Chapter 1 IDAHO FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT

Sec.

§ 37-101 — 37-112. Enforcement of food and drug laws. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1905, p. 54, §§ 1 to 3, 6, 8, 21, 22, 31, 38 to 40; reen. R.C., §§ 1114 to 1116, 1119, 1121, 1123, 1147, 1149 to 1152; am. S.L. 1909, p. 231, § 1; S.L. 1911, ch. 128, § 1, p. 415; reen. C.L. 65:1 to 65:3, 65:7 to 65:9, 65:11 to 65:16; C.S., §§ 1671 to 1682; I.C.A.,§§ 36-101 to 36-112, were repealed by S.L. 1959, ch. 153, § 24, p. 351.

§ 37-113. Short title.

This act may be cited as the Idaho Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.

History.

1959, ch. 153, § 1, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

§ 37-114. Definitions. — For the purpose of this act

  1. The term “board” means the state board of health and welfare and “director” means the director of the department of health and welfare.
  2. The term “person” includes individual, partnership, corporation, and association;
  3. The term “food” means (1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article;
  4. The term “drug” means (1) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them, and (2) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (3) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and (4) articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in clause (1), (2) or (3), but does not include devices or their components, parts or accessories;
  5. The term “device” (except when used in paragraph (k) of this section and in section [sections] 37-115(g), 37-123(f), 37-127(b) and 37-130(c), Idaho Code) means instruments, apparatus and contrivances, including their components, parts and accessories, intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or other animals; or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals;
  6. The term “cosmetic” means (1) articles intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance, and (2) articles intended for use as a component of any such articles, except that such term shall not include soap;
  7. The term “official compendium” means the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them;
  8. The term “label” means a display of written, printed or graphic matter upon the immediate container of any article, and a requirement made by or under authority of this act that any word, statement, or other information appear on the label shall not be considered to be complied with unless such word, statement, or other information also appears on the outside container or wrapper, if there be any, of the retail package of such article, or is easily legible through the outside container or wrapper;
  9. The term “immediate container” does not include package liners;
  10. The term “labeling” means all labels and other written, printed or graphic matter (1) upon an article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article;
  11. If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the labeling is misleading, or if an advertisement is alleged to be false because it is misleading, then, in determining whether the labeling or advertisement is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or in any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the labeling or advertisement fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling or advertisement relates under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling or advertisement thereof or under such conditions of use as are customary or usual;
  12. The term “advertisement” means all representations disseminated in any manner or by any means other than by labeling, for the purpose of inducing, or which are likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics;
  13. The representation of a drug in its labeling or advertisement, as an antiseptic shall be considered to be a representation that it is a germicide, except in the case of a drug purporting to be, or represented as, an antiseptic for inhibitory use as a wet dressing, ointment, dusting powder, or such other use as involves prolonged contact with the body;
  14. The term “new drug” means (1) any drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof; or (2) any drug the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of investigations to determine its safety for use under such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material extent or for a material time under such conditions;
  15. The term “contaminated with filth” applies to any food, drug, device, or cosmetic not securely protected from dust, dirt, and as far as may be necessary by all reasonable means, from all foreign or injurious contaminations;
  16. The provisions of this act regarding the selling of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics, shall be considered to include the manufacture, production, processing, packing, exposure, offer, possession, and holding of any such article for sale, and the sale, dispensing, and giving of any such article and the supplying or applying of any such articles in the conduct of any food, drug, or cosmetic establishment.
  17. The term “federal act” means the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Title 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.; 52 Stat. 1040 et seq.).
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 2, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 14, p. 633.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Board of health and welfare,§ 56-1005.

Director of department of health and welfare,§ 56-1003.

Compiler’s Notes.

The United States Pharmacopoeia, referred to in subsections (d) and (g), is a non-governmental official public standards-setting authority for prescription and over-the-counter medicines. See http://www.usp.org .

The Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, referred to in subsections (d) and (g), is the official compendium for homeopathic drug in the United States. See http://hpus.com .

The National Formulary, referred to in subsections (d) and (g), contains standards for medicines, dosage forms, drug substances, excipients, medical devices, and dietary supplements. See http://www.usp.org/USPNF .

The bracketed insertion near the beginning of subsection (e) was added by the compiler to correct the enacting legislation. The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

The words “this act” in the introductory paragraph and in subsections (h) and (p) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

§ 37-115. Prohibited acts.

The following acts and the causing thereof within the state of Idaho are hereby prohibited:

  1. The manufacture, sale, or delivery, holding or offering for sale of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded;
  2. The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic;
  3. The receipt in commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded, and the delivery or proffered delivery thereof for pay or otherwise;
  4. The sale, delivery for sale, holding for sale, or offering for sale of any article in violation of section 37-124 or 37-127[, Idaho Code];
  5. The dissemination of any false advertisement;
  6. The refusal to permit entry or inspection, or to permit the taking of a sample, as authorized by section 37-133[, Idaho Code];
  7. The giving of a guaranty or undertaking which guaranty or undertaking is false, except by a person who relied on a guaranty or undertaking to the same effect signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person residing in the state of Idaho from whom he received in good faith the food, drug, device, or cosmetic;
  8. The removal or disposal of a detained or embargoed article in violation of section 37-118[, Idaho Code];
  9. The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale and results in such article being misbranded;
  10. Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely representing, or without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag, label, or other identification device authorized or required by regulations promulgated under the provisions of this act;
  11. The using, on the labeling of any drug or in any advertisement relating to such drug, of any representation or suggestion that an application with respect to such drug is effective under section 37-128[, Idaho Code], or that such drug complies with the provisions of such section.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 3, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertions in subsections (d), (f), (h), and (k) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

The words “this act” at the end of subsection (j) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

CASE NOTES

Sale of Misbranded Drug.

The sale and delivery of an over-the-counter hay fever medication in an unmarked container violated the prohibition against selling and delivering a misbranded drug, and this violation was grounds for discipline under subdivisions (1)(a) and (f) of§ 54-1726. Brown v. Idaho State Bd. of Pharmacy, 113 Idaho 547, 746 P.2d 1006 (Ct. App. 1987).

§ 37-116. Injunctions authorized.

In addition to the remedies hereinafter provided the director is hereby authorized to apply to the district court for, and such court shall have jurisdiction upon hearing and for cause shown, to grant a temporary or permanent injunction restraining any person from violating any provision of section 37-115, Idaho Code, irrespective of whether or not there exists an adequate remedy at law.

History.

1959, ch. 153, § 4, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 15, p. 633.

§ 37-117. Violations — Penalty — Exceptions.

    1. Any person who intentionally adulterates a drug that is held for sale or distribution, or that is to be administered or dispensed, shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be subject to imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years or a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or both. (1)(a) Any person who intentionally adulterates a drug that is held for sale or distribution, or that is to be administered or dispensed, shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be subject to imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years or a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or both.
    2. Any health care provider who, with knowledge that a drug has been adulterated, permits that drug to be administered or dispensed to a person shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be subject to imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years, or a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or both. For the purposes of this subsection, the term “health care provider” shall be defined as any person licensed in this state to prescribe, dispense, conduct research with respect to, or administer drugs in the course of professional practice and any unlicensed person, who, as part of such person’s employment or profession, provides health care services.
    3. The determination of whether or not a drug has been adulterated shall be made in accordance with the provisions of section 37-126, Idaho Code.
  1. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act or of rules promulgated by the board of health and welfare thereunder or who interferes with the director of the department of health and welfare or the personnel of the department in the administration of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall on conviction thereof be subject to imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both such imprisonment and fine, but if the violation is committed after a conviction of such person under this section has become final, such person shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1000), or both such imprisonment and fine.
  2. No person shall be subject to the penalties of subsection (2) of this section, for having violated section 37-115 (a) or (c), Idaho Code, if he establishes a guaranty or undertaking signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person residing in the state of Idaho from whom he received in good faith the article, to the effect that such article is not adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this act, designating this act.
  3. No publisher, radio broadcast licensee, or agency or medium for the dissemination of an advertisement, except the manufacturer, packer, distributor, or seller of the article to which a false advertisement relates, shall be liable under this section by reason of the dissemination by him of such false advertisement, unless he has refused, on the request of the director to furnish him the name and post-office address of the manufacturer, packer, distributor, seller, or advertising agency, residing in the state of Idaho who causes him to disseminate such advertisement.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 5, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 16, p. 633; am. 2002, ch. 231, § 1, p. 661.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Board of health and welfare,§ 56-1005.

Director of department of health and welfare,§ 56-1003.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsections (2) and (3) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

§ 37-117A. Reporting and disclosure requirements for employment related adulteration or misappropriation of certain drugs.

  1. When the employment of a health care provider has been terminated, either voluntarily or involuntarily, for adulteration or misappropriation of controlled substances, as defined in chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, the employer shall, within thirty (30) days of the termination, furnish written notice of the termination, described herein as “notice of termination,” to the health care provider’s professional licensing board of the state of Idaho, which shall include a description of the controlled substance adulteration or misappropriation involved in the termination. An employer who in good faith provides such information shall not be held civilly liable for the disclosure or the consequences of providing the information. There is a rebuttable presumption that an employer is acting in good faith when the employer provides such information. The presumption of good faith is overcome only upon showing by clear and convincing evidence that the employer disclosed the information with actual malice or with deliberate intent to mislead. For the purposes of this section, “actual malice” means knowledge that the information was false or given with reckless disregard of whether the information was false. For the purposes of this section, the term “health care provider” means any person licensed by a professional licensing board of the state of Idaho whose license permits the health care provider to dispense or administer controlled substances. For the purposes of this section, “employer” means a person or entity licensed under chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code, or chapter 13, title 39, Idaho Code, who employs a health care provider or providers.
  2. A professional licensing board that receives a notice of termination from an employer pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall maintain the notice of termination for the health care provider. The notice of termination shall be subject to disclosure in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of this section.
  3. Any prospective employer of a health care provider shall, before hiring such health care provider, request in writing that the health care provider’s professional licensing board furnish the prospective employer any notice of termination maintained by the board with respect to the health care provider. The prospective employer shall maintain the confidentiality of such information and shall not disclose it to any other person or entity without the prior written approval of the health care provider or as required by law, court order or the rules of civil procedure. The professional licensing board shall require, as a condition of furnishing the notice of termination, that the prospective employer file a written request for the health care provider’s notice of termination, stating under oath that the request for the notice of termination is made for a bona fide hiring purpose, that the request is made pursuant to the provisions of this section, and that the prospective employer will not disclose the information to any other person or entity without the prior written approval of the health care provider or as required by law, court order or rules of civil procedure. In the event that the prospective employer discloses the information in the notice of termination to any other person or entity in violation of the provisions of this section, and unless the disclosure is required by law, court order or the rules of civil procedure, the health care provider may pursue a civil cause of action against the prospective employer for a breach of the health care provider’s right of privacy. Upon receipt of a request made in accordance with this section for a health care provider’s notice of termination, the professional licensing board shall furnish the notice of termination to the prospective employer. The professional licensing board shall not be held liable for the correctness or completeness of the information contained in the notice of termination and shall include a disclaimer statement on all released information, attesting that the information has not been verified by the professional licensing board. An employer who obtains a notice of termination from the appropriate professional licensing board as provided in this section shall not be held civilly liable for hiring or contracting with a health care provider who the employer in good faith believes has been rehabilitated from drug abuse, absent the employer’s gross negligence or reckless conduct. (4) Notices of termination submitted hereunder shall be maintained and available to employers as set forth above for fifteen (15) years from the date of receipt by the professional licensing board.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-117A, as added by 2004, ch. 333, § 1, p. 993.

§ 37-118. Tagging and detention of article or product suspected of being adulterated or misbranded — Embargo and condemnation under certain conditions and by certain procedures.

  1. Whenever a duly authorized agent of the director finds or has probable cause to believe, that any food, drug, device, or cosmetic is adulterated, or so misbranded as to be dangerous or fraudulent, within the meaning of this act, he shall affix to such article a tag or other appropriate marking, giving notice that such article is, or is suspected of being, adulterated or misbranded and has been detained or embargoed, and warning all persons not to remove or dispose of such article by sale or otherwise until permission for removal or disposal is given by such agent or the court. It shall be unlawful for any person to remove or dispose of such detained or embargoed article by sale or otherwise without such permission.
  2. When an article detained or embargoed under subsection (a) of this section has been found by such agent to be adulterated, or misbranded, he shall petition the probate court or district court in the county in whose jurisdiction the article is detained or embargoed for a libel for condemnation of such article. When such agent has found that an article so detained or embargoed is not adulterated or misbranded, he shall remove the tag or other marking.
  3. If the court finds that a detained or embargoed article is adulterated or misbranded, such article shall, after entry of the decree be destroyed at the expense of the claimant thereof, under the supervision of such agent, and all court costs and fees, and storage and other proper expenses, shall be taxed against the claimant of such article or his agent; provided, that when the adulteration or misbranding can be corrected by proper labeling or processing of the article, the court, after entry of the decree and after such costs, fees and expenses have been paid and a good and sufficient bond, conditioned that such article shall be so labeled or processed, has been executed, may by order direct that such article be delivered to the claimant thereof for such labeling or processing under the supervision of an agent of the director. The expense of such supervision shall be paid by the claimant. Such bond shall be returned to the claimant of the article on representation to the court by the director that the article is no longer in violation of this act, and that the expenses of such supervision have been paid.
  4. Whenever the director or any of its authorized agents shall find in any room, building, vehicle of transportation or other structure, any meat, sea food, poultry, vegetable, fruit or other perishable articles which are unsound, or contain any filthy, decomposed, or putrid substance, or that may be poisonous or deleterious to health or otherwise unsafe, the same being hereby declared to be a nuisance, the director or its authorized agent, shall forthwith condemn or destroy the same, or in any other manner render the same unsaleable as human food.
  5. Whenever the director or its duly authorized agent shall find, or have probable cause to believe, that any food, drug, device or cosmetic is offered or exposed for sale, or held in possession with intent to distribute or sell, or is intended for distribution or sale in violation of any provision of this act, whether it is in the custody of a common carrier or any other person, the director may affix to such article a tag or other appropriate marking, giving notice that such article is, or is suspected of being, in violation of this act, and has been embargoed. Within seven (7) days after an embargo has been placed upon any article, the embargo shall be removed by the director or a summary proceeding for the confiscation of the article shall be instituted by the director. No person shall remove or dispose of such embargoed article by sale or otherwise without the permission of the director or agent; or after summary proceedings have been instituted, without permission from the court. If the embargo shall be removed by the director or by the court, neither the director nor the state shall be held liable for damages because of such embargo in the event that the court shall find that there was probable cause for the embargo.
  6. Such proceeding shall be by complaint, verified by affidavit, which may be made on information and belief in the name of the director or agent against the article to be confiscated.
  7. The complaint shall contain: (1) a particular description of the article, (2) the name of the place where the article is located, (3) the name of the person in whose possession or custody the article was found, if such name be known to the person making the complaint or can be ascertained by reasonable effort, and (4) a statement as to the manner in which the article is adulterated or misbranded or the characteristics which render its distribution or sale illegal.
  8. Upon the filing of the verified complaint, the court shall issue a warrant directed to the proper officer to seize and take in his possession the article described in the complaint and bring the same before the court who issued the warrant and to summon the person named in the warrant, and any other person who may be found in possession of the article, to appear at the time and place therein specified.
  9. Any such person shall be summoned by service of a copy of the warrant in the same manner as a summons issuing out of the court in which the warrant has been issued.
  10. The hearing upon the complaint shall be at the time and place specified in the warrant, which time shall not be less than five (5) days or more than fifteen (15) days from the date of issuing the warrant, but, if the execution and service of the warrant has been less than three (3) days before the return of the warrant, either party shall be entitled to a reasonable continuance. Upon the hearing the complaint may be amended.
  11. Any person who shall appear and claim the food, drug, device, or cosmetic seized under the warrant shall be required to file a claim in writing.
  12. If, upon the hearing, it shall appear that the article was offered or exposed for sale, or was in possession with intent to distribute or sell, or was intended for distribution or sale, in violation of any provision of this act, it shall be confiscated and disposed of by destruction or sale as the court may direct, but no such article shall be sold contrary to any provision of this act. The proceeds of any sale, less the legal costs and charges, shall be paid into the state treasury.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 6, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 17, p. 633.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsections (a), (c), (e), and ( l ) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153 which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

§ 37-119. Prosecutions of violations — Right of party to notice and presentation of views prior to prosecution.

It shall be the duty of each county prosecuting attorney to whom the director or his agent reports any punishable violation of this act (including, but not limited to, rules and regulations) to cause appropriate proceedings to be instituted in the proper court without delay and to be prosecuted in the manner required by law. Before any violation of this act is reported to the county prosecuting attorney for the institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding is contemplated shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his views before the director or his designated agent, either orally or in writing, in person, or by attorney, with regard to such contemplated proceeding.

History.

1959, ch. 153, § 7, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 18, p. 633.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153 which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

§ 37-120. Report of minor violations.

Nothing in this act shall be construed as requiring the director to report for the institution of proceedings under this act, minor violations of this act, whenever the director believes that the public interest will be adequately served in the circumstances by a suitable written notice or warning.

History.

1959, ch. 153, § 8, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 19, p. 633.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

§ 37-121. Promulgation of reasonable standards by board.

Whenever in the judgment of the board such action will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers, the board shall promulgate regulations fixing and establishing for any food or class of food a reasonable definition and standard of identity, and/or reasonable standard of quality and/or fill of container. In prescribing a definition and standard of identity for any food or class of food in which optional ingredients are permitted, the board shall, for the purpose of promoting honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers, designate the optional ingredients which shall be named on the label. The definitions and standards so promulgated shall conform so far as practicable to the definitions and standards promulgated under authority of the federal act.

History.

1959, ch. 153, § 9, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Federal References.

The reference at the end of the section to “the federal act” is a reference to the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, compiled at 21 U.S.C.S. § 301 et seq.

§ 37-122. Food deemed adulterated. — A food shall be deemed to be adulterated

    1. If it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health; or (2) if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious substance which is unsafe within the meaning of section 37-125[, Idaho Code]; or (3) if it consists in whole or in part of a diseased, contaminated, filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is otherwise unfit for food; or (4) if it has been produced, prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered diseased, unwholesome, or injurious to health; or (5) if it is the product of a diseased animal or an animal which has died otherwise than by slaughter, or that has been fed upon the uncooked offal from a slaughterhouse; or (6) if its container is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health. (a) (1) If it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health; or (2) if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious substance which is unsafe within the meaning of section 37-125[, Idaho Code]; or (3) if it consists in whole or in part of a diseased, contaminated, filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is otherwise unfit for food; or (4) if it has been produced, prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered diseased, unwholesome, or injurious to health; or (5) if it is the product of a diseased animal or an animal which has died otherwise than by slaughter, or that has been fed upon the uncooked offal from a slaughterhouse; or (6) if its container is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health.
    1. If any valuable constituent has been in whole or in part omitted or abstracted therefrom; or (2) if any substance has been substituted wholly or in part therefor; or (3) if damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner; or (4) if any substance has been added thereto or mixed or packed therewith so as to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its quality or strength or make it appear better or of greater value than it is. (b) (1) If any valuable constituent has been in whole or in part omitted or abstracted therefrom; or (2) if any substance has been substituted wholly or in part therefor; or (3) if damage or inferiority has been concealed in any manner; or (4) if any substance has been added thereto or mixed or packed therewith so as to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its quality or strength or make it appear better or of greater value than it is.
  1. If it is confectionery and it bears or contains any alcohol or non-nutritive article or substance except harmless coloring, harmless flavoring, harmless resinous glaze not in excess of four-tenths of one per centum (.4%), harmless natural gum, and pectic; Provided, that this paragraph shall not apply to any confectionery by reason of its containing less than one-half of one per centum (.5%) by volume of alcohol derived solely from the use of flavoring extracts, or to any chewing gum by reason of its containing harmless non-nutritive masticatory substances.
  2. If it bears or contains a coal-tar color other than one from a batch which has been certified under authority of the federal act.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 10, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Federal References.
Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertion in subdivision (a)(2) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

§ 37-123. Food deemed misbranded. — A food shall be deemed to be misbranded

  1. If its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.
  2. If it is offered for sale under the name of another food.
  3. If it is an imitation of another food, unless its label bears, in type of uniform size and prominence, the word, imitation, and, immediately thereafter, the name of the food imitated.
  4. If its container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading.
  5. If in package form, unless it bears a label containing (1) the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor; (2) an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, measure, or numerical count: Provided, that under clause (2) of this paragraph reasonable variations shall be permitted, and exemptions as to small packages shall be established, by regulations prescribed by the board.
  6. If any word, statement, or other information required by or under authority of this act to appear on the label or labeling is not prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness (as compared with other words, statements, designs, or devices, in the labeling) and in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use.
  7. If it purports to be or is represented as a food for which a definition and standard of identity has been prescribed by regulations as provided by section 37-121[, Idaho Code], unless (1) it conforms to such definition and standard, and (2) its label bears the name of the food specified in the definition and standard, and, in so far as may be required by such regulations, the common names of optional ingredients (other than spices, flavoring, and coloring) present in such food.
  8. If it purports to be or is represented as — (1) A food for which a standard of quality has been prescribed by regulations as provided by section 37-121[, Idaho Code], and its quality falls below such standard unless its label bears, in such manner and form as such regulations specify, a statement that it falls below such standard; or (2) A food for which a standard or standards of fill of container have been prescribed by regulation as provided by section 37-121[, Idaho Code], and it falls below the standard of fill of container applicable thereto, unless its label bears, in such manner and form as such regulations specify, a statement that it falls below such standard.
  9. If it is not subject to the provisions of paragraph (g) of this section, unless it bears labeling clearly giving (1) the common or usual name of the food, if any there be, and (2) in case it is fabricated from two or more ingredients, the common or usual name of each such ingredient; except that spices, flavorings, and colorings, other than those sold as such, may be designated as spices, flavorings, and colorings, without naming each; Provided, that, to the extent that compliance with the requirements of clause (2) of this paragraph is impractical or results in deception or unfair competition, exemptions shall be established by regulations promulgated by the board.
  10. If it purports to be or is represented for special dietary uses, unless its label bears such information concerning its vitamin, mineral, and other dietary properties as the board determines to be, and by regulations prescribed, as, necessary in order to fully inform purchasers as to its value for such uses. (k) If it bears or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative, unless it bears labeling stating that fact; Provided, that to the extent that compliance with the requirements of this paragraph is impracticable, exemptions shall be established by regulations promulgated by the board.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 11, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsection (f) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

The bracketed insertions in subsections (g) and (h) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

§ 37-124. Contamination of food with microorganisms — Permit regulations — Access to factory.

  1. Whenever the director finds after investigation that the distribution in Idaho of any class of food may, by reason of contamination with microorganisms during manufacture, processing, or packing thereof in any locality, be injurious to health, and that such injurious nature cannot be adequately determined after such articles have entered commerce, he then, and in such case only, shall prescribe regulations providing for the issuance, to manufacturers, processors, or packers of such class of food in such locality, of permits to which shall be attached such conditions governing the manufacture, processing, or packing of such class of food, for such temporary period of time, as may be necessary to protect the public health; and after the effective date of such regulations, and during such temporary period, no person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into commerce any such food manufactured, processed or packed by any such manufacturer, processor, or packer unless such manufacturer, processor, or packer holds a permit issued by the director as provided by such regulations.
  2. The director is authorized to suspend immediately upon notice any permit issued under authority of this section if it is found that any of the conditions of the permit have been violated. The holder of a permit so suspended shall be privileged at any time to apply for the reinstatement of such permit, and the director shall, immediately after prompt hearing and an inspection of the establishment, reinstate such permit if it is found that adequate measures have been taken to comply with and maintain the conditions of the permit, as originally issued or as amended.
  3. Any officer or employee duly designated by the director shall have access to any factory or establishment, the operator of which holds a permit from the director for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the conditions of the permit are being complied with, and denial of access for such inspection shall be ground for suspension of the permit until such access is freely given by the operator.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 12, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 20, p. 633.

§ 37-125. Poisonous or deleterious substance — Regulations as to use.

Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food except where such substance is required in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice, shall be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2) of section 37-122(a)[, Idaho Code]; but when such substance is so required or cannot be so avoided, the board shall promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as the board finds necessary for the protection of public health, and any quantity exceeding the limits so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2) of section 37-122(a)[, Idaho Code]. While such a regulation is in effect limiting the quantity of any such substance in the case of any food, such food shall not, by reason of bearing or containing any added amount of such substance, be considered to be adulterated within the meaning of clause (1) section 37-122(a)[, Idaho Code]. In determining the quantity of such added substance to be tolerated in or on different articles of food, the board shall take into account the extent to which the use of such substance is required or cannot be avoided in the production of each such article and the other ways in which the consumer may be affected by the same or other poisonous or deleterious substances.

History.

1959, ch. 153, § 13, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertions in this section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

§ 37-126. Drugs or devices deemed adulterated.

A drug or device shall be deemed to be adulterated:

    1. If it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance; or (2) if it has been produced, prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have been contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health; or (3) if it is a drug and its container is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health; or (4) if it is a drug and it bears or contains, for purposes of coloring only, a coal-tar color other than one from a batch certified under the authority of the federal act. (a) (1) If it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance; or (2) if it has been produced, prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have been contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health; or (3) if it is a drug and its container is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health; or (4) if it is a drug and it bears or contains, for purposes of coloring only, a coal-tar color other than one from a batch certified under the authority of the federal act.
  1. If it purports to be or is represented as a drug the name of which is recognized in an official compendium, and its strength differs from, or its quality or purity falls below, the standard set forth in such compendium. Such determination as to strength, quality or purity shall be made in accordance with the tests or methods of assay set forth in such compendium or in the absence of or inadequacy of such tests or methods of assay, these prescribed under authority of the federal act. No drug defined in an official compendium shall be deemed to be adulterated under this paragraph because it differs from the standard of strength, quality, or purity therefor set forth in such compendium, if its difference in strength, quality, or purity from such standard is plainly stated on its label. Whenever a drug is recognized in both the United States Pharmacopoeia and the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States it shall be subject to the requirements of the United States Pharmacopoeia unless it is labeled and offered for sale as a homeopathic drug, in which case it shall be subject to the provisions of the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States and not to those of the United States Pharmacopoeia. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to prohibit a change in the strength, quality or purity of a drug, if the change is made by or pursuant to the orders of a practitioner prescribing the drug for the purpose of administering the drug to a patient.
  2. If it is not subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section and its strength differs from, or its purity or quality falls below, that which it purports or is represented to possess. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to prohibit a change in the strength, quality or purity of a drug, if the change is made by or pursuant to the orders of the practitioner prescribing the drug for the purpose of administering the drug to a patient.
  3. If it is a drug and any substance has been: (1) mixed or packed therewith so as to reduce its quality or strength; or (2) substituted wholly or in part therefor. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to prohibit a change in the strength, quality or purity of a drug, if the change is made by or pursuant to the orders of the practitioner prescribing the drug for the purpose of administering the drug to a patient.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 14, p. 351; am. 2002, ch. 231, § 2, p. 661.

STATUTORY NOTES

Federal References.

The references at the end of subsection (a) and at the end of the second sentence in subsection (b) to “the federal act” are references to the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, compiled at 21 U.S.C.S. § 301 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The United States Pharmacopoeia, referred to in subsection (b), is a non-governmental official public standards-setting authority for prescription and over-the-counter medicines. See http://www.usp.org .

The Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United State, referred to in subsection (b), is the official compendium for homeopathic drug in the United States. See http://hpus.com .

CASE NOTES

Sale of Misbranded Drug.

The sale and delivery of an over-the-counter hay fever medication in the unmarked container violated the prohibition against selling and delivering a misbranded drug, and this violation was grounds for discipline under§ 54-1726. Brown v. Idaho State Bd. of Pharmacy, 113 Idaho 547, 746 P.2d 1006 (Ct. App. 1987).

§ 37-127. Drugs or devices deemed misbranded. — A drug or device shall be deemed to be misbranded

  1. If its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.
  2. If in package form unless it bears a label containing (1) the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor; and (2) an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, measure, or numerical count; Provided, that under clause (2) of this paragraph reasonable variations shall be permitted, and exemptions as to small packages shall be established, by regulations prescribed by the board.
  3. If any word, statement, or other information required by or under authority of this act to appear on the label or labeling is not prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness (as compared with other words, statements, designs or devices, in the labeling) and in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use.
  4. If it is for use by man and contains any quantity of the narcotic or hypnotic substance alpha-eucaine, barbituric acid, beta-eucaine, bromal, cannabis, carbromal, chloral, coca, cocaine, codeine, heroin, marihuana [marijuana], morphine, opium, paraldehyde, peyete [peyote], or sulphonmethane, or any chemical derivative of such substance, which derivative has been by the board after investigation, found to be, and by regulations under this act, designated as habit forming, unless its label bears the name and quantity or proportion of such substance or derivative and in juxtaposition therewith the statement “Warning — May be habit forming.”
  5. If it is a drug and is not designated solely by a name recognized in an official compendium unless its label bears (1) the common or usual name of the drug, if such there be; and (2), in case it is fabricated from two (2) or more ingredients, the common or usual name of each active ingredient, including the kind and quantity or proportion of any alcohol, and also including, whether active or not, the name and quantity or proportion of any bromides, ether, chloroform, acetanilid, acotphenetidin, amidapyrine, anti-pyrine, atropine, hyoscine, hyoscyamine, arsenic, digitalis glucosines, mercury, ouabain, strophanthin, strychnine, thyroid, or any derivative or preparation of any substances, contained therein: Provided, that to the extent that compliance with the requirements of clause (2) of this paragraph is impracticable, exemptions shall be established by regulations promulgated by the board.
  6. Unless its labeling bears (1) adequate directions for use; and (2) such adequate warnings against use in those pathological conditions or by children where its use may be dangerous to health, or against unsafe dosage or methods or duration of administration or application, in such manner and form, as are necessary for the protection of users: Provided, that where any requirement of clause (1) of this paragraph, as applied to any drug or device, is not necessary for the protection of the public health, the board shall promulgate regulations exempting such drug or device from such requirements.
  7. If it purports to be a drug the name of which is recognized in an official compendium, unless it is packaged and labeled as prescribed therein: Provided, that the method of packing may be modified with the consent of the board. Whenever a drug is recognized in both the United States Pharmacopoeia and the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, it shall be subject to the requirements of the United States Pharmacopoeia with respect to packaging and labeling unless it is labeled and offered for sale as a homoeopathic [homeopathic] drug, in which case it shall be subject to the provisions of the Homoeopathic [Homeopathic] Pharmacopoeia of the United States, and not to those of the United States Pharmacopoeia.
  8. If it has been found by the board to be a drug liable to deterioration, unless it is packaged in such form and manner, and its label bears a statement of such precautions, as the board shall by regulations require as necessary for the protection of public health. No such regulation shall be established for any drug recognized in an official compendium until the board shall have informed the appropriate body charged with the revision of such compendium of the need for such packaging or labeling requirements and such body shall have failed within a reasonable time to prescribe such requirements.
    1. If it is a drug and its container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading; or (2) if it is an imitation of another drug; or (3) if it is offered for sale under the name of another drug. (i) (1) If it is a drug and its container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading; or (2) if it is an imitation of another drug; or (3) if it is offered for sale under the name of another drug.
  9. If it is dangerous to health when used in the dosage, or with the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.
  10. If it is a drug sold at retail and quantity of aminopyrine, barbituric acid, cinchophen, dinitrophenol, sulfanilamide or their derivatives, or any other drug which has been found by the board to be dangerous to health when used in the dosage, or with the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, and so designated by the board in a regulation adopted; unless it is sold on a written prescription signed by a member of the medical, osteopathic, chiropodial, dental, or veterinary profession who is licensed by law to administer such drug, and its label bears the name and place of business of the seller, the serial number and date of such prescription, and the name of such member of the medical, osteopathic, chiropodial, dental, or veterinary profession.
  11. A drug sold on a written prescription signed by a member of the medical, osteopathic, chiropodial, dental, or veterinary profession (except a drug sold in the course of the conduct of a business of selling drugs pursuant to diagnosis by mail) shall be exempt from the requirements of this section if — (1) such member of the medical, osteopathic, chiropodial, dental, or veterinary profession is licensed by law to administer such drug, and (2) such drug bears a label containing the name and place of business of the seller, the serial number and date of such prescription, and the name of such member of the medical, osteopathic, chiropodial, dental, or veterinary profession.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 15, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsections (c) and (d) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

The bracketed words “marijuana” and “peyote” in subsection (d) and “homeopathic” and “Homeopathic” in the second sentence in (g) were inserted by the compiler to correct the enacting legislation.

The United States Pharmacopoeia, referred to in subsection (g), is a non-governmental official public standards-setting authority for prescription and over-the-counter medicines. See http://www.usp.org .

The Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United State, referred to in subsection (g), is the official compendium for homeopathic drug in the United States. See http://hpus.com .

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

§ 37-128. Sale of new drugs — Regulations and procedures.

  1. No person shall sell, deliver, offer for sale, hold for sale or give away any new drug unless (1) an application with respect thereto has become effective under section 505 of the federal act, or (2) when not subject to the federal act unless such drug has been tested and has not been found to be unsafe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, and prior to selling or offering for sale such drug, there has been filed with the director an application setting forth (a) full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use; (b) a full list of the articles used as components of such drug; (c) a full statement of the composition of such drug; (d) a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of such drug; (e) such samples of such drugs and of the articles used as components thereof as the board may require; and (f) specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug.
  2. An application provided for in subsection (a)(2) shall become effective on the sixtieth (60th) day after the filing thereof, except that if the director finds after due notice to the applicant and giving him an opportunity for a hearing, that the drug is not safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof, he shall, prior to the effective date of the application, issue an order refusing to permit the application to become effective.
  3. This section shall not apply — (1) to a drug intended solely for investigational use by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety in drugs provided the drug is plainly labeled “For investigational use only”; or (2) to a drug sold in this state at any time prior to the enactment of this act or introduced into interstate commerce at any time prior to the enactment of the federal act; or (3) to any drug which is licensed under the Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act of July 1, 1902 (U.S.C. 1934 ed. title 42, Chap. 4).
  4. An order refusing to permit an application under this section to become effective may be revoked by the director.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 16, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 21, p. 633.

STATUTORY NOTES

Federal References.

Section 505 of the federal act, referred to in subsection (a), is section 505 of the Federal, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and it is compiled at 21 USCS § 355.

The phrase “enactment of the federal act”, in subsection (c), refers to the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 USCS § 301 et seq., which was enacted June 25, 1938, effective 12 months after enactment. The Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act of July 1, 1902, referred to in clause (3) of subsection (c) of this section, was repealed by Act of July 1, 1944, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 714. The present law on this subject is Act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, Title III, § 351, 58 Stat. 702, which may be found in 42 USCS § 262 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The phrase “enactment of this act”, in subsection (c), refers to the enactment of S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which was approved and effective March 15, 1959.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

§ 37-129. Cosmetics deemed adulterated. — A cosmetic shall be deemed to be adulterated — (a) If it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to users under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling or advertisement thereof, or under such conditions of use as are customary or usual. Provided, that this provision shall not apply to coal-tar hair dye, the label of which bears the following legend conspicuously displayed thereon: “Caution

This product contains ingredients which may cause skin irritation on certain individuals and a preliminary test according to accompanying directions should first be made. This product must not be used for dyeing the eyelashes or eyebrows; to do so may cause blindness,” and the labeling of which bears adequate directions for such preliminary testing. For the purposes of this paragraph (e) the term “hair dye” shall not include eyelash dyes or eyebrow dyes.

(b) If it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance.

(c) If it has been produced, prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health.

(d) If its container is composed, in whole or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to health.

(e) If it is not a hair dye and it bears or contains a coal-tar color other than one from a batch which has been certified under authority of the federal act.

History.

1959, ch. 153, § 17, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Federal References.

The reference at the end of subsection (e) to “the federal act” is a reference to the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, compiled at 21 U.S.C.S. § 301 et seq.

§ 37-130. Cosmetics deemed misbranded. — A cosmetic shall be deemed to be misbranded

  1. If its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.
  2. If in package form unless it bears a label containing (1) the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor; and (2) an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, measure, or numerical count: Provided, that under clause (2) of this paragraph reasonable variations shall be permitted, and exemptions as to small packages shall be established by regulations prescribed by the board.
  3. If any word, statement, or other information required by or under authority of this act to appear on the label or labeling is not prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness (as compared with other words, statements, designs, or devices, in the labeling) and in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use.
  4. If its container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 18, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsection (c) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

§ 37-131. False advertising.

  1. An advertisement of a food, drug, device, or cosmetic shall be deemed to be false if it is false or misleading in any particular.
  2. For the purpose of this act the advertisement of a drug or device representing it to have any effect in albuminuria, appendicitis, arteriosclerosis, blood poison, bone disease, Bright’s disease, cancer, carbuncles, cholecytitis, diabetes, diptheria [diphtheria], dropsy, erysipelas, gallstones, heart and vascular diseases, high blood pressure, mastoiditis, measles, meningitis, mumps, nephritis, otitis media, paralysis, pneumonia, poliomyelitis (infantile paralysis), prostate gland disorders, pyelitis, scarlet fever, sexual impotence, sinus infection, smallpox, tuberculosis, tumors, typhoid, uremia, venereal disease, shall also be deemed to be false, except that no advertisement not in violation of subsection (a) shall be deemed to be false under this subsection if it is disseminated only to members of the medical, osteopathic, chiropodial, dental, or veterinary professions, or appears only in the scientific periodicals of these professions, or is disseminated only for the purpose of public-health education by persons not commercially interested, directly or indirectly, in the sale of such drugs or devices: Provided, that whenever the board determines that an advance in medical science has made any type of self-medication safe as to any of the diseases named above, the board shall by regulation authorize the advertisement of drugs having curative or therapeutic effect for such disease, subject to such conditions and restrictions as the board may deem necessary in the interests of public health: Provided, that this subsection shall not be construed as indicating that self-medication for diseases other than those named herein is safe or efficacious.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 19, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” near the beginning of subsection (b) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

The bracketed word “diphtheria” in subsection (b) was inserted by the compiler to correct the spelling.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

§ 37-132. Regulations by board — Hearings — Notice.

  1. The authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of this act is hereby vested in the board. The board is hereby authorized to make the regulations promulgated under this act conform, in so far as practicable with those promulgated under the federal act.
  2. Hearings authorized or required by this act shall be conducted by the board or such officer, agent, or employee as the board may designate for the purpose.
  3. Before promulgating any regulations contemplated by section 37-121; 37-123(j); 37-124; 37-127(d), (f), (g), (h), and (k), or 37-131(b)[, Idaho Code], the board shall give appropriate notice of the proposal and of the time and place for a hearing. The regulation so promulgated shall become effective on a date fixed by the board (which date shall not be prior to 30 days after its promulgation). Such regulation may be amended or repealed in the same manner as is provided for its adoption, except that in the case of a regulation amending or repealing any such regulation the board, to such an extent as it deems necessary in order to prevent undue hardship, may disregard the foregoing provisions regarding notice, hearing, or effective date.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 20, p. 351.

STATUTORY NOTES

Federal References.

The reference at the end of subsection (a) to “the federal act” is a reference to the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, compiled at 21 U.S.C.S. § 301 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsections (a) and (b) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

The bracketed insertion in subsection (c) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

§ 37-133. Inspection of establishments — Examination of specimens — Reports — Receipt for samples.

The director or his duly authorized agent shall have free access at all reasonable hours to any factory, warehouse, or establishment in which foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics are manufactured, processed, packed, or held for introduction into commerce, or to enter any vehicle being used to transport or hold such foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics in commerce, for the purpose: (1) of inspecting such factory, warehouse, establishment, or vehicle to determine if any of the provisions of this act are being violated, and (2) to secure samples or specimens of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic after paying or offering to pay for such sample. It shall be the duty of the director to make or cause to be made examinations of samples secured under the provisions of this section to determine whether or not any provision of this act is being violated.

  1. Upon the completion of any inspection of a factory, warehouse, or other establishment and prior to leaving the premises, the director or his duly authorized agent making the inspection shall give to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, a report in writing setting forth any condition or practice observed by him which in his judgment indicates that any food, drug, device, or cosmetic in the establishment (1) consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substances; or (2) has been prepared, packed, or held in unsanitary condition whereby it may have become contaminated with filth or whereby it may be rendered injurious to health.
  2. If the director or his duly authorized agent making any such inspection of any warehouse, factory, or other establishment has obtained any samples in the process of the inspection, upon completion of the inspection and prior to his leaving the premises, he shall give to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, a receipt describing the samples obtained.
  3. Whenever in the course of any such inspection of the factory, or other establishment where food is manufactured, processed, or packed, the director or his duly authorized agent making the inspection obtains a sample of any such food and if analysis is made of such sample for the purpose of determining whether such food consists in whole or part of any filthy, putrid or decomposed substance, or is otherwise unfit for food, a copy of the results of such analysis shall be sent promptly to the owner, operator, or agent in charge.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 21, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 22, p. 633.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsection (a) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

§ 37-134. Publication of reports by director — Dissemination of information.

  1. The director may cause to be published from time to time reports summarizing all judgments, decrees, and court orders which have been rendered under this act, including the nature of the charge and the disposition thereof.
  2. The director may also cause to be disseminated such information regarding food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics as the board deems necessary in the interest of public health and the protection of the consumer against fraud. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the director from collecting, reporting, and illustrating the results of the investigations of the director.
History.

1959, ch. 153, § 22, p. 351; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 23, p. 633.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsection (1) refer to S.L. 1959, Chapter 153, which is compiled herein as§§ 37-113 to 37-117 and 37-118 to 37-134.

Section 23 of S.L. 1959, ch. 153 read: “If any provision of this act is declared unconstitutional or the applicability thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the constitutionality of the remainder of the act and applicability thereof to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.”

Effective Dates.

Section 25 of S.L. 1959, ch. 153 declared an emergency. Approved March 16, 1953.

Section 182 of S.L. 1974, ch. 23 provided the act should be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1974.

Chapter 2 ADULTERATION AND BRANDING

Sec.

§ 37-201 — 37-216. Manufacture or sale of adulterated or misbranded articles prohibited — Distribution of free samples prohibited — Inspectors’ right of access — Standards established — Disposition of fines. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 196, §§ 1 to 12, p. 653; reen. C.L. 65:17 to 65:32; C.S., §§ 1683 to 1698; am. S.L. 1923, ch. 29, § 1, p. 30; I.C.A.,§§ 36-301 to 36-316 were repealed by S.L. 1959, ch. 153, § 24, p. 351.

§ 37-217. Sale of tainted food a misdemeanor. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1864, p. 467, § 131; R.S. & R.C., § 1619; reen. C.L. 65:32a; C.S., § 1699; I.C.A.,§ 36-317, was repealed by S.L. 1959, ch. 153, § 24, p. 351.

§ 37-218 — 37-222. Baking powders and vinegars, regulation. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1905, p. 54, §§ 23, 25 to 28; reen. R.C., §§ 1134, 1136 to 1139; reen. C.L. 65:33 to 65:37; C.S., §§ 1700 to 1704; I.C.A.,§§ 36-318 to 36-322, were repealed by S.L. 1959, ch. 153, § 24, p. 351.

§ 37-223. Nonfat dry milk solids, defatted milk solids and milk defined. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1953, ch. 128, § 1, p. 204, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 36, § 1.

Chapter 3 DAIRIES AND DAIRY PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-301. Statement of purpose.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the legislature of the state of Idaho that the public interest requires that all dairy products produced, distributed, offered for sale or sold in Idaho meet minimum standards of sanitary condition, quality, identity, classification and grade. To accomplish this purpose, the director of the department of agriculture shall inspect dairy products, dairy farms, production facilities and processing facilities, issue permits and enforce minimum standards in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

History.

1911, ch. 190, § 1, p. 627; reen. C.L. 65:38; C.S., § 1705; I.C.A.,§ 36-401; am. 1967, ch. 54, § 1, p. 104; am. 2014, ch. 275, § 1, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, rewrote the section heading and the section text, which formerly read: “All wholesale dairymen and other persons having stationary places of business, keeping and offering for sale milk, shall at all times keep the name or names of the dairyman or dairymen, from whom the milk on sale shall have been obtained.”

§ 37-302. Inspections.

  1. It shall be the duty of the director of the department of agriculture to cause to be visited as frequently as it may deem necessary all dairies supplying dealers and consumers with milk, and inspect the same to ascertain and certify sanitary conditions and milk quality. A copy of the inspection report shall be left with the owner and such information given as will assist the producer to improve the sanitary conditions or remedy such defects as the inspection report indicates. A copy of the inspection report shall be kept on file in the office of the director.
  2. The director of the department of agriculture is hereby authorized and directed to designate any agent to inspect, examine and test any or all dairy products in accordance with rules as the department may prescribe; and to ascertain and certify the grade, classification, quality or sanitary condition thereof and other pertinent facts as the department may require. The director or agent of the department of agriculture of the state of Idaho shall make sanitary inspection of milk, cream, butter and dairy products of any kind whatsoever, intended for human consumption, and of containers, utensils, equipment, buildings, premises or anything whatsoever employed in the production, handling, storing, processing or manufacturing of dairy products or that would affect the purity of the products. Inspections, examinations and tests shall be made to meet the requirements of the laws of the state and of the United States for the sale of the products or their transportation in both intrastate and interstate commerce. Any agent designated by the director to make inspections shall have the right for that purpose to enter any premises and buildings where milk, cream, butter or dairy products shall be produced, stored, processed or manufactured.
  3. Whenever an inspection of any dairy product is made by the department of agriculture, or whenever permanent or temporary inspectors or employees are used by the department for the purpose of enforcing or promulgating an inspection or sanitary program for any dairy product, the department is authorized to fix, assess and collect or cause to be collected from the dairy processors, fees or assessments for services when they are performed by employees or agents of the department, the fees to be on a uniform basis in an amount reasonably necessary to cover the cost of such inspection and the administration of the department of agriculture dairy inspection program; provided however, that the department shall so adjust the fees to be collected under this section as to meet the expenses necessary for this inspection service only, all of the fees to be used for this purpose alone; and provided further, that in no event shall the fees or assessments exceed four (4) mills per pound of butterfat produced by any dairyman in Idaho or received by processors. All such fees and moneys collected or received by the department, its employees or agents under this act shall be deposited in the dairy industry and inspection fund, which fund is hereby created. All moneys coming into the fund are hereby appropriated to the department of agriculture to be used in the inspection required by law to be made of the dairy industry and dairy products. The fees and assessments accrued in any given month are due and payable no later than the twentieth day of the following month.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-302, as reen. 1967, ch. 54, § 2, p. 104; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 24, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 1, p. 295; am. 2014, ch. 275, § 2, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, substituted “Inspections” for “Dairies to be inspected” in the section heading; added the subsection (1) designation to the existing provisions; inserted “to ascertain and certify sanitary conditions and milk quality” at the end of the first sentence in subsection (1); and added subsections (2) and (3).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the second sentence in subsection (3) refers to S.L. 2014, Chapter 275, which is compiled as§§ 37-301 to 37-319.

Section 2 of S.L. 1967, ch. 54 repealed and reenacted this section. Prior to 1967 this section comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 2, p. 627; reen. C.L. 65:39; C.S., § 1706; I.C.A.,§ 36-402.

§ 37-303. Standards and rules.

  1. The director of the department of agriculture is hereby authorized to promulgate and enforce reasonable rules as may be necessary or desirable to establish standards and to carry out its functions and the intent and purposes of this chapter.
  2. All milk or cream utilized in the manufacture of dairy products and all manufactured dairy products produced, distributed, offered for sale, or sold in Idaho shall meet the requirements established by this chapter, of federal law, and rules or regulations promulgated or adopted pursuant to state or federal law.
  3. The following standards concerning the sanitation of milk and cream are hereby established:
    1. The term “processor” means any individual, partnership, association or corporation doing business in the state of Idaho that produces, purchases, obtains or uses in the state of Idaho any milk or cream for use in the manufacture of butter, cheese, evaporated milk, frozen desserts, frozen novelties, edible dry milk or other dairy products. The term “processor” shall not include any individual, partnership, association or corporation that produces, purchases, obtains or uses milk or cream for his or its own consumption. The term “producer” means any person, firm or corporation who owns or controls one (1) or more cows, goats, sheep or water buffalo, a part or all of the milk from which is sold or offered for sale to a processor.
    2. No processor shall purchase or obtain in any manner, or use in any manner, for the sale or manufacture of any dairy products as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection, any unacceptable milk or cream as herein defined.
    3. The processor shall, for the purpose of determining the acceptability or unacceptability of milk or cream, cause all milk or cream to be tested and graded according to the standards herein defined before purchase, acquisition or use in any manner. Provided however, that where the processor customarily purchases the milk or cream of any person regularly engaged in the production thereof, the processor is required to test milk and cream of such producer not less than once each month by the approved bacteria tests and approved mastitic tests, or other tests as may be prescribed by the director of the department of agriculture. When milk or cream from any producer is found unacceptable as a result of required testing, the processor shall thereafter test the milk or cream of the producer daily by the same test until it is found to be acceptable. Each processor shall retain for at least one (1) year at the place where milk or cream is received, a record of such tests in the form and of the content that shall be prescribed by the department of agriculture and shall exhibit the record at the place where the same is kept whenever requested to do so by the producer or the department and shall permit copies thereof to be taken.
    4. Milk and dairy product quality standards and standards of identity will be established by rules promulgated by the department.
    5. Any milk, cream or dairy product that is unclean, unwholesome or unfit for human consumption, as determined by the department, shall be rejected as unacceptable.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-303, as added by 2014, ch. 275, § 3, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES
Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-303, Excluding poor milk from sale, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 3, p. 627; reen. C.L. 65:40; C.S., § 1707; I.C.A.,§ 36-403; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 1, p. 357, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 54, § 5.

§ 37-304. Permit issuance and revocation.

  1. The director or the director’s authorized agent shall issue a permit authorizing the sale of milk for human consumption to all dairy farms that meet the standards and requirements of this chapter, and rules promulgated pursuant to this chapter.
  2. The director or his agent may issue a permit to sell milk for human consumption to a new or expanding dairy farm only upon presentation to the director by the new or expanding dairy farm of the following:
    1. A certified letter, supplied by the board of county commissioners, certifying the new or expanding dairy farm’s compliance with applicable county livestock ordinances; and
    2. Evidence that a valid water right exists to supply adequate water for the new or expanding dairy farm; or
    3. A copy of an application for a permit to appropriate water that has been filed with the Idaho department of water resources and which, if approved, will supply adequate water for the dairy farm; or
    4. A copy of an application to change the point of diversion, place, period and nature of use of an existing water right that has been filed with the Idaho department of water resources and which, if approved, will supply adequate water for the dairy farm.
  3. As used in this section:
    1. “Animal units” shall be as defined in rule by the director.
    2. “Expanding dairy farm” means an existing, legally permitted dairy farm that increases, or applies to increase, its existing animal units beyond the number for which it is permitted under applicable county livestock ordinances or increases, or applies to increase, the waste containment system.
    3. “New dairy farm” means a dairy farm constructed after the effective date of this act.
  4. Whenever, under any law of this state or rule, the director of the department of agriculture or his agent is required to inspect dairy farms for compliance with rules prescribed by the department, or determine the sanitary condition of anything referred to in section 37-303, Idaho Code, or the purity of milk, cream, butter or other dairy products intended for human consumption, the director shall make or cause to be made an examination and inspection and shall report his findings and conclusions. When the issuance or the revoking of any license or permit by the department of agriculture is required to be made after an inspection involving milk quality, sanitary conditions and purity for human consumption of any milk, cream, butter or other dairy products, the issuance or revocation of license or permit shall be based upon the report or reports so made by the director.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-304, as added by 2014, ch. 275, § 4, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of water resources,§ 42-1701 et seq. Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-304, Milk wagons to be kept clean, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 4, p. 627; reen. C.L. 65:41; C.S., § 1708; I.C.A.,§ 36-404; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 2, p. 357, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 54, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

The phrase “the effective date of this act” in paragraph (3)(c) refers to the effective date of S.L. 2014, Chapter 275, which was effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-305. Enforcement.

The director of the department of agriculture may bring civil actions to enjoin violations of this chapter or rules promulgated to implement the provisions of this chapter.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-305, as added by 2014, ch. 275, § 5, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-305, Milk wagons to be covered, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 5, p. 627; reen. C.L. 65:42; C.S., § 1709; I.C.A.,§ 36-405; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 3, p. 357, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 54, § 7.

§ 37-306. Department to cooperate with other agencies.

The department of agriculture is hereby authorized to advise and assist and to cooperate with the federal government or any of its agencies, other departments, agencies and institutions of this state, counties, school districts, and municipalities and other public and private welfare agencies, in the exercise of any of the powers and duties of the department under this chapter.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-306, as added by 2014, ch. 275, § 7, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-306, Milk-bottling place, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 6, p. 628; reen. C.L. 65:43; C.S., § 1710; I.C.A.,§ 36-406; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 4, p. 357; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 23, § 25, p. 633; am. S.L. 1992, ch. 93, § 2, p. 295, was repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 6, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-307. Milk haulers and tanks — Definitions.

As used in this act, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following definitions are adopted:

  1. “Milk hauler” means the operator of a transportation tank and may be an employee or the owner of the equipment.
  2. “Farm tank” means a tank used to cool, store or cool and store milk prior to transportation to the processing plant.
  3. “Transportation tank,” “bulk tank” and “feeder tank” mean tanks used to transport milk from a farm to a processing plant.
  4. “Chlorine” means chlorine, or other type of sanitizer approved by the director of the department of agriculture.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-307, as added by 2014, ch. 275, § 8, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-307, Care and use of containers for delivering milk and cream, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 7, p. 628; reen. C.L. 65:44; C.S., § 1711; I.C.A.,§ 36-407; am. S.L. 1937, ch. 107, § 1, p. 160, was repealed by S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 5, p. 357.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the introductory paragraph refers to S.L. 2014, Chapter 275, which is compiled as§§ 37-301 through 37-319.

§ 37-308. Standards for transportation tanks.

The following standards are hereby adopted relating to transportation tanks:

  1. The transportation tank and accessories in the milk handling operation shall comply with the requirements of the 3A sanitary standards symbol administrative council, 3A standards for transportation tanks existing at the time of the passage of this act.
  2. Suitable facilities, including hot and cold running water, detergent, brushes, sanitizers and sanitizing equipment, a concrete floor with proper drainage and waste disposal, shall be provided for washing and sanitizing of transportation tanks. Unless the truck is to be used within a few hours of the washing operation the sanitizing of the tank shall be omitted until just before the tank truck is to be used. During the interim, the tank truck shall be protected from contamination by closing port holes, etc. Since the tank truck may be sanitized on a different date and at a different time from the cleaning and washing operation, a tag shall provide space for recording this information. The washing, sanitizing and maintenance of the transportation tank and accessories shall be the responsibility of the processor or milk hauler. The department of agriculture shall be informed in writing designating the person responsible for the cleaning, sanitizing and maintenance of the transportation tank.
  3. The transportation tank and all accessories shall be thoroughly rinsed after each usage, and shall be thoroughly cleaned and sanitized daily and the tank tagged and sealed with a tag attached indicating that the tank has been washed, sanitized or washed and sanitized. This tag shall also contain the name of the person doing the work and the date on which the work was done. The tag shall be removed by the hauler at his first pickup and retained at the receiving plant for a minimum of thirty (30) days.
  4. Single length, durable, nontoxic, flexible milk conductor tubing shall be used for conveying milk from the farm tank to the transportation tank. The inside diameter of milk conductor tubing shall not be less than one and three-eighths (1 3/8) inches. If two (2) lengths of tubing are used, they shall be connected either by the use of sanitary couplings or a piece of 3A sanitary tubing with clamps which can be removed without tools. The connections between the pump and the vehicle tank, and between the pump and the milk conductor tubing shall remain assembled, except when dismantled for cleaning. The open end of the milk tubing shall be capped with an approved protective cap at all times, except when loading or unloading. The outlet valve, milk pump and the milk conductor tubing and samples shall be enclosed in a properly drained, insulated, dust-tight cabinet.
  5. The transportation tank and the accessories shall be used for no other purpose than the handling of milk unless such other use is approved by the department of agriculture.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-308, as added by 2014, ch. 275, § 10, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.
Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-308, Milk must be bottled or packaged in paper cartons, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 8, p. 628; reen. C.L. 65:45; C.S., § 1712; am. S.L. 1929, ch. 19, § 1, p. 20; I.C.A.,§ 36-408; am. S.L. 1941, ch. 141, § 3, p. 274; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 6, p. 357; am. S.L. 1967, ch. 54, § 3, p. 104; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 23, § 26, p. 633; am. S.L. 1992, ch. 93, § 3, p. 295, was repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 9, effective July 1, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

The phrase “at the time of the passage of this act” in subsection (1) refers to the passage of S.L. 2014, Chapter 275, which was approved by the governor on March 26, 2014, and was effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-309. Standards for milk haulers.

The following standards are hereby adopted relating to milk haulers and to the operation of transportation tanks:

  1. All milk haulers must possess a permit issued by the state department of agriculture. All milk haulers shall be subject to such examination and abilities as the department of agriculture may prescribe by rule or regulation in order to receive and retain such permit. The fee for the permit shall be twenty-five dollars ($25.00). The permit shall be valid for three (3) years and must be renewed by December 31 of the third year.
  2. The milk line shall be passed through a special port opening through the milk house wall with care to prevent contact with the ground or floor of the milk house. The port opening shall be closed when not in use.
  3. It shall be the responsibility of the milk hauler to assure that in the event the processor washes and sanitizes the truck the operation has been adequately performed, and that prior to use the tank truck has been properly sanitized. In the event it is the milk hauler’s responsibility to sanitize the tank truck, it shall be done with a chlorine solution of proper strength.
  4. The milk hauler’s hands shall be washed immediately before gauging the milk.
  5. The milk shall be observed and checked for abnormalities or adulterations, and all abnormal or adulterated milk shall be rejected.
  6. The milk volume in the farm tank shall be determined in a sanitary manner.
  7. The milk in the farm tank shall be thoroughly agitated. Milk samples for analysis shall be taken in a sanitary manner into properly identified sterile containers. All sampling shall follow standard methods.
  8. After the milk is pumped to the transportation tank the milk conductor tubing shall be capped and returned to the vehicle storage cabinet. Care shall be taken to prevent soiling of the milk line by contact with the milk house floor, operator’s hands or the ground.
  9. The milk hauler shall rinse the farm tank and accessories free of milk with clean water immediately after emptying.
  10. The milk hauler shall be responsible for proper use of the transportation tank and accessories.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-309, as added by 2014, ch. 275, § 11, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-309, Cans must be washed and scalded, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 9, p. 628; reen. C.L. 65:46; C.S., § 1713; am. S.L. 1921, ch. 119, § 1, p. 294; I.C.A.,§ 36-409, was repealed by S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 7, p. 357.

§ 37-310. Standards for quality control of milk samples.

The following standards are hereby adopted relating to quality control of milk samples taken from tanks:

  1. As often as is deemed necessary, the department of agriculture may take samples for analysis from each farm tank or each transportation tank.
  2. All milk samples taken from farm tanks or transportation tanks shall be taken in a sanitary manner in accordance with standard methods. Samples for bacteriological analysis shall be properly iced and transported in accordance with standard methods, thirty-two (32) to forty (40) degrees Fahrenheit.
  3. The department of agriculture shall have access to all records maintained by the receiving plant relating to butterfat, temperature and bacteriological sampling and any other samples of bulk farm tank milk.
  4. Milk samples for analysis shall be available on the farm tank pickup truck at all times during the collection period and delivery to the plant, as required by the department of agriculture.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-310, as added by 2014, ch. 275, § 13, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-310, Empty bottles from quarantined premises, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 10, p. 628; reen. C.L. 65:47; C.S., § 1714; I.C.A.,§ 36-410; am. S.L. 1992, ch. 93, § 4, p. 295, was repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 12, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-311. Reports of volumes purchased.

All milk processors, cooperatives and organizations that procure milk from Idaho dairy farms or process milk received from other states shall, by the twentieth day of the following month in which the milk was produced or processed, provide a full and accurate account of the amount of milk purchased and the volume of dairy products processed to the department of agriculture pursuant to procedures established by the department.

History.

1905, p. 54, § 12; reen. R.C., § 1146; am. 1909, p. 231, § 1, subd. 1146; reen. C.L. 65:62; C.S., § 1729; I.C.A.,§ 36-425; am. 1955, ch. 147, § 1, p. 289; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 21, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-311, Refilling bottles owned by others, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 11, p. 628; compiled and reen. C.L. 65:48; C.S., § 1715; I.C.A.,§ 36-411, was repealed by S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 8, p. 357.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-325 and rewrote the section heading and the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-325.

§ 37-312. Butter and whey butter — Definitions and qualities.

Butter is the product made by gathering the fat of fresh or ripened milk or cream into a mass, which also contains a small portion of other milk constituents, with or without salt or a harmless coloring matter. Butter shall be clean and non-rancid and shall contain not less than eighty percent (80%) of butterfat. Whey butter or whey cream butter is the food product made by gathering the fat of fresh or ripened whey cream separated from cheese whey and formed into a mass, which also contains a small portion of other milk constituents, with or without salt or a harmless coloring matter. Whey butter shall be clean and non-rancid and shall contain not less than eighty percent (80%) butterfat. The term butter includes whey butter and whey cream butter.

History.

1905, p. 54, § 19; reen. R.C., § 1131; reen. C.L. 65:68; C.S., § 1735; S.L. 1929, ch. 65, § 1, p. 95; I.C.A.,§ 36-432; am. 1937, ch. 107, § 2, p. 160; am. 1988, ch. 161, § 1, p. 291; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 24, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-312, Cold storage butter must be dated, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 12, p. 628; reen. C.L. 65:49; C.S., § 1716; I.C.A.,§ 36-412, was repealed by S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 9, p. 357.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-332 and substituted “percent” for “per cent” and “butterfat” for “butter fat” throughout the section; and substituted “non-rancid” for “nonrancid” in the fourth sentence of the section.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-332.

§ 37-313. Butter grades.

The grades of butter shall comply with the United States department of agriculture’s 1989 “Standards for Grades of Butter.” “Undergrade” butter is butter scoring less than 90 under this standard. It is hereby declared to be unlawful to sell, or offer for sale any butter within the state of Idaho unless the wrappers and containers in which said butter is packaged are conspicuously labeled as to grades. Any butter that scores less than 90 and is sold or offered for sale within the state of Idaho must be conspicuously labeled with the words “undergrade butter” upon the wrappers and container in which said butter is packaged.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-332a, as added by 1955, ch. 258, § 1, p. 598; am. 1957, ch. 75, § 1, p. 122; am. 1959, ch. 54, § 1, p. 112; am. 1988, ch. 161, § 2, p. 291; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 25, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-313, Sale of diluted milk forbidden, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 13, p. 629; reen. C.L. 65:50; C.S., § 1717; I.C.A.,§ 36-413; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 10, p. 357, was repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 14, effective July 1, 2014.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-332a and rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-332a.

For the USDA’s 1989 standards for grades of butter, see https://www.ams.usda.gov/grades-standards/butter-grades-and -standards .

§ 37-314. Improperly graded butter.

Butter that fails to meet the grade labeled on the butter container may be rejected. Butter that has been rejected due to failure to meet the standard may be relabeled, regraded or reprocessed if authorized by the department of agriculture.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-332b, as added by 1955, ch. 258, § 2, p. 598; am. 1959, ch. 54, § 2, p. 112; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 26, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former § Milk deemed to be adulterated, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 14, p. 629; reen. C.L. 65:51; C.S., § 1718; I.C.A.,§ 36-414; am. S.L. 1935, ch. 98, § 1, p. 207; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 11, p. 357; am. S.L. 1957, ch. 167, § 1, p. 306; am. S.L. 1967, ch. 54, § 4, p. 104; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 23, § 27, p. 633; am. S.L. 1992, ch. 93, § 5, p. 295, was repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 15, effective July 1, 2014.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-332b and rewrote the section heading and the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-332b.

§ 37-315. Advertising substitutes for dairy products.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to make use of the words milk, cream, butter, cheese, creamery, dairy, churn, cow, the name of any dairy breed or any pictorial representation of any of these terms in connection with the sale, offering for sale or advertisement of any substance designed to be used as a so-called substitute for milk, cheese, butter or any other dairy products.

History.

1921, ch. 149, § 1, p. 341; I.C.A.,§ 36-434; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 34, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-315, Milkmen afflicted with disease, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 15, p. 630; reen. C.L. 65:52; C.S., § 1719; I.C.A.,§ 36-415; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 23, § 28, p. 633; am. S.L. 1992, ch. 93, § 6, p. 295, was repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 16, effective July 1, 2014.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-334.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-334.

§ 37-316. Food products made to resemble dairy products — Definitions.

