CHAPTER 21 Judicial Retirement

Court and Judges

21.010. Court consists of seven judges. [Repealed]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (939, 951: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.010 .

21.020. Appellate court districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (939 to 946) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 305, § 2.

21.021. Appellate court districts — Election of judges — Jurisdiction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1972, ch. 305, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.010 .

21.030. New counties, part of which district. [Repealed]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (948) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976.

21.040. Election of judges, when held. [Repealed].

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (947: amend. Acts 1972, ch. 305, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976.

21.050. Power of court and judges — Writs and process. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (949, 954) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.050 .

21.055. Reversal or modification of judgments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 514, 515: amend. 1968 Ky. Acts ch. 152, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.060 .

21.056. Procedure for reversal or modificatoin of judgment — Method of taking and perfecting. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (CC. 734: amend. and trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 33) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.060 .

21.060. Appellate civil jurisdiction of Court of Appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (950-1: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 24, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.020 .

21.070. Amount in controversy, how ascertained. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (950-2) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.020 .

21.080. Appeals in cases involving less than $2500. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (950-3: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 24, § 2; 1958, ch. 101) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see 22A.020 .

21.085. Time limit on right of appeal by persons under disability. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 745: amend. & trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 34) was repealed by Acts 1960, ch. 104, § 1.

21.090. Terms of court — Absence of judges. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (953, 954) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976.

21.100. Effect of equal division of court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976.

21.110. Travel expense allowance or equivalent for judges and commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1948, ch. 61, §§ 2, 3) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

21.120. Enforcement of mandates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 762: amend. & trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.050 .

21.130. Damages upon affirmance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 764: amend. & trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 35) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 59, § 3 and Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 26A.300 .

21.135. Opinions to be delivered. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 765: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976.

21.140. Appeals in criminal cases. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 1; 1964, ch. 72, § 1; 1974, ch. 406, § 297) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.020 .

Officers and Employees

21.150. Commissioners of Court of Appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (962b-1: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 49, §§ 1, 2; 1960, ch. 84, Act III, § 16; 1966, ch. 255, § 25; 1974, ch. 203, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14.

21.151. Compensation of retired commissioners of Court of Appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 16.

21.155. Law clerks for court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1946, ch. 156) was repealed by Acts 1954, ch. 238, § 2.

21.160. Clerical assistants for judges and commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (962a: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 248) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976.

21.170. Clerk’s salary. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (960a-1: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 26, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29. For present law see KRS 64.480 .

21.180. Salaries of deputies of clerk fixed by court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (960a-3) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.040 .

21.190. Assistance clerk of Court of Appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (960a-4) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.040 .

21.200. Notice to special judges of hearing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (952) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.040 .

21.210. Inspection of clerk’s office by court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (961) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.040 .

21.220. Administrative director. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (962: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 238, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. 1, § 4.

21.230. Process, to whom directed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (4551-5: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 26) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 22A.070 .

21.240. Court reporter and his clerk — Appointment and compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-1) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

21.250. Duties of reporter. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-2, 955a-8) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 156, § 8.

21.260. Publication of opinions of Court of Appeals — No copyright. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-3: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 146, § 1; 1950, ch. 156, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976. For present law see KRS 21A.070 .

21.270. Number of copies; distribution. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-4) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 156, § 8.

21.280. No copyright; preservation of pages or forms. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-5: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 146, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 156, § 8.

21.290. Reprinting of reports. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-6) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 156, § 8.

21.300. Advance sheets, publication. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-7) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 156, § 8.

21.305. Circuit judges to be special commissioners of Court of Appeals — Duties — Compensation — Removal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 14, effective March 23, 1976.

21.310. Advance sheets, subscriptions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-10) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 156, § 8.

21.320. Certification of cost of publication. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (955a-9) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 156, § 8.

Judicial Retirement System for Judges and Commissioners

21.345. Definitions.

  1. For the purposes of KRS 21.350 to 21.510 , “retirement” means a voluntary resignation or a failure of reelection, but does not include a removal for cause.
  2. The word “service” as used in KRS 21.370 to 21.480 means service transferred from the Kentucky Retirement Systems pursuant to KRS 21.370 (2), service as a city police judge purchased pursuant to KRS 21.370(3), and service as a Justice of the Supreme Court, as a Judge of the Court of Appeals created by Section 111 of the Constitution of Kentucky, as a regular Circuit Judge, or as a regular Judge of the District Court, including service in one (1) and then another of those capacities. It also includes service as a special Circuit Judge under the conditions described in subsection (3) of this section, as a Judge or commissioner of the former Court of Appeals, or as director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, prior to January 1, 1976, and service continuing beyond that date, in any capacity in or for the Court of Justice, by any person who held the office of commissioner of the former Court of Appeals, or director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, on December 31, 1975. The word “service” embraces only service performed while a member of the retirement system established by KRS 21.350 to 21.510 , except that service in any of the positions mentioned, before the Judicial Retirement System was made applicable to that category of position, and service transferred from the Kentucky Retirement Systems pursuant to KRS 21.370(2), shall be included.
  3. For the purposes of KRS 21.345 to 21.510 , a “year” of service means a total of twelve (12) months of service, which need not be in the same calendar year. Service for any part of the calendar month in which the member’s term of service begins or ends shall be deemed to constitute a month of service.
  4. The term “accumulated employer credit” as used in KRS 21.345 to 21.580 means the employer pay credit deposited to the member’s account and interest credited on such amounts as provided by KRS 21.402 .
  5. The term “accumulated contributions” as used in KRS 21.345 to 21.580 , means:
    1. For a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, the contributions made by the member to the Judicial Retirement Plan; and
    2. For a member who begins participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, in the hybrid cash balance plan, the contributions made by the member to the Judicial Retirement Plan and interest credited on such amounts as provided by KRS 21.402 .
  6. The term “accumulated account balance” as used in KRS 21.345 to 21.580 means:
    1. For members who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, the member’s accumulated contributions; or
    2. For members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, in the hybrid cash balance plan as provided by KRS 21.402 , the combined sum of the member’s accumulated contributions and the member’s accumulated employer credit.
  7. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any director of the Administrative Office of the Courts appointed after January 1, 1976, nor shall they apply to any commissioner of the Court of Appeals not appointed prior to January 1, 1976. The administrative director of the courts and commissioners of the Court of Appeals appointed prior to January 1, 1976, shall continue to be members of the system so long as they continue to render service in any capacity in or for the Court of Justice.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 5; 1962, ch. 9, § 2 (last sentence); 1974, ch. 85, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 14; 1978, ch. 193, § 1, effective July 1, 1978; 1980, ch. 271, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 299, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 480, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 189, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 167, § 29, effective July 15, 1996; 2013, ch. 120, § 19, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 12, § 4, effective July 15, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Subsection (1) of this section was formerly compiled as KRS 21.390 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys. v. AG, 132 S.W.3d 770, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 238 ( Ky. 2003 ), rehearing denied, Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys. v. AG of Ky., 2004 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Judicial Retirement System is a “governmental plan” which includes any plan established by a state or agency for its employees, and is thus excluded from the provisions of the Pension Reform Act 29 USCS, § 1003 and 45 USCS, §§ 215n, 228(a)). OAG 75-206 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Judge, retired for permanent disability, eligibility for retirement benefits, SCR 4.270.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, The Kentucky Divorce Statute: A Call for Reform, 66 Ky. L.J. 724 (1977-1978).

21.347. Judicial Retirement Plan — Judicial retirement fund — Established.

The Judicial Retirement System established by KRS 21.345 to 21.510 shall hereafter be designated and known as the Judicial Retirement Plan. There is established within that plan a state fund to be known as the judicial retirement fund, which shall consist of all money and securities of the Judicial Retirement System immediately prior to July 1, 1980; all allotments to be received of moneys theretofore appropriated to or for the Judicial Retirement System or Judicial Retirement Board and not yet allotted; all state appropriations to the judicial retirement fund or the Judicial Retirement Plan; all earnings from investment of the fund (including insurance benefits); and all contributions from members of the plan. The fund may have a subordinate administrative account. The benefits provided to be paid by reason of membership in the Judicial Retirement Plan shall not be chargeable to any other retirement fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 18, effective July 1, 1980; 1984, ch. 111, § 24, effective July 13, 1984.

21.350. Establishment of system; membership.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, membership in the retirement system established by KRS 21.350 to 21.510 shall consist of, and be confined to, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals created by Section 111 of the Constitution of Kentucky, Circuit Judges, and Judges of the District Court, who have elected to participate in accordance with KRS 21.360 .
  2. Any person who was a member on December 31, 1975, by virtue of holding on that date the office of commissioner of the former Court of Appeals or director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall continue in membership so long as he continues to render service in any capacity in or for the Court of Justice.
  3. The limitation of membership made by this section does not affect rights to benefits based on service rendered before the 1978 amendment to this section took effect.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 1; 1978, ch. 193, § 2, effective July 1, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 196, effective July 15, 1980.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Bivin, The Historical Developments of the Kentucky Courts, 47 Ky. L.J. 465 (1959).

21.355. Membership. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1976, ch. 60, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 193, § 10, effective July 1, 1978. For present law see KRS 21.350 .

21.357. Summary plan description — Publication — Recipients.

  1. The Judicial Retirement Board shall prepare and furnish to all active members a summary plan description, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the members and beneficiaries, and sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise them of their rights and obligations under the Judicial Retirement System.
  2. The summary plan description shall include:
    1. The name and address of the retirement system, the name of the manager, and the name and address of each member of the Judicial Retirement Board;
    2. The name and address of the person designated for the service of legal process;
    3. The system’s requirements for participation and benefits;
    4. A description of retirement formulas for normal, early and disability retirement, and survivor benefits;
    5. A description of the requirements for vesting of pension benefits;
    6. A list of circumstances which would result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits;
    7. The sources of financing retirement benefits, and statutory requirements for funding;
    8. A statement after each actuarial valuation as to whether funding requirements are being met; and
    9. The procedures to be followed in presenting claims for benefits under the plan, and the remedies available under the plan for the redress of claims which are denied in whole or in part.
  3. The board may publish the summary plan description in the form of a comprehensive pamphlet or booklet, or in the form of periodic newsletters which shall incorporate all the information required in the summary plan description within a period of two (2) years. Any changes in statutory requirements or administrative practices which alter the provisions of the plan as described in the summary plan description shall be summarized as required in subsection (1) of this section and furnished to members in the form of a supplement to a comprehensive booklet, or reported in the periodic newsletter.
  4. The board shall provide to retirees and beneficiaries so much of the summary plan description as they need to understand changes in benefits which apply to them.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 246, § 14, effective July 15, 1980.

21.360. Election to participate — Delayed election. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

    1. Each Judge of the District Court in office on July 1, 1978, may within thirty (30) days after that date, and any judge or justice of any court entitled to be a member thereafter taking office may within thirty (30) days after taking office, elect to make monthly contributions to the retirement system in an amount equal to: (1) (a) Each Judge of the District Court in office on July 1, 1978, may within thirty (30) days after that date, and any judge or justice of any court entitled to be a member thereafter taking office may within thirty (30) days after taking office, elect to make monthly contributions to the retirement system in an amount equal to:
      1. Five percent (5%) of his or her monthly official salary, if the judge or justice became a member of the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan prior to September 1, 2008;
      2. Six percent (6%) of his or her monthly official salary, if the judge or justice became a member of the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014; or
      3. Six percent (6%) of his or her monthly official salary, if the judge or justice who becomes a member of the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, which shall be used to fund benefits as follows:
        1. Five percent (5%) of the monthly official salary shall be used to provide funding for benefits provided under KRS 21.402 ; and
        2. One percent (1%) of the monthly official salary to be used exclusively to help fund retiree health benefits as provided by KRS 21.427 and which shall not be refunded to the member if the member withdraws his or her accumulated account balance as provided by KRS 21.460 . The deducted amounts under this subdivision shall be credited to an account established pursuant to 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(h) , within the fund established by KRS 21.347 .
    2. The election shall be effective to establish membership in the system as of July 1, 1978, or as of the date the judge or justice took office, as the case may be. The election shall be addressed to and filed with the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, and shall constitute an authorization by the member, to the secretary, to thereafter cause to be deducted from the member’s official salary, each month, the amount required by paragraph (a) of this subsection, as a voluntary contribution by the member towards the funding of the retirement system. For a member who began contributing to the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, the contribution shall continue until the judge or justice is vested in a service retirement allowance equal to one hundred percent (100%) of final compensation. Thereafter employee contributions shall be discontinued but continued service and retirement benefits shall not be affected thereby.
  1. A judge or justice entitled to elect membership in the retirement system who failed to elect membership within thirty (30) days after taking office in 1980 or who elected membership in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System may elect membership not later than August 31, 2005. An election, upon being made pursuant to this section, shall operate to create an inviolable contract between the member entitled to elect membership under this subsection and the Commonwealth, guaranteeing to and vesting in the member the rights and benefits provided for under the terms and conditions of KRS 21.350 to 21.510 , except that the General Assembly reserves the right to amend, reduce, or suspend any legislative changes to the provisions of KRS 21.345 to 21.580 that become effective on or after July 1, 2018.
    1. When any judge makes a delayed election of membership in the Judicial Retirement Plan under subsection (2) of this section, his active membership in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System shall terminate, as of the date his membership in the Judicial Retirement Plan becomes effective, and any credit in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, earned for service as a judge, which he then has or which he subsequently regains while being an active member of the Judicial Retirement Plan, shall be transferred to and counted as service credit in the Judicial Retirement Plan, and shall no longer constitute credit in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, except for the purpose of validating any other credit in that system, if the member pays the difference, if any, between the amount transferred from the Kentucky Employees Retirement System and the actuarial value of the transferred service. (3) (a) When any judge makes a delayed election of membership in the Judicial Retirement Plan under subsection (2) of this section, his active membership in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System shall terminate, as of the date his membership in the Judicial Retirement Plan becomes effective, and any credit in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, earned for service as a judge, which he then has or which he subsequently regains while being an active member of the Judicial Retirement Plan, shall be transferred to and counted as service credit in the Judicial Retirement Plan, and shall no longer constitute credit in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, except for the purpose of validating any other credit in that system, if the member pays the difference, if any, between the amount transferred from the Kentucky Employees Retirement System and the actuarial value of the transferred service.
    2. Any credit he then has in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, earned for service in any capacity other than a judge, shall not be affected. Notwithstanding any provisions of KRS 61.680 to the contrary, final compensation used to determine benefits for any service credit remaining in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System shall be based on the highest years of compensation as a judge whether the years occur before or after the judge elects membership in the Judicial Retirement Plan.
    3. No person may attain credit in more than one (1) of the retirement plans or systems mentioned in this section for the same period of service. When credit is transferred from the Kentucky Employees Retirement System to the Judicial Retirement Plan, the Kentucky Employees Retirement System shall transfer to the Judicial Retirement Fund an amount equal to the employee’s and employer’s contributions attributable to that credit, together with interest on the contributions from the date made to the date of transfer at the actuarially-assumed interest rate of the Kentucky Employees Retirement System in effect at the time the contributions were made, compounded annually at that same interest rate.
  2. Membership and benefit rights for judges and justices (other than Judges of the District Court), and for the commissioners and administrative director, who took office prior to July 1, 1978, shall be dependent upon valid elections having been made under this section (and KRS 21.355 and 21.365 ) prior to the 1978 amendment to this section. The terms of such elections, including the contribution rate, shall continue to govern for the duration of the member’s service.
  3. When any Judge of the District Court in office on July 1, 1978, elects membership in the Judicial Retirement Plan in accordance with this section, his membership in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System shall terminate as of July 1, 1978, and any credit in that system he earned for service as a Judge of the District Court shall be nullified; provided that the effect of such service to validate any other service credit in that system shall not be nullified.
  4. The state shall,  solely for the purpose of compliance with Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue  Code, pick up the employee contributions  required by this section for all compensation earned after August  1, 1982, and the contributions so picked up shall be treated as employer  contributions in determining tax treatment under the United States  Internal Revenue Code and KRS 141.010 . The picked-up employee contribution  shall satisfy all obligations to the retirement system satisfied prior  to August 1, 1982, by the employee contribution, and the picked-up  employee contribution shall be in lieu of an employee contribution.  The state shall pay these picked-up employee contributions from the  same source of funds which is used to pay earnings to the employee.  The employee shall have no option to receive the contributed amounts  directly instead of having them paid by the employer to the system.  Employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, shall be treated  for all purposes of KRS 21.345 to 21.570 in the  same manner and to the same extent as employee contributions made  prior to August 1, 1982.
  5. An election once made under this section, either to participate or not to participate in the Judicial Retirement Plan, shall be considered to apply, to all future service in any office covered by the plan, except as provided by KRS 21.374 and 21.385(3), whether such service is in the same or a different office, and whether or not it is continuous.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 2; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(2); 1978, ch. 193, § 3, effective July 1, 1978; 1982, ch. 166, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 458, § 9, effective April 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 25, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 360, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. VII D, § 642, effective April 11, 1990; 1994, ch. 266, § 6, effective July 15, 1994; 2005, ch. 86, § 6, effective June 20, 2005; 2008 (1st. Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 5, effective June 27, 2008; 2013, ch. 120, § 20, effective July 1, 2013; 2018 ch. 171, § 65, effective April 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 65, effective April 27, 2018; 2018 ch. 107, § 5, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

(7/14/2018). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts chs. 107, 171, and 207, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Compiler's Notes.

KRS 21.355 and 21.365 referred to in subsection (4) of this section were repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 193, § 10.

Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, referred to in (6), may be found as 26 USCS § 414(h).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Karem v. Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys., 293 S.W.3d 401, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

21.365. Circuit judges and director of administrative office of the courts entitled to participate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 9, §§ 2, 3; 1968, ch. 145; 1976, ch. 62, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 193, § 10, effective July 1, 1978.

21.370. Term of service to qualify if member began participating before January 1, 2014 — Transfer of service credit to Judicial Retirement Plan — Purchase of service credit for service as police judge and for military service — Special provisions for active members.

    1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of KRS 21.410 and in subsection (2) of KRS 21.420 , no benefits shall be payable under KRS 21.350 to 21.480 to any member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, or to his surviving spouse, unless he has completed at least eight (8) years of service, including service before becoming a member. (1) (a) Except as provided in subsection (2) of KRS 21.410 and in subsection (2) of KRS 21.420 , no benefits shall be payable under KRS 21.350 to 21.480 to any member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, or to his surviving spouse, unless he has completed at least eight (8) years of service, including service before becoming a member.
    2. No surviving spouse of a retired member shall be entitled to any benefits unless the person was the spouse of the member at the time he retired.
  1. A member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who has qualified for benefits under this section may transfer to the Judicial Retirement Plan up to ten (10) years of service credit which he has earned in a retirement system administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems, and he may transfer to the Judicial Retirement Plan up to ten (10) years of service credit which he has earned in the Kentucky Legislators’ Retirement Plan. If the member elects to transfer his service credit, the system or plan from which the transfer is made shall transfer to the judicial retirement fund an amount equal to the employee’s and employer’s contributions attributable to that credit, together with interest on the contributions from the date made to the date of transfer at the actuarially assumed interest rate of the system or plan from which the transfer is made in effect at the time the contributions were made, compounded annually at that same interest rate. The member shall be entitled to the transferred service credit, at the rate at which he qualifies under KRS 21.400 , when he pays the total difference between the amount of the funds transferred and the cost of the credit to the Judicial Retirement Plan, as determined by the actuary for the Judicial Retirement Plan. The member may pay by transfer, if authorized under subsection (5)(d) of this section, or by lump sum or increments as set forth in subsection (4)(b) of this section. The payments made under this section shall be considered accumulated contributions of the member and shall not be picked up by the employer under KRS 21.360(6).
  2. Any active member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who is vested in the Judicial Retirement Plan under subsection (1) of this section or KRS 21.375 , shall receive service credit for a maximum of four (4) years for his period of service as a city police judge for a city within the Commonwealth of Kentucky, if the service was performed prior to the first Monday in January, 1978, and if the service has not been credited to the member’s account with any other public defined benefit plan, by paying the retirement system one hundred percent (100%) of the actuarial cost of the service as determined by the board of trustees, based on assumptions used in the most recent biennial evaluation. The period of service to be purchased shall be certified to the board of trustees by the custodian of the records of the city for which the service was performed. The service credit shall be awarded and the cost shall be determined in conformity with the rate which applies to the member in question under KRS 21.400 . Service credit awarded under this subsection shall be equivalent, for all purposes of the Judicial Retirement Plan, to other service credit earned in the plan. The payments made under this section shall be considered accumulated contributions of the member and shall not be picked up by the employer under KRS 21.360(6).
      1. Any active member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who is vested in the Judicial Retirement Plan under subsection (1) of this section or KRS 21.375 , or his beneficiary acting in his place if the member dies prior to retirement, shall receive service credit for a maximum of four (4) years for his period of service in the Armed Forces of the United States, if his discharge therefrom is honorable and he has not been credited with the service by any other retirement system administered by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by paying the retirement system thirty-five percent (35%) of the actuarial cost of the service as determined by the board of trustees, based on assumptions used in the most recent biennial evaluation. The service credit shall be awarded and the cost shall be determined in conformity with the rate which applies to the member in question under KRS 21.400 . Service credit awarded under this subsection shall be equivalent, for all purposes of the Judicial Retirement Plan, to other service credit earned in the plan. (4) (a) 1. Any active member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who is vested in the Judicial Retirement Plan under subsection (1) of this section or KRS 21.375 , or his beneficiary acting in his place if the member dies prior to retirement, shall receive service credit for a maximum of four (4) years for his period of service in the Armed Forces of the United States, if his discharge therefrom is honorable and he has not been credited with the service by any other retirement system administered by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by paying the retirement system thirty-five percent (35%) of the actuarial cost of the service as determined by the board of trustees, based on assumptions used in the most recent biennial evaluation. The service credit shall be awarded and the cost shall be determined in conformity with the rate which applies to the member in question under KRS 21.400 . Service credit awarded under this subsection shall be equivalent, for all purposes of the Judicial Retirement Plan, to other service credit earned in the plan.
      2. Any active member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who is vested in the Judicial Retirement Plan may purchase and receive service credit for one (1) month of service for each six (6) months of service in the reserves or the National Guard by paying the retirement system one hundred percent (100%) of the actuarial cost of the service as determined by the board of trustees, based on assumptions used in the most recent biennial evaluation. The service credit shall be awarded and the cost shall be determined in conformity with the rate that applies to the member in question as provided in KRS 21.400. Service credit awarded under this subsection shall be equivalent, for all purposes of the Judicial Retirement Plan, to other service credit earned in the plan. The service in the military reserves or the National Guard shall be treated as service earned prior to participation in the plan. The purchase can be made by the member in a transfer, if authorized under subsection (5)(d) of this section, or by a lump-sum payment or installment payments. The payment shall not be picked up by the employer as provided in KRS 21.360(6).
    1. The member, if the member began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, may purchase all of his military service credit at one (1) time, or in increments of no less than one (1) year, unless there is a fraction remaining after all full years have been paid for. Payment of the total or the increment may be made by lump sum or by monthly installments through payroll deduction. If the member chooses to pay by installment, the cost of the service credit shall be computed in the same manner as for a lump-sum payment, which shall be the principal. Interest, at the annual actuarial rate in effect at the time each payment is made, shall be added to each monthly payment at the rate of one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual interest rate applied to the declining principal amount. Installment purchases shall be for no less than twelve (12) nor more than sixty (60) months. If the member leaves office before completing his installment payments, he may satisfy his contract by a lump-sum payment of the remaining principal amount, but no further installment payments shall be accepted thereafter. In this case, the member shall be credited with the military service credit for which he has paid, in years or months but no fraction less than a full month, and any payment remaining after credit for full months has been awarded shall be returned to the member.
    2. The payments made under this section shall be considered accumulated contributions of the member and shall not be picked up by the employer under KRS 21.360(6).
    1. Any active member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who is vested in the Judicial Retirement Plan under subsection (1) of this section or KRS 21.375 shall receive service credit for a maximum of four (4) years each for his period of service as a Domestic Relations Commissioner, a Master Commissioner, or a District Court Trial Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or a combination thereof, if the service has not been credited to the member’s account with any other public defined benefit plan, by paying the retirement system one hundred percent (100%) of the actuarial cost of the service as determined by the board of trustees, based on assumptions used in the most recent biennial evaluation. The period of service to be purchased shall be certified to the board of trustees by the custodian of the records. The service credit shall be awarded and the cost shall be determined in conformity with the rate that applies to the member in question under KRS 21.400 . Service credit awarded under this subsection shall be equivalent, for all purposes of the Judicial Retirement Plan, to other service credit earned in the plan. The member may pay by transfer as set forth in paragraph (d) of this subsection, or by lump sum or increments as set forth in subsection (4)(b) of this section. The payments made under this section shall be considered accumulated contributions of the member and shall not be picked up by the employer under KRS 21.360(6). (5) (a) Any active member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who is vested in the Judicial Retirement Plan under subsection (1) of this section or KRS 21.375 shall receive service credit for a maximum of four (4) years each for his period of service as a Domestic Relations Commissioner, a Master Commissioner, or a District Court Trial Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or a combination thereof, if the service has not been credited to the member’s account with any other public defined benefit plan, by paying the retirement system one hundred percent (100%) of the actuarial cost of the service as determined by the board of trustees, based on assumptions used in the most recent biennial evaluation. The period of service to be purchased shall be certified to the board of trustees by the custodian of the records. The service credit shall be awarded and the cost shall be determined in conformity with the rate that applies to the member in question under KRS 21.400 . Service credit awarded under this subsection shall be equivalent, for all purposes of the Judicial Retirement Plan, to other service credit earned in the plan. The member may pay by transfer as set forth in paragraph (d) of this subsection, or by lump sum or increments as set forth in subsection (4)(b) of this section. The payments made under this section shall be considered accumulated contributions of the member and shall not be picked up by the employer under KRS 21.360(6).
    2. Any active member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who is vested in the Judicial Retirement Plan under subsection (1) of this section or KRS 21.375 shall receive service credit for his period of service to the United States Government, other than service in the Armed Forces, if the service has not been credited to the member’s account with any other public defined benefit plan, by paying the retirement system one hundred percent (100%) of the actuarial cost of the service as determined by the board of trustees, based on assumptions used in the most recent biennial evaluation. The period of service to be purchased shall be certified to the board of trustees by the custodian of the records. The service credit shall be awarded and the cost shall be determined in conformity with the rate that applies to the member in question under KRS 21.400. Service credit awarded under this subsection shall be equivalent, for all purposes of the Judicial Retirement Plan, to other service credit earned in the plan. The member may pay by transfer as set forth in paragraph (d) of this subsection, or by lump sum or increments as set forth in subsection (4)(b) of this section. The payments made under this section shall be considered accumulated contributions of the member and shall not be picked up by the employer under KRS 21.360(6).
    3. Any member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who was in office on June 21, 2001, and who was in active contributing status to the applicable retirement plan on June 21, 2001, and who has at least one hundred eighty (180) months of service credit may purchase a combined maximum total of five (5) years retirement service credit that is not otherwise purchasable, by paying the retirement system one hundred percent (100%) of the actuarial cost of the service as determined by the board of trustees, based on assumptions used in the most recent biennial evaluation. The service credit shall be awarded and the cost shall be determined in conformity with the rate that applies to the member in question under KRS 21.400. Service credit awarded under this subsection shall be equivalent, for all purposes of the Judicial Retirement Plan, to other service credit earned in the plan, except that the service purchased under this subsection shall not be used in determining a retirement allowance until the member has accrued at least two hundred forty (240) months of service, excluding service purchased under this subsection. If the member does not accrue at least two hundred forty (240) months of service, excluding service purchased under this subsection, then upon retirement, death, or written request following termination, the payment shall be refunded. The member may pay by transfer as set forth in paragraph (d) of this subsection, or by lump sum or increments as set forth in subsection (4)(b) of this section. The payments made under this section shall be considered accumulated contributions of the member and shall not be picked up by the employer under KRS 21.360(6).
    4. A member of the Judicial Retirement Plan may purchase service credit under the provisions of this section by transferring funds through a direct trustee-to-trustee transfer permitted under the applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code and any regulations or rulings issued thereunder, or through a direct rollover as contemplated by and permitted under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a)(31) . Service credit may also be purchased by a rollover of funds pursuant to and permitted under the rules specified in 26 U.S.C. sec. 402(c) and 26 U.S.C. sec. 408(d)(3) . The Judicial Retirement Fund shall accept the transfer or rollover to the extent permitted under the rules specified in the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and any regulations and rulings issued thereunder. The amount shall be credited to the individual member’s contribution account and shall be considered accumulated contributions of the member and shall not be picked up by the employer under KRS 21.360(6).

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 3; 1962, ch. 9, § 4; 1974, ch. 386, § 2; 1990, ch. 480, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 189, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 266, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 389, § 7, effective July 15, 1998; 2001, ch. 146, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 90, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 258, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 86, § 7, effective June 20, 2005; 2013, ch. 120, § 21, effective July 1, 2013.

21.372. Limitations and exclusions on increases in final compensation for members retiring on or after January 1, 2018 — Exception for bona fide promotion or career development — Exclusion — Determination by board — Administrative regulations — Inapplicability to hybrid cash balance plan participants.

  1. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Bona fide promotion or career advancement”:
      1. Means a professional advancement in substantially the same line of work held by the member in the four (4) years immediately prior to the final sixty (60) months preceding retirement or a change in employment position based on the training, skills, education, or expertise of the member that imposes a significant change in job duties and responsibilities to clearly justify the increased compensation to the member, including any circumstance when a member is elected or appointed to another court within the Court of Justice; and
      2. Does not include any circumstance where a judge or justice participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan takes a position of employment with an employer participating in any of the other state-administered retirement systems; and
    2. “Year” has the same meaning as in KRS 21.345(3).
    1. For members retiring on or after January 1, 2018, the plan shall identify any consecutive year utilized in determining the member’s final compensation in which the member’s compensation increased at a rate of ten percent (10%) or more over the member’s compensation in the immediately preceding year. (2) (a) For members retiring on or after January 1, 2018, the plan shall identify any consecutive year utilized in determining the member’s final compensation in which the member’s compensation increased at a rate of ten percent (10%) or more over the member’s compensation in the immediately preceding year.
    2. Except as limited or excluded by subsections (3) and (4) of this section, any amount of increase in compensation for a year identified under paragraph (a) of this subsection that exceeds ten percent (10%) more than the member’s compensation from the immediately preceding year shall not be used in the calculation of the member’s final compensation for the purposes of determining the member’s monthly pension benefit under KRS 21.400 .
    3. If the member’s final compensation is reduced for the purposes of determining the member’s pension benefit under KRS 21.400 as provided by paragraph (b) of this subsection, the retirement system shall, notwithstanding KRS 21.460 and as applicable, refund the member contributions attributable to the reduction in creditable compensation.
  2. In order to ensure the prospective application of the potential reduction in pension benefits as provided in subsection (2) of this section, only the compensation earned by the retiring member on or after July 1, 2017, shall be subject to reduction under subsection (2) of this section. Compensation earned by the retiring member prior to July 1, 2017, shall not be subject to reduction under subsection (2) of this section.
  3. Subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall not apply to increases that are the direct result of a bona fide promotion or career advancement or to compensation used in accordance with KRS 61.680(7) in which the member does not have sixty (60) months of service in the Judicial Retirement Plan.
  4. The board of trustees shall determine whether increases in compensation during the final sixty (60) months preceding retirement constitute a bona fide promotion or career advancement and may promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to administer this section. All state-administered retirement systems shall cooperate to implement this section.
  5. This section shall not apply to employees participating in the hybrid cash balance plan as provided by KRS 21.402 .

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 125, § 2, effective March 27, 2017; 2018 ch. 107, § 6, effective July 14, 2018; 2021 ch. 102, § 41, effective April 1, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

21.374. Election by member participating in the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after September 1, 2008, but before January 1, 2014 — Participation in hybrid cash balance plan — Private letter ruling — Administrative regulations.

Notwithstanding KRS 6.500 to 6.577 and 21.345 to 21.580 :

  1. Subject to the provisions of this section, any member who began participating in the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014, may in lieu of the benefits he or she is currently eligible to receive under the plans, elect to receive the benefits and rights provided to members who began participating in the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, including participating in the hybrid cash balance plan created pursuant to KRS 21.402 ;
  2. The election provided by this section shall be made in writing and on a form prescribed by the Judicial Form Retirement System board;
  3. For each member who makes an election provided by this section:
    1. Any service credit the member has accrued prior to January 1, 2014, shall be considered as service credit earned on or after January 1, 2014, for purposes of determining benefits under KRS 6.500 to 6.577 and 21.345 to 21.580 ;
    2. On the member’s effective election date, the value of the member’s accumulated contributions, less any interest, shall be deposited into the member’s hybrid cash balance account as provided by KRS 21.402 and considered part of the member’s accumulated account balance;
    3. On the member’s effective election date, an employer pay credit as provided by KRS 21.402 shall be added to the member’s accumulated account balance for each month the member contributed to the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to his or her effective election date; and
    4. Interest credits as provided by KRS 21.402 shall only be applied for periods occurring on or after the member’s effective election date;
  4. Before accepting an election provided by this section, the Judicial Form Retirement System board shall provide the member with information detailing the potential results of the member’s election;
  5. An election made pursuant to this section shall be irrevocable; and
    1. A member of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan shall not be eligible to make an election prescribed by this section until the Judicial Form Retirement System receives a favorable private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service regarding this section. (6) (a) A member of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan shall not be eligible to make an election prescribed by this section until the Judicial Form Retirement System receives a favorable private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service regarding this section.
    2. If the Internal Revenue Service denies the request for a private letter ruling as provided by paragraph (a) of this subsection, this section shall be void.
    3. The Judicial Form Retirement System may promulgate administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A in order to carry out this section.

HISTORY: Repealed and reenacted by 2021 ch. 102, § 42, effective April 1, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

21.375. Vesting through combined service credit.

A person who does not have the amount of service required for service retirement in the Judicial Retirement Plan but who is a member of that plan, or is a former member who has service credit therein in accordance with subsection (2) or (3) of KRS 21.460 , shall become vested in the Judicial Retirement Plan for benefits attributable to the amount of his actual service credit therein if such service credit, when combined with service credit which he has in, or for which he is receiving benefits from, the Legislators’ Retirement Plan, the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, County Employees Retirement System, State Police Retirement System, or Teachers’ Retirement System, is equal to the amount of service required for service retirement.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 60, § 2; 1978, ch. 193, § 4, effective July 1, 1978; 1982, ch. 458, § 1, effective April 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Once an individual retires and begins to draw benefits from one or more of the state retirement systems and is thereafter elected or appointed to a position covered by the Judicial Retirement System he cannot count the service credit in those other state retirement systems toward vesting in the Judicial Retirement System. OAG 78-538 .

21.380. Normal retirement age.

  1. The normal retirement date or age of a member shall be his sixty-fifth birthday, except that the normal retirement age for a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, shall be reduced by one (1) year, but no more than five (5) years total, for:
    1. Each five (5) years of service credit in the plan; and
    2. Each year of service credit the member has earned beyond that needed to receive a retirement benefit of one hundred percent (100%) of final compensation.
  2. KRS 21.350 to 21.480 do not require that a member retire at the normal retirement date.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 4; 1962, ch. 9, § 5; 1994, ch. 266, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 2013, ch. 120, § 22, effective July 1, 2013.

21.385. Payment of benefits while continuing in service — Options for member who began participating before January 1, 2014 — Multiple retirements by one person — Individual who retires on or after January 1, 2019, not eligible to earn benefits in Legislators’ Retirement Plan or Judicial Retirement Plan for service after that date. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

  1. In a situation in which, by reason of federal tax law, the failure to commence the payment of retirement benefits to a vested member of the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan, by a specified date after the member reaches a specified age, as designated by the federal tax law, will result in the imposition of a special excise tax, the member, without retiring, shall be entitled, as of the specified date, to commence drawing from the plan the monthly benefit he would have been entitled to had he retired on that date. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 21.360 and 61.680 , a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, may, at his option, continue to be a participating member of the plan thereafter until he retires, or, may elect to cease to be a participating member of the plan, in which latter event he shall not be required to become a participating member of the Kentucky Employees Retirement System.
  2. A member drawing benefits from the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan pursuant to subsection (1) of this section who elects to continue as a participating member of the plan, or a person drawing benefits from the plan by reason of having retired, who by reason of reemployment again becomes a participating member of the plan, shall continue to draw the benefits until he retires, and accrue additional benefits, but in the calculation of the additional benefits only the years of service after he commenced drawing the initial benefits shall be counted, and the monthly additional benefit shall not exceed such amount as, when added to the initial monthly benefit, will equal the final compensation on which the additional benefit was calculated. The member’s surviving spouse, if married to the member at the time of his ultimate retirement, shall be considered to be the surviving spouse with respect to both the additional and the initial benefits.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of KRS 6.500 to 6.577 or 21.345 to 21.580 to the contrary, an individual who retires and begins drawing a retirement allowance from one (1) or more of the systems or plans administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems, the Teachers’ Retirement System, or the Judicial Form Retirement System on or after January 1, 2019, shall not be eligible to earn benefits in the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or Judicial Retirement Plan for service as a judge, justice, or legislator that occurs on or after January 1, 2019.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 299, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2013, ch. 120, § 23, effective July 1, 2013; 2018 ch. 107, § 8, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

21.390. Retirement defined. [Transferred.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 5) was recompiled as subsec. (1) of KRS 21.345 .

21.400. Computation of retirement allowance for member who began participating before January 1, 2014 — Benefit reduction for early retirement.

  1. A member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who retires on or after his normal retirement date shall receive a service retirement allowance, payable monthly during his lifetime, in an amount per month equal to two and seventy-five hundredths percent (2.75%) of his final compensation multiplied by the number of years of his service, but in no event to exceed one hundred percent (100%) of final compensation, except that for any service performed while a member prior to July 1, 1978, any service prior to July 1, 1962, creditable under KRS 21.345 , and any service performed in continued membership (or allowable under KRS 21.410 or 21.420 ) after June 30, 1978, by a person who was a member on that date, the monthly percentage figure shall be five percent (5%) of his final compensation multiplied by the number of years of his service, and except that for any service performed by a member who elected membership at an annual accrual rate of four and fifteen one hundredths percent (4.15%) and for any service performed in continued membership thereafter (or allowable under KRS 21.410 to 21.420 ), the benefit, payable monthly during his lifetime shall be an amount equal to four and fifteen one-hundredths percent (4.15%) of his final compensation multiplied by the number of years of his service, and except that allowances heretofore granted, and rights related thereto, shall not be affected by the 1978 or 1980 amendments to this section. For this purpose, “final compensation” means the average monthly compensation of the member for the sixty (60) months of service immediately preceding his retirement, including, in the case of a Circuit Judge, compensation received as special commissioner of the former Court of Appeals. If, at the time of retirement or death of a member his total period of service in one or more positions covered by the system has not amounted to sixty (60) months, his “final compensation” shall be computed as if he had served in the first position he occupied under the system for such period of time as to bring his total service (in all positions) to sixty (60) months. If that category of position was not in existence for that period, it shall be treated as though it had been in existence for that period and as if the compensation paid for the presumed period of existence was at the rate provided for the category when it in fact first was created.
  2. A member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who retires before his normal retirement date shall be vested with the right to receive, when he reaches his normal retirement age, a service retirement allowance computed on the basis of the number of years of his actual service, and payable in accordance with:
    1. The provisions of subsection (1) of this section; or
    2. KRS 21.580 if the member retires as a Senior Status Special Judge while the pilot program created in KRS 21.580 is in effect.
  3. In lieu of the right provided for in subsection (2) of this section, a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who retires before his normal retirement age may elect, at any time before reaching his normal retirement age, to be paid commencing as of the time of the election a monthly service retirement allowance equal in amount to the monthly allowance that would have become payable under subsection (2) of this section when he reached his normal retirement age, reduced at the rate of five percent (5%) for each year by which his actual age at the time the election is made is lower than the normal retirement age.
  4. A member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who retires before his normal retirement date when his benefit is based on twenty-seven (27) years or more of service in the Judicial Retirement Plan, or if his judicial service credit, when combined with service he has in, or for which he is receiving benefits from, the Legislators’ Retirement Plan, the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, County Employees Retirement System, State Police Retirement System, or the Teachers’ Retirement System, is equal to twenty-seven (27) years, shall be vested with the right to receive a service retirement allowance computed on the basis of the number of years of his actual service, and payable in accordance with:
    1. The provisions of subsection (1) of this section; or
    2. KRS 21.580 if the member retires as a Senior Status Special Judge while the pilot program created in KRS 21.580 is in effect.
  5. In lieu of the right provided for in subsection (2) of this section, a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who retires before his normal retirement age may elect, at any time before reaching his normal retirement age, to be paid commencing as of the time of the election, a monthly service retirement allowance equal in amount to the monthly allowance that would have become payable under subsection (2) of this section when he reached normal retirement age, reduced at the rate of five percent (5%) for each year by which his years of service or combined service pursuant to subsection (4) of this section are lower than twenty-seven (27).
  6. Subsections (1) to (5) of this section shall not apply to members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 6; 1962, ch. 9, § 6, effective July 1, 1962; 1978, ch. 193, § 5, effective July 1, 1978; 1980, ch. 407, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 299, § 7, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 292, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 305, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 120, § 24, effective July 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 3 of Acts 2000, ch. 305, effective July 14, 2000, read: “On the effective date of this Act [July 14, 2000], and annually thereafter the Judicial Retirement System shall provide a written report to the Legislative Research Commission and to the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court containing: (1) Number of judges who have retired as Senior Status Special Judges since the effective date of the Act [July 14, 2000]; (2) Compensation and other benefits paid to those Senior Status Special Judges; (3) Number of days each Senior Status Special Judge has served as a special judge; (4) The fiscal impact on the judicial retirement system and the General Fund as a result of the retirement of the Senior Status Special Judges; and (5) Any other relevant information that may be requested.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Recoupment of Benefits Previously Paid.

The Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Judicial Form Retirement System was prohibited from deducting from retirement benefits, being drawn by retired judge, a sum representing benefits which had been previously paid to him during an earlier period of retirement since judges serve in Kentucky for terms to which they are elected, and their return to active service following a period of retirement is an easily foreseeable circumstance; therefore, if the Legislature had intended that benefits be recouped in that event, it could have so provided, but did not so provide. Cornett v. Board of Trustees, 764 S.W.2d 644, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Legislators’ Retirement Plan, 6.500 to 6.535 .

Kentucky Employees Retirement System, KRS 61.510 to 61.705 .

County Employees Retirement System, KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .

Teachers’ Retirement System, KRS 161.220 to 161.716 , 161.990 .

21.402. Hybrid cash balance plan for certain members of Legislators’ Retirement Plan and Judicial Retirement Plan — Member contributions and employer pay credits — Interest credits — Termination of employment — Options upon retirement — Individual members’ accounts established by board of Judicial Form Retirement System. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

  1. A member of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, whose participation in the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan begins on or after January 1, 2014, shall receive the retirement benefits provided by this section in lieu of the retirement benefits provided under KRS 6.520 and 21.400 . The retirement benefit provided by this section shall be known as the hybrid cash balance plan and shall operate as another benefit tier within the Legislators’ Retirement Plan and the Judicial Retirement Plan.
  2. The hybrid cash balance plan shall provide a retirement benefit based upon the member’s accumulated account balance, which shall include:
    1. Contributions made by the member as provided by KRS 6.500 to 6.577 and 21.345 to 21.580 , except for employee contributions prescribed by KRS 6.505(1)(d)2.b. and 21.360(1)(a)3.b.;
    2. An employer pay credit of four percent (4%) of the creditable compensation earned by the employee for each month the employee is contributing to the hybrid cash balance plan provided by this section; and
    3. Interest credits added annually to the member’s accumulated account balance as provided by this section.
    1. Member contributions and employer pay credits as provided by subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section shall be credited to the member’s account monthly as contributions are reported and posted to the plan. (3) (a) Member contributions and employer pay credits as provided by subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section shall be credited to the member’s account monthly as contributions are reported and posted to the plan.
    2. Interest credits, as provided by subsection (2)(c) of this section, shall be credited to the member’s account annually on June 30 of each fiscal year, as determined by subsection (4) of this section.
    1. On June 30 of each fiscal year, the plan shall determine if the member contributed to the hybrid cash balance plan or another state-administered retirement system during the fiscal year. (4) (a) On June 30 of each fiscal year, the plan shall determine if the member contributed to the hybrid cash balance plan or another state-administered retirement system during the fiscal year.
    2. If the member contributed to the hybrid cash balance plan or another state-administered retirement system during the fiscal year, the interest credit added to the member’s account for that fiscal year shall be determined by multiplying the member’s accumulated account balance on June 30 of the preceding fiscal year by a percentage increase equal to eighty-five percent (85%) of the plan’s geometric average net investment return, but in no case shall be less than zero percent (0%).
    3. If the member did not contribute to the hybrid cash balance plan or another state-administered retirement system during the fiscal year, then no interest credit shall be added to the member’s account for that fiscal year.
    4. For purposes of this subsection, “plan’s geometric average net investment return”:
      1. Means the annual average geometric investment return, net of administrative and investment fees and expenses, over the last five (5) fiscal years as of the date the interest is credited to the member’s account; and
      2. Shall be expressed as a percentage and based upon the plan in which the member has an account.
    1. Upon termination of employment, a member who has less than five (5) years of service credited under the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, who elects to take a refund of his or her accumulated account balance as provided by KRS 21.460 , shall forfeit the accumulated employer credit, and shall only receive a refund of his or her accumulated contributions. (5) (a) Upon termination of employment, a member who has less than five (5) years of service credited under the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, who elects to take a refund of his or her accumulated account balance as provided by KRS 21.460 , shall forfeit the accumulated employer credit, and shall only receive a refund of his or her accumulated contributions.
    2. Upon termination of employment, a member who has five (5) or more years of service credited under the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, who elects to take a refund of his or her accumulated account balance as provided by KRS 21.460, shall receive a full refund of his or her accumulated account balance.
  3. A member participating in the hybrid cash balance plan provided by this section may retire:
    1. Upon reaching normal retirement age, provided he or she has earned five (5) or more years of service credited under the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, or another state-administered retirement system; or
    2. If the member is at least age fifty-seven (57) and has an age and years of service total of at least eighty-seven (87) years. The years of service used to determine eligibility for retirement under this paragraph shall only include years of service credited under the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, or another state-administered retirement system.
  4. A member eligible to retire under subsection (6) of this section may elect to:
    1. Receive a monthly retirement allowance payable for life by having his or her accumulated account balance annuitized by the retirement plan in accordance with the actuarial assumptions and actuarial methods adopted by the board and in effect on the member’s retirement date;
    2. Receive the actuarial equivalent of his or her retirement allowance calculated under paragraph (a) of this subsection payable under one (1) of the options set forth in KRS 21.420(8)(b); or
    3. Take a refund of his or her accumulated account balance as provided by KRS 21.460 .
  5. The board of the Judicial Form Retirement System shall establish individual members’ accounts for each member participating in the hybrid cash balance plan as provided by this section. The Judicial Form Retirement System may promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to administer the provisions of this section.
  6. The provisions of this section shall not apply to members who began participating in the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 120, § 12, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 12, § 5, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 125, § 5, effective March 27, 2017; 2018 ch. 107, § 9, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

21.405. Increase of retirement benefits.

  1. As of July 1, 1982, the board of trustees of the Kentucky Judicial Form Retirement System shall recompute the monthly benefits of persons then receiving benefits under the Judicial Retirement Plan, provided the person began participating in the plan prior to January 1, 2014, by using the same service credit rate and the same number of years of service that were used in computing the benefits then being received but substituting, in lieu of the “final compensation” that was used in the computation of the benefit then being received an amount equal to fifty-five percent (55%) of the final compensation of the office in which the credit was earned for a person retiring as of June 30, 1982.
  2. As of July 1, 1983, and as of July 1 of each year thereafter, the board of trustees of the Kentucky Judicial Form Retirement System shall recompute the monthly benefits of persons then receiving benefits under the Judicial Retirement Plan, provided the person began participating in the plan prior to January 1, 2014, by using the following formula: two and three-fourths percent (2.75%) times fifty-five percent (55%) of the final compensation of the office in which the retirement credit was earned for a person retiring as of the recomputation date, times the number of years of service credit (not to exceed thirty-six (36) years).
  3. In making the recomputations provided for in subsections (1) and (2) of this section for members who began participating in the plan prior to January 1, 2014, the same reduction factor, in case of an actuarially reduced benefit or a surviving spouse’s benefit, shall be used as was used in determining the benefit then being received. If the benefit as recomputed in accordance with subsection (1) or (2) of this section is higher than the benefit then being received, the recomputed benefit shall thereafter be paid monthly, commencing as of the date specified for the recomputation, subject to future adjustment at ensuing annual recomputations in accordance with subsection (2) of this section. For the purposes of this section, the following office equivalents shall be used: Judge of former Court of Appeals - Justice of Supreme Court; any position other than judge or justice that was covered by the Judicial Retirement System - Judge of the present Court of Appeals.
  4. Effective August 1, 1998, to July 1, 2008, a recipient of a monthly pension benefit from the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan who began participating in the plan prior to January 1, 2014, shall have his or her benefit increased on July 1 of each year by the percentage increase in the annual average of the consumer price index for all urban consumers for the most recent calendar year as published by the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics, not to exceed five percent (5%). In determining the state’s appropriation to the Judicial Retirement Fund, only the costs of increases granted as of the most recent valuation date shall be recognized. The benefits of this subsection as provided on August 1, 1998, to July 1, 2008, shall not be considered as benefits protected by the inviolable contract provisions of KRS 21.480 . The General Assembly reserves the right to suspend or reduce the benefits conferred in this subsection if in its judgment the welfare of the Commonwealth so demands.
    1. Effective July 1, 2009, and on July 1 of each year thereafter, a recipient of a monthly pension benefit from the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan shall have his or her benefit increased by one and one-half percent (1.5%), if: (5) (a) Effective July 1, 2009, and on July 1 of each year thereafter, a recipient of a monthly pension benefit from the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan shall have his or her benefit increased by one and one-half percent (1.5%), if:
      1. The funding level of the plan is greater than one hundred percent (100%) and subsequent legislation authorizes the use of any surplus actuarial assets to provide an increase in retirement allowances described by this subsection; or
      2. The General Assembly appropriates sufficient funds to fully prefund the increase described by this subsection in the year the increase is provided.
    2. The board of trustees of the Kentucky Judicial Form Retirement System shall, at least thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of regular sessions of the General Assembly held in even-numbered years, advise the General Assembly of the following:
      1. Whether the plan has a funding level greater than one hundred percent (100%) and if the plan can support an increase in recipients’ retirement allowances as provided by paragraph (a) of this subsection over the next budget biennium without reducing the funding level of the plan below one hundred percent (100%); and
      2. If no surplus actuarial assets are available, the level of funds needed to fully prefund an increase for plan recipients over the next budget biennium if a one and one-half percent (1.5%) increase is provided annually over the biennium.
    3. For purposes of this subsection, “funding level” means the actuarial value of assets divided by the actuarially accrued liability expressed as a percentage that is determined and reported by the plan’s actuary in the plan’s actuarial valuation.
    4. The full increase described by this subsection shall only be provided if the recipient has been receiving a benefit for at least twelve (12) months prior to the effective date of the increase. If the recipient has been receiving a benefit for less than (12) months prior to the effective date of the increase provided by this subsection, the increase shall be reduced on a pro rata basis for each month the recipient has not been receiving benefits in the twelve (12) months preceding the effective date of the increase.
    5. In determining the state’s appropriation to the Judicial Retirement Fund, only the costs of increases granted as of the most recent valuation date shall be recognized.
    6. The benefits of this subsection as provided on July 1, 2009, and thereafter shall not be considered as benefits protected by the inviolable contract provisions of KRS 21.480 . The General Assembly reserves the right to suspend or reduce the benefits conferred in this subsection if in its judgment the welfare of the Commonwealth so demands.
  5. In addition to the increase to a recipient’s retirement allowance as provided by subsection (5) of this section, the General Assembly may, by subsequent legislation, provide supplemental increases to a recipient’s retirement allowance to help adjust for actual changes in the recipient’s cost of living if the General Assembly appropriates sufficient funds to fully prefund the benefit in the year the increase is provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 380, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 26, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 360, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2008 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 4, effective June 27, 2008; 2013, ch. 120, § 25, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 12, § 6, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/1/2013). This statute was amended by Section 25 of 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 120. Section 81 of that Act reads, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act to the contrary, the amendments in Sections 16, 25, and 69 of this Act shall in no way nullify the provisions of 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 19, Part I, 1.(4), 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 68, Part I, 2.(2), or 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 144, Part IV, 10., which suspended the cost-of-living adjustment that would have been provided to retirees and beneficiaries of the Legislative Retirement Plan, the Judicial Retirement Plan, the State Police Retirement System, the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, and the County Employees Retirement System on July 1, 2012, and July 1, 2013.”

