Compiler’s Notes.

The first section of this title in Compiled Laws declared an emergency in the enactment of that code. The enactment of Compiled Laws was approved January 25, 1919.

The following note is taken from Compiled Statutes of Idaho: “Part V of Compiled Laws, entitled as above, ‘General Code Provisions,’ is not applicable to Compiled Statutes as a code, since no formal enactment of Compiled Statutes as such has been made. It is inserted in this compilation as referring only to Compiled Laws but an additional section (§ 73-120) has been added to embrace the local and special laws enacted at the 1919 session.”

Accrual of Right Before Amendment Effective.

When a statutory period of limitation is amended to reduce the limitation period, a party whose right accrues before the effective date of the amendment cannot be heard to complain if he is given the full time for action according to the terms of the amended statute from and after the effective date of the amended statute; thus, where the 1976 amendment to§ 31-3504 reduced the time period for applying for medically indigent benefits from within one year of discharge from the hospital to within 45 days following admission to the hospital, and the indigent applicant who had received medical treatment through February, 1976, was given 45 days from the effective date of the 1976 amendment, July 1, 1976, in which to file an application, the trial court did not err in holding that the plaintiff’s application filed in November of 1976 was untimely. University of Utah Hosp. ex rel. Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 469 (1982).

Amendment During Litigation.

A city’s exercise of the right of eminent domain to condemn the property of an electrical power co-operative within newly annexed territory was governed by the statute in force at the time it filed its answer and counterclaim and not one which became effective subsequently to such filing, but prior to trial of the cause. Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968).

Where subsequent to district court’s decision in child custody case, the legislature recodified and substantially modified the applicable statute, the former version of the statute controls the disposition of the case under this section. Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235, 629 P.2d 127 (1980).

Attorney Fees.

Statutes authorizing discretionary awards of attorney fees generally are held to be remedial or procedural; consequently, they are given retroactive effect. Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988).

In suit by architects against state building authority for breach of contract that provided for architectural and certain other services,§ 12-120(3) clearly could be applied to award attorney fees against the authority because such action involved a contract for services as well as a commercial transaction; further, the fact that the provisions of§ 12-120(3) regarding contracts relating to services were not added to the section until its 1986 amendment and the definition of party did not include the state of political subdivisions thereof until the 1987 amendment of the section, did not prohibit application of such section, since the suit was filed after the passage of either of these amendments, as the proper function is upon the time of the filing, not the time the cause of action arose. Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 835 P.2d 1282 (1992).

Construction of Statutes.

The construction given a statute by the executive and administrative officers of the state is entitled to great weight and will be followed unless there are cogent reasons for a change. Breckenridge v. Johnston, 62 Idaho 121, 108 P.2d 833 (1940).

In the absence of an express declaration of legislative intent that a statute apply retroactively, it will not be so applied; however, a statute, which is remedial or procedural in nature, and which does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy contractual or vested rights, is generally held not to be a retroactive statute, even though it was enacted subsequent to the events to which it applies. Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 745 P.2d 1051 (1987).

Statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights are deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive, and they may be applied retrospectively. Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988).

An application of law is deemed retrospective if it affects substantive rights. Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988).

Notwithstanding that direct appeal was fully conducted and final in 1985, the district court relied upon the 1986 amendment to§ 19-4901 in ruling that defendant had waived most of the issues raised in his petition. This was error. This section clearly prohibits the retroactive application of newly passed legislation. As is readily apparent from the text of§ 19-4901, there is not even a hint of legislative intent that§ 19-4901 could be retroactively applied. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992).

Express Declaration of Retroactivity.

Paternity action against defendant determined to be father of child was not barred by the statute of limitations as the 1986 amendments to§ 7-1107 clearly expressed the legislature’s intention that the statute of limitations not run on a cause of action for any child born before or after the effective dates of the amendment. Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 915 P.2d 6 (1996). Express Declaration of Retroactivity.

The 1974 legislative amendment to subsection 1. of§ 5-218 is not retroactive in its application to January 1974, since a statute is not retroactive under this section unless expressly so declared, and the only express declaration of retroactivity in this amendment is to causes of action discovered within three years prior to its passage, on April 3, 1974. Lincoln County v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 102 Idaho 489, 632 P.2d 678 (1981).

There is general agreement in the case law of this jurisdiction that there must be a clear expression of legislative intent of retroactivity before a statute will be given such effect. University of Utah Hosp. ex rel. Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 469 (1982).

Generally a statute will not be applied retroactively in the absence of clear legislative intent to that effect. However, retroactive legislation is only that which affects vested or already existing rights. City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 660 P.2d 1355 (1983).

Intention.

If the language clearly refers to the past as well as to the future, then the intent to make law retroactive is expressly declared within the meaning of this section. Express words “this statute is to be deemed retroactive” are not necessary. Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 (1914). See also Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1088 (1923); Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Barker, 38 Idaho 529, 223 P. 529 (1924); State v. Cleland, 42 Idaho 803, 248 P. 831 (1926).

Unless the legislature in its enactments uses expressions clearly indicative of the intent that the statute be given retrospective effect, it will not be so construed. In re Pahlke, 56 Idaho 338, 53 P.2d 1177 (1936).

Retroactive application of a statute is not allowed unless there is clear legislative intent to that effect; the language of the Idaho competition act indicates that it does not apply retroactively to permit the recovery of damages based upon conduct that occurred before its effective date. State v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428 (2005).

Sex Offender Registration.

Although convicted sex offender contended that applying a 2009 amendment to the sex offender registration law to him violated this section, the offender did not contend that applying the amendment to him would violate any constitutional provision. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing his petition to be exempted from the duty to register as a sex offender Bottum v. Idaho State Police, 154 Idaho 182, 296 P.3d 388 (2013).

Statute of Limitations.

This section does not preclude the legislature from amending the statute of limitations applicable to a given individual after the individual has committed a crime, but prior to the running of the statute of limitations in existence at the time of the commission of the crime. State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 796 P.2d 121 (1990).

When Validity Dependent on Non-retroactive Effect.

General rule that all statutes are to be so construed, if possible, as to be valid, requires that the statute shall never be given a retrospective operation, when to do so would render it unconstitutional, and words of statute admit of any other construction. Lawrence v. Defenbach, 23 Idaho 78, 128 P. 81 (1912).

Am. Jur. 2d.

C.J.S.

Application to Particular Statutes.

Appeal. First Nat’l Bank v. C. Bunting & Co., 7 Idaho 387, 63 P. 694 (1900).

Attachment. Glidden v. Whittier, 46 F. 437 (C.C.D. Idaho 1891); Simmons Hdwe. Co. v. Alturas Com. Co., 4 Idaho 334, 39 P. 550 (1895); Vollmer v. Spencer, 5 Idaho 557, 51 P. 609 (1897); Knutsen v. Phillips, 16 Idaho 267, 101 P. 596 (1909).

Bar commissioners. In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665 (1928).

Blue sky law. Boise Ass’n of Credit Men v. Seawell, 47 Idaho 473, 276 P. 318 (1929).

Change of place of trial. State v. Reed, 3 Idaho 754, 35 P. 706 (1894).

Claim and delivery. Blackfoot Stock Co. v. Delamue, 3 Idaho 291, 29 P. 97 (1892).

Corporations. Donaldson v. Thousand Springs Power Co., 29 Idaho 735, 162 P. 334 (1916) (on rehearing); Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 45 Idaho 244, 263 P. 32 (1927).

Costs. McDonald v. Burke, 3 Idaho (Hasb.) 266, 28 P. 440 (1892).

Criminal procedure. State v. Watkins, 7 Idaho 35, 59 P. 1106 (1900).

Depositions. Darby v. Heagerty, 2 Idaho 282, 13 P. 85 (1887).

Disqualification of judges. Hultner-Wallner v. Featherstone, 48 Idaho 507, 283 P. 42 (1929).

Frauds. C.R. Shaw Lumber Co. v. Manville, 4 Idaho 369, 39 P. 559 (1895).