As used in sections 37-315 and 37-318, Idaho Code:

  1. “Dairy product” includes:
    1. Milk, skim milk, milk fat, cream, sour cream, lowfat milk and nonfat milk used in fluid, concentrated or dry form.
    2. Cheese. All varieties including asiago, blue, brick, caciocavallo, cheddar, colby, cook cheese, cottage, cream, washed curd, edam, gammelost, gorgonzola, gouda, granular and grated, gruyere, hard, limburger, monterey, monterey jack, mozzarella, scamorze, muenster, neufchatel, nuworld, parmesan, reggiano, pasteurized, blended and processed cheeses, pasteurized cheese spreads, provolone, pasta filata, romano, roquefort, samsoe, sapsago, semi-soft and skim milk, spiced, swiss and emmentaler as described in 21 CFR, part 133.
    3. Butter as defined in section 37-312, Idaho Code.
    4. Ice cream, frozen custard, ice milk, sherbet as defined in 21 CFR, part 135, frozen yogurt dessert mix, frozen yogurt dessert, frozen lowfat and nonfat yogurt dessert, dietetic or dietary frozen dessert, lowfat or nonfat frozen dairy dessert, and milk shake base as defined in state department of agriculture dairy rules or regulations.
    5. Any manufactured food which:
      1. Uses milk or a milk ingredient as the principal or characterizing constituent of the food product;
      2. Does not contain ingredients added for the purpose of replacing milk or milk ingredients;
      3. Does not contain milk-derived ingredients at levels in excess of those permitted in similar standardized dairy products;
      4. Does not contain any vegetable-derived ingredients unless the ingredients are used as carriers or function as stabilizers or emulsifiers; and
      5. Has no standard of identity recognized by any federal or state of Idaho law, rule or regulation as a dairy product.
  2. “Milk ingredient” includes milk, skim milk, milk fat, cream, sour cream, lowfat milk and nonfat milk used in fluid, concentrated or dry form.
  3. “Milk derived ingredient” includes buttermilk, whey, modified whey products, casein, lactose, lactalbumins and lactoglobulins used in fluid, concentrated or dry forms.
  4. “Artificial dairy product” means any food manufactured or labeled so as to purport to resemble the identity, intended use, composition, physical and sensory properties of a dairy product as defined in subsection (1) of this section.
  5. For the purpose and within the meaning of this act, an “artificial dairy product” shall not include a “dairy product” as defined in this section or any other manufactured food which has a federal or state of Idaho standard of identity as a food product. Food products made to resemble those food products other than dairy products in this subsection, are exempt from the labeling requirements of this chapter.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-334a, as added by 1985, ch. 61, § 1, p. 121; am. 1987, ch. 7, § 1, p. 8; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 10, p. 295; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 35, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-316, Selling milk from infected premises, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 16, p. 630; am. 1917, ch. 103, § 1, p. 379; reen. C.L. 65:53; C.S., § 1720; I.C.A.,§ 36-416; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 29, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 7, p. 295, was repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 17, effective July 1, 2014.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-334a and updated references throughout the section in light of the 2014 revision of chapter 3 of title 37; and, in subsection (1), substituted “rules or regulations” for “regulations” at the end of paragraph (d) and substituted “rule or regulation” for “regulation” in paragraph (e)5.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-334a.

The term “this act” in subsection (5) refers to S.L. 1987, Chapter 7, which is compiled as§§ 37-316 to 37-319.

§ 37-317. Quality standards for food products made to resemble dairy products.

Quality standards (e.g., bacteria, coliform, etc.) for food products made to resemble dairy products shall be at least the equivalent of the established quality standards of the dairy product resembled.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-334d, as added by 1987, ch. 7, § 5, p. 8; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 36, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-317, Milk required to be cooled — When saleable, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-317, as added by S.L. 1957, ch. 167, § 2, p. 300; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 23, § 30, p. 633; am. S.L. 1992, ch. 93, § 8, p. 295, was repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 18, effective July 1, 2014.

Another former§ 37-317, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 17, p. 630; reen. C.L. 65:54; C.S., § 1721; I.C.A.,§ 36-417, was repealed by S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 12, p. 357.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-334d.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-334d.

§ 37-318. License requirements for manufacturers of food products made to resemble dairy products.

  1. It is unlawful to engage in the manufacture of food products resembling dairy products, unless a license for the current calendar year for each separate plant or place used for such business is issued by the director of the Idaho department of agriculture.
  2. Applications for a license shall be in the form which shall be prescribed by the director of the Idaho department of agriculture.
  3. The application shall be accompanied by a fee of one hundred dollars ($100). The fee shall be prorated on a monthly basis for any licensee that commences operations after the first quarter in any calendar year whether or not such plant was licensed during the preceding calendar year.
  4. Plant licenses are not required if the plant is located in a state other than Idaho.
  5. The director of the Idaho department of agriculture shall issue to each applicant that meets the requirements of this section, a license which entitles the applicant to manufacture, sell, or distribute food products resembling dairy products for the then current calendar year for which the license is issued, unless the license is sooner revoked or suspended.
  6. The license shall expire at the end of each calendar year.
  7. It is unlawful for any person to sell any food product resembling dairy products which has been produced in a plant that is in an unsanitary condition.
  8. The manufacture of food products resembling dairy products under unhealthful or unsanitary conditions or which violate the provisions of sections 37-315 through 37-318, Idaho Code, and rules or regulations adopted pursuant thereto, shall be grounds for revocation or suspension of such license.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-334e, as added by 1987, ch. 7, § 6, p. 8; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 37, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-318, Milk kept near insanitary premises, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 18, p. 630; compiled and reen. C.L. 65:55; C.S., § 1722; I.C.A.,§ 36-418, was repealed by S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 13, p. 357.

Amendments.
Compiler’s Notes.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-334e and in subsection (8), substituted “rules or regulations” for “regulations”. Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-334e.

§ 37-319. Penalty — Enforcement.

  1. Any person, firm or corporation, violating the provisions of sections 37-315 through 37-318, Idaho Code, or any part or provision of any of said sections, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200) or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment.
  2. In addition, any products not in compliance with the provisions of sections 37-315 through 37-318, Idaho Code, shall be subject to seizure and disposition in accordance with an appropriate court order or rule adopted by the director of the department of agriculture.
History.

1921, ch. 149, § 2, p. 341; I.C.A.,§ 36-435; am. S.L. 1937, ch. 107, § 3, p. 160; 1985, ch. 61, § 4, p. 121; am. 1987, ch. 7, § 8, p. 8; am. and redesig. 2014, ch. 275, § 38, p. 685.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-319, Skim milk — When saleable, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 19, p. 630; reen. C.L. 65:56; C.S., § 1723; I.C.A.,§ 36-419; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 14, p. 357; am. S.L. 1957, ch. 167, § 3, p. 300, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 54, § 8.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 275, redesignated the section from§ 37-335 and updated references throughout the section in light of the 2014 revision of chapter 3 of title 37.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-335.

§ 37-320. Skimmed milk

Standard. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, comprising S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 20, p. 630; reen. C.L. 65:57; C.S., § 1724; I.C.A.,§ 36-420; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 15, p. 357; am. S.L. 1957, ch. 167, § 4, p. 300, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 54, § 9.

§ 37-321. Skim milk

Manufacturers may handle wholesale. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, comprising S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 21, p. 631; reen. C.L. 65:58; C.S., § 1725; I.C.A.,§ 36-421; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 16, p. 357, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 54, § 10.

§ 37-322. Standard for cream. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 19, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1911, ch. 190, § 22, p. 631; reen. C.L. 65:59; C.S., § 1726; I.C.A.,§ 36-422.

§ 37-323. Weight of milk. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 190, § 23, p. 631; reen. C.L. 65:60; C.S., § 1727; I.C.A.,§ 36-423, was repealed by S.L. 1955, ch. 176, § 17, p. 357.

§ 37-324. Penalty for violations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 20, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1911, ch. 190, § 24, p. 631; reen. C.L. 65:61; C.S., § 1728; I.C.A.,§ 36-424; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 9, p. 295.

§ 37-325. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-325 was amended and redesignated as§ 37-311, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 21, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-326. Standards for dairy products. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 22, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1905, p. 54, § 11; reen. R.C., § 1127; reen. C.L. 65:63; C.S., § 1730; I.C.A.,§ 36-426; am. 1986, ch. 101, § 1, p. 281.

§ 37-327. Sale of cheese containing foreign substances unlawful. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1905, p. 54, § 14; reen. R.C. § 1128; reen. C.L. 65:64; C.S., § 1731; I.C.A.,§ 36-427, was repealed by S.L. 1986, ch. 101, § 2.

§ 37-328. Fraudulent sale of imitation butter unlawful — Regulations pertaining to sale of colored oleomargarine or margarine

Misadvertising of oleomargarine or margarine unlawful. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1885, p. 61, § 1; S.L. 1899, p. 393, §§ 3, 4; R.S. & R.C., § 6917; reen. C.L. 65:65; C.S., § 1732; I.C.A.,§ 36-428; am. S.L. 1951, ch. 195, § 3, p. 416, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

§ 37-329. Use of imitation butter in eating houses

Required to post notices. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-329, as added by S.L. 1951, ch. 195, § 7, p. 416, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

§ 37-330. Penalty for violating sections 37-325 through 37-329. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 23, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1927, ch. 28, § 1, p. 31; I.C.A.,§ 36-430; am. 1955, ch. 147, § 2, p. 289.

§ 37-331. Process butter

Restrictions on sale. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1905, p. 54, § 15; reen. R.C., § 1130; reen. C.L. 65:67; C.S., § 1734; I.C.A.,§ 36-431, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

§ 37-332. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-332 was amended and redesignated as§ 37-312, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 24, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-332a. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-332a was amended and redesignated as§ 37-313, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 25, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-332b. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-332b was amended and redesignated as§ 37-314, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 26, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-332c. Butter graders — Employment — Notice to department — Chief grader — Responsibility of graders — Change of graders — Notice to department — Responsibility of manufacturer for wrapper

Revocation of privilege of using grade emblem. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 27, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-332c, as added by 1955, ch. 258, § 3, p. 598; am. 1959, ch. 54, § 3, p. 112.

§ 37-332d. Licensing of butter graders — Examination — Duration

Fees. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 28, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-332d, as added by 1955, ch. 258, § 4, p. 598; am. 1990, ch. 411, § 1, p. 1139.

§ 37-332e. Revocation or suspension of license. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 29, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-332e, as added by 1955, ch. 258, § 5, p. 598.

§ 37-332f. Enforcement of act by department

Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 30, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-332f, as added by 1955, ch. 258, § 6, p. 598.

§ 37-332g. Violations of statute — Misdemeanor

Punishment. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 31, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-332g, as added by 1955, ch. 258, § 7, p. 598.

§ 37-332h. License fees, disposition, use. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 32, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-332h, as added by 1955, ch. 258, § 8, p. 598.

§ 37-333. Weight of butter. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 33, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1905, p. 54, § 20; reen. R.C., § 1132; reen. C.L. 65:69; C.S., § 1736; I.C.A.,§ 36-433.

§ 37-334. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-334 was amended and redesignated as§ 37-315, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 34, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-334a. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-334a was amended and redesignated as§ 37-316, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 35, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-334b. Label requirements for food products made to resemble dairy products. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 37-334b, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-334b, as added by S.L. 1985, ch. 61, § 2, p. 121, was repealed by S.L. 1987, ch. 7, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-334b, as added by S.L. 1987, ch. 7, § 3, p. 8, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 86, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

§ 37-334c. Ingredient and nutritional values. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-334c, as added by S.L. 1985, ch. 61, § 3, p. 121; am. S.L. 1987, ch. 7, § 4, p. 8, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 86, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

§ 37-334d. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-334d was amended and redesignated as§ 37-317, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 36, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-334e. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-334e was amended and redesignated as§ 37-318, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 37, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-334f. Registration requirements for food products made to resemble dairy products. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-334f, as added by S.L. 1987, ch. 7, § 7, p. 8; am. S.L. 1990, ch. 213, § 31, p. 480, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 86, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

§ 37-335. [Amended and Redesignated.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-335 was amended and redesignated as§ 37-319, pursuant to S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 38, effective July 1, 2014.

§ 37-336. Oleomargarine — Purchase for public institutions unlawful

Exception. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1931, ch. 66, § 1, p. 115; I.C.A.,§ 36-436; am. S.L. 1967, ch. 300, § 1, p. 852, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

§ 37-337. Penalty for violating section 37-336. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1931, ch. 66, § 2, p. 115; I.C.A.,§ 36-437, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

§ 37-338. Department of agriculture to administer act. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 39, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-338, as added by 1955, ch. 147, § 3, p. 289; am. 1987, ch. 7, § 9, p. 8.

§ 37-339. Breed name of dairy cattle carried on label of milk and milk products

Policy. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 40, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1959, ch. 282, § 1, p. 593.

§ 37-340. Use of breed name on label unlawful unless derived exclusively from registered dairy herds

Permit. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 41, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1959, ch. 282, § 2, p. 593; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 11, p. 295.

§ 37-341. Administration and enforcement of act. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 42, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1959, ch. 282, § 3, p. 593; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 31, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 12, p. 295.

§ 37-342. Violations of §§ 37-339 through 37-343 a misdemeanor. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 43, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1959, ch. 282, § 4, p. 593.

§ 37-343. Injunction proceedings additional remedy for violations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 275, § 44, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1959, ch. 282, § 5, p. 593; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 32, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 13, p. 295.

Chapter 4 SANITARY INSPECTION OF DAIRY PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-401. Inspections, examinations and tests by department of agriculture — Dairy farms — Nutrient management plans required — Certain evidence required.

  1. The director of the department of agriculture is hereby authorized and directed to designate any agent to inspect, examine and test any or all dairy products in accordance with rules as the department may prescribe; and to ascertain and certify the grade, classification, quality or sanitary condition thereof and other pertinent facts as the department may require. The director or agent of the department of agriculture of the state of Idaho shall make sanitary inspection of milk, cream, butter and dairy products of any kind whatsoever, intended for human consumption, and of containers, utensils, equipment, buildings, premises or anything whatsoever employed in the production, handling, storing, processing or manufacturing of dairy products or that would affect the purity of the products. Inspections, examinations and tests shall be made to meet the requirements of the laws of the state and of the United States for the sale of the products or their transportation in both intrastate and interstate commerce. Any agent designated by the director to make inspections shall have the right for that purpose to enter any premises and buildings where milk, cream, butter or dairy products shall be produced, stored, processed or manufactured.
  2. Acting in accord with rules of the department, the director or agent of the department shall review plans and specifications for construction of new, modified or expanded waste systems and inspect any dairy farm to ascertain and certify sanitary conditions, waste systems and milk quality.
  3. The director or agent shall issue a permit authorizing the sale of milk for human consumption to all dairy farms that meet the requirements of this chapter, and rules promulgated pursuant to this chapter.
  4. All dairy farms shall have a nutrient management plan approved by the department. The nutrient management plan shall cover the dairy farm site and other land owned and operated by the dairy farm owner or operator. Nutrient management plans submitted to the department by the dairy farm shall include the names and addresses of each recipient of that dairy farm’s livestock waste, the number of acres to which the livestock waste is applied and the amount of such livestock waste received by each recipient. The information provided in this subsection shall be available to the county in which the dairy farm, or the land upon which the livestock waste is applied, is located. If livestock waste is converted to compost before it leaves the dairy farm, only the first recipient of the compost must be listed in the nutrient management plan as a recipient of livestock waste from the dairy farm. Existing dairy farms shall submit a nutrient management plan to the department on or before July 1, 2001.
  5. Any new dairy farms or dairy farms that change owners or operators shall have an approved nutrient management plan on file with the department prior to the issuance of the milk permit for that dairy. The nutrient management plan shall be implemented upon approval of the plan by the department. (6) The director or his agent may issue a permit to sell milk for human consumption to a new or expanding dairy farm only upon presentation to the director by the new or expanding dairy farm of:
    1. A certified letter, supplied by the board of county commissioners, certifying the new or expanding dairy farm’s compliance with applicable county livestock ordinances; and
    2. Evidence that a valid water right exists to supply adequate water for the new or expanding dairy farm; or
    3. A copy of an application for a permit to appropriate water that has been filed with the Idaho department of water resources and which, if approved, will supply adequate water for the dairy farm; or
    4. A copy of an application to change the point of diversion, place, period and nature of use of an existing water right that has been filed with the Idaho department of water resources and which, if approved, will supply adequate water for the dairy farm.

(7) As used in this section:

(a) “Animal units” shall be as defined in rule by the director.

(b) “Expanding dairy farm” means an existing, legally permitted dairy farm that increases, or applies to increase, its existing animal units beyond the number for which it is permitted under applicable county livestock ordinances or increases, or applies to increase, the waste containment system.

(c) “New dairy farm” means a dairy farm constructed after the effective date of this act.

(8) The nutrient management plan, and all information generated by the dairy as a result of such plan, shall be deemed to be trade secrets, production records or other proprietary information, shall be kept confidential and shall be exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 74-107, Idaho Code.

History.

1943, ch. 85, § 1, p. 171; am. 1949, ch. 183, § 1, p. 385; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 248, p. 364; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 14, p. 293; am. 1996, ch. 81, § 1, p. 264; am. 2000, ch. 188, § 1, p. 464; am. 2001, ch. 387, § 1, p. 1365; am. 2001, ch. 388, § 1, p. 1366; am. 2011, ch. 232, § 1, p. 634; am. 2015, ch. 141, § 78, p. 379.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of water resources,§ 67-3301.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 2001 acts — ch. 387, § 1, effective July 1, 2001 and ch. 388, § 1, effective April 11, 2001, which contained a minor conflict that has been resolved and have been compiled together.

The 2001 amendment, by ch. 387, § 1, added the subsection designations (1) to (4) and added the present second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth sentences in subsection (3).

The 2001 amendment, by ch. 388, § 1, in the head field, added “Certain evidence required” following “management plans required”; added the subsections designations (1) to (3) and added subsections (4) through (5)(c). The 2011 amendment, by ch. 232, corrected the designation problems caused by the multiple 2001 amendments and added subsection (8).

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 141, substituted “74-107” for “9-340D” in subsection (8).

Compiler’s Notes.

The phrase “effective date of this act”, at the end of subdivision (7)(c), refers to the effective date of S.L. 2001, Chapter 388, which was effective on April 11, 2001.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2000, ch. 188 declared an emergency. Approved April 4, 2000.

Section 2 of S.L. 2001, ch. 388 declared an emergency. Approved April 11, 2001.

Section 2 of S.L. 2011, ch. 232 declared an emergency. Approved April 6, 2011.

CASE NOTES

Local Regulation.

Where a dairymen’s association and a cattle association filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of Gooding County, Idaho, Ordinance No. 90, which regulated water quality at confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), the supreme court held that Ordinance 90 did not violate Idaho Const., Art. XII, § 2. While§ 42-101 provided that control over the appropriation of water was vested in the state, local governing board’s had the authority under§ 67-6537 to consider the effect any proposed amendments to the comprehensive plan would have on the water quantity in the area; therefore, regulation of CAFOs by the local government was permitted by this section. Idaho Dairymen’s Ass’n v. Gooding County, 148 Idaho 653, 227 P.3d 907 (2010).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

CAFO.

Because the legislature has authorized both the counties and the state to regulate confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), and because these authorities overlap, it is unlikely that a court would conclude the state has completely occupied the field of CAFO regulation or that state law provides an exclusive regulatory program that preempts all local regulation.OAG 08-01.

Forfeited Funds.

The Idaho department of agriculture may not allow a dairyman, whose permit to sell milk for human consumption is temporarily revoked, unfettered discretion as to which charitable organization forfeited funds are donated.OAG 00-39.

§ 37-402. Standards, rules and regulations.

The following standards, rules and regulations concerning the sanitation of milk and cream are hereby established:

  1. The term “processor” as used herein shall mean any individual, partnership, association, or corporation doing business in the state of Idaho that produces, purchases, obtains or uses in the state of Idaho any milk or cream for use in the manufacture of butter, cheese, evaporated milk, frozen desserts, frozen novelties, edible dry milk, or other dairy products. The term “processor” shall not include any individual, partnership, association or corporation which produces, purchases, obtains, or uses milk or cream for his or its own consumption. The term “producer” as used in this act shall mean any person, firm or corporation who owns or controls one or more cows a part or all of the milk from which is sold or offered for sale to a processor.
  2. No processor shall purchase or obtain in any manner, or use in any manner, for the sale or manufacture of any of the above named dairy products any unacceptable milk or cream as herein defined.
  3. The processor shall, for the purpose of determining the acceptability or unacceptability of milk or cream, cause all milk or cream to be tested and graded according to the standards herein defined before purchase, acquisition, or use in any manner, provided, however, that where the processor customarily purchases the milk or cream of any person regularly engaged in the production thereof, the processor is required to test milk and cream of such producer not less than once each month by the standard sediment test approved bacteria test and an approved mastitic test, or such other test as may be prescribed by the director of the department of agriculture and when milk or cream from any such producer is found unacceptable as a result of either test, the processor shall thereafter test the milk or cream of such producer daily by the same test until it is found to be acceptable. Each such processor shall retain for at least one (1) year at the place where such milk or cream is received a record of such tests in the form and of the content which shall be prescribed by the department of agriculture and shall exhibit such record at the place where the same is kept whenever requested to do so by the producer or the department and shall permit copies thereof to be taken.
  4. Milk or cream is unacceptable which does not meet the standards and comply with the regulations promulgated by the director under this act.
  5. Any milk or cream which is unclean, unwholesome or unfit for human consumption, as determined by the department, shall be rejected as unacceptable.
  6. When any milk or cream is rejected as unacceptable it shall be the duty of the director or his agent to notify all processors in the immediate area, giving the producer’s name and address.
  7. Following receipt of such notification no processor shall purchase, obtain or use milk or cream from such producer until notified by the director or his agent that milk or cream from such producer is acceptable or until the milk or cream of such producer has subsequently been found to be acceptable for ten (10) consecutive days after testing the same in the manner hereinabove described.
History.

1943, ch. 85, § 2, p. 171; am. 1949, ch. 183, § 2, p. 385; am. 1951, ch. 240, § 1, p. 498; am. 1970, ch. 98, § 1, p. 245; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 249, p. 364; am. 1978, ch. 110, § 1, p. 228; am. 1986, ch. 101, § 3, p. 281.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in subsection 1 refers to S.L. 1949, Chapter 183, which is codified as§§ 37-401, 37-402, and 37-404.

The term “this act” at the end of subsection 4 refers to S.L. 1970, Chapter 98, which is codified as§§ 37-402, 37-407, and 37-408.

In both instances, the probable intended reference is to “this chapter”, being chapter 4, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-403. Basis for issuance or revocation of licenses or permits.

Whenever, under any law of this state or rule, the director of the department of agriculture or any agent is required to inspect dairy farms and dairy waste systems for compliance with rules prescribed by the department, or determine the sanitary condition of anything referred to in section 37-401, Idaho Code, or the purity of milk, cream, butter, or other dairy products intended for human consumption, the director shall make or cause to be made an examination and inspection and shall report his findings and conclusions. When the issuance or the revoking of any license or permit by the department of agriculture is required to be made after an inspection involving waste systems, milk quality, and sanitary conditions and purity for human consumption of any milk, cream, butter, or other dairy products, the issuance or revocation of license or permit shall be based upon the report or reports so made by the director. The duration of such revocation shall be determined by the director. For violations regarding waste systems the department shall allow the dairy farm’s milk to be processed, provided the milk meets quality standards. The value of the milk sold by the violator during the revocation shall be remitted to the county where the violation occurred for deposit in the county current expense fund. The amount remitted to the county current expense fund shall be less processor expenses associated with the procurement of the milk.

History.

1943, ch. 85, § 3, p. 171; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 250, p. 364; am. 1996, ch. 81, § 2, p. 264; am. 2000, ch. 260, § 1, p. 731.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2000, ch. 260 declared an emergency. Approved April 12, 2000.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Forfeited Funds.

The Idaho department of agriculture may not allow a dairyman, whose permit to sell milk for human consumption is temporarily revoked, unfettered discretion as to which charitable organization forfeited funds are donated.OAG 00-39.

§ 37-404. Coloring when unfit for human consumption.

Whenever the director of the department of agriculture or his agent finds any milk, cream or other dairy products unacceptable for human consumption under the foregoing, he shall color the same with a harmless edible dye so that it may thereafter be identified as having been condemned for human consumption.

History.

1943, ch. 85, § 4, p. 171; am. 1949, ch. 183, § 3, p. 385; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 251, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

§ 37-405. Department may make rules and orders.

The department of agriculture is hereby invested with authority to make rules and orders as may be necessary or desirable for carrying out its various functions and the intent and purpose of this act.

History.

1943, ch. 85, § 5, p. 171; am. 1996, ch. 81, § 3, p. 264.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act”, at the end of the section, refers to S.L. 1943, ch. 85, which is compiled as§§ 37-401 to 37-408.

§ 37-406. Department to cooperate with other agencies.

The department of agriculture is hereby authorized to advise and assist and to cooperate with the federal government or any of its agencies, other departments, agencies and institutions of this state, counties, school districts, and municipalities, and other public and private welfare agencies, in the exercise of any of the powers and duties of the department.

History.

1943, ch. 85, § 6, p. 171.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

§ 37-407. Fees and assessments to be collected from dairy processors.

Whenever an inspection of any dairy product is made by the department of agriculture, or whenever permanent or temporary inspectors or employees are used by said department for the purpose of enforcing or promulgating an inspection or sanitary program for any dairy product, the department is authorized to fix, assess and collect or cause to be collected from the dairy processors, fees or assessments for such services when they are performed by such employees or agents of the department, such fees to be on a uniform basis in an amount reasonably necessary to cover the cost of such inspection and the administration of the department of agriculture dairy inspection program; provided, however, that the department shall so adjust the fees to be collected under this section as to meet the expenses necessary for this inspection service only, all of said fees to be used for this purpose alone; and provided further, that in no event shall the fees or assessments exceed four (4) mills per pound of butterfat produced by any dairyman in Idaho or received by processors. All such fees and moneys collected or received by the department, its employees or agents under this act shall be deposited in the “dairy industry and inspection account” which account is hereby created. All moneys coming into said account are hereby appropriated to the department of agriculture to be used in the inspection required by law to be made of the dairy industry and dairy products. The fees and assessments accrued in any given month are due and payable no later than the twentieth day of the following month.

History.

1943, ch. 85, § 7, p. 171; am. 1950 (E.S.), ch. 76, § 1, p. 101; am. 1951, ch. 240, § 2, p. 498; am. 1967, ch. 66, § 1, p. 148; am. 1970, ch. 98, § 2, p. 245; am. 1982, ch. 22, § 1, p. 26; am. 1995, ch. 78, § 1, p. 208.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act”, in the second sentence, refers to S.L. 1943, ch. 85, which is compiled as§§ 37-401 to 37-408.

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 1951, ch. 240, declared an emergency. Approved March 20, 1951.

§ 37-408. Penalty for violations.

Anyone failing to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter or any standards, rules or orders promulgated hereunder shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200) or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed three (3) months, or by both a fine and imprisonment. The director of the department of agriculture may bring civil actions to enjoin violation of this chapter or the standards, rules or orders promulgated thereunder.

History.

1943, ch. 85, § 8, p. 171; am. 1970, ch. 98, § 3, p. 245; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 252, p. 364; am. 1996, ch. 81, § 4, p. 264.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Effective Dates.

Section 5 of S.L. 1996, ch. 81 declared an emergency. Approved March 6, 1996.

CASE NOTES

Cited

Idaho Dairymen’s Ass’n v. Gooding County, 148 Idaho 653, 227 P.3d 907 (2010).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Forfeited Funds.

The Idaho department of agriculture may not allow a dairyman, whose permit to sell milk for human consumption is temporarily revoked, unfettered discretion as to which charitable organization forfeited funds are donated.OAG 00-39.

§ 37-409. Milk haulers and tanks — Definitions.

As used in this act, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following definitions are adopted:

  1. The term “milk hauler” is the operator of a transportation tank and may be an employee or the owner of the equipment.
  2. The term “farm tank” is a tank used to cool and/or store milk prior to transportation to the processing plant.
  3. The terms “transportation tank,” “bulk tank” and “feeder tank” mean tanks used to transport milk from a farm to a processing plant.
  4. The term “chlorine” shall mean chlorine, or other type of sanitizer approved by the director of the department of agriculture.
History.

I.C., § [37-409] 37-408, as added by 1961, ch. 295, § 1, p. 522; am. 1965, ch. 20, § 1, p. 33; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 253, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Sections 1 to 5 of S.L. 1961, ch. 295 were enacted as§§ 37-408 to 37-412 but were renumbered as§§ 37-409 to 37-413, as there already was a section compiled as§ 37-408.

The words “this act” in the introductory paragraph refer to S.L. 1961, Chapter 295, which is compiled as§§ 37-409 to 37-413.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1965, ch. 20, declared an emergency. Approved February 11, 1965.

§ 37-410. Standards for holding and cooling tanks.

The following standards are hereby adopted relating to farm holding and/or cooling tanks:

  1. Each producer desiring to install a farm holding and/or cooling tank shall obtain approval from the director of the department of agriculture of the state of Idaho or his duly authorized representative, and shall furnish the following information to said director:
  2. The milk house and/or milk room shall have a concrete floor of smooth finish easily cleanable.
  3. Farm tanks and all equipment used in connection therewith shall comply with the Sanitary Standards Symbol Administrative Council, 3A standards in effect at the time of the passage of this act.
  4. The farm tank shall be located in the milk room so as to provide not less than thirty-six inches (36″) clearance on all working sides of the tank, provided, however, that in the case of producers using tanks at the time of the enactment of this act clearances as specified above may be waived by the director if the producer demonstrates his ability to keep the interior and exterior surfaces of the tank and the walls and floors of the milk house in a clean condition. All tanks shall be located so as to provide at least six (6) inches of clearance between the floor and bottom of tanks, except that a four (4) inch minimum clearance is acceptable if the bottom slopes upward at least six (6) inches in a horizontal distance of twelve (12) inches. Remote compressors which are located in milk rooms shall be so installed as to be easily cleanable. Floor drains shall be trapped and shall not be located under the farm tank.
  5. A fixed, properly encased opening not less than six (6) inches above the floor of the milk house or the outside loading platform, whichever is higher, shall be provided in an exterior wall of the milk house on the side closest to the tank outlet to accommodate the milk conductor tubing used to pump the milk from the farm tank to the truck [transportation] tank. Such openings shall not be less than six (6) inches or more than eight (8) inches in size and shall be provided with a flat, tight, self-closing device.
  6. When electricity is the motive power for the milk transport tank milk pump, a lock type electrical connection with ground and weatherproof type receptacle located on the outside of the building with a switch box located on the inside of the building shall be provided.
  7. Water for washing farm tanks shall be from an approved supply and shall be under pressure. Hoses for washing the milk house and the bulk tank shall be used for no other purpose and be stored on a rack convenient to the bulk tank. An automatic hot water storage tank (pressure type) shall be provided and shall be not less than thirty (30) gallons capacity and equipped with a thermostat capable of maintaining water temperature at least 140° Fahrenheit. Extra capacity, higher temperature, or both shall be provided for CIP installations, off peak heating, and milk house heating or other hot water usages. Gas heaters, if used, shall be properly vented.
  8. Adequate evenly distributed artificial light, not placed directly over the tank, shall be provided and shall be so located that cleaning will be easily accomplished. Adequate lighting may be obtained by providing two (2) one hundred fifty (150) watt flood lamps about one (1) foot from the ends of the tank and a one hundred (100) watt bulb over the wash vats. I. Farm tanks shall be protected from overhead contamination.
  1. Tank make, model, and capacity.
  2. A sketch (approximately to scale) of the milk room floor plan showing location of tank, outlet of tank, wall opening for milk conductor tubing, other milk house equipment and access area for tank truck approach.

J. All outside openings shall be screened and self-closing doors shall open outward.

K. The truck approach shall be properly graded and surfaced to prevent pooling of water at the point of loading. Adequate artificial light shall be provided to illuminate this area to facilitate loading during hours when natural light is insufficient. This area shall be provided with a concrete slab or an asphalt surface of sufficient size to effectively protect the milk conducting hose from contamination.

L. Cleaning and bactericidal treatment shall conform to regulations adopted by the department of agriculture. Farm tanks shall be thoroughly cleaned after each use, and then prior to the next milking exposed to two hundred (200) parts per million (1,000,000) of residual chlorine. In cases where farm tanks are equipped with removable drop pipes, a vat large enough and low enough for the washing and sanitizing of this equipment shall be provided. Chemical sprayers are recommended for sanitizing farm tanks and if utilized, shall be used for no other purpose.

M. Indicating thermometers on all farm tanks shall be kept in proper operating condition. The driver shall possess an accurate approved type thermometer to enable him to check the indicating thermometers of the farm bulk tanks. The department of agriculture, using an approved type thermometer, shall check, periodically, the indicating thermometer on farm bulk tanks to determine its accuracy.

N. Abnormal milk, adulterated milk and milk containing objectionable odors shall not be added to the farm tank. The sampler and/or tester shall check the milk for abnormalities before pumping the milk to the tank truck. The entire supply of milk in the farm tank shall be rejected if such milk is detected.

O. Bulk cooling tanks shall be designed and equipped with refrigeration to permit the cooling of the milk to 40° Fahrenheit or lower within two (2) hours after each milking, and maintain it at 45° Fahrenheit or below until picked up.

P. All steps necessary shall be employed to prevent the contamination of milk handled through bulk farm pick up. This shall pertain to all phases of this type of milk handling. The bulk farm tank and accessories shall be used for no other purpose than the handling of milk and the operations incident thereto.

History.

I.C., § [37-410] 37-409, as added by 1961, ch. 295, § 2, p. 522; 1967, ch. 66, § 2, p. 148; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 254, p. 364; am. 1976, ch. 359, § 1, p. 1176; am. 1986, ch. 101, § 4, p. 281.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

Sections 1 to 5 of S.L. 1961, ch. 295 were enacted as§§ 37-408 to 37-412 but were renumbered as§§ 37-409 to 37-413, as there already was a section compiled as§ 37-408. Sanitary standards and accepted practices for the food, beverage, and pharmaceutical industries, once governed by the Sanitary Standards Symbol Administrative Council, referred to in subsection C, are now governed by 3-A Sanitary Standards, Inc. See http://www.3-a.org .

The phrases “time of the passage of this act” in subsection C and “time of the enactment of this act” in subsection D refer to the passage and approval of S.L. 1961, Chapter 295, which was approved on March 13, 1961.

The bracketed insertion in subsection E was added by the compiler to supply the probable intended word. See definitions in§ 37-409.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 263 of S.L. 1974, ch. 18 provided the act should be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1974.

§ 37-411. Standards for transportation tanks.

The following standards are hereby adopted relating to transportation tanks:

  1. The transportation tank and accessories in the milk handling operation shall comply with the requirements of the Sanitary Standards Symbol Administrative Council, 3A standards for transportation tanks existing at the time of the passage of this act.
  2. Suitable facilities, including hot and cold running water, detergent, brushes, sanitizers, and sanitizing equipment, a concrete floor with proper drainage and waste disposal shall be provided for washing and sanitizing of transportation tanks. Unless the truck is to be used within a few hours of the washing operation the sanitizing of the tank shall be omitted until just before the tank truck is to be used. During the interim the tank truck shall be protected from contamination by closing port holes, etc. Since the tank truck may be sanitized on a different date and at a different time from cleaning and washing operation, a tag shall provide space for recording this information. The washing, sanitizing and maintenance of the transportation tank and accessories shall be the responsibility of the processor or milk hauler. The department of agriculture shall be informed in writing designating the person responsible for the cleaning, sanitizing and maintenance of the transportation tank.
  3. The transportation tank and all accessories shall be thoroughly rinsed after each usage and shall be thoroughly cleaned and sanitized daily and the tank tagged and sealed with a tag attached indicating that the tank has been washed and/or sanitized. This tag shall also contain the name of the person doing the work and the date on which the work was done. The tag shall be removed by the hauler at his first pickup and shall be retained at the receiving plant for a minimum of thirty (30) days.
  4. Single length, durable, non-toxic, flexible milk conductor tubing shall be used for conveying milk from the farm tank to the transportation tank. The inside diameter of milk conductor tubing shall not be less than one and three-eighths (1 3/8) inches. If two (2) lengths of tubing are used, they shall be connected either by the use of sanitary couplings or a piece of 3A sanitary tubing with clamps which can be removed without tools. The connections between the pump and the vehicle tank, and between the pump and the milk conductor tubing shall remain assembled except when dismantled for cleaning. The open end of the milk tubing shall be capped with an approved protective cap at all times except when loading or unloading. The outlet valve, milk pump and the milk conductor tubing and samples shall be inclosed in a properly drained, insulated, dust tight cabinet.
  5. The transportation tank and the accessories shall be used for no other purpose than the handling of milk unless such other use is approved by the department of agriculture.
History.

I.C., § [37-411] 37-410, as added by 1961, ch. 295, § 3, p. 522; am. 1967, ch. 66, § 3, p. 148; am. 1986, ch. 101, § 5, p. 281.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Sanitary standards and accepted practices for the food, beverage, and pharmaceutical industries, once governed by the Sanitary Standards Symbol Administrative Council, referred to in subsection A, are now governed by 3-A Sanitary Standards, Inc. See http://www.3-a.org .

The phrase “time of passage of this act”, in subsection A, refers to S.L. 1961, Chapter 295, which was approved on March 13, 1961.

Sections 1 to 5 of S.L. 1961, Chapter 295, were enacted as§§ 37-408 to 37-412 but were renumbered as§§ 37-409 to 37-413, as there already was a section compiled as§ 37-408.

§ 37-412. Standards for milk haulers.

The following standards are hereby adopted relating to milk haulers and to the operation of transportation tanks:

  1. All milk haulers must possess a permit issued by the department of agriculture. All milk haulers shall be subject to such examination and abilities as the department of agriculture may prescribe by regulation in order to receive and retain such permit. The fee for the permit shall be twenty-five dollars ($25.00). The permit shall be valid for three (3) years and must be renewed by December 31 of the third year.
  2. The milk line shall be passed through a special port opening through the milk house wall with care to prevent contact with the ground or floor of the milk house. The port opening shall be closed when not in use.
  3. It shall be the responsibility of the milk hauler to assure that in the event the processor washes and sanitizes the truck the operation has been adequately performed, and that prior to use the tank truck has been properly sanitized. In the event it is the milk hauler’s responsibility to sanitize the tank truck it shall be done with a chlorine solution of proper strength.
  4. The milk hauler’s hands shall be washed immediately before gauging the milk.
  5. The milk shall be observed and checked for abnormalities or adulterations, and all abnormal or adulterated milk shall be rejected.
  6. The milk volume in the farm tank shall be determined in a sanitary manner.
  7. The milk in the farm tank shall be thoroughly agitated. Milk samples for analysis shall be taken in a sanitary manner into properly identified sterile containers. All sampling shall follow standard methods.
  8. After the milk is pumped to the transportation tank the milk conductor tubing shall be capped and returned to the vehicle storage cabinet. Care shall be taken to prevent soiling of the milk line by contact with the milk house floor, operator’s hands or the ground.
  9. The milk hauler shall rinse the farm tank and accessories free of milk with clean water immediately after emptying.
  10. The milk hauler shall be responsible for proper use of the transportation tank and accessories.
History.

I.C., § [37-412] 37-411, as added by 1961, ch. 295, § 4, p. 522; am. 1986, ch. 101, § 6, p. 281; am. 1990, ch. 411, § 2, p. 1139.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Sections 1 to 5 of S.L. 1961, ch. 295 were enacted as§§ 37-408 to 37-412 but were renumbered as§§ 37-409 to 37-413, as there already was a section compiled as§ 37-408.

§ 37-413. Standards for quality control of milk samples.

The following standards are hereby adopted relating to quality control of milk samples taken from tanks:

  1. As often as is deemed necessary the department of agriculture may take samples for analysis from each farm tank or each transportation tank.
  2. All milk samples taken from farm tanks or transportation tanks shall be taken in a sanitary manner in accordance with standard methods. Samples for bacteriological analysis shall be properly iced and transported in accordance with standard methods (32-40° F).
  3. The department of agriculture shall have access to all records maintained by the receiving plant relating to butterfat, temperature, and bacteriological sampling and any other samples of bulk farm tank milk.
  4. Milk samples for analysis shall be available on the farm tank pick up truck at all times during the collection period and delivery to the plant, as required by the department of agriculture.
  5. The sanitary requirements concerning milk and cream established by section 37-402, Idaho Code, are hereby adopted and shall be applicable hereto.
History.

I.C., § [37-413] 37-412, as added by 1961, ch. 295, § 5, p. 522.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Sections 1 to 5 of S.L. 1961, ch. 295 were enacted as§§ 37-408 to 37-412 but were renumbered as§§ 37-409 to 37-413, as there already was a section compiled as§ 37-408.

The numbers in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Chapter 5 INSPECTION AND LICENSING OF DAIRY PRODUCT DEALERS AND ESTABLISHMENTS — MILK COMPONENTS AND QUALITY TESTING

Sec.

§ 37-501. Director and deputy director of dairying

Appointment, qualifications and term of office. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1925, ch. 244, § 1, p. 435; am. S.L. 1929, ch. 232, § 1, p. 454; I.C.A.,§ 36-701, was repealed by S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 1.

§ 37-502. Inspections of dairy product establishments.

It shall be the duty of the director of the department of agriculture, to make inspections or cause inspections to be made in this state of all places required to be licensed by the provisions of this act, where dairy products are sold, offered for sale, or manufactured in the enforcement of the present dairy laws and all future dairy legislation hereinafter enacted, and to collect statistics on the manufacture and sale of dairy products in Idaho.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 2, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-702; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 255, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1925, Chapter 224, which is codified as§§ 37-502 to 37-505, 37-510, 37-511, and 37-513 to 37-516. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 5, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-503. Licenses — Retail vendor excepted — Fees — Posting — Definitions.

Every creamery, milk plant, shipping or cream buying station, milk condensing plant, cheese factory, mix making plant, ice cream factory, reprocessing plant, casein plant, powdered milk plant, or factory of milk products, or other person receiving or purchasing milk or cream in bulk other than a retail vendor of milk on the basis of volume, milk components or milk quality therein, shall annually obtain a license therefor. Such license shall be issued by the department upon being satisfied that the building, places, or premises where such milk or dairy products are to be received or purchased are maintained in a sanitary manner, and that a laboratory or enclosed test room is provided in which to test milk and cream, that ample light is provided therein, and that at all times the room is kept in a clean and sanitary condition, and upon payment of such license fee to the department according to the following schedule:

Milk condensery, one hundred dollars ($100), reprocessing plant, one hundred dollars ($100), creamery, fifty dollars ($50.00), cheese factory, twenty dollars ($20.00), ice cream factory, twenty dollars ($20.00), mix making plant, twenty dollars ($20.00), casein plant, twenty dollars ($20.00), milk powder plant, thirty dollars ($30.00), cream buying or shipping station, fifteen dollars ($15.00). When one (1) or more kinds of dairy products are being manufactured by the same firm on the same premises, this shall be construed to require that a separate license be procured for each kind of product manufactured and sold. The license, when issued, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the plant for which issued.

The term “creamery” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein milk or cream is manufactured into butter for sale.

The term “milk plant” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein milk is received for bottling, pasteurizing, clarifying or otherwise processing.

The term “shipping or cream buying station” shall mean any place where milk or cream is delivered by the producers to a buyer, not a manufacturer, or to the agent or representative of a manufacturer or processor of dairy products for shipment or transportation to such manufacturer or processor.

The term “milk condensing plant” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein milk is condensed or processed by removing a considerable portion of the water or other milk constituents normally contained therein.

The term “cheese factory” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein milk is manufactured into cheese.

The term “ice cream factory” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein milk or cream, regardless of butterfat content, and with or without other constituents, shall be manufactured into a frozen or semifrozen product for human consumption and for sale at wholesale or retail. This term shall not include “frozen dessert machines.”

The term “frozen dessert machine” shall mean the freezer or other device by which the liquid ingredients for frozen dessert are frozen to a solid or semisolid consistency and are discharged, expelled or drawn off for sale at retail. The term “mix making plant” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein milk or cream, with or without other constituents, shall be mixed or processed for resale to ice cream factories; provided, that any duly licensed ice cream factory may carry on, as a part of its business, the business of mix making plant without being required to pay therefor, additional license for so doing.

The term “reprocessing plant” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein a dairy product is mixed, dried, shredded, packaged or further processed into a dairy product. A reprocessing plant does not include retail stores, restaurants or similar institutions.

The term “casein plant” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein casein is manufactured for sale.

The term “powdered milk plant” shall mean any place, building or structure wherein milk or any product of milk is processed by evaporating or removing therefrom the water or moisture contained therein to a point where the product may be handled as a dry product. A powdered milk plant also includes a facility wherein dry milk products are blended or processed into other milk products.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 8, p. 435; am. 1927, ch. 98, § 1, p. 127; am. 1929, ch. 233, § 1, p. 455; I.C.A.,§ 36-703; am. 1937, ch. 147, § 1, p. 240; am. 1941, ch. 134, § 1, p. 266; am. 1947, ch. 160, § 1, p. 412; am. 1967, ch. 124, § 1, p. 282; am. 1982, ch. 6, § 1, p. 8; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 15, p. 295; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 2, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

“Department” means department of agriculture,§ 37-516.

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, in the first paragraph, substituted “on the basis of volume, milk components or milk quality” for “on the basis of the amount of milk fat” in the first sentence and deleted “and that cream scales are protected and placed on a solid foundation and away from drafts” following “sanitary manner” in the second sentence; in the sixth paragraph, substituted “processed by removing a considerable portion of the water or other milk constituents” for “processed by evaporation of a considerable portion of the water”; in the second-to-last paragraph, rewrote the first sentence, which read: “The term ‘reprocessing plant’ shall mean any place, building or structure wherein a cheese product is made by comminuting and mixing one or more lots of cheese of the same variety or of different varieties into a homogenous, plastic mass with or without the addition of water and emulsifying agents” and added the second sentence; and in the last paragraph, added the last sentence.

§ 37-504. Licenses — Duration and revocation.

Licenses shall be issued by the department for the period of one (1) year, fees for which shall be prorated for the appropriate number of months until renewal, and shall expire on December thirty-first of each year issued, and may be revoked by the department after a hearing on ten (10) days’ notice to the licensee, if such licensee shall fail to comply with the provisions of this act. No such license shall be issued, and if issued may be revoked, in the following cases:

  1. If there shall be permitted to exist any other cause or thing calculated or tending to render the milk or cream, or any product thereof, used or produced in such manufacturing or processing operations, unclean, impure and unhealthy.
  2. If the licensee does not meet rules adopted by the department of agriculture for the processing of grade A and manufacturing grade milk and milk products.
History.

1925, ch. 224, § 9, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-704; am. 1937, ch. 147, § 2, p. 240; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 3, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

“Department” means department of agriculture,§ 37-516.

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, rewrote the section, providing for the proration of license fees and revising provisions relating to the non-issuance and revocation of certain licenses.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in the introductory paragraph refer to S.L. 1925, Chapter 224, which is codified as§§ 37-502 to 37-505, 37-510, 37-511, and 37-513 to 37-516. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 5, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-505. Reports of licensees.

All buyers of butterfat, cream, milk or other dairy products, required to be licensed by the provisions of this act, shall report to the director of the department of agriculture monthly the number of pounds of each grade of cream, butterfat or other dairy products purchased or manufactured and prices paid.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 4, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-705; am. 1939, ch. 89, § 1, p. 148; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 256, p. 364; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 4, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, deleted “at each station operated by any creamery, cheese factory, condenser, casein, milk powder or ice cream plant in the state” from the end and deleted the former last sentence, which read: “Such report blanks are to be furnished by the department and additional reports may be called for at the discretion of the department.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1925, Chapter 224, which is codified as§§ 37-502 to 37-505, 37-510, 37-511, and 37-513 to 37-516. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 5, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-506. Method of testing milk and cream.

All milk and cream purchased or sold in the state of Idaho at a price based upon or determined by the milkfat, protein, lactose, solids nonfat or somatic cell counts thereof, shall be tested by methods approved by the director of the department of agriculture of the state of Idaho. Samples must be taken from every shipment of milk and cream. Accurate thermometers must be provided at all times. Milk and cream samples must be protected and in a tamper-proof place between thirty-three (33) and forty-five (45) degrees Fahrenheit. Such samples may be examined and tested by the department of agriculture at any time. The department of agriculture is authorized to conduct audits of a person’s, corporation’s, cooperative’s or company’s payments for milk or cream to determine if such payments comply with established requirements.

History.

1913, ch. 132, § 1, p. 482; am. 1915, ch. 100, § 1, p. 238; reen. C.L. 65:71; C.S., § 1738; I.C.A.,§ 36-706; am. 1947, ch. 160, § 2, p. 412; am. 1963, ch. 49, § 1, p. 201; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 257, p. 364; am. 1986, ch. 101, § 7, p. 281; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 5, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Penalty for violation,§ 37-509.

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, rewrote the section, revising testing provisions and authorizing the department of agriculture to conduct certain audits relating to payments for milk and cream.

§ 37-507. Statement of milk or cream purchased.

Every person, corporation, cooperative or company that determines the value of any milk or cream received or bought by such person, corporation, cooperative or company on a milk volume, component or somatic cell count basis shall, when paying for such milk or cream, include in every statement or check issued to any patron in payment therefor a statement of the number of pounds of milk, milk components and the average somatic cell counts, if applicable, for which payment is made. Records for such transactions shall be retained by the purchaser of the milk or cream for at least one (1) year from the date the tests were conducted.

History.

1913, ch. 132, § 3, p. 482; reen. C.L. 65:73; C.S., § 1740; I.C.A.,§ 36-707; am. 1947, ch. 160, § 3, p. 412; am. 1970, ch. 34, § 1, p. 72; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 6, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Penalty for violation,§ 37-509.

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, rewrote the section, revising provisions relating to statements of milk and cream purchased.

§ 37-508. Apparatus to be correct

Penalty. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1913, ch. 132, § 4, p. 482; reen. C.L. 65:74, C.S., § 1741; I.C.A.,§ 36-708, was repealed by S.L. 1970, ch. 34, § 2, p. 72.

§ 37-509. Penalty for violations.

  1. Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of this chapter or the rules promulgated hereunder for carrying out any requirements herein specified may be assessed a civil penalty by the department or its duly authorized agent of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each offense.
  2. Assessment of a civil penalty may be made in conjunction with any other department administrative action.
  3. No civil penalty may be assessed unless the person, corporation, cooperative or company charged was given notice and opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the Idaho administrative procedure act.
  4. If the department is unable to collect such penalty or if any person, corporation, cooperative or company fails to pay all or a set portion of the civil penalty as determined by the department, it may recover such amount by action in the appropriate district court.
  5. Any person, corporation, cooperative or company against whom the department has assessed a civil penalty under the provisions of this section may, within twenty-eight (28) days of the final action by the agency making the assessment, appeal the assessment to the district court of the county in which the violation is alleged by the department to have occurred.
  6. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the director to report minor violations for prosecution when he believes that the public interest will be best served by suitable warnings or other administrative action.
History.

1913, ch. 132, § 6, p. 483; reen. C.L. 65:77; C.S., § 1744; I.C.A.,§ 36-709; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 16, p. 295; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 7, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, rewrote the section, which formerly read: “Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of sections 37-506 through 37-508, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200), for each and every offense, or be imprisoned in the county jail not less than thirty (30) days nor more than sixty (60) days, or both such fine and imprisonments.”

Cross References.

Administrative procedure act,§ 67-5201 et seq.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Effective Dates.

Section 32 of S.L. 1992, ch. 93 provided that the act should be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1993.

§ 37-510. Retention of tested samples.

Every operator testing components in milk or cream for the purpose of determining their commercial value when purchased or sold shall keep for the period of forty-eight (48) hours after completing a test a portion sufficient for two (2) tests of each and every sample tested. These samples shall be accessible to the director or his representative at any and all times and legible record of all tests made by the operator of said tests shall be accessible to the department for a period of thirty (30) days following such tests.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 5, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-710; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 258, p. 364; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 8, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, substituted “Every operator testing components” for “Every operator of a Babcock test for butterfat” in the first sentence.

§ 37-511. Tester’s and grader’s license — Examination — Licensee’s substitute.

Every person testing or grading milk or cream to determine the milk fat as a basis of fixing the purchase price or to determine the acceptability of such milk or cream shall secure a tester’s license from the department and shall make such tests and grading only by such process as has been approved by the department, and no person shall make such test and grading without such license, and other than by such process. Each applicant for such license shall be required to submit to examination or by actual demonstration show competency in testing and grading cream and milk according to the regulations prescribed by the department. The fee for each licensee shall be twenty-five dollars ($25.00). The license shall be valid for three (3) years and must be renewed by December 31 of the third year. With the approval of the department any licensee may appoint a substitute to act for a period not to exceed fourteen (14) days.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 6, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-711; am. 1947, ch. 160, § 4, p. 412; am. 1990, ch. 411, § 3, p. 1139.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

§ 37-512. Testing and grading when purchase-price based on milk fat or butter fat content.

All buyers of cream or milk, who purchase milk or cream at a purchase price based upon or determined by the milk fat or butter fat content thereof, shall maintain at the plant, creamery, station or factory where such milk or cream is being received, a person licensed by the department of agriculture to test and grade milk and cream.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-711A, as added by 1947, ch. 160, § 5, p. 412.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

§ 37-513. False tests — Evidence.

No person shall falsely manipulate or misread milk or cream testing apparatus. The writing of a check or payment of money by such person, corporation, cooperative or company for cream or milk shall constitute prima facie evidence that such test was made.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 7, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-712; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 9, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, deleted “the Babcock test or any other” following “misread” in the first sentence and inserted “corporation, cooperative or company” in the second sentence.

§ 37-514. Testing without license — Separate offenses.

The testing of each lot of milk or cream by an unlicensed person shall constitute a separate offense.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 12, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-713.

§ 37-515. Fees and fines — Disposition.

Fees and fines collected under the provisions of this act shall be credited and paid into the dairy industry and inspection fund. The department is authorized by rule to set forth parameters relating to payments, refunds or other adjustments whenever the department determines milk or cream component testing fails to meet requirements. The payments or refunds shall be made to the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 10, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-714; am. 1933, ch. 47, § 3, p. 75; am. 1950 (E. S.), ch. 76, § 2, p. 101; am. 2011, ch. 115, § 10, p. 315.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Disposition of fines and forfeitures,§ 19-4705.

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 115, added the last sentence.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in the first sentence refer to S.L. 1925, Chapter 224, which is codified as§§ 37-502 to 37-505, 37-510, 37-511, and 37-513 to 37-516. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 5, title 37, Idaho Code.

Sections 3 and 4 of S.L. 1950 (E. S.), ch. 76 provided for the transfer of balance in dairy inspection accounts fund and agricultural department inspection fund to dairy industry and inspection account.

Effective Dates.

Section 5 of S.L. 1950 (E. S.), ch. 76, provided that said act should be in full force and effect on and after March 8, 1950.

§ 37-516. Rules for administration — “Department” defined.

The director of the department of agriculture is empowered to prescribe rules and regulations in the administration of this act not inconsistent with its provisions. The term “department,” as used in this act, means the department of agriculture.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 11, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-715; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 259, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in both sentences refer to S.L. 1925, Chapter 224, which is codified as§§ 37-502 to 37-505, 37-510, 37-511, and 37-513 to 37-516. The reference probably should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 5, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-517. Violation a misdemeanor. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 11, effective July 1, 2011.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 13, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-716.

§ 37-518. Prosecutions

Duty of prosecuting attorney. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 12, effective July 1, 2011.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 14, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-717.

§ 37-519. Construction with sanitary and health laws. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 13, effective July 1, 2011.

History.

1925, ch. 224, § 15, p. 435; I.C.A.,§ 36-718; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 260, p. 364.

Chapter 6 DAIRY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL ACT

Sec.

§ 37-601. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and cited as the “Dairy Environmental Control Act.”

History.

I.C.,§ 37-601, as added by 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-601, Use of standard glassware required, which comprised S.L. 1927, ch. 217, § 1, p. 311; I.C.A.,§ 36-801; am. S.L. 1951, ch. 14, § 1, p. 23; am. S.L. 1970, ch. 39, § 1, p. 86; am. S.L. 1992, ch. 93, § 17, p. 295, was repealed by S.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 14, effective July 1, 2011.

§ 37-602. Legislative findings and purpose.

  1. The legislature finds that:
    1. The water resources of the state are among the state’s most valuable natural resources;
    2. Maintaining an ecologically sound and economically viable dairy industry in this state is vital to the Idaho economy;
    3. Dairy environmental management systems that are constructed, operated and maintained in accordance with plans that are approved by the department of agriculture are an effective means of protecting the state’s water resources and providing valuable resources for crop production and other uses;
    4. The department’s authority to review, approve and enforce dairy environmental management plans should be consistent and coordinated with the department of environmental quality’s authorities pursuant to title 39, Idaho Code, to protect state ground and surface waters and to obtain approval from the United States environmental protection agency to implement and administer an Idaho NPDES program governing the discharge of pollutants to the waters of the United States as defined in the federal clean water act;
    5. The state should encourage and promote performance and innovation in the design, construction, operation and maintenance of dairy environmental management systems; and
    6. Adequate funding from the legislature for the department of agriculture is necessary to meet the requirements and accomplish the purposes of this chapter.
  2. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to authorize the department of agriculture to review, approve and enforce dairy environmental management plans to ensure that dairy environmental management systems are constructed, operated and maintained in a manner that protects the natural resources of the state.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-602, as added by 2016, ch. 129, § 7, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Department of environmental quality,§ 39-104.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 37-602, Fee for testing glassware, which comprised S.L. 1927, ch. 217, § 2, p. 311; I.C.A.,§ 36-802; am. S.L. 1967, ch. 35, § 1, p. 59, was repealed by S.L. 1970, ch. 39, § 2, p. 86.

Former§ 37-602, Declaration of policy and statement of legislative intent, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-602, as added by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720, was repealed by S.L. 2016, ch. 129, § 6, effective July 1, 2016.

Federal References.
Compiler’s Notes.

The federal clean water act, referred to in paragraph (1)(d), is codified as 33 U.S.C.S. § 1251 et seq. Compiler’s Notes.

For further information on the national pollution discharge elimination system (NPDES), see http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/ .

The abbreviations enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

§ 37-603. Authority and duties of director and agency coordination.

  1. The director of the department shall be solely responsible for approving and enforcing dairy environmental management plans. The department is authorized to adopt rules to implement the provisions in this chapter.
  2. The department shall implement programs to recognize, support and promote performance and innovation in the design, construction, operation and maintenance of dairy environmental management systems. The department shall consult and coordinate with the Idaho dairymen’s association in the implementation of such programs.
  3. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of the department of environmental quality to administer and enforce an Idaho NPDES program for dairy farms that discharge pollutants to waters of the United States, including without limitation, the authority to issue permits, access records, conduct inspections and take enforcement action, as set forth in chapter 1, title 39, Idaho Code, and the rules adopted pursuant thereto. The provisions of this chapter do not alter the requirements, liabilities and authorities with respect to or established by an Idaho NPDES program.
  4. The director of the department of environmental quality and the director of the department of agriculture shall, as appropriate, establish an agreement relating to the administration of an Idaho NPDES program that recognizes the expertise of the department of agriculture. The director shall have the authority to exercise any other authorities delegated by the director of the department of environmental quality regarding the protection of ground water, surface water and other natural resources associated with dairy farms, and this shall be the authority for the director of the department of environmental quality to so delegate.
  5. The director of the department of environmental quality shall consult with the director of the department of agriculture before certifying discharges from dairy farms as provided under 33 U.S.C. section 1341.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-603, as added by 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720; am. 2016, ch. 129, § 8, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Department of environmental quality,§ 39-104.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-603, Standard Babcock testing glassware, which comprised S.L. 1927, ch. 217, § 5, p. 311; I.C.A.,§ 36-803, was repealed by S.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 14, effective July 1, 2011.

Amendments.
Compiler’s Notes.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 129, added “and agency coordination” in the section heading; rewrote subsection (1), which formerly read: “ Notwithstanding the provisions of chapters 1 and 36, title 39, Idaho Code, the director of the department of agriculture shall be solely responsible for protecting ground water within the boundaries of dairy farms regulated under this chapter and solely responsible for protecting surface water within the boundaries of dairy farms regulated under this chapter that are not under, or required to be under, an NPDES permit issued by the federal EPA or the department of environmental quality. The department is authorized to adopt rules to implement the provisions in this chapter”; added present subsection (2) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly; rewrote present subsection (3), which formerly read: “Except as provided in section 37-609, Idaho Code, nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of the department of environmental quality regarding surface or ground water quality or violation of surface or ground water quality standards beyond the boundaries of dairy farms regulated under this chapter. In addition, nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of the department of environmental quality to implement an NPDES permit program for dairy farms”; and added the first sentence in present subsection (4). Compiler’s Notes.

For further information on the national pollution discharge elimination system (NPDES), see http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/ .

§ 37-604. Definitions.

When used in this chapter:

  1. “Agricultural stormwater discharge” means a precipitation-related discharge of dairy byproducts from land areas under the control of a dairy farm where the dairy byproducts have been land applied in accordance with an approved nutrient management plan.
  2. “Best management practice” means a practice, technique or measure that is determined to be a reasonable precaution, a cost-effective and practicable means of preventing or reducing the discharge of pollutants from a point source or a nonpoint source to a level compatible with environmental goals, including water quality goals and standards.
  3. “Certified planner” means a person who has completed nutrient management certification in accordance with the nutrient management standard and is approved by the department.
  4. “Dairy byproduct” means solids and liquids associated with dairy animal rearing and milk production including, but not limited to: manure, manure compost, process water, bedding, spilled feed and feed leachate, and livestock carcasses or parts thereof.
  5. “Dairy farm” means land owned or operated by a department-permitted grade A or manufacture grade facility where one (1) or more milking cows, sheep or goats are kept, and from which all or a portion of the milk produced thereon is delivered, sold or offered for sale for human consumption.
  6. “Dairy environmental management plan” means a plan for managing a dairy environmental management system. The dairy environmental management plan shall consist of dairy storage and containment facilities criteria and a dairy nutrient management plan that are approved by the director.
  7. “Dairy environmental management system” means the areas and structures within a dairy farm where dairy byproducts are collected, stored, treated or applied to land. These areas and structures may include corrals, feeding areas, collection systems, conveyance systems, storage ponds, treatment lagoons, evaporative ponds and land application areas.
  8. “Dairy nutrient management plan” means a plan prepared in conformance with the nutrient management standard for managing the land application of dairy byproducts that is prepared by a certified planner and approved by the department.
  9. “Dairy storage and containment facilities” means the areas and structures within a dairy farm where dairy byproducts are collected, stored or treated in conformance with engineering standards and specifications published by the United States department of agriculture natural resources conservation service or by the American society of agricultural and biological engineers (ASABE), or other equally protective criteria approved by the director. These areas may include corrals, feeding areas, collection systems, conveyance systems, storage ponds, treatment lagoons, evaporative ponds and compost areas.
  10. “Department” means the Idaho department of agriculture.
  11. “Director” means the director of the Idaho department of agriculture or his designee.
  12. “Export” means the delivery of dairy byproducts from a dairy farm to a third party for the third party’s use.
  13. “Land application” means spreading on, or incorporating into the soil mantle, dairy byproducts as a soil amendment for agricultural use of nutrients and for other beneficial purposes. (14) “Modification” or “modified” means structural changes and alterations to a dairy storage and containment facility that would require increased storage or containment capacity or alter the function of the waste system.

(15) “National pollutant discharge elimination system” (NPDES) means the point source permitting program established pursuant to section 402 of the federal clean water act.

(16) “Noncompliance” means a practice or condition that does not meet the requirements of a dairy environmental management plan. Noncompliance does not include an upset condition.

(17) “Nutrient management standard” means criteria for managing the land application of nutrients and soil amendments published in the United States department of agriculture, natural resources conservation service, conservation practice standard, nutrient management code 590, or other equally protective criteria approved by the director.

(18) “Person” means any individual, association, partnership, firm, joint stock company, joint venture, trust, estate, political subdivision, public or private corporation, state or federal governmental department, agency or instrumentality, or any legal entity that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties.

(19) “Process water” means water directly or indirectly used or produced in dairy animal rearing, milk production and environmental management processes including, but not limited to: excess milk; spillage or overflow from watering, washing, spraying or cooling dairy animals; water containing dairy manure; water used in washing, cleaning, or flushing barns, manure pits and other areas involved in the milk production and environmental management processes; water used for dust control; and water that comes into contact with any raw materials, products, or byproducts of the dairy production and environmental management processes.

(20) “Unauthorized discharge” means a discharge of pollutants from a dairy farm to waters of the United States as defined in the federal clean water act that is required to be but is not authorized by an NPDES permit. For purposes of the department’s authorities under this chapter, unauthorized discharge shall not include an upset condition or agricultural stormwater discharge.

(21) “Unauthorized release” means a release of dairy byproducts to ground water or surface waters of the state that are not waters of the United States or beyond land owned or operated by the dairy farm that results from a dairy farm’s failure to comply with its environmental management plan. Unauthorized release shall not include an upset condition, an agricultural stormwater discharge or infiltration from storage and containment facilities that is within engineering standards and specifications published by the United States department of agriculture natural resources conservation service or by the ASABE, or other equally protective criteria approved by the director.

(22) “Upset condition” means precipitation, earthquake, vandalism or other occurrence beyond the control of the dairy farm owner or operator that exceeds criteria for storage and containment facilities and nutrient management in an approved environmental management plan.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-604, as added by 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720; am. 2016, ch. 129, § 9, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-604, Violation a misdemeanor, which comprised S.L. 1927, ch. 217, § 3, p. 311; I.C.A.,§ 36-804, was repealed by S.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 14, effective July 1, 2011.

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 129, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison would be impracticable.

Federal References.

Section 402 of the federal clean water act, referred to in subsection (15), is codified as 33 U.S.C.S. § 1342.

For further information on the national pollution discharge elimination system (NPDES), see http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/ .

For further information on the United States department of agriculture natural resources conservation service, see http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/site/national/ home .

Compiler’s Notes.

For further information on the American society of agricultural and biological engineers, see http://www.asabe.org .

For further information on nutrient management code 590, see http://www. extension.uidaho.edu/nutrient/nutrientmanagementplanning/PDF/Code590.pdf .

§ 37-605. Dairy storage and containment facility design and construction.