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See Judicial Branch Budget, 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 170, Pt. I, A, 2, (3) at 1168.

21.410. Disability retirement — Computation.

    1. If upon examination of a member under his normal retirement age by one (1) or more qualified physicians employed by the retirement board, it is certified to the satisfaction of the board that such member is so physically or mentally disabled as to be incapacitated for further performance of duty, and that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, the member may retire for disability. (1) (a) If upon examination of a member under his normal retirement age by one (1) or more qualified physicians employed by the retirement board, it is certified to the satisfaction of the board that such member is so physically or mentally disabled as to be incapacitated for further performance of duty, and that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, the member may retire for disability.
      1. A member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who retires for disability as provided by this subsection shall be entitled to receive commencing immediately a disability retirement allowance, payable monthly during his disability, in an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly service retirement allowance he would have received commencing at his normal retirement date if he had continued in service until that date and had then retired, computed however on the basis of his final compensation at time of actual retirement. (b) 1. A member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who retires for disability as provided by this subsection shall be entitled to receive commencing immediately a disability retirement allowance, payable monthly during his disability, in an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly service retirement allowance he would have received commencing at his normal retirement date if he had continued in service until that date and had then retired, computed however on the basis of his final compensation at time of actual retirement.
      2. A member who begins participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, who retires for disability as provided by this subsection shall be entitled to a disability retirement allowance equal to the higher of twenty percent (20%) of the member’s monthly official salary or the retirement allowance determined in the same manner as for retirement at his or her normal retirement date under KRS 21.402 .
      3. A member who begins participating in the Legislators’ Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, who retires for disability as provided by this subsection shall be entitled to a disability retirement allowance equal to the higher of twenty percent (20%) of the member’s monthly creditable compensation or the retirement allowance determined in the same manner as for retirement at his or her normal retirement date under KRS 21.402 .
    1. A member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, need not have completed eight (8) years of service in order to be eligible for benefits under subsection (1) of this section. (2) (a) A member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, need not have completed eight (8) years of service in order to be eligible for benefits under subsection (1) of this section.
    2. A member who begins participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, must have completed at least five (5) years of service in order to apply and be eligible for the disability benefits provided by this section.
  1. The retirement board shall cause a member who has been retired for disability and who is still under his normal retirement age to undergo periodic examination by one (1) or more qualified physicians employed by the board, to determine whether he continues to be incapacitated for service of the character required of a judge or commissioner. If upon any such examination it is certified to the satisfaction of the board that the member is no longer so incapacitated, or if the member refuses to submit to examination, the board shall terminate his disability retirement allowance. He shall then be entitled to such rights, if any, under subsection (2) or (3) of KRS 21.400 or under KRS 21.402 as he would have been entitled to had he voluntarily retired on the date he was retired for disability.
  2. Upon reaching his normal retirement age, a member who began participating in the plan prior to January 1, 2014, and who has been receiving a disability retirement allowance may apply for and receive, in lieu thereof, the service retirement allowance he would have been entitled to receive at normal retirement age had he voluntarily retired on the date he was retired for disability.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 7; 2013, ch. 120, § 26, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 12, § 7, effective July 15, 2016.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a Circuit Judge suffered a severe stroke just seven days before his term in office ended, the Judicial Retirement System could grant the judge disability retirement pursuant to this section, even though the medical certification and the subsequent determination to grant disability benefits were made after the date when the judge left office. OAG 76-199 .

21.415. Disability retirement benefits.

Retirement benefits for a Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Circuit Judge, or District Judge retired for disability under Section 121 of the Constitution of Kentucky shall be in accordance with KRS 21.410 . The Judicial Retirement Board, in the case of such a retirement, shall exercise no function with respect to determining the existence or continuance of disability.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 60, § 3; 1978, ch. 193, § 6, effective July 1, 1978.

21.420. Death benefits for members — Designation of beneficiary to receive accumulated contributions or accumulated account balance.

  1. After the death of a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, who at the time of his death was receiving a service retirement allowance (other than an actuarially reduced allowance under subsection (3) of KRS 21.400 ), or was receiving a disability retirement allowance, his surviving spouse is entitled to receive during his lifetime a monthly allowance equal to one-half (1/2) of that he was receiving.
    1. If a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, dies before retirement and before reaching normal retirement age, without regard to length of service, his surviving spouse is entitled to receive during his lifetime a monthly allowance equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly allowance the member would have received commencing at his normal retirement date if he had continued in service until that date and had then retired, computed however on the basis of his final compensation at time of death. (2) (a) If a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, dies before retirement and before reaching normal retirement age, without regard to length of service, his surviving spouse is entitled to receive during his lifetime a monthly allowance equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly allowance the member would have received commencing at his normal retirement date if he had continued in service until that date and had then retired, computed however on the basis of his final compensation at time of death.
    2. If a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, dies before retirement and after reaching normal retirement age, his surviving spouse is entitled to receive during his lifetime a monthly allowance equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly allowance the member would have been entitled to, on the basis of his years of service, had he retired on the date of his death.
  2. If a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, dies after retirement and was at the time of his death receiving an actuarially reduced allowance under subsection (3) of KRS 21.400 , or was not at the time of his death receiving a retirement allowance but had acquired the vested right under subsection (2) of KRS 21.400 to have received an allowance upon reaching normal retirement age, his surviving spouse is entitled to receive during his lifetime a monthly allowance equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly allowance the member would have received when he reached normal retirement age.
  3. A member, or a retiree who began participating in the plan prior to January 1, 2014, who has not commenced drawing retirement benefits pursuant to KRS 21.400 , and who dies without a spouse or eligible children entitled to survivor’s benefits, may designate a beneficiary who shall receive the accumulated contributions of the member. A member, or a retiree who began participating in the plan on or after January 1, 2014, who has not commenced drawing retirement benefits pursuant to KRS 21.402 , who dies without a spouse or eligible children entitled to survivor’s benefits, may designate a beneficiary who shall receive the accumulated account balance of the member. Absent a designation by the member or retiree, the accumulated contributions or accumulated account balance, as applicable based upon the member’s participation date, shall be paid to the member’s estate.
  4. A member who began participating in the plan prior to January 1, 2014, who commences drawing retirement benefits pursuant to KRS 21.400 or 21.410 , and who dies without a spouse or eligible children entitled to survivor’s benefits and before the benefits received by the member equal the accumulated contributions of the member, may designate a beneficiary who shall receive the balance of the accumulated contributions of the member. A member who began participating in the plan on or after January 1, 2014, who commences drawing retirement benefits pursuant to KRS 21.402 or 21.410 , and who dies without a spouse or eligible children entitled to survivor’s benefits and before the benefits received by the member equal the accumulated account balance of the member, may designate a beneficiary who shall receive the balance of the accumulated account balance of the member. Any benefits received shall be deducted from the accumulated contributions or accumulated account balance. Absent a designation by the member, the balance of the accumulated contributions or accumulated account balance, as applicable based upon the member’s participation date, shall be paid to the member’s estate.
  5. A member who begins participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, may designate a beneficiary who shall receive the balance of the accumulated contributions of the member, in the event survivor’s benefits are being paid pursuant to subsection (1), (2), or (3) of this section, and the survivor dies prior to receiving benefits equal to the member’s contributions. In this event, the provisions of subsection (5) of this section shall apply as to offset and payment.
  6. A member who begins participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, may, prior to the drawing of benefits, elect in writing to the executive secretary of the Judicial Form Retirement System, to take an optional retirement allowance which shall be actuarially equivalent to the amount of retirement allowance otherwise payable to the member and the member’s spouse. If the member dies after retirement, the option chosen shall prevail over the provisions of subsections (1) and (3) of this section. If the member dies prior to retirement, the option chosen shall prevail over the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. The options shall include:
    1. Survivorship one hundred percent (100%). The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during the member’s lifetime and have the retirement allowance continued after death to the spouse during the lifetime of the spouse.
    2. Survivorship sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%). The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during the member’s lifetime and have two-thirds (2/3) of the retirement allowance continue after death to the spouse during the lifetime of the spouse.

      If a retiree, living or deceased, chose either of the optional retirement benefit allowances specified in paragraphs (a) or (b) of this subsection from July 15, 1994, to July 15, 1998, the optional allowance shall be adjusted accordingly, and the new benefit shall commence August 1, 1998. Each recipient of benefits from the plan, who retired from July 15, 1994, to July 15, 1998, shall have a one-time opportunity to select an optional retirement allowance. The election by the recipient shall be prior to August 1, 1998, at which time the new benefit shall commence. The option chosen shall prevail, subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this section notwithstanding.

  7. For a member who begins participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014:
    1. If the member dies prior to drawing a retirement allowance, then the surviving spouse may elect to:
      1. Take a refund of the member’s accumulated account balance or accumulated contributions as provided by KRS 21.402 ; or
      2. If the member had at least five (5) years of service in the plan at the time of his or her death, have the member’s accumulated account balance annuitized into a monthly benefit payable for life that is equal to the benefit that would have been paid had the member retired immediately prior to his or her date of death and elected to receive benefits payable under the survivorship one hundred percent (100%) option as provided by paragraph (b)1. of this subsection. In lieu of the benefits provided by this paragraph to the surviving spouse, the member may elect to have the benefits payable under this paragraph paid to an individual dependent child by completing the forms provided prescribed by the Judicial Form Retirement System. If no surviving spouse or dependent children are eligible to receive benefits, then the provisions of subsection (4) of this section shall apply to the member.
    2. If a member dies on or after the date the member begins drawing a retirement allowance, the benefits payable to the surviving spouse shall be based upon whether or not the member elects prior to retirement to receive an optional retirement allowance. The election shall be in writing on the forms prescribed by the Judicial Form Retirement System and shall be actuarially equivalent to the amount of retirement allowance otherwise payable to the member. The optional retirement allowances shall include:
      1. Survivorship one hundred percent (100%). The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during the member’s lifetime and have the retirement allowance continued after death to the spouse during the lifetime of the spouse;
      2. Survivorship sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%). The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during the member’s lifetime and have two-thirds (2/3) of the retirement allowance continue after death to the spouse during the lifetime of the spouse; or
      3. Survivorship fifty percent (50%). The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during the member’s lifetime and have one-half (1/2) of the retirement allowance continue after death to the spouse during the lifetime of the spouse. In lieu of the benefits provided by this paragraph to the surviving spouse, the member may elect prior to retirement to have the benefits payable under this paragraph paid to an individual dependent child by completing the forms provided by the Judicial Form Retirement System. If no surviving spouse or dependent children are eligible to receive benefits, then the provisions of subsection (5) of this section shall apply to the member.
    3. For purposes of this section a “dependent child” shall mean a child who is less than twenty-one (21) years of age or a disabled child who is eligible for Social Security disability benefits.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 8; 1974, ch. 386, § 3; 1994, ch. 266, § 4, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 389, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2013, ch. 120, § 27, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 12, § 8, effective July 15, 2016.

21.425. Benefits to surviving or disabled children of members who began participating before January 1, 2014 — Designation of beneficiaries.

  1. In any circumstances in which a surviving spouse would be entitled to any allowance under KRS 21.420 , but there is no surviving spouse or the surviving spouse subsequently dies, and there is a surviving child or children of the member under the age of twenty-one (21), or there is a disabled child or children, the monthly allowance that the surviving spouse would have received or was receiving shall be continued, as follows:
    1. If the member does not have a disabled child or children, the benefit shall continue until there are no children remaining under the age of twenty-one (21); or
    2. If the member has a disabled child or children, the benefit shall continue until the death of the last remaining disabled child.
  2. A member may designate his child or children under the age of twenty-one (21), or his disabled child or children, to receive the death benefit payable under KRS 21.420 instead of his spouse, or he may designate that his spouse shall receive a percentage of the death benefit, and his child or children under the age of twenty-one (21), or his disabled child or children, shall receive the remainder. The member making such a choice shall designate his beneficiary or beneficiaries in writing to the manager of the Judicial Form Retirement System on a form provided by the manager.
  3. For purposes of this section, “disabled” means an individual determined by the Social Security Administration to be entitled to total disability benefits.
  4. Subsections (1) to (3) of this section shall not apply to a member who begins participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 306, § 1; 1974, ch. 232, § 1; 1974, ch. 386, § 4; 1982, ch. 458, § 10, effective April 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 389, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 327, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 120, § 28, effective July 1, 2013.

21.427. Health insurance and benefits for recipients — Premium reimbursement plan — Coordination with all state-administered retirement systems or plans.

    1. The board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System shall arrange by appropriate contract or on a self-insured basis for a group hospital and medical insurance plan for recipients of a retirement allowance from the Judicial Retirement Plan, and their dependents. For recipients, or dependents, eligible for Medicare coverage, the board shall provide Medicare supplement hospital and medical insurance coverage. For recipients, or dependents, not eligible for Medicare coverage, the board shall provide hospital and medical insurance coverage comparable to that provided under the major state employees’ group insurance, and the board may arrange for the recipients to be included in the major state employees group. For recipients of a retirement allowance who are not eligible for the same level of hospital and medical benefits as recipients living in Kentucky, the board shall provide a medical insurance premium reimbursement plan as described in subsection (3) of this section. (1) (a) The board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System shall arrange by appropriate contract or on a self-insured basis for a group hospital and medical insurance plan for recipients of a retirement allowance from the Judicial Retirement Plan, and their dependents. For recipients, or dependents, eligible for Medicare coverage, the board shall provide Medicare supplement hospital and medical insurance coverage. For recipients, or dependents, not eligible for Medicare coverage, the board shall provide hospital and medical insurance coverage comparable to that provided under the major state employees’ group insurance, and the board may arrange for the recipients to be included in the major state employees group. For recipients of a retirement allowance who are not eligible for the same level of hospital and medical benefits as recipients living in Kentucky, the board shall provide a medical insurance premium reimbursement plan as described in subsection (3) of this section.
    2. For the purpose of this section, the “dependent” of a recipient means the spouse or minor children, or both, of a recipient who is a living former member of the Judicial Retirement Plan, or the minor children of a deceased former member whose surviving spouse is the recipient.
    1. Depending upon the number of months of service credit upon which the retirement allowance was based, and upon there having been at least forty-eight (48) months of judicial service, all or a portion of the premium required to provide hospital and medical benefits under this section shall be paid from the judicial retirement fund, as follows: (2) (a) Depending upon the number of months of service credit upon which the retirement allowance was based, and upon there having been at least forty-eight (48) months of judicial service, all or a portion of the premium required to provide hospital and medical benefits under this section shall be paid from the judicial retirement fund, as follows:
    2. For members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014:
      1. Participation in the health insurance coverage and benefits provided under this section shall not be allowed until the member has earned at least one hundred eighty (180) months of service credited under KRS 21.345 to 21.580 or another state-administered retirement system.
      2. A member who meets the minimum service requirements as provided by subparagraph 1. of this paragraph shall be eligible for a monthly insurance benefit upon retirement of ten dollars ($10) for each year of service as a participating member of the Judicial Retirement Plan.
      3. The minimum service required to participate in benefits as provided by subparagraph 1. of this subparagraph shall be waived for a member who is disabled in the line of duty as defined in KRS 61.621 , and the member shall be entitled to the health benefits payable under this subsection as though the member has twenty (20) years of service in the Judicial Retirement Plan.
      4. The minimum service required to participate in benefits as provided by subparagraph 1. of this subparagraph shall be waived for a member who is killed in the line of duty as described in KRS 61.621 , and the member’s spouse and eligible dependents shall be entitled to the health benefits the member would have received if he or she had retired with twenty (20) years of service in the Judicial Retirement Plan.
      5. The monthly insurance benefit amount provided by this paragraph shall be increased July 1 of each year by one and one-half percent (1.5%). The increase shall be cumulative and shall continue to accrue after the member’s retirement for as long as a monthly insurance benefit is payable to the retired member.
      6. Under no circumstances shall the cost of coverage be paid for the spouse, dependents, or beneficiaries of a member who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, except as provided by subparagraph 4. of this paragraph.
    3. The health insurance payments provided by this subsection shall be made by the fund only if the recipient agrees to pay the remaining, if any, amount of the premium by deduction from his retirement allowance or by another method equally insuring the payment by him.
    4. Notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary, any member with the minimum number of months of judicial service required by paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection who is also eligible for benefits, or who is receiving benefits from any retirement plan or system administered by the Commonwealth shall be entitled to hospital and medical benefits as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection except that the number of months of service credit used in calculating the level of benefits shall be the sum of service credited to the member in all the state-administered retirement systems or plans.
      1. Upon request of the member, the Judicial Retirement System shall compute the member’s combined service in all the state-administered retirement systems or plans and calculate the portion of the member’s premium to be paid by the Judicial Retirement Plan, according to the criteria established in paragraph (a) of this subsection. For members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, the state-administered retirement systems or plans shall pay to the Judicial Retirement Plan the applicable percentage of the plan’s cost of the retiree’s hospital and medical premium which shall be equal to the percentage of the member’s number of months of service in the applicable state-administered retirement systems or plans divided by his total combined service. The amounts paid by all the state-administered retirement systems or plans shall not be more than one hundred percent (100%) of the premium amount adopted by the respective boards of trustees.
      2. A member who elects hospital and medical benefits under this subsection shall lose any claim to insurance benefits under any of the other state-administered retirement systems or plans.
    Click to view This paragraph shall not apply to members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014.
  1. The board shall establish a medical insurance premium reimbursement plan for recipients of a retirement allowance who are not eligible for the same level of hospital and medical benefits as recipients living in Kentucky having the same Medicare hospital and medical insurance eligibility status. An eligible recipient shall file proof of payment for hospital and medical insurance premiums at the retirement office. Reimbursement to eligible recipients shall be made on a quarterly basis. The recipient shall be eligible for reimbursement of substantiated medical insurance premiums for an amount not to exceed the total monthly contribution determined by the board of trustees. The plan shall not be made available if all recipients are eligible for the same level of coverage as recipients living in Kentucky.
  2. Premiums paid for hospital and medical insurance procured under this section shall be exempt from any premium tax which might otherwise be required under KRS Chapter 136. The payment of premiums by the judicial retirement fund shall not constitute income to the recipient. No commission shall be paid for hospital and medical insurance procured under this section.

Months of Judicial Service Percentage of Premium 240 or more 100% 180 to 239, inclusive 75% 120 to 179, inclusive 50% 48 to 119, inclusive 25%

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 299, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 167, § 30, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 389, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 448, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 120, § 29, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 12, § 9, effective July 15, 2016.

21.430. Judicial retirement board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 9; 1962, ch. 9, § 7; 1976, ch. 60, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 23, effective July 1, 1980. For present law see KRS 21.530 .

21.440. Duties of investment committee — Duties of board — Actuarial valuations, investigations, and analyses — Audit.

    1. The investment committee for the judicial retirement fund shall at least once in every two (2) year period procure an actuarial valuation of the judicial retirement fund. The valuation shall, at a minimum, include: (1) (a) The investment committee for the judicial retirement fund shall at least once in every two (2) year period procure an actuarial valuation of the judicial retirement fund. The valuation shall, at a minimum, include:
      1. A description of the actuarial assumptions used in the actuarial valuation, which shall be reasonably related to the experience of the fund and represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience;
      2. A description of any funding methods utilized or required by state law in the development of the actuarial valuation results;
      3. A description of any changes in actuarial assumptions and methods from the previous year’s actuarial valuation;
      4. The actuarially recommended contribution rate for employers for the upcoming budget periods;
      5. A thirty (30) year projection of the funding levels, unfunded liabilities, and actuarially recommended contribution rates for employers based upon the actuarial assumptions, funding methods, and experience of the system as of the valuation date; and
      6. A sensitivity analysis that evaluates the impact of changes in plan assumptions, including but not limited to the investment return assumption, payroll growth assumption, and medical inflation assumptions, on employer contribution rates, funding levels, and unfunded liabilities.
    2. At least once in each five (5) year period, the board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System shall cause an actuarial investigation to be made of all the relevant experience under the retirement plan relative to the actuarial assumptions and funding methods previously adopted by the board. The actuarial investigation shall include at a minimum a summary of the changes in actuarial assumptions and funding methods recommended in the investigation and the projected impact of the recommended changes on funding levels, unfunded liabilities, and actuarially recommended contribution rates for employers over a thirty (30) year period.
    3. Pursuant to the investigation, the board shall from time to time revise the actuarial tables previously adopted by the board and shall thereupon revise the bases of the rates of contributions required under KRS 21.345 to 21.580 .
    4. For any change in actuarial assumptions, funding methods, retiree health insurance premiums and subsidies, or any other decisions made by the board that impact system liabilities and actuarially recommended contribution rates for employers and that are not made in conjunction with the actuarial investigation required by paragraph (b) of this subsection, an actuarial analysis shall be completed showing the projected impact of the changes on funding levels, unfunded liabilities, and actuarially recommended contribution rates for employers over a thirty (30) year period.
    5. A copy of the valuation, the five (5) year actuarial investigation, and any analysis required by this subsection shall be forwarded electronically to the Legislative Research Commission within ten (10) days of receipt by the committee, and the Legislative Research Commission shall distribute the information received to the committee staff and co-chairs of any committee that has jurisdiction over the Judicial Form Retirement System. The actuarial valuation required by paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be submitted no later than November 15 following the close of the fiscal year.
    6. All the investigations and valuations shall be certified to the board by an actuary who shall be a fellow of the Conference of Consulting Actuaries or a member of the American Academy of Actuaries.
    1. The board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System shall annually procure an audit of the system and each of the funds therein. The audit shall be conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this subsection, the board may select an independent certified public accountant or the Auditor of Public Accounts to perform the audit. If the audit is performed by an independent certified public accountant, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall not be required to perform an audit pursuant to KRS 43.050(2)(a), but may perform an audit at his discretion. The board shall make copies of the audit required by this section available for examination by any member or beneficiary in the office of the manager of the system and in such other places as may be necessary to make the audit available to all members and beneficiaries. A copy of the audit shall be sent to the Legislative Research Commission within ten (10) days of receipt by the committee. (2) (a) The board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System shall annually procure an audit of the system and each of the funds therein. The audit shall be conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this subsection, the board may select an independent certified public accountant or the Auditor of Public Accounts to perform the audit. If the audit is performed by an independent certified public accountant, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall not be required to perform an audit pursuant to KRS 43.050(2)(a), but may perform an audit at his discretion. The board shall make copies of the audit required by this section available for examination by any member or beneficiary in the office of the manager of the system and in such other places as may be necessary to make the audit available to all members and beneficiaries. A copy of the audit shall be sent to the Legislative Research Commission within ten (10) days of receipt by the committee.
    2. Once every five (5) years, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall perform the audit described by this subsection, and the system shall reimburse the Auditor of Public Accounts for all costs of the audit. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall determine which fiscal year during the five (5) year period the audit prescribed by this paragraph will be completed.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 10; 1980, ch. 246, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 111, § 27, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 489, § 13, effective July 13, 1990; 2012, ch. 75, § 4, effective April 11, 2012; 2016 ch. 133, § 4, effective July 15, 2016; 2021 ch. 64, § 2, effective June 29, 2021.

21.450. Funding of benefits — Trustee — Duties of board or investment adviser — Accrual of benefits.

  1. The benefits provided by KRS 21.350 to 21.510 to be paid shall be funded through contract with a reputable life insurance company authorized to do business in this state, or through investment and reinvestment of funds in securities which, at the time of making the investment, are by law permitted for the investment of funds by fiduciaries in this state, or through a combination of such methods. To the extent that funding is provided through insurance contract, no contributions, payments or premiums shall be subject to any tax on insurance premiums or annuity considerations. The investment committee for the judicial retirement fund shall be trustee of any and all funds contributed or appropriated to the retirement system, and shall have sole authority to make insurance contracts or investments.
  2. The board members or any investment adviser shall discharge their duties with respect to the funds of the retirement system solely in the interest of the members and beneficiaries and:
    1. For the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to members and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
    2. With the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; and
    3. In accordance with the laws, regulations and other instruments governing the funds.
  3. Any accrual of benefits provided under this or any other applicable statute shall be no less than the benefit adjustment provided for in KRS 21.405(4) from the date of the last establishment of that benefit.
  4. The board shall establish ethics policies and procedures by promulgation of administrative regulations in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13A. The ethics policies shall include but not be limited to annual financial and conflict of interest disclosure requirements which must be completed by all board members and made available to the public upon request.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 11; 1978, ch. 384, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 246, § 9, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 111, § 169, effective July 13, 1984; 2000, ch. 448, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2012, ch. 75, § 5, effective April 11, 2012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Under Kentucky Supreme Court precedents, H.B. 389(4) 2000 Reg. Sess. ( Ky. 2000 ), which amended a provision of the Judicial Retirement Act, KRS 21.450(3) was clearly an unconstitutional delegation, as the unintelligible statute had neither “an intelligible principle,” nor standards controlling the exercise of administrative discretion, and the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that Ky. H.B. 389(4), subsequently codified at KRS 21.450(3), was unconstitutional because it violated the nondelegation doctrine embodied in Ky. Const. §§ 27, 28, 29 and 60. Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys. v. AG, 132 S.W.3d 770, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 238 ( Ky. 2003 ).

2.Legislative Intent.

In an action for a declaratory judgment by the Kentucky Board of Trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System if the legislative intent in amending KRS 21.450 by H.B. 389(4), 2000 Reg. Sess. ( Ky. 2000 ), was to amend KRS 61.510(13), that fact was certainly not apparent, or even vaguely discernible, from the language of the bill. Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys. v. AG, 132 S.W.3d 770, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 238 ( Ky. 2003 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Section 4 of House Bill 389, which amended KRS 21.450 , was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Judicial Form Retirement System, as it was impossible to determine from the plain language of the amendment or its legislative history the meaning of the words in the section. OAG 00-5 .

21.455. Registration and custody of securities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1976, ch. 60, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 23, effective July 1, 1980. For present law, see KRS 21.550 .

21.460. Refund of contributions or account balance for members who began participating before January 1, 2014 — Purchase of service credit — Interest on deferred refunds — Repayment.

    1. For members who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014: If any member of the plan ceases, other than by death or by disability retirement under KRS 21.410 , to hold an office qualifying him or her for membership in the plan established by KRS 21.350 to 21.480 , without having met the requirements for vesting, he or she shall be refunded on demand the amount of his or her accumulated contributions and any service credit he or she had in the plan shall be nullified. (1) (a) For members who began participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014: If any member of the plan ceases, other than by death or by disability retirement under KRS 21.410 , to hold an office qualifying him or her for membership in the plan established by KRS 21.350 to 21.480 , without having met the requirements for vesting, he or she shall be refunded on demand the amount of his or her accumulated contributions and any service credit he or she had in the plan shall be nullified.
    2. A member who begins participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, may, if the member ceases to hold an office qualifying him or her for membership in the plan established by KRS 21.345 to 21.580 , elect to take a refund of his or her accumulated account balance subject to the limitations provided by KRS 21.402 .
  1. The member may elect to leave his or her contributions in the plan, in which event the service credit he or she had in the plan shall be considered to be service credit for vesting purposes as provided in KRS 21.375 and for service retirement eligibility as provided in KRS 61.680(7), and, in the event he or she again becomes a member of the Judicial Retirement Plan, shall be counted toward his or her total service credit in that plan.
  2. If a person who has been refunded his or her accumulated contributions or accumulated account balance in accordance with subsection (1) of this section subsequently becomes a member of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan, the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, County Employees Retirement System, State Police Retirement System, or Teachers’ Retirement System, he or she may while holding such membership repurchase the service credit he or she previously had in the Judicial Retirement Plan by repaying to that plan the amount that was refunded to him or her with interest at six percent (6%) per annum, in which event such service credit shall have operative effect to the same limited extent as provided in subsection (2) of this section. Service purchased under this subsection on or after January 1, 2014, shall not be used to determine the member’s participation date in the Judicial Retirement Plan.
  3. If a person who has been refunded his accumulated contribution or accumulated account balance in accordance with subsection (1) of this section thereafter becomes again the holder of an office qualifying him or her for membership in the Judicial Retirement Plan, he or she shall not be entitled to credit for his or her prior period of service unless he or she has previously repaid his or her refunded contributions in accordance with subsection (3) of this section or unless within thirty (30) days after again assuming office he or she repays to the plan the amount that was refunded to him or her with interest at six percent (6%) per annum. Service purchased under this subsection on or after January 1, 2014, shall not be used to determine the member’s participation date in the Judicial Retirement Plan.
  4. If the taking of a refund of contributions by a member of the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan, when first entitled thereto, would subject the member to a federal excise tax, by reason of the refund’s being made before the member has reached an age designated by the federal taxing act, and the member has elected, pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, to defer taking a refund, so much of the contributions as would have been subject to the excise tax shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, from the date the member first could have taken a refund until the date the refund is taken or the date as of which the federal excise tax no longer would apply to a refund, whichever is sooner, the interest to be paid by the plan at the time of the refund. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 12; 1962, ch. 9, § 8; 1968, ch. 152, § 6; 1982, ch. 458, § 2, effective April 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 28, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 299, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 2013, ch. 120, § 30, effective July 1, 2013; 2018 ch. 107, § 10, effective July 14, 2018; 2021 ch. 102, § 43, effective April 1, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of any legal relationship between the Judicial Retirement System and its ex-member the fact that the latter may subsequently obtain service credit in another state retirement system would not entitle him to count that service credit toward vesting in the Judicial Retirement System. OAG 78-538 .

Since there is no legal obligation on the part of the Judicial Retirement System to an ex-member who does not demand a refund, the contributions then being held by the Judicial Retirement System do not constitute or reflect service credit in that system, and, at best, the contributions simply constitute an amount of money belonging to the ex-member which he has left in the hands of the Judicial Retirement System. OAG 78-538 .

21.470. Exemption from taxation, execution — Taxability after December 31, 1997.

All retirement allowances and other benefits accrued or accruing to any person under the provisions of KRS 21.350 to 21.510 are hereby exempted from any state, county or municipal tax, and shall not be subject to execution, attachment, garnishment or any other process whatsoever, nor shall any assignment thereof be enforceable in any court. Except retirement benefits accrued or accruing to any person under the provisions of KRS 21.350 to 21.510 on or after January 1, 1998, shall be subject to the tax imposed by KRS 141.020 , to the extent provided in KRS 141.010 and 141.0215 .

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 13; 1995 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 3, effective April 28, 1995.

21.480. KRS 21.350 to 21.510 creates vested interest for members who began participating before January 1, 2014 — Exceptions — Amendment of benefits and rights. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

  1. For members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2014, it is hereby declared that in consideration of the contributions by the members, and in further consideration of benefits received by the state through the inducement of qualified and experienced judges and commissioners to continue in service, KRS 21.350 to 21.510 , except as provided in KRS 6.696 , shall constitute an inviolable contract of the Commonwealth, and the rights and benefits provided therein shall, not be subject to reduction or impairment by alteration, amendment or repeal, except:
    1. As provided in KRS 6.696 ; and
    2. The General Assembly reserves the right to amend, reduce, or suspend any legislative changes to the provisions of KRS 21.345 to 21.580 that become effective on or after July 1, 2018.
    1. For members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, the General Assembly reserves the right to amend, suspend, or reduce the benefits and rights provided under KRS 21.345 to 21.580 if, in its judgment, the welfare of the Commonwealth so demands, except that the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall not be affected. (2) (a) For members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, the General Assembly reserves the right to amend, suspend, or reduce the benefits and rights provided under KRS 21.345 to 21.580 if, in its judgment, the welfare of the Commonwealth so demands, except that the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall not be affected.
    2. For purposes of this subsection, the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall be limited to the accumulated account balance the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction.
    3. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to limit the General Assembly’s authority to change any other benefit or right specified by KRS 21.345 to 21.580, for members who begin participating in the Judicial Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2014, except the benefits specified by paragraph (b) of this subsection.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit the General Assembly’s authority to amend, reduce, or suspend the benefits and rights of members of the Judicial Retirement Plan as provided by KRS 21.345 to 21.580 that the General Assembly had the authority to amend, reduce, or suspend, prior to July 1, 2013.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 14; 1993 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 76, effective September 16, 1993; 2013, ch. 120, § 31, effective July 1, 2013; 2018 ch. 107, § 11, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In light of the contractual obligation created by this section, the General Assembly may now limit retirement benefits to a certain maximum percentage of final annual salary only prospectively as to present nonretired and future members of the retirement plan. OAG 78-4 .

The General Assembly could enact legislation guaranteeing members of this retirement system only the amount each has contributed toward his retirement benefits but such legislation may not have retroactive effect. OAG 78-4 .

Since Chapter 4 of Acts 1993 (1st Ex. Sess.) contained an emergency clause [§ 92] it became effective as a whole when the Governor tendered the bill, which he had signed, to the Secretary of State on February 18, 1993. However, section 87 (13) of Ch. 4 of Acts 1993 (1st Ex. Sess.), provided that, except as provided in §§ 88, 89, and 90, §§ 1-84 of the Act should become effective two hundred ten (210) days after the effective date of the Act, September 16, 1993; other subsections within § 87 establish a transition schedule with other specific dates calculated from the effective date of the Act. Such schedule is actually a listing of deadlines within which certain actions called for in § 87 of the Act are to be completed. Such schedule is as follows: “within 45 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before April 5, 1993; “within 60 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before April 19, 1993; “within 75 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before May 4, 1993; “within 90 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before May 19, 1993; “within 150 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before July 19, 1993; “within 180 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before August 17, 1993; “two hundred ten (210) days after the effective date of the act” = September 16, 1993. OAG 93-25 .

21.490. Termination of membership in Kentucky employees’ retirement system — Refund of contributions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 23, effective July 1, 1980.

21.500. Provision for judge or commissioner who is over seventy on effective date of system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 111, § 199, effective July 13, 1984.

21.510. Appropriation — Transfer of funds to judicial retirement fund.

For the purposes of KRS 21.350 to 21.510 , there is appropriated to the judicial retirement fund all sums received from contributions of members of the retirement system created by KRS 21.350 to 21.510 . There further is appropriated, out of the general expenditure fund in the State Treasury, the sum of $53,600 for the fiscal year 1960-61 and the sum of $73,600 for the fiscal year 1961-62. The amount of accumulated state employer contributions to the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, on account of judges and commissioners of the Court of Appeals having been members of that system, also is hereby transferred to the judicial retirement fund. All sums appropriated or transferred to the judicial retirement fund shall be deemed to constitute a continuing fund which shall not lapse at the end of any fiscal year.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. III, § 18; 1984, ch. 111, § 29, effective July 13, 1984.

21.520. Disposition and use of assets of former special circuit judge fund — Segregation of funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 10; 1974, ch. 386, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 111, § 199, effective July 13, 1984.

21.525. Contributions by state — Normal contributions — Past service liability contribution — Employer costs for hybrid cash balance plan.

  1. The state, by appropriation to the Judicial Retirement Board, shall contribute annually to the Judicial Retirement System an amount equal to the percent as computed under subsection (2) of this section of the creditable compensation of active members of the Judicial Retirement System, to be known as the “normal contributions,” and an additional amount equal to one percent (1%) of the unfunded past service liabilities, plus annual interest accruing thereon at the actuarially assumed rate of interest adopted by the board to be known as the “past service contribution.”
  2. The normal contribution rate shall be determined either by the entry age normal cost funding method or the unit credit actuarial method, as selected by the board. The past service liability shall be determined by actuarial methods consistent with the methods prescribed for determining the normal contribution rate. The board shall adopt the actuarial assumptions that are to be used in making the determinations.
  3. Normal contributions and the past service liability contribution for each fiscal biennium shall be determined on the basis of the actuarial valuation last preceding the commencement of the biennium.
  4. Employer costs for the hybrid cash balance plan as provided by KRS 21.402 shall be incorporated into the employer contribution rate of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan and the Judicial Retirement Plan as a new benefit tier within the plans.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 246, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 299, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 2013, ch. 120, § 32, effective July 1, 2013.

21.530. Coordination of Legislators’ Retirement and Judicial Retirement Plans — Board.

  1. For administrative purposes only, as hereinafter provided, the Legislators’ Retirement Plan and the Judicial Retirement Plan shall be coordinated under the name, Judicial Form Retirement System, but each of the plans shall maintain its separate identity. A board of trustees of that system hereby is created, to consist of eight (8) members, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court, two (2) by the Governor, subject to Senate confirmation in accordance with KRS 11.160 for each appointment or reappointment, one (1) by the President of the Senate, one (1) by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and one (1) by the president and speaker jointly. The appointments by the Governor shall:
    1. Not be from among the members of either of the plans in the system, or from among the persons drawing benefits from either of those plans; and
    2. Have investment experience. For purposes of this paragraph, a trustee with “investment experience” means an individual who does not have a conflict of interest, as provided by KRS 21.540 , and who has at least ten (10) years of experience in one (1) of the following areas of expertise:
      1. A portfolio manager acting in a fiduciary capacity;
      2. A professional securities analyst or investment consultant;
      3. A current or retired employee or principal of a trust institution, investment or finance organization, or endowment fund acting in an investment-related capacity;
      4. A chartered financial analyst in good standing as determined by the CFA Institute; or
      5. A university professor, teaching investment-related studies.
    1. The members of the board shall serve for terms of four (4) years, commencing as of July 1, 1980, and until their successors are chosen and have qualified; provided that if a member of the board who was a member of one (1) of the plans in the system when he was appointed ceases to be a member of that plan, a vacancy shall thereupon be deemed to exist in his position on the board; and provided further, that the members of the Judicial Retirement Board in office on July 1, 1980, shall serve for the remainder of the terms for which they were appointed, as the members of the board created by this section, in the positions appointable by the Supreme Court and the Governor. Vacancies shall be filled by the appointing authority for the unexpired term. (2) (a) The members of the board shall serve for terms of four (4) years, commencing as of July 1, 1980, and until their successors are chosen and have qualified; provided that if a member of the board who was a member of one (1) of the plans in the system when he was appointed ceases to be a member of that plan, a vacancy shall thereupon be deemed to exist in his position on the board; and provided further, that the members of the Judicial Retirement Board in office on July 1, 1980, shall serve for the remainder of the terms for which they were appointed, as the members of the board created by this section, in the positions appointable by the Supreme Court and the Governor. Vacancies shall be filled by the appointing authority for the unexpired term.
    2. A trustee shall not serve more than three (3) consecutive four (4) year terms. A trustee who has served three (3) consecutive terms may be appointed again after an absence of four (4) years from the board. The term limits established by this paragraph shall apply to trustees serving on or after July 1, 2012, and all terms of office served prior to July 1, 2012, shall be used to determine if the trustee has exceeded the term limits provided by this paragraph.
  2. The members of the board shall annually elect a chairman. The chairman shall not serve more than four (4) consecutive years as chairman of the board. A trustee who has served four (4) consecutive years as chairman of the board may be elected chairman of the board after an absence of two (2) years from the position.
  3. Gubernatorial appointees, and judicial and legislative appointees who do not receive an annual salary from the State Treasury in another capacity shall receive an amount equal to the per diem compensation paid to members of the General Assembly for each day they are in session. All members shall be reimbursed for their necessary expenses.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 19, effective July 1, 1980; 1994, ch. 486, § 16, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 448, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 128, § 5, effective June 24, 2003; 2012, ch. 75, § 6, effective April 11, 2012; 2017 ch. 12, § 1, effective March 10, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(3/10/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 14 provided that amendments made to subsection (1) of this statute in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 1 that require Senate confirmation of, and modify the requirements for, gubernatorial appointments to the Judicial Form Retirement System and the Kentucky Retirement Systems boards of trustees shall apply to appointments or reappointments made on or after March 10, 2017, the effective date of that Acts chapter.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in:

Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys. v. AG, 132 S.W.3d 770, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 238 ( Ky. 2003 ), rehearing denied, Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys. v. AG of Ky., 2004 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 2004 ); Karem v. Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys., 293 S.W.3d 401, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

21.540. Duties of board of trustees — Qualified domestic relations orders — Intent to conform with federal law — Availability of information on Web site — Conflicts of interest — Prohibition against fees for unregulated placement agents — Investment procurement policy — Release of certain information from accounts of current or former legislators.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 21.550 , 21.560 , and subsections (3) and (7) of this section, the board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System shall be charged with the administration of that system and of KRS 21.350 to 21.510 , and shall have all powers necessary thereto, including the power to promulgate all reasonable administrative regulations, pass upon questions of eligibility and disability, make employments for services, and to contract for fiduciary liability insurance, and for investment counseling, actuarial, auditing, and other professional services subject to the limitations of KRS Chapters 45, 45A, 56, and 57. The administrative expenses shall be paid out of an administrative account which shall be funded by transfers of the necessary money, in appropriate ratio, from the funds provided for in KRS 21.550 and 21.560 .
    1. A qualified domestic relations order issued by a court or administrative agency shall be honored by the Judicial Form Retirement System if the order is in compliance with the requirements established by the retirement system. (2) (a) A qualified domestic relations order issued by a court or administrative agency shall be honored by the Judicial Form Retirement System if the order is in compliance with the requirements established by the retirement system.
    2. Except in cases involving child support payments, the Judicial Form Retirement System may charge reasonable and necessary fees and expenses to the participant and the alternate payee of a qualified domestic relations order for the administration of the qualified domestic relations order by the retirement system. All fees and expenses shall be established by administrative regulations promulgated by the board of trustees of the retirement system. The qualified domestic relations order shall specify whether the fees and expenses provided by this subsection shall be paid:
      1. Solely by the participant;
      2. Solely by the alternate payee; or
      3. Equally shared by the participant and alternate payee.
    3. For purposes of this subsection, a “qualified domestic relations order” shall mean any judgment, decree, or order, including approval of a property settlement agreement, that:
      1. Is issued by a court or administrative agency; and
      2. Relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a member.
  2. Notwithstanding any other evidence of legislative intent, it is hereby declared to be the controlling legislative intent that the provisions of KRS 21.345 to 21.580 and 6.500 to 6.577 shall conform with federal statutes or regulations and meet the qualification requirements under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a) , applicable federal regulations, and other published guidance, and the board shall have the authority to promulgate administrative regulations, with retroactive effect if required under federal law, to conform the Legislators’ Retirement Plan and the Judicial Retirement Plan with federal statutes and regulations and to meet the qualification requirements under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a) .
  3. In order to improve public transparency regarding the administration of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan and the Judicial Retirement Plan, the board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System shall adopt a best-practices model by posting the following information to the system’s Web site and shall make it available to the public:
    1. Meeting notices and agendas for all meetings of the board. Notices and agendas shall be posted to the system’s Web site at least seventy-two (72) hours in advance of the board or committee meetings, except in the case of special or emergency meetings as provided by KRS 61.823 ;
    2. A list of the members of the board of trustees and membership on each committee established by the board, including any investment committees;
    3. A list of system staff and each staff’s salary;
    4. A list of the fund’s professional consultants and their respective fees and commissions paid by the system;
    5. A list of the system’s expenditures;
    6. The annual financial audit of the system, which shall include but not be limited to a statement of plan net assets, a statement of changes in plan net assets, an actuarial value of assets, a schedule of investments, a statement of funded status and funding progress, and other supporting data;
    7. All external audits;
    8. The annual actuarial valuation report of pension and retiree health benefits of each retirement plan administered by the system, which shall include a general statistical section and information on contributions, benefit payouts, and retirement plan demographic data;
    9. All board minutes or other materials that require adoption or ratification by the board of trustees or committees of the board. The items listed in this paragraph shall be posted within seventy-two (72) hours of adoption or ratification by the board or committees;
    10. All bylaws, policies, or procedures adopted or ratified by the board of trustees or by committees of the board;
    11. The summary plan description for each plan administered by the system;
    12. A document or a link to documents containing an of the statutes governing the plans administered by the Judicial Form Retirement System;
    13. Investment information, including all investment holdings in aggregate, fees, and commissions for each fund administered by the board, which shall be updated on a quarterly basis for fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 2017. The system shall request from all managers, partnerships, and any other available sources all information regarding fees and commissions and shall, based on the requested information received:
      1. Disclose the dollar value of fees and commissions paid to each individual manager or partnership;
      2. Disclose the dollar value of any profit sharing, carried interest, or any other partnership incentive arrangements, partnership agreements, or any other partnership expenses received by or paid to each manager or partnership; and
      3. As applicable, report each fee or commission by manager or partnership consistent with standards established by the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA). In addition to the requirements of this paragraph, the system shall also disclose the name and address of all individual underlying managers or partners in any fund of funds in which system assets are invested;
    14. An update of net investment returns, asset allocations, and the performance of the funds against benchmarks adopted by the board for each fund, for each asset class administered by the board, and for each manager over a historical period. The update shall be posted on a quarterly basis for fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 2017;
    15. All contracts or offering documents for services, goods, or property purchased or utilized by the system. Notwithstanding KRS 61.878 , all contracts, including investment contracts, shall be subject to review by the board, the Auditor of Public Accounts, and the Government Contract Review Committee established pursuant to KRS 45A.705 . If any public record contains material which is not excepted under KRS 61.878 , the system shall separate the excepted material by removal, segregation, or redaction, and make the nonexcepted material available for examination; and
    16. Information regarding the system’s financial and actuarial condition that is easily understood by the members, retired members, and the public. Nothing in this subsection shall require or compel the Judicial Form Retirement System to disclose information specific to the account of an individual member of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan.
  4. No trustee or employee of the board shall:
    1. Have any interest, direct or indirect, in the gains or profits of any investment or transaction made by the board, provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit a member or retiree of one (1) of the retirement plans administered by the system from serving as a trustee;
    2. Directly or indirectly, for himself or herself or as an agent, use the assets of the system, except to make current and necessary payments authorized by the board;
    3. Become an endorser, surety, or obligor for moneys loaned by or borrowed from the board;
    4. Have a contract or agreement with the retirement system, individually or through a business owned by the trustee or the employee;
    5. Use his or her official position with the retirement system to obtain a financial gain or benefit or advantage for himself or herself or a family member;
    6. Use confidential information acquired during his or her tenure with the systems to further his or her own economic interests or that of another person; or
    7. Hold outside employment with, or accept compensation from, any person or business with which he or she has involvement as part of his or her official position with the system. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit:
      1. A trustee from serving as a judge or member of the General Assembly; or
      2. A trustee from serving on the board if the compensation is de minimus and incidental to the trustee’s outside employment. If the compensation is more than de minimus, the trustee shall disclose the amount of the compensation to the other trustees and recuse himself or herself from any matters involving hiring or retaining a person or a business from whom more than de minimus amounts are received by the trustee. For purposes of this section, “de minimus” means an insignificant amount that does not raise a reasonable question as to the trustee’s objectivity.
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision of KRS 6.500 to 6.577 and 21.345 to 21.580 to the contrary, no funds of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, including fees and commissions paid to an investment manager, private fund, or company issuing securities, who manages systems assets, shall be used to pay fees and commissions to placement agents. For purposes of this subsection, “placement agent” means a third-party individual, who is not an employee, or firm, wholly or partially owned by the entity being hired, who solicits investments on behalf of an investment manager, private fund, or company issuing securities.
  6. All contracts for the investment or management of assets of the system shall not be subject to KRS Chapters 45, 45A, 56, and 57. Instead, the board shall conduct the following process to develop and adopt an investment procurement policy with which all prospective contracts for the investment or management of assets of the system shall comply:
    1. On or before July 1, 2017, the board shall consult with the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee to develop an investment procurement policy, which shall be written to meet best practices in investment management procurement;
    2. Thirty (30) days prior to adoption, the board shall tender the preliminary investment procurement policy to the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee for review and comment;
    3. Upon receipt of comments from the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee, the board shall choose to adopt or not adopt any recommended changes;
    4. Upon adoption, the board shall tender the final investment procurement policy to the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee;
    5. No later than thirty (30) days after receipt of the investment procurement policy, the secretary or his or her designee shall certify whether the board’s investment procurement policy meets or does not meet best practices for investment management procurement; and
    6. Any amendments to the investment procurement policy shall adhere to the requirements set forth by paragraphs (b) to (e) of this subsection.
      1. Upon request by any person, the Judicial Form Retirement System shall release the following information from the accounts of any member or retiree of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, if the member or retiree is a current or former officeholder in the Kentucky General Assembly: (8) (a) 1. Upon request by any person, the Judicial Form Retirement System shall release the following information from the accounts of any member or retiree of the Legislators’ Retirement Plan or the Judicial Retirement Plan, if the member or retiree is a current or former officeholder in the Kentucky General Assembly:
        1. The first and last name of the member or retiree;
        2. The plan or plans in which the member has an account or from which the retiree is receiving a monthly retirement allowance;
        3. The status of the member or retiree, including but not limited to whether he or she is a contributing member, a member who is not currently contributing to the plans but has not retired, or a retiree drawing a monthly retirement allowance;
        4. If the individual is a retiree, the monthly retirement allowance that he or she was receiving at the end of the most recently completed fiscal year; and
        5. If the individual is a member who has not yet retired, the estimated monthly retirement allowance that he or she is eligible to receive on the first date he or she would be eligible for an unreduced retirement allowance, using his or her service credit, final compensation, and accumulated account balance at the end of the most recently completed fiscal year.
      2. No information shall be disclosed under this paragraph from an account that is paying benefits to a beneficiary due to the death of a member or retiree.
    1. The release of information under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall not constitute a violation of the Open Records Act, KRS 61.870 to 61.884 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 20, effective July 1, 1980; 1984, ch. 111, § 30, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 263, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 266, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2010, ch. 132, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 148, § 4, effective July 15, 2010; 2012, ch. 75, § 7, effective April 11, 2012; 2013, ch. 43, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2017 ch. 4, § 3, effective March 10, 2017; 2017 ch. 12, § 2, effective March 10, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(3/10/2017). This statute was amended by 2017 Ky. Acts chs. 4 and 12, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(3/10/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 12 provided that amendments made to subsections (1) and (6) of this statute in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 2 governing placement agents and contracts or offerings entered into by the state-administered retirement systems shall apply to contracts and offerings established or contracts or offerings renewed on or after July 1, 2017.