Guest statute. Peterson v. Winn, 84 Idaho 523, 373 P.2d 925 (1962).

Habeas corpus. In re Dowling, 4 Idaho 715, 43 P. 871 (1896).

Homestead and exemption. Wright v. Westheimer, 3 Idaho 232, 28 P. 430, 35 Am. St. 269 (1891); Mellen v. McMannis, 9 Idaho 418, 75 P. 98 (1904).

Incorporation of towns. State ex rel. Holcomb v. Inhabitants of Pocatello, 3 Idaho 174, 28 P. 411 (1891).

Lien. Phillips v. Salmon River Mining & Dev. Co., 9 Idaho 149, 72 P. 886 (1903); Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Idaho Consol. Mines Co., 20 Idaho 300, 118 P. 301 (1911); Hill v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 22 Idaho 274, 125 P. 204 (1912); Smith v. Faris-Kesl Constr. Co., 27 Idaho 407, 150 P. 25 (1915); Armitage v. Bernheim, 32 Idaho 594, 187 P. 938 (1919); Abernathy v. Peterson, 38 Idaho 727, 225 P. 132 (1924); Riggen v. Perkins, 42 Idaho 391, 246 P. 962 (1926).

Limitations., 3 Idaho 672, 34 P. 813 (1893).

Local improvement districts. McQueen v. City of Moscow, 28 Idaho 146, 152 P. 799 (1915); Gould v. Hill, 43 Idaho 93, 251 P. 167 (1926); Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Sharp, 45 Idaho 611, 264 P. 665 (1928).

New trial. Coast Lumber Co. v. Wood, 18 Idaho 28, 108 P. 338 (1910).

Pleading. Wheeler v. Commercial Bank, 5 Idaho 15, 46 P. 830 (1896); State v. American Sur. Co., 26 Idaho 652, 145 P. 1097 (1914) (brief of counsel).

Revenue and taxation. Salisbury v. Lane, 7 Idaho 370, 63 P. 383 (1900); Parsons v. Wrble, 21 Idaho 695, 123 P. 638 (1912); State ex rel. Peterson v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho 784, 156 P. 1141 (1916) (dissenting opinion).; Overland Co. v. Utter, 44 Idaho 385, 257 P. 480 (1927); Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618, 284 P. 203 (1930).

Service of summons on nonresident. Guynn v. McDaneld, 4 Idaho 605, 43 P. 74 (1895).

Sodomy. State v. Altwatter, 29 Idaho 107, 157 P. 256 (1916).

Syndicalism. In re Moore, 38 Idaho 506, 224 P. 662 (1924).

Undertaking on appeal. Barnes v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 6 Idaho 519, 57 P. 267 (1899); Smith v. Field, 19 Idaho 558, 114 P. 668 (1911). Water rights. Hamilton v. Swendsen, 46 Idaho 175, 267 P. 229 (1928).

Workmen’s compensation. McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 773, 203 P. 1068 (1921); In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087 (1929); Burchett v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 48 Idaho 524, 283 P. 515 (1929).

To restrict time within which materialman must perfect its lien to one day less than the six months in§ 45-510 would not be in keeping with the policy of liberal construction embodied in this section. Cather v. Kelso, 103 Idaho 684, 652 P.2d 188 (1982).

Common-Law Rule Changed.

This section changes the rule that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed. Darby v. Heagerty, 2 Idaho 282, 13 P. 85 (1887); McQueen v. City of Moscow, 28 Idaho 146, 152 P. 799 (1915).

In the exercise of its inherent judicial power, the court may use the common law or other appropriate method if the statute or rule does not describe the procedure. J.I. Case Co. v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 280 P.2d 1070 (1955).

General Rules.

— Alternate Constructions.

When legislative act is fairly open to two constructions one of which will carry out and other defeat some public purpose, former should be adopted. State ex rel. Black v. State Bd. of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201 (1921).

— Change in Common Law.

It is not to be presumed that legislature intended to abrogate or modify rule of common law by enactment of statute upon same subject; it is rather to be presumed that no change in common law was intended, unless language employed clearly indicates such intention. Cox v. St. Anthony Bank & Trust Co., 41 Idaho 776, 242 P. 785 (1925).

Changes in common law by adoption of statute are not to be presumed unless intent to accomplish that purpose appears. Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 269 P. 993 (1928).

In enacting the workmen’s compensation law abolishing every remedy for all injuries received by a workman in the course of his employment, the legislature did not intend to take from the workman his common-law remedy for the negligent act of his employer, resulting in serious injury and damage to the workman, and give the workman no other remedy in lieu thereof, and the legislature would be deemed to have assumed that every injury would impair the workman’s usefulness in some degree, and that a workman should, in some measure, be compensated under the new remedy set up by the compensation law. Olson v. Union Pac. R.R., 62 Idaho 423, 112 P.2d 1005 (1941).

— Clerical and Typographical Errors.

Clerical errors or misprints in a statute, which would render it meaningless or absurd or which would defeat its intended operation, will not be permitted to go uncorrected when the true reading is obvious and the real meaning of the legislature is apparent on the face of the enactment taken as a whole. Frontier Milling & Elevator Co. v. Roy White Coop. Mercantile Co., 25 Idaho 478, 138 P. 825 (1914).

— Conclusiveness of Board’s Findings.

Obvious clerical errors or misprints will be corrected or words read in if the omission or error is plainly indicated and the true meaning is obvious and the operation of the enactment would be otherwise defeated. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948). — Conclusiveness of Board’s Findings.

The accident board’s [now industrial commission] findings of facts, when supported by sufficient, though conflicting, competent evidence, are conclusive upon the district court and supreme court. Ramsay v. Sullivan Mining Co., 51 Idaho 366, 6 P.2d 856 (1931).

— Conflicting Acts.

The general rule at common law seems to have been that, of two inconsistent statutes enacted at the same session of the legislature, the one which went into effect at the later date would prevail. Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 (1914).

Where two conflicting acts upon the same subject-matter are passed at the same session of the legislature, and their conflict is such that they cannot be harmonized and stand together, and where one of them contains an emergency clause and the other does not, and the one containing the emergency clause was passed by both houses of the legislature after the other, under such circumstances, the act containing the emergency clause should prevail over the other. Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 (1914).

While it was not necessary for the purposes of this case to lay down a general rule for all cases, the court said that it was inclined to the opinion that, in case of an irreconcilable conflict between two acts passed at the same session of the legislature, the one should prevail which was last approved by the governor. Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 (1914).

When statutes are necessarily inconsistent, the statute which deals with the common subject-matter in a more minute and particular way will prevail over a statute of a more general nature. Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 (1914); Koelsch v. Girard, 54 Idaho 452, 33 P.2d 816 (1934).

— Constitutionality Favored.

Doubt as to constitutionality of statute should be resolved in its favor, and to declare it unconstitutional it must clearly appear to be so. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Dunbar, 39 Idaho 691, 230 P. 33 (1924); Smallwood v. Jeter, 42 Idaho 169, 244 P. 149 (1926); Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 45 Idaho 244, 263 P. 32 (1927); Packard v. O’Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 P. 881 (1927); In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665 (1928).

Test of constitutionality of act is not what is done thereunder in any particular instance, but what may be done under it. Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Challis Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 46 Idaho 403, 268 P. 26 (1928).

Public policy of state is to be found in its constitution and statutes, and statute cannot declare public policy contrary or repugnant to constitution. Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Challis Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 46 Idaho 403, 268 P. 26 (1928).

While tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed, statute must be clearly prohibited by constitution before it can be declared in violation thereof. Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618, 284 P. 203 (1930).

The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not destroy. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948).

— Constitutional Law.

The general principles of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of the Constitution and also to Constitutional Amendments. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948).

— General and Particular Provisions.

A general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one, unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. People ex rel. Springer v. Lytle, 1 Idaho 143 (1867).

When there are two provisions in statute one of which is general and the other particular, latter will prevail; and if both cannot apply, particular provision will be treated as exception to general provision. State v. Jones, 34 Idaho 83, 199 P. 645 (1921); Herrick v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 13, 204 P. 477 (1922); In re Drainage Dist. No. 3, 40 Idaho 549, 235 P. 895 (1925).