  1. All dairy storage and containment facilities shall be designed and constructed in accordance with engineering standards and specifications published by the United States department of agriculture natural resources conservation service or by the American society of agricultural and biological engineers, or other equally protective criteria approved by the director. Design, construction, operation and maintenance of storage and containment facilities in accordance with such criteria shall be considered a best management practice that is intended to prevent unauthorized discharges, unauthorized releases, violations of state water quality standards, contamination of ground water and surface water and endangerment to human health and the environment.
  2. Each dairy farm shall have storage and containment facilities criteria that are approved by the department and included in the dairy’s environmental management plan. Dairy storage and containment facilities criteria shall be implemented by the dairy farm and enforced by the department to ensure that there is no unauthorized discharge or unauthorized release from the dairy farm. The department’s review and approval of plans under this section shall supersede the department of environmental quality’s implementation of plan and specification review and approval pursuant to section 39-118, Idaho Code.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-605, as added by 2016, ch. 129, § 11, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Prior Laws.

Another former§ 37-605, Action by prosecuting attorney, which comprised S.L. 1927, ch. 217, § 4, p. 311; I.C.A.,§ 36-805, was repealed by S.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 14, effective July 1, 2011.

Former§ 37-605, Design and construction, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-605, as added by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720, was repealed by S.L. 2016, ch. 129, § 10, effective July 1, 2016.

Federal References.

For further information on the United States department of agriculture natural resources conservation service, see http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/site/national/ home .

Compiler’s Notes.

For further information on the American society of agricultural and biological engineers, see http://www.asabe.org .

§ 37-606. Dairy nutrient management plan.

  1. Each dairy farm shall have a dairy nutrient management plan that is approved by the department and included in the dairy farm’s environmental management plan. The dairy nutrient management plan shall be implemented by the dairy farm and enforced by the department to prevent unauthorized discharges, unauthorized releases, violations of state water quality standards, contamination of ground water and surface water and endangerment to human health and the environment.
  2. The nutrient management plan shall cover the dairy farm site and other land owned and operated by the dairy farm owner or operator to which dairy byproducts may be applied. Nutrient management plans submitted to the department by the dairy farm shall identify each recipient to whom dairy byproducts are exported, the amount exported to each recipient and the number of acres to which they are applied by each recipient. The information provided pursuant to this subsection shall be available to the county in which the dairy farm is located. Only the first recipient of manure compost must be listed in the nutrient management plan.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-606, as added by 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720; am. 2015, ch. 141, § 79, p. 379; am. 2016, ch. 129, § 12, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-606, Time of taking effect, which comprised S.L. 1927, ch. 217, § 6, p. 311; I.C.A.,§ 36-806, was repealed by S.L. 2011, ch. 115, § 14, effective July 1, 2011.

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 141, substituted “74-107” for “9-340D” in subsection (3).

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 129, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison would be impracticable.

§ 37-606A. Dairy environmental management plan.

  1. Each dairy farm shall comply with the dairy environmental management plan that is approved and on file with the department to prevent unauthorized discharges, unauthorized releases, violations of state water quality standards, contamination of ground water and surface water and endangerment to human health and the environment.
  2. The environmental management plan and all information generated by the dairy as a result of such plan shall be deemed to be trade secrets, production records or other proprietary information; shall be kept confidential; and shall be exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 74-107, Idaho Code, unless such plan is a required component of an NPDES permit.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-606A, as added by 2016, ch. 129, § 13, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Federal References.

For further information on the national pollution discharge elimination system (NPDES), see http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/ .

§ 37-607. Inspections.

  1. The director or his designee is authorized to enter and inspect any dairy farm to determine compliance with the dairy farm’s environmental management plan. The director shall have access to or copy any records pertaining to the dairy environmental management system to ensure compliance with the dairy environmental management plan.
  2. The director shall comply with the biosecurity protocol of the operation so long as the protocol does not inhibit reasonable access to:
    1. Enter and inspect at reasonable times the premises or land application site or sites of a dairy farm;
    2. Review, copy, or review and copy at reasonable times any records that must be kept under conditions of this chapter;
    3. Sample or monitor at reasonable times substances or parameters directly related to compliance with this chapter.
  3. All inspections and investigations conducted under the authority of this chapter shall be performed in conformity with section 17, article I, of the constitution of the state of Idaho. The state shall not, under the authority granted by this chapter, conduct warrantless searches of private property in the absence of either consent from the property owner or other authorized person.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-607, as added by 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720; am. 2016, ch. 129, § 14, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 129, in subsection (1), rewrote the first two sentences, which formerly read: “The director or his designee is authorized to enter and inspect any dairy farm to determine that dairy waste has been managed to prevent an unauthorized discharge or contamination of surface and ground water, and to determine compliance with a nutrient management plan. The director shall have access to or copy any facility records deemed necessary to ensure compliance with this chapter and the federal clean water act” and designated the former last sentence as subsection (2); deleted “an NPDES permit or” preceding “this chapter” in paragraph (2)(c); and redesignated former subsection (2) as subsection (3).

§ 37-608. Unauthorized discharges and unauthorized releases.

  1. No dairy farm shall cause an unauthorized discharge or an unauthorized release.
  2. The department of environmental quality shall be solely responsible and authorized to determine whether the discharge of pollutants from a dairy farm to waters of the United States is required to be authorized by an NPDES permit under chapter 1, title 39, Idaho Code. The provisions of this chapter do not define when a dairy farm is required to obtain an NPDES permit for a discharge, do not exempt a dairy farm from NPDES permitting requirements for such discharges or alter the authority of the department of environmental quality with respect to such discharges. The department shall consult with the department of environmental quality regarding its discovery of unauthorized discharges and any compliance, corrective or other enforcement actions the department has undertaken pursuant to the provisions of this chapter to enable the department of environmental quality to determine whether additional action by the department of environmental quality is warranted.
  3. The department shall determine the appropriate corrective, compliance or other enforcement action to be taken with respect to unauthorized releases.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-608, as added by 2016, ch. 129, § 16, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Department of environmental quality,§ 39-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-608, Unauthorized discharges — Compliance schedules — Penalties, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-608, as added by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720, was repealed by S.L. 2016, ch. 129, § 15, effective July 1, 2016.

Federal References.

For further information on the national pollution discharge elimination system (NPDES), see http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/ .

§ 37-609. Noncompliance — Enforcement — Penalties.

  1. A dairy farm operating in compliance with its environmental management plan shall not be subject to enforcement action pursuant to this chapter.
  2. The department shall address noncompliance with an environmental management plan through corrective actions, compliance schedules or other actions authorized by rules adopted pursuant to this chapter. Dairy farms shall not be subject to fines, corrective actions or compliance schedules under this chapter for upset conditions or agricultural stormwater discharges. The department’s authority to address noncompliance with environmental management plans does not alter the authority of the department of environmental quality with respect to the discharge of pollutants to waters of the United States.
  3. For noncompliance conditions or unauthorized releases, the director or his designee shall have the authority to assess a fine of up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per occurrence. Civil penalties collected under this subsection shall be remitted to the county where the violation occurred for deposit in the county current expense fund.
  4. In any case in which the United States environmental protection agency initiates an enforcement action regarding an alleged violation of the clean water act related to a discharge of pollutants from a dairy farm to waters of the United States, any pending administrative or civil enforcement action initiated by the director relating to the same discharge shall be deemed void. If a compliance order addressing the alleged noncompliance has already been issued by the director, that order shall remain in full force and effect.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-609, as added by 2016, ch. 129, § 18, p. 376.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of environmental quality,§ 39-101 et seq.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-609, Safe harbor, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-609, as added by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 1, p. 720, was repealed by S.L. 2016, ch. 129, § 17, effective July 1, 2016.

Federal References.

The federal clean water act, referred to in subsection (4), is codified as 33 U.S.C.S. § 1251 et seq.

For further information on the United States environmental protection agency, see https://www3.epa.gov .

Chapter 7 PASTEURIZATION OF MARKET MILK AND MARKET MILK PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-701. Statement of purpose. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1801, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305.

§ 37-702. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1802, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305; am. 1967, ch. 53, § 1, p. 99; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 33, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 18, p. 295.

§ 37-703. Director of department of agriculture to enforce. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1803, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 34, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 19, p. 295.

§ 37-704. Department of Public Health to issue certificates of compliance. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised I.C.A.,§ 36-1804, as added by S.L. 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 53, § 4.

§ 37-705. Certificate to be renewed annually. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1805, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 20, p. 295.

§ 37-706. Certificate necessary for labeling as pasteurized. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1806, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 35, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 21, p. 295.

§ 37-707. Standards for equipment and sanitation. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1807, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305; am. 1967, ch. 53, § 2, p. 99; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 36, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 22, p. 295.

§ 37-708. Rules, regulations and standards to be prescribed. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1808, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 37, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 23, p. 295.

§ 37-709. Penalty for violations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1809, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305.

§ 37-710. Injunctions against violations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1810, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 24, p. 295.

§ 37-711. Separability. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1811, as added by 1947, ch. 128, § 1, p. 305.

Chapter 8 GRADES OF QUALITY FOR MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-801. Use of grade terms restricted. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1701, as added by 1941, ch. 141, § 1, p. 274; am. 1951, ch. 157, § 1, p. 352; am. 1967, ch. 46, § 1, p. 86; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 38, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 25, p. 295.

§ 37-802. Licenses. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1702, as added by 1941, ch. 141, § 1, p. 274; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 39, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 26, p. 295.

§ 37-803. Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1703, as added by 1941, ch. 141, § 1, p. 274; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 40, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 27, p. 295.

§ 37-804. Revocation of licenses. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1704, as added by 1941, ch. 141, § 1, p. 274.

§ 37-805. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1705, as added by 1941, ch. 141, § 1, p. 274; am. 1951, ch. 157, § 2, p. 352; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 41, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 28, p. 295.

§ 37-806. Penalty for violations

Injunctions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1706, as added by 1941, ch. 141, § 1, p. 274; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 29, p. 295.

§ 37-807. Separability. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1941, ch. 141, § 2, p. 274.

§ 37-808. Policy to improve dairy quality requirements. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1959, ch. 82, § 1, p. 191.

§ 37-809. Adoption of federal standards for certain dairy products. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, comprising S.L. 1959, ch. 82, § 2, p. 191, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 46, § 2.

§ 37-810. Administration of act

Publication of grade standards. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1959, ch. 82, § 3, p. 191; am. 1965, ch. 163, § 1, p. 316; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 42, p. 633; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 30, p. 295.

§ 37-811. Compliance with naming and grading regulations required. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 3, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1959, ch. 82, § 4, p. 191.

§ 37-812. Violations of law misdemeanor. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, comprising S.L. 1959, ch. 82, § 5, p. 191, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 46, § 3.

§ 37-813. Rules and regulations

Effect. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, comprising S.L. 1959, ch. 82, § 6, p. 191, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 46, § 4.

Chapter 9 LABELS AND BRANDS FOR DAIRY PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-901 — 37-907. Labels and brands for dairy products. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1911, ch. 212, §§ 1 to 7, p. 685; reen. C.L. 65:78 to 65:84; C.S. §§ 1745 to 1751; I.C.A.,§§ 36-601 to 36-607; S.L. 1974, ch. 23, § 43, p. 633, were repealed by S.L. 1991, ch. 30, § 6.

Chapter 10 DISCRIMINATION AND UNFAIR COMPETITION IN BUYING AND SELLING DAIRY PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-1001. Discrimination by buying at higher price — Prima facie evidence

Grades of cream. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 1, p. 157; am. 1925, ch. 78, § 1, p. 112; I.C.A.,§ 36-1101.

§ 37-1002. Discrimination by selling at lower price

Unfair discrimination defined. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 2, p. 157; am. 1927, ch. 221, § 1, p. 320; I.C.A.,§ 36-1102.

§ 37-1003. Special rebates, collateral contracts, and other devices. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 3, p. 157; I.C.A.,§ 36-1103.

§ 37-1003a. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1103A, as added by 1949, ch. 275, § 1, p. 560.

§ 37-1003b. Unfair and unlawful practices enumerated. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 36-1103B, as added by 1949, ch. 275, § 1, p. 560; am. 1983, ch. 36, § 1, p. 86.

§ 37-1003c — 37-1003f. Refrigeration facilities — Equipment — Sale — Competitive, conditions — Permissive practices — Collusion or joint participation prohibited. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised I.C.A.,§§ 36-1103c to 36-1103f as added by 1949, ch. 275, § 1, p. 564, were repealed by 1963, ch. 190, § 9.

§ 37-1004. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 4, p. 157; I.C.A.,§ 36-1104.

§ 37-1005. Duty of director of department of agriculture. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 5, p. 157; I.C.A.,§ 36-1106; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 261, p. 364.

§ 37-1006. Prosecutions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 6, p. 157; I.C.A.,§ 36-1106; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 262, p. 364.

§ 37-1007. Person injured may maintain action. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 7, p. 157; I.C.A.,§ 36-1107.

§ 37-1008. Prohibited contracts void. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 8, p. 157; I.C.A.,§ 36-1108.

§ 37-1009. Revocation of corporate charter. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 9, p. 157; I.C.A.,§ 36-1109.

§ 37-1010. Separability. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1923, ch. 121, § 10, p. 157; I.C.A.,§ 36-1110.

§ 37-1011. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1963, ch. 190, § 2, p. 579; 1965, ch. 150, § 1, p. 289.

§ 37-1012. Unlawful marketing practices in connection with sale of dairy products

Exceptions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1963, ch. 190, § 3, p. 579.

§ 37-1013. Violation a misdemeanor

Penalty. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1963, ch. 190, § 4, p. 579.

§ 37-1014. Enjoining violations — Costs

Damages. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1963, ch. 190, § 5, p. 579.

§ 37-1015. Trade association may maintain action. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2014, ch. 284, § 4, effective July 1, 2014.

History.

1963, ch. 190, § 6, p. 579.

Chapter 11 ACQUISITION OF RAW MILK

Sec.

§ 37-1101. Acquisition of raw milk and raw milk products by owner.

  1. The acquisition of raw milk or raw milk products from cows, sheep or goats by an owner of such cows, sheep or goats for use or consumption by the owner or members of the owner’s household shall not constitute the sale or retail sale of raw milk or raw milk products and shall not be prohibited. The acquisition of raw milk or raw milk products from cows, sheep or goats by an owner of a cow share, sheep share or goat share for use or consumption by the owner or members of the owner’s household shall not constitute the sale or retail sale of raw milk or raw milk products and shall not be prohibited provided the following conditions are met:
    1. Unless otherwise permitted by the Idaho state department of agriculture, no more than seven (7) cows, fifteen (15) sheep or fifteen (15) goats may be kept as part of a cow share, sheep share or goat share program.
    2. The owner of a cow share, sheep share or goat share shall receive raw milk or raw milk products directly from the farm or dairy where the cow, sheep, goat or dairy herd is located and the farm or dairy shall be registered pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. A person who is the owner of a cow share, sheep share or goat share in a cow, sheep, goat or dairy herd may receive raw milk or raw milk products on behalf of another owner of the same cow, sheep, goat or dairy herd. A person who is not an owner of a cow share, sheep share or goat share in the same cow, sheep, goat or dairy herd shall not receive raw milk or raw milk products on behalf of the owner of a cow share, sheep share or goat share.
    3. The raw milk or raw milk products are obtained pursuant to the ownership of a cow, sheep, goat, cow share, sheep share or goat share. A cow share, sheep share or goat share is an undivided ownership interest in a cow, sheep, goat or herd of cows, sheep or goats, created by a written contractual relationship between an owner and a farmer that includes a bill of sale, stock certificate or other written evidence satisfactory to the director of the Idaho state department of agriculture of a bona fide ownership interest in the cow, sheep, goat or dairy herd. Such written contractual relationship shall also include boarding terms under which the cow, sheep, goat or dairy herd are boarded, milked and cared for. Such written contractual relationship shall also clearly set forth that the share owner is entitled to receive a share of milk or milk products from the cow, sheep, goat or dairy herd and contain a conspicuous notification that the milk or milk products are raw and not pasteurized.
    4. Information describing the standards used by the farm or dairy with respect to herd health, and in the production of milk from the herd, is provided to the share owner by the farmer together with results of tests performed on the cows, sheep or goats that produced the milk, tests performed on the milk and an explanation of the tests and test results.
    5. A farm or dairy operating a cow share, sheep share or goat share program with more than three (3) cows, seven (7) sheep or seven (7) goats shall test such raw milk or raw milk products at a frequency of at least four (4) separate months during any consecutive six (6) month period. Each batch of raw milk shall test negative for drugs. Milk quality tests and drug tests shall be conducted utilizing testing methods approved by the Idaho state department of agriculture. In no event shall such raw milk or raw milk products contain:
      1. More than fifteen thousand (15,000) bacteria per milliliter;
      2. More than twenty-five (25) coliform per milliliter;
      3. More than five hundred thousand (500,000) somatic cells per milliliter of raw milk from a cow or more than seven hundred fifty thousand (750,000) somatic cells per milliliter of raw milk from a sheep or goat.
    6. Whenever three (3) of the last five (5) consecutive bacteria, coliform, or somatic cell tests exceeds any of the milk quality standards listed in this section, the cow share, sheep share or goat share owners shall be notified and no milk shall be offered for human consumption until such time it meets the standard.
    7. Milk testing positive for drugs shall not be used for human consumption.
    8. All cows, sheep or goats kept as part of a cow share, sheep share or goat share program shall be tuberculosis and brucellosis free and shall be tested for tuberculosis and brucellosis annually.
  2. Registration of a farm or dairy as required by subsection (1)(b) of this section shall be accomplished by delivering to the Idaho state department of agriculture a written statement containing:
    1. The name of the farmer, farm or dairy;
    2. A valid, current address of the farmer, farm or dairy; and
    3. A statement that raw milk or raw milk products are being produced at the farm or dairy.
  3. No person who obtains raw milk or raw milk products in accordance with this section shall sell such raw milk or raw milk products. Unless otherwise permitted by the Idaho state department of agriculture, it shall be unlawful for an owner of a cow, sheep, goat, cow share, sheep share or goat share to sell, offer for sale or advertise for sale to any person or distribute to any restaurant or food establishment, grocery store or farmers market any raw milk or raw milk products produced as provided herein. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200) or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed three (3) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The director of the Idaho state department of agriculture may bring civil actions to enjoin violation of the provisions of this section.
  4. No producer of raw milk or raw milk products as provided in this section shall publish any statement that implies approval or endorsement by the Idaho state department of agriculture.
  5. The Idaho state department of agriculture is charged with the responsibility of administration and enforcement of this chapter and is empowered to promulgate and enforce rules not inconsistent with this chapter.
  6. The Idaho state department of agriculture is authorized to issue a hold order to stop the distribution of raw milk or raw milk products when it is deemed necessary to protect human health.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-1101, as added by 2010, ch. 359, § 1, p. 944.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former chapter 11 of title 37 titled “Filled Milk”, which comprised the following sections, was repealed by S.L. 1996, ch. 85, § 1, effective July 1, 1996:

§ 37-1101, which comprised S.L. 1923, ch. 37, § 1, p. 43; I.C.A.,§ 36-501; am. S.L. 1955, ch. 149, § 1, p. 296.

§ 37-1102, which comprised S.L. 1923, ch. 37, § 2, p. 43; I.C.A.,§ 36-502.

§ 37-1103, which comprised S.L. 1923, ch. 37, § 3, p. 43; I.C.A.,§ 36-503.

§ 37-1104, which comprised S.L. 1923, ch. 37, § 4, p. 43; I.C.A.,§ 36-504.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2010, ch. 359 declared an emergency. Approved April 11, 2010.

Chapter 12 ICE CREAM AND FROZEN DESSERTS

Sec.

§ 37-1201. Definitions.

For the purpose and within the meaning of this act, the term “frozen desserts and frozen novelties” shall be defined as provided in regulations promulgated by the director of the department of agriculture.

History.

1949, ch. 44, § 1, p. 77; am. 1949, ch. 201, § 1, p. 418; am. 1963, ch. 123, § 1, p. 352; am. 1977, ch. 308, § 1, p. 879; am. 1979, ch. 118, § 1, p. 365.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1949, Chapter 44, which is compiled as§§ 37-1201 to 37-1205.

Acts 1949, ch. 44, § 6, repealed Acts 1933, ch. 162, as amended. This had the effect of repealing§§ 37-1201, 37-1202, 37-1203 of the Idaho Code. However, since the 1949 act covered the same subject matter, it has been given the same section numbers as the 1933 act with such additional sections as the new act made necessary.

§ 37-1202. Labeling and advertising frozen desserts and frozen novelties.

  1. All packages and containers used in the sale and distribution of frozen desserts or frozen novelties shall bear a label. The label shall plainly give the name of the product as defined in regulations promulgated by the director of the department of agriculture, and if a trade or brand name is used, the name of the product shall be in letters at least one-half the size of the letters of such brand or trade name. The label shall also bear the name and address of the manufacturer or distributor.
  2. Wherever any frozen desserts or frozen novelties are sold or dispensed over counters, through machines, or in any other manner than in labeled cartons, packages or containers, the seller or dispenser thereof shall in his advertising or his offer to sell or dispense such product plainly display the name of the product as defined in regulations promulgated by the director of the department of agriculture in letters at least one-half of the size of the letters of the trade or brand name. When any frozen dessert or frozen novelty is sold or dispensed, other than in packages or containers, without any advertising or the use of a trade or brand name, the seller or dispenser thereof shall conspicuously display at the counter, machine or place where the product is sold or dispensed, a sign with letters at least four (4) inches high describing the product so sold or dispensed.
History.

1949, ch. 44, § 2, p. 77; am. 1977, ch. 308, § 2, p. 879; am. 1979, ch. 118, § 2, p. 365.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 1977, ch. 308 declared an emergency. Approved March 31, 1977.

§ 37-1203. Violations unlawful.

It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, firm or corporation to manufacture, dispense, sell or offer to sell any frozen dessert or frozen novelty which does not conform to the standards set forth in this act, and it shall be unlawful to manufacture, sell, offer for sale or dispense such frozen desserts or frozen novelties without having and displaying the appropriate labels and signs required by section 37-1202, Idaho Code. It shall be unlawful to manufacture, sell, offer to sell or dispense any frozen dessert or frozen novelty, whether herein defined or not, unless the same shall conform to one (1) of the definitions or standards herein described.

History.

1949, ch. 44, § 3, p. 77; am. 1992, ch. 93, § 31, p. 295.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” near the middle of the first sentence refer to S.L. 1949, Chapter 44, which is compiled as§§ 37-1201 to 37-1205.

Effective Dates.

Section 32 of S.L. 1992, ch. 93 provided that the act should be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1993.

§ 37-1204. Penalties.

Any person, partnership, firm or corporation violating, or who shall fail to comply with, the preceding sections, or any part, provision, or section thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) and not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not exceeding six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment.

History.

1949, ch. 44, § 4, p. 77.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

§ 37-1205. Enforcement and duties of department of agriculture.

Enforcement of this act shall be in the department of agriculture of the state of Idaho and it shall be the duty of such department to exercise and supervise and conduct such investigations as may be necessary for the enforcement of this act.

History.

1949, ch. 44, § 5, p. 77.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1949, Chapter 44, which is compiled as§§ 37-1201 to 37-1205.

Section 6 of S.L. 1949, ch. 44, provides as follows: “Chapter 162 of the Idaho Session Laws of 1933, as amended, be, and the same is hereby repealed.”

Chapter 13 LICENSING OF DEALERS IN DAIRY PRODUCT SUBSTITUTES

Sec.

§ 37-1301 — 37-1307. Schedule of fees — Licenses — Disposition of fees and fines — Reports — Violation — Duty of attorney general — Effect. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1929, ch. 70, §§ 1 to 7, p. 108; I.C.A.,§§ 36-901 to 36-907; am. S.L. 1933, ch. 47, § 4, p. 75; am. S.L. 1949, ch. 13, § 1, p. 13; am. S.L. 1950 (E. S.), ch. 12, § 1, p. 23, were repealed by S.L. 1968 (2nd E. S.), ch. 4, § 1.

Chapter 14 TAX ON SALE OF OLEOMARGARINE PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-1401 — 37-1408. Oleomargarine tax — Procedure — Penalties — Regulations. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1931, ch. 93, §§ 1 to 9, p. 157; I.C.A.,§§ 36-1002 to 36-1009; am. S.L. 1933, ch. 47, § 5, p. 75; am. S.L. 1950 (E. S.), ch. 12, § 2, p. 23; am. S.L. 1951, ch. 195, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, p. 416; am. S.L. 1961, ch. 289, § 1, p. 513, were repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 212, § 1.

Chapter 15 EGGS AND EGG PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-1501. Terms defined.

The word “eggs” whenever used in this act shall mean and include foreign eggs in the shell, and the words “foreign eggs” shall mean and include eggs produced in any foreign country, and egg products manufactured from eggs produced in any foreign country.

The word “egg products” whenever used in this act shall mean and include egg powder, powdered eggs, dried eggs, liquid frozen eggs, and any other product, by whatsoever trade name designated, manufactured from foreign eggs or any part thereof.

History.

1939, ch. 218, § 1, p. 460.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1939, Chapter 218, which is compiled as§§ 37-1501 to 37-1507.

§ 37-1502. Sale when unfit for human food unlawful.

It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer or expose for sale, in this state, any eggs or egg products unfit for human food; and for the purpose of this act, an egg shall be deemed unfit for human food when it is addled, putrid, rotten, in whole or in part; when the yolk is stuck to the shell; the inside contains molds, black spots or black rot, heavy blood spots or rings or bloody whites, or an incubated egg as defined in this act; or any material of an unwholesome nature; and egg products shall be deemed unfit for human food when manufactured from eggs unfit for human food.

History.

1939, ch. 218, § 2, p. 460.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1939, Chapter 218, which is compiled as§§ 37-1501 to 37-1507.

§ 37-1503. Eggs in the shell.

It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer or expose for sale in this state any foreign eggs in the shell, without having stamped on each such egg, in legible type and in durable indelible ink, the words “Foreign Produced Eggs From .t . . .” and the name of the country in which such egg is produced.

History.

1939, ch. 218, § 3, p. 460.

§ 37-1504. Eggs other than in the shell and egg products.

It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer or expose for sale in this state any foreign eggs in any other from [form] than in the shell, or any egg products manufactured from foreign eggs, without having stamped or printed in legible type in letters two inches (2″) high, in durable paint or ink on the side and on the cover of each container the words “Foreign Produced Eggs From . . . .,” following [followed] by the name of the country in which such eggs were produced, or in which the eggs from which such egg products were manufactured were produced.

History.

1939, ch. 218, § 4, p. 460.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed words “form” and “followed” were inserted by the compiler to supply the probable intended words.

§ 37-1505. Serving in restaurants, hotels and other establishments.

It shall be unlawful for any person owning or operating any restaurant, hotel, cafe, coffee shop, or other place where food is served, or any bakery or confectionery shop where food products are sold, to serve or sell any foreign eggs or egg products manufactured from foreign eggs without posting and maintaining in a conspicuous place where the customers entering any such place of business can see it, a placard or sign bearing the words “We Use Foreign Produced Eggs” printed or painted in legible letters not less than two inches (2″) high.

History.

1939, ch. 218, § 5, p. 460.

§ 37-1506. Manufacture or sale of food products containing eggs or egg products.

It shall be unlawful for any person manufacturing and/or selling any food products containing eggs or egg products to sell, offer or expose for sale in this state any food products containing foreign eggs, or egg products manufactured from foreign eggs, without having printed on the outside of the wrapper or container of each such food product in legible letters of bold faced type of a size not less than 8-point, the words “Foreign Eggs Used in This Product,” or if such products are sold, offered or exposed for sale in bulk without displaying in a conspicuous place at the point where such food products are offered or exposed for sale, a placard or sign printed in letters two inches (2″) high, and containing the words “Foreign Eggs Used in This Product.”

History.

1939, ch. 218, § 6, p. 460.

§ 37-1507. Violation a misdemeanor.

Any person who violates or fails to comply with any of the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History.

1939, ch. 218, § 7, p. 460.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Penalty for misdemeanor when not otherwise provided,§ 18-113.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1939, Chapter 218, which is compiled as§§ 37-1501 to 37-1507.

§ 37-1508 — 37-1518. Eggs, grades and standards — Licenses — Official seals — Improper designation — Records — Quality — Enforcement of act — Penalty. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1953, ch. 148, §§ 1 to 12, p. 241, were repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 143, § 13.

§ 37-1519. Purpose.

The legislature of the state of Idaho recognizes that the candling, storing, grading, packing, selling, peddling, distributing, labeling, dealing in and trading in eggs in the state of Idaho is in the public interest and hereby declares that the provisions of this act are vital to the economy of the state of Idaho and the well being of its citizens.

The purpose of this act is to establish standards of grades for eggs and authorize standards of sanitation, cleanliness and temperature for the handling and storage of eggs for sale in the state of Idaho, and to require compliance with the labeling regulations and the designation of the grade of eggs sold in the state of Idaho.

History.

1963, ch. 143, § 1, p. 406.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1963, Chapter 143, which is compiled as§§ 37-1519 to 37-1523 and 37-1524 to 37-1529.

§ 37-1520. Definitions.

When used in this act:

  1. The term “candling” shall refer to the act or function of determining the grade of eggs; and the term “candler” shall refer to the person performing that act or function.
  2. The term “carton” shall mean a container containing one (1) dozen eggs.
  3. The term “director” shall refer to the director of the department of agriculture.
  4. The term “consumer” shall mean a person who purchases eggs or egg products for use as food and not for resale in any form.
  5. The term “container” shall mean any carton, case, box, basket, sack, bag or other receptacle.
  6. The term “dealer” or “egg handler” shall mean any person who acquires eggs or egg products from a producer or distributor for resale to consumers.
  7. The term “distributor” shall refer to any person having possession or control of eggs or egg products for the purpose of candling, grading, packing, selling, peddling, distributing, dealing in or trading in eggs or egg products for resale to a dealer in the state of Idaho, but shall not refer to a producer when engaging in the sale of eggs or egg products to a distributor or when engaging in the sale of eggs directly to a consumer at the place of production.
  8. The term “grade” when used as a verb shall mean to classify eggs as to quality and size, and when used as a noun shall mean the classification as to quality and size so established.
  9. The term “person” shall include an individual, partnership, corporation, firm, association and agent.
  10. The term “producer” shall mean a person engaged in the business of operating or controlling the operation of one or more farms, ranches or establishments on which eggs or egg products are produced in the state of Idaho.
  11. The term “sale” or “sell” or “selling” or “sold” shall include sale, offer of sale, display for sale, have in possession for sale, exchange, barter, trade or other dealing.
  12. “Intrastate commerce” means any eggs or egg products in intrastate commerce whether such eggs or egg products are intended for sale, held for sale, offered for sale, sold, stored, transported or handled in this state in any manner and prepared for eventual distribution in this state whether at wholesale or retail.
History.

1963, ch. 143, § 2, p. 406; am. 1969, ch. 39, § 1, p. 97; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 173, p. 364; am. 1975, ch. 175, § 1, p. 477; am. 1982, ch. 26, § 1, p. 51.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in the introductory paragraph refer to S.L. 1963, Chapter 143, which is compiled as§§ 37-1519 to 37-1523 and 37-1524 to 37-1529.

§ 37-1521. Regulations for grades and standards.

The director of the department of agriculture shall issue regulations for the enforcement of this act which regulations shall have the force and effect of law. Such regulations may relate to all phases of inspection and grading of eggs and egg products and to the sanitation and conditions of eggs and egg product production, storage and transportation. In arriving at such regulations the director shall consider all pertinent federal egg and egg product laws and regulations.

History.

1963, ch. 143, § 3, p. 406; 1965, ch. 8, § 1, p. 9; rep. & reen. 1969, ch. 39, § 2, p. 97; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 174, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the first sentence refers to S.L. 1969, Chapter 39, which is compiled as§§ 37-1520, 37-1521, and 37-1530.

§ 37-1522. Licenses.

  1. No person shall act as a distributor of eggs in the state of Idaho without first obtaining a license therefor from the director for each physically separate establishment at which such business is conducted.
  2. No producer or distributor shall engage in candling eggs for official grade designation in the state of Idaho without first obtaining a license therefor from the director. Each producer or distributor who candles or assigns grades to eggs shall have or designate an individual candler who shall be responsible for making this determination.
  3. Each application for a license under this act shall be in writing upon forms prescribed by the director, and shall be accompanied by the annual license fee contemplated in section 37-1523, Idaho Code.
  4. Each license shall be in a form prescribed by the director and shall bear the license number assigned to each licensee.
  5. The license of a distributor shall be conspicuously displayed and posted at the separate establishment for which that license is issued. The license of an egg candler shall be conspicuously displayed and posted at the place of business where that egg candler is performing those services.
  6. The director shall refuse to issue a license to a distributor or egg candler who at the time of application therefor is not complying fully with the regulations and standards adopted, established and prescribed therefor under the provisions of this act; and shall be empowered to revoke or suspend a license issued to a distributor or egg candler upon determination of noncompliance with these regulations and standards or during the period of noncompliance with these regulations and standards.
History.

1963, ch. 143, § 4, p. 406; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 175, p. 364; am. 1982, ch. 26, § 2, p. 51.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsections (c) and (f) refer to S.L. 1963, Chapter 143, which is compiled as§§ 37-1519 to 37-1523 and 37-1524 to 37-1529.

§ 37-1523. Fees — Renewal.

  1. The annual license fee for each physically separate establishment of a distributor shall be twenty dollars ($20.00). The annual license fee for each egg candler shall be five dollars ($5.00). The period for which the license fee is paid and for which the license is issued shall be July first to and including the following June thirtieth, and if the license is issued within that period the license fee shall nevertheless be the full amount above stated. Each license shall be renewed on July first of each year.
  2. All license fees, assessments and moneys collected by the director under the provisions of this act shall be placed in a separate fund in the state treasury to be used by the director solely for the purpose of inspection, administration and the enforcement of this act.
History.

1963, ch. 143, § 5, p. 406; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 176, p. 364; am. 1975, ch. 175, § 2, p. 477; am. 1982, ch. 26, § 3, p. 51.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsection (b) refer to S.L. 1963, ch. 143, which is compiled as§§ 37-1519 to 37-1523 and 37-1524 to 37-1529.

§ 37-1523A. Assessments — Exemptions to assessments — Prepayment — Audit.

  1. There is hereby levied an assessment not to exceed four (4) mills per dozen eggs (4/10 of a cent per dozen eggs) entering intrastate commerce as prescribed by rules and regulations issued by the director. Such assessment shall be applicable to all eggs entering intrastate commerce in retail cartons. Such assessment shall be paid to the department of agriculture on a monthly basis on or before the 25th day following the month such eggs enter intrastate commerce. The director may require reports by egg handlers, dealers, or distributors along with the payment of the assessment fee. Such reports may include any and all pertinent information necessary to carry out the purpose of this act. The director, may by regulations, require egg container manufacturers to report on a monthly basis on agriculture containers sold to any egg handler, dealer or distributor.
  2. The assessment provided in this section shall not apply to:
    1. Sale and shipment to points outside of this state;
    2. Sale to the United States government and its instrumentalities;
    3. Sale to breaking plants for processing into egg products;
    4. Sale to consumers at the place of production or processing;
    5. Sale between egg distributors;
    6. Idaho shell egg producers having three hundred (300) or less hens may sell ungraded shell eggs produced upon their premises to retailers, provided that each carton or other container of ungraded shell eggs sold shall be clearly marked “ungraded” and shall bear the name and address of the Idaho producer.
  3. Any egg handler, dealer or distributor may prepay the assessment provided for in subsection (1) of this section by purchasing Idaho state egg seals from the director to be placed on egg containers showing that the proper assessment has been paid. Any carton manufacturer may apply to the director for a permit to place reasonable facsimiles of the Idaho state egg seals to be imprinted on egg containers. The director shall from time to time prescribe rules and regulations governing the affixing of seals and he is authorized to cancel any such permit issued pursuant to this chapter whenever he finds that a violation of the terms of which the permit has been granted has been violated.
  4. Every egg handler, dealer or distributor who pays assessments required under the provisions of this section on a monthly basis in lieu of seals shall be subject to audit by the director on an annual basis or more frequently if necessary. Failure to pay assessments when due or refusal to allow an audit may be cause for a suspension or revocation of an egg handler, dealer or distributor’s license. The conditions and assessments applicable to egg handlers, dealers and distributors set forth in section 37-1523, Idaho Code, shall also be applicable to payments to the director for facsimiles of seals placed on egg containers.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-1523A, as added by 1975, ch. 175, § 3, p. 477; am. 1982, ch. 26, § 4, p. 51; am. 1987, ch. 21, § 1, p. 27.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” near the end of subsection (1) refers to S.L. 1975, Chapter 175, which is compiled as§§ 37-1520 and 37-1523 to 37-1524.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1987, ch. 21 declared an emergency. Approved March 2, 1987.

§ 37-1524. Statements on container.

  1. Each carton or other container in which eggs are being sold or offered for sale by a distributor, egg handler or dealer in the state of Idaho shall bear:
    1. A legible statement of the grade and size of eggs.
    2. A legible statement of the name and address of the distributor by or for whom the eggs were graded and candled.
  2. The words “fresh,” “country,” “hennery,” “ranch” or words of similar import shall not be deemed a substitute for official grade designation. Each advertisement of eggs for sale by a dealer shall plainly and conspicuously indicate the official grade and size thereof.
History.

1963, ch. 143, § 6, p. 406; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 177, p. 364; am. 1975, ch. 175, § 4, p. 477.

§ 37-1525. Records — Enforcement.

The director is hereby directed and empowered:

  1. To administer and enforce the provisions of this act.
  2. To require records to be kept. Every distributor and dealer purchasing or selling eggs in the state of Idaho shall keep a record of each purchase and a record of each sale other than to a consumer. Such record may be an invoice or sales slip and shall show the date of such transaction and the name and address of the person with whom such transaction was made. Such records shall be held for a period of at least two (2) years and shall be open for examination by a representative of the director at any reasonable time.
  3. To require each person who sells to any retailer, or to any restaurant, hotel, boarding house, baker, or other institution or concern which purchases eggs for serving to guests or patrons thereof or for its use in preparation of any food products for human consumption, candled or graded eggs other than those of his own production sold and delivered on the premises where produced, to furnish that retailer or other purchaser with an invoice covering each such sale, showing the exact grade or quality and the size or weight of the eggs sold, according to the standards prescribed, together with the name and address of the person by whom the eggs were sold.
  4. Through authorized representatives to enter and inspect any place or conveyance of a distributor or dealer within the state of Idaho where eggs are candled, stored, packed, delivered for shipment, loaded, shipped, transported or sold, and may inspect all invoices, eggs and the cases and containers thereof and equipment found in such places or conveyances, and may take copies of invoices and representative samples of eggs and the cases and containers thereof found in such places or conveyances for inspection and for the purpose of determining whether or not any provisions of this act have been violated.
  5. Through authorized representatives to seize and hold as evidence an advertisement, sign, placard, invoice, case or container of eggs, or such part of any pack, load, lot, consignment or shipment of eggs packed, stored, delivered for shipment, loaded, shipped, transported or sold in violation of any provision of this act, reasonably necessary to establish the fact of such violation.
History.

1963, ch. 143, § 7, p. 406; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 178, p. 364; am. 1982, ch. 26, § 5, p. 51.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsections (a), (d), and (e) refer to S.L. 1963, Chapter 143, which is compiled as§§ 37-1519 to 37-1523 and 37-1524 to 37-1529.

§ 37-1526. Violation a misdemeanor — Penalties.

Any person convicted of violating any provisions of this act or the rules and regulations issued thereunder or who shall impede, obstruct, hinder, or otherwise prevent or attempt to prevent the director or his duly authorized representative in performance of his duty in connection with the provisions of this act, shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100) for the first violation, and not less than one hundred dollars ($100) or more than three hundred dollars ($300) for a subsequent violation.

History.

1963, ch. 143, § 8, p. 406; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 179, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” near the beginning of the section refer to S.L. 1963, Chapter 143, which is compiled as§§ 37-1519 to 37-1523 and 37-1524 to 37-1529.

§ 37-1527. Director’s discretionary action.

Nothing in this act shall be construed as requiring the director or his representative to report for prosecution or for the institution of seizure proceeding a minor violation of the act when he believes that the public interest will be best served by a suitable warning notice in writing.

Before the director reports a violation for such prosecution, an opportunity shall be given the person in asserted violation to present his understanding of the facts to the director.

History.

1963, ch. 143, § 9, p. 406; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 180, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” and “the act” in the first paragraph refer to S.L. 1963, Chapter 143, which is compiled as§§ 37-1519 to 37-1523 and 37-1524 to 37-1529.

§ 37-1528. Duty to prosecute.

It shall be the duty of each prosecuting attorney to whom any violation is reported to cause appropriate proceedings to be instituted and prosecuted without delay in a court of competent jurisdiction.

History.

1963, ch. 143, § 10, p. 406.

§ 37-1529. Right to injunction.

The director is hereby authorized to apply for and the court to grant a temporary or permanent injunction restraining any person from violating or continuing to violate any of the provisions of this act or any rules or regulations promulgated under this act notwithstanding the existence of other remedies at law, said injunction to be issued without bond.

History.

1963, ch. 143, § 11, p. 406; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 181, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1963, Chapter 143, which is compiled as§§ 37-1519 to 37-1523 and 37-1524 to 37-1529.

Section 12 of S.L. 1963, ch. 143 read: “If any clause, sentence, paragraph or part of this act shall for any reason be adjudged invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have been rendered.”

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1963, ch. 143 provided the act should take effect from and after July 1, 1963.

§ 37-1530. Contracts with federal government.

The director of the department of agriculture may with the approval of the governor contract with any agency or subdivision of the federal government in relation to egg or egg product inspection, and may also receive on behalf of state egg or egg product inspection or for federal egg or egg product inspection, funds from any division or agency of the federal government.

History.

I.C.A.,§ 37-1530, as added by 1969, ch. 39, § 3, p. 97; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 182, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of department of agriculture,§ 22-101.

Effective Dates.

Section 263 of S.L. 1974, ch. 18 provided the act should be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1974.

Chapter 16 IMPORTED FOOD PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-1601 — 37-1603. Meat, poultry, eggs and butter — Label requirements — Notice of sale — Penalty. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1921, ch. 188, §§ 1 to 3, p. 390; I.C.A.,§§ 36-1401 to 36-1403, were repealed by S.L. 1965, ch. 78, § 8.

§ 37-1604. Sale of imported food products — Label requirements

Definitions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1965, ch. 78, § 1, p. 127; am. 1984, ch. 127, § 1, p. 302.

§ 37-1605. Administration of act

Inspection and sampling. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1965, ch. 78, § 2, p. 127.

§ 37-1606. Labeling of products containing imported meat. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1965, ch. 78, § 3, p. 127.

§ 37-1607. Injunctive power to enforce law. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1965, ch. 78, § 4, p. 127.

§ 37-1608. Duty of county attorneys. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1965, ch. 78, § 5, p. 127.

§ 37-1609. Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1965, ch. 78, § 6, p. 127.

§ 37-1610. Penalty. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1965, ch. 78, § 7, p. 127.

Chapter 17 BUTCHERS, MEAT DEALERS, AND MEAT PEDDLERS

Sec.

§ 37-1701 — 37-1711. Butchers, meat dealers and meat — Registration and regulation. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1933, ch. 69, §§ 1 to 11, p. 108; am. S.L. 1947, ch. 85, § 1, p. 141; am. S.L. 1949, ch. 96, § 1, p. 172; am. S.L. 1949, ch. 133, § 1, p. 236; am. S.L. 1949, ch. 134, §§ 1 to 3, p. 237; am. S.L. 1959, ch. 239, §§ 1, 2, p. 514, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 34.

§ 37-1712 — 37-1715. Sale of adulterated sausage prohibited. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1949, ch. 103, §§ 1 to 4, p. 192; am. S.L. 1953, ch. 111, § 1, p. 146, were repealed by S.L. 1957, ch. 213, § 8, p. 450.

§ 37-1716. Penalty. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1949, ch. 103, § 5, p. 192; am. S.L. 1953, ch. 111, § 1, p. 146, was repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 34.

Chapter 18 POULTRY GRADING AND LABELING

Sec.

§ 37-1801 — 37-1807. Meat inspection [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1943, ch. 102, §§ 1 to 7, p. 196; am. S.L. 1950 (E. S.), ch. 78, § 1, p. 104; am. S.L. 1951, ch. 83, § 1, p. 152; am. S.L. 1953, ch. 99, § 1, p. 133, were repealed by S.L. 1957, ch. 213, § 8, p. 450.

§ 37-1808 — 37-1821. Poultry inspection. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1959, ch. 128, §§ 1 to 7, p. 274 and S.L. 1959, ch. 147, §§ 1 to 7, p. 342; am. S.L. 1965, ch. 126, § 2, p. 253, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 34.

§ 37-1822 — 37-1830. [Reserved.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1971, ch. 66, §§ 1 to 9, p. 151; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, §§ 183, 184, p. 364, were repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 135, § 1.

§ 37-1831 — 37-1839. Prepackaged and unpackaged poultry grading and regulation. [Repealed.]

Chapter 19 MEAT INSPECTION

Sec.

[Inspection Requirements — Adulteration — Misbranding]
[Meat Processors and Related Industries]
[Federal-State Cooperation]
[Auxiliary Provisions]

[INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS — ADULTERATION — MISBRANDING]

§ 37-1901. Definitions. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 1, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 185, p. 364; am. S.L. 1978, ch. 99, § 1, p. 184, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1902. Inspection requirements

Purpose. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 2, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 186, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1903. Inspection of animals to be slaughtered. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 3, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 187, p. 364; am. S.L. 1980, ch. 98, § 1, p. 217, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1904. Post-mortem inspection. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 4, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 188, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1905. Application of inspection provisions. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 5, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 189, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1906. Inspection of meat food products

Labeling. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 6, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 190, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1907. Label on container. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 7, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 191, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1908. Inspection of sanitary conditions. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 8, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 192, p. 364; am. S.L. 1978, ch. 99, § 2, p. 184, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1909. Inspection during nighttime. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 9, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 193, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1910. Prohibitions. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 10, p. 260; am. S.L. 1980, ch. 98, § 2, p. 217, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1911. Official marks — Authorization by director

Prohibitions. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 11, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 194, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1912. Sale or transportation of improperly labeled meat prohibited

Slaughter and preparation in separate establishments. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 12, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 195, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1913. Inspectors — Appointment

Duties. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 13, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 196, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1914. Bribery

Penalty. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 14, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 197, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1915. Exceptions to inspection requirement. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 15, p. 260; am. S.L. 1971, ch. 101, § 1, p. 218; am. S.L. 1971, ch. 353, § 1, p. 1346; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 198, p. 364; am. S.L. 1975, ch. 85, § 1, p. 176; am. S.L. 1978, ch. 99, § 3, p. 184, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1916. Storage regulations. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 16, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 199, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

[MEAT PROCESSORS AND RELATED INDUSTRIES]

§ 37-1917. Animals not intended as human food. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 17, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 200, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1918. Records required. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 18, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 201, p. 364; am. S.L. 1978, ch. 99, § 4, p. 184, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1919. Registration of businesses. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 19, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 202, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1920. Buying, selling or transporting dead animals

Regulations. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 20, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 203, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

[FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION]

§ 37-1921. State agency to cooperate with federal authorities. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 21, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 204, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

[AUXILIARY PROVISIONS]

§ 37-1922. Refusal of, withdrawal of inspection services. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 22, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 205, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1923. Detention. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 23, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 206, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1924. Seizure of contraband — Condemnation — Release and disposal

Right to jury trial. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 24, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 207, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1925. Jurisdiction. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 25, p. 260, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1926. Forcible interference

Penalty. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 26, p. 260, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1927. Violations of law

Penalties. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 27, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 208, p. 364; am. S.L. 1978, ch. 99, § 5, p. 184, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1928. Additional powers of director — Hearings — Refusal to attend or testify — False statements — Failure to file reports — Unauthorized disclosure of information

Penalties. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 28, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 209, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1929. Application of law to federally inspected plants. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 29, p. 260, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1930. State brand board

Powers. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 30, p. 260, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1931. No fee for inspection — Overtime pay

Disposition of fees. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 31, p. 260; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 18, § 210, p. 364, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1932. Title of act. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which comprised S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 33, p. 260, was repealed by S.L. 2006, ch. 94, § 1.

§ 37-1933 — 37-1935. Penalties — Suspension or failure of licensee to conform to act — Fees. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1957, ch. 213, §§ 6 to 7, p. 450; am. S.L. 1959, ch. 58, § 2, p. 125; am. S.L. 1961, ch. 133, § 1, p. 192; am. S.L. 1965, ch. 219, § 1, p. 503; am. S.L. 1967, ch. 218, § 1, p. 664, were repealed by S.L. 1969, ch. 87, § 34.

Chapter 20 FOOD-PROCESSING ESTABLISHMENTS, CANNING FACTORIES, AND COLD STORAGE PLANTS

Sec.

§ 37-2001 — 37-2008. Food processing establishments, canning factories and cold storage plants. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1921, ch. 223, §§ 1 to 8, p. 510; I.C.A.,§§ 36-1501 to 36-1508; am. S.L. 1974, ch. 23, §§ 44, 45, p. 633, were repealed by S.L. 1991, ch. 142, § 1. For present comparable law, see§ 39-1601 et seq.

Chapter 21 DOMESTIC WATER AND ICE

Sec.

§ 37-2101. Manufacture and storage of ice.

Ice manufactured or stored for human consumption shall be made from pure water, and shall be kept stored in clean places free from all filth, offal, refuse, and polluted waters and separate and removed from contact with animal or vegetable matter, and not in proximity to any cesspool, privy vault or sewer, nor in places where such ice may be subject to contamination from, or in the action of, acids, oils, noxious, offensive or injurious gases, smoke or vapors; and all ice manufactured or stored in violation of this section shall be deemed polluted ice and not fit for human consumption; and it shall be unlawful to sell, offer for sale, or store for sale such polluted ice, for human consumption.

History.

1913, ch. 173, § 1, p. 549; reen. C.L. 65:85; C.S., § 1752; am. 1921, ch. 176, § 1, p. 370; I.C.A.,§ 36-1201.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Penalty for violation of this section,§ 37-2103.

§ 37-2102. Domestic water to be protected.

Any person or persons, corporation or corporations, or officers of a municipality, owning or maintaining any plant or public water system as defined in rules of the department, for the supply to the inhabitants of this state, or any part thereof, of water for domestic purposes shall protect the same and keep it free from all impurities and all other foreign substances which tend to injure the health of the ultimate consumers of such water, whether such impurities or foreign substances are chemical or bacterial. It shall be the duty of any of the persons or corporations owning or maintaining such a plant or public water system to provide notices to the radio and television station serving the area served by the public water system or by direct mail to those persons consuming such water of any acute violations from the standards established by the United States environmental protection agency as soon as possible but in no case later than seventy-two (72) hours. An acute health violation is defined as: (i) any violations specified by the state as posing an acute risk to human health; (ii) violation of the maximum contaminant level for nitrate or nitrite as established by federal regulation; (iii) violation of the maximum contaminant level for total coliforms, when fecal coliforms of E. coli are present in the water distribution system; or (iv) occurrence of a waterborne disease outbreak as defined by federal regulation. For purposes of this section, maximum contaminant level shall mean the maximum permissible level of a contaminant in water which is delivered to any user of a public water system.

History.

1913, ch. 173, § 2, first part, p. 550; reen. C.L. 65:86; C.S., § 1753; am. 1921, ch. 176, § 2, p. 370; I.C.A.,§ 36-1202; am. 1949, ch. 165, § 1, p. 353; am. 1974, ch. 23, § 46, p. 633; am. 1974, ch. 113, § 1, p. 1281; am. 1996, ch. 336, § 1, p. 1136; am. 1998, ch. 119, § 1, p. 447.

STATUTORY NOTES

Federal References.

For further information on the United States environmental protection agency, see https://www3.epa.gov .

Effective Dates.

Section 182 of S.L. 1974, ch. 23 provided that the act should be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1974.

Section 2 of S.L. 1974, ch. 113, declared an emergency. Approved March 29, 1974.

§ 37-2103. Violation a misdemeanor.

Any person, persons, corporation, corporations or officers of a municipality, failing or neglecting to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History.

1913, ch. 173, § 2, last part, p. 550; reen. C.L. 65:87; C.S., § 1754; am. 1921, ch. 176, § 3, p. 370; I.C.A.,§ 36-1203.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Penalty for misdemeanor when not otherwise provided,§ 18-113.

Chapter 22 SALE OF DRUGS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

Sec.

§ 37-2201 — 37-2215. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1947, ch. 154, §§ 1 to 9, 11 to 15, p. 398; am. S.L. 1957, ch. 112, § 3, p. 190; am. S.L. 1957, ch. 326, § 1, p. 689; am. S.L. 1963, ch. 172, § 1, p. 496; am. S.L. 1965, ch. 258, § 1, p. 657; I.C.,§ 37-2202A, as added by S.L. 1967, ch. 358, § 1, p. 1007; am. S.L. 1967, ch. 358, §§ 2, 3, p. 1007; I.C.,§ 37-2210, as added by S.L. 1967, ch. 358, § 4, p. 1007; 1971, ch. 40, § 1, p. 87; I.C.,§ 37-2204A, as added by S.L. 1975, ch. 92, § 1, p. 188; am. S.L. 1976, ch. 138, § 2, p. 512; am. S.L. 1976, ch. 140, § 1, p. 515, were repealed by 1979, ch. 131, § 2.

For present comparable law, see§ 37-2701 et seq.

Chapter 23 NARCOTIC DRUGS

Sec.

§ 37-2301 — 37-2323. Regulation of narcotic drugs. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, comprising S.L. 1937, ch. 131, §§ 1 to 24, p. 202 were repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 435, § 119. For present comparable law, see§ 37-2701 et seq. and§ 37-3201 et seq.

Chapter 24 BARBITURATES

Sec.

§ 37-2401 — 37-2409. Regulation of use and dispensing of barbiturates. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, comprising S.L. 1947, ch. 143, §§ 1 to 9, p. 342, were repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 434, § 23. For present comparable law, see§ 39-2701 et seq.

Chapter 25 OILS

Sec.

§ 37-2501. Adulterated or misbranded oil — Manufacture and sale unlawful.

It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, keep for sale, or offer for sale within the state of Idaho any gasoline, benzine, naphtha, lubricating oil or grease, road oil, bituminous road materials, diesel fuel, fuel oil for boilers and internal combustion engines, which is adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this chapter, and any person who shall manufacture, sell, keep for sale, or offer for sale any of the above-named articles, which is adulterated or misbranded, within the meaning of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00), nor more than $300.00, and each and every sale in violation hereof shall be deemed a separate offense.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 1, p. 411; reen. C.L. 65:116; C.S., § 1783; I.C.A.,§ 36-1601; am. 1967, ch. 150, § 1, p. 338.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Disposition of fines and forfeitures,§ 19-4705.

Exceptions, excuses, provisos, and exemptions need not be negated in a complaint, information or indictment to enforce the provisions of this act,§ 19-1433.

Obstruction of inspection,§ 37-2503.

§ 37-2502. Inspection.

It shall be the duty of the department of agriculture to inspect and take samples of the above-named articles that are manufactured, kept for sale, or offered for sale, or sold within the state of Idaho and to cause the same to be tested and to enforce the provisions of this chapter.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 2, p. 411; reen. C.L. 65:117; C.S., § 1784; I.C.A.,§ 36-1602; am. 1939, ch. 96, § 1, p. 162; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 211, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

§ 37-2503. Right of access for inspection — Penalty for obstructing entry or inspection.

For obtaining information regarding the suspected violation of this chapter, the department of agriculture shall have access to all places where the above-named articles are sold, offered for sale or kept for sale, manufactured or transported, or stored, and may take samples therefrom for analysis, tendering payment therefor. Any person obstructing such entry or inspection, or failing upon request to assist therein shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 37-2501, Idaho Code.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 4, p. 412; reen. C.L. 65:118; C.S., § 1785; I.C.A.,§ 36-1603; am. 1939, ch. 96, § 2, p. 162; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 212, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

§ 37-2504. Oil to be labeled.

Gasoline, benzine, naphtha, lubricating oil and grease, road oil, bituminous road materials, diesel fuel and fuel oil must be sold under their true name and grades, respectively, and such names and grades must be impressed or otherwise plainly marked upon the barrel, can, vessel, or other container in which the same is stored, sold, offered or exposed for sale, respectively, or upon a label conspicuously and securely fastened thereto, giving the true name and grade of the product, name and address of manufacturer or dealer, who sells the same.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 3, p. 411; reen. C.L. 65:119; C.S., § 1786; I.C.A.,§ 36-1604; am. 1967, ch. 150, § 2, p. 338.

§ 37-2505. Confiscation of unlawful articles.

Possession by any person of any of the articles above-named in this chapter shall be considered prima facie evidence that the same is kept by such person for sale and, if in violation of this chapter, the department of agriculture shall be authorized to seize upon and take possession of such article and upon the order of any court of competent jurisdiction its official shall destroy the same: provided, that in case the legal disability which exists against such article is one which can be removed by proper labeling, the official shall relabel and sell the same and pay the proceeds into the state treasury.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 5, p. 412; reen. C.L. 65:120; C.S., § 1787; I.C.A.,§ 36-1605; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 213, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

§ 37-2506. Quality standards.

The standards of quality for motor gasoline, benzine, naphtha, grease, road oil, bituminous road products, fuel oil for heating purposes and diesel fuel shall be the latest specifications adopted by the American Society for Testing and Materials or other specifications adopted as standard by an Idaho governmental agency for its use, for those products. Motor oils shall conform to the latest viscosity classifications of the Society of Automotive Engineers. Motor oils falling outside those viscosity classifications shall not carry the SAE designation.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2506, as added by 1967, ch. 150, § 4, p. 338.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-2506, which comprised S.L. 1917, ch. 124, § 6, p. 412; reen. C.L. 65:121; C.S., § 1788; I.C.A.,§ 36-1606, was repealed by S.L. 1967, ch. 150, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

The American Society for Testing and Materials, referred to in this section, was renamed as ASTM International in 2001. See http://www.astm.org .

The Society of Automotive Engineers, referred to in this section, was renamed as SAE International in 2006. See http://www.sae.org .

§ 37-2507. Analysis by chemist.

The department of agriculture is directed to make, or accomplish by contract with qualified laboratories, all analyses and tests of articles inspected in this chapter and to employ, in such analyses and tests, the standard methods of analysis which have been or shall be adopted by the American Society for Testing and Materials or other standard methods of analysis adopted as standard by an Idaho governmental agency when analyzing or testing products for such agency’s use.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 7, p. 412; reen. C.L. 65:122; C.S., § 1789; I.C.A.,§ 36-1607; am. 1939, ch. 96, § 3, p. 162; am. 1967, ch. 150, § 5, p. 338; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 214, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture, see§ 22-101 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The American Society for Testing and Materials, referred to in this section, was renamed as ASTM International in 2001. See http://www.astm.org .

§ 37-2508. Chemist as witness.

In all prosecutions arising under this chapter the certificate of any chemist from a qualified testing laboratory as approved by the department of agriculture, when duly sworn to by such officer shall be prima facie evidence of the fact or facts therein certified, or in case it is necessary for such chemist to appear as a witness in court, the judge of the district court wherein such trial shall be held, shall issue a subpoena for his attendance at the trial and it shall be the duty of such chemist to obey such subpoena, and all his actual and necessary expenses shall be paid by the county wherein such trial is held in the same manner that county officers are paid and, in case of conviction, shall be charged to the defendant as part of the costs of prosecution.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 8, p. 413; reen. C.L. 65:123; C.S., § 1790; I.C.A.,§ 36-1608; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 215, p. 364; am. 1990, ch. 379, § 1, p. 1053.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture, see§ 22-101 et seq.

§ 37-2509. Duty of attorney general and prosecuting attorneys.

It shall be the duty of the attorney general of the state of Idaho or the prosecuting attorney in any county of the state, when called upon by the department of agriculture, to render all legal assistance in his power to execute the provisions of this chapter and to prosecute cases arising under this chapter.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 9, p. 413; reen. C.L. 65:124; C.S., § 1791; I.C.A.,§ 36-1609; am. 1939, ch. 96, § 4, p. 162; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 216, p. 364.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Department of agriculture, see§ 22-101 et seq.

Exceptions, excuses, provisos, and exemptions need not be negated in a complaint, information or indictment to enforce the provisions of this chapter,§ 19-1433.

§ 37-2510. Penalty of publicity.

When any person has been convicted of manufacturing, selling, keeping for sale or offering for sale within the state of Idaho any gasoline, benzine, naphtha, lubricating oil or grease, road oil, bituminous road materials, diesel fuel and fuel oil for boilers and internal combustion engines, which is adulterated or misbranded, it shall be the duty of the department of agriculture to publish the fact in at least one (1) newspaper published in the county in which such adulterated or misbranded article or articles is found, giving the name of the article, the name of the manufacturer, the name of the dealer or person selling or offering the same for sale and such other information as will be beneficial to the consumers.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 10, p. 413; reen. C.L. 65:125; C.S., § 1792; I.C.A.,§ 36-1610; am. 1939, ch. 96, § 5, p. 162; am. 1967, ch. 150, § 6, p. 338; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 217, p. 364; am. 1990, ch. 379, § 2, p. 1053.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of agriculture,§ 22-101 et seq.

Effective Dates.

Section 263 of S.L. 1974, ch. 18, provided the act should be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1974.

§ 37-2511. Person defined.

The word “person,” as used in this chapter shall be construed to import both the plural and the singular, as the case demands, and shall include corporations, companies, societies and associations. When construing and enforcing the provisions of this chapter, the act, omission, or failure of any officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any corporation, company, society, or association, within the scope of his employment or office shall in every case be also deemed to be the act, omission, or failure of such corporation, company, society or association as well as that of the person.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 11, p. 413; reen. C.L. 65:126; C.S., § 1793; I.C.A.,§ 36-1611.

§ 37-2512. Adulteration of oils — Misbranded defined.

For the purposes of this chapter an article shall be deemed to be adulterated:

  1. If any substance has been mixed and packed with it so as to reduce or lower or injuriously affect its quality, purity or strength.
  2. If any substance has been substituted, wholly or in part, for the article.
  3. If the article fails to conform to any of the requirements of the standards of quality, purity and strength adopted by the American Society for Testing and Materials or other specifications adopted as standard by an Idaho governmental agency for its use.

The term “misbranded,” as used herein, shall apply to all articles, the package or label of which shall bear any statement, design or device regarding such article, or the ingredients or substances contained therein, or the properties of such article which are false or misleading in any particular whatsoever.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 12, p. 413; reen. C.L. 65:127; C.S., § 1794; I.C.A.,§ 36-1612; am. 1967, ch. 150, § 7, p. 338.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The American Society for Testing and Materials, referred to in this section, was renamed as ASTM International in 2001. See http://www.astm.org .

§ 37-2513. Disposition of fines.

All fines, exclusive of costs, collected by any of the courts of this state, as penalties, for the violation of this chapter or any of its provisions, shall be paid by the proper officers of said court to the state treasurer of the state of Idaho.

History.

1917, ch. 124, § 14, p. 414; reen. C.L. 65:128; C.S., § 1795; I.C.A.,§ 36-1613.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State treasurer,§ 67-1201 et seq.

§ 37-2514. Reclaimed oil defined.

Reclaimed oil as used in this act is defined as any lubricating oil or motor oil which has been previously used for the lubrication of internal combustion engines or any gearing or shafting attached to or connected thereto, or for any other lubricating purpose and includes any lubricating or motor oil which after such use has been re-run, filtered, redistilled, settled or reprocessed in any manner.

History.

1951, ch. 237, § 1, p. 490.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” near the beginning of the section refer to S.L. 1951, Chapter 237, which is compiled as§§ 37-2514 to 37-2517 and 37-2520.

§ 37-2515. Sign or label on containers — Containers of one gallon or less.

Except as provided in this act containers of reclaimed oil which [are] sold or offered for sale or delivery shall bear a superimposed sign or label of rectangular shape not less than four (4) by six (6) inches containing the words “reclaimed motor oil” or “lubricating oil, reclaimed” in red letters of gothic type over a white background with a stroke of not less than one-eighth inch (1/8″) in width and not less than three-fourths inch (¾″) in height.

On all containers of reclaimed oil which is [are] sold or offered for sale of one (1) gallon or less, a superimposed sign or label of rectangular shape of not less than two (2) by three (3) inches containing the words “reclaimed motor oil” or “lubricating oil, reclaimed,” in red letters of gothic type over a white background with a stroke of not less than one-sixteenth inch (1/16″) in width and not less than one-half inch (½″) in height shall be sufficient.

Lubricants blended with re-refined/recycled oil shall be labeled as such. The size type on containers of one (1) gallon or less shall be at least one-eighth inch (1/8″) high and on containers larger than one (1) gallon at least one-fourth inch (¼″) high.

History.

1951, ch. 237, § 2, p. 490; am. 1994, ch. 425, § 1, p. 1333.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” near the beginning of the first paragraph refer to S.L. 1951, Chapter 237, which is compiled as§§ 37-2514 to 37-2517 and 37-2520.

The bracketed insertions near the beginning of the first and second paragraphs were added by the compiler to correct the syntax of those sentences.

§ 37-2516. Product blended with reclaimed oil.

If any reclaimed oil is used in blending or compounding in any other petroleum product sold or offered for sale or delivery the fact of such blending or compounding shall be indicated on all containers in the manner required by this act for containers of reclaimed oil.

Lubricants blended with re-refined/recycled oil shall be labeled as such. The size type on containers of one (1) gallon or less shall be at least one-eighth (1/8) inch high and on containers larger than one (1) gallon at least one-fourth (¼) inch high.

History.

1951, ch. 237, § 3, p. 490; am. 1994, ch. 425, § 2, p. 1333.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in the first paragraph refer to S.L. 1951, Chapter 237, which is compiled as§§ 37-2514 to 37-2517 and 37-2520.

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 1994, ch. 425, declared an emergency and provided this act shall be in full and force on and after April 1, 1994. Approved April 7, 1994.

§ 37-2517. Underground storage or fill-pipe — Affixation and visibility of metal tag.