(3/10/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 13 provided that amendments made to subsections (1) and (7) of this statute in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 2 governing the application of the Model Procurement Code, KRS Chapter 45A, and related statutes to the state-administered retirement systems, shall apply to contracts and offerings established or contracts or offerings renewed on or after July 1, 2017.

(4/11/2012). 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 75, sec. 18, provides that the amendments made to subsection (6) of this statute regarding unregulated placement agents by 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 75, sec. 7, “shall apply to contracts established or contracts renewed on or after July 1, 2012.”

21.550. Investments, judicial retirement fund.

  1. Those members of the board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System who are appointed by the Supreme Court, together with the members appointed by the Governor, shall constitute an investment committee for the Judicial Retirement Plan, and as such shall have full and sole authority over the judicial retirement fund and the investment thereof, including the prescribing of funding standards, the adoption of actuarial methods and assumptions, and the making of employments or contracts for required personal services, including administrative, actuarial and investment counseling services. The committee shall be considered trustee of the judicial retirement fund and shall have the sole authority to make investment transactions or obtain insurance contracts for funding purposes. The fund shall be invested in securities which, at the time of making the investment, are by law permitted for the investment of funds by fiduciaries in this state, or funding may be accomplished in part by contract with a reputable life insurance company authorized to do business in this state. To the extent that funding is provided through insurance contract, no contributions, payments or premiums shall be subject to any tax on insurance premiums or annuity considerations.
  2. The investment committee for the judicial retirement fund shall appoint one (1) or more custodians of the securities acquired under authority of this section, each of whom shall be responsible for the safekeeping of the securities in his custody. All registered securities shall be registered in the name “Kentucky Judicial Retirement Fund” (securities heretofore registered in the name “Kentucky Judicial Retirement System” may continue in that name), or in nominee name as provided comparably in KRS 286.3-225 , and every change in registration, by reason of sale or assignment of such securities, shall be accomplished by the signatures of the chairman of the investment committee or a member of that committee appointed by the chairman, and by the secretary-treasurer of the fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 21, effective July 1, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 247 instructs the Reviser of Statutes to adjust KRS references throughout the statutes to conform with the 2006 renumbering of the Financial Services Code, KRS Chapter 286. Such an adjustment has been made in this statute.

Research References and Practice Aids

2010-2012 Budget Reference.

See Judicial Branch Budget, 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 154, Pt. I, 2, (1) at 2117.

See Legislative Branch Budget, 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 156, Pt. I, 1, (1) at 2123.

21.560. Investments — Legislative retirement fund.

The members of the board of trustees of the Judicial Form Retirement System who are appointed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, singly or jointly, together with the members of the board who are appointed by the Governor, shall constitute an investment committee for the Legislators’ Retirement Plan, and as such shall have all the powers and duties with respect to the legislators’ retirement fund as are given by KRS 21.440(1) and 21.550 to the investment committee of the Judicial Retirement Plan with respect to the judicial retirement fund. The committee provided for by this section may, with the concurrence of the investment committee for the Judicial Retirement Plan, arrange for the legislators’ retirement fund and the judicial retirement fund to constitute a common fund for investment purposes only, to be under the management of the investment committee for the Judicial Retirement Plan, each fund sharing in the common fund in proportion to the value of its assets contributed to the common fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 22, effective July 1, 1980; 1984, ch. 111, § 31, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 486, § 17, effective July 15, 1994.

21.565. Administration and assets of plan created under KRS 21.567.

  1. The Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan excess benefit plan established in KRS 21.567 shall be administered by the board of trustees of the Kentucky Judicial Form Retirement System. The board shall have the same authority in its administration as it has in the administration of the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan.
  2. The plan shall constitute a qualified governmental excess benefit plan as provided in 26 U.S.C. sec. 415(m) .
  3. All retired members and beneficiaries of the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan whose effective retirement dates are July 1, 1998, or after, and whose retirement allowances have been limited by 26 U.S.C. sec. 415 shall be participants in the plan. Each member’s participation in the plan shall be determined each fiscal year and shall cease for any year in which the retirement allowance is not limited by 26 U.S.C. sec. 415 .
  4. A participant shall receive a benefit equal to the difference between the retirement allowance otherwise payable from the plan prior to any reduction or limitation required by 26 U.S.C. sec. 415 and the actual retirement allowance payable as limited by 26 U.S.C. sec. 415 . The benefit shall be subject to withholding for applicable state and federal taxes. The benefit shall be paid in accordance with the retirement payment option selected by the member for the retirement allowance.
    1. The board, in accordance with the recommendation of the actuary, shall determine the required contribution to pay benefits each fiscal year. The required contribution for each fiscal year shall be the total amount of benefits payable under this section to all participants plus the amount required to pay any employment taxes on the benefits paid from the plan. (5) (a) The board, in accordance with the recommendation of the actuary, shall determine the required contribution to pay benefits each fiscal year. The required contribution for each fiscal year shall be the total amount of benefits payable under this section to all participants plus the amount required to pay any employment taxes on the benefits paid from the plan.
    2. The required contribution shall be paid from state appropriations.
    3. The required contribution shall be deposited into the separate fund. The plan is intended to be exempt from federal income tax under 26 U.S.C. sec. 115 and 26 U.S.C. sec. 415(m)(1) .
    4. The benefit liability shall be determined on a fiscal year basis, and contributions shall not be accumulated to pay benefits in future fiscal years. Any assets not used to pay benefits in the current fiscal year shall be paid to the Retirement Plan.
  5. The benefits payable from the plan shall be treated in accordance with KRS 21.470 .

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 90, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

21.567. Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan excess benefit plan — Excess benefit fund.

  1. There is created and established:
    1. An excess benefit plan to be known as the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan excess benefit plan. The plan is created for the purpose of providing retirement allowances payable from the retirement plan under KRS 21.345 to 21.580 that would otherwise be limited by 26 U.S.C. sec. 415 ; and
    2. A state fund to be known as the Kentucky Judicial Retirement Plan excess benefit fund which shall consist of all the assets of the plan.
  2. The administration and assets of the plan created under this section shall be as set forth in KRS 21.565 .

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 90, § 2, effective July 15, 2002.

21.570. Nonseverability of provisions.

If any provision of Acts 1980, ch. 407, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the entire chapter shall be invalid, and to this end the provisions of Acts 1980, ch. 407 are not severable.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 407, § 28, effective July 1, 1980.

Compiler’s Notes.

Acts 1980, ch. 407 referred to in this section is compiled as KRS 6.190 , 6.226 to 6.229 (now repealed), 6.500 to 6.535 , 21.347 , 21.400 , 21.530 to 21.570 , 64.005 , 64.057 , 64.485 .

21.580. Senior Status Program for Special Judges. [Repealed effective July 1, 2007; See 5/23/2007 LRC Note.]

  1. As a pilot project to determine the effectiveness of using senior retired judges to combat backlog and delay in Kentucky courts, there is hereby created a “Senior Status Program for Special Judges.” The program shall be implemented as follows:
    1. KRS 21.400 (1) and any other provision in KRS Chapter 21 to the contrary notwithstanding, a member who retires at a time when combining his total years of judicial service credit and his age equals or exceeds the number seventy-five (75), may elect, within ninety (90) days following retirement, to participate in the “Senior Status Program for Special Judges,” if he complies with the provisions of this subsection. In that event, the member shall be entitled to a service retirement allowance, commencing at the member’s normal retirement age, payable monthly during his lifetime in an amount equal to five percent (5%) of his final compensation multiplied by the number of years of his judicial service, not to exceed twenty (20) years of judicial service at the five percent (5%) factor, not to exceed one hundred percent (100%) of final compensation. “Final compensation”, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, for all members retiring under any provision of KRS 21.345 to 21.570 or this section, or similar statutes governing the same positions, as defined in KRS 21.400 shall be based on a period of thirty-six (36) months. Any nonjudicial time shall be counted as is otherwise provided in KRS Chapter 21, but in no event shall service retirement allowance exceed one hundred percent (100%) of final compensation.
      1. In the event the retiring judge elects to retire as a “Senior Status Special Judge” under this subsection, he shall commit to serve, upon appointment by the Chief Justice of the Commonwealth, as special judge for one hundred twenty (120) work days per year for a term of five (5) years without compensation other than the retirement benefits under this subsection. The Senior Status Special Judge may agree to work more than one hundred twenty (120) days in any year within the five (5) years of service; however, the Senior Status Special Judge shall be compensated as otherwise provided by law, in addition to his retirement benefits, for any days served in excess of one hundred twenty (120) in that year. If the Senior Status Special Judge has not served a total of six hundred (600) days within the five (5) year period outlined in this subsection, the Chief Justice shall require the Senior Status Special Judge to serve at no additional compensation to the Senior Status Special Judge, until the six hundred (600) day period is served by the Senior Status Special Judge. The Senior Status Special Judge and the Chief Justice may agree in writing to serve less than the one hundred twenty (120) days in any one (1) or more of the five (5) years; however, any of the days not served in a given year shall be served at the end of the five (5) year period set forth in this subsection.
      2. Should any member electing to retire under the Senior Status Program for Special Judges fail, when ordered by the Chief Justice to serve the requisite number of days not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) days a year for the five (5) year period outlined in this subsection, unless otherwise agreed in writing, he shall no longer be eligible for benefits computed under this subsection and shall return to the benefits otherwise provided under this chapter.
      3. Subject to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution, the Chief Justice shall give due regard, when practical, to the desirability of appointing Senior Status Special Judges to serve within their judicial region as defined by the regional administration charter.
    2. The inviolable contract provisions of Kentucky law, KRS 21.480 , shall apply during the period of time that KRS 21.580 is effective; however, no other provisions of 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 305 shall be considered subject to an inviolable contract of the Commonwealth.
    3. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to invalidate provisions in the current law which require a penalty for retiring before the normal retirement age.
  2. The Senior Status Program for Special Judges created by this section shall be open to any member who is a judge in office on June 24, 2003, and who subsequently retires as a Senior Status Special Judge on or before January 31, 2009.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 305, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 305, § 4, repealed effective July 1, 2007; 2002, ch. 258, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 128, § 6, effective June 24, 2003.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 3 of Acts 2000, ch. 305, effective July 14, 2000, read:

“On the effective date of this Act, and annually thereafter the Judicial Retirement System shall provide a written report to the Legislative Research Commission and to the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court containing: (1) Number of judges who have retired as Senior Status Special Judges since the effective date of the Act; (2) Compensation and other benefits paid to those Senior Status Special Judges; (3) Number of days each Senior Status Special Judge has served as a special judge; (4) The fiscal impact on the judicial retirement system and the General Fund as a result of the retirement of the Senior Status Special Judges; and (5) Any other relevant information that may be requested.”

This section (Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 305, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 305, § 4, repealed effective July 1, 2007; 2002, ch. 258, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 128, § 6, effective June 24, 2003) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 305, § 4, effective July 1, 2007.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(5/23/2007). On May 23, 2007, the Franklin Circuit Court held that the enrollment and expiration dates for the Senior Status Program for Special Judges established by this statute were extended to January 31, 2009. George v. Board of Trustees of Judicial Form Retirement System , 07-CI-00587.

(6/24/2003). 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 305, sec. 1, created KRS 21.580 , which established the Senior Status Program for Special Judges. Section 4 of the same Act repealed KRS 21.580 effective July 1, 2007. Thereafter, 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 258, sec. 1, amended KRS 21.580 to change the retirement date from June 30, 2007, to January 31, 2009, and 2003 Ky. Acts ch. 128, sec. 6, amended KRS 21.580 to extend eligibility for the program to judges in office on June 24, 2003. Neither of these Acts specifically addresses the repeal set out in the 2000 Act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Appointment.

Appellants had no right to have a senior judge reappointed to their case as the senior judge had no claim to the case since senior judge assignments were made by the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court under KRS 21.580 ; while a properly assigned special judge had all the powers and responsibilities of a regular judge under KRS 26A.020 , those powers and responsibilities were always secondary to those of the regular judge and could only ever come into play when the regular judge was unable to hear the case. Cox v. Braden, 266 S.W.3d 792, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 117 S.W.3d 109, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 229 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003); Dalton v. Fortner, 125 S.W.3d 316, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003), rehearing denied, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 5 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Penalties

21.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (4551-6) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

CHAPTER 21A Supreme Court of Kentucky

21A.010. Supreme Court districts.

The Commonwealth is divided into seven (7) Supreme Court districts composed as follows:

  1. First District: Allen, Ballard, Butler, Caldwell, Calloway, Carlisle, Christian, Crittenden, Edmonson, Fulton, Graves, Hickman, Hopkins, Livingston, Logan, Lyon, Marshall, McCracken, McLean, Muhlenberg, Simpson, Todd, Trigg, and Webster Counties.
  2. Second District: Barren, Breckinridge, Bullitt, Daviess, Grayson, Hancock, Hardin, Hart, Henderson, Larue, Meade, Ohio, Union, and Warren Counties.
  3. Third District: Adair, Bell, Casey, Clay, Clinton, Cumberland, Estill, Garrard, Green, Jackson, Knox, Laurel, Lee, Leslie, Lincoln, Marion, McCreary, Metcalfe, Monroe, Nelson, Pulaski, Rockcastle, Russell, Taylor, Washington, Wayne, and Whitley Counties.
  4. Fourth District: Jefferson County.
  5. Fifth District: Anderson, Bourbon, Boyle, Clark, Fayette, Franklin, Jessamine, Madison, Mercer, Scott, and Woodford Counties.
  6. Sixth District: Bath, Boone, Bracken, Campbell, Carroll, Fleming, Gallatin, Grant, Harrison, Henry, Kenton, Lewis, Mason, Nicholas, Oldham, Owen, Pendleton, Robertson, Shelby, Spencer, and Trimble Counties.
  7. Seventh District: Boyd, Breathitt, Carter, Elliott, Floyd, Greenup, Harlan, Johnson, Knott, Lawrence, Letcher, Magoffin, Martin, Menifee, Montgomery, Morgan, Owsley, Perry, Pike, Powell, Rowan, and Wolfe Counties.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 2, effective March 23, 1976; 1984, ch. 185, § 2, effective April 3, 1984; 1991 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 1, effective December 20, 1991.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

An Overview of Kentucky’s New Court System, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1977 Ky. Bench & B. 13.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 Ky. L.J. 145 (1984-85).

21A.020. Election of justices, when held.

Elections for Justices of the Supreme Court shall be held at the regular elections, and every eight (8) years thereafter, as follows:

  1. In the fifth district, in 1976;
  2. In the third district, in 1978;
  3. In the seventh district, in 1980; and
  4. In the first, second, fourth and sixth districts, in 1982.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 3, effective March 23, 1976.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Bartlett, The Selection and Election of Judges in Kentucky, Vol. 53, No. 3, Summer 1989, Ky. Bench & Bar 26.

21A.030. Clerk of Supreme Court — Appointment, duties, fee schedule, assistants — Annual audit.

  1. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the court to serve at its pleasure. The annual salary of the clerk shall be fixed by the General Assembly.
  2. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the clerk shall take the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution.
  3. The clerk shall perform such duties as the Supreme Court may assign, and shall be bonded to the Commonwealth, for faithful performance of duty, in such manner and in such amount as the Supreme Court shall determine.
  4. The clerk may appoint assistants in the number and at the salaries fixed by the Supreme Court.
  5. The Supreme Court shall adopt a seal. The clerk shall be the keeper of the seal and shall use it upon such documents as the Supreme Court may require.
  6. A fee schedule for services rendered by the clerk shall be fixed by rule of the Supreme Court, except that charges to litigants for the reproduction of appellate records and briefs shall be fixed and administered by the clerk. All fees collected by the clerk shall be remitted to the State Treasury.
  7. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall audit the financial accounts of the clerk at least once every year.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 4, effective March 23, 1976.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 15, provides that KRS 21A.030(1) and (4) shall become effective on the first Monday in January, 1980, or on any earlier date upon which the constitutional office of clerk of the Supreme Court becomes vacant.

21A.040. Enforcement of mandates.

The Supreme Court may enforce its mandates by fine or imprisonment, or both.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 5, effective March 23, 1976.

21A.050. Reversal or modification of judgments — Procedures for appeal.

  1. A judgment, order or decree of a lower court may be reversed, modified or set aside by the Supreme Court for errors appearing in the record.
  2. The method of bringing a judgment, order or decree of a lower court to the Supreme Court for review shall be established by Supreme Court rule. The procedures for appellate review shall be established by the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure and other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 6, effective March 23, 1976.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Collier, Criminal Procedure, 68 Ky. L.J. 655 (1979-1980).

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Dissolution Decree, § 24.27.

21A.060. Effect of equal division of court.

If the Supreme Court is equally divided in the decision of a case, the judgment, order or decree of the lower court shall stand affirmed.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 7, effective March 23, 1976.

21A.070. Publication of opinions.

  1. All opinions of the Supreme Court shall be published.
  2. The Supreme Court shall determine which opinions of the Court of Appeals and lower courts shall be published.
  3. The Supreme Court shall select the method of publication and the publisher or publishers of the opinions of the Court of Justice.
  4. There shall be no copyright of the opinions.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 8, effective March 23, 1976.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note, Judicial v. Legislative Power in Kentucky: A “Comity” of Errors, 71 Ky. L.J. 829 (1982-83).

Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 Ky. L.J. 145 (1984-85).

Snyder and Irland, The Separation of Governmental Powers Under the Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 Ky. L.J. 165 (1984-85).

21A.080. Process, to whom directed.

The original or final process of the Supreme Court may be directed to the sheriff of any county.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 9, effective March 23, 1976.

21A.090. Security personnel and services for Court of Justice.

  1. At the request of the Chief Justice, the Governor may provide through the Department of Kentucky State Police such security personnel and services for the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals as shall be necessary.
  2. When the Chief Justice, in his discretion, believes that local law enforcement personnel should be supplemented or superseded by the State Police, the Governor may provide through the Department of Kentucky State Police the necessary security personnel and services for any person or facility in the Court of Justice.
  3. Department of Kentucky State Police officers serving the Court of Justice pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) of this section shall have statewide authority when performing any duty related to the Court of Justice.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 10, effective March 23, 1976; 1978, ch. 384, § 538, effective June 17, 1978; 2007, ch. 85, § 107, effective June 26, 2007.

21A.100. Court of Appeals records become Supreme Court records.

The records of the Court of Appeals involving proceedings before that court, prior to January 1, 1976, shall become part of the permanent records of the Supreme Court. Such records shall be given the same faith and credit as are records of the Supreme Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 11, effective March 23, 1976.

21A.110. Retired justice or judge serving as special judge — Compensation — Expenses.

Any retired justice or judge assigned to active judicial service pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Constitution shall be compensated for his or her service as follows:

  1. The salary for each day which the justice or judge serves shall be as set by the Supreme Court pursuant to KRS § 48.195 and in accordance with its rules, not to exceed 1/260 of the annual salary for a Circuit Judge regardless of the judicial office in which he or she performs the judicial duties; and
  2. Necessary expenses incidental to the performance of the duties of such assignment shall be paid out of the State Treasury upon approval by the Chief Justice or his designee.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 12, effective March 23, 1976; 1998, ch. 447, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2015 ch. 12, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

21A.120. Special justice of Supreme Court — Qualifications — Compensation — Expenses.

  1. If it becomes necessary for the Governor to appoint a justice to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 110(3) of the Constitution, a person so appointed shall possess the qualifications of a Supreme Court Justice.
  2. The salary for each day which the justice serves shall be 1/250 of the annual salary of a Justice of the Supreme Court, except that a retired justice or judge appointed pursuant to this section shall be compensated as provided by KRS 21A.110 and not under this section.
  3. Salary and necessary expenses incidental to the performance of the duties of such assignment shall be paid out of the State Treasury upon approval by the Chief Justice, or his designee.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 67, § 13, effective March 23, 1976.

21A.130. Board of Bar Examiners — Compensation and expenses.

  1. To assist in the evaluation of applicants for admission to the practice of law, the Supreme Court may appoint a Board of Bar Examiners.
  2. The Supreme Court shall make reasonable allowances to each member of the Board of Bar Examiners for his services, for necessary clerical assistance and for necessary expenses incurred in the performance of his duties, such allowances to be paid at such times as the court directs. The court may make allowances to other persons for services and expenses necessary or proper in connection with the conducting of examinations of applicants for admission to practice law. The allowances provided for in this subsection shall be paid out of such appropriation as is made for the purpose.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 58, §§ 3, 4(2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

This section, and KRS 21A.140 to 21A.160 are void because they purport to erect powers and limitations that no longer fall within the legislative province since the 1975 amendment to Const., § 116, completely removed the authority to regulate the legal profession from the legislature and authorized the Supreme Court to exercise that authority. Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Board of Bar Examiners, SCR 2.000.

21A.140. Disposition of fees paid for admission to practice of law.

Any fees fixed by the Supreme Court to be paid by applicants for admission to the practice of law and for the issuance of a license to practice law shall be promptly paid into the State Treasury by the person, officer, or agency designated by the Supreme Court to receive or collect the fees.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 58, § 4(1); 1994, ch. 87, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 348, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

KRS 21A.130 , this section, KRS 21A.150 and KRS 21A.160 are void because they purport to erect powers and limitations that no longer fall within the legislative province since the 1975 amendment to Const., § 116, completely removed the authority to regulate the legal profession from the legislature and authorized the Supreme Court to exercise that authority. Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fees to be paid by applicants for admission to practice law, SCR 2.020 .

21A.150. Powers of Kentucky Bar Association in disciplinary proceedings.

As deemed necessary in the exercise of its power to discipline attorneys, as granted by Section 116 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may authorize the Kentucky Bar Association to conduct hearings, administer necessary oaths, take testimony under oath, compel the attendance of witnesses, and compel the production of records and other evidence.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 58, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

KRS 21A.130 , KRS 21A.140 , this section and KRS 21A.160 are void because they purport to erect powers and limitations that no longer fall within the legislative province since the 1975 amendment to Const., § 116, completely removed the authority to regulate the legal profession from the legislature and authorized the Supreme Court to exercise that authority. Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Procedure in disciplinary proceedings, SCR 3.140 et seq.

21A.160. Organization and control of state bar vested in Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has power to provide for the organization, government and membership of the state bar of Kentucky and to adopt rules and regulations to govern conduct and activity of the state bar and its members.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 58, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

KRS 21A.130 , KRS 21A.140 , KRS 21A.150 and this section are void because they purport to erect powers and limitations that no longer fall within the legislative province since the 1975 amendment to Const., § 116, completely removed the authority to regulate the legal profession from the legislature and authorized the Supreme Court to exercise that authority. Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, SCR 3.130.

21A.170. In-service training for judges, domestic relations commissioners, and trial commissioners on child sexual abuse, domestic violence, and crimes against the elderly.

The Supreme Court shall provide, at least once every two (2) years, in-service training programs for Circuit Judges, District Judges, and domestic relations and trial commissioners in:

  1. Child development, the dynamics of physical and sexual abuse, the impact of violence on child development, the treatment of offenders, and related issues;
  2. Dynamics of domestic violence, effects of domestic violence on adult and child victims, legal remedies for protection, lethality and risk issues, model protocols for addressing domestic violence, available community resources and victims services, and reporting requirements; and
  3. Dynamics of crimes against the elderly, including but not limited to elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation; the effects of these crimes on the elderly, institutions in which they may reside, and their families; legal remedies for protection; lethality and risk issues; financial implications; model protocols for addressing elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation and other crimes against the elderly; available community resources and victims services; and reporting requirements.

Each Circuit Judge, District Judge, and trial and domestic relations commissioner shall successfully complete the training prescribed by the Supreme Court by rule.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 351, § 8, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 54, § 10, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 132, § 15, effective June 20, 2005.

21A.180. Training for judges, domestic relations commissioners, and trial commissioners on adult abuse, neglect, and exploitation investigations and prosecutions.

The Administrative Office of the Courts, under the direction of the Supreme Court, shall develop training for Circuit Judges, District Judges, and domestic relations and trial commissioners on investigation and prosecution of cases of adult abuse, neglect, and exploitation and on the investigation and services provided under KRS Chapter 209. This multidisciplinary training shall specify the roles and responsibilities of Circuit Judges, District Judges, and domestic relations and trial commissioners, and employees in their respective offices, with respect to the investigations and prosecutions of these cases.

History. Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 132, § 14, effective June 20, 2005.

21A.190. Pilot project to study the feasibility and desirability of conducting some open juvenile proceedings.

  1. The General Assembly respectfully requests that the Supreme Court of Kentucky institute a pilot project to study the feasibility and desirability of the opening or limited opening of court proceedings, except for proceedings related to sexual abuse, to the public which are related to:
    1. Dependency, neglect, and abuse proceedings under KRS Chapter 620; and
    2. Termination of parental rights proceedings under KRS Chapter 625.
    1. The pilot project may be established in a minimum of three (3) diverse judicial districts or judicial circuits or a division or divisions thereof chosen by the Chief Justice. (2) (a) The pilot project may be established in a minimum of three (3) diverse judicial districts or judicial circuits or a division or divisions thereof chosen by the Chief Justice.
    2. A pilot project authorized by this subsection shall not be established in a judicial district or judicial circuit or a division thereof when objected to by the applicable judge or county attorney.
  2. The pilot project shall:
    1. Require participating courts to be presumptively open;
    2. Last for four (4) years, unless extended or limited by the General Assembly; and
    3. Be monitored and evaluated by the Administrative Office of the Courts to determine:
      1. Whether there are adverse effects resulting from the opening of certain proceedings or release of records;
      2. Whether the pilot project demonstrates a benefit to the litigants;
      3. Whether the pilot project demonstrates a benefit to the public;
      4. Whether the pilot project supports a determination that such proceedings should be presumptively open;
      5. Whether the pilot project supports a determination that such proceedings should be closed;
      6. How open proceedings under the pilot project impact the child;
      7. The parameters and limits of the program;
      8. Suggestions for the operation and improvement of the program;
      9. Rules changes which may be needed if the program is to be made permanent and expanded to all courts; and
      10. Recommendations for statutory changes which may be needed if the program is to be made permanent and expanded to all courts.
  3. The Administrative Office of the Courts:
    1. Shall provide an annual report to the Legislative Research Commission, the Child Welfare Oversight and Advisory Committee established in KRS 6.943 , and the Interim Joint Committee on Judiciary by September 1 of each year the program is in operation with statistics, findings, and recommendations; and
    2. May make periodic progress reports and statistical reports and provide suggestions to the Interim Joint Committee on Health and Welfare and to the Interim Joint Committee on Judiciary when determined necessary by the Chief Justice.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 76, § 1, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 159, § 48, effective July 14, 2018.

21A.192. Procedures for courts participating in pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190.

  1. A court chosen for the pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190 shall, subject to written authorization by the Chief Justice:
    1. Open all or some of its proceedings to the public relating to cases identified in KRS 21A.190 (1), subject to subsection (2) of this section;
    2. Set parameters for members of the public related to attendance at open proceedings and the information obtained during the proceedings; and
    3. Establish a procedure to require each member of the public attending a proceeding not to disclose the name or personal identifying information regarding any person who is a party to the proceeding, or person testifying at the proceeding.
    1. A court chosen for the pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190 may close the hearing or any part thereof upon motion of a party or upon its own motion if the court determines that closure is in the best interest of the child, the public, or for other good cause shown. The party seeking closure shall have the burden of proof. (2) (a) A court chosen for the pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190 may close the hearing or any part thereof upon motion of a party or upon its own motion if the court determines that closure is in the best interest of the child, the public, or for other good cause shown. The party seeking closure shall have the burden of proof.
    2. In considering whether closure of a hearing is in the best interest of the child or the public, the court shall give priority to the best interest of the child. The court shall also consider all relevant circumstances of the case, including but not limited to:
      1. The nature of the allegations;
      2. The age and maturity level of the child;
      3. The benefit to the child, family, and public of maintaining confidentiality;
      4. The benefit to the public of an open hearing;
      5. The effect of confidentiality on the fact-finding process;
      6. The wishes of the parties, victims, and the parents of any children involved in the case; and
      7. Whether reasonable alternatives to closure are available.
    3. The court shall make written findings of fact and conclusions of law to support an order of closure, and any order of closure shall be no broader than is necessary to protect the interests asserted by the party seeking closure.
  2. Unless otherwise authorized by law, a court chosen for the pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190 shall not:
    1. Release any record discussed at any open proceeding authorized by KRS 21A.190 , prior to, at, or after the proceeding which is made confidential pursuant to law;
    2. Permit audio, visual, or other recording of the proceedings by any person who is attending the proceeding, a party to the proceeding, or testifying at the proceeding;
    3. Permit any audio, visual, or other recording of the proceedings for official court purposes to be made a public record, copied, or released to the public; or
    4. Permit any member of the public attending the proceeding, who is not a party to the proceeding, or who is not testifying at the proceeding, to disclose the name or personal identifying information of any person who is a party to a proceeding or testifying at a proceeding, outside of the courtroom.
  3. A person may take written notes during a hearing, as provided in KRS 21A.190 , and remove them from the courtroom following the hearing provided that no name or personal identifying information of any minor who is a party to the proceeding or testifying at the proceeding shall be taken from the courtroom. The provisions of this subsection are not intended to apply to, and shall not limit the use or publication of, any information obtained by means other than attendance at a proceeding authorized by this section.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 76, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

21A.300. Prohibition against solicitation of professional employment from victim or relative of victim of accident or disaster.

  1. Notwithstanding KRS 21A.160 , for a period of thirty (30) days following the filing of a criminal or civil action, or claim for damages, or a traffic citation, injury, accident, or disaster, an attorney or an attorney referral service shall be subject to the following prohibition. An attorney or an attorney referral service shall not directly solicit, or knowingly permit another person to directly solicit on his or its behalf, a victim of the accident or disaster, or a relative of the victim, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment relating to a criminal or civil action, or claim for damages, arising out of the traffic citation, injury, accident, or disaster.
  2. Notwithstanding KRS 21A.160 , an attorney shall not knowingly accept a referral from an attorney referral service when that referral has resulted from the attorney referral service violating the prohibition established in subsection (1) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 192, § 1, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

The Kentucky General Assembly did not violate separation-of-powers principles by enacting KRS 21A.300 and 21A.310(1), which impose criminal sanctions on practicing attorneys who solicit accident or disaster victims by direct mail within 30 days of the event. Chambers v. Stengel, 37 S.W.3d 741, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 2001 ) (on certification from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals).

The 30 day prohibition of attorney solicitation of victims of an accident, injury, or disaster is not vague and, therefore, does not violate the due process clause of the federal constitution because (1) the terms “solicit,” “victim,” “accident or disaster,” and “general public” are common terms, and individuals of common intelligence do not have to guess at their meaning, and (2) the statute sufficiently sets out the conduct prohibited such that it gives fair notice to citizens and does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by police, judges, or juries. Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 2001 FED App. 0212P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15393 (6th Cir. Ky. 2001 ).

The 30 day prohibition of attorney solicitation of victims of an accident, injury, or disaster is not vague and, therefore, does not violate the equal protection clause of the federal constitution because (1) the state has a substantial interest in protecting both the privacy of its citizens and the reputation of its attorneys, and (2) the statute is narrowly fashioned to advance such interests. Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 2001 FED App. 0212P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15393 (6th Cir. Ky. 2001 ).

The 30 day prohibition of attorney solicitation of victims of an accident, injury, or disaster is not an unreasonable regulation of commercial speech since (1) the record contained more than mere speculation and conjecture, and the state’s interests in protecting the privacy of its citizens and the reputation of its attorneys were directly and materially advanced by the statute, (2) there existed a reasonable fit between the legislature’s goal and the means chose to accomplish it, even if the statute did not employ the least restrictive means necessary. Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 2001 FED App. 0212P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15393 (6th Cir. Ky. 2001 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Professional Responsibility, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 35 (2002).

21A.310. Penalties for violation of KRS 21A.300.

  1. Notwithstanding KRS 21A.160 , any person violating any provision of KRS 21A.300 shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  2. The Kentucky Supreme Court may discipline any attorney who violates any provision of KRS 21A.300 .
  3. A penalty may be imposed on an attorney pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, subsection (2) of this section, or both subsections.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 192, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2011, ch. 69, § 2, effective June 8, 2011; 2015 ch. 46, § 4, effective June 24, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

The Kentucky General Assembly did not violate separation-of-powers principles by enacting KRS 21A.300 and 21A.310(1), which impose criminal sanctions on practicing attorneys who solicit accident or disaster victims by direct mail within 30 days of the event. Chambers v. Stengel, 37 S.W.3d 741, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 2001 ) (on certification from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals).

The 30 day prohibition of attorney solicitation of victims of an accident, injury, or disaster is not vague and, therefore, does not violate the due process clause of the federal constitution because (1) the terms “solicit,” “victim,” “accident or disaster,” and “general public” are common terms, and individuals of common intelligence do not have to guess at their meaning, and (2) the statute sufficiently sets out the conduct prohibited such that it gives fair notice to citizens and does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by police, judges, or juries. Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 2001 FED App. 0212P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15393 (6th Cir. Ky. 2001 ).

The 30 day prohibition of attorney solicitation of victims of an accident, injury, or disaster does not violate the equal protection clause of the federal constitution because (1) the state has a substantial interest in protecting both the privacy of its citizens and the reputation of its attorneys, and (2) the statute is narrowly fashioned to advance such interests. Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 2001 FED App. 0212P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15393 (6th Cir. Ky. 2001 ).

The 30 day prohibition of attorney solicitation of victims of an accident, injury, or disaster is not an unreasonable regulation of commercial speech since (1) the record contained more than mere speculation and conjecture, and the state’s interests in protecting the privacy of its citizens and the reputation of its attorneys were directly and materially advanced by the statute, (2) there existed a reasonable fit between the legislature’s goal and the means chose to accomplish it, even if the statute did not employ the least restrictive means necessary. Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 2001 FED App. 0212P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15393 (6th Cir. Ky. 2001 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Classification of offenses; penalties, see KRS 532.020 .

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Professional Responsibility, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 35 (2002).

21A.320. Permissible types of solicitation.

Nothing contained in KRS 21A.300 and 21A.310 shall prohibit an attorney or attorney referral service from:

  1. Soliciting employment by advertising directed to the general public; or
  2. Accepting representation of a client who has contacted the lawyer as the result of a recommendation or referral by a friend, neighbor, relative, or acquaintance not acting at the specific request or instigation of:
    1. The lawyer; or
    2. Anyone acting, with the lawyer’s actual knowledge, on the lawyer’s behalf.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 192, § 3, effective July 15, 1996.

21A.350. Weighted caseload analysis of need to increase, decrease, or rearrange circuits or districts or reallocate judges — Certification of necessity.

  1. Beginning in 2020 and  every eight (8) years thereafter, the Supreme Court may direct the  Administrative Office of the Courts to perform a weighted caseload  analysis to determine the need to reduce, increase, or rearrange the  Commonwealth’s judicial circuits and districts, to reallocate  the assignment of judges, or to modify the number of judges relative  to their respective populations or caseloads. This analysis shall  include caseload totals by case type and case weight and the total  number of judges necessary for the Commonwealth’s judicial  circuits and districts.
  2. The Supreme Court shall  submit any weighted caseload analysis performed under subsection (1)  of this section to the General Assembly by December 31 of the year  in which the analysis is performed. If the analysis indicates a need  to reduce, increase, or rearrange the judicial circuits or districts,  to reallocate the assignment of judges, or to modify the number of  judges due to population or caseload changes, a certification of necessity  shall be submitted as required by Sections 112 and 113 of the Constitution  of Kentucky, which may include a proposed redrawing of circuit or  district boundaries, reallocation of the assignment of judges, or  modification of the number of judges.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 57, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

CHAPTER 22 Judicial Council And Judicial Conference [Repealed]

22.010. Members — Presiding officer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1126a-1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 8.

22.020. Meetings — Who required to attend. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1126a-2, 1126a-5) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 8.

22.030. Duties — Reports to Council and to Legislature — Hearings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1126a-3, 1126a-4) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 8.

22.040. Compensation of members — Expenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1126a-6, 1126a-7) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 8; subsec. (1) was also repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

22.050. Judicial council — Membership — Chief justice — Terms — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 1; 1956, ch. 79, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 61, § 12. For present law see KRS 27A.010 to 27A.130 .

22.060. Judicial conference — Membership — Chairman. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 2; 1970, ch. 245, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 61, § 12. For present law see KRS 27A.010 to 27A.130 .

22.070. Meetings of council and conference — Chairman of council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 3; 1956, ch. 79, § 2; 1972, ch. 355, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 61, § 12. For present law see KRS 27A.010 to 27A.130 .

22.080. Duties of judicial council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 4; 1960, ch. 84, Art. I, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 61, § 12. For present law see KRS 27A.010 to 27A.130 .

22.090. Duties of judicial conference. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 61, § 12. For present law see KRS 27A.010 to 27A.130 .

22.100. Expenses of members of council and conference. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 208, § 6; 1972, ch. 355, § 2) was repealed in part by Acts 1960, ch. 84, Art. I, sec. 4 and by Acts 1976, ch. 61, § 12. For present law see KRS 27A.010 to 27A.130 .

22.110. Administrative office of the courts established — Director — Other employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1960, ch. 84, Art. I, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 61, § 12. For present law see KRS 27A.010 to 27A.130 .

22.120. Duties of director. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1960, ch. 84, Art. I, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 61, § 12. For present law see KRS 27A.010 to 27A.130 .

CHAPTER 22A Court of Appeals

22A.010. Numbers of judges — Districts.

  1. The Court of Appeals shall consist of fourteen (14) judges, with two (2) judges from each of seven (7) Court of Appeals districts.
  2. The districts of the Court of Appeals shall correspond in geographical dimensions to the districts of the Supreme Court, as defined in KRS Chapter 21A.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 70, § 2, effective March 23, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Apportionment of Districts.

A convicted felon will not suffer irreparable damage if the appeal of his criminal conviction will be heard before the Court of Appeals that he alleges is malapportioned under law establishing appellate court districts, so that a federal court cannot intervene pending the state court appeal. Scott v. Hill, 449 F.2d 634, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7706 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 928, 92 S. Ct. 979, 30 L. Ed. 2d 801, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 3729 (1972), cert. denied, Scott v. Hill, 405 U.S. 928, 92 S. Ct. 979, 30 L. Ed. 2d 801, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 3729 (1972) (Decided under prior law).

The question of whether the “one-man, one-vote” rule applied to the election of the Kentucky Court of Appeals judges under former law establishing appellate court districts presented a substantial constitutional question which, in a proper case, should be heard by a three-judge district court. Scott v. Hill, 449 F.2d 634, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7706 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 928, 92 S. Ct. 979, 30 L. Ed. 2d 801, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 3729 (1972), cert. denied, Scott v. Hill, 405 U.S. 928, 92 S. Ct. 979, 30 L. Ed. 2d 801, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 3729 (1972) (Decided under prior law).

The “one-man, one-vote” principle should not and does not apply to the judiciary. Kentucky State Bar Asso. v. Taylor, 482 S.W.2d 574, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1972 ) (Decided under prior law).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 77 ( Ky. 1995 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Assignment of new county to districts, KRS 67.280 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

An Overview of Kentucky’s New Court System, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1977 Ky. Bench & B. 13.

Bartlett, The Selection and Election of Judges in Kentucky, Vol. 53, No. 3, Summer 1989, Ky. Bench & Bar 26.

22A.020. Jurisdiction — Appeal procedures.

  1. Except as provided in Section 110 of the Constitution, an appeal may be taken as a matter of right to the Court of Appeals from any conviction, final judgment, order, or decree in any case in Circuit Court, including a family court division of Circuit Court, unless such conviction, final judgment, order, or decree was rendered on an appeal from a court inferior to Circuit Court.
  2. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of the Circuit Court in civil cases, but only as authorized by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision in this section, there shall be no review by appeal or by writ of certiorari from that portion of a final judgment, order or decree of a Circuit Court dissolving a marriage.
  4. An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals by the state in criminal cases from an adverse decision or ruling of the Circuit Court, but only under the following conditions:
    1. Such appeal shall not suspend the proceedings in the case.
    2. Such appeal shall be taken in the manner provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of the Supreme Court, except that the record on appeal shall be transmitted by the clerk of the Circuit Court to the Attorney General; and if the Attorney General is satisfied that review by the Court of Appeals is important to the correct and uniform administration of the law, he may deliver the record to the clerk of the Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by the above-mentioned rules.
    3. When an appeal is taken pursuant to this subsection, the Court of Appeals, if the record so warrants, may reverse the decision of the Circuit Court and order a new trial in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy or otherwise violate any constitutional rights of the defendant.
  5. Any party aggrieved by the judgment of the Circuit Court in a case appealed from a court inferior thereto may petition the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 70, § 3, effective March 23, 1976; 2003, ch. 66, § 16, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Constitutionality.

Since under §§ 109 and 116 of the Constitution the Supreme Court only has the power to prescribe rules governing appellate procedure and jurisdiction and since the only restriction on appeal by the Commonwealth set forth by the Constitution of Kentucky, as stated in § 115, is that the Commonwealth may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case for any purpose other than securing a certification of the law; therefore, when the legislature, by enactment of subsection (4) of this section, attempted to establish rules of appellate procedure, it acted contrary to the dictates of the Constitution. Commonwealth v. Schumacher, 566 S.W.2d 762, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 524 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), disapproved, Commonwealth v. Littrell, 677 S.W.2d 881, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 285 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Although a trial court’s decision was not a final order, KRS 22A.020(4) allowed the Commonwealth to take an interlocutory appeal. Section 22A.020(4) did not violate Ky. Const. § 2 even though it was solely for the benefit of the Commonwealth as it furthered the Commonwealth’s legitimate interest in the administration of justice. Ballard v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 69, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 2010 ).

