c.

CASE NOTES

Authority of Court.

While the statute grants the court the authority to continue to order hearings until children are placed in a permanent living situation that is approved by the court, it does not give the court the authority to select the adoptive parents. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Hays, 137 Idaho 233, 46 P.3d 529 (2002).

Court Order.

Neither the magistrate’s original judgment nor the amended judgment and corresponding order complied with this section, because the original judgment did not include a recitation of the facts upon which the court was relying. The magistrate’s attempt to incorporate its oral pronouncements by reference into an amended judgment and corresponding findings and an order was deficient, as the order’s incorporation by reference was not the functional equivalent of a written recital and the court reporter’s transcription of the oral proceedings did not constitute a written order of the court sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. Idaho Dep’t of Health v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 162 Idaho 69, 394 P.3d 112 (Ct. App. 2017).

Final Determination.

When, after a hearing, the magistrate court issued an order stating that “the parents have made enough progress that it would not be in the children’s best interest to terminate their parental rights at this time,” the department of health and welfare (DHW) had failed to meet its burden to provide clear and convincing evidence that father’s parental rights should be terminated, and DHW’s petition to terminate the parent and child relationship should have been dismissed, not held in abeyance for future determination. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In the Interest of Doe), 163 Idaho 536, 415 P.3d 945 (2018).

Findings.

The magistrate’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law required by this section must be more than conclusionary statements and should be prepared by the court, not the attorneys involved in the termination dispute. Idaho Dep’t of Health And Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe Children), 161 Idaho 745, 390 P.3d 866 (Ct. App. 2017).

Criminal Case.

While it was true that defendant’s legal rights, privileges and obligations toward his child ceased if his parental rights were terminated, the district court’s directive to pay restitution in the form of child support was a condition of probation in a criminal case; thus, to determine its validity, the appellate court need only consider whether the order was reasonably related to the purpose of probation and rehabilitation. State v. Jeffs, 140 Idaho 466, 95 P.3d 84 (Ct. App. 2004).

Parties Bound.

Where natural mother’s habeas corpus petition related to the merits of a custody dispute which she had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and appeal in the state court system, she was bound by the state judgment despite her reframing the dispute as a petition for habeas corpus. Tree Top v. Smith, 577 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978).

Cross References.

Penalty for misdemeanor where none prescribed,§ 18-317.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the first sentence of the first paragraph refers to S.L. 1963, Chapter 145, which is codified as§§ 16-2001 through 16-2015. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 20, title 16, Idaho Code. The bracketed insertion near the end of the first paragraph was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 26, substituted “Any appeal from” for “An appeal may be taken to the district court from” at the beginning, and “shall be taken to the supreme court, provided however” for “in the manner and form as appeals are taken in other civil proceedings from the magistrates division of the district court to district courts, provided, however” near the middle.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 15 of S.L. 1963, ch. 145 reads: “If any section, sub-section, sub-division, paragraph, sentence, part or provision of this act shall be found to be invalid or ineffective by any court it shall be conclusively presumed that this act would have been passed by the legislature without such invalid or ineffective section, sub-section, sub-division, paragraph, sentence, part or provision, and this act as a whole shall not be declared invalid by reason of the fact that one or more sections, sub-sections, sub-divisions, paragraphs, sentences, parts or provisions may be so found invalid.”

Effective Dates.

Section 5 of S.L. 1971, ch. 170 declared an emergency. Approved March 20, 1971.

Jurisdiction.

Where court had jurisdiction of case under this section, court’s statement in its order that matter was heard pursuant to an appeal under this law was sufficient to identify the jurisdiction-granting statute without reciting jurisdictional findings. State ex rel. Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834 (1970).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” at the beginning of this section refers to S.L. 1963, Chapter 145, which is codified as§§ 16-2001 through 16-2015. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 20, title 16, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 17 of S.L. 1963, ch. 145 reads: “This act shall take effect August 1, 1963. Termination proceedings initiated prior to such date shall not be affected by this act.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the last paragraph refers to S.L. 1976, Chapter 189, which is compiled as§§ 16-2101 to 16-2107.

The bracketed insertion near the end of the section was added by the compiler to add clarity.

Compiler’s Notes.

Regulations implementing the provisions of this compact can be found at https://aphsa.org/AAICPC/AAICPC/ICPC Regulations.aspx .

Cross References.

Board of examiners, art. IV, § 18, Idaho Const. and§ 67-2001 et seq.

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2401, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2402, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2403, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2003, ch. 249, § 1, p. 641; am. 2007, ch. 309, § 1, p. 870; am. 2008, ch. 219, § 1, p. 678; am. 2019, ch. 46, § 1, p. 126.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2404, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2007, ch. 309, § 2, p. 870.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2404A, as added by 2007, ch. 309, § 3, p. 870.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2405, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

RESEARCH REFERENCES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2406, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2005, ch. 307, § 1, p. 956.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2407, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2408, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2409, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2005, ch. 307, § 2, p. 956.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2410, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2411, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2013, ch. 293, § 1, p. 770.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2412, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2413, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2414, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2415, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2005, ch. 307, § 3, p. 956.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2416, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2005, ch. 307, § 4, p. 956.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2417, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281. STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

County prosecuting attorneys,§ 31-2601 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1997, ch. 404 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 1998.

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2418, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2005, ch. 307, § 5, p. 956.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2419, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2005, ch. 307, § 6, p. 956.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2420, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2421, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2422, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2423, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2005, ch. 307, § 7, p. 956.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2424, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2425, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2426, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2427, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2428, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281; am. 2020, ch. 82, § 8, p. 174.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2429, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2430, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2431, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2432, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2433, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES

History.

I.C.,§ 16-2434, as added by 1997, ch. 404, § 1, p. 1281.

STATUTORY NOTES