If the container of reclaimed oil sold or offered for sale or delivery is an underground storage tank the sign or label required by this article to be attached shall be affixed to the inlet end of the fill-pipe of the underground tank and shall consist of a metal tag firmly attached or affixed and plainly visible while the tank is being filled. The letters on such sign or label may be any convenient size.

History.

1951, ch. 237, § 4, p. 490.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this article” in the first sentence probably should read “this act,” being S.L. 1951, Chapter 237, which is codified as§§ 37-2514 to 37-2517 and 37-2520.

§ 37-2518, 37-2519. Display of baskets containing bottles of oil — Sufficiency of labels — Intermingling of bottles. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The following sections were repealed by S.L. 1999, ch. 57, § 1, effective July 1, 1999.

37-2518: I.C.,§ 37-2518, as added by S.L. 1951, ch. 237, § 5, p. 490.

37-2519: I.C.,§ 37-2519, as added by S.L. 1951, ch. 237, § 6, p. 490.

§ 37-2520. Penalties for violation of act.

Any person who shall sell or offer for sale or delivery any reclaimed oil the container of which is not labeled or marked as provided in this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than twenty-five dollars, nor more than $300.00, and each and every sale in violation hereof shall be deemed a separate offense.

History.

1951, ch. 237, § 7, p. 490.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Exceptions, excuses, provisos, and exemptions need not be negated in a complaint, information or indictment to enforce the provisions of this chapter,§ 19-1433.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” near the middle of the section refer to S.L. 1951, Chapter 237, which is compiled as§§ 37-2514 to 37-2517 and 37-2520.

Chapter 26 ENRICHMENT OF BREAD AND FLOUR

Sec.

§ 37-2601. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 1, p. 164; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 218, p. 364.

§ 37-2602. Enrichment of flour. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 2, p. 164.

§ 37-2603. Enrichment of bread and rolls. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 3, p. 164.

§ 37-2604. Enforcement of provisions

Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 4, p. 164; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 219, p. 364.

§ 37-2605. Revision of standards to conform to interstate shipments. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 5, p. 164; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 220, p. 364.

§ 37-2606. Suspension of enrichment during shortage. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 6, p. 164; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 221, p. 364.

§ 37-2607. Publication of orders, rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 7, p. 164; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 222, p. 364.

§ 37-2608. Method of publication. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 8, p. 164.

§ 37-2609. Inspection and investigation. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 9, p. 164; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 223, p. 364.

§ 37-2610. Penalty for violation. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2020, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

History.

1961, ch. 109, § 10, p. 164; am. 1974, ch. 18, § 224, p. 364.

Chapter 27 UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

Article I

Sec.

Article II

Article III

Article IV

Article V

Article VI

Idaho Code Art. I

Article I

§ 37-2701. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Administer” means the direct application of a controlled substance whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to the body of a patient or research subject by:
    1. A practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or
    2. The patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner.
    3. Isomerization devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in increasing the potency of any species of plant which is a controlled substance;
    4. Testing equipment used, intended for use, or designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness or purity of controlled substances;
    5. Scales and balances used, intended for use, or designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled substances;
    6. Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting controlled substances;
    7. Separation gins and sifters used, intended for use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining, marijuana;
    8. Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in compounding controlled substances;
    9. Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other containers used, intended for use, or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances;
    10. Containers and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing controlled substances;
    11. Hypodermic syringes, needles and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled substances into the human body;
    12. Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body, such as:
  2. “Agent” means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser. It does not include a common or contract carrier, public warehouseman or employee of the carrier or warehouseman.
  3. “Board” means the state board of pharmacy created in chapter 17, title 54, Idaho Code, or its successor agency.
  4. “Bureau” means the drug enforcement administration, United States department of justice, or its successor agency.
  5. “Controlled substance” means a drug, substance or immediate precursor in schedules I through VI of article II of this chapter.
  6. “Counterfeit substance” means a controlled substance which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, number or device, or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer, distributor or dispenser other than the person who in fact manufactured, distributed or dispensed the substance.
  7. “Deliver” or “delivery” means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one (1) person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.
  8. “Director” means the director of the Idaho state police.
  9. “Dispense” means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery.
  10. “Dispenser” means a practitioner who dispenses.
  11. “Distribute” means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance.
  12. “Distributor” means a person who distributes.
  13. “Drug” means (1) substances recognized as drugs in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; (2) substances intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or animals; (3) substances, other than food, intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or animals; and (4) substances intended for use as a component of any article specified in clause (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection. It does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories.
  14. “Drug paraphernalia” means all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. It includes, but is not limited to: (1) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing or harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived;
    1. Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls;
    2. Water pipes;
    3. Carburetion tubes and devices;
    4. Smoking and carburetion masks;
    5. Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a marijuana cigarette, that has become too small or too short to be held in the hand;
    6. Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials;
    7. Chamber pipes;
    8. Carburetor pipes;
    9. Electric pipes;
    10. Air-driven pipes;
    11. Chillums;
    12. Bongs;
    13. Ice pipes or chillers;
    14. “Opiate” means any substance having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability. It does not include, unless specifically designated as controlled under section 37-2702, Idaho Code, the dextrorotatory isomer of 3-methoxy-n-methylmorphinan and its salts (dextromethorphan). It does include its racemic and levorotatory forms.
    15. “Peace officer” means any duly appointed officer or agent of a law enforcement agency, as defined herein, including, but not limited to, a duly appointed investigator or agent of the Idaho state police, an officer or employee of the board of pharmacy, who is authorized by the board to enforce this chapter, an officer of the Idaho state police, a sheriff or deputy sheriff of a county, or a marshal or policeman of any city.
  15. “Financial institution” means any bank, trust company, savings and loan association, savings bank, mutual savings bank, credit union, or loan company under the jurisdiction of the state or under the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.
  16. “Immediate precursor” means a substance which the board has found to be and by rule designates as being the principal compound commonly used or produced primarily for use, and which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail or limit manufacture.
  17. “Isomer” means the optical isomer, except as used in section 37-2705(d), Idaho Code.
  18. “Law enforcement agency” means a governmental unit of one (1) or more persons employed full-time or part-time by the state or a political subdivision of the state for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime and enforcing state laws or local ordinances, employees of which unit are authorized to make arrests for crimes while acting within the scope of their authority.
  19. “Manufacture” means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion or processing of a controlled substance, and includes extraction, directly or indirectly, from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container, except that this term does not include the preparation or compounding of a controlled substance:
    1. By a practitioner as an incident to his administering, dispensing or, as authorized by board rule, distributing of a controlled substance in the course of his professional practice; or
    2. By a practitioner, or by his authorized agent under his supervision, for the purpose of, or as an incident to, research, teaching, or chemical analysis and not for delivery.
  20. “Marijuana” means all parts of the plant of the genus Cannabis, regardless of species, and whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. It does not include the mature stalks of the plant unless the same are intermixed with prohibited parts thereof, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds or the achene of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted therefrom or where the same are intermixed with prohibited parts of such plant, fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination. Evidence that any plant material or the resin or any derivative thereof, regardless of form, contains any of the chemical substances classified as tetrahydrocannabinols shall create a presumption that such material is “marijuana” as defined and prohibited herein. (u) “Narcotic drug” means any of the following, whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:
    1. Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium or opiate.
    2. Any salt, compound, isomer, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of the substances referred to in clause 1, but not including the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium.
    3. Opium poppy and poppy straw.
    4. Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, isomer, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, but not including decocainized coca leaves or extractions of coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine.
  21. “Practitioner” means:
  22. “Prescriber” means an individual currently licensed, registered or otherwise authorized to prescribe and administer controlled substances in the course of professional practice.
  23. “Production” includes the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance.
  24. “Simulated controlled substance” means a substance that is not a controlled substance, but which by appearance or representation would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled substance. Appearance includes, but is not limited to, color, shape, size, and markings of the dosage unit. Representation includes, but is not limited to, representations or factors of the following nature:
  25. “State,” when applied to a part of the United States, includes any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession thereof, and any area subject to the legal authority of the United States of America.
  26. “Ultimate user” means a person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for his own use or for the use of a member of his household or for administering to an animal owned by him or by a member of his household.
  27. “Utility” means any person, association, partnership or corporation providing telephone and/or communication services, electricity, natural gas or water to the public.

(2) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing or preparing controlled substances;

In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority should consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, the following: 1. Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use;

2. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any controlled substance;

3. The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter;

4. The proximity of the object to controlled substances;

5. The existence of any residue of controlled substances on the object;

6. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this chapter; the innocence of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation of this chapter shall not prevent a finding that the object is intended for use, or designed for use as drug paraphernalia;

7. Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use;

8. Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use;

9. National and local advertising concerning its use;

10. The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;

11. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products;

12. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object(s) to the total sales of the business enterprise;

13. The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community;

14. Expert testimony concerning its use.

(w) “Opium poppy” means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L., except its seeds.

(y) “Person” means individual, corporation, government, or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, or any other legal entity.

(z) “Poppy straw” means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium poppy, after mowing.

(1) A physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator, or other person licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled substance in the course of his professional practice or research in this state;

(2) A pharmacy, hospital, or other institution licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled substance in the course of its professional practice or research in this state. (bb) “Prescribe” means a direction or authorization permitting an ultimate user to lawfully obtain or be administered controlled substances.

(1) Statements made by an owner or by anyone else in control of the substance concerning the nature of the substance, or its use or effect;

(2) Statements made to the recipient that the substance may be resold for inordinate profit; or

(3) Whether the substance is packaged in a manner normally used for illicit controlled substances.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2701, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 1, p. 261; am. 1974, ch. 27, § 78, p. 811; am. 1975, ch. 196, § 1, p. 545; am. 1980, ch. 388, § 1, p. 977; am. 1982, ch. 169, § 1, p. 442; am. 1983, ch. 218, § 1, p. 599; am. 1989, ch. 266, § 1, p. 646; am. 1995, ch. 116, § 23, p. 386; am. 1999, ch. 280, § 1, p. 696; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 84, p. 1450; am. 2010, ch. 118, § 2, p. 256; am. 2014, ch. 79, § 1, p. 211; am. 2015, ch. 25, § 1, p. 30.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former title 37, chapter 27, comprising S.L. 1967, ch. 435, §§ 1 to 23, p. 1436, was repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 3.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 118, added subsection (q) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly. The 2014 amendment, by ch. 79, substituted “this chapter” for “this act” throughout the section; substituted “drug enforcement administration” for “Bureau of Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs” in subsection (d); and inserted present subsection (bb) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 25, in subsection (i), deleted “prescribing, administering,” preceding “packaging”; in paragraph (s)(1), inserted “or, as authorized by board rule, distributing”; added subsection (bb); and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

Compiler’s Notes.

For further information about the drug enforcement administration, see http://www.dea.gov/index.shtml .

The United States Pharmacopoeia, referred to in subsection (m), is a non-governmental official public standards-setting authority for prescription and over-the-counter medicines. See http://www.usp.org .

The Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United State, referred to in subsection (m), is the official compendium for homeopathic drug in the United States. See http://hpus.com .

The National Formulary, referred to in subsection (m), contains standards for medicines, dosage forms, drug substances, excipients, medical devices, and dietary supplements. See http://www.usp.org/USPNF .

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1975, ch. 196 declared an emergency. Approved March 28, 1975.

Section 30 of S.L. 1995, ch. 116 declared an emergency. Approved March 14, 1995.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality.

The legislature’s classification of cocaine as a narcotic for regulatory and penalty purposes is not in conflict with constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Cianelli, 101 Idaho 313, 612 P.2d 550 (1980). The classification of cocaine as a narcotic drug is constitutional. State v. McNeely, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1983).

Delivery.

An examination of the word “delivery”, as defined pursuant to this section, makes it clear that a defendant need not have been an agent of another to be guilty under§ 37-2732. State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 662 P.2d 1135 (1983).

A violation of§ 37-2732(a)(1)(B) occurs when a controlled substance is intentionally and unlawfully delivered; it is immaterial that the recipient is an unexpected person. State v. Castillo, 108 Idaho 205, 697 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1985).

Jury instruction was proper where court advised the jury that they could convict defendant of delivery of cocaine if they found he had “attempted to deliver” cocaine, as the instruction followed the statutory language whereby “deliver” or “delivery” are defined as the actual, constructive or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship. State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho 199, 804 P.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1990).

Defendant claimed that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and that the jury should have been given the definition of “deliver”, asserting that an indirect transfer did not equate to a constructive transfer and that the district court’s instruction lessened the state’s burden of proof; however, the jury was instructed from the pattern Idaho criminal jury instructions, which were presumptively correct. State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho 373, 93 P.3d 704 (Ct. App. 2004).

Double Jeopardy.

The facts establishing the statutory elements of manufacturing a controlled substance are different from the facts required to prove the elements of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and separate convictions for these offenses did not violate state and federal constitutional protection against double jeopardy. State v. Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 794 P.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1990).

Drug Paraphernalia.

Under the definition of drug paraphernalia in this section and the provisions of§ 37-2734B, what the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant used an item with an illegal drug (use), or marketed an item with the intent that it be used with illegal drugs (intended for use), or designed an item with the intent that it be used with illegal drugs (designed for use). State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 P.2d 856 (1985).

The intent terminology in the definition of drug paraphernalia refers to that of the person who has control of the illegal paraphernalia. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 P.2d 856 (1985).

Evidence.

Where no evidence was produced at trial of fingerprints, footprints, or any other physical evidence which would have connected either defendant to the cultivation activity in the greenhouse, a conviction of either defendant for manufacturing marijuana could not be sustained. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990).

Manufacture.

Substance identification is an issue to be decided by the jury, and, where a drug analyst testified at length to the laboratory tests she conducted on the plant material found in defendant’s home and at the end of the testimony concluded that in her opinion each of the evidence envelopes contained marijuana, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. State v. Griffith, 130 Idaho 64, 936 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1997). Manufacture.

Growing marijuana plants in a greenhouse was not sufficient to sustain a conviction of manufacture of marijuana against the defendant. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990).

Marijuana.

The definition of marijuana was intended to include those parts of marijuana which contain THC and exclude those parts which do not and was not limited to any particular species of marijuana. State v. Miles, 97 Idaho 396, 545 P.2d 484 (1976), overruled on other grounds, State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981).

The trial court erred in holding that the growing of marijuana was within the personal use exception of the manufacturing statutes,§§ 37-2732, 37-2737A, and this section. State v. Griffith, 127 Idaho 8, 896 P.2d 334 (1995).

The definition of marijuana in this section is unambiguous and will be interpreted by the court in accordance to its language. State v. Griffith, 130 Idaho 64, 936 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1997).

Under the definition of marijuana in this section, the state is not required to offer evidence that the material disputed at trial contains THC in order to prove such material is marijuana; but, as the section indicates, if the state does introduce evidence that the material contains THC, it creates a presumption in favor of the state that the material is marijuana. State v. Griffith, 130 Idaho 64, 936 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1997).

Where officers discovered approximately one pound of marijuana in the garage at defendant’s home and approximately $151,000 in currency at defendant’s automotive repair shop, the evidence was sufficient to support his felony conviction for possession of marijuana. State v. Patterson, 139 Idaho 858, 87 P.3d 967 (Ct. App. 2003).

Prosecution.

In prosecution for delivery of a controlled substance, state is not required to make information available to the defense in the absence of a specific request and motions and orders of discovery containing standard requests for names and addresses of all potential witnesses having knowledge of relevant facts does not constitute a specific request. State v. Totten, 99 Idaho 117, 577 P.2d 1165 (1978).

Question of Law.

The question whether a substance is designated in the uniform controlled substances act as a controlled substance is a question of law for the court, and not the jury, to decide. State v. Hobbs, 101 Idaho 262, 611 P.2d 1047 (1980).

Separate Offenses.
Testing of Drugs.

Where the informations separately charging defendant with the two crimes of manufacturing and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance contained no specific factual allegations showing what acts were alleged to be the basis for each respective crime, and since there were no specific references to separate acts committed at different times in order to satisfy the “temporal” test under§ 18-301, the district court erred in refusing to dismiss one of the counts against defendant. State v. Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 794 P.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1990). Testing of Drugs.

The fact that a state expert witness began her testing analysis with the assumption that the substance in question, prednisolone, was a drug did not detract from the relevance of the tests performed or the conclusions drawn since, even assuming that a nondrug substance might theoretically give the same test results as prednisolone, the possibility of such an occurrence did not bar the jury from deciding that the evidence presented was convincing enough to persuade them, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the substance was prednisolone. State v. Kellogg, 102 Idaho 628, 636 P.2d 750 (1981).

Ultimate User.

Term “ultimate user” in subsection (i) is the person who was intended to use the prescription drug. State v. Sherman, 156 Idaho 435, 327 P.3d 993 (Ct. App. 2014).

Cited

State v. Kincaid, 98 Idaho 440, 566 P.2d 763 (1977); State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 863, 693 P.2d 1065 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Pardo, 109 Idaho 1036, 712 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 756 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Walker, 121 Idaho 18, 822 P.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1991); State Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel. Cade v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 889 P.2d 109 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ambro, 142 Idaho 77, 123 P.3d 710 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 185 P.3d 272 (2008).

Decisions Under Prior Law
Constitutionality.

In view of former section which stated a requisite general policy for the sale of drugs, defined the public agency which was to apply it and delineated that agency’s powers, the failure of the legislature to specifically define prescription drugs for purposes of former section did not render the section invalid under Idaho Const., Art. II § 1 or Art. III, § 1 as an improper delegation of legislative authority. State v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514 (1977).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

A.L.R.

A.L.R. — Construction and Application of § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)), and Predecessor Provision, Rendering Inadmissible Any Alien Convicted of, or Who Admits to, Violating Federal, State, or Foreign Laws Relating to Controlled Substances. 93 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Idaho Code Art. II

Article II

§ 37-2702. Authority to control.

  1. The board shall administer the regulatory provisions of this act and may add substances to or delete or reschedule all substances enumerated in the schedules in section 37-2705, 37-2707, 37-2709, 37-2711, or 37-2713, Idaho Code, pursuant to the procedures of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code. In making a determination regarding a substance, the board shall consider the following:
    1. The actual or relative potential for abuse;
    2. The scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known;
    3. The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance;
    4. The history and current pattern of abuse;
    5. The scope, duration, and significance of abuse;
    6. The risk to the public health;
    7. The potential of the substance to produce psychic or physiological dependence liability; and
    8. Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this article.
  2. After considering the factors enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, the board shall make findings with respect thereto and issue a rule controlling the substance if it finds the substance has a potential for abuse.
  3. If the board designates a substance as an immediate precursor, substances which are precursors of the controlled precursor shall not be subject to control solely because they are precursors of the controlled precursor.
  4. If any substance is designated, rescheduled, or deleted as a controlled substance under federal law and notice thereof is given to the board, the board shall similarly control the substance under this act by promulgating a temporary rule or proposing a statutory amendment, or both, within thirty (30) days from publication in the federal register of a final order designating a substance as a controlled substance or rescheduling or deleting a substance, unless within that thirty (30) day period, the board objects to inclusion, rescheduling, or deletion. In that case, the board shall publish the reasons for objection and afford all interested parties an opportunity to be heard. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board shall publish its decision, which shall be final unless altered by statute. Upon publication of objection to inclusion, rescheduling, or deletion under this act by the board, control under this act is stayed until the board publishes its decision.
  5. Authority to control under this section does not extend to distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2702, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 2, p. 261; am. 2017, ch. 4, § 1, p. 5.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 4, substituted “by promulgating a temporary rule or proposing a statutory amendment, or both, within thirty (30) days” for “after the expiration of thirty (30) days” near the middle of the first sentence in subsection (d).

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in subsections (a) and (d) refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

Section 6 of S.L. 2017, ch. 4 declared an emergency. Approved February 13, 2017.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 539 P.2d 263 (1975).

§ 37-2703. Nomenclature.

The controlled substances listed or to be listed in the schedules in sections 37-2705, 37-2707, 37-2709, 37-2711 and 37-2713, Idaho Code, are included by whatever official, common, usual, chemical, or trade-name designated.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2703, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

§ 37-2704. Schedule I tests.

The board shall place a substance in schedule I if it finds that the substance:

  1. Has high potential for abuse; and
  2. Has no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2704, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

CASE NOTES

Marijuana.

There is a rational relationship between classifying marijuana as a schedule I drug and a legitimate government purpose therefor. Recent changes in the social and legal landscapes do not provide the court a basis upon which to change that classification. The legislature or proper administrative board has that responsibility. State v. Rainier, 159 Idaho 142, 357 P.3d 867 (Ct. App. 2015).

§ 37-2705. Schedule I.

  1. The controlled substances listed in this section are included in schedule I.
  2. Any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, unless specifically excepted, whenever the existence of these isomers, esters, ethers and salts is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Acetyl-alpha-methylfentanyl (N-[1-(1-methyl-2-phenethyl)-4- piperidinyl]-N-phenylacetamide);
    2. Acetylmethadol;
    3. Acetyl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylacetamide);
    4. Acryl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylacrylamide;
    5. Allylprodine;
    6. Alphacetylmethadol (except levo-alphacetylmethadol also known as levo-alpha-acetylmethadol, levomethadyl acetate or LAAM);
    7. Alphameprodine;
    8. Alphamethadol;
    9. Alpha-methylfentanyl;
    10. Alpha-methylthiofentanyl (N-[1-methyl-2-(2-thienyl)ethyl-4- piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);
    11. Benzethidine;
    12. Betacetylmethadol;
    13. Beta-hydroxyfentanyl (N-[1-(2-hydroxy-2-phenethyl)-4- piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);
    14. Beta-hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl (N-(1-(2-hydroxy-2-phenethyl)-3- methyl-4-piperidinyl)-N-phenylpropanamide);
    15. Betameprodine;
    16. Betamethadol;
    17. Betaprodine;
    18. Clonitazene;
    19. Cyclopentyl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylcyclopentanecarboxamide) ;
    20. Cyclopropyl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylcyclopropanecarboxamide) ;
    21. Dextromoramide;
    22. Diampromide;
    23. Diethylthiambutene;
    24. Difenoxin;
    25. Dimenoxadol;
    26. Dimepheptanol;
    27. Dimethylthiambutene;
    28. Dioxaphetyl butyrate;
    29. Dipipanone;
    30. Ethylmethylthiambutene;
    31. Etonitazene; (32) Etoxeridine;
  3. Any of the following opium derivatives, their salts, isomers and salts of isomers, unless specifically excepted, whenever the existence of these salts, isomers and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Acetorphine;
    2. Acetyldihydrocodeine;
    3. Benzylmorphine;
    4. Codeine methylbromide;
    5. Codeine-N-Oxide;
    6. Cyprenorphine;
    7. Desomorphine;
    8. Dihydromorphine;
    9. Drotebanol;
    10. Etorphine (except hydrochloride salt);
    11. Heroin;
    12. Hydromorphinol;
    13. Methyldesorphine;
    14. Methyldihydromorphine;
    15. Morphine methylbromide;
    16. Morphine methylsulfonate;
    17. Morphine-N-Oxide;
    18. Myrophine;
    19. Nicocodeine;
    20. Nicomorphine;
    21. Normorphine;
    22. Pholcodine;
    23. Thebacon.
  4. Hallucinogenic substances. Any material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, their salts, isomers and salts of isomers, unless specifically excepted, whenever the existence of these salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation (for purposes of this paragraph only, the term “isomer” includes the optical, position and geometric isomers): (1) Dimethoxyphenethylamine, or any compound not specifically excepted or listed in another schedule that can be formed from dimethoxyphenethylamine by replacement of one (1) or more hydrogen atoms with another atom(s), functional group(s) or substructure(s) including, but not limited to, compounds such as DOB, DOC, 2C-B, 25B-NBOMe;
  5. b. /ut/f6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and their optical isomers.
  6. c. /ut/f3/f,/f4 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and its optical isomers. (Since nomenclature of these substances is not internationally standardized, compounds of these structures, regardless of numerical designation of atomic positions are covered.) d. [(6aR,10aR)-9-(hydroxymethyl)-6,6-dimethyl-3-(2methyloctan-2-yl)-6a,7,10,10a-tetrahydrobenzo[c]chromen-1-o1)], also known as
  7. d. 1-(4-cyanobutyl)-N-(2-phenylpropan-2-yl)-1 H-indazole-3-carboxamide (4-cn-cumyl-BUTINACA).
  8. e. Ethyl 2-(1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1H-indazole-3carboxamido)-3,3-dimethylbut anoate * (5f-edmbpinaca).
  9. f. (1-(4-fluorobenzyl)-1H-indol-3-yl)(2,2,3,3tetramethylcyclopropy l)methanone (fub-144).
  10. g. 1-(5-fluoropentyl)-N-(2-phenylpropan-2-yl)-1H-indazole-3-carbox amide (5f-cumyl-pinaca; sgt25).
  11. h. (1-(5-fluoropentyl)-N-(2-phenylpropan-2-yl)-1 H-pyrrolo[2.3-B]pyridine-3-carboxamide(5fcumyl-P7AICA).
  12. i. Methyl 2-(1-(cyclohexylmethyl)-1H-indole-3-carboxamido)-3-methylbutano ate (MMB-CHMICA, AMB-CHMICA).
  13. j. Methyl 2-(1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1H-indole-3-carboxamido)-3,3-dimethylbuta noate (5f-mdmbpica).
  14. k. N-(adamantan-1-yl)-1-(4-fluorobenzyl)-1H-indazole3-carboxamide (fub-akb48; fub-apinaca).
    1. Gamma hydroxybutyric acid (some other names include GHB; gamma-hydroxybutyrate, 4-hydroxybutyrate; 4-hyroxybutanoic acid; sodium oxybate; sodium oxybutyrate);
    2. Flunitrazepam (also known as “R2,” “Rohypnol”);
    3. Mecloqualone;
    4. Methaqualone.
    5. Alpha-pyrrolidinohexanophenone* (a-php);
    6. 4-chloro-alpha-pyrrolidinovalerophenone* (4chloro-a-pvp);
    7. Fenethylline;
    8. Methcathinone (some other names: 2-(methyl-amino)-propiophenone, alpha-(methylamino)-propiophenone, N-methylcathinone, AL-464, AL-422, AL-463 and UR1423);
    9. (+/-)cis-4-methylaminorex [(+/-)cis-4,5-dihydro-4-methyl-5-phenyl-2- oxazolamine];
    10. 4-methyl-alpha-ethylaminopentiophenone* (4meap);
    11. 4′-methyl-alpha-pyrrolidinohexiophenone* (mphp);
    12. N-benzylpiperazine (also known as: BZP, 1-benzylpiperazine);
    13. N-ethylamphetamine;
    14. N-ethylhexedrone*;
    15. N,N-dimethylamphetamine (also known as: N,N-alpha-trimethyl-benzeneethanamine).

(33) Fentanyl-related substances. “Fentanyl-related substances” means any substance not otherwise listed and for which no exemption or approval is in effect under section 505 of the federal food, drug, and cosmetic act, 21 U.S.C. 355, and that is structurally related to fentanyl by one (1) or more of the following modifications:

i. Replacement of the phenyl portion of the phenethyl group by any monocycle, whether or not further substituted in or on the monocycle;

ii. Substitution in or on the phenethyl group with alkyl, alkenyl, alkoxyl, hydroxyl, halo, haloalkyl, amino, or nitro groups;

iii. Substitution in or on the piperidine ring with alkyl, alkenyl, alkoxyl, ester, ether, hydroxyl, halo, haloalkyl, amino, or nitro groups;

iv. Replacement of the aniline ring with any aromatic monocycle, whether or not further substituted in or on the aromatic monocycle; and/or

v. Replacement of the N-propionyl group by another acyl group;

(34) 4-Fluoroisobutyryl fentanyl (N-(4-fluorophenyl)-N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)isobutyramide) ;

(35) Furanyl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylfuran-2-carboxamide);

(36) Furethidine;

(37) Hydroxypethidine;

(38) Isobutyryl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylisobutyramide);

(39) Ketobemidone;

(40) Levomoramide;

(41) Levophenacylmorphan;

(42) 3-Methylfentanyl;

(43) 3-methylthiofentanyl (N-[(3-methyl-1-(2-thienyl)ethyl-4- piperidinyl]-N-phenylpropanamide);

(44) Morpheridine;

(45) MPPP (1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine);

(46) MT-45 (1-cyclohexyl-4-(1,2-diphenylethyl)piperazine);

(47) Noracymethadol;

(48) Norlevorphanol;

(49) Normethadone;

(50) Norpipanone;

(51) Ocfentanil (N-(2-fluorophenyl)-2-methoxy-N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl) acetamide);

(52) Para-chloroisobutyryl fentanyl (N-(4-chlorophenyl)-N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl) isobutyramide);

(53) Para-fluorobutyryl fentanyl (N-(4-fluorophenyl)-N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl) butyramide);

(54) Para-fluorofentanyl (N-(4-fluorophenyl)-N-[1-(2-phenethyl)-4- piperidinyl] propanamide);

(55) Para-methoxybutyryl fentanyl (N-(4-methoxyphenyl)-N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl) butyramide);

(56) PEPAP (1-(-2-phenethyl)-4-phenyl-4-acetoxypiperidine);

(57) Phenadoxone;

(58) Phenampromide; (59) Phenomorphan;

(60) Phenoperidine;

(61) Piritramide;

(62) Proheptazine;

(63) Properidine;

(64) Propiram;

(65) Racemoramide;

(66) Tetrahydrofuranyl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidine-4-yl)-N-phenyltetrahydrofuran-2-carbo xamide;

(67) Thiofentanyl (N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-thienyl)ethyl-4-piperidinyl]-

propanamide);

(68) Tilidine;

(69) Trimeperidine;

(70) u-47700 (3,4-Dichloro-N-[2-(dimethylamino)cyclohexyl]-N-methylbenzamide ;

(71) Valeryl fentanyl (N-(1-phenethylpiperidin-4-yl)-N-phenylpentanamide).

(2) Methoxyamphetamine or any compound not specifically excepted or listed in another schedule that can be formed from methoxyamphetamine by replacement of one (1) or more hydrogen atoms with another atom(s), functional group(s) or substructure(s) including, but not limited to, compounds such as PMA and DOM;

(3) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy-amphetamine;

(4) 5-methoxy-N,N-diisopropyltryptamine;

(5) Amphetamine or methamphetamine with a halogen substitution on the benzyl ring, including compounds such as fluorinated amphetamine and fluorinated methamphetamine;

(6) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine;

(7) 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA);

(8) 3,4-methylenedioxy-N-ethylamphetamine (also known as N-ethyl-alpha-methyl-3,4 (methylenedioxy) phenethylamine, and N-ethyl MDA, MDE, MDEA);

(9) N-hydroxy-3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (also known as N-hydroxy-alpha-methyl-3,4(methylenedioxy) phenethylamine, and N-hydroxy MDA);

(10) 3,4,5-trimethoxy amphetamine;

(11) 5-methoxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine (also known as 5-methoxy-3-2[2-(dimethylamino)ethyl]indole and 5-MeO-DMT);

(12) Alpha-ethyltryptamine (some other names: etryptamine, 3-(2-aminobutyl) indole);

(13) Alpha-methyltryptamine;

(14) Bufotenine;

(15) Diethyltryptamine (DET);

(16) Dimethyltryptamine (DMT);

(17) Ibogaine;

(18) Lysergic acid diethylamide;

(19) Marihuana;

(20) Mescaline;

(21) Parahexyl;

(22) Peyote;

(23) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;

(24) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;

(25) Psilocybin;

(26) Psilocyn;

(27) Tetrahydrocannabinols or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following:

i. Tetrahydrocannabinols:

a. /ut/f1 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and their optical isomers, excluding dronabinol in sesame oil and encapsulated in either a soft gelatin capsule or in an oral solution in a drug product approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

6aR-trans-3-(1,1-dimethylheptyl)-6a,7,10,10a-tetrahydro-1-hydro xy- 6,6-dimethyl-6H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-9-methanol (HU-210) and its geometric isomers (HU211 or dexanabinol).

ii. The following synthetic drugs:

a. Any compound structurally derived from (1H-indole-3-yl) (cycloalkyl, cycloalkenyl, aryl)methanone, or (1H-indole-3-yl) (cycloalkyl, cycloalkenyl, aryl)methane, or (1H-indole-3-yl) (cycloalkyl, cycloalkenyl, aryl), methyl or dimethyl butanoate, amino-methyl (or dimethyl)-1-oxobutan-2-yl) carboxamide by substitution at the nitrogen atoms of the indole ring or carboxamide to any extent, whether or not further substituted in or on the indole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted to any extent in or on the cycloalkyl, cycloalkenyl, aryl ring(s) (substitution in the ring may include, but is not limited to, heteroatoms such as nitrogen, sulfur and oxygen).

b. N-(1-amino-3-methyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1 H-indazole-3-carboxamide (5F-AB-PINACA).

c. 1-(1.3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-(ethylamino)-pentan-1-one (N-ethylpentylone, ephylone).

l . Naphthalen-1-yl 1-(5-fluoropentyl)-1H-indole-3-carboxylate (NM2201; CBL2201).

m. Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)pyrrole by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the pyrrole ring to any extent, whether or not further substituted in the pyrrole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent.

n. Any compound structurally derived from 1-(1-naphthylmethyl)indene by substitution at the 3-position of the indene ring to any extent, whether or not further substituted in the indene ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent.

o. Any compound structurally derived from 3-phenylacetylindole by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring to any extent, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the phenyl ring to any extent.

p. Any compound structurally derived from 2-(3-hydroxycyclohexyl)phenol by substitution at the 5-position of the phenolic ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the cyclohexyl ring to any extent. q. Any compound structurally derived from 3-(benzoyl)indole structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring to any extent, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted in the phenyl ring to any extent.

r. [2,3-dihydro-5-methyl-3-(4-morpholinylmethyl)pyrrolo[1,2,3-de]- 1,4-benzoxazin-6-yl]-1-napthalenylmethanone (WIN-55,212-2).

s. 3-dimethylheptyl-11-hydroxyhexahydrocannabinol (HU-243).

t. [(6S, 6aR, 9R, 10aR)-9-hydroxy-6-methyl-3-[(2R)-5-phenylpentan-2-yl]oxy-5,6,6a ,7,8,9,10, 10a-octahydrophenanthridin-1-yl]acetate (CP 50,5561).

(28) Ethylamine analog of phencyclidine: N-ethyl-1-phenylcyclohexylamine (1-phenylcyclohexyl) ethylamine; N-(1-phenylcyclohexyl) ethylamine, cyclohexamine, PCE;

(29) Pyrrolidine analog of phencyclidine: 1-(phenylcyclohexyl)-pyrrolidine, PCPy, PHP;

(30) Thiophene analog of phencyclidine 1-[1-(2-thienyl)-cyclohexyl]-piperidine, 2-thienylanalog of phencyclidine, TPCP, TCP;

(31) 1-[1-(2-thienyl) cyclohexyl] pyrrolidine another name: TCPy;

(32) Spores or mycelium capable of producing mushrooms that contain psilocybin or psilocin.

(e) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:

(f) Stimulants. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers:

(1) Aminorex (some other names: aminoxaphen, 2-amino-5-phenyl-2-oxazoline, or 4,5-dihydro-5-phenyl-2-oxazolamine);

(2) Cathinone (some other names: 2-amino-1-phenol-1-propanone, alpha-aminopropiophenone, 2-aminopropiophenone and norephedrone);

(3) Substituted cathinones. Any compound, except bupropion or compounds listed under a different schedule, structurally derived from 2-aminopropan-1-one by substitution at the 1-position with either phenyl, naphthyl or thiophene ring systems, whether or not the compound is further modified in any of the following ways:

i. By substitution in the ring system to any extent with alkyl, alkylenedioxy, alkoxy, haloalkyl, hydroxyl or halide substituents, whether or not further substituted in the ring system by one (1) or more other univalent substituents;

ii. By substitution at the 3-position with an acyclic alkyl substituent;

iii. By substitution at the 2-amino nitrogen atom with alkyl, dialkyl, benzyl or methoxybenzyl groups, or by inclusion of the 2-amino nitrogen atom in a cyclic structure. (4 Alpha-pyrrolidinoheptaphenone* (PV8);

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2705, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1977, ch. 234, § 1, p. 698; am. 1980, ch. 160, § 1, p. 340; am. 1981, ch. 102, § 1, p. 149; am. 1984, ch. 160, § 1, p. 390; am. 1985, ch. 25, § 1, p. 41; am. 1986, ch. 209, § 1, p. 534; am. 1987, ch. 38, § 1, p. 61; am. 1988, ch. 190, § 1, p. 337; am. 1989, ch. 177, § 1, p. 428; am. 1995, ch. 1, § 1, p. 3; am. 1996, ch. 36, § 1, p. 90; am. 1998, ch. 160, § 1, p. 545; am. 2003, ch. 185, § 1, p. 499; am. 2004, ch. 302, § 1, p. 845; am. 2010, ch. 117, § 1, p. 243; am. 2011, ch. 46, § 1, p. 105; am. 2011, ch. 47, § 1, p. 109; am. 2011, ch. 134, § 1, p. 368; am. 2012, ch. 181, § 1, p. 472; am. 2013, ch. 253, § 1, p. 623; am. 2014, ch. 349, § 1, p. 870; am. 2017, ch. 4, § 2, p. 5; am. 2018, ch. 36, § 1, p. 68; am. 2019, ch. 24, § 1, p. 28; am. 2020, ch. 13, § 1, p. 29.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 117, added paragraphs (d)(5), (d)(8), (d)(16), and (f)(6) and made related redesignations; and deleted paragraph (g)(3), which read: “4 methylaminorex (also known as 2-amino-4-methyl-5-phenyl-2-oxazoline).”

This section was amended by three 2011 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 46, inserted “2-amino-1-phenol-1-propanone” in paragraph (f)(2), and added paragraph (f)(3) and redesignated former paragraphs (f)(3) to (f)(8) as paragraphs (f)(4) to (f)(9).

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 47, rewrote paragraph (d)(30).

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 134, deleted subsection (g), which was a temporary listing of substances subject to emergency scheduling.

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 181, added paragraph (d)(15) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly; substituted “to any extent” for “by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl” throughout paragraph (d)(31)(ii); and inserted “[(6S, 6aR, 9R, 10aR)-” and “(2R)-” in the formula in paragraph (d)(31)(ii)i. The 2013 amendment, by ch. 253, rewrote (d)(31)ii.a., which formerly read, “Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or 1H-indol-3- yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring to any extent, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent.”

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 349, in subsection (d), deleted “(1) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxy amphetamine”, “(2) 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine”, “(4) 2,5-dimethoxy-4-ethylamphetamine (another name: DOET)” and “(5) 2,5-dimethoxy-4-(n)-propylthiophenethylamine” and redesignated the subsequent paragraphs accordingly, rewrote paragraph (3) (now (1)), which formerly read “(3) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine (some other names: alpha-desmethyl DOB, 2C-B)”, rewrote paragraph (6) (now (2)), which formerly read “(6) 4-methoxyamphetamine (PMA)”, and rewrote paragraph (9) (now (5)), which formerly read “(9) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine (DOM, STP)”.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 4, added paragraph (56) in subsection (b); and, in subsection (d), inserted “methyl or dimethyl butanoate, amino-methyl (or dimethyl)-1-oxobutan-2-yl)” in paragraph (27)(ii)(a).

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 36, in subsection (a), added present paragraph (3) and redesignated the subsequent paragraphs accordingly; and substituted “in either a soft gelatin capsule or in an oral solution” for “in a soft gelatin capsule” in paragraph (d)(27)i.a.

The 2019 amendment, by ch. 24, in subsection (b), added paragraphs (18), (19), (32), (35), (43), (48), (49), (50), (52), and (67), and redesignated the remaining paragraphs accordingly.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 13, in subsection (b), added present paragraphs (4), (34), (35), and (66) and renumbered the remaining paragraphs accordingly; in paragraph (27)ii of subsection (d), added present paragraphs b to l and re-lettered the remaining paragraphs accordingly; and in subsection (f), added present paragraphs (4) to (6), (10), (11), and (14) and renumbered the remaining paragraphs accordingly.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2011, ch. 46 declared an emergency. Approved March 10, 2011.

Section 2 of S.L. 2011, ch. 47 declared an emergency. Approved March 10, 2011.

Section 2 of S.L. 2013, ch. 253 declared an emergency. Approved April 3, 2013.

Section 6 of S.L. 2017, ch. 4 declared an emergency. Approved February 13, 2017.

Section 4 of S.L. 2019, ch. 24 declared an emergency. Approved February 14, 2019.

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality.

There is no fundamental right to possess or to grow marijuana, even for personal consumption in the privacy of the home and, under the restrained review test, it was not irrational or arbitrary for the legislature to proscribe its cultivation, even for personal use, and to attach felony penalties for such conduct; accordingly this section and§ 37-2732 are not unconstitutional. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 678 P.2d 60 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S. Ct. 296, 83 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984).

This section and§ 37-2732 prohibiting the growing and use of marijuana do not violate the prohibitions against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment contained in U.S. Const., Amend. VIII andIdaho Const., Art. I, § 6. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 678 P.2d 60 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S. Ct. 296, 83 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984).

Marijuana.

Punishment of three years probation, 45 days in jail and $1,000 fine was not grossly disproportionate to offense of possession with intent to manufacture, considering the amount of marijuana and paraphernalia seized, nor was it clearly arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 678 P.2d 60 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S. Ct. 296, 83 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984).

Quantity.

Because the language of the controlled substances statute is plain and unambiguous, even a trace amount of the substance will satisfy the requirement of the statute, and a refusal to adopt the usable-quantity rule does not lead to a result which is palpably absurd. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 988 P.2d 685 (1999).

Synthetic Substances.

Schedule I hallucinogens include synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure. AM-2201 is a controlled substance under that definition. State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 356 P.3d 368 (2015).

Cited

State v. Kincaid, 98 Idaho 440, 566 P.2d 763 (1977); State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 863, 693 P.2d 1065 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 815 P.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Local Initatives.

Provisions of local initiatives allowing persons to use marijuana for medicinal purposes, declaring that the growth and cultivation of industrial hemp is a positive and beneficial farming activity, conflict with state law and are invalid.OAG 07-02.

§ 37-2706. Schedule II tests.

The board shall place a substance in schedule II if it finds that:

  1. The substance has high potential for abuse;
  2. The substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions; and
  3. The abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychic or physical dependence.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2706, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

§ 37-2707. Schedule II.

  1. Schedule II shall consist of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Substances, vegetable origin or chemical synthesis. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following substances whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:
    1. Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium or opiate, excluding apomorphine, dextrorphan, nalbuphine, nalmefene, naloxone, naltrexone and their respective salts, but including the following:
    2. Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of the substances referred to in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, except that these substances shall not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium.
    3. Opium poppy and poppy straw.
    4. Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, but shall not include the following:
    5. Benzoylecgonine.
    6. Methylbenzoylecgonine (Cocaine — its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers). (7) Concentrate of poppy straw (the crude extract of poppy straw in either liquid, solid or powder form which contains the phenanthrine alkaloids of the opium poppy).
    7. Concentrate of poppy straw (the crude extract of poppy straw in either liquid, solid or powder form which contains the phenanthrine alkaloids of the opium poppy).
  3. Any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, whenever the existence of these isomers, esters, ethers and salts is possible within the specific chemical designation, unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule:
    1. Alfentanil;
    2. Alphaprodine;
    3. Anileridine;
    4. Bezitramide;
    5. Bulk Dextropropoxyphene (nondosage forms);
    6. Carfentanil;
    7. Dihydrocodeine;
    8. Diphenoxylate;
    9. Fentanyl;
    10. Isomethadone;
    11. Levo-alphacetylmethadol (also known as levo-alpha-acetylmethadol, levomethadyl acetate, LAAM);
    12. Levomethorphan;
    13. Levorphanol;
    14. Metazocine;
    15. Methadone;
    16. Methadone — Intermediate, 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4, 4-diphenyl butane;
    17. Moramide — Intermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpholino-1, 1-diphenyl propane-carboxylic acid;
    18. Pethidine (meperidine);
    19. Pethidine — Intermediate — A, 4-cyano-1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine;
    20. Pethidine — Intermediate — B, ethyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylate;
    21. Pethidine — Intermediate — C, 1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid;
    22. Phenazocine;
    23. Piminodine;
    24. Racemethorphan;
    25. Racemorphan;
    26. Remifentanil;
    27. Sufentanil.
  4. Stimulants. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system:
    1. Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its optical isomers;
    2. Lisdexamfetamine;
    3. Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers;
    4. Phenmetrazine and its salts;
    5. Methylphenidate.
  5. Depressants. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation: (1) Amobarbital;
  6. Hallucinogenic substances.
    1. Nabilone ................ (another name for nabilone:(+/-)-trans-3-(1,1- dimethylheptyl)-6,6a,7,8,10,10a- hexahydro-1- hydroxy-6,6-dimethyl-9H- dibenzo[b,d]pyran-9-one) (21 CFR 1308.12 (f))
  7. Immediate precursors. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances:
    1. Immediate precursor to amphetamine and methamphetamine:
      1. Anthranilic acid;
      2. Ephedrine;
      3. Lead acetate;
      4. Methylamine;
      5. Methyl formamide;
      6. N-methylephedrine;
      7. Phenylacetic acid;
      8. Phenylacetone;
      9. Phenylpropanolamine;
      10. Pseudoephedrine.

1. Decocainized coca leaves or extractions of coca leaves, which extractions do not contain cocaine; or ecgonine; or

2. [/f1/f2/f3I]ioflupane.

(2) Glutethimide;

(3) Pentobarbital;

(4) Phencyclidine;

(5) Secobarbital.

Except that any combination or compound containing ephedrine, or any of its salts and isomers, or phenylpropanolamine or its salts and isomers, or pseudoephedrine, or any of its salts and isomers which is prepared for dispensing or over-the-counter distribution is not a controlled substance for the purpose of this section, unless such substance is possessed, delivered, or possessed with intent to deliver to another with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, amphetamine or any other controlled substance in violation of section 37-2732, Idaho Code. For purposes of this provision, the requirements of the uniform controlled substances act shall not apply to a manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer of over-the-counter products containing the listed substances unless such person possesses, delivers, or possesses with intent to deliver to another the over-the-counter product with intent to manufacture a controlled substance.

(2) Immediate precursors to phencyclidine (PCP):

(a) 1-phenylcyclohexylamine;

(b) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile (PCC).

(3) Immediate precursor to fentanyl: 4-anilino-N-phenethyl-4-piperidine (ANPP).

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2707, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 3, p. 261; am. 1977, ch. 234, § 2, p. 698; am. 1980, ch. 160, § 2, p. 340; am. 1981, ch. 102, § 2, p. 149; am. 1984, ch. 160, § 2, p. 390; am. 1985, ch. 25, § 2, p. 41; am. 1986, ch. 209, § 2, p. 534; am. 1987, ch. 38, § 2, p. 61; am. 1988, ch. 190, § 2, p. 337; am. 1989, ch. 177, § 2, p. 428; am. 1992, ch. 24, § 1, p. 72; am. 1995, ch. 1, § 2, p. 3; am. 1998, ch. 328, § 1, p. 1058; am. 2000, ch. 110, § 1, p. 242; am. 2010, ch. 117, § 2, p. 243; am. 2011, ch. 134, § 2, p. 368; am. 2016, ch. 70, § 1, p. 245.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Uniform controlled substances act,§ 37-2751 and notes thereto.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 117, in paragraph (b)(1), added paragraphs 8, 9, 16, and 19 and made related redesignations; added paragraphs (b)(5), (c)(26), and (d)(2), and made related redesignations; and in paragraph (f)(1), substituted “Nabilone” for “Nabiline”.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 134, added paragraph (g)(3).

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 70, added the paragraph (b)(4)1. designation, inserted “of coca leaves” in paragraph (b)(4)1., and added paragraph (b)(4)2.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

CASE NOTES

Chain of Custody.

The court determined from the testimony of officer that the white envelope containing drug evidence was sealed when it left the officer and that it was sealed in the same way when the criminologist received it. Mere speculation that the evidence was mishandled or tampered with was insufficient to establish a break in the chain of custody. State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 838 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1992).

Cocaine.

The legislature’s classification of cocaine as a narcotic for regulatory and penalty purposes is not in conflict with constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Cianelli, 101 Idaho 313, 612 P.2d 550 (1980).

Construction.

The classification of cocaine as a narcotic drug is constitutional. State v. McNeely, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1983). Construction.

The phrase “having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system” in subsection (d) of this section modifies the word “substances” not the word “quantity”; had the Idaho legislature intended that a quantitative analysis be required under subsection (d) of this section, the legislature would have set forth required amounts as it did for certain other substances. State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 884 P.2d 419 (Ct. App. 1994).

Proof of Stimulant Effect.

Whether or not this section required the state to prove that the methamphetamine which defendant delivered to law enforcement agents had a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, defense counsel admitted at oral argument that he had failed to raise the issue at trial and in such a situation, where the issue was not raised below, the court would not consider it on appeal. State v. Caswell, 121 Idaho 801, 828 P.2d 830 (1992).

Quantity.

Although the legislature did not proscribe the possession of “any quantity” of cocaine as it did for methamphetamine, its classification of cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance and its limited availability demonstrate that the legislature intended the possession of even trace or residual quantities of cocaine to fall within the scope of§ 37-2732(c). State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 983 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1999).

The state need not prove that the amount of a controlled substance possessed was a usable amount. State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484, 314 P.3d 166 (2013).

Search Warrant Description.

Although a warrant describes a controlled substance in a certain form, the purpose of the search is not limited to finding the substance in that particular form and the scope of the warrant shall extend to alternate forms of the same substance which are similarly controlled by statute. State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1982).

Where a search warrant on its face authorized police to search for PCP on mint leaves or in a powdered form, but instead the PCP was found in a liquid solution, the controlled substance had not lost its identity; it had merely taken a different form still controlled by this section and remained subject to search. State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1982).

Sentence.

The three concurrent indeterminate five-year sentences for three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, one for each count, involving a presumed confinement for one and two-thirds years, was held reasonable when viewed upon the facts. State v. Edwards, 113 Idaho 821, 748 P.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1987).

Cited

State v. Hoak, 120 Idaho 415, 816 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20, 843 P.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 866 P.2d 181 (1993).

§ 37-2708. Schedule III tests.

The board shall place a substance in schedule III if it finds that:

  1. The substance has a potential for abuse less than the substances listed in schedules I and II;
  2. The substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and
  3. Abuse of the substance may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2708, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 539 P.2d 263 (1975).

§ 37-2709. Schedule III.

  1. Schedule III shall consist of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Stimulants. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, (whether optical or geometric), and salts of such isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Those compounds, mixtures, or preparations in dosage unit form containing any stimulant substances listed in schedule II which compounds, mixtures, or preparations were listed as excepted compounds under 21 CFR 1308.32, and any other drug of the quantitative composition shown in that list for those drugs or which is the same except that it contains a lesser quantity of controlled substances.
    2. Benzphetamine;
    3. Chlorphentermine;
    4. Clortermine;
    5. Phendimetrazine.
  3. Depressants. Unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a potential for abuse associated with a depressant effect on the central nervous system:
    1. Any compound, mixture or preparation containing:
    2. Any suppository dosage form containing:
    3. Any substance which contains any quantity of a derivative of barbituric acid or any salt thereof, including, but not limited to:
    4. Chlorhexadol;
    5. Embutramide;
    6. Any drug product containing gamma hydroxybutyric acid, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, for which an application is approved under section 505 of the federal food, drug, and cosmetic act;
    7. Ketamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers — 7285. (Some other names for ketamine: (+/-)-2-(2-chlorophenyl)-2-(methylamino)-cyclohexanone).
    8. Lysergic acid;
    9. Lysergic acid amide;
    10. Methyprylon;
    11. Perampanel, and its salts, isomers and salts of isomers;
    12. Sulfondiethylmethane;
    13. Sulfonethylmethane;
    14. Sulfonmethane;
    15. Tiletamine and zolazepam or any salt thereof.
  4. Nalorphine.
  5. Narcotic drugs. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule:
    1. Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing limited quantities of any of the following narcotic drugs, or any salts thereof:
      1. Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine, or any of its salts, per 100 milliliters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with an equal or greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium;
      2. Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine, or any of its salts, per 100 milliliters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
      3. Not more than 1.8 grams of dihydrocodeine, or any of its salts, per 100 milliliters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
      4. Not more than 300 milligrams of ethylmorphine, or any of its salts, per 100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
      5. Not more than 500 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams, or not more than 25 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
      6. Not more than 50 milligrams of morphine, or any of its salts, per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams with one (1) or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts.
    2. Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following narcotic drugs or their salts, as set forth below:
      1. Buprenorphine.
      2. [Reserved].
  6. Anabolic steroids and human growth hormones. Any drug or hormonal substance, chemically and pharmacologically related to testosterone (other than estrogens, progestins and corticosteroids) that promotes muscle growth including any salt, ester or isomer of a drug or substance listed in this subsection, if that salt, ester or isomer promotes muscle growth.
    1. 13beta-ethyl-17beta-hydroxygon-4-en-3-one;
    2. 17alpha-methyl-3alpha, 17beta-dihydroxy-5alpha-androstane;
    3. 17alpha-methyl-3beta, 17beta-dihydroxy-5alpha-androstane;
    4. 17alpha-methyl-3beta,17beta-dihydroxyandrost-4-ene;
    5. 17alpha-methyl-4-hydroxynandrolone;
    6. 17alpha-methyl-delta1-dihydrotestosterone;
    7. 19-nor-4-androstenediol;
    8. 19-nor-4-androstenedione;
    9. 19-nor-4,9(10)-androstadienedione;
    10. 19-nor-5-androstenediol;
    11. 19-nor-5-androstenedione;
    12. 1-androstenediol;
    13. 1-androstenedione;
    14. 3alpha,17beta-dihydroxy-5alpha-androstane;
    15. 3beta,17beta-dihydroxy-5alpha-androstane;
    16. 4-androstenediol;
    17. 4-androstenedione;
    18. 4-hydroxy-19-nortestosterone;
    19. 4-hydroxytestosterone;
    20. 5-androstenediol;
    21. 5-androstenedione;
    22. Androstenedione;
    23. Bolasterone;
    24. Boldenone;
    25. Boldione;
    26. Calusterone;
    27. Chlorotestosterone (4-chlorotestosterone);
    28. Clostebol;
    29. Dehydrochlormethyltestosterone;
    30. Delta1-dihydrotestosterone;
    31. Desoxymethyltestosterone;
    32. Dihydrotestosterone (4-dihydrotestosterone);
    33. Drostanolone;
    34. Ethylestrenol;
    35. Fluoxymesterone;
    36. Formebulone;
    37. Furazabol;
    38. Human growth hormones;
    39. Mestanolone;
    40. Mesterolone;
    41. Methandienone;
    42. Methandranone;
    43. Methandriol;
    44. Methandrostenolone;
    45. Methasterone (2a, 17a-dimethyl-5a-androstan-17=beta-ol-3-one);
    46. Methenolone;
    47. Methyldienolone;
    48. Methyltestosterone;
    49. Methyltrienolone; (50) Mibolerone;
  7. Hallucinogenic substances.
    1. Dronabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil and encapsulated in a soft gelatin capsule in the federal Food and Drug Administration approved product — 7369. (Some other names for dronabinol: (6aR-trans)-6a,7,8,10a- tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-3-pentyl-6H-dibenzo [b,d]pyran-1-ol or (-)-delta-9-(trans)-tetrahydrocannabinol).
  8. The board may except by rule any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any stimulant or depressant substance listed in subsection (b) or (c) of this section from the application of all or any part of this act if the compound, mixture, or preparation contains one (1) or more active medicinal ingredients not having a stimulant or depressant effect on the central nervous system, and if the admixtures are included therein in combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration that vitiate the potential for abuse of the substances which have a stimulant or depressant effect on the central nervous system.

i. Amobarbital;

ii. Secobarbital;

iii. Pentobarbital or any salt thereof and one (1) or more other active medicinal ingredients which are not listed in any schedule.

i. Amobarbital;

ii. Secobarbital;

iii. Pentobarbital or any salt of any of these drugs and approved by the Food and Drug Administration for marketing only as a suppository.

i. Aprobarbital;

ii. Butabarbital (secbutabarbital);

iii. Butalbital, excluding drug products exempted by the federal drug enforcement administration (DEA);

iv. Butobarbital (butethal);

v. Talbutal;

vi. Thiamylal;

vii. Thiopental;

viii. Vinbarbital.

(51) Nandrolone;

(52) Norbolethone;

(53) Norclostebol;

(54) Norethandrolone;

(55) Normethandrolone;

(56) Oxandrolone;

(57) Oxymesterone;

(58) Oxymetholone;

(59) Prostanozol (17=beta-hydroxy-5a-androstano[3,2-c]pyrazole);

(60) Stanolone;

(61) Stanozolol;

(62) Stenbolone;

(63) Testolactone;

(64) Testosterone;

(65) Testosterone cypionate;

(66) Testosterone enanthate;

(67) Testosterone propionate;

(68) Tetrahydrogestrinone;

(69) Trenbolone.

Anabolic steroids that are expressly intended for administration through implants or injection to cattle or other nonhuman species, and that are approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration for such use, shall not be classified as controlled substances under this act and shall not be governed by its provisions.

In addition to the penalties prescribed in article IV of the uniform controlled substances act, any person shall be guilty of a felony who prescribes, dispenses, supplies, sells, delivers, manufactures or possesses with the intent to prescribe, dispense, supply, sell, deliver or manufacture anabolic steroids or any other human growth hormone for purposes of enhancing performance in an exercise, sport or game or hormonal manipulation intended to increase muscle mass, strength or weight without a medical necessity as determined by a physician.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2709, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 4, p. 261; am. 1977, ch. 234, § 3, p. 698; am. 1980, ch. 160, § 3, p. 340; am. 1982, ch. 91, § 1, p. 165; am. 1984, ch. 160, § 3, p. 390; am. 1992, ch. 24, § 2, p. 72; am. 1996, ch. 36, § 2, p. 90; am. 2000, ch. 110, § 2, p. 242; am. 2003, ch. 185, § 2, p. 499; am. 2006, ch. 203, § 1, p. 620; am. 2010, ch. 117, § 3, p. 243; am. 2012, ch. 181, § 2, p. 472; am. 2014, ch. 33, § 1, p. 48; am. 2015, ch. 29, § 1, p. 62; am. 2017, ch. 4, § 3, p. 5; am. 2019, ch. 24, § 2, p. 28.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Article IV of uniform controlled substances act,§ 37-2732 et seq.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Amendments.

The 2006 amendment, by ch. 203, inserted “commonly known as hydrocodone” in subsections (e)(1)(iii) and (iv).

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 117, rewrote the section, revising provisions relating to schedule III drugs and other substances.

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 181, substituted “were listed as excepted compounds under 21 CFR 1308.32” for “were listed on August 25, 1971, as excepted compounds under 21 C.F.R. Sec. 308.32” in paragraph (b)(1); deleted paragraph (f)(28) “Chorionic gonadotropin;” and renumbered the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 33, inserted present paragraphs (f)(45) and (f)(59) and redesignated the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 29, added paragraph (b)(11) and redesignated the subsequent paragraphs; and, in subsection (e), deleted former paragraphs (1)(iii) and (1)(iv), which read: “(iii) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone, commonly known as hydrocodone, or any of its salts, per 100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with a fourfold or greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium; (iv) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone, commonly known as hydrocodone, or any of its salts, per 100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with one (1) or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts”; and redesignated the subsequent paragraphs.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 4, inserted “or injection” in the first paragraph following paragraph (f)(69); deleted former subsection (h), which read: “Other substances. Unless specifically excepted, or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substance, including its salts: (1) Butorphanol”; redesignated former subsection (i) as present subsection (h); and substituted “subsection (b) or (c) of this section” for “subsections (b) and (c) of this section” near the beginning of present subsection (h).

The 2019 amendment, by ch. 24, added “excluding drug products exempted by the federal drug enforcement administration (DEA)” at the end of paragraph (c)(3)iii; and substituted “subsection” for “paragraph” near the end of the introductory paragraph in (f).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act”, in the undesignated paragraph following subdivision (f)(69), refers either to S.L. 1989, Chapter 197, which is codified as§ 37-2711, or to S.L. 1992, Chapter 24, which moved provisions relating to anabolic steroids from§ 37-2711 to this section and which is codified as§§ 37-2707, 37-2709, and 37-2711. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. The term “this act”, in subsection (i), refers to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

S.L. 2000, ch. 110, § 2 added subsection (g) with a paragraph designated as (1) but with no (2).

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

Section 3 of S.L. 2015, ch. 29 declared an emergency. Approved March 5, 2015.

Section 6 of S.L. 2017, ch. 4 declared an emergency. Approved February 13, 2017.

Section 4 of S.L. 2019, ch. 24 declared an emergency. Approved February 14, 2019.

CASE NOTES

Elements of Offense.

In a prosecution for delivery of a controlled substance listed in this section, the state was not required to prove that the substance defendant delivered was a sufficient “usable quantity” that had the potential for abuse associated with a depressant effect on the central nervous system, but only to prove that defendant delivered a substance containing a controlled drug which the board had determined to have such a potential. State v. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 539 P.2d 263 (1975).

Cited

State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 884 P.2d 419 (Ct. App. 1994).

§ 37-2710. Schedule IV tests.

The board shall place a substance in schedule IV if it finds that:

  1. The substance has a low potential for abuse relative to substances in schedule III;
  2. The substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and
  3. Abuse of the substance may lead to limited physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to the substances in schedule III.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2710, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

§ 37-2711. Schedule IV.

  1. Schedule IV shall consist of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Narcotic drugs. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following narcotic drugs, or their salts calculated as the free anhydrous base or alkaloid, in limited quantities as set forth below:
    1. No more than 1 milligram of difenoxin and not less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit;
    2. Dextropropoxyphene (alpha-(+)-4-dimethylamino-1, 2-diphenyl- 3-methyl-2-propionoxybutane).
    3. 2-[(dimethylamino)methyl]-1-(3-methoxyphenyl)cyclohexanol (including tramadol), including its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers.
  3. Depressants. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Alfaxalone 5[alpha]-pregnan-3[alpha]-ol-11,20-dione;
    2. Alprazolam;
    3. Barbital;
    4. Bromazepam;
    5. Camazepam;
    6. Carisprodol;
    7. Chloral betaine;
    8. Chloral hydrate;
    9. Chlordiazepoxide;
    10. Clobazam;
    11. Clonazepam;
    12. Clorazepate;
    13. Clotiazepam;
    14. Cloxazolam;
    15. Delorazepam;
    16. Diazepam;
    17. Dichloralphenazone;
    18. Estazolam;
    19. Ethchlorvynol;
    20. Ethinamate;
    21. Ethyl loflazepate;
    22. Fludiazepam;
    23. Flurazepam;
    24. Fospropofol;
    25. Halazepam;
    26. Haloxazolam; (27) Ketazolam;
    27. Lormetazepam;
    28. Mebutamate;
    29. Medazepam;
    30. Meprobamate;
    31. Methohexital;
    32. Methylphenobarbital (mephobarbital);
    33. Midazolam;
    34. Nimetazepam;
    35. Nitrazepam;
    36. Nordiazepam;
    37. Oxazepam;
    38. Oxazolam;
    39. Paraldehyde;
    40. Petrichloral;
    41. Phenobarbital;
    42. Pinazepam;
    43. Prazepam;
    44. Quazepam;
    45. Suvorexant;
    46. Temazepam;
    47. Tetrazepam;
    48. Triazolam;
    49. Zaleplon;
    50. Zolpidem;
    51. Zopiclone.
  4. Fenfluramine — Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, isomers (whether optical, position, or geometric), and salts of such isomers, whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible:
    1. Dexfenfluramine;
    2. Fenfluramine.
  5. Stimulants. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers (whether optical, position, or geometric), and salts of such isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
    1. Cathine ((+)-norpseudoephedrine);
    2. Diethylpropion;
    3. Fencamfamin;
    4. Fenproporex;
    5. Lorcaserin;
    6. Mazindol;
    7. Mefenorex;
    8. Modafinil;
    9. Pemoline (including organometallic complexes and chelates thereof);
    10. Phentermine;
    11. Pipradrol;
    12. Sibutramine;
    13. SPA ((-)-1-dimethylamino-1,2-diphenylethane).
  6. Other substances. Unless specifically excepted, or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts:
    1. Pentazocine;
    2. Butorphanol (including its optical isomers);
    3. Eluxadoline (5-[[[(2S)-2-amino-3-[4-aminocarbonyl)-2,6-dimethylphenyl]-1-ox opropyl] [(1S)-1-(4-phenyl-1H-imidazol-2-yl)ethyl] amino]methyl]-2-methoxybenzoic acid) (including its optical isomers) and its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.
  7. The board may except by rule any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any depressant substance listed in subsection (c) of this section from the application of all or any part of this act if the compound, mixture, or preparation contains one (1) or more active medicinal ingredients not having a depressant effect on the central nervous system, and if the admixtures are included therein in combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration that vitiate the potential for abuse of the substances which have a depressant effect on the central nervous system.

(28) Loprazolam;

(29) Lorazepam;

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2711, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1977, ch. 234, § 4, p. 698; am. 1980, ch. 160, § 4, p. 340; am. 1981, ch. 102, § 3, p. 149; am. 1982, ch. 91, § 2, p. 165; am. 1984, ch. 160, § 4, p. 390; am. 1986, ch. 209, § 3, p. 534; am. 1988, ch. 190, § 3, p. 337; am. 1989, ch. 177, § 3, p. 428; am. 1989, ch. 197, § 1, p. 493; am. 1992, ch. 24, § 3, p. 72; am. 1996, ch. 36, § 3, p. 90; am. 1999, ch. 67, § 1, p. 177; am. 2010, ch. 117, § 4, p. 243; am. 2012, ch. 181, § 3, p. 472; am. 2014, ch. 33, § 2, p. 48; am. 2015, ch. 29, § 2, p. 62; am. 2017, ch. 4, § 4, p. 5.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 117, added paragraphs (c)(15), (c)(48), (c)(50), (d)(1), (e)(7), and (f)(2); and made related redesignations.