2.Construction.

“Rendered on an appeal from a court inferior to Circuit Court” is construed as referring only to decisions of the Circuit Court made while sitting as an appellate review court, and not to those made sitting as a trial court. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.2d 52, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 546 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

3.Original Jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to enjoin sale of property under judgment. (Decided under prior law) Allensworth v. Allensworth's Ex'x, 240 Ky. 333 , 42 S.W.2d 329, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1931 ).

4.Interlocutory Rulings.

A Commonwealth’s Attorney seeking an appeal of discretionary rulings within a trial court’s jurisdiction has a remedy under subsection (4) of this section and, in this connection, the term “proceedings” as used in subdivision (4)(a) of this section is construed as referring to proceedings after the attachment of jeopardy, so that, unless the constitutional right to a speedy trial were unduly threatened, there is no reason why an interlocutory “ruling” entered prior to trial, if it decides a matter vital to the Commonwealth’s case, could not be reviewed by appeal. Eaton v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 637, 1978 Ky. LEXIS 334 ( Ky. 1978 ).

Whereas this section authorizes the Commonwealth to appeal from an interlocutory order, there is no comparable provision for an appeal by the defendant. Evans v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d 346, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1982 ).

This section gives the Commonwealth the authority to appeal from interlocutory orders under certain conditions. Those conditions are that (a) the appeal will not stay the proceedings, and (b) the defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial and against double jeopardy are not violated. Commonwealth v. Evans, 645 S.W.2d 350, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 280 (Ky. Ct. App.), aff'd, 645 S.W.2d 346, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1982 ).

The Supreme Court has construed subsection (4) of this section to permit an appeal of an interlocutory ruling only if the ruling decides a matter vital to the Commonwealth’s case; where the ruling vital to the prosecution’s case was the order suppressing evidence of the statements by the deceased officer, this order was properly appealable, but the ruling denying reconsideration did the prosecution no further damage and was not appealable. Commonwealth v. Cobb, 728 S.W.2d 540, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987), overruled in part, Parker v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Unquestionably, this section provides for interlocutory appeals but only from Circuit Court, not to Circuit Court from District Court. The proper procedure for appeals from District Court is governed by KRS 23A.080 . Tipton v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 239, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), overruled in part, Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 2004 ), abrogated in part, Commonwealth v. Lamberson, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 733 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2007).

An interlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth does not require the continuance of pre-trial proceedings until the determination of the appeal and, therefore, the trial court did not improperly dismiss a criminal proceeding against the defendant where (1) the court issued an order stating that the case would be dismissed in 60 days if the Commonwealth did not proceed to trial; (2) the Commonwealth failed to seek intermediate relief from the Court of Appeals following entry of such order; and (3) the Commonwealth took no steps to avoid dismissal of the action. Commonwealth v. Blincoe, 33 S.W.3d 533, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000), overruled in part, Smith v. Commonwealth, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 421 (Ky. Dec. 16, 2021).

Interlocutory appeal, under KRS 22A.020 , may only be taken from a judgment or order that has been signed by the judge and service thereof noted on the docket by the Circuit Court clerk under RCr 12.04, RCr 12.06, and CR 58; to meet these requirements, it is axiomatic that the judgment or order appealed from be reduced to writing. Commonwealth v. West, 147 S.W.3d 72, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 197 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Oral interlocutory order was not an appealable order as it had not been signed by the judge and as no notation of service had been made on the docket. Commonwealth v. West, 147 S.W.3d 72, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 197 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Filing of an appeal in a negligence case did not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to enter a subsequent order because the appeal was an inappropriate interlocutory appeal; only certain appeals were timely and appropriately brought, pursuant to CR 73.02 and KRS 22A.020 , 417.220 . Moctar v. Yellow Cab of Louisville, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 175 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2012), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 431 (Ky. Sept. 18, 2013).

An order granting a subpoena duces tecum and requiring defendant to comply therewith was interlocutory and was not appealable, however, defendant could apply to the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent entry of the order. (Decided under prior law) Claussner Hosiery Co. v. Paducah, 275 Ky. 149 , 120 S.W.2d 1039, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 386 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Interlocutory judgments are such as are given in the middle of a cause, upon some plea, proceeding or default, which is only intermediate, and does not finally determine or complete the suit. Final judgments are such as at once put an end to the action by declaring that the plaintiff has or has not entitled himself to the remedy sued for. (Decided under prior law) Adkins v. Carol Mining Co., 281 Ky. 328 , 136 S.W.2d 32, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 40 ( Ky. 1940 ).

An order sustaining or overruling a motion to quash the return of an officer on a summons is not a final order for the purposes of an appeal. (Decided under prior law) Bastian Bros. Co. v. Field, 280 Ky. 727 , 134 S.W.2d 648, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1939 ); Wallins v. Luten Bridge Co., 291 Ky. 73 , 163 S.W.2d 276, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 181 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where, in a declaratory judgment action, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition and proceeded to make a declaration of rights, the plaintiff did not decline to plead further, and the petition was not dismissed, the ruling of the court was interlocutory and appeal was not proper. (Decided under prior law) Campbell v. Daugherty, 259 Ky. 372 , 82 S.W.2d 460, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 322 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Appellate court was not authorized by the Kentucky Constitution or statute to consider an appeal from an interlocutory order denying defendant immunity under this section because this section did not include a provision for allowing such an appeal. Commonwealth v. Farmer, 423 S.W.3d 690, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 2014 ).

5.Right to Appeal.

The Kentucky two-tier trial court system with lay judicial officers in the first tier in smaller cities and an appeal of right with a de novo trial before a traditionally law-trained judge in the second does not violate either the due process or equal protection guarantees of the Constitution of the United States. (Decided under prior law)North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 76 (U.S. 1976).

The law in force at the time the appeal is prayed and not when the judgment was rendered governs the right to appeal. (Decided under prior law)Hale v. Grogan, 106 Ky. 311 , 50 S.W. 257, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1856 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1899 ). See Terry v. Johnson, 105 Ky. 760 , 49 S.W. 767, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1562 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 268 ( Ky. 1899 ); Frost v. Rowan, 56 S.W. 427, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1777 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 490 ( Ky. 1900 ); Alexander v. Warner, 58 S.W. 700, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 720 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 692 ( Ky. 1900 ); Piper v. Spencer, 58 S.W. 815, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 780 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 275 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900); Gough v. Illinois C. R. Co., 166 Ky. 568 , 179 S.W. 449, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 723 ( Ky. 1915 ).

Any person may appear and resist the alteration of a public road and in doing so he makes himself a party and has the right to appeal. (Decided under prior law)Carrick v. Garth, 159 Ky. 505 , 167 S.W. 687, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 829 ( Ky. 1914 ).

The right of appeal is a privilege controlled by the legislature, as the legislature has the power to designate in what classes of cases appeals may be taken. (Decided under prior law)Morton v. Woodford, 99 Ky. 367 , 35 S.W. 1112, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 271 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1896 ). See Hale v. Grogan, 49 S.W. 464, 1899 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1899 ); Gough v. Illinois C. R. Co., 166 Ky. 568 , 179 S.W. 449, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 723 ( Ky. 1915 ).

No one may complain of a judgment which does not in any manner affect or touch his financial or any other rights. (Decided under prior law)Security Finance Co. v. Langan, 281 Ky. 249 , 135 S.W.2d 903, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The right to appeal from a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction to an appellate court is not inherent, but is one which must be based upon statutory authority. (Decided under prior law)Mason v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 291 Ky. 654 , 165 S.W.2d 346, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1942 ).

The fact that defendant, in suit to enforce execution lien on judgment against her, had unsuccessfully sought to avoid the judgment by asserting a setoff and counterclaim, could not affect her right to appeal from the judgment, so long as the appeal was taken within the time allowed. (Decided under prior law)Potts v. Potts, 299 Ky. 216 , 184 S.W.2d 987, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1945 ).

As a general rule, a party may not appeal from a judgment in his own favor, but in action of illegitimate child to enforce promise of father to will her certain land where judgment for money damages was taken against administrator of estate, and personal assets might be insufficient to pay the judgment in addition to the other claims against the estate, interest of heirs in the matter adjudged being direct and substantial they were necessarily aggrieved by judgment adverse to administrator and could appeal from it even though complaint had been dismissed as to them. (Decided under prior law)Miller v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 884, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1960 ), limited, Cheshire v. Barbour, 455 S.W.2d 62, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Where the appellant filed a notice of appeal within the required time but it was subsequently determined that the appellant was entitled to appeal as a matter of right, the motion should not be denied, where the time for appeal as a matter of right expired during the adjudication of the controversy. (Decided under prior law)Commonwealth by Luckett v. Monson, 465 S.W.2d 717, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Where the Commonwealth sued the valuation administrator of a county to compel him to assess the citizens at a fair rate, the Commonwealth was entitled to an appeal as a matter of right. (Decided under prior law)Commonwealth by Luckett v. Monson, 465 S.W.2d 717, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Defendant’s appeal of an order revoking her probation was a statutory right to appeal, and thus, whether the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (FDD) would deprive her of a constitutional right was moot; the court of appeals’ denial to apply the FDD was inextricably intertwined with the incorrect conclusion of law that defendant had a constitutional right to appeal, and thus, the supreme court took judicial notice of all governmental documents and public records indicating her absconsion. Commonwealth v. Hess, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 320 (Ky. June 17, 2021).

6.Parties.

Where attorneys are not made parties to the appeal, the Court of Appeals cannot consider the question of the allowance of their fees. (Decided under prior law) Arms v. Arms, 246 Ky. 827 , 56 S.W.2d 536, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1933 ); Whitsitt v. Adams, 291 Ky. 610 , 165 S.W.2d 180, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 292 ( Ky. 1942 ).

An appeal does not lie against one not a party to proceedings in which judgment was rendered. (Decided under prior law) White v. England, 348 S.W.2d 936, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Appeal brought against persons who were not parties in the Circuit Court proceedings must be dismissed for the term party as used in CR 73.02 and 73.03 means a party of record. (Decided under prior law) White v. England, 348 S.W.2d 936, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1961 ).

7.Final Orders and Judgments.

The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction of an appeal unless the order or judgment appealed from was a final one. (Decided under prior law)Harrison v. Stroud, 150 Ky. 797 , 150 S.W. 993, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 982 ( Ky. 1912 ); Kentucky Heating Co. v. Louisville, 178 Ky. 42 4, 198 S.W. 1150, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 734 ( Ky. 1917 ); Autry v. Autry, 191 Ky. 42 , 229 S.W. 79, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 264 ( Ky. 1921 ); Claussner Hosiery Co. v. Paducah, 275 Ky. 149 , 120 S.W.2d 1039, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 386 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where city sought to recover damages for the alleged unlawful use of its streets by a gas company an order merely deciding that the use was unlawful was not a final one. (Decided under prior law)Kentucky Heating Co. v. Louisville, 178 Ky. 424 , 198 S.W. 1150, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 734 ( Ky. 1917 ).

An order to be final must not only determine that one of the parties is entitled to relief of a final character, but it must go further and give that relief by its own force or be enforceable for that purpose without further action of the court or by process for contempt. (Decided under prior law) Elkhorn Land & Improv. Co. v. Ratliffe, 181 Ky. 603 , 205 S.W. 687, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 588 ( Ky. 1918 ).

A final order either terminates the action itself, decides some matter litigated by the parties, or operates to divest some right, in such a manner as to put it out of the power of the court making the order, after the expiration of the term, to place the parties in their original condition. (Decided under prior law) Searcy v. Three Point Coal Co., 280 Ky. 683 , 134 S.W.2d 228, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 188 ( Ky. 1939 ); Adkins v. Carol Mining Co., 281 Ky. 328 , 136 S.W.2d 32, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 40 ( Ky. 1940 ).

An order dismissing an action without prejudice is not an appealable order. (Decided under prior law) Estes v. Gatliff, 291 Ky. 93 , 163 S.W.2d 273, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1942 ). See C. I. T. Corp. v. Teague, 293 Ky. 521 , 169 S.W.2d 593, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 654 ( Ky. 1943 ).

An order dismissing an action without prejudice is an appealable order. (Decided under prior law)C. I. T. Corp. v. Teague, 293 Ky. 521 , 169 S.W.2d 593, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 654 ( Ky. 1943 ). See Estes v. Gatliff, 291 Ky. 93 , 163 S.W.2d 273, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1942 ).

An order overruling a motion to set aside, on ground of fraud, that part of a divorce judgment relating to an agreed property settlement was appealable. (Decided under prior law)Friedman v. Friedman, 307 Ky. 439 , 211 S.W.2d 403, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1948 ).

A “final order” means one where the last say has been said, while an “interlocutory order” means one that is speaking between. (Decided under prior law) Jacoby v. Carrollton Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 246 S.W.2d 1000, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 650 ( Ky. 1952 ).

The final and appealable character of an order should be tested on the basis of whether the order grants or denies the ultimate relief sought in the action or requires further steps to be taken in order that the parties’ rights may be finally determined. (Decided under prior law) Evans Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Ousley, 388 S.W.2d 130, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 416 ( Ky. 1965 ).

With certain enumerated exceptions, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction only of final orders and judgments of Circuit Courts in civil cases. (Decided under prior law) Webster County Soil Conservation Dist. v. Shelton, 437 S.W.2d 934, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 462 ( Ky. 1969 ).

An order abating an action in the Circuit Court to allow review of the claim before the Workmen’s (now Workers’) Compensation Board was not a final and appealable judgment. (Decided under prior law) Polk v. Geoghegan, 447 S.W.2d 602, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 1969 ).

8.—Assistance of Counsel in Prosecution of Appeals.

When a statute authorizes an original appeal as a matter of right, the equal protection clause of U.S. Const., amend. XIV guarantees that an indigent defendant shall have the assistance of counsel in prosecuting the appeal. (Decided under prior law) Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 782 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

9.—Dismissal Order.

An order of dismissal is a final order. (Decided under prior law) Long v. Reiss, 290 Ky. 198 , 160 S.W.2d 668, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1942 ).

An order dismissing a counterclaim is not a final order from which an appeal lies. (Decided under prior law) Jacoby v. Carrollton Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 246 S.W.2d 1000, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 650 ( Ky. 1952 ).

10.—Divorce Actions.

In divorce action brought by husband, in which wife’s answer asked for divorce from bed and board, where parties submitted case for “final judgment,” and court granted wife relief asked, this ruling was a final order, and had the effect of dismissing husband’s petition, from which order an appeal could be taken. (Decided under prior law) Swartz v. Caudill, 279 Ky. 206 , 130 S.W.2d 80, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 264 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Although orders quashing depositions or refusing their filing normally would be treated as interlocutory and not reviewable by Court of Appeals, in original action seeking relief against certain orders in divorce action, Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review orders quashing or refusing to file defendant’s depositions in divorce action since judgment granting a divorce is nonreviewable by Court of Appeals and defendant might sustain irreparable damage without any remedy by appeal or otherwise. (Decided under prior law)Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 284 Ky. 137 , 143 S.W.2d 1082, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 459 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of appeal by wife from order granting temporary alimony pending final disposition of divorce action, regardless of whether court had jurisdiction of appeal from order abating the suit under authority of Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act since appeal from order granting temporary alimony is independent of the final determination of the rights of the parties and possesses the essential elements of a final judgment being enforceable by rule or execution. (Decided under prior law) Ahrens v. Ahrens, 299 Ky. 497 , 185 S.W.2d 694, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 441 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Where the plaintiff filed suit for divorce or an annulment in the alternative and the annulment was denied with provision that a divorce would be granted when a judgment was tendered and no judgment was tendered, the appeal was dismissed because it was not prosecuted from a final order or judgment. (Decided under prior law) Brown v. Brown, 430 S.W.2d 458, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1968 ).

An appeal from a final order awarding an absolute divorce which attacked the right of the prevailing party to the divorce but did not seek to set the divorce aside was not prohibited by law prohibiting appeal from that part of a judgment granting a divorce. (Decided under prior law) Sharp v. Sharp, 491 S.W.2d 639, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 576 ( Ky. 1973 ).

11.—Injunction.

Where judgment in suit by landowners against owner of property adjoining theirs to enjoin him from using his property as a commercial parking lot which they alleged was in violation of the zoning and certain other city ordinances merely denied the injunction, it was not a final order because it did not dismiss the complaint or otherwise terminate the litigation or finally dispose of the issues and therefore an appeal from such judgment must be dismissed. (Decided under prior law) Stewart v. Jackson, 311 S.W.2d 568, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1958 ).

12.—New Trial.

Order granting a new trial is not a final order or judgment from which an appeal may be taken. (Decided under prior law) Dailey v. Lexington & E. R. Co., 180 Ky. 668 , 203 S.W. 569, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1918 ); Morris v. Morris, 225 Ky. 823 , 10 S.W.2d 277, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 872 ( Ky. 1928 ); Murphy v. Harmon, 291 Ky. 504 , 165 S.W.2d 11, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 262 ( Ky. 1942 ).

13.—Order Adjudging Costs and Continuing Case.

A judgment not attempting to dispose of a case but merely adjudging costs incurred at a particular term and continuing the case was not final and appealable. (Decided under prior law) Trade Discount Co. v. J. R. Cox & Co., 143 Ky. 515 , 136 S.W. 901, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 437 ( Ky. 1911 ).

14.Orders Regarding Real Estate.

A judgment construing a deed without giving enforceable relief is not a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken. (Decided under prior law) Elkhorn Land & Improv. Co. v. Ratliffe, 181 Ky. 603 , 205 S.W. 687, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 588 ( Ky. 1918 ).

Judgment ordering a sale of real estate for division was not a final judgment from which an appeal could be prosecuted by one who claimed a lien upon the property, but who did not oppose the sale, and sought only to subject the proceeds to his asserted lien. (Decided under prior law) Pool v. Pool, 183 Ky. 341 , 209 S.W. 62, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1919 ).

An order requiring plaintiff in an action for trespass in cave which plaintiff claimed extended under his land to pay costs of survey unless it should develop that cave did extend under plaintiff’s land, in which event the court reserved for further adjudication question of distribution of costs, was not a final appealable order. (Decided under prior law) Edwards v. Lee, 230 Ky. 375 , 19 S.W.2d 992, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 1929 ).

A judgment in an action to enforce a claim for one-third of the rent received from certain lands, which merely adjudged that plaintiff was entitled to a lien on the land for one-third of the rent, without determining the amount of the rent, or whether there was in fact any rent, and continuing the action for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due, without disposing of a pending cross-petition, was not a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken. (Decided under prior law) Wallace v. Haven, 278 Ky. 613 , 129 S.W.2d 153, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 478 ( Ky. 1939 ).

In action by lessor against insolvent coal mining company for rents and royalties, in which action labor and compensation claimants intervened, judgment fixing order of priority of all claims and directing a sale of the property was a final order and appealable, though judgment also provided that defendant could except to itemized list made on his property, and case was reserved on the docket for further proceedings; the matters not finally fixed were matters of administration and not of judicial decision. (Decided under prior law) Adkins v. Carol Mining Co., 281 Ky. 328 , 136 S.W.2d 32, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 40 ( Ky. 1940 ).

An order granting or refusing a writ of possession to a purchaser at judicial sale is a final order and may be appealed from. (Decided under prior law) Henderson v. Meadows, 290 Ky. 188 , 160 S.W.2d 588, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where land was sold at a judicial sale in the course of an action seeking to sell land and distribute the proceeds among heirs, and the purchaser, who was one of the heirs, became dissatisfied with the transaction and petitioned court to vacate the sale, an order vacating the sale was not a “final order” and thus, not appealable. (Decided under prior law) Keffer v. Keffer, 307 Ky. 831 , 212 S.W.2d 314, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 836 ( Ky. 1948 ).

15.—Redocketing Order.

Where complaint was dismissed and case stricken from the docket and sixteen months later a motion to redocket the case was sustained, an appeal from the order redocketing the case was not appealable order. (Decided under prior law) Evans Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Ousley, 388 S.W.2d 130, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 416 ( Ky. 1965 ).

16.Appeal.

There is no appeal as a matter of right to the Court of Appeals from an appellate decision of the Circuit Court since such review can only be had by a motion for discretionary review under this rule. Commonwealth v. Hurd, 612 S.W.2d 766, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

Subsection (5) of this section may hint of a review procedure but it would apply only in that a party aggrieved by the judgment of a Circuit Court on an appeal of an interlocutory order in a criminal case could seek discretionary review in the Court of Appeals to have the Circuit Court decision vacated as being beyond the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction. Tipton v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 239, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), overruled in part, Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 2004 ), abrogated in part, Commonwealth v. Lamberson, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 733 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2007).

Where defendant’s conviction in District Court was reversed in the Circuit Court, and state filed both notice of appeal and motion for discretionary review under CR 76.20, the state was not entitled to appeal as a matter of right in Court of Appeals where motion for discretionary appeal was denied, since Const. § 115 provides only for one appeal as a matter of right in each case, not one appeal by each party; thus appeal was properly dismissed. Commonwealth v. Hurd, 612 S.W.2d 766, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

The proper method of invoking the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in a judgment of the Circuit Court in a case appealed to it from District Court was governed by this section and not CR 73.02 and required that the party aggrieved by the decision of the Circuit Court petition the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari, since the Circuit Court was sitting as an appellate court when it rendered its ruling. Beard v. Commonwealth ex rel. Shaw, 891 S.W.2d 382, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals under CR 73.02 may not serve to transfer jurisdiction to an appellate court when a motion for a discretionary review was called for by the rules under CR 76.20 and the policy of substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of this section did not apply. Beard v. Commonwealth ex rel. Shaw, 891 S.W.2d 382, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Denial of writ of prohibition was proper since company could appeal, under Ky. Const., § 115 and KRS 22A.020(1), any contempt order issued by the trial court for breach of noncompetition order on substantive or jurisdictional grounds and did not show irreparable harm if the writ was not issued. Newell Enters. v. Bowling, 158 S.W.3d 750, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 2005 ).

Petition to prohibit possible sanctions for contempt stands on its own merits, and a writ of prohibition will not issue unless it is shown that the standard for the issuance of a writ of prohibition has been met. Newell Enters. v. Bowling, 158 S.W.3d 750, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 2005 ).

When appellant’s appointed counsel filed his appeal from a RCr 11.42 motion in the wrong court, it was error for the court of appeals to deny appellant’s motion for a belated appeal. When incompetence of counsel, especially state-appointed counsel, costs an indigent defendant a right of appeal under KRS 22A.020(1), that defendant ought to be entitled to a reinstated or belated appeal, even in collateral proceedings. Moore v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 2006 ).

17.—Commonwealth.

In Commonwealth v. Schumacher, 566 S.W.2d 762, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 524 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), the Court of Appeals determined that the requirement in subdivision (4)(b) of this section which procedurally required the Commonwealth’s attorney to get the permission of the Attorney General before appealing a case was unconstitutional because only the Supreme Court, under present law, has the authority to establish appellate procedure. The court did not say nor intend to suggest that the legislature could not give the Commonwealth the right to appeal under certain conditions; clearly, the legislature may and has. Commonwealth v. Evans, 645 S.W.2d 350, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 280 (Ky. Ct. App.), aff'd, 645 S.W.2d 346, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1982 ).

The Commonwealth could properly appeal from order transferring the venue of a criminal case even assuming such order was interlocutory. Commonwealth v. Evans, 645 S.W.2d 350, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 280 (Ky. Ct. App.), aff'd, 645 S.W.2d 346, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1982 ).

An appeal by the Commonwealth from a ruling of the Circuit Court refusing to admit certain prior testimony of an absent witness was not a certification of law, and therefore, the Court of Appeals had the jurisdiction to decide whether the evidence was properly denied admittance. Commonwealth v. Howard, 665 S.W.2d 320, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 475 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

KRS 22A.020(4) allows the Commonwealth to appeal a trial court’s order granting a new trial to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky; the Commonwealth’s appeal suspends the trial court’s order, and if the Court of Appeals concludes from a review of the record that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial, the Court of Appeals is required to reverse the order and reinstate the verdict. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 56 ( Ky. 2002 ).

Because neither defendant’s double jeopardy nor speedy trial rights would be violated by the Commonwealth’s good faith interlocutory appeal of a suppression order, staying defendant’s trial while the order was reviewed under CR 76.33 did not violate KRS 22A.020(4). Commonwealth v. Lamberson, 201 S.W.3d 497, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Commonwealth had a statutory right to appeal an order granting defendant’s motion to suppress. Commonwealth v. Parker, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 173 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011, sub. op., 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 996 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011).

In a case involving the suppression of evidence, an appeal filed by the Commonwealth was timely, even though it was inappropriate for review under the civil rule for altering or amending a judgment, because the Commonwealth forfeited its motion before the trial court with an alternative request for findings of fact and conclusions of law under a rule of criminal procedure; the motion for findings under the rule of criminal procedure was treated as a motion under the rules of civil procedure seeking findings of fact, thus tolling the appeal period. Parker v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Court of Appeals erred in reversing the dismissal of a case because the Commonwealth had no right to appeal the order of dismissal that it requested in order to obtain appellate review of two adverse and clearly interlocutory pretrial rulings, the order of dismissal was not an interlocutory order or an adverse decision or ruling, the dismissal discharged defendant from custody (or the obligations of his bond) and terminated the litigation, and any difficulty imposed by the two pretrial rulings became moot, were irrelevant to any actual case or controversy, and were simply matters for academic discourse. Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 770, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 627 ( Ky. 2016 ).

18.— County Attorney.

A County Attorney has the right to appeal an adverse decision or ruling in a criminal action from District to Circuit Court without the prior approval of the Attorney General. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 785 S.W.2d 67, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 10 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

19.Role of Attorney General.

The Attorney General’s role in reviewing appeals before they are docketed in the Court of Appeals is a purely administrative act, designed to eliminate frivolous, vexatious or meritless appeals; this section is a legislative assignment of an executive duty, not a judicial duty. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 785 S.W.2d 67, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 10 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

20.New Trial Order.

Although Court of Appeals correctly accepted Commonwealth’s appeal from trial court’s decision to grant a new trial on basis of newly-discovered evidence and was within its authority under this section to review issue presented, it should have limited its opinion to certifying the law and it had no authority to “set aside” the new trial order. Commonwealth v. Littrell, 677 S.W.2d 881, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 285 ( Ky. 1984 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 56 ( Ky. 2002 ).

21.Order Transferring Case.

An appeal could be taken by Commonwealth from order transferring case whether such appeal was or was not from a final judgment. (Decided under prior law) Commonwealth v. Cooper, 295 Ky. 247 , 173 S.W.2d 128, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1943 ).

22.Void Judgment.

Where no motion was made to dismiss appeal from a void judgment, Court of Appeals would entertain the appeal and declare such judgment void, for this would enable a party injured thereby to have the judgment removed from the record without injury to the adverse party who acquired no rights under the void judgment. (Decided under prior law) Epling v. Ratliff, 364 S.W.2d 327, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1963 ).

23.Divorce.

Under this section, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction for review by appeal or writ of certiorari from that portion of a final judgment, order or decree of a Circuit Court dissolving a marriage. Drake v. Drake, 809 S.W.2d 710, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 7 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

Arrearage arising out of a prior temporary maintenance order became reviewable when it was incorporated in a dissolution decree, which is final and reviewable. Calloway v. Calloway, 832 S.W.2d 890, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 140 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Mandamus is not available to attack a final judgment dissolving a marriage where direct appeal is proscribed by statute. Goldman v. Eichenholz, 851 S.W.2d 463, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 22 ( Ky. 1993 ), dismissed, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 680 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2002).

Even though there was generally no appeal allowed from a divorce action, an appeal was permitted if the divorce judgment was void. However, a motion to set aside a divorce decree under CR 60.02 based on the fact that a marriage had been annulled by the Roman Catholic Church was properly denied because the motion was untimely filed, there was no evidence of civil fraud, and constitutional reasons did not allow an interface between church and state law. Age v. Age, 340 S.W.3d 88, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 23 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Court of Appeals cannot reverse a judgment granting a divorce. (Decided under prior law) Irwin v. Irwin, 105 Ky. 632 , 49 S.W. 432, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1761 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 1 899 ); Shehan v. Shehan, 152 Ky. 1 91 , 153 S.W. 243, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 640 ( Ky. 191 3); Evans v. Evans, 247 Ky. 1, 56 S.W.2d 547, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 339 ( Ky. 1933 ); Hanks v. Hanks, 282 Ky. 236 , 138 S.W.2d 362, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 155 ( Ky. 1940 ); De Simone v. De Simone, 388 S.W.2d 591, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 439 ( Ky. 1965 ).

The Court of Appeals cannot review a judgment granting a divorce even though question of jurisdiction is involved. (Decided under prior law) Auxier v. Auxier, 151 Ky. 504 , 152 S.W. 573, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 531 (Ky.), modified, 155 Ky. 174 , 159 S.W. 678, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1913 ).

An appeal from an order refusing to set aside a judgment of divorce is not a direct appeal from a judgment of divorce, but a reversal of that order would have the effect of reversing the divorce decree, therefore Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction. (Decided under prior law) Gribben v. Gribben, 227 Ky. 96 , 11 S.W.2d 998, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 462 ( Ky. 1928 ); Bushong v. Bushong, 272 Ky. 474 , 114 S.W.2d 735, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1938 ); Winfrey v. Winfrey, 286 Ky. 245 , 150 S.W.2d 689, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Although divorce judgment was obtained pursuant to void property settlement agreement, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to disturb the judgment, but Court has jurisdiction to consider validity of agreement in a proceeding to enforce it, and to order a proper settlement. (Decided under prior law) Dodd v. Dodd, 278 Ky. 662 , 129 S.W.2d 166, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 481 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where lower court dismissed motion to set aside judgment granting divorce, made on grounds of fraud in taking depositions, Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to review or reverse, since only fraud alleged was as to procedural, and not jurisdictional, matters. (Decided under prior law) Winfrey v. Winfrey, 286 Ky. 245 , 150 S.W.2d 689, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1941 ).

The Court of Appeals could not interfere with decree of divorce to wife by trial court, although on first appeal the appellate court indicated husband should have been granted the divorce. (Decided under prior law) Whaley v. Whaley, 289 Ky. 241 , 158 S.W.2d 416, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 526 ( Ky. 1942 ).

It is only where a divorce judgment is void that an appeal may be prosecuted. (Decided under prior law) Self v. Self, 293 Ky. 255 , 168 S.W.2d 743, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Judgment of divorce based upon a finding that the plaintiff has the necessary residence, although erroneous, is not void and is not appealable. (Decided under prior law) Self v. Self, 293 Ky. 255 , 168 S.W.2d 743, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Former statute forbade the reversal by the Court of Appeals of a judgment granting a decree of divorce, but the court could review the evidence to determine whether the judgment was correct in all other respects. (Decided under prior law) Smith v. Smith, 297 Ky. 395 , 180 S.W.2d 275, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 734 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Court of Appeals has power to reverse a judgment of divorce to the extent that it denies to the wife a restoration of her maiden name. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 300 Ky. 209 , 187 S.W.2d 804, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 797 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Judgment of divorce could not be reversed on ground that credibility of witnesses was not established as required by KRS 403.030 (repealed), since Court of Appeals has no power to reverse a judgment granting a divorce. (Decided under prior law) Philpot v. Philpot, 300 Ky. 114 , 188 S.W.2d 107, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 512 ( Ky. 1945 ).

When a divorce decree is erroneously granted, the error may be considered in a determination of the chancellor’s judgment in respect to alimony. (Decided under prior law) Fields v. Fields, 303 Ky. 624 , 198 S.W.2d 298, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 898 ( Ky. 1946 ).

When divorce judgment is void an appeal may be prosecuted to Court of Appeals but where judgment is only erroneous, even in jurisdictional matters, no appeal lies. (Decided under prior law) Weintraub v. Murphy, 240 S.W.2d 594, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 985 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where husband in action for divorce pleaded Nevada divorce decree as defense and wife alleged husband had not established bona fide domicile in Nevada, appeal to Court of Appeals was not appeal from judgment granting divorce but was appeal from judgment dismissing wife’s action on ground that Nevada decree was entitled to full faith and credit, and court could assume jurisdiction. (Decided under prior law) Taylor v. Taylor, 242 S.W.2d 747, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1068 ( Ky. 1951 ).

While the Court of Appeals may not reverse a judgment granting a divorce, it may reverse a judgment refusing to grant a divorce. (Decided under prior law) West v. West, 309 S.W.2d 341, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 345 ( Ky. 1958 ).

In action to set aside judgment granting divorce where there was question of jurisdiction and case was referred to commissioner who reported that residence of the parties was such as to confer jurisdiction, appeal based on alleged procedural irregularity that appellant was not notified of filing of commissioner’s report must fail for such irregularity could not render the judgment void and Court of Appeals does not have authority to review whether the granting of a divorce is erroneous. (Decided under prior law) Elswick v. Elswick, 322 S.W.2d 129, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 303 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Where the question of jurisdiction in a divorce action has been raised in the lower court and there is any evidence to show the jurisdictional residence of the parties, the lower court’s judgment granting a divorce based upon a determination that it has jurisdiction is not void and cannot be questioned on appeal regardless of the fact that the determination may be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and be clearly erroneous. (Decided under prior law) Elswick v. Elswick, 322 S.W.2d 129, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 303 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Notwithstanding provision of former section denying jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to reverse a judgment of divorce, it had jurisdiction to direct that a judgment of divorce from bed and board be set aside and an absolute divorce granted. (Decided under prior law)Dunning v. Dunning, 325 S.W.2d 315, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Since former section specifically denied the right of appeal from the portion of a judgment granting a divorce, Court of Appeals could not reverse part of judgment that granted a divorce to both husband and wife even though it was doubtful of the propriety of such judgment. (Decided under prior law) Goetz v. Goetz, 341 S.W.2d 249, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 73 ( Ky. 1960 ).

While decree as to custody of children in divorce action is not final in the sense that trial court cannot change it, it is an appealable order. Gates v. Gates, 412 S.W.2d 223, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 406 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Where the appellant contended that the trial court erred in granting a divorce to the appellee instead of granting it to the appellant, the contention could not be considered on the appeal. (Decided under prior law) Horn v. Horn, 430 S.W.2d 342, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where a judgment in favor of the wife was granted on her counterclaim for divorce but the judgment was actually submitted by counsel for the husband with notice to the wife and her counsel, the wife was not entitled to have the judgment of divorce set aside even though she had not authorized her counsel to obtain a final divorce. (Decided under prior law) Greenwell v. Greenwell, 449 S.W.2d 21, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Since there is no appeal from that portion of a judgment granting a divorce, the remedy of prohibition will be granted to compel a judge to disqualify. (Decided under prior law) Howerton v. Price, 449 S.W.2d 746, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 470 ( Ky. 1970 ).

The Court of Appeals is without authority to reverse that portion of a judgment granting a divorce even if it is felt that the divorce was granted to the wrong person. Gernert v. Gernert, 457 S.W.2d 831, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1970 ).

24.—Alimony, Custody, Maintenance.

Although the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review a judgment granting a divorce it may review the evidence to determine if the judgment was proper in other respects, such as awarding alimony, custody of children and attorney fees. (Decided under prior law) Tuggles v. Tuggles, 30 S.W. 875, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 221 (1895); Garrett v. Garrett, 44 S.W. 112, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1674 (1898); Williams v. Williams, 136 Ky. 71 , 123 S.W. 337, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1909 ); Logan v. Logan, 171 Ky. 115 , 188 S.W. 301, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 305 ( Ky. 1916 ); Wesley v. Wesley, 181 Ky. 135 , 204 S.W. 165, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 522 ( Ky. 1918 ); Axton v. Axton, 182 Ky. 286 , 206 S.W. 480, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 360 ( Ky. 1918 ), overruled in part, Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v. Hulette, 293 S.W.2d 458, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1956 ); Morris v. Morris, 193 Ky. 18 9, 235 S.W. 358, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 207 ( Ky. 1921 ); Miles v. Miles, 203 Ky. 431 , 262 S.W. 576, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 920 ( Ky. 1924 ); Lewis v. Lewis, 224 Ky. 18 , 4 S.W.2d 1106, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 521 ( Ky. 1928 ); Miller v. Miller, 229 Ky. 436 , 17 S.W.2d 412, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 783 ( Ky. 1929 ); Colyer v. Colyer, 233 Ky. 752 , 26 S.W.2d 511, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 613 ( Ky. 1930 ); Jones v. Jones, 239 Ky. 153 , 39 S.W.2d 262, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 76 2 ( Ky. 1931 ); Farnau v. Farnau, 241 Ky. 530 , 44 S.W.2d 531, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 1931 ); Arms v. Arms, 246 Ky. 827 , 56 S.W.2d 536, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1933 ); Hartkemeier v. Hartkemeier, 248 Ky. 803 , 59 S.W.2d 1014, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1933 ); Walden v. Walden, 250 Ky. 379 , 63 S.W.2d 290, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 697 (Ky. 1933); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 254 Ky. 285 , 71 S.W.2d 624, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1934 ); Glenn v. Glenn, 255 Ky. 422 , 74 S.W.2d 472, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1934 ); Polivick v. Polivick, 259 Ky. 653 , 83 S.W.2d 8, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 362 ( Ky. 1935 ); Partin v. Partin, 270 Ky. 596 , 110 S.W.2d 298, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 125 ( Ky. 1937 ); Land v. Land, 280 Ky. 122 , 132 S.W.2d 742, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 76 ( Ky. 1939 ); Winfrey v. Winfrey, 286 Ky. 245 , 150 S.W.2d 689, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1941 ); Sowders v. Sowders, 286 Ky. 269 , 150 S.W.2d 903, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 263 ( Ky. 1941 ); Clay v. Clay, 301 Ky. 547 , 191 S.W.2d 819, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 742 ( Ky. 1945 ); Witt v. Witt, 307 S.W.2d 1, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1957 ); Kivett v. Kivett, 312 S.W.2d 884, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 414 ( Ky. 1958 ); Hinton v. Hinton, 377 S.W.2d 888, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 506 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Equity will not permit a judgment granting wife a divorce which was procured by husband’s fraud to defeat wife’s subsequent action for alimony, as no appeal would lie from the judgment. (Decided under prior law) Asher v. Asher, 249 Ky. 215 , 60 S.W.2d 592, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 504 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Court of Appeals is without power to relieve husband of alimony payments provided for in agreed judgment, where neither fraud nor want of consent was shown. (Decided under prior law) Hargis v. Hargis, 252 Ky. 198 , 66 S.W.2d 59, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 1001 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Although the Court of Appeals has no power to reverse a judgment granting a divorce, it may review the evidence for the purpose of determining the propriety of a judgment wherein alimony has been refused, 99d may review a judgment to determine whether alimony was properly denied or awarded. (Decided under prior law)Rayburn v. Rayburn, 300 Ky. 209 , 187 S.W.2d 804, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 797 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Although no appeal will lie from the granting of a divorce one will lie for the refusal to grant alimony to a defendant wife and alimony may be granted in the Court of Appeals to a wife found at fault in the Circuit Court. (Decided under prior law)Cooper v. Cooper, 314 Ky. 413 , 234 S.W.2d 658, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1043 ( Ky. 1950 ).

An adjudication of the right to have child maintenance payments increased is reviewable by the Court of Appeals without regard to the amount involved, because it involves more than the requirement to pay money. (Decided under prior law)Stone v. Stone, 275 S.W.2d 910, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1955 ), overruling in part Littleton v. Littleton, 295 Ky. 720 , 175 S.W.2d 502, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 341 (1943), overruled, Stone v. Stone, 275 S.W.2d 910, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1955 ), and Noble v. Noble, 310 Ky. 726 , 221 S.W.2d 654, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1001 ( Ky. 1949 ), overruled, Stone v. Stone, 275 S.W.2d 910, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 391 (Ky. 1955).

25.Criminal Cases.

After the record is docketed in the Court of Appeals and the motion for appeal is filed, an appeal on motion is considered the same as an appeal as a matter of right. (Decided under prior law) Adkins v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 417, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where the punishment may involve a jail sentence and the defendant has been placed in jeopardy, the Commonwealth is not entitled to a new trial. (Decided under prior law) Commonwealth v. Allen, 441 S.W.2d 424, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Jeopardy attaches at the swearing of the first witness. (Decided under prior law)Commonwealth v. Lewis, 548 S.W.2d 509, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1977 ).

Commonwealth’s appeal of the order granting defendant’s motion to suppress had to be dismissed because it was untimely; defendant’s counsel made the Commonwealth aware of the fact that its motion to reconsider was improper, but the Commonwealth chose to press forward without so much as even attempting to file a protective notice of appeal. Commonwealth v. Robertson, 578 S.W.3d 368, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

26.—Assistance of Counsel in Prosecution of Appeal.

Appellate review, as such in criminal cases is not a constitutional right, but when a statute such as former section authorizes an original appeal as a matter of right, the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment guarantees an indigent defendant the assistance of counsel in prosecuting it. (Decided under prior law) McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1963 ); Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 776, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 376 ( Ky. 1969 ).

27.—Grounds for Appeal.

Where the circumstances of representation of the defendant by his employed counsel on the trial level were not such as to shock the conscience of the court or render the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice, the ground urged concerning lack of adequate representation by counsel was without merit. (Decided under prior law) Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 776, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 376 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Although ordinarily the Court of Appeals will not certify the law on an appeal from a directed verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, it did so where the case involved aiding and abetting another in the sale of unregistered securities. (Decided under prior law)Commonwealth v. Allen, 441 S.W.2d 424, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1969 ).

28.—Misdemeanors.

In misdemeanor cases punishable by fine alone the Commonwealth may appeal from a judgment of acquittal, and, upon reversal thereof, have a new trial notwithstanding the former verdict and judgment of acquittal. (Decided under prior law) Commonwealth v. Devine, 396 S.W.2d 60, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1965 ).

In misdemeanor cases where the punishment is by a fine only, the Commonwealth may have a reversal and a new trial should the law and facts authorize such course. (Decided under prior law) Commonwealth v. Allen, 441 S.W.2d 424, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1969 ).

It is only in misdemeanor cases where the punishment is by fine alone that the Commonwealth may have the law certified and obtain reversal for a new trial. (Decided under prior law) Commonwealth v. Wallace, 486 S.W.2d 61, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 109 ( Ky. 1972 ), overruled in part, Sutton v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 879, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1981 ).

29.—Recusals.

Notice of appeal naming only an order denying a motion to recuse, and not a final judgment, was fatally defective as neither the rule of substantial compliance nor its subsidiary rule of relation forward could salvage such a notice of appeal. Cassetty v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.3d 129, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 328 ( Ky. 2016 ).

Cited in:

Yocom v. United States Steel Corp., 566 S.W.2d 160, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 914 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Gettys, 610 S.W.2d 899, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Perry County Fiscal Court v. Commonwealth, 674 S.W.2d 954, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1984 ); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1986 ); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 753 S.W.2d 872, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Commonwealth v. Bass, 777 S.W.2d 916, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 1989 ); Commonwealth v. Erickson, 132 S.W.3d 884, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Billingsley v. Commonwealth, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 162 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 2009 ); Commonwealth v. Newkirk, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 180 (Nov. 21, 2014); Commonwealth v. Terrell, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 69 (Apr. 2, 2015); Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1.Appeal.

Unpublished decision: Due to a 2003 amendment to KRS 22A.020 , a circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal of a family court order removing a minor from the custody of his maternal great-grandmother and giving custody to his paternal grandmother. Thorn v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 560, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 265 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

Unpublished decision: Legislative intent that KRS 620.155 only applied to counties without a family court resolved any conflict between KRS 22A.020 and KRS 620.155 regarding whether a circuit court or the court of appeals had jurisdiction of an appeal from a family court order Thorn v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 560, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 265 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Adoption, appeal from Circuit Court, KRS 199.560 .

Air pollution control district, appeal from Circuit Court judgment reviewing division of hearing board, KRS 77.305 .

Allotment of dower, appeal from judgment regarding, KRS 381.135 .

Civil cases, appeals, 72.01 to 76.46.

Claims, Board of, appeal from judgment of Circuit Court based on award of, KRS 44.150 .

Criminal cases, appeals, RCr. 12.02 to 12.82.

Death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for twenty years or more, appeal from sentence of, Const., § 110.

Election contests and recounts, appeals in, KRS 120.075 , 120.165 , 120.270 , 120.300 .

Habeas corpus proceeding, appeal from, KRS 419.130 .

Land jointly held, division of, appeal from judgment regarding, KRS 381.135 .

Police or firemen of fourth-class or fifth-class city, when appeal allowed in case of discipline or removal, KRS 95.766 .

Sewer construction district, appeal from decision concerning establishment of, KRS 76.305 .

Statutory limitation on time for taking appeal, docketing of in Court of Appeals within time specified, KRS 446.190 .

Zoning and planning cases, appeals in, KRS 100.347 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Preston, Video Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, volume 52, No. 2, Spring 1988 Ky. Bench & B. 11.

Family Court: Understanding Family Court in Kentucky, Vol. 68, No.6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 7.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Collier, Criminal Procedure, 68 Ky. L.J. 655 (1979-1980).

Kentucky Law Survey, Fortune, Criminal Rules, 70 Ky. L.J. 395 (1981-82).

Note, Judicial v. Legislative Power in Kentucky: A “Comity” of Errors, 71 Ky. L.J. 829 (1982-83).

Gillig, Kentucky Post-Conviction Remedies and the Judicial Development of Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42, 83 Ky. L.J. 265 (1994-95).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Schechter, Survey of Kentucky Family Law Decisions Rendered In 1993, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 387 (1994).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, Form 253.30.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Family Court, § 5.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Criminal Appeals, § 104.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Dissolution Decree, §§ 24.27, 24.29.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Support of Children (On Dissolution), § 27.15.

22A.030. Facilities.

  1. The administrative director of the courts shall provide for such physical facilities as are available for the operation of the Court of Appeals, and may utilize the services of the Finance and Administration Cabinet in securing such facilities.
  2. The Court of Appeals may use any public property of, or any property leased or rented to, the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions for the holding of court and for its ancillary functions upon proper agreement with the applicable authorities.
  3. The Court of Appeals may use any federal courtroom or other facility for the holding of court and for its ancillary functions upon proper agreement with the applicable authorities.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 70, § 4, effective March 23, 1976.

22A.040. Clerk — Appointment — Compensation — Oath — Bond — Assistants — Fee schedule — Seal — Annual audit.

  1. The clerk of the Court of Appeals shall be appointed by the court to serve at its pleasure. The annual salary of the clerk shall be fixed by the Supreme Court not to exceed twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000).
  2. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the clerk shall take the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution.
  3. The clerk shall perform such duties as the Court of Appeals may assign, and shall be bonded to the Commonwealth, for faithful performance of duty, in such manner and in an amount not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as the Supreme Court shall determine.
  4. The clerk may appoint assistants in the number and at the salaries fixed by the Supreme Court.
  5. The Court of Appeals shall adopt a seal. The clerk shall be the keeper of the seal and shall use it upon such documents as the Court of Appeals may require.
  6. A fee schedule for services rendered by the clerk shall be fixed by rule of the Supreme Court, except that charges to litigants for the reproduction of appellate records and briefs shall be fixed and administered by the clerk. All fees collected by the clerk shall be remitted to the State Treasury.
  7. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall audit the financial accounts of the clerk at least once every year.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 70, § 5, effective March 23, 1976.

22A.050. Enforcement of mandates.

The Court of Appeals may enforce its mandates by fine or imprisonment, or both.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 70, § 6, effective March 23, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Nullification.

Where the Court of Appeals ruled that a judicial sale to the second highest bidder should be set aside and the property sold to the first highest bidder, and upon the default of the first highest bidder to be readvertised and resold, the mere allegation that the first highest bidder acted in bad faith and never intended to make good its bid would not be sufficient to nullify the resale mandate. (Decided under prior law) E'Town Shopping Center, Inc. v. Holbert, 452 S.W.2d 396, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 355 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Cited:

Covington v. Court of Justice, 784 S.W.2d 180, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1990 ).

22A.060. Reversal or modification of judgment — Procedure for appellate review.