— Implied Repeals.

Though a subsequent statute be not repugnant in all its provisions to the prior one, yet if the latter was clearly intended to provide the only rule that should govern in the case provided for, it repeals the original act. People ex rel. Springer v. Lytle, 1 Idaho 143 (1867).

Subsequent statute does not repeal earlier one by implication unless the two are irreconcilable and inconsistent. Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 242 P. 314 (1925); Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 753, 243 P. 654 (1926).

In arriving at legislative intent as to act alleged to have impliedly repealed or superseded another statute, nature of several acts involved including their respective titles, history of such enactments, state of law when passed, together with history of times as well as objects and purposes to be attained, are proper matters for consideration. State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho 180, 250 P. 239 (1926).

— Invoking Question of Constitutionality.

Constitutionality of statute will not be determined in any case unless such determination is absolutely necessary in order to determine merits of case in which constitutionality of such statute is drawn in question. Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922).

Constitutionality of statute must be raised at earliest possible moment consistent with good pleading and orderly procedure; otherwise it will be deemed to be waived. Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 242 P. 314 (1925); Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 753, 243 P. 654 (1926).

Party seeking to enforce statute or avail himself of its provisions may not question its constitutionality. Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 242 P. 314 (1925); Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 753, 243 P. 654 (1926).

After portions of state law have been declared by federal courts to violate federal constitution, inquiry as to whether remaining portions which are not violative are sufficient in themselves, so that it cannot be said that entire act falls, ordinarily presents no federal question. Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 261 P. 244 (1927).

— Legislative Intent.

When a statutory or constitutional provision is adopted from another state, where the courts of the state have placed a construction upon the language of such statute or constitution, it is to be presumed that it was enacted in view of such judicial interpretation and that the purpose was to adopt the language as the same had been interpreted and construed by the courts of the state from which it was taken. Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 75 P. 246 (1904). Intent must be expressed by words used, and legislative intention not expressed in some appropriate manner has no legal existence. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Dunbar, 39 Idaho 691, 230 P. 33 (1924).

Court in construing statute should aim to give it sensible construction, such as will effectuate legislative intent, and, if possible, avoid absurd conclusion. Hartman v. Meier, 39 Idaho 261, 227 P. 25 (1924).

Where word, clause or sentence appears in statute which clearly defeats intention of legislature and which may be omitted without defeating object or purpose of statute, and where intention can be definitely determined with word or clause stricken out, this may be done. State v. Bowman, 40 Idaho 470, 235 P. 577 (1925).

One of the recognized rules of construction of statutes is to look to the state of law when statute was enacted in order to see for what it was intended as substitute. Cox v. St. Anthony Bank & Trust Co., 41 Idaho 776, 242 P. 785 (1925).

Intention of legislature may be ascertained not only from phraseology of statute but also by considering its nature, its design, and consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other. Overland Co. v. Utter, 44 Idaho 385, 257 P. 480 (1927).

In construing statute, object is to determine what legislature intended and to give effect to that intention. Hamilton v. Swendsen, 46 Idaho 175, 267 P. 229 (1928); Gallafent v. Tucker, 48 Idaho 240, 281 P. 375 (1929); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 36, 116 P.2d 221 (1941).

Court is limited to declaration of intent of legislature and can neither legislate nor, by construction of statute, enlarge words to include other conduct of like, equal or greater atrocity, simply because it may be within the same mischief to be remedied, when it is not fairly included in language of act. In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267 P. 452 (1928).

In order to determine the meaning of an ambiguous statute, it is necessary to consider and construe together all the sections of the statutes applicable and, from all the provisions, determine what was really meant by the legislature. Lebrecht v. Union Indem. Co., 53 Idaho 228, 22 P.2d 1066 (1933).

In the interpretation of a statute the court’s only concern is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent as expressed, irrespective of the wisdom, practicability, policy, expediency, or possible results. State ex rel. Parsons v. Bunting Tractor Co., 58 Idaho 617, 77 P.2d 464 (1938).

Where an amendment is made, it carries with it the presumption that the legislature intended the statute thus amended to have a meaning different than theretofore accorded it. State ex rel. Parsons v. Bunting Tractor Co., 58 Idaho 617, 77 P.2d 464 (1938).

It is the duty of courts to execute laws according to their true intent and meaning; and that intent, when collected from the whole and every part of the statute taken together, must prevail over the literal sense of the terms and control the strict letter of the law. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948).

— Liberal Construction.

Workmen’s compensation law must be liberally construed. Olson v. Union Pac. R.R., 62 Idaho 423, 112 P.2d 1005 (1941).

It has been the uniform practice of the supreme court to exercise liberality of construction in favor of employees under the workmen’s compensation law. Anderson v. Woesner, 66 Idaho 441, 159 P.2d 899 (1944). All statutes must be liberally construed with a view to accomplishing their aims and purposes, attaining substantial justice, and the courts are not limited to the mere letter of the law, but may look behind the letter to determine its purpose and effect, the object being to determine what the legislature intended, and to give effect to that intent. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948).

— Mandatory or Directory.

Constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory unless by express provision or by necessary implication different intention is manifested. State v. Malcom, 39 Idaho 185, 226 P. 1083 (1924).

Negative or prohibitory statute will, as a general rule, be construed as mandatory. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Dunbar, 39 Idaho 691, 230 P. 33 (1924).

Statute may be mandatory in form, but if it is not clear that it was the intention of legislature that it should be so construed, courts may construe mandatory words to be directory only. Overland Co. v. Utter, 44 Idaho 385, 257 P. 480 (1927).

The word “may” appearing in legislation has the meaning or expresses the right to exercise discretion; a permissive right, rather than the imperative or mandatory meaning of “must.” State ex rel. Parsons v. Bunting Tractor Co., 58 Idaho 617, 77 P.2d 464 (1938).

— Purpose of Statutes.

In construing statute, court should take into consideration reason for law — that is, object and purpose of same, as well as legislative intention in its enactment. State v. Bowman, 40 Idaho 470, 235 P. 577 (1925).

Object of statute must be kept in mind and it should not be given construction that will defeat end of justice. Dunn v. Boise City, 45 Idaho 362, 262 P. 507 (1927).

In construing statutes, courts are not limited to mere letter of law, but may look behind letter to determine its purpose and effect. Hamilton v. Swendsen, 46 Idaho 175, 267 P. 229 (1928).

— Stare Decisis.

Where statute has for long time been given fixed, definite meaning, courts will not change same except for most compelling reasons, although different construction might have been adopted to avoid hardship were it question of first instance. Healy v. Taylor, 37 Idaho 749, 218 P. 190 (1923).

— Statutes Construed Together.

Where two acts are passed and approved on the same day, they should be construed as a single act. Oneida County v. Evans, 25 Idaho 456, 138 P. 337 (1914); Garrett Transf. & Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 33 P.2d 743 (1934).

Statutes of state must be construed together to the end that various sections and provisions may be made to harmonize. State v. Montroy, 37 Idaho 684, 217 P. 611 (1923).

Where general policy or purpose is plainly declared in series or system of statutes, any special provision in any of statutes should, if possible, be given construction which will bring them in harmony with that policy or purpose. State v. Bowman, 40 Idaho 470, 235 P. 577 (1925).

— Statutes in Pari Materia.

No one provision of constitution or statute should be separated from all others and considered alone; but all provisions bearing on particular subject should be brought into view, and it is duty of court to have recourse to whole constitution, if necessary, to ascertain true intent and meaning of any particular provision. Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Challis Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 46 Idaho 403, 268 P. 26 (1928). — Statutes in Pari Materia.

The rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together applies with peculiar force to statutes passed at the same session of the legislature; they are to be construed together and should be so construed, if possible, as to harmonize and give force and effect to the provisions of each. Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 (1914).

Where several laws are passed at same session of legislature and are in pari materia they should be construed together and reconciled, if possible. State v. McBride, 33 Idaho 124, 190 P. 247 (1920); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Dunbar, 39 Idaho 691, 230 P. 33 (1924).