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 181, added paragraph (c)(5) and renumbered the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 33, inserted present paragraphs (c)(1) and (e)(5) and redesignated the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 29, added paragraphs (b)(3), (c)(46), and (c)(47), deleted former paragraph (c)(4), which read: “Quazepam,” and made related redesignations.

Compiler’s Notes.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 4, in subsection (c), added present paragraph (24) and redesignated the remaining paragraphs accordingly; and, in subsection (f), rewrote paragraph (2), which formerly read: “Fospropofol”, and added paragraph (3). Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act”, in subsection (g), refers to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 4 of S.L. 1996, ch. 36 declared an emergency. Approved February 19, 1996.

Section 3 of S.L. 2015, ch. 29 declared an emergency. Approved March 5, 2015.

Section 6 of S.L. 2017, ch. 4 declared an emergency. Approved February 13, 2017.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 884 P.2d 419 (Ct. App. 1994).

§ 37-2712. Schedule V tests.

The board shall place a substance in schedule V if it finds that:

  1. The substance has low potential for abuse relative to the controlled substances listed in schedule IV;
  2. The substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and
  3. The substance has limited physical dependence or psychological dependence liability relative to the controlled substances listed in schedule IV.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2712, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

§ 37-2713. Schedule V.

  1. Schedule V shall consist of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Narcotic drugs. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following narcotic drugs and their salts, as set forth below.
  3. Narcotic drugs containing nonnarcotic active medicinal ingredients. Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following limited quantities of narcotic drugs or salts thereof, which shall include one (1) or more nonnarcotic active medicinal ingredients in sufficient proportion to confer upon the compound, mixture, or preparation, valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the narcotic drug alone:
    1. Not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams;
    2. Not more than 100 milligrams of dihydrocodeine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams;
    3. Not more than 100 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams;
    4. Not more than 2.5 milligrams of diphenoxylate and not less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit;
    5. Not more than 100 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams;
    6. Not more than 0.5 milligrams difenoxin and not less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit.
  4. Other substances. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts:
    1. Brivaracetam ((2S)-2-[(4R)-2-oxo-4-propylpyrrolidin-1-yl]butanamide) (also referred to as BRV; UCB-34714; Briviact) (including its salts);
    2. Ezogabine [N-[2-amino-4-(4-fluorobenzylamino)-phenyl]-carbamic acid ethyl ester]-2779;
    3. Lacosamide;
    4. Pregabalin;
    5. Pyrovalerone.
  5. Approved cannabidiol drugs. A drug product in finished dosage formulation that has been approved by the U.S. food and drug administration that contains cannabidiol (2-[1R-3-methyl-6R-(1-methylethenyl)-2-cyclohexen-1-yl]-5-penty l-1,3- benzenediol) derived from cannabis and no more than 0.1 percent (w/w) residual tetrahydrocannabinols.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2713, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1977, ch. 234, § 5, p. 698; am. 1980, ch. 160, § 5, p. 340; am. 1984, ch. 160, § 5, p. 390; am. 1986, ch. 209, § 4, p. 534; am. 1989, ch. 177, § 4, p. 428; am. 1990, ch. 29, § 1, p. 44; am. 2003, ch. 185, § 3, p. 499; am. 2010, ch. 117, § 5, p. 243; am. 2012, ch. 181, § 4, p. 472; am. 2017, ch. 4, § 5, p. 5; am. 2019, ch. 24, § 3, p. 28.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 117, added paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) and made related redesignations.

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 181, added paragraph (d)(1) and renumbered the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 4, in subsection (d), added present paragraph (1), deleted former paragraph (4), which read: “Propylhexedrine (except as Benzedrex/tm inhaler)”, and redesignated former paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as present paragraphs (2), (3), and (4).

The 2019 amendment, by ch. 24, added subsection (e).

Effective Dates.

Section 6 of S.L. 1980, ch. 160 declared an emergency. Approved March 25, 1980.

Section 6 of S.L. 2017, ch. 4 declared an emergency. Approved February 13, 2017.

Section 4 of S.L. 2019, ch. 24 declared an emergency. Approved February 14, 2019.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 884 P.2d 419 (Ct. App. 1994).

§ 37-2713A. Schedule VI.

  1. Schedule VI shall consist of the drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name or brand name designated, listed in this section.
  2. Volatile nitrites. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or preparation containing any of the following drugs or their related compounds, congeners or isomers as follows:
    1. Amyl nitrite;
    2. Butyl nitrite;
    3. Isobutyl nitrite;
    4. Isoamyl nitrite;
    5. Isopentyl nitrite.

Except that any combination or compound containing amyl nitrite which is prepared pursuant to a prescription issued by a licensed practitioner is not a controlled substance for the purpose of this section.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2713A, as added by 1989, ch. 268, § 1, p. 654.

§ 37-2714. Republishing of schedules. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 36, § 2, effective July 1, 2018.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2714, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

Idaho Code Art. III

Article III

§ 37-2715. Rules.

The board may promulgate rules and charge reasonable fees relating to the registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances within this state.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2715, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

§ 37-2716. Registration requirements.

  1. Every person who manufactures, distributes, prescribes, administers, dispenses, or conducts research with any controlled substance within this state shall obtain annually a registration issued by the board in accordance with this chapter and its rules.
  2. Every prescriber, except veterinarians, shall also register with the board to obtain online access to the controlled substances prescriptions database.
  3. Persons registered by the board under this chapter may possess, manufacture, distribute, dispense, prescribe, administer, or conduct research with those substances to the extent authorized by their registration and licensing entity and in conformity with the other provisions of this chapter.
  4. The following persons need not register and may lawfully possess controlled substances under this chapter:
    1. An agent or employee of any person registered pursuant to this chapter, if he is acting in the usual course of his business or employment;
    2. A common or contract carrier or warehouseman, or an employee thereof, whose possession of any controlled substance is in the usual course of business or employment;
    3. An ultimate user or a person in possession of any controlled substance pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner or in lawful possession of a schedule V substance.
  5. The board may waive by rule the requirement for registration of certain persons if it finds it consistent with the public health and safety.
  6. A separate registration is required at each principal place of business or professional practice where the applicant manufactures, distributes, administers, dispenses, or conducts research with controlled substances, except a separate registration is not required under this chapter for practitioners engaging in research with nonnarcotic controlled substances in schedules II through IV where the practitioner is already registered under this chapter in another capacity.
  7. Practitioners registered under federal law to conduct research with schedule I substances may conduct research with schedule I substances within this state upon registering in Idaho and furnishing the board with evidence of the practitioner’s federal registration.
  8. The board may inspect the establishment of a registrant or applicant for registration in accordance with this chapter and board rule.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2716, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1974, ch. 27, § 79, p. 811; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 85, p. 1450; am. 2014, ch. 79, § 2, p. 211; am. 2015, ch. 25, § 2, p. 30.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Amendments.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 79, inserted present subsection (b) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly and substituted “this chapter” for “this act” in present subsections (c) and (d).

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 25, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

§ 37-2717. Registration.

The board shall register an applicant to manufacture, prescribe, administer, dispense, distribute or conduct research with controlled substances included in sections 37-2705, 37-2707, 37-2709, 37-2711 and 37-2713, Idaho Code, unless it determines that the issuance of that registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. In determining the public interest, the board shall consider the following factors:

  1. Maintenance of effective controls against diversion of controlled substances into other than legitimate medical, scientific, or industrial channels;
  2. Compliance with applicable state and local law;
  3. Any convictions of the applicant under any federal and state laws relating to any controlled substance;
  4. Past experience in the manufacture, dispensing, prescribing, administering, research or distribution of controlled substances, and the existence in the applicant’s establishment of effective controls against diversions;
  5. Furnishing by the applicant of false or fraudulent material in any application filed under this chapter;
  6. Restriction, suspension or revocation of the applicant’s federal registration; and
  7. Any other factors relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2717, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 2015, ch. 25, § 3, p. 30.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 25, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975).

§ 37-2718. Discipline.

  1. A registration under section 37-2717, Idaho Code, may be restricted, suspended or revoked by the board upon a finding that the registrant:
    1. Has furnished false or fraudulent material information in any application filed under this act;
    2. Has been found guilty of a felony or misdemeanor under any state or federal law relating to any controlled substance;
    3. Has had his federal registration restricted, suspended or revoked; or
    4. Has violated this chapter, any rule of the board promulgated under this act, an order of the board or any federal regulation relating to controlled substances; provided, however, that no restriction, revocation or suspension procedure be initiated under this paragraph without the board first giving notice of the procedure to the state licensing board with authority over the registrant’s professional license.
  2. The notice required in subsection (a) (4) of this section shall be given immediately in the event action is taken without an order to show cause as allowed under section 37-2719(b), Idaho Code. In all other cases, such notice shall be given as early as reasonably practicable without risking compromise of the board’s investigation but no later than the earlier of:
    1. Issuance of an order to show cause under section 37-2719(a), Idaho Code; or
    2. Setting of a hearing for approval of a resolution of the matter through informal proceedings.
  3. Restriction, revocation or suspension procedures arising solely from “practice-related issues” shall be referred by the board to such registrant’s state licensing board.
    1. Upon such referral, the registrant’s state licensing board shall commence such investigation of the referred matter as it deems necessary and shall take action upon the registrant’s license or shall inform the board of pharmacy, in writing, that it has investigated the referred matter and has concluded that no action is necessary.
    2. For purposes of this section, the term “practice-related issues” refers to issues involving questions regarding the professional conduct of the registrant within the scope of the registrant’s profession.
  4. The board may limit the revocation or suspension of a registration to the particular controlled substance with respect to which grounds for revocation or suspension exist.
  5. If the board restricts, suspends or revokes a registration, all pertinent controlled substances owned or possessed by the registrant at the time of the restriction or suspension or the effective date of the revocation order may be placed under seal. No disposition may be made of substances under seal until the time for taking an appeal has elapsed or until all appeals have been concluded unless a court, upon application therefor, orders the sale of perishable substances and the deposit of the proceeds of the sale with the court. Upon a revocation order becoming final, all controlled substances may be forfeited to the state.
  6. The board shall promptly notify the bureau and the state licensing board with authority over the registrant’s professional license of all orders restricting, suspending or revoking registration and all forfeitures of controlled substances.
  7. In the event the drug enforcement administration or a state licensing board with authority over a registrant’s professional license or registration takes an action against the registrant in any fashion which suspends, restricts, limits or affects the registrant’s ability to manufacture, distribute, prescribe, administer, dispense, or conduct research with any controlled substance, the professional licensing board shall promptly notify the board of pharmacy of the action. (1) Upon such action, the board of pharmacy shall be authorized to issue its order suspending, restricting, limiting or otherwise affecting the registrant’s controlled substance registration in the same fashion as the professional licensing board action.

(2) The board of pharmacy order may be issued without further hearing or proceeding, but shall be subject to the effect of any reversal or modification of the professional licensing board action by reason of any appeal or rehearing.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2718, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1981, ch. 102, § 4, p. 149; am. 1985, ch. 152, § 1, p. 405; am. 2001, ch. 211, § 1, p. 835; am. 2015, ch. 25, § 4, p. 30; am. 2020, ch. 14, § 1, p. 35.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 25, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable, changing the section heading from “Revocation and suspension of registration” to “Discipline.”

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 14, inserted “the drug enforcement administration or” and “or registration” near the beginning of the introductory paragraph in subsection (g).

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in paragraph (a)(1) refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

The words “this act” in paragraph (a)(4) refer to S.L. 2015, Chapter 25, which is codified as§§ 37-2701 and 37-2716 to 37-2720. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter,” being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 5 of S.L. 1981, ch. 102 declared an emergency. Approved March 24, 1981.

§ 37-2719. Order to show cause.

  1. Except as set forth in section 37-2718(g), Idaho Code, before denying, restricting, suspending or revoking a registration, or refusing a renewal of registration, the board shall serve upon the applicant or registrant an order to show cause why the registration should be restricted, denied, revoked, or suspended, or why the renewal should be refused. The order to show cause shall contain a statement of the basis therefor and shall call upon the applicant or registrant to appear before the board at a time and place not less than thirty (30) days after the date of service of the order, but in the case of a denial or renewal of registration the show cause order shall be served not later than thirty (30) days before the expiration of the registration. These proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, without regard to any criminal prosecution or other proceeding. Proceedings to refuse renewal of registration shall not abate the existing registration which shall remain in effect pending the outcome of the administrative hearing.
  2. The board may suspend, without an order to show cause, any registration simultaneously with the institution of proceedings under section 37-2718, Idaho Code, or where renewal of registration is refused, if it finds that there is an imminent danger to the public health or safety which warrants this action. The suspension shall continue in effect until the conclusion of the proceedings, including judicial review thereof, unless sooner withdrawn by the board or dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.
  3. In conjunction with a proceeding for denying, restricting, suspending or revoking a registration, or refusing a renewal of registration, and upon a finding of grounds for such denial, restriction, suspension, revocation or refusal to renew, the board may also impose an administrative fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) per occurrence and the costs of prosecution and administrative costs of bringing the action including, but not limited to, attorney’s fees and costs and costs of hearing transcripts.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2719, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 2001, ch. 211, § 2, p. 835; am. 2015, ch. 25, § 5, p. 30.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 25, in subsection (a), inserted “restricting” preceding “suspending”, substituted “should be restricted, denied” for “should not be denied” preceding “revoked”, and deleted “not” preceding “be refused” in the first sentence; and, in subsection (c), inserted “restricting” preceding “suspending”, “restriction” preceding “suspension”, and “two thousand dollars ($2,000) per occurrence and” preceding “the costs of prosecution.”

§ 37-2720. Records — Drug storage — Inventory.

Persons registered under this chapter shall keep records, store controlled substances and maintain inventories in conformance with the recordkeeping, storage and inventory requirements of federal law and with any additional rules the board issues.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2720, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 2015, ch. 25, § 6, p. 30; am. 2016, ch. 74, § 1, p. 252.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 25, deleted “to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances” following “registered” and substituted “chapter” for “act”.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 74, substituted “Drug storage — Inventory” for “of registrants” in the section heading; and inserted “store controlled substances” and “storage” in the text of the section.

§ 37-2721. Order forms. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 36, § 3, effective July 1, 2018. For present comparable provisions, see§ 37-2722.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2721, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

§ 37-2722. Issuing, distributing, and dispensing of controlled substances.

No person shall issue or dispense a prescription drug order for a controlled substance unless it is in compliance with applicable state and federal law and rules of the board.

  1. Controlled substances included in schedule I shall be distributed only by a registrant to another registrant pursuant to the federal drug enforcement administration (DEA) order form 222.
  2. Controlled substances included in schedule II shall:
    1. Be distributed only by a registrant to another registrant pursuant to DEA order form 222.
    2. Be dispensed only pursuant to a valid prescription drug order, except when dispensed directly by a prescriber.
    3. Not be refilled.
    4. Include a quantity that is both spelled out in English and written in numerical form, when a written prescription drug order is required.
  3. Controlled substances included in schedule III or IV shall:
    1. Be dispensed only pursuant to a valid prescription drug order, except when dispensed directly by a prescriber.
    2. Not be filled or refilled more than six (6) months after the date thereof or be refilled more than five (5) times, unless renewed by the practitioner.
  4. Controlled substances included in schedule V shall not be distributed or dispensed other than for a medical purpose.
  5. A pharmacist may dispense a controlled substance pursuant to a valid prescription drug order of an individual licensed in a jurisdiction other than the state of Idaho as long as the individual is acting within the jurisdiction, scope and authority of his license.
  6. Prior to issuing to a patient a prescription for outpatient use for an opioid analgesic or benzodiazepine listed in schedule II, III, or IV, the prescriber or the prescriber’s delegate shall review the patient’s prescription drug history for the preceding twelve (12) months from the prescription drug monitoring program and evaluate the data for indicators of prescription drug diversion or misuse. This review is not required:
    1. For patients:
      1. Receiving treatment in an inpatient setting;
      2. At the scene of an emergency or in an ambulance;
      3. In hospice care; or
      4. In a skilled nursing home care facility; or
    2. For a prescription in a quantity intended to last no more than three (3) days.
  7. Subsection (f) of this section shall be effective on and after October 1, 2020, and shall apply only to individuals required by this chapter to register for the prescription drug monitoring program.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2722, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 2000, ch. 276, § 1, p. 898; am. 2001, ch. 178, § 1, p. 601; am. 2018, ch. 36, § 4, p. 68; am. 2020, ch. 220, § 1, p. 652.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 36, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 220, added subsections (f) and (g).

Compiler’s Notes.

The abbreviation enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

§ 37-2723. Form and contents of prescription. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 36, § 5, effective July 1, 2018. For present comparable provisions, see§ 37-2722.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2723, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1996, ch. 12, § 1, p. 31; am. 2011, ch. 133, § 1, p. 367.

§ 37-2724. Use in hospital — Form of order — Record

Nursing home, extended care facility. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 36, § 6, effective July 1, 2018. For present comparable provisions, see§ 37-2722.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2724, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1976, ch. 108, § 1, p. 432; am. 1997, ch. 18, § 1, p. 27; am. 2001, ch. 178, § 2, p. 601.

§ 37-2725. Prescription drug order blanks.

  1. Paper prescription drug order blanks shall comply with federal law and shall utilize noncopyable paper that contains security provisions against copying that results in some indication on the copy that it is a copy and therefore rendering it null and void.
  2. Prescription drug order blanks shall not be transferable. Any person possessing any such blank otherwise than is herein provided is guilty of a misdemeanor.
  3. The prescription drug order blank shall contain the name and address of the prescriber. Prescription drug order blanks may contain the printed names of multiple prescribers who are affiliated; provided however, such prescription drug order blanks shall contain a means, in addition to the signature of the prescriber, such as a box or a check, for clear identification of the printed name and address of the prescriber issuing the prescription.
  4. Prescriptions written by a prescriber in an institutional facility or other health care facility in which a prescriber may attend a patient, other than his or her regular place of business, may be written on prescription drug order blanks kept or provided by that facility that contain the name and address of that facility, but not necessarily of the prescriber, provided the prescriber’s name must be stamped, written or printed on the completed prescription in a manner that is legible to a pharmacist.
  5. Failure of a prescriber to clearly mark the prescriber’s printed name and address on the prescription as required in subsection (3) of this section, or to stamp, write or print the prescriber’s name legibly as required in subsection (4) of this section shall subject the prescriber to appropriate discipline by the board.
  6. Prescription drug order blanks or drugs lost or stolen must be immediately reported to the board.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2725, as added by 2001, ch. 178, § 4, p. 601; am. 2002, ch. 367, § 1, p. 1035; am. 2011, ch. 133, § 2, p. 367; am. 2018, ch. 36, § 7, p. 68.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-2725, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-2725, as added by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. S.L. 1982, ch. 91, § 3, p. 165; am. S.L. 1997, ch. 18, § 2, p. 27, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 178, § 3.

Amendments.

The 2011 amendment, by ch. 133, in subsection (1), in the second sentence, deleted “Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section” from the beginning, substituted “Paper prescriptions” for “Written prescriptions,” and deleted the former last two sentences, which read: “Board rules, policies or requirements promulgated or issued to implement the provisions of house bill no. 331 of the first regular session of the fifty-sixth Idaho legislature that amended this section 37-2725, Idaho Code, shall be null and void and without effect after June 30, 2002. The board shall adopt rules using negotiated rulemaking procedures to implement the provisions of this section that are consistent with, but no more stringent than the requirements of this section and the federal requirements for prescription blanks”; deleted former subsection (7), which read: “Prescription blanks issued or approved by the board prior to the effective date of this act shall remain valid and may be used by practitioners after the effective date of this act”; and redesignated former subsection (8) as present subsection (7). The 2018 amendment, by ch. 36, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2002, ch. 367 declared an emergency. Approved March 27, 2002.

Section 3 of S.L. 2011, ch. 133 declared an emergency. Approved March 25, 2011.

§ 37-2726. Filing prescriptions — Database.

  1. All controlled substances, and opioid antagonists as defined in section 54-1733B, Idaho Code, dispensed for humans shall be filed with the board electronically in a format established by the board or by other method as required by board rule. The board may require the filing of other prescriptions by board rule. The board shall establish by rule the information to be submitted pursuant to the purposes of this section and the purposes set forth in section 37-2730A, Idaho Code.
  2. The board shall create, operate and maintain a controlled substances prescriptions database containing the information submitted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to be used for the purposes and subject to the terms, conditions and immunities described in section 37-2730A, Idaho Code. The board shall retain the information submitted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section for a period of five (5) years from the date the controlled substance was dispensed. The database information must be made available only to the following:
    1. Authorized individuals employed by Idaho’s boards or other states’ licensing entities charged with the licensing and discipline of practitioners;
    2. Peace officers employed by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies engaged as a specified duty of their employment in enforcing law regulating controlled substances;
    3. Authorized individuals under the direction of the department of health and welfare for the purpose of monitoring and enforcing that department’s responsibilities under the public health, medicare and medicaid laws;
    4. A practitioner, licensed in Idaho or another state, having authority to prescribe controlled substances, or a delegate under the practitioner’s supervision, to the extent the information relates specifically to a current patient of the practitioner to whom the practitioner is prescribing or considering prescribing any controlled substance;
    5. A pharmacist, licensed in Idaho or another state, having authority to dispense controlled substances, or a delegate under the pharmacist’s supervision, to the extent the information relates specifically to a current patient to whom that pharmacist is dispensing or considering dispensing any controlled substance, or providing pharmaceutical care as defined in the Idaho pharmacy act;
    6. An individual who is the recipient of a dispensed controlled substance entered into the database may access records that pertain to that individual, upon the production of positive identification, or that individual’s designee upon production of a notarized release of information by that individual;
    7. Upon a lawful order issued by the presiding judge in a court of competent jurisdiction for the release of prescription monitoring program records of a named individual;
    8. Prosecuting attorneys, deputy prosecuting attorneys and special prosecutors of a county or city and special assistant attorneys general from the office of the attorney general engaged in enforcing law regulating controlled substances; and
    9. A medical examiner or coroner who is an officer of or employed by a state or local government, for determining a cause of death or for performing other duties authorized by law.
  3. The board shall require pharmacists and prescribers, except veterinarians, to annually register with the board to obtain online access to the controlled substances prescriptions database. (4) The board must maintain records on the information disclosed from the database, including:
    1. The identification of each individual who requests or receives information from the database and who that individual represents;
    2. The information provided to each such individual; and
    3. The date and time the information is requested or provided.

(5) The board shall promulgate rules to ensure that only authorized individuals have access to the database.

(6) The board shall limit to four (4) the number of delegates that a practitioner or pharmacist may permit to access the database under the practitioner’s or pharmacist’s supervision.

(7) Any person who knowingly misrepresents to the board that he is a person entitled under subsection (2) of this section to receive information from the controlled substances prescriptions database under the conditions therein provided, and who receives information from the controlled substances prescriptions database resulting from that misrepresentation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed six (6) months, or by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or both. The foregoing criminal penalty is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.

(8) Any person in possession, whether lawfully or unlawfully, of information from the controlled substances prescriptions database that identifies an individual patient and who knowingly discloses such information to a person not authorized to receive or use such information under any state or federal law or rule or regulation, or the lawful order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or written authorization of the individual patient shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed six (6) months, or by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or both. The foregoing criminal penalty is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to disclosure of individual patient information by the patient himself. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to disclosure of information by a prosecuting attorney, deputy prosecuting attorney or special prosecutor of a county or city or by a special assistant attorney general from the office of the attorney general in the course of a criminal proceeding, whether preconviction or postconviction.

(9) Any person with access to the board’s online prescription monitoring program pursuant to a board-issued user account, login name and password who intentionally shares or recklessly fails to safeguard his user account, login name and password, resulting in another person not authorized to receive or use such information under the provisions of any state or federal law, rule or regulation obtaining information from the controlled substances prescriptions database, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed six (6) months or by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or both. The foregoing criminal penalty is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.

(10) The board may, at its discretion, block access to certain controlled substances prescriptions database data if the board has reason to believe that access to the data is or may be used illegally.

(11) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in this section are assumed by the dispensing practitioner recording and submitting the data. (12) For purposes of this section, “delegate” means a nurse, medical or office assistant, current student of a health profession if a licensed practitioner or registered graduate of such profession may access the database, or a registered pharmacy technician who is designated by a supervising practitioner or pharmacist to access the database according to the provisions of this section and who must register with the state board of pharmacy for such access.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2726, as added by 2001, ch. 178, § 5, p. 601; am. 2006, ch. 175, § 2, p. 535; am. 2008, ch. 129, § 1, p. 362; am. 2012, ch. 185, § 1, p. 489; am. 2012, ch. 198, § 1, p. 531; am. 2014, ch. 32, § 1, p. 46; am. 2014, ch. 79, § 3, p. 211; am. 2015, ch. 27, § 1, p. 42; am. 2016, ch. 72, § 1, p. 249; am. 2016, ch. 82, § 1, p. 262; am. 2017, ch. 22, § 1, p. 40; am. 2018, ch. 10, § 1, p. 14.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Idaho pharmacy act,§ 54-1701 et seq.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-2726, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-2726, as added by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 178, § 3.

Amendments.

The 2006 amendment, by ch. 175, added “Database” in the section heading and rewrote the section which formerly read: “All controlled substances prescriptions shall be filed with the board electronically or by other method as required by board rule. The board may require the filing of other prescriptions by board rule.”

The 2008 amendment, by ch. 129, added paragraph (2)(h) and present subsections (5) and (6) and redesignated former subsections (5) and (6) as subsections (7) and (8).

This section was amended by two 2012 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 185, substituted “dispensed for humans” for “prescriptions” in the first sentence in subsection (1).

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 198, in subsection (2), substituted “employed by Idaho’s boards or other states’ licensing entities charged with” for “employed by the boards responsible for conducting investigations related to” in paragraph (2)(a); substituted “practitioner, licensed in Idaho or another state” for “licensed practitioner” near the beginning of paragraph (2)(a); substituted “pharmacist, licensed in Idaho or another state” for “licensed pharmacist” and added “or providing pharmaceutical care as defined in the Idaho pharmacy act” in paragraph (2)(e); added subsections (7) and (8); renumbered former subsection (7) as subsection (9); and deleted former subsection (8), which read, “The definitions set forth in section 37-2701, Idaho Code, shall apply to this section.” This section was amended by two 2014 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 32, rewrote paragraph (2)(f), which formerly read: “An individual who is the recipient of a dispensed controlled substance prescription entered into the database or that individual’s attorney, upon providing evidence satisfactory to the board that the individual requesting the information is in fact the person about whom the data entry was made or the attorney for that person”.

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 79, inserted present subsection (3) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 27, rewrote paragraph (2)(g), which formerly read: “Upon the lawful order of a court of competent jurisdiction”.

This section was amended by two 2016 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 72, added paragraph (2)(i).

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 82, inserted “or a delegate under the practitioner’s supervision” in paragraphs (2)(d) and (2)(e); added present subsection (6) and redesignated the subsequent subsections accordingly; and added subsection (12).

The 2017 amendment, by ch. 22, added the second sentence in the introductory paragraph of subsection (2); inserted “pharmacists and” near the beginning of subsection (3); and, in subsection (12), inserted “current student of a health profession if a licensed practitioner or registered graduate of such profession may access the database.”

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 10, inserted “and opioid antagonists as defined in section 54-1733B, Idaho Code” near the beginning of subsection (1).

§ 37-2727. Controlled substances in opioid (narcotic) treatment programs.

  1. At a facility with a controlled substance registration certificate issued by the United States department of justice, drug enforcement administration, for the operation of a narcotic treatment program, a nurse licensed under chapter 14, title 54, Idaho Code, may, pursuant to a valid order of a physician licensed under chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code:
    1. Prepare and administer to a patient at that facility a controlled substance whether or not a practitioner is present; and
    2. Deliver at that facility to a patient for subsequent use by the patient off-site, take-home doses of a controlled substance, provided that:
      1. The patient is entitled to receive take-home doses of the controlled substance;
      2. The take-home doses delivered by the nurse to the patient were obtained at the facility by the nurse from a locked storage area suitable to prevent unauthorized access and to ensure a proper environment for preservation of the drugs within such area; and
      3. The take-home doses were prepared pursuant to a valid prescription drug order of the physician and were provided in a suitable container appropriately labeled for use by the patient.
      4. If the amount due to such person is less than the value of the conveyance, the conveyance may be sold at public auction by the director or appropriate prosecuting attorney. The director, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, shall publish a notice of the sale by at least one (1) publication in a newspaper published and circulated in the city, community or locality where the sale is to take place at least one (1) week prior to sale of the conveyance. The proceeds from such sale shall be distributed as follows in the order indicated:
        1. To the bona fide or innocent owner, purchaser, conditional sales vendor, lienholder or mortgagee of the conveyance, if any, up to the value of his interest in the conveyance.
        2. The balance, if any, in the following order:
      5. In any case, the director, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, may, within thirty (30) days after judgment, pay the balance due to the bona fide lienholder, mortgagee or conditional sales vendor and thereby purchase the conveyance for use to enforce this act.
  2. A nurse acting under the authority of this section is exempt from the registration requirements imposed by this chapter.
  3. The facility must be registered under chapter 17, title 54, Idaho Code.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2727, as added by 2007, ch. 250, § 1, p. 735; am. 2018, ch. 36, § 8, p. 68.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-2727, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-2727, as added by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 178, § 3.

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 36, substituted “opioid (narcotic)” for “narcotic” in the section heading; rewrote paragraph (1)(b)(iii), which formerly read: “The take-home doses were prepared pursuant to a valid order of the physician by a pharmacist licensed under chapter 17, title 54, Idaho Code, and were delivered by the pharmacist to the locked storage area at the facility in a suitable container appropriately labeled for subsequent delivery by the nurse to the patient and for subsequent use by the patient entitled to receive the take-home doses of the controlled substance”; and added subsection (3).

§ 37-2728 — 37-2730. Retention of prescription book by prescriber — Prescription book open for inspection — Filling prescriptions — Disposition of original and copy. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The following sections were repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 178, § 3:

§ 37-2730A. Prescription tracking program.

  1. The board shall maintain a program to track the prescriptions for controlled substances that are filed with the board under section 37-2726, Idaho Code, for the purpose of assisting in identifying illegal activity related to the dispensing of controlled substances and for the purpose of assisting the board in providing information to patients, practitioners and pharmacists to assist in avoiding inappropriate use of controlled substances. The tracking program and any data created thereby shall be administered by the board.
  2. The board shall use the information obtained through the tracking program in identifying activity it reasonably suspects may be in violation of this chapter or medical assistance law. The board shall report this information to the individuals and persons set forth in section 37-2726(2), Idaho Code. The board may release unsolicited information to pharmacists and practitioners when the release of information may be of assistance in preventing or avoiding inappropriate use of controlled substances. The board may provide the appropriate law enforcement agency, medicaid or medicare agency or licensing board with the relevant information in the board’s possession, including information obtained from the tracking program, for further investigation, or other appropriate law enforcement or administrative enforcement use.
  3. Information, which does not identify individual patients, practitioners or dispensing pharmacists or pharmacies, may be released by the board for educational, research or public information purposes.
  4. Nothing herein shall prevent a pharmacist or practitioner from furnishing another pharmacist or practitioner information obtained pursuant to and in compliance with this chapter.
  5. Unless there is shown malice or criminal intent or gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, the state of Idaho, the board, any other state agency, or any person, or entity in proper possession of information as herein provided shall not be subject to any liability or action for money damages or other legal or equitable relief by reason of any of the following:
    1. The furnishing of information under the conditions herein provided;
    2. The receiving and use of, or reliance on, such information;
    3. The fact that any such information was not furnished; or
    4. The fact that such information was factually incorrect or was released by the board to the wrong person or entity.
  6. The board may apply for any available grants and accept any gifts, grants or donations to assist in developing and maintaining the program required by this section.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2730A, as added by 2000, ch. 194, § 1, p. 479; am. 2001, ch. 178, § 6, p. 601; am. 2006, ch. 175, § 3, p. 535; am. 2012, ch. 198, § 2, p. 531; am. 2013, ch. 6, § 1, p. 14.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Amendments.

The 2006 amendment, by ch. 175, in subsection (2), rewrote the second sentence, which formerly read: “The board may report this information to the appropriate law enforcement agency, Medicaid or medicare agency or licensing board” and substituted “appropriate law enforcement agency, medicaid or medicare agency or licensing board” for “agency or board” in the third sentence; deleted former subsections (3) and (4), which read: “(3) The board may, in its discretion, authorize release of information from the tracking program to patients, practitioners and pharmacists where release of such information may be of assistance in preventing or avoiding inappropriate use of controlled substances.

“(4) Information obtained from the program is confidential and, except as otherwise provided by this section, must not be disclosed by the board or by any recipient of such information from the board, provided however, such information must be disclosed:

“(a) Upon the request of a person about whom the information requested concerns or upon the request on his behalf by his attorney; or

“(b) Upon the lawful order of a court of competent jurisdiction”;

and redesignated former subsections (6) and (7) as present subsections (4) and (5).

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 198, inserted the third sentence in subsection (2).

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 6, added present subsection (4) and redesignated former subsections (4) and (5) as present subsections (5) and (6).

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of S.L. 2002, ch. 27 amended section 4 of S.L. 2000, ch. 194 to delete the July 1, 2002 sunset date for this section.

§ 37-2731. Information required on label.

A practitioner with statutory authority to dispense a controlled substance shall affix to the package a label pursuant to board rule.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2731, as added by Acts 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 5, p. 261; am. 2018, ch. 36, § 9, p. 68.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 36, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 562, 961 P.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1998).

Idaho Code Art. IV

Article IV

§ 37-2732. Prohibited acts A — Penalties.

  1. Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.
    1. Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:
      1. A controlled substance classified in schedule I which is a narcotic drug or a controlled substance classified in schedule II, except as provided for in section 37-2732B(a)(3), Idaho Code, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for a term of years not to exceed life imprisonment, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both;
      2. Any other controlled substance which is a nonnarcotic drug classified in schedule I, or a controlled substance classified in schedule III, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both;
      3. A substance classified in schedule IV, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years, fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both;
      4. A substance classified in schedules V and VI, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  2. Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to create, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver, a counterfeit substance.
    1. Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:
      1. A counterfeit substance classified in schedule I which is a narcotic drug, or a counterfeit substance classified in schedule II, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than fifteen (15) years, fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both;
      2. Any other counterfeit substance classified in schedule I which is a nonnarcotic drug contained in schedule I or a counterfeit substance contained in schedule III, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both;
      3. A counterfeit substance classified in schedule IV, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years, fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both;
      4. A counterfeit substance classified in schedules V and VI or a noncontrolled counterfeit substance, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
    2. Any person who violates this subsection and has in his possession a controlled substance which is a nonnarcotic drug classified in schedule I except lysergic acid diethylamide, or a controlled substance classified in schedules III, IV, V and VI is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof may be imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, or fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  3. It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. (1) Any person who violates this subsection and has in his possession a controlled substance classified in schedule I which is a narcotic drug or a controlled substance classified in schedule II, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than seven (7) years, or fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both.
  4. It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away. A violation of this section shall deem those persons guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars ($300) and not more than ninety (90) days in the county jail, or both.
  5. If any person is found to possess marijuana, which for the purposes of this subsection shall be restricted to all parts of the plants of the genus Cannabis, including the extract or any preparation of cannabis which contains tetrahydrocannabinol, in an amount greater than three (3) ounces net weight, it shall be a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  6. If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense defined in this act, said persons shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
    1. It is unlawful for any person to manufacture or distribute a “simulated controlled substance,” or to possess with intent to distribute, a “simulated controlled substance.” Any person who violates this subsection shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and not more than one (1) year in the county jail, or both. (g)(1) It is unlawful for any person to manufacture or distribute a “simulated controlled substance,” or to possess with intent to distribute, a “simulated controlled substance.” Any person who violates this subsection shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and not more than one (1) year in the county jail, or both.
    2. It is unlawful for any person to possess a “simulated controlled substance.” Any person who violates this subsection shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars ($300) and not more than six (6) months in the county jail, or both.
  7. It is unlawful for any person to cause to be placed in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication, or to post or distribute in any public place, any advertisement or solicitation offering for sale simulated controlled substances. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished in the same manner as prescribed in subsection (g) [(g)(1)] of this section.
  8. No civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by virtue of this chapter on any person registered under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or other use by a registered practitioner, as defined in section 37-2701(aa), Idaho Code, in the course of professional practice or research.
  9. No prosecution under this chapter shall be dismissed solely by reason of the fact that the dosage units were contained in a bottle or other container with a label accurately describing the ingredients of the imitation controlled substance dosage units. The good faith of the defendant shall be an issue of fact for the trier of fact.
  10. Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chapter or upon conviction of a felony pursuant to the “racketeering act,” section 18-7804, Idaho Code, or the money laundering and illegal investment provisions of section 18-8201, Idaho Code, the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies shall include, but not be limited to, the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials, and any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees. In the case of reimbursement to the Idaho state police, those moneys shall be paid to the Idaho state police for deposit into the drug and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund created in section 57-816, Idaho Code. In the case of reimbursement to the office of the attorney general, those moneys shall be paid to the general fund. A conviction for the purposes of this section means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s).

(2) Any person who violates this subsection and has in his possession lysergic acid diethylamide is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years, or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2732, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 6, p. 261; am. 1972, ch. 409, § 1, p. 1195; am. 1974, ch. 242, § 1, p. 1606; am. 1977, ch. 185, § 1, p. 515; am. 1982, ch. 169, § 2, p. 442; am. 1983, ch. 218, § 2, p. 599; am. 1984, ch. 200, § 1, p. 489; am. 1986, ch. 286, § 1, p. 709; am 1989, ch. 268, § 2, p. 654; am. 1992, ch. 20, § 1, p. 64; am. 1993, ch. 105, § 1, p. 266; am. 1999, ch. 143, § 1, p. 407; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 86, p. 1450; am. 2004, ch. 242, § 1, p. 705; am. 2009, ch. 108, § 3, p. 344; am. 2010, ch. 118, § 3, p. 256.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Exceptions, excuses, provisos, and exemptions need not be negated in a complaint, information or indictment to enforce the provisions of this act,§ 19-1433.

General fund,§ 67-1205.

State police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

Uniform controlled substances act,§ 37-2751 and notes thereto.

Amendments.

The 2009 amendment, by ch. 108, inserted “and driving while under the influence” in the fourth sentence in subsection (k). The 2010 amendment, by ch. 118, updated the section reference in subsection (i) in light of the 2010 amendment of§ 37-2701.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in subsection (f) refers to S.L. 1977, Chapter 185, which is codified only as this section. Probably the reference should be to “this section.”

The bracketed insertion in subsection (h) was added by the compiler. At the time that subsection (h) was added to this section in 1983, the referenced penalty in subsection (g) was identical to that now found in paragraph (1) of subsection (g).

The letter “s” enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

Section 5 of S.L. 1972, ch. 409, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

Section 3 of S.L. 1982, ch. 169 declared an emergency. Approved March 23, 1982.

Section 2 of S.L. 1984, ch. 200 declared an emergency. Approved April 3, 1984.

Section 2 of S.L. 2004, ch. 242 declared an emergency. Approved March 23, 2004.

CASE NOTES

Appeal.

Where district court accepted defendant’s conditional plea of guilty to felony possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces under subsection (e) of this section, defendant was allowed to reserve certain adverse rulings for appeal. State v. Wengren, 126 Idaho 662, 889 P.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1995).

At or On Premises.
Burden of Proof.

Because a vehicle can be at or on the premises of a place, including a public parking lot, a person within a vehicle is also capable of being at or on the premises of a place within the scope of subsection (d). State v. Amstad, 164 Idaho 403, 431 P.3d 238 (2018). Burden of Proof.

To obtain convictions of manufacturing marijuana, the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the defendants had cultivated, or had aided and abetted in cultivating, the marijuana. State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986).

Conspiracy.

The essential elements of conspiracy are the existence of an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose and the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense. State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461, 745 P.2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1987).

Once a conspiracy is shown, there must be evidence linking the defendant with it. State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461, 745 P.2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1987).

Agreement to conspire need not be proven directly, but may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461, 745 P.2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1987).

Where the defendant’s wife had been heavily involved in distributing methamphetamine and she pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, the defendant accompanied his wife on several occasions either to pick up narcotics or to make payments, a witness testified that the defendant had agreed that his wife would sell methamphetamine and that he encouraged and assisted his wife in her activities, at least one recorded conversation revealed that the defendant and his wife had requested an amount significantly more than necessary for personal use, and during a search of the defendant’s residence, police found methamphetamine, the jury reasonably could infer the existence of a conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine and could infer a connection between the defendant and the conspiracy. State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461, 745 P.2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1987).

Act in furtherance of conspiracy need be committed by only one member of the conspiracy, and the act is then imputed to all other conspirators. State v. Brown, 113 Idaho 480, 745 P.2d 1101 (Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 116 Idaho 467, 776 P.2d 829 (1988).

The prosecution must allege and prove an overt act in order to obtain a conviction for conspiracy to violate subsection (f) of this section. State v. Brown, 113 Idaho 480, 745 P.2d 1101 (Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 116 Idaho 467, 776 P.2d 829 (1988).

The overt act requirement to obtaining a conviction under subsection (f) of this section is satisfied by slight evidence, and the act in furtherance of the conspiracy need not itself be criminal. State v. Brown, 113 Idaho 480, 745 P.2d 1101 (Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 116 Idaho 467, 776 P.2d 829 (1988).

Where the telephone calls gave meaning to the conspirators’ other acts of visiting prison and possessing marijuana, the prosecutor’s information, taken as a whole, contained sufficient allegations to satisfy the pleading requirement of an overt act. State v. Brown, 113 Idaho 480, 745 P.2d 1101 (Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 116 Idaho 467, 776 P.2d 829 (1988).

Constitutionality.

Where an officer involved in a vehicle search performed at the police station testified that he had extensive experience in drug enforcement, where he stated that, in his opinion, the chemicals and equipment found in the vehicle could be used to manufacture methamphetamine, where the chemicals and equipment were found in a vehicle occupied by defendants, and where the state submitted evidence that in preparation for departure, defendant and co-defendant had left with an empty vehicle and had returned to retrieve another co-defendant with a vehicle loaded with the “stuff,” the state produced sufficient evidence to support the probable inference that there was an agreement between the parties, and the magistrate did not err in finding probable cause to bind defendant over to district court for trial on charges of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance. State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 798 P.2d 61 (Ct. App. 1990). Constitutionality.

The title of the legislative act which enacted this section sufficiently describes the subject matter as required by Idaho Const., Art. III, § 16 and this section is not unconstitutionally void. State v. O’Bryan, 96 Idaho 548, 531 P.2d 1193 (1975).

Subsection (c)(2) [now (e)] does not abridge any right of privacy implicitly guaranteed by the Idaho or U.S. Constitutions. State v. Kincaid, 98 Idaho 440, 566 P.2d 763 (1977).

This section, by prohibiting the possession of substances acquired before its effective date, does not unconstitutionally deprive persons of their property without just compensation. State v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483, 600 P.2d 787 (1979).

There is no fundamental right to possess or to grow marijuana, even for personal consumption in the privacy of the home and, under the restrained review test, it was not irrational or arbitrary for the legislature to proscribe its cultivation, even for personal use, and to attach felony penalties for such conduct; accordingly this section and§ 37-2705 are not unconstitutional. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 678 P.2d 60 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S. Ct. 296, 83 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984).

Section 37-2705 and this section prohibiting the growing and use of marijuana do not violate the prohibitions against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment contained in U.S. Const., Amend. VIII andIdaho Const., Art. I, § 6. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 678 P.2d 60 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S. Ct. 296, 83 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984).

Separate convictions for manufacturing a controlled substance and for possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver did not violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy; each crime requires proof of an element not required by the other. State v. Randles, 115 Idaho 611, 768 P.2d 1344 (Ct. App. 1989), aff’d in part, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990).

Constructive Possession.

In order to prove constructive possession, knowledge of the controlled substance and physical control of the controlled substance must be independently proven beyond a reasonable doubt, by either circumstantial or direct evidence. State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 945 P.2d 1390 (Ct. App. 1997).

Constructive possession of a controlled substance exists where a nexus between the accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance. State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 945 P.2d 1390 (Ct. App. 1997).

Continuous Single Act.

Although defendant may not have been in exclusive possession of her residence — which was occupied by three to ten people when the police arrived — there was substantial evidence to show that she did have exclusive possession of her bedroom — no one was inside, there was women’s and unisex clothing in the room, and a sealed envelope addressed to defendant in a bag in the room. Consequently, there was evidence of circumstances to buttress an inference that defendant knew of and exercised control over the cocaine found in the dresser in what was proven to be her bedroom. State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997). Continuous Single Act.

Where in a prosecution of defendant for both conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and for aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance, the evidence showed that everything the defendant did to aid and abet the delivery of the cocaine, he did also in furtherance of the conspiracy, his conduct was one continuous “act,” and, therefore, he could be convicted and sentenced of only one crime but not both. State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 682 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1984).

Where the state proved an intent to deliver marijuana as it was being produced by the manufacturing process, but where there was no evidence of an “act” by defendant in committing the crime of possession with intent to deliver that was not also an “act” of manufacturing marijuana, it was double jeopardy to punish defendant for both crimes. State v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 14, 867 P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1993).

Delivery.

A violation of subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section occurs when a controlled substance is intentionally and unlawfully delivered; it is immaterial that the recipient is an unexpected person. State v. Castillo, 108 Idaho 205, 697 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1985).

Where defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the delivery of marijuana, although he did not touch the marijuana, his involvement in the sale was a combination of his presence at the scene and comments he made during the transaction, and, since it was difficult to consider his statements as anything other than counseling the sale and an expression of his intent to see the delivery completed, there was substantial evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant aided and abetted the delivery of the marijuana. State v. Hickman, 119 Idaho 366, 806 P.2d 959 (Ct. App. 1991).

Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine was vacated, where the state failed to argue or present any evidence to show that defendant intended to deliver the methamphetamine to a third party. State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 185 P.3d 272 (2008).

— Duress.

Where a defendant picked up a package at the airport that the police knew contained methamphetamine, and where the police officer, who did not tell defendant that he was a police officer, told defendant that he knew what was inside the package and would call police unless she gave him a “pinch” of it, such substance was not delivered under duress. Defendant failed to show how her life would be endangered if she had refused to deliver the illegal substance; therefore, trial judge did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the delivery charge. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

Because defendant convicted of delivery of controlled substance did not show he sold cocaine under any type of threat, nor that he reasonably believed his life would be endangered if he refused to participate in the transaction, trial court’s denial of requested instruction on the affirmative defense of duress was affirmed. State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 924 P.2d 1230 (Ct. App. 1996).

Double Jeopardy.

Since the intent of the legislature in enacting§ 37-2739B clearly was to provide for an enhanced minimum term of confinement as a penalty upon the commission of drug offenses within 1000 feet of schools, defendant’s claim that, since possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school, he suffered multiple punishments for the same offense, in violation of double jeopardy protection, must fail. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Where defendant was charged with a single crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver subject to an enhanced penalty,§ 19-1719 did not apply. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver was not barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy due to the prior civil forfeiture of his property in an action brought under§ 37-2744 since the United States supreme court in United States v. Ursery , 518 U.S. 267, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996) declared that civil forfeiture in general, and specifically in cases involving drug statutes, do not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Entrapment.

Where defendant picked up a package at the airport that the police knew contained methamphetamine, action of the police officer, who did not tell defendant that he was a police officer, in telling defendant that he knew what was inside the package and would call police unless she gave him a “pinch” of it, was not entrapment since the ruse was not to convince an innocent citizen to commit a crime, but to discover whether defendant knew that the package sent to her contained methamphetamine, and as such, it served as a legitimate method of ferreting out a crime. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

Because insufficient evidence existed upon which to find drug dealer who had conversed with officer’s informant was an agent of the state and because taped conversation fragment between these two failed to make a prima facie showing that they conspired together to induce defendant to deliver drugs, district court properly denied defendant’s requested jury instruction on entrapment. State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 924 P.2d 1230 (Ct. App. 1996).

Evidence.

Where defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the fact that he was caught with 394.4 grams of marijuana and 3.828 grams hashish, and testimony of narcotics expert that based on his experience such substances were being held for sale was enough substantial and competent evidence to support conviction. State v. Badger, 96 Idaho 168, 525 P.2d 363 (1974).

Where evidence showed that a search had turned up both marijuana and heroin, and paraphernalia used in connection with both, that defendant admitted knowledge of the marijuana and was found within inches of the heroin, that he denied knowledge of the heroin before the arresting officers were aware of its nature, that papers were found listing the searched premises as the defendant’s address, and where the marijuana and drug-related paraphernalia were found in common areas to which he had access, there was substantial evidence to support his convictions for possession of both drugs. State v. Greene, 100 Idaho 464, 600 P.2d 140 (1979).

Where defendant’s evidence did not contradict the state chemist’s opinion that the capsules contained a controlled substance, i.e., amobarbital and secobarbital, instead, he attempted to discredit the state chemist’s opinion by introducing expert testimony which challenged the reliability of the testing procedures used, such a challenge went only to the weight to be afforded testimony. State v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483, 600 P.2d 787 (1979). Where the expert testimony showed that the defendant when arrested had in his possession a sufficient quantity of PCP either to prepare more than 800 ordinary packets of solid material, or to distribute some 40 to 70 vials of liquid PCP solution having a total value between $4,000 and $7,000, the evidence afforded a substantial basis for the jury to infer an intent to deliver. State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1982).

Where informant and undercover officer, who was wearing a hidden microphone, followed by another officer in an unmarked vehicle, who was tape recording the conversations made in undercover officer’s presence, picked up defendant who directed them to a certain house which defendant entered and then returned accompanied by a friend who sold the officer a white envelope containing a substance that was later identified as PCP, the evidence was more than sufficient to convict defendant of aiding and abetting in the delivery of a controlled substance. State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 662 P.2d 1135 (1983).

In prosecution for violation for conspiracy to violate this chapter, court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the co-conspirators’ statements before there was independent proof of the conspiracy for, although not explicit on the record, it was clear that the state “promised” to produce independent proof of the conspiracy, in fact, the district court expressly admitted the testimony upon the condition that the state produce sufficient independent proof of the conspiracy and the court recognized its power to strike those statements if proof was not forthcoming. State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 863, 693 P.2d 1065 (Ct. App. 1984).

In a prosecution for conspiracy to violate this section, hearsay statements of co-conspirators were properly admitted where a prima facie proof of the conspiracy was presented by independent evidence. Evidence that a co-conspirator arranged a narcotics transaction by calling defendant’s phone number, that narcotics transactions took place at the defendant’s house while he was present, and that a search of defendant’s house revealed packaging and paraphernalia similar to those used by co-conspirators was adequate independent evidence. State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 863, 693 P.2d 1065 (Ct. App. 1984).

In prosecution for delivery of cocaine, the trial court did not err in admitting drug paraphernalia evidence, even though the defendant was not charged with the paraphernalia violation, because the evidence was clearly relevant to show, if nothing more, that the defendant had the accouterments necessary to deal cocaine. State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988).

Verdict on conviction for possession of psilocybin mushrooms with intent to deliver was not supported by substantial evidence since state did not offer evidence which established that defendant, individually, knew of the illegal drugs and that he exercised dominion over them; the state did not meet this requirement since when the police began their search of the car, defendant told the officers that the bag with the mushrooms in it was not his and since, at trial, defendant’s passenger repeatedly declared that he, and not defendant, owned the mushrooms. State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 771 P.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1989).

Where the only evidence the police had against defendant at the time of his arrest for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance was that he was with another, whom the police did have probable cause to believe had delivered a controlled substance, defendant’s mere presence was not sufficient to lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that defendant was guilty of conspiring to deliver a controlled substance; the arrest was made without probable cause and was illegal. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 776 P.2d 458 (1989). Where no evidence was produced at trial of fingerprints, footprints, or any other physical evidence which would have connected either defendant to the cultivation activity in the greenhouse, a conviction of either defendant for manufacturing marijuana could not be sustained. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990).

Evidence of other acts was inadmissible under Idaho Evid. R. 404 to prove that informant acted in conformity with a character trait of being an overreaching government informant who would coerce innocent people into dealing in drugs and was not a sufficient indication of the existence of a habit to permit admission of the evidence under Idaho Evid. R. 406. State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 801 P.2d 1299 (Ct. App. 1990).

Where defendant admitted he was the go-between in the consummation of the sale of marihuana and accepted money from the police officer in exchange for approximately one ounce of marihuana, when the jury found defendant was guilty of “delivery” of a controlled substance, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Walker, 121 Idaho 18, 822 P.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1991).

While chemical analysis is preferable, it is not essential to prove the identity of a controlled substance; circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove the identity of a substance where laboratory analysis is not available; however, it remains incumbent upon the state to provide evidence that meets the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997).

There was substantial evidence to support the inference that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine where drug paraphernalia, including a scale with cocaine residue, was found in his truck. State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 983 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1999).

Evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance, where the only evidence offered to identify the substance came from the testimony of the arresting officer that, in his opinion, the substance looked like methamphetamine. Proof of the chemical composition of the alleged controlled substance should have been established by chemical analysis. State v. Tryon, 164 Idaho 254, 429 P.3d 142 (2018).

— Chain of Custody.

United Parcel Service supervisor, who had control of a package containing a controlled substance between the possession of two witnesses, was not called to testify, but defendant offered no evidence of tampering or any evidence that would raise a suspicion that the evidence had been altered during the supervisor’s possession of the package, and mere speculation is insufficient to establish a break in the chain of custody. State v. Wilson, 120 Idaho 643, 818 P.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1991).

The court determined from the testimony of officer that the white envelope containing drug evidence was sealed when it left the officer and that it was sealed in the same way when the criminologist received it. Mere speculation that the evidence was mishandled or tampered with was insufficient to establish a break in the chain of custody. State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 838 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1992).

— Cultivated Marijuana.
— Drug Dealers.

Where some of the marijuana plants were growing in containers and had been “groomed” to be more productive, many of the plants had been watered and fertilized with a horse manure mixture or compost, some plants had been boxed in with poles and the area at the base of the plants had been cleared of weeds, and other plants had small, coded tags attached to them as if to identify certain plants, the evidence was clear that the marijuana was cultivated and not wild. State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986). — Drug Dealers.

In the absence of information showing that defendant dealt drugs in the past, the magistrate could reasonably conclude that defendant was a drug trafficker and although proof of such facts might have lent additional support to the inference that defendant was involved in drug dealing, its absence does not detract from the inference the magistrate reasonably could draw from the quantity of drugs alone. State v. Sholes, 120 Idaho 639, 818 P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1991).

Where United Parcel Manager opened a package addressed to a non-existent address and discovered a controlled substance, defendant later claimed the package, and the amount signified the controlled substance was intended for further distribution, the magistrate reasonably could infer that defendant was involved in drug dealing. State v. Sholes, 120 Idaho 639, 818 P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1991).

— Individual Guilt.

There must be substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that establishes the guilt of each defendant as an individual rather than the collective guilt of two or more persons; the state’s evidence establishing the existence of cultivated marijuana and the status of the defendants as joint owners of the property where some of the marijuana was found did not constitute substantial evidence to uphold the conviction of either defendant individually. State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986).

Marijuana packaged in a baggie found in defendant’s purse, which expert testimony established as the type of packaging normally used to distribute marijuana for sale, was sufficient to identify defendant as an individual connected with marijuana being dried, processed, weighed and packaged throughout a particular house. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990).

There was no question that the evidence tying defendant to the controlled substances was sufficient for a jury to infer individual guilt; the district court committed no error in instructing the jury on constructive and nonexclusive possession. State v. Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 829 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1992).

— Of Possession.

Where defendant was convicted in district court of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver although none of the drugs were found on defendant’s person, the fact that defendant fled from police into the backyard where cocaine was then found by police in a trash can supports the contention that defendant disposed of the cocaine by placing it into the trash can and the jury could reasonably disbelieve defendant’s story that he never saw the police and was chasing a puppy. Evidence of defendant’s interaction with a drug distributor and the defendant’s possession of marked currency provided to the distributor for purchase of cocaine from defendant further supports the prosecution’s reasonable inference of defendant’s knowledge and control of the substance as necessary to establish constructive possession of cocaine by defendant. State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 889 P.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1995). Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of methamphetamine where a witness testified that defendant, a passenger, appeared nervous at the scene of an automobile accident, he reached deep into a garbage can, and soon thereafter a police officer found a methamphetamine pipe in the garbage can. State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 132 P.3d 455 (Ct. App. 2005).

— Relevant.

In prosecution for delivery of and trafficking in methamphetamine, evidence that defendant sent two money orders, both for substantial amounts, to the identical person in a city within the same week that two packages were sent from fictitious people and addresses and delivered to defendant through an airline from the same city made it more probable that defendant was engaged in trafficking methamphetamine and thus such evidence was relevant; however, the trial court’s conclusion that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its unfair prejudice was not an abuse of discretion, and such evidence was properly admitted. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

In prosecution for possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver and failing to affix a controlled substance tax stamp where contents of bag containing an unidentified white powder were identified only to the extent that the bags did not contain controlled substances, no tests to determine the true chemical composition of the powders were requested or performed by either party and the bags could have contained powdered tattoo ink or epsom salts, no connection to defendant was established and such evidence was not relevant; however, admission of such evidence was harmless since it did not affect defendant’s substantial rights as there was other evidence sufficient to show that the premises and controlled substance found therein belonged to defendant. State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 370, 900 P.2d 1381 (Ct. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 127 Idaho 356, 900 P.2d 1367 (1995).

In trial of defendant convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, district court did not err in admitting evidence of prior drug transaction with undercover officer because it was relevant to the state’s rebuttal of defendant’s affirmative defense of entrapment and was relevant to prove defendant’s motive or intent. State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 924 P.2d 1230 (Ct. App. 1996).

— Searches and Seizures.

An unconsented police entry into a residential unit, be it a house, apartment, or hotel or motel room, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; even if the rental period had expired, this does not inevitably terminate the justified privacy expectation. Thus, the district court erred in not suppressing evidence of marijuana plants seized in a warrantless search. State v. Johnson, 108 Idaho 619, 701 P.2d 239 (Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986).

Officers may only conduct a search of an individual’s home without first obtaining a search warrant where the search is incident to an arrest, in response to exigent circumstances, or where there is proper consent. A lessor who has granted the lessee exclusive possession over a certain area may not, during the period of the tenancy, give an effective consent to a police search of that area; this is so whether the arrangement involves the rental of a house, an apartment, a room in a rooming house, hotel or even a locker. Thus, the landlord’s consent to a police search of the tenant’s apartment was ineffective, and the evidence of marijuana obtained in such warrantless search should have been suppressed. State v. Johnson, 108 Idaho 619, 701 P.2d 239 (Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986). The gross weight of the controlled substance seized was more consistent with a dealer amount than a user amount and drug paraphernalia necessary for redistribution would probably be present at the address to which the package containing the controlled substance was mailed; therefore, the officer’s affidavit presented a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause was present to search defendant’s residence for evidence of drug repackaging and records of sale. State v. Wilson, 120 Idaho 643, 818 P.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1991).

The warrant issued in this case covered only instrumentalities and evidence of drug trafficking and was not issued for the purpose of seizing the contents of the package addressed to defendant and delivered to his residence; therefore, because its execution was neither predicated upon the delivery of the package nor upon the occurrence of any other event, the warrant was not “anticipatory.” State v. Sholes, 120 Idaho 639, 818 P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1991).

The defendant’s appeal from an Idaho R. Crim. P. 11 conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of this section was denied; the defendant was arrested for failure to maintain insurance, in violation of§ 49-1229 and a subsequent search of his automobile uncovered cocaine and other drug paraphernalia; the defendant sought to suppress the evidence seized, contending that the search of his vehicle was an unconstitutional search and seizure and that the Idaho Constitution provided more protection than afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; the trial court properly denied the suppression motion. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 825 P.2d 501 (1992).

Where police officers discovered cocaine and scales in the console of defendant’s vehicle, after he was arrested for the misdemeanor charge of operating a motor vehicle without liability insurance, the court of appeals upheld the search and seizure of evidence as a search incident to arrest. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1174 (Ct. App. 1991), aff’d, 121 Idaho 723, 827 P.2d 1174 (1992).

As a casual visitor, defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment that police entered without a warrant; therefore, his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated, and the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 922 P.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1996).

In prosecution for possession of a controlled substance found in patrol car in which defendant was placed after his arrest on an outstanding warrant, defendant’s right against illegal search and seizure were not violated where evidence showed that seizure of defendant did not occur when police officers first arrived at the residence and defendant came out in response of officer’s commands as contended by defendant, but only after defendant was arrested upon an outstanding warrant discovered after an outstanding warrant check was made and defendant was placed in patrol car. State v. Fuentes, 129 Idaho 830, 933 P.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1997).

The factors to be considered by the magistrate in application for search warrant include the reliability of, and the basis of knowledge of, persons who have supplied information that is related by the affiant or witness. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

If a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the search was invalid. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

The affidavit for a search warrant of a law enforcement agent which does not specifically identify each source may, nonetheless, be sufficient to support probable cause if a reader could reasonably infer that the information came from other law enforcement personnel. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997). Since in application for search warrant a common sense reading of postal inspector’s affidavit reasonably identified the sources of his information as other government officials carrying out investigatory or regulatory responsibilities, and since those sources were presumptively reliable, defendant’s challenge to search warrant failed. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

In application for search warrant where, given a common sense interpretation federal agent’s testimony indicated that her information came from the observations of state and federal law enforcement personnel and postal employees involved in the same investigation and nothing in the evidence presented contradicted the presumption that these sources were reliable, there was a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed for issuing the search warrant. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

Because the officer lawfully entered the bedroom to conduct a Type I protective sweep subsequent to defendant’s arrest pursuant to the warrants, and upon entering the bedroom observed, in plain view, the contraband which was the basis of the criminal charges, the evidence was lawfully seized. State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 991 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1999).

The officers’ initial entry into the residence and subsequent search of the portable safe was pursuant to defendant’s prior written acknowledgment and consent to the search of her residence in conjunction with her living with a felony probationer. State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 2 P.3d 153 (Ct. App. 2000).

Suppression of evidence — a syringe taken from defendant’s pocket — was denied where the officer was justified in stopping defendant for investigatory purposes and was justified in frisking defendant for weapons, and the officer did not exceed the scope of the frisk. State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 997 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 2000).

Evidence police found when they searched trash cans set near the street that was used to get a search warrant was properly admitted, because there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in items deposited in a public area, conveyed to a third-party for collection, and readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 26 P.3d 1222 (2001).

Police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle after observing erratic speeds and traffic violations; evidence of drug manufacturing obtained during subsequent search of defendant’s house was admissible since initial search was consensual and items were recovered by means of a search warrant. State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32 P.3d 685 (Ct. App. 2001).

— Sufficient.

Evidence provided a sufficient basis for the jury to infer that the defendant knew of methamphetamine under his seat in a car, had the power and intention to control the illegal drugs, and exhibited the requisite intent to deliver the same where the arresting officer observed the defendant look back at him as he approached the car and furtively reach under the seat, where the defendant initially lied about his identity, and where a subsequent search found drug paraphernalia, a cellular telephone, a ledger, cash and a pager. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117 (1999).

— Unlawfully Obtained.

There was substantial circumstantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant delivered controlled drugs to another man, given in part that, after seeing the defendant, the man gave drugs to the informant, raising the inference that defendant was the source of the drugs. State v. Garcia, 156 Idaho 352, 326 P.3d 354 (Ct. App. 2014). — Unlawfully Obtained.

Where evidence was seized as a result of an investigatory stop that became unreasonable due to the illegal detention of the driver, then the evidence was obtained unlawfully also as to the passengers, who had standing under State v. Haworth , 106 Idaho 405, 679 P.2d 1123 (1984), to challenge the reasonableness of the derivative detention resulting from the investigatory stop. State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 880 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1994).

Inevitable discovery doctrine did not save drug evidence from exclusion where, after suppressing both the drugs and the admission because of a tainted frisk search and a too-close-in-time admission, all that remained was a person who had been nothing but cooperative for over 20 minutes in someone else’s residence that had drug paraphernalia in the garage. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 407 P.3d 1285 (2017).

Exercise of Religion.

Prosecution of defendant who claimed that he was an ordained minister and that he provided marijuana to be smoked by his friends as a sacrament did not violate his right to the free exercise of religion under the state and federal constitutions. This section is a statute of general application and it does not proscribe any conduct because it is engaged in for religious reasons or because of the religious belief it portrays. It is entirely neutral with respect to religion. State v. Fluewelling, 150 Idaho 576, 249 P.3d 375 (2011).

Forfeiture.

In light of recent precedent from the United States supreme court,§ 37-2744 does not create forfeiture proceedings which are criminal in nature or which result in punishment for double jeopardy analysis; conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and forfeiture of pickup truck affirmed. State v. McGough, 129 Idaho 371, 924 P.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1996).

Because the U.S. supreme court recently determined that civil forfeitures in general, and specifically in cases involving money laundering and drug statutes, do not constitute “punishment” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, there was no double jeopardy attached to defendant’s convictions and sentences for delivery of controlled substance, money laundering, and failure to pay income tax and the prior forfeiture of his property under§ 37-2744. State v. Ross, 129 Idaho 380, 924 P.2d 1224 (1996).

General Intent.

The possession of a controlled substance in violation of this section only requires a general intent in that it only requires knowledge that one is in possession of the substance. State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 983 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1999).

Informants.