  1. A judgment, order or decree of a lower court may be reversed, modified or set aside by the Court of Appeals for errors appearing in the record.
  2. The method of bringing a judgment, order or decree of a lower court to the Court of Appeals for review shall be established by Supreme Court rule. The procedures for appellate review shall be established by the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure and other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 70, § 7, effective March 23, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Power of Appellate Jurisdiction.

Within limits prescribed by statutes, appellate jurisdiction is the power and authority to review, revise, correct or affirm decisions of an inferior court, and more particularly to exercise the same judicial power which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction. (Decided under prior law)Copley v. Craft, 341 S.W.2d 70, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1960 ).

2.Reversal.

In proceeding contesting will on ground of undue influence where jury held that will was obtained by undue influence, Court of Appeals’ action in reversing trial court was not a usurping of the right of trial by jury or the discretionary power of the Circuit Court for former Const., § 110 created and conferred appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals and former law expressly authorized a reversal of a judgment for errors appearing in the record and the Court of Appeals in performance of its duty decided that as a matter of law evidence present in the trial court to establish undue influence was not sufficient to establish the allegation. (Decided under prior law)Copley v. Craft, 341 S.W.2d 70, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1960 ).

3.Correction of Erroneous Judgment.

In an action in which judgment was rendered against defendants, husband and wife, for amount of notes assumed by wife in purchase of real estate, and husband made no defense and did not file motion in lower court for a new trial or to vacate the judgment, the Court of Appeals had authority to correct the erroneous judgment where the pleadings did not support it. (Decided under prior law)Samuels v. Weikel, 195 Ky. 552 , 242 S.W. 835, 242 S.W. 836, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 346 ( Ky. 1922 ).

4.Vacation.

Where plaintiff recovered judgment under KRS 418.005 against the surety on a bond given in accordance with KRS 425.305 (repealed), the court erred in granting, during the subsequent term, the surety’s motion to set aside the judgment against him, the proper remedy for the surety being an action to vacate the judgment. (Decided under prior law)Malnowski v. Stacy, 231 Ky. 23 , 20 S.W.2d 1008, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1929 ).

5.Shock Probation.

Former KRS 23.035 that governed reversal, vacation or modification of judgments was subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure which provided for retention of a judgment for a period of 10 days and the court could not utilize the provisions of shock probation as provided by KRS 439.265 within this 10-day period. (Decided under prior law)Commonwealth ex rel. Molloy v. Meade, 554 S.W.2d 399, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Cited:

Granville & Nutter Shoe Co. v. Florsheim Shoe Co., 569 S.W.2d 721, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 572 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

22A.070. Direction of process.

The original or final process of the Court of Appeals may be directed to the sheriff of any county.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 70, § 8, effective March 23, 1976.

CHAPTER 23 Circuit Courts Generally [Repealed]

23.010. Court of record — Original civil jurisdiction — Judge conservator of the peace. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (966) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978. For present law, see KRS 23A.010 .

23.020. Franklin Circuit Court — Venue in revenue and fiscal cases. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (340a-2, 976, 4171, 4182, 4233) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.030. Appellate civil jurisdiction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (978) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978. For present law, see KRS 23A.080 .

23.032. Appeal from fine or imprisonment — Appeals by city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 2; 1964, ch. 72, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978. For present law, see KRS 23A.080 .

23.035. Reversal, vacation or modification of judgments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 513: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.040. Circuit court districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (963: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 209, §§ 1, 2; 1948, ch. 212, §§ 1, 2; 1950, ch. 143, §§ 1, 2; 1950, ch. 178, §§ 1, 2; 1954, ch. 71, § 1; 1954, ch. 116, §§ 1 to 4; 1956, ch. 59, §§ 1 to 3; 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 1; 1960, ch. 39, § 4; 1960, ch. 170; 1962, ch. 270, §§ 1 to 3; 1968, ch. 152, § 7; 1970, chs. 71, 167; 1972, ch. 177, §§ 1, 2, 6, 7; 1974, ch. 17, §§ 1(1), (2), 2(1),(2); 1976, ch. 45, §§ 1 to 4; 1976, ch. 62, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective March 19, 1977. For present law, see KRS 23A.020 .

23.045. Court of Appeals to establish circuit court terms. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 201, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 18) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.050. Terms of court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (965 to 965-38: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 29, § 1; 1942, ch. 38, §§ 1, 2; 1942, ch. 187, §§ 1, 2; 1942 ch. 191, §§ 1, 2; 1942, ch. 194, §§ 1, 2; 1946, ch. 32; 1946, ch. 59; 1946, ch. 105; 1946, ch. 108; 1948, ch. 7, § 1; 1948, ch. 209, § 5; 1948, ch. 212, § 5; 1950, ch. 143, § 5; 1950, ch. 178, § 5; 1950, ch. 200, § 1; 1952, ch. 3; 1952, ch. 7, § 1; 1952, ch. 13; 1952, ch. 22, § 1; 1952, ch. 91; 1952, ch. 100, § 1; 1952, ch. 105, § 1; 1952, ch. 142, § 1; 1954, ch. 71, §§ 3, 5; 1954, ch. 93, § 1; 1954, ch. 116, § 9; 1954, ch. 128, § 1; 1954, ch. 210, § 1; 1956, ch. 44, § 1; 1956, ch. 55, § 1; 1956, ch. 59, §§ 6, 7, 8; 1956, ch. 83, § 1; 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 2; 1956 (4th Ex. Sess.), ch. 8, §§ 1, 2; 1958, ch. 29; 1958, ch. 74; 1958, ch. 87; 1958, ch. 88; 1960, ch. 39, §§ 5, 6; 1960, ch. 70; 1960, ch. 170, § 5; 1960, ch. 190; 1960, ch. 201, § 1; 1960, ch. 230; 1962, ch. 54; 1962, ch. 237; 1962, ch. 247, § 1; 1962, ch. 270, § 8; 1962, ch. 274; 1962, ch. 277) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 201, § 2.

23.055. Supreme court to supervise circuit court dockets. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 200, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 19) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.060. Court to be held at more than one place in certain counties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (963d-1, 963e-1, 963e-6) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.070. Juries and conduct of court when held at more than one place. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (963d-1, 963e-2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.080. Civil and criminal cases, where tried when court held at more than one place. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (963d-1, 963e-3, 963e-4) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

23.085. Places of holding court in certain counties containing only fourth-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1964, ch. 197, §§ 1-4; 1970, ch. 141, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.090. Fiscal court to provide court facilities — Order dividing terms — Assignment of cases — Acquisition of quarters in city by fiscal court for courts and county purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (963d-1, 963e-5: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 160; 1964, ch. 58, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.091. Fiscal court and urban-county governing body to furnish facilities and financial support until January 1, 1978. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1976, ch. 1, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.095. National and state flags to be provided for each courtroom — Size. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1964, ch. 20) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.100. Election to determine whether court to be held at place other than county seat. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (963e-7) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.110. Extension of term — Special terms — When held — How called — Notification. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-13: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 69; 1976, ch. 62, § 20) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.120. When special term mandatory — Chief justice may call — Notice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-12: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 62, § 21) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.125. Motion day to be established by rule — Precedence over assigned juridical day. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 4; 1976, ch. 62, § 22) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.130. Continuance of undisposed business. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (974) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.140. No discontinuance on failure to sit. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (975) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.145. Defendant confined on misdemeanor charge, trial by county judge — Transfer — Proceedings after judgment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1073-1076: reenacted by Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 57) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.150. Orders and judgments in vacation or in chambers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (964b-1: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 45; 1976, ch. 62, § 23) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.160. When criminal and penal cases heard. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-13: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 95) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.170. Oath of circuit judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (972) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.180. Judges’ commissions — Appointment of special judges — Record of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-10, 973) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.190. Successor of judge may sign orders. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (977) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

23.200. Salary of judges. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-8, 4357-5) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

23.210. Salary may be supplemented. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (979a-1, 979a-2, 1018, 1018a-1, 1019, 1019b-9, 1020a-1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

23.215. Miscellaneous expense allowance for judges. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1948, ch. 61, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

23.220. Circuit judges to act as special judges — Commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-1, 971-8: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 133, § 1), was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978. For present law, see KRS 26A.020 .

23.230. Special judge by agreement if regular judge absent or cannot preside, or office is vacant — Designation of special judge by chief justice of Supreme Court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-6, 971-7: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 35; 1954, ch. 133, § 2; 1976, ch. 62, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491. For present law, see KRS 26A.020 .

23.240. Designation of special judge by Chief Justice in courts not of continuous session. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-2, 971-4) was repealed by Acts 1954, ch. 133, § 4.

23.250. Designation of special judge by Chief Justice in courts of continuous session. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-3) was repealed by Acts 1954, ch. 133, § 4.

23.260. Special judge for special term. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-12, 971-13: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 62, § 25) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

23.270. Refusal of circuit judge to act — Effect. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-14: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 62, § 26) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.280. Clerks to notify chief justice of terms — Roster to be kept. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-11: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 62, § 27) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

23.290. Pay for special judges — Approval of claims. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (971-5, 971-7, 971-10: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 123, §§ 6, 29; 1964, ch. 151; 1976, ch. 62, § 28) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

23.300. Special circuit judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 1; 1960, ch. 166, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

23.310. Eligibility of regular circuit judges for appointment as special circuit judges; contributions to special circuit judge fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

23.320. Application for appointment as special circuit judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

23.330. Duties of special circuit judges; prohibited activity; removal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

23.340. Compensation of special circuit judges; expense allowance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

23.350. Special circuit judge fund; contributions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 6; 1960, ch. 166, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

23.360. Committee to control and manage fund; appoinment, terms, vacancies, chairman, meetings, expenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

23.370. Investment of fund; pro rata reduction of allowances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 8; 1960, ch. 166, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

23.380. Refund of contributions to defeated candidate for re-election as circuit judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 83, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 9, § 9.

CHAPTER 23A Circuit Court

23A.010. Jurisdiction of Circuit Court — Court of record and of continuous session.

  1. The Circuit Court is a court of general jurisdiction; it has original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not exclusively vested in some other court.
  2. The Circuit Court has appellate jurisdiction as specified in this chapter.
  3. The Circuit Court is a court of record and of continuous session.
  4. The Circuit Court may be authorized by law to review the actions or decisions of administrative agencies, special districts or boards. Such review shall not constitute an appeal but an original action.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 475, effective January 2, 1978; 1996, ch. 40, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 66, § 13, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.In General.

The Circuit Court has jurisdiction of all matters, both in law and equity, of which jurisdiction is not exclusively delegated to some other tribunal, and no statute should be construed to divest it of jurisdiction of any matter unless it is in express terms or clearly so provided. (Decided under prior law)Commonwealth v. Prall, 141 Ky. 560 , 133 S.W. 217 ( Ky. 1911 ).

Court has jurisdiction if the proper parties are before the court and present to it a controversy which the court has authority to decide, and a decision appropriate to that question, though erroneous, is within its jurisdiction. (Decided under prior law)Covington Trust Co. v. Owens, 278 Ky. 695 , 129 S.W.2d 186, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 486 ( Ky. 1939 ).

2.Jurisdiction.

When representation by public defender of suspect in police custody had been requested by family member, there existed justiciable cause, by way of the right created by RCr 2.14, sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the state Circuit Court, even prior to an indictment, under Const., § 112(5) and subsection (1) of this section to issue an order requiring police officers to cease questioning of the suspect and allow access to an attorney. West v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 338, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1994 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Terrell, 464 S.W.3d 495, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Generally, state courts of general jurisdiction have in rem subject matter jurisdiction over real property in the state. While a partition action is in the nature of an in rem proceeding, it also has characteristics of a quasi in rem proceeding because it deals with the title to realty and operates as to the parties in the proceeding. Accordingly, a partition action requires both in rem subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. Hisle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 258 S.W.3d 422, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 27 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

For the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, proof of damages is not required. Jackson v. Beattyville Water Dep't, 278 S.W.3d 633, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Cemetery owner’s complaint and supplemental interrogatory answers, which set out damages allegedly caused by a water department to the cemetery that exceeded $4,000, satisfied the jurisdictional requirements under KRS chs. 23A and 24A for bringing suit in Circuit Court; the damage amount did not have to be proven to establish jurisdiction. Jackson v. Beattyville Water Dep't, 278 S.W.3d 633, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Incumbent was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because a candidate's declaratory judgment action was not a challenge to his bona fides, but was a challenge to the statute that prevented him from being a bona fide candidate, the incumbent failed to satisfy the threshold criteria for obtaining relief by an original action, and there was no sufficient showing that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or acted erroneously within its jurisdiction to the incumbent's irreparable detriment. Davis v. Wingate, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 147 (Ky. Ct. App. June 10, 2014), aff'd, 437 S.W.3d 720, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 352 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Court of appeals erred in granting a health care plan's petition for a writ prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing an order staying discovery in declaratory judgment litigation because the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction since the award of partial summary judgment and the appeal did not implicate whether it had authority to hear the case. the underlying claims related to the plan's action for ascertaining its right to an early termination of a Medicaid contract. Commonwealth v. Wingate, 460 S.W.3d 843, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 16 ( Ky. 2015 ), modified, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1703 (Ky. May 14, 2015).

3.Criminal Jurisdiction.

Where jurisdiction initially attached in the Circuit Court, it was not lost when that court, during the course of the trial, dismissed one felony count of a three-count indictment; jurisdiction having attached by reason of the felony charge was not divested by its final determination. Broughton v. Commonwealth, 596 S.W.2d 22, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Entry of a guilty plea did not preclude the consideration of whether a transfer order in a juvenile case was facially invalid, and a waiver rule did not apply to a facially insufficient transfer order. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 11, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 2012 ).

4.Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Both federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements, particularly agreements to arbitrate. (Decided under prior law)Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. United Brick & Clay Workers, 339 S.W.2d 933, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 492 ( Ky. 1960 ).

5.Equity.

Decision on the facts in suit in equity, where parties agreed court should try issues of fact, must be given same consideration as verdict of properly instructed jury and will not be disturbed unless palpably against weight of evidence. (Decided under prior law)Hagman v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 214 Ky. 56 , 282 S.W. 1112, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1926 ); Horlander v. Owensboro, 289 Ky. 181 , 158 S.W.2d 418, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 527 ( Ky. 1942 ).

6.Injunction.

Although the Circuit Court had original jurisdiction of an action for injunction, it had no right to entertain such a case on appeal from a court that had no jurisdiction. (Decided under prior law) Brady v. Brannon, 134 Ky. 769 , 121 S.W. 679, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 438 ( Ky. 1909 ).

The Circuit Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine injunction suit brought to prevent police judge and other city officials from enforcing license tax ordinance against appellee and from arresting and trying him for alleged violations thereof. (Decided under prior law) Mayfield v. Reed, 278 Ky. 5 , 127 S.W.2d 847, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Circuit Court had jurisdiction of action against city and officers thereof for declaration of rights and injunction against prosecution of plaintiff for violating city ordinance. (Decided under prior law) Harrodsburg v. Southern R. Co., 278 Ky. 10 , 128 S.W.2d 233, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Circuit Courts, in considering applications for injunctions, have discretion not only with respect to whether the injunction shall be granted, but also as to when it shall take effect if granted, including the right to impose conditions on which the granting depends. (Decided under prior law) Gregory v. Crain, 291 Ky. 194 , 163 S.W.2d 289, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 187 ( Ky. 194 2 ).

7.Lien.

Where a creditor has filed suit in a state court to enforce a lien four months before the debtor is adjudged a bankrupt, the creditor may proceed with the action until its termination free from and independent of the bankruptcy court, but the trustee may intervene to take any surplus proceeds after the plaintiff has satisfied his lien. (Decided under prior law) Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. McEuen, 281 Ky. 113 , 134 S.W.2d 1012, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 22 ( Ky. 1939 ).

8.Review of Administrative Decisions.

The review which subsection (4) of this section provides is discretionary and not every administrative ruling is subject to attack in the courts. Taxpayer's Action Group v. Madison County Bd. of Elections, 652 S.W.2d 666, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 294 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

The “saving statute” (KRS 413.270 ) was applicable to actions for review/appeal to the Circuit Court from administrative agencies because, under subsection (4) of this section, an appeal to the Circuit Court from an order of an administrative agency is not a true appeal but rather an original action. Jent v. Commonwealth, Natural Resources & Envtl. Protection Cabinet, 862 S.W.2d 318, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 123 ( Ky. 1993 ).

KRS 23A.010 , providing for judicial review of a metro government’s licensing decision, did not guarantee prompt judicial determination within any particular period of time, and without such, or the allowing of contested speech during the appeal period, adult entertainment operators were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional challenge of a local ordinance and thus were entitled to injunctive relief. Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't, 252 F. Supp. 2d 406, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4444 (W.D. Ky. 2003 ), amended, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13025 (W.D. Ky. July 18, 2003).

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure applied to an action seeking review of a Public Service Commission order; while a builder seeking review of a commission order erred by directing service of process to incorrect parties, the summonses nevertheless issued in good faith, and since the action was otherwise timely commenced, a trial court’s dismissal of the action was improper and was reversed. Arlinghaus Builders v. Ky. PSC, 142 S.W.3d 693, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 342 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

In this Open Records Act action, the order was reversed in part because the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conclude the university violated the Open Meetings Act where neither party invoked the circuit court’s jurisdiction to enforce provisions. Univ. of Ky. v. Hatemi, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 114 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2021).

9.Original Action in Circuit Court.

Defendants were not left without adequate remedy by dismissal of direct appeal from fiscal court to Circuit Court, since this section provides for original actions in Circuit Court to review actions by fiscal court. Varney v. Varney, 609 S.W.2d 704, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 398 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

10.Presumption of Regularity.

It is presumed that the Circuit Court has performed its duty and followed the mandatory requirements enjoined upon it by law and the mere failure of its record to show such affirmative steps and actions will not be allowed to overcome that presumption; the burden is cast on the one complaining of noncompliances to prove the noncompliance. (Decided under prior law) Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 370 , 130 S.W.2d 764, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1939 ).

11.Subjects Within Jurisdiction.

Circuit Court had jurisdiction, in action by county to cancel a bond issue, to cancel the bonds, to allow a fee in favor of defending counsel whose services were rendered for all defendants as represented by those actually served, and to fix and enforce a lien on the bonds of the defendants for that fee. (Decided under prior law) Covington Trust Co. v. Owens, 278 Ky. 695 , 129 S.W.2d 186, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 486 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The Circuit Court has jurisdiction of proceeding to compel utility to restore service to customer, and application to the Public Service Commission for relief is not a prerequisite for although Service Commission had primary jurisdiction over public utilities in such matters it was not vested with exclusive jurisdiction. (Decided under prior law) Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Dulworth, 279 Ky. 309 , 130 S.W.2d 753, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Circuit Court had jurisdiction over subject matter of action in which plaintiffs claimed damages for severe injuries received by them when wall fell on them due to concurrent and joint negligence of defendants. (Decided under prior law) Brown v. Knuckles, 413 S.W.2d 899, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 403 ( Ky. 1967 ).

One type of writ of prohibition was not granted in a contractual dispute between a health plan and a laboratory because a circuit court was not acting outside of its jurisdiction when it ordered a deposit of money into the court; circuit courts had jurisdiction over contractual payments when the amount in controversy exceeded the minimum jurisdictional limit. PremierTox 2.0 v. Miniard, 407 S.W.3d 542, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 385 ( Ky. 2013 ).

Circuit court in Kentucky had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a foreclosure case via statute and the Kentucky Constitution. Cubar v. Town & Country Bank & Trust Co., 473 S.W.3d 91, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 128 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

12.Subjects Outside Jurisdiction.

The Circuit Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an independent action to set aside or modify a judgment of a fiscal court fixing the compensation of public officers pursuant to KRS 67.130 . (Decided under prior law)Wolfe County v. Tolson, 283 Ky. 11 , 140 S.W.2d 671, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1940 ).

13.— Federal Laws.

The state courts have no jurisdiction of questions arising under the National Labor Relations Act, but are not deprived of jurisdiction of questions involving landlord and tenant merely because the landlord is also the employer of the tenant. (Decided under prior law) Coldiron v. Good Coal Co., 276 Ky. 833 , 125 S.W.2d 757, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 601 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The state courts are not concerned with the infringement of patents; that is a matter exclusively for the federal courts. (Decided under prior law)Acy v. Whaley, 281 Ky. 400 , 136 S.W.2d 575, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 58 ( Ky. 1940 ).

14.Fiscal Courts.

The appropriate standard of review for a Circuit Court to employ when considering the actions of a Fiscal Court regarding the closing of a county road is limited to determining whether the decision not to close the road was arbitrary, including whether there was substantial evidence to support the decision. A trial de novo is expressly prohibited. Trimble Fiscal Court v. Snyder, 866 S.W.2d 124, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 154 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

“Original action” necessarily encompassed a trial de novo. A challenge to the Fiscal Court’s action must be designated an “original action,” because the Fiscal Court is not a judicial court, which precludes an “appeal” per se. Nonetheless, calling the proceeding an original action does not convert the review of a local legislative body’s decision into a trial de novo. Rather, the proper standard for review is that applicable to all such matters. Trimble Fiscal Court v. Snyder, 866 S.W.2d 124, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 154 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

A claimant who appeals from an order of the fiscal court disallowing his claim cannot recover a greater amount in the Circuit Court than that claimed before the fiscal court. (Decided under prior law)Hudgins v. Carter County, 115 Ky. 133 , 72 S.W. 730, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1980 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Appeals from fiscal courts to the Circuit Court are to be tried de novo in the Circuit Court, as if no judgment had been rendered. (Decided under prior law)Jefferson County v. Young, 120 Ky. 456 , 86 S.W. 985, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 849 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1905 ).

The matter of appeal to the Circuit Court from an order allowing a claim in the fiscal court is a summary, simple method of trying the dispute between the claimant and the county. The pleadings may be written or oral and the matter is tried de novo. (Decided under prior law)Owen County v. Walker, 141 Ky. 516 , 133 S.W. 236, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 43 ( Ky. 1911 ).

Since county treasurer could only act as ordered by the fiscal court claim for sum of approximately $500 for newspaper advertising of treasurer’s report is against fiscal court and not treasurer. (Decided under prior law) Enterprise Publishing Co. v. Harlan County, 310 S.W.2d 551, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1958 ).

15.— Allowances, Sufficiency.

Excessive allowances to clerk by fiscal court may be corrected by the Circuit Court on an appeal prosecuted for the county by the county attorney. (Decided under prior law) Elliott v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 335 , 138 S.W. 300, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 626 ( Ky. 1911 ); Commonwealth Use Hickman County v. Scarborough, 148 Ky. 561 , 147 S.W. 31, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 496 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Where the fiscal court allowed expenses to a county employee, the proper method of determining the power of the fiscal court to do so was appeal to the Circuit Court of the county, and a declaratory judgment action for the purpose was improper. (Decided under prior law)Oldham County ex rel. Wooldridge v. Arvin, 244 Ky. 551 , 51 S.W.2d 657, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 463 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Where county jailer’s request for compensation for heat, fuel, and light furnished jail and inferior court was turned down by fiscal court, jailer had adequate remedy at law by appeal to Circuit Court and injunction would not be appropriate. (Decided under prior law) Pulaski County v. Decker, 312 Ky. 796 , 229 S.W.2d 968, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 776 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Where fiscal court directed payment of $311.44 on bill of $519.06 submitted by publishing company, issue as to sufficiency of allowance of fiscal court should have been raised by an appeal, and company could not maintain independent action for entire claim. (Decided under prior law)Enterprise Publishing Co. v. Harlan County, 310 S.W.2d 551, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where claimant for advertising of treasurer’s report in newspaper had submitted bill for $519.06 but fiscal court order had directed payment of only $311.44, fiscal court admitted its liability by its order allowing claimant compensation for its services and the only question to be presented to a Circuit Court was the sufficiency of the allowance and this issue should have been raised by appeal from the fiscal court order and trial court properly declined to entertain this claim in an independent action. (Decided under prior law) Enterprise Publishing Co. v. Harlan County, 310 S.W.2d 551, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1958 ).

When the fiscal court has taken jurisdiction to adjudicate the amount of a claim the claimant should not be permitted to ignore the order and by independent action have the Circuit Court pass upon this issue in a de novo proceeding. (Decided under prior law) Enterprise Publishing Co. v. Harlan County, 310 S.W.2d 551, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where a claim against a county has been rejected by the fiscal court, the claimant has the option of either appealing from the fiscal court order or bringing an independent action, but an original independent action can only be maintained where the fiscal court has wholly rejected the claim and it makes no difference whether the claimant has actually received and accepted the allowance made or not. (Decided under prior law)Enterprise Publishing Co. v. Harlan County, 310 S.W.2d 551, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1958 ).

16.— Appealable Orders.

Appeal is not the proper method of attacking a fiscal court order as void. (Decided under prior law) Monroe County Court v. Miller, 132 Ky. 102 , 116 S.W. 272, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Though a consent order of the fiscal court fixing the salary of the county judge (now county judge/executive) is void, no appeal lies therefrom unless a motion to set it aside is first made and overruled. (Decided under prior law) Monroe County Court v. Miller, 132 Ky. 102 , 116 S.W. 272, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Discretion of fiscal court in making an appropriation within its power can be reviewed only by an appeal to the Circuit Court. (Decided under prior law) Caldwell County v. Durret Const. Co., 180 Ky. 594 , 203 S.W. 291, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 98 ( Ky. 1918 ).

Order which was simply a contract between the fiscal court and the sureties on sheriff’s bond was not a judgment from which an appeal could be taken. (Decided under prior law) Leslie County v. Maggard, 227 Ky. 583 , 13 S.W.2d 766, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 924 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Where fiscal court was proceeding erroneously in canceling warrants issued for medical care furnished poor of county, remedy by appeal existed to correct erroneous order. (Decided under prior law) Stumbo v. Clark, 255 Ky. 287 , 73 S.W.2d 8, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1934 ).

All orders of the fiscal court are appealable. (Decided under prior law) Shreve v. Taylor County Public Library Board, 419 S.W.2d 779, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Order of fiscal court establishing a public library district pursuant to KRS 173.710 to 173.800 is appealable by member of fiscal court and citizens and taxpayers. (Decided under prior law)Shreve v. Taylor County Public Library Board, 419 S.W.2d 779, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 1967 ).

An appeal from a judgment of the fiscal court refusing to close a road may be taken to the Circuit Court. (Decided under prior law)Walker v. Lyon County Fiscal Court, 425 S.W.2d 730, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 429 ( Ky. 1968 ).

17.— Appeal Bond.

County attorney may prosecute an appeal to the Circuit Court in the name of the county from an order of the fiscal court allowing a claim, without executing an appeal bond. (Decided under prior law) Clay County v. Roach, 174 Ky. 436 , 192 S.W. 489, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1917 ).

18.— Proper Appellant.

Either the claimant or the county may prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the fiscal court upon a claim presented to it, and upon which it passes. (Decided under prior law) Jefferson County v. Waters, 111 Ky. 286 , 63 S.W. 613, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 669 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1901 ).

An appeal will lie to the Circuit Court from an order of the fiscal court fixing the salary of a county officer, by the officer or by any person aggrieved, including a taxpayer or a bona fide candidate for the office. (Decided under prior law) Caddell v. Fiscal Court of Whitley County, 258 Ky. 114 , 79 S.W.2d 407, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1935 ). See Butler County v. Gardner, 96 S.W. 582, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 922 (1906); Monroe County Court v. Miller, 132 Ky. 102 , 116 S.W. 272, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1909 ); Breathitt County v. Turner, 223 Ky. 727 , 4 S.W.2d 695, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 419 ( Ky. 1928 ); Akins v. Peak, 239 Ky. 847 , 40 S.W.2d 324, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1931 ).

County attorney has authority to prosecute appeal from order of fiscal court without being ordered to do so by the fiscal court. (Decided under prior law) Johnson County v. High Test Oil & Gas Co., 267 Ky. 760 , 103 S.W.2d 272, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 385 ( Ky. 1937 ). See Kenton County by Hanlon v. Jameson, 150 Ky. 440 , 150 S.W. 528, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 916 ( Ky. 1912 ); Knott County v. Michael, 264 Ky. 36 , 94 S.W.2d 44, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Any aggrieved person may appeal from an order of the fiscal court. (Decided under prior law) Howard v. Saylor, 305 Ky. 504 , 204 S.W.2d 815, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1947 ).

County judge (now county judge/executive) had authority to appeal to Circuit Court from fiscal court order employing county auditor, and he was not required to first request county attorney to prosecute the appeal. (Decided under prior law) Howard v. Saylor, 305 Ky. 504 , 204 S.W.2d 815, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1947 ).

The county attorney has authority to prosecute an appeal from an order of the fiscal court allowing unjust or illegally presented claims and such authority can be exercised by him contrary to the wishes or directions of the fiscal court. (Decided under prior law)Hoskins v. Leslie County Fiscal Court, 242 S.W.2d 874, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1086 ( Ky. 1951 ).

19.Appeals.

A statutory “appeal” to the Circuit Court from any agency or tribunal other than the District Court is an original action and not an “appeal.” Sarver v. County of Allen, 582 S.W.2d 40, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 263 ( Ky. 1979 ).

Issuance of summons upon the Attorney General commenced the appeal to the Circuit Court from the order of the administrative agency; once commenced, the mere delay in serving the secretary did not defeat the action. Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Highways v. Campbellsville, 740 S.W.2d 162, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 530 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

Language of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 23A.010 is a legislative directive that the judicial review of administrative actions shall be governed by the same procedural rules of the courts applicable to original actions; the judicial review authorized by Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.347(2) falls squarely within that mandate. Isaacs v. Caldwell, 530 S.W.3d 449, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 439 ( Ky. 2017 ).

Cited:

Dalton v. First Nat’l Bank, 712 S.W.2d 954, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1165 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Wood v. Wingfield, 816 S.W.2d 899, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 70 ( Ky. 1991 ); Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1245 (6th Cir. 2000); Worrell v. Stivers, 523 S.W.3d 436, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 30 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The phrase, “may be authorized by law,” in subsection (4) of this section suggests that the review, which is not an appeal but an original action, is an inchoate authority and requires some further and positive legislative act or rule of the Supreme Court of Kentucky to permit such original actions. OAG 79-401 .

The terms, “administrative agencies, special districts or boards,” used in subsection (4) of this section, do not include fiscal courts. OAG 79-401 .

KRS 61.170 requires an indictment by a Circuit Court grand jury in order to charge the offense of malfeasance or neglect of county officers; but since KRS 24A.110 vests exclusive jurisdiction of misdemeanor cases, generally, in the District Court, the Circuit Court in which such an indictment is returned has necessarily, because of the jurisdictional statute, the authority and duty to refer the indictment for trial or other appropriate disposition to the district court of that county. OAG 80-152 .

Under the broad legislative policy expressed in KRS 178.080 and 178.115 , the acceptance of a road as a part of the county road system is left to the sound discretion of the fiscal court under the specific guidelines set out in those sections. The action of a fiscal court in exercising such discretion could be reviewed, by direct action, in a Circuit Court as an alleged arbitrary or capricious exercise of the discretion; no appeal can be taken from a fiscal court order to the District Court, however, since that court has no appellate jurisdiction. OAG 82-445 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Administrative orders, jurisdiction to enforce or review orders of:

Air Pollution Control District, Hearing Board of, appeal from, KRS 77.305 .

Airport Zoning Board of Appeals, appeals from, KRS 183.871 .

Board of Assessment Appeals, appeals from, KRS 133.120 .

Board of Dentistry, KRS 313.085 .

Cabinet for Human Resources, secretary of, revoking or suspending license of frozen food locker plant, KRS 221.040 .

City Civil Service Commission, KRS 90.370 , 95.766 .

City or county planning units, KRS 100.347 .

County Debt Commission, KRS 66.310 .

Damages claims against state agencies, appeals from Board of Claims, KRS 44.140 .

Department of Mines and Minerals, KRS 351.040 .

Health facilities and services, appeal to Franklin Circuit Court concerning certificate of need or license, KRS 216B.115 .

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, KRS 338.091 .

Planning commission, appeals from, KRS 100.347 .

Police or firemen in fourth-class or fifth-class city, removal or discipline by city council, appeals from, KRS 95.766 .

Public assistance, appeals to Circuit Court from refusal to grant assistance or granting of insufficient assistance, KRS 205.231 .

Public Service Commission, KRS 278.410 .

Revenue Cabinet, KRS 131.130 , 131.140 .

Slum clearance and redevelopment agencies, KRS 99.390 .

Soil Conservation District Board of Adjustment, KRS 262.520 .

State Real Estate Commission, KRS 324.200 .

Teacher’s contract, orders of Board of Education terminating, appeal from, KRS 161.790 .

Transportation Cabinet, under Motorists’ Financial Responsibility Law, KRS 187.300 .

Appeals, right of, Const., § 115.

Circuit clerk, KRS 30A.010 to 30A.435 .

Commonwealth, bond not required to prosecute remedy, KRS 454.190 .

Commonwealth’s attorney, Circuit Judge to enforce penalty against for neglect of duty, KRS 61.130 .

County government, KRS Ch. 67.

County law library in county containing second-class city, Circuit Judges to control, KRS 172.170 .

Court of Appeals, KRS Ch. 22A.

Court of Justice, KRS Ch. 26A.

Criminal jurisdiction:

Extradition proceedings, KRS 440.290 , 440.300 .

Probation, KRS Ch. 439.

Districts, Const., § 112; KRS Ch. 24A.

Elisor, Circuit Judge may appoint, KRS 70.200 .

Fees of Commissioners of Circuit Court, A.P., Part IV, §§ 1-4, 16.

Friend of the court, power to appoint in certain counties, KRS 403.090 .

Jailer is officer of court, KRS 71.050 .

Jailer, judge not to be surety on bond of, KRS 71.010 .

Judicial power vested in courts, Const., § 109.

Jurisdiction in particular proceedings:

Adoption, KRS 199.470 .

Annexation proceedings by cities, KRS 81A.020 , 81A.400 to 81A.520 .

Attachments for rent, KRS 383.030 .

Divorce, actions for, KRS 403.010 , 403.140 .

Drainage district case, if amount exceeds ten dollars, KRS 269.200 .

Elections:

Contest of elections, KRS 120.055 , 120.065 , 120.155 , 120.165 .

County board of elections, appeal from, KRS 116.135 .

Escheats, where property in control of federal court, KRS 393.170 .

Mental illness, involuntary hospitalization, proceedings for, KRS 202A.051 .

Mentally ill person, detention without warrant, KRS 202A.041 .

Public assistance payments, recovery, KRS 205.227 .

Removal of peace officers, KRS 61.300 , 63.170 .

Soil conservation districts, enforcement of land-use ordinances, KRS 262.430 .

Jurisdiction to be uniform, Const., § 59(1).

Marriage, affirmed or avoided by Circuit Court, KRS 402.250 .

Master commissioner and receiver, appointment, salary, number of deputies, KRS Ch. 31A.

National guard, Circuit Judge may call out, KRS 38.030 .

Oath, judge may administer official, KRS 62.020 .

Record books, preservation and replacement, KRS 30A.080 .

Record of resignation of Commonwealth’s attorney or circuit clerk, judge to make, KRS 63.010 .

Retirement of Circuit Judges, KRS 21.350 to 21.480 .

Salaries of Circuit Judges, Const., § 246; KRS 48.195 .

Sale of business opportunities in violation of law, restraining order or injunction against, KRS 367.817.

Sheriff, judge not to be surety on bond for, KRS 70.020 .

Special or local acts regulating jurisdiction of Circuit Court prohibited, Const., § 59(1).

Supreme Court, KRS Ch. 21A.

Vacancy in office of Circuit Judge to be filled by Governor, KRS 63.190 .

Venue:

Change of venue, KRS. Ch. 452.

Civil, KRS 452.400 to 452.500 .

Criminal:

Generally, KRS 452.510 to 452.530 , 452.560 .

Offenses by common carriers, KRS 277.990 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

An Overview of Kentucky’s New Court System, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1977 Ky. Bench & B. 13.

Siler, A Calculated Risk: Removal of the Indeterminate Complaint, Vol. 54, No. 4, Winter 1990, Ky. Bench & Bar 19.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Leathers, Rethinking Jurisdiction and Notice in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 755 (1982-83).

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Notification of Withdrawal from School, Form 256.08.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Circuit Court, § 4.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Court Procedure, § 23.1.

23A.020. Judicial circuits.

The state is divided into judicial circuits, each to be composed of the following counties:

  1. First Judicial Circuit. Ballard, Carlisle, Fulton, and Hickman.
  2. Second Judicial Circuit. McCracken.
  3. Third Judicial Circuit. Christian.
  4. Fourth Judicial Circuit. Hopkins.
  5. Fifth Judicial Circuit. Crittenden, Union, and Webster.
  6. Sixth Judicial Circuit. Davies.
  7. Seventh Judicial Circuit. Logan and Todd.
  8. Eighth Judicial Circuit. Warren.
  9. Ninth Judicial Circuit. Hardin.
  10. Tenth Judicial Circuit. Hart, Larue, and Nelson.
  11. Eleventh Judicial Circuit. Green, Marion, Taylor, and Washington.
  12. Twelfth Judicial Circuit. Henry, Oldham, and Trimble.
  13. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Garrard and Jessamine.
  14. Fourteenth Judicial Circuit. Bourbon, Scott, and Woodford.
  15. Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. Carroll, Grant, and Owen.
  16. Sixteenth Judicial Circuit. Kenton.
  17. Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. Campbell.
  18. Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. Harrison, Nicholas, Pendleton, and Robertson.
  19. Nineteenth Judicial Circuit. Bracken, Fleming, and Mason.
  20. Twentieth Judicial Circuit. Greenup and Lewis.
  21. Twenty-first Judicial Circuit. Bath, Menifee, Montgomery, and Rowan.
  22. Twenty-second Judicial Circuit. Fayette.
  23. Twenty-third Judicial Circuit. Estill, Lee, and Owsley.
  24. Twenty-fourth Judicial Circuit. Lawrence, Johnson, and Martin.
  25. Twenty-fifth Judicial Circuit. Clark and Madison.
  26. Twenty-sixth Judicial Circuit. Harlan.
  27. Twenty-seventh Judicial Circuit. Knox and Laurel.
  28. Twenty-eighth Judicial Circuit. Lincoln, Pulaski, and Rockcastle.
  29. Twenty-ninth Judicial Circuit. Adair and Casey.
  30. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit. Jefferson.
  31. Thirty-first Judicial Circuit. Floyd.
  32. Thirty-second Judicial Circuit. Boyd.
  33. Thirty-third Judicial Circuit. Perry.
  34. Thirty-fourth Judicial Circuit. Whitley and McCreary.
  35. Thirty-fifth Judicial Circuit. Pike.
  36. Thirty-sixth Judicial Circuit. Magoffin and Knott.
  37. Thirty-seventh Judicial Circuit. Carter, Elliott, and Morgan.
  38. Thirty-eighth Judicial Circuit. Butler, Edmonson, Ohio, and Hancock.
  39. Thirty-ninth Judicial Circuit. Breathitt, Wolfe, and Powell.
  40. Fortieth Judicial Circuit. Clinton, Cumberland, and Monroe.
  41. Forty-first Judicial Circuit. Clay, Jackson, and Leslie.
  42. Forty-second Judicial Circuit. Calloway and Marshall.
  43. Forty-third Judicial Circuit. Barren and Metcalfe.
  44. Forty-fourth Judicial Circuit. Bell.
  45. Forty-fifth Judicial Circuit. Muhlenberg and McLean.
  46. Forty-sixth Judicial Circuit. Breckinridge, Grayson, and Meade.
  47. Forty-seventh Judicial Circuit. Letcher.
  48. Forty-eighth Judicial Circuit. Franklin.
  49. Forty-ninth Judicial Circuit. Allen and Simpson.
  50. Fiftieth Judicial Circuit. Boyle and Mercer.
  51. Fifty-first Judicial Circuit. Henderson.
  52. Fifty-second Judicial Circuit. Graves.
  53. Fifty-third Judicial Circuit. Shelby, Anderson, and Spencer.
  54. Fifty-fourth Judicial Circuit. Boone and Gallatin.
  55. Fifty-fifth Judicial Circuit. Bullitt.
  56. Fifty-sixth Judicial Circuit. Caldwell, Livingston, Lyon, and Trigg.
  57. Fifty-seventh Judicial Circuit. Russell and Wayne.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 476; 1992, ch. 356, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 2001, ch. 72, § 1, effective June 21, 2001.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Creation of New Districts.

An act creating a new district is not required to be passed at the first session after an enumeration. (Decided under prior law) Brown v. Moss, 126 Ky. 833 , 105 S.W. 139, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1288 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1907 ).

The legislature in creating a new district may provide such details as are necessary to carry the act into effect without confusion in the public business. (Decided under prior law) Watkins v. Snyder, 148 Ky. 733 , 147 S.W. 899, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 542 ( Ky. 1912 ).

2.Changing Judicial Districts.

An act changing judicial districts without creating a new district is invalid unless it complies with Const., §§ 128 (repealed) and 59, and is passed at the first legislative session after an enumeration. (Decided under prior law)Fields v. Nickell, 248 Ky. 526 , 58 S.W.2d 912, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 264 ( Ky. 1933 ).

3.Commonwealth’s Attorney.

When the legislature, in creating a new district, provided that the Commonwealth’s Attorney in one of the old districts from which counties were taken to form the new district should be Commonwealth’s Attorney for the new district, he was entitled to remain in office in the new district up to the end of the term for which he was elected. (Decided under prior law)Watkins v. Snyder, 148 Ky. 733 , 147 S.W. 899, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 542 ( Ky. 1912 ).

When a new district is created by taking counties out of old districts, the Commonwealth’s Attorney of each of the old districts continues in his old district as Commonwealth’s Attorney, and has a reasonable time after the act takes effect to change his residence. (Decided under prior law) McCreary v. Fields, 148 Ky. 730 , 147 S.W. 901, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 543 ( Ky. 1912 ). See Adams v. Roberts, 119 Ky. 364 , 83 S.W. 1035, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 1271 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1904 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Consolidation of counties, disposition of districts upon, KRS 67.280 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Bartlett, The Selection and Election of Judges in Kentucky, Vol. 53, No. 3, Summer 1989, Ky. Bench & Bar 26.

23A.030. Judicial circuits with one Circuit Judge.

Each judicial circuit shall have one (1) Circuit Judge, except as otherwise provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 477.

23A.040. Judicial circuits with two Circuit Judges and two numbered divisions. [Effective until January 2, 2023]

The following judicial circuits are entitled to two (2) judges and shall have two (2) numbered divisions of the Circuit Court:

  1. Fourth Judicial Circuit.
  2. Fifth Judicial Circuit.
  3. Tenth Judicial Circuit.
  4. Eleventh Judicial Circuit.
  5. Twelfth Judicial Circuit.
  6. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.
  7. Eighteenth Judicial Circuit.
  8. Twentieth Judicial Circuit.
  9. Twenty-first Judicial Circuit.
  10. Twenty-fourth Judicial Circuit.
  11. Thirty-second Judicial Circuit.
  12. Thirty-fourth Judicial Circuit.
  13. Thirty-seventh Judicial Circuit.
  14. Thirty-eighth Judicial Circuit.
  15. Thirty-ninth Judicial Circuit.
  16. Forty-first Judicial Circuit.
  17. Forty-second Judicial Circuit.
  18. Forty-third Judicial Circuit.
  19. Forty-sixth Judicial Circuit.
  20. Forty-ninth Judicial Circuit.
  21. Fiftieth Judicial Circuit.
  22. Fifty-first Judicial Circuit.
  23. Fifty-third Judicial Circuit.
  24. Fifty-seventh Judicial Circuit.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 478; 1980, ch. 247, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 356, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 204, § 2, effective October 1, 1996; 1996, ch. 377, § 2, effective October 1, 1996; 1998, ch. 517, §§ 3, 12, effective September 1, 1998, January 1, 1999, and September 1, 1999; 2000, ch. 541, § 1, effective July 1, 2000; 2001, ch. 72, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; 2003, ch. 66, § 4, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 173, § Pt. XIII, 1.(3), § 1, effective July 15, 2006; 2006, ch. 250, § 1, effective January 1, 2007; 2017 ch. 75, § 1, effective March 21, 2017; 2018 ch. 57, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(1/1/2007). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 205, Part V, sec. 6, provides that the new judgeships created by subsections (1), (16), (21) and (26) of this statute shall become effective January 1, 2007.

(3/21/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 75, sec. 4, provides that the amendments to this statute in Section 1 of that Act apply retroactively to April 16, 2016.

23A.040. Judicial circuits with two Circuit Judges and two numbered divisions. [Effective January 2, 2023]

The following judicial circuits are entitled to two (2) judges and shall have two (2) numbered divisions of the Circuit Court:

  1. Fourth Judicial Circuit.
  2. Fifth Judicial Circuit.
  3. Tenth Judicial Circuit.
  4. Eleventh Judicial Circuit.
  5. Twelfth Judicial Circuit.
  6. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.
  7. Eighteenth Judicial Circuit.
  8. Twentieth Judicial Circuit.
  9. Twenty-first Judicial Circuit.
  10. Twenty-fourth Judicial Circuit.
  11. Thirty-first Judicial Circuit.
  12. Thirty-second Judicial Circuit.
  13. Thirty-fourth Judicial Circuit.
  14. Thirty-seventh Judicial Circuit.
  15. Thirty-eighth Judicial Circuit.
  16. Thirty-ninth Judicial Circuit.
  17. Forty-first Judicial Circuit.
  18. Forty-second Judicial Circuit.
  19. Forty-third Judicial Circuit.
  20. Forty-sixth Judicial Circuit.
  21. Forty-ninth Judicial Circuit.
  22. Fiftieth Judicial Circuit.
  23. Fifty-first Judicial Circuit.
  24. Fifty-third Judicial Circuit.
  25. Fifty-seventh Judicial Circuit.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 478; 1980, ch. 247, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 356, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 204, § 2, effective October 1, 1996; 1996, ch. 377, § 2, effective October 1, 1996; 1998, ch. 517, §§ 3, 12, effective September 1, 1998, January 1, 1999, and September 1, 1999; 2000, ch. 541, § 1, effective July 1, 2000; 2001, ch. 72, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; 2003, ch. 66, § 4, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 173, § Pt. XIII, 1.(3), § 1, effective July 15, 2006; 2006, ch. 250, § 1, effective January 1, 2007; 2017 ch. 75, § 1, effective March 21, 2017; 2018 ch. 57, § 2, effective July 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 57, § 6, effective January 2, 2023.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(1/2/2023). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 57, secs. 2 and 6, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

23A.045. Judicial circuits with three Circuit Judges and three numbered divisions. [Effective until January 2, 2023]

The following judicial circuits are entitled to three (3) Circuit Judges and shall have three (3) numbered divisions of the Circuit Court:

  1. Second Judicial Circuit.
  2. Third Judicial Circuit.
  3. Sixth Judicial Circuit.
  4. Fourteenth Judicial Circuit.
  5. Seventeenth Judicial Circuit.
  6. Twenty-seventh Judicial Circuit.
  7. Thirty-first Judicial Circuit.
  8. Thirty-fifth Judicial Circuit.
  9. Forty-eighth Judicial Circuit.
  10. Fifty-fifth Judicial Circuit.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 517, §§ 4, 12, effective September 1, 1998 and September 1, 1999; 2000, ch. 541, § 2, effective July 1, 2000; 2003, ch. 66, § 5, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 173, Pt. XIII, 1.(3), § 2, effective July 15, 2006; 2006, ch. 250, § 2, effective January 1, 2007; 2017 ch. 75, § 2, effective March 21, 2017; 2018 ch. 57, § 3, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(1/1/2007). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 250, Part V, sec. 6, provides that the new judgeships created by subsections (3) and (10) of this statute shall become effective January 1, 2007.

(3/21/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 75, sec. 4, provides that the amendments to this statute in Section 2 of that Act apply retroactively to April 16, 2016.