Sections of statute which are in pari materia must be construed together. Blackaby v. Dunning, 40 Idaho 20, 232 P. 566 (1924).

— Statutory Construction Given by Officials.

The construction given to a statute by the executive and administrative officers of the state is entitled to great weight and will be followed unless there are cogent reasons for a change. Breckenridge v. Johnston, 62 Idaho 121, 108 P.2d 833 (1940).

— Surplusage.

Words that fail to have any useful purpose may be eliminated in arriving at intention of legislature. State v. Bowman, 40 Idaho 470, 235 P. 577 (1925).

— Title of Act.

The rule which permits reading the title of an act in aid of statutory construction applies only in cases where the legislative meaning is left in doubt by failure to express it clearly and completely in the law. Curoe v. Spokane & I.E.R.R., 32 Idaho 643, 186 P. 1101 (1920).

After the codification by the legislature of the laws of the state, it is too late to question the validity of one of them on the ground that the title of the bill by which it was originally enacted did not conform with Idaho Const., Art. III, § 16. Curoe v. Spokane & I.E.R.R., 32 Idaho 643, 186 P. 1101 (1920).

While a title is not required for a proposed constitutional amendment, nevertheless, if one exists, it may be resorted to as an aid to construction. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948).

— Words and Phrases.

Words “taxes” and “taxpayers” may have different meanings in different connections, and have been frequently construed in different senses by the courts. Hartman v. Meier, 39 Idaho 261, 227 P. 25 (1924).

In its broadest sense, regulatory license is a tax, but licensee is not taxpayer within meaning of statute. Hartman v. Meier, 39 Idaho 261, 227 P. 25 (1924).

Where ordinary words and terms of statute are used in sense in which they are generally understood, it is not necessary to define or explain them. State v. Marks, 45 Idaho 92, 260 P. 697 (1927). In construction of statutes, words should be given their usual and ordinary meaning. King v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 37, 46 Idaho 800, 272 P. 507 (1928); State ex rel. Parsons v. Bunting Tractor Co., 58 Idaho 617, 77 P.2d 464 (1938).

Penal Statutes.

This section does not authorize courts, by a liberal construction of a statute, to include within it, as criminal, acts that are not clearly within its terms. Ex parte Moore, 38 Idaho 506, 224 P. 662 (1924); Boise Ass’n of Credit Men Ltd. v. Seawell, 47 Idaho 473, 276 P. 318 (1929).

Amendments in Revisions.

Changes made by revision of statute, as distinguished from legislative enactment, will not be regarded as altering the law, unless it is clear such was intention, and if statute as revised is ambiguous, reference may be had to prior statutes. Libby v. Pelham, 30 Idaho 614, 166 P. 575 (1917); Duncan v. Idaho County, 42 Idaho 164, 245 P. 90 (1926).

Act, as originally passed, governs over same act as it appears in revision or codification of entire body of law. State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 228 P. 796 (1924).

Cross References.

Legal notices, publication on day following holiday,§ 60-108.

Nonjudicial days,§ 1-1607.

School holidays,§ 33-512.

Compiler’s Notes.

S.L. 1933, ch. 124 enlarged the powers of the governor to declare legal holidays and to limit such holidays to certain classes of business and activities and to restrict the issuance and enforcement of judicial writs and process during such holidays. Said act also provided that the authority conferred upon the governor by it should automatically terminate with the 31st day of December, 1934. Such chapter was repealed by S.L. 1963, ch. 13, § 236.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1943, ch. 36 declared an emergency. Approved Feb. 9, 1943.

Section 2 of S.L. 1945, ch. 38 declared an emergency. Approved Feb. 20, 1945.

Section 2 of S.L. 1955, ch. 19 declared an emergency. Approved February 7, 1955.

Section 2 of S.L. 1969, ch. 11 provided that this amendment should be effective January 1, 1971.

Debt Moratorium.

Where the substance of the controversy between the parties as to the constitutionality of the moratorium statute has become moot and has disappeared by the effluxion of time, and a judgment rendered would be ineffectual, the question will not be determined by the court. Jorgensen v. George, 56 Idaho 81, 50 P.2d 1 (1935).

Saturday.

It is well recognized and subject to judicial notice that the county offices in this state are closed all day Saturday for the transaction of business. Cather v. Kelso, 103 Idaho 684, 652 P.2d 188 (1982).

Prior Laws.

Former§ 73-108A, which compiled (I.C.,§ 73-108A, as added by 1987, ch. 1, § 1, p. 3) was repealed by S.L. 1990, ch. 371, § 3. For present law see§ 73-108.

Cross References.

Superintendent of public instruction,§ 33-102B.

Cross References.

Idaho state historical society,§ 67-4123 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 162, in the second sentence, substituted “Monday shall be celebrated as” for “Monday, March 5, shall be” and “Friday shall be celebrated as” for “Friday, March 3, shall be”.

Legislative Intent.

Section 1 of S.L. 2014, ch. 31 provided: “Legislative Intent. President Abraham Lincoln, having signed the congressional act creating the Idaho Territory on March 4, 1863, it is the intent of the Legislature to recognize March 4 as IDAHO DAY, through which the people of Idaho may yearly celebrate the rich history, cultural diversity, unique beauty and boundless resources of the State of Idaho and thereby gain a renewed sense of courage and confidence for the future. Throughout its one hundred fifty year history, Idaho has been the birthplace and home of remarkable men and women who have distinguished themselves nationally and internationally in the fields of law, literature, music, the arts, athletics, philanthropy, politics and even space exploration. The same combination of adventure, ambition, industry, innovation and enterprise that led to Idaho’s founding has created a cradle for entrepreneurs, innovators and visionaries. Their work has had a global reach and helped create the Panama Canal, Hoover Dam, the Chunnel, potato chips and computer memory chips, the supermarket, the engineering of wood products, farm machinery and locomotives, the laser printer and enough patents to rank Idaho among the nation’s most prominent intellectual incubators. It is the purpose of this act to provide the mechanism through which state and local agencies of government, historical societies, schools, colleges and universities, Indian tribes, service organizations, clubs, the media and Idaho citizens in general can educate others about Idaho, her culture, her resources, her history and her greatness.”

Acceptance of Nomination.

These sections do apply to the time of filing an acceptance of nomination (C.L. 27:10). Seawell v. Gifford, 22 Idaho 295, 125 P. 182 (1912).

Certificate of Nomination.

Under former§ 34-645 requiring the filing of certificate of nomination not less than forty [now thirty] days before ensuing general election, the tender of the certificate on the fortieth day before the election is timely, as against the contention that forty [30] days were required to intervene between the date of filing and the date of election. Oliason v. Girard, 57 Idaho 41, 61 P.2d 288 (1936).

Doubt as to whether filing under nomination statute might be made on the fortieth [now thirtieth] day preceding election day should be resolved in favor of a citizen trying to avail himself of the privileges the statute intended to confer. Oliason v. Girard, 57 Idaho 41, 61 P.2d 288 (1936).

Direct Primary Law.

This section and§ 73-110, have no application to the requirement of the direct primary law (C.L. 27:5) that nomination papers be filed at least thirty days prior to date of primary. Seawell v. Gifford, 22 Idaho 295, 125 P. 182 (1912).

Fractions of Days Not Counted.

The rule for computation of time in order to determine the date on which an act provided by law must be done is applicable in determining the maximum and minimum time within which filing may be made under nomination statute. Oliason v. Girard, 57 Idaho 41, 61 P.2d 288 (1936). Fractions of Days Not Counted.

The law takes no notice of fractions of a day, and a fraction of a day is deemed a day, unless in the particular case it is necessary to ascertain relative order of occurrences on the same day. Oliason v. Girard, 57 Idaho 41, 61 P.2d 288 (1936).

Notice of Appeal.