Where the record contained no information relating to an informant’s past reliability, however, where the informant’s detailed account of defendant’s marijuana growing operation supported the informant’s present credibility, where the informant accurately described defendant’s physical appearance, house, car, length of time lived at the house, and the esoteric fact he was using a false name for purpose of his utility bills, and where each of these facts were independently corroborated by the investigating officer, the independent corroboration of these facts provided a substantial basis for believing the informant’s statements were true. State v. McAndrew, 118 Idaho 132, 795 P.2d 26 (Ct. App. 1990). The magistrate at the preliminary hearing determined, contrary to defendant’s argument, that the informant was not a participant in the commission of the crime of possession with intent to deliver; rather, the informant’s activities confirmed the presence of controlled substances in the defendant’s trailer, upon which the magistrate based his assessment that there was probable cause to have defendant answer for the crime; therefore, the magistrate and the district judge did not abuse their discretion in denying defendant’s requests for disclosure of the informant’s identity in pre-trial proceedings. State v. Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 829 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1992).

In prosecution for delivery and trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of§ 38-2732B and this section, where defendant failed to articulate any basis for her assertion that the in camera hearing was insufficient to protect her rights and also failed to demonstrate how the informant’s identity would have presented her with necessary information that the in camera hearing did not, trial court did not err in refusing to disclose the informant’s identity. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

Defendant’s conviction of possession of a controlled substance in violation of paragraph (c)(1) was appropriate where an officer possessed a reasonably articulable suspicion for defendant’s detention. The officers possessed the requisite suspicion that, at the least, defendant was acting in violation of this section, given her presence in the house that two neighbors had told the police that they suspected was the site of drug activities and both neighbors had independently alerted authorities of their suspicions regarding the drug activity. State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 218 P.3d 790 (Ct. App. 2009).

Information.

Where an information charged defendants with conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of this section, and which stated as the basis for such that they did so “by conspiring with each other to manufacture a controlled substance, to wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II(D) Controlled Substance by they, the said defendants, obtaining and possessing glassware and other lab equipment for the manufacture of Methamphetamine and chemicals necessary for said manufacture,” although the phrasing of the information could have been improved, it adequately notified defendants of the criminal acts with which they were charged. State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 798 P.2d 61 (Ct. App. 1990).

The information included all of the elements of the offense and sufficiently informed defendant of those acts for which he was accused, the pleading identified the substance that defendant was alleged to have possessed and the date and place of possession, and, in the absence of any suggestion in the information that the state was charging defendant with possession of only a portion of the cocaine found on that date, defendant was on notice that he must be prepared to present a defense regarding all of the cocaine so found. State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995).

Charging information was not jurisdictionally deficient for failing to specifically allege defendant’s possession of methamphetamine was “knowing,” as “knowing” possession was necessarily implied by the allegation of “unlawful” possession contained in the information. State v. Davis, 144 Idaho 276, 159 P.3d 913 (Ct. App. 2007).

Instructions.

Instructions failed to accurately and fairly represent the law and misled the jury where that jury could have found that the defendant had positive knowledge of the drugs in question, but also could have concluded that he should have known that the substances were methamphetamine and cocaine. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117 (1999).

Whether defendant knew or believed that he possessed methamphetamine, such possession was the result of a deliberate and conscious act; thus, a jury instruction which instructed the jury to find defendant guilty if the state proved that he possessed methamphetamine and he knew or thought it was methamphetamine separated innocent from criminal conduct, was a correct statement of the law and did not mislead the jury. State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 129 P.3d 1261 (Ct. App. 2005).

Intent.

Evidence of defendant’s prior drug use was admissible because it was not presented to show his character or to show that he acted in conformity with a particular trait of character, rather, the challenged evidence was relevant to prove the specific intent element of the charged offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 590, 6 P.3d 840 (Ct. App. 2000).

Petitioner raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was aware of the intent element of the charge of possession of a controlled substance prior to pleading guilty to that charge where he claimed that the controlled substance was placed in his wallet by his girlfriend without his knowledge, he repeatedly asserted in his postconviction filings that he was not made aware of the intent element by the states, the district court, or his attorney, and even the presentence investigation report did not refute the petitioner’s allegation that he was unaware of the intent element. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 152 P.3d 1237 (Ct. App. 2007).

The crime of possession of a controlled substance does not require a specific intent. It only requires the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance and either knowledge of the identity of the substance or knowledge that the substance is a controlled substance. State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484, 314 P.3d 166 (2013).

Intent to Deliver.

Where drug enforcement administration expert in narcotics testified that an individual addict would not possess fifteen grams of heroin for personal use and that packaging and purity of the heroin seized at defendant’s residence were consistent with sales activity and inconsistent with mere personal use, the evidence was sufficient to uphold conviction for “intent to deliver.” State v. Gomez, 101 Idaho 802, 623 P.2d 110 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 963, 102 S. Ct. 503, 70 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981).

Evidence of the quantity and variety of controlled substances found will not, by itself, support an inference of intent to deliver a controlled substance under this section. State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1982).

Where substantial quantities and values of a prohibited substance are combined with evidence of suspicious activities, money, or transaction records, the inference of intent to deliver may be sustained. State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1982).

The existence of drug paraphernalia, even without packaging material, may be sufficient to support an inference of an intent to deliver. State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1982). Where the quantity and economic value of the controlled substances suggest personal use, the mere existence of packaging material will not provide an adequate basis to infer an intent to deliver the controlled substance as the packaging may be consistent with the defendant’s purchase of the substances for personal use. State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1982).

Where the quantities and values of the controlled substances in question are substantial, and the packaging material is coupled with paraphernalia, there is an adequate basis to infer an intent to deliver. State v. O’Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1982).

Judgment.

Where verdicts were returned finding defendant guilty of conspiracy to deliver and delivery of cocaine and also possession of controlled substances, an offense of which defendant was not separately charged, but judgments were entered only on the conspiracy and delivery charges, because there was no showing of prejudice and no attack was made on the sufficiency of the evidence of support the judgments entered, there was no error. State v. McNeely, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1983).

Jury Instruction.

Where jury requested that judge define “control” as used in instruction related to possession of marijuana under this section and judge, after unsuccessfully trying to locate defense counsel, conferred with prosecuting attorney and typed out definition for jury, it was harmless error for judge to so act, despite fact that he violated procedure under§ 19-2204, since the information filed against defendant contained the correct definition. State v. Randolph, 102 Idaho 153, 627 P.2d 782 (1981).

In a prosecution for delivery of cocaine based entirely on circumstantial evidence, it was reversible error to refuse to give the instruction that a defendant cannot be convicted unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with guilt but cannot not be reconciled with any other rational conclusion, and that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the jury must adopt the interpretation of innocence. State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988).

In prosecution for delivery of cocaine, it was not error for the court to refuse a requested instruction dealing with drug paraphernalia, as the defendant was not charged with a paraphernalia violation. State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988).

The failure to give the requested instruction advising the jury to examine a paid informant’s testimony with greater caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses was at most harmless error, where the informant’s testimony was not the sole or primary evidence against the defendant. State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988).

Where, in prosecution for delivery of cocaine, the defendant never claimed to have delivered any cocaine, the giving of the instruction that the state did not have the burden of proving that the defendant did not have any authority under law to deliver the controlled substances was harmless because the question of the defendant’s authority to deliver was not at issue in the trial. State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988). Where, in prosecution for delivery of cocaine, there was substantial evidence presented to show the state’s theory of the defendant’s involvement in the crime, that evidence fully supported an aiding and abetting instruction. State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988).

Where, in prosecution for delivery of cocaine, the testimony of the defendant’s alibi witness established the defendant’s presence for only part of the evening, the district court did not err in giving the instruction that allowed the jury to make a reasonable doubt determination of whether the defendant was involved in the crime, nor did the court err in refusing to give the defendant’s requested alibi instruction. State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988).

The instruction requested by defendant on possession of paraphernalia only served to suggest a crime that could have been, but was not, directly or indirectly charged. Therefore, the court was not required to give any instruction about the crime of possession of paraphernalia. State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 838 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1992).

The defense of necessity could not logically have applied to the charged offense of which defendant was found guilty, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver; thus any error in the denial of her requested jury instruction was harmless. State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2001).

In a prosecution for possession of a controlled substance, the state need only prove the defendant’s knowledge that he had a controlled substance in his possession and need not prove that the defendant was aware of the precise type of controlled substance. State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 132 P.3d 455 (Ct. App. 2005).

In prosecution for possession of amphetamine, defendant was entitled to a new trial due to conflict between oral and written instructions. In light of defense counsel’s focus in closing argument around incorrect standard provided in oral instructions, defendant was prejudiced by correct, but looser, standard provided in written instructions. State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332, 160 P.3d 771 (Ct. App. 2007).

In an appeal in which the state challenged the propriety of the district court’s jury instruction regarding the elements of possession of a controlled substance under subsection (c), the supreme court concluded there was no need for it to determine if the jury instruction given by the district court was error, because such an error was harmless. State v. Razo-Chavez, 159 Idaho 590, 364 P.3d 291 (2016).

Knock and Announce.

District court erred in denying suppression motion of defendant charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; the five seconds the police waited after a knock and announce was not a reasonable length of time to allow an occupant of defendant’s home to answer the door in the early morning, when no exigency existed or arose and the alleged volume of drugs in the home was itself insufficient to create reasonable suspicion of an exigency allowing the police to almost immediately enter the home after knocking and announcing. State v. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628, 130 P.3d 1166 (Ct. App. 2005).

Knowledge.

The mens rea element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance is knowledge of possession, not knowledge that the substance possessed is a controlled substance. State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 866 P.2d 181 (1993). Where defendant claimed that he did not know the nature of the residue in the vial that he possessed, not that he did not know the illegal nature of the substance he possessed; testimony of third party was relevant to the issue of knowledge of what the substance was. State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997).

To be convicted under this section, an individual need not know that the substance possessed is a controlled substance. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117 (1999).

Defendant’s mistaken belief that the cotton ball in his possession no longer contained any methamphetamine residue did not absolve him of guilt where he earlier knew of and controlled that same methamphetamine residue as part of a larger quantity that he was using. State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 122 P.3d 321 (Ct. App. 2005).

The determination of probable cause may be met by means of circumstantial evidence supportive of reasonable inferences on the part of the magistrate. For the purposes of determining whether there was probable cause to believe that defendant had possessed methadone, the magistrate judge could reasonably have inferred that defendant consumed the methadone, that defendant possessed it before she consumed it, and that defendant knew it was either methadone or a controlled substance when she was possessing it. State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484, 314 P.3d 166 (2013).

Lesser Included Offenses.

Possession with intent to deliver is not a lesser-included charge of trafficking in methamphetamine under either the statutory or pleading theories. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016).

Manufacturing and Possession.

This section treats manufacturing as a criminal act distinguishable from delivery or possession with intent to deliver. This is a constitutionally permissible legislative choice. State v. Randles, 115 Idaho 611, 768 P.2d 1344 (Ct. App. 1989), aff’d in part, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990).

The facts establishing the statutory elements of manufacturing a controlled substance are different from the facts required to prove the elements of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver; manufacturing is completed when a person produces or otherwise prepares the controlled substance. On the other hand, possession with intent to deliver does not require any production, processing or synthesizing of a drug; it is complete upon actual or constructive possession coupled with the intent to transfer, or attempt to transfer, the substance to another person. State v. Randles, 115 Idaho 611, 768 P.2d 1344 (Ct. App. 1989), aff’d in part, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990).

Growing marijuana plants in a greenhouse was not sufficient to sustain a conviction of manufacture of marijuana against the defendant. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (1990).

The facts establishing the statutory elements of manufacturing a controlled substance are different from the facts required to prove the elements of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and separate convictions for these offenses did not violate state and federal constitutional protection against double jeopardy. State v. Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 794 P.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1990).

Mere Presence.

In prosecution for delivery of a controlled substance, circumstantial evidence that police informant was quite familiar and had a lot of experience with methamphetamine, that he had purchased the drug from defendant on several occasions, that it was packaged in the same manner on such occasions as it was during the transaction in question, that police officer who was listening to informant’s and defendant’s conversation over a listening device confirmed informant’s description of the transaction, was sufficient evidence from which jury could find that the substance defendant delivered to informant was methamphetamine. State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997). Mere Presence.

This section precludes the interpretation that a person violates the statute simply by his presence at a place where controlled substances are sold. State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 688 P.2d 1203 (Ct. App. 1984).

Necessity Defense.

Where defendant picked up a package at the airport that the police knew contained methamphetamine, and where police officer, who did not tell defendant that he was a police officer, told defendant that he knew what was inside the package and would call police unless she gave him a “pinch” of it, the delivery of the substance to the police officer was not the result of necessity; defendant’s fear of being held accountable for a crime she had committed could not serve to justify the commission of another offense. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

One Act as Multiple Crimes.

This section permits one act to constitute several crimes and a woman involved in the sale of marijuana might be tried for conspiracy, possession of more than three ounces, and frequenting a place where marijuana was found. State v. Ramsey, 99 Idaho 1, 576 P.2d 572 (1978).

Although it is possible for a person to violate both section 37-2732B and this section, section 37-2732B requires the amount of cocaine involved to be at least twenty-eight grams, while this section contains no such quantity requirements. State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 977 P.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1998).

Personal use exception.

The trial court erred in holding that the growing of marijuana was within the personal use exception of the manufacturing statutes,§§ 37-2737A, 37-2701 and this section. State v. Griffith, 127 Idaho 8, 896 P.2d 334 (1995).

Possession.

Where, although defendant charged with certain crimes under this section did not have actual possession of the drugs in question, he did have constructive possession, and this was established by evidence that the defendant knew of the drugs and had equal control with co-defendant over the premises in which they were found. State v. Hickman, 119 Idaho 366, 806 P.2d 959 (Ct. App. 1991).

In order to establish possession of a controlled substance, a defendant need not have actual physical possession of the substance; the state need only prove that the defendant has such dominion and control over the substance to establish constructive possession. What is crucial to the state’s proof is a sufficient showing of a nexus between the accused and the controlled substance. Knowledge of the existence of controlled substances may be inferred through circumstances. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994). Where defendant was convicted in district court of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver under this section, the fact that defendant received marijuana in the mail in a package addressed to him at a location where he was known to sometimes reside was not sufficient to establish constructive possession of marijuana because it did not warrant an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the drugs knowingly. State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 889 P.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1995).

In prosecution for possessing a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver and failing to affix a controlled substance tax stamp, where friends of defendant testified that he personally used the drug, and there was evidence that the only place that the drug was found in the clubhouse was in the closet filled with defendant’s belongings, that defendant attempted to drive away when he arrived at the clubhouse and saw that a search was being conducted, that he was an officer of the club and frequently approached police as the contact person for the group, that he often resided at the clubhouse and received personal mail there, that he controlled access to the bedroom and kept a list of personal effects there, that he protected the room with firearms, that small bags similar to those used to package the drug were found in the room, that the drug was found on a beam scale in an amount usually kept for personal use but was consistent for an amount intended for sale, taken together these facts were sufficient to support the inferences that defendant knew of the methamphetamine and exercised dominion and control over it by occupying and controlling the room. State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 370, 900 P.2d 1381 (Ct. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 127 Idaho 356, 900 P.2d 1367 (1995).

The magistrate’s finding of probable cause was supported by the evidence where cocaine was found both scattered across the seat and floor of defendant’s pickup and in a bindle lying near his feet and the paper used to make the bindle of cocaine was torn from a bank deposit slip bearing defendant’s name and lying under the floor mat of the pickup. From this evidence, a reasonable inference could be drawn that defendant had physically possessed the cocaine and had either dropped the bindle himself or had previously transferred the bindle to his companion. State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995).

Where a police officer found a glass cylinder with a teardrop bottom containing brown residue in defendant’s coat pocket, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301, 92 P.3d 551 (Ct. App. 2004).

Probable Cause to Arrest.

Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for violating this section, where the evidence showed that he was present for at least 30 minutes in an apartment, the apartment emanated a strong odor of marijuana, and the apartment owner admitted there was marijuana and drug paraphernalia inside the apartment. State v. Williams, 162 Idaho 56, 394 P.3d 99 (Ct. App. 2016).

Procuring Agent Theory.

The “procuring agent” theory has no application to a statutory scheme like Idaho’s, where the prohibited act is delivery rather than sale. State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 662 P.2d 1135 (1983).

Quantity.

The definition of the word “delivery” in§ 32-2701 makes it clear that a defendant need not have been an agent of another to be guilty under this section. State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 662 P.2d 1135 (1983). Quantity.

Although the legislature did not proscribe the possession of “any quantity” of cocaine as it did for methamphetamine, its classification of cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance and its limited availability demonstrate that the legislature intended the possession of even trace or residual quantities of cocaine to fall within the scope of this section. State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 983 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1999).

Because the language of the controlled substances statute is plain and unambiguous, even a trace amount of the substance will satisfy the requirement of the statute, and a refusal to adopt the usable-quantity rule does not lead to a result which is palpably absurd. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 988 P.2d 685 (1999).

Testimony that defendant represented that the weight of the methamphetamine was one ounce was, as a matter of law, testimony that the defendant represented that the weight of the methamphetamine was more than 28 grams; one ounce equals 28.35 grams under federal law. There is no requirement that the represented weight be expressed in the wording of the statute. State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 354 P.3d 1186 (2015).

Question of Law.

It is not an abuse of judicial discretion for a judge to impose a sentence which is well within the statutory limits. State v. Miles, 97 Idaho 396, 545 P.2d 484 (1976), overruled on other grounds, State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the indeterminate sentence of not more than three years for delivery of marijuana, where defendant had had numerous brushes with the law prior to the arrest which led to conviction, and although of a relatively minor nature, these gave support to the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant probation at the time of sentencing. State v. Powers, 100 Idaho 290, 596 P.2d 802 (1979).

There was no abuse of discretion in defendant’s sentence of five years’ imprisonment, to run concurrently with a three-year sentence on another charge, in view of fact that the maximum term authorized for delivery of a controlled substance was life imprisonment and a $25,000 fine, and in view of the presentence investigation report’s observation that defendant had previously abused the terms of a parole arrangement. State v. Powers, 100 Idaho 614, 603 P.2d 569 (1979).

The question whether a substance is designated in this chapter as a controlled substance is a question of law for the court, and not the jury, to decide. State v. Hobbs, 101 Idaho 262, 611 P.2d 1047 (1980).

Restitution.

Defendant confused the provisions of§ 19-5304(1) — requiring that a court order a defendant to pay victims for any economic losses directly resulting from the criminal conduct for which the defendant is convicted — with the provisions of subsection (k) of this section — which authorizes the courts to “order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation” for which the defendant is convicted; in this case the district court expressly ordered restitution pursuant to the latter statute and thus, contrary to defendant’s claim, the district court had statutory authority, and hence jurisdiction, to order him to pay restitution to the law enforcement agencies. State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1991). An order for restitution of costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigation is a direct consequence of entering a guilty plea and the sentencing court may not impose restitution upon a defendant who pleads guilty, unless defendant is advised of that possibility prior to entering the plea. State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 861 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1098, 114 S. Ct. 936, 127 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1994).

Trial court abused its discretion in ordering a defendant, convicted of racketeering for his participation in growing and processing marijuana, to pay restitution to the county for costs of investigating and prosecuting the action against him; as it existed during the period relevant to defendant’s appeal, this section was limited to a conviction of felony violation under this chapter. State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 877 P.2d 898 (1994) (see 2004 amendment authorizing restitution in misdemeanor cases).

Statutory language of paragraph (k) is broad enough to encompass prosecutorial expenses associated with drug court operations incurred before a judgment of conviction has been entered against the defendant. State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 808, 87 P.3d 295 (Ct. App. 2003).

A reasonable reading of subsection (k) includes costs incurred for law enforcement employees’ attendance at a restitution hearing and the costs of their investigation. State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 252 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2010).

Under§ 19-5304, the court properly entered a civil judgment for restitution against a defendant who agreed to plead guilty to two counts of trafficking in cocaine and one count of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, even though there was no mention of restitution in the plea agreement. State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012).

Because the dismissal of a felony conviction became final after the expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the dismissal on appeal, a district court’s jurisdiction to amend the order expired at that time. Jurisdiction was not extended for a motion, seeking reimbursement for restitution already paid to the court, that was filed 10 months after the dismissal. Even assuming the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, it lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonparty agencies that collected, disbursed, or retained the monies paid. State v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 157, 280 P.3d 184 (Ct. App. 2012).

Subsection (k) allows an award of restitution for any costs incurred by law enforcement agencies, and law enforcement agencies expressly includes county prosecuting attorney offices. Thus, that provision plainly encompasses restitution for the salaries of prosecutors for their time devoted to particular cases. State v. Cardoza, 155 Idaho 889, 318 P.3d 658 (Ct. App. 2014).

A trial court has discretion to deny all or part of the restitution request for an economic loss, including the costs for prosecuting the case. In that regard, the trial court should look to subsection (7) and consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. State v. Harer, 160 Idaho 98, 369 P.3d 316 (Ct. App. 2016).

Subsection (k) does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to stand trial and present a defense, as it is not premised upon whether he exercised his rights, but is aimed at the legitimate governmental end of recovering prosecution costs. State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 390 P.3d 412 (2017).

Subsection (k) does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to equal protection, as it does not distinguish among defendants, but treats equally all defendants who are convicted. State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 390 P.3d 412 (2017).

Restitution award was not supported by substantial evidence, where the state’s unsworn statement of costs, submitted as evidence of its prosecution costs, did not even state that restitution was sought only for expenses actually incurred in prosecuting the charge that resulted in the defendant’s conviction, and did not include costs associated with a mistrial, acquittal, or the conviction of defendant’s spouse. State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 390 P.3d 418 (2017). Subsection (k) does not permit recovery of reasonable.prosecution expenses. By its plain terms, it grants the court discretion to award restitution to the state for prosecution expenses actually incurred. State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 390 P.3d 424 (2017).

Restitution under subsection (k) must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. An award of restitution will not be disturbed, if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Unsworn representation, even by an officer of the court, does not constitute substantial evidence upon which restitution may be based. State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 390 P.3d 424 (2017).

The district court is not statutorily required to articulate its reasoning for declining to award total or partial restitution for prosecution costs; therefore, the articulation of one reason, e.g., defendant’s future limited earning capacity, does not erase all others. State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 434 P.3d 209 (2019).

Restitution proceedings under subsection (k) are subject to the general Idaho rules of evidence hearsay rules. State v. Cunningham, 164 Idaho 759, 435 P.3d 539 (2019).

District court erred in awarding restitution to the state because, although the defendant agreed to pay restitution for investigative and prosecution expenses, the costs associated with the county prosecutor’s office and the city’s police department were not sufficiently presented in the state’s restitution requests. State v. Hess, — Idaho —, — P.3d —, 2020 Ida. App. LEXIS 92 (Ct. App. April 30, 2020).

Searches.

Search of defendant’s car was proper and supported by probable cause where drug-detection dog used to sniff the exterior indicated the presence of a controlled substance and defendant’s initial detention was proper and did not constitute an arrest without probable cause where, after a proper initial stop due to defendant’s excessive speed, officer acquired information contrary to what defendant had been telling him and became suspicious of objects in the back seat of defendant’s car. State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 925 P.2d 1125 (Ct. App. 1996).

In a case where defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine, defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as he failed to demonstrate that his arrest was unlawfully made in violation of the restrictions on the warrants for his arrest in a public place or in violation of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Shellenbarger, 140 Idaho 185, 90 P.3d 935 (Ct. App. 2004).

The automobile exception to the warrant requirement justified the search of defendant’s purse following a drug dog’s alert on the vehicle. State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 357 P.3d 1281 (Ct. App. 2015).

— Consent.

The reasonable belief that the third person possessed authority, as an occupant, to consent to a search of the house was sufficient to validate the search. State v. Misner, 135 Idaho 277, 16 P.3d 953 (Ct. App. 2000).

— Drug Detection Dogs.
— Exigent Circumstances.

The officer’s brief questioning and his use of the drug detection dog to sniff the exterior of defendant’s truck did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 17 P.3d 301 (Ct. App. 2000). — Exigent Circumstances.

The circumstances known to officer immediately before she entered defendant’s apartment — a violent fight in progress with one participant already having been injured, the presence of a small child who could be victimized, and the consequent risk of bodily harm to one or more occupants of the apartment if the police did not intervene — constituted an exigent circumstance that justified officer’s entry for purpose of preventing further violence and rendered discovery of methamphetamine lawful. State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 925 P.2d 1131 (Ct. App. 1996).

Where defendant had just been found unconscious under circumstances suggesting that he was under the influence of drugs, the fact that he was declining treatment did not make unreasonable the paramedics’ belief that he required further attention; therefore, the exigent circumstance had not yet dissipated when police officers entered the motel room while defendant was still on the floor with paramedics continuing to evaluate or treat him, because law enforcement officers may enter premises to seize contraband that was found in plain view by firefighters or other emergency personnel if the exigency is continuing and the emergency personnel are still lawfully present. State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 21 P.3d 491 (Ct. App. 2001).

— Improper.

Where there was no evidence to suggest that defendant was uncooperative, that he had a propensity for violence, or that there were suspicious bulges in his clothing, nor did the officer who frisked defendant testify that he had any information prior to the frisk to indicate that defendant was armed, based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officers on the scene, a reasonably prudent person would have no cause to believe that defendant was armed and dangerous; therefore, the district court erred in determining that the officers were justified in frisking defendant. State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 11 P.3d 489 (Ct. App. 2000).

Because there was no clear request for consent to search defendant’s home, and it could not be inferred that defendant consented to the officers conducting a search to find items that were not in plain view, the search was unreasonable and defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted; the court thus vacated defendant’s conviction of possession of methamphetamine. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 336, 79 P.3d 157 (Ct. App. 2003).

Defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance was improper where the evidence found in his wallet should have been suppressed; although a drug dog’s alert to defendant’s vehicle, and subsequent failure of a search of that vehicle to disclose contraband, might have caused the officers’ suspicions to be aroused, the officers could not lawfully arrest him on the basis of their suspicions and could not reasonably conclude that defendant was in possession of drugs. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 108 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2005).

Where a controlled drug transaction took place at one location in a mobile home park, but a search of that location failed to find any marijuana, and the officer determined that the suspect lived in an adjoining space and obtained a search warrant for that space based solely on the residence of the suspect, the search of the adjoining space was invalid for lack of a nexus between the place to be searched and the item to be seized, and the evidence should have been suppressed. State v. Belden, 148 Idaho 277, 220 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2009).

— Pat-down.

Where a police officer intentionally removed all items from a suspect’s pocket, he acted unreasonably and not in a minimally intrusive fashion, and exceeded the scope of a pat-down search for weapons. The baggy of methamphetamine that the officer removed from defendant’s pocket was, therefore, the fruit of an unreasonable search and should have been suppressed. State v. Watson, 143 Idaho 840, 153 P.3d 1186 (Ct. App. 2007).

Based on a response to a possible burglary, an officer was justified in conducting a Terry frisk that led the officer to the lawful discovery of contraband cigarettes in juvenile defendant’s pocket. Upon defendant’s admission that he also possessed marijuana, the officer was permitted to reach into defendant’s pocket and remove the marijuana. State v. Doe (In re Doe), 145 Idaho 980, 188 P.3d 922 (Ct. App. 2008).

During a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by defendant, a police officer found a number of unused syringes in the defendant’s pocket and a small amount of methamphetamine, another syringe, and other paraphernalia in the vehicle; defendant was not permitted to suppress the evidence as the frisk was justified by officer safety. State v. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 195 P.3d 716 (Ct. App. 2008).

— Private.

Where airport narcotics police had given business cards and profile sheets to airline employees and had given them awards when they provided the police with packages containing controlled substances, airline employee who conducted search of package containing a substance which was later determined to be a controlled substance, who stated that she never saw the profile sheets, that she did not receive any training from the police, that she did not expect to receive a payment when she opened the package, but was simply doing her duty as a citizen, was not an agent of the police, and her search was a private search; thus, defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not impaired. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

— Probable Cause Standard.

Under the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution andIdaho Const., Art. I, § 17, a search warrant may be issued only upon a finding of probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

To determine whether probable cause exists in order to issue a search warrant, a magistrate must employ the totality of circumstances standard set forth in Illinois v. Gates , 402 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), and make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

A magistrate’s evaluation of probable cause is based on facts set forth in an affidavit or any sworn, recorded testimony given in support of the search warrant. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

The stop was valid because the facts as found by the district court provided objectively reasonable grounds to support the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity, where the officer responded at night to a reported burglar alarm at a building that the officer was aware had been burglarized and vandalized in the recent past, and defendant was the only person at the scene of the reported alarm other than the officer. State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 997 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 2000). The affidavit in support of the request for a search warrant contained reliable, nonstale information that an informant had observed growing, harvested, drying and stored marijuana, thus supplying probable cause to the magistrate that a crime was being committed on the property to be searched. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 471, 4 P.3d 1122 (Ct. App. 2000).

— Proper.

Since the discovery of a vial of a controlled substance and its seizure were the result of defendant’s voluntary request for the officer to retrieve a cigarette from defendant’s pocket, the search and seizure did not implicate the fourth amendment of the constitution and suppression was not necessary. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 961 P.2d 641 (1998).

Motion to suppress the evidence was denied where the officer had two warrants for defendant’s arrest and defendant failed to prove that the police officer’s actions of entering the curtilage and looking into the lighted basement window were unreasonable. State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 991 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1999).

Where there were specific and articulable facts and inferences which reasonably warranted a frisk for weapons, and where, during the search for weapons, the defendant removed a container of amphetamines from his pocket and threw it away from his person, defendant’s voluntary abandonment of the container was not tainted by the frisk and its subsequent entry into evidence was proper. State v. Hughes, 134 Idaho 811, 10 P.3d 760 (Ct. App. 2000).

It is not a constitutional violation for an officer to exercise his discretion to check to see if the vehicle is stolen if the license plate has been cancelled, revoked, suspended, or altered; therefore, opening the door of the vehicle to check the vehicle identification number did not rise to the level of a constitutionally prohibited search, and the officer was in a place where he had a lawful right to be when he observed the contraband. State v. Geissler, 134 Idaho 902, 11 P.3d 1120 (Ct. App. 2000).

— Protective Sweep.

Because the bedroom searched by the officer was immediately adjoining the place of defendant’s arrest, the officer could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, enter the bedroom and perform a Type I Buie protective sweep ( Maryland v. Buie , 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990)). State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 991 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1999).

— Review.

Where, while one officer was applying for warrant, other officers entered defendant’s home without warrant and seized drugs defendant informed them about after they told him his pregnant wife could be arrested if drugs were found in common areas, since appellate court can only review those facts which were before the judge when he issued search warrant, and since appellate court was not provided with tape recording or transcript of the oral affidavit of officer obtaining warrant, court could not review whether the information supplied in support of the warrant, exclusive of any alleged reference to illegally obtained information, was sufficient to find probable cause to issue the warrant. State v. Soto, 127 Idaho 324, 900 P.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1995). When probable cause to issue a search warrant is questioned on appeal, the reviewing court’s function is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

Affidavits for search warrants should not be reviewed and tested in a hypertechnical manner; rather such affidavits must be tested and interpreted by both the magistrate and reviewing appellate court in a common sense and realistic fashion. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

Issuance of search warrant based solely on affidavit signed by postal inspector was sufficient to support a search warrant where affidavit stated that U.S. Postal Inspection personnel intercepted the package which appeared suspicious, described the characteristics of the parcel and its mailing label, and similar characteristics of previous mailing to defendant’s address, stated that a check with postal sources at the post office where the mailing originated disclosed that the return address was fictitious, and described the training and experience the police department’s drug-sniffing dog that was used in the investigation and said that the dog alerted to the suspect parcel. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 938 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1997).

— Warrantless.

Warrantless search of a defendant’s vehicle was valid where police officer had made a lawful custodial arrest of the defendant as she attempted to back the vehicle out of its parking spot and such search was conducted as a result of such arrest. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

It was error to deny a motion to suppress evidence of drugs under this section, and drug paraphernalia under§ 37-2734A(1), found in belongings of car passengers when driver was stopped for speeding and vehicle search was a result of officer’s unreasonable extension of the traffic stop and its inherent detention. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.3d 461 (Ct. App. 2002).

In prosecution for possession and trafficking of methamphetamine, trial court erred in denying defendants motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of police officer’s entry, along with firefighters, into defendant’s garage after a fire had been put out. There was no exigency that would allow police to follow emergency personnel into the garage without a search warrant, because the firefighters did not find any contraband or evidence of a crime while investigating the fire’s cause and they did not request the assistance of a police officer. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 136 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2006).

While police officer’s initial detention of defendant was without reasonable suspicion, it ended when defendant jumped up from picnic table where officer was questioning him and ran. Thus, methamphetamine dropped by defendant when he was tackled was not suppressible under the fruit of the poisonous tree theory. Had defendant remained at table, however, evidence would have been suppressible. State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 146 P.3d 697 (Ct. App. 2006).

Where police officers had observed defendant smoking a marijuana cigarette, their statement that defendant would be subject to arrest if he did not turn over what drugs he had did not render defendant’s subsequent consent to search his truck involuntary, as it merely informed defendant of their intention to do something that was within their authority based on the circumstances. State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 152 P.3d 645 (Ct. App. 2006).

Sentencing.

Where the sentence was well within the limits set by the legislature for the punishment of the crime of selling heroin, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to two years in prison although there was a strong showing of rehabilitation made in his favor. State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, 508 P.2d 141 (1973). Since the maximum sentence for violation of this section is 15 years [now life] and/or a $25,000 fine, a sentence of 3 years in prison was not an abuse of discretion. State v. O’Bryan, 96 Idaho 548, 531 P.2d 1193 (1975).

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court in a heroin delivery case to sentence the defendant to an indeterminate period not to exceed eight years pursuant to this section, despite the fact that there was evidence in the record to support mitigation of the punishment, since the record also contained evidence that the defendant was extensively and intentionally involved in the trafficking of heroin and that he was selling extremely pure heroin, which posed the threat of death to the unwary. State v. Gonzales, 102 Idaho 701, 638 P.2d 1390 (1981).

Where the defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver a nonnarcotic drug or substance and the record adequately demonstrated that, prior to sentencing the defendant to the maximum prison sentence permissible, the trial judge closely examined the presentence report, considered six letters submitted on defendant’s behalf, the facts and circumstances of this offense, the defendant’s prior record, the defendant’s previous actions and character, rehabilitation prospects, feasibility of probation, and the interest of society, the trial judge did not clearly abuse his discretion. State v. Couch, 103 Idaho 496, 650 P.2d 638 (1982).

Where defendant was given maximum sentences of five years for offenses of drunk driving and marijuana possession and was not given any reduction for presentence confinement, the term of imprisonment imposed exceeded the statutory maximum. Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455, 660 P.2d 67 (1983).

Punishment of three years probation, 45 days in jail and $1,000 fine was not grossly disproportionate to offense of possession with intent to manufacture, considering the amount of marijuana and paraphernalia seized, nor was it clearly arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 678 P.2d 60 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S. Ct. 296, 83 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984).

Since former§ 18-301 prohibited the trial court from convicting and sentencing the defendant for both conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and aiding and abetting the delivery arising from the defendant’s continuous course of conduct, the appellate court chose to vacate the delivery conviction and affirm the conspiracy conviction based upon a policy of deterrence arising from enforcement of the crime of conspiracy. State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 682 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1984).

Where defendant was convicted of conspiracy to violate the controlled substance law by selling heroin, district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to an indeterminate 15-year term, for heroin is a schedule I controlled substance, and is a “narcotic drug,” and the maximum penalty for the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a schedule I narcotic drug is life imprisonment, a $25,000 fine, or both and defendant’s sentence was well within the statutory maximum. State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 863, 693 P.2d 1065 (Ct. App. 1984).

The trial court possesses discretionary authority to determine an appropriate sentence, within statutory limits. State v. Garza, 109 Idaho 40, 704 P.2d 944 (Ct. App. 1985).

A fixed sentence of ten years for a conviction of delivery of heroin was not excessive where the defendant had two prior convictions for similar offenses; the sentencing judge acted within his discretion in determining that substantial confinement was necessary to protect society from the defendant’s repeated drug trafficking. State v. Garza, 109 Idaho 40, 704 P.2d 944 (Ct. App. 1985). The defendant’s indeterminate five-year sentence for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver was not an abuse of discretion, where the judge could have reasonably concluded that the defendant’s involvement went beyond the sale of a single ounce of marijuana, and the defendant was later convicted of another crime. State v. Paz, 112 Idaho 407, 732 P.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1987).

The three concurrent indeterminate five-year sentences for three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, one for each count, involving a presumed confinement for one and two-third years, was held reasonable when viewed upon the facts. State v. Edwards, 113 Idaho 821, 748 P.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1987).

In prosecution for unlawful delivery of heroin and cocaine, the judge abused his discretion by pronouncing a 30-year indeterminate sentence and by declining to reduce the sentence when requested to do so pursuant to Idaho R. Crim. P. 35, where the defendant had no prior criminal record and was of good character before his involvement in these drug transactions, and his participation in the transactions was encouraged by offers of large sums of money from government agents; 20 years was the heaviest appropriate sanction. State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 757 P.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 787 P.2d 281 (1990).

In prosecution for attempted manufacture of methamphetamine, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to a fixed 15-year prison term, where he intentionally left the state to avoid the sentence, resulting in the forfeiture of the security which was his mother’s home, he was convicted in subsequent drug-involved crimes, and he was previously involved in a killing. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 761 P.2d 1151 (1988).

The court properly denied a motion for a reduction of sentence by defendant convicted of possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver and of theft by possession of stolen property where defendant was sentenced to concurrent, unified sentences of seven years with three years minimum confinement and of five years with three years minimum confinement, and these sentences were well within the statutorily permitted maximum penalties. State v. Garcia, 115 Idaho 559, 768 P.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1989).

Where a unified sentence has been imposed, and where defendant claims that the sentence is excessive, an appellate court examines the minimum period of confinement established by the sentencing court as the probable measure of confinement. State v. Heer, 116 Idaho 969, 783 P.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1989).

Where defendant was convicted of possessing approximately nine pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver and was sentenced as a persistent violator to 30 years with a 15-year minimum term of confinement, and the sentencing judge wanted to send a “message” to drug traffickers, to law enforcement officers and to the public, as well as wanting to protect society, such “message” sentences must be tailored to the facts at hand, and the goals of protecting society and sending a “message” in this case, where defendant’s prior record involved a long history of criminal offenses, but no violent crimes and no activities in controlled substances other than marijuana, did not require a minimum period of incarceration exceeding ten years. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 785 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1989).

It was not necessary for the court to resort to§ 37-2739A for authority to impose a life sentence as a maximum penalty as the offense with which defendant was charged, delivery of a schedule II controlled substance, carries with it the maximum possible penalty of life imprisonment. State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594, 790 P.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1990). A unified sentence of five and one-half years with a one-year minimum confinement period followed by a four and one-half year indeterminate period was not excessive for a conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. State v. Zamora, 118 Idaho 619, 798 P.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1990).

Where the sentencing judge imposed a minimum period of confinement of three years for possession of controlled substance with the intent to deliver, the sentence was reasonable where it accomplished the primary objective of protecting society and met any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Huck, 119 Idaho 10, 802 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App. 1990).

Where sentence imposed, an indeterminate term of nine years with a minimum period of three years’ incarceration, was clearly within the statutory maximum of a fixed life sentence and defendant provided no argument showing that the sentence was unreasonable in light of the facts of his case the sentence was upheld. State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 801 P.2d 1299 (Ct. App. 1990).

Where, although defendant, convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana, did not have a prior felony record, he had a significant misdemeanor record which would give some cause for concern about his willingness and ability to be law abiding, where, in addition, the police found nine ounces of cocaine, 16 ounces of marijuana, $11,900 in cash, drug paraphernalia and other evidence of the sale of controlled substances, where defendant admitted to using cocaine on a daily basis for a period of several years, a pattern which the district court characterized as a $100,000 a year habit, and where the district judge found, and the record supported his finding, that defendant was engaged in a regular activity of selling drugs for profit, namely cocaine, the district judge properly determined that the need to protect society warranted a prison term. State v. Christiansen, 119 Idaho 841, 810 P.2d 1127 (Ct. App. 1990).

Where a sentence imposed for the delivery charge was twice the length of that given for the possession charge, the sentence was not excessive where court’s comments underscored the seriousness of the menace which drug dealing presents to society, and the need to protect against that harmful activity, and in light of the legislature’s implicit determination that delivery of a controlled substance is the more serious crime, warranting a maximum penalty of life imprisonment compared to the three-year maximum sentence provided for possession. State v. Fuller, 118 Idaho 962, 801 P.2d 1313 (Ct. App. 1990).

Although district judge noted that the defendant had no prior record, had children, and was recently remarried, these factors were outweighed by the fact that her ex-husband, and her friends and acquaintances, used and had dealings with drugs, and the court properly determined that one-year of confinement was the best way to keep the defendant from repeating her crime and from being a further threat to the public and to herself. State v. Marks, 119 Idaho 64, 803 P.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1991).

Where the district judge found the defendant was not being fully truthful about her involvement with drugs but was minimizing her drug activities and where defendant’s disregard for orders to appear at court for evaluation further dissuaded the judge from ordering probation initially, the objectives of general deterrence and rehabilitation as stated in the judge’s reasoning satisfied the reasonableness test of the measure of confinement and the sentence of confinement was not an abuse of discretion. State v. Marks, 119 Idaho 64, 803 P.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1991).

Unified sentences of 15 years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years, on two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, heroin, with the sentences to be served concurrently were not unreasonably and excessively harsh and therefore did not constitute an abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion where facts that defendant was 30 years old, divorced with dependent children, was a reliable and hard worker when employed, had no formal education, had considerable familial support and was well liked by his friends, had no prior criminal record had one shoplifting conviction five years earlier and did not smoke, drink or use drugs and expressed contrition and repentance over his involvement with these drug transactions were balanced against the nature of the offense and the protection of the public interest, and the period of incarceration clearly reflect the primary objective of protection of society, and the deterrence both of defendant and other individuals who may be tempted to engage in the distribution of large quantities of heroin or other controlled substances. State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 815 P.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1991). Defendant’s fixed term of two years confinement for delivery of a controlled substance was reasonable in light of the nature of the crimes he committed; the maximum penalty which the district court could have imposed under Idaho law; his character as revealed by his extensive criminal history and the other information contained in his presentence investigation report; and the facts showed that he was a threat to society. State v. Esparza, 120 Idaho 578, 817 P.2d 1102 (Ct. App. 1991).

The district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion where it considered defendant’s extensive criminal background of five felonies and one misdemeanor, and emphasized the court’s concern for the protection of society from the harm that could result from his conduct, and the court considered defendant’s drug and alcohol problem. State v. Hoak, 120 Idaho 415, 816 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1991).

The three-year minimum period of confinement imposed by the trial court did not represent an abuse of discretion where defendant was charged with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine, based on three separate and substantial transactions involving a total amount in excess of $8,000 despite progress reports that were quite favorable. State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1991).

Where defendant sold heroin on five separate occasions to an undercover officer and, simultaneously with his arrest on these charges, he was also arrested on an outstanding federal warrant for illegal entry into the United States and for possessing heroin and cocaine, unified sentences of 20 years in the custody of the board of correction with minimum periods of confinement of ten years was reasonable. State v. Sanchez, 121 Idaho 124, 822 P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1991).

A unified sentence of seven years in the custody of the board of correction for delivery of a controlled substance with a minimum period of confinement of three years, to be served concurrently with a sentence defendant was already serving, was reasonable where defendant was on parole at the time she committed the offense, had background and marital problems, and had unfortunately allowed herself to fall into a “vicious cycle” of association with drug dealers and users and abusers of drugs. State v. Ochoa, 121 Idaho 536, 826 P.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1992).

Although the record revealed that the sentence imposed for the drug possession count was clearly in excess of that provided by this section which limits the period of confinement to a maximum of three years, the Idaho supreme court will not address on appeal a challenge to the legality of a sentence where the trial court was not given an opportunity to consider the issue. State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 828 P.2d 871 (1992).

Where defendant received a sentence of a fixed four year term followed by an indeterminate eight year term for manufacturing of illegal drugs, the record indicated that the trial court took into consideration both the seriousness of the crimes and defendant’s unique background, including his education and lack of any criminal record; furthermore, the sentence for the manufacturing count clearly was within the maximum penalty permitted pursuant to this section; consequently, the sentence imposed for the manufacturing count was not unreasonable under the facts of this case and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s plea for leniency. State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 828 P.2d 871 (1992). A unified sentence of nine years with a minimum period of confinement of two years, for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, was not an abuse of discretion, where although the evidence presentence indicated that defendant’s behavior and attitudes were good, and that he was taking advantage of the programs offered at the Idaho state correctional institution, the district court decided not to reduce the sentence imposed because of the magnitude and seriousness of the crime. State v. Brydon, 121 Idaho 890, 828 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds, State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 21 P.3d 936 (Ct App. 2001).

Where defendant was sentenced to a unified 25 year sentence, with 12 years fixed, for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a fixed five-year term, to run concurrently, for possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces and in addition, the court imposed maximum fines of $25,000 and $10,000 respectively, the sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 829 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1992).

Unified sentences of eight years with minimum periods of confinement of three years on each of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance was not excessive where the primary occupation of the defendant at the time of his arrest was the sale of drugs. State v. Lamas, 121 Idaho 1027, 829 P.2d 1376 (Ct. App. 1992).

A 10-year term which included a minimum of five-years’ incarceration for delivery of heroin was not an abuse of discretion where defendant was in possession of a .45 caliber pistol when he was arrested, he was a party to three drug transactions, and he purportedly was the one from whom the other two defendants got their drugs. State v. Jardin, 121 Idaho 1030, 829 P.2d 1379 (Ct. App. 1992).

A unified sentence of six years imprisonment with a minimum period of confinement of three years delivery of heroin, a controlled substance was not an abuse of discretion where defendant had only recently immigrated to the United States and the facts in the presentence report indicated that he was involved in an organized drug distribution syndicate. State v. Pena, 121 Idaho 1032, 829 P.2d 1381 (Ct. App. 1992).

An eight-year prison term, with five years fixed, for delivery of heroin was not an abuse of discretion where the district judge rejected defense counsel’s argument that the state could ill afford the costs of incarcerating an illegal alien and the terse comments of the judge in sentencing defendant clearly demonstrated his concern for retribution and for the protection of society from the “poison” being distributed by drug traffickers. State v. Perez, 122 Idaho 1, 830 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1992).

Where defendant had been charged with two separate deliveries of heroin and had pled guilty to one count of delivery under an agreement with the state, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the sentence of five to eight years it had previously imposed. State v. Gonzales, 122 Idaho 17, 830 P.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1992).

Because defendant’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum of life imprisonment, and no contention was made that the sentence was otherwise illegal, the court refused to consider the issue of whether sentence of 10 years minimum confinement and $10,000 fine was unduly harsh for conviction of delivery of a controlled substance, heroin. Ruiz v. State, 122 Idaho 222, 832 P.2d 1157 (Ct. App. 1992). The judgment of conviction imposing a unified sentence of five years, including a two-year fixed period of confinement for two counts of delivery of hydromorphone, a controlled substance, was affirmed, where defendant was on parole for a similar crime at the time of the instant offense, and at the time of sentencing was a self-admitted drug addict with an extensive criminal record; although defendant had made an agreement with the prosecutor, whereby certain charges were dismissed and the prosecutor agreed to recommend a lesser sentence, the court was not bound by the sentence recommendation made by the state. State v. Qualls, 122 Idaho 542, 835 P.2d 1353 (Ct. App. 1992).

Where defendant delivered five ounces, approximately 142 grams, of cocaine to an undercover police officer, a sentence of ten years in the custody of the board of correction, including a minimum period of three years’ incarceration, was reasonable. State v. Salgado, 123 Idaho 247, 846 P.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1993).

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a reduction of sentence where defendant’s sentences for drug offenses were reasonable and where defendant committed several disciplinary offenses in prison during the time before the court relinquished jurisdiction. State v. Sapp, 124 Idaho 17, 855 P.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1993).

Where defendant was manufacturing and selling methamphetamine, a minimum period of confinement of seven years on each of three charges, to run concurrently, was not unreasonable. State v. Follinus, 124 Idaho 26, 855 P.2d 863 (1993).

Sentence of forty years with ten years fixed for conspiracy to deliver cocaine was not an abuse of discretion, where defendant admitted to the scope of his involvement with the distribution of drugs in county. State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 861 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1098, 114 S. Ct. 936, 127 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1994).

Sentence of five years and a $5,000 fine for conspiracy to distribute marijuana was not an abuse of discretion, where defendant was heavily involved in drug distribution and refused to fully cooperate with and admit his full involvement to the pre-sentence investigator. State v. Robles-Rivas, 125 Idaho 160, 868 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1993).

Where record did not indicate that district court relied upon unsubstantiated statements offered by the state, yet did indicate that court properly weighed defendant’s previous felony conviction and nature of the instant offense, 10-year sentence, with fixed 2-year term of incarceration, for felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, was not unreasonable and was affirmed. State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 924 P.2d 637 (Ct. App. 1996).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to a sentence that included a fixed imprisonment term of five years where defendant was charged with delivery of heroin and with being a persistent violator, despite defendant’s contention that the court did not give adequate consideration to his drug addiction. State v. Zamora, 129 Idaho 817, 933 P.2d 106 (1997).

Where the maximum sentence for which the crime to which defendant plead guilty was life imprisonment, defendant had the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in sentencing him to a fixed imprisonment term of five years. State v. Zamora, 129 Idaho 817, 933 P.2d 106 (1997).

Sentence for possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school of a fixed minimum term of 5 years to be served consecutively to minimum term of sixty days for the substantive offense was proper and by imposing such sentence the court correctly perceived the mandatory nature of the fixed minimum sentence prescribed by§ 37-2739B and the bounds of its sentencing discretion. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996). While the sentence of twenty years with five years fixed was one of the longest sentences imposed on a first-time youthful drug offender in the state, it was not so harsh as to be unreasonable under any view of the facts. State v. Chareunsouk, 135 Idaho 1, 13 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2000).

Information regarding a defendant’s expressions of political views on the legalization and use of marijuana is relevant to the sentencing decision, for it bears upon the likelihood that the defendant will repeat the crime. State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2001).

There was no abuse of discretion in a sentence imposed for delivery of methamphetamine, which consisted of a unified prison term of seven years with three years determinate, or in a district court’s decision not to reduce defendant’s possession of methamphetamine sentence upon revocation of probation, because (1) at the time of sentencing, defendant had a twenty-year history of criminal offenses relating to alcohol and drug abuse; (2) before the instant offenses, defendant had been convicted three times for driving under the influence, once for unlawfully obtaining a legend drug by fraud, and twice for possession of methamphetamine, in addition to numerous theft offenses; and (3) while on probation for possession of methamphetamine, defendant engaged in the business of selling that drug to others. State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 179 P.3d 360 (Ct. App. 2008).

Where defendant served his entire prison term following a sentence for possession of methamphetamine in violation of this section, state’s jurisdictional challenge to lower court decision was moot since outcome would have no effect on defendant. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 232 P.3d 327 (2010).

— Deportation.

Where the district court did not order defendant’s deportation, but merely made a provision conditioning the suspension of his sentence upon the likely event that he would be deported by a proper federal authority, conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver was affirmed; such provision in a sentence is not an abuse of judicial discretion. State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 411, 925 P.2d 832 (1996).

Specific Factual Allegations.

Where the informations separately charging defendant with the two crimes of manufacturing and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance contained no specific factual allegations showing what acts were alleged to be the basis for each respective crime, and since there were no specific references to separate acts committed at different times in order to satisfy the “temporal” test under former§ 18-301, the district court erred in refusing to dismiss one of the counts against defendant. State v. Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 794 P.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1990).

Unauthorized Possession.

It is immaterial when a controlled substance was acquired, for the offense is the unauthorized possession of a controlled substance, without regard to the time the substance was acquired. State v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483, 600 P.2d 787 (1979).

This section does not provide a penalty for the acquisition of controlled substances prior to the effective date of the act, rather, the penalty it imposes is for continuing to possess a controlled substance after the act’s effective date. State v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483, 600 P.2d 787 (1979). The law itself by classification of marijuana as a drug not used for medicinal purposes, negates the burden on the state to prove absence of a prescription. State v. Segovia, 93 Idaho 208, 457 P.2d 905 (1969) (see§ 37-2745).

Cited

State v. O’Mealey, 95 Idaho 202, 506 P.2d 99 (1973); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969 (1974); State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 534 P.2d 771 (1975); State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho 387, 545 P.2d 475 (1976); State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 627, 550 P.2d 130 (1976); Gibbs v. Shaud, 98 Idaho 37, 557 P.2d 631 (1976); State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834, 573 P.2d 153 (1978); State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 592 P.2d 852 (1979); State v. Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306, 629 P.2d 702 (1981); State v. Salinas, 103 Idaho 54, 644 P.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. Molinelli, 105 Idaho 833, 673 P.2d 433 (1983); State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3, 674 P.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 800, 683 P.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Young, 107 Idaho 671, 691 P.2d 1286 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Peterson, 108 Idaho 463, 700 P.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Rice, 109 Idaho 985, 712 P.2d 686 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 716 P.2d 1328 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Prestwich, 110 Idaho 966, 719 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Forshaw, 112 Idaho 162, 730 P.2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Schaffer, 112 Idaho 1024, 739 P.2d 323 (1987); State v. Burnside, 113 Idaho 65, 741 P.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Nab, 113 Idaho 168, 742 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 744 P.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Molina, 113 Idaho 449, 745 P.2d 1070 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Thompson, 113 Idaho 466, 745 P.2d 1087 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Prestwich, 115 Idaho 317, 766 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 752 P.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Wright, 115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Woodman, 116 Idaho 716, 779 P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Cardenas, 119 Idaho 109, 803 P.2d 1015 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Cervantes, 122 Idaho 238, 832 P.2d 1173 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Barreto, 122 Idaho 453, 835 P.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20, 843 P.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1992); Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 857 P.2d 634 (1993); State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 887 P.2d 1102 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 893 P.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 922 P.2d 1059 (1996); Blewett v. Klauser, 129 Idaho 612, 930 P.2d 1357 (1997); State v. Gett, 130 Idaho 196, 938 P.2d 1234 (1997); State v. Larrea, 130 Idaho 290, 939 P.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 1 P.3d 809 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 32 P.3d 679 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Swader, 137 Idaho 733, 52 P.3d 878 (Ct. App. 2002); United States v. Patzer, 284 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 71 P.3d 1072 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 76 P.3d 990 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 181 P.3d 1249 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 266 P.3d 1161 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 262 P.3d 278 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 262 P.3d 682 (Ct. App. 2011); Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898, 277 P.3d 1050 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 328 P.3d 504 (2014); State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430, 362 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2015); State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 391 P.3d 1252 (2017); State v. Wenzel, 162 Idaho 474, 399 P.3d 145 (Ct. App. 2017); State v. Islas, — Idaho —, 443 P.3d 274 (Ct. App. 2019).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Local Initiatives.

Provisions of local initiatives allowing persons to use marijuana for medicinal purposes declaring that the growth and cultivation of industrial hemp is a positive and beneficial farming activity conflict with state law and are invalid.OAG 07-02.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in state prosecution of narcotics defendant — Marijuana cases. 1 A.L.R.6th 549.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in state prosecution of narcotics defendant — Cocaine cases. 2 A.L.R.6th 551.

Availability of defense of duress or coercion in prosecution for violation of federal narcotics laws. 71 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 481.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Marijuana offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Cocaine and crack cocaine offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 61.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Heroin offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 133.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which aliens can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Illicit methamphetamine offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 151.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Miscellaneous or unspecified narcotics offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 335.

§ 37-2732A. Sacramental use of peyote permitted.

The criminal sanctions provided in this chapter do not apply to that plant of the genus Lophophora Williamii [Williamsii] commonly known as peyote when such controlled substance is transported, delivered or possessed to be used as the sacrament in religious rites of a bona fide native American religious ceremony conducted by a bona fide religious organization; provided, that this exemption shall apply only to persons of native American descent who are members or eligible for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe. Use of peyote as a sacrament in religious rites shall be restricted to Indian reservations as defined in subsection (2) of section 63-3622Z, Idaho Code. A person transporting, possessing or distributing peyote in this state for religious rites shall have on their person a tribal enrollment card, a card identifying the person as a native American church member and a permit issued by a bona fide religious organization authorizing the transportation, possession and distribution of peyote for religious rites.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2732A, as added by 1991, ch. 125, § 1, p. 278.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertion in the first sentence was added by the compiler to supply the correct botanical name of the referenced plant.

§ 37-2732B. Trafficking — Mandatory sentences.

  1. Except as authorized in this chapter, and notwithstanding the provisions of section 37-2732, Idaho Code:
    1. Any person who knowingly manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, one (1) pound of marijuana or more, or twenty-five (25) marijuana plants or more, as defined in section 37-2701, Idaho Code, is guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in marijuana.” If the quantity of marijuana involved:
      1. Is one (1) pound or more, but less than five (5) pounds, or consists of twenty-five (25) marijuana plants or more but fewer than fifty (50) marijuana plants, regardless of the size or weight of the plants, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of one (1) year and fined not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000);
      2. Is five (5) pounds or more, but less than twenty-five (25) pounds, or consists of fifty (50) marijuana plants or more but fewer than one hundred (100) marijuana plants, regardless of the size or weight of the plants, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of three (3) years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000);
      3. Is twenty-five (25) pounds or more, or consists of one hundred (100) marijuana plants or more, regardless of the size or weight of the plants, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of five (5) years and fined not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000).
      4. The maximum number of years of imprisonment for trafficking in marijuana shall be fifteen (15) years, and the maximum fine shall be fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
      5. For the purposes of this section, the weight of the marijuana is its weight when seized or as determined as soon as practicable after seizure, unless the provisions of subsection (c) of this section apply.
    2. Any person who knowingly manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine is guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in cocaine.” If the quantity involved:
      1. Is twenty-eight (28) grams or more, but less than two hundred (200) grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of three (3) years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000);
      2. Is two hundred (200) grams or more, but less than four hundred (400) grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of five (5) years and fined not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);
      3. Is four hundred (400) grams or more, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of ten (10) years and fined not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).
      4. The maximum number of years of imprisonment for trafficking in cocaine shall be life, and the maximum fine shall be one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
    3. Any person who knowingly manufactures or attempts to manufacture methamphetamine and/or amphetamine is guilty of a felony which shall be known as “trafficking in methamphetamine and/or amphetamine by manufacturing.” Any person convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and/or amphetamine by attempted manufacturing shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of two (2) years and not to exceed fifteen (15) years imprisonment and fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Any person convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and/or amphetamine by manufacturing shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of five (5) years and not to exceed life imprisonment and fined not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). The maximum number of years of imprisonment for trafficking in methamphetamine and/or amphetamine by manufacturing shall be life, and the maximum fine shall be one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000). (4) Any person who knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams or more of methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or amphetamine is guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine.” If the quantity involved:
    4. Any person who knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams or more of methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or amphetamine is guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine.” If the quantity involved:
      1. Is twenty-eight (28) grams or more, but less than two hundred (200) grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of three (3) years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000);
      2. Is two hundred (200) grams or more, but less than four hundred (400) grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of five (5) years and fined not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);
      3. Is four hundred (400) grams or more, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of ten (10) years and fined not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).
      4. The maximum number of years of imprisonment for trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine shall be life, and the maximum fine shall be one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
    5. Any person who knowingly manufactures, delivers, brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of the below-specified quantities of any of the following immediate precursors to methamphetamine or amphetamine (namely ephedrine, methylamine, methyl formamide, phenylacetic acid, phenylacetone, or pseudoephedrine) as defined in section 37-2707(g)(1), Idaho Code, or any compound, mixture or preparation which contains a detectable quantity of these substances, is guilty of a felony which shall be known as “trafficking in immediate precursors of methamphetamine or amphetamine.” If the quantity:
      1. Of ephedrine is five hundred (500) grams or more;
      2. Of methylamine is one-half (½) pint or more;
      3. Of methyl formamide is one-quarter (¼) pint or more;
      4. Of phenylacetic acid is five hundred (500) grams or more;
      5. Of phenylacetone is four hundred (400) grams or more;
      6. Of pseudoephedrine is five hundred (500) grams or more;
  2. Any person who agrees, conspires, combines or confederates with another person or solicits another person to commit any act prohibited in subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a felony and is punishable as if he had actually committed such prohibited act.
  3. For the purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of this section the weight of the controlled substance as represented by the person selling or delivering it is determinative if the weight as represented is greater than the actual weight of the controlled substance.

such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of ten (10) years and fined not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). The maximum number of years of imprisonment for trafficking in immediate precursors of methamphetamine or amphetamine in the quantities specified in paragraphs (A) through (F) of this subsection (5) shall be life, and the maximum fine shall be one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000). If the quantity of pseudoephedrine is twenty-five (25) grams or more, but less than five hundred (500) grams, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to ten (10) years and fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). (6) Any person who knowingly manufactures, delivers or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, two (2) grams or more of heroin or any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, or two (2) grams or more of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of any such substance is guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in heroin.” If the quantity involved:

(A) Is two (2) grams or more, but less than seven (7) grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of three (3) years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000);

(B) Is seven (7) grams or more, but less than twenty-eight (28) grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of ten (10) years and fined not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);

(C) Is twenty-eight (28) grams or more, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and fined not less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).

(D) The maximum number of years of imprisonment for trafficking in heroin shall be life, and the maximum fine shall be one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).

(7) A second conviction for any trafficking offense as defined in subsection (a) of this section shall result in a mandatory minimum fixed term that is twice that otherwise required under this section.

(8) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with respect to any person who is found to have violated the provisions of this section, adjudication of guilt or the imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for parole prior to serving the mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment prescribed in this section. Further, the court shall not retain jurisdiction.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2732B, as added by 1992, ch. 336, § 1, p. 1005; am. 1995, ch. 58, § 1, p. 129; am. 1995, ch. 103, § 1, p. 331; am. 1998, ch. 168, § 1, p. 563; am. 1999, ch. 143, § 2, p. 407; am. 2002, ch. 186, § 1, p. 537; am. 2006, ch. 245, § 1, p. 749.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 1995 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

The 1995 amendment, by ch. 58, § 1, in subdivision (a)(2)(A) added “two hundred” preceding “(200) grams” and in subsection (a)(7) in the first sentence added “the” following “adjudication of guilt or” and added “or execution” preceding “of sentence shall not”. The 1995 amendment, by ch. 103, § 1, in subdivision (a) (1) (A) deleted “in excess of” following “is” and added “or more” preceding “but not less than five”; in subdivision (a) (2) (A) added “two hundred” preceding “(200) grams”; in subdivision (a) (5) (C) substituted “fifteen (15)” for “twenty-five (25)” following “mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of”; in subsection (a) (7) in the first sentence deleted “, except as provided in subsection (a) (8) of this section” following “prescribed in this section” and deleted subsection (a) (8).

The 2006 amendment, by ch. 245, in the last paragraph of subsection (5), inserted “in the quantities specified in paragraphs (A) through (F) of this subsection (5)” and added the last sentence.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1995, ch. 103 declared an emergency. Approved March 13, 1995.

CASE NOTES

Concurrent Fines.

Although, under common law and§ 18-308, trial courts may impose concurrent terms of imprisonment, there is no similar authority with regard to concurrent fines. State v. Lemmons, 161 Idaho 652, 389 P.3d 197 (Ct. App. 2017).

Constitutionality.

This section, after its 1995 amendment which deleted the provision allowing the mandatory sentence to be reduced upon the motion of the prosecuting attorney, fully compiles with the requirement ofIdaho Const., Art. V, § 13 that mandatory sentences shall not be reduced and, therefore, such section is constitutional. State v. Puetz, 129 Idaho 842, 934 P.2d 15 (1997).

The amendment to Idaho Const., Art. IV, § 13, effectively circumscribed the power of the courts to suspend a mandatory minimum sentence contained in a statute enacted pursuant to the authority of the constitution; therefore, subsection (a)(7) [now (a)(8)] of this section does not violate the constitution. State v. Pena-Reyes, 131 Idaho 656, 962 P.2d 1040 (1998).

This section is not unconstitutional in that it does not impermissibly abrogate the inherent authority of the courts to suspend sentences, as that authority has been effectively circumscribed byIdaho Const., Art. V, § 13; nor does it deny due process because there is no element of intent, as the legislature elected not to make intent an element of the offense. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 966 P.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1998).

The statute is not unconstitutionally vague because the definition of marijuana plant is clear; it means plants with a root structure attached. State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001).

Statutory fine for trafficking in controlled substances under paragraph (a)(3) was a mandatory sentence imposed by that section and authorized by the Idaho Constitution; therefore, because the Idaho supreme court had upheld the legislative power to mandate minimum sentences, and treated mandatory minimum fines as part of the sentences, the fines, as part of the sentences, did not create a separation of powers violation under theIdaho Const., Art. V, § 13. State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 56 P.3d 780 (Ct. App. 2002).

Due Process.

Where, even if an information had not fully informed defendant of the charge which he had to defend against, trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing, a violation of paragraph (a)(3), the preliminary hearing evidence established that defendant was given notice of how the state intended to present its case, and the evidence which had to be refuted at trial; consequently, defendant could not claim prejudice to his defense, and his due process challenge failed. State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 75 P.3d 203 (Ct. App. 2003).

State did not violate defendant’s due process rights by destroying the hazardous portions of the methamphetamine lab because it was not done in bad faith and the police had no reason to believe that the presence or absence of fingerprints on the lab equipment would have potentially exculpatory value. State v. Edney, 145 Idaho 694, 183 P.3d 782 (Ct. App. 2008).

Duress.
Enhanced Sentence.

Where a defendant picked up a package at the airport that the police knew contained methamphetamine, and where the police officer, who did not tell defendant that he was a police officer, told defendant that he knew what was inside the package and would call police unless she gave him a “pinch” of it, such substance was not delivered under duress for defendant failed to show how her life would be endangered if she had refused to deliver the illegal substance; therefore, trial judge did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the delivery charge. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994). Enhanced Sentence.