23A.045. Judicial circuits with three Circuit Judges and three numbered divisions. [Effective January 2, 2023]

The following judicial circuits are entitled to three (3) Circuit Judges and shall have three (3) numbered divisions of the Circuit Court:

  1. Second Judicial Circuit.
  2. Third Judicial Circuit.
  3. Sixth Judicial Circuit.
  4. Fourteenth Judicial Circuit.
  5. Seventeenth Judicial Circuit.
  6. Twenty-seventh Judicial Circuit.
  7. Thirty-fifth Judicial Circuit.
  8. Forty-eighth Judicial Circuit.
  9. Fifty-fifth Judicial Circuit.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 517, §§ 4, 12, effective September 1, 1998 and September 1, 1999; 2000, ch. 541, § 2, effective July 1, 2000; 2003, ch. 66, § 5, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 173, Pt. XIII, 1.(3), § 2, effective July 15, 2006; 2006, ch. 250, § 2, effective January 1, 2007; 2017 ch. 75, § 2, effective March 21, 2017; 2018 ch. 57, § 3, effective July 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 57, § 7, effective January 2, 2023.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(1/2/2023). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 57, secs. 3 and 7, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

23A.050. Judicial circuits with four Circuit Judges and four numbered divisions.

The following judicial circuits are entitled to four (4) judges and shall have four (4) numbered divisions of the Circuit Court:

  1. Eighth Judicial Circuit.
  2. Ninth Judicial Circuit.
  3. Twenty-fifth Judicial Circuit.
  4. Twenty-eighth Judicial Circuit.
  5. Fifty-fourth Judicial Circuit.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 479; 2003, ch. 66, § 6, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 173, Pt. XIII, 1.(3), § 3, effective July 15, 2006; 2006, ch. 250, § 3, effective January 1, 2007; 2009, ch. 44, § 2, effective August 1, 2010; 2018 ch. 57, § 4, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(1/1/2007). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 250, Part V, sec. 6, provides that the new judgeships created by subsection (2) of this statute shall become effective January 1, 2007.

23A.055. Sixteenth Judicial Circuit.

The Sixteenth Judicial Circuit is entitled to five (5) judges and shall have five (5) numbered divisions of the Circuit Court.

History. Enact. Acts 2009, ch. 44, § 1, effective August 1, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(8/1/2010). 2009 Ky. Acts ch. 44, sec. 1, provides that the new judgeship created by this statute shall become effective August 1, 2010.

23A.060. Twenty-second Judicial Circuit.

The Twenty-second Judicial Circuit is entitled to nine (9) judges and shall have nine (9) numbered divisions of the Circuit Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 480; 1996, ch. 204, § 1, effective October 1, 1996; 2003, ch. 66, § 7, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Woodward v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 599, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1997 ).

23A.070. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit — Family court — Funds from previously created campaign accounts.

  1. The Thirtieth Judicial Circuit is entitled to twenty-three (23) judges and shall have twenty-three (23) numbered divisions of the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court divisions designated for family court shall be consecutively numbered beginning with the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit, First Division, Family Court. All other Circuit Court divisions shall be consecutively numbered beginning with the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit, First Division, and shall appear on the ballot prior to the designated family court divisions. These designations shall apply for election purposes and all other purposes.
  2. Notwithstanding any provision of KRS 121.180(10) to the contrary, a judicial candidate whose division number is altered pursuant to subsection (1) of this section subsequent to the establishment of a campaign account with the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance may expend the funds contained in the established account for election to the judicial division to which they were elected or appointed.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 481; 1996, ch. 377, § 1, effective October 1, 1996; 2003, ch. 66, § 8, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 124, § 1, effective June 20, 2005.

23A.080. Appeals from District Court — Issuance of writs by Circuit Court.

  1. A direct appeal may be taken from District Court to Circuit Court from any final action of the District Court.
  2. The Circuit Court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the complete determination of any cause within its appellate jurisdiction.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 482, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.In General.

Appeals from inferior courts to Circuit Courts are only such as are expressly allowed by statute. (Decided under prior law)Renshaw v. Cook, 129 Ky. 347 , 111 S.W. 377, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 860 , 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 895 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 165 (Ky. Ct. App. 1908); Grayson v. Grayson, 299 Ky. 232 , 185 S.W.2d 251, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Former section was the general law on the subject of appeals from inferior courts in certain cases, but it did not control where there was a special law governing the particular kind of appeal to be prosecuted. (Decided under prior law) Hart v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 343 , 269 S.W. 300, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 1924 ).

The Legislature did not intend anything significant by the word “Action” instead of “judgment” or its equivalent. The emphasis is on the word “final”; so the legislature did not authorize interlocutory orders to be reviewable by direct appeal. Tipton v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 239, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), overruled in part, Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 2004 ), abrogated in part, Commonwealth v. Lamberson, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 733 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2007).

The statute makes no provision for interlocutory appeals. Commonwealth v. Williams, 995 S.W.2d 400, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

As a Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to take an interlocutory appeal from the District Court, and the Commonwealth would suffer irreparable harm if the District Court’s order suppressing the results of a breathalyzer test was enforced, the mandamus was the proper means for the Circuit Court to redress the District Court judge’s error. Billingsley v. Commonwealth, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 162 (Ky. Ct. App. June 4, 2004, sub. op., 2004 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 929 (Ky. Ct. App. June 4, 2004).

The circuit court’s opinion was reversed and the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of defendant for second-offense driving under the influence was reinstated because the circuit court erred under KRS 23A.080 by substituting its evaluation of the evidence for that of the district court. Commonwealth v. Spalding, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 149 (Ky. Ct. App. May 19, 2006, sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033 (Ky. Ct. App. May 19, 2006).

2.Appealable Orders.

Review of District Court rulings is available through an original proceeding for relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition in the appellate court. Tipton v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 239, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), overruled in part, Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 2004 ), abrogated in part, Commonwealth v. Lamberson, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 733 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2007).

Unquestionably, KRS 22A.020 provides for interlocutory appeals but only from the Circuit Court, not to the Circuit Court from the District Court. The proper procedure for appeals from a District Court is governed by this section. Tipton v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 239, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), overruled in part, Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 2004 ), abrogated in part, Commonwealth v. Lamberson, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 733 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2007).

Appeal may be taken to the Circuit Court and then to Court of Appeals from a judgment establishing a highway, notwithstanding repeal of law expressly authorizing such appeals. (Decided under prior law)Burton v. Bryant, 199 Ky. 447 , 251 S.W. 192, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 848 ( Ky. 1923 ).

In habeas corpus proceeding for release from county jail on ground that judgment was void because trial commissioner had no legal authority or power and defendant was convicted of five charges but tried on only one, defendant instead of appealing denial of writ of habeas corpus to Court of Appeals should have exhausted his remedy of appeal to the Circuit Court where the case would have been tried de novo and question of lack of judicial authority in presiding judge and trial on multiple charges would have been eliminated. (Decided under prior law) Brown v. Hoblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 2 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Where a testator’s will left all of his property to his wife to use, sell, or transfer during her life and at her death any remaining property was to go to his children in equal shares and named his wife as executor and she qualified, administered the estate, and filed her final report, which was approved, the executors of the wife’s estate could not enjoin the enforcement of an order appointing administrators de bonis non of the testator’s estate after his wife’s death, because the wife’s administrators had no interest in the testator’s estate and, if they had, the proper method of opposing the appointment was by appeal to the circuit court. (Decided under prior law)Williams v. Ratcliffe, 402 S.W.2d 432, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Appeal taken by the Commonwealth was authorized by this section, as there was no question that the district court's order of dismissal was final. Williams v. Commonwealth, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 29 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015, sub. op., 2015 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 863 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

3.Writs of Prohibition.

In aid of its appellate jurisdiction, as found in subsection (2) of this section, the Circuit Court inherently has the power to issue writs of prohibition. Tipton v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 239, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), overruled in part, Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 2004 ), abrogated in part, Commonwealth v. Lamberson, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 733 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2007).

Circuit court had authority to issue a writ of prohibition to a district court judge who had issued an order precluding all county attorneys from objecting to questions made to defense witnesses during a preliminary hearing because the Kentucky Supreme Court was not the proper forum and access of such matters to the circuit court provided the parties with rapid and easy access to address claims of immediate and irreparable harm. Delahanty v. Commonwealth ex rel. Maze, 295 S.W.3d 136, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Commonwealth did not have an adequate remedy by appeal because the order did not dispose of the ultimate issue, i.e., whether defendant was guilty of DUI, nor did it include finality language. Peters v. Commonwealth, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2010), rev'd, 353 S.W.3d 592, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Even though the Commonwealth showed that there was an inadequate remedy by appeal and that it would have suffered great and irreparable injury if a trial court erred by suppressing a juvenile’s statement, a writ of prohibition was not appropriate for the State in a sodomy case because the 13-year-old juvenile’s statement given to police at a school was properly suppressed as involuntary in nature; although a 32-minute interrogation did not seem excessive, the repetitive questioning amounted to coercion by importunity. Even though Miranda rights were read, the juvenile was ordered by school officials into a room, he faced authority figures with considerable power who feigned superior knowledge, and they repeatedly demanded answers. Commonwealth v. Bell, 365 S.W.3d 216, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Circuit court properly denied the a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the district court from suppressing the results of defendant’s breathalyzer test in the DUI case under KRS 189A.010(1)(b) because, although the Commonwealth had no adequate remedy by appeal and would suffer great and irreparable injury, the evidence showed that defendant did not intend to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated but, rather, that he had returned to his vehicle after an evening of merry-making, entered his vehicle, and started it to warm himself while he sobered. Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 694 (Ky. Dec. 11, 2013).

4.Writs of Mandamus.

Because the district court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s motion to transfer appellant juvenile’s robbery case to the circuit court did not dispose of the ultimate issue in the case concerning appellant’s guilt, there was no finality within the meaning of RCr P. 54.02(1); therefore, the Commonwealth’s only remedy was to petition for a writ of mandamus. The circuit court did not err by granting a petition for writ of mandamus under KRS 23A.080(2) directing the district court to transfer appellant’s robbery case to the circuit court, because the conditions of KRS 635.020(4) were satisfied; appellant was older than 14 years of age and a participant in a crime in which a gun was used. K.N. v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.3d 816, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Circuit court properly granted the Commonwealth's petition for a writ of mandamus because the Commonwealth did not have an adequate remedy by appeal; the district court's denial of the motion to transfer defendant juvenile to circuit court was an interlocutory order because further proceedings were necessary in district court to dispose of all the issues in the case. D.M.K. v. Calvert, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 429 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017), review denied, ordered not published, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 59 (Ky. Feb. 7, 2018).

5.Appeal Bond.

Where the appellant filed an appeal in the circuit court from a ruling appointing another party as administrator of an estate, but the appellant did not file a bond on appeal, the appeal was dismissed for failure to file the bond. (Decided under prior law)Stathis v. Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co., 444 S.W.2d 112, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1969 ).

6.Bastardy Proceedings.

Bastardy proceeding is tried de novo on appeal to Circuit Court. (Decided under prior law)West v. Shepherd's Committee, 127 Ky. 323 , 105 S.W. 419, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 205 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1907 ).

7.County Attorney.

The authority of the county attorney is implied to prosecute an appeal in all cases where an appeal is allowed by law. (Decided under prior law)Breckinridge County v. Rhodes, 127 Ky. 444 , 105 S.W. 903, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 352 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1907 ).

8.Guardians.

Where guardian appealing under former section failed to execute a bond, his appeal would be dismissed. (Decided under prior law)In re Huggins, 102 S.W. 849, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 475 (1907).

Where a case is appealed to the Circuit Court on a question of appointment of a guardian, it is proper for the Circuit Court to try the case de novo. (Decided under prior law)Wright v. Boswell's Guardian, 103 S.W. 314, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 700 (1907).

Tort-feasor, seeking to settle claim for personal injury to minor, held not entitled to appeal from order removing guardian of minor. (Decided under prior law)Stuart v. Richardson, 407 S.W.2d 716, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 185 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Cited:

Singleton v. Commonwealth, 740 S.W.2d 159, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1484 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Woodward v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 599, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1997 ); K.R. v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 179, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 2012 ); Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 558 S.W.3d 475, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 95 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A direct appeal may be taken from District Court to Circuit Court from any final action of the District Court. OAG 78-190 .

Jurisdiction to order the return to defendant of personal property seized for forfeiture does not vest in any court until there has been a conviction. Until that time, property is not subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the appropriate law enforcement agency. The Commonwealth may hold property which may be subject to forfeiture under the penal code until the underlying criminal charges have been resolved, and upon conviction subject the property to forfeiture. A district court order directing that personal property seized incident to an arrest or by execution of a search warrant be returned to the defendant is not a final action, so a direct appeal would not be available. Rather, review, if any, would be available through an original proceeding for relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition in the Circuit Court pursuant to the authority of SCR 1.040(6), CR 81 and subsection (2) of this section. OAG 91-67 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Appeals in particular cases:

Apportionment of taxes on real property when one owner does not pay taxes due, KRS 134.421 .

Drainage district, establishment of, KRS 268.020 .

Eminent domain, KRS 416.540 to 416.670 .

Ferry rights and rates, KRS 280.290 .

License to place of entertainment, KRS 231.090 .

Restoration of persons to sound mind, KRS 202A.141 .

Roads, order of fiscal court establishing, KRS 178.115 .

School districts, division of, KRS 160.210 .

Sewer construction district in county having metropolitan sewer district, KRS 76.305 .

Voluntary assignments, KRS 379.160 .

Water district, establishment, alteration, assessments, KRS 74.010 , 74.110 , 74.150 , 74.160 .

Wills, admission or rejection, KRS 394.240 .

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order Setting Trial (AOC 030) Practice Context for Bonds, Form 4.07.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Appeals from Kentucky District Courts to Circuit Court, § 100.00.

23A.090. Security services provided by sheriff — Compensation.

  1. The sheriff of the county in which the Circuit Court is sitting shall provide such deputies, certified court security officers, and ordinary equipment as the Chief Circuit Judge shall deem necessary to provide security services to the court and its facilities.
  2. The sheriff shall be compensated for these duties at rates to be determined by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 483, effective January 2, 1978; 2007, ch. 54, § 9, effective June 26, 2007.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fees earned by deputies providing security services for the Circuit and District Courts are really fees of the sheriff’s office, and must go into the general official receipts of the sheriff; the sheriff may be given proper credit against his excess fees, where he takes such fees earned by the deputies and applies them on their salaries, but such fees earned by the deputies must first be turned into the regular sheriff’s account. OAG 80-259 .

23A.100. Jurisdiction of family court.

  1. As a division of Circuit Court with general jurisdiction pursuant to Section 112(6) of the Constitution of Kentucky, a family court division of Circuit Court shall retain jurisdiction in the following cases:
    1. Dissolution of marriage;
    2. Child custody;
    3. Visitation;
    4. Maintenance and support;
    5. Equitable distribution of property in dissolution cases;
    6. Adoption; and
    7. Termination of parental rights.
  2. In addition to general jurisdiction of Circuit Court, a family court division of Circuit Court shall have the following additional jurisdiction:
    1. Domestic violence and abuse proceedings under KRS Chapter 403 subsequent to the issuance of an emergency protective order in accord with local protocols under KRS 403.725 ;
    2. Proceedings under the Uniform Act on Paternity, KRS Chapter 406, and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, KRS 407.5101 to 407.5902 ;
    3. Dependency, neglect, and abuse proceedings under KRS Chapter 620; and
    4. Juvenile status offenses under KRS Chapter 630, except where proceedings under KRS Chapter 635 or 640 are pending.
  3. Family court divisions of Circuit Court shall be the primary forum for cases in this section, except that nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the concurrent jurisdiction of District Court.

HISTORY: Repealed, reenact. and amend., Acts 2003, ch. 66, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2015 ch. 102, § 38, effective January 1, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.In General.

Former husband’s breach of oral contract complaint was properly dismissed by Circuit Court; the complaint was an attempt to collaterally attack a property settlement from a dissolution action over which the family division had exclusive jurisdiction under KRS 23A.100 . Bush v. Combest, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 293 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2004).

Trial court erred in treating a father’s exceptions to a commissioner’s child custody recommendations as a CR 59.05 motion and by transferring the case to a Family Court because the recommendation was not a final judgment; rather, the trial court should have simply reviewed the exceptions, conducted a hearing, and entered a final judgment adjudicating the custody issue. The Family Court’s jurisdiction over domestic issues was not intended to be exclusive. Pursley v. Pursley, 242 S.W.3d 346, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

While KRS 23A.100(2)(b) conferred general jurisdiction of the trial on a Family Court division for paternity proceedings, the Kentucky paternity statutes did not apply to grant subject matter jurisdiction to Kentucky courts to determine a paternity claim where there was no evidence or allegation that the marital relationship ceased 10 months before the child’s birth. Pursuant to KRS 406.011 a child born during lawful wedlock, or within 10 months thereafter, was presumed to be the husband and wife’s child. J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 115 ( Ky. 2008 ), overruled in part, J.A.S. v. Bushelman, 342 S.W.3d 850, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 76 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Family court erred in declining to make findings that a child satisfied the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act that could enable her to acquire special immigrant status because the fact-finding process fell squarely within its jurisdiction to provide an adequate remedy for the child, who had been adjudged to be dependent and whose substantial rights were affected by such findings or lack thereof. N.B.D. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 248 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2018), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 262 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2018).

In keeping with its independence from the federal immigration process, the family court is fully authorized as the finder of fact to conclude under Kentucky law that a petitioner has failed to present evidence to support the special immigrant factors or that the evidence presented was not credible. N.B.D. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 248 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2018), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 262 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2018).

Court of Appeals erred in reversing a family court decision declining to conduct a Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) hearing at the disposition phase of a dependency, neglect, and abuse case regarding an unaccompanied Guatemalan minor because, while the minor was a dependent child and entitled to the protection and care of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the courts of Kentucky were not required to make additional findings related to SIJ classification unless they first determine that the evidence to be gleaned from such a supplemental hearing was relevant to the child’s best interests, and there were also grave concerns about the use of the juvenile process in the case to circumvent federal immigration law. Commonwealth v. N.B.D., 577 S.W.3d 73, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 2019 ), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 157, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1096, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3427 (U.S. 2020).

2.Declaratory Judgments.

Where the estate of a decedent filed a complaint for determination of paternity of a child allegedly fathered by the decedent, although the Family Court did not have jurisdiction over a paternity action under KRS 406.021 or KRS 406.180 , as the estate was not the proper party to file such a suit, and neither the child nor mother ever lived in the United States, the court had jurisdiction under KRS 418.040 to enter a declaratory judgment as to the child’s paternity. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Bradley, 244 S.W.3d 741, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

3.Domestic Violence Orders.

Contrary to a husband’s arguments, the fact that a District Court declined to issue an emergency protective order did not leave a Family Court without jurisdiction to issue a domestic violence order subsequent to a hearing on a wife’s petition; under KRS 23A.100(3), the Family Court was the primary forum for cases involving domestic violence and abuse although the District Court had concurrent jurisdiction to enter protective orders under KRS 403.725 . Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Family Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with District Courts regarding the issuance of domestic violence orders. Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Court of appeals erred in holding that a family court lost jurisdiction to issue a domestic violence order on the ground that it failed to conduct a hearing within 14 days after the issuance of an emergency protective order because the family court’s failure was, at most, the erroneous exercise of subject matter jurisdiction; it was not a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under KRS 23A.100(2). Daugherty v. Telek, 366 S.W.3d 463, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 73 ( Ky. 2012 ).

When a family court judge recused in a divorce action, she simultaneously and automatically disqualified herself from a domestic violence order proceeding as the very purpose for the creation of the family courts was to consolidate litigation and controversies related to a family into one court. Boone v. Boone, 501 S.W.3d 434, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

4.Paternity Actions.

In accordance with KRS 23A.100(2)(b), the family court had jurisdiction over an action to establish paternity to a child conceived while a married couple was legally separated and pursuing a divorce; given the unusual facts of this case and the inherent rights of biological parents, the grant of joint custody to appellant former husband could not prevent appellee alleged biological father from pursuing his paternity action. The family court had jurisdiction to make the proper balancing of the parties’ rights and determine the best interests of the child. Smith v. Garber, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 142 (Ky. June 17, 2010, sub. op., 2010 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 115 (Ky. June 17, 2010), modified in part, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 105 (Ky. June 16, 2011).

Mother was estopped from arguing that KRS 406.180 limited jurisdiction to children born “out of wedlock.” The mother and her husband judicially admitted that another man was the father of a child born during the marriage, and diagnostic testing confirmed the other man’s paternity; the mother’s judicial admissions were sufficient to rebut the presumption that her husband was the father of the child. S.B. v. M.C., 352 S.W.3d 345, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Understanding Family Court in Kentucky, Vol. 68, No.6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 7.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Kentucky Law Journal.

May, Social Reform for Kentucky’s Judicial System: The Creation of Unified Family Courts, 92 Ky. L.J. 571 (2003).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Schechter, An Introduction to Re-envisioning the Role of the Juvenile Court in the 21st Century, 34 N. Ky. L. Rev. 181 (2007).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Family Court, § 5.00.

23A.110. Additional jurisdiction of family court to be construed to promote underlying purposes.

The additional jurisdiction of a family court division of Circuit Court shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are as follows:

  1. To strengthen and preserve the integrity of the family and safeguard marital and familial relationships;
  2. To protect children and adult family members from domestic violence and abuse;
  3. To promote the amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen between family members;
  4. To assure an adequate remedy for children adjudged to be dependent, abused, or neglected, and for those children adjudicated as status offenders;
  5. To mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage;
  6. To make adequate provision for the care, custody, and support of minor children of divorce and for those children who have been born out of wedlock; and
  7. To provide a level of proceedings, when necessary, that is more appropriate to a family court division of Circuit Court.

History. Repealed, reenact. and amend., Acts 2003, ch. 66, § 2, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Counseling.

Family court’s termination of reconciliation counseling between a mother and daughter was not an abuse of discretion under KRS 23A.110(1) because the evidence supported a conclusion that reconciliation counseling would be unsuccessful and possibly counterproductive. N.B. v. C.H., 351 S.W.3d 214, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 250 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

2.Special Immigrant Status.

Family court erred in declining to determine whether a minor who was born in Guatemala and currently resided in Kentucky satisfied the criteria for a special immigrant (SIJ) status because the court was most emphatically not being directed to address immigration issues or the minor’s immigration status, the SIJ fact-finding process fell squarely within the court’s jurisdiction to provide an adequate remedy for the minor, who had been adjudged to be dependent and whose substantial rights were affected by such findings or lack thereof, and the minor would be unable to proceed with an application for SIJ status and might possibly face deportation without such remedy. N.B.D. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 262 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2018, sub. op., 2018 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 963 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2018).

Cited in:

Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Mediation — The Power Tool of Choice in Family Courts, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 26.

23A.120. Position of domestic relations commissioner abolished in family court.

In any judicial circuit where a family court is established or has been established, the position of domestic relations commissioner is abolished, and no commissioner shall be appointed to hear or determine any matter within the jurisdiction of the family court.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 86, § 1, effective January 1, 2003.

Fees and Costs

23A.200. Fees and costs for civil cases.

  1. The Supreme Court shall by rule set the filing fees and miscellaneous costs for civil cases filed in the Circuit Court.
  2. The following fee shall be paid directly to the sheriff or other officer serving the process by the party requesting the service, at the time of the request as follows:

Service of process (per process) . . . . . $20.00

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 56, effective January 1, 1978; 1978, ch. 200, § 4, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 141, § 30, effective July 1, 1982; 1982, ch. 159, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 266, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 445, § 34, effective July 1, 1982; 1994, ch. 134, § 3, effective July 1, 1994; 1996, ch. 248, § 6, effective July 15, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by § 30 of Acts 1980, ch. 396, which would have taken effect July 1, 1982; however, Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 146, effective July 1, 1982, repealed Acts 1980, ch. 396. In addition, Acts 1982, ch. 445, § 44, specifically repealed the amendment to this section by Acts 1980, ch. 396, § 30.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

This section was amended by four 1982 Acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

This section was amended in 1982 Acts Chapter 445, which contains the following language in Section 45 of that Act: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 1982.” The Ky. Constitution, in Section 55, requires that a reason be set forth for the emergency. However, no reason is set forth in this Act. The effective date for 1982 Acts with no emergency provision is July 15, 1982.

Although a reference to mental health proceedings under KRS Ch. 387 was added in (1) of this section by 1982 Acts ch. 445, § 34, the provisions of KRS Ch. 387 relating to such proceedings were repealed by 1982 Acts ch. 141, § 146.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of the fact that under KRS 453.010 the Circuit Court is not required to mandate the paying of costs by the Commonwealth, the Department of Labor should not pay the advance filing fee when appealing Workmen’s (now Workers’) Compensation Board opinions. OAG 77-775 .

A filing fee of $70.00 in civil cases is payable in advance, but the $10.00 fee for issuing orders of attachment is not payable until termination of the suit. OAG 78-136 .

The clerk’s fee for issuance of a garnishment need not be paid in advance. OAG 78-136 .

The Commonwealth, except for the provisions of KRS 416.620 , pertaining to proceedings for eminent domain, is exempt from paying costs, although it may, pursuant to KRS 453.010 , pay costs when such costs are approved and allowed by the judge of the court in which the case was filed. OAG 78-343 .

To apply the provisions of this section to suits filed prior to January 2, 1978, would make the statute retroactive in its application; since there is no provision or indication in the statute or in the bill enacting the statute that such an objective was intended and since KRS 446.080(3) states that no statute shall be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared the filing fee requirement is applicable only to suits filed on and after January 2, 1978. OAG 78-517 .

If the sheriff must make a return on the item or document, he is entitled to a $3.00 fee for service, regardless of whether the process is served alone or in a group with other process, but if no return is required on the document (i.e., a pleading) he may not charge the $3.00 fee. OAG 79-510 .

The sheriff must compute his mileage per service of process and charge the responsible party at the applicable rate per mile traveled. OAG 79-510 .

The word “process” as used in this section and KRS 24A.170 does not refer to every legal document, but is a technical term which refers to documents, such as summonses, by which the court may command a person to appear in an action or before the court, or the means, such as a temporary restraining order, whereby the court compels compliance with its demands. OAG 79-510 .

The advance fees required by this section and KRS 24A.170 would have to be paid by an urban county government in civil actions to which it was a party. OAG 83-186 .

23A.205. Court costs for criminal cases in Circuit Court — Payment required — Exceptions.

  1. Court costs for a criminal case in the Circuit Court shall be one hundred dollars ($100).
  2. The taxation of court costs against a defendant, upon conviction in a case, shall be mandatory and shall not be subject to probation, suspension, proration, deduction, or other form of nonimposition in the terms of a plea bargain or otherwise, unless the court finds that the defendant is a poor person as defined by KRS 453.190(2) and that he or she is unable to pay court costs and will be unable to pay the court costs in the foreseeable future.
  3. If the court finds that the defendant does not meet the standard articulated in subsection (2) of this section and that the defendant is nonetheless unable to pay the full amount of the court costs, fees, or fines at the time of sentencing, then the court may establish an installment payment plan in accordance with KRS 534.020 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 58, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 200, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 321, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 606, § 43, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 328, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 183, § 1, effective August 1, 2002; 2017 ch. 158, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Consistent With KRS 31.110.

This section and KRS 31.110 are not inconsistent. Edmonson v. Commonwealth, 725 S.W.2d 595, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1987 ).

Statute allowing for costs to be assessed after sentencing, KRS 23A.205 , allowed for court costs to be waived for “poor persons,” as defined in KRS 453.190(2), but did not give defendant the blanket immunity from costs that defendant suggested was required by KRS 31.110 . Rather, the trial court could consider under KRS 23A.205 both a defendant’s ability to pay at present and in the foreseeable future, whereas statutes such as KRS 31.100 regarding “needy persons” focused on a defendant’s inability to provide payment for representation by an attorney at all and KRS 31.211 provided solely for a “present tense” determination, which did not apply to defendant because defendant had been released from custody and could work to pay for the modest court costs assessed against defendant. Maynes v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 922, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 20 ( Ky. 2012 ).

2.Court Costs Properly Assessed.

Trial court's imposition of court costs and the arrest fee was affirmed where the record did not reflect an assessment of appellant's financial status, other than that he was appointed a public defender and permitted to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, and simply because appellant was represented by a public defender did not mean he was necessarily exempt from court costs. Spicer v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.3d 26, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 435 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Assessment of court costs was facially valid and did not constitute error, as the court expressly imposed court costs and made provisions for deferred payment, without finding that defendant was a “poor person.” Nunn v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.3d 741, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2015 ).

In a drug case, there was no error in requiring defendant to pay court costs because, even though defendant stated he did not believe he had money in a commissary account, the trial court did not find him to be a poor person. The trial court found that defendant would have been able to earn money to pay the nominal court costs after his release from prison. Hunt v. Commonwealth, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 65 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2016).

Trial court did not err in imposing court costs where it made no factual determination that defendant was a poor person under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23A.205 . Howard v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 471, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 333 ( Ky. 2016 ).

Trial court did not err in imposing court costs on appellant as the assessment of court costs was mandatory absent a specific finding that he was a poor person under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23A.205 , and there had been no adjudication of his poverty status. Constant v. Commonwealth, 603 S.W.3d 654, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Imposition of costs as mandated by Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23A.205(2) was affirmed where the court had engaged defendant directly and advised him that counsel could ask that costs be waived, defendant indicated that he had $200.00 to pay into court that day, and as a result, the court imposed a minimal fine of $130.00 and gave defendant 10 days to pay it. Regardless of defendant’s status as a poor person, the circuit court concluded that defendant could pay court costs either at the time of sentencing or in the foreseeable future. Louisville R. Co. v. Masterson, 96 S.W. 534, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 829 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906).

Appellate court properly affirmed the circuit court’s order imposing court costs against defendant in spite of his indigency because the record did not reflect the trial court adjudged him a “poor person,” either explicitly or implicitly, defendant was not deemed to be a “poor person” who was exempt from court costs, simply because he was determined to be a “needy person” eligible for the services of a public defender, he did not raise the issue of his poverty status before the trial court, and the decision regarding court costs was not inconsistent with the facts in the record. Chadwell v. Commonwealth, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Aug. 26, 2021).

3.Costs Improperly Assessed.

There was no method by which a trial court could indirectly impose fines under KRS 534.040(4) and court costs under KRS 23A.205(2) against a defendant by reducing his pretrial jail time credit; therefore, language in the judgment that could be taken to indicate that such credit would be reduced was ordered stricken. Smith v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 399, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 2012 ).

Court reversed the imposition of court costs and remanded for a finding whether defendant was a poor person, as defined in KRS 453.190(2), was unable to pay court costs, and would be unable to pay the court costs in the foreseeable future. Smith v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 908, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 2012 ).

Although appellant’s argument concerning costs and a fine was not preserved, costs and fines were imposed as part of a sentence, and thus could not be waived by failure to object. Butler v. Commonwealth, 367 S.W.3d 609, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 73 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Because defendant was found to be a “poor person” under KRS 453.190(2), a trial court erred in imposing costs under KRS 23A.205 and assessing a partial public defender fee under KRS 31.211(1). Miller v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 857, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 2013 ).

Order requiring defendant to pay court costs despite defendant's indigency was not disturbed on appeal because defendant did not inform the trial court of defendant's indigency. Roe v. Commonwealth, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2080 (Ky. Sept. 24, 2015).

4.Court Costs Improperly Assessed.

Decision to impose or waive court costs was to be made by the trial court by or at the time of sentencing; there was no statutory basis for a court to exercise jurisdiction to determine the appropriateness of court costs beyond the end of the proceedings, much less once the sentence has been imposed and served and the defendant has been released from prison. Buster v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 294, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 162 ( Ky. 2012 ).

Appellant was ordered to pay costs and fees immediately upon release from custody, and he was facing an over seven-year sentence during which he could not work; thus, there was not a reasonable basis to find that appellant would soon be able to pay costs, and that part of the order imposing costs and fees was vacated. Butler v. Commonwealth, 367 S.W.3d 609, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 73 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

While the trial court provided defendant with a six-month period of time to pay the court costs once he was released from incarceration, there was no indication in the record that the court made any findings regarding whether defendant was “poor” and whether he could presently or in the foreseeable future pay the court costs as required by KRS 23A.205 . McElroy v. Commonwealth, 389 S.W.3d 130, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

The trial court's imposition of court costs under this section was unreasonable and constituted palpable error, as defendant had no job, asserts, or income, was facing a three and one-half year prison sentence, had nothing but a phone card while in jail, and was specifically found to be indigent under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 453.190 shortly after sentencing. Jones v. Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 820, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 442 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay court costs in installments beginning sixty days after his release, as those necessarily could not be paid within one year of the date of sentencing. Applegate v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.3d 83, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 239 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

5.Matter Remanded.

Imposition of court costs was reversed and the case was remanded for a determination of whether defendant was a poor person as defined by KRS 453.190(2), unable to pay court costs now, and would be unable to pay court costs in the foreseeable future as court costs could be imposed on an indigent defendant, unless the court found that the defendant was a poor person as defined by KRS 453.190(2) and that he or she was unable to pay court costs and would be unable to pay the court costs in the foreseeable future under KRS 23A.205 . Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.3d 607, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Prior to imposing court costs, the trial court issued no finding on whether defendant was a poor person and did not inquire into his ability to pay cost in the future, and such constituted reversible error; the was a question of fact to be determine by the trial court on remand. Boone v. Commonwealth, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 152 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 407 (Ky. Aug. 13, 2014).

Cited:

Martin v. Commonwealth, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011); Goncalves v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d 180, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 2 ( Ky. 2013 ); Elliott v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 207, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 2 86 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Former subsection (3)(b) of this section set a fifteen cent per page copying fee for documents generated by or for the Circuit Courts in criminal matters and under this statute, a $1.00 per page reproduction fee appears to be excessive. OAG 91-193 .

23A.206. Additional costs imposed in criminal cases — Funds distributed to local governments and counties — Funds used for police, jails, and transport of prisoners.

  1. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Local government” means a city, county, charter county, urban-county, or consolidated local government; and
    2. “Police department” means a police department created by a local government which employs one (1) or more officers certified pursuant to KRS 15.380 to 15.404 .
  2. In criminal cases a fee of twenty dollars ($20) shall be added to the costs imposed by KRS 23A.205 that the defendant is required to pay.
  3. The circuit clerk shall pay the funds from fees collected under this section to the Finance and Administration Cabinet pursuant to KRS 23A.215 for distribution as provided in subsection (5) of this section to local governments with police departments or local governments that contract for police services, and to counties with fiscal responsibilities for jails or the transporting of prisoners.
  4. All funds distributed to local governments shall be used for payment of expenses for operation of the local government’s police department or contracted police services. All funds distributed to counties with fiscal responsibilities for jails or the transporting of prisoners shall be used for the payment of costs associated with the housing or transporting of prisoners.
  5. Payments shall be distributed quarterly by the Finance and Administration Cabinet beginning October 1, 2004, as follows:
    1. Thirty percent (30%) of the total shall be distributed equally to all local governments with police departments or that contract for police services;
    2. Fifty percent (50%) of the total shall be distributed to local governments with police departments or local governments that contract for police services on a per capita basis according to the number of certified police officers employed by the police department on July 1 each year or providing services to the local government pursuant to a contract on July 1 of each year. For purposes of this subsection, each local government that contracts for police services shall be considered to employ one (1) police officer for each sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) it expends during each fiscal year for police services under a written contract; and
    3. Twenty percent (20%) of the total shall be distributed equally to counties with fiscal responsibilities for jails or the transporting of prisoners.
  6. On or before August 1 of each year, the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet shall certify to the Finance and Administration Cabinet the number of certified police officers employed by each local government.
  7. On or before August 1 of each year, each local government contracting for police services shall certify to the Finance and Administration Cabinet the amount of money expended for police services under a written contract during the previous fiscal year.
  8. The Finance and Administration Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A deemed necessary for the administration of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 78, § 1, effective April 6, 2004; 2007, ch. 85, § 108, effective June 26, 2007.

23A.2065. Additional fees for criminal cases — Allocation to general fund and telephonic behavioral health jail triage system.

In addition to the twenty dollar ($20) fee created by KRS 23A.206 , in criminal cases a ten dollar ($10) fee shall be added to the costs imposed by KRS 23A.205 that the defendant is required to pay. The first five dollars ($5) of each fee collected under this section shall be placed into the general fund, and the remainder of the fee shall be allocated to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services for the implementation and operation of a telephonic behavioral health jail triage system as provided in KRS 210.365 and 441.048 .

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 137, § 4, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 99, § 97, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 158, § 3, effective July 1, 2008.

23A.207. Fees for criminal cases.

In criminal cases, the following fees shall be charged by the circuit clerk and paid to the clerk at the time the corresponding services are requested:

  1. Preparing an attestation  . . . . .  $0.50
  2. Preparing a certification  . . . . .  $5.00
  3. Preparing a copy of a document (per page)  . . . . .  $0.25

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 183, § 2, effective August 1, 2002.

23A.208. Additional fee for sex crime, stalking, or related inchoate offenses.

  1. In addition to fees created by KRS 23A.205 , 23A.206 , and 23A.2065 , an administrative fee of thirty dollars ($30) shall be added to the costs that the defendant is required to pay for the following crimes:
    1. A sex crime, meaning an offense described in:
      1. KRS Chapter 510;
      2. KRS 530.020 ;
      3. KRS 530.064(1)(a);
      4. KRS 531.310 ; and
      5. KRS 531.320 ;
    2. Stalking, meaning conduct prohibited under KRS 508.140 and 508.150 ; and
    3. A criminal attempt, conspiracy, facilitation, or solicitation to commit the crimes set forth in this subsection.
  2. The first one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) of each fee collected under this section shall be placed into the general fund, and the remainder of the fee shall be allocated by the clerk of the court on a quarterly basis to the address protection program fund established in KRS 14.260 to be used solely to establish, operate, and maintain the confidential address protection program established in KRS 14.260 .
  3. The court may waive all or any portion of the fee required by this section if the court finds that a person subject to the surcharge is indigent or financially unable to pay all or any portion of the surcharge. The court may waive only the portion of the surcharge that the court finds the person is financially unable to pay.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 101, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

23A.209. Additional fee for expenses of Kentucky Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force.

In addition to the twenty dollar ($20) fee created by KRS 23A.206 and the ten dollar ($10) fee created by KRS 23A.2065 , a ten dollar ($10) fee shall be added in criminal cases to the costs imposed by KRS 23A.205 . The fee collected under this section shall be allocated to the Department of Kentucky State Police for the training, salaries, and equipment of the Kentucky Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 122, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

23A.210. Fees for appeals from District Court or transfer of cases to Circuit Court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 57, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 200, § 6, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 134, § 9, effective July 1, 1994.

23A.215. Disposition of Circuit Court fees and costs.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all fees and costs collected pursuant to KRS 23A.200(1) shall be deposited in the general fund of the State Treasury.
  2. Fees consisting of reimbursement for incidental direct outlays, including but not limited to postage and legal advertising, may be retained by the clerk and expended for these purposes in accordance with relevant directives of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  3. Additional costs in Circuit Court civil cases authorized by subsection (2) of KRS 23A.200 shall be paid to the sheriff or other officer serving the process.
  4. Filing fees in civil actions shall be recoverable as costs.
  5. No later than the seventh working day of each month the circuit clerk shall pay the funds collected from each court cost collected under KRS 23A.205 to the court cost distribution fund established in KRS 42.320 and report to the Finance and Administration Cabinet and the Administrative Office of the Courts the amounts deposited into the court cost distribution fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 62, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 200, § 7, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 321, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 134, § 4, effective July 1, 1994; 2002, ch. 183, § 3, effective August 1, 2002.

23A.220. Assessment by the fiscal court of additional fees and costs.

A fiscal court, by ordinance, may assess additional fees and costs for the purpose of paying expenses for courthouses, bonds related to them, and administration expenses of the Circuit Court as follows:

  1. In civil cases, a fee of twenty-five dollars ($25) may be added to filing fees;
  2. In criminal cases, a cost of twenty-five dollars ($25) may be added to the court costs that the defendant is required to pay; and
  3. In civil cases that are appealed from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals, a fee of twenty-five dollars ($25) may be added to the filing fees.

History. Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 54, § 2, effective March 15, 2001.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 5 of Chapter 54 of the Acts of the 2001 Regular Session read:

“The provisions of Section 1 to 4 of this Act shall supersede and prevail over any conflicting provisions of the 2000 Kentucky Acts Chapter 524 (House Joint Resolution 84), the 2000-2002 Judicial Branch Budge Memorandum.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Appeals.

Because an inmate timely tendered a notice of appeal with the proper filing fees, payment of the court facility fees was not a condition precedent, and failure to tender the court facility fee within the time limits of CR 73.02(1)(a) did not require automatic dismissal of the appeal. Moreover, the trial court could issue a show cause order to ensure the court facility fee was paid. Hill v. Ky. Parole Bd., 250 S.W.3d 314, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 104 ( Ky. 2008 ).

2.Expenditure of Funds.

Argument relating to a fiscal court’s expenditure of funds collected via a court fee tax were rejected because there was no allegation of the improper use of the funds, the fiscal court had the discretion to use the funds for administration expenses and courthouse expenses which were not necessarily limited to the courthouse in Alexandria, Kentucky, and the issue was better left to the required audits of county expenditures. Nolan v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 217 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2010).

CHAPTER 24 Circuit Courts Having Continuous Session [Repealed]

24.010. Counties of less than 150,000 population constituting separate circuits — Continuous session — Where court held — Where cases tried. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (980: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 51; 1976, ch. 62, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

24.020. Legal notices. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (980) was repealed by Acts 1958, ch. 42, § 29.

24.030. Rules. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (980) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.040. Juries to be drawn and meet in two places — Number of grand juries. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (980, 981) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

24.045. Additional judge for Fayette County — Divisions of court — Sessions and business of court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 168, §§ 1 to 4) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.046. Judicial circuits having more than one judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 5; 1966, ch. 247, § 1; 1968, ch. 120, § 1; 1968, ch. 157, § 1; 1972, ch. 177, § 11; 1976, ch. 62, § 30) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.047. Two judges in Warren County. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1968, ch. 12, §§ 1, 2) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 203, § 55.

24.048. Six judges in Fayette County — Numbered divisions — Election of judges. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1972, ch. 177, § 12; 1976, ch. 62, § 31) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.049. Two judges in Franklin County — Divisions. [Repealed].

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1974, ch. 17, § 3(1), (2); 1976, ch. 62, § 32) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.050. Two judges in Kenton County. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (963-2) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.051. Rules and distribution of cases in court with four judges. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1966, ch. 247, §§ 2, 3; 1968, ch. 157, § 2; 1976, ch. 62, § 33) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.052. Warren County to have court of continuous session — Terms. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 270, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

24.055. Additional judge for Campbell County; sessions and business of court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1954, ch. 73, §§ 1, 2(2), 3) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.056. Additional judge for Pike County; divisions of court; sessions and business of court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1954, ch. 89, §§ 1, 2) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.060. Two divisions in court having two judges and continuous session. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-1) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.065. Courts having more than one judge, in counties having less than 150,000 population — Jurisdiction — Divisions — Rules. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 1; 1972, ch. 177, § 13; 1976, ch. 62, § 34) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.068. Criminal and civil branches of circuit courts in counties having a population of 150,000 or more, but less than 250,000 — Adoption of rules. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 1; 1972, ch. 177, § 13; 1976, ch. 62, § 35) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.070. Election of judges for two divisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-13) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.075. Election of judges by numbered divisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.080. Which division to try actions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-2) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.090. Assignment of actions to divisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-3, 1019b-4) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.100. Either division may act provisionally until case assigned. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This sections (1019b-5) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.110. Division of pending cases when additional judge added. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-7) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.120. Equalization of docket. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-6) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.130. Transfer and consolidation of actions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-8) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 6.

24.140. What judge to preside when court held in two places; assignment of cases. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-10) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.150. Other judge may act when one disqualified; special judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-14) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.160. Rules; general terms; order book. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1019b-11) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 119, § 6.

24.170. Number of judges in Jefferson County. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (963a-1, 963a-2: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 27; 1970, ch. 69, § 1; 1972, ch. 177, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.175. Two additional judges for Jefferson County; divisions of court; election of judges; business of court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1950, ch. 167, §§ 1 to 4, 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

24.176. Two further additional judges; divisions for Thirtieth Circuit Court District. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1960, ch. 72, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

24.177. Two more judges; divisions for Jefferson County. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1964, ch. 63, §§ 1 to 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

24.180. Jefferson County Circuit Court — Continuous session — Branches and divisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-4, 1020-5: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 28 1970, ch. 69, § 2; 1972, ch. 177, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 14, § 491.

24.190. Election of judges — Separate votes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-1: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 14, § 491.

24.200. Each judge to preside in division — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-2, 1020-7: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 30) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 14, § 491.

24.210. Court to make rules governing assignment of civil actions — Criminal prosecutions — Proceedings on bail bonds and recognizances. [Repealed]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-6: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 46; 1966, ch. 255, § 31) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 14, § 491.

24.220. Transfer of cases involving common fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-26) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 6.

24.230. Proceeding valid in any branch. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-9: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 32) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.240. Judge of one division may preside over another. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-10: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 33) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.250. Rules — General term — Order book. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-20: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 34) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.260. Action on bond of court officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020-24, 1020-25: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 35) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491.

24.265. Bailiff — Appointment — Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1964, ch. 104, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 36) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491. Effective January 2, 1978.

24.270. Clerical assistants for judges of chancery branch. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1020b-2: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, §§ 4, 7; 1966, ch. 255, § 36) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

CHAPTER 24A District Court

24A.010. Jurisdiction of District Court — Court of record and continuous session.

  1. The District Court is a court of limited jurisdiction; it has original jurisdiction in all matters specified in KRS 24A.110 to 24A.130 .
  2. The District Court may be authorized by law to adjudicate the actions or decisions of local administrative agencies, special districts, or boards. Such adjudication shall not constitute an appeal but an original action.
  3. The District Court has no appellate jurisdiction.
  4. The District Court is a court of record.
  5. The District Court is a court of continuous session. Sessions of the District Court may be scheduled at such times, including nights, weekends, and holidays, and at such locations, as may be convenient, subject to the direction of the Supreme Court by rule or order.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 1; 1998, ch. 517, § 5, effective September 1, 1998; 2003, ch. 66, § 14, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Domestic Violence Orders.

Contrary to arguments by a husband who was the subject of a domestic violence order, a District Court was a court of limited jurisdiction and nothing within KRS ch. 24A gave District Courts exclusive jurisdiction in domestic violence proceedings. Under KRS 403.725 , the District Court had concurrent jurisdiction with Family Courts for the issuance of domestic violence orders. Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Because a District Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over a decision by a code enforcement board under KRS 65.8831 , the District Court was to conduct a de novo review of the record created before the code enforcement board and was not confined to a determination as to whether the board’s decision was arbitrary. Highview Manor Ass'n, LLC v. Louisville Metro Health Dep't, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 185 (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 2008), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 319 S.W.3d 380, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 2010 ).

2.Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Family Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with District Courts regarding the issuance of domestic violence orders. Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

3.Jurisdiction.

That part of KRS 65.8831(1) limiting review of a code enforcement board’s decision to the record created before the board was an unconstitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction to a district court in violation of Ky. Const. § 113 and KRS 24A.010(3). Such decisions were subject to de novo trials in district court. Louisville Metro Health Dep't v. Highview Manor Ass'n, LLC, 319 S.W.3d 380, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 610 S.W.2d 896, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Fawbush v. Bond, 613 S.W.2d 414, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 222 ( Ky. 1981 ); Commonwealth v. Carroll County Fiscal Court, 633 S.W.2d 720, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of the fact that the District Judge must be available at all times to issue civil or criminal process and the fact that his is a court of continuous session, a person could not carry on the work of a District Judge and be a master commissioner at the same time. OAG 77-186 .

While prosecution as an habitual violator of the motor vehicle laws is not a criminal prosecution, it clearly comes under the jurisdiction of the District Court. OAG 78-177 .

Under the broad legislative policy expressed in KRS 178.080 and 178.115 , the acceptance of a road as a part of the county road system is left to the sound discretion of the fiscal court under the specific guidelines set out in those sections. The action of a fiscal court in exercising such discretion could be reviewed, by direct action, in a Circuit Court as an alleged arbitrary or capricious exercise of the discretion; no appeal can be taken from a fiscal court order to the District Court, however, since that court has no appellate jurisdiction. OAG 82-445 .