Notice of appeal filed on ninety-first day is good when last day fell on Sunday. Falls Creek Timber Co. v. Day, 39 Idaho 495, 228 P. 313 (1924); Myers v. Harvey, 39 Idaho 724, 229 P. 1112 (1924).

Notice of Trial.

Notice given on February 13 that case was set for trial in probate court on February 17 did not comply with statutory requirement of five days’ notice. Simpson v. Simpson, 51 Idaho 99, 4 P.2d 345 (1931).

Saturday.

It is well recognized and subject to judicial notice that the county offices in this state are closed all day Saturday for the transaction of business. Cather v. Kelso, 103 Idaho 684, 652 P.2d 188 (1982).

Service of Summons.

Service on March 31 fixing hearing April 10 is a ten days’ notice. Empire Mill Co. v. District Court, 27 Idaho 383, 149 P. 499, writ denied, 27 Idaho 400, 149 P. 505 (1915).

In computing time of service of summons, day on which service was made must be excluded. Soderman v. Peterson, 36 Idaho 414, 211 P. 448 (1922).

Sundays.

Where 90th day fell on Sunday appeal on following day though on 91st day was timely. Huggins v. Green Top Dairy Farms, Inc., 74 Idaho 266, 260 P.2d 407 (1953).

Transcripts.

Transcript filed on Friday preceding Monday, the first day of the term of supreme court, was held to have been filed in time. Sebree v. Smith, 2 Idaho 357, 16 P. 477 (1888).

Weekend Days.

Intervening weekend days must be included in computing the ten-day notice period for liquor license applicant to notify alcohol beverage control division of one’s intention to accept the license. Young v. Idaho Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870, 853 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1993).

Construction.

This section does not eliminate question of notice when required by the constitution or statutes, but is evidence of legislative intent to authorize a majority of all deriving their powers from legislature to act in every matter over which they have authority, unless otherwise expressed by statute. Akley v. Perrin, 10 Idaho 531, 79 P. 192 (1905).

Amendments.

The 2013 amendment, by ch. 335, designated the extant provisions of the section as subsection (3) and added subsections (1) and (2).

Adoption of Statutory or Constitutional Provision.

By the adoption of a constitutional or statutory provision from another jurisdiction after the courts of such jurisdiction have construed the same, it is presumed that such construction was also adopted. Bishop v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 64 Idaho 806, 137 P.2d 963 (1943).

Application.

A basic rule of statutory construction is that the application of a statute is an aid to construction, especially where the public relies on that application over a long period of time. State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 947 P.2d 400 (1997). Only when the language is ambiguous will a court look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations. Statutory language is not ambiguous merely because the parties present differing interpretations to the court. City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contrs., Inc., 163 Idaho 579, 416 P.3d 951 (2018).

Application to Particular Statutes.

Attachment. Howard v. Grimes Pass Placer Mining Co., 21 Idaho 12, 120 P. 170 (1911).

Fraud in managing corporation. State v. Paulsen, 21 Idaho 686, 123 P. 588 (1912).

Guest statute. Peterson v. Winn, 84 Idaho 523, 373 P.2d 925 (1962).

Horticultural inspectors. Ingard v. Barker, 27 Idaho 124, 147 P. 293 (1915).

Intoxicating liquors. Ada County v. Boise Com. Club, 20 Idaho 421, 118 P. 1086 (1911).

Murder indictment. Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho 391, 17 P. 139 (1888).

School districts. In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58, 34 Idaho 222, 200 P. 138 (1921).

Sunday closing. State v. Morris, 28 Idaho 599, 155 P. 296 (1916).

Wife’s separate property. Sencerbox v. First Nat’l Bank, 14 Idaho 95, 93 P. 369 (1908).

Withdrawal of attorney. Smith-Nieland v. Reed, 39 Idaho 788, 231 P. 102 (1924).

Intent of Legislature.

While word “agree” usually imports unanimity and under ordinary conditions will be given that meaning, yet where word “unanimously” was stricken out by amendment after original bill was introduced, meaning of word “agree” will be considered modified to conform to intention of legislature. In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58, 34 Idaho 222, 200 P. 138 (1921).

Presumption Court Followed Section.

On appeal, the supreme court, will assume that the trial court determined the meaning of any words in question in accordance with the rule provided by this section and in the light of the evidence adduced on the hearing. First Sec. Bank v. Enking, 54 Idaho 735, 35 P.2d 266 (1934).

Words Without Technical Meaning.

A statute written in plain and ordinary language in common every-day use, dealing with a subject that is neither technical nor scientific, should be construed as the ordinary reading public would read and understand it. Howard v. Grimes Pass Placer Mining Co., 21 Idaho 12, 120 P. 170 (1911).

When words have no technical meaning or when they have not been used or employed in a technical sense in the statute, they should be given their ordinary significance as popularly understood. State v. Morris, 28 Idaho 599, 155 P. 296 (1916).

The word “forfeit” is in common usage and its popular and accepted meaning is “to lose” or “to lose the right to.” Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 (1965).

Cross References.

Secured transactions under Uniform Commercial Code,§ 28-9-101 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2010 amendment, by ch. 235, redesignated the subsections; and added paragraph (2)(a).

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 33 of S.L. 1967, ch. 272, read as follows: “Transactions validly entered into before the effective date specified in section 32 and the rights, duties and interest flowing from them remain valid thereafter and may be terminated, completed, consummated or enforced as required or permitted by any statute amended by this act as though such amendment had not occurred.”

Effective Dates.

Section 32 of S.L. 1967, ch. 272, provided that the act should become effective at midnight December 31, 1967, contemporaneously with the Uniform Commercial Code.

Application of Section.

Person. Ada County v. Boise Com. Club, 20 Idaho 421, 118 P. 1086 (1911); Riggen v. Perkins, 42 Idaho 391, 246 P. 962 (1926); State v. Lockie, 43 Idaho 580, 253 P. 618 (1927).

Personal property. Murphy v. Montandon, 3 Idaho (Hasb.) 325, 29 P. 851 (1892); Sencerbox v. First Nat’l Bank, 14 Idaho 95, 93 P. 369 (1908); Meholin v. Carlson, 17 Idaho 742, 107 P. 755 (1910); Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinberg, 44 Idaho 332, 257 P. 31 (1927).

Real property. Hall v. Blackman, 8 Idaho 272, 68 P. 19 (1902).

Singular and plural. Houser v. Hobart, 22 Idaho 735, 127 P. 997 (1912); State v. Holder, 49 Idaho 514, 290 P. 387 (1930).

Writ. State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927).

This section serves as an instructive guide to be applied only when it is necessary to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature and it is neither mandatory nor a rule of general application. C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 547 P.2d 1116 (1976).

The provisions of this section cannot be applied to§ 6-801 in order to imply legislative support of the “unit” rule in Idaho comparative negligence cases, since this section is to be used only to give effect to legislative intent rather than to determine it. Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 624 P.2d 383 (1980).

“Corporation” Defined.

A corporation is a “person” as that term is used in the criminal statutes. State v. Adjustment Dept. Credit Bureau, Inc., 94 Idaho 156, 483 P.2d 687 (1971).

Masculine and Feminine Genders.

Where ordinance, providing for giving of bond, and the bond given thereunder by a public depository to a city treasurer, who happened to be a woman, each used the pronoun “her,” the obligation of the bond was not limited to the term of that particular treasurer but covered subsequent masculine incumbents. City of Pocatello v. Fargo, 41 Idaho 432, 242 P. 297 (1925).

Nuncupative Will.

In the absence of a statutory definition of nuncupative wills, courts must look to the common law for the meaning of that term. Cannon v. Seyboldt, 55 Idaho 796, 48 P.2d 406 (1935).

Person Aggrieved.

An appeal filed by city from order incorporating a village to which incorporation the city objected on the grounds that the proposed village contained fewer than 125 residents, that the proposed boundaries were irregular, bizarre and fantastic, that its incorporation would materially hamper the ordinary growth of the city would be dismissed on the ground that the city was neither a “person aggrieved” by the order, nor a “taxpayer of the county” and, therefore, was not authorized to appeal under the provisions of former§ 31-1509. In re Fernan Lake Village, 80 Idaho 412, 331 P.2d 278 (1958).