The plain language of paragraph (7) clearly demonstrates that, if it is established at the time of sentencing that the conviction for which the defendant is being sentenced is the second trafficking conviction for the defendant, the sentencing court shall apply a mandatory minimum fixed term that is twice what is otherwise required. The plain language does not require that the arrest for the second trafficking offense occur after a defendant’s first trafficking conviction. State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 180, 268 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2010).

Entrapment.

Where defendant picked up a package at the airport that the police knew contained methamphetamine, action of the police officer, who did not tell defendant that he was a police officer, in telling defendant that he knew what was inside the package and would call police unless she gave him a “pinch” of it, was not entrapment since the ruse was not to convince an innocent citizen to commit a crime, but to discover whether defendant knew that the package sent to her contained methamphetamine, and as such, it served as a legitimate method of ferreting out a crime. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

Defendant challenged the description in instruction of the predisposition element of entrapment, that defendant “was not ready and willing to commit the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine before the law enforcement officials spoke” with defendant. However, the instruction called upon the jury to determine whether defendant was predisposed to commit the charged offense “without the actions” of the state or its agent and did not mislead the jury or prejudice defendant. State v. Henry, 138 Idaho 364, 63 P.3d 490 (Ct. App. 2003).

Equal Protection.

Because the classification of persons convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance is neither a suspect classification nor an invidiously discriminatory classification, the rational basis test is used in claims of equal protection violation. State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 977 P.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1998).

Evidence.

In prosecution for delivery of and trafficking in methamphetamine, evidence, that defendant sent two money orders, both for substantial amounts, to the identical person in a city within the same week that two packages were sent from fictitious people and addresses and delivered to defendant through an airline from the same city, made it more probable that defendant was engaged in trafficking methamphetamine and, thus, such evidence was relevant; however, the trial court’s conclusion that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its unfair prejudice was not an abuse of discretion and such evidence was properly admitted. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for trafficking by attempted manufacture of methamphetamine where police found hundreds of pseudoephedrine tablets, lithium batteries, and anhydrous ammonia in defendant’s home. State v. Swader, 137 Idaho 733, 52 P.3d 878 (Ct. App. 2002). In defendant’s drug case, the state’s evidence showing that defendant manufactured or possessed over 2500 grams of a substance that contained methamphetamine was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that defendant violated paragraph (a)(3)(C) [now (a)(4)(C)] by manufacturing or possessing 400 grams or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. State v. Palmer, 138 Idaho 931, 71 P.3d 1078 (Ct. App. 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support jury’s verdict of guilty of aiding and abetting trafficking in cocaine and aiding and abetting failure to affix illegal drug tax stamps where defendant arranged for the sale of cocaine to a confidential informant and accompanied him to the drug dealer’s residence where the sale took place. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003).

Defendant claimed that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and that the jury should have been given the definition of “deliver” contained within§ 37-2701, asserting that an indirect transfer did not equate to a constructive transfer and that the district court’s instruction lessened the state’s burden of proof; however, the jury was instructed from the pattern Idaho criminal jury instructions, which were presumptively correct. Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho 373, 93 P.3d 704 (Ct. App. 2004).

Note written by defendant’s co-conspirator to the co-conspirator’s girlfriend, showing that the co-conspirator was attempting to cover up the crime by dissuading his girlfriend from divulging information to police, was not hearsay; although the note was offered in error under Idaho Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(E), such error was harmless because the note was admissible on other grounds. State v. Harris, 141 Idaho 721, 117 P.3d 135 (Ct. App. 2005).

Even though the district court erred by creating the impression that only a general intent was required to find defendant guilty of conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, the error was harmless, because there was overwhelming evidence that defendant was an active participant in the group, including: (1) a co-conspirator’s testimony that defendant was the group’s boss; (2) the high level of phone contact between defendant’s two phones and his co-conspirators’ phones; (3) when defendant was arrested, officers found inside his vehicle the titles of several of the vehicles used by his co-conspirators in the drug operation; (4) officers watched defendant visiting several of the residences from which the co-conspirators were known to operate and in which drugs, cash, and other paraphernalia were later found; and (5) a document linking the drug operation to Utah, where defendant lived, that provided a breakdown of the drugs transported from Utah. State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 201 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2008).

Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting trafficking in methamphetamine, because the state provided evidence that the principal represented to an undercover officer that the principal was selling 28 grams or more of methamphetamine to the officer, defendant admitted in an interview to being present to offer protection to the principal in both transactions in which the principal sold methamphetamine to the officer, and defendant was paid by the principal in previously marked bills. State v. Wilson, — Idaho —, 438 P.3d 302 (2019).

Fixed Term Sentences.
Forfeiture Improper.

Because the fixed term sentences provided in this section do not fall within the specific limitation on inherent judicial power specified in the 1978 amendment to Idaho Const., Art. 5, § 13, the trial courts are free to exercise their inherent power to impose the fixed term sentences they consider appropriate. State v. Sarabia, 125 Idaho 815, 875 P.2d 227 (1994). Forfeiture Improper.

Trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of defendant’s motorcycle as part of his conviction for trafficking in 28 grams or more of methamphetamine, a violation of paragraph (a)(4)(A), where no drugs were found in the motorcycle, and there was no evidence that defendant had previously used it to obtain the drugs he possessed when arrested or that it facilitated the offense for which he was convicted. State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 84 P.3d 1038 (Ct. App. 2004).

Informants.

In prosecution for delivery and trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of§ 37-2732 and this section, where defendant failed to articulate any basis for her assertion that the in camera hearing was insufficient to protect her rights and also failed to demonstrate how the informant’s identity would have presented her with necessary information that the in camera hearing did not, trial court did not err in refusing to disclose the informant’s identity. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

Information.

Information was sufficient where every element made criminal by paragraph (a)(3) was alleged in the amended information, the elements of offense charged, reference to particular section of the drug trafficking statute, and the information regarding person, place and time involved fairly informed defendant of the charge he had to defend against. State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 75 P.3d 203 (Ct. App. 2003).

It was not error for an information to have charged defendant with both manufacture and attempted manufacture of methamphetamine in the same count of the information, because the statute enumerated a series of acts either of which, separately or all together, could constitute the offense, and all of such acts could have been set forth and charged in a single count. State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 75 P.3d 203 (Ct. App. 2003).

Lesser Included Offenses.

Possession with intent to deliver is not a lesser-included charge of trafficking in methamphetamine under either the statutory or pleading theories. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016).

Jurisdiction.

In defendant’s drug case, where the second amended information was filed increasing the amount of methamphetamine from 28 grams to 400 grams, it did not charge a greater or different offense than the offense charged in the first amended information but merely increased defendant’s potential mandatory minimum sentence. Because the offense charged was the same, it was unnecessary for a preliminary hearing to be conducted on the basis of the amendment, and, accordingly, the court was not deprived of jurisdiction over defendant’s third trial. State v. Palmer, 138 Idaho 931, 71 P.3d 1078 (Ct. App. 2003).

Necessity Defense.
One Act as Multiple Crimes.

Where defendant picked up a package at the airport that the police knew contained methamphetamine, and where police officer, who did not tell defendant that he was a police officer, told defendant that he knew what was inside the package and would call police unless she gave him a “pinch” of it, the delivery of the substance to the police officer was not the result of necessity; defendant’s fear of being held accountable for a crime she had committed could not serve to justify the commission of another offense. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994). One Act as Multiple Crimes.

Although it is possible for a person to violate both this section and 37-2732, this section requires the amount of cocaine involved to be at least twenty-eight grams, while section 37-2732 contains no such quantity requirements. State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 977 P.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1998).

Possession.

In order to establish possession of a controlled substance, a defendant need not have actual physical possession of the substance; the state need only prove that the defendant has such dominion and control over the substance to establish constructive possession. What is crucial to the state’s proof is a sufficient showing of a nexus between the accused and the controlled substance. Knowledge of the existence of controlled substances may be inferred through circumstances. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

Prosecutorial Misconduct.

There was no prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor reiterated what the district court had already instructed, that the state bears the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt and that defendant has no obligation to present evidence; the prosecutor stated that criminal defendants had those and a number of other rights. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003).

In defendant’s drug case, because there was overwhelming evidence that methamphetamine had been manufactured in the house, any prosecutorial misstatement of the law during closing was harmless. The jury instructions provided a proper statement of the law and the jury had been instructed to disregard arguments or statements of counsel that were not based on evidence or the law. State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 193 P.3d 878 (Ct. App. 2008).

Quantities.

It was permissible for the state to establish trafficking under subsection (a)(3) [now (a)(4)] of this section by adding together quantities of methamphetamine found in package received by defendant and in can found in defendant’s car. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

In prosecution for trafficking in methamphetamine which according to subdivision (a)(3) [now (a)(4)] requires possession of at least 28 grams, where package received by defendant contained 27.02 grams and STP can located in defendant’s car contained 6.8 grams, since the can was in defendant’s car and she had just received a package containing a substantial amount of methamphetamine, the same substance as that contained in the can, and although defendant took the package to her car before delivering a sample to an undercover police officer, the package was found unopened in the car indicating that she had extracted the sample from another source within her car, jury could find that defendant had sufficient dominion and control over the can and its contents; thus, trial court did not err in refusing to grant defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the trafficking charge. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994). Under subsections (a)(3) [now (a)(4)] and (c), a defendant may be convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine if the defendant represented the weight of the delivered substance to be twenty-eight grams or more, even if the actual weight was less; therefore, the evidence presented to the jury, showing that defendant represented the amount sold to be one ounce — which is more than 28 grams — was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction. State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 3 P.3d 65 (Ct. App. 2000).

Testimony that defendant represented that the weight of a quantity of methamphetamine was one ounce was, as a matter of law, testimony that the defendant represented that the weight of the methamphetamine was more than 28 grams; one ounce equals 28.35 grams under federal law. There is no requirement that the represented weight be expressed in the wording of the statute. State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 354 P.3d 1186 (2015).

Reduction Denied.

District court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to reduce a sentence for conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamines because a five-year fixed sentence was mandatory. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 69 P.3d 1052 (2003).

Search Warrant.

After excluding the illegally obtained information from the search warrant application, the remaining information contained adequate facts from which the magistrate could have concluded that probable cause existed for issuance of the search warrant. State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 992 P.2d 769 (1999).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in his house where there was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant where information justified an initial vehicle stop, and several grams of methamphetamine, over $900 in cash, and documents that appeared to be drug ledgers were found on defendant, and evidence indicated that defendant’s drug possession at the time of his arrest was not an isolated instance but a part of ongoing drug trade activities; although the evidence did not point directly to defendant’s home as a repository of other contraband, courts are entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense. State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 84 P.3d 1038 (Ct. App. 2004).

Searches.
— Private.
— Probable Cause.

Where airport narcotics police had given business cards and profile sheets to airline employees and had given them awards when they provided the police with packages containing controlled substances, airline employee who conducted search of package containing a substance which was later determined to be a controlled substance, who stated that she never saw the profile sheets, that she did not receive any training from the police, and that she did not expect to receive a payment when she opened the package, but was simply doing her duty as a citizen, was not an agent of the police, and her search was a private search; thus, defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not impaired. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994). — Probable Cause.

The affidavit in support of the request for a search warrant contained reliable, nonstale information that an informant had observed growing, harvested, drying and stored marijuana, thus supplying probable cause to the magistrate that a crime was being committed on the property to be searched. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 471, 4 P.3d 1122 (Ct. App. 2000).

— Warrantless.

Warrantless search of a defendant’s vehicle was valid where police officer had made a lawful custodial arrest of the defendant as she attempted to back the vehicle out of its parking spot and such search was conducted as a result of such arrest. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994).

The protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement was not rendered inapplicable to this case simply because defendant was detained rather than formally arrested at the time the protective sweep occurred. State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 992 P.2d 769 (1999).

The protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement applies when the suspect is arrested/detained outside, rather than inside the residence, provided that the officers have the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support the sweep. State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 992 P.2d 769 (1999).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence after a traffic stop and search of his person where police had reasonable suspicion to stop and search defendant where the detective was aware that defendant had previously been the subject of investigation for illegal drug activity and had just made a brief visit to a residence where a confidential informant had recently made a drug buy and the same informant had told police that the defendant made drug purchases at that location every two or three days and was selling drugs. State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 84 P.3d 1038 (Ct. App. 2004).

Warrantless entry into a residence to preserve evidence of the felony crime of trafficking in marijuana was not invalid because it was done before the search warrant hearing to preserve evidence of a nonviolent crime, and considering the penalty, trafficking in marijuana is not a relatively minor offense. State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 90 P.3d 306 (2004).

Sentence Upheld.

Based upon the seriousness of the offense, the evidence of defendant’s character, and the danger of reoffense that he presented, a unified life sentence with a seven and one-half year determinate term of incarceration and a $ 50,000 fine was not an abuse of the district court’s sentencing discretion. State v. Wilhelm, 135 Idaho 111, 15 P.3d 824 (Ct. App. 2000).

Defendant, convicted of conspiracy to traffic in at least 28 grams of heroin, was properly sentenced to a unified term of life imprisonment with 15 years determinate. State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 90 P.3d 1279 (Ct. App. 2004).

Defendant’s unified sentences of 15 years, with 5 years determinate, were not excessive, as defendant had two prior drug convictions and those sentences had not been enough to deter him from committing additional drug-related crimes. State v. Harris, 141 Idaho 721, 117 P.3d 135 (Ct. App. 2005).

Defendant’s 10-year sentence, with a minimum period of confinement of three years, for trafficking in methamphetamine was appropriate. Although sentence was for a first time felony, it fell well within the minimum of three years and the maximum of life mandated by the provisions of this section for trafficking. State v. Dewitt, 153 Idaho 658, 289 P.3d 60 (Ct. App. 2012). In a case involving trafficking in methamphetamine, an argument that a sentence was excessive was rejected, because the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion in sentencing defendant to a unified term of 10 years, with 4 years fixed. The district court considered the nature of the offense and character of the offender, and the mitigating and aggravating factors and the objectives of protecting society and achieving deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution or punishment. The record also showed that the defendant was actively involved in distributing large amounts of methamphetamine in the community. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016).

Sentencing.

While it is true that Idaho trial courts have broad common law sentencing discretion, the legislature has limited that discretion for sentences in drug trafficking cases by requiring courts to impose mandatory minimum imprisonment terms and fines on each count of trafficking for which a defendant is convicted. State v. Lemmons, 161 Idaho 652, 389 P.3d 197 (Ct. App. 2017).

Single Offense.

Where the district court concluded that defendant could be convicted of only a single offense of trafficking in methamphetamine and amphetamine under paragraph (a)(3) [now (a)(4)], and to remedy the prosecutor’s error in charging and trying defendant for two separate offenses, the district court dismissed one of the counts before sentencing, defendant suffered a judgment of conviction and sentence for only one count, trafficking in methamphetamine. State v. Aguilar, 135 Idaho 894, 26 P.3d 1231 (Ct. App. 2001).

Sufficiency of Information.

In defendant’s drug case, although the information might have been drafted more precisely, the information sufficiently set forth the facts essential to the offense where it alleged that on or about a specific date, in the state of Idaho, defendant knowingly manufactured methamphetamine. State v. Palmer, 138 Idaho 931, 71 P.3d 1078 (Ct. App. 2003).

Unreasonable Sentence.

Where prosecutor’s recommended a unified sentence of fifteen years with ten years fixed and defendant had no prior convictions for trafficking, delivery or possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, district court’s fixed fifteen-year sentence was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion in imposing the maximum possible penalty for what was essentially an intermediate marijuana trafficking offense under this section. State v. Flores, 131 Idaho 285, 955 P.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1998).

Cited

State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 897 P.2d 993 (1995); State v. McGough, 129 Idaho 371, 924 P.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 411, 925 P.2d 832 (1996); State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 996 P.2d 298 (2000); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 266 P.3d 1161 (Ct. App. 2011); Black v. State, 165 Idaho 100, 439 P.3d 1272 (Ct. App. 2019).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in state prosecution of narcotics defendant — Cocaine cases. 2 A.L.R.6th 551.

Availability of defense of duress or coercion in prosecution for violation of federal narcotics laws. 71 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 481.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Marijuana offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Cocaine and crack cocaine offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 61.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Heroin offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 133.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which aliens can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Illicit methamphetamine offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 151.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Miscellaneous or unspecified narcotics offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 335.

§ 37-2732C. Using or being under the influence — Penalties.

  1. Except as authorized in this chapter, it is unlawful for any person on a public roadway, on a public conveyance, on public property or on private property open to the public, to use or be under the influence of any controlled substance specified in subsection (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of section 37-2705, Idaho Code, or subsection (b), (c) and (d) of section 37-2707, Idaho Code, or subsection (c)(6) of section 37-2709, Idaho Code, or any narcotic drug classified in schedule III, IV or V, except when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the state to dispense, prescribe, or administer controlled substances. It shall be the burden of the defense to show that it comes within this exception.
  2. Any person convicted of violating the provisions of subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than six (6) months, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by both.
  3. Any person who is convicted of violating subsection (a) of this section, when the offense occurred within five (5) years of that person being convicted of two (2) or more separate violations of that subsection and who refuses to complete a licensed drug rehabilitation program offered by the court pursuant to subsection (d) shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a mandatory minimum period of time of not less than one hundred twenty (120) days, nor more than one (1) year. The court may not reduce the mandatory minimum period of incarceration provided in this subsection.
  4. The court may, when it would be in the interest of justice, permit any person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section, punishable under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, to complete a licensed drug rehabilitation program in lieu of part or all of the imprisonment in the county jail. As a condition of sentencing, the court may require the offender to pay all or a portion of the drug rehabilitation program. In order to alleviate jail overcrowding and to provide recidivist offenders with a reasonable opportunity to seek rehabilitation pursuant to this subsection, counties are encouraged to include provisions to augment licensed drug rehabilitation programs in their substance abuse proposals and applications submitted to the state for federal and state drug abuse funds.
  5. Notwithstanding subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section, or any other provision of law to the contrary, any person who is unlawfully under the influence of cocaine, cocaine base, methamphetamine, heroin, or phencyclidine while in the immediate personal possession of a loaded, operable firearm is guilty of a public offense and is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail or the state prison for not more than one (1) year. As used in this subsection, “immediate possession” includes, but is not limited to, the interior passenger compartment of a motor vehicle.
  6. Every person who violates subsection (e) of this section is punishable upon the second and each subsequent conviction by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of time not in excess of four (4) years.
History.

(g) In addition to any fine assessed under this section and notwithstanding the provisions of section 19-4705, Idaho Code, the court may, upon conviction, assess an additional cost to the defendant in the way of restitution, an amount not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200) to the arresting and/or prosecuting agency or entity. These funds shall be remitted to the appropriate fund to offset the expense of toxicology testing. History.

I.C.,§ 37-2732C, as added by 1996, ch. 261, § 1, p. 857; am. 2003, ch. 185, § 4, p. 499; am. 2010, ch. 117, § 6, p. 243.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 117, substituted “subsection (c)(6) of section 37-2709” for “subsection (c)(5) of section 37-2709” in the first sentence in subsection (a).

Effective Dates.

Section 6 of S.L. 1996, ch. 261 provided that §§ 1 to 4 of the act should become effective July 1, 1996 and that § 5 should become effective March 28, 1997.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in state prosecution of narcotics defendant — Cocaine cases. 2 A.L.R.6th 551.

§ 37-2733. Prohibited acts B — Penalties.

  1. It is unlawful for any person:
    1. Who is subject to article III of this act to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of section 37-2722, Idaho Code;
    2. Who is a registrant, to manufacture a controlled substance not authorized by his registration, or to distribute or dispense a controlled substance not authorized by his registration to another registrant or other authorized person;
    3. To refuse or fail to make, keep or furnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice or information required under this act;
    4. To refuse an entry into any premises for any inspection authorized by this act; or
    5. Knowingly to keep or maintain any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling, building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other structure or place, which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances in violation of this act for the purpose of using these substances, or which is used for keeping or selling them in violation of this act.
  2. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2733, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 409, § 2, p. 1195.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The phrase “article III of this act”, in subdivision (a)(1), refers to article III of the provisions enacted by S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which are now codified as§§ 37-2715 to 37-2731.

The words “this act”, in paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) in subsection (a), refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 5 of S.L. 1972, ch. 409, provided this act shall take effect on and after July 1, 1972.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

A.L.R.

A.L.R. — What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Miscellaneous or unspecified narcotics offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 335.

§ 37-2734. Prohibited acts C — Penalties.

  1. It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally:
    1. To distribute as a registrant a controlled substance classified in schedule I or II, except pursuant to the requirements of section 37-2722, Idaho Code;
    2. To use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a registration number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person;
    3. To acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge;
    4. To furnish false or fraudulent material information in, or omit any material information from, any application, report, or other document required to be kept or filed under this act, or any record required to be kept by this act; or
    5. To make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling thereof so as to render the drug a counterfeit substance.
  2. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than four (4) years, or fined not more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), or both.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2734, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 7, p. 261; am. 1972, ch. 409, § 3, p. 1195; am. 2018, ch. 36, § 10, p. 68.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 36, substituted “schedule I or II, except pursuant to the requirements of section 37-2722, Idaho Code” for “schedules I or II, except pursuant to an order form as required by section 37-2721, Idaho Code” in paragraph (1)(a).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act”, in subdivision (a)(4), refers to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect on and after July 1, 1972.

Section 5 of S.L. 1972, ch. 409, provided this act shall take effect on and after July 1, 1972.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 924 P.2d 637 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Summers, 152 Idaho 35, 266 P.3d 510 (Ct. App. 2011).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

A.L.R.

A.L.R. — What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Miscellaneous or unspecified narcotics offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 335.

§ 37-2734A. Prohibited acts D — Penalties.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance.
  2. It is unlawful for any person to place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia.
  3. Any person who is in violation of the provisions of subsections (1) and/or (2) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2734A, as added by 1980, ch. 388, § 2, p. 977; am. 1990, ch. 311, § 1, p. 851.

CASE NOTES

Evidence.

Because the officer lawfully entered the bedroom to conduct a Type I protective sweep subsequent to defendant’s arrest pursuant to the warrants, and upon entering the bedroom observed, in plain view, the contraband which was the basis of the criminal charges, the evidence was lawfully seized. State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 991 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1999).

Evidence of defendant’s prior drug use was admissible because it was not presented to show his character or to show that he acted in conformity with a particular trait of character, rather, the challenged evidence was relevant to prove the specific intent element of the charged offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 590, 6 P.3d 840 (Ct. App. 2000).

Lawful Entry.

Motion to suppress the evidence was denied where the officer had two warrants for defendant’s arrest and defendant failed to prove that the police officer’s actions of entering the curtilage and looking into the lighted basement window were unreasonable. State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 991 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1999).

Where defendant had just been found unconscious under circumstances suggesting that he was under the influence of drugs, the fact that he was declining treatment did not make unreasonable the paramedics’ belief that he required further attention; therefore, the exigent circumstance had not yet dissipated when police officers entered the motel room while defendant was still on the floor with paramedics continuing to evaluate or treat him, because law enforcement officers may enter premises to seize contraband that was found in plain view by firefighters or other emergency personnel if the exigency is continuing and the emergency personnel are still lawfully present. State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 21 P.3d 491 (Ct. App. 2001). Evidence of drug paraphernalia was not suppressible on the ground that the seizing officer illegally entered defendant’s home because the officer did not derive this evidence from any exploitation of the unlawful entry; rather, it was found in a search incident to an arrest for battery of the officer and, thus, was not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 198 P.3d 735 (Ct. App. 2008).

Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

Possession of drug paraphernalia is not a “lesser included offense” of the crime of possession of cocaine. The instruction requested by defendant on possession of paraphernalia only served to suggest a crime that could have been, but was not, directly or indirectly charged. Therefore, the court was not required to give any instruction about the crime of possession of paraphernalia. State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 838 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1992).

An instruction requiring the state to prove not only that the defendant possessed paraphernalia while in the state of Idaho, but also that he intended to use that paraphernalia to introduce a controlled substance into the body, is an accurate statement of the law State v. Mann, 162 Idaho 36, 394 P.3d 79 (2017).

Probable Cause.

If an officer observes a marijuana pipe in plain view, in actual or constructive possession of a person, he has probable cause to arrest that individual for violating this section. State v. Chambliss, 116 Idaho 988, 783 P.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1989).

Searches.

It was error to deny a motion to suppress evidence of drugs under§ 37-2732(c)(3) and drug paraphernalia, subsection (1) of this section, found in belongings of car passengers when driver was stopped for speeding and vehicle search was a result of officer’s unreasonable extension of the traffic stop and its inherent detention. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.3d 461 (Ct. App. 2002).

During a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by defendant, a police officer found a number of unused syringes in his pocket and a small amount of methamphetamine, another syringe, and other paraphernalia in the vehicle; defendant was not permitted to suppress the evidence as the frisk was justified by officer safety. State v. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 195 P.3d 716 (Ct. App. 2008).

Cited State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 P.2d 856 (1985); State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 562, 961 P.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 1 P.3d 809 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 11 P.3d 489 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 266 P.3d 1161 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Tryon, 164 Idaho 254, 429 P.3d 142 (2018); State v. Islas, — Idaho —, 443 P.3d 274 (Ct. App. 2019).

Cited
Local Initiatives.

Provisions of local initiatives allowing persons to use marijuana for medicinal purposes declaring that the growth and cultivation of industrial hemp is a positive and beneficial farming activity conflict with state law and are invalid.OAG 07-02.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Marijuana offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Cocaine and crack cocaine offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 61.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which aliens can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Illicit methamphetamine offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 151.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Miscellaneous or unspecified narcotics offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 335.

§ 37-2734B. Prohibited acts E — Penalties.

It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance. Any person who is in violation of this section is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than nine (9) years, fined not more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), or both.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2734B, as added by 1980, ch. 388, § 3, p. 977.

CASE NOTES

Use.

In essence,§ 37-2701 and this section require a double-layered state of mind: Under§ 37-2701 the defendant must first have marketed or designed an item with the intent that it be used with illegal drugs before his or her knowledge, or imputed knowledge, of its use by a buyer or retailer comes into play under this section; thus, so-called constructive knowledge only becomes an issue where the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that the defendant intended to market or design items to be used to produce, store, or consume illegal drugs and then delivered, possessed with intent to deliver, or manufactured with intent to deliver such items; and it is only after the defendant has passed this threshold, that he or she is then obligated to become aware of objective facts that would fairly indicate the use for which the item was acquired. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 P.2d 856 (1985).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Miscellaneous or unspecified narcotics offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 335.

§ 37-2734C. Prohibited acts F — Penalties.

  1. A person is guilty of the crime of unlawful storage of anhydrous ammonia in a container that:
    1. Is not approved by the United States department of transportation to hold anhydrous ammonia; or
    2. Was not constructed to meet state and federal industrial health and safety standards for holding anhydrous ammonia.
  2. Violation of this section is a felony.
  3. This section does not apply to public employees or private contractors authorized to clean up and dispose of hazardous waste or toxic substances pursuant to the provisions of chapter 22, title 49, Idaho Code.
  4. Any damages arising out of the unlawful possession of, storage of, or tampering with anhydrous ammonia equipment shall be the sole responsibility of the person or persons unlawfully possessing, storing or tampering with the anhydrous ammonia. In no case shall liability for damages arising out of the unlawful possession of, storage of, or tampering with anhydrous ammonia or anhydrous ammonia equipment extend to the lawful owner, installer, maintainer, designer, manufacturer, possessor or seller of the anhydrous ammonia or anhydrous ammonia equipment, unless such damages arise out of the acts or omissions of the owner, installer, maintainer, designer, manufacturer, possessor or seller that constitute negligent misconduct to abide by the laws regarding anhydrous ammonia possession and storage.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2734C, as added by 2002, ch. 257, § 3, p. 747.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

A.L.R.

A.L.R. — What constitutes “aggravated felony” for which alien can be deported or removed under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)) — Miscellaneous or unspecified narcotics offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 335.

§ 37-2735. Penalties under other laws.

Any penalty imposed for violation of this act is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction otherwise authorized by law.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2735, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in this section refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-2735A. Drug hotline fee.

In addition to any other penalties, a person convicted of a violation of this chapter shall be subject to an additional fine of ten dollars ($10.00) to be deposited in the drug and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund, as set forth in section 57-816, Idaho Code, to be used for the purposes designated in that section.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2735A, as added by 2006, ch. 113, § 1, p. 308; am. 2009, ch. 108, § 4, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2009 amendment, by ch. 108, inserted “and driving while under the influence.”

§ 37-2736. Bar to prosecution.

If a violation of this act is a violation of a federal law or the law of another state, a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2736, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act”, in this section, refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-2737. Distribution to persons under age 18.

Any person eighteen (18) years of age or over who violates section 37-2732(a), Idaho Code, by distributing any nonnarcotic drug classified in schedule I, or any controlled substance classified in schedule III, IV, V, or VI, to a person under eighteen (18) years of age who is at least three (3) years his junior is punishable by the fine authorized by section 37-2732(a)(1)(B), (C) or (D), Idaho Code, by a term of imprisonment of up to twice that authorized by section 37-2732(a)(1)(B), (C) or (D), Idaho Code, or by both.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2737, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1990, ch. 268, § 2, p. 755.

§ 37-2737A. Manufacture or delivery of controlled substance where children are present.

  1. Except as authorized in this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture or deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance as defined in schedules I, II, III and IV in this chapter, upon the same premises where a child under the age of eighteen (18) years is present.
  2. As used in this section, “premises” means any:
    1. Motor vehicle or vessel;
    2. Dwelling or rental unit including, but not limited to, apartment, townhouse, condominium, mobile home, manufactured home, motel room or hotel room;
    3. Dwelling house, its curtilage and any other outbuildings.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, a person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for a term not to exceed five (5) years, fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or be both so imprisoned and fined.
  4. A person who violates the provisions of this section by manufacturing or delivering, or possessing with the intent to manufacture or deliver, methamphetamine or amphetamine in quantities as specified in section 37-2732B(a)(4), Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for a term of up to ten (10) years, fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or be both so imprisoned and fined.
  5. Any fine imposed under the provisions of this section shall be in addition to the fine imposed for any other offense, and any term of imprisonment shall be consecutive to any term imposed for any other offense, regardless of whether the violation of the provisions of this section and any of the other offenses have arisen from the same act or transaction.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2737A, as added by 1991, ch. 275, § 1, p. 711; am. 2006, ch. 76, § 1, p. 234.

STATUTORY NOTES

Amendments.

The 2006 amendment, by ch. 76, inserted “Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section” at the beginning of subsection (3); added present subsection (4); and redesignated former subsection (4) as present subsection (5).

Compiler’s Notes.

Schedules I, II, III and IV, referred to in subsection (1) of this section, are compiled as§§ 37-2705, 37-2707, 37-2709 and 37-2711.

CASE NOTES

Not Multiple Punishments.

Defendant’s sentence did not violate the statutory prohibition against multiple punishments for the same act or omission, as this section provides that the defendant’s crime of manufacture or delivery of controlled substances where children were present is specifically excepted from the§ 18-301 prohibition against multiple punishment for the same act or omission. State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 890 P.2d 323 (1995).

Cited

State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 915 P.2d 14 (1996); State v. Swader, 137 Idaho 733, 52 P.3d 878 (Ct. App. 2002).

§ 37-2738. Sentencing criteria in drug cases.

  1. Any person who pleads guilty to, is found guilty of or has a judgment of conviction entered upon a violation of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), (c) or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, shall be sentenced according to the criteria set forth herein.
  2. Prior to sentencing for a violation enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, the defendant shall undergo, at his own expense (or at county expense through the procedures set forth in chapters 34 and 35, title 31, Idaho Code), a substance abuse evaluation at a facility approved by the Idaho department of health and welfare. Provided however, if the defendant has no prior or pending charges under the provisions of subsection (a), (b), (c) or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, and the court does not have any reason to believe that the defendant regularly abuses drugs and is in need of treatment, the court may, in its discretion, waive the evaluation with respect to sentencing for a violation of subsection (b), (c)(3), or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, and proceed to sentence the defendant. The court may also, in its discretion, waive the requirement of a substance abuse evaluation with respect to a defendant’s violation of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), (c) or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, and proceed to sentence the defendant if the court has a presentence investigation report, substance abuse assessment, criminogenic risk assessment, or similar assessment which has evaluated the defendant’s need for substance abuse treatment conducted within twelve (12) months preceding the date of the defendant’s sentencing.
  3. In the event a substance abuse evaluation indicates the need for substance abuse treatment, the evaluation shall recommend an appropriate treatment program, together with the estimated costs thereof, and recommendations for other suitable alternative treatment programs, together with the estimated costs thereof. The person shall request that a copy of the completed evaluation be forwarded to the court. The court shall take the evaluation into consideration to determine an appropriate sentence. If a copy of the completed evaluation has not been provided to the court, the court may proceed to sentence the defendant; however, in such event it shall be presumed that substance abuse treatment is needed unless it is shown by a preponderance of evidence that treatment is not required. If the defendant has not made a good faith effort to provide the completed copy of the evaluation to the court, the court may consider the failure of the defendant to provide or report an aggravating circumstance in determining an appropriate sentence. If treatment is ordered, the person or facility performing the evaluation shall not be the person or facility that provides the treatment, unless this requirement is waived by the sentencing court, and with the exception of federally recognized Indian tribes or federal military installations where diagnoses and treatment are appropriate and available. Nothing herein contained shall preclude the use of funds authorized pursuant to the provisions of chapter 3, title 39, Idaho Code, for court ordered substance abuse treatment for indigent defendants.
  4. When sentencing an individual for the crimes enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, the court shall not enter a withheld judgment unless it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
    1. The defendant has no prior finding of guilt for any felony, any violation of chapter 80, title 18, Idaho Code, or subsection (a), (b), (c) or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, whatsoever; and
    2. The sentencing court has an abiding conviction that the defendant will successfully complete the terms of probation; and (c) The defendant has satisfactorily cooperated with law enforcement authorities in the prosecution of drug related crimes of which the defendant has previously had involvement.
  5. Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of the Idaho Code identified in subsection (1) of this section shall, when granted a probationary period of any sort whatsoever, be required by the court to complete a period of not less than one hundred (100) hours of community service work.

The requirements for the granting of a withheld judgment pursuant to this subsection shall not apply to a defendant who has been admitted to a problem solving court program approved by the drug court and mental health court coordinating committee and is participating in, or about to begin participating in, such a program, or who participated in such a problem solving court program in connection with the pending case and who successfully graduated from such a program prior to sentencing.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2738, as added by 1989, ch. 174, § 2, p. 423; am. 2003, ch. 285, § 1, p. 770; am. 2004, ch. 22, § 1, p. 24; am. 2016, ch. 161, § 1, p. 444.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-2738, which comprised I.C.,§ 37-2738, as added by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939, was repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 174, § 1.

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 161, added the last paragraph in subsection (4).

CASE NOTES

Community Service.

Subsection (5) requires a person convicted of possession of a controlled substance to complete a minimum one hundred hours of community service. UnderIdaho Const., Art. V, § 13, a magistrate may not suspend any hours of that community service below the statutory minimum. State v. Garcia-Pineda, 154 Idaho 482, 299 P.3d 794 (Ct. App. 2013).

Substance Abuse Evaluations.
Withheld Sentence.

This section places the burden of getting a substance abuse evaluation, and providing a copy to the court, squarely on the shoulders of the defendant, but does not empower a defendant to prevent sentencing indefinitely by declining to obtain or furnish an evaluation to the court. State v. Furlong, 132 Idaho 526, 975 P.2d 1191 (Ct. App. 1999). Withheld Sentence.

Since the judiciary does not have the “inherent power” to withhold judgments, then any such power conferred on the courts by the legislature may be abrogated by statute. Thus, a withheld sentence that does not meet the standards of this section is invalid and must be corrected under the state’s motion. State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 919 P.2d 319 (1996).

§ 37-2739. Second or subsequent offenses.

  1. Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this act, who is not subject to a fixed minimum term under section 37-2739B, Idaho Code, may be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized, fined an amount up to twice that otherwise authorized, or both.
  2. For purposes of this section, an offense is considered a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to his conviction of the offense, the offender has at any time been convicted under this act or under any statute of the United States or of any state relating to narcotic drugs, marijuana, depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drugs.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2739, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 8, p. 261; am. 1990, ch. 268, § 3, p. 755.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in this section refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 191 P.3d 240 (Ct. App. 2008).

§ 37-2739A. Mandatory minimum penalty.

Any person who is convicted of violating the felony provisions of section 37-2732(a), Idaho Code, by distributing controlled substances to another person, who is not subject to a fixed minimum term under section 37-2739B, Idaho Code, and who has previously been convicted within the past ten (10) years in a court of the United States, any state or a political subdivision of one or more felony offenses of dealing, selling or trafficking in controlled substances on an occasion or occasions different from the felony violation of section 37-2732(a), Idaho Code, and which offense or offenses were punishable in such court by imprisonment in excess of one (1) year, shall be sentenced to the custody of the state board of correction for a mandatory minimum period of time of not less than three (3) years or for such greater period as the court may impose up to a maximum of life imprisonment. The mandatory minimum period of three (3) years incarceration shall not be reduced and shall run consecutively to any other sentence imposed by the court.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2739A, as added by 1981, ch. 88, § 1, p. 122; am. 1990, ch. 268, § 4, p. 755.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of correction,§ 20-201 et seq.

CASE NOTES

Admission.

To be used to enhance a sentence under this section, an admission to an earlier, qualifying offense must be voluntary; that is, it must be made with a full understanding of the consequences. State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 180, 268 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2010).

Legislative Intent.
Maximum Sentence.

It is clear from this section that the legislature intended that mandatory minimum sentences be imposed for violations defined herein, notwithstanding the indeterminate sentence law. State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594, 790 P.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1990). Maximum Sentence.

It was not necessary for the court to resort to this section for authority to impose a life sentence as a maximum penalty as the offense with which defendant was charged, delivery of a schedule II controlled substance, carries with it the maximum possible penalty of life imprisonment. State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594, 790 P.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1990).

Minimum Sentence.

When this section is applicable to a given case, it is permissible for a sentencing court to order, under§ 19-2513, a minimum period of incarceration that includes the minimum mandatory requirement of three years set forth in this section. State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594, 790 P.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1990).

§ 37-2739B. Fixed minimum sentences in drug cases.

  1. The legislature intends to allow fixed minimum sentences for certain aggravating factors found in cases brought under the uniform controlled substances act. The legislature hereby finds and declares that trafficking in controlled substances in the state of Idaho is a primary contributor to a societal problem that causes loss of life, personal injury and theft of property, and exacts a tremendous toll on the citizens of this state. To afford better protection to our citizens from those who traffic in controlled substances, the fixed minimum sentencing contained in subsections (b) and (c) of this section is enacted. By enacting fixed minimum sentences, the legislature does not seek to limit a court’s power to impose a greater sentence pursuant to section 19-2513, Idaho Code.
  2. Any person who is found guilty of violating the provisions of section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or of any attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, may be sentenced to a fixed minimum term of confinement to the custody of the state board of correction, which term shall be at least five (5) years and may extend to life, for each of the following aggravating factors found by the trier of fact:
    1. That the defendant has previously been found guilty of or convicted of a violation of section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or of an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, or an offense committed in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this jurisdiction, would be punishable as a violation of section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or as an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense.
    2. That the violation occurred on or within one thousand (1,000) feet of the property of any public or private primary or secondary school, or in those portions of any building, park, stadium or other structure or grounds which were, at the time of the violation, being used for an activity sponsored by or through such a school.
    3. That the violation consisted of the delivery or attempted delivery of a controlled substance to a minor child under the age of eighteen (18) years.
  3. The fixed minimum terms provided in this section may be imposed where the aggravating factors are separately charged in the information or indictment and admitted by the accused or found to be true by the trier of fact at the trial of the substantive crime; provided, however, that the prosecutor shall give notice to the defendant of intent to seek a fixed penalty at least fourteen (14) days prior to trial. During a fixed minimum term of confinement imposed under this section, the offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct except for meritorious service. Each fixed minimum term imposed shall be served consecutively to the others, and consecutively to any minimum term of confinement imposed for the substantive offense.
  4. Any person who is found guilty of violating the provisions of section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or of any attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, and who is sentenced to serve at least one (1) minimum term of confinement under this section, may be fined an amount up to twice that otherwise provided for the substantive offense.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2739B, as added by 1990, ch. 268, § 1, p. 755.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of correction,§ 20-201 et seq.

Uniform controlled substances act,§ 37-2751 and notes thereto.

CASE NOTES

Conflict With Other Statutes.

Any conflict between§ 18-301 (now repealed) which prohibited double punishment where a single act resulted in the commission of two or more crimes and this section which provides for a sentence enhancement for commission of a drug crime within 1000 feet of a school, must be resolved in favor of the more recent, special statute, this section. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Construction.

Subsection (b)(2) of this section creates liability from two perspectives: (1) where the offense occurs on or within 1000 feet of a primary or secondary school; and (2) where the offense occurs in that portion of a building, park, stadium or other structure or grounds, which was at the time of the violation being used for an activity sponsored by a primary or secondary school. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Double Jeopardy.

Where defendant was charged with a single crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver subject to an enhanced penalty,§ 19-1719 did not apply. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Since the intent of the legislature in enacting this section clearly was to provide for an enhanced minimum term of confinement as a penalty upon the commission of drug offenses within 1000 feet of schools, defendant’s claim, that since possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance,§ 37-2732(a)(1)(A), is a lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school, this section, and he was convicted of both charges he suffered multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of double jeopardy protection, must fail. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Evidence.

Since information charged that defendant possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a private, primary or secondary school, there was no need for the state to produce any evidence with respect to the school property other than as to its location and the distance between that location and where defendant possessed the controlled substance and was not required to prove that the school was in use when he possessed the substance. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

There was sufficient evidence to support conviction of possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a primary or secondary school where police officer testified as to measurements he had taken from the alley behind the house where the car containing the controlled substance was located to the property of the primary school and that such measurements showed that the offense was committed within the 1000 feet distance set forth in the statute. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Mandatory Confinement.

Where defendant pled guilty to two counts of delivery of a controlled substance and one aggravating factor for having a prior conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, the court properly sentenced defendant to a unified term of fifteen years on the first count of delivery of a controlled substance, including a fixed minimum term of five years for the prior conviction enhancement, and a unified term of fifteen years, with five years fixed, for the second count. This section requires a fixed minimum term of confinement; the district court is without power to suspend the sentence, withhold judgment, or retain jurisdiction State v. Patterson, 148 Idaho 166, 219 P.3d 813 (Ct. App. 2009).

Sentence Proper.

Sentence for possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school of a fixed minimum term of 5 years to be served consecutively to minimum term of 60 days for the substantive offense was proper. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Cited

State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 890 P.2d 323 (1995).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

§ 37-2739C. Medical assistance — Drug-related overdose — Prosecution for possession.

  1. A person acting in good faith who seeks medical assistance for any person experiencing a drug-related medical emergency shall not be charged or prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance pursuant to section 37-2732(c) or (e), Idaho Code, for using or being under the influence of a controlled substance pursuant to section 37-2732C(a), Idaho Code, or for using or possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia pursuant to section 37-2734A(1), Idaho Code, if the evidence for the charge of possession of or using or being under the influence of a controlled substance or using or possessing drug paraphernalia was obtained as a result of the person seeking medical assistance.
  2. A person who experiences a drug-related medical emergency and is in need of medical assistance shall not be charged or prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance pursuant to section 37-2732(c) or (e), Idaho Code, for using or being under the influence of a controlled substance pursuant to section 37-2732C(a), Idaho Code, or for using or possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia pursuant to section 37-2734A(1), Idaho Code, if the evidence for the charge of possession of or using or being under the influence of a controlled substance or using or possessing drug paraphernalia was obtained as a result of the medical emergency and the need for medical assistance.
  3. The protections in this section from prosecution shall not be grounds for suppression of evidence in other criminal charges.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2739C, as added by 2018, ch. 265, § 1, p. 637.

Idaho Code Art. V

Article V

§ 37-2740. Powers of enforcement personnel.

  1. Any peace officer, as defined by this act, may:
    1. Carry firearms in the performance of his official duties;
    2. Execute and serve search warrants, arrest warrants, administrative inspection warrants, subpoenas, and summonses issued under the authority of this state;
    3. Make arrests without warrant for any offense under this act committed in his presence, or if he has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a violation of this act which may constitute a felony or a misdemeanor;
    4. Make seizures of property pursuant to this act.
  2. The director of the Idaho state police shall administer the state-level program of Idaho to suppress the unlawful traffic and abuse of controlled substances and shall have the authority to appoint and commission agents to enforce the provisions of this act.
  3. All duly authorized peace officers while investigating offenses under this act in the performance of their official duties, and any person working under their immediate direction, supervision, or instruction, provided such person shall not deviate from the lawful direction of the peace officer, are immune from prosecution under this act.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2740, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 9, p. 261; am. 1974, ch. 27, § 80, p. 811; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 87, p. 1450.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act”, in the introductory paragraph in subsection (a) and in subsections (b) and (c), refers to S.L. 1972, ch. 133, which is codified as§§ 37-2701, 37-2702, 37-2707, 37-2709, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2734, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2743, 37-2744, 37-2745, and 37-2747. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

The words “this act”, in subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(4), refer to S.L. 1971, ch. 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133 provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

CASE NOTES

Probable Cause.

Where the officer was dispatched to investigate a report of suspicious activities by three men at a public rest room, the officer’s way into the rest room was temporarily blocked by one of the individuals, after the officer entered, he found two other persons conversing inside a doorless toilet stall, one of the men dropped a syringe, and the officer observed track marks on the defendant’s arms as well as a cut-off soda pop can with a singed bottom, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia, and the discovery of heroin, during a search incident to the arrest, was lawful. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 756 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

A.L.R.

A.L.R. — Construction and Application of § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)), and Predecessor Provision, Rendering Inadmissible Any Alien Convicted of, or Who Admits to, Violating Federal, State, or Foreign Laws Relating to Controlled Substances. 93 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

§ 37-2741. Administrative inspections and warrants.

  1. Issuance and execution of administrative inspection warrants shall be as follows:
    1. A magistrate, within his jurisdiction, and upon proper oath or affirmation showing probable cause, may issue warrants for the purpose of conducting administrative inspections authorized by this act or rules hereunder, and seizures of property appropriate to the inspections. For purposes of the issuance of administrative inspection warrants, probable cause exists upon showing a valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this act or rules hereunder, sufficient to justify administrative inspection of the area, premises, building or conveyance in the circumstances specified in the application for the warrant;
    2. A warrant shall issue only upon an affidavit of a designated officer or employee having knowledge of the facts alleged, sworn to before the judge or magistrate and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the judge or magistrate is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the area, premises, building, or conveyance to be inspected, the purpose of the inspection, and, if appropriate, the type of property to be inspected, if any. The warrant shall:
      1. State the grounds for its issuance and the name of each person whose affidavit has been taken in support thereof;
      2. Be directed to a person authorized by section 37-2740, Idaho Code, to execute it;
      3. Command the person to whom it is directed to inspect the area, premises, building, or conveyance identified for the purpose specified and, if appropriate, direct the seizure of the property specified;
      4. Identify the item or types of property to be seized, if any;
      5. Direct that it be served during normal business hours and designate the judge or magistrate to whom it shall be returned;
    3. A warrant issued pursuant to this section must be executed and returned within ten (10) days of its date unless, upon a showing of a need for additional time, the court orders otherwise. If property is seized pursuant to a warrant, a copy shall be given to the person from whom or from whose premises the property is taken, together with a receipt for the property taken. The return of the warrant shall be made promptly, accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken. The inventory shall be made in the presence of the person executing the warrant and of the person from whose possession or premises the property was taken, if present, or in the presence of at least one (1) credible person other than the person executing the warrant. A copy of the inventory shall be delivered to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken and to the applicant for the warrant;
    4. The judge or magistrate who has issued a warrant shall attach thereto a copy of the return and all papers returnable in connection therewith and file them with the clerk of the court in the county in which the inspection was made.
  2. The board may make administrative inspections of controlled premises in accordance with the following provisions:
    1. For purposes of this section only, “controlled premises” means:
      1. Places where persons registered or exempted from registration requirements under this act are required to keep records; and
      2. Places including factories, warehouses, establishments, and conveyances in which persons registered or exempted from registration requirements under this act are permitted to hold, manufacture, compound, process, sell, deliver, or otherwise dispose of any controlled substance. (2) When authorized by an administrative inspection warrant issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section an officer or employee designated by the board, upon presenting the warrant and appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, may enter controlled premises for the purpose of conducting an administrative inspection.
      3. Inventory any stock of any controlled substance therein and obtain samples thereof;
      4. In any other exceptional or emergency circumstance where time or opportunity to apply for a warrant is lacking; or
      5. In all other situations in which a warrant is not constitutionally required;

(3) When authorized by an administrative inspection warrant, an officer or employee designated by the board may:

(A) Inspect and copy records required by this act to be kept;

(B) Inspect, within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, controlled premises and all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished material, containers and labeling found therein, and, except as provided in subsection (b)(5) of this section, all other things therein, including records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities bearing on violation of this act; and

(4) This section does not prevent the inspection without a warrant of books and records pursuant to an administrative subpoena issued in accordance with chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, nor does it prevent entries and administrative inspections, including seizures of property, without a warrant:

(A) If the owner, operator, or agent in charge of the controlled premises consents;

(B) In situations presenting imminent danger to health or safety;

(C) In situations involving inspection of conveyances if there is reasonable cause to believe that the mobility of the conveyance makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant;

(5) An inspection authorized by this section shall not extend to financial data, sales data, other than shipment data, or pricing data unless the owner, operator, or agent in charge of the controlled premises consents in writing.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2741, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in paragraphs (a)(1), (b)(1), and (b)(3) refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-2741A. Utility records — Inspection and copying — Wrongful disclosure.

  1. Upon request of the attorney general or prosecuting attorney, a subpoena for the production of records of a utility may be signed and issued by a magistrate judge if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that a violation of the provisions of section 37-2732, 37-2732B, 37-2733, 37-2734 or 37-2734A, Idaho Code, has occurred or is occurring and that the records sought will materially aid in the investigation of such activity or appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information that will do so. The subpoena shall be served on the utility as in civil actions. The court may, upon motion timely made and in any event before the time specified for compliance with the subpoena, condition compliance upon advancement by the attorney general or prosecuting attorney of the reasonable costs of producing the records specified in the subpoena.
  2. A response to a subpoena issued under this section is sufficient if a copy or printout, duly authenticated by an authorized representative of the utility as a true and correct copy or printout of its records, is provided, unless otherwise provided in the subpoena for good cause shown.
  3. Except as provided in this subsection, a utility served with a subpoena under this section may disclose to the customer the fact that a subpoena seeking records relating to the customer has been served. A magistrate judge may order that the attorney general, prosecuting attorney or utility refrain from disclosing the fact that a subpoena has been served.
  4. A utility shall be reimbursed in an amount set by the court for reasonable costs incurred in providing information pursuant to the provisions of this section.
  5. The provisions of this section do not preclude the use of other legally authorized means of obtaining records, nor preclude the assertion of any legally recognized privileges or the right to seek a protective order where appropriate.
  6. Disclosure by the attorney general, county prosecuting attorney, or any peace officer or other person designated by the attorney general or the county prosecuting attorney, of information obtained under this section, except in the proper discharge of official duties, is punishable as a misdemeanor.
  7. Upon filing of any civil or criminal action, the nondisclosure requirements of any subpoena or order under this section shall terminate, and the attorney general or prosecuting attorney filing the action shall provide copies to the defendant of all subpoenas or other orders issued under this section.
  8. A good faith reliance on a court order by a utility shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought against such utility under the laws of this state.
  9. The term “utility,” as used herein, shall mean every corporation, association, company, partnership, sole proprietorship, business entity, person, or any municipal corporation, mutual nonprofit or cooperative corporation which provides water, gas or electrical services to members of the public, for compensation, within the state of Idaho.
History.

(j) If an action is not filed within two (2) years and the investigation is no longer active, records obtained pursuant to this section shall be destroyed by the attorney general or prosecuting attorney. History.

I.C.,§ 37-2741A, as added by 1989, ch. 266, § 2, p. 646; am. 1991, ch. 218, § 1, p. 521; am. 1994, ch. 358, § 1, p. 1125.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

CASE NOTES

Privacy.

This section creates no privacy interest in utility company records. State v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 14, 867 P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1993).

The scope of protection afforded byIdaho Const., Art. I, § 17, does not extend to the individual power consumption records maintained by a utility. Any expectation of privacy in those records is not objectively reasonable. If, as a matter of policy, a utility chooses to voluntarily disclose such information to a law enforcement officer without a subpoena issued under either this section or Idaho R. Civ. P. 17, that disclosure is lawful, and there is neither any statutory nor constitutional basis for suppression of evidence so obtained. State v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 14, 867 P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1993).

Use of Subpoena.

Where peace officer used “other legally authorized means” to obtain orally the same information he later obtained in written form from utility company with use of a subpoena, the Idaho R. Civ. P. 17 subpoena used was harmless in that it did not reveal any information which law enforcement had not already obtained orally. State v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 14, 867 P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1993).

Cited

State v. Spor, 134 Idaho 315, 1 P.3d 816 (Ct. App. 2000).

§ 37-2742. Injunctions.

  1. The district courts have jurisdiction to restrain or enjoin violations of this act.
  2. The defendant may demand trial by jury for an alleged violation of an injunction or restraining order under this section.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2742, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” at the end of subsection (a) refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-2743. Cooperative arrangements.

  1. The director of the Idaho state police shall cooperate with federal and other state agencies in discharging his responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled substances. To this end, he may:
    1. Arrange for the exchange of information among governmental officials concerning the use and abuse of controlled substances;
    2. Coordinate and cooperate in training programs concerning controlled substance law enforcement at local and state levels;
    3. Cooperate with the bureau by establishing a centralized unit to accept, catalogue, file, and collect statistics, including records of drug dependent persons and other controlled substance law offenders within the state, and make the information available for federal, state and local law enforcement purposes. The name or identity of a patient or research subject whose identity could not be obtained under subsection (c) of this section shall be subject to disclosure according to chapter 1, title 74, Idaho Code;
    4. Conduct programs of eradication aimed at destroying wild or illicit growth of plant species from which controlled substance may be extracted;
    5. Enter into agreements with other states to coordinate and facilitate the enforcement of this act; and
    6. Require law enforcement agencies to report such information regarding traffic in controlled substances and abuse of controlled substances as he deems necessary to enforce this act. Such reports shall be on forms supplied by the director of the Idaho state police and shall include, but not be limited to, the following information: Names, ages, sex, race, and residences of individuals involved in violations of this act; the contraband confiscated, showing the kind, location, quantity, date, and place where seized; the circumstances surrounding the arrests and a report of the disposition of charges.
  2. Results, information, and evidence received from the bureau relating to the regulatory functions of this act, including results of inspections and investigations conducted by the bureau may be relied and acted upon by the board in the exercise of its regulatory functions under this act.
  3. A practitioner engaged in medical practice or research is not required or compelled to furnish the name or identity of a patient or research subject to the director, nor may he be compelled in any state or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative or other proceedings to furnish the name or identity of an individual that the practitioner is obligated to keep confidential and as such the name or identity of the patient or research subject is subject to disclosure according to chapter 1, title 74, Idaho Code.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2743, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 10, p. 261; am. 1974, ch. 27, § 81, p. 811; am. 1990, ch. 213, § 32, p. 480; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 88, p. 1450; am. 2015, ch. 141, § 80, p. 379.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 141, substituted “chapter 1, title 74” for “chapter 3, title 9” at the end of paragraph (a)(3) and at the end of subsection (c).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in subdivisions (a)(5) and (a)(6) refers to S.L. 1972, ch. 133, which is codified as§§ 37-2701, 37-2702, 37-2707, 37-2709, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2734, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2743, 37-2744, 37-2745, and 37-2747. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

The words “this act” in subsection (b) refer to S.L. 1971, ch. 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

Section 111 of S.L. 1990, ch. 213 as amended by § 16 of S.L. 1991, ch. 329 provided that §§ 3 through 45 and 48 through 110 of the act should take effect July 1, 1993 and that §§ 1, 2, 46 and 47 should take effect July 1, 1990.

§ 37-2744. Forfeitures.

  1. The following are subject to forfeiture:
    1. All controlled substances that have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, acquired, possessed or held in violation of this act or with respect to which there has been any act by any person in violation of this act;
    2. All raw materials, products and equipment of any kind that are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substances or counterfeit substances in violation of this act;
    3. All property that is used, or intended for use, as a container for property used in the commission of an act prohibited by section 37-2732B, 37-2732(a) or (b), or 37-2737A, Idaho Code;
    4. All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, that are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt or manufacture of substances as prohibited by section 37-2732B, 37-2732(a) or (b), or 37-2737A, Idaho Code, but:
      1. No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance is a consenting party or privy to a violation of this act;
      2. No conveyance is subject to forfeiture under this section if the owner establishes that he could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that the conveyance was being used, had been used, was intended to be used or had been intended to be used in any manner described in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
      3. A forfeiture of a conveyance encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if the security interest was created without any knowledge or reason to believe that the conveyance was being used, had been used, was intended to be used, or had been intended to be used for the purpose alleged.
    5. All books, records, and research products and materials, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data that are used, or intended for use, in violation of this act.
      1. All moneys, currency, negotiable instruments, securities or other items easily liquidated for cash, such as, but not limited to, jewelry, stocks and bonds, or other property described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection that is found in close proximity to property described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (5), (7) or (8) of this subsection and that has been used or is intended for use in connection with the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession of property described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (5), (7) or (8) of this subsection; (6)(A) All moneys, currency, negotiable instruments, securities or other items easily liquidated for cash, such as, but not limited to, jewelry, stocks and bonds, or other property described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection that is found in close proximity to property described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (5), (7) or (8) of this subsection and that has been used or is intended for use in connection with the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession of property described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (5), (7) or (8) of this subsection;
      2. Items described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a contraband controlled substance in violation of this chapter, all proceeds, including items of property traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys or other things of value used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this chapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
    6. All drug paraphernalia as defined by section 37-2701, Idaho Code.
    7. All simulated controlled substances, which are used or intended for use in violation of this chapter. (9) All weapons, or firearms, which are used in any manner to facilitate a violation of the provisions of this chapter.
  2. Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by the director, or any peace officer of this state, upon process issued by any district court, or magistrate division thereof, having jurisdiction over the property. Seizure without process may be made if:
    1. The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
    2. The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal racketeering or civil forfeiture proceeding based upon a violation of this chapter;
    3. Probable cause exists to believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
    4. Probable cause exists to believe that the property was used or is intended to be used in violation of this chapter.
  3. In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be instituted promptly.
    1. When property is seized under this section, the director or the peace officer who seized the property may:
      1. Place the property under seal;
      2. Remove the property to a place designated by him; or
      3. Take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
    2. The peace officer who seized the property shall within five (5) days notify the director of such seizure.
    3. In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be instituted within thirty (30) days by the director or appropriate prosecuting attorney.
  4. Property taken or detained under this section may be subject to replevin during the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings upon a hearing and finding by the district court, or magistrate division thereof, having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings, that the property is: (i) reasonably necessary for the owner’s employment or personal use, that the property will not be disposed of or used for criminal activity, and that reasonable security has been posted; or (ii) that the seizure violated the provisions of this section. The right of replevin shall terminate upon an order of forfeiture as set forth in this section. Property that is being held that has evidentiary value in the underlying criminal case shall not be subject to replevin. Forfeiture proceedings shall be civil actions against the property subject to forfeiture and the standard of proof shall be preponderance of the evidence.
    1. All property described in paragraphs (1), (7) and (8) of subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the state. Controlled substances that are seized or come into possession of the state, the owners of which are unknown, shall be deemed contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the state.
    2. When property described in paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or (9) of subsection (a) of this section is seized pursuant to this section, forfeiture proceedings shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court for the county wherein such property is seized. The procedure governing such proceedings shall be the same as that prescribed for civil proceedings by the Idaho rules of civil procedure. The court shall determine whether such property was used, or intended for use, in violation of this chapter. The court shall also determine whether a property forfeiture is proportionate to the crime alleged, charged or proven. Factors to be considered by the court in making such a determination shall include, but are not limited to, the nature and severity of the crime, the fair market value of the property, the intangible or subjective value of the property, the hardship to the defendant, the effect of forfeiture on the defendant’s family or financial circumstances, and any other sanctions or penalties that have been imposed upon the defendant. The court may tailor the forfeiture of property according to its determination of proportionality as justice requires. (3) When conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, are seized pursuant to this section, a complaint instituting forfeiture proceedings shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court for the county wherein such conveyance is seized.
      1. Notice of forfeiture proceedings shall be given to each owner or party in interest who has a right, title, or interest which in the case of a conveyance shall be determined by the record in the Idaho transportation department, or a similar department of another state if the records are maintained in that state, by serving a copy of the complaint and summons according to one (1) of the following methods:
      2. Within twenty (20) days after the mailing or publication of the notice, the owner of the conveyance or claimant may file a verified answer and claim to the property described in the complaint instituting forfeiture proceedings.
      3. If at the end of twenty (20) days after the notice has been mailed there is no verified answer on file, the court shall hear evidence upon the fact of the unlawful use, or intent to use, and shall order the property forfeited to the director, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, if such fact is proved.
      4. If a verified answer is filed, the forfeiture proceeding shall be set for hearing before the court without a jury on a day not less than thirty (30) days therefrom; and the proceeding shall have priority over other civil cases.
  5. When property is forfeited under this section, or is received from a federal enforcement agency, the director, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, may:
    1. Upon a showing that the property as set forth in this section is suited for and likely to be used for law enforcement activities, the plaintiff or law enforcement agency may, with judicial approval, retain it for official use;
    2. Sell that which is not required to be destroyed by law and which is not harmful to the public.
    3. Take custody of the property and remove it for disposition in accordance with law.
    1. The director or any peace officer of this state seizing any of the property described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall cause a written inventory to be made and maintain custody of the same until all legal actions have been exhausted unless such property has been placed in lawful custody of a court or state or federal law enforcement agency. After all legal actions have been exhausted with respect to such property, the property shall be surrendered by the court, law enforcement agency, or person having custody of the same to the director to be destroyed pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection. The property shall be accompanied with a written inventory on forms furnished by the director. (f)(1) The director or any peace officer of this state seizing any of the property described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall cause a written inventory to be made and maintain custody of the same until all legal actions have been exhausted unless such property has been placed in lawful custody of a court or state or federal law enforcement agency. After all legal actions have been exhausted with respect to such property, the property shall be surrendered by the court, law enforcement agency, or person having custody of the same to the director to be destroyed pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection. The property shall be accompanied with a written inventory on forms furnished by the director.
    2. All property described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this section that is seized or surrendered under the provisions of this act may be destroyed after all legal actions have been exhausted. The destruction shall be done under the supervision of the Idaho state police by a representative of the office of the director. An official record listing the property destroyed and the location of destruction shall be kept on file at the office of the director. Except, however, that the director of the Idaho state police or his designee may authorize the destruction of drug or nondrug evidence, or store those items at government expense when, in the opinion of the director or his designee, it is not reasonable to remove or transport such items from the location of the seizure for destruction. In such case, a representative sample will be removed and preserved for evidentiary purposes and, when practicable, destroyed as otherwise is in accordance with this chapter. On-site destruction of such items shall be witnessed by at least two (2) persons, one (1) of whom shall be the director or his designee who shall make a record of the destruction.
  6. Species of plants from which controlled substances in schedules I and II may be derived that have been planted or cultivated in violation of this act, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or that are wild growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
  7. The failure, upon demand by the director, or his duly authorized agent, of the person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which the species of plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate registration, or proof that he is the holder thereof, constitutes authority for the seizure and forfeiture of the plants.
  8. The director shall have the authority to enter upon any land or into any dwelling pursuant to a search warrant, to cut, harvest, carry off or destroy such plants described in subsection (g) of this section.
  9. On or before March 31, 2019, and by March 31 of each year thereafter, each state or local law enforcement agency in this state that has seized or forfeited property pursuant to this section shall retain the following information from the previous calendar year:
    1. Name of the law enforcement agency that seized the property;
    2. Date of seizure;
    3. Type and description of property seized, including make, model, year, and serial number, if applicable;
    4. Crime, if any, for which the suspect has been charged, including whether such crime is a violation of state or federal law;
    5. Criminal case number, if any;
    6. Outcome, if any, of suspect’s case;
    7. If forfeiture was not processed under state law, the reason for the federal transfer, if known;
    8. Forfeiture case number;
    9. Date of forfeiture decision;
    10. Whether there was a forfeiture settlement agreement;
    11. Date and outcome of property disposition as described by one (1) of the following: returned to owner, partially returned to owner, sold, destroyed, or retained by law enforcement; and
    12. Value of the property forfeited based on the value realized, if sold, or a reasonable good faith estimate of the value, if possible.

Mere presence or possession of United States currency, without other indicia of criminal activity, is insufficient cause for seizure.

(I) Upon each owner or party in interest by mailing a copy of the complaint and summons by certified mail to the address as given upon the records of the appropriate department.

(II) Upon each owner or party in interest whose name and address is known, by mailing a copy of the notice by registered mail to the last known address.

(I) At the hearing any owner who has a verified answer on file may show by competent evidence that the conveyance was not used or intended to be used in any manner described in subsection (a)(4) of this section.

(II) At the hearing any owner who has a verified answer on file may show by competent evidence that his interest in the conveyance is not subject to forfeiture because he did not know that the conveyance was being used, had been used, was intended to be used or had been intended to be used in any manner described in subsection (a)(4) of this section.