The enacting of an ordinance which contains provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the District Court which are identical to the provisions found in the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, KRS 383.505 to 383.715 , would not be an enlargement of the court’s jurisdiction and would not, therefore, invalidate such an ordinance. OAG 83-251 .

Where a District Court has found, as a result of a preliminary hearing proceeding, that probable cause exists to believe that a felony has been committed, but a grand jury has not yet returned an indictment, the District Court does not have the authority to order that personal property seized incident to the arrest or by execution of a search warrant be returned to the defendant. OAG 91-67 .

Unless a District Court, upon a showing of good cause, amends a felony charge to a misdemeanor or finds a lack of probable cause and releases the defendant from custody, its sole authority with respect to a felony charge is the authority to examine the charge and determine whether to commit the defendant to jail or hold him to bail or other form of pre-trial release. OAG 91-67 .

A District Court which has found probable cause to believe a felony has been committed lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion in that criminal proceeding for the release of personal property held as evidence by the Commonwealth. This section, which defines a District Court’s criminal jurisdiction, provides no such authority. Therefore, a District Court cannot entertain a motion to suppress evidence obtained incident to or in support of a felony charge on the grounds that such evidence was unlawfully obtained. However, there may be cases in which the District Court may be empowered, pursuant to its jurisdiction in civil matters, to entertain an independent civil proceeding for the return of property not subject to forfeiture which is held as evidence. OAG 91-67 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Transition to district court, A.P., Part I, §§ 1 to 6.

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

An Overview of Kentucky’s New Court System, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1977 Ky. Bench & B. 13.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, The Kentucky Divorce Statute: A Call for Reform, 66 Ky. L.J. 724 (1977-1978).

Leathers, Rethinking Jurisdiction and Notice in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 755 (1982-83).

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

24A.020. Exclusive jurisdiction granted District Court by statute — Exception.

When jurisdiction over any matter is granted to District Court by statute, such jurisdiction shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the statute specifically states that the jurisdiction shall be concurrent.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 1, effective January 1, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Misdemeanor Offenses.

After an indictment has been returned incorporating misdemeanor offenses with related felony offenses, the misdemeanor offenses may be tried in the Circuit Court along with the felony offenses. Keller v. Commonwealth, 594 S.W.2d 589, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Cited:

Elery v. Martin, 4 S.W.3d 550, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 123 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

24A.030. Judicial districts. [Effective until January 2, 2023]

The state is divided into judicial districts, each to be composed of the following counties:

  1. First Judicial District. Fulton and Hickman.
  2. Second Judicial District. McCracken.
  3. Third Judicial District. Christian.
  4. Fourth Judicial District. Hopkins.
  5. Fifth Judicial District. Crittenden, Union, and Webster.
  6. Sixth Judicial District. Daviess.
  7. Seventh Judicial District. Logan and Todd.
  8. Eighth Judicial District. Warren.
  9. Ninth Judicial District. Hardin.
  10. Tenth Judicial District. Hart and Larue.
  11. Eleventh Judicial District. Green, Marion, Taylor, and Washington.
  12. Twelfth Judicial District. Henry, Oldham, and Trimble.
  13. Thirteenth Judicial District. Garrard, Jessamine, and Lincoln.
  14. Fourteenth Judicial District. Bourbon, Scott, and Woodford.
  15. Fifteenth Judicial District. Carroll, Grant, and Owen.
  16. Sixteenth Judicial District. Kenton.
  17. Seventeenth Judicial District. Campbell.
  18. Eighteenth Judicial District. Harrison, Nicholas, Pendleton, and Robertson.
  19. Nineteenth Judicial District. Bracken, Fleming, and Mason.
  20. Twentieth Judicial District. Greenup and Lewis.
  21. Twenty-first Judicial District. Bath, Menifee, Montgomery, and Rowan.
  22. Twenty-second Judicial District. Fayette.
  23. Twenty-third Judicial District. Estill, Lee, and Owsley.
  24. Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Lawrence, Johnson, and Martin.
  25. Twenty-fifth Judicial District. Clark and Madison.
  26. Twenty-sixth Judicial District. Harlan.
  27. Twenty-seventh Judicial District. Knox and Laurel.
  28. Twenty-eighth Judicial District. Pulaski and Rockcastle.
  29. Twenty-ninth Judicial District. Adair and Casey.
  30. Thirtieth Judicial District. Jefferson.
  31. Thirty-first Judicial District. Floyd.
  32. Thirty-second Judicial District. Boyd.
  33. Thirty-third Judicial District. Perry.
  34. Thirty-fourth Judicial District. Whitley and McCreary.
  35. Thirty-fifth Judicial District. Pike.
  36. Thirty-sixth Judicial District. Magoffin and Knott.
  37. Thirty-seventh Judicial District. Carter, Elliott, and Morgan.
  38. Thirty-eighth Judicial District. Butler, Edmonson, Ohio, and Hancock.
  39. Thirty-ninth Judicial District. Breathitt, Wolfe, and Powell.
  40. Fortieth Judicial District. Clinton, Russell, and Wayne.
  41. Forty-first Judicial District. Clay, Jackson, and Leslie.
  42. Forty-second Judicial District. Calloway.
  43. Forty-third Judicial District. Barren and Metcalfe.
  44. Forty-fourth Judicial District. Bell.
  45. Forty-fifth Judicial District. Muhlenberg and McLean.
  46. Forty-sixth Judicial District. Breckinridge, Grayson, and Meade.
  47. Forty-seventh Judicial District. Letcher.
  48. Forty-eighth Judicial District. Franklin.
  49. Forty-ninth Judicial District. Allen and Simpson.
  50. Fiftieth Judicial District. Boyle and Mercer.
  51. Fifty-first Judicial District. Henderson.
  52. Fifty-second Judicial District. Graves.
  53. Fifty-third Judicial District. Shelby, Anderson, and Spencer.
  54. Fifty-fourth Judicial District. Boone and Gallatin.
  55. Fifty-fifth Judicial District. Bullitt.
  56. Fifty-sixth Judicial District. Caldwell, Livingston, Lyon, and Trigg.
  57. Fifty-seventh Judicial District. Nelson.
  58. Fifty-eighth Judicial District. Marshall.
  59. Fifty-ninth Judicial District. Ballard and Carlisle.
  60. Sixtieth Judicial District. Cumberland and Monroe.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 2; 1984, ch. 311, § 1, effective January 6, 1986; 1986, ch. 251, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 274, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 2000, ch. 541, § 3, effective July 1, 2000.

Compiler's Notes.

Section 5 of Acts 2000, ch. 541, effective July 1, 2000, read:

“(1) The present District Judge who resides in the Twenty-ninth Judicial District as amended by Section 3 of this Act [this section] shall remain the District Judge for the Twenty-ninth Judicial District.

“(2) The present District Judge of the former Twenty-ninth Judicial District who resides in the Sixtieth Judicial District as created by Section 3 of this Act [this section] shall become the District Judge for the Sixtieth Judicial District.

“(3) No new vacancy shall be created by Section 3 of this Act [this section]. Each present District Judge shall serve the district, as amended or created by Section 3 of this Act [this section], in which he resides for the remainder of his present elected term.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Judicial Immunity.

Where plaintiff charged with traffic offenses was 15 years old at the time of the offense and thus properly under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile session of the District Court under KRS 208.020 , (now repealed) District Court judge who had jurisdiction over traffic offenses under this section and KRS 24A.110 was immune from suit alleging civil rights violations in plaintiff’s arrest and detention, since, despite judge’s erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, he was not so clearly without jurisdiction as to deprive him of immunity. Allsup v. Knox, 508 F. Supp. 57, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16607 (E.D. Ky. 1980 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Bartlett, The Selection and Election of Judges in Kentucky, Vol. 53, No. 3, Summer 1989, Ky. Bench & Bar 26.

24A.030. Judicial districts. [Effective January 2, 2023]

The state is divided into judicial districts, each to be composed of the following counties:

  1. First Judicial District. Ballard, Carlisle, Fulton, and Hickman.
  2. Second Judicial District. McCracken.
  3. Third Judicial District. Christian.
  4. Fourth Judicial District. Hopkins.
  5. Fifth Judicial District. Crittenden, Union,  and Webster.
  6. Sixth Judicial District. Daviess.
  7. Seventh Judicial District. Logan and Todd.
  8. Eighth Judicial District. Warren.
  9. Ninth Judicial District. Hardin.
  10. Tenth Judicial District. Hart and Larue.
  11. Eleventh Judicial District. Green, Marion,  Taylor, and Washington.
  12. Twelfth Judicial District. Henry, Oldham,  and Trimble.
  13. Thirteenth Judicial District. Garrard, Jessamine,  and Lincoln.
  14. Fourteenth Judicial District. Bourbon, Scott,  and Woodford.
  15. Fifteenth Judicial District. Carroll, Grant,  and Owen.
  16. Sixteenth Judicial District. Kenton.
  17. Seventeenth Judicial District. Campbell.
  18. Eighteenth Judicial District. Harrison, Nicholas,  Pendleton, and Robertson.
  19. Nineteenth Judicial District. Bracken, Fleming,  and Mason.
  20. Twentieth Judicial District. Greenup and Lewis.
  21. Twenty-first Judicial District. Bath, Menifee,  Montgomery, and Rowan.
  22. Twenty-second Judicial District. Fayette.
  23. Twenty-third Judicial District. Estill, Lee,  and Owsley.
  24. Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Lawrence, Johnson,  and Martin.
  25. Twenty-fifth Judicial District. Clark and Madison.
  26. Twenty-sixth Judicial District. Harlan.
  27. Twenty-seventh Judicial District. Knox and Laurel.
  28. Twenty-eighth Judicial District. Pulaski and Rockcastle.
  29. Twenty-ninth Judicial District. Adair and Casey.
  30. Thirtieth Judicial District. Jefferson.
  31. Thirty-first Judicial District. Floyd.
  32. Thirty-second Judicial District. Boyd.
  33. Thirty-third Judicial District. Perry.
  34. Thirty-fourth Judicial District. Whitley and McCreary.
  35. Thirty-fifth Judicial District. Pike.
  36. Thirty-sixth Judicial District. Magoffin and  Knott.
  37. Thirty-seventh Judicial District. Carter, Elliott, and Morgan.
  38. Thirty-eighth Judicial District. Butler, Edmonson,  Ohio, and Hancock.
  39. Thirty-ninth Judicial District. Breathitt, Wolfe,  and Powell.
  40. Fortieth Judicial District. Clinton, Russell,  and Wayne.
  41. Forty-first Judicial District. Clay, Jackson,  and Leslie.
  42. Forty-second Judicial District. Calloway.
  43. Forty-third Judicial District. Barren and Metcalfe.
  44. Forty-fourth Judicial District. Bell.
  45. Forty-fifth Judicial District. Muhlenberg and  McLean.
  46. Forty-sixth Judicial District. Breckinridge,  Grayson, and Meade.
  47. Forty-seventh Judicial District. Letcher.
  48. Forty-eighth Judicial District. Franklin.
  49. Forty-ninth Judicial District. Allen and Simpson.
  50. Fiftieth Judicial District. Boyle and Mercer.
  51. Fifty-first Judicial District. Henderson.
  52. Fifty-second Judicial District. Graves.
  53. Fifty-third Judicial District. Shelby, Anderson,  and Spencer.
  54. Fifty-fourth Judicial District. Boone and Gallatin.
  55. Fifty-fifth Judicial District. Bullitt.
  56. Fifty-sixth Judicial District. Caldwell, Livingston,  Lyon, and Trigg.
  57. Fifty-seventh Judicial District. Nelson.
  58. Fifty-eighth Judicial District. Marshall.
  59. Fifty-ninth Judicial District. Cumberland and Monroe.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 2; 1984, ch. 311, § 1, effective January 6, 1986; 1986, ch. 251, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 274, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 2000, ch. 541, § 3, effective July 1, 2000; 2018 ch. 57, § 8, effective January 2, 2023.

Compiler's Notes.

For this section as effective until January 2, 2023, see the bound volume.

24A.040. Judicial districts with one District Judge.

Each judicial district shall have one (1) District Judge, except as otherwise provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 3.

24A.050. Judicial districts with two District Judges and two numbered divisions.

The following judicial districts are entitled to two (2) District Judges and shall have two (2) numbered divisions of the District Court:

  1. Second Judicial District.
  2. Third Judicial District.
  3. Fourth Judicial District.
  4. Ninth Judicial District.
  5. Eleventh Judicial District.
  6. Twelfth Judicial District.
  7. Thirteenth Judicial District.
  8. Fourteenth Judicial District.
  9. Fifteenth Judicial District.
  10. Seventeenth Judicial District.
  11. Twenty-first Judicial District.
  12. Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
  13. Twenty-seventh Judicial District.
  14. Twenty-eighth Judicial District.
  15. Thirty-first Judicial District.
  16. Thirty-second Judicial District.
  17. Thirty-fourth Judicial District.
  18. Thirty-fifth Judicial District.
  19. Thirty-eighth Judicial District.
  20. Fortieth Judicial District.
  21. Forty-first Judicial District.
  22. Forty-sixth Judicial District.
  23. Forty-eighth Judicial District.
  24. Fifty-first Judicial District.
  25. Fifty-third Judicial District.
  26. Fifty-fourth Judicial District.
  27. Fifty-sixth Judicial District.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 4; 1978, ch. 90, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 247, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 311, § 2, effective January 6, 1986; 1986, ch. 113, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 274, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 307, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 517, § 7, effective September 1, 1998, September 1, 1999, and January 1, 2000; 2000, ch. 541, § 4, effective July 1, 2000; 2001, ch. 72, § 3, effective June 21, 2001; 2003, ch. 66, § 9, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 173, Pt. XIII, 1.(3), § 4, effective January 1, 2007, 2006, ch. 250, § 4, effective January 1, 2007; 2018 ch. 57, § 5, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(1/1/2007). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 250, Part V, sec. 6, provides that the new judgeships created by sections 1 to 5 of that part shall become effective January 1, 2007. The revisions to this statute in that Act supersede those made in 2005 Ky. Acts 173, Pt. XIII, 1.(3), sec. 4, which were also to be effective January 1, 2007. That 2005 version of the statute was used as the base document for the 2006 revisions.

24A.060. Judicial districts with three District Judges and three numbered divisions.

The following judicial districts are entitled to three (3) District Judges and shall have three (3) numbered divisions of the District Court:

  1. Sixth Judicial District.
  2. Eighth Judicial District.
  3. Sixteenth Judicial District;
  4. Twenty-fifth Judicial District.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 5; 1996, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 517, § 8, effective September 1, 1998, and September 1, 1999; 2003, ch. 66, § 10, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 173, Pt. XIII, 1.(3), § 5, effective January 1, 2007; 2006, ch. 250, § 5, effective January 1, 2007; 2009, ch. 44, § 3, effective January 3, 2011.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(1/1/2007). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 250, Part V, sec. 6, provides that the new judgeships created by subsections (2) and (3) of this statute shall become effective January 1, 2007. The revisions to this statute in that Act supersede those made in 2005 Ky. Acts 173, Pt. XIII, 1.(3), sec. 5, which were also to be effective January 1, 2007. That 2005 version of the statute was used as the base document for the 2006 revisions.

24A.070. Sixteenth Judicial District. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 6.) was repealed by 2009 Ky. Acts ch. 44, sec. 4, effective January 3, 2011.

24A.080. Twenty-second Judicial District.

The Twenty-second Judicial District is entitled to five (5) District Judges and shall have five (5) numbered divisions of the District Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 7; 2003, ch. 66, § 11, effective June 24, 2003.

24A.090. Thirtieth Judicial District.

The Thirtieth Judicial District is entitled to seventeen (17) District Judges and shall have seventeen (17) numbered divisions of the District Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 8; 2003, ch. 66, § 12, effective June 24, 2003.

24A.100. Trial commissioners.

  1. In any county which does not have a District Judge resident in the county there shall be a trial commissioner.
  2. Trial commissioners shall be appointed in the manner required by Section 113 of the Constitution of Kentucky and shall perform such duties as may be directed by the Supreme Court.
  3. Trial commissioners in District Court shall be compensated as provided in the judicial personnel system, provided, however that no trial commissioner shall be compensated at a rate greater than seven thousand two hundred dollars ($7,200) per year. Except that during the disability or suspension of a District Judge for a period in excess of sixty (60) days, a trial commissioner who is qualified as an attorney and who is authorized to perform extraordinary duties, may be compensated by the Supreme Court in an amount not exceeding the salary of a District Judge, provided such trial commissioner shall not engage in the practice of law during the period of extraordinary service.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 9; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 78, effective January 2, 1978; 1982, ch. 449, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person would be prohibited from holding the office of trial commissioner, which is a state office, while at the same time serving as county judge/executive. OAG 77-661 .

There is no authority under this section for the appointment of a judge pro tem of the District Court or the appointment of a pro tem trial commissioner. OAG 77-661 .

Since the position of trial commissioner is a state office and membership on the county election board is a county office, an individual would be prohibited from holding both positions at the same time by Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 . OAG 80-266 .

A county sheriff must execute and make due return on all criminal process lawfully issued by a county trial commissioner (process as authorized by SCR 5.030 ) and placed in the sheriff’s hands or with his lawful deputies. OAG 80-332 .

The positions of deputy circuit clerk, a state officer under KRS 30A.010 , and trial commissioner of the county District Court, a state officer under this section are compatible with one another, since neither Const., § 165, nor KRS 61.080 prohibits a person from holding two state offices at the same time; however, they may be incompatible under the doctrine of practical or common law. OAG 81-124 .

A lawyer who represents defendants in criminal cases cannot also be appointed to the position of trial commissioner pursuant to this section and Const., § 113, since the judicial functions of the trial commissioner are inherently inconsistent and repugnant to the role of a defense attorney in criminal cases, and, in addition, the trial commissioner of one district court cannot personally appear in criminal matters before another District Court within the same judicial district. OAG 81-177 .

If a city has either established a position of legal advisor as a form of city employment or created the office of city attorney, no one could hold at the same time the state office of trial commissioner and the office of city attorney or city employment without violating Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 . However, if an attorney is employed on a personal service contract basis, he would be considered an independent contractor and there would be no constitutional or statutory objection to his serving as trial commissioner of the District Court. OAG 82-502 .

24A.110. Criminal jurisdiction.

  1. The District Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to make final disposition of all criminal matters, including violations of county, urban-county, or city ordinances or codes, except:
    1. Offenses denominated by statute as felonies or capital offenses; and
    2. Offenses punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary.
  2. The District Court has exclusive jurisdiction to make a final disposition of any charge or a public offense denominated as a misdemeanor or violation, except where the charge is joined with an indictment for a felony, and all violations of county, urban-county, or city ordinances and, prior to trial, to commit the defendant to jail or hold him to bail or other form of pretrial release.
  3. The District Court has, concurrent with Circuit Court, jurisdiction to examine any charge of a public offense denominated as a felony or capital offense or which may be punished by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary and to commit the defendant to jail or hold him to bail or other form of pretrial release.
  4. The District Court may, upon motion and for good cause shown, reduce a charge of a felony to a misdemeanor in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Disposition of Felony Cases.

Where jurisdiction initially attached in the Circuit Court, it was not lost when that court, during the course of the trial, dismissed one felony count of a three-count indictment; jurisdiction having attached by reason of the felony charge was not divested by its final determination. Broughton v. Commonwealth, 596 S.W.2d 22, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

District Court ruling that there was no probable cause for search of defendant charged with drug possession and that evidence seized in the search should be suppressed was not binding on Circuit Court in subsequent trial since District Courts have no jurisdiction for final disposition of felony cases under this section. Waugh v. Commonwealth, 605 S.W.2d 43, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 366 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Where a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with burglary in the first degree and persistent felony offender in the first degree, the issuance of the indictment on the felony charge terminated the jurisdiction in the District Court and placed the sole jurisdiction in the Circuit Court; therefore, the District Court had no jurisdiction to accept the defendant’s plea to a reduced charge and there was no double jeopardy when the defendant was subsequently arraigned in the Circuit Court. Commonwealth v. Hamblem, 628 S.W.2d 345, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

This section unequivocally places jurisdiction in the Circuit Court when an indictment charges both a felony and a misdemeanor. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 61, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1982 ).

District Court has no power to dispose of any charges which constitute lesser included offenses of the felony charged in the indictment. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 61, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Action of the District Court in accepting a plea of guilty to a possession charge after the return of the grand jury’s indictment for trafficking did not preclude a Circuit Court conviction on the same possession charge, as once the indictment was returned charging the offense of trafficking, the District Court no longer had jurisdiction to make a final disposition of the offense of possession, a lesser included offense. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 61, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Until such time as an indictment is reported to the Circuit Judge in a felony case, the District Court may exercise its jurisdiction and enter any order or judgment it deems appropriate; the reporting of an indictment to the Circuit Judge is essential to the validity of that action. Commonwealth v. Karnes, 657 S.W.2d 583, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 263 ( Ky. 1983 ).

As a District Court lacked jurisdiction to make a final adjudication as to defendant’s felony charges, its dismissal of those charges did not preclude the Commonwealth, on double jeopardy grounds, from proceeding against defendant in Circuit Court on the same charges. Commonwealth v. Stephenson, 82 S.W.3d 876, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 2002 ).

County attorney and the district court did not have the authority to approve a deferred prosecution on a charge of first-degree possession of a controlled substance under KRS 218A.14151 because only the Commonwealth’s attorney and the circuit court had jurisdiction over a felony offense. Commonwealth v. Vibbert, 397 S.W.3d 910, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 60 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

2.Misdemeanor Offenses.

After an indictment has been returned incorporating misdemeanor offenses with related felony offenses, the misdemeanor offenses may be tried in the Circuit Court along with the felony offenses. Keller v. Commonwealth, 594 S.W.2d 589, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1980 ).

A District Court has jurisdiction to hold a preliminary hearing on a misdemeanor charge and to refer that misdemeanor to the grand jury if it is joined with a felony. When the District Court conducts such a preliminary hearing, jeopardy will not attach on the misdemeanor to the extent that it has been joined with a felony. Commonwealth v. Arnette, 701 S.W.2d 407, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 296 ( Ky. 1985 ).

Special Circuit Judge could not enforce his judgment accepting defendant’s plea of guilty of charge of driving under the influence (DUI) since such charge had not been consolidated with felony charge of possession of cocaine and, since District Court and not Circuit Court had jurisdiction. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 806 S.W.2d 643, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1991 ).

A Circuit Court, vested with jurisdiction by a grand jury indictment, does not lose jurisdiction when a felony indictment is amended to a misdemeanor. Commonwealth v. Adkins, 29 S.W.3d 793, 2000 Ky. LEXIS 109 ( Ky. 2000 ).

Although a Governor’s blanket pardon for individuals involved in a merit system investigation was valid under Ky. Const. § 77 and there was no evidence that defendant rejected the pardon, the order dismissing the indictment was vacated because the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction and the District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the misdemeanor charges under KRS 24A.110 . Commonwealth v. Groves, 209 S.W.3d 492, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

District court properly granted summary judgment to the police officer on the arrestee’s claim for false arrest because officer acted pursuant to legal process, and although it was later determined that arrest warrant lacked probable cause, district court had authority to issue the warrant based on a charge of terroristic threatening. Juillerat v. Mudd, 735 Fed. Appx. 887, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 14238 (6th Cir. Ky. 2018 ).

3.Remand of Misdemeanor Charge.

Where a felony and misdemeanor are originally joined but later separated, the Circuit Court may remand the misdemeanor to the District Court for disposition. Kimbro v. Lassiter, 648 S.W.2d 860, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 237 ( Ky. 1983 ).

The Circuit Court judge did not commit reversible error in remanding a misdemeanor charge to the District Court after a felony count that was coupled with the misdemeanor was dismissed by the Circuit Court. Kimbro v. Lassiter, 648 S.W.2d 860, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 237 ( Ky. 1983 ).

Where a misdemeanor offense and a felony offense are joined in a single indictment, after the Commonwealth dismisses the felony charge then the trial court should immediately remand the misdemeanor to the District Court. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 806 S.W.2d 643, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1991 ).

4.Judicial Immunity.

Where plaintiff charged with traffic offenses was 15 years old at the time of the offense and thus properly under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile session of the District Court under KRS 208.020 (now repealed), District Court judge who had jurisdiction over traffic offenses under KRS 24A.030 and this section was immune from suit alleging civil rights violations in plaintiff’s arrest and detention, since, despite judge’s erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, he was not so clearly without jurisdiction as to deprive him of immunity. Allsup v. Knox, 508 F. Supp. 57, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16607 (E.D. Ky. 1980 ).

5.Reduction of Charges.

Since District Court had concurrent jurisdiction with Circuit Court over charges of second-degree robbery, receiving stolen property and first-degree persistent felony offender, the District Court had authority to reduce such charges to a misdemeanor and enter judgment thereon prior to the return of indictment in Circuit Court and, subsequently, Circuit Court acted properly in dismissing the case on grounds of double jeopardy. Commonwealth v. Karnes, 657 S.W.2d 583, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 263 ( Ky. 1983 ).

6.Administrative Search Warrants.

KRS 338.101(2), which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Franklin Circuit Court to issue a search warrant to enforce the right of the Commissioner of Labor to conduct inspections of businesses, is not in conflict with subsection (1) of this section as this section deals exclusively with the jurisdiction of District Court in criminal matters. Stovall v. A. O. Smith Corp., 676 S.W.2d 475, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 501 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

7.Traffic Offenses.

Writ of prohibition was inappropriate based on a judge’s lack of jurisdiction to sua sponte invalidate Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.574(6) as unconstitutional where district courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over traffic offenses, and the alleged errors implicated particular-case jurisdiction, which belonged to the erroneous action category of writs. Delahanty v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.3d 489, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Cited:

Stratford v. Crossman, 655 S.W.2d 500, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 343 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Fulton v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 553, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 03 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1994 ); Peters v. Commonwealth, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 11, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 2012 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1.Misdemeanor Offenses.

Unpublished decision: Pursuant to KRS 24A.110(2), the district court, rather than the circuit court, enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction to make a final disposition of the defendant’s charge of failing to register a change of address as a sex offender, because the charge against the defendant could only be brought under the 1998 version of 17.510 , for which the offense was a Class A Misdemeanor, rather than the 2000 version of the statute, for which the offense was a Class D Felony. Peterson v. Shake, 120 S.W.3d 707, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 2003 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A grand jury may return a misdemeanor indictment, however it would be impractical to affirmatively seek a misdemeanor indictment, where it is not required, and is not a usual method of procedure. OAG 78-168 .

The District Court has jurisdiction to dispose of any nonfelony criminal offense and the charge may be brought by information or complaint. OAG 78-168 .

The enforcement of city ordinances is generally within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court and all fees, fines, forfeitures and costs in any District Court case shall be collected and accounted for by the circuit court clerk and paid into the state treasury; however, the city does not receive fines imposed by the District Court and collected by the Circuit Court Clerk although the city, pursuant to former KRS 24A.190 through 24A.192 , may have funds returned to it if it qualifies under those statutes. OAG 78-682 .

The only reading of KRS 318.190 , 23A.010 and this section which gives effect to all three statutes is that the misdemeanor penalty established by KRS 318.990 must be prosecuted in District Court. OAG 78-742 .

Where a defendant, who is charged with a felony, is placed on trial before a Circuit Judge and jury, and the felony charge is amended to a lesser included misdemeanor charge by the Circuit Judge, the Circuit Court must proceed with trial of the misdemeanor to judgment. OAG 79-570 .

The authority for a District Court to order transfer of District Court prisoners to an out-of-the-county jail is an inherent power under its general criminal jurisdiction. OAG 79-588 .

The county attorney is required to prosecute violations of municipal ordinances in the District Court. OAG 80-34 .

The District Court’s criminal jurisdiction under this section inherently gives him the authority to see to it that prisoners under his jurisdiction and requiring incarceration are placed in a suitable county jail. OAG 80-129 .

KRS 61.170 requires an indictment by a Circuit Court grand jury in order to charge the offense of malfeasance or neglect of county officers; but since this section vests exclusive jurisdiction of misdemeanor cases, generally, in the District Court, the Circuit Court in which such an indictment is returned has necessarily, because of the jurisdictional statute, the authority and duty to refer the indictment for trial or other appropriate disposition to the District Court of that county. OAG 80-152 .

Even if subsection (4) of this section is interpreted literally, it is impossible for a District Court to amend a third or subsequent offense under KRS Chapter 242 and treat it as a first or second offense, since the convictions of the first and second offense are already of record and nothing can change that fact. OAG 80-335 .

Since the record of two or more prior convictions under KRS Chapter 242 indicates that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to try the defendant a third time, the defendant could, under RCr 10.22 (abolished), file a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground of no jurisdiction, provided that the motion is filed within five days after determination of guilt; in view of RCr 13.04, a defendant in such case could file a motion to set aside the judgment under the terms outlined in CR 60.02. OAG 80-335 .

Where court records show two convictions under KRS Chapter 242, the third offense under that chapter would be a felony, and the District Court would not have jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea or try the case since this section expressly provides that the District Court has no jurisdiction of felony cases. OAG 80-335 .

The judge has the primary duty to determine where the defendant is to be committed and to enter an order directing such commitment; however, the court may order the sheriff to keep it informed of what facilities are available for housing the prisoners, and where the judges have ordered the sheriff to keep them informed of what facilities are available to house prisoners, he must do so. OAG 80-482 .

Where a peace officer issues a citation pursuant to KRS 431.015 charging a person with the violation of a city ordinance, and the person fails to appear in response to the citation, the District Court cannot acquire jurisdiction under subsection (2) of this section and cannot impose a fine against the person until the person is properly before the court, either by way of a voluntary personal appearance or pursuant to a warrant or summons. OAG 81-252 .

Felony cases do not have to go through District Court before they are presented to the grand jury and once a person is indicted on a felony charge by a grand jury, the case cannot be sent back to the District Court since the District Court no longer has jurisdiction in the case. OAG 83-31 .

The District Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court to examine a charge of first-degree wanton endangerment, a felony. OAG 83-31 .

A District Court which has found probable cause to believe a felony has been committed lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion in that criminal proceeding for the release of personal property held as evidence by the Commonwealth. This section, which defines a District Court’s criminal jurisdiction, provides no such authority. Therefore, a District Court cannot entertain a motion to suppress evidence obtained incident to or in support of a felony charge on the grounds that such evidence was unlawfully obtained. However, there may be cases in which the District Court may be empowered, pursuant to its jurisdiction in civil matters, to entertain an independent civil proceeding for the return of property not subject to forfeiture which is held as evidence. OAG 91-67 .

Unless a District Court, upon a showing of good cause, amends a felony charge to a misdemeanor or finds a lack of probable cause and releases the defendant from custody, its sole authority with respect to a felony charge is the authority to examine the charge and determine whether to commit the defendant to jail or hold him to bail or other form of pre-trial release. OAG 91-67 .

Where a District Court has found, as a result of a preliminary hearing proceeding, that probable cause exists to believe that a felony has been committed, but a grand jury has not yet returned an indictment, the District Court does not have the authority to order that personal property seized incident to the arrest or by execution of a search warrant be returned to the defendant. OAG 91-67 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Weigand and Farr, Part of the Moving Stream: State Constitutional Law, Sodomy, and Beyond, 81 Ky. L.J. 449 (1992-93).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Bill of Costs (AOC 130), Form 3.07.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Circuit Court, § 4.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for District Courts, § 3.00.

24A.120. Civil and probate jurisdiction.

District Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in:

  1. Civil cases in which the amount in controversy does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), exclusive of interest and costs, except matters affecting title to real estate and matters of equity; however, nothing herein shall prohibit execution levy on real estate in enforcement of judgment of District Court;
  2. Matters involving probate, except matters contested in an adversary proceeding. Such adversary proceeding shall be filed in Circuit Court in accordance with the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and shall not be considered an appeal;
  3. Matters not provided for by statute to be commenced in Circuit Court shall be deemed to be nonadversarial within the meaning of subsection (2) of this section and therefore are within the jurisdiction of the District Court; and
  4. Matters involving trusts in accordance with KRS 386B.2-030 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 11; 1978, ch. 384, § 122, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 54, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 259, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 188, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 137, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1998, ch. 517, § 6, effective September 1, 1998; 2002, ch. 320, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 66, § 15, effective June 24, 2003; 2011, ch. 91, § 1, effective June 8, 2011; 2014, ch. 25, § 96, effective July 15, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/8/2011). 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 91, sec. 4, provides that “any case which has been filed in a Circuit Court or District Court prior to the effective date of this Act (June 8, 2011) and the change in jurisdictional amounts (made by 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 91) shall remain in the court in which the case was originally filed, until the disposition of the case.”

(6/24/2003). Under the authority of KRS 7.136 , the Reviser of Statutes has renumbered the paragraphs and subsections of this section. To conform with this renumbering, a reference in subsection (3) to “paragraph (b) of this subsection” has been changed to read “subsection (2) of this section.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Civil.

Appellate court properly granted a lessee’s petition for a writ of prohibition of the first class—thereby vacating the circuit court’s denial of its motion to dismiss the lessors’ claim for breach of contract—because the challenged writ action was correctly initiated in the appellate court since none of the lessors satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement prescribed by the legislature or met the court’s jurisdictional requirement in order to certify the class, and, while the lessors sought “legal and equitable remedies,” their single cause of action was breach of contract, which was regularly adjudicated in the district court. Imhoff v. House, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 307 (Ky. Aug. 26, 2021).

2.—Jurisdictional Amount.

A single plaintiff may not aggregate multiple claims against multiple parties in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount necessary to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. Dalton v. First Nat'l Bank, 712 S.W.2d 954, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1165 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Even though two of a company’s three claims against a credit card debtor did not meet the amount in controversy limit in KRS 24A.120(1), it could aggregate the claims in the same action under CR 18.01. Nat'l Check Bureau, Inc. v. Irby, 229 S.W.3d 913, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

For the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, proof of damages is not required. Jackson v. Beattyville Water Dep't, 278 S.W.3d 633, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Cemetery owner’s complaint and supplemental interrogatory answers, which set out damages allegedly caused by a water department to the cemetery that exceeded $4,000, satisfied the jurisdictional requirements under KRS chs. 23A and 24A for bringing suit in Circuit Court; the damage amount did not have to be proven to establish jurisdiction. Jackson v. Beattyville Water Dep't, 278 S.W.3d 633, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

One type of writ of prohibition was not granted in a contractual dispute between a health plan and a laboratory because a circuit court was not acting outside of its jurisdiction when it ordered a deposit of money into the court; circuit courts had jurisdiction over contractual payments when the amount in controversy exceeded the minimum jurisdictional limit. PremierTox 2.0 v. Miniard, 407 S.W.3d 542, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 385 ( Ky. 2013 ).

Landlord was entitled to a writ of prohibition as to a forcible detainer action because the action was brought before a district court whose jurisdiction did not exceed $5,000, and the amount in controversy was $8,100, so the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and the court’s orders were void, although the landlord was not entitled to a writ on the grounds Ky. R. Civ. P. 59.05 did not apply to forcible detainer actions, even though the landlord was correct. Anthony v. McLaughlin, 566 S.W.3d 581, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 305 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

3.—Notice Requirements.

Although subsection (2) of KRS 394.240 uses such language as “shall forthwith lodge a notice,” the failure to file such a notice does not strip the Circuit Court of jurisdiction to hear the case; jurisdiction of a Circuit Court is invoked by filing a complaint in accordance with CR 3 regardless of whether the notice requirements of subsection KRS 394.240 are complied with. Justice v. Conn, 724 S.W.2d 227, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1494 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Subsection (2) of this section states that the Circuit Court shall have jurisdiction over adversary proceedings which shall be filed in accordance with the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore, although KRS 394.240(2) uses such language as “shall forthwith lodge a notice,” the failure to file such a notice does not strip the Circuit Court of jurisdiction to hear the case. West v. Goldstein, 830 S.W.2d 379, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 50 ( Ky. 1992 ).

4.—Equitable Relief.

In holding that a customer had abandoned certain vehicle parts to an auto parts retailer after not paying for services performed for eleven (11) years, the District Court was not fashioning equitable relief, but rather was merely acknowledging the retailer’s legal claim to the parts following the customer’s abandonment of the auto parts. Kelley v. Nationwide Auto Restoration, LLC, 246 S.W.3d 470, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 493 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

5.Guardianship Proceedings.

District court acted soundly within its jurisdiction when it issued an order requiring a guardian to provide all financial records for an accounting and to make restitution to a guardianship account, because the district court was granted exclusive jurisdiction to manage and settle guardianship accounts under KRS 24A.120 , 387.520 . Karem v. Bryant, 370 S.W.3d 867, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 2012 ).

A son’s motion for discretionary review, pursuant to CR 76.20(1), of a judgment affirming a District Court order removing him as co-guardian for his mother was denied because the matter was not a probate proceeding, and the District Court’s jurisdiction was provided by KRS 387.520(1); even if KRS 24A.120 (2) applied, the removal of a guardian was nonadversarial under KRS 24A.120 (3) since no statute granted a Circuit Court jurisdiction to remove a guardian and since the General Assembly had vested District Courts with exclusive original jurisdiction in removal matters, it was immaterial whether the removal proceeding could have been construed as adversarial pursuant to KRS 24A.120. Hall v. Coyle, 240 S.W.3d 656, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 419 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

6.Support Action.

When child support arrearages exceed $2,500.00 in a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) action, KRS 407.170 (repealed) controls because subsection (1) of this section is the general civil jurisdiction statute of the District Court, while KRS 407.170 (repealed) is addressed specifically to jurisdiction in URESA actions; therefore, the District Court may assert jurisdiction over a URESA action regardless of the amount of arrearages. Kampschaefer v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 567, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

7.Probate Jurisdiction.

District Courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters, except for adversary proceedings, or those proceedings provided for by statute to be commenced in Circuit Court, and there is no statute providing for an action to determine the validity of a will to be commenced in the Circuit Court. Mullins v. First American Bank, 781 S.W.2d 527, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

The District Court’s jurisdiction over probate matters continues until such time as a suit is filed in Circuit Court under a statute authorizing such a filing. Mullins v. First American Bank, 781 S.W.2d 527, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

The district court had jurisdiction over a renunciation of a will filed pursuant to KRS 392.080 since (1) the renunciation of a will is a matter involving probate, and (2) the matter was not contested in an adversary proceeding. McElroy v. Taylor, 977 S.W.2d 929, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Circuit court made the requisite certification of jurisdiction to retain a trust administration case and decide it on the merits because the circuit court made sufficient findings on the record related to its certification of jurisdiction, and the record support its findings; a beneficiary was provided with, and took advantage of, the opportunity to argue the jurisdictional issue both orally at the hearing dates and in his court filings. Beardmore v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 60 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017), review denied, ordered not published, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 204 (Ky. June 6, 2018).

8.—Contest of Will.

Although the validity of a will had been originally contested in a probate proceeding in a county court before the adoption of the judicial article which eliminated the county courts, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear subsequent proceedings in the case as an original action rather than as an appeal, even though the party who filed the action in the Circuit Court failed to comply with certain procedural matters involving that court’s jurisdiction. Smith v. Riherd, 603 S.W.2d 494, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 351 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

While the District Court exercises supervision and control of guardians and while the guardianship statutes are mandatory and are to be strictly construed, upon the filing of a claim pursuant to KRS 395.510 where acts of mismanagement, fraud, or deception are alleged, the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to settle the estate and adjudicate all claims associated therewith. Priestley v. Priestley, 949 S.W.2d 594, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1997 ).

9.—Duties of Probate Court.

KRS 394.240 and this section read together, require (1) that all proceedings for the admission to probate of a will or codicil be commenced in the District Court; (2) that the District Court either admit or reject the instrument; and (3) that the District Court retain jurisdiction over the matter until such time as a will contest, or adversary proceeding, is commenced in the Circuit Court. Mullins v. First American Bank, 781 S.W.2d 527, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

10.—Admissibility of Codicil.

In an action regarding the admissibility of a codicil to a will, the District Court can and should decide as to the codicil’s validity; thereafter an aggrieved party may, if desired, contest the codicil by following the procedure in KRS 394.240 , and if such an adversarial action is pursued in Circuit Court, the District Court shall retain jurisdiction to entertain any motions or matters not related to the adversarial proceeding, and shall, at the conclusion of the Circuit Court action, proceed with the probate of the estate to its conclusion. Mullins v. First American Bank, 781 S.W.2d 527, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

11.—Adversary Proceeding.

The removal of the executor because of conflict of interest due to his indebtedness to the estate was not an adversarial matter beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court where there was no dispute surrounding the existence of the executor’s debts or their measure against the value of his mother’s estate. Morris v. Brien, 712 S.W.2d 347, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1066 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

An adversary proceeding is not created by the mere opposition of a party to the admission to probate of a will, and such opposition does not therefore divest the District Court of its jurisdiction or its duty to rule on the merits of the matter before it. Mullins v. First American Bank, 781 S.W.2d 527, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

12.Contested Matter.

The District Court lacks jurisdiction to decide a contested matter, or matters provided by statute to be commenced in Circuit Court. Vega v. Kosair Charities Committee, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 895, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

In an action to settle a probate estate, the Circuit Court alone had subject matter jurisdiction over all the contested issues presented in the case, and absent any non-contested issues, there was nothing over which the District Court retained any authority to act. Hale v. Moore, 289 S.W.3d 567, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 5 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Cited in:

Fischer v. Jeffries, 697 S.W.2d 159, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 725 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Wood v. Wingfield, 816 S.W.2d 899, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 70 ( Ky. 1991 ); Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1994 ); Abell v. Reynolds, 191 S.W.3d 1, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 95 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction of uncontested probate matters, any papers relative to an uncontested estate in which no final settlement was filed prior to January 2, 1978, should be transferred to the clerk of the District Court of that county and duplicates should be filed with the county clerk. OAG 78-68 .

The District Judge has the authority to take the executor’s bond book or administrator’s bond book from the county clerk’s office and surrender it to the circuit clerk since the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction of uncontested probate matters (wills and settlement of estates). OAG 78-118 .

Since this section vests the exclusive jurisdiction over uncontested probate or estate matters in the District Court, it repeals KRS 424.340 by implication. OAG 78-147 .

The responsibility for advertising for creditors with respect to probate and estate matters rests with the personal representative, especially since the statutes place this task on no public official. OAG 78-147 .

The county attorney would handle civil appeals to Circuit Court in which the county is a party. OAG 78-190 .

Since the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction of uncontested probate matters, and since a contest of probate matters can only be filed in the Circuit Court, if at the time a will and related papers are offered and tendered with the District Court no adversary proceeding in such estate has been instituted in the Circuit Court, the District Court may proceed to exercise its jurisdiction; thus a party cannot come into the District Court objecting to the probate of the will or threatening to file litigation in Circuit Court, since such adversary party will have to file a suit in Circuit Court contesting such proposed will. OAG 79-81 .

A clerk is not responsible in any way to any person who may be misled if a certified copy of an order of appointment is given to an administrator named in the copy who uses it to show his appointment, when actually the estate has been settled: the clerk has no duty to inform the public of the active or inactive status of each estate. OAG 79-136 .

The clerk is not responsible for determining whether an estate has been settled before making certified copies of court orders showing appointment of administrators, executors, etc., in connection with the administration and settlement of estates. OAG 79-136 .

The District Court has jurisdiction in actions under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act where there is an attempt to enforce support arrearage in excess of $1,500, notwithstanding the provisions of this section because, while this section generally governs the District Court’s jurisdiction, in the specific matter of uniform support actions, KRS 407.100(4) (repealed) and 407.170 (repealed) are controlling so that, regardless of the amount of support money sued for, the District and Circuit Courts have concurrent jurisdiction of such actions. OAG 80-159 ; OAG 80-615 .

A District Court which has found probable cause to believe a felony has been committed lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion in that criminal proceeding for the release of personal property held as evidence by the Commonwealth. KRS 24A.110 , which defines a District Court’s criminal jurisdiction, provides no such authority. Therefore, a District Court cannot entertain a motion to suppress evidence obtained incident to or in support of a felony charge on the grounds that such evidence was unlawfully obtained. However, there may be cases in which the District Court may be empowered, pursuant to its jurisdiction in civil matters, to entertain an independent civil proceeding for the return of property not subject to forfeiture which is held as evidence. OAG 91-67 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July, 1978, Ky. Bench & Bar 16.

Siler, A Calculated Risk: Removal of the Indeterminate Complaint, Vol. 54, No. 4, Winter 1990, Ky. Bench & Bar 19.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Weigand and Farr, Part of the Moving Stream: State Constitutional Law, Sodomy, and Beyond, 81 Ky. L.J. 449 (1992-93).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for District Courts, § 3.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Family Court, § 5.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Complaint for Assault and Battery, Form 35.06.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Guardian and Ward of Minors, § 261.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Mechanic’s Liens, § 153.00.

24A.130. Juvenile jurisdiction.

The juvenile jurisdiction of District Court shall be exclusive in all cases relating to minors in which jurisdiction is not vested by law in some other court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Termination Action.

The District Court retains jurisdiction over cases relating to minors after a Circuit Court termination action is filed to the extent that its orders do not conflict with Circuit Court orders regarding custody. Cabinet for Human Resources v. McDonald, 697 S.W.2d 958, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 667 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

2.Military Reservation.

Federal District Court and not state District Court had jurisdiction over juvenile for crimes committed on Fort Knox military reservation since by KRS 3.030 the Kentucky Legislature has expressly granted jurisdiction to federal courts for matters occurring on the premises of Fort Knox and such statute does not conflict with KRS 610.010 . United States v. Juvenile Male, 939 F.2d 321, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15266 (6th Cir. Ky. 1991 ).

3.Transfer Order.

Entry of a guilty plea did not preclude the consideration of whether a transfer order in a juvenile case was facially invalid, and a waiver rule did not apply to a facially insufficient transfer order. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 11, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 2012 ).

4.Interpersonal Protection Order.

District court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue an interpersonal protection order (IPO) where a juvenile was the respondent. Under the unequivocal language of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 456.030(6)(a), jurisdiction over IPO cases was not vested exclusively between the district court and the circuit court, and thus, under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24A.130 and 610.010(1), the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the IPO hearing. Doe v. Ramey, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 45 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020, sub. op., 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 655 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

10.Juvenile Court Jurisdiction.

District court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue an interpersonal protection order (IPO) where a juvenile was the respondent. Under the unequivocal language of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 456.030(6)(a), jurisdiction over IPO cases was not vested exclusively between the district court and the circuit court, and thus, under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24A.130 and 610.010(1), the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the IPO hearing. Doe v. Ramey, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 45 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020, sub. op., 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 655 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Cited in:

Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section does not enlarge the usual and historically provided for juvenile session jurisdiction. OAG 78-104 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Bill of Costs (AOC 130), Form 3.07.

24A.140. Services provided by sheriff or city police — Compensation — Alternate arrangements with other law enforcement officers or agencies.

  1. When sessions of District Court are held in:
    1. The county courthouse or other county-owned facility;
    2. Urban-county facilities;
    3. State-owned, leased, or controlled facilities;
    4. Special district facilities; or
    5. Private facilities;

      the sheriff shall be responsible for attending court, keeping order, and providing the same services to District Court as are provided to the Circuit Court.

  2. The sheriff shall be compensated for these services in the same manner and at the same rates as for similar services rendered to the Circuit Court.
  3. When sessions of District Court are held in city facilities, the city police shall be responsible for attending court, keeping order, and providing the same services to District Court as are provided by the sheriff to Circuit Court. Compensation for these services shall be the same as allowed to the sheriff as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  4. If the Administrative Office of the Courts determines that the provision of services by any law enforcement officer or agency named herein would place an undue burden on such officer or agency, the Administrative Office of the Courts may arrange with any other law enforcement officer or agency in the Commonwealth to provide such services. Compensation shall be as provided in subsection (2) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 28, § 13; 2019 ch. 44, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Compensation for Services.