Real Property.

Because a mortgage creates a future, contingent right to sell property, with no element of a present right of possession, it is not real property. McKay v. Walker, 160 Idaho 148, 369 P.3d 926 (2016).

Sufficiency of Attestation of Mark.

Mark made in place of a signature is sufficiently witnessed by notary’s signature affixed to his certificate of acknowledgment of instrument. First Nat’l Bank v. Glenn, 10 Idaho 224, 77 P. 623 (1904).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” appearing throughout this section refers to S.L. 2010, chapter 235, which is codified throughout the Idaho Code.

The phrase “the effective date of this act” in the first sentence in subsection (3) refers to the effective date of S.L. 2010, chapter 235, which was effective July 1, 2010.

Construction.

Some doubt is cast upon completeness of this repeal by the dictum of court. Sanders v. Coeur d’Alene, 27 Idaho 353, 149 P. 290 (1915).

Legislative Intent.

In arriving at the legislative intent of an act alleged to have repealed or superseded another, the nature of the several acts involved with their history as well as the objects and purposes sought to be attained, are to be considered. State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho 180, 250 P. 239 (1926).

Champerty and Maintenance.

Common-law rule of champerty and maintenance is not in force in this state. Merchants Protective Ass’n v. Jacobsen, 22 Idaho 636, 127 P. 315 (1912).

Community Standard of Health Care.

Custom.

Because defendant doctor was one of only six cardiovascular surgeons in the state of Idaho and all six of these cardiovascular surgeons practiced together in Boise as a professional association, the standard of health care practice in the community ordinarily served by hospital was indeterminable and no “similar Idaho communities” existed about which plaintiff could have presented evidence of the standard of practice for a cardiovascular surgeon performing patent ductus arteriosus surgery; therefore,§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 did not provide a means of establishing the applicable standard of practice in this case and in resolving whether out-of-state doctor qualified as an expert witness to testify on plaintiff’s behalf, the court turned to decisions predating the enactment of§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752, 828 P.2d 315 (1992). Custom.

There being no statute which expressly or impliedly rejects the doctrine of custom, the doctrine does obtain in Idaho. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979).

Defense.

The possibility of harm at an indeterminate date in the future is insufficient to satisfy the first element of the necessity defense, a specific threat of immediate harm. State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 920 P.2d 391 (1996).

Distress Damage Feasant.

Right of distress damage feasant existed under common law and is applicable to this state insofar as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with constitution and laws. Kelly v. Easton, 35 Idaho 340, 207 P. 129 (1922).

Felony Murder Rule.

Where a third party grabbed defendant’s gun during a kidnapping and shot the victim, the district court committed reversible error by relying on the proximate-cause theory — rather than the agency theory — when instructing the jury on felony murder under§ 18-4001 and subsection (d) of§ 18-4003. The instruction allowed the jury to find defendant liable for any killing that occurred contemporaneously with the kidnapping, without regard to whether defendant and the shooter were engaged in a common scheme or plan to kidnap the victim. Idaho’s felony-murder statute must be viewed through the lens of the English common law under this section, which was that the felony-murder rule applied only to co-conspirators acting in concert in furtherance of the common plan or scheme to commit the underlying felony. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 233 P.3d 71 (2010), overruled on other grounds, Verska v. St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011).

Husband and Wife.

Where plaintiff brought an action for damages to her person and character for torts committed against her during coverture, she may join her husband as a party defendant, if he participated in the wrongs, as constitution and statutes as a whole removed common-law rule that a married woman could not sue her husband for wrongs committed by him against her person. Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949).

Immunity.

Where forms containing corrections officers’ personal information were disclosed to an inmate during criminal proceeding discovery, the prosecutor and the county were immune from the officers’ state law claims because responding to discovery was a quasi-judicial function. Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007). Since Idaho recognizes the common law when it is not “repugnant to, or inconsistent with” constitutional or state law, absolute prosecutorial immunity is recognized for activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007).

In General.

The common law, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States, is a rule of decision of the courts of Idaho only in cases not provided for by the statutory law of this state. State v. Iverson, 79 Idaho 25, 310 P.2d 803 (1957); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Columbia Basin Steel & Iron, Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 471 P.2d 574 (1970).

Although legislature may abrogate the common law, it cannot do so in an unconstitutional manner. State ex rel. Rich v. Idaho Power Co., 81 Idaho 487, 346 P.2d 596 (1959).

The common law is still in effect in Idaho. State v. Grow, 93 Idaho 588, 468 P.2d 320 (1970).

This section provides that the rules of the common law are in effect, unless modified by other legislative enactments. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086, 111 S. Ct. 960, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1048 (1991).

Modification.

Common law can almost always be overturned or modified by the legislature. State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971).

Monopolies.

There is no common-law right to reasonable rates from any monopoly created by the state. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989).

Necessity.

Defendant charged with possession of marijuana was entitled to present evidence at trial on the common-law defense of necessity, because of her claim that she suffered from rheumatoid arthritis and used marijuana to control the pain and muscle spasms associated with that disease. State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990).

Recision of Insurance Contract.

Rules of the common law were in effect in Idaho under the provisions of this section, unless modified by other legislative enactments; and a party that desired to rescind a contract had to, prior to rescinding, tender back to the other party any consideration or benefit received under the contract by the rescinding party. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 45 P.3d 829 (2002).

Removal of Trees.

The common law of England being followed insofar as not repugnant to the laws of Idaho and the Constitutions of the United States and the state of Idaho would be followed in an action to remove trees damaging the foundation of a house. Lemon v. Curington, 78 Idaho 522, 306 P.2d 1091 (1957).

Riparian Rights.

Riparian owner upon streams of this state, both navigable and nonnavigable, takes to thread of stream, subject, however, to an easement for use of the public. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 P. 499 (1908).

Common-law doctrine of riparian rights insofar as those rights conflict with right of an appropriator of the waters of a stream, is repugnant to, and in conflict with, the constitution and statutes of this state, and to that extent has been abrogated thereby. Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 101 P. 1059 (1909).

This section adopts only so much of the common law as is applicable to conditions in this state. English doctrine of riparian rights on navigable streams has been repeatedly held not applicable to this country. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 161 P. 854 (1916).

Rule Against Perpetuities.

The common-law rule against perpetuities is generally stated to be that no interest in real estate is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest plus the period of gestation. Locklear v. Tucker, 69 Idaho 84, 203 P.2d 380 (1949).

Idaho has adopted what is intended to be a complete system governing alienation of real property; and the common-law rule against perpetuities is not in force in this jurisdiction. Locklear v. Tucker, 69 Idaho 84, 203 P.2d 380 (1949).

School District.

A school district is not entitled to a preference of its claim against a closed bank’s assets for the amount of an unpaid cashier’s check received for the school district’s check on its unsecured sinking fund deposit and sent to the state finance commissioner in payment of the district’s indebtedness to the state department of public investments, in the absence of a showing that the bank acted only as district’s agent in transmitting funds. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Diefendorf, 57 Idaho 191, 64 P.2d 393 (1937).

Statutory Subsidy Void.

When statutory provision for compensation by the state to utilities ordered to relocate their facilities was declared unconstitutional, the common-law rule that a utility forced to move its facilities must do so at its own expense was applied. State ex rel. Rich v. Idaho Power Co., 81 Idaho 487, 346 P.2d 596 (1959).

Succession of Property.

Under the code, a complete system for the succession to property of decedent is provided for; hence, court will not consider the common law. In re Reil’s Estate, 70 Idaho 64, 211 P.2d 407 (1949).

As the state statutes purport to provide a complete system for the succession to property of decedents, the common-law restriction on succession of a killer to the estate of his victim would not apply to the claim of one convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of her husband as to a situation for which there is no statutory declaration or provision. Anstine v. Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 447 P.2d 677 (1968).

Survival of Actions.