(III) If the court finds that the property was not used or was not intended to be used in violation of this act, or is not subject to forfeiture under this act, the court shall order the property released to the owner as his right, title, or interest appears on records in the appropriate department as of the seizure.

(IV) An owner, co-owner or claimant of any right, title, or interest in the conveyance may prove that his right, title, or interest, whether under a lien, mortgage, conditional sales contract or otherwise, was created without any knowledge or reason to believe that the conveyance was being used, had been used, was intended to be used, or had been intended to be used for the purpose alleged; (i) In the event of such proof, the court shall order the conveyance released to the bona fide or innocent owner, purchaser, lienholder, mortgagee, or conditional sales vendor.

  1. To the director, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, for all expenditures made or incurred by him in connection with the sale, including expenditure for any necessary repairs, storage, or transportation of the conveyance, and for all expenditures made or incurred by him in connection with the forfeiture proceedings including, but not limited to, expenditures for witnesses’ fees, reporters’ fees, transcripts, printing, traveling and investigation.
  2. To the law enforcement agency of this state which seized the conveyance for all expenditures for traveling, investigation, storage and other expenses made or incurred after the seizure and in connection with the forfeiture of any conveyance seized under this act.
  3. The remainder, if any, to the director for credit to the drug and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund or to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for credit to the local drug enforcement donation fund, or its equivalent.
    1. To the director, or prosecuting attorney on behalf of the county or city law enforcement agency, for all expenditures made or incurred in connection with the sale, including expenditure for any necessary repairs, maintenance, storage or transportation, and for all expenditures made or incurred in connection with the forfeiture proceedings including, but not limited to, expenditures for witnesses’ fees, reporters’ fees, transcripts, printing, traveling and investigation.
    2. To the law enforcement agency of this state which seized the property for all expenditures for traveling, investigation, storage and other expenses made or incurred after the seizure and in connection with the forfeiture of any property seized under this act. (C) The remainder, if any, to the director for credit to the drug and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund or to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for credit to the local agency’s drug enforcement donation fund; or

The director, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, shall publish a notice of the sale by at least one (1) publication in a newspaper published and circulated in the city, community or locality where the sale is to take place at least one (1) week prior to sale of the property. The proceeds from such sale shall be distributed as follows in the order indicated:

Local law enforcement agencies shall submit the information required by this subsection to the county prosecutor for its jurisdiction on a form as promulgated in rule by the Idaho state police, and such prosecutor shall retain the form for a period of seven (7) years.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2744, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 11, p. 261; am. 1972, ch. 409, § 4, p. 1195; am. 1974, ch. 27, § 82, p. 811; am. 1980, ch. 388, § 4, p. 977; am. 1982, ch. 265, § 1, p. 680; am. 1983, ch. 218, § 3, p. 599; am. 1986, ch. 286, § 2, p. 709; am. 1988, ch. 47, § 3, p. 54; am. 1990, ch. 239, § 1, p. 676; am. 1990, ch. 312, § 1, p. 852; am. 1992, ch. 174, § 1, p. 546; am. 1994, ch. 285, § 1, p. 893; am. 1994, ch. 286, § 1, p. 893; am. 1999, ch. 218, § 1, p. 578; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 89, p. 1450; am. 2009, ch. 108, § 5, p. 344; am. 2014, ch. 78, § 1, p. 205; am. 2018, ch. 221, § 1, p. 494; am. 2020, ch. 14, § 2, p. 35.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Drug and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund,§ 57-816.

Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

Idaho transportation department,§ 40-501 et seq.

Amendments.

This section was amended by two 1994 acts which appear to be compatible and have been compiled together.

Both 1994 amendments substituted “lienholder” for “lien holder” throughout subsection (d)(3)(D)(IV), in subsection (e)(2)(A) substituted “including, but not limited to,” for “including but not limited to” and in the first sentence of subsection (f)(2) inserted “the” following “surrendered under”.

The 1994 amendment, by ch. 285, § 1, also added subsection (a)(9).

The 1994 amendment, by ch. 286, § 1, also inserted “or appropriate prosecuting attorney” following “director” throughout the section; in paragraph (d)(3)(D)(IV)(ii)2.C., added “or to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for credit to the local drug enforcement donation account, or its equivalent.”; in subsection (e)(2)(A) substituted “prosecuting attorney on behalf of the” for “by the director, to his agent” following “To the director or”; and deleted former paragraph (e)(4) which read “Upon the recommendation of the director only, the court may order property forfeited, in whole or in part, to a city or county the law enforcement agency of which participated in the events leading to the seizure of the property. Upon such order, the city or county shall use the property for drug enforcement purposes consistent with this act.”. The 2009 amendment, by ch. 108, in subsections (d)(3)(D)(IV)(ii)2C. and (e)(2)(C), inserted “and driving while under the influence.”

The 2014 amendment, by ch. 78, substituted “Idaho state police by a representative” for “supervisory drug analyst of the Idaho state police, a representative” in the second sentence in paragraph (f)(2).

The 2018 amendment, by ch. 221, substituted “used in the commission of an act prohibited by section 37-2732B, 37-2732(a) or (b), or 37-2737A, Idaho Code” for “described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this section” in paragraph (a)(3); substituted “or manufacture of substances as prohibited by section 37-2732B, 37-2732(a) or (b), or 37-2737A, Idaho Code” for “possession or concealment, for the purpose of distribution or receipt of property described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this section” in the introductory paragraph of paragraph (a)(4); added the last paragraph in subsection (b); in subsection (d), rewrote the first sentence in the introductory paragraph, which formerly read: “Property taken or detained under this section shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the director, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, subject only to the orders and decrees of the district court, or magistrate’s division thereof, having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings” and added the second and third sentences; in paragraph (d)(2), inserted “or (9)” in the first sentence, rewrote the third sentence, which formerly read: “The court shall order the property forfeited to the director, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, if he determines that such property was used, or intended for use, in violation of this chapter, or, in the case of items described in paragraph (6)(A) of subsection (a), was found in close proximity to property described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (5), (7) or (8) of subsection (a) of this section”, and added the last three sentences; substituted “forfeiture because he did not know” for “forfeiture because he could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence” in paragraph (d)(3)(D)(II); deleted the former last sentence in paragraph (d)(3)(D)(IV)(i), which read: “The court may order payment of all costs incurred by the state or law enforcement agency as a result of such seizure”; rewrote paragraph (e)(1), which formerly read: “Retain it for official use”; and added subsection (j).

The 2020 amendment, by ch. 14, deleted “and a representative of the state board of pharmacy” from the end of the first sentence in paragraph (f)(2).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act”, appearing five times in subsection (a), refers to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

The term “this act”, appearing four times in subsections (d) and (e), refers to S.L. 1972, Chapter 133, which is codified as§§ 37-2701, 37-2702, 37-2707, 37-2709, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2734, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2743, 37-2744, 37-2745, and 37-2747. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

Section 5 of S.L. 1972, ch. 409, provided this act shall take effect on and after July 1, 1972.

Section 2 of S.L. 1999, ch. 218 declared an emergency. Approved March 23, 1999.

CASE NOTES

Applicability of Rules of Civil Procedure.

A forfeiture proceeding pursuant to this section is a civil action prosecuted against the seized property; generally, the responding claimant challenging the forfeiture action is the owner of the seized property and, with the exception of special procedural rules directing the manner in which notice is given and the appropriate manner for a claimant to respond, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to forfeiture proceedings. Richardson v. One 1972 GMC Pickup, 121 Idaho 599, 826 P.2d 1311 (1992).

Where Idaho department of law enforcement (department) brought action against defendant for forfeiture of defendant’s personal property under this section, after entry of judgment against defendant and prior to defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment, the property was transferred to the county; since the civil forfeiture statutes did not authorize the department to bring a forfeiture action in its own name as representative of, and for the benefit of another governmental entity and as forfeiture proceedings were governed by Idaho R. Civ. P. 17, forfeiture actions must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, which in this case was the county. As such, in the event of reversal of the forfeiture judgment and remand to the district court, the county could be joined as a party plaintiff pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 19 and the department’s argument that defendant’s appeal should be dismissed as moot as the property of the action was no longer in the department’s control would be obviated by proper pleading. State Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel. Cade v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 889 P.2d 109 (Ct. App. 1995).

Attorney’s Fees.

In a civil forfeiture case, because a county filed a plainly untimely complaint and unreasonably resisted a motion to dismiss the action, an award of attorney fees was proper. The county’s reliance on a mandatory/directory analysis relating to the word “shall” in paragraph (c)(3) was not reasonable and did not enable the county to avoid liability for attorney fees. Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291, 323 P.3d 1252 (Ct. App. 2014).

Construction.

Since the legislature may have intended to provide the state with a 30-day period, under this section, to prepare its case, a literal reading of the requirement of subdivision (d)(3)(D) of this section requiring a hearing to be set not “less” than 30 days after filing a verified answer would not necessarily be irrational or absurd and the provision must be interpreted as written. State, Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 595 P.2d 299 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Verska v. St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011).

In context of criminal forfeiture, the words “such violation” in§ 37-2801(2), plainly refer to the specific violation of which a defendant has been found guilty; in this respect,§ 37-2801(2), which is a criminal forfeiture statute, differs significantly from the civil forfeiture provision within this section. State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 84 P.3d 1038 (Ct. App. 2004).

Prohibition of excessive fines under U.S. Const., Amend. VIII limits forfeitures made pursuant to this section. Nez Perce County Prosecuting Atty. v. Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 136 P.3d 364 (Ct. App. 2006).

In a civil forfeiture action, the state must prove that the vehicle at issue was involved the “distribution or receipt” of controlled substances and must prove that element by a preponderance of the evidence. Ada County Prosecuting Atty. v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 298 P.3d 245 (2013).

District court erred by ordering the civil forfeiture of an owner’s vehicle, after the owner pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance and the owner’s spouse pleaded guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance, after marijuana was found in the vehicle, because the prosecutor failed to establish that the vehicle was used for the purpose of distribution or receipt of a controlled substance. McHugh v. Reid, 156 Idaho 299, 324 P.3d 998 (Ct. App. 2014).

Currency.

Where forfeiture of currency required findings both of close proximity to controlled substances and use or intention for use in violation of law, a forfeiture judgment based solely on a finding of proximity was error, and the action was remanded for further findings. State ex rel. Rooney v. One 1977 Subaru Two Door, 114 Idaho 43, 753 P.2d 254 (1988) (decision prior to 1986 amendment).

Double Jeopardy.

In light of recent precedent from the United States supreme court, this section does not create forfeiture proceedings which are criminal in nature or which result in punishment for double jeopardy. State v. McGough, 129 Idaho 371, 924 P.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1996).

Because the U.S. supreme court recently determined that civil forfeitures in general, and specifically in cases involving money laundering and drug statutes, do not constitute “punishment” for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, there was no double jeopardy attached to defendant’s convictions and sentences for delivery of controlled substance, money laundering, and failure to pay income tax and the prior forfeiture of his property under this section. State v. Ross, 129 Idaho 380, 924 P.2d 1224 (1996). Defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver was not barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy due to the prior civil forfeiture of his property in an action brought under this section, since the United States supreme court in United States v. Ursery , 518 U.S. 267, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996) declared that civil forfeiture in general, and specifically in cases involving drug statutes, do not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1996).

Entrapment Defense.

The entrapment defense may be asserted in a civil forfeiture proceeding which is predicated on the commission of a crime for which entrapment is a defense. Cade v. One 1987 Dodge Lancer Shelby 4-door, VIN 1B3BX68E3HN435087, 125 Idaho 731, 874 P.2d 542 (1994).

Exclusionary Rule.

Given the important policies served by§ 19-4409 and the quasi-penal nature of forfeiture proceedings, the exclusionary rule for violations of§ 19-4409, first adopted in State v. Rauch , 99 Idaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978), extends to forfeiture actions brought under the authority of this section. Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, United States Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 814 P.2d 952 (Ct. App. 1991).

Illegal Seizure.

The mere fact that property is seized illegally does not immunize it from forfeiture. Although evidence which is the product of the seizure must be excluded at trial, the state may pursue a forfeiture claim if it can show that the property is subject to forfeiture with evidence which is not tainted by the illegal seizure. Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, United States Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 814 P.2d 952 (Ct. App. 1991).

Priority for Forfeitures.

In the absence of a showing of substantial prejudice, a complaint seeking forfeiture of a vehicle should not be dismissed merely because it was not given priority over other civil cases, if in fact such priority was not given. State, Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 595 P.2d 299 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Verska v. St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011).

The provision of subdivision (d)(3)(D) of this section that a forfeiture proceeding be given priority over other civil cases was intended to be directory and not mandatory. State, Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 595 P.2d 299 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Verska v. St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011).

Seizure by State.

Once the state has seized property pursuant to this section, a third party cannot get a lien interest in the seized property which is protected by this section. State ex rel. Rooney v. One 1974 Green Targa Porsche Auto., 112 Idaho 432, 732 P.2d 670 (1986).

In 1986 the legislature amended this section adopting what appears to be a “per se” rule of mandatory forfeiture of money or property found in close proximity to contraband controlled substances, without the necessity of finding that the money was used or intended for use in violation of the act. State ex rel. Rooney v. One 1977 Subaru Two Door, 114 Idaho 43, 753 P.2d 254 (1988). District court erred in granting involuntary dismissal of a county’s civil forfeiture claim, where it established that the aggrieved individual made three large deposits into his bank account in the months leading up to his arrest, he was unemployed on the day he was arrested, he had made a number of large cash withdrawals from the account that were approximately equal to the value of the methamphetamine he possessed upon his arrest, and he used the account for a restaurant purchase on the same day he was meeting with his supplier. That evidence tended to show that the bank funds were more likely than not used or intended for use in connection with drug trafficking. Ada County Prosecuting Atty. v. Demint, 161 Idaho 342, 385 P.3d 897 (Ct. App. 2016).

Standard of Proof.

This section provides that forfeiture proceedings are civil actions against the property subject to forfeiture which are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and that the standard of proof applied is the preponderance of the evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel. Richardson v. $34,000 United States Currency, 121 Idaho 211, 824 P.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1991).

Where a claimant’s motor home and a travel trailer were forfeited based on the nature of marijuana-growing operation, the claimant’s culpability, and the connection between the conveyances and the operation, a finding that the forfeiture was not disproportionate to the claimant’s drug trafficking offense was improper since the proportionality analysis failed to consider the monetary value of the conveyances and their character as the residence of the claimant and the claimant’s spouse, economic hardship to the claimant and third parties, penalties authorized by the legislature, and factors for determining the gravity of the claimant’s offense. Nez Perce County Prosecuting Atty. v. Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 136 P.3d 364 (Ct. App. 2006).

Cited

State v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483, 600 P.2d 787 (1979); State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 P.2d 856 (1985); State v. Pardo, 109 Idaho 1036, 712 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1985); Blewett v. Klauser, 129 Idaho 612, 930 P.2d 1357 (1997).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Evidence Considered in Tracing Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit Forfeiture, or Declaration as Contraband, Under State Law — Amount and Packaging of Money and Drugs. 34 A.L.R.6th 539.

§ 37-2744A. Real property subject to forfeiture.

  1. Any real property, including any interest therein and any appurtenances thereto or improvements thereon, which is used in any manner or part, to commit or to facilitate the commission of a violation of the provisions of this chapter punishable by more than one (1) year of imprisonment, shall be subject to forfeiture under the provisions of this section.
  2. Property subject to forfeiture under the provisions of this section may be seized by the director upon determining that a parcel of property is subject to forfeiture, by filing a notice of forfeiture with the recorder of the county in which the property or any part thereof is situated. The notice must contain a legal description of the property sought to be forfeited; provided, however, that in the event the property sought to be forfeited is part of a greater parcel, the director may, for the purposes of this notice, use the legal description of the greater parcel. The director shall also send by certified mail a copy of the notice of forfeiture to any persons holding a recorded interest or of whose interest the director has actual knowledge. The director shall post a similar copy of the notice conspicuously upon the property and publish a copy thereof once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks immediately following the seizure in a newspaper published in the county. The owner or party in lawful possession of the property sought to be forfeited may retain possession and use thereof and may collect and keep income from the property while the forfeiture proceedings are pending.
  3. In the event of a seizure pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, a complaint instituting forfeiture proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be filed in the district court in the county in which the real property is situated within ninety (90) days of the date of seizure. The complaint shall be served in the same manner as other complaints subject to the Idaho rules of civil procedure on all persons having an interest in the real property sought to be forfeited.
  4. Real property sought to be forfeited under the provisions of this section shall not be subject to an action for detainer or any other collateral action, but is deemed to be in the custody of the director subject only to the orders and decrees of the district court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings. Forfeiture proceedings shall be civil proceedings in which the burden of proof shall be on the director to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property sought to be forfeited is subject to forfeiture. Upon being satisfied that an owner or claimant as defined in paragraph (4) of this subsection should not be subjected to forfeiture because that person had no knowledge or reason to believe that the real property was being used or had been used for the purposes alleged by the department, the director shall release the property to the owner or other claimant. The procedure applicable to such cases shall be the same as that prescribed by the Idaho rules of civil procedure. Following service the director may, where appropriate, seek default judgment pursuant to the Idaho rules of civil procedure. If an answer is filed the court shall proceed to set the case for hearing before the court without a jury.
    1. Following the hearing, if the court finds that the property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to subsection (a) of this section the court shall order the property forfeited to the director and title shall vest as of the date of the original seizure.
    2. Following the hearing, if the court finds that the property is not subject to forfeiture pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the court shall order the property released to the owner or owners thereof.
    3. Any owner who has an answer on file may show by competent evidence that his interest in the property sought to be forfeited is not subject to forfeiture because he could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that the real property was being used, or had been used in any manner in violation of the provisions of this section. If the court finds that the property was not used in violation of the provisions of this section or is not subject to forfeiture under the provisions of this section, the court shall order the property released to the owner.
    4. An owner, co-owner or claimant of any right, title or interest in the real property sought to be forfeited may prove that his right, title or interest, whether under a lien, mortgage, or otherwise, was created without any knowledge or reason to believe that the real property was being used or had been used for the purposes alleged by the department;
      1. In the event of such proof, the court shall order the real property released to the innocent owner, purchaser, lienholder or mortgagee.
      2. If the amount due to such person is less than the value of the real property, the real property may be sold in a commercially reasonable manner by the director. The proceeds from such sale shall be distributed as follows in the order indicated:
        1. To the innocent owner, purchaser or mortgagee of the real property, if any, up to the value of his interest in the real property.
        2. The balance, if any, in the following order:
          1. To the director for all expenditures made or incurred by the department in connection with the sale, including expenditure for any necessary repairs or maintenance of the real property, and for all expenditures made or incurred by the department in connection with the forfeiture proceedings including, but not limited to, expenditures for witnesses’ fees, reporters’ fees, transcripts, printing, travel, investigation, title company fees and insurance premiums.
          2. The remainder, if any, to the director for credit to the drug [and driving while under the influence] enforcement donation account.
  5. In issuing any order under the provisions of this section, the court shall make a determination that the property, or a portion thereof, was actually used in violation of the provisions of this act. The size of the property forfeited shall not be unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in violation of the provisions of this section.
  6. When property is forfeited under the provisions of this section the director may:
    1. Retain it for official use; or
    2. Sell the property in a commercially reasonable manner. The proceeds shall be distributed by the director as follows:
      1. To reimburse for all expenditures made or incurred in connection with the sale, including expenditures for any necessary repairs or maintenance, and for all expenditures made or incurred in connection with the forfeiture proceedings including, but not limited to, expenditures for attorneys’ fees, title company fees, insurance premiums, recording costs, witnesses’ fees, reporters’ fees, transcripts, printing, travel and investigation.
      2. The remainder, if any, shall be credited to the drug [and driving while under the influence] enforcement donation account.

(C) In any case, the director may, within thirty (30) days after judgment, pay the balance due to the innocent owner, purchaser, lienholder or mortgagee and thereby purchase the real property for use in the enforcement of this act.

History.

(3) Recommend to the court that the property, or proceeds thereof, be forfeited in whole or in part to a city or county, the law enforcement agency of which participated in the events leading to the seizure of the property or proceeds. Property distributed pursuant to this recommendation shall be used by the city or county for purposes consistent with the provisions of this chapter. History.

I.C.,§ 37-2744A, as added by 1989, ch. 341, § 2, p. 862; am. 1994, ch. 395, § 1, p. 1250.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

Former§ 37-2744A was amended and redesignated as§ 37-2744B by § 1 of S.L. 1989, ch. 341.

The bracketed insertions in subdivisions (d)(4)(B)(ii)(2) and (f)(2)(B) were added by the compiler to correct the name of the referenced account.

The term “this act” in paragraph (d)(4)(C) and subsection (e) refers to S.L. 1989, Chapter 341, which is codified as§§ 37-2744A and 37-2744B.

CASE NOTES

Attorney Fees.

This section does not, in and of itself, provide for an award of attorney fees. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel. Cade v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 873 P.2d 1336 (1994).

Section 12-117 provides statutory authority on which to base an award of attorney fees in a real property forfeiture action brought by the department of law enforcement pursuant to this section. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel. Cade v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 873 P.2d 1336 (1994).

Defenses Not Shown.

In a forfeiture proceeding, district court properly refused to set aside a default judgment in favor of the Idaho state police, because, even though excusable neglect or a mistake of fact was shown by an attorney’s lack of action, no meritorious defense was pleaded or shown. Idaho State Police v. Real Prop., 144 Idaho 60, 156 P.3d 561 (2007).

Excessiveness.

The excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to in rem forfeitures made pursuant to this section. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel Cade v. Real Property Located in Minidoka County, 126 Idaho 422, 885 P.2d 381 (1994).

The fact that subsection (e) of this section purports to limit the size of a property which could be taken does not preclude the possibility that the property actually taken could constitute an excessive fine under the Eight Amendment; subsection (e) cannot shield the forfeiture from Eight Amendment review. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel Cade v. Real Property Located in Minidoka County, 126 Idaho 422, 885 P.2d 381 (1994). The mere fact that the real property taken under this section is not divisible does not preclude the possibility that the forfeiture is excessive. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel Cade v. Real Property Located in Minidoka County, 126 Idaho 422, 885 P.2d 381 (1994).

Where the excessiveness of property forfeiture is at issue, one possible measure of an in rem forfeiture’s excessiveness could be the relationship between the forfeited property and the offense. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel Cade v. Real Property Located in Minidoka County, 126 Idaho 422, 885 P.2d 381 (1994).

Reasonable Basis in Fact.

There was substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s finding that the department of law enforcement acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law when it filed a second notice of seizure against owner’s property. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel. Cade v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 873 P.2d 1336 (1994).

Right to jury trial.

There is a right to jury trial for forfeiture proceedings under this section because that right existed at common law when the Idaho Constitution was adopted; to the extent that this section denies such right, it is unconstitutional. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement ex rel Cade v. Real Property Located in Minidoka County, 126 Idaho 422, 885 P.2d 381 (1994).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

§ 37-2744B. Authorization to receive and administer federal forfeitures and private donations.

The director of the Idaho state police is authorized to receive and dispose of any real or personal property which has been seized by a federal drug enforcement agency, or any donations from private citizens, the proceeds of which shall be placed in the drug and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund created in section 57-816, Idaho Code.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2744A, as added by 1986, ch. 286, § 3, p. 709; am. and redesig. 1989, ch. 341, § 1, p. 862; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 90, p. 1450; am. 2010, ch. 79, § 13, p. 133.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 79, inserted “and driving while under the influence.”

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as§ 37-2744A.

Section 4 of S.L. 1986, ch. 286 read: “The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of remaining portions of this act.”

§ 37-2745. Burden of proof — Liabilities.

  1. It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this act in any complaint, information, indictment or other pleading or in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under the provisions of this act. The burden of proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.
  2. In the absence of proof that a person is the duly authorized holder of an appropriate registration, valid prescription, or order form issued under the provisions of this act, he is presumed not to be the holder of the registration, valid prescription or form. The burden of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption.
  3. In all prosecutions under the provisions of this act involving the analysis of a controlled substance or a sample thereof, a certified copy of the analytical report with the notarized signature of the bureau chief of the Idaho forensic laboratory and the criminalist who conducted the analysis shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the results of the analytical findings.
  4. Notwithstanding any statute or rule to the contrary, the defendant may subpoena the criminalist to testify at the preliminary hearing and trial of the issue at no cost to the defendant.
  5. No liability is imposed under the provisions of this act upon any authorized state, county or municipal officer, engaged in the lawful performance of his duties.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2745, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 12, p. 261; am. 1993, ch. 158, § 1, p. 408.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in subsections (a), (b), and (e) refers to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

The term “this act” in subsection (c) refers to S.L. 1993, Chapter 158, which is codified as this section. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

For further information on the Idaho state police forensic services, see https://isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html .

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

CASE NOTES
Constitutionality.

This section does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof of an element of the crime to the defendant, because lack of authority to deliver a controlled substance is not an element of the crime. State v. Nab, 113 Idaho 168, 742 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1987).

Entrapment.

Requested instruction on entrapment defense was properly denied when defendant offered no substantial evidence linking informant’s supposedly violent nature and coercive method of operation to the defendant. State v. Totten, 99 Idaho 117, 577 P.2d 1165 (1978).

Instruction.

Instruction which created a mandatory presumption that defendant did not have authority to deliver the controlled substance and placed the burden of proof on the defendant without informing the jury of the quantum of evidence required to meet that burden was erroneous, but harmless, where the defendant’s defense was that he did not deliver a controlled substance, and his authority to do so was not at issue. State v. Nab, 113 Idaho 168, 742 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1987).

Cited

State v. Collinsworth, 96 Idaho 910, 539 P.2d 263 (1975).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

§ 37-2746. Judicial review.

All final determinations, findings and conclusions of the board under this act are final and conclusive decisions of the matters involved. Any person aggrieved by the decision may obtain review of the decision in the district court of the county where the aggrieved person resides. Findings of fact by the board, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2746, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in the first sentence refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-2747. Education and research.

  1. The director or his authorized agent shall carry out educational programs designed to prevent and deter misuse and abuse of controlled substances. In connection with these programs he may:
    1. Promote better recognition of the problems of misuse and abuse of controlled substances within the regulated industry and among interested groups and organizations;
    2. Assist the regulated industry and interested groups and organizations in contributing to the reduction of misuse and abuse of controlled substances;
    3. Consult with interested groups and organizations to aid them in solving administrative and organizational problems;
    4. Evaluate procedures, projects, techniques, and controls conducted or proposed as part of educational programs on misuse and abuse of controlled substances;
    5. Disseminate the results of research on misuse and abuse of controlled substances to promote a better public understanding of what problems exist and what can be done to combat them; and
    6. Assist in the education and training of state and local law enforcement officials in their efforts to control misuse and abuse of controlled substances.
  2. The director shall encourage research on misuse and abuse of controlled substances. In connection with the research, and in furtherance of the enforcement of this act, he may:
    1. Establish methods to assess accurately the effects of controlled substances and identify and characterize those with potential for abuse;
    2. Make studies and undertake programs of research to:
      1. Develop new or improved approaches, techniques, systems, equipment and devices to strengthen the enforcement of this act;
      2. Determine patterns of misuse and abuse of controlled substances and the social effects thereof; and
      3. Improve methods for preventing, predicting, understanding and dealing with the misuse and abuse of controlled substances; and
    3. Enter into contracts with public agencies, institutions of higher education, and private organizations or individuals for the purpose of conducting research, demonstrations, or special projects which bear directly on misuse and abuse of controlled substances.
  3. The director may enter into contracts for educational and research activities without performance bonds.
  4. The director may authorize persons engaged in research on the use and effects of controlled substances to withhold the names and other identifying characteristics of individuals who are the subjects of the research. Persons who obtain this authorization are not compelled in any civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding to identify the individuals who are the subjects of research for which the authorization was obtained.
  5. The director may authorize the possession and distribution of controlled substances by persons lawfully engaged in education and research. Persons who obtain this authorization are exempt from state prosecution for possession and distribution of controlled substances to the extent of the authorization.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2747, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939; am. 1972, ch. 133, § 13, p. 261; am. 1974, ch. 27, § 83, p. 811.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in the introductory paragraph in subsection (b) refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 14 of S.L. 1972, ch. 133, provided this act shall take effect from and after July 1, 1972.

Section 196 of S.L. 1974, ch. 27 provided the act should be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1974.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969 (1974).

Idaho Code Art. VI

Article VI

§ 37-2748. Pending proceedings.

  1. Prosecution for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of this act is not affected or abated by this act. If the offense being prosecuted is similar to one set out in article IV of this act, then the penalties under article IV apply if they are less than those under prior law.
  2. Civil seizures or forfeitures and injunctive proceedings commenced prior to the effective date of this act are not affected by this act.
  3. All administrative proceedings pending under prior laws which are superseded by this act shall be continued and brought to a final determination in accord with the laws and rules in effect prior to the effective date of this act. Any substance controlled under prior law which is not listed within schedules I through V, is automatically controlled without further proceedings and shall be listed in the appropriate schedule.
  4. The board shall initially permit persons to register who own or operate any establishment engaged in the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of any controlled substance prior to the effective date of this act and who are registered or licensed by the state.
  5. This act applies to violations of law, seizures and forfeiture, injunctive proceedings, administrative proceedings and investigations which occur following its effective date.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2748, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” throughout this section refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

The phrase “effective date of this act” throughout this section refers to the effective date of S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which was effective on May 1, 1971.

CASE NOTES

Cited

State v. Musquiz, 96 Idaho 105, 524 P.2d 1077 (1974).

§ 37-2749. Continuation of rules.

Any orders and rules promulgated under any law affected by this act and in effect on the effective date of this act and not in conflict with it continue in effect until modified, superseded or repealed.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2749, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The phrase “effective date of this act” refers to the effective date of S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which was effective on May 1, 1971.

§ 37-2750. Uniformity of interpretation.

This act shall be so applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act among those states which enact it.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2750, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” refer to S.L. 1971, ch. 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

§ 37-2751. Short title.

This act may be cited as the “Uniform Controlled Substances Act.”

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2751, as added by 1971, ch. 215, § 1, p. 939.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act”, in this section, refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 215, which is compiled as§§ 37-2701 to 37-2713, 37-2714 to 37-2724, 37-2731, 37-2732, 37-2733, 37-2734, 37-2735, 37-2736, 37-2737, 37-2739, 37-2740, 37-2741, 37-2742 to 37-2744, and 37-2745 to 37-2751. Probably the reference should be to “this chapter”, being chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.

Section 2 of S.L. 1971, ch. 215, read: “If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.”

Effective Dates.

Section 4 of S.L. 1971, ch. 215, provided the act should be in full force and effect on and after May 1, 1971.

Chapter 28 CRIMINAL FORFEITURES

Sec.

§ 37-2801. Property subject to criminal forfeiture.

Any person who is found guilty of, who enters a plea of guilty, or who is convicted of a violation of the uniform controlled substances act, chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, punishable by imprisonment for more than one (1) year, no matter the form of the judgment or order withholding judgment, shall forfeit to the state of Idaho:

  1. Any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; and
  2. Any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of such violation.

The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, that the person forfeit to the state of Idaho all property described in this section. The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed or interpreted in any manner to prevent the state of Idaho, attorney general or the appropriate prosecuting attorney from requesting restitution pursuant to section 37-2732(k), Idaho Code; or, if appropriate, from pursuing civil forfeiture pursuant to section 37-2744 and/or section 37-2744A, Idaho Code. Nor shall an order of forfeiture pursuant to this chapter be used as an offset against, or in any manner be used to diminish the amount of, a restitution order under section 37-2732(k), Idaho Code. The issue of criminal forfeiture shall be for the court alone, without submission to a jury, as a part of the sentencing procedure within the criminal action.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2801, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Prior Laws.

Former§§ 37-2801 to 37-2807, which comprised S.L. 1967, ch. 435, §§ 61, 79 to 2, 84, 85, p. 1436, were repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 3.

CASE NOTES

Construction.
Forfeiture Improper.

In context of criminal forfeiture, the words “such violation”, in subsection (2), plainly refer to the specific violation of which a defendant has been found guilty; in this respect, subsection (2), which is a criminal forfeiture statute, differs significantly from the civil forfeiture provision,§ 37-2744. State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 84 P.3d 1038 (Ct. App. 2004). Forfeiture Improper.

Trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of defendant’s motorcycle as part of his conviction for trafficking in 28 grams or more of methamphetamine, a violation of§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), where no drugs were found in the motorcycle, and there was no evidence that defendant had previously used it to obtain the drugs he possessed when arrested or that it facilitated the offense for which he was convicted. State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 84 P.3d 1038 (Ct. App. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Evidence Considered in Tracing Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit Forfeiture, or Declaration as Contraband, Under State Law — Amount and Packaging of Money and Drugs. 34 A.L.R.6th 539.

Evidence considered in tracing currency, bank account, or cash equivalent to illegal drug trafficking so as to permit forfeiture, or declaration as contraband, under state law — Factors other than proximity, explanation, amount, packaging, and odor. 101 A.L.R.6th 1.

§ 37-2802. Property subject to forfeiture.

“Property” subject to criminal forfeiture under this chapter includes:

  1. Real property, including things growing on, affixed to, or found on the land; and
  2. Tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims and securities.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2802, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Evidence Considered in Tracing Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit Forfeiture, or Declaration as Contraband, Under State Law — Amount and Packaging of Money and Drugs. 34 A.L.R.6th 539.

Evidence considered in tracing currency, bank account, or cash equivalent to illegal drug trafficking so as to permit forfeiture, or declaration as contraband, under state law — Factors other than proximity, explanation, amount, packaging, and odor. 101 A.L.R.6th 1.

§ 37-2803. Inventory.

Any peace officer of this state seizing property subject to forfeiture under the provisions of this chapter shall cause a written inventory to be made and maintain custody of the same until all legal actions have been exhausted. A copy of the inventory shall be sent, within five (5) days of the seizure, to the director of the Idaho state police. Upon completion of the forfeiture action pursuant to this chapter, a final inventory shall be made which indicates the disposition of the seized property, and a copy of that inventory shall also be sent to the director of the Idaho state police.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2803, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 91, p. 1450.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Director of Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

§ 37-2804. Forfeiture request — Rebuttable presumption.

Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this chapter shall not be ordered forfeited unless the attorney general or the appropriate prosecuting attorney has filed a separate allegation within the criminal proceeding seeking forfeiture of specific property as described in section 37-2801, Idaho Code. The attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney shall file, within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the criminal information or indictment, a separate part II forfeiture request and notice with the trial court.

There is a rebuttable presumption that any property of a person subject to the provisions of section 37-2801, Idaho Code, is subject to forfeiture under this chapter if the state of Idaho establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that:

  1. The property was acquired by a person during the period of the violation of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, or within a reasonable time after such violation; and
  2. There was no likely source for such property other than the violation of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2804, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

§ 37-2805. Preservation of property — Warrant of seizure — Protective orders.

  1. Upon application of the state of Idaho, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in section 37-2801, Idaho Code, for forfeiture under this chapter upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of the uniform controlled substance act for which criminal forfeiture may be ordered and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this chapter.
  2. The state may request the issuance of a warrant authorizing the seizure of property subject to forfeiture under this chapter in the same manner as provided for a search warrant. If the court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the property to be seized would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture and that an order under subsection (1) of this section may not be sufficient to assure the availability of the property for forfeiture, the court shall issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of such property by the appropriate law enforcement agency upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper.
  3. The court may, upon application of the state of Idaho, enter such appropriate restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of the state of Idaho in the property subject to forfeiture. Any income accruing to or derived from property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses to the property which are required by law, or which are necessary to protect the interests of the state of Idaho or third parties.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2805, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Uniform controlled substances act,§ 37-2751 and notes thereto.

§ 37-2806. Institution of proceedings — Third parties.

Upon the filing of a part II forfeiture request pursuant to section 37-2804, Idaho Code, or in the event of seizure pursuant to a warrant of seizure, or upon entry of an order of forfeiture pursuant to section 37-2801, Idaho Code, the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney shall, if appropriate, institute proceedings pursuant to sections 37-2807 or 37-2808, Idaho Code, or both, within five (5) days of such event.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2806, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

§ 37-2807. Personal property — Rights of third parties.

  1. Within five (5) days of any of the events specified in section 37-2806, Idaho Code, notice, including a copy of the request for forfeiture, shall be given to each co-owner or party in interest who has or claims any right, title or interest in any of such personal property according to one (1) of the following methods:
    1. Upon each co-owner of or party in interest in a titled motor vehicle, aircraft or other conveyance, by mailing notice by certified mail to the address of each co-owner and party in interest as given upon the records of the appropriate department of state or federal government where records relating to such conveyances are maintained.
    2. Upon each secured party and assignee designated as such in any UCC-1 financing statement on file in an appropriate filing office covering any personal property sought to be forfeited, by mailing notice by certified mail to the secured party and the assignee, if any, at their respective addresses as shown on such financing statement.
    3. Upon each co-owner or party in interest whose name and address is known, by mailing notice by registered mail to the last known address of such person.
  2. Within twenty (20) days after the mailing of the notice, the co-owner or party in interest may file a verified answer and claim to the property described in the notice.
  3. If a verified answer is filed within twenty (20) days after mailing of the notice, the forfeiture proceeding against all co-owners and parties in interest who have filed verified answers shall be set for hearing before the court without a jury on a day not less than sixty (60) days after the mailing of the notice; and the proceeding shall have priority over other civil cases.
    1. At the hearing, any co-owner or party in interest who has a verified answer on file may show by competent evidence that his interest in the titled motor vehicle, aircraft or other conveyance is not subject to forfeiture because he could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that the titled motor vehicle, aircraft or other conveyance was being used, had been used or was intended to be used for the purposes described in section 37-2801, Idaho Code.
    2. A co-owner, or claimant of any right, title, or interest in the property may prove that his right, title or interest, whether under a lien, mortgage, security agreement, conditional sales contract or otherwise, was created without any knowledge or reason to believe that the property was being used, had been used or was intended to be used for the purpose alleged;
      1. In the event of such proof, the court shall order that portion of the property or interest released to the bona fide or innocent co-owner, purchaser, lienholder, mortgagee, secured party or conditional sales vendor.
      2. If the amount due to such person is less than the value of the property, the property may be sold at public auction or in another commercially reasonable method by the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney. If sold at public auction, the attorney general, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, shall publish a notice of the sale by at least one (1) publication in a newspaper published and circulated in the city, community or locality where the sale is to take place at least one (1) week prior to sale of the property. The proceeds from such sale shall be distributed as follows in the order indicated:
        1. To the bona fide or innocent co-owner, purchaser, conditional sales vendor, lienholder, mortgagee or secured party of the property, if any, up to the value of his interest in the property. 2. The balance, if any, in the following order:
          1. To the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney, for all expenditures made or incurred by them in connection with the sale, including expenditure for any necessary repairs, storage or transportation of the property, and for all expenditures made or incurred by him in connection with the forfeiture proceedings including, but not limited to, expenditures for witnesses’ fees, reporters’ fees, transcripts, printing, traveling and investigation.
          2. To the law enforcement agency of this state which seized the property for all expenditures for traveling, investigation, storage and other expenses made or incurred after the seizure and in connection with the forfeiture of any property seized under this chapter.
          3. The remainder, if any, to the director of the Idaho state police for credit to the drug and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund created in section 57-816, Idaho Code, or to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for credit to the local drug enforcement donation fund, or its equivalent.

3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, upon being satisfied that the interest of a co-owner or claimant should not be subject to forfeiture because they neither knew nor should have known that the personal property was being used or had been used for the purposes alleged, or that due to preexisting security interests in such property there is no equity which may be forfeited, the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney may release the property to the co-owner, holder of the security interest, or other claimant.

4. In any case, the attorney general, or appropriate prosecuting attorney, may, within thirty (30) days after order of forfeiture, pay the balance due to the bona fide lienholder, mortgagee, secured party or conditional sales vendor and thereby purchase the property for use to enforce this chapter.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2807, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 92, p. 1450; am. 2009, ch. 108, § 6, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Director of Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2009 amendment, by ch. 108, inserted “and driving while under the influence” in subsection (3)(b)(ii)2C.

§ 37-2808. Real property — Rights of third parties.

  1. Real property subject to forfeiture under the provisions of this chapter may be seized by the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney upon determining that a parcel of property is subject to forfeiture, by filing a notice of seizure with the recorder of the county in which the property or any part thereof is situated. The notice must contain a legal description of the property sought to be forfeited; provided however, that in the event the property sought to be forfeited is part of a greater parcel, the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney may, for the purposes of this notice, use the legal description of the greater parcel. The attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney shall also send by certified mail a copy of the notice of seizure to any persons holding a recorded interest or of whose interest the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney has actual knowledge. The attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney shall post a similar copy of the notice conspicuously upon the property and publish a copy thereof once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks immediately following the seizure in a newspaper published in the county. The co-owner or party in lawful possession of the property sought to be forfeited may retain possession and use thereof and may collect and keep income from the property while the forfeiture proceedings are pending.
  2. In the event of a seizure pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, a request for forfeiture shall be filed with the trial court within the time limit imposed by section 37-2804, Idaho Code. The request shall be served in the same manner as complaints subject to the Idaho rules of civil procedure on all persons having an interest in the real property sought to be forfeited.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, upon being satisfied that the interest of a co-owner or claimant should not be subject to forfeiture because they neither knew nor should have known that the real property was being used or had been used for the purposes alleged, or that due to preexisting security interests in such property there is no equity which may be forfeited, the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney may release the property to the co-owner, holder of the security interest, or other claimant.
  4. Within twenty (20) days of the mailing of the notice, the co-owner or party in interest may file a verified answer and claim to the property described in the notice.
  5. If a verified answer is filed within twenty (20) days after mailing of the notice, the forfeiture proceeding against all co-owners and parties in interest who have filed verified answers shall be set for hearing before the court without a jury on a day not less than sixty (60) days after the mailing of the notice; and the proceeding shall have priority over other civil cases.
    1. A co-owner, or claimant of any right, title or interest in the real property sought to be forfeited may prove that his right, title or interest, whether under a lien, mortgage, deed of trust or otherwise, was created without any knowledge or reason to believe that the real property was being used or had been used for the purposes alleged; (b) Any co-owner who has a verified answer on file may show by competent evidence that his interest in the property sought to be forfeited is not subject to forfeiture because he could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that the real property was being used, or had been used in any manner in violation of the provisions of section 37-2801, Idaho Code.
  6. In the event of such proof, the court shall order the release of the interest of the co-owner, purchaser, lienholder, mortgagee or beneficiary.
    1. If the amount due to such person is less than the value of the real property, the real property may be sold in a commercially reasonable manner by the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney. The proceeds from such sale shall be distributed as follows in the order indicated:
      1. To the innocent co-owner, purchaser, mortgagee or beneficiary of the real property, if any, up to the value of his interest in the real property.
      2. The balance, if any, in the following order:
        1. To the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney for all expenditures made or incurred in connection with the sale, including expenditure for any necessary repairs or maintenance of the real property, and for all expenditures made or incurred in connection with the forfeiture proceedings including, but not limited to, expenditures for witnesses’ fees, reporters’ fees, transcripts, printing, travel, investigation, title company fees and insurance premiums.
        2. The remainder, if any, to the director of the Idaho state police for credit to the drug and driving while under the influence enforcement donation fund created in section 57-816, Idaho Code.
    2. In any case, the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney may, within thirty (30) days after the order of forfeiture, pay the balance due to the innocent co-owner, purchaser, lienholder, mortgagee or beneficiary and thereby purchase the real property for use in the enforcement of this chapter.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2808, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 93, p. 214; am. 2009, ch. 108, § 7, p. 344.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Director of Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2009 amendment, by ch. 108, inserted “and driving while under the influence” in subsection (6)(a)(ii)2.

§ 37-2809. Proportionality.

In issuing any order under the provisions of this chapter, the court shall make a determination that the property, or a portion thereof in the case of real property, was actually used in violation of the provisions of this chapter. The size of the property forfeited shall not be unfairly disproportionate to the size of the property actually used in violation of the provisions of this chapter.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2809, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

§ 37-2810. Authority of the attorney general.

With respect to property ordered forfeited under this chapter, the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney is authorized to:

  1. Restore forfeited property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other action to protect the rights of innocent persons which is in the interest of justice and which is not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter;
  2. Compromise claims arising under this chapter;
  3. Award compensation to persons providing information resulting in a forfeiture under this chapter; and
  4. Take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and maintain property ordered forfeited under this chapter pending its disposition.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2810, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

§ 37-2811. Bar on intervention.

Except as provided in sections 37-2807 and 37-2808, Idaho Code, no party claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture under this section may:

  1. Intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under this chapter; or
  2. Commence an action at law or equity against the state of Idaho concerning the validity of his alleged interest in the property subsequent to the filing of an indictment or information alleging that the property is subject to forfeiture under this chapter.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-2811, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

§ 37-2812. Jurisdiction — Depositions.

The district courts of the state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction over:

  1. Property for which forfeiture is sought that is within the state at the time the action is filed; or
  2. The interest of a co-owner or interest holder in the property if the co-owner or interest holder is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state.

In order to facilitate the identification and location of property declared forfeited after the entry of an order declaring property forfeited to the state of Idaho, the court may, upon application of the state of Idaho, order that the testimony of any witness relating to the property forfeited be taken by deposition and that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording or other material not privileged be produced at the same time and place, in the same manner as provided for the taking of depositions under rule 26 of the Idaho rules of civil procedure.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2812, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

§ 37-2813. Disposition of property.

On the motion of a party and after notice to any persons who are known to have an interest in the property and an opportunity to be heard, the court may order property that has been seized for forfeiture sold, leased, rented or operated to satisfy an interest of any interest holder who has timely filed a proper claim or to preserve the interests of any party. The court may order a sale or any other disposition of the property if the property may perish, waste, be foreclosed on or otherwise be significantly reduced in value or if the expenses of maintaining the property are or will become greater than its fair market value. If the court orders a sale, the court shall designate a third party or state property manager to dispose of the property by public sale or other commercially reasonable method and shall distribute the proceeds in the following order of priority:

  1. Payment of reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the sale.
  2. Satisfaction of exempt interests in the order of their priority.
  3. Preservation of the balance, if any, in the actual or constructive custody of the court in an interest-bearing account, subject to further proceedings under this chapter.

When property is forfeited under this chapter, the attorney general or appropriate prosecuting attorney, may:

(1) Retain it for official use; and/or

(2) Sell that which is not required to be destroyed by law and which is not harmful to the public, pursuant to section 37-2807 or 37-2808, Idaho Code.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2813, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

§ 37-2814. Forfeiture of substitute property.

If any of the property described in section 37-2801, Idaho Code, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant:

  1. Cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
  2. Has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
  3. Has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
  4. Has been substantially diminished in value; or
  5. Has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty;

the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of any property described in section 37-2801, Idaho Code.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2814, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

§ 37-2815. Construction.

The provisions of this section [chapter] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-2815, as added by 1996, ch. 230, § 1, p. 749.

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertion in this section was added by the compiler to add the probable intended term.

Section 2 of S.L. 1996, ch. 230 read: “The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Chapter 29 NARCOTIC DRUGS — LICENSING OF DISPENSERS

Sec.

§ 37-2901 — 37-2906. Licensing and dispensing of narcotics — Regulation. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1967, ch. 435, §§ 38, 88-92, p. 1436, were repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 3, p. 939. For present comparable law, see§ 37-2701 et seq.

Chapter 30 NARCOTIC DRUGS — PRESCRIBING AND DISPENSING — RECORDS

Sec.

§ 37-3001 — 37-3045. Persons authorized to dispense narcotics — False or fictitious prescriptions prohibited — Regulation of prescriptions — Dispensing without valid license prohibited. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections, which comprised S.L. 1967, ch. 435,§§ 25-28, 40-60, 62-78, 83, 86, 87, were repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 3, p. 939. For present comparable law, see§ 37-2701 et seq.

Chapter 31 NARCOTIC DRUGS — TREATMENT OF ADDICTS

Sec.

§ 37-3101. Definitions.

For the purposes of this act, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intent:

  1. “Physician” means a person licensed to practice medicine or surgery in this state as provided for under chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code.
  2. “Hospital” means a public or private institution licensed pursuant to the laws of this state as provided for under chapter 13, title 39, Idaho Code.
  3. “Drug” means a narcotic or hallucinogenic drug as defined in sections 37-2702, 37-2703, and subsection (c) of section 37-3301, Idaho Code.
History.

1971, ch. 340, § 1, p. 1325.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§§ 37-3101 to 37-3110, which comprised S.L. 1967, ch. 435, §§ 29 to 37, 39, were repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 3 and S.L. 1971, ch. 340, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” in the introductory paragraph refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 340, which is compiled as§§ 37-3101 to 37-3105.

Sections 37-2702, 37-2703 and 37-3301 of the Idaho Code, as referred to in subsection 3., have been repealed and present provisions relating to such definitions are found in§ 37-2701.

§ 37-3102. Request for treatment and rehabilitation — Information confidential.

A person may request treatment and rehabilitation for addiction or dependency to any drug, as defined in section 37-3101[, Idaho Code], from a physician qualified to administer such treatment under the provisions of this act; and such physician or any employee or person acting under his direction or supervision shall not report or disclose the name of such person or the fact that treatment was requested or has been undertaken to any law enforcement officer or agency; nor shall such information be admissible as evidence in any court, grand jury, or administrative proceeding unless authorized by the person seeking treatment. A physician may undertake the treatment and rehabilitation of such person or refer such person to another physician or hospital for such purpose. If the person seeking such treatment or rehabilitation is sixteen (16) years of age or older, the fact that such person sought treatment or rehabilitation for such drug addiction or dependency, or that he is receiving such treatment or rehabilitation service, shall not be reported or disclosed to the parents or legal guardian of such person without his consent, and such person who may give legal consent to receive such treatment and rehabilitation under the provisions of this act shall be counseled as to the benefits of involving his parents or legal guardian in his treatment or rehabilitation.

History.

1971, ch. 340, § 2, p. 1325; am. 1972, ch. 149, § 1, p. 323.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-3102 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertion in the first sentence was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

The words “this act” near the beginning and end of the section refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 340, which is compiled as§§ 37-3101 to 37-3105.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1972, ch. 149 declared an emergency. Approved March 17, 1972.

§ 37-3103. Treatment or rehabilitation — Procedures.

A person seeking treatment or rehabilitation for drug addiction or dependency shall first be examined and evaluated by a physician. Such a physician shall prescribe a proper course of treatment and medication, if needed. The treating physician may further prescribe a course of treatment or rehabilitation and authorize another physician or hospital to provide the prescribed treatment or rehabilitation services. Treatment or rehabilitation services may be provided to a person individually or in a group. Any hospital participating in such treatment or rehabilitation shall not report or disclose to a law enforcement officer or agency the name of any person receiving or engaging in such treatment or rehabilitation, nor shall any person receiving or participating in such treatment or rehabilitation report or disclose the name of any other person engaged in or receiving such treatment or rehabilitation, or that such a program is in existence, to a law enforcement officer or agency. However, any person engaged in or receiving such treatment or rehabilitation may authorize the disclosure of his name and individual participation.

History.

1971, ch. 340, § 3, p. 1325.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-3103 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3101.

§ 37-3104. Use of drugs by physician in treatment.

A physician may use any drug or medicine which shall be authorized or released by a federal agency or authority with jurisdiction to so act; providing that the physician adheres to the criterion for the use of such drug or medicine as established by the federal agency or authority with jurisdiction to so act. Such drug or medicine may be used to treat any person addicted to or dependent on drugs as the physician or hospital deems appropriate, subject to the provisions of this act.

History.

1971, ch. 340, § 4, p. 1325.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-3104 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words “this act” at the end of the section refer to S.L. 1971, Chapter 340, which is compiled as§§ 37-3101 to 37-3105.

§ 37-3105. Reports — Form.

Every physician that provides treatment or rehabilitation services to a person addicted to or dependent upon drugs shall each quarter of every year, commencing July 1, 1971, make a statistical report to the director of the department of health and welfare or his designee in such form and manner as the director of the department of health and welfare shall prescribe for each such person treated or to whom rehabilitation services were provided during the preceding quarter. The form of the report prescribed shall be furnished by the director of the department of health and welfare and be so designated that a carbon copy shall be sent quarterly to the director of the Idaho state police and the state board of pharmacy; the report shall include the doctor’s signature. The name or address of any person treated or to whom rehabilitation services were provided shall not be reported.

History.

1971, ch. 340, § 5, p. 1325; am. 1981, ch. 114, § 5, p. 169; am. 2000, ch. 469, § 94, p. 1450.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

Director of Idaho state police,§ 67-2901 et seq.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-3105 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3101.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 42 of S.L. 1981, ch. 114 read: “The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of remaining portions of this act.”

Effective Dates.

Section 7 of S.L. 1971, ch. 340 declared an emergency. Approved March 30, 1971.

§ 37-3106 — 37-3110. Reports concerning treatment of addicts. [Repealed.]

STATUTORY NOTES

Compiler’s Notes.

For repeal of former§§ 37-3106 to 37-3110, see Prior Laws,§ 37-3101.

Chapter 32 LEGEND DRUG CODE IMPRINT

Sec.

§ 37-3201. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3201, as added by 1981, ch. 41, § 1, p. 63; am. 2002, ch. 26, § 3, p. 29; am. 2002, ch. 69, § 1, p. 155; am. 2006, ch. 290, § 3, p. 888; am. 2009, ch. 244, § 1, p. 748; am. 2011, ch. 135, § 1, p. 375; am. 2013, ch. 28, § 1, p. 52; am. 2013, ch. 270, § 4, p. 698; am. 2014, ch. 146, § 6, p. 391; am. 2015, ch. 28, § 11, p. 44.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former Chapter 32 of Title 37, consisting of§§ 37-3201 to 37-3226, which comprised S.L. 1967, ch. 435, §§ 24, 93 to 116, 118; S.L. 1970, ch. 251, §§ 1 to 3, was repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 3, p. 939.

Compiler’s Notes.

S.L. 2018, ch. 37, § 18 amended this section, effective March 7, 2018. S.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 repealed this section, effective July 1, 2018. From March 7, 2018, until July 1, 2018, this section read as follows: “As used in this chapter:

“(1) ‘Code imprint’ means a series of letters or numbers assigned by the manufacturer or distributor to a specific drug, or marks or monograms unique to the manufacturer or distributor of the drug, or both;

“(2) ‘Distributor’ means a person who distributes for resale a drug in solid dosage form under his own label even though he is not the actual manufacturer of the drug;

“(3) ‘Solid dosage form’ means capsules or tablets intended for oral use;

“(4) ‘Legend drug’ means any drug defined by section 54-1705(35), Idaho Code.”

§ 37-3202. Code imprint required. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3202, as added by 1981, ch. 41, § 1, p. 63.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-3202 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3201.

§ 37-3203. List of legend drugs provided. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3203, as added by 1981, ch. 41, § 1, p. 63.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-3203 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3201.

§ 37-3204. Exemptions may be permitted. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3204, as added by 1981, ch. 41, § 1, p. 63.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-3204 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3201.

§ 37-3205. Seizure. [Repealed.]

Repealed by S.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1, effective July 1, 2018.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3205, as added by 1981, ch. 41, § 1, p. 63.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former§ 37-3205 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3201.

Former§ 37-3205 was repealed. See Prior Laws,§ 37-3201.

Chapter 33 RETAIL SALES OF PSEUDOEPHEDRINE PRODUCTS

Sec.

§ 37-3301. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Pseudoephedrine product” means any compound, mixture or preparation containing any detectable quantity of pseudoephedrine, its salts or optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers.
  2. “Retailer” means any person, other than a wholesaler, who sells or offers for sale or distributes at retail pseudoephedrine products, irrespective of the quantity or amount or the amount of sales of such pseudoephedrine products.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-3301, as added by 2006, ch. 95, § 1, p. 269.

STATUTORY NOTES

Prior Laws.

Former title 37, chapter 32, consisting of§§ 37-3301 to 37-3321, which comprised S.L. 1967, ch. 434, §§ 1 to 21; S.L. 1968 (2nd E. S.), ch. 11, § 1; S.L. 1970, ch. 148, §§ 3 to 7, were repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 3. For present comparable law, see§ 37-2701 et seq.

§ 37-3302. Sales of pseudoephedrine products.

A retailer shall ensure that:

  1. Pseudoephedrine products offered for sale are located either in an area where the public is not permitted or inside a locked display case; and
  2. All distributions of pseudoephedrine products are conducted by an employee of the retailer. No pseudoephedrine products shall be dispensed by a self-service system of any kind.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-3302, as added by 2006, ch. 95, § 1, p. 269.

§ 37-3303. Limitations on sales and purchases.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any retailer to knowingly sell, transfer or otherwise furnish in a single day a pseudoephedrine product or products containing more than a base amount of three and six-tenths (3.6) grams of pseudoephedrine.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly purchase from a retailer more than the daily sales limit of a pseudoephedrine product or products containing a base amount of three and six-tenths (3.6) grams per purchaser or more than a base amount of nine (9) grams of pseudoephedrine in a single thirty (30) day period, regardless of the number of transactions.
  3. The retailer shall not sell the pseudoephedrine product unless the purchaser presents a photographic identification card issued by a state or by the federal government.
    1. A retailer shall, before completing a sale under the provisions of this section, submit the required information to the electronic sales tracking system established under section 37-3303A, Idaho Code, as long as such a system is available without charge to the retailer for accessing the system. The retailer may not complete the sale if the system generates a stop sale alert, except as permitted in section 37-3303A, Idaho Code. (4)(a) A retailer shall, before completing a sale under the provisions of this section, submit the required information to the electronic sales tracking system established under section 37-3303A, Idaho Code, as long as such a system is available without charge to the retailer for accessing the system. The retailer may not complete the sale if the system generates a stop sale alert, except as permitted in section 37-3303A, Idaho Code.
    2. If a retailer selling a nonprescription pseudoephedrine product experiences mechanical or electronic failure of the electronic sales tracking system and is unable to comply with the electronic sales tracking requirement, he or she shall make available for inspection by any law enforcement officer or board inspector during normal business hours the logbook required by the federal combat methamphetamine epidemic act of 2005 until such time as he or she is able to comply with the electronic sales tracking requirement.
    3. A retailer selling a nonprescription pseudoephedrine product may seek an exemption from submitting transactions to the electronic sales tracking system in writing to the board of pharmacy stating the reasons for the exemption. The board may grant an exemption for good cause shown, but in no event shall a granted exemption exceed one hundred eighty (180) days. The board may grant multiple exemptions for any retailer if the good cause shown indicates significant hardship for compliance with this section. A retailer that receives an exemption shall make available for inspection by any law enforcement officer or board inspector during normal business hours the logbook required by the federal combat methamphetamine epidemic act of 2005. For purposes of this subsection, “good cause” includes, but is not limited to, situations where the installation of the necessary equipment to access the system is unavailable or cost prohibitive to the retailer.
    4. A retailer may withdraw from participating in the electronic sales tracking system if the system is no longer being furnished without charge for accessing the system. A retailer who withdraws from the electronic sales tracking system is subject to the same requirements as a retailer who has been granted an exemption under subsection (c) of this section.
    5. For the purposes of subsection (4) of this section and section 37-3303A, Idaho Code:
      1. “Charge for accessing the system” means charges relating to:
        1. Access to the web-based electronic sales tracking software;
        2. Training; and
        3. Technical support to integrate to point of sale vendors, if necessary.
      2. “Charge for accessing the system” does not include:

1. Charges relating to required internet access; 2. Optional hardware that a pharmacy may choose to purchase for work flow purposes; or

3. Other equipment.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3303, as added by 2006, ch. 95, § 1, p. 269; am. 2012, ch. 303, § 1, p. 841.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

Amendments.

The 2012 amendment, by ch. 303, rewrote subsections (1) through (3) and added subsection (4).

Federal References.

The federal combat methamphetamine epidemic act, referred to in paragraphs (4)(b) and (c), is P.L. 109-177, which is codified at varying sections in the United States Code.

§ 37-3303A. Electronic tracking system.

  1. The board of pharmacy shall implement a real-time electronic sales tracking system to monitor the nonprescription sale of pseudoephedrine products in this state provided that such system is available to the state without charge for accessing the system to the state or retailers. If a real-time electronic sales tracking system is not available to the state without charge for accessing the system to the state or retailers, the board of pharmacy shall not be required to create such a system.
  2. The records submitted to the tracking system shall include the following:
    1. The purchaser’s name and address;
    2. The purchaser’s signature, either on a written form or stored electronically in the tracking system, attesting to the validity of all information provided;
    3. The type of photographic identification presented pursuant to section 37-3303, Idaho Code;
    4. The number and issuing government entity of the photographic identification presented;
    5. The date and time of sale; and
    6. The name and quantity of the product sold.
  3. The records submitted to the tracking system are for the confidential use of the retailer who submitted such records, except that:
    1. The records must be produced in court when lawfully required;
    2. The records must be open for inspection by the board of pharmacy; and
    3. The records must be available to any general or limited authority Idaho peace officer to enforce the provisions of this chapter or to federal law enforcement officers.
  4. The electronic sales tracking system shall be capable of generating a stop sale alert, which shall be a notification that completion of the sale would result in the seller or purchaser violating the quantity limits in section 37-3303, Idaho Code. The system shall contain an override function for use by a dispenser of pseudoephedrine products. Each instance in which the override function is utilized shall be logged by the system.
  5. The board of pharmacy shall have the authority to adopt rules necessary to implement and enforce the provisions of this section and section 37-3303, Idaho Code.
  6. A retailer participating in the electronic sales tracking system:
    1. Is not liable for civil damages resulting from any act or omission in carrying out the requirements of this section or section 37-3303, Idaho Code, other than an act or omission constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct; and
    2. Is not liable for civil damages resulting from a data breach that was proximately caused by a failure on the part of the electronic sales tracking system to take reasonable care through the use of industry standard levels of encryption to guard against unauthorized access to account information that is in the possession or control of the system.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-3303A, as added by 2012, ch. 303, § 2, p. 841.

STATUTORY NOTES
Cross References.

State board of pharmacy,§ 54-1706.

§ 37-3304. Penalties.

A person who knowingly violates any provision of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3304, as added by 2006, ch. 95, § 1, p. 269.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Penalty for misdemeanor when not otherwise provided,§ 18-113.

§ 37-3305. Preemption.

The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to preempt more stringent regulation of retail sales of pseudoephedrine products by any county, city or other political subdivision.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3305, as added by 2006, ch. 95, § 1, p. 269.

§ 37-3306. Application.

The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to a pseudoephedrine product dispensed pursuant to a valid prescription unless otherwise provided by law.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3306, as added by 2006, ch. 95, § 1, p. 269.

Chapter 34 SYRINGE AND NEEDLE EXCHANGE ACT

Sec.

§ 37-3401. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Syringe and Needle Exchange Act.”

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3401, as added by 2019, ch. 181, § 1, p. 584.

§ 37-3402. Legislative intent.

In adopting this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to prevent the transmission of disease and to reduce morbidity and mortality among individuals who inject drugs.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3402, as added by 2019, ch. 181, § 1, p. 584.

§ 37-3403. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Department” means the state department of health and welfare.
  2. “Director” means the director of the department.
  3. “Entity” means:
    1. The department;
    2. A government entity; or
    3. A private organization, whether for profit or nonprofit.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-3403, as added by 2019, ch. 181, § 1, p. 584.

STATUTORY NOTES

Cross References.

Department of health and welfare,§ 56-1001 et seq.

§ 37-3404. Syringe and needle exchange program.

  1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary:
    1. An entity may operate a syringe and needle exchange program in this state if such entity complies with the provisions of this section and with rules promulgated by the department;
    2. An entity may procure supplies needed to operate a syringe and needle exchange program in this state if such entity complies with the provisions of this section and with rules promulgated by the department; and
    3. An entity may supply a syringe and needle exchange program with materials necessary to operate the program if such entity complies with rules promulgated by the department.
  2. An entity operating a syringe and needle exchange program must:
    1. Facilitate the exchange of used syringes or needles for new syringes or needles in sealed sterile packaging; and
    2. Ensure that the recipient of a new syringe or needle is given verbal and written instruction on:
      1. Methods for preventing the transmission of blood-borne diseases, including hepatitis C and human immunodeficiency virus; and
      2. Options for obtaining:
        1. Services for the treatment of a substance use disorder;
        2. Testing for a blood-borne disease; and
        3. An opioid antagonist pursuant to section 54-1733B, Idaho Code.
  3. An entity operating a syringe and needle exchange program must report annually to the department on the following information about the program:
    1. The number of individuals who have exchanged syringes or needles;
    2. The number of used syringes or needles exchanged for new syringes or needles; and
    3. The number of new syringes or needles provided in exchange for used syringes or needles.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-3404, as added by 2019, ch. 181, § 1, p. 584.

§ 37-3405. Report.

No later than July 1, 2020, and every two (2) years thereafter, the department shall report to the senate and house of representatives health and welfare committees on:

  1. The activities and outcomes of syringe and needle exchange programs operating in the state, including:
    1. The number of individuals who have exchanged syringes or needles;
    2. The number of used syringes or needles exchanged for new syringes or needles;
    3. The number of new syringes or needles provided in exchange for used syringes or needles;
    4. The estimated impact, if any, that the programs have had on blood-borne infection rates; and
    5. The estimated impact, if any, of the programs on the number of individuals receiving treatment for a substance use disorder;
  2. The potential for additional reductions in the number of syringes and needles contaminated with blood-borne disease if the programs receive additional funding;
  3. The potential for additional reductions in state and local government spending if the programs receive additional funding;
  4. Whether the programs promote illicit use of drugs; and
  5. Whether the programs, in the opinion of the director, should be continued, continued with modifications, or terminated.
History.

I.C.,§ 37-3405, as added by 2019, ch. 181, § 1, p. 584.

§ 37-3406. Rules.

The department may promulgate such rules as are necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter.

History.

I.C.,§ 37-3406, as added by 2019, ch. 181, § 1, p. 584.