Where members of the city police force provided security services to the District Court, the city was entitled to receive the funds held by the clerk of the Circuit Court. Baskett v. Radcliff, 709 S.W.2d 463, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1131 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If the sheriff’s regular deputy staff is inadequate to meet the total statutory responsibilities of the sheriff, including the service of process and legal papers, he may, in writing, empower the elected constables, as peace officers, to assist him in the serving of process under his supervision and direction, with the fees resulting from the process serving by such constables accruing to the sheriff’s office. OAG 78-66 .

The sheriff is still a fee officer, and he is still entitled to the fee for arrests in misdemeanor cases. OAG 78-162 .

When sessions of District Court are held in city facilities, the city policemen shall be responsible for attending court, keeping order, and providing the same services to District Court as are provided by the sheriff to Circuit Court and compensation for such services shall be the same as allowed to the sheriff. OAG 78-162 .

The sheriff, in serving process and performing other services in District Court, is compensated under existing applicable fee schedules, subject to the contingency of KRS 64.340 that a convicted defendant pays the fees in misdemeanor cases and such contingency is constitutional. OAG 78-193 .

A sheriff in serving a summons is compensated under the existing applicable fee schedule subject to the contingency of KRS 64.340 that a convicted defendant pays the fees in a misdemeanor case. OAG 79-354 .

This section impliedly repealed former KRS 208.370 . OAG 79-636 .

This section was passed in the implementation of the new judicial system, and was designed to provide for the services of sheriffs in all District Court proceedings. OAG 79-636 .

Under this section, KRS 64.090 and KRS 64.092 , the sheriffs of Kentucky are entitled to the payment of fees for service of process and court attendance in connection with services rendered in the juvenile session of District Court, as well as in the regular session of District Court. OAG 79-636 .

The allowance paid to salaried city policemen for serving subpoenas, under this section, should, under KRS 95.740(2) (repealed), be turned over to the city treasury, if the policemen are serving subpoenas in city owned vehicles. OAG 79-655 .

The fees earned by deputies providing security services for the Circuit and District Courts are really fees of the sheriff’s office, and must go into the general official receipts of the sheriff; the sheriff may be given proper credit against his excess fees, where he takes such fees earned by the deputies and applies them on their salaries, but such fees earned by the deputies must first be turned into the regular sheriff’s account. OAG 80-259 .

A county sheriff must execute and make due return on all criminal process lawfully issued by a county trial commissioner (process as authorized by SCR 5.030 ) and placed in the sheriff’s hands or with his lawful deputies. OAG 80-332 .

Except where the District Court or trial commissioner indicates a need for immediacy in serving a warrant, the sheriff must exercise reasonable diligence in executing the process, bearing in mind his other duties, work schedule and convenience. OAG 80-332 .

There is nothing that prohibits a District Court or a trial commissioner from issuing criminal process after regular business hours. OAG 80-332 .

Although this section suggests a responsibility for sheriffs and city police in attending District Court and serving process depending upon who owns the court facility, the court, in issuing criminal process, must keep in mind the geographical jurisdictional limitations of police in second-class cities, which restricts service of process to their city. OAG 81-300 .

Assuming that District Court is being held in one of the facilities mentioned in subdivisions (1)(a) through (1)(e) of this section, the sheriff is responsible for waiting on the court and serving court process; under subsection (2) of this section, the sheriff shall be compensated for such services in the same manner and at the same rates as are provided to the Circuit Court. Thus the sheriff’s fee schedule in KRS 64.090 determines his fees. OAG 82-140 .

There is no statutory basis for compensating the sheriff for transporting misdemeanants from one county to another. OAG 82-140 .

The sheriff’s collection of his fee in a criminal case is conditioned upon the conviction of the defendant and his payment of the fee to the court clerk. OAG 82-140 .

A sheriff is allowed a fee of $2.00 for serving a subpoena on a witness for defendant in a criminal case, pursuant to KRS 64.090 ; the sheriff’s collection of such fee is conditioned upon the conviction of the defendant and his payment of the fee to the court clerk. OAG 83-179 .

Where a county has an arrangement to use a second county’s juvenile detention center to house certain juveniles, it is the responsibility of the sheriff of the first county, or his deputies, under KRS 24A.140 and KRS 70.140 , to transport juveniles who have been arrested by city police in the first county to the detention facility in the second county; it is not the responsibility of the city police who effected the arrest. OAG 81-357 .

Subsection (1) of this section requires the sheriff to provide the “same services to the District Court as are provided to the Circuit Court” which would include serving all necessary criminal process and allied papers; moreover, since the process is issued by the court, KRS 70.070 , governing execution of process by the sheriff, means that the sheriff is required to execute criminal process coming out of the Circuit and District Courts which process is placed in his hands by order or direction of the particular court. OAG 84-37 .

24A.150. Procedure for transfer of coverage for judge formerly under plan established by city of second or third class.

If a person covered by a pension plan established under KRS 26.650 or 26.653 is elected as a District Judge before January 1, 1978, the provisions of subsections (2) to (5) of KRS 61.527 shall be carried out by the governing body of any pension plan applying to District Judges.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 23, § 2, effective January 1, 1978.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 26.650 and 26.653 referred to in this section have been repealed.

24A.170. Fees and costs for civil cases.

  1. The Supreme Court shall by rule set the filing fees and miscellaneous costs for civil cases filed in the District Court.
  2. The following fee shall be paid directly to the sheriff or other officer serving the process by the party requesting the service, at the time of the request:

Service of process (per process) . . . . . $20.00

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 59, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 200, § 8, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 141, § 137, effective July 1, 1982; 1982, ch. 159, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 266, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 445, § 35, effective July 1, 1982; 1990, ch. 234, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 134, § 5, effective July 1, 1994; 1996, ch. 248, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

This section was amended in 1982 Acts Chapter 445, which contains the following language in Section 45 of that Act: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 1982.” The Ky. Constitution, in Section 55, requires that a reason be set forth for the emergency. However, no reason is set forth in this Act. The effective date for 1982 Acts with no emergency provision was July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Commonwealth, except for the provisions of KRS 416.620 , pertaining to proceedings for eminent domain, is exempt from paying costs, although it may, pursuant to KRS 453.010 , pay costs when such costs are approved and allowed by the judge of the court in which the case was filed. OAG 78-343 .

If the sheriff must make a return on the item or document, he is entitled to a fee for service, regardless of whether the process is served alone or in a group with other process, but if no return is required on the document (i.e., a pleading) he may not charge the fee. OAG 79-510 .

The word “process” as used in KRS 23A.200 and this section does not refer to every legal document, but is a technical term which refers to documents, such as summonses, by which the court may command a person to appear in an action or before the court, or the means, such as a temporary restraining order, whereby the court compels compliance with its demands. OAG 79-510 .

The advance fees required by KRS 23A.200 and this section would have to be paid by an urban county government in civil actions to which it was a party. OAG 83-186 .

If a sheriff refuses to serve process on the ground that the requester owes him for an unrelated fee, the sheriff would be in violation of KRS 70.070 and would be liable on his official bond for such neglect of duty; he would also be subject to the court’s holding him in contempt, since the illegal failure to serve summons would constitute an interference with the proper exercise of the court’s judicial functions. OAG 84-114 .

A sheriff may not refuse to serve a properly issued process for the requester for the reason that the requester owes him a fee bill involving an unrelated matter. OAG 84-114 .

A sheriff can legally refuse to serve or attempt to serve a civil summons where he has not yet been paid to serve it. OAG 84-114 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Illegitimacy and Paternity Proceedings, § 31.30.

24A.175. Court costs for criminal cases in District Court — Payment required — Exceptions — Treatment of minor defendant.

  1. Court costs for a criminal case in the District Court shall be one hundred dollars ($100), regardless of whether the offense is one for which prepayment is permitted.
  2. There shall be no court costs for a parking citation when:
    1. The fine is paid to the clerk before the trial date in the same manner as provided for speeding citations under KRS 189.394(3); and
    2. The citation does not involve parking in a fire lane or blocking the traveled portion of the highway.
  3. The taxation of court costs against a defendant, upon conviction in a case, including persons sentenced to state traffic school as provided under KRS 186.574 , shall be mandatory and shall not be subject to probation, suspension, proration, deduction, or other form of nonimposition in the terms of a plea bargain or otherwise, unless the court finds that the defendant is a poor person as defined by KRS 453.190(2) and that he or she is unable to pay court costs and will be unable to pay the court costs in the foreseeable future.
  4. If the court finds that the defendant does not meet the standard articulated in subsection (3) of this section and that the defendant is nonetheless unable to pay the full amount of the court costs, fees, or fines at the time of sentencing, then the court may establish an installment payment plan in accordance with KRS 534.020 .
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, the court shall not adjudicate a traffic violation involving a defendant who is under the age of eighteen (18), unless the person that assumed liability of the minor under the provisions of KRS 186. 590 is present. This subsection shall not apply to emancipated minors.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 60, effective January 2, 1978; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, § 1, effective July 1, 1979; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 1, effective May 12, 1979; 1980, ch. 268, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 235, § 19, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 266, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 141, § 6, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 321, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 415, § 10, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 198, § 18, effective October 1, 1996; 1998, ch. 606, § 159, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 328, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 512, § 12, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 183, § 4, effective August 1, 2002; 2014, ch. 81, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2017 ch. 158, § 3, effective June 29, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 81, sec. 3 provided that the amendments made to this statute in Section 2 of that Act shall be known as the “Denzel Steward Act of 2014.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Compensation for Services.

Where members of the city police force provided security services to the District Court, the city was entitled to receive the funds held by the clerk of the Circuit Court. Baskett v. Radcliff, 709 S.W.2d 463, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1131 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Where the sheriff did not provide any of the services to the District Court which would give rise to his entitlement to the fees established in former subsection (7) of this section and subdivision (7) of KRS 64.092 , the trial court properly denied the sheriff’s claim to the sums being held for such purposes by the clerk of the Circuit Court. Baskett v. Radcliff, 709 S.W.2d 463, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1131 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Cited in:

Wells v. Kentucky Local Correctional Facilities Constr. Authority, 730 S.W.2d 951, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Doyle v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm’n, 885 S.W.2d 917, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 86 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

As between legislation of a broad and general nature on one hand and legislation dealing minutely with a specific matter on the other hand, the specific will prevail over the general, and, accordingly, the specific prohibition of KRS 189.990 against imposing of costs in parking violations prevails over the generality of this section, which purports to require payment of costs in all criminal prosecutions upon conviction. OAG 78-328 .

Where two statutes enacted at the same session are destructively repugnant, the law last enacted must be regarded as the final expression of the legislative will and permitted to prevail; since amended KRS 189.990 (1) and this section are destructively repugnant, KRS 189.990 , as the last enacted, prevails. OAG 78-328 .

A reasonable construction of former subsection (5) of this section means that the jail money paid by the circuit clerk to the county treasurer should be considered for expenditure, during the fiscal year received, through the budget item or items established for county jail operations, since Const., § 157 and KRS Chapter 68 contemplate a pay-as-you-go budget and no fiscal court can deliberately budget surpluses. OAG 80-448 .

It is the responsibility of the fiscal court to see that any county jail money, arising out of this section, which is actually surplus at the end of a particular fiscal year is either placed in a reserve fund for construction, or budgeted for expenditure for noncapital jail purposes for subsequent fiscal years, depending upon the necessary operational expenses of the county jail; in any event, this section requires that the so-called jail money be spent for the sole purpose of defraying the costs of operation of the county jail. OAG 80-448 .

The money coming into the county treasury pursuant to former subsection (5) of this section may be budgeted or earmarked by way of a special reserve fund for construction purposes, which may be maintained and carried over for the number of fiscal years necessary, provided that the fiscal court has by order or resolution committed the county to a definite capital project, supported by a bond issue or holding corporation action on the part of fiscal court. OAG 80-448 .

The phrase “costs of operation of the county jail” in former subsection (5) of this section is very broad; under ordinary usage of language the phrase is broad enough to embrace the use of the money for new construction of a jail or construction of a new addition. OAG 80-448 .

Former subsection (5) of this section was enacted to allay a shortage of funding for the operation of jails and housing of prisoners and the funds allotted hereunder were intended to be used to defray all costs associated with performing the duty of operating a jail. OAG 80-535 .

The funds allotted pursuant to former subsection (5) of this section may be used for capital expenditures in connection with constructing a new jail or renovating an old one. OAG 80-535 .

The money allotted under former subsection (5) of this section may be used for juvenile detention costs such as the payment of per diem fees to families who keep juveniles or to the county juvenile detention center for keeping out of county juveniles insofar as these juveniles could be housed and kept in the county jail if there was one. OAG 80-535 .

The money allotted under former subsection (5) of this section may be used to pay the charges made to a county which had no jail by other counties that house and keep its prisoners in their jails. OAG 80-535 .

Where prisoners that would have been housed in a county jail, if it had one, were instead housed in a city jail, the city could charge the county on a cost-sharing percentage or per diem basis for housing the county prisoners, just as one county may charge another for performing like services and the county jail fund could be used to pay this charge. OAG 80-535 .

Where there is a jail, the funds collected under former subsection (5) of this section may be used to defray the costs of running the physical facility and of keeping and housing prisoners therein and, where the county does not have a jail, the funds may be used to cover the costs of providing alternative methods of housing and keeping prisoners. OAG 80-535 .

Payment of a salary to a jailer during the closing of the jail for capital improvements is legal where the jailer is putting in at least a normal five-day work week supervising the capital improvements on the jail and preparing himself to run the jail once it reopens. OAG 80-661 .

Where a new jailer supervised capital improvements on jail and, while the jail was closed for such improvements, also took applications and interviewed prospective deputies and worked on a daily basis with state officials and prepared a procedures manual which the county judge/executive had requested that he prepare, such activities related exclusively to the county jail operation and the phrase “operation of the county jail” in former subsection (5) of this section is broad enough to cover the period during which the jail was being repaired and the new jailer was preparing himself to adequately perform as jailer once the jail reopened; moreover, the repair of the jail is vital to its effective use as a place of detention and thus the repair period must logically fall within the ambit of jail operations, therefore, the regular jailer’s salary may be paid to the new jailer during said period out of the cost money described in former subsection (5) of this section. OAG 80-661 .

The money going to the counties from this section is for the sole purpose of defraying the costs of operation of the county jail. Such money may be spent to fund or partially fund the salary of a jail matron, which is properly a part of the costs of operating a county jail, subject to proper budgeting procedure under KRS Ch. 68. OAG 82-137 .

Although the two 1982 amendments to this section are generally similar in that they involve court cost increases, there is no express nor implied basis for repeal of one by the other; thus effect must be given to both. OAG 82-208 .

The 1982 amendment by ch. 235 provides for the $5.00 increase of costs listed under subdivisions (1)(a) and (b) of this section in order to help in the funding of county jails while Acts 1982, ch. 266, which increases the same fees by $7.00, is an “Act relating to fees and costs for utilizing state services” (performed by state employees or officers); the two amendments, in increasing such court costs, had two different purposes in mind and for that reason they cannot be considered in duplication of each other. OAG 82-208 .

There are no apparent conflicts between the two 1982 amendments to this section, and thus the $5.00 increase of ch. 235 and the $7.00 increase of ch. 266 must be added together for a total of $12.00 increase of the court costs dealt with in subdivisions (1)(a) and (b) of this section. OAG 82-208 .

Since former subsections (5) and (6) of this section had two different purposes in mind, one being jail operational costs, the other being construction costs, they are not in duplication of each other. OAG 82-314 .

The principle that the specific shall prevail over the general means that former subsection (6) of this section must be recognized as being exclusive of former subsection (5) of this section, since it deals with the specific expense of construction costs. OAG 82-488 .

The mandate of former subsection (5) of this section was such that the fiscal court was restricted to using that money only for county jail operational costs. None of those funds can be reserved for some other purpose, such as jail construction costs. OAG 82-488 .

Former subsection (6) money was to be used only for jail construction, while former subsection (5) money was to be used by the fiscal court for jail operational costs that do not include construction costs. When those subsections are read in pari materia, the emerging intent is that operational costs may cover any jail expense except construction costs; in that manner, the two subsections are a part of a connected system. OAG 82-488 .

24A.176. Additional costs imposed in criminal cases — Funds distributed to local governments and counties — Funds used for police, jails, and transport prisoners.

  1. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Local government” means a city, county, charter county, urban-county, or consolidated local government; and
    2. “Police department” means a police department created by a local government which employs one (1) or more officers certified pursuant to KRS 15.380 to 15.404 .
  2. In criminal cases a fee of twenty dollars ($20) shall be added to the costs imposed by KRS 24A.175 that the defendant is required to pay.
  3. The circuit clerk shall pay the funds from fees collected under this section to the Finance and Administration Cabinet pursuant to KRS 24A.175 for distribution as provided in subsection (5) of this section to local governments with police departments or local governments that contract for police services, and to counties with fiscal responsibilities for jails or the transporting of prisoners.
  4. All funds distributed to local governments shall be used for payment of expenses for operation of the local government’s police department or contracted police services. All funds distributed to counties with fiscal responsibilities for jails or the transporting of prisoners shall be used for the payment of costs associated with the housing or transporting of prisoners.
  5. Payments shall be distributed quarterly by the Finance and Administration Cabinet beginning October 1, 2004, as follows:
    1. Thirty percent (30%) of the total shall be distributed equally to all local governments with police departments or local governments that contract for police services;
    2. Fifty percent (50%) of the total shall be distributed to local governments with police departments on a per capita basis according to the number of certified police officers employed by the police department on July 1 each year or providing services to the local government pursuant to a contract on July 1 of each year. For purposes of this subsection, each local government that contracts for police services shall be considered to employ one (1) police officer for each sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) it expends during each fiscal year for police services under a written contract; and
    3. Twenty percent (20%) of the total shall be distributed equally to counties with fiscal responsibilities for jails or the transporting of prisoners.
  6. On or before August 1 of each year, the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet shall certify to the Finance and Administration Cabinet the number of certified police officers employed by each local government.
  7. On or before August 1 of each year, each local government contracting for police services shall certify to the Finance and Administration Cabinet the amount of money expended for police services under a written contract during the previous fiscal year.
  8. The Finance and Administration Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A necessary for the administration of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 78, § 2, effective April 6, 2004; 2007, ch. 85, § 109, effective June 26, 2007.

24A.1765. Additional fees for criminal cases — Allocation to general fund and telephonic behavioral health jail triage system.

In addition to the twenty dollar ($20) fee created by KRS 24A.176 , in criminal cases a ten dollar ($10) fee shall be added to the costs imposed by KRS 24A.175 that the defendant is required to pay. The first five dollars ($5) of each fee collected under this section shall be placed into the general fund, and the remainder of the fee shall be allocated to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services for the implementation and operation of a telephonic behavioral health jail triage system as provided in KRS 210.365 and 441.048 .

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 137, § 5, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 99, § 98, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 158, § 4, effective July 1, 2008.

24A.177. Fees for criminal cases.

In criminal cases, the following fees shall be charged by the circuit clerk and paid to the clerk at the time the corresponding services are requested:

  1. Preparing an attestation  . . . . .  $0.50
  2. Preparing a certification  . . . . .  $5.00
  3. Preparing a copy of a document (per page)  . . . . .  $0.25.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 183, § 5, effective August 1, 2002.

24A.178. Additional fee for sex crime, stalking, or related inchoate offenses.

  1. In addition to fees created by KRS 24A.175 , 24A.176 , and 24A.176 5, an administrative fee of thirty dollars ($30) shall be added to the costs that the defendant is required to pay for the following crimes:
    1. A sex crime, meaning an offense described in:
      1. KRS Chapter 510;
      2. KRS 530.020 ;
      3. KRS 530.064(1)(a);
      4. KRS 531.310 ; and
      5. KRS 531.320 ;
    2. Stalking, meaning conduct prohibited under KRS 508.140 and 508.150 ; and
    3. A criminal attempt, conspiracy, facilitation, or solicitation to commit the crimes set forth in this subsection.
  2. The first one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) of each fee collected under this section shall be placed into the general fund, and the remainder of the fee shall be allocated by the clerk of the court on a quarterly basis to the address protection program fund established in KRS 14.260 to be used solely to establish, operate, and maintain the confidential address protection program established in KRS 14.260 .
  3. The court may waive all or any portion of the fee required by this section if the court finds that a person subject to the surcharge is indigent or financially unable to pay all or any portion of the surcharge. The court may waive only the portion of the surcharge that the court finds the person is financially unable to pay.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 101, § 2, effective June 24, 2015.

24A.179. Additional fee for expenses of Kentucky Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force.

In addition to the twenty dollar ($20) fee created by KRS 24A.176 and the ten dollar ($10) fee created by KRS 24A.176 5, a ten dollar ($10) fee shall be added in misdemeanor cases to the costs imposed by KRS 24A.175 . The fee collected under this section shall be allocated to the Department of Kentucky State Police for the training, salaries, and equipment of the Kentucky Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 122, § 2, effective June 24, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, H, 4, (2) at 1100.

24A.180. Disposition of District Court fees and costs.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section all fees and costs collected pursuant to KRS 24A.170(1) shall be deposited in the general fund of the State Treasury.
  2. Fees consisting of reimbursement for incidental direct outlays, including but not limited to postage and legal advertising, may be retained by the clerk and expended for these purposes in accordance with relevant directives of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  3. Additional costs in District Court civil cases authorized by subsection (2) of KRS 24A.170 shall be paid to the sheriff or other officer serving the process.
  4. Filing fees in civil actions shall be recoverable as costs.
  5. No later than the seventh working day of each month the circuit clerk shall pay the funds from each court cost collected under KRS 24A.175 to the court cost distribution fund established in KRS 42.320 and report to the Finance and Administration Cabinet and the Administrative Office of the Courts the amounts deposited into the court cost distribution fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 61, effective January 2, 1978; 1984, ch. 321, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 134, § 6, effective July 1, 1994; 2002, ch. 183, § 6, effective August 1, 2002.

24A.185. Assessment by the fiscal court of additional fees and costs.

A fiscal court, by ordinance, may assess additional fees and costs for the purpose of paying expenses for courthouses, bonds related to them, and administration expenses of the District Court as follows:

  1. In all traffic offense cases, a fee of ten dollars ($10) may be added to the court costs;
  2. In probate cases, a filing fee of ten dollars ($10) may be added to each filing fee;
  3. In misdemeanor cases, a cost of twenty dollars ($20) may be added to the court costs;
  4. In small claim cases, a fee of ten dollars ($10) may be added to all filing fees; and
  5. In civil cases, a fee of ten dollars ($10) may be added to all filing fees.

History. Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 54, § 3, effective March 15, 2001.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 5 of Chapter 54 of the Acts of the 2001 Regular Session read:

“The provisions of Section 1 to 4 of this Act shall supersede and prevail over any conflicting provisions of the 2000 Kentucky Acts Chapter 524 (House Joint Resolution 84), the 2000-2002 Judicial Branch Budget Memorandum.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Expenditure of Funds.

Argument relating to a fiscal court’s expenditure of funds collected via a court fee tax were rejected because there was no allegation of the improper use of the funds, the fiscal court had the discretion to use the funds for administration expenses and courthouse expenses which were not necessarily limited to the courthouse in Alexandria, Kentucky, and the issue was better left to the required audits of county expenditures. Nolan v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 217 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2010).

24A.190. Definitions for KRS 24A.191 to 24A.193. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 16, § 1) was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 78, § 4.

24A.191. Computation of net court revenue and base court revenue. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 16, § 2; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 8, § 1, effective May 12, 1979; 1982, ch. 385, § 13, effective July 1, 1982) was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 78, § 4.

24A.192. Return to cities and counties of net court revenue. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 16, § 3) was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 78, § 4.

24A.193. Authority for administrative regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 16, § 4; 1994, ch. 508, § 6, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 78, § 4.

24A.195. Reporting of convictions under KRS 186.560.

All courts shall report convictions under KRS 186.560 to the Transportation Cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 434, § 2, effective July 15, 1986.

24A.197. Position of domestic relations commissioner abolished in family court.

In any judicial district where a family court is established or has been established, the position of domestic relations commissioner is abolished, and no commissioner shall be appointed to hear or determine any matter within the jurisdiction of the family court.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 86, § 2, effective January 1, 2003.

Small Claims

24A.200. Purpose.

The purpose of KRS 24A.200 to 24A.360 is to improve the administration of justice in small noncriminal cases, and make the judicial system more available and comprehensible to the public; to simplify practice and procedure in the commencement, handling, and trial of such cases in order that plaintiffs may bring actions in their own behalf, and defendants may participate actively in the proceedings rather than default; to provide an efficient and inexpensive forum with the objective of dispensing justice in a speedy manner; and generally to promote the confidence of the public in the overall judicial system by providing a forum for small claims.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Appeals.

The overriding thrust of this section is efficiency, speed, and understandability, and it is that thrust which gives rise to the ten-day limit on appeals rather than the usual 30-day limit. Hibberd v. Neil Huffman Datsun, Inc., 791 S.W.2d 726, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 87 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

2.Simplified Procedure.

Seller involved in a small claims action against the buyer, who sued it when the generator that the buyer purchased from the seller soon caught fire, could not show that a presumption of the Kentucky Products Liability Act (Act), contained in KRS 411.310(2), applied. Since a small claims action was involved, that Act did not apply and, indeed, the simplified small claims procedure set forth in statutes such as KRS 24A.200 and KRS 24A.300(2) governed such actions. Northern Tool & Equip., Inc. v. Durbin, 392 S.W.3d 424, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 18 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Cited:

Miller v. Jones, 658 S.W.2d 888, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Baker v. Ryan, 967 S.W.2d 591, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a county fiscal court ordered the county ambulance service, a service neither funded nor regulated by the court, but the majority of whose employees are paid through CETA, to not take individuals failing to pay their ambulance bills to small claims court, the fiscal court order is a nullity as an attempted usurpation of the power of the legislature to define jurisdiction of and access to the Small Claims Court. OAG 79-194 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

An Overview of Kentucky’s New Court System, Vol. 41, No. 2, April, 1977, Ky. Bench & Bar 13.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July, 1978 Ky. Bench & B. 16.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Small Claims Court, § 2.00.

24A.210. Definitions.

As used in KRS 24A.200 to 24A.360 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Division” means the small claims division of District Court;
  2. “Party” means any person, natural or otherwise, who has been a party to the transaction in dispute;
  3. “Clerk” means the clerk of the Circuit Court;
  4. “Judge” means the judge or trial commissioner of District Court;
  5. “Where the defendant resides” means the county wherein the defendant has his principal place of residence or, in the case of a corporate defendant, the county of the corporation headquarters;
  6. “Where the defendant is doing business” includes counties where the defendant operates a place of business or dispatches sales representatives for the purpose of selling a product or service.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 3.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An attorney-at-law may but is not required to appear in Small Claims Court on behalf of a corporation; however, any person appearing for a corporation in the small claims division of the District Court who is not an attorney must be an officer of, or regularly employed in a managerial capacity by, the corporation which is a party to the litigation. OAG 80-572 .

24A.220. Establishment of small claims division.

A small claims division of each District Court shall be established by the first Monday of January, 1978.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 4.

24A.230. Jurisdiction — Authority.

  1. The small claims division shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the District Court, in all civil actions, other than libel, slander, alienation of affections, malicious prosecution and abuse of process actions, when the amount of money or damages or the value of the personal property claimed does not exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) exclusive of interest and costs.
  2. The division may also be used in civil matters when the plaintiff seeks to disaffirm, avoid, or rescind a contract or agreement for the purchase of goods or services not in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) exclusive of interest and costs.
  3. The division shall have authority to grant appropriate relief, except no prejudgment actions for attachment, garnishment, replevin or other provisional remedy may be filed in the division.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 5; 1980, ch. 36, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 137, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2011, ch. 91, § 2, effective June 8, 2011.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/8/2011). 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 91, sec. 4, provides that “any case which has been filed in a Circuit Court or District Court prior to the effective date of this Act (June 8, 2011) and the change in jurisdictional amounts (made by 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 91) shall remain in the court in which the case was originally filed, until the disposition of the case.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1980 ); Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 232 ( Ky. 1987 ); Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

While one may not break up one’s cause of action so as to attain the $500 maximum necessary for a small claim, one could sue on multiple claims of less than $500, one at a time, and need not combine them even though all are against one defendant. OAG 79-36 .

As a bank must, clearly, be engaged in the business of lending money at interest, it is precluded from having an action brought in its name to collect on delinquent accounts, such action being in the furtherance of that business. OAG 79-94 .

A city may bring a personal action against a taxpayer in the small claims division of District Court to enforce the collection of delinquent municipal property taxes so long as the amount sought does not exceed $1,000; the limitation on the number of actions that may be brought by one party per year (25) would also apply to cities. OAG 83-413 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1978, Ky. Bench & Bar 16.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Small Claims Court, § 2.00.

24A.240. Appearance of attorneys — Actions prohibited — Personal representatives as parties.

  1. The appearance of an attorney-at-law on behalf of any party is permitted but not required.
  2. No party may file an assigned claim or a class action in the division.
  3. No person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation engaged, either primarily or secondarily, in the business of lending money at interest, nor any collection agency or collection agent, may bring an action in the division in furtherance of their business.
  4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate, a guardian, a trustee or a conservator may be a party in the division.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 6.

Opinions of Attorney General.

As a bank must, clearly, be engaged in the business of lending money at interest, it is precluded from having an action brought in its name to collect on delinquent accounts, such action being in the furtherance of that business. OAG 79-94 .

An attorney at law may but is not required to appear in Small Claims Court on behalf of a corporation; however, any person appearing for a corporation in the small claims division of the District Court who is not an attorney must be an officer of, or regularly employed in a managerial capacity by, the corporation which is a party to the litigation. OAG 80-572 .

A city may bring a personal action against a taxpayer in the small claims division of district court to enforce the collection of delinquent municipal property taxes so long as the amount sought does not exceed $1,000; the limitation on the number of actions that may be brought by one party per year (25) would also apply to cities. OAG 83-413 .

A collection agency can advance the small claims court costs for filing fees, along with the proper papers, to its clients without violating the law, so long as the action was not filed in the collection agency’s name and so long as the collection agency did not make any court appearance for its client. OAG 83-420 .

24A.250. Limitation on number of claims filed by party during calendar year — Exception.

  1. No party shall file more than twenty-five (25) claims in any one (1) calendar year in the small claims division of any District Court in the Commonwealth. Any business engaged in trade or commerce shall be entitled to the maximum number of claims allowed under this section for each established location in the district that has been engaged in trade or commerce for at least six (6) months.
  2. Any party who files a claim in the division shall sign an affidavit with the clerk at the time of filing the claim stating that he has not brought more than the maximum number of claims allowed under subsection (1) of this section.
  3. If any party files a claim in excess of the maximum number of claims allowed, that claim shall be dismissed without prejudice at the cost of the plaintiff.
  4. The limitation on the number of claims and the other requirements of this section shall not apply to claims brought by city, county, or urban-county governments.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 7; 1990, ch. 53, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1978, Ky. Bench & Bar 16.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Small Claims Court, § 2.00.

24A.260. Commencement of action.

  1. The plaintiff shall commence an action in the small claims division by filing a claim on a form provided by the clerk.
  2. The plaintiff may bring an action in the small claims division in the judicial district where the party defendant or his agent resides or is doing business.
  3. Nothing in this section shall limit the exercise of jurisdiction on any other basis authorized in the Kentucky Revised Statutes or in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 8; 1982, ch. 124, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Notice of Transfer of Action (AOC 122), Form 2.07.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Venue and Change of Venue, § 38.00.

24A.270. Filing fee.

The filing fee in the small claims division of the District Court shall be the same as the filing fee for claims of five hundred dollars ($500) or less filed in the District Court, except where personal service is not required pursuant to KRS 24A.280(2), the sheriff’s fee and mileage cost shall not be charged.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 9; 1980, ch. 36, § 2, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

Although KRS 24A.270 is included in Acts 1980, ch. 36, § 2, the proposed change was deleted by committee amendment.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1980 ); Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 232 ( Ky. 1987 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1978, Ky. Bench & Bar 16.

24A.280. Time for hearing — Service of notice on defendant — Continuances.

  1. The court shall set a time for hearing. The hearing time set shall be not less than twenty (20) days nor more than forty (40) days after service of process.
  2. The clerk shall notify the defendant of the claim and his right to appear by sending the defendant a copy of the claim and a summons directing the defendant to appear at the time set for hearing and informing the defendant that if he fails to appear, judgment may be entered against him. The mode of service shall be as authorized in the Kentucky Revised Statutes or in the Rules of Civil Procedure.
  3. To promote quick settlement of small claims, the division shall grant continuances only where reasons of fairness and justice so require.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 10; 1980, ch. 114, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 124, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1978, Ky. Bench & Bar 16.

Wiederstein, Firm Hearing and Trial Dates: A Partial Answer to Reducing Delay in the Courts, Vol. 70, No. 3, May 2006, Ky. Bench & Bar 18.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Notice of Transfer of Action (AOC 122), Form 2.07.

24A.290. Counterclaim — Notice.

The defendant may file with the clerk a counterclaim against the plaintiff in an amount not in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) exclusive of interest and costs, if the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim, and if the counterclaim does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the division cannot acquire jurisdiction. Any counterclaim shall be filed with the clerk, and a copy delivered to the plaintiff at least five (5) days prior to the time of the hearing. If the defendant’s counterclaim is in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the division, then the provisions of KRS 24A.310(1) shall apply.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 11; 1980, ch. 36, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 463, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2011, ch. 91, § 3, effective June 8, 2011.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/8/2011). 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 91, sec. 4, provides that “any case which has been filed in a Circuit Court or District Court prior to the effective date of this Act (June 8, 2011) and the change in jurisdictional amounts (made by 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 91) shall remain in the court in which the case was originally filed, until the disposition of the case.”

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1978, Ky. Bench & Bar 16.

24A.300. Pleadings — Forms — Pretrial discovery not permitted.

  1. No formal pleadings other than the claim and notice, and the counterclaim and notice, if appropriate, shall be required in the division.
  2. All forms provided in KRS 24A.200 to 24A.360 shall be of a simplified, nontechnical form.
  3. There shall be no pretrial discovery in the small claims division of the District Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Simplified Procedure.

Seller involved in a small claims action against the buyer, who sued it when the generator that the buyer purchased from the seller soon caught fire, could not show that a presumption of the Kentucky Products Liability Act (Act), contained in KRS 411.310(2), applied. Since a small claims action was involved, that Act did not apply and, indeed, the simplified small claims procedure set forth in statutes such as KRS 24A.200 and KRS 24A.300(2) governed such actions. Northern Tool & Equip., Inc. v. Durbin, 392 S.W.3d 424, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 18 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

24A.310. Removal of action to District or Circuit Court — Transfer of action to small claims division.

  1. An action shall be removed from the small claims division to the regular docket of District or Circuit Court as appropriate whenever the defendant’s counterclaim exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the division or the District Court.
  2. An action shall be removed from the division to the District Court if a party defendant would otherwise have a right to a jury trial and gives notice to the division requesting a jury trial as provided in KRS 24A.320(2).
  3. An action may be removed from the division to the District Court if the judge, in his discretion, deems the action too complex for the simplified procedure of the division.
  4. An action originally filed in the District or Circuit Courts may be transferred to the small claims division on motion of the defendant if the claim is within the jurisdictional limit of, and otherwise could have been brought originally in, the division, unless the plaintiff demands a jury trial. No action transferred to the division shall be counted in the maximum number of claims that the plaintiff may bring under KRS 24A.250(1).

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Miller v. Jones, 658 S.W.2d 888, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1978, Ky. Bench & Bar 16.

24A.320. Waiver of jury trial — Removal to regular docket when jury trial requested.

  1. All claims in the small claims division shall be tried without a jury. Upon filing a claim, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have waived his right to a jury trial in the division. This waiver shall be explained on the claim form provided by the clerk.
  2. If the defendant in any action desires a jury trial, he shall give written notice to the division at least seven (7) days prior to the time set for the hearing, and the case shall be removed to the regular docket of the District Court, and shall thereafter be subject to all the provisions of law and rules of court applicable to proceedings in the District Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 14; 1990, ch. 463, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Miller v. Jones, 658 S.W.2d 888, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Greene, An Old Challenge in a New Dress, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1978, Ky. Bench & Bar 16.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Small Claims Court, § 2.00.

24A.330. Informal hearings.

The hearing and disposition of all matters in the small claims division shall be informal.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 15.

24A.340. Appeal.

Any party aggrieved by the judgment of the small claims division may appeal within ten (10) days of the judgment to the Circuit Court in the judicial circuit where such division is located.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

In enacting this section, the General Assembly did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the rule-making power of the judiciary, and this section is a valid enactment as to appeals from the small claims division as recognized by CR 73.01(1), while the 30-day appeal period of CR 73.02(1)(a) governs all other appeals including those from the District Court. Miller v. Jones, 658 S.W.2d 888, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

2.Time Limitation Not Tolled.

The time to take an appeal from a small claims division judgment under this section is not tolled by motions under CR 50.02, 52.02, and CR 59. Hibberd v. Neil Huffman Datsun, Inc., 791 S.W.2d 726, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 87 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Laramore, Final Judgment: The Beginning of the End, Vol. 58, No. 3, Summer 1994, Ky. Bench & Bar 8.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Appeals from Kentucky District Courts to Circuit Court, § 100.00.

24A.350. Informational pamphlet — Preparation and distribution.

  1. The Attorney General shall prepare an informational pamphlet or suitable material in layman’s language explaining the jurisdiction of the small claims division, procedures followed by the division, rights and responsibilities of parties to proceedings in the division, and other similar matters of importance.
  2. The informational pamphlet shall be made available to all clerks. A copy of the pamphlet shall be given to the plaintiff upon filing the claim and mailed or delivered to the defendant along with service of process.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 17.

24A.360. Short title.

KRS 24A.200 to 24A.360 shall be known and may be cited as the “Small Claims Act”.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 9, § 1.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Small Claims Court, § 2.00.

CHAPTER 25 County (Probate), Quarterly and Justices’ Courts [Repealed]

25.010. Criminal and penal jurisdiction of county, quarterly and justices’ courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1093: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 37) was repealed by Acts 1976, (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.012. Jurisdiction of county judge or justice of peace to examine criminal charge — Homicide. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.014. Jury trial in criminal prosecutions in county, quarterly and justices’ courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.015. Process, to whom directed — Special agent — Who may execute. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 701: amend. & trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 29; 1968, ch. 152, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.020. Judge or justice to have powers and duties as clerks. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 702: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.025. Quarterly court clerk — County clerk’s duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 703: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.030. District in which trial to be held — More than one defendant — Transient defendant. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 710 to 712: amend. & trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, §§ 1, 30; 1970, ch. 132, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.035. Jury trial, when may be claimed — Qualifications of jurors. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 713: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.037. Jury commissioners for inferior courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Procedures — Compensation — Expenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1964, ch. 147, §§ 1, 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.038. Trial commissioners for inferior courts in county containing an urban-county government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1976, ch. 37, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.040. Docket — Records and indexes to be kept. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 715: trans. & amend. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 31) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.045. New judgment if record lost or destroyed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 719: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.050. Setoff or counterclaim in excess of court’s jurisdiction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 720: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1 ) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.055. Trial of provisional remedy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 721: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.060. Exemption of land from levy under execution. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 722: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.065. Procedure for sale of land when return of execution shows “no property found.” [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 722: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.070. Appeals, docketing and procedure for trial. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 726: trans. & amend. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 32) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.110. Civil jurisdiction of county court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1057) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.120. Terms of county court — Where held. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1058: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 167, §§ 8, 18; 1944, ch. 173, § 3; 1966, ch. 255, § 38) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.130. County judge, bond of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1061: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 124, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.140. County judge pro tem — Special judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1059) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.150. County judge, powers of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1071) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.160. Record of orders and judgments — Who may sign. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1060: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 41, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.170. Settlement with fiduciaries — Special commissioner. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1062, 1065: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 167, §§ 12, 24) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.172. When informal settlement may be accepted from fiduciary. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1972, ch. 2, § 1; 1974, ch. 308, § 23; 1976, ch. 218, § 23) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.175. Periodic accounting by fiduciaries — Final settlement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 167, § 12; 1944, ch. 173, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.180. Evidence — How produced — Allowances to be supported by facts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1062 to 1064) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.190. Report and filing of settlement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1066, 1067) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.195. Notice of filing settlement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 167, § 14; 1966, ch. 239, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.200. Exceptions — Confirmation — Recording — Effect as evidence. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1067: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 167, §§ 13, 25) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.205. Certification of list of fiduciaries delinquent in accounting — Notice — Fee. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 167, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.210. Sureties of fiduciaries, inquiry into solvency of — Additional surety. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1068) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.215. Settlement of accounts of fiduciaries — Jurisdiction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (C.C. 472: amend. & trans. 1952, ch. 84, § 72) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.220. County judge or county clerk may not be fiduciary. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1070) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.225. Practice of law by county judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1976, ch. 58, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 58, § 7, effective January 1, 1978.

25.230. Compensation of special commissioner in counties having city of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1067a) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.240. Office of county judge — Filing and preservation of papers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1069) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.250. Salary of county judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1072) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29. For present law see KRS 64.535 .

25.260. Compensation of county judge for serving in misdemeanor case. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1732a-2) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29. For present law see KRS 64.535 .

25.270. Vacation of county judge — Salary of pro tem judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1072a: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 134, §§ 1, 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.280. Trial commissioner for county court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1077b-1: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 44, §§ 1, 2; 1946, ch. 11, § 1; 1966, ch. 152, § 1; 1968, ch. 52, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.290. Stenographer to county judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1061a-1, 1061a-4: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 164, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.300. Duties of stenographer — May administer oath. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1061a-2, 1061a-3) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.310. Salary of stenographer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1061a-4: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, § 7; 1946, ch. 229; 1948, ch. 157) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

25.320. County judge expense allowance fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 285, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, and Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 8, effective January 2, 1978.

25.330. Payments to judges from fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1962, ch. 285, § 3; 1966, ch. 228, § 1; 1970, ch. 188, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(2); 1974, ch. 189, § 1; 1976, ch. 73, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, and Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 8, effective January 2, 1978.

25.350. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1970, ch. 43, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.360. County judge pro tem to assume duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1970, ch. 43, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.370. Appointment of county judge pro tem. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1970, ch. 43, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.380. Succession of fiscal court member. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1970, ch. 43, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.390. Duration of successor’s service. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1970, ch. 43, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.410. Civil jurisdiction of quarterly courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1051; amend. 1952, ch. 76, § 1; 1960, ch. 238, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.420. Real property cases, transfer of to circuit court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1052) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.430. Motions against constables and their sureties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1053) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.440. Appeals from justices’, police and fiscal courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1054) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.450. County judge to preside — Pro tem judge — Terms of court — Where held in certain counties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1050; amend. 1942, ch. 126 § 1, 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.460. Special judge of quarterly court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (968, 970, 971, 1056) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.470. Records of quarterly courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1055; amend. 1954, ch. 51, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.480. Clerk, quarterly court — Appointment — Powers — Duties — Salary. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1055; amend. 1962, ch. 234, § 62(2); 1964, ch. 159, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.490. Clerks and deputy clerks in quarterly courts in counties having an urban-county government and in counties of 250,000 population — Salaries — Duties — Bonds — Disposition of fees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1055a-1, 1055a-3; amend. 1942, ch. 180 § 4, 7; 1950, ch. 158, § 1; 1962, ch. 210 § 62; 1976, ch. 37 § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.500. Fee for commencing civil action in quarterly court in counties of 250,000 population. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1055a-2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.510. Bonds for appearance of persons arrested — Clerk or deputy to take — Office to be open at night. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1055a-4; amend. 1976, ch. 37, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.610. Civil jurisdiction of justices’ courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1086: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 76, § 2; 1960, ch. 238, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.620. Terms of justice’s court — How fixed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1085, 1085a-1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.625. Fiscal court may allow justice to hold court in courthouse in county with second or third-class city — County to provide office and equipment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1970, ch. 132, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.630. Absence or disability of justice — Vacancy — Successor of justice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1090, 1108) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.640. Powers of justice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1084, 1087) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.650. Bond of justice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1084: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 251; 1966, ch. 124, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.660. Record books — Receipts for payment of fines and forfeitures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1088, 1092: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 51, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.670. Warrants and motions, order of trial. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1089) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.680. Reappportionment of county into justices’ districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1082) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.690. Commissioners to reapportion county. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1079, 1083) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.700. Establishment of boundaries — Election precinct line not to be crossed — Exceptions to report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1080, 1081) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.710. Recorder and deputy recorder in counties of 250,000 population. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1083a-4: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, §§ 4, 7) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.720. Duties and powers of recorder. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1083a-5) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.730. Liability of recorder and sureties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1083a-8) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.740. Office of justice, constables and recorders — Expense of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1083a-10) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.750. Uniform rules of court — Adoption and amendment by justices. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1083a-12) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.760. Blank warrants. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1092) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.770. False entries on books of justice or recorder. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1083a-13, 1083a-14) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 336, effective January 1, 1975.

25.780. Justice’s clerks in county containing second-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1960, ch. 239) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

25.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1065, 1083a-13, 1083a-14, 1088, 1092: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 298) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

CHAPTER 26 Police Courts [Repealed]

26.010. Criminal and penal jurisdiction of police courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1093, 2912, 3147, 3359, 3513, 3651, 3710: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 39) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.020. Jurisdiction as an examining court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2912, 3147, 3362, 3513, 3625) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.030. Civil jurisdiction of police courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3513, 3651, 3710) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.035. Procedure in civil cases in police courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.040. Real estate cases, transfer of from police court in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3518) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.050. Terms of police courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2924, 3158, 3357, 3523, 3651, 3710) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.060. Place for holding police courts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2928, 3150, 3357, 3522) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.070. Orders, how modified, vacated or suspended in cities of first class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2918) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.080. Appeals to circuit court and Court of Appeals from police court in cities of first class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2922) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 61.

26.090. Appeals to Court of Appeals from police court in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3063) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 61.

26.100. Appeals to circuit court from police court in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3367) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 61.

26.110. Appeals to circuit court and Court of Appeals from police court in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3517, 3519) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 61.

26.120. Appeals from police courts in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3651, 3710) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 61.

26.130. Organization of police court in cities of first class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2911-1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.140. Police judge in cities of first class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2915, 2923, 2924, 2926) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.150. Judge of police court in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3146, 3170: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 40; 1970, ch. 272, § 1; 1972, ch. 63, § 1; 1974, ch. 390, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.155. Equation of compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1974, ch. 390, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.160. Riot, rout or unlawful assembly — Duty of police judge in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3149) has been repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 336, effective January 1, 1975.

26.170. Police judge, third-class cities, salary, qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3352, 3353, 3354, 3356: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 24, § 3; 1964, ch. 73, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.180. Powers of police judge in cities of third class — Fees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3355, 3362) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.190. Police court and judge in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3510, 3511, 3513, 3515) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.200. Police judge in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3625, 3652, 3671, 3691) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.210. Compensation of police judge in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3642, 3652, 3711) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.220. Trial commissioners of police court in cities of first class — Judge pro tempore. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2925: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 213; 1950, ch. 166; 1954, ch. 31) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.230. Police judge in cities of first class, how sworn off bench. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2927) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.235. Trial commissioners of police court in cities of second class — Powers — Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1966, ch. 243, § 1; 1972, ch. 262, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.240. Judge pro tem of police court in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3170: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 243, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.250. Judge pro tem of police court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3295: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 73, § 2; 1964, ch. 186; 1966, ch. 255, § 41) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.260. Judge pro tem of police court in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3512) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.270. Judge pro tem of police courts in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3652, 3711) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.280. Records of police court in cities of first class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2918) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.290. Courts of record — Seal — Certified copies of record. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2911-1, 3150, 3358, 3361, 3521) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.300. Practice in police courts, how governed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2915, 3524, 3651, 3710: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 62(2); 1968, ch. 152, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.310. Procedure in examining court, cities of first class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2912) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.320. Style of prosecutions and process. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2943, 3063, 3360, 3525, 3642, 3702) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.330. Process, by whom issued. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2934, 3156, 3355: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 139, § 1; 1962, ch. 234, §§ 5, 61; 1972, ch. 241, § 2; 1972, ch. 262, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.340. Process in cities of first class, how directed and executed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2943) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

26.350. Process in cities of fourth class, to whom directed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This se