An action for the destruction of personal property caused by the negligence of a tort-feasor survives the tort-feasor, but consequential damages flowing from the injury to the person of the deceased in his lifetime does not survive. Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944).

Claims of medical expenses, lost income, lost earning capacity, emotional distress, anguish, and pain and suffering were personal to decedent and did not fall under any statutory exceptions; thus, applying the common law, all claims abated upon the decedent’s death. Estate of Shaw v. Dauphin Graphic Machs., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Idaho 2005), rev’d in part, 240 Fed. Appx. 177 (9th Cir. 2007).

The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. Under the common law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 617, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012).

Treasure Trove.

Because it was already beginning to be abrogated in England hundreds of years before Idaho was settled, the doctrine of treasure trove was not part of the common law adopted in Idaho upon enactment of the statute. Corliss v. Wenner, 136 Idaho 417, 34 P.3d 1100 (Ct. App. 2001).

Use by Court.

In the exercise of its inherent judicial power, the court may use the common law or other appropriate method if the statute or rule does not describe the procedure. J.I. Case Co. v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 280 P.2d 1070 (1955).

Scope of Revision.

Whatever is included in a statutory revision must be construed together as the law; all that formerly existed but is not included is repealed. Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho 651, 23 P. 232 (1890).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is analogous to R.C., § 17. It was reenacted and appeared in C.L. as § 500:17a; in C.S. as § 9458, and in I.C.A. as§ 70-119.

Compiled Statutes of 1919 contained the following note: “Subdivision 78a was omitted from Compiled Laws through inadvertence, attention being called thereto in the commissioner’s report. It was inserted by 1919, ch. 159, p. 518. Repeating what was said by Code Commissioner MacLane: ‘This enumeration is made without any attempt on the part of the commissioner to determine how far these special or local acts are still in force, and they are continued in force only so far as they have not been superseded, repealed, amended or modified by subsequent legislation.’”

Subdivision 3.

The state auditor is prohibited by the constitution from drawing his warrant upon any fund in payment of a claim until the proper legislative appropriation has been made. Evans v. Huston, 27 Idaho 559, 150 P. 14 (1915).

Subdivision 4.

The territorial legislature had authority to create and organize an independent school district and it was as fully an educational corporation as any other educational corporation within the state. Howard v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1, 17 Idaho 537, 106 P. 692 (1910).

Subdivision 21.

In the passage of an act to increase the public indebtedness, the legislature must be governed by the assessed value of the taxable property as it then exists and cannot leave the ascertainment of future assessed valuations to the future acts of ministerial or executive officers. Lewis v. Brady, 17 Idaho 251, 104 P. 900 (1909).

Subdivision 33.

When an act embraces two distinct subjects, neither of which is properly connected with the other, the act is repugnant to the constitution and must fall. State ex rel. Moore v. Banks, 37 Idaho 27, 215 P. 468 (1923).

Cross References.

General fund,§ 67-1205.

State board of education, 33-101 et seq.

State controller,§ 67-1001 et seq.

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 254, rewrote the section catchline, which formerly read: “Certain documents to be in English”; and rewrote the section which formerly read: “Any document, certificate or instrument required to be filed, recorded or endorsed by any officer of this state, or of any county, city or district in this state, shall be in the English language or shall be accompanied by a certified translation in English.”

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of S.L. 2007, ch. 254 provides: “Severability. The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.”

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 1999, ch. 334 declared an emergency. Approved March 24, 1999.

Construction.

This section aids Congress’s objective to improve child support enforcement effectiveness, and, in passing§ 54-5210, the Idaho legislature declared it is in the public interest to provide a mechanism to remove from practice incompetent or unprincipled practitioners of construction. The requirement that a social security number be listed on an application for an Idaho contractor license does qualify an applicant’s right to contract: but, because that requirement pursues legitimate state objectives, it does not violate his contract rights. Ricks v. State Contrs. Bd., 164 Idaho 689, 435 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2018).

Religious Freedom.

Section 54-5210, 42 U.S.C.S. § 666(a)(13), and this section do not violate a contractor’s free exercise of religion by requiring him to include his social security number on his application for individual registration with the Idaho bureau of occupational licenses. Ricks v. State Contrs. Bd., 164 Idaho 689, 435 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2018).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” appearing twice in this section refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” appearing throughout this section refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

Cross References.

Board of commissioners of the state bar,§ 3-401 et seq.

Secretary of state,§ 67-901 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The phrase “the effective date of this act,” appearing twice in this section refers to the effective date of S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which was effective March 12, 1949.

The term “this act” appearing throughout this section refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

Effective Dates.

Section 9 of S.L. 1974, ch. 5 provided this act take effect on and after July 1, 1974.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2003, ch. 56 declared an emergency retroactively to January 1, 2003 and approved March 13, 2003.

Cross References.

Secretary of state,§ 67-901 et seq.

State board of examiners,§ 67-2001 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertion near the end of the section was added the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

The term “this act” near the end of the section refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Compilation.

The Idaho Code is a compilation of laws enacted by the legislature; it is not a codification in the sense that the legislature has enacted the contents of the current version of the Idaho Code as the laws of Idaho. Peterson v. Peterson, 156 Idaho 85, 320 P.3d 1244 (2014).

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” near the end of the section refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

Cross References.

Secretary of state,§ 67-901 et seq.

State board of examiners,§ 67-2001 et seq.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1957, ch. 136 declared an emergency. Approved March 7, 1957.

Section 3 of S.L. 1979, ch. 157 declared an emergency. Approved March 29, 1979.

Cross References.

Code fund,§ 73-215.

State treasurer,§ 67-1201 et seq.

Summary administration procedure for small estates,§ 15-3-1201 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1992, ch. 255 provided that the act would become effective January 1, 1993.

Section 2 of S.L. 1969, ch. 137 provided that this amendment should be effective at 12:01 a.m. on January 11, 1971.

Section 7 of S.L. 1979, ch. 219 provided that the act should take effect July 1, 1979.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” appearing throughout this section refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

Cross References.

General fund,§ 67-1205.

State treasurer,§ 67-1201 et seq.

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 2002, ch. 19 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2002.

Cross References.

Attorney general,§ 67-1401 et seq.

Code commission officers,§ 73-203.

State treasurer,§ 67-1201 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” appearing twice in this section refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

Cross References.

State treasurer,§ 67-1201 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The office of the commissioner of public investments, referred to in the last sentence, was abolished by S.L. 1974, ch. 40, § 1.

Cross References.

Code defined,§ 73-215.

State controller,§ 67-1001 et seq.

State treasurer,§ 67-1201 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” appearing twice in this section refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

Effective Dates.

Section 241 of S.L. 1994, ch. 180 provided: “This act shall be in full force and effect on and after the first Monday of January, 1995, if the state board of canvassers has certified that an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Idaho has been adopted at the general election of 1994 to change the name of the state auditor to state controller.” Since such amendment was adopted, the amendment to this section by § 239 of S.L. 1994, ch. 180 became effective January 2, 1995.

Cross References.

State board of examiners,§ 67-2001 et seq.

State controller,§ 67-1001 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” near the end of the first sentence refers to S.L. 1955, chapter 59, which is codified as§§ 73-205 and 73-219.

The term “this act” in the last sentence refers to S.L. 1953, chapter 250, which is codified as§§ 73-201, 73-202, 73-205, 73-209, 73-213, 73-214, 73-216, and 73-218 to 73-220. Probably, both references should read “this chapter,” being chapter 2, title 73, Idaho Code.

Effective Dates.

Section 241 of S.L. 1994, ch. 180 provided: “This act shall be in full force and effect on and after the first Monday of January, 1995, if the state board of canvassers has certified that an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Idaho has been adopted at the general election of 1994 to change the name of the state auditor to state controller.” Since such amendment was adopted, the amendment to this section by § 239 of S.L. 1994, ch. 180 became effective January 2, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” refers to S.L. 1949, chapter 167, which is compiled as§§ 73-201 to 73-221.

The bracketed insertions were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

The reference enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 11 of S.L. 1953, ch. 250 declared an emergency. Approved March 18, 1953.

Cross References.

Secretary of state,§ 67-901 et seq.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 22 of S.L. 1949, ch. 167 read: “The provisions of this act are hereby declared separable, and if any section, clause or phrase hereof is declared unconstitutional or void, the validity of the remaining portions of this act shall not thereby be affected.”

Section 23 of S.L. 1949, ch. 167 read: “All 1943 Idaho Code fund treasury notes issued and outstanding pursuant to Session Laws of 1943, Chapter 103, and all 1947 Idaho Code fund treasury notes issued or to be issued and outstanding pursuant to Session Laws of 1947, Chapter 224, are hereby expressly validated, legalized, and ratified, and no right, privilege or interest secured by or vested in any holder of any such treasury note or notes shall in anywise be impaired or abrogated by reason by any provision of this act.

“Session Laws of 1947, Chapter 224, and each of its provisions, where applicable, is hereby expressly continued in full force and effect to the end that each and every of the purposes and objects thereof may be fully and completely accomplished.”

Effective Dates.

Section 24 of S.L. 1949, ch. 167 declared an emergency. Approved March 12, 1949.

Section 6 of S.L. 1972, ch. 161 provided the act should take effect on and after July 1, 1972.

Legislative Intent.

Section 1 of S.L. 1978, ch. 358 read: “It is the intention of the legislature to extend to residents of Idaho the advantage of the increased marital declaration permitted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 by enacting a statute that will cause marital deduction formula clauses to refer to the increased deduction permitted by HR10612, Section 2002(d)(1) (B)(iv).”

Federal References.

The Internal Revenue Code § 2056(c) as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, referred to in this section, is compiled as 26 U.S.C. § 2056(c).

Compiler’s Notes.

The reference enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 3 of S.L. 1978, ch. 358 declared an emergency and made the act effective retroactive to January 1, 1977 and thereafter. Approved March 29, 1978.

Effective Dates.

Section 1 of S.L. 2000, ch. 134 amended Section 3, ch. 133, to read: “This act shall be in full force and effect on and after February 1, 2001”.

Section 3 of S.L. 2000, ch. 133 declared an emergency. Approved March 31, 2000.

Recognized Religious Beliefs.

Defendant’s marijuana use was not substantially motivated by a religious belief under Idaho’s free exercise of religion protected act. Although defendant’s testimony linked his marijuana use to legitimate religious beliefs and practices, he used parts of various recognized religions to “meld into a justification for his use of marijuana” and did not establish a link between any recognized religious beliefs he may have and his marijuana use. State v. White, 152 Idaho 361, 271 P.3d 1217 (Ct. App. 2011).

Possession of marijuana and paraphernalia charges were not subject to dismissal on the basis of defendant’s right to religious freedom under the Idaho free exercise of religion protected act. Defendant failed to show his use of marijuana, as a member of a cognitive therapy church, comprised an exercise of “religion” such that it is protected by the act. State v. Cordingley, 154 Idaho 762, 302 P.3d 730 (Ct. App. 2013).

Retroactivity.

Idaho free exercise of religion protected act,§ 73-401 et seq., does not apply retroactively because the act has no language indicating that the Idaho legislature intended that it was to be retroactively applied to activity occurring before the act went into effect on February 1, 2001. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2004).

District court properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) a physician assistant’s action against the Idaho state board of medicine and the Idaho state board of medicine board of professional discipline under the Idaho free exercise of religion protected act,§ 73-401 et seq., where the district court correctly concluded that the act did not apply retroactively to the boards’ conduct in failing to reinstate the physician assistant’s license. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2004).

Substantially Burden.

By prohibiting the government from imposing any substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise unless the burden is justified by a compelling, and not just a legitimate, governmental interest, the Religious Exercises in Land Use and by Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc, accords greater protection to an inmate than Idaho’s free exercise of religion protected act. Hyde v. Fisher, 146 Idaho 782, 203 P.3d 712 (Ct. App. 2009).

Effective Dates.

Section 1 of S.L. 2000, ch. 134 amended Section 3, ch. 133, to read: “This act shall be in full force and effect on and after February 1, 2001”.

Section 3 of S.L. 2000, ch. 133 declared an emergency. Approved March 31, 2000.

Federal Preemption.

Order from the state DOT denying plaintiff’s application to renew his driver’s license for failure to provide his social security number was upheld because the state of Idaho was required by federal law to record the social security number of all driver’s license applicants. Lewis v. DOT, 143 Idaho 418, 146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006).

Inmate’s Rights.

Where corrections board had compelling interests in creating tobacco-free policy for prisons and its tobacco-free policy was the least restrictive means to further those interests, policy did not violate inmate’s exercise of religion under Idaho free exercise of religion protected act. Roles v. Townsend, 138 Idaho 412, 64 P.3d 338 (Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 839, 124 S. Ct. 98, 157 L. Ed. 2d 71 (2003).

By prohibiting the government from imposing any substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise unless the burden is justified by a compelling, and not just a legitimate, governmental interest, the Religious Exercises in Land Use and by Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc, accords greater protection to an inmate than Idaho’s free exercise of religion protected act. Hyde v. Fisher, 146 Idaho 782, 203 P.3d 712 (Ct. App. 2009).

Preemption.

Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (FERPA),§ 73-401 et seq., does not directly conflict with 42 U.S.C.S. § 666(a)(13), but the operation of FERPA does impede the federal statute’s objective of improving child support enforcement effectiveness by exempting individuals from the requirement of providing social security numbers on professional license applications. The federal statute, thus, preempts FERPA in this context. Ricks v. State Contrs. Bd., 164 Idaho 689, 435 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2018).

Recognized Religious Beliefs.

Defendant’s marijuana use was not substantially motivated by a religious belief under Idaho’s free exercise of religion protected act. Although defendant’s testimony linked his marijuana use to legitimate religious beliefs and practices, he used parts of various recognized religions to “meld into a justification for his use of marijuana” and did not establish a link between any recognized religious beliefs he may have and his marijuana use State v. White, 152 Idaho 361, 271 P.3d 1217 (Ct. App. 2011).

Denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss charges for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia against him on the basis his right to religious freedom under the Idaho free exercise of religion protected act was appropriate, because he failed to show his use of marijuana, as a member of a cognitive therapy church, comprised an exercise of “religion” protected by the act. State v. Cordingley, 154 Idaho 762, 302 P.3d 730 (Ct. App. 2013).

Security Bond.

Requirement to post a security bond as a condition precedent to filing a civil action against a law enforcement officer did not apply to indigent prisoner seeking writ of habeas corpus for violation of his free exercise of religion. Hyde v. Fisher, 143 Idaho 782, 152 P.3d 653 (Ct. App. 2007).

A.L.R.

§ 73-403. Applicability.

1. This chapter applies to all state laws and local ordinances and the implementation of those laws and ordinances, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether enacted or adopted before, on or after the effective date of this chapter.
2. State laws that are enacted or adopted on or after the effective date of this chapter are subject to this chapter unless the law explicitly excludes application by reference to this chapter.
3. This chapter shall not be construed to authorize any government to burden any religious belief.

History.

I.C.,§ 73-403, as added by 2000, ch. 133, § 2, p. 352.

Compiler’s Notes.

The phrase “the effective date of this chapter” refers to the effective date of S.L. 2000, chapter 133, which, pursuant to section 3 of that act, as amended by S.L. 2000, ch. 134, § 1, was effective February 1, 2001.

Effective Dates.

Section 1 of S.L. 2000, ch. 134 amended Section 3, ch. 133, to read: “This act shall be in full force and effect on and after February 1, 2001”.

Section 3 of S.L. 2000, ch. 133 declared an emergency. Approved March 31, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in this section refers to S.L. 2000, chapter 133, which is codified as§§ 73-401 to 73-404.

Effective Dates.

Section 1 of S.L. 2000, ch. 134 amended Section 3, ch. 133, to read: “This act shall be in full force and effect on and after February 1, 2